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Negotiated Identity, Contested Belonging and Political Inclusion:
National Identity and Political Culture in Scotland and Quebec

Ailsa Henderson

PhD (Politics) Thesis

Department of Politics, Centre of Canadian Studies
University of Edinburgh
2000
I hereby declare that this thesis is the result of research and composition undertaken solely by myself.

Ailsa Henderson
To my grandmothers,
Annie Bella Henderson and Barbara Summers Buchan,
who both love to talk about politics,
and with whom I’ve shared so many happy afternoons
while completing this work
Acknowledgements

Several people have made the construction of this thesis much easier than it might have been. In particular I wish to thank my supervisors, Professor Alice Brown, Professor Ged Martin and Professor Lindsay Paterson, who each devoted time and effort to reading countless chapters and drafts over the years, and my examiners, Professor David McCrone and Professor Michael Keating. Each has raised issues and challenged assertions that have enriched this work. I am also indebted to the Centre of Canadian Studies, its Director Colin Coates, and administrative secretary Grace Owens, who have provided me with advice and support throughout my tenure in Edinburgh, and to Dr Andy Thompson, who has provided invaluable assistance with statistics and methods. A thank you also to friends and colleagues who have read chapters, papers, presentations and drafts and who have been both kind and rigorous in their comments and suggestions.

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Thank you to my research subjects who took time out of busy schedules to meet with me. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. I am also grateful to all those who provided statistical and opinion polling data for this thesis: the Economic and Social Research Council, Edinburgh University data library, Canadian Electoral Study team, Queen’s University Centre for the Study of Democracy Public Opinion Archive, Senator Joan Fraser, formerly of the Council for Canadian Unity, Chris Baker at Environics, and Patrick Beauchamp at Ekos.

A final thank you to my parents. It was their trans-Atlantic migration that initially sparked my interest in belonging and identity, rights and inclusion.
Abstract

Early political culture research, in its attempt to determine which combination of attitudes, values and behaviours created the ideal electorate, often treated national identity as tool of integration. If individuals felt a sense of national identity then the political culture would be in a healthier state than if citizens expressed their loyalty to rival sub-groups, or felt no national identity at all. Since these works, little attention has been paid to the role of national identity within political culture. Altered by discussions of post-materialism, mundane political culture, or rational choice theories, political culture has abandoned the initial interactive focus of examination to other literatures studying social capital and new social movements. The thesis argues that national identity has remained an under-explored aspect of political culture, and that an integrated approach would benefit analyses of States where nationalist movements have sought greater political autonomy. Relying on case studies of Scotland and Quebec, the thesis examines the way in which national identity is treated by political actors to create a hierarchy of belonging within the nation. Perceptions of national inclusion, as determined by this hierarchy, affect the patterns of interaction within the political culture. The sense of ease with which people feel integrated in the political system is not currently explored by surveys of trust, efficacy, satisfaction and confidence. Relying on survey data and qualitative interviews, the thesis seeks to demonstrate that the way in which individuals draw boundaries around themselves, their nations and political systems forms an integral part of political culture.
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<td>ADQ</td>
<td>Action démocratique du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BES</td>
<td>British Election Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BQ</td>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>British Social Attitudes</td>
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<td>CES</td>
<td>Canadian Election Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Campaign for a Scottish Assembly</td>
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<td>CSG</td>
<td>Consultative Steering Group</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
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<tr>
<td>QLP</td>
<td>Quebec Liberal Party, see LPC</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Scottish Constitutional Convention</td>
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<td>SCUA</td>
<td>Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association</td>
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<td>SCUP</td>
<td>Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party</td>
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<td>SCVO</td>
<td>Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations</td>
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<td>SES</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
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<td>STUC</td>
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Introduction: Scotland and Quebec in Context

Within two years electorates in Quebec and Scotland each found themselves voting in referendums that would determine their future levels of self-determination. In Quebec, the October 1995 referendum offered the second chance since 1980 to re-negotiate the political partnership with the rest of Canada, with the option of full sovereignty should negotiations prove fruitless. The close result, 50.6% to 49.4% for the federalists, directly reflected a campaign that promised no clear winner and the extent to which the issue of sovereignty divided – and continues to divide - the population. For Scots, the September 1997 referendum on a devolved Parliament provided an opportunity to alter fundamentally the unitary character of the British state and deliver a much sought after measure of autonomy. Backed by 64% of the electorate, a tax-varying Parliament has recently opened its doors.1 Despite the similar constitutional nature of the two referendums, the electorates each voted on packages that promised differing levels of autonomy, and produced disparate margins of victory on the backs of two differing turnout levels.

The establishment of the Scottish Parliament provides a useful opportunity to reflect on the success and struggles of other regional or sub-national Parliaments, particularly those where nationalist parties seek to form a government. Comparisons between Scotland and Quebec became increasingly plentiful when it appeared that following an expected Labour win in the May 1997 General Election Scotland would acquire its own legislature for the first time in 300 years (Keating 1996a, Keating 1997, Bateman 1996).2 Given the

1 In response to the first question, should there be a Scottish Parliament, 74% voted yes. Sixty-four percent backed the second question, granting the Parliament tax-varying powers.
2 PhD dissertations on the topic have a longer history. See, for example Newman 1989, Teghtsoonian 1988.
frequency with which politicians on either side point to the other as proof of success or failure, the extent to which Quebec provides lessons for the establishment of the Scottish political system warrants attention. For Scottish nationalists, the electoral strength of the Parti Québécois would provide evidence that nationalist parties can govern prudently while at the same time calling for greater autonomy in key areas of jurisdiction. For nationalists in Quebec, radical constitutional change in Scotland would offer a striking example of movement noticeably absent in the Canadian arena. For those less enamoured of separatism, the presence of a nationalist party bent on increasing political autonomy presents a serious danger to the ability of the government to function and thus poses a threat to the economic and social well-being of all within its borders. As Scottish politicians, on either side of the separatist divide, each use Quebec to prove their case, a deeper examination of the differences and similarities between the two cases seems prudent.

Political circumstances in the Balkans, and, closer to home, in Northern Ireland, serve as reminders of the potentially destructive salience of national identity. The much-vaunted end of nationalism, as unlikely now as when first heralded, remains a normative construction of politics, along with idealised theories of the good citizen and the good State. (Carr 1965, Fukuyama 1993, Smith 1981) The obvious saliency of nations, nationalism and national identity to individuals in the modern polity stands above debates concerning the extent to which modern nationalist troubles stem from exclusive applications of national pride and autonomy, or represent the failure of nationalism itself to include all within its boundaries. But, just as two attempts to achieve increased levels of political autonomy follow different paths and achieve different results, so too do nations, and nationalist programmes, encourage distinct markers of identity and motives for belonging to achieve greater senses of collective power. As a result, each nation promotes its own identity, includes its self-defined population and determines its goals in accordance with the context in which it works. This thesis examines these constructions
of membership and identity to determine how two modern, Western nations create their own political cultures while national society fights for greater political autonomy.

Following the small, if significant, resurgence of political culture studies and a growing literature on social capital, this work uses national identity in Scotland and Quebec as an independent variable, and measures its influence upon the dependent political values, attitudes and behaviour of two electorates. Numerous studies have analysed statistical data in an attempt to determine which social characteristics, whether union membership, age, social class, country of birth, language or religion, affect perceptions of national identity (Adsett and Willmott 1999, Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999, Cloutier, Guay and Latouche 1992, Mendelsohn 1999). As receives treatment in chapter two, this thesis argues that while these studies are useful, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the effect of national identity on political attitudes, rather than the other way around, provides for a fuller understanding of how national identity might interact with other social or political variables. The period preceding the establishment of new governmental institutions provides a unique opportunity to measure the prevalence and strength of certain aspects of political culture before new institutions and influences change. Although measures of such culture can provide, at best, brief snapshots of attitudes and behaviour at any given moment in time, a (re-) examination of Scotland and Quebec, in the shadow of a new Parliament and in the wake of a particularly divisive referendum, provides for a greater understanding of value change as affected both by time and significant events. Periods of heightened political activity, particularly when in reference to potential increases in control of, and power over, political affairs, prompt greater attention to questions of ideal political structures and relationships. Debates concerning how governments, citizens and society should interact highlight the distance between the ideal future and the present political climate. Traditional measures of political culture such as trust, efficacy, satisfaction, confidence and levels of participation surface as popular gauges of a healthy democracy. In this context the thesis
examines the construction of national identity, its promotion and influence on political culture in contemporary Scotland and Quebec.

**OUTLINE OF TOPIC**

Although comparative in nature, the thesis aims to provide more than a study of nationalism in two contexts. It seeks also to provide a sociological understanding of the political relationships among citizens, and between individuals and the State in Scotland and Quebec. To this end, the dissertation examines how the construction and understanding of national identity in both case studies affects traditional measures of political culture. As will be examined in chapter two, initial analyses of political attitudes suggested that national identity could foster a positive sense of cohesion within a political system. In each case, national identity was equated with State loyalty. Sub-State group membership, at either the national or local level, posed a potentially destructive influence on the creation of a stable polity. As a result, most analyses of political culture have devoted only cursory attention to sub-State identities, and often portrayed these in a negative light (Pye and Verba 1965, Foster 1982, Savage 1981, Westle 1993). Rather than determining whether, and in which contexts, such values pose risks for political cultures, the dissertation seeks to determine how the promotion of certain markers of identity can affect the sense of belonging and value acquisition of individuals in Scotland and Quebec. The thesis argues that the way in which the boundaries of the nation are articulated leads individuals to assess their level of belonging in the nation. National membership within the boundaries of the larger State, in this case, Scotland and Quebec, affects other aspects of political culture. Individuals who feel themselves excluded from the nation possess different values and exhibit different political behaviours from those individuals who do not question their membership in the nation.

In its use of political culture, and the corollary subjects of political socialisation, political attitudes and political behaviour, this thesis aligns itself with a particular comparative tradition (Almond and Verba 1963, Almond and Verba 1989, Almond, Powell and
Mundt 1993, Inglehart 1977, Inglehart 1990, Halman and Nevitte 1996). A dissertation that emphasises the processual politics in a comparative light brings with it several advantages and disadvantages. Rather than presenting an area studies examination of two separate devolved governments the thesis attempts to extract from national detail patterns within political culture that transcend national boundaries. A full description highlights the ways in which the two political systems possess similar elements.

Of particular importance, this dissertation examines Scotland and Quebec at different stages in their political paths. When research for this dissertation began, devolution was a general election away and despite widespread expectations that the political mood would alter, the dramatic changes in the structure of Scottish political life both added value to and complicated the Scottish data collection. Thus while it is accurate to draw attention to the similar vibrancy of nationalist movements, autonomist parties and civic society in Scotland and Quebec, it is an important distinction that Quebec has had its own legislature elected by near-universal suffrage since 1867. Although a cursory examination of the two case studies at present would suggest the two possess remarkably similar political settlements, the recent acquisition of a parliament in Scotland and the process by which it was achieved continues to exert a profound influence on its political culture.

JUSTIFICATION OF CASE STUDIES

As will be examined in chapter two, theoretical definitions of the nation coalesce around two preferred options. According to the first, the nation is defined as a list of characteristics. Thus, a nation exists when a group of people is united by a common language, common territory, common history, and common institutions (Geertz 1963). A second school argues that nations exist as social communities that are willed into existence. Whether created through a ‘daily plebiscite’ (Renan 1882) or constructed as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1992) the perception of a bond between national members creates the nation. Thus a nation exists if it is perceived to exist by its
members. For the purposes of this thesis, either definition would apply to Scotland and Quebec. As receives treatment later in the chapter, both Scotland and Quebec possess distinct histories and institutions protected, in each case, in eighteenth century documents that guaranteed their continued existence. Although current differences in the level of recognition enjoyed by each nation affect the extent to which they can be compared, the objective list of characteristics which distinguish the Scots and Québécois from other Britons and Canadians justifies their treatment as nations.

Before providing a comprehensive analysis of the way in which Scotland and Quebec, and their host states, differ, terms used throughout this thesis warrant greater clarification. As previously explained, both Scotland and Quebec are treated as nations. Both case studies possess vibrant nationalist and autonomist movements although the two should not be equated. Within this thesis, nationalist is used as a general term to refer to all social organisations or political parties that seek to strengthen the culture of Scotland or Quebec or the position of Scotland or Quebec within the host State. If the political party advocates a policy of independence then it is referred to as separatist or sovereignist. It is worth noting that there is not a clear-cut division between nationalism and separatism for social movements and political parties in Scotland and Quebec. Indeed, a belief in the existence of the nation and a belief in the need for constitutional change could be seen as two axes along which organisations may move. In other words, a party seeking to endorse greater autonomy in either location need not rely on the rhetoric of nationalism to express its policies. A nationalist organisation need not endorse constitutional change. Before the advent of devolution both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats were keen to promote the concept of devolution but reluctant to rely on nationalist justification for constitutional change. In contrast, the Quebec Liberal Party has often advocated

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Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 1

constitutional renewal in Quebec and has relied on a Quebec nationalist critique of the Canadian federation. In both cases, it would be accurate to refer to these parties as autonomist even though they share different views of nationalism. Post-devolution, however, both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have ceased to argue for additional constitutional power and could accurately be referred to as unionist. Thus, there is a difference between constitutional preference, as explained by the labels unionist, autonomist, separatist, sovereignist, or pro-independence, and nationalist. Levels of nationalism may or may not inform constitutional preferences. In this thesis, care has been taken to ensure that the label applied to any organisation or political party fits its action at the time. When referring to the entire movement or general consensus for constitutional change in Scotland or Quebec, the label nationalist is used as a short-hand for the admittedly diverse views of participants.

The 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum, and the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum, demonstrate how two democratically active nationalist movements concerned with cultural identity have each sought to extend their levels of political autonomy by asking the people to provide a mandate for constitutional change. The success of the Scottish devolution campaign, and the close referendum result in Quebec, provide a useful opportunity to examine the influence of identity on political culture in each case. That two relatively similar contexts (liberal democracies, autonomist movements working within the political system, absence of violence, an open dialogue between separatist and non-separatist options) produced different results allows for a wider understanding of the interaction between identity, political attitudes and political behaviour. In particular,

to which Scotland and Quebec are modern or ancient nations must follow attempts to determine that they exist as nations at all.

4 While it could be argued that the 1997 devolution referendum took place at the behest of the British Labour Prime Minister, it is unlikely that such an event would have been suggested, were it not for the pressure exerted by the coalition of nationalist and autonomist bodies in Scotland that consistently argued for a devolution of power.

5 The argument that Scotland and Quebec exist within similar contexts depends, of course, on perception and point of reference. The pattern of acknowledged national difference lends credence to the nationalist
the task facing newly-elected members of the Scottish Parliament in defining the
structures and policies of a new legislature will ensure that the current political culture
has an enduring influence over future politics in Scotland. Periods of far-reaching
constitutional change also provide the closest approximation of experimental design in
political science. Although the attitudes and behaviour of individuals should not be
regarded merely as quantitative items awaiting measurement, the existence of a clear
before-and-after context illuminates any examination. The absence of any control group
obviously inhibits the extent to which such situations may mimic scientific experiments,
and yet time-series data, in the form of election studies or political documents, allows for
a comparison between pre-devolution and post-devolution politics in Scotland. Such
unprecedented influence, recent election results in Scotland and Quebec and the ever-
changing strategies of identity-centred nationalist parties form the backdrop for this
examination.

Institutional protection accorded in the 1707 Acts of Union and the 1774 Quebec Act
ensured the distinct nature of key agents of socialisation. While it would be easy to claim
that the education system, Church and legal system have assumed a degree of importance
within Scottish and Québécois society only because of their very distinctness, cross-
national studies show that such institutions hold similar roles in different
parliamentary histories of Scotland and Quebec share a common loss of political
autonomy accompanied by institutional protection and integration into the larger
economic, social and political network. The reactions of these territories following this
loss of autonomy have significant ramifications for the creation of political culture.
Sentiments of trust, confidence, satisfaction and political integration within and between
the nation/State stem from the reaction of political elites and their attempts to align or

cause in Scotland that has been lacking in Canada while the existence of federalism in Canada allows for
de facto self-determination in some areas.

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isolate the nation throughout the democratic development of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, high activity levels of Scottish elites within the growth of the British Empire contrast with the efforts of post-war Quebec political leaders to ensure that Quebec society enjoyed minimal interference from Canadian politicians. This is not to say that the political histories of Scotland and Quebec can be characterised by their consistent levels of isolationism or integration, but rather that at different times, national political and social elites pursued different courses of action in an attempt to secure prosperity for the nation.

The nineteenth century witnessed several attempts to accommodate political difference within the United Kingdom and Canada. Efforts to acknowledge the particular languages, religions or institutions of Scotland and Quebec took different forms and had different effects in either State. For Scotland, recognition as one of the historic nations of the United Kingdom allowed for a series of exemptions that altered the parallel structure of the union. For example, the 1885/6 creation of the Scottish Office and the later designation of a Scottish Secretary provided a separate bureaucracy dedicated solely to the interests of the Scottish population. The further creation of the Scottish Grand Committee, Scottish Affairs Select Committee and Scottish Question Time sought to maintain the fundamental character of a unitary state while providing adaptive elements which suited the interests of the Scots.6 Half a decade earlier, the 1841 union of present-day Ontario and Quebec at the wishes of the British government aimed to assimilate the particularities of a French and Catholic province in accordance with the liberal ideals of the day. That assimilation of the French was seen as a means of emancipation has done little for the political capital made of the views of Lord Durham by contemporary nationalists (Ajzenstat 1988). Assimilation, as called for in Lord Durham's report, has become a symbol of national tragedy and mis-treatment experienced at the hands of the

6 MacCormick argues that this anomatisation of the union has continued with the introduction of asymmetrical devolution (MacCormick 1998).
British government (Gouvernement du Québec 1979). Political deadlock and a distinct cultural consciousness, among other issues, prompted the creation of Canadian Confederation in 1867, a political settlement engineered to provide a requisite measure of autonomy for Quebec to ensure the continued vitality of the French language, Catholic religion, culture and social structure. (Silver 1997, Bonenfant 1967, Martin 1993, Périn 1993) Thus, in two adaptive attempts, the British parliamentary system sought to accommodate difference, one through its bureaucracy, the other through a separation of jurisdiction that kept Quebec matters out of federal politics. The differing fortunes enjoyed by the distinct populations embedded an institutional ethos that has affected the way Scotland and Quebec interact within their respective States. The various aspects of these relationships, from political aspects to international recognition, dominate the following section.

That the two nations enjoyed similar institutional protection following their respective losses of sovereignty should not obscure the influence of factors inherent in that loss which served to produce two particularly distinct civil societies. Faced with similar minority positions, Scotland and Quebec each placed particular emphasis on collective identity and action. The circumstances of the Conquest and Acts of Union, however, dictated the importance of these civic values. The military defeat imposed on New France could not have had the same effect as a voluntary political partnership even in the face of public opposition to the union arrangement. The political integration of Scots within the British parliamentary system, despite limited electoral franchise, provided the nation with a focus of assimilated political activity unmatched in Quebec. Although far from immediate, political opportunities for Francophones in Quebec existed within a relatively distinct sphere of activity. Even after the union of the two Canadian provinces in 1841 Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario) possessed their own representatives in the united legislature. While political participation was eventually an

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7 In its post-1997 election policy statement, the Bloc Québécois presents a brief chronology of Quebec, noting that ‘In 1840, England once again altered the structure of the colonial regime’ (BQ nd).
option in both Scotland and Quebec, the context and outlet of that activity was notably different.

The accomplishments of political elites in Scotland and Quebec, post-autonomy, point to the different political cultures in the two areas. The successful integration of the Scottish political elite within the British Empire (Lynch 1992, Paterson 1994a, Kellas 1989) contrasts with visions of a decapitated political and social echelon that either left Quebec for France or ceded political control to the new arrivals (Brunet 1962, Brunet 1964, Frégault 1956, Iguarta 1974, Séguint 1970). Here, the legacy of negotiated partnership versus conquest, even conquest viewed as providential by the religious elite, influences current political culture. In Quebec, 1950s visions of retarded economic growth and stunted democratic development, as linked to lost sovereignty (Brunet 1964) or the Catholic Church (Trudeau 1956) have recently ceded ground to more natural interpretations of economic, social and political development in Quebec (Létourneau 1997). Similar shifts in the degree of goodwill shown the British Empire in Scottish historiography betray a common trend in the changing use of history. (Finlay 1994b, Paterson 1994a, Lynch 1992) Whatever the eighteenth century, or indeed mid-twentieth century view of events, the current interpretations of such historical developments, in all their revisionism, are what inform current nationalist and political discourse.

The rise of modern, organised nationalist movements does not mark the beginning of dissatisfaction with the constitutional solutions reached following the British Conquest and Acts of Union. Resistance to Canadian Confederation and the British State has a long and rich history beyond the scope of this chapter. (McNaught 1988, Lynch 1992). Beginning first as non-partisan movements and later as pressure groups attempting to

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8 Political elites are defined as elected members of democratic legislatures, appointed officials or civil servants, whereas social or sectoral elites are defined as members of social institutions who by their position and privilege exert a level of influence unmatched in the general population.

9 Ouellct claims the decapitation thesis overemphasises whatever influence the economic elite had in pre-Conquest Quebec (Ouellct 1966).
influence existing active parties, modern nationalist movements find their origins in the post-war realignment of the electorate. (Crewe, Sarlvik and Alt 1977, Denver 1994, Rose and McAllister 1986, Rose and McAllister 1990). The current Scottish National Party owes its origins to such diverse groups as the Scottish Home Rule Association, the National Party of Scotland and the Conservative-splinter group, the Scottish Party. (Mitchell 1996) The Parti Québécois, although formed by members of René Lévesque’s Mouvement Souverain­té-Association and the Ralliement Nationale, can trace its inspiration to autonomist efforts of the Patriotes in 1837 and later, the Bloc Populaire and Rassemblement pour l’Indépendence Nationale. (Pelletier 1988) Democratic parties highlighting national particularity and the goal of greater political autonomy, by virtue of their efforts to gain members and voters, are afforded greater attention by individuals and the media, thus bringing what might otherwise represent a narrow cultural movement into the mainstream political discourse.

The different constitutional structures in Scotland and Quebec have dictated that nationalist political parties assert themselves and pursue their goals differently. The early recognition of administrative autonomy in Scotland has provided a generally accepted recognition of national status. The institutional accommodation available to Scotland and Wales, particularly in the form of a Secretary of State, was not available for equally diverse regions in England (MacCormick 1998) Despite the presence of a provincial government, and role as the de facto representative of French Canada, recognition of Quebec’s nationhood is much less accepted by the rest of Canada. The consensus that exists among Quebec political parties, and among British parties operating in Scotland, pre-empts the need for discussions about particularity that drive much of the debate between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Thus, an accepted view that Quebec and Scotland constitute nations absolves all but autonomist parties in Quebec from reiterating the list of characteristics that distinguish the nation from the host State. This lack of recognition has affected the way in which Quebec nationalists have constructed the boundaries and membership of the nation. That there is still much convincing to be done
by Quebec suggests that full acknowledgement of Quebec's distinct society could move the debate away from social characteristics and closer to the value driven debate in Scotland. At this point, an analysis of the different ways in which Scotland and Quebec are distinguishable proves fruitful. Relevant distinction, is, obviously and ultimately a matter of personal discretion. The following aspects exert the greatest influence on political culture according both to modern understandings of political culture and interpretations of political activity in Scotland and Quebec. In an effort to demonstrate that Scotland and Quebec provide a useful comparison for understandings of culture and identity the following sections examine the political, demographic, international, economic, cultural and social bases on which the two can be compared.

SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC IN CONTEXT

Political Aspects: Canada and the United Kingdom

As stated earlier, Scotland and Quebec each exist within similar parliamentary systems. This aids the comparative analysis of the thesis as significant differences between levels of confidence and satisfaction with the State and politics in general can be attributed to the particular differences of the national situation rather than to different forms of representation. That said, the differences in the structure and form of representative democracy used must be noted. For the purposes of this analysis, the primary unity of comparison will be the host State, as only a full investigation of the way in which Canada and the United Kingdom differs can allow for a later comparison of Quebec and Scotland.

As stated previously, despite the possession of democratically-elected legislatures in Scotland and Quebec, the status of these legislatures, and the process by which they were acquired, point to differences of political context in each case. Most importantly, Canada distinguishes itself as a federation of ten provinces and three territories. Although based in principle on equality between the provinces, the opportunity to opt out of federal programmes and the exercise of differential political weight through the constitutional amending formula has allowed for variations in the powers exercised by the provincial
governments. By establishing its own pension system in the 1960s, for example, Quebec embraced an opportunity to extend its jurisdiction. The United Kingdom, until recently a unitary state, has embarked on a project of asymmetrical devolution to three of its four composite nations. Marking differing degrees of legislative freedom, the three assemblies, in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, provide for the much-vaunted distinct solutions to distinct problems. The Welsh assembly exercises all the administrative power previously held in the Welsh Office without the ability to pass primary legislation. The inclusion of social security and participation in a North-South Council with the Republic of Ireland promise the Northern Irish Assembly a greater degree of power. The Scottish Parliament possesses the largest remit of jurisdiction, with the ability to legislate on all issues previously under the remit of the Scottish Office, although unlike Quebec, the legislature is not sovereign. In addition, the approval of a second question on tax-varying powers in the 1997 referendum grants the Parliament the power to raise or lower the basic rate of income tax by three pence on the pound as of January 1, 2000. The period of constitutional change in Scotland has prompted a sudden identity crisis of proportions oddly familiar to observers of Canadian political life (Macmillan 1999, Royle 1999, Wilson 1999). Similarly, the creation of a Parliament has continued a debate about democratic inclusion and political ideals consistent with the goals of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly and the Scottish Constitutional Convention. (Campaign for a Scottish Assembly 1988, Scottish Constitutional Commission 1994, Scottish Constitutional Convention 1990, Scottish Constitutional Convention 1995).

Electoral methods provide an additional comparison. Both, until recently, have relied exclusively upon First Past the Post (FPTP) elections offering a winner-take-all approach to government. Until 1993, both Canada and the United Kingdom operated on two, or two-plus party systems that regularly promised strong governments and the certain delivery of legislative agendas. Although often different from what was promised in political manifestos, once decided, the legislative packages of governments rarely met
with substantial difficulty in their travels through the legislative process. Just as the FPTP creates conditions for strong governments so too does it allow for potential distortions between votes won and seats gained. The 1993 Canadian General Election, in which the governing Conservative party was reduced to 2 seats, highlighted for some the inequity of the FPTP system and the regional distortions it can produce. Despite garnering approximately one fifth of the popular vote, the party constituted less than one percent of the House. Provinces voting as a block against the federal trend, as in the case of Quebec, were guaranteed a greater representation of regional voice than those supporting second parties to a lesser degree. The exacerbation of regional voting patterns has heralded a change in the pan-provincial cohesion of federal politics (such as it ever existed), prompting much work on the psephology of vote choice and the future fortunes of Canada (Clarke, Jenson, Leduc and Pammett 1996). In Britain, the ability of the Labour and Conservative parties to gain 95% of Commons seats despite only winning 75% of the votes highlights both the rigidity and strength of the two party system and the potentially distorting influence of FPTP. Even in Scotland, the ratio between the percentage of votes and percentages of seats has often exposed the ability of the electoral system to reward the most popular party with additional seats. Since 1964, for example, the Labour party has consistently received a higher percentage of votes that the Conservative party by a margin of between four and almost eighteen percent. At its most popular, the Labour party received almost 50 percent of the votes in 1966. At its least popular, the party received 35 percent of the votes. And yet, between 1964 and 1992 the party consistently gained between 57 and 69 percent of the Scottish seats at Westminster. Similarly, the disparity between regional voting patterns and federal trends, is a familiar

10 Exceptions although plentiful, are not nearly as frequent as a list such as this might suggest. Some of the more popular examples include speedy elections following the February 1974 election of a minority Labour government, and the Clark government’s inability to pass its budget in 1979. Opposition to devolution in 1979 forced the British Labour government to amend its bill significantly, in particular by adding the provision of a referendum which effectively prevented approval of the bill. In addition, the assent of constitutional packages eluded Brian Mulroney’s Conservative governments twice in eight years.
event in Scottish politics. The electoral weight of the south of Britain often vetoed the electoral preferences of Scottish voters. At its most obvious, a 32% gap developed between the voting preferences of the Scottish and English electorate. In the 1983 and 1987 elections, for example, English voters backed the Conservative Party by margins of 19% and fourteen percent respectively. Scottish Labour votes exceeded Conservative votes by seven percent in 1983 and eighteen percent in 1987. The resulting gap, of 25% in 1983 and 32% in 1987, emphasises the propensity for regional voting patterns in Britain. Facing Conservative governments long after a majority of voters ceased to voice a preference for Tory prime ministers such as Margaret Thatcher, the democratic deficit in Scotland educated the electorate on the potential for inconsistency within an apparently sound electoral system. That said, the democratic ‘deficit’ argument rarely notes that in four cases, English voting preferences have been overturned by the overall preferences of UK voters. In 1910, 1950, 1964 and in the second election of 1974 the Conservative party won a majority of the seats in England but the combined effect of voting trends throughout the UK led to non-Conservative governments.

**Table 1.1 Partisan distribution in Canada and the United Kingdom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada (1997)</th>
<th># seats</th>
<th>% votes</th>
<th>United Kingdom (1997)</th>
<th># seats</th>
<th>% votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Québécois</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Liberal Democrat</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ulster Unionists</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of seats</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Total number of seats</td>
<td>659</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 The 1997 general election results signify a change from this trend. While the Labour and Conservative parties managed to win 74% of the popular vote, they hold 88% of the seats in the House of Commons.
12 Data for the 1983 example comes from Kellas 1989. Data for the 1987 example was worked out from voting statistics available from the House of Commons. The raw percentages are as follows: English votes in 1983: Conservatives 46%, Labour 26.9%; 1987: Conservatives 46.2%, Labour 29.8%; Scottish votes in 1983: Labour 35.1%, Conservative 28.4%; 1987: Labour 42.4%, Conservatives 24%.
Partisan competition in Scotland and Quebec, currently hosts domestic autonomist parties that garner increasingly significant proportions of the popular vote. A summary of the main patterns of electoral dominance highlight the two-party nature of electoral politics in Scotland and Quebec. In the immediate post-war period to the mid 1970s, the main competitors in Quebec elections were the Liberal Party and the conservative Union Nationale. Following the creation of the separatist Parti Québécois in 1968, the main electoral battle has been between the Quebec Liberal Party and the PQ. In Scotland during early the twentieth century a dominant Liberal party competed with a Scottish unionist party. By 1922, the earlier extension of the franchise and an increasing class consciousness turned the campaign for seats into a battle between the Conservatives and the Labour party. The creation of the Scottish National Party in 1934 did not affect the electoral fortunes of the two main parties until the second election of 1974, when the party managed to elect 11 MPs. Since then, the SNP and Labour party have seen themselves as the main rivals in the Scottish political arena. The extent to which this presents an accurate reflection of electorate preferences may be found in the following table.

### Table 1.2 Partisan distribution in Quebec and Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>% seats</td>
<td>% votes</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parti Québécois</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Québec Liberal Party</strong></td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Action démocratique du Québec</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of seats</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of seats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = coalition partners Where con votes refers to constituency votes and reg'l votes refers to regional votes.
Electoral activity at other levels warrants brief attention. The election of municipal governments and, in Quebec, directly elected mayors, provides an additional outlet for voter choice. Plagued by activity levels often 30 percent below general elections, as in the case of Quebec, the inability to directly elect council leaders, and a series of scandals in efficiency and propriety have dogged democracy at the local level (Alexander 1997, Sinclair 1997). The very public and bitter disputes between rival parties in local government have attracted much negative attention from a general public reluctant to endorse one questionably sound party over another. Evidence of support for the services provided by local government co-exists with earlier, less favourable analyses from the public (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Harvie 1998) and the inability to exert a direct voice at the local level.13

British voters possess an additional opportunity to elect representatives to the European Parliament. Until the 1999 European elections, all British MEPs were elected on the basis of large regional constituencies. As of 1999, the eight Scottish MEPs are elected on a nation-wide system of proportional representation. This additional outlet for political expression hazards a potential loss of confidence or satisfaction with political representation.14 If anything, the low expectations of voters for European politics ensure that less than overwhelming performances will not particularly damage political

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14 Whether the locus of democracy matters less than its mere existence, is worthy of greater discussion. Social capital literature, for example, would argue that the nature of democratic interaction matters more than the presence of opportunity. Chapter five deals with issues of democratic representation, civic engagement and resultant satisfaction with the polity.
satisfaction levels.\textsuperscript{15} Where the European Parliament provides an obvious benefit is in the political weight enjoyed by different political parties. For the past two European elections the Scottish electorate has returned two SNP MEPs among the eight sent to Brussels. Comparatively, under ten percent of the 72 Scottish Westminster MPs are from the SNP. In Scotland, what has traditionally been considered the main stage of political life, Westminster, has witnessed the smallest presence of the nationalist party, effectively shifting the political expression of nationalism to both a higher, European, and lower, local council, stage. This has changed with the election of 35 SNP representatives to the 129-member Scottish Parliament. In Quebec, however, the political presence of separatist parties in both the National Assembly and, for the past two elections, in the federal House of Commons, ensures that the nationalist debate occupies both provincial and federal politics.\textsuperscript{16}

Additional parliamentary institutions provide a point of comparison. In both Canada and the United Kingdom, Heads of State and Upper Houses occupy similar positions. The Queen, and in the case of Canada, her official representative the Governor General, have, not surprisingly, near parallel relationships with the population. Removed from the public by hereditary rule or a selection process dominated by patronage, the office of Head of State is effectively de-politicised.\textsuperscript{17} This distance from the mainstream political arena limits the frequency and passion of the debate over the office and its cost.\textsuperscript{18} The unelected Upper House, in conjunction with the hereditary monarch, serves to concentrate

\textsuperscript{15} In its 1995 report Footprints in New Snow the Nunavut Implementation Commission highlighted the danger of unreasonable expectations – either too high or too low – in creating a stable political culture (NIC 1995).
\textsuperscript{16} A future study chronicling the amount of time devoted to nationalist issues in the Houses of Parliament and newspapers would be able to draw a more informed link between political behaviour and the presence of nationalist issues within the political psyche of a nation.
\textsuperscript{17} This is not to say that the selection of governors general has been without controversy, but that the controversy is limited, at most, to concentrated attention every seven years and removed from partisan politics.
\textsuperscript{18} In Australia, the governor general is still seen as a British symbol. In Canada, the assiduous appointment of Francophones to the post has, in recent years, distanced the position from the British Crown. The linguistic duality of governors general has reinforced a Canadian, rather than a British image, making the post seem less foreign.
the locus of representative democracy outside two institutions, effectively pinning future State political expectations and their fulfilment on one House. Thus, any substandard functioning of the Upper House or Head of State, entails a smaller impact on perceptions of efficacy, confidence and satisfaction because neither institution has been selected by the population. Public confidence is not lost because it was never invested through a participatory rite. The absence of nationalist parties from the Upper Houses in both locations, and the ability of the Head of State to transcend the political debate limits the effect of these institutions in constructing national identity and political culture. The influence of different institutions within the political sphere receives further attention in chapter five.

**International Influence: Canada and the United Kingdom**

Despite the similar political institutions that bind Canada and the United Kingdom, the evolution towards Canadian independence from 1867 led the former colony down a different path in international affairs. Although the foreign policies of the two countries were similar until the Statute of Westminster in 1931, since then Canada’s international weight has increased significantly, a shift mirrored in proportion if not direction, in Britain. The changing fortunes of the larger Nation State provide, in the case of Scottish nationalists, an impetus for departure unheralded in more prosperous times. The consequences for political confidence of declining international weight, and difficulties with larger economic partners suggest that the benefits of tying national destiny to a declining hegemonic power resemble an offer of diminishing returns rather than the promise of security predicted by the architects of the 1707 Treaty of Union. Most often, this argument surfaces as a marriage analogy. The once fruitful partnership of Scotland and England/Wales is no longer advantageous to either partner (Brown, McCrone and

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19 In one of its special edition polls, Angus Reid noted that the percentage of Canadians wishing to leave the Senate as it is has remained constant in the period 1987 to 1998, at little over ten percent. The proportion of Canadians wishing to reform the upper house has dropped from 59 to 43 percent, while the percentage of those wishing to abolish the Senate has rise from 22 to 41 percent (Angus Reid 1998)
Paterson 1998). For separatists in Quebec, the North American Free Trade Agreement and the series of over-lapping international organisations of which Canada is a member form the back-drop for Canadian ranking that ranges from one to four on the United Nations Development Index. If Britain is portrayed as an ‘awkward and reluctant partner’ (George 1998) in the European Union, Canada appears to be doing well out of its international obligations and arrangements.

Historically, the two have occupied different positions within the international, or imperial, arena. Quebec began as a colony of France and later, following the 1760 Conquest of New France, became a British colony. Scotland, in comparison, has simultaneously enjoyed the disadvantages of English imperial attention and post-union, economic and political advantages as an imperial partner. Colonial critiques of the present nationalist movement in Quebec and Scotland surface in the literature. Hechter claims that Britain operates along a system of internal colonialism, where disadvantaged peripheral regions are exploited for the benefit of an increasingly powerful centre (Hechter 1987). In Canada, Laforest claims that the power exercised by the federal government in the appointment of Senators, Supreme Court Justices, and as holder of the public purse, mirrors closely the power of imperial centres over colonies (Laforest 1998). Laforest’s contemporary analysis sits among older theories that attribute Canada’s political development to its former colonial economic dependence on Britain (Creighton 1956, Innis 1930). Associated with such critiques, differing notions of national confidence and success permeate the contemporary discourse.

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20 The Statute of Westminster repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, which ruled illegal any colonial law that contradicted a British law.
21 In addition to military campaigns within its borders in 1715 and 1745 and the subsequent proscription of markers of highland life between 1746 and 1752, the persistent if not malicious anglicisation of Scotland can be directly attributable to the union (Lynch 1992).
22 McCrone subjects Hechter’s analysis to careful scrutiny in Understanding Scotland, arguing that by splitting Britain between highland and lowland areas, Hechter treated Scotland as a highland region in its entirety, ignoring the diversity within the Scottish economy (Hechter 1975, McCrone 1992). According to McCrone, Hechter’s decision to adapt his analysis (Hechter 1982) by arguing that Scotland represented an over-developed, rather than under-developed region further limits the degree to which his analysis can be considered useful (McCrone 1992).
Participation in international organisations and groups such as the G7, NATO, Commonwealth and United Nations have provided Canada with a strong international voice despite its middle-power size and wealth. The cultural particularities of bilingualism have aided a Canadian presence in the diplomatic world. Membership in La Francophonie, stemming from middle power diplomacy attempted by former prime minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, also allows Quebec an opportunity to participate more than other provinces (Axworthy and Trudeau 1990).\(^{23}\) The cultural particularity of Quebec thus grants Canada a role in institutions in which it would not otherwise be involved, such as La Francophonie, but also affects the pattern of interaction between Canada and other states or international bodies (Latouche 1998).\(^{24}\) The bilingual nature of Canada, thanks to Quebec, has increased the country’s stature in the international arena. Although both Canada and the UK are participating in similar institutions, for Canada this has heralded a rising stature within international politics. For the former imperial power, it signifies both a changing world and a transitory position within the international power structure. In short, the increasing influence of international collaboration provides new opportunities for regional or national groups to exercise a voice beyond the Nation-State. The lack of a written constitution in Britain has allowed Scotland to establish a presence in Europe beyond other devolved regions let alone participating units of unitary States like France (Keating 1999). International context also affects the degree of regional, or continental, integration.

Despite the absence of full-scale supra-national or continental political institutions, Canada is much more a North American country, integrated into more than its continental economy, in a way that Britain has yet to achieve in Europe (Lipset 1990, Nevitte 1996).

\(^{23}\) The relationship between British Columbia and the Asian economies and the experiences of Alberta trade teams highlight how the characteristics of other provinces affect their participation in other international fora.
Despite the formal economic and political ties binding Britain to Europe, the country has yet to assimilate its political views, its consumer and cultural habits to the Continent.\textsuperscript{25} This is not to suggest that economic integration naturally precedes cultural integration or vice versa. Whether this stems from the integrative effects of a common language receives attention in chapters three and four. The economic ties between Canada and the United States account for much of the integration. The two countries participate in the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. Canadian trade with the United States accounts for 80\% of all exports and three quarters of imports.\textsuperscript{26} Even British Columbia, with its emphasis on Asia-Pacific economic activity, trades twice as much with the US as with Asia. Forty percent of BC imports and exports stem from American trade while 20\% stem from trade with Asia.

The previous two sections highlight that despite the similar political institutions, the division of power and process of supra-national integration distinguishes the Canadian and British experiences. The following four sections explore the demographic, economic, cultural and social aspects of Quebec and Scotland’s positions within their respective host States.

\textsuperscript{24} Latouche also notes “Even though the US continues to profess in every forum that it prefers to deal with a united Canada, it has taken full advantage of Quebec’s activism in its own negotiations with Canada” (Latouche 1998)

\textsuperscript{25} Public opinion polls from Angus Reid Group Inc and Europinion “Continuous Tracking” Surveys illustrate this point. In March 2000, Angus Reid gauged perceptions of economic indicators in seventeen countries. UK results distinguish themselves from data gathered in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. When asked about taxes, 51\% of UK respondents indicated they felt tax levels were too high. The average for the other countries was 70\%. Similarly, support for public spending was 25\% higher in the UK (Angus Reid 2000). In its analysis of attitudes towards the EU, Europinion determined that UK residents are the least interested in Europe about their rights as EU citizens, the least interested in discovering new things about themselves (Europinion 1997) the least convinced their country has benefited from the EU (Europinion 1995), the least convinced the country should integrate more into the EU, the least likely to accept unrestricted immigration from south of the Mediterranean, the most convinced those suffering human rights abuses should be admitted and the most convinced the EU should set education and training as a main objective (Europinion 1996).

\textsuperscript{26} Exports to the US total $181,049.3 million while American imports total $144,661.3 million (Statistics Canada 2000)
Demographic Aspects: Quebec and Scotland

Notwithstanding their similar historical importance, demographically Scotland and Quebec occupy different positions within the UK and Canada. At roughly twenty-five percent of the total Canadian population and as home to over 80 percent of the Canada’s francophones, Quebec claims that it exercises a voice as one of the two founding nations. The political and linguistic necessities of bilingual representatives and public servants have, since the late 1960s, ensured the dominant presence of Quebecers in key government roles. With brief exceptions Canada has been governed since 1968 by a succession of Prime Ministers from Quebec. The presence of Quebecers extends to 10 of 37 current cabinet ministers, three of the nine supreme court justices, one quarter of the seats in the House of Commons and in the Senate, the head of the army, and fifty percent of the governors general since the first Canadian held the post in 1952. Until the departure of Jean Charest as leader of the Progressive Conservative party in 1998, three of the five official parties were led by MPs representing Quebec seats. For extended periods of time, both the leader of the opposition and the Prime Minister have been representing Quebec seats. This dominance is not an unchanging characteristic of the Canadian political system. Francophones were under-represented in the federal civil service and federal Cabinet until the arrival of Prime Minister Trudeau. Paradoxically, this rise in political weight coincides with the demographic decline of Quebecers within

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28 The exceptions are Joe Clark June 1979-March 1980, John Turner June to Sept 1984, Kim Campbell June to November 1993. These three prime ministers, who are from Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia respectively ruled for a total of twenty months in more than thirty years.

29 Fourteen of the 37 ministers are from Ontario. It is worth nothing, however, that the Liberals only managed to elect 24 MPs from Quebec and 101 from Ontario. As a result, Quebec ministers are over-represented within the cabinet when their electoral success is taken into account.

30 Most recently this ended with the election of the Reform party as her majesty’s loyal opposition in 1997.
the Canadian population. At the time of the Conquest, the French birthrate was 55/1000 (Francis, Smith and Jones 1996). It now stands at 11/1000 (Statistics Canada 1999).

Although exerting a smaller power when compared to the overrepresentation of Quebec Prime Ministers the presence of Scots within the British cabinet suggest that Scotland is also adept at securing greater political representation that its proportion of the population warrants. Scotland boasts five of the twenty-two Cabinet ministers, and two party leaders, Alex Salmond, leader of the SNP, and Charles Kennedy, leader of the Liberal Democrats. Although the presence of Scottish MPs in the current Labour cabinet could have more to do with the strength of the Labour party in Scotland rather than Scottish political influence within the union, a pattern of anomalous treatment of Scotland suggests that a culturally distinct nation can exert a greater influence within the wider State.

Representing one tenth of the population and one of four historic nations in the United Kingdom Scotland’s acknowledged role within its State is more secure than that held by Quebec. Evidence of the historically-acknowledged difference is found in the anomalies and asymmetries of British governmental institutions. (MacCormick 1998) Canada’s French province must contend with the view that it is one of ten governments, a position in conflict with the historical vision of Canada as the product of two founding nations. That one of ten governments claims to be the modern day representative of a founding nation is contested both by those who balk at the compact theory of Confederation and those who prefer to place less emphasis on the Quebec government’s current role as national proxy. What the two case studies do have in common is a historical particularity and role in the construction of the modern State balanced with the current demographic confines of a minority population. As John Trent emphasises, minority status brings with it a sense of frailty and concern for survival that compounds the sense of difference
In response, constitutional observers in the rest of Canada assert that English Canada is as distinct from Quebec as the French province is from the majority. Although seeking to provide a critique of current claims for “distinct society” status, these statements fail to incorporate the demographic influence of constitutional demands. Only the minority population worries about its distinctiveness, for the dominant or majority population, by its very demographic and cultural weight, provides the context for all political negotiations. In sum, in both cases Scotland and Quebec represent small, culturally distinct nations with a solid presence at the wider State level in spite of demographic minority status. Status as a cultural minority determines much of how the nationalist movement constructs the debate, establishes boundaries and markers of the project and its identity.

**Economic Aspects: Quebec and Scotland**

On initial examination, the economic fortunes of both case studies appear remarkably similar. Both exist as periphery to the economic centre of southern England and southern Ontario respectively. Both areas are rich in natural resources but not particularly well-off, suffering from above average unemployment, limited foreign investment and fluctuating consumer confidence. Equalisation payments in Canada and the Barnett formula in Britain ensure that stable funding is guaranteed despite whatever effect such top-up measures may have on perceptions of national self-sufficiency. Economic critiques of the current situation and future prospects as a sovereign State figure in both

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31 The extent to which minority status and cultural particularity affects the collective values and attitudes of Scotland and Quebec receives attention in chapter four.
32 Additional examples can be found in discourses on race and the dominance of whiteness (Bonnett 2000). Often, it is the ‘other’ that is examined or analysed. Studies of the ‘other’ underpin our understanding of ourselves (Said 1995). Whiteness, much like maleness, and until recently, Englishness, has escaped similar attention (Bonnett 2000).
33 Quebec’s unemployment rate, at 9.8%, is three percent higher than the Canadian rate for March 2000. The Scottish ILO rate for Dec 1998 was 7.3%, one percent above the British rate of 6.2%.
34 The Barnett formula calculates the block grant given from Westminster to Scotland. The formula functions on a purely proportional scale although a falling population in Scotland has meant that it traditionally receives more than its strictly proportional share. The SNP argues that because Scotland’s oil revenues are transferred directly to London, it receives a smaller share that it is due given the contribution of North Sea oil to the British economy.
nationalist discourses. Whether Scotland gains or loses money receives particular attention from the SNP and Labour Party who each argue opposing points of view. Arguments that Quebec may gain money but is generally 'held down' by the circumstances of Confederation dominate financial debates within the province. Disputes over natural resources and the receipt of a fair share of public funding provide material for political parties occupying various points along the nationalist spectrum. The recent Parliamentary elections in Scotland witnessed a series of reports from business groups and think tanks assessing various aspects of the economic situation in Scotland. The most heated debate, and heightened media attention, concerned the predictions of economic well-being for an independent Scotland (SNP Research Dept 1996, SNP Parliamentary Group 1998). In the last decade, the sovereignty debate has witnessed the increasing importance of the economic feasibility of independence in Scotland and in Quebec. Political autonomy predicated in the nineteenth century upon cultural particularity has given way to arguments about good governance and economic vitality.

Economic disparities within Canada and Britain mirror an equally uneven distribution of wealth with Quebec and Scotland. The economic imbalance between anglophones and francophones in Quebec presents a microcosm of the larger Canadian, and British, picture. The falling income gap, much improved since the 1950s, owes much to the education and bureaucratisation of a technocratic, francophone middle class in the 1960s (Gagnon 1993, McRoberts 1993). The once dominant anglophone business class has given way to a bilingual workforce. Economic imbalance within Scotland, bound much more to public perception, is tied to the felt presence of southern English residents integrating themselves into rural economies (Jedrej and Nuttall 1995). Frustration with the pattern of land sales and composition of the rural population has led to the creation of a small number of nationalist grassroots organisations intent on monitoring the incursion

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35 During the 1999 election campaign the Scottish National Party promised to release two manifestos, the first with costings for a devolved Scotland, and the second with projected costings for an independent Scotland. In the end, only the one full manifesto was published (SNP 1999), although press releases later in the campaign covered further economic details.
of English landowners and incoming residents into the Scottish countryside (Scottish Watch 1993, Scottish Watch 1994). The perception of inequality as it relates to collective groups often banishes discussions of individual economic disparity. These inequalities, which surface later in examinations of social capital and political participation, have important ramifications for the social exclusion of citizens. In general, the constitutional debate has been much kinder to the Scottish economy than to Quebec. Despite expressions of dissatisfaction from businesses warning that they will relocate should Scotland become independent, the country as a whole has not witnessed a deterioration of its economic performance as judged by the outside world. In comparison, New York bond raters such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s have been particularly unkind to separatist administrations in Quebec, on occasion ranking the province’s bond rating behind that of Newfoundland.36

Cultural Aspects: Quebec and Scotland

Cultural markers provide one of the key differences between the relative situations in Scotland and Quebec. The French language, and its role in the historical development of Canada and the nationalist movement of Quebec provides a clear, unquestionable sense of cultural distance from the rest of Canada. Language, and more specifically its protection, fuels the search for greater autonomy and, it is argued, future cultural security. Whether the movement still emphasises linguistic particularity receives attention in chapter four. What Scotland lacks in linguistic difference (despite the debate concerning the status of Gaelic37 and the Scots language) it gains in a full complement of easily identifiable cultural markers, some invented, some authentic, supplementing a sense of history that predates European contact with North America (Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998, Trevor Roper 1983). For Seton Watson, each decade of a nation’s history lends additional

36 Above average growth in the province of Newfoundland for 1998 and 1999, in particular could be credited with such results. Current ratings from Dominion Bond Rating Services indicate that both short-term and long-term bonds for Quebec are recorded as A(low) and stable (DBRS 1999)

37 According to the 1991 Census there are 69,510 individuals who are able to either speak, read or write Gaelic. This represents just under two percent of the population (Scottish Office 1998).
weight to its sense of consciousness and justification for self-determination (Seton Watson 1977). Both nations easily identify their markers of difference, one grounded in language and culture, the other in former independence and a history of treatment as a recognised nation, to further the nationalist cause. For autonomist parties like the SNP, the PQ and the BQ, these markers of difference lend credence to calls for greater self-determination. For broadly defined ‘nationalist’ parties and movements, they lend added strength to the need for domestically-created solutions to national issues. The strength of the nationalist movements in Scotland and Quebec have been little affected by the differing constitutional fortunes of the two nations, more specifically, by whether the separate political consciousness existed in an autonomous nation or fledgling colony. A longer history allows, however, for increased confidence in the survival of the nation. It is much easier to predict the continued existence of a nation if it has already existed for hundreds of years. This increased confidence manifests itself in a decreased vigilance in patrolling the boundaries of national membership. Language charters and school boards alike are designed to ensure the survival of French Quebec, a cultural promotion which sits uneasily with some anglophones in Quebec.

The linguistic difference of Quebec also affects the circumstances in which the nationalist debate takes place. Language in Quebec acts as a barrier to global communication networks operating in English. This degree of what Raymond Breton once defined as institutional completeness insulates Quebec from the cultural influence of the United States in a way that English Canada does not enjoy (Breton 1964). The integrative pull of the European continent exerts a much weaker influence on the United Kingdom. Different European languages, cultures, institutions and histories ensure that the United Kingdom is relatively protected from cultural and political trends in continental Europe (Bulmer, George and Scott 1992, George 1998). These differing international aspects affect the tactics and emphases of nationalists in each case study. Quebec exists as an
isolated culture within the integrated cultural sphere of North America while Scotland, although part of the British cultural sphere within Europe, finds itself equally embedded in British cultural markers. This has significant implications for a sense of cultural ownership and an awareness of the “other” in Quebec (Léger and Léger 1990). This element of the nationalist debate, particularly as it relates to cultural survival, is largely lacking in Scotland, where national culture is seen as distinct within Britain. 38

**Social Aspects: Quebec and Scotland**

Just as the economic situations of the two case studies appear remarkably similar, so too do the social influences on the nationalist movements have much in common. The social structures of life in Scotland and Quebec appear, by many indicators, as little more than variants of Western trends. Urban development, communications networks, print capitalism, trade patterns and distance to international markets affect the level of cosmopolitanism and global contact of the society in which nationalism asserts itself. Higher immigration levels in Quebec and a resulting multicultural society have forced an ongoing debate about cultural accessibility and national membership that have served to, at least highlight and at most dampen, the parochial tendencies typified by many nationalist movements. In Scotland, the relative lack of a substantial ethnic minority population reduces the total amount of racism in society although sectarianism in Scotland’s West coast detracts from whatever intolerance-free image Scotland might desire (McCrone 1992, Harvie 1998). Politicians on either side of the partisan divide in both Scotland and Quebec strive to portray the nation as resolutely outward-looking, and integrated into a global economy.

The previously highlighted aspects of the Nation-State relationship in Scotland and Quebec receive additional treatment throughout the following chapters of this thesis. Each of the social, cultural and political contexts has important implications for wider

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38 In contrast, Callum Brown argues that social characteristics such as gender, age and class have prevented the emergence of a unified mass culture in Scotland (Brown 1996).
issues of elections and representation, the relationship between elites and general population, the socialisation of political values and attitudes, understandings of the interaction between citizens and the State, the relations among citizens, and the modern civic needs fulfilled by national identity. Before turning to an examination of the theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis, this chapter first outlines the different approaches to political authority exhibited by nationalist movements in Scotland and Quebec.

**DIFFERENCES IN MOVEMENTS**

As implied in the previous section, in historical development and in the current political situation the two nationalist movements of Scotland and Quebec exist in near parallel situations. When compared with the existence of nationalist regimes throughout the world, that the two are liberal democracies alone dictates much of what can be considered a limited comparative analysis. Where the two differ, however, are in the emphases and tendencies within the nationalist movements, the use and construction of identity, and the resulting differences within and between the nation and the larger State. As stated earlier, in both cases eighteenth-century constitutional settlements protected institutions of civil society integral to the survival and development of a distinct identity and political society. The value of the comparison, however, lies as much in the differences between the context and tactics of each nationalist programme. Attempts to categorise nationalist movements into civic or ethnic approaches often place Quebec and Scotland on opposite sides of the divide (Ignatieff 1993). If ethnic nationalism is seen as backward-looking, based on blood ties and generally exclusive, civic nationalism is portrayed as its inclusive and forward-looking counterfoil (Brubaker 1996, Hobsbawm 1990, Ignatieff 1993, Ignatieff 1996, Kohn 1967, Plamenatz 1976). The dominant nationalist parties in both locations admit to these differences. The Scottish National Party emphasises its civic nationalist goals while at least one of the sovereignist parties in Quebec, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), admits that nationalism in Quebec is not entirely civic. The BQ argument, is that civic movements are post-national forces. Because the push
towards greater autonomy hinges upon the existence of a distinct nation, separatism in Quebec cannot be post-national, and thus, not entirely civic (Bloc Québécois 1999). Opposition to Scottish devolution has been both a minority view and strongly aligned with supporters of the Conservative party. Whether the party has attracted a wider array of unionists from across the political spectrum or whether party affiliation has coloured perceptions of constitutional settlement remains outwith the scope of this thesis. Few challenge the inclusiveness of the Scottish settlement although the exceptions to this statement will be examined in chapter four. In Quebec however, opposition to greater autonomy divides neatly along linguistic, and often ethnic, lines. Critics of the nationalist movements from within and outwith Quebec, have sought to undermine the political programme with charges of exclusion. (Alliance Quebec nd.a Alliance Quebec nd.b, Alliance Quebec nd.c, Alliance Quebec nd.d, Alliance Quebec nd.e, Henderson 1997, Johnson 1994, Tetley 1982) Thus, while nationalists in Scotland and Quebec operate within the context of a Western, liberal-democratic parliamentary system, each group uses different justifications for greater autonomy and creates different interpretations of national identity and membership. Here, relevant distinctions present themselves between nationalism and separatism, autonomy and independence, partisan and social movements. In Quebec, both provincial parties, the Parti Québécois and the Quebec Liberal Party (QLP), can be considered nationalist parties. Whatever the constitutional policies of these parties, both support degrees of autonomy for Quebec than are greater than the federal government and other provinces are willing to accede. Both believe that the French language and a unique culture make Quebec a distinct society. Where the two differ is in their support for sovereignty. Recently, the Parti Québécois has been consistent in its support for independence providing the Quebec electorate votes for such a package and negotiations with the federal government for a renewed federalism fail. At its most sovereignist, the Quebec Liberal Party backed a measure of sovereignty association between Quebec and Canada that is consistent with the soft-end of the Parti

39 "L'identité exclusivement civique, voire post-nationale, n'est pas adaptée à la situation particulière du Québec. L'identité québécoise ne doit pas se dissoudre dans une identité civique qui ignore la présence
Québécois' proposals. Since the late 1980s, however, the QLP has backed away from such measures and sits, somewhat uneasily, between the constitutional proposals put forward by the PQ and those of the federal Liberal Party. In Scotland, the consensus works from constitutional settlement to nationalism rather than the other way round. In other words, if Quebec political parties are both nationalist and differ on the issue of the constitution, the majority of Scottish political parties have agreed on the constitution but differ on the issue of nationalism. During the devolution referendum, three of the four main parties in Scotland backed the establishment of a Scottish Parliament but only the Scottish National Party considers itself a nationalist party. Although Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP each had different reasons for promoting change, the consensus around the need for change is noteworthy. This situation stands in contrast to the post-devolution position of the four main parties, where consensus surrounding the status quo is less clear. For reasons discussed later in the thesis, what has been seen as the a priori commitment of parties in Quebec, that they are nationalist, pro-autonomy parties, appears a more radical position. Despite support for greater political autonomy, the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties have avoided the nationalist label, fearing that it would suggest a level of radicalism or xenophobia they appear unprepared to accept. Throughout the history of the autonomist movements in Scotland and Quebec, political parties seeking change have co-existed with wider social movements seeking varying levels of sovereignty. A full examination of these movements, and the changing support for such programmes of change, appear in chapters three, four and five of the thesis.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Although comparative in nature the thesis aims to provide more than a study of nationalism in two contexts. Rather, it seeks to provide a sociological understanding of the political relationships among citizens and between citizens and the State in Scotland and Quebec. As will be discussed in chapter two, traditional examinations of nationalist or autonomist movements and national identity have often treated the nation as a
d'une majorité nationale de francophones” (Bloc Québécois 1999).
homogeneous entity. Such treatments do not acknowledge the variety of goals and aims held by nationalists nor do they consider the centre-periphery relations that occur within nations and nationalist political projects. This thesis relies on recent developments in social identity theory, social psychology and political culture, including growing literatures on social capital and new social movements, to expand the discussion on national integration and belonging.

Early works on political culture emphasised its role as a guarantor of democratic stability (Almond and Verba 1963, Pye and Verba 1965, Bluhm 1974). The proper balance of efficacy and deference was seen as providing citizens with a sense of security and politicians with the room to govern. Usually comparative in nature, the studies assigned countries to categories within a hierarchy of political development. Criticised for lying somewhere between descriptions of national character and Eurocentric notions of the "developed polity", political culture research was charged with being vague in its conclusions and dubious in its methodological reliance on psychological critiques of early childhood experiences. A full examination of the development of political culture as an analytical tool is found in chapter two. Survey research, by its very nature, requires at the very least some expectation of the results in order to frame the questions in such a way as to elicit the meaningful answers. While this critique of social survey research still holds, the increased sophistication of opinion-polling techniques, the existence of new datasets, and international surveys justifies, on a methodological level, a re-examination of political attitudes and behaviour. The value of linking micro- and macro-level analysis to explain the socialising influence of civil society and governmental institutions has assumed increased importance on the eve of widespread constitutional change.

The return to political culture analyses has occurred amidst the surging development of another critical literature on the meaning and construction of social identity. Identity research in the various fields of social psychology, nationalism studies, and political science brings a different approach to the examination of self consciousness, group
attachment, belonging and integration. This thesis relies upon the burgeoning literature on social and national identity in an effort to determine what light identity theory can shed on issues of value acquisition and political integration. Although identity receives a full examination with political culture in chapter two, it is necessary to summarise the theory of identity and political culture used throughout this thesis. This work claims that the basis upon which individuals may choose to evaluate their claims to belonging present varying opportunities for inclusion; for although identity is a self-ascribed tag its validity may not be acknowledged by other members of society. In the development of a national political programme, nationalist leaders project and encourage a sense of national identity in order to sustain the necessity of the project. The political use of pre-existing markers of cultural identity clarifies the components of that identity, allowing it to be harnessed as a potent political force. The intentions of leaders and parties are largely irrelevant for it is the message, as carried by agents of socialisation and construed by citizens that determines the inclusive nature of the movement. Thus, a national identity that is civic in its goals and application does not necessarily make the movement inclusive. Likewise, an inclusive leadership dealing with a population in which hostility and suspicion are common, will have little hope of ensuring a consistently inclusive notion of national membership. The values and attitudes held by the population will undermine the efforts of political elites to forge a united identity. Similarly, an exclusive view of national membership in a society where both national membership and autonomy enjoy low political saliency will wreak little damage on the alienated individual psyche. Chapter three deals with the nationalist messages as promoted by agents of socialisation, while chapters four and five analyse how the population understands these messages.

**METHODOLOGY**

This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the relationship between national identity and political culture in Scotland and Quebec. The benefits of a comparative analysis include the ability to generalise about political activity, to improve the classification of politics or political systems, and to develop models that enhance the predictability of
political action (Hague, Harrop and Breslin 1998, Dalton 1996, Daalder 1997) The formulation of generalisations necessitates the easy identification of exceptions, an exercise made difficult by the existence of two comparative examples. The list of countries or regions hosting nationalist independence parties that rely on identity as a pillar of secession extends beyond Scotland and Quebec. Catalonia and the Basque region in Spain, Padania in Italy, and Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium each highlight the diversity of experiences that exist within the limited confines of Western Europe. The choice of Scotland and Quebec for this thesis depended in part on timing, in part on the availability of literature, and in part on personal circumstance. Both nations held referenda seeking greater political autonomy within two years. A developed literature on nationalism frequently makes references to Scotland and Quebec as examples of peaceful, political, democratic and thus comparable nationalist movements. As highlighted in the previous examination of the ways in which Canada and Britain offer relatively similar institutional and democratic contexts, the nationalist movements of Scotland and Quebec allows for a fruitful comparison of political attitudes in each case.

This thesis supplements statistical analyses of elections studies and opinion polls with content analyses of political statements and interview material from political activists in the Scotland and Quebec. Data analysis, as driven by a reading of political culture and social and national identity theory, looks for evidence of a developed theory rather than presenting a series of tabular data on various aspects of political and social life in Scotland and Quebec. In most cases, the quantitative data used has received an initial examination by the primary investigators of the electoral studies. Owing to the limitations of space and time, most of the data analysis stems from election studies, voting behaviour and opinion polls in the 1990s. It is worth noting that data collected in Scotland and Quebec was performed using difference sampling methods, different interview techniques and different questions. Data gathered during an election campaign will capture different moods than data gathered in the middle of a legislative term. Data gathered by the government cannot be equated with data gathered by a private opinion
polling firm or a newspaper. Even when data is collected using similar methods and at similar times, the questions themselves may capture different attitudes. This is highlighted in chapter four with an analysis of the different identity questions used in each election study. Because of this disparity, it would be irresponsible to provide a direct comparison between data in each case study. As a result, sections dealing with quantitative data are separated so that the results for Quebec and Scotland are discussed in isolation. Once the analysis of data has been performed, the two case studies are compared.

Additional qualitative evidence, gathered through content analyses and discourse analyses, accompanies the attitudinal and behavioural data. This triangulation of resources seeks to provide a sense of accuracy and depth to the analysis while minimising the negative aspects of each investigative method. An analysis of the potential pitfalls associated with each approach emphasises the benefits of combing qualitative and quantitative research techniques.

The questionable centrality of political beliefs, the relationship between attitudes, values and behaviour, the doubtful comparability of cross-national data using a variety of questions with nuanced meanings, sampling issues, interview techniques and the treatment of incomplete data plague any researcher seeking to apply quantitative techniques in an effort to probe the hearts and minds of human subjects. Political culture has been criticised for being too positivist (Pateman 1989) ignoring economic factors (Jackman and Miller 1996a, Jackman and Miller 1996b) or behavioural factors (Reisinger 1995) and being methodologically slippery (Whitefield and Evans 1999) in addition to receiving the usual charges that it has been applied incorrectly (Inglehart 1988) The appeal of political culture, however, has led to a small resurgence of analyses (Welch 1993, Lane 1992). Literatures such as social capital, which attempt to link the level of citizen interaction with the stability of society or democracy, still rely on examinations of
political culture to provide a sense of context to the work (Putnam 1993). For these researchers, the methodological issues involved are outweighed by the supposed benefits of the cultural approach.

Most works using national identity as an independent variable exerting influence over partisan preference or voter turnout rely on a variation of Luis Moreno’s five-point identity scale. (Moreno 1988) Developed while comparing national identity in Scotland and Catalonia, Moreno’s scale requires respondents to describe their sense of allegiance given the following options: Scottish not British, More Scottish than British, Equally Scottish and British, More British than Scottish, British not Scottish. Such a categorisation lends itself to straightforward quantification and cross-national comparison. Despite the importance of creating data to test relationships between variables, what Moreno’s scale gains in applicability it lacks in description. The scale fails to identify the strength with which national feelings are held, what such self-identification actually means to the individual, and leaves hidden the components of identity itself. What, for instance, are the distinguishing characteristics of the Scottish or Québécois national identity? How is the identity of an individual who self-identifies as solely Scottish different from the identity of an individual whose self-definition allows for a minimal sense of Britishness? If used in isolation, Moreno’s categories, while valuable in their ability to demonstrate the effect of national identity on political behaviour, fail to provide a sense of context to national identity; what it is about national identity that affects subsequent behaviour. Although Canadian newspapers have been quick to commission opinion polls using the Moreno identity scales, the election surveys in Canada rely on a different instrument to measure the varying levels of identity within the country. Asking respondents to indicate their level of attachment to their province and

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40 Used in the 1997 British Election Survey and Scottish Election booster survey, the results from similar questions have been used in several papers presented at a fall 1997 conference for the Centre for Research on Elections and Social Trends (CREST) (Scottish Affairs Special Issue, 1998). Similar examinations of recent election survey material may be found in Evans and Norris 1999, Taylor and Thomson 1999.
country on two scales of 1 to 100, while avoiding the binary opposition of the British scale, provides little insight into the motivations of belonging. As will be argued in chapter two, identity is not a thing and should not be treated as such. That said, in attempts to mobilise identity behind a political project, nationalist parties encourage the creation and acquisition of a definable identity package that provides citizens with the tools to interpret their past, present and future. For those who exclude themselves from national identity a reluctance to align oneself with the associated values and characteristics of the nation matters as much as the notion of belonging itself. Although both scales provide an accurate reflection of belonging or attachment, their continued use in isolation inhibits a solid understanding of identity in Scotland and Quebec.

Part of the problem of previous statistical examinations of political culture is that they are looking for relationships between variables that exert a cursory influence on the development of political attitudes. Although the influence of social class and trust and efficacy levels form the backbone of a system’s political culture, equally important is the perception of boundaries around these cultures. That a population feels itself different, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, speaks volumes about the relationships between citizens and the State. The perception of boundaries is often ignored in favour of the observed objective absence of boundaries. This thesis argues that, for example, the fact that Scots consider themselves to be more communitarian than their English counterparts influences political behaviour even though by most objective measures, Scottish political attitudes closely resemble those in the rest of the UK.

The second methodological technique involves a content analysis of the political manifestos of the political parties, government constitutional documents and final reports of royal commissions and consultative fora. The analysis has sought to highlight the identification of certain pillars of identity, the assumed tenets of nationalist discourse and the grounds for collective inclusion and exclusion in the nation. Initially, the research process encompassed an analysis of documents from school curricula boards, the Church
of Scotland Church and Nation Committee and the Quebec Order of Catholic Bishops. In the interests of space, a full analysis of these documents has not been included in the thesis. Chapter three contains references to particular documents, where they highlight similar or noticeably different themes. In addition, the research process involved the content analysis of ten newspapers over a four month period in 1998 and 1999. In the interests of space this analysis does not appear in the thesis.\textsuperscript{41}

In dealing with the qualitative aspects of the thesis efforts were made to ensure that in the identification of individuals to interview, access to decision makers, the selection and interpretation of interview questions remained justifiable. Based on a theoretical understanding of the construction of national identity, Scottish and Québécois nationalism, and a preliminary round of interviews with various political actors and academics, fieldwork interviews emphasised the views of some 65 individuals across the spectrum of national membership, as determined by the majority view. A complete analysis of the selection of these individuals appears in Appendix D. Thus, the thesis sought to represent the views of unity groups, separatist groups, immigrants, and non-Francophones in Quebec, along with Scottish-born residents, and those born outside Scotland in order to provide a range of experiences from those at the nucleus of political nationalism to those occupying the margins of national belonging. It was intended that this selection of individuals would allow for an analysis of the way in which the construction of national identity by various agents of socialisation and political actors affects different individuals and groups throughout society.

In sum, this thesis seeks to test a developing theory of integration and belonging through a variety of primary data sources. Party platforms, constitutional documents and submissions to governmental commissions allow for a reconstruction of the perceived development of each nation’s history and identity. Opinion polls and election studies test the acceptance of these constructions within the population. Used to provide a sense of

\textsuperscript{41} It is expected that academic articles based on this analysis will follow the completion of the PhD.
context, primary interviews add depth to the wealth of statistical information available on identity and political attitudes. This hybrid collection of primary sources allows for a greater understanding of the role key agents of socialisation play in the construction of dominant political behaviours. Each chapter places varying emphasis on the available data according to the role of the chapter within the thesis.

**THESIS OUTLINE**

Perceptions of inclusion and exclusion, as they stem from claims to belonging in the nation, provide the dominant tool for examining political culture in Scotland and Quebec. A secondary level of analysis details how this dynamic affects participation, satisfaction and the distribution of political attitudes within society. Chapter two establishes a theoretical framework for further analysis of national identity and political culture. Generated by such agents of socialisation as the family, education system, and the Church, political culture establishes the parameters for political attitudes on which all further variants are based. Considered as tools of integration, national identity and political culture share a common purpose and stem from similar civil institutions. Any examination of political culture thus takes its place between the fields of social psychology, political sociology and social anthropology. Methodological and definitional difficulties have plagued political culture as a concept and undermined its potential usefulness as an analytical tool. This thesis establishes and operationalises key definitions to examine how the interaction and negotiation affecting national identity influences the political dispositions of citizens. In so doing it examines the potentially integrative role of the polity as a corrective for national exclusion. With this in mind, chapter two argues that nationalist programmes construct identity in such a way as to provide identifiable characteristics to mark the boundaries of the nation. The implications of this definition of identity allow individuals to make conclusions about their own sense of belonging within the nation.
Civic values promoted through the historical development of the nation in Scotland and Quebec appear remarkably similar. In both case studies, the survival of institutions following the loss of political independence allowed for the maintenance of a civil society that served as the guardian of identity.\footnote{National identity in both case studies obviously have roots extending beyond the eighteenth century. For the purposes of this chapter, the timing of the two events, and the similarities in their influence on civil society, provide a convenient starting point. For an analysis of identity prior to 1707 see, for example, Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998.} \footnote{42} Much as the 1707 Treaty of Union allowed for the survival of the distinct Scottish education system, legal system and Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the 1774 Quebec Act preserved the role of the Catholic Church, civil code and French language in Britain's colony. Current nationalist parties rely on these institutions, and use them to foster a sense of collectivism and civic duty, proudly democratic and egalitarian. These parties also refer to values and descriptors of the nation's population that extend beyond these basic founding values. The pre-eminence of culture and language in political constructions of Quebec identity, in addition to recurrent references to the Québécois people, link the individual to the process of national building. The result is a defined collective in search of self-determination fuelled by feelings of its distinctiveness. Different approaches in Scotland, in particular attention to the state of democracy in the current system, suggest that the emphasis is portrayed as one of an unjust situation that must be rectified rather than a people experiencing an injustice.

Chapter three examines how these parties have aligned certain values and institutions with a politicised national identity. In so doing, the chapter chronicles the promotion of a common understanding of national development in Scotland and Quebec. History, both as it has promoted a particular understanding of the relationship between the individual and the State and how it is constructed within the nation, receives particular attention in the analysis of primary interview data. Party programmes and constitutional documents also provide their own potted histories of national development as a means of establishing the context that justifies the particular document. Platforms from all post 1979 British general elections and Quebec provincial elections since 1980, in addition to the various constitutional reports distributed in the push towards devolution and sovereignty since
1979, are subject to a content analysis to test for understandings of history, identity and political society. Any evidence of difference from the larger political unit is tested against socio-economic variables which could account for a variation in attitudes and behaviour.

An analysis of recent opinion polls, national election studies and interview material forms the basis for an examination of national identity in chapter four. Relying on key literature to establish a sense of context, the chapter analyses data from the last two federal elections studies in Canada and Britain. Through a comparison with interview material, the chapter seeks to determine how the need for belonging, highlighted by the nationalist programme, affects perceptions of inclusion and exclusion that might alter the prioritisation of political values in society. In its concentration on recent data it also seeks to determine how potentially divisive referenda and elections affect the trust and efficacy of those on the losing side. With greater attention to definitions of the self, and the alignment of self-identification with distinct political options, the potential for alienation within the nation and political society, insofar as the two are not coterminous, rises. In short, the chapter seeks to establish the extent to which institutional structures or traumatic events, as affected by national identity, have the potential to create new political cultures or cause fissures in the old culture.

Chapter five returns to traditional measures of political culture. The 1997 election studies for Scotland and Quebec are analysed to determine whether attitudes to identity and attitudes such as efficacy, deference, satisfaction and confidence may be considered distinct. The chapter then relies on the identity groups created by the various identity questions in each dataset to determine whether national identity plays a role in the values and attitudes held by individuals. The statistical analysis reveals that although identity groups share views of politicians, their views of society and social inclusion differ. The quantitative data is supplemented by qualitative information from the interviews, which shows that individuals across the identity spectrum tend to share views of politicians but
differ on the issue of national belonging. The thesis ends with a conclusion that examines the main lines of argument and suggests possible directions for future research.

This thesis does not chronicle a litany of oppressive acts inflicted by nationalists on those who do not possess the proper pedigree, nor does it attempt to answer who, ultimately, is responsible for correcting the perceptions of alienation. It does not accuse nationalists in general or separatist parties in Scotland or Quebec of building nationalist programmes on the basis of ethnic divisions within the population. In recent years these groups, who are not exclusionist in their motives, have done much to foster a sense of civic nationalism inclusive of all within its borders. Rather the thesis recognises that it is the very nature of collective identity, that is shared by some and shunned by others, that this brings with it an inevitable sense of separateness. Identity, however, cannot be equated neatly with a sense of inclusion. Identity, as viewed by various disciplines in the social sciences, is a self-directed process of identification. In the articulation of a national identity a sense of self is attached to a collective sense of difference. Reasons for holding an identity, and the markers by which it can be identified, change in function and meaning over time. The collective ascription of a sense of self-consciousness, self-esteem and self-respect affects the self-location of the individual in the civic polity. This interaction, between national identity and political culture, forms the basis of this thesis.
Integration into any national culture brings with it a sense of belonging that affects political and social attitudes in both a cognitive and unconscious way. An emerging dynamic between those who feel well-integrated into dominant society and those who feel they occupy a more marginal position mirrors any other situation in which there is an imbalance of power. And yet, an individual objectively occupying the margins of national culture may not exhibit the personal identity crises or tensions that an individual much closer to the majority view might experience. Despite the difference between "comfort levels" and location in the dominant culture, a lack of integration can affect the political perceptions of acceptable access and voice within the nation, State or society. This chapter charts the navigation of collective political identity by individuals through an examination of cultural approaches to political relationships.

Shifting ways of viewing the world, crediting as causing a rise in cultural approaches (Melucci 1995, Habermas 1987), receive similar treatment in the analysis of political values and attitudes. In his examination of comparative political culture Inglehart, in particular, highlights the effects of changing economic and social structures on the cultural parameters of political systems (Inglehart 1977, 1990). By providing a field of analysis in which political values and national identity can be examined as mutually reinforcing interactive processes, this chapter owes much to the composite aspects of culture in society: namely, the processes of socialisation, interaction, and integration. The chapter argues that despite the obvious collective processes at work within nationalist movements, national identity also exerts an excluding or categorising influence. Calls for concerted and collective action, as reinforced by images and icons of national history and promises of a brighter independent future, ignore the negotiated aspects of belonging. Even imagined communities such as nations possess a nucleus and a periphery between which individuals negotiate their placement.
Efforts by nationalist parties, civil institutions and the media to highlight the inclusiveness of the nation tend not to question the effect this has on the individuals who either do not feel included or, for whatever reason, wish not to be included in the popularly received notions of national membership. This process of inclusion or exclusion takes on new meaning when the nation exists within or across State boundaries. Official State inclusion, as determined objectively by citizenship legislation and subjectively by the activities of dominant agents of socialisation, conflict with the efforts of nations to graft their own sense of belonging, one often driven by political intentions, onto the civic polity. The goals and benefits of national membership, as determined by the State and by the nation often, but not always, coincide. For Van der Veer “citizenship is enough for political membership in the State, it is not for cultural membership in the nation” (Van der Veer 1998). The first few terms of the Scottish Parliament will determine whether the Scottish nation emerges as an entity separate from the Scottish polity in a way that the Québecois nation can be distinguished from Quebec the province. In other words, whereas the national boundaries and political-regional boundaries have hitherto been coterminous, the presence of stronger political boundaries, and thus a territorial notion of Scots, may encourage the creation of national boundaries that include a smaller population within the region. When the interests or markers of belonging of each of these units diverge there is room for a conflict of belonging. Depictions of the interaction between notions of identity, political integration, power, and a resulting theory of negotiated belonging and contested identities seek to explain the way identity affects political culture in Scotland and Quebec.

The plethora of definitions, methods and theoretical approaches to political culture provide evidence of its widespread appeal and potential for confusion. Continued support for the political culture approach stems in part from a general belief that otherwise successful economic models, such as rational choice theories, underestimate the importance of cultural factors as determinants of political activity. Research touting the explanatory power of a shared values approach co-exists with a burgeoning literature decrying the lack of coherence in the application of political
culture research practices (Lane 1992, Reisinger 1995). Since it first gained prominence as the analytical tool of choice in several examinations of political attitudes and behaviour in the early 1960s, political culture approaches have suffered varying degrees of attention and success. Likewise, national identity literature has contained much controversy although here the issue of definitions reveals a debate about the origins and purposes of collective identities and nations (Anderson 1992, Brass 1991, Breuilly 1993, Connor 1990, Deutsch 1966, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1990, Kedourie 1994, Smith 1986, Taylor 1997). Treating nations as homogenous collectives this literature emphasises the reasons for inter-personal ties rather than the effect such relationships have on the social and civic attitudes of individuals. Even those works highlighting the exclusionary aspects of nationalism prefer to label all nationalism as rooted in the ‘narcissism of minor difference’ rather than examining the different ways that nationalist-induced inclusion and exclusion can affect the polity (Ignatieff 1993, Seton Watson 1997, Gellner 1964, Gellner 1996). The following examination details the main critiques of political culture and national identity literature before proceeding to an analysis of the interaction between the two research traditions in relation to socialisation, integration and difference in interaction.

POLITICAL CULTURE

In her 1992 work Ruth Lane criticises the “fundamental failure to settle on an operational definition of the internal structure of political culture, that is, the variables of which it is composed” (Lane 1992). Although challenged and nuanced definitions form the mainstay of much theoretical political work, scientific approaches to politics have rarely witnessed a phrase that has been so universally employed and customarily derided as political or civic culture. Used by some as a residual character to explain whatever rational choice theory omitted, and by others as the bedrock of a nation’s political system, political culture suffers from the problem of being overused with a lack of precision. The muddy approach to political culture has not escaped notice from its own practitioners (Kavanagh 1972, Gibbins 1989, Lane 1992, Welch 1993,

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1 Even essentially contested notions such as power, and the oft-misused democracy have not been subject to an almost continuous re-definition with each new work.

2 Franklin and Braun, for example, equate political culture with zeitgeist (Franklin and Braun 1995)
Much of the problem, it would appear, stems from the basic appeal of the concept. Referring broadly to the shared and divergent values related to a political system, the concept can bend forgivingly around most theoretical approaches or methodological preferences. In his 1976 article Patrick reported the use of 30 different definitions in post-1963 works, all claiming to provide analyses of political culture (Patrick 1976 quoted in Rosamund 1997). It has been used, at times, as an independent, interdependent or dependent variable. It is not so much that academics disagree with the plethora of definitions offered over the last thirty years, but rather that each project seeking to employ the concept redefines it in profitable ways.

Topics enjoying easy access to behavioural data tend to include such indicators in definitions. Projects lacking large databases of attitudinal or behavioural data might include institutional approaches within the definition.

A survey of the related literature highlights three sources of disagreement: goals of research, theoretical scope of concept, and methods employed. Each of these three aspects highlights key debates within the field of political culture. Goal most often refers to whether research aims to uncover an ideal, or stable form of political culture. Scope of concept determines the components for analysis included within the definition of political culture. Two particular debates concern the treatment of national identity and the inclusion of political behaviour in measures of political culture. Methods refer not only to the statistical or data gathering techniques but to larger questions of comparative versus sociological examinations (Welch 1993) and the location of culture within society (Lane 1992, Reisinger 1995). In particular, methodological practices must address whether culture resides within individuals or exists as group property. Clearly, divisions within goals, concepts, and methods are cross-cutting. Research divided on the basis of goals may employ similar methods to measure relevant variables while approaches using different data-gathering techniques may seek to explain diverse visions of political culture. With these potential divisions in mind the following examination of political culture provides for a greater understanding of the key debates affecting the application of political culture approaches. An acknowledgement of these divisions, and a clear statement of the
resultant definitions used throughout the thesis must precede any work promising to analyse the causes and effects of political culture.

**Goals**

Earliest approaches to political culture, as found in Plato, Aristotle, de Tocqueville, Weber and Bagehot, attempted to provide comprehensive examinations of the political characteristics held by populations. In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, for example, Weber sought to link the ideological foundations of Western “Puritan worldly asceticism” with the accumulationist pursuit of wealth and productive spirit required by any good capitalist (Weber 1968). In other works, the goal was not to uncover the reasons for attitudinal or behaviour preferences, but rather to describe a national character in an accurate manner. De Tocqueville, for example, chronicled the individualism and frontier spirit of American political culture (de Tocqueville 1945). These qualitative sociological efforts retreated with the behavioural revolution of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Researchers operating after this watershed have, not surprisingly, criticised these works as subjective character studies providing little more than cursory insights into the political habits of a nation (Kavanagh 1972, Lane 1992, Welch 1993). Improved statistical techniques and greater access to subjects prompted more scientific approaches to political activities and a renewed vigour to political culture. The wave of interest in political culture research was further motivated by two politically relevant circumstances: the failure of otherwise successful constitutions grafted onto Third World polities (Brown 1979) and the German experience with Nazism (Almond 1993, Eatwell 1997).³ Political culture specialists sought to explain the subjective orientations to the political system that inhibited the acceptance of constitutions and allowed for the rise of Nazism. Thus in an effort to prevent other failed democratic experiments, the modern treatment of normative political culture sought to explain why some polities allowed

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³ Although originally devoted to explaining the collapse of democratic institutions in Germany while detailing the robustness of democracy in Great Britain and the United States, Almond has since moved on to ground the explosive growth of certain Asian-Pacific economies as products of particular national political cultures (Almond 1993).
democracy to flourish while others proved less fertile. In this context Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba collected attitudinal survey data in five countries in an attempt to uncover the political characteristics most supportive of the democratic system (Almond and Verba 1963). Later criticised for being inaccurate in its analysis (Kavanagh 1989, Topf and Heath 1987) and tied to ideal-type visions of democratic systems and ethnocentric visions of political development (Pateman 1989) the theme of political progress and development, despite its dubious connotations when used in a comparative context, has provided a tempting benchmark to be used by future political analysts. Almost immediately, research attempts offered variations on the theme of political progress and successful democratic integration (Pye and Verba 1965).

Just as initial optimism surrounding the Civic Culture approach later gave way to a spate of research on the decline of civic culture in the five original case studies, so too have recent approaches from slightly different literatures chronicled the decline of social capital in Great Britain and the United States4 (Bennett 1998, Putnam 1993, Putnam 1995a, Putnam 1995b, Putnam 1996). Social capital research, and more particularly its links to political involvement, receives attention later in this chapter. In these, and earlier, works, the weakened social bonds between citizens, declining trust and confidence, and rising social anomie, wreak havoc on the carefully balanced social relations required in a functioning democracy (Putnam 1993). Despite insistent criticism that ideal political cultures provide unreasonable - and disconcertingly American - benchmarks of regime success, much recent literature has followed in the normative tradition established by Almond and Verba. The rising proportion of negative political traits, such as political cynicism and social exclusion, and diminishing signs of positive social and political interaction, still occupy much political analysis (Bennett 1998). In these more recent works, however, the influences of post-modernity, post-industrialisation or post-Fordist economic models assume equal responsibility for weakened political culture or social capital (Gibbins 1989).

4 A particularly useful collection of articles can be found in issue 40(5) of the American Behavioral Scientist. The entire issue examines social capital in the United States.
The second use of political culture deals with value change in society. Although linked, in part, to works aligned with the Almond and Verba approach, these analyses avoid explicit judgement on the ideal complement of political attitudes and behaviours. Instead, they emphasise the interaction between social, economic and political context and individual reaction to a changing world order. Probably best known among the value change specialists, Ron Inglehart has argued in several recent books and articles that unprecedented political security and economic prosperity has changed the way individuals interact with each other, and how they view the quality of their own lives (Inglehart, 1977, Inglehart 1988, Inglehart 1990, Inglehart 1995). Not as State-oriented as the first use of political culture, these works emphasise how a shifting cultural order has changed the very way that political stability and ideal-types can be identified. In short, while Almond and Verba and their antecedents attempted to measure the changing political stability of democratic systems, Inglehart and others used changing value structures to challenge the traditionally held normative constructions of the political good life (Nevitte 1996, Halman and Nevitte 1996, Nevitte and Gibbins 1991). Avoiding analyses that rely on an over-burdened left-right spectrum of political values, these studies often use Inglehart’s 13-item index of materialism-post-materialism. The scale asks respondents to indicate their support for a series of political issues ranging from law and order to environmental policies and self-actualisation. Specific data from this scale appears in chapter three. Additional works rely on three different spectrums measuring in turn, liberal-authoritarian, socialist-laissez-faire and nationalist-cosmopolitan (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999). In so doing, they claim that current notions of personal and systemic success are more closely aligned with seemingly esoteric notions of well-being and fulfilment. The pursuit of higher quality of life, broadly conceived, has overtaken political stability as the focus of both individuals, and political culture research. Traditional measures of political culture are as distinct from modern interpretations, as materialism is from post-materialism.
Much as a critique of power is implied within examinations of stability, a third separate literature tends to use political culture as a tool for critiquing the dissemination of power and ideas throughout society. Particularly popular among Communist studies specialists, here, political culture features as the dependent variable in a political system dominated by economic and political power relations. This Marxist approach to political culture expresses a more sympathetic view of State-constructed — and manipulated - political culture. The attempts of various communist states to undertake this very project received attention in a series of articles in the 1970s and 1980s (White 1979, Almond 1992, Almond 1993, Welch 1993, Brown and Gray 1979). Although credited by Brown for marginalising political culture as an analytic approach, studies in this field have contributed to culture viewed as subservient to “material forces and systemic requirements” (Brown 1979, Street 1994). A heightened attention to the power of socialisation, and attempts to consciously alter a malleable political culture dominate works of this approach. In *Compliance Ideologies*, Wilson examines the ways regimes legitimate themselves and the way political culture reinforces the maintenance of power within the political system. In the main, research in this area highlights the persistent nature of political culture. Cultural and religious identities display a resilience in the face of State attempts to weaken their importance (White 1979, Almond 1993, Brown and Gray 1979).

As stated at the outset, the lines between these three goals remain blurred. Political culture viewed as a transmitter of dominant ideas shares much with State-led political socialisation processes as examined in Communist political culture. The assiduous use of political socialisation in an effort to create supportive political cultures also links to ideal political cultures examined by those following the *Civic Culture* model. The relationships between these works also crosscut other areas of division. The goals of research colour the conceptual definitions used to construct observable, measurable and analysable political culture. Again, works divide according to three clusters: those defining political culture according to its components, those describing political culture in terms of its function and, not surprisingly given recent attention,
works avoiding explicit definition. A brief examination of each cluster in turn will provide some depth to understandings of how political culture has been used in the social sciences.

**Scope/Definitions**

Current critiques of political culture as a method of analysis often expose the seemingly random selection of definitions as a means of undermining cultural explanations of political orientations. Doubtless, the variety of definitions proves distracting for any student seeking to apply a cultural approach and presents an easy target for those who remain sceptical of the concept’s explanatory power. Definition by relevant components provides a first example of the diverse uses of political culture. For Almond and Verba, political culture refers to “attitudes towards the political system [and] toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba 1963). And yet, as Reisinger notes, Verba later expanded this definition in another work to include “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the situation in which political actions take place” (Reisinger 1995, Verba 1965). Lane notes that the wrongly assumed singularity of vision between the two grandfather works in political culture, namely Almond and Verba’s *Civic Culture* and Pye and Verba’s *Political Culture and Political Development*, accounts for much of the confused application of political culture approaches (Lane 1992). The expanded definition is but one example of the different methods employed in the later work. More recent approaches, no doubt mistaking the two definitions for a unity of purpose, have amended Almond’s definition, with the substitution of values, expectations, orientations, norms, beliefs, feelings or knowledge, for attitudes (Dickson 1996). The extent to which any of these items are interchangeable remains debatable.

Two significant amendments to the original definition include the much debated addition of political behaviour, and the use of structures and institutions. The inclusion of national identity creates a third debate which receives greater treatment at the end of the chapter. The argument employed by those who would expand the
definition to include one or both of these measures hinges on the mutual
reinforcement of attitudes, behaviours and structures in which political culture
operates. Thus Pammett and Whittington claim political culture touches all aspects of
a political system, its structures and institutions, citizen behaviour and attitudes
(Pammett and Whittington 1976). While such a definition eliminates, to a certain
degree, the arbitrary determinism raised by rational choice proponents, it opens the
gates for tautological explanations of culture (Barry 1970, Pateman 1989). If values
are used to explain behaviours, and behaviours are used to highlight the existence of
certain values, the inclusion of one to better explain the other ends without having
expanded an understanding of political culture in operation. Rather, it just gathers
more data. Such problems have prompted recent critics to draw parallels between
contemporary analyses of political culture and the very national character studies so
once derided (Reisinger 1995). Nonetheless, the inclusion of political behaviour
remains a hotly contested debate. In their original study Almond and Verba excluded
political activity, whereas recent analyses by Inglehart and others have included
measures of social and political interaction (Inglehart 1990). As a rule, research
within the field of Communist studies excludes political behaviour from definitions of
political culture. Notable exceptions, however, do exist (Tucker 1973, Fagen 1969,
White 1979, 1984). Further debate concerns the inclusion of social activity measures
at the expense of more explicitly political behaviour. Those arguing for an inclusion
of structures and institutions distinguish between those who prioritise the influence of
economic and social factors, and those who value the role of constitutions and rules
(Kavanagh 1972, Pammett and Whittington 1976).\(^5\)

Such diversity in the items for measurement, and the various ways in which one
constructs the components of political culture, create a daunting myriad of options. If
that were not enough, upon construction, the components of political culture must fit

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\(^5\) Attitudes themselves are broken down into forensic and latent (Bluhm 1974) or cognitive, affective
and evaluative (Pammett and Whittington 1976). The selection of particular attitudes as more
central to self conception further divides works (Pammett and Whittington 1976, Almond and Verba
1963). Lastly, authors separate the systemic components to which these political orientations can be
directed; namely, the political community, regime and authority (Easton 1990) or political system,
political process, policy outputs (Almond, Powell and Mundt 1993).
together convincingly as a cohesive whole. Given that the field of social psychology is devoted to the complex interaction between beliefs and values, the centrality of attitudes, and the links between beliefs and behaviour, political culture has faced criticism in the way it integrates the disparate components to create a meaningful aggregate. Most often, a vision of the way these aspects hang together surfaces upon statistical analysis, thus varying greatly from study to study. That such measures depend entirely on the data collected, poses a potential problem for those hoping to uncover general patterns of relationships within political culture.

Other definitions move beyond the requisite components to explain how political culture functions. The distinction between definition by function and definition by component benefits from an example. Although discussed later in this chapter, definitions of nations abound. Often, efforts to determine whether a collective is a nation or not rely on a checklist of components. Thus, as Stalin argues, “a nation is a historically constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (Stalin in Hutchinson and Smith 1994) Alternative definitions attempt to describe how a nation functions. Thus, Benedict Anderson claims a nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson 1992) One century earlier, Renan described the nation as “a daily plebiscite” (Renan 1882) For these two authors, a continued belief that the nation exists, and that as individuals we are part of that nation, is all that is needed to keep the nation alive. Several definitions of political culture also emphasis the functional relationship between variables. Archie Brown defines political culture as the “subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations” held by citizens in a polity (Brown 1979) Other definitions include both a list of components and a functional element. Kavanagh, defines political culture as the orientations and values of a polity, whether shared or not, as determined by the traditions, norms and symbols of a political system (Kavanagh 1972). This definition raises two questions about the way political culture functions: first, the extent to which values must be shared throughout society – is political culture homogeneous;
and second, the relationship between factors influencing political culture. For the purposes of this thesis, the first question warrants an explanation.

Political culture relies on cultural integration; how individuals integrate themselves into the political system using the cultural tool-kit provided in early and adult socialisation. Variations in educational practices, government institutions or regional economic performance can create self-perpetuating sub-cultures or variants within any political culture. The extent to which values are shared within a political culture or, rather, the proportion of individuals who must share certain pre-dispositions, remains a hotly contested topic in understandings of political culture. Disparate notions of political culture thus employ different approaches and possess varying tolerance for difference and heterogeneity within culture. The distribution of values throughout a polity raises issues about the boundaries of a political culture and the varying importance of sub-cultures (Foster 1982, Savage 1981). Traditionally, Nation-State boundaries divide political cultures, even cultures possessing similar traits. Often, this has led to a false comparison of cultures. Lipset, for instances, warns of the dangers of comparing Canada and the United States in isolation (Lipset 1968, Lipset 1990). Viewed in light of the United States, Canada once appeared as a deferential society, a view recently challenged by Neil Nevitte in *The Decline of Deference* (Nevitte 1996). Lipset has argued, however, that viewed in light of Continental political cultures, Canadian value dispositions share more with American values that a dual comparison might suggest. Thus, the distribution of values throughout society raises issues of borders and highlights the importance of prudent comparisons. Second, the existence of sub-groups warrants attention. Those who argue that political culture is created in the interaction between sub-groups in any given polity emphasise functional definitions of political culture (Wildavsky 1987) Such definitions highlight the importance of value clusters and the differential importance of elite culture in driving mass political attitudes. Greater attention to integration, and the various aspects of functioning political culture appear in the section on identity and political culture.
Methods

Similarly linked to both definitions and theoretical approaches, the methods employed by political culture researchers vary, in the first instance, with the anticipated, or theorised, locus of culture in a system. Whether culture resides in the minds and behaviours of individuals, as Coleman suggests (Coleman 1988), or whether it exists outwith seemingly-independent political and social actors⁶, as Durkheim argues (Durkheim 1964), affects the selection of political culture measurement approaches, in particular, the operationalisation of constituent variables.

Both Kavanagh, and Pammett and Whittington highlight the difference approaches employed by works relying on political culture. From opinion polls and surveys to content analyses, the eclectic use of sources inhibits the potential comparability of many examinations. Whether driven by theoretical preferences or the availability of data, the diverse list of methods employed to analyse political culture does not operate in a vacuum. If content analyses are used to uncover well-hidden biases in political attitudes, the approach has probably been predicated on a particular view of where culture is located. Similarly, the dedicated use of survey data, gleaned from thousands of questionnaires and opinion poll data, betrays a belief that individual-level rather than aggregate indicators can provide for a more accurate assessment of political culture. For this reason, Elkins and Simeon expressed reservations about the traditional survey methods of political culture researchers. “Individuals,” they note, “have beliefs, values and attitudes but they do not have cultures” (Elkins and Simeon 1979). Thus, researchers must pay heed that they are measuring aspects of a culture, rather than culture itself. Reisinger similarly warns that political culture research has been unable to systematically integrate individual-level measurements into coherent unified understandings of culture (Reisinger 1995). If micro- and macro-data present incompatible findings, researchers may lack confidence in presenting this data. Those researchers including political behaviour in their definition of political culture would

⁶ Such a view is consistent with John Stuart Mill’s articulation of liberalism. In the search for a universal vision of the Good, cultures entertain competing notions of the good life. The particular blend of disparate definitions, present in the final definition, forms the total societal culture (Mill 1992)
be sure to include appropriate measures with which to gauge civic engagement, whether individual voting data, party membership statistics or protest rally attendance figures. These two distinctions, between individual level data and aggregate measures, and the location of culture within or outwith the individual, provide the two poles of methodological analysis in political culture research.  

### Main Critiques of Political Culture

Although treated above, an additional word about the way in which different literatures challenge the usefulness of political culture research warrants attention. As described by Eatwell, rational choice can be either thick or thin. Thick notions of rational choice claim that political values and behaviours are motivated by utility. Thin notions claim that such dependent variables are motivated by economic gain (Eatwell 1997). For the most part, practitioners of thin notions of rational choice have displayed the greatest antipathy for political culture approaches (Whitefield and Evans 1999). Such critiques stem from rational choice theorists who feel that a stronger emphasis on economic models of political attitudes and behaviour provides for a greater accuracy in determining the causality between variables. This charge is a fair one and addressed in most political culture works as a point of legitimate criticism. Where such debates run into difficulty concerns the intentions of each literature. In the main, political culture research seeks to understand the conditions which best account for regime stability or value change. Works within the tradition have rarely promised to provide accurate models of voting behaviour. Rather than address the micro processes of political activities the research seeks to establish the broad conditions in which individual choices, including voting choices, are made (Barry 1970, Wildavsky 1987). Rational choice literature, for its part, has provided

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7 Further measurement issues concern the comparability of cross-national data. The selection and operationalisation of variables affects the extent to which questions and data are meaningful in cross-national circumstances. The increasing use of international survey programmes and standardised question working has mitigated this effect.

8 Other critiques stem from those who prefer an institutionalist approach (Jackman and Miller 1996a, Jackman and Miller 1996b)
accurate assessments of the conditions affecting voter choice and partisan support.\footnote{Exceptions to this claim, in particular in the case of recent Scottish voting trends, suggest that economic factors provide less accurate predictors of voting behaviour than factors such as identity (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999).}

Part of the problem stems from the translation of goals from one literature to another. In particular, several critiques of political culture establish the conditions, influenced as they are by the goals of rational choice literature, by which political culture can succeed. In his 1995 article, for example, Reisinger sets out seven tasks that the field of political culture must fulfil in order to succeed (Reisinger 1995) One of these tasks involves the establishment of an explicit link between political attitudes and political behaviour. If, however, within political culture the inclusion of political behaviour remains a contested subject, the establishment of an explicit link appears unlikely. Other critiques question the danger of shifting conceptual definitions. As stated earlier, this had accompanied the proliferation of political culture research. The lack of a definition does not seem to be an insurmountable problem, nor one that detracts from the usefulness of political culture as a concept, but rather, raises serious questions about the usefulness of some political culture research. Thus, a healthy number of critiques deal with the application of political culture as a concept rather than irresolvable problems of the concept itself.

From within the field of political culture, critiques have tended to emphasis the improper selection of variables. For such practitioners, much of the success of political culture as a concept depends upon its ability to explain the political world. In turn, the variables chosen to exert an influence over political attitudes and behaviour provide varying success rates for practitioners. In response to claims that rational choice theory provided a predictive element to political behaviour that political culture lacked, Ron Inglehart was able to prove that cultural factors such as religion outweighed social class in its influence over voting (Inglehart 1977). In his 1988 article heralding a return to political culture approaches Inglehart also pointed to several deficiencies of Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture. Although supportive of the idea that the democratic system is based on certain supportive habits, Inglehart claimed that Almond and Verba’s exclusive attention to trust, over such variables as
general life and political satisfaction limits the original analysis. He notes that while political satisfaction tends to vary as an indicator of government personality, the more reliable measure of life satisfaction and trust provide a clearer understanding of support for democratic systems (Inglehart 1988)

**Development of Western Political Culture**

Political culture specialists, faced with a plethora of options both theoretical and practical have thus attempted to shed some light on the development of the polity and interactive relationships within the political system. A fascination with historical justifications for current political dilemmas or preferences dominated earlier theoretical works and case study examinations alike. For example, relying on Louis Hartz’s view of fragment cultures and their influence on the political development of he colonial world, Gad Horowitz, Kenneth McRae and David Bell each sought to attribute Canada’s political biases to the arrival of diverse populations throughout its colonial period (Hartz 1964, Horowitz 1966, McRae 1978, Bell and Tepperman 1987) A brief examination of how political scientists account for the current ‘state of things’ in political sociology sheds light on the fundamental shifts in the creation of a modern political community, and the preferences and biases of the political culture approach.

Research seeking to chart the development of Western, liberal political culture often stresses the importance of dual tensions during two periods of history: a tension between the Church and limited government during medieval times; and a tension between the primacy of the autonomous individual and popular sovereignty post-Reformation (Bluhm 1974). 10 The passive obedience of the medieval world, in which a subject culture ensured individuals obeyed their rulers, juxtaposed the dominance of the Church with a limited and vague notion of political community. The religious, social and political upheaval of the Reformation emphasised the individual as the new

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10 In contrast, Gray claims the Reformation, by rendering religion a matter of personal rather than State significance, the advent of popular sovereignty and the conquest of populations exerted a profound influence over the development of political culture in Western liberal democracies (Gray 1979).
foundation of the political order. Charged with extending individual freedom, governmental responsibility protected an individual’s right to private property and enhanced a Protestant Work Ethic devoted to political action and reform (Weber 1968). Notwithstanding the variation among Protestant countries, and the exaggerated distance between the work ethics of Protestant and Catholic countries, the founding myths of liberalism and individual rights anchor most of Western political culture. The search for new values and experiments in living, typified in the writings of JS Mill, can claim responsibility for modern civic nationalist movements relying on the rhetoric of political progress in the search for greater self-determination (Mill 1992). In the face of the autonomous individual-government relationship sprang the rival notion of “The People”, a vision of popular sovereignty invoked in the name of egalitarianism. Seen as a limit on the role of political authority, popular sovereignty attempted to encourage policy in the name of the people, emphasising the values of the group over the individual. The French Revolution, with its notions of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité expressed not only a sense of popular sovereignty but through an emphasis on fraternity highlighted a sense of belonging and collective interdependence driving much of the current nationalist debate. Through such events “the people” of popular sovereignty became “the nation” (Baycroft 1998). A series of conflicts between revolutionary France and other European nations reinforced the importance of national borders and the emotional link between a people and the nation, characterised in Robespierre’s ‘On property’ speech in 1793. Just as the eighteenth century witnessed the composition of the Marseillaise, it also witnessed the writing of the first national hymn of Norway, the first Finnish national poem (Hobsbawm 1990), the partition of Poland, the revolt of the American colonies, and demand for parliamentary independence in Ireland. Welfare liberalism, in its efforts to deliver classical liberalism in an era of universal suffrage, merely de-emphasises

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11 Research identifying collectivist strains (Grant 1965, Horowitz 1966, Trudeau 1956) within political culture receive greater attention that those emphasising the importance of individual rights, largely because of the unquestioned dominance of liberalism in Western political culture. To possess a collectivist culture is noteworthy, largely because it contradicts the general trend of liberalism. That said, even those works identifying strains of collectivism must acknowledge that such tendencies operate within a larger liberal framework.

12 Marxist analyses of nationalist development point out that the French Revolution was a victory of one class over another rather than a nation against a tyrannical king. (Gellner 1964, Nairn 1977)
some of the notions of private property in favour of economic equality of opportunity. These broad trends blended with original cultures to produce the diverse range of liberal political cultures. The gradual dismantling of the British empire in particular, allowed for a diversity of cultures to develop from what had once been united origins. Chapter three examines the particular development of political attitudes in Britain and Canada as host cultures for Scotland and Quebec.

IDENTITY
The increased use of the concept of identity, evident in the expanded number of articles and books, betrays the changing way that such works theorise identity. Identity in quantitative political science extends beyond normative theory and assumes a role as an independent variable capable of exerting observable influence on other political values. When used as a method of understanding constitutional change, identity encourages political scientists to delve into the neighbouring disciplines of psychology and sociology. Explaining the link between political science and social psychology Rosamund states, “Everybody is a somebody … How they become who they are and what happens when they realise who they are and what they should do accordingly are really what the study of politics is about.” (Rosamund 1997). In addition, the adoption of the concept and term by the popular press provides an example of academic debate brought out of the ivory tower by its very relevance. And yet, just as with political culture, the appeal and consequent use of the concept has done much violence to the theorised importance of identity, both how it functions and what it implies. Identity, as used in quantitative examinations and popular histories alike, spans a litany of diverse uses, meaning anything from self-esteem to personal label to belonging. National identity literature, grounded as it is in examinations of nationalism and collective processes, has done little to embrace the burgeoning literature on social identity currently exerting so much influence in the rest of the humanities. This section examines identity as it is theorised and used within the social sciences before evaluating how national identity studies might take advantage of a more interactive approach.
Not surprisingly, within the social sciences differing approaches to identity, from social psychology to nationalism studies, provide a gamut of often-contradictory definitions and approaches to a seemingly unified topic. Treated as both a reified thing and an on-going process identity surfaces in political science literature as self-ascribed independent and variable tag (woman, Reform voter, member of British ethnic group) and as a subjective, context-dependent sense of self. The resultant confusion, particularly between identity as a labelled vision of self and identity as a sense of belonging, proves a familiar stumbling block for theorists and scientists alike. Recent attempts to provide some clarity to the use of the term express frustration with its current haphazard use (Mendelsohn 1999). The following examination emphasises the differing approaches to identity before turning to an analysis of national identity. Also, much as with political culture, literature on identity enjoys the benefits of two diverse approaches, one theoretical, one data-driven, that each seek to extend the boundaries of knowledge of a rather murky topic. All disciplinary efforts to examine political culture and identity, whether anthropological, sociological, psychological or political, approach the topic from a theory-driven or data-driven perspective. Throughout this section these two types of works are considered in tandem, quantitative case studies with abstract theory, in order to point to the use made of identity in current academic work, how it has been constructed by different disciplines, and how this concerted use has led to a cross-fertilisation of identity-centred ideas.

**Identity as a Process**

The thesis relies on a particular understanding of national identity and how it affects the formation of political attitudes, a sense of political community and patterns of political participation in Scotland and Quebec. The treatment of national identity within nationalism studies and some sociological literature relies on visions of identity as influenced by the demand of measurement techniques and the conflation of national identity labels and citizenship. This section proves that part of the inconsistent treatment of national identity stems from a schism within the wider literature on identity and, more importantly, the dual nature of identity: the tension between a
dynamic process of collective self-identification and a static need for self-definition according to meaningful categories. These two tensions, between identity as a process and identity as a label inform the following examination of identity in a wider humanities literature and its application to analyses of nationalism and nationalist movements in Scotland and Quebec.

The fundamental search for belonging, as highlighted by earlier psychologists, unlocks much of the mysteries of human behaviour. The need for individuals to feel that they belong to a wider collective group, whether defined as a family, social group or nation, forms one of the tenets of social psychology exerting a renewed influence on studies of social relations (Kristeva 1993, Craib 1998). Freud’s efforts to identify the attributes of the self - super ego, ego and id - suggest that through a continuous process of identification with objects individuals develop an ego, or sense of self (Freud 1922). The interaction between individuals in the processes of group formation suggest that the search for social membership and integration stems from psychological dictates of social behaviour that, in Freud’s view, reduce all sociology to a study of psychology. As later argued by attachment theorists, from the earliest-formed intimate relationships individuals acquire the social and emotional coping skills to ensure survival in the social world. Children with secure attachments are better able to deal with uncertainty that those less possessive of strong social links. Or, in Erikson’s view, identity crises must be resolved if children are to development into mature and stable adults (Erikson 1974). Membership in a social community is thus seen as a necessity of human nature (Shils 1982), and the primary good distributed by society (Walzer 1992). Recent investigations of modernity and the resultant social forces affecting self-conception reinforce the importance of stable social membership. In their collection on attachment theory, Roberts and Kramer claim that the absence of political and economic certainties in the post-war period encourage individuals to reflect “To whom do we belong? With whom or what do we identify?” (Kramer and Roberts 1996). For them, as for others working within the diverse fields of sociology, psychology and cultural studies, the benefits of belonging present themselves

13 For an analysis of the integrating aspects of culture see Schudson 1994.
forcefully to individuals in search of reassurance. The goal of integration, as sought after as it is unquestionable, motivates examinations of identity. In their ability to provide psychological and pragmatic support social communities ensure both sanity and sustenance (Pahl 1996). The well-worn links between personal identity and social cohesion received initial examination by Marx and Durkheim, and later by social anthropologists (Mead 1964, Cohen 1996). In this sense, self identity refers to the process of social identification with a collective group, as motivated by the benefits of belonging perceived to accrue from social attachment. Because face-to-face contact with every member of the social group was impossible in all but the smallest societies, identification was essentially a voluntary act of faith, expressed through shared symbols and beliefs (Durkheim 1964). This analogy, of an imagined link between group members, was transferred to an analysis of nations by Benedict Anderson. Anderson’s nation as an imagined community holds resonance as much because it is vague as because it accurately describes the patterns of interaction (Anderson 1992).

Two corollary debates highlight the changing influences on and of identity theory: the influence of modernity on social identification, and the development of theories of social categorisation. An examination of each in turn extends the analysis of identity for it highlights two important aspects of the identity debate: how it functions, and why it is salient.

**Social Identity Theory (how identity functions)**

How individuals navigate the search for belonging has received much treatment in post-war social psychology. If political sociology focuses on the collective processes of social integration (Parsons 1969), social psychology examines the individual level processes with particular attention to the interpersonal aspects of social integration (Weatherell 1996)\(^\text{14}\) Social identity theorists assert that self-perception and belonging stem from the interactive processes involved in self-alignment and self-identification with social groups (Tajfel 1982, Turner 1982, Oakes 1996). In the search for

\(^{14}\) Examined through yet another lens, integration into the polity has received treatment from Lijphart. For Lijphart, the democratic stability of antagonistic multinational states depends upon the elite accommodation of different groups - as defined by mutually exclusive characteristics - and the physical separation of the divided population. (Lijphart 1977)
belonging, individuals attach themselves to groups, or acknowledge their pre-existing membership in groups, by a cataloguing of group characteristics. In their efforts to define the group in positive terms, individuals search for characteristics that best portray the group or ensure that existing traits are defined in a positive light. The identity process, which stems from Freud’s definition of a need for belonging, continues as a pattern of social categorisation. Henri Tajfel viewed the identity process as a cyclical pattern of creating an identity, determining its membership, and making the identity salient to members.¹⁵ Thus, membership rests on the definition of markers by which group members can distinguish their own crowd from others. Individuals internalise the social identity and use it to determine their place in society. Most importantly, the interaction occurs not among individuals as differentiated persons (interpersonal behaviour), but rather among individuals as group members, defined by their collective characteristics (intergroup behaviour) (Tajfel and Turner 1979). The adage that knowing what one is not is half of knowing what one is, receives further treatment in examinations of group definition. Thus for Edward Said, the West knows what it is only in comparison to the East, the Occident as opposed to the Orient (Said, 1995).

This understanding of identity highlights the tendency to heighten the perceived differences between two groups and reinforce the perceived homogeneity within groups. This socially constructed identity also has psychological ramifications for individuals as they take on the goals, needs and successes of a collective or group. In so doing, individuals cede some of their ability for self-definition. The group identifies how individuals can determine whether they are group members, and, consequently, what it means for admitted individuals to be considered group members. The categorisation is not only a clarifying tool but makes the identity meaningful. Social identity is the self-selection or self-alignment with a community which best ensures a personal sense of security. In MacCormick’s view, the formation of a ‘we’ nullifies all previous personal alienation (MacCormick 1998). That said, once an individual

joins a community, how one defines security may change as the group member takes on collective security as an aim rather than personal security. And yet, as Mowlam has argued, strong communities can lead to a sense of personal exclusion, the repression of minority views and identities (Mowlam 1996). The group to which an individual seeks to belong, whether based on occupation or a “community of association” (Pahl 1996) can be grounded in either voluntary or automatic relationships. Membership in social groups mirrors, as will be seen later, the discourse surrounding the increased saliency of nations and national identity. As Gellner notes, circumstances such as the uneven distribution of resources can make relevant previously benign social characteristics (Gellner 1983). The adage that blondes have more fun is meaningless for a number of reasons, not least because it is impossible to prove. If hair colour correlated with increased income, however, what it means to have red or brown hair would take on more meaning. In sum, identity is not only a socially-constructed product of interaction but also an expression of social location. The impact of collective association on individual self-perception, however, raises further issues of consistency.

The internalisation of collective characteristics by diverse individuals raises serious questions about the perceived consistency of the term and the level of agreement about the constituent parts of the associated identity. For some, this lack of consistency ensures the salience and inclusiveness of the identity. The personal process of internalisation guarantees that an identity can be for individuals whatever they want (Cohen 1994). That said, the level of coherence in understood notions of what it means to be Spanish, conservative, or feminist depend on popularly recognised notions of group characteristics. The room for self-definition within these characteristics depends on the extent to which the label or group is a ‘given’ or ‘more-determined’ group, proscribed by race, sex or size, or whether it is a purely social group, dependent on values or voluntary associations. Some identifications seem almost too natural to ignore. For many, sex, race, residency and citizenship are routes of identity determined by the genetic and geographical dictates of birth. Social groupings such as class, or ideological groups, along with those experiencing tension
within their ‘natural’ identification routes – provide room for a more laboured, deliberate, reflexive and conscious identification. What happens, for instance, when the composite package, what it means to identify as Québécois, lies outwith the control of the individual seeking, or questioning, identification? Obviously, the majority of groups exist within the nebulous middle ground between entirely predetermined and entirely self-selected membership. The room for human agency over social traits such as social class, age or political beliefs allows for a greater agency in self-definition.

At first glance, national identity would appear to be one of the collective groupings usually recognised as predetermined (or ‘more determined’). The tendency to collate nationality with citizenship lends one to believe that the rules and regulations of immigration, naturalisation and citizenship exert a total influence on self perception. Notwithstanding the added weight to claims of belonging that pieces of paper provide, significant differences between being and feeling dictate the usefulness of these helpful guides to membership. As the section on national identity explains, nations are not the same as States, gender is not the same as sex, and race does not always correlate perfectly with skin colour.

**Modernity and Post Modernity (why identity is salient)**

The influence of the processes of modernity, and the state of post-modernity, on identity and belonging form a large part of identity literature. The visible influence of modernity stems from the vision of the Enlightenment individual as a rational and self-determining actor slowly undermined by the threats to economic and social security witnessed in the process of industrialisation and urbanisation (Rustin 1996, Nairn 1977). The industrial revolution, and its corollary process of urbanisation forced individuals into more crowded, more mechanised, more regulated environments. A progressive limiting of individual freedom was the result (Rocher and Salée 1997)\(^\text{16}\), even as the anonymity of the city loosened the moral and social bonds that

\(^{16}\) Rocher and Salée go so far as to claim “le désir de reconnaissance, d’autonomie et l’idée concomitante de souveraineté sont les principes moteurs des communautés politiques modernes” (Rocher and Salée 1997).
characterised life in the countryside (Gellner 1983). Global conflict further detracted from personal autonomy. Modern economic and political processes have slowly worn away the isolation of individuals from local and global society. The growth of the welfare state in the post-war period was seen as an effort to ensure a measure of self-determination for individuals. Processes of post-modernity, in addition to the dismantling of the social safety net, have forced individuals to re-engage questions of self-determination and social solidarity. For Pahl, "The mood of the late 1990s is surely that people are engaged in a struggle to find an identity for themselves which is sensitive to them as the individuals they see themselves to be" (Pahl 1996). For Hall, and Laclau, personal identities are fractured, pulling individuals in different directions according to the varying definitions, goals and priorities of identities in conflict (Hall 1992, Hall 1996, Laclau 1994). The multi-layered individual has replaced the integrative society.

In response to these changes, patterns of political participation emphasised the need for integration and social belonging. Collective action of social actors in the 1960s and 1970s highlighted the importance of group membership by "providing the impetus for a politicization of identity by challenging the white, male heterosexual, and middle-class dominated hierarchies of modern Western society" (Dunn 1998). Dunn continues, "mass culture motivates a search for personal moorings through an attachment to diverse groups, communities, value systems, and cultural traditions." (Dunn 1998). Just as such changes have affected the nature of social identity so too have they affected understandings of national identity.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY**

Clearly, the desire for national membership stems from the similar social and psychological processes that motivate collective social adhesion. Anderson's imagined community sits well with other sociological visions of the nation. Here, a nation exists as more than a composite of necessarily characteristics; a common people, a common language, a common history, a common territory. Nations as the result of interactive processes involve all who feel a sense of community, and express
it on a regular basis. The psychological bond, whether described as a 'sense of belonging' (Connor 1978) or fellow feeling (Geertz 1963) is reinforced by seemingly banal national discourses or symbols (Billig 1995). Or, as Holmes claims, "[t]he nation is as fictional and as necessary a notion as the self" (Holmes 1996). The process of national identification thus operates within the same system, and is subject to the same changing conditions, as other processes of social identification. Both nation and self are composite entities in which diversity is repressed for the sake of survival. The additional power of nations stem not from their difference to other communities or social groups, but rather that they have been able to assert themselves, at times, as the preferred community of association and self-definition. Likely by sheer size, influence of institutions and, most importantly, because the national membership is vague enough that it can become whatever people want it to be, nations and nationalisms locate individuals within a people (Greenfeld 1992). And yet, as Pahl notes, "simply because people may use collective forms to assert their identities it would be a great mistake to assume that this implies uniformities of identity" (Pahl 1996). The less-restrictive conditions of national membership increase the likelihood of saliency. National identity as a malleable construct both increases the opportunities for self-identification and pitches it into a debate on manipulation and misinterpretation.

Not surprisingly, the treatment of national identity finds greatest attention from writers already dealing with issues of nationhood and nationalism. For the most part, such literature chronicles the efforts of recognised nationalist actors such as political parties and the media to package identity as a political project. The incursion of a nationalist discourse into seemingly banal aspects of collective interaction (Billig 1995a) receives attention alongside debates concerning the inclusive or exclusive nature of national identity (Geertz 1963, Greenfeld 1992). In this latter debate much attention surrounds the division between civic and ethnic, modern or primordial, national identities. Nationalist interpretations of identity as undeniable good co-exist with equally vociferous claims that national identity can introduce nothing positive to political debate.
Nationalism the doctrine that makes the nation the object of every political endeavour and national identity the measure of every human value, has since the French Revolution challenged the whole idea of a single humanity, of a world community and its moral unity. Instead nationalism offers a narrow, conflict-laden legitimation for political community, which inevitably pits culture-communities against each other and, given the sheer number and variety of cultural differences, can only drag humanity into a political Charybdis (Smith 1991).

Often, this negative view of national identity is tied to the two-fold classification of nationalist movements as either civic or ethnic. Movements are divided according to their relative levels of inclusiveness. If civic nationalism is seen as forward-looking, progressive, tied to institutions, inclusive and associated with Western nationalisms (Hobsbawm 1990), ethnic nationalism is seen as grounded in blood and belonging (Ignatieff 1993, Ignatieff 1996). That said, the characteristics of nationalist movements stubbornly resist clustering around the 'good' and 'bad' poles. The result is an increasing amount of confusion in the analysis of national identity. For some, the problem stems from the under-theorised relationship between the individual and the nation (Fossum 1999). Other research focuses on the damage that an inconsistent application of identity has inflicted on the concept as an analytical tool (McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998, Mendelsohn 1999). An analysis of the way in which national identity surrounds issues of belonging, collective recognition and rights, and claims to membership precedes the following section on political participation.

**Belonging**

For Ian Taylor, the rebirth of nationalist movements, the rise of particularist politics and a resurgent attention to self-identity stem from the perceived loss of control over economic destinies, the subversion of national and local identities to larger entities and the rising power of trans-national consumption industries, of which the electronic media reigns supreme (Taylor 1996). In their efforts to cope with this social *bouleversement*, people are organising themselves in a Hobbesian struggle for survival. This pattern of self-selection into inclusionary and exclusionary groups has been described by some as the advent of a neo-medievalism. Others, sticking to this
primordial theme, have called upon a decidedly anthropological language. Walzer speaks of a return of the tribes while Melucci refers to Nomads of the Present (Walzer 1992, Melucci 1989). In his examination of the way in which individuals incorporate themselves into national societies, Schudson points to concerted efforts by political parties, the media and the education system to reinforce a common language, common symbols and common rituals (Schudson 1994)\textsuperscript{17}. The increasing salience of identity has been accepted by theorists and practitioners alike.

In “Nationalism and the Historians” Anthony Smith notes that the nation serves “individual and collective needs for warmth, strength and stability which assume much greater importance once the ties of family and neighbourhood are loosened” (Smith 1992). Freud’s self in search of belonging has manifested itself in a post-modern age as a search of national belonging. Furthermore, the individual need for national membership co-exists with a nation’s need for recognition; individuals seek recognition of their social and national acceptance just as nations aspire to recognition through a transfer of autonomy and increase self-determination. Micro and macro processes associated with the search for security, recognition, and development, act in tandem. In accordance with the increased saliency of national belonging, political systems have responded with packages of rights and benefits for certain national members.

**Collective recognition of groups**

The collective recognition of groups has received much attention within the communitarian field of political science. Such recognition could arrive as constitutional protection, or through institutional design. Most importantly, the explicit recognition of collective groups affects the importance of group membership in the nation. It is one thing to belong to a nation, another to belong to one denied recognition by the State. Membership in a such a nation can have a profound effect on personal and social identity. In the presence of differentiated rights or privileges,

\textsuperscript{17} While chroncling the increasing salience of national identity Schudson quotes the 1978 mandate review of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, in which the body emphasised its role in the “creation of a national consciousness” (Schudson 1994)
however, national belonging assumes a much greater importance. An examination of the diverse ways in which national groups may be recognised will make possible a proper examination of the nation and political State in the subsequent chapters.

For Lijphart, national minorities must be accommodated in the institutional design of a political system (Lijphart 1977). Populations possessing distinct characteristics may be integrated into the system through an system of elite accommodation. In Switzerland, for example, the six-member Cabinet ensures representation for the regional, partisan, and linguistic divisions within the population. This form of consociational democracy divides the populations at the mass level but brings together national representatives within the political system. The power-sharing executive in the devolved assembly of Northern Ireland provides an additional example of efforts made to ensure that different collective groups assert their political voice. An additional method of collective recognition occurs in the distribution of political jurisdiction. Those states possessing distinct populations within their borders, notably Canada, Spain and, increasingly, the United Kingdom, have established variations of asymmetrical federalism in recognition of the distinct needs and wishes of the minority population. The particular solution selected depends in part on the status of the national minority. The member nations of the UK have received explicit recognition as such while in Spain, despite recognition of different languages, there is no formal recognition of, for example, the nation of Catalonia. In Canada, nationhood in Quebec remains a matter of much dispute. Other forms of recognition ensure exception to the ‘distinct’ population. In its negotiations with the United States, Canada managed to secure a cultural exemption in the Free Trade Agreement, and subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement, because of its particular cultural needs.

In still other cases, individual members of distinct populations are granted different rights than non-members. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, entrenches the rights of women, Aboriginal peoples, the aged and the disabled. While there is not explicit recognition of the Québécois as a people, despite
several failed attempts to rectify this, the issue of national rights and national membership enjoys a heightened importance in Canada as a result. Thus, in all these cases, recognition for the minority collective group ensures access to different rights and privileges. Recognition as an individual member of the nation, however, functions somewhat differently. In particular, national membership is tied to authority and authenticity.

**Membership claims**

The transformation of a previously innocuous label into a passport to attendant rights and entitlements, whether actual or perceived, raises the appeal of national membership. Corresponding efforts to align with national groups present the issue of identity claims; who can consider themselves a member of the group, and who cannot. Whether on the basis of gender, profession or social class each identity comes with relevant rules governing self-placement within a group and recognition as a group member. Citizenship legislation and census regulations, for example, provide objective rules with which the individual can evaluate his or her identity. Citizenship in the United Kingdom normally requires a parent to have been born in the United Kingdom for non-residents to be considered citizens. The rights of citizenship, however, can be extended to other individuals. Citizenship of Commonwealth countries provides individuals with the right to vote in British elections. Non-residents with a British grandparent can gain the right to work in Britain without applying for a visa. Other citizenship regulations employ different measures of acceptance. German citizenship has been grounded in notions of ethnic purity\(^{18}\) while Switzerland requires a ten year residency in the country before the rights of citizenship can be attained. The association of identity and recognition affects an individual's sense of inclusion because of the rights associated with membership. The denial of these rights can prove a stumbling block to an integrated, participative society.

\(^{18}\) As of January 1, 2000 German citizenship requires an eight-year period of residency in Germany, a knowledge of the German language and the surrendering of former passports not subject to exemption. Children born in Germany automatically receive a German passport providing one of the parents fulfils citizenship requirements.
The rights associated with identity imply a uniformity and equality not throughout humanity but rather among those with the same identity. As Hill states, “Citizenship is the participation in the national community of all members on an equal basis and as an absolute right” (Hill 1990). Canadians have different rights from Americans, for example. This extends to individuals possessing differentiated identities within the Nation-State. The recognition of specific collective groups in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms implies that formalised rights for identified group members are different from those of other groups. Aboriginal peoples, the aged, and women, for example, receive formal protection within the Charter. The inevitability of an unequal distribution of rights has proved a stumbling block to constitutional settlements in Canada since the early 1980s.

The ability to point to an identity tag, suggestive as it is of the acquisition of rights, is important for the perception of personal inclusion or sense of belonging. For Shafir and Peled, the competing claims to belonging and the attendant benefits of national membership mirror a debate about citizenship and entitlement (Shafir and Peled 1998). For them, all claims stem from the same need, and the same social transformations, from modernity to post-modernity. And yet, according to Melucci, the collective actor cannot construct an identity independent of its recognition. The resulting expectation of acceptance affects the context in which an identity claim is made. As highlighted earlier, the objective rules in which claims to some identity labels such as citizenship provide useful gauges for the likelihood of acceptance.

National identity operates in a more subjective sphere. Claims for recognition may be met by attempts to incorporate collective groups into the State while individual claims are perceived to be judged by other members of the national group. Thus, in a negotiation of markers of identity individuals are won over to various conceptions of themselves and society (Hall 1992, Hall 1996). Although Wood claims that such a situation rarely accommodates the competing claims of State and civil society (Wood 1998), competing definitions of the collective determine whether individuals may feel that their claim to belonging may be made.
Recognised membership in a community is noticeably different in the absence of political jurisdiction. The need for belonging within the nation does not follow accepted rules of membership but rather depends on the level of acceptance of existing national members. The difficulties associated with the measurement and analysis of national identity are grounded in the absence of appropriate guidelines for the application of a identity tag or label. Who is a Scot? Must a Scot be born in Scotland? Educated in Scotland? Is there a minimum period of residency? Potential members see their inclusion as meaningful, treated as a claim of credibility. Thus the recent selection of Labour candidates for the North-East Scotland European by-election witnessed competing attempts to establish a claim to Scottishness. When one candidate, claiming to have been born in Scotland, was challenged, her response was that she had been conceived in Scotland. National membership was seen as important for credibility. Similar debates surface in Quebec, where singer Céline Dion was accused of not being a real Quebecker because she sings in English and lives in the United States (Wells 1999). Unlike with citizenship, where the use of a label signifies access to rights and entitlements, the self-ascription of a national identity label affects sense of authority and authenticity. The ability to speak as part of a group, to speak 'as a Scot', can occur only if one is considered to be a Scot by others.

Thus, the sense of national belonging, rooted as it is in the notion of identity labels and recognition, depends on the acceptance of national members. The ways in which individuals assess their likely acceptance highlights the interactive process of identity. The projection of possible markers of identity provide guidelines for the self-evaluation of belonging. As a result, individuals may construct their own personal notions of national identity (Cohen 1994). What it means to be Scottish for someone living in the Central Belt, and what it means for someone living in the Highlands, or abroad, might not necessarily include the same symbols, myths, common understandings or values.
Just as the acquisition of political power highlights the absence of economic power (Hill 1990) objective State inclusion highlights the absence of subjective, or national inclusion. The extent to which this matters depends in part on the construction of identity – whether it is relatively inclusive or exclusive – and in part on the salience of identity to the political society. Kavanagh argues that even in societies not experiencing calls for constitutional change on the basis of national difference, national identity remains one of the most important cleavages in a political culture “The development of a clear and unambiguous sense of identity is more than a facilitating factor in the creation of a nation; it may be then in some sense the major constituting factor of a new nation” (Kavanagh 1972). Kavanagh relies on Lucien Pye’s vision of national identity as a unifying or divisive force.

**POLITICAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY**

The previous two sections examined the use of political culture and national identity in recent literatures. This section does not repeat these findings but rather raises themes and issues that develop out of the combined use of political culture and national identity. It begins first with an examination of the role of national identity in political culture literature to determine whether dominant studies in political culture have included identity and, whether identity has been used as a label, tag, or as a negotiated process. Next it examines the implications involved in any analysis of political culture and national identity. Third, the issue of socialisation, integration and community each receive treatment before the fourth and final section argues for a concerted theory of identity and political culture.

The development of political culture and national identity literatures owe similar debts to various associated disciplines which have affected the way in which both concepts have been theorised, measured and researched. In his examination of political culture and political behaviour, Pye records a debt to Erikson while anthropologist Margaret Mead clarified the importance of the individual search for identity when examining culture. That the two processes share often similar processes of socialisation has bound them, not only in a tandem process of development, but made them subject to
similar social, economic and political changes. Perhaps it is this cross-fertilisation that led the early works of political culture to consider identity. Furthermore, these works all referred to identity in a similar manner. The integrative benefits of national identity were often seen as a precursor to a stable and inclusive political culture. Individuals who did not feel themselves part of the nation, could not be expected to exhibit the political values and behaviours expressed by other integrated members. In this case, national identity was equated with a sense of belonging within the State. For its part, the State was considered to have one integrating culture that would bring individuals into a homogeneous whole. Thus, for Bluhm, a sense of nationalism “is the most universally shared aspect of modern political culture” (Bluhm 1974). The presence of rival cultures received attention only as obstacles to national integration. In short, identity was equated with identification to a larger national group (thus Pye’s debt to Erikson). In these works, the concept of identity is not presented as a vision of ego identity or a fluid sense of self but rather an alignment of self with others in a larger, bounded, homogenous polity. For Pye, “Beliefs relevant to national identity, for instance, may have a heavy expressive loading in which the major satisfactions derive from the identification itself” He continues, “The question of national identity is the political culture version of the basic personal problem of self identity” (Pye 1965). While this statement establishes a link between the two notions of identity, it precludes the possibility that personal identity and national identity are linked; that national identity can influence self-perception. The paramount importance of stability evident in earlier works found a parallel treatment of integration as not only beneficial but necessary. Recent treatment of both national identity and political culture treat the processes of post-materialism not as a new ‘ideal-type’ political culture but as a variable exerting influence on the sense of integration exhibited by individuals. Post-materialist, post-modern (and post-Fordist) society breaks the social bonds between individuals challenging the sense of social capital, common social trust and satisfaction (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1995) but also encouraging individuals to revert to a society where primordial kinship ties, or smaller units of identification, form the bedrock of society. This theme of integration as highlighted in all of the literature incorporating national identity within political culture, warrants further attention.
The most explicit reference to the inclusion of national identity in political culture is found in Verba’s conclusion in Pye and Verba’s *Political Culture and Political Development*. As will be examined later, the definition preferred by Verba, of nations as “foci of identification and loyalty”, has been used by subsequent political culture researchers (Brown 1979, Westle 1993). For these works, nation and State are seen as two sides of the same coin. As Deutsch explains, national integration is seen as the way to overcome attachment to smaller, ethnic, cultural or linguistic groups (Deutsch 1966). State loyalty and national identification were seen as expressions of the same disposition. Slightly more nuanced understandings of the relationship between State and nation surface in later works. Badie and Birnbaum argue, for example, that as the State separates politics from social relations, the nation came to be seen as the locus of social relations (Badie and Birnbaum 1994). The conflation of social relations and political demands in the post-war period has changed the role of the nation as a conduit between people and the State. In his return to the dominant ideology Hill claims that nationalism acts as a ‘counter-ideology’ within political culture (Hill 1990). Relying on Nairn’s argument in *The Enchanted Glass* (Nairn 1988) Hill demonstrates how the monarchy in Britain transcends a national identity that could be divided by class and regional loyalties. The top-down nationalism counters the potentially destructive force of bottom-up national identity. And yet few of these works addressed the notion of competing bottom-up nationalisms within the State.

Not surprisingly, the Canadian contribution to political culture research raised the possibility of rival notions of national identity. According to Pammett and Whittington, the focal point of loyalty, whether city, province, region or country, will be determined by the way key agents of socialisation seek to transmit a sense of history (Pammett and Whittington 1976) Efforts to physically re-construct the past - whether through buildings or monuments - can influence the location of loyalty. Thus, the potential existence of multiple provincial political cultures in Canada depends upon the ability of, for example, newspapers and education systems to reinforce a sense of provincial loyalty. The option of differential or mutually
antagonistic loyalties receives treatment only as barrier to national inclusion. The existence of antagonistic political cultures, however, receives much less attention. Attention to hierarchical loyalties, to town, province or country, and the influence they have on national integration, differs from a concerted examination of competing sub-State and State political cultures. Furthermore, the socialisation processes that reinforce a sense of national cohesion are also the processes reinforcing a particular view of authority, sense of political trust, efficacy and, perhaps most relevant, political community.

In sum, most examinations of political culture have paid little attention to the sociological debates concerning identity. Those works including identity tend to define it as national identity qua State loyalty or integration. This thesis goes beyond these previous treatments to question how national identity functions within political culture. Before elaborating an integrated theory of identity and political culture the following section examines related issues affecting a concerted analysis of the two concepts. In particular, it questions whether the two undergo separate processes of socialisation, how notions of integration and alienation affect the nation and the State, and lastly, how membership is acquired. The following exposition argues that it is possible to dis-aggregate the two notions of nation and State to separate national and political belonging.

Socialisation

Agents of socialisation provide individuals with the cultural tools to integrate themselves into society. Under the influence of social institutions such as the family, school or Church, young children, and later adults, acquire a knowledge of social norms. Research on socialisation distinguishes several different approaches to norm dissemination. When absorbing social rules individuals may be privy to political or national socialisation, formal or informal socialisation, implicit or explicit socialisation. For the purposes of this thesis, only socialisation aimed at constructing a vision of national and political integration proves relevant. To this end, the thesis examines agents involved in overtly political socialisation rather than cultural or social
development. Disentangled notions of apolitical and political socialisation notwithstanding, the thesis argues that political parties exert an influence distinct from that exercised by Church or home.

In their examination of socialisation processes Pammett and Whittington highlight the different approaches throughout the social sciences. Anthropology tends to view socialisation as a transmission of culture, psychology views it as the creation of a social defence mechanism, while sociology sees it as the acquisition of social norms, integrating the individual into society. Political science, for its part, tends to rely on the sociological perspective, viewing socialisation as the acquisition of a subset of social roles relating to the political system (Pammett and Whittington 1976) As mentioned earlier in the chapter, agents of socialisation are divided between public (school, media) and private (parents, peers) agents of socialisation. Kavanagh also distinguishes between latent, or non-political agents and purposive or overtly political agents. Agents with which individuals come in contact for extended periods of time at an early age, most noticeably the family, are seen as most important in forming social roles. Almond and Verba, and Hahn stress the importance of education in forming early social values (Almond and Verba 1963, Hahn 1998), while the media, family or Church may each engender a sense of empathy within the wider political community (Wood 1997). Overtly political views such as national identity and party identification, come later in life (Hahn 1998).

The thesis argues that although national identity and State political identity share a socialisation process, the patterns of identification function differently. The potential for challenging the national identity claims of individuals is not present in the political system, where objective markers testify to inclusion. Feelings of doubt and the resulting negotiation of identity functioning at the national level can exert an influence on political attitudes such as personal trust and efficacy. Thus, interaction as it relates to national identity can have an effect on attitudes already formed by the socialisation process. For, as Pammett and Whittington argue, “non-political attitudes may precede and in fact even have causal impacts on political attitudes and behaviour”
The two also point to the problem caused by those individuals who would consider themselves legally members of a political culture, while not necessarily psychologically members (Pammett and Whittington 1976). The following section determines whether just as one can speak of a separation of attitudes, one can speak of two processes of integration.

**Integration**

A perfectly valid question, what power has to do with examinations of identity and political culture, depends on the *a priori* acceptance that exclusion from the dominant collective identity is meaningful to individuals. The weight and resonance associated with a state of un-belonging stem from the benefits of national membership both as articulated in a specific circumstance and as they relate to Western patterns of social interaction. A loss of belonging is meaningful because it is associated with a distance from power, broadly conceived, or tangible rights. Thus, a lack of identity or sense of belonging potentially alienates the individual in two ways. First, in a Marxist sense, the inability to negotiate identity and join groups at will is alienating because it implies a loss of capacity, autonomy or ability to self-ascribe the identity label or group membership (Nairn 1977). Second, in a communitarian sense, a loss of group membership brings an alienation in and of itself (Taylor 1993). The relative weight of each depends on the role of identity and benefits of belonging in society. It is worth asking whether a multicultural society in which identity is not questioned will cause less alienation than a relatively homogenous society in search of its identity? Chapters four and five pay greater attention to each type of alienation and the nature of power in relation to identity and political integration.

Political culture research approaches integration from an anthropological view of culture. Defined as that which allows individuals to identify with wider society, communicate effectively and understand the ‘rules of the game’, culture helps to integrate the individual into the social world. Political culture catalogues the process of political integration, the incorporation of individuals into the civic polity. Methodological approaches aside, most research in this area describes the socialisation of individuals and their resulting values and behaviour to determine what
level of political integration exists within a nation State. What researchers then do with this information, whether it is used to describe ideal-type cultures, decry current political practices, lament or praise the state of the political activity, matters less than the over-riding and under-explored goal of political culture research: charting integration.

For Almond and Verba, the key to a successful and stable democracy was a balanced political culture, one that provided the necessary deference and participation to both allow a system to work, and question it when it did not. The issue of consensus, was, however, left outside their analysis, as political culture was taken to mean the aggregate of political attitudes and behaviours. This view is shared by others, who claim that a nation’s political culture is the result of an amalgam of the various subcultures as created by different cleavages within the State (religious, regional, social class, occupational and role cultures, elite versus mass) (Kavanagh 1972, Pammett and Whittington 1976, ) Lane and Wildavsky likewise claim that political culture is created in the interactive process between subcultures (Lane 1992, Wildavsky 1987) In Lane’s words, “[t]he peculiarities of a nation’s politics will vary according to the type of political culture held by those in the government, by the elite groups outside the government, acting as opposition, and by the several competitor groups seeking access to elite positions” (Lane 1992) Thus, cultures are shared and produced by groups, rather than nations, the interaction of which produces as nexus of political attitudes and beliefs that characterise, influence, and are influenced by, the State’s political system. Or, in Bluhm’s view, political culture developed as a concept to explain what men have in common. The common culture exists not as a homogenous whole but rather as an amalgam of diverse parts (Bluhm 1974)

For Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba particularly, the level of integration within a polity determined much of its future success:

The development of a clear and unambiguous sense of identity is more than a facilitating factor in the creation of a nation; it may be in some sense the major constituting factor of the new nation ... The creation of a national
identity among the members of a nation is the cultural equivalent of the drawing of the boundaries of the nation (Verba, 1965)

According to Wildavsky, political culture provides the coherent rationale to the political system, structuring decision-making processes and reinforcing power relationships (Wildavsky 1987). Based on these bonds of interaction, social capital literature emphasises the integrating value of identity and political culture. Although “it is currently fashionable to bemoan the loss of social glue” (Pahl 1996), emphasis on the optimal bonds of social interaction explain how an otherwise divided society might withstand hardship and difference if alienation is minimised.

In their examination of identity and political culture in Israel, Shafir and Peled argue that the best method of State integration comes from the extension of citizenship and entitlement, (Shafir and Peled 1998) The 1950 Law of Return granted automatic citizenship to any Jewish immigrant to Israel, an offer that, according to Shafir and Peled, secured secondary citizenship status of Israel’s non-Jewish citizens. Under the revised 1970 Law of Return, one Jewish grandparent was needed for citizenship. “The political culture that emerged from the intersection of these social processes may be analysed as a pattern of interaction between the exclusionary dimensions of Israel’s colonizing and nation building practises and the inclusionary aspects of its democratic state institutions” (Shafir and Peled 1998). Thus, State inclusion is grounded in national membership, for membership in the nation guarantees State inclusion.

Community Membership

Most political culture literature explicitly including national identity within measures of political attitudes and values points to the integrative role of national identity. Membership in the nation is seen as a necessary step to full participation in the political system. Often, membership in the nation is equated with membership in the polity. As Neil MacCormick would have it, a member of ‘us’ in the political sense is member of ‘us’ in personal sense (MacCormick 1998). In the case of Scotland and Quebec, this is not necessarily so. Thus, while most examinations would indicate that the modernising forces exert an obvious effect on perceptions of national cum political
integration, a view that these two collectives exist within separate spheres requires separate treatment. Any distinction between national and political communities hinges on the ability to prove that the two possess different agents of socialisation, different definitions of membership, different patterns of integration and encourage different political values and attitudes. This thesis argues that the same way in which one is taught to be a political citizen, one is also taught to be a member of a nation; or rather, one is provided with the tools to acquire national membership, or distinguish national members from non-members. The dominant view, that national integration fosters a healthy political culture depends upon the view of State as binding agent. This cannot be the case when the State reinforces a sense of distance between members and non-members of the nation.

The previous discussion illustrates the way in which political culture literature has been used, how national identity is perceived as similar or distinct from social identity, and how political culture literature has traditionally integrated these issues within its attempts to depict and explain state cultures. The various definitions of political culture cannot but affect the way in which identity is seen to exert an influence. Although the lack of theorised contact between national identity literature and studies of political culture has not exhausted the link between the two, the thesis argues that an additional gap stems from the tendency of such works to avoid political behaviour. This is not to say that political culture analyses do not include measures of political behaviour, but rather, that national identity as it is used and understood by political culture specialists usually relies on attitudinal measures, whereas political behaviour specialists almost exclusively treat identity as a quantifiable independent variable exerting an influence over voting patterns. In its efforts to develop a theory of identity, belonging and inclusion this thesis not only seeks to integrate the diverse theoretical underpinnings and methods of identity and political culture research, but aims to capitalise on theorised understandings of political behaviour. Recent research examining social capital and new social movements, in particular, adopt a less quantitative view of behavioural studies. A review of such works must precede any advances in political culture theory.
THEORIES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

If political culture began as an analysis of the health of democratic systems, the participation of individuals in political life seems an appropriate measure with which to analyse civic health. At first glance, a polity in which citizens participate regularly in the political process appears to be in better health than a political system in which citizens rarely vote much less seek to influence political affairs. Participation theorists have long warned that low levels of participation provide an inadequate check on the political system. Often, to ensure that politicians receive proper scrutiny from a sufficiently large and representative population, this has led to general support for obligatory voting (Lijphart 1997, Verba 1996). Furthermore, inadequate levels of participation are symptomatic of low levels of trust, seen as both a reflection and source of dissatisfaction with the political system (M. Hetherington 1998). Others claim, however, that a lack of activity is not necessarily linked to an excluded and alienated electorate, and furthermore, that exclusion from the political system is not necessarily a bad thing. Just as inclusion can imply active membership and participation, so too can it imply a co-option into the dominant agenda that proves as dangerous for critical evaluation of political activities as does a lack of participation (Dryzek 1996). And yet, notwithstanding this seeming importance, a summary of traditional measures of political culture betrays the disputed inclusion of political behaviour. The argument for excluding such indicators stems from the potential influence of intervening variables which might detract from the ability to judge the influence of political culture.

Notions of civic engagement occupy classical normative political theory, liberal rights discourse, and theories of new social movements, identity politics, and social capital. The study of political participation is inextricably linked with normative visions of the Good Citizen. Lack of participation is seen as negative because it appears indicative of a lack of trust. Consequently, lack of trust is seen as both a reflection and source of dissatisfaction with the political system (M. Hetherington 1998). Low levels of participation provide an opportunity to critique theories of democratic involvement. Thus, throughout the literature, attention to the motivations and benefits of
participation co-exist with normative evaluations of participation as a guarantor of regime stability.

Much of the political behaviour literature uses participation as a dependent variable, influenced by the value predispositions and socio-economic status of potentially active individuals. Competing explanations of participation, most notably the socio-economic model versus the resource model, are both tied to the notion of equality (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). If the notion of equal rights is to be assured, citizens must possess actual access to their political representatives and equal opportunities to influence government decisions. As Verba states, "...in the democratic ideal, elected officials should give equal consideration to the needs and preferences of all citizens" (Verba 1996). Normally, the striking contrast between formal equality and inequality of influence is ignored as an unavoidable side-effect of both the modern polity and the capitalist system. Since the 1960s, literature addressing these issues has advocated that despite whatever formal equality may exist among citizens, the influence of socio-economic factors, in particular education, serves to distort the socio-economic profile of those who participate in politics and those who do not (Almond and Verba 1963, Barnes and Kaase 1979, Verba and Nie 1972). More recent explanations suggest that just as variables such as social class and education have witnessed a declining ability to explain voting behaviour, so too have such variables ceased to provide adequate interpretations of political activity levels. Rather, as Sidney Verba has argued in two publications, resources, in particular time, money and civic skills, exert a greater influence on political participation (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, Verba, Nie and Kim 197819). Only in their influence on the development of civic skills do education and occupation retain their explanatory power over political engagement. In the face of research highlighting the uneven distribution of participation throughout society, political scholars have supported compulsory voting as the only means to redress this inequality of voice (Lijphart 1997)

19 The resource model, suggested in the 1978 work, receives full treatment in the 1995 article.
The principle of equal access implies a concomitant equality of opportunity both to participate and to be a representative. Thus, because voting is a free and equally available activity for all citizens, those who choose to exercise this voice and those who do not should not be distinguishable on the basis of class, income, age, gender or race. The obviously unequal patterns of participation in all developed polities sit uneasily with participation theorists. Efforts to mitigate, or explain, this inequality, form the mainstay of related literature. Particularly vibrant debates within American political science are dominated by calls for compulsory voting. For Kennedy,

...active citizenship only flourishes where there is trust in the political system: the ideal civic culture would be one in which the political ideas and values of the citizens fostered political equality and participation and where government was seen as trustworthy and acting in the public interest (Kennedy 1996)

Political participation, as defined by classical behaviour specialists such as Milbrath, Verba, Dahl, and more recent authors such as Woshinsky, involves any behaviour intended to affect the outcomes of government (Dahl 1963, Milbrath 1965, Pye and Verba 1965 Woshinsky 1995) Among the more recent treatments of the topic some argue that participation in social or civic life, due to traditional divisions between private and public life, should be included in any measures of political activity (Abu Laban 1997). The civic voluntarism of many women, for example, has long been excluded from traditional government-oriented measures of participation.

For these authors, uneven or low rates of political participation are almost universally seen as a negative influence on the stability of the political system. Unwillingness to participate suggests a low sense of trust, efficacy and satisfaction in the system and is inextricably linked to low levels of inclusion or integration. For Pye and Verba, participation in the political sphere engenders a sense of civic responsibility (Pye and Verba 1965). Inactive citizens are painted as more detrimental to the health of the polity than active citizens intent on radically changing the political course of the State. In his article “Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization” John Dryzek argues that political inclusion, in the sense that it implies a co-option into the State agenda, should not be considered a laudable goal. Rather, active, seemingly

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“alienated” citizens will exert more beneficial pressure on the State (Dryzek 1996) A strong “oppositional force”, as Habermas would describe it, ensures a vibrant democracy more than uniformly active and integrated citizens (Habermas 1987). Or, in Robert Putnam’s words “Tocqueville was right ... Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society” (Putnam 1993). When a vigorous civil society depends on alienated, if organised, individuals, remains outwith the scope of this thesis.

Early studies argue, and authors of early examinations continue to claim, that political participation in a given polity is uneven. The gap between active and inactive citizens allows for differential influence within the political system. Unequal influence is seen, by most researchers on political behaviour, to undermine the stability of the political system (Lijphart 1997, Verba 1996). For these authors compulsory voting corrects the imbalance; low voter turnout under-represents the partisan wishes of those on the lower end of the economic spectrum, reinforcing an elite or dominant ideological preference that will not be corrected without the concerted involvement of those whom the system does not serve (Lipset 1960, Key 1948, Hirschman 1970, Kaase 1996). In his 1997 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Arend Lijphart also argued that user-friendly voter registration, proportional election formulas, infrequent elections and weekend voting would stimulate voter turnout. By concentrating on voting, and by treating the symptoms of the problem, these works provide a limited analysis of political participation and a limited solution to a serious problem. Recognised as stemming from low trust and efficacy, low rates of participation are effectively ruled illegal. While this would artificially raise the level of activity, high turnout levels could mask serious problems within the polity. Although it is argued that compulsory voting could ‘kick start’ interest in political life, one must recognise that healthy democratic systems and high levels of political activity do not always co-exist.

Factors influencing participation receive attention in a series of articles linked to the major studies in political participation. Early models attributed fluctuating
participation levels to differences in socio-economic status (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Individuals possessing above average levels of education, professional employment and middle-class incomes were more likely to participate in all aspects of political life. In their review of political behaviour studies Verba, Nie, Kim and others expand this analysis to include the notion of political resources (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, Brade, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Individuals possessing civic skills, gleaned throughout childhood and adult socialisation in the family, school and work environment, are more likely to participate in politics regardless of socio-economic background (see also Kavanagh 1972). An availability of both time and money exerts positive influences on participation. Unlike money, time is in no way attached to traditional indicators of participatory zeal. Educational qualifications and job status correlate poorly with time available for political activity. In addition, political influence outwith traditional notions of participation escapes assessment in many of these works.

Other, more psychological explanations of participation rely on two main theories: mobilisation and decline of community. These explanations of participation stem from two main camps: those arguing for the mobilisation thesis and those citing a decline of community as the main motivating factor. Within the general view that individuals are mobilised to participate one can distinguish between the influence of socio-economic status and political resources on the one hand, and the influence of social capital theories on the other. According to the first explanation, individuals possessing higher levels of education, social wealth, political interest, time and money are more likely to participate in politics. For social capital theorists, the expected benefits of positive social interaction among citizens encourage individuals to participate in the civic and political spheres. Theorists advocating a decline of community theory claim that modernisation has stripped social communities of the links previously maintained among citizens. As a result, individuals tend to feel disassociated from their fellow citizens and feel less encouraged to participate in civic or political activities. For theorists of the new social movement view, modernisation, and even a resulting decline of community, can have an opposite effect. By filling the gap left by modern
society in which kinship ties or strong social bonds are absent, new social movements bind citizens together in common political projects, often, but not exclusively, tied to collective identity.

The seemingly incompatible conclusions of the mobilisation theory and decline of community theory mask the similarities in the propositions. There is, in fact, a false opposition between these two views. Both theories are reacting to the peripheralisation of the actor. In one case, the creation of a centre and periphery encourages reactive participation whereas in other circumstances, activity is dampened by the loss of interest or sense of efficacy/agency. A brief examination of two recent theoretical developments, those affecting social capital and new social movements research, will better explain how political circumstances in Scotland and Quebec affect and react to the changing nature of political participation.

**Social Capital**

A growing attention to the relations between citizens, and the possible relationships between social relations and political involvement, forms the basis of a growing literature on social capital. If political culture began as an attempt to uncover the conditions that best guarantee the continued stability of political systems, social capital concerns itself with the continued health of societies. Grounded in a belief that culture refers to the entire pattern of behaviour in a society, both political culture and social capital works investigate the web of inter-related phenomenon, of institutions, attitudes and behaviour (Calvert 1993). Before Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work*, a work which popularised the concept and approach for students of social interaction, social capital was viewed as that benefit which accrued to people whose membership in diverse social organisations (Bourdieu 1985) or reliance on social ties (Coleman 1988) ensured healthy level of participation (Portes and Landolt 1996). In his research into political attitudes and behaviour in Italy Putnam uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis in a normative examination reminiscent of *The Civic Culture* (Putnam 1993). Despite debate that his work contributes to the field of political culture (Tarrow 1996, Wood 1997) Putnam’s book bridges the gap between attitudes
to democracy and public participation. Putnam asks, in Tarrow’s estimation “How do traditions of association and civic engagement affect political behaviour.” (Tarrow 1996). The main argument of the book claims that societies rich in social capital will provide positive contexts in which democracy can flourish. Putnam’s stretching of the term, from an benefit enjoyed by individuals to a characteristic held by societies has muddied slightly understandings if not applications of the concept (Portes and Landolt 1996). Just as early political culture gave way to a growing literature with disputed definitions, so too does general confusion surround the creation of social capital. Jeremy Weinstein asks, how to societies acquire social capital: “Is [social capital] good or bad? Can we invest in ‘it’ or are we stuck with what we have? What is ‘it’ good for?” (Weinstein, 1999). The resulting index of civic participation used by Putnam seeks to account for the differences between the democratically developed North and underdeveloped Southern political dispositions in Italy. In his critique of Putnam’s work, Sidney Tarrow questions both the claimed visible links between social interaction and democratic stability and the use of institutional performance as a proxy for democratic development (Tarrow 1996). Boix and Posner likewise subject the link between social capital and government success to close scrutiny (Boix and Posner 1995).

Not surprisingly, the concept of social capital, both lauded and derided by political analysts, escapes clear definition. As with political culture, it is the loose and ill-defined nature of social capital that bestows upon it an explanatory power greater than rational action theory (Goldthorpe 1998, Coleman 1990). For some, social capital is enjoyed by individuals (Coleman 1988) for others, it is the co-operative capacity of a community (Putnam 1993, Putnam 1995a, Putnam 1995b, Putnam 1996, Boix and Posner 1995). Others employ more general definitions. Whether referred to as social glue (Marquand 1998), trust relations (Coleman 1990), or simply, as a resource (Wood 1997), social capital enables a society to overcome social and political inequality or other potentially divisive phenomena. Such a definition renders social capital particularly useful in examinations of polities enduring collective tension as a result of nationalist aspirations. That said, the theory presents an
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uncharacteristically optimistic view of human nature given the prevalence in the discipline of self-interest driven rational choice theories. The glaring inconsistency in the evaluation of human behaviour, motivated by short-term gain when it comes to partisan preference, and long-term expected benefit when it comes to social interaction, suggests that dominant theories in political science sit uneasily with researchers.20

For the purposes of this thesis, the under-theorised aspect of social capital most of interest is the influence of strong social ties, and the benefits that accrue from them, on those who stand outside the web of activity. The mutual dependence of one group within society, whether encouraged by the social conditions of immigration, or the perception of discrimination, reinforce a border around those within the web of interaction. No doubt Putnam would argue that social capital, because of its role as a societal good, is not in evidence in such situations. And yet other theorists who rely on such notions of social interaction and public participation would point out that the social capital stems from the act of participation, and thus is enjoyed by those who participate, not by society as a whole. Notions of social capital are particularly relevant to studies of nations and nationalism because of the overlapping circles of inclusion and perceived exclusion. If one of the factors feeding the development of nationalism, and thus the increased salience of national identity, is a sense of exclusion, disadvantage or even social dislocation, (Gellner 1983, Hall 1992, Nairn 1977, Pahl 1996, Rustin 1996) then an absence of participation can encourage a reactive tightening of the social web of interaction. As theorists note, the drawing of a boundary around the nation, which follows from such a perception of exclusion, in turn excludes all those who are not members of the nation, thus, the ebb and flow of social capital. Any effort to examine how national identity affects political attitudes and behaviour must examine how co-operation and participation are distributed and perceived within the polity.

20 Responding to anticipated criticism Wood notes social capital “can be used as an explanatory theoretical framework in ways that do not necessarily lead to the ‘polyannish’ reduction of political life to a ‘nicer’ civil society.” (Wood 1997)
New Social Movements

Just as social capital literature provides an alternative interpretation of functioning political culture, new social movements analyses examine political behaviour from the view of collective mobilisation. New social movements distinguish themselves from older movements like the workers' movement in their goals, patterns of mobilisation and intra-group relations (Scott 1990). The study of new social movements was credited with rejuvenating sociology as a discipline by focusing on the social actor at the expense of social structures or institutions. While earlier examinations viewed new social movements as any organised collective seeking to effect change from the social or political system, more recent evaluations claim that these groups can consistently defend the status quo. An enhanced positive for the collective, however achieved, forms the basis of campaigning (Scott 1990). For some groups, the status quo may present a better situation than proposed change. New social movements distinguish themselves from older campaigns by their reliance on social identities, and their reaction to changing social conditions. Emphasis on such psychological benefits as consciousness raising, sense of personal and collective autonomy take precedence over more concrete demands for freedom or material security. This unambiguous distinction between old and new movements has, however, drawn criticism from some who see more fuzzy boundaries between the social and the political. Scott criticises this false distinction, claiming that the political sphere transcends many social campaigns (Scott 1990). Efforts to reinforce a clear and dichotomous view of new social movements stem from the justifications for their rise in popularity. For some, new social movements can be seen as a response to changing social forces, whether caused by post-industrial society (Touraine 1995) or a historical progress of rationalisation (Habermas 1990). For others, new social movements are proof of failed social democratic parties who, in their efforts to appeal to the mass or average citizen, have pushed some groups or individuals to the margins of the political debate. It is in their integrative function that new social movements become relevant in examinations of identity and political culture. In particular, the proliferation of unity groups throughout Quebec suggests that those who consider themselves alienated within the dominant political discourse are searching for an outlet for their
participation. The role of these groups is much clearer than that of existing political parties.

Can political parties be considered new social movements? The wealth of social movement literature on Green Parties suggests that they can, providing the asserted goals defend the interests of collective groups, whether nations, women, or in this case, humanity (Diani and Lodi 1988). Problems arise, however, when these groups form governments. Just as opposition parties must change their goals when confronted with the cruel realities of government, new social party governments must move away from issues of collective autonomy to the more mundane issues of balanced budgets and resource management. Given that much of the literature maintains that new social movements prefer issues of personal enlightenment over the attainment of power, it would appear that nationalist parties cease to be new social movements when they bid for power rather than influence. With these restrictions in mind, the literature on new social movements is relevant to a discussion on national identity and political culture only insofar as it is tied to identity, or symptomatic of a greater shift towards identity politics and the goals of political autonomy. Rigid definitions of what a social movement is and is not are less helpful.

A THEORY OF NEGOTIATED IDENTITY, CONTESTED BELONGING AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The thesis attempts to provide a sociological understanding of interactive processes affecting subjective understandings of the political system. In so doing, it relies on a definition of political culture that includes both attitudes to, and patterns of interaction with, the State and other members of the polity. Chapter three relies upon a case study approach to highlight the divergent forces exerting an influence in each case study. In particular, it examines traditional perceptions of the state in Scotland and Quebec, before turning to the way in which political parties, government commissions and government documents have emphasised certain markers of national identity. Thus, the chapter focuses on the efforts of groups and institutions to engender a sense of identity and political cohesion while tracing the macro trends within national
identity and political culture. Chapters four and five focus on the individual-level reactions to such messages, on the negotiation of identity and the interaction between variables and groups within the political cultures of Scotland and Quebec. In so doing, it relies upon a particular pattern of negotiation between national identity and political culture. It is this attempt to deal with institutional symbols, individual reactions, and attitudes and behaviour as they relate to the State and other citizens, that forms the focus of this thesis. The resulting theory of negotiated identity, contested belonging and political integration serves as an analytical tool throughout the thesis.

In particular, the thesis seeks to determine how the identification process of an individual is affected by the markers of an entirely collective identity. In particular, whether a loss of control over self-conception creates a sense of dissonance within the political culture. The thesis sees the interaction between notions of power, difference and integration as they affect individuals as a microcosm of a larger negotiation at the national level. It argues that difference, in Canada and in Britain, has been accommodated, to a certain degree, within the current political arrangement, dividing power equitably among constituent groups and evenly among citizens. An increasing sense of difference has fostered an interest in a redistribution of power. This rising sense of difference accompanies a perception of reduced integration within the State. Whether the weakened bonds of integration brought with them a sense of distinctness, or whether the process works the other way, doesn’t matter for the purposes of this thesis. The acknowledgement of difference precedes any redistribution of power or autonomy. Groups, feeling somehow dis-integrated from the whole, are moved to seek greater power, often in the form of greater political autonomy. The effect on individuals is fairly simple. An increased sense of collective dis-integration reinforces membership in the collective. Attention to the distance between collective members and non-members forms the basis for the resulting theory of integration.

This division, between individual understandings of identity and political culture, and institutional efforts to create markers of identity, focuses on what Robert Wood has referred to as the two faces of political culture: the first examines the way political culture and specifically social capital, structure people’s lives, and how they interact with one another, while the second, deals with the ‘shared
This theory attempts to chronicle what happens within polities where national difference has reached a sufficient salience to occupy public debate, media, political parties, and affect electoral behaviour. Chapter three begins with an analysis of the importance of national identity to the populations in Scotland and Quebec, before continuing to an analysis of the way identity is constructed by political actors. As a result, the theory accepts that the search for national belonging exists, to a greater or lesser degree, in Scotland and Quebec. It also presumes the existence of competing social identities, some of which may conflict, competing and different national identities and competing notions of the name identity. In other words, for any individual, his or her social identity, as it relates to occupation, gender, age, place of residence, social class or linguistic group co-exists with national identity. The salience and composition of each of these identities changes over time (Hall 1992, Hall 1996, Laclau 1994, McCrone 1998). In addition, there may be different national identities competing either for primacy or co-existence. Thus, claims to be Canadian or Québécois, British or Scottish, may affect the decisions made by individuals. For some, being both Canadian and Québécois may not present a conflict, for others, it may seem anathema. Lastly, there may be different understandings of what it means to be Scottish or Québécois. Part of how these issues are resolved affects the way that individuals will think and act within the political culture. The way in which these divergent negotiation processes are handled, forms the focus of the theory.

**Figure 2.1 Identity as a Politicised Social Construct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Givens'</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The search of national belonging - importance of identity in post modern age, individual need for belonging, national imagined community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The coexistence of other identities/allegiances - both tags and processes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Cultural elements* which determine why individuals structure their ties the way they do (Wood 1997)
3. Existence of a coherent identity package put forward by agents/arbiters, consisting of markers of identity

4. Existence of a hierarchy of national identity markers

'Process'

5. Self-examination of own 'fit' with package - taking markers and perceptions of others into consideration

6. Negotiation with others of 'fit' based on perceptions of acceptance and own possession of objective markers

7. Potential alienation from nation or from State or both or neither (alienation from nation can prevent integration at the State level)

8. Level of belonging, or lack thereof determines political attitudes and behaviour (influence of lack of belonging depends on a) the construction of identity - whether it subscribes to an exclusive notion of membership b) salience of identity to nationalist debate

The thesis concerns itself with numbers three through eight, having accepted that numbers one and two occur within both Scotland and Quebec. That said, chapter three examines the extent to which the search for national belonging occupies the hearts and minds of individuals in both case studies. The following section describes the rest of the theory.

As part of its 'givens', the theory argues that even though the process of selecting or acquiring a national identity, is, as with other social identities, a self-directed process, it is nonetheless influenced by popular conceptions of that identity. Thus, the acquisition and maintenance depends on an act of negotiation between two participants: those who will possess the identity, and those who facilitate its popular understanding. What it means to be Scottish is determined by more than statements in
party manifestos and curriculum authorities. It is also affected by the perceptions of that identity by members and non-members, hence Anderson’s imagined community. This thesis argues that despite the power of arguments for a personal nationalism (Cohen 1994) - that identity ultimately exists in the minds of individuals, there is an identifiable identity package existing if not as a checklist of characteristics that one must possess, then certainly as a general consensus on who is a Scot, or who is Québécois. Or, as Gosling notes, communities are defined by an amalgam of “individual prejudices and shared social constructs” (Gosling 1996). Equally important, are corollary notions of what it means to be Québécois or Scottish. This thesis highlights the promotion of certain pillars of identity, whether objective markers of belonging such as place of birth, residency or ancestry, or subjective notions of integration tied to common values and shared beliefs. The thesis argues that the accuracy of these pillars is less important than their general acceptance. For example, if a significant proportion believes that part of what it means to be Scottish is tied to notions of Celtic ancestry, then future archaeological studies proving no such link exists will have little effect. Furthermore, one of the central tenets of ‘Scottishness’, a belief in the common weel, need not bear out in the actual behaviour of Scots. As Finlay states, “the factual invalidation of myths in weighty academic tomes does not and never has invalidated them as complex icons of cultural, social and political belief.” (Finlay 1997) The historical accuracy of the pillar matters less than its public perception. Whether such messages are a plea for membership, in the case of a reflexive civic movement, or an attempt to mobilise ethnic, latent characteristics, depends on the construction of identity and type of nationalism.

The process of negotiation, between those who wear the identity and those who promote its pillars, occupies a shifting group of individuals. Those who question or analyse their identity are considered part of the group who promote it by other self-evaluating individuals. This is tied to the notion of national identity as an inherently vague and malleable entity. The presence of national culture and history may serve as pillars of identity but it is rare that the specifics of such are enunciated in more than a scattered form. Universal values of democracy and liberalism often receive promotion.
As pillars of identity but in Western political cultures these are hardly distinguishing characteristics. To this extent, Cohen’s notion of personal nationalism holds true, for in the face of a general identity package individuals are left to elaborate how national pillars fit with visions of the self. What the thesis investigates, is whether in certain situations individuals are more likely to accept their inclusion and bend notions of national identity in ways that suit them, or whether they are more likely to doubt their inclusion, citing an exclusive concept of identity. The thesis argues that the extent to which individuals act in different ways lies in part in the particular promotion of identity - whether in the vague notion muted there is room for obvious inclusion and exclusion - and whether it is salient to daily life. Both factors, promotion and salience, are affected by the politicisation of identity. If cultural national identity exists as a fuzzy aggregate of values then a politicised national identity emerges as a consensual package of markers by which individuals can evaluate their membership and position within the nation. If cultural identity represents the vague, inclusive aspect of national allegiance, politicised national identity is the more exclusive, enunciated force. The potency of cultural identity lies in its ability to appeal to a wide variety of people, whereas the power of political identity hinges on the potential for mobilisation in the name of a political project. In their efforts to advance the nationalist cause political parties in Scotland and Quebec have manipulated cultural identity into a political tool, articulating a framework of civic values and national characteristics that, often, justify greater political autonomy. In so doing, they have created a more exclusive, and admittedly powerful identity.

The thesis argues that the power of this politicised identity, more than the pillars themselves, raise the potential for exclusion. In a departure from the oft-employed categories of civic and ethnic nationalism, this examination of national identity claims that inclusion and exclusion operate within all national discourses. The extent of this

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22 One Quebec Liberal Party policy paper on identity, for example, makes reference to the shared Quebec values of individual freedom, pluralism and a willingness to decrease social inequalities. Quebec Liberal Party (1997) Recognition and interdependence. Montreal: Quebec Liberal Party. In its recent election manifesto the Scottish National Party best represented Scots as the party of “Democracy, Compassion and Enterprise”
exclusion, whether it is based on inherited characteristics or selected values, or felt by individuals who exclude themselves in the face of publicly-inclusive notions of belonging, varies according to the treatment of national identity by nationalist actors.

Item four in the theory of inclusion argues that markers and pillars of identity exist in a hierarchical order. This is not to say that governments or political actors enunciate the specific characteristics of national membership and order them in a meaningful way, but rather, given the vague consensus of markers by which individuals may evaluate their membership, there is a perceived ranking. The hierarchy that exists in the minds of members and non-members depends on the pillars available, and the particular national history. In other words, for any given nation, some individuals may consider themselves automatic members, and some may not. Those born into a society are generally seen to have a greater - often unquestioned - justification for belonging than temporary visitors. Location depends on whether these individuals can make a reasonable claim to belong. Whether objective markers such as family background or citizenship, or subjective factors such as values or cultural habits guarantee acceptance, depends, again, on the particular construction of identity promoted and accepted by the polity.

Somewhere along the hierarchy there is a spot where some people feel they belong but others will not agree, some people feel they do not belong but others would see them as members; there is a gap in understanding between the label we would ascribe to ourselves and the label we think others would ascribe to us. These are negotiated or contested identities. In other words, although identity is a self-ascribed tag, willingness to profess a sense of belonging depends on the acknowledgement of its validity by other members of society. 24 The content and myths of any particular

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23 For Laclau, the politicisation of cultural identity is part and parcel of the politicisation of social life, accompanied by the proliferation of particularist groups (Laclau 1994).
24 Our willingness to accept the position of others as arbiters of our identity is another issue. A brief example, however, illustrates the point. In its file of newspaper articles on Scottish-English relations the Council for Racial Equality includes over 100 articles on the presence of anti-English sentiment in Scotland. Of those articles, over 70% present the view of politically active members of society. Of those mentioning a party by name, all but one mention the SNP exclusively, while the remaining article reports a view from the Scottish Conservative Party. In each case, the view of the SNP was
identity exert their influence in the construction of a scale of belonging rather than as determinants of political attitudes in themselves. The thesis departs from previous examinations of national identity and political culture by arguing that the position on the identity hierarchy, rather than the components that determine the position, affects political attitudes and behaviour. Those who feel that their identity is under challenge may not exhibit the same behaviour as others expressing similar attachment. The examination of political behaviour must acknowledge that although identity may be a primary determinant, the conditions under which the identity is claimed, the demographic characteristics of the individual, exert an equally important influence.

Item five deals with the way in which individuals assess their position within the identity hierarchy. Subscribing to social identity theory’s vision that a detailing of identity characteristics precedes the creation of a meaningful identity, item five argues that individuals accept the hierarchy and self-evaluate their own levels of belonging on the basis of the accepted pillars. The thesis relies on statistical data from recent election studies and opinion polls, and interview material, to determine the extent to which individuals evaluate their level of belonging based on certain characteristics. According to item six, following this evaluation process, individuals seek to negotiate their ‘owed’ level of belonging with the degree of acceptance within society. The thesis argues that part of the negotiation process relies on assumed notions of belonging and acceptance in the host society, some of which may not accurately reflect the majority opinion within Scotland or Quebec. The thesis argues that individuals question their own level of belonging, conforming to expected notions of acceptance rather than their own ‘owed’ level of belonging. In particular, item six concerns itself with the expected acceptance of claims to belonging, and the way that individuals negotiate these claims. As a result, it deals with exclusion, not because exclusion and alienation are rampant in either society, nor because nationalism is an ethnically-driven power struggle that divides populations, but because in the face of generally positive and inclusive messages, some individuals or groups of individuals,

treated as synonymous with the views of Scottish nationalism in general. This conflating of party and public views, while understandable, elevates the SNP to a position of arbitration on the characteristics of Scottish nationalism.
feel their sense of identity is questioned, or questionable. The thesis argues that part of the reason for presumed exclusion lies in the collective ascription of pillars and characteristics of membership that do not always incorporate the diverse blend of competing identities within individuals (Shafir and Peled 1998). Part of the reason this occurs lies in the stateless aspect of both Scotland and Quebec. In the presence of citizenship requirements, individuals are provided with objective measures for the formal acceptance into the State, a preliminary level of inclusion which may lead to a more comprehensive sense of belonging. The thesis thus draws a distinction between being included - that which is conferred by others - and belonging as a self-directed process. The absence of such formal requirements in Scotland and Quebec, allows group members to determine the pillars by which individuals evaluate their level of belonging.

The following table summarises the distinction between different claims to belonging.

**Table 2.2 Identity Claims and Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>included</td>
<td>contested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>contested</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item seven argues that there is a difference between inclusion and belonging within the State and inclusion and belonging within the nation. The thesis examines the way that presumed exclusion within the nation affects the level and form of participation within the formal political sphere. It argues the conditions under which some individuals mediate their national exclusion by increased political participation depends on the self-evaluation of the identity position. Often, those lacking the
objective markers of belonging will participate more in non-partisan political activities than those possessing greater ‘claims’ to belonging.

The resulting political attitudes and behaviour of those within these contested categories produce two drastically different reactions from similarly excluded individuals. This has less to do with the importance of identity in Quebec and Scotland than with the resources available to different groups. The range of participation - from greater political involvement to total exit - is larger because other similarly alienated groups - those suffering from poverty or other forms of social exclusion - do not have the resources, support, or clout to mount a political plea for attention or to pick up and move.

The more the perceived sense of alienation depends on subjective characteristics, the more radical the response. For example, the increased alienation of some anglophones and allophones since the Quebec referendum has created a rise in vigilant rights-oriented community and non-partisan political organisations, for others it has led to an exit from the political system. The difference, between objective and subjective markers affects the reaction to perceived exclusion. Those possessing objective markers of belonging but feel that they do not belong tend to take-up more radical options, whether as exit from the system or as advocates of non-mainstream political ideas, while those possessing only subjective markers of belonging opt for more mainstream political activities.

In short, this thesis seeks to examine the negotiation between the objective label - identity as a census characteristic, the subjective label - an entirely self-directed sense of attachment, and the resulting sense of belonging - the negotiated identity. The thesis treats identity as a reference group, distinguishing itself from other works which distinguish between collective, national identity, reference groups and demographic groups (Martin 1998) Rather, it claims that identity functions as any other reference group asserting its dominance, policing its boundaries in a variety of contexts with varying levels of assertiveness. Sociologist Stuart Hall argues that identity is a
negotiated process in which the multiple identities possessed by any individual assert their dominance in negotiation with the other possible self-definitions (Hall 1992, Hall 1996). It is possible to see this negotiation process, not just between competing notions of personal identity, but as a compromise between self-definition in a vacuum and the perception we think others have of us. The resultant identity lies somewhere in between this view of the self, and self as seen through the eyes of others. In a twist on the concept of street credibility, this paper examines the influence of identity credibility. Furthermore, if, as Bauman suggests, the search for identity represents an attempted escape from uncertainty, any loss of identity, or denial of identity by others within society, plunges the unaligned or unattached individual into uncertainty, disorienting the values and attitudes that might otherwise be shared with other members of society (Bauman 1996). Any questioned or contested identity assumes greater importance in the absence of a formalised notion of membership. When citizenship, as signified by a passport, is not congruent with membership in the nation, claims to belonging assume a heightened sense of importance.
An understanding of the interaction between national identity and political culture stems from the construction and perception of difference created in the social and political sphere. The cohesive identity and political community bind themselves in opposition to other dissimilar cultures. This chapter chronicles the construction of both concepts by examining perceptions of difference in Scotland. When answering the question “Are Scotland and Quebec different?” one must first determine, different from what? And different how? For the purposes of this chapter the object of comparison is not just the other case study but the wider Nation-State as well. In so doing the chapter proves that the comparison in chapters four and five relates to nation differences between Scotland and Quebec rather than State differences between Britain and Canada. Thus, is Scotland different from the rest of Britain? Is Quebec different from the rest of Canada? Second, one must distinguish between institutional difference and sociological difference. Daily life in Scotland and Quebec may be objectively different, operating under different laws and dependent on different institutions, but unless the distinction is meaningful it is not very useful for the purposes of this investigation. For example, it does not matter if the tax laws are different in two countries (for those studying political culture) unless the higher or lower rates affect the attitudes of citizens. If the tax rates are high, and reinforce a sense of alienation from the State on the part of resentful ratepayers, or if high rates encourage a sense of dependency on the State, then these are two cases where institutional, or quantitative difference, can become sociologically meaningful. Thus, the first question asked in this chapter “Are Scotland and Quebec different?” is examined in light of these two parameters first by relying on the general consensus in the literature and second on the perceptions of citizens. In the third section, data from opinion polls, voting records and electoral studies are examined to provide a more detailed reflection of political attitudes in Scotland and Quebec. As chapter two
argues, this thesis seeks to extend beyond traditional quantitative treatments of election studies to determine how national identity interacts with political culture. In so doing it examines previous treatments of political culture in both cases and provides complementary statistical data, highlighting areas where it differs from traditional analyses. Having established how this data fits in with previous investigations, the chapter then turns to political records in Scotland and Quebec, to determine how and in what way political parties, constitutional commissions and governments construct visions of national identity and political inclusion. In particular, the chapter argues that in the construction of a political identity and in the nationalist debate, a political culture and national identity have been constructed in which the treatment of history, the placement of other and the question of authenticity determine accepted notions of difference.

Rising nationalist sentiment in post-war Scotland has received attention from a variety of sources, each seeking to explain how goals of political autonomy have replaced expressions of Britishness. Greater political self-determination has witnessed an increased interest in Scottish identity, how it is defined, what it represents and how, if at all, it affects peoples’ lives (Macmillan 1999, Royle 1999, Wilson 1999). Whether the increased attention to identity led to strengthened calls for constitutional change, or whether the introduction of devolution sparked an increased level of introspection is, for our purposes, irrelevant. Post-devolution, the tenor of self-examination has changed, lingering over the pillars of Scottish identity, whether it is more or less possible to be both British and Scottish and, further south, what it means to be English.¹ Both the political and sociological repercussions of the devolution settlement depend on the perception of difference. Cultural depiction of national life depends on a sense of separate existence; the presence of easy distinction between Scotland and the rest of Britain. Variance exists, in the form of economic performance and social structures, but also receives treatment by diverse institutions throughout society. These groups identify difference and project it back to society.

¹ Two television series by Andrew Marr and Darcus Howe examine the meaning of Britishness as it relates to nation and race respectively.
Any examination of national identity and political culture in Quebec finds its roots in the debated division between the State and the nation, such as it exists. Perceptions of inclusion or exclusion stemming from nationally-identified markers of membership are affected or corrected by official State regulations. Thus, those who would consider themselves outside the Québécois nation may claim an unwavering affinity or sense of belonging to the province and/or territory of Quebec. Individuals who are uncertain of their location in the nation are persuaded, by their love of, for example, Montreal, or their experiences as tax-payers, that they belong in Quebec. Whether institutionally- or locally-defined this affinity distinguishes itself from a sense of belonging to the nation. This rather confusing interaction between the nation and the State is both ignored and accepted by actors on either side of the nationalist divide. As chapter two explains, this thesis concentrates on the views of those who feel themselves on the fringes of national membership. As a result, the dominant view of these individuals, that the construction of a Quebec nation, despite the inclusion attentions of its participants, at times excludes them from active participation, forms one of the premises of this chapter. A full understanding of this division depends on a thorough examination of the demographic and economic trends in Quebec, the dominant cleavages within the society, the division of power among diverse cultural and linguistic groups, and the views of institutions concerning the nation and the State. The chapter provides a picture of the dominant messages of national and political socialisation before examining in chapters four and five how such messages are assimilated and acted upon by residents in Quebec.

DEMOGRAPHY AND ECONOMY: ARE SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC DIFFERENT?

When seeking to determine whether the two nations distinguish themselves from their larger states on non-cultural indicators, two aspects require attention: first, the extent to which the demographic and economic trends in each case point to a markedly different society, and second, regardless of such trends, whether the nations are perceived as different. Any gap between perception and observable difference will
exert an influence over the debate as it allows much room for the assumption of political stances chosen by politically relevant actors in Quebec. An additional layer of analysis concerns the unit of examination. Both the case study and its regions require attention in this section. For example, either case study may exhibit similar levels of immigration or unemployment to other areas in the wider State, but if the communities influenced by these characteristics are differentially affected throughout the nation it will negate the effect of such differences on the political culture. The high levels of immigration to the city of Montreal or the relatively high unemployment levels in northern Quebec, while obviously influential over the felt environment of individuals in those areas, might exert less influence over the political attitudes and behaviours of individuals across the nation.

Economically and socially Scotland distinguishes itself from the rest of Britain. In part, this stems from the demands of geography. The very location of the nation, at the northern end of an island in the North Atlantic, dictates much of what is economically possible. For Scotland, proximity to the sea, a temperate if wet climate, large tracts of sparsely populated land, a small population and relatively low population density determine much of the function of politics and business (Devine 1988, Harvie 1992, Payne 1996). By comparison, on most social and economic measures Quebecers do not distinguish themselves from the Canadian average more than any other province. Quebec as a distinct society refers to language and culture rather than such markers as income or life expectancy although nationalist programmes since in the 1960s have made much of the additional economic progress that could be made given greater future autonomy. On measures of population density, income distribution and cosmopolitanism, the cities and towns of Quebec reflect similar demographic trends to those in other parts of the country. By language and religion alone, Quebec distinguishes itself. These two measures exert a considerable influence on the perception of difference in Quebec. A community bounded from the rest of the country by its official language exists within a sphere of institutional completeness allowing for greater control over self-definition (Breton 1964). That said, significant economic difference, could become the boundary that a
nation draws around itself (Gellner 1983, Nairn 1977). In this case, language is the most obvious difference between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and as a result, language forms the backbone of contemporary perceptions of difference. Thus, in the first instance, Quebec occupies a different position within the Canadian federation than Scotland within Britain if only because of the linguistic boundary that it can draw around itself. Measures of difference in Scotland are more subject to the pressures of time and, when present, appear less obvious. The Scottish health record, for example, although highlighting a significant deviation from British trends, does not occupy public imagination the way that drastically different economic or religious circumstances might (Office of National Statistics 1999).

As the comparative table in Appendix C demonstrates, on such diverse measures of economic performance, educational attainment, population density, and life expectancy, the two nations do not distinguish themselves from Canada and the UK as a whole. The concord between these figures masks differing approaches and solutions to similar situations in the nations and the wider states. Evaluations of crises, and the ways in which they are handled, may produce similar results across borders, but such differences betray different political attitudes and perceptions of difference. For example, notwithstanding similar levels of educational attainment, the Scottish attitude to education is perceived to be different from that in England. Similarly, efforts to decrease the operating deficit in Quebec, while similar in the intended outcome sought by the Canadian federal government, have highlighted different priorities and tactics. Thus, even considerable objective similarity should not be equated with a uniformity and homogeneity of society.

Significant deviations also exist. Scotland’s multicultural population, at approximately one percent, is much smaller than the English rate of seven percent. Glasgow holds the highest rate, at a little over three percent, incomparable to rates of

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2 The Scottish death rate is the highest in the United Kingdom, at 1,184 deaths per 100,000 individuals. The UK rate is 1,029 (Office of National Statistics 1999). Paradoxically, Scots self rate their level of health higher than other areas in the UK. When asked whether they would report their
twenty percent in urban centres such as London and Leeds. By comparison, Quebec’s proportion of immigrants mirrors closely Canadian patterns of immigration. Quebec’s proportion of bilingual residents, however, far outdistances the rest of Canada. In the 1996 census more than one third of Quebecers reported they spoke both of Canada’s two official languages. Although Canada’s only officially bilingual province recorded a similar level of bilingualism, at 29.5, one tenth of the populations in Ontario, PEI and Manitoba speak both English and French. As previously stated, by language and religion Quebec distinguishes itself from the rest of Canada. Although in 1991 the country as a whole reported more Catholics than Protestants (12.3 million compared to 9.8 million) every province except Quebec and neighbouring New Brunswick reported a greater number of Protestants. In Canada, Catholics account for 46% of the population while 86% of the Quebec population is Catholic.

**Internal Variation**

Social characteristics such as age, gender, educational attainment and social class exert an influence over political attitudes and behaviour in Scotland and Quebec in much the same way that such factors affect voting and participation in other western democracies (Halman and Nevitte 1996). While certain characteristics correlate with levels of participation, they do not represent the main cleavages within political life. For some, this lack of attention has masked a serious imbalance of power that has yet to receive its proper attention (Brown, Breitenbach and Myers 1994, Breitenbach 1993, Yuval Davis 1997). Part of the reason for the low salience of these characteristics could have something to do with difficulties facing the creation of communities around gender and age that have not been experienced by those creating communities around region, religion and linguistic background. A brief examination of three relevant cleavages within Scotland and Quebec emphasises that the two case studies should not be considered as monolithic entities. The examination also highlights that despite the underlying diversity within Scotland and Quebec, the size, pattern and influence of these differences do not provide mirror images of state of health as good, fairly good or not so good. 57% of Scots indicated that their health was good, compared to 55% for Great Britain (Office of National Statistics 1999).
heterogeneity. The level and pattern of homogeneity within each nation must be taken into account when determining the relationship between national identity and political culture.

**Regionalism**

Scottish political research often stresses the importance of regional variation with respect to political attitudes and behaviour. The distribution of economic resources and wealth, from the more prosperous central belt and oil-rich Aberdeen to the economically-depressed highlands and islands, is linked to geography and the related factor of economic activity. Residents in the low-density highlands and islands, where the majority of Scotland’s Gaelic speakers reside, are harder hit by increases in petrol prices than those in the urban south. The Shetland Islands are closer to Norway than they are to Edinburgh, which remains a £250 flight away. As a result, perceptions of difference in Scotland are compounded by the geographic and economic dictates of regional location. For consistently under-performing areas, economic disparity, when added to geographical distance, adds to perceptions of dislocation. The relationship between power and economic performance explains, in part, the rivalry between Edinburgh and Glasgow, Scotland two largest cities. While the rivalry manifests itself in the form of popular culture competitions between the two cities, from magazine reports on which city produces a better quality of life to television commercials advertising the frequent rail-links between the two cities, economic disparity and the perception that as the seat of Parliament Edinburgh gets a better deal, point to a more serious perception of dislocation in Glasgow. In 1998 the city was declared a jobless blackspot worthy of additional funding under new Labour’s New Deal (Scotland Office 2000). Furthermore, despite the two-week relocation of the Parliament allowing the Church of Scotland to hold its general assembly in its own building, Glasgow has not met with great success in its efforts to house elements of the political system within its borders. The presence of the Royal Museum of Scotland, National Gallery, National Portrait Gallery, to name a few, reinforces Rosie’s argument that part of

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3 A flight from Lerwick to Edinburgh costs approximately the same as one from Glasgow to Toronto.
London’s financial success lies in the capital’s ability to house British institutions that provide only capital residents with jobs (Rosie 2000)\(^4\).

Within Quebec, a friendly rivalry between Montreal, Canada’s second largest city, and Quebec City, the provincial capital, occupies much less space in the public debate. As in Scotland, the smaller, and more eastern city is the capital although the population statistics for the two Canadian cities are approximately double the size of the Scottish counterparts. Part of this reason stems from the presence of a multicultural and multilingual population that distinguishes Montreal from the rest of the province. By measures of ethnicity, mother tongue and language of use, Montreal’s heterogeneity stands in stark contrast to the provincial capital, let alone other smaller cities within the province (Statistics Canada 1999). Quebec as a province hosts a visible minority population comparable in proportion to Manitoba - six and seven percent respectively. That said, the proportion of Montreal residents who were not born in Canada stands at twenty percent, approximately half the rate in Toronto, Canada’s largest city. Of the other urban centres in Quebec the proportions of immigrants range from 0.4 percent in Chicoutimi-Jonquière to 2.1 in Sherbrooke (Statistics Canada 1999).

As in Scotland, economic activity ranges throughout the province. The nationalist Lac Saint-Jean region, which contains Chicoutimi-Jonquière, records an unemployment rate for 1999 of 11.3, while the jobless rate in Trois Rivières stands at 11.2. Both rates are not only higher than the capital’s rate of 8.4 but represent greater rates of joblessness than St John’s, the capital of perennially depressed Newfoundland. Unemployment rates in Montreal and Sherbrooke fall between these two poles. The cities of Quebec have five of the seven highest urban unemployment rates in Canada. As in the case of Scotland, the concentrated population in the southern portion of the nation, in this case, along the St Lawrence River, affects the location of industry and employment prospects. Almost 80 percent of the population

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\(^4\) The capital also contains the Scottish Agricultural Museum, Scottish Mining Museum, Scottish Museums Council, and the Scottish Vintage Bus Museum in addition to the Scotland Office, Scottish Arts Council, Scottish Charities Office, Scottish Higher Education Funding, Scottish Law Commission and various consulates for foreign countries.
of Quebec lives in the fertile St Lawrence Lowlands next to the River. Inaugurated in 1959 the Seaway was considered the main entry point to the North American continent and links the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Lakes. The north of the province is sparsely populated. The northernmost five federal constituencies, for example, occupy 1,133,243 km², representing just over ten percent of the total Canadian land mass, or almost three quarters of Quebec’s territory. Approximately 370,000 individuals live in these five constituencies. Thus, an area almost five times larger than the UK and fifteen times larger than Scotland houses the population of Edinburgh. The concentration of population, economic and political resources obviously undermines the perceived national homogeneity in Scotland and Quebec.

Religion
While it would be churlish to compare the sectarian violence in Northern Ireland to the relationship between Protestants and Catholics in Scotland, the west coast of the nation has witnessed its share of sectarian difficulties (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Devine 1998, Devine 2000). A declining church attendance, credited with removing much of the doctrinal salience of religion, has not vitiated the often fierce violence erupting at football games in Glasgow and Edinburgh, where each of the two local teams represent different religious communities. For the most part, however, the relationship between religious community and political power has determined voting behaviour rather than inter-personal friendships. As in Scotland, the proportion of the population belonging to minority communities is concentrated within Quebec. That almost 90% of the population is Catholic at once exacerbates the perception of minority status but minimises the potential for inter-community conflict given the disproportion size of one vis-à-vis the rest. That said, anti-semitism experienced by the province’s Jewish population in the first half of the twentieth century points to the link between religious belief and access to political power. Both anglophones and francophones expressed intolerant views although it is worth noting that neither fascism nor racial intolerance should be considered to have been dominant.

5 The five constituencies are Abitibi, Charlevoix, Jonquière, Manicougan and Roberval.
and majority views outside certain circles (Chartrand 1997). That said, the existence of public examples has received continued attention in academic and journalistic works (Richler 1991). The oft-quoted Abbé Groulx is recorded as stating “il est impossible de piler, an Allemagne, sur la queue de cette chienne de juiverie, sans qu’on entende japper au Canada” (Chartrand 1997). The position of Abbé Lionel Groulx in Quebec society tends to polarise the active religious organisations if not their members. The campaign by B’nai Brith to remove the name of a man who openly advocated intolerance, has met with frustration, not least from former Quebec Liberal leader and Devoir editor Claude Ryan. The nationalist newspaper Le Devoir, never with a circulation much above 17 000 in the period before WWII provided in the 1930s and 40s additional examples of anti-semitism (Chartrand 1997). Anti-semitism within Quebec manifested itself in the early part of the twentieth century as an opposition to immigration. Within the anglophone community, McGill university, founded in 1821 from the estate of Scottish merchant James McGill, enforced quotas for Jewish students until the end of World War II (Frost 1984). More recently, the Muslim population, again concentrated in Montreal, has encountered difficulties with cultural intolerance. Young Muslim girls, for example, have been prevented, on occasion, from wearing the hijab in school. Thus, while the much greater homogeneity of religious belief in Quebec mitigates the potential size of any religious minority, thus minimising potential inter-community conflict, evidence of religious intolerance, permitted both by the State and by citizens, highlights the significance of religion as a relevant political cleavage.

**Language**

In Quebec, the dominance of anglophone merchants within Montreal established an artificial boundary not only between the city and the rest of the province, but also physically divided the city. The relationship between the anglophone and francophone communities in Quebec has received extensive treatment from both anglophone and

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6 The Faculty of Arts at McGill set higher entry standards for Jewish students - 750 instead of 600 on the entrance requirements, while the Faculties of Law and of Medicine employed quota systems (Frost 1984).
francophone academics (Caldwell and Waddell 1982, Legault 1992, Scowen 1991). The particular reaction of the anglophone community to calls for constitutional change receives greater treatment in chapters four and five.

Unlike the status of French in Quebec, Gaelic is not an official language in Scotland. Equivalent to approximately one percent of the population, Scotland's Gaelic speakers are concentrated on the nation's north-west coast. By comparison, almost one quarter of the Welsh population speaks Welsh. In addition, the status of Scots within the English-speaking political system remains a contested issue. Notwithstanding the cultural contributions of Scots authors, poets and song writers, the language or dialect shows few signs of gaining official status in the Parliament. A Spring 2000 Gaelic debate in the Scottish Parliament highlights the efforts of the newly-elected politicians to embrace the Gaelic community although the small proportion of MSPs who could actually participate in the debate underlines the difficulties that the community faces. Scotland lacks the spectrum of intercommunity antagonism among the linguistic groups in Quebec, in part because of size, and in part because language has not been considered an important element of national identity in Scotland.

As this section has emphasised, national boundaries often imply an air of comparability that is not always present. In both Scotland and Quebec nationalists and separatists perceive themselves to be cut-off from meaningful influence despite the proximity of some of their Members of Parliament to positions of power and authority. This sense of political impoverishment coupled with occasional measures of slower-than-average economic growth, creates a powerful perception of difference among sections of the population. In the case of internal diversity and demographic similarity, it is the sociological importance of the distinction that guarantees its salience and influence.

7 Additional research examines the links between regional accents and perceptions of inferiority in Scotland (Miller 1996).
POLITICAL CULTURE IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC

The development of a Western and liberal political culture provides the context for the Scottish and Quebec debates. Whatever differences do exist with the rest of the United Kingdom and Canada, the diverse regions of both States possess similar democratic structures, elect governments on the backs of similar turnout levels, view politicians, judges, journalists, teachers and other authorities with similar levels of trust and cynicism (Gwyn 1995). The argument that either Scotland or Quebec operates within a significantly different political culture must take note that at best, the difference, while still significant, is one of nuance within a relatively homogenous debate. Both the size of the difference, and the underlying pattern of difference, receive treatment in this section. Despite the varying reactions to new-right policies, or attempts to preserve programmes linked to the post-war social democratic Welfare State, the room to manoeuvre within the Occidental political culture is not significant. As Gwyn notes “The British electorate is no better informed, more interested in politics, or more politically active than most other Western democratic electorates” (Gwyn 1995). Cross-national studies performed by academics in a variety of locations produce surprisingly similar results (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Nevitte 1996; Halman and Nevitte 1996; Nevitte and Gibbins 1990). Whatever gap existed among first-world Western nations when Almond and Verba began the fieldwork for The Civic Culture has been closed by years of unprecedented economic and political security, an increasingly powerful global communications network, international trade and political alliances.

Regional differences between Scotland and the rest of Britain are tied to the unitary parliamentary institutions that have governed politics since the union in 1707. The Scottish Grand Committee, Scottish Question Time and Scottish Affairs Select Committee all sought to allow for the expression and debate of a distinctly Scottish voice within the Westminster system. For English MPs, the standing committee on

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8 For the purposes of chapters three and four, political culture refers to subjective orientations to the political system, both as it affects interaction with the State and interaction among citizens.
regional affairs established under standing order 117 created the same opportunity although the committee has not been standing since 1978. Despite the presence of a different local government structure, a Secretary of State to orchestrate matters of administrative devolution and adapted elements within the Westminster system, politics in Scotland operated in a similar sphere and manner to other areas in Britain. A unified civil service served the Scottish Office and Whitehall as one bureaucracy, further emphasising the links between the Scottish political system and Westminster (Kellas 1989). Those who argue that a distinctly Scottish system existed before devolution point to the existence of the adapted parliamentary venues, the separate Scottish conferences for political parties and, perhaps most importantly, the political debate the occurred within civil society. Influenced as it was by the surviving institutions and the ‘Scottish values’ of both civil society and the public, Scottish political debate took on a different timbre to that in England. Furthermore, the relative autonomy of the civil service and indeed local government allowed for the implementation of distinctly Scottish policies that were not followed south of the border. As a result, although the uniformity of institutions may have served to focus public perceptions of trust, efficacy and satisfaction on the behaviour of elected representatives in London, and although Scottish politicians operated within a unified British system, Scottish political debate prior to 1999 discussed different issues and proposed different solutions to that in the rest of the UK.⁹ Faced with this combination of separate institutions and unified activity research on Scottish political culture has sought to determine whether the similarities lead to a homogeneous political culture within Britain, or whether the consistent efforts to adapt the system to the Scottish situation have created a distinct political culture in Scotland (Kellas 1989, MacCormick 1998).

⁹ Since 1999, the existence of a Scottish Parliament has created a distinctly Scottish political system, operating under different democratic rules and discussing different political issues from Westminster. Because the data on Scottish political culture deals with the period before 1999, it is essential to understand how the system then operated, in order to properly examine the research.
Scottish Political Culture

Within early works, Scottish political culture received little attention perhaps only because the unit of analysis was always Great Britain (Almond and Verba 1963, Almond and Verba 1989, Hill 1990, Kavanagh 1972, Kavanagh 1989). In part, this is because some of the statistical data used to measure such attitudes was only available in aggregate Nation State form, a fact which eases the comparability between States but does little to aid an understanding of the micro processes at work. This approach to data collection remains today in such collections as The Eurobarometer polls, World Values studies and ISSP data, all of which rely on data measured at the State level, while over-sampling slightly for the regions. In the 1995 ISSP survey on national identity this meant that 96 cases were from Scotland, out of the almost 1000 used for Great Britain. Of the available British-wide data more attention has been placed on urban/rural divisions, the influence on social class, religion and age than on national or regional variations. That this diminishes the attention to whatever distinctions do and do not exist is usually justified by a) the small Scottish population within Great Britain as a whole and b) the negligible distinction between Scottish (as a whole) and British (as a whole) political culture.

Three themes, and one key question, dominate political culture research on Scotland. Firstly, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, analyses of political attitudes and behaviour in the Britain attempted to respond to the vision of English political culture promoted in Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture. A second theme tracks value change in Britain, particularly the rise of post-materialism at the expense of materialist values. The third emphasis highlights divisions within British political culture while the fourth source of debate juxtaposes alternative explanations for Scottish distinctiveness, emphasising the various influences of economic productivity, institutions and identity over Scottish political attitudes. An analysis of recent statistics from the 1992 and 1997 election studies and recent opinion poll data supplements the examination of each debate in turn. The works and data examined below concentrate on traditional

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10 Other efforts to examine political culture in Britain restricted themselves to analyses of England (McKenzie and Silver 1967, Rose 1965).
measures of political culture such as trust and efficacy, and more recent measures of post-materialism. If subjective orientations of individuals can be directed at the State – its structures, policy outputs, symbols – or at fellow citizens, the following section concentrates on the State-oriented attitudes of citizens in Scotland and the rest of Britain. In an effort to highlight perceptions of political influence, integration and inclusion, the section emphasises the changing nature of political and personal trust, efficacy, satisfaction and confidence. Examinations of voting and referendum preferences, as influenced by socio-economic characteristics of individuals, policy preferences and rational choice theories receive attention in chapters four and five. The relative stability of political attitudes, in the face of changing voter preferences, (Denver 1994, Rose and McAllister 1990) suggests that such a strategy would be worthwhile. As such, this chapter limits its examination to attitudes concerning the State and its institutions within the Britain and Scotland. The following section excludes policy preferences, support for social democracy or nationalist options in an attempt to allow for a clear comparison with Quebec.

Several analyses of political culture in Britain have cited working class deference, homogeneity, and capitalism as central tenets of British political attitudes (Almond and Verba 1963, Rose 1965). For Rose, the presence of a national identity that preceded industrialisation bound a public that divided itself solely according to class (Rose 1965). Thirty years later Eatwell argued the overlapping influences of Anglo-Saxon invaders, Norman conquest and the Industrial Revolution have created a culture characterised by its spirit of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ (Eatwell 1997). Hill concurs in part, arguing that, whether ‘gentlemanly’ or not, the capitalist system has dominated British political culture, emphasising the accumulationist tendencies and individualism in which Thatcherism flourished (Hill 1990). In the first quantitative examination of political attitudes in Britain, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba emphasised the ideal-type blend of political deference and activism that existed in England. With little attention to the possible regional variations within British political culture, Almond and Verba’s original assessment of a homogeneous culture
typified by its uniform support for authority has formed the basis of future attitude research (Almond and Verba 1963)

Responses to *The Civic Culture* were plagued, initially, by a lack of survey data on British political attitudes. Until the creation of the annual British Social Attitudes Survey in 1983, political culture research depended on private data collection carried out by individual academics. Thus, after 1959, when Almond and Verba began their work, no new data covered similar ground until Alan Marsh’s study more than ten years later (Marsh 1977). Although not directly criticising Almond and Verba for the conclusions reached in their work, Marsh notes that “political trust is at a much lower ebb than would seem healthy from Almond and Verba’s view at least, for a democratic society” (Marsh 1977), effectively questioning the claim that Britain closely approximated an ideal-type political culture. Further works suggested Almond and Verba overestimated the deferential nature of the British population (Kavanagh 1972, 1980; Topf and Heath 1987, Jowell and Topf 1989; Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; McKenzie and Silver 1967; Gwyn 1995, Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996). Researchers appear divided on the rate of value change concerning deference. For some, Britain has always been a less deferential society than Almond and Verba suggested, (Topf 1989, Heath and Topf 1987, Kavanagh 1980) while for others, the existing level of deference could merely be the result of changing attitudes to government (Marsh 1977, Beer 1982). Of the studies noting an absence of deference and efficacy, most works associated the decline with current decreasing political satisfaction. Kavanagh and Beer both claimed that the decreased levels of deference compromised confidence in the system (Kavanagh 1980) thus increasing the likelihood of a system breakdown (Beer 1982). Gwyn agrees that British levels of deference appear lower than originally estimated, but adds that this poses no threat to the stability of the British political system. British levels of deference, confidence, satisfaction and efficacy approximate European levels, suggesting that realism, rather than political cynicism, characterises the British electorate (Gwyn 1995).
The following tables track the changing support for governments and representatives after Almond and Verba's first study to the recent British Election Study in 1997. Including data from Marsh's Political Action study, the table includes data from various years of on-going attitude surveys. Begun in 1983, the British Social Attitudes tracks the policy preferences and views of the State among the British electorate. Sample sizes of approximately 3,600 respondents allow for an analysis of political attitudes according to socio-economic data. Scottish respondents form approximately ten percent of the overall sample. In comparison, the British Election Survey began in 1974 and contains a sample size of approximately 5000. Separate Scottish data, which will be examined later, was collected in 1974, 1979, 1992 and 1997. Fieldwork for both surveys is currently performed by Social and Community Planning Research in London, now renamed the National Centre for Policy Research. The Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends also participates in the collection of election survey data.

Table 3.1 Political Culture in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People like me have no say in what government does</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and government so complicated that cannot understand what is going on</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs lose touch with the people quickly</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties only interested in votes, not opinions</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British government of any party cannot be trusted to place needs of country above interests of own political party</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The statistics show a slight decrease in efficacy and government confidence. Most strikingly, however, analyses of these numbers illustrate a decreased trust in the British government regardless of party. An additional example highlights this trend. A comparison of opinion polls appearing in The Independent points to the low regard with which individuals now view politicians. In 1973, when respondents were asked whether they felt "politicians are in politics for what they can get out of it" less than
half, 39%, agreed. In 1996 the proportion agreeing had risen to two thirds (Independent 1996).

A related issue concerns the view of public institutions within society. Senses of confidence, satisfaction and social trust are bound up in attitudes concerning the functioning of institutions such as schools and hospitals and performance reviews of elites like the police. Given that most individuals do not possess a drastically different value set for both social and political activities, a brief analysis of perceptions of institutional confidence highlights several preferences within British political culture (Curtice and Jowell 1995).

### Table 3.2 Confidence in British Public Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%Think are well run</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>% change '83-'94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>+8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BBC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manufacturing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>+22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Press</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* change from 1987 to 1994 Source: Curtice and Jowell 1995

The table shows that despite decreased confidence in politicians, political parties and the political system, individuals possess stable measures of confidence in their social institutions. Over a ten year period, public confidence in several institutions increased. Whether the table would have captured increased variance in attitudes if data was gathered over different governments is unknown. Furthermore, whether the perceptions of individuals are affected by understandings of the relationship between the running of, for example, the NHS or BBC and the government, remains beyond the remit of this study. For now, the table highlights that declining confidence and satisfaction does not apply to all social institutions, but in Britain as a whole, is reserved for the political system.
Not surprisingly, the increase in cynicism and declining trust in government so characteristic throughout Western democracies, has asserted itself within Scotland. In his analysis of opinion polls for Scottish Affairs, McCrone notes that significant proportions of the electorate believe the standards of public institutions have fallen. While obviously tracking different elements, public views of institutions, whether expressing confidence or dissatisfaction, tap similar elements of dissatisfaction. The monarchy, government and legal system each receive low marks while significant proportions also believe that moral standards throughout the country, and particularly for young people, have deteriorated (82% and 83% respectively) (McCrone 1993). The trend does not vary significantly from year to year. In 1994, nine out of ten voters expressed dissatisfaction with the government and almost eight out of ten felt politicians should observe higher standards of behaviour. The media did not escape disapproval, as fully 72% expressed dissatisfaction with media interference in the private lives of politicians. That said, over half the electorate felt politicians should be dismissed if they have extra-marital affairs (McCrone 1994). The time scale of the studies analysed by McCrone and presented in Table 3.3 suggest that it would be unwise to compare them too closely, the apparently incompatibility between the general increase in satisfaction among British citizens and the decreased satisfaction in social institutions in Scotland warrants further attention. Although beyond the remit of the dissertation, it would be interesting to determine whether the voting patterns of the Scots so distanced the electorate from the political system that perceptions of social institutions were affected as a result.

In both Scotland and Britain as a whole, researchers have sought to account for these political attitudes by correlating preferences with social characteristics such as partisan support, religion, social class, level of education and home region. The oft-quoted link between education and political competence, once a staple of political

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11 Eighty-five percent believe the standards of monarchy have fallen while 76% and 65% express similar opinions of government and the legal system. The trend is similar across all partisan and social groups although Conservative supporters express a tendency to defend their government. That said, even 60% of Conservatives feel the moral standards of government have fallen in last 10 years, a decade marked by Conservative rule.
culture studies, has been questioned by Kavanagh (Kavanagh 1989). Likewise, the importance of social class no longer exerts a powerful influence over political sympathies. Rather, the subjective perception of class, rather than the objective markers of class such as income or occupation, exerts a greater role over political attitudes (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999). The reasons for the changing influence of social characteristics receive greater attention in the following section, which tracks the changing nature of British political attitudes in the post-war period.

The second theme dominating British political culture research involves the context-dependent work achieved by Ron Inglehart preceding his 1977 book *The Silent Revolution*. As previously stated, Inglehart's thesis linked levels of unprecedented economic and political stability with an increasingly post-materialist approach to politics in the West. The second wave of political culture research emphasises the nature and rate of value change in Britain, with particular emphasis on the differing levels of materialists and post-materialists.

In their 1987 examination of British political culture Anthony Heath and Richard Topf examine the series of social changes linking Britain to a Western trend of upward mobility, increased educational attainment and rising affluence previously cited in academic literature (Inglehart 1977, Heath and Topf 1987). The authors support the conclusions reached by Marsh (1977) and Beer (1982) that the British electorate exhibits patterns of declining political deference, but then, as others have argued, trust and efficacy levels were never particularly high. The authors do not distinguish between attitudes to politicians, now marked by an insistent cynicism, and attitudes to the political system. According to their own measures of political behaviour, distrust in politicians has not acted as a bar to political action. This suggests that although deference is in decline, confidence levels in the system remain relatively unchanged. In a second layer of analysis, Heath and Topf claim that the social changes experienced in Britain have increased personal levels of self-confidence and destabilised traditional patterns of partisan alignment. Rising confidence levels, and a
corollary increase in the demands placed on governments co-exist with a shift in preferences from material to quality of life issues. Thus, as expectations of government performance rise, the markers by which government success is measured shift away from traditional indicators such as job creation and unemployment. The inability of governments to meet the moving target of demands could explain the defection of former political activists to alternative forms of political participation. The conclusions reached by Heath and Topf pose a familiar problem for political culture analysis. In their work, a false distinction presents itself between political culture and political behaviour for participation in the political sphere is used throughout the chapter as a proxy for the stability of political culture. Heath and Topf claim that “political culture has undergone a transformation similar to that which we have seen in political behaviour”. Throughout, measures of political behaviour are used to highlight changes in political culture, the two are used interchangeably. As a result, the observed transformation of political culture does not mirror the change in political behaviour, but rather, is measured by it.\footnote{Factor analysis, or principal axis components analysis, poses several challenges to the researcher. Notwithstanding the importance of gauging inter-relationships among variables, the empirical data neither replaces solid theory, nor allows for the data collection process, both of which could affect the results (Davis and Dale 1994, Kritzer 1996, Schmidt and Hunter 1995).}

In their analysis of the 1992 British Rights Survey, Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff adapt Inglehart’s 13-point post-materialism scale (Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996).\footnote{According to the scale, support for more say on the job, a less impersonal society, more say in the government, having ideas count, freedom of speech and support for more beautiful cities count as post-materialist values. Materialist values include support for strong defence forces, government...} Ranging from questions dealing with traditional, or materialist preoccupations with law, order and stability to questions probing more ephemeral preferences such as self-actualisation and the physical environment the Inglehart scale seeks to classify populations as either materialist or post-materialist. The British Rights Survey, however, concentrates on public support for tolerance and intolerance of different behaviours and the provision of entrenched protection for collective groups. The questionnaire also covers traditional measures of political culture such as trust and efficacy. Based on approximately 2 000 interviews with the electorate and
1000 interviews with politicians, the study attempts to determine whether regions or collective groups within Britain possess coherent political cultures.

Table 3.3 British Rights Survey 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of ...</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>respect for authority</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law and order</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defence</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free speech</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerating different lifestyles and beliefs</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional ideas of right and wrong</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>following God's will</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic protection</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender equality</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homosexual equality</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help for the disabled</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reducing unemployment</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taking care of the needy</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-reliance</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual achievements</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holding down inflation</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cutting taxes</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achieving economic growth</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights protected by ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>back-bench MPs</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local councils</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tabloids</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>broadsheets</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade unions</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>churches</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British courts</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European courts</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996, Sample size= 2,066

Although the results highlight the congruity between the British and Scottish electorates on all measures of tolerance, they also reveal a contradictory web of attitudes among the British electorate. Relatively strong support for tolerating different lifestyles and beliefs co-exist with strong support for traditional ideas of right and wrong. The British electorate appears sympathetic to the needs of the disabled,

commitment to fighting rising prices, a stable economy, the fight against crime, economic growth and maintenance of order (Inglehart 1990)
unemployed and the needy. In both Scotland and the rest of Britain, there appears little confidence in the ability of public institutions to protect the rights of individuals.

The dynamics of value change, or in the case of singular studies, the particular conditions that led to current value compositions remains a key element of analysis. If, as Inglehart suggests, economic and social prosperity account for a greater level of post-materialism, the uneven distribution of wealth throughout Britain warrants close attention. For while some studies have reinforced the homogenous view of the British electorate, others have sought to emphasise the existence of distinct and coherent value clusters within Britain. Thus, a third theme in British political culture seeks to uncover regional or national differences within patterns of political attitudes. Works addressing Scottish political culture have, in the main, emphasised the similarities in political attitudes across Great Britain and argued that if any difference exists it is a) small and b) a result of socio-economic factors. The third theme within the literature emphasises the generally uniform distribution of values and attitudes throughout Great Britain.

Dependent on much larger sample sizes than previously gathered, the comparative analysis of variant political cultures in Britain began with the onset of the British Social Attitudes Survey in 1983. The British Social Attitudes Survey, in addition to Election Surveys and the individual research projects of academics throughout Britain, have extended the original analysis of British political culture received in Almond and Verba’s 1963 *The Civic Culture*. Originally praised as a propitious combination of deferential efficacy and democratic participation, political culture in Britain has undergone an apparently global transformation characterised by declining levels of trust, efficacy, satisfaction, confidence and deference. Attention to Scottish political attitudes, the extent to which they differ from the norm and the way in which they do so, is limited to a single chapter in five of the sixteen annual reports thus produced. A survey of each of these chapters highlights the general similarity in political and social attitudes across Britain and demonstrates that Scottish deviation,
albeit to a limited degree, has consistently pointed to greater support for State-led social policy. In a series of chapters for the annual British Social Attitudes Survey, John Curtice tracks the differences between the North and South of Britain. While these geographical divisions do not correlate with national borders, Curtice argues that socio-economic conditions in the North of Britain serve to reinforce whatever institutional factors might create a distinct Scottish culture.

In his first article examining political attitudes throughout Great Britain, Curtice emphasises the uneven distribution of partisan support on the mainland (Curtice 1988). The use of voting statistics to measure political culture would likely be considered an affront to those who claim political attitudes and political behaviours are subject to different influences. Nevertheless, Curtice claims proof of different attitude constructs can be found in the diverse voting habits in north and south Britain. Labour’s success in the Northeast of England and in Scotland can be traced to similar regional variations in economic performance. Curtice claims alternative explanations of partisan preference, in particular support for a neighbourhood effect influenced by daily social interaction, prove less useful that its proponents suggest (Books and Prysby 1991). In particular, Curtice claims that neighbourhoods are often chosen as sites of residence on the basis of pre-existing attitudes that exert an equal influence on partisan support. He also notes that the differences in economic optimism survive attempts to control for regional variations in economic prosperity.

For Curtice, the congruity of views with regard to services provided by the State disappears with the introduction of orientations to market forces. Although those in the North and South of the country tend to hold similar views of education and health, differing economic circumstances tend to polarise views of economic expectations. As in Curtice’s 1992 article, most of the indicators included in the analysis deal with economic expectations and perceptions of economic reality for survey participants. By measures of unemployment and average income, Scotland is quite different from England. That said, examinations of national difference disguise the regional

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14 A separate survey has been dedicated to the analysis of political attitudes in Northern Ireland since
variations within England. A prosperous South-East tends to over-emphasise the economic divergence between the North and South of Britain. Despite these regional, rather than national, differences, Curtice’s analysis seeks to solve this problem by relying on north and south rather than Scotland and England as units of analysis. By attempting to compare the economic attitudes of two regions whose primary difference is one of economic activity, Curtice runs the risk of overemphasising the lack of coherence within British political culture. In general, the 1992 article paints a picture of increasing pessimism within the British electorate. Unfortunately, the lack of attention to such measures as civic interaction, trust, efficacy, satisfaction and confidence suggests that the article does not provide an accurate measure of political culture as such but rather chronicles the varied orientations to the economic policy followed by the government and the extent to which different populations are willing to tolerate State intrusion in their lives.

The most recent analysis of political culture provides a more comprehensive examination of political orientations within Britain (Curtice and Jowell, 1995). In particular, the chapter seeks to prove how declining efficacy matters. The authors link decreased deference and the current government’s agenda for constitutional change. Thus, calls from some organisations such as Charter 88 for a Bill of Rights, the introduction of various forms of proportional representation and reform of the House of Lords find their roots in changing levels of public deference. The authors distinguish between personal and political efficacy so that their examination is not in direct conflict with conclusions reached by Parry in his 1992 examination of political participation in Britain (Parry 1992) Although Parry linked low personal efficacy with unconventional political activity, Curtice and Jowell emphasise the decreased political efficacy encourages a will to reform the existing system rather than prompting more radical solutions. Other research has relied on the diverse sources of quantitative data from which to examine political culture.

1989.
In his analysis of the 1992 British Rights Study, Malcolm Dickson identified a significant difference between the attitudes of Scottish and English on eleven out of eighteen items included in his study (Dickson, 1996). Relying on the same survey data as Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff (Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996), Dickson argues Scottish voters hold consistently different policy preferences. The indicators used by Dickson, chosen as representatives of policy and partisan preferences, were intended to highlight the existence of a Scottish dimension to politics, media, sports, arts and civil society. Noting that "the degree of similarity outweighs any small empirical difference" he identified greater Scottish support (with a 99% confidence interval) reducing unemployment, providing help for the disabled, protecting ethnic minorities, strengthening law and order, taking care of the needy, and consistently, a smaller support for self-reliance. Most measures seem to indicate a greater willingness among Scottish residents for a pro-active and implicated State. The heightened belief in governmental responsibility could be linked to a greater sense of cohesion fostered by a strong civil society, or a reaction to years of perceived democratic neglect on the part of Westminster. The study excludes measures of political behaviour from its analysis and presents little explanation for the different political min-dset in Scotland. The greater willingness to accept state activity does seem to provide proof that Prime Minister Thatcher's programme of limited government was anathema to the Scottish political culture. This willingness has signification implications for the newly established Scottish Parliament. In particular, the belief that the political system must take a more pro-active role in the social welfare of the population adds to the expectations surrounding an institution whose very establishment is already imbued with the correction of past injustices.

Lastly, the issue of variant cultures receives two different treatments at the hands of Scottish political academics. While a clear division of works into one of two camps remains impossible, the tendency of works to emphasise cultural and institutional factors versus economic and structural (ie centre-periphery) factors provides a useful tool of analysis with which to examine research on Scottish political culture. Here, one must distinguish between the relative importance of cultural or economic factors...
over the acquisition of political attitudes as can be determined by an analysis of available statistical data, and the perceptions, held by the population, as to the degree of influence of one over the other (Blondel 1999). In other words, just because religious activity does not influence political attitudes does not mean that a separate Church of Scotland has not reinforced a sense of difference in Scotland. The popular conception that cultural factors distinguish Scotland from England, even in the face of economic and statistical evidence to the contrary, matters little in the game of political capital played by separatist and unionist nationalists.

Those firm believers in the influence of Scottish civil society, its distinct institutions as protected following the Acts of Union, have had two recourses: to lament the lack of available data and to correct it, or to claim that a level of distinctness such as that which distinguishes the Scots and the English could never be measured in the first place. Malcolm Dickson's recent efforts to highlight the varying influence of institutions and particular socio-economic circumstance is an apt example of the first while *Politics and Society in Scotland*, by Alice Brown, David McCrone and Lindsay Paterson, is an example of the second. Brown et al argue, for example that people do not list nationalism and self-determination as important to them and prefer to mention education and health only because their views of independence and self-determination are already bound up in their views of education and health. Thus, despite what one might say, individuals really do find independence and self-determination important to their daily lives. The difference could be characterised as one of data-driven versus theory-driven analyses of Scottish political culture.

In *The Scottish Electorate*, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge outlined three possible explanations for voting behaviour in Scotland: rational choice, national identity and welfare rationality (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999). In other words, the personal economic motivations of individuals, their sense of attachment to the nation or Scottishness, or desired social benefits could each be responsible for structuring political behaviour in Scotland. The Church of Scotland and a distinct education system, for example, could create a democratic intellect and
egalitarian spirit in Scottish society. Despite the minimal effect on partisan preference and preferred constitutional option, political attitudes show little correlation with identity. For Glasgow academic James Kellas, despite the importance of these institutions, identity is seen as a poor predictor of both attitudes and partisan preference (Kellas 1989). For their part, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge argue for a welfare rationality, that in their support for a Scottish Parliament voters were motivated by the potential benefits to society as a whole (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999).

Practitioners of rational choice theories, however, have expended much energy debunking the idea that socialism and egalitarianism in Scotland stem from institutions within society. Dickson claims any difference stems from socio-economic particularities of the region, rather than from identity. Scots are not inherently more socialist, but rather vote according to their needs. The structure of society, with its higher dependence on public sector employment, council housing and heavy industry, creates needs that were traditionally met by the (Old) Labour party (Dickson 1994, Dickson 1996). Similarly, Curtice argues that the few differences between Scotland and England can account for a regionalism that has been increasingly salient since 1955. The North-South divide is exacerbated by rising employment and a resultant pessimism in economic periphery of Britain, although Curtice points out that the psychological divide influences attitudes as much as economic circumstance (Curtice 1988, Curtice 1992, Curtice 1996).15

Works examining political culture in Scotland concentrate on two key issues: the relative difference between Scottish and English political attitudes, and the effect of identity on certain attitudes. The treatment of these two themes can be divided into three key camps: early examinations of civic culture in Scotland, Edinburgh-based examinations and Strathclyde – British Social Attitudes works. Such a division is possible because of the small number of academics working in the area and the tendency of teams of individuals to collaborate on numerous projects.
All sources agree that identity does not possess unlimited explanatory power in the construction of values, attitudes and behaviour in Scotland. Research by Kavanagh and Miller continues in The Civic Culture tradition by highlighting the deferential nature of the general public (Kavanagh 1972, Kavanagh 1989, Miller, Timpson and Lessnoff 1996). Working-class Toryism is examined much in the way that Canadian works have sought to explain the existence of Red Tories in Canadian political culture. These British-wide examinations form the backdrop against Scottish visions of political culture.

Sociological examinations of political culture in Scotland have been limited to overviews of the distribution of values and attitudes in Great Britain and more recent statistical examinations of survey data. Previously, institutional analyses formed the bedrock of Scottish political culture research (Kellas 1989). One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Scottish system is the existence of four main political parties. The grafting of a social democratic spectrum onto a spectrum of political autonomy ensures that parties that hold consistent views on one spectrum act as a broad church for the other spectrum. For example, the Scottish National Party is relatively consistent in its support for independence, despite recent public disputes about the best way to attain greater political autonomy. This level of coherence on the national spectrum co-exists with a range of views within the party along a more traditional left-right spectrum. The roots of this division may be traced to the creation of the Scottish National Party in 1934 as an amalgam of nationalists from the left-wing independence movement. Similarly, Scottish Labour is relatively consistent in its social-democratic views, although the introduction of New Labour may detract from the former coherence. Despite a unity of purpose with respect to social policy, the party contains within its ranks members who hold a diverse array of opinions on the nationalist question ranging from unrepentant unionism to independence within Europe. Only the Conservative party remains internally consistent in its support for centre-right policies and a preference for unionism. This is not to say that the

15 Curtice's analysis sits easily with interpretations of nationalism which emphasise the role of
Conservative party, or indeed any of the four main parties operating within Scotland have held unchanging and consistent views towards the constitutional position of Scotland. The differing views of parties with regards to left-right politics and nationalism extend to views of the State. The influence of identity groups on views of parties appears in the statistical tables in chapter five.

If, according to original institutional analyses, the measure of Scottish distinctiveness was the separateness of its political parties, tables highlighting the relative congruity among party views present a mixed blessing. The absence of a striking difference between the views of the SNP, which lacks a sister party in England, and the three other British parties would suggest that Scottish politics holds little claim to distinguishing characteristics. On the other hand, a unity of views among party activists in Scotland could signal a coherence and different value set. This would be true were it not for the similar views among voters in the rest of Britain.

According to Pye and Verba, one of the major determinants of a sense of identity is historical (Pye and Verba 1965), namely, the way in which history has infused a people with a sense of common experience and sense of self. For Eatwell, diverse references to King Arthur and Boadicea, Robin Hood and the Dunkirk spirit, have coloured British political culture. The absence of such references in Scotland, in addition to the symbolic difference of national flags, patron saints, bank notes, sports teams, churches and governmental institutions reinforces a view of separateness in Scotland that filters through to political culture (Eatwell 1997). In the face of much evidence to the contrary, Scottish political culture is seen as distinct both because it is bounded by a sense of history and a set of contemporary institutions that ensure Scottish political debate occurs in a different forum that the wider British debate. The parameters of British political culture and identity, liberalism, democracy, presence in Europe, co-exist with the perception of distinct Scottish political life. The psychological borders erected before devolution have ensured that the population sees itself as interacting within a distinct political culture.
Québécois Political Culture

Political culture in Quebec depends in part on the cultural factors that distinguish the province from the rest of the country and in part on the institutions that structure political life in Quebec. The social context of the province, predominantly French, predominantly Catholic and, until recently, predominantly working class, has provided points of difference according to which political parties have defined themselves. The relative homogeneity of Quebec masks the formation of collective groups aligned with reinforcing markers of difference. Although current literature de-emphasises the influence of these divisions on daily social life, the political debates created by compounding cleavages still exert an influence over political attitudes, political behaviour and partisan preference. Thus, the relatively small Protestant community currently differs on the basis of language and, until recently, social class. The more noticeable presence of a small wealthy, English Protestant community in a working-class, French, Catholic society had significant ramifications for partisan strategy and voting behaviour. This cleavage in society, however, should not be confused with the presence of a subculture within Quebec. If cleavages form around dichotomous issues (support for language legislative, support for the Liberal Party, or even support for independence) this does not prove that the collectives possess a cohesive cluster of attitudes and behaviours that distinguish them from one another. Support for social initiatives of the government, for municipal politics, and for economic policy, are much less determined by social characteristics. With these arguments in mind the following section examines the influence of certain cleavages over political behaviour in Quebec, before examining the general spread of political orientations in the province.

As in Britain, research on political culture(s) in Canada first developed as an analysis of political attitudes and behaviour within the Nation-State. Only later did it provide in-depth analyses of regional or provincial sub-cultures or variations within that political culture. An examination of the key trends in Canadian political culture research highlights the elements which distinguish the research from, and tie it to,
political culture in the Scotland. As in Britain, three issues dominate Canadian political culture: the origins and nature of political attitudes in Canada; the increasing Americanisation of political attitudes throughout the country, and the existence of regional variants or sub cultures within Canada. Each issue highlights the way in which political attitudes in Quebec have developed differently, and often independently, of attitudes in the rest of Canada.

As stated in chapter three, all English-speaking democracies, bilingual Canada included, are liberal democracies. The basic values of popular sovereignty, political equality, majority rule, and protection of individual rights can be found in convention and constitution in Canada (Russell 1993). If, as Whittington and Van Loon argue, it is the "purity of [Western] commitment to liberalism that ultimately distinguishes their political cultures one from the other", the Canadian political culture contains some strikingly illiberal elements (Whittington and Van Loon 1995). The protection of collective rights for linguistic groups, first in the 1774 Quebec Act and later in the British North America Act 1867, and the subsequent recognition of collective rights for, among others, Aboriginal peoples, women, the aged and the disabled, in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms stands as a testament to the Canadian commitment to an integration of individual and collective rights. The co-existence of support for these seemingly opposing views dominates much of Canadian political culture research.

Absent from the initial Civic Culture study of political culture, Canadian examinations of political attitudes and behaviours escaped the reactive flood of literature based on Almond and Verba's conclusions. While behaviouralists in Britain, the United States and Germany absorbed or attacked the view of national culture, Canadian works developed in reaction to a work different in scope and in methodological outlook. Louis Hartz's 1964 The Founding of New Societies sparked a controversy in Canadian political science akin to influence of The Civic Culture (Hartz 1964). Hartz's work differed from that provided by Almond and Verba on a number of levels, not least the reliance on historiography and normative readings of political
development rather than an analysis of survey data. Claiming that political cultures of colonial societies owed much to the attitudes held by the fragment populations arriving from other, usually imperial, powers, Hartz’s work had much to offer a country which prided itself on being a nation of immigrants. Clearly this label means something different now, in a multicultural Canada, than it did then, when immigration often reinforced the British character of the country. The impact of these founding fragments depends on the particular segment arriving, the ideological evolution occurring at the point of departure and the point at which values in the new society congeal into a distinctive blend. The debate among different theoretical visions ceases upon arrival in the new society, where natural opponents have not yet formed. This process, by which what existed as a fragment in one culture becomes the reference point for a new culture, accounts for the marked differences among the English-speaking democracies. For Hartz, the middle-class liberalism of the Canadian and American settlers accounts for the less radical political system when compared to political system formed by working class Britons who departed for Australia after the Industrial Revolution. In addition, Hartz claimed that the seigneurial system of the ancien régime in New France, as installed by the rural settlers from pre-revolutionary France, led to a feudal fragment in the province of Quebec. The result, according to Hartz, is a blended Canadian political culture that is essentially liberal but contains ‘illiberal’ fragments. The magnitude and form of such illiberalism formed the focus of subsequent works in Canadian political culture research.

Applying Hartz’s theoretical framework, Kenneth McRae further analysed the dual fragments affecting English and French Canada. French Canada, influenced by its Catholic homogeneity and strong authority, was joined by a Loyalist population characterised by its ‘Lockean liberalism’ rather than its Tory streak (McRae 1964, McRae 1978). Nuances such as this, and the practice of comparing Canada and the United States in tandem which tends to emphasise the distance between the two countries at the expense of their overwhelming similarities, muddies what could be an illuminating investigation. Bound by efforts to “assert a [distinct] Canadian identity”,
studies of political culture sought improper models with which to establish a comparison (McRae 1978). McRae’s gauntlet set the tone for further analyses.

In his adaptation of Hartz’ theory Gad Horowitz sought to identify the ways in which the Canadian political culture differs from American political culture (Horowitz 1966). Arguing that Hartz underestimated the differences between the Canadian and American value sets, Horowitz claims the answer lies in the ‘Tory-touched’ liberalism present in Canadian institutions. The arrival of the United Empire Loyalists exerted a profound influence over the developing institutions both by virtue of their number and the historical period in which they arrived. With their counter-revolutionary attitudes, the loyalists emphasised the pre-existing British character of Canada. A preference for order, authority and collectivist approaches to rights imprinted Canadian political attitudes at a time when the institutions were sufficiently malleable to adapt to new influences. This view is discounted by Azjenstat and Smith, who feel Horowitz overemphasises the impact of the loyalists (Ajzenstat and Smith 1995). A sizeable literature surrounds the presence or absence - and subsequent measurement - of a tory-streak in Canadian political culture (Ajzenstat and Smith 1998, Christian 1978, Horowitz 1977, Preece 1977, Preece 1978, Truman 1977, Wiseman 1998) In an effort to bridge these divergent views, Seymour Lipset argues that formative events, rather than fragment cultures or ill-defined points of congealment, exert the greatest influence on the development of political attitudes (Lipset 1968). Thus, incidents like the conquest of New France, the rebellions of 1837 and the Red River Rebellion preceding the entry of Manitoba into Confederation encouraged the creation of a strong central government. For Lipset, the significant event could not be the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists, but rather the refusal of Canada to rebel against Britain in an effort to secure greater political autonomy. Thus, the spontaneous refusal of Canadians to rebel, rather than the arrival of a population that fled rebellion, constitutes a significant formative event in Canada’s political development because it bound the population together in a united stand against rebellion. As a result, Canadian political institutions have become more elitist, ascriptive and particularist. The conclusion reached by Lipset resembles that advocated by Hartz and Horowitz.
although the logical arguments used to support the conclusion are quite different. As a result, the presence of communitarianism in Canadian political attitudes holds a similar place to the role of socialism in the myth of Scottish political culture. Whether the enduring popularity of this view owes more to the emphasis placed on it by most of the major text books introducing first year university students to political science rather than strong evidence to defend its claim, is worth considering (Jackson and Jackson 1998, Nevitte 1995, Whittington and Van Loon 1996)

Rival attempts to explain political culture in Canada are grounded in economic analyses of the federation. As with the previous studies, the conclusion, that Canadian political culture is characterised by a strong central government and collectivist-tinged approach to rights remains the same. For Harold Innis, Canada has been influenced by the State that developed during the colonial period when the importance of economic development, and in particular the dependence on Britain for a stable economy encouraged a strong central government to manage the fur trade (Innis 1930). According to Innis, the Canadian psyche was marked by the colonial experience as a staple producer; the attention to supply-side economics has encouraged small 'c' conservatism, a sense of caution, and deference to dominate Canadian political attitudes. Compatible with Innis’s evaluation of economic and political development, Creighton argues the entrepreneurial activity of settlers in the St Lawrence valley created a dominant merchant class that, together with the ruling colonial powers concentrated economic and political power in the hands of a restricted elite (Creighton 1956). These two works, when considered in conjunction with John Porter’s seminal examination of Canadian elites, emphasise the power and influence wielded by the (British-) Canadian political, business and media class (Porter 1965, Preston 1985). The diversity of these approaches, employing qualitative, historical and economic lenses through which to analyse Canadian political culture, stand in contrast to British political culture research, which has consistently prioritised a qualitative approach.

Despite their different attempts to explain relatively similar phenomena, each of the studies rely on interpretations of history and examinations of institutional practice
rather than survey data. These more intuitive studies were dealt a serious blow by the onset of statistical evaluations claiming Canadian conservatives were much less communitarian than previously alleged (Nevitte and Gibbins 1985, Nevitte and Gibbins 1990). In particular, in his analysis of recent World Values Survey results, Neil Nevitte debunked the view of Canada as a deferential, illiberal political culture (Nevitte 1996).

Table 3.4: Political Culture in Canada

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<tr>
<td>Today's problems are so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on</td>
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Other questions receiving less consistent inclusion in statistical examinations of political culture tap varying degrees of efficacy. Data from the most recent election survey reveal that 80% believe MPs lose touch with people quickly, 68% believe government doesn’t care what the people think, and 83% believe politicians are ready to lie to get elected. The extent to which these attitudes vary across social groups receives examination later in the chapter. As in the UK, trends over time demonstrate a gradual realignment of political attitudes away from the traditional positions of deference and efficacy towards more cynical and proactive attitudes. Whereas in Britain this has been associated with a western pattern of increased disenchantment with the political class, in Canada the debate has collided with research charting the ‘Americanisation’ of Canadian political culture.

Early comparative examinations of Canadian political culture inevitably contained comparisons with the attitudes and behaviours south of the 49th parallel. Works by Hartz, Horowitz, Lipset and Bell emphasised the difference between the conservative and deferential Canadians and their liberal neighbours (Hartz 1964, Horowitz 1966,
In *Lament for a Nation*, George Grant argued that in their attempts to distinguish themselves from Americans, Canadians created an identity around their illiberal nature (Grant 1965). In other words, in an effort to distance themselves from the most liberal nation, Canadians had to detract from their own liberal views. For Grant, the declining importance of conservatism in Canada signalled the end of a tory-touched liberalism and marked the "defeat of Canadian nationalism" (Grant 1965).

Questioning the deductive approaches of earlier works, Nevitte and Gibbins subjected traditional understandings of Canadian political culture to a rigorous statistical analysis (Gibbins and Nevitte 1985). Nevitte and Gibbins determined that Canadian Tories were not more likely to favour State intervention. Furthermore, although the English Canadian and American right occupied similar positions on the political spectrum, the American left was farther from the centre than the left in Quebec and English Canada. The French Canadian right occupied a middle role, creating a more restrictive political spectrum than that available in English Canada and the United States. Lastly, despite similar political spectrums, political issues in the United States related to ideological issues while Canadian political contests, in both English and French Canada, eschewed ideological debate in favour of more moderate issue-driven politics (Nevitte and Gibbins 1985). The battle between deductive and inductive approaches has also drawn attention from those who focus their attention on the presence of Red Tories in Canada. In his 1977 article Truman applies a fourteen-point scale to test the presence of a value set that "predate[s] the liberal revolution" (Truman 1977). Declaring his scale a qualified success, Truman noted that although Canadian and American responses did not point to large patterns of divergence, there was a sizeable difference between the attitudes of northern and southern Americans.

In his analysis of the World Value Survey results, Neil Nevitte questioned the original preconceptions of Canadian political culture: that it was a deferential culture supportive of strong authority. Nevitte claims that Canadians, if they ever were particularly deferential, are now less willing to accept government authority than Americans (Nevitte 1996). The work also highlights the rise in cynicism and decline
in satisfaction that plagues all regions of the country. While limiting comparisons to those between linguistic groups rather than between provinces, *The Decline of Deference* thesis highlights several significant value differences that can be assumed to represent inter-provincial divergence. Levels of support for protest activity and greater moral permissiveness point to a French political culture that displays increased support for non-traditional, post-materialist values. The extent to which these changes represent an Americanising political culture in Canada has become an important debate within Canadian politics (Nesbitt-Larking 1998a). Nevitte's tracking of the inexorable march towards post-materialism in Canada stands distinct from works such as Grant's *Lament for a Nation*, which equated the Canadian adoption of Western political trends - in this case an increased support for individual rights - with the end of Canadianism. The debate over the Americanisation of Canadian political culture, however, rages on (Charlton and Barker 1998). In each case, the presumed Americanisation is presumed to be the process by which Canada takes on the political values of the United States, rather than the creation of a unified, jointly (if inequitably) created continental culture.

In his contributions to political culture research, Nesbitt-Larking has argued, not only that Canadians are becoming more American in their attitudes, but that this pattern has progressed, unchecked and under-analysed since the 1970s (Nesbitt-Larking 1998a, Nesbitt-Larking 1998b). Nesbitt-Larking credits the same Canadian jingoism, which he labels as "pro-Canadian assertiveness" (Nesbitt-Larking 1998b) with dissuading researchers from employing political culture analyses of the Canadian political system. Nesbitt-Larking then goes on to chronicle the "grave dangers to the integrity and continuance of Canada itself" (Nesbitt-Larking 1998b) caused by the gradual replacement of communitarian approaches to rights and society with a liberalism that prioritises individual rights. Rather than relying on statistical data the research chronicles the increased attention to balanced-budgets, government downsizing, the growth of the right-wing, populist Reform Party, the power of the corporate elite and decreased deference as proof of Canada's Americanisation. Frustration with the traditional tenets of the Canadian federation, namely some
measure of recognition for Quebec, official bilingualism and multiculturalism, have also recently come under fire. Critics of these theories argue that Canadians were never very distinct in the first place, were not more collectivist in their approaches, not more socialist in their policies, not more deferential in their attitudes to elites nor more Tory-touched as liberals. The alternative perception of Canada, promoted in such diverse works as *Lament for a Nation* and *The Politics of Recognition* (Taylor 1992) either stands in direct conflict with, or distorts beyond recognition, the actual state of Canadian political culture (Peacock 1998). Such a construction will sound familiar to researchers of Scottish political culture, who must contend with the gap between perceptions of collectivism and the attitudes of voters within Scotland.

Other evidence of value change avoids the issue of Americanisation in favour of global trends. In a twist on Inglehart’s thesis, that unprecedented security in the post-war period has facilitated the development of post-materialist values, Environics president Michael Adams claims that recent trends in Canadian attitudes betray an increased insecurity, despondence an aversion to both political and economic risks (Adams 1998). The factors that Nesbitt-Larking characterises as proof of Americanisation are, for Adams, signs of widespread resentment and cynicism among Canadians. For Adams, diverse evidence, from opinion polls to introduction of new television programmes of political satire show that Canadians are running low on the usual stock of political culture reserves: trust, efficacy, satisfaction and confidence. Adams’ book, *Sex in the Snow*, claims that Canadians - that nation of ‘repressed hedonists’, have finally broken free of the bonds of deference.

Yet another debate concentrates on the existence of regional or multiple political cultures. As stated in chapter two, those arguing for a series of sub-cultures within a political system take an aggregate view of culture, arguing that the resultant political culture is a product of the interaction among its diverse sub-cultures. For others, the existence of sub-cultures, particularly in a State that has witnessed its share of constitutional deadlock, is portrayed as a sign of weakness, of a less than unified culture (Almond and Verba 1963, Verba 1965). As a result, the debate about
subcultures, particularly in Canada, is emotionally loaded, as if proof of Quebec’s political distinctiveness might lend credence to the arguments of its separatists.

The most accessible proof of regional political divergence, as in the United Kingdom, lies in voting patterns (Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1998, Kellas 1989, Wilson 1974). Evidence of distinct partisan preferences are compounded by the electoral success of regional political parties promising to represent regional interests. Thus, the existence of the Scottish National Party, the Parti Québécois and the Bloc Québécois lends credence to the view that politics in Scotland and Quebec are different from that in the rest of the country; different because the electorate expresses itself through alternate parties and different because the agendas of these regional parties contain local or region-specific issues of interest. The same could be said of the Reform Party, which began its campaign for seats in the federal House of Commons in 1988 with the slogan ‘the West wants in’. Since then, however, the party has attempted to field candidates across the country, detracting from its claim to be a regionalist parties.

Although statistical examinations of regional political cultures are relatively rare in Britain (Curtice 1988, Curtice 1992, Curtice 1996) attention to the different provincial value sets has drawn the attention of Canadian researchers since the 1970s. If, as Wilson argues, political culture reflects the way in which individuals orient themselves within the political system, then the existence of meaningful political boundaries in Canada - of provincial institutions, assemblies, bureaucracies and legislation, has created distinct political cultures (Wilson 1974). Research discussing the presence of one, two (English and French) three (English, French and Aboriginal) five (regional) or ten (provincial) cultures mirrors debates concerning the existence of two, three, four or ten founding partners in the creation of Canada. Research in this respect divides along provincial lines. Those writing outside the province of Quebec highlight the dangers of excluding groups, whether First Nations Peoples, regions or other provinces, from their role in nation-building. Those within Quebec, both anglophones and francophones, tend to argue that the historical recognition of French
Canada at the expense of other groups is a function of the constitutional settlement negotiated by political actors from the Act of Union in 1840. Thus, as previously stated, examinations of regional political cultures enter a politically loaded debate where proof of difference adds to the political weight expressed by the subject area.

In their first examination of provincial political cultures, Simeon and Elkins determined that the measures of trust and efficacy, as used by Almond and Verba, appear higher for provincial governments than for federal governments. In their attempts to examine regional cultures Simeon and Elkins created a typology relying on measures of high and low trust and efficacy. Provinces were then categorised according to their answers. The authors noted that on some measures of civic culture, differences among provinces were larger than those between Italy and the United States.

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<th>Table 3.5: Regional Political Culture in Canada</th>
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Source: Simeon and Elkins 1974, Simeon and Elkins 1980

In a previous analysis of provincial cultures, Wilson argued that the Canadian provinces could be categories according to three types of culture. The distinction between underdeveloped, transitional, and developed cultures lay in the voting patterns of provincial electorates. If two parties were able to capture a large majority of the votes, and if partisan preferences were stable over time, the culture could be considered developed. Unfortunately for Wilson and for Simeon and Elkins, the results of the two studies presented different views of provincial political cultures in Canada. The confusion lies in the artificial priority given to provincial institutional boundaries or systems. For Gidengil, provincial political cultures are motivated by centre-periphery relations (Gidengil 1990). Although the distribution of socio-economic characteristics could lead one to suggest that cohesive provincial cultures exist, Gidengil's examination of regionally depressed areas within Quebec highlights
divergent efficacy scores with wealthier, and similarly francophone, areas in the province. The view is consistent with uneven development theories touted by Gellner, Nairn, Hechter and others (Gellner 1983, Hechter 1982, Hechter 1987, Nairn 1977).

Other works analysing the potential for divergent political cultures within Canada emphasise the potential cleavages of language and centre-periphery relations. In their analysis of attitudes to language rights and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Sniderman et al report that defensive support for linguistic stability encourages a changing view of rights provision for anglophones and francophones in Canada (Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell and Tetlock 1989). Each linguistic group seems convinced of the necessity of specific rights provision with respect to their own collective group while reluctant to extend similar rights to other linguistic groups. The research shows that while francophones are more consistent in their support for linguistic rights Anglophones exhibit a clear preferences for English language rights within Quebec at the expense of French language rights outside Quebec. In his critique of their research Macmillan argues Sniderman et al did not sufficiently tap the group preferences for different rights (Macmillan 1990) Greater support for the recognition of collective rights among francophones, rather than their existence as a minority language group, could explain the consistent support for language rights. Similarly, a general reluctance to ensure linguistic rights for francophones outside Quebec could be motivated by a greater support for individual rights among anglophones rather than a general reticence to secure minority language rights.

Furthermore, while the initial research highlights the individual motivation behind attitudes within the Canadian political culture, there is insufficient proof of multiple cultures within Canada.

For those who argue that Canadian political culture is the product of interaction between several sub-cultures, Peter Lyon’s question, “Is there an Anglo-Canadian Political Culture (Lyon 1983) poses a simple question. Surely one of the most important interactions must occur between the cultures of the two founding nations. For many, however, the absence of a homogeneous English Canadian culture,
particularly given the presumed unity of francophones in Canada, stands as one of the most important threats to Canadian unity. In their textbook on Canadian politics Jackson and Jackson refer to “English-Speaking Canadians: A Cultural Fruitcake” (Jackson and Jackson 1998). Originally written in 1981 on the eve of the repatriation of Canada’s constitution, Lyon’s focus was not the unity of English versus French political cultures in Canada, but rather, whether Canadians were sufficiently distanced from the UK in their political attitudes and behaviours to have anything other than a variant-British political culture. His argument, that Canadians possess their own political culture, points to the various attempts made since 1867 to accommodate French Canadians within an otherwise British political setting. No mention is made of the American influence referred to in other works.

In each of these themes, political culture in Quebec has been characterised as an illiberal element tempering, or sullyng, Canadian liberalism though it is worth mentioning that traditional examinations of political culture in Quebec are rather thin on the ground. Instead, the political attitudes and behaviours of Quebecers are examined in works that seek to analyse the development of nationalism and nationalist thought within the province (Cloutier, Guay and Latouche 1992, Taylor 1991) This is not to distinguish between nationalism and ‘other’ political attitudes, for one surely influences the other. Rather, that in their attempts to examine the most distinguishing aspect of political life in Quebec, namely the presence of a large and vibrant nationalist movement, social scientists within Quebec have not studied perceptions of efficacy and trust within the State to the same extent as academics in the rest of the country. As will be discussed later, several works integrate themes of political culture, namely value change, into their analysis, but this is, for the most part, a recent phenomenon.

In those works addressing aspects of political culture in Quebec, Canadian political culture is portrayed as an amalgam of diverse influences, lying somewhere between the individualism of the United States and the feudal fragment of French Canada. This French ‘illiberal culture’ thesis was argued vociferously by former prime minister
and academic Pierre Elliott Trudeau in his introduction to *La Grève de l’Amiante* (Trudeau 1959). Citing the power of the Catholic Church and an under-developed, rural economy, Trudeau later argued that the pillars of Quebec political culture created obstacles to the development of democracy (Trudeau 1958). It could be argued, however, that Trudeau’s vision of democracy was based on an individualist approach to rights and so while it is true to say that Quebec political attitudes did not ape those in the United States, it is not strictly accurate to label them anti-democratic. Research citing much of the same evidence, that Quebec owed its contemporary political system to a particular blend of French feudal fragments, a strong, authoritarian and involved Catholic Church, a fear of the State, underdeveloped economy and the practice of political patronage lent credence to this claim (Bélanger 1974, Bernard 1977, Brunet 1964, Heintzman 1983, Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems 1956). For others, Trudeau’s assessments of Quebec as a priest-ridden, semi-feudal and illiberal society were fundamentally inaccurate (Létourneau 1997). The retarded-development thesis has provided a particularly active debate within Quebec historiography. The basic argument, that Quebecers are much more collectivist, runs as follows: in the post-Conquest period, a dominated population lost its natural elites (Brunet 1962, Brunet 1964, Frégault 1956, Iguarta 1974, Séguin 1970) and vigilantly protected its language and culture by prioritising the values of survivance (Cook 1989), simultaneously developing a suspicion of the (British) State (Bernard 1977). This view was supported by francophone and anglophone academics, although within the province the social scientists of Montreal and Quebec City contested various points throughout their research for years (Rudin 1997). In the last decade, a cohort of academics has argued that the original analysis over-estimated the influence of the Church, if not in the every-day lives of individuals, then certainly in the formation of their overtly political attitudes (Létourneau 1997). The extent to which the Quiet Revolution is seen as a dramatic break with the past or an adaptation of previous practice depends on the initial analysis of Quebec’s development. Those arguing for the dominant role of the Church tend to stress the caesura between *la grande noirceur* of the immediate post-war period and the big-government days of the 1960s. The role of the Quiet Revolution in Quebec’s political
culture has provided a rich literature though its main points lie outwith the scope of this thesis.

An example of how the retarded development theory affects understandings of political culture in Quebec proves useful. In one of the few works that explicitly address the issue of political culture in Quebec, Bernard subscribes to the culture-through-interaction thesis, arguing that the co-existence of several distinct ideologies mould contemporary political culture (Bernard 1977). Admittedly written as the Parti Québécois came to power in Quebec, and thus presenting a view of political life that has changed much in the past two decades, Bernard’s argument, that a combination of reactionary, progressive, radical and revolutionary ideologies form the basis of political attitudes in Quebec, still holds weight. In particular, Bernard argues that Quebec political culture is characterised by the particular nature of its interaction between conservative, religious elements dominant in the 19th century and more recent liberal values. While English Canada gradually lost interest with the traditional values of conservatism, Quebec retained these elements, only prioritising liberalism in the latter half of the 20th century. Notwithstanding the support for collectivism stemming from a heightened attention to *survivance*, and the popularity of a political ideology that maintained a holistic, if traditional, view of society, the growth of overtly socialist parties in Quebec was stunted by the hostility of the Catholic Church to the more fundamental aspects of socialism and Marxism. This particular ideological blend has had an effect on the perception of State authority, thought this fact is not paid great attention in Bernard’s work. In particular, a heightened attention to the power of the State-as-potential oppressor before the Quiet Revolution led to a profound belief in its capacity for action during the 1960s (McRoberts 1993).

The attention to collective rights, whether stemming from a survival instinct or less sociological origins, forms the source of the greatest fault-line between the political cultures in English Canada and Quebec. The prioritisation of collective rights over individual rights, evident in the popularity of first conservative and later social-democratic political parties, and enshrined in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights,
stands in conflict with the tendency to prioritise individual rights in federal political life (Legault 1992, Taylor 1991). This seeming incompatibility is blamed for much of Canada’s current constitutional woes, not least the repeated failure to ratify constitutional accords promising measures of collective security for Quebec through items such as the ‘distinct society’ clause. It is worth stating that both systems maintain a respect for both individual and collective rights, but that the tendency to prioritise one over the other works in opposite ways. Thus even in the face of a revisionist historiography, a general consensus surrounds the characterisation of Quebec political culture vis-à-vis the rest of Canada: more collectivist, more respectful of authority, and thus more supportive of the State.

The concerted practice of tearing down shibboleths is no less evident in recent assessments of Quebec’s affinity to American attitudes and behaviours. The argument that Quebecers are no less post-materialist in their outlook also forms the focus of some recent works. Pelletier, for example, examines how the emergence of post-materialist values, characterised by a commitment to public policy, a desire for active and representative participation and ‘new individualism’ has affected partisan support within Quebec. The results demonstrate that while activists in New Social Movements exhibit post-materialist values to a greater degree than party workers in general, supporters of the PQ are almost as post-materialist in their outlook as social activists (Pelletier and Guérin 1996, Pelletier 1997). Furthermore, academics and journalists have sought to emphasise the Américanité of Quebecers. The linguistic border surrounding the province paradoxically ensures a level of cultural security that those within English Canada lack, leaving Quebecers free to integrate themselves more fully into continental culture and affairs (Lachapelle 1999, Beaudoin 1999). For Lachapelle, the Americanization of Quebec, such as it exists, is a geo-political inevitability (Lachapelle 1999). Quebec’s support for the free trade agreements, and indeed for former prime minister Brian Mulroney, who at his least popular earned a
10% approval rating among Anglophones (Ekos 1998)\textsuperscript{16}, points to level of continentalism unmatched in tone if not degree in the rest of the country. These different works agree on the basic context of political culture in Quebec. Quebec as a liberal-democracy, Western First-World nation, province within a federation and member region of NAFTA, the Commonwealth, Francophonie and United Nations, determines much of the political orientations within the nation. Broad support for freedom of political expression and other fundamental human rights co-exist with a declining interest and confidence in politics that can be found in other Western countries. In addition, Quebec’s political development has formed a polity that takes a holistic view of society, supports collective measures and a strong State. Despite their disparate origins, the obvious similarities with Scotland should not escape notice.

\textbf{NATIONAL IDENTITY IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC}

National identity in Scotland and Quebec, both by structure and by content, stands in direct contrast. The eighteenth-century accommodation of pre-existing 'national' institutions each provided Scotland and Quebec with obvious markers of difference. That said, the role of different social institutions, and the institutions themselves, have imbued each nation, not surprisingly, with a distinct construction of nationhood. The status of Gaelic as a remnant of a highland identity (Harvie 1998) and the questionable position of the Scots language in contemporary Scotland (Miller 1996) cannot equate themselves with the role and power of French within Quebec, where language has created a separate forum for debate and social interaction. In addition, the constitutional settlements in Scotland and Quebec, have, until recently, ensured different roles of identity within society. In the drive for independence nationalists in

\textsuperscript{16} Recent research by public opinion polling firm Ekos demonstrates that former prime ministers Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney were more popular among English Canadians than among French Canadians. When asked to decide who was the best prime minister of Canada, four percent of respondents indicated their support for Mulroney. (Ekos 1998).
Quebec have politicised the concept of identity, increasing its salience in society.\footnote{As the author has argued elsewhere, by articulating sovereignty as a goal of a collective group bound by national identity, the salience of identity in Quebec assumes a heightened importance (Henderson 1999)} That, in conjunction with a readily identifiable marker such as language, alters the extent to which Scotland can be compared with Quebec. In Scotland, the attainment of devolution has been portrayed and understood as a problem of political inequality (Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Mitchell 1996). Debates about who is and is not a Scot highlight the distance between the two notions of identity. Literature often portrays Scottish national identity as the civic and inclusive contrast to Québécois identity (Hobsbawm 1990). Thus, in two key ways, national identity in Scotland and Quebec distinguish themselves - in the pillars of identity and in the salience of that identity within the political system. The following section examines the treatment of national identity in each case by academics before turning to the promotion and construction of identity by political agents of socialisation. In its examination of identity in chapter four the thesis deals with salience, where it receives a more quantitative focus.

The treatment of national identity in Scottish literature falls short of arguing that identity is an essentialised, reified object bestowed upon residents at the border, yet still points to the existence of common identity markers that Scots use as badges of their identity (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989, Broun, Finlay and Lynch 1998, Finlay 1994, McCrone 1992). National institutions, in particular, draw attention from recent works. This section emphasises two main themes in its analysis of Scottish identity. First, how literature has sought to identify the pillars of Scottishness and second, the treatment of Scottish and British identity as compatible or antagonistic. In so doing, the section comments on the accessibility of Scottishness to those who might consider themselves ‘outside’ the nation.

**Pillars of Scottish National Identity**

Early works emphasised the historical roots of modern Scottish identity (Harvie 1981, Smout 1986), obviously subscribing to the view that modern nations ground
themselves in the mythical past (Smith 1991). Most recent works, however, align themselves with an instrumentalist view of nationalism, that national identity is the product of social and historical forces manipulated, either wittingly or unwittingly by a political or cultural elite. In this vein McCrone, Morris and Kiely highlight the various attempts to create a banal nationalism (Billig 1995) that would allow Scots to identify a distinct and tangible national identity. In this work, the processes of identity construction, rather than the institutions responsible for them, receive attention. In particular, the authors chronicle the way in which the current heritage industry reinforces images and perceptions, both domestic and international, of Scottishness (McCrone, Morris and Kiely 1995).

Other analyses of Scottish identity concentrate on the influence of institutions, highlighting the role of the holy trinity of post-union Scottish institutions that carried Scottish identity. The role of Calvinism, a democratically-structured Church of Scotland and school system ordered by the principles of egalitarianism and meritocracy has created the current Scottish identity (McCrone 1992, Harvie 1998). Created by John Knox, the General Assembly of the established Church offered opportunities for Church members to debate and vote on issues related to doctrine, practice and national life. That process has continued today in the activities of the Church and Nation committee (Forrester 1994). In its ability to act as a social leveller, the education system assumed integrates itself into the rubric of Scottish egalitarianism.

If Scotland has made a great contribution to the theory and practice of education, it is because of the tradition of Scottish homes. The Scottish ploughman, walking behind his team, cons ways and means of making his son a farmer, and so sends him to the village school. The Scottish farmer ponders upon the future of his son, and sees it most assured not by the inheritance of money but by the acquisition of that knowledge which will give him power, and so the sons of many Scottish farmers find their way to Edinburgh and a University degree (Menzies 1942).

Academic research ties the Scottish education system, as a pillar of identity, with positive movements in Scotland's historical development. The Scottish
Enlightenment, that period in the eighteenth century when Edinburgh writers such as Adam Smith, David Hume and William Robertson articulated ideas that made Scotland the intellectual vanguard of Europe, is portrayed as the result of distinctly Scottish traits (Calder 1994, Colley 1994, Daiches, Jones and Jones 1986, Devine and Mitchison 1988, Harvie 1998, Lynch 1992). Thus by doctrine and by structure, the church, education and legal system have created a lad o’ pairs communitarian outlook that has coloured everything from approaches to culture to voting patterns (Product 2000, Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Osborne and Armstrong 1996).

Less traditional, though no less powerful, social institutions such as the press, broadcast media and sports teams are entrusted with the dual role of socialising a younger generation and providing markers of difference around which an older generation can rally. Warning that the oft-assumed correlation between identity and the press warrants close attention, Kendrick and McCrone argue that the Scottish press has been successful because of a pre-existing Scottish identity (Kendrick 1989, McCrone 1992). MacInnes argues, however, that the Scottish press accounts for perceptions of difference (MacInnes 1992). In the last two general election campaigns none of the Scottish newspapers explicitly supported the Conservatives. At one point, the absence of sympathetic coverage prompted Conservative-supporting businessmen to bid for control of The Glasgow Herald (Smith 1994). Post-devolution, the need for a separate Scottish six o’clock news was articulated as a necessity if the media was to remain a legitimate national institution. Furthermore, many of the recent attempts to prove that Scottish identity is civic, inclusive and benign come from analyses of the divergent behaviour of Scottish and English football fans. The friendly tartan army, bedecked in tartan hats and orange wigs, currently receives favourable coverage when compared to the isolated examples of English football hooliganism (Harvie 1998).

18 Paradoxically, the Scottish Enlightenment witnessed a period of enchantment with the notion that Scotland was ‘North Britain’. Scottish patriotism and a dedication to the British State went hand in hand (Calder 1994, Colley 1994, Daiches, Jones and Jones 1986, Devine and Mitchison 1988, Lynch 1992)
A related debate concerns the importance of the pillar versus perception within Scottish identity. In other words, does a distinct legal traditional actually affect the way Scots interact with one another, or does the existence of a separate institution in itself create a sufficiently meaningful boundary around the nation? For Thomson, "the substantive rules of Scottish private law do not reflect any fundamental values inherent in the Scottish character" (Thomson 1995). Similarly, until recently, the Scottish curriculum remained overwhelmingly British in character (Humes and Paterson 1983, Paterson 1994b). Valued in its creation of a literate society and tool as a social leveller, the education system is credited with offering more than a sense of Scottish particularity. In its 1998 update to the Higher Core requirements for History and English, the Scottish Qualifications Authority notes that there is no obligation to use Scottish texts in the syllabus for English, and only four of the twenty-two history modules cover Scottish history. Attention to British, rather than solely Scottish, literature and history, ensures that the education system reinforces a sense of unity within Great Britain. Despite this, the Scottish education system, in its structure if not its content, has been considered one of the pillars of Scottish identity. This ties in with research conducted by Finlay and Cohen: namely, that fact does not always outweigh fiction in the construction of identity (Finlay 1994b) and that individuals create their own identity from diverse material available to them in society (Cohen 1996). As previously stated, Cohen argues that what it means to be Scottish is affected by personal circumstance as much as the accepted checklist of Scottish pillars. The choice, however, does not take place in a vacuum. The pillars by which individuals evaluate their choices, and the impetus to do so - whether it is popular to consider oneself Scottish or not - change over time.

**Scottish Identity and Scottish Values?**

In addition to institutions, social values form important pillars of Scottishness. What it means to be Scottish has as much to do with the socialising influence of a separate legal system, education system and Church, as the end result. The previous section on political culture highlighted some of the ways in which Scottish political attitudes distinguish themselves from British attitudes. These values in themselves are
important but it is the way in which they have been associated with Scottishness that warrants attention here. The popularity of left-of-centre values, whether manifesting themselves as egalitarian, communitarian, or socialist are closely aligned with measures of Scottishness, in part because of the institutions that give rise to them, and in part because of the way that political parties speaking for the nation have aligned themselves with values. It is worth nothing, however, that the values equated with Scottishness have changed over time. The most useful analysis comes from the way in which political parties have aligned themselves with certain values and identity packages in an effort to win votes.

Before the turn of the last century, the Liberal party enjoyed tremendous popularity in Scotland. Keir Hardie, who founded the Labour Party in Scotland, so feared his chances of electoral battle with the Scottish Liberals that he left Scotland to fight a seat in England (Harvie 1998). Liberalism in the nineteenth century was the creed of common sense. Individual responsibility, the equality of men before God, small government, free trade, the iniquity of the House of Lords, the improvement of popular education and later, home rule, bound notions of liberalism and Scottish identity together. From 1832 to 1914 Scottish voters backed the Liberals, regularly rewarding the party with more than fifty percent of the popular vote. In 1865, the party won eighty-five percent of the popular vote in Scotland and it was not until 1922 that the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the main alternative to the Conservative Party. When Liberals divided over the issue of home rule, it was the breakaway Liberal Unionists who absorbed the Scottish Conservatives into their ranks, although the resultant name change can be blamed for leading people to believe that the integration worked in the opposite direction.

With the extension of the electoral franchise and the political education of the working class, the dominant Liberal values now had two identity-value competitors. 'Common sense' unionism had previously emphasised the cohesive bonds of Protestantism and the economic benefits of imperialism (Colley 1994, Morton 1999). Scottishness and unionism were not anathema, as they could have been considered
between 1979 and 1997, but rather, mutually reinforcing ideologies. In the immediate post-Treaty period, the economic and political power enjoyed by an increasingly affluent middle and upper class in Scotland backed a fusion of pro-union Scottish identity (Morton 1999). Economic prosperity and the administrative control gained through the creation of the Scottish Office in 1886 reinforced favourable interpretations of the union (Paterson 1994). Calls for home rule within the Liberal party, and later, the rise of the Labour Party challenged these notions of nationalist unionism.

The economic conditions of voters, a decline in symbols of Britishness, such as the army, and a simultaneous rise in institutions establishing boundaries around the Scottish population, such as the media, encouraged a re-evaluation of the ‘common sense’ identity-value relationship (Dickson 1993). While the literature charting the rise of Labour within Scotland offers an interesting evaluation of national political history (Donnachie and Whatley 1992, Keating and Bleiman 1979, Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge 1999, Kellas 1989), the fact that it occurred at all matters more for this thesis. Since 1922, the Labour party has sought to align itself with what it considers to be key values of Scottishness, emphasising support for the common weal and social democracy. The extent to which it continues to do so forms the focus of the following section on agents of socialisation. The Scottish National Party, at one point to the right of the Labour party on the political spectrum, has since 1974 sought to defeat Labour on its own ground (Mitchell 1996). As a result, the two dominant political parties in Scotland each position themselves to the left of the political centre, and, until 1997, each sought to portray itself as the nationalist defender of the Scottish people. In truth, all four main parties have sought to portray themselves as the true Scottish party - although the Liberal Democrats have done so less convincingly and more half-heartedly than the other three no doubt because their stance on nationalism (Lynch 1998) - but Labour and the SNP appear to have enjoyed greater success at this than the others.
Post-devolution, the party in the best position to argue that it is the inheritor of Scottish identity-values, both as the original left-wing party and as the governing party that brought devolution to Scotland, has been distancing itself from the identity and values that gained it support during the 1980s. Labour’s efforts to cool the ‘flames of nationalism’ have resulted in a decidedly unionist message from the party (Blair 1999, Brown 1999, Brown and Alexander 1998, Dewar 1999). Unlike in Quebec, where parties that do not support separatism may still claim to be nationalist, Labour’s post-devolution volte face mean that it is concurrently supporting the status quo rather than change, but also denouncing nationalism in all its forms. Rather than distancing left wing values and national identity, the party has distanced itself from this construction, leaving the SNP to continue to argue that it stands for increased autonomy in the name of national identity and a social democratic package.

Until recently, Scottish historiography highlighted the oppositional nature of nations within Britain. As Smout has noted, Scottish history was often described as a litany of defeats and victories at the hands of the English (Smout 1994). Finlay likewise noted that the nineteenth century produced few Scottish histories of note, largely because the Scottish identity was seen as secure (Finlay 1994b). Scottish history, and the holy trinity of institutions, prevented Scottish identity from aligning itself entirely with the State, but is also credited with the promotion of a low sense of collective esteem (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989). The presumed static nature of this situation negatively affected Scottish historiography. Recent attention to how Scotland has historically asserted itself as different seeks to correct this trend (Colley 1994, Devine 2000, Lynch 1992). Within this context, Britishness has been treated as an artificially-forged political identity that, when it suited the interests of its constituent members, was only just appealing enough to ensure its continued existence (Colley 1994). The identity amalgam was less linked to values fostered in daily lives and more to the political projects of an imperial state (Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998). Thus, if Scottish identity could be considered a national identity promoted and sustained by social institutions that were perceived to touch the daily lives of members, British identity was equated with a remote, political State (R. Cohen 1994).
Since devolution, the compatibility of British and Scottish identities has drawn much attention as academics, political commentators and politicians attempt to predict whether institutional boundaries will weaken further a sense of Britishness (Macmillan 1999, Wilson 1999, Colley 1999). For Macmillan, devolution has emphasised national difference to such a degree that it cannot be overpowered by a re-branding of Britishness as ‘Cool Britannia’ (Macmillan 1999). In part, Colley explains, this is because devolution alters the reference points for individuals (Colley 1999). The front pages of newspapers report events in the Scottish parliament and the additional layer of politicians is physically closer to its electorate. For some, this new-found freedom detracts from the oppressive nature of Britishness, making it more easy to hold dual identities, rather than more difficult (Wilson 1999). In both analyses devolution has strengthened national identity in Scotland. Whether this will lead to calls for independence, or will solidify Scotland’s place within the UK, is a matter for future research.

In Quebec, the tension between Canadian and Québécois identities exists although a larger debate concerns the level of inclusion and access that Québécois identity affords non-francophones. Thus, if contemporary identity debates in Scotland ponder the compatibility of multiple national identities - if Scots can still feel British - , the multiple identity debate in Quebec wonders whether English Canadians can ever feel Québécois. An examination of identity literature in Quebec highlights the relevant pillars by which individuals can assess their level of belonging.

**Pillars of Québécois National Identity**

The creation of a distinct Quebec identity predates the creation of a francophone province within Canada upon Confederation in 1867. The arrival of French settlers in the 1600s and the British Conquest in 1759-1760 provide two developmental phases for an identity with an ever-present attention to the ‘other’. Although the Quebec Act of 1774 guaranteed the continued prosperity of the French education system, the Catholic Church and a seigneurial system of land tenure, the development of a
distinctly Québécois identity, as opposed to a French Canadian identity, lies in the increasing involvement of the Quebec government in the social welfare of its citizens. With the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the linguistic and cultural vitality of French Canadians became a formal priority of a pro-active and interventionist provincial Liberal government. While language differences prompted extra constitutional powers in the Constitution Act of 1867 (Silver 1982), and in turn informed a francophone vision of Canada that relied on the partnership of two founding peoples, it was only in the latter half of the twentieth century that provincial borders began to dictate identity labels. As a result, Quebecers "reaffirmed [their] identity by rejecting the term French Canadian and calling [themselves] Québécois" (Lahaise in Gougeon, 1994, Gagnon, Keating 1996)

Analyses of Québécois identity by English Canadian academics often emphasised the previously-mentioned importance of *survivance* or survival. The post-Conquest sense of dislocation, while examined as a social phenomenon by previously mentioned francophone historians, appears as a pillar of identity among English works that argue a fear of extinction has created a fierce collective spirit among francophones. As one English-Canadian academic has argued, the linguistic and cultural fragility that followed the Conquest created a "...defensive paranoia of a people who see themselves threatened at every turn, and who feel they must assert their rights, whether in fact these rights are being threatened or not" (Waite 1980). For others, the sense of difference manifested itself in a lack of self-confidence not dissimilar to that believed to exist in Scottish identity. In his previous incarnation as a political science professor at the Université de Montréal, Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion emphasised the mutually reinforcing influences of hope and fear that underline Quebec national identity and the separatist movement in Quebec. Thus, fear that the French language will be swamped by English influence and fear of independence itself bind Quebecers in a perpetual state of flux (Dion 1995). In this analysis, Louis Balthazar agrees, stating "By definition, nationalism is a movement of people who feel uncomfortable" (Levine, Balthazar and McRoberts 1989). Thus while most analyses agree that cultural survival formed an important pillar of early French Canadian identity, the manner in which that concern for *survivance* manifested
itself remains open to debate. Greater consensus surrounds the role of social institutions.

The ease with which some authors claim Quebec and English Canadian identities function differently (Laforest and Gibbins 1997, Trent 1997, Coleman 1984) could rest in the assumed origins and pillars of these two groups. Efforts to explain that Canadians are distinct from Americans, or rather that a Canadian identity exists, often rely on analyses of political culture. As explained earlier, the arrival of the United Empire Loyalists and a concomitant support for tory-tinged liberalism, in theory if not in practice, is portrayed as the bedrock of Canadian identity. In other words, Canadians are different from Americans because they approach politics differently (Grant 1965, Lipset 1968). The arrival of the Loyalists, who felt caught between a lack of support for the American revolution and an Americanised sense of identity, is referred to by others as the beginning of English Canada's identity crisis (Bell 1970). Thus the Loyalists imbued Canadian political culture with a perpetual search for identity and a counter-revolutionary mindset (Lipset 1968). In his investigation of shared values among Canadians, Taylor argues that Canadians feel different from Americans because they display greater support for collectivism, and live in a less violent and conflict-ridden society. The fundamental differences are ones of values rather than an ethnic sense of difference (Taylor 1991). For Quebecers, there are sufficient markers of difference between French Canadians and Americans that a reliance on attitudes and values assumes much less importance (Preston 1985, Taylor 1991). A starting point for many analyses are the institutions that survived the Quebec Act of 1774.

Religion rather than language remained the most important pillar of identity until the 1960s. Following the Conquest, the absence left by a departed political and social elite was filled by a Church convinced of its providential mission in North America (Dufour 1989). Language at this time, merely provided the cultural buffer that sustained a Catholic presence within Canada (McRoberts 1988). The exact role of the Church in articulating and sustaining national identity in Quebec remains outwith
the focus of this thesis (Gingras and Leblond 1995) although the desire of the institution to maintain a cultural served to construct an exclusive national identity. Despite declining church attendance, the church still remains a powerful pillar. Almost 90 percent of Quebecers are Catholic and the institution, through its annual statements, often underlines the role of the Church in the nationalist movement and contemporary political debate (Assemblée des évêques du Québec 1973, 1977, 1981, 1995, Assemblée des évêques du Québec. Comité des affaires sociales 1976, Assemblée des évêques du Québec. Comité de théologie 1994)

The secularisation of Québécois society and the spread of liberal values coincided with a larger role for the State and shifting identity pillars. This change occurred in the middle of the twentieth century. In one of the last articulations of traditional visions of Quebec society, the Tremblay report emphasised the importance of social cohesiveness and the Church as a social institution (Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems 1956). In the 1960s, as the identity label transformed from Canadien français to Québécois, language replaced religion as the pre-eminent marker of identity (McRoberts 1988, Coleman 1984, Keating 1996a). In addition to these two markers - religion, and language - a third institution separates Quebecers from other Canadians. The position of the Quebec civil code resembles that of the Scottish legal system. Although some argue that the spirit of “mutual interdependence” and authoritarianism that motivates the code has drawn a boundary around Quebecers (Waite 1980), these extent to which the legal system influences the day-to-day interaction of provincial residents is a matter of debate.

Those who would argue that national identity in Quebec is linked to a civic nationalism claim identity has less to do with pillars of collective association and more to do with a profound sense of distance within the Canadian federation (Imbeau and Laforest 1991/92, Laforest and Gibbins 1997, Nemni 1994). That the population is French and Catholic matters less than the fact that it is not English (Robitaille 1999, Laforest and Gibbins 1997, McRoberts 1988). In his attempts to chart increasing support for sovereignty in the 1970s and 1980s, McRoberts hints that the Québécois
identity lies as much in English Canada's -or rather the federal government's - intransigence as in a self-directed sense of difference (McRoberts 1988). McRoberts further argues that the growth in support for nationalism, and by extension national identity, lies in the materialistic impulses of the rising new middle class educated in the 1960s. Such a view is supported by quantitative examinations of opinion poll data (Pinard and Hamilton 1986, Coleman 1984, Meadwell 1989, Guntzel 1997). Thus, whether in reaction to federal deadlock or as a play for greater social mobility, national identity remains divorced from the traditional pillars of society. Thus, the project of national self-determination drives the sense of identity. And yet, the correlation between support for an avowedly nationalist-sovereignist party and national identity detracts from the diversity of Quebec identity.

For some, the very phrase 'Québécois identity' warrants attention as it denies anglophones and allophones a descriptive label in their own language (Jenson 1995). For others, the seemingly thwarted attempts of individuals other than French, Catholic Quebecers to feel that they belong within society lead to charges of an ethnic national identity (Breton 1988). Academic literature on identity in Quebec often equates Quebecers and francophones. While lamenting the lack of attention to the diversity within Québécois nationalism and national identity Jean-Louis Roy claims the underlying common factors among all notions of national identity is a sense of destiny as francophones (Roy 1987). This tendency to equate Quebecers and francophones prompts Keating to argue that "Quebec nationalism has in any case only partly made the transition from ethnic to civic" (Keating 1995a). Thus, while the movement has developed beyond inward-looking protectionism it remains civic by ideal rather than membership.

The reason that identity in Quebec has earned itself the ethnic label, while such charges are rarely levelled in Scotland, has much to do with early ethnic analyses of

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19 Elsewhere McRoberts distinguishes between nationalism as a sentiment of group membership, as an ideology and as a social movement (Levine, Balthazar and McRoberts 1989). In his 1988 evaluation he suggests the social motivations of nationalism as a movement have affected the ways in which people view nationalism as a sense of collective identity.
Quebec national identity. For the previously mentioned Abbé Groulx, the nation was a historical community rather than a racially-bounded entity. That said, Groulx believed in the superiority of French civilisation although supporters are quick to point out that the anti-semitism that appears in his work was peripheral to his understanding of the nation (Trépanier in Gougeon 1994). Charting the changing use of history and collective memory, Sarra Bournet notes that what was once the call of separatists - 'Le Québec aux Québécois' - has now become 'Un pays pour tous les Québécois' (Sarra Bournet 1999). Furthermore, the extent to which Québécois national identity is seen as ethnic or civic depends on perceptions of language. Seen as something attached to birth and ancestry, language acquires ethnic properties. Seen as something acquired or learned, language can become a civic pillar. The conditions of membership depend on the comprehension of a tool for social communication, nothing more, nothing less. The distillation of ethnic language being used by nationalists and separatists further reinforces the civic character of Québécois national identity. And yet ethnic traces remain. Former Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau did little for his party when he announced on referendum night that the Québécois had been defeated by 'l'argent et le vote ethnique' (Parizeau 1995b). Government pamphlets on the history of Quebec entitled 'Qui étaient nos ancêtres?' only serve to reinforce the view that identity in Quebec has more in common with the primordial attachments analysed by Smith, Geertz and Brass than the modern construct of Gellner and Hobsbawm.

And yet, little-read government pamphlets do not an ethnic nation make. Part of the furore stems from the salience of national identity in Quebec rather than the way it is constructed. The extent to which identity matters in both Scotland and Quebec, forms the focus of the next chapter. The following section instead focuses on the treatment of national identity by political agents of socialisation.

**POLITICAL SOCIALISATION IN SCOTLAND AND QUEBEC**

As highlighted in chapter two, agents of socialisation such as the family, Church environment and education system exert an influence on the development of political
attitudes and behaviours in childhood and adulthood. Family life, early education and Church experiences, and later, the media, political parties and the governments they form, colour the perceptions of individuals, socialising them into a wider societal culture. In Stateless nations, the institutions of civil society are charged with maintaining a sense of identity made potentially fragile by the absence of a State (Keating 1996). For some authors, the very absence of a political system, which can provide objective markers of difference to citizens, encourages a level of vigilance in the protection of a national identity. Civil society, as the guarantor of that identity, assumes a heightened importance in such situations (Keating 1996, Paterson 1994, Hearn 1996). As explained in the previous section, the influence of a separate Scottish Church, legal system, and, in the case of Quebec, a separate language, whether by content or by mere presence served as pillars around which a distinct identity could coalesce. In part because the influence of these institutions remains well documented within their respective literatures, this section examines the efforts of political parties and constitutional actors to influence the political attitudes and values of national members. To this end it examines the manifestos for political parties since the 1979 and 1980 referendums in Scotland and Quebec, in addition to the various constitutional accords or constitutional briefs of governments and implicated actors. The section examines three themes: how a sense of identity is linked to the national debate, in other words, how these institutions promote the markers and benefits of belonging, secondly, how these institutions view national progress; and thirdly, how they link rights-based dialogues and notions of empowerment with Scottish and Québécois national identity. The section argues that in their manifestos and public documents, parties and governments create a sense of identity that allows individuals to make judgements about their level of inclusion in the nation and the polity, and foster a sense of difference by emphasising homogeneous political cultures within the nation or State.

Traditional political culture texts often emphasise the role of childhood agents of socialisation. School curricula, classroom and peer group dynamics, or, for adults, media coverage, receive well deserved attention in several noted texts (Hahn 1997,
Putnam 1994, Chomsky 1990). This thesis emphasises the content of political party documents and government accords for two reasons. Firstly, the thesis seeks to make claims about national identity and its relationship with political attitudes and behaviour. In order to discuss such issues, agents who provide expressed attention to identity and political culture warrant close attention. Second, media coverage, as is adequately documented (Smith 1991, Maclnnes 1992), can distort or ignore the political views and intended messages of political actors. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, the thesis argues that political documents and constitutional accords represent the clearest distillation of political views, in part because they are public documents, and in part because there is no medium between the reader and the agent of socialisation. As a result, the section seeks to present the views of parties and governments, as they related to identity and political culture, before analysing in the succeeding two chapters, how such messages are received by the public. Documents from Scotland and Quebec are reviewed thematically, to allow for a greater comparison.

Difference

In his exposition of banal nationalism Michael Billig highlighted the subtle ways in which public debate forms people’s perceptions about the nation.

The everyday ideology of contemporary society will have its nationalist themes and myths, permitting the national community to be imagined in various ways. In this sense, the assumptions of nationalism will be used in commonplace discussions about politics, foreigners, and royal families ... by encouraging certain forms of argumentation, also silence other arguments and other possible critiques (Billig 1995a)

A similar pattern of emphasis governs nationalist publicity in Scotland and Quebec, most strikingly, in attempts to establish a sense of national difference. How the nation is described sets up an unspoken comparison with other countries. Thus, claiming that Scotland or Quebec is a social democratic nation suggests that there are other polities less supportive of State-led responses to income inequality. The chronicling of national characteristics, in party manifestos and constitutional documents co-exists
with efforts to establish a sense of ownership over the national debate. An examination of each of these aspects in turn highlights how a sense of national difference is asserted in Scotland and Quebec.

Political parties have published separate manifestos for Scotland, though initially without any regularity, since the 1950 general election. While the extent to which these offer diverse legislative packages differs from party to party, the Scottish manifestos attempt to establish a stronger link between the party and its intended audience. For the Conservative party, this has meant, at times, replacing the word Britain with the word Scotland, or adding specific references to Scottish organisations by name. In its 1979 manifestos, for example, the British version mentions future consultation with the unions, and warns that “In Britain, profits are still dangerously low”. In its Scottish manifesto, the party promises future consultation “with the unions and the STUC” and warns “In Scotland, as in Britain as a whole, profits are still dangerously low.” (Conservative Party 1979, Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1979). Then, as now, the section on democratic renewal provides the greatest disparity between British and Scottish manifestos. The 1979 UK manifesto does not include the page-long section promising “to bring government closer to the people and allow more decisions affecting Scotland to be made in Scotland” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1979). In addition to an altered section on devolution, the 1992 Conservative manifestos contain significant differences in the introductions and conclusions. The references are not attempts to tailor the debate to the specific needs and interests in Scotland, but rather, efforts to reinforce a recognition that the party is speaking to an electorate of Scots.

Let us affirm our faith in the historic Union which is the United Kingdom and let us ensure that Scotland continues to flourish and prosper. We want a modern Scotland, a confident Scotland. We have achieved much together and I believe we can build on that success of recent years. We offer the vision of a prosperous Scotland with a strong voice in the affairs of our nation (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1992)

Detractors of devolution, who argued that the imposition of borders between Scotland and England would undermine perceptions of British unity, appear
to have overlooked that this practice already existed in election campaigns. While the British Conservative manifesto includes a detailed list of plans for democratic renewal in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Scottish manifestos mention only Scottish devolution.

Each of the four political parties operating in Britain chronicles the characteristics it believes to highlight best Scottish distinctiveness. Efforts to emphasise a sense of Scottish difference are often linked to the institutions that survived the Acts of Union. In his 1995 Williamson Memorial Lecture SNP leader Alex Salmond emphasised the "passion for improvement, education, family and tradition that buttress[es] our society" (Salmond 1995a). Two years later the SNP manifesto re-emphasised some of these pillars of identity:

Scotland still exists despite the determined efforts of those who rule us to diminish, dismiss and deride our national aspirations. Scotland’s institutions in the law, education, administration and in sport still have their distinctive national characteristics despite a constant erosion by the Westminster Parliament (SNP 1997).

The 1999 manifesto of the SNP contains similar references as may be seen from the following two quotations: “Scotland’s great achievements have been built on the foundations of great education”; and “the Scottish legal system has long been viewed with pride and rightly so” (SNP 1999). Previous documents emphasise the importance of similar pillars (SNP 1983, SNP 1987).

References to the institutions that have created a distinct national character are not limited to the SNP. Each of the other three main parties in Scotland have underlined the importance of Scotland’s education and legal system. Even the Conservative and Unionist party affirmed the existence of a “clear Scottish identity” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1992). Conservative leader John Major, the 1992 manifesto adds, “believes that the growing successes of Scotland are down to the qualities of the people of Scotland” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1992). The qualities themselves lie undefined but constant references to a
distinct Scottish voice within the document suggests that Scottish distinctiveness is unquestioned. Later documents refer to the Scots as “the world’s greatest instinctive entrepreneurs”, a nation of “patriots, entrepreneurs and innovators” with “an internationalist outlook” “by culture and history” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1997). The Liberal Democrats agree, noting “Scotland has a proud tradition as inventors and entrepreneurs,” “proud traditions in university education”, “once led the world in medicine”, and has a “tradition of enterprise and innovation” (Scottish Liberal Democrats 1999).

In addition to institutional explanations of Scottish distinctiveness the parties emphasise the importance of distinctly Scottish values. In his 1995 10th Donaldson speech former SNP MP and current MSP George Reid claimed identity “implies a return to separate, national roots” (Reid 1995). The national roots he characterised as “a tradition built on the commonweal of the Celts, the moral responsibility of the Calvinists, the social concern of the Catholics, the humanity of the Labour movement and the civic nationalism of today” (Reid 1995). Additional SNP documents further elaborate on this theme (Salmond 1996, Salmond 1998, SNP Research Dept 1995). The most recent party manifesto declared “traditionally, Scots have believed in values of compassion, community and the common weel [sic] (SNP 1999). The 1999 Conservative manifesto confirms that “a sense of community is deeply ingrained in the Scottish psyche” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1999). In his introduction to A Lifetime of Opportunity, Labour leader and then Secretary of State for Scotland Donald Dewar agreed, noting “For me, what makes our country special is not just the beauty of our land but the strength of our values. It is a country where equality of opportunity and social justice are central to our sense of self.” He adds “These traditional Scottish values are also the values of Scottish New Labour” (Dewar 1998). This quote shows not only that parties of diverse political views share a vision of Scotland’s key institutions, shared values and distinctiveness, but also try to align the views of their party with the historically-justified views of Scots. In 1988 Margaret Thatcher declared “Tory values are in tune with everything that is finest in the Scottish character, and with the proudest moments in Scottish history … Scottish
values are Tory values - and vice versa” (Scotsman 14 May 1988). Political debate has also involved efforts of parties to paint their opponents as out of tune with traditional Scottish values. The SNP, in particular, has often adopted this approach, criticising Thatcherite values as “anti-Scottish”, contemporary Conservative policies as “anti-Scottish elitist dogma” and Blairite policies as evidence of a “contempt for traditional values and lack of respect for the common weel [sic]” (Salmond 1996). Salmond’s conference speech two years later repeated the attack on new Labour values as anathema to Scottish “culture and identity” (Salmond 1998).

Until the 1997 Canadian federal elections, political parties rarely provided manifesto booklets containing a full list of policies. Instead, the parties released policies to the press throughout the campaign in an effort to capture the electorate’s interest. As a result, the statements reviewed for this thesis stem from the constitutional packages published by political parties, provincial and federal governments and referendum campaigns. That said, the Quebec parties have, since the 1994 provincial election, provided full manifestos detailing their campaign promises. These works, and other constitutional documents from the parties, are considered in tandem with government documents and commission reports. Within Quebec, sovereignists and federalists have provided lists of characteristics that distinguish Quebec from the other provinces. The 1980 Yes pamphlet argues that by language and culture, Quebecers are distinct from other Canadians, and furthermore, that this difference not only conveys upon Quebec the status of proxy-nation for French Canada, but that any constitutional settlement offering less than full equality between the two ‘peoples’ is an injustice to Quebecers (Directeur général des élections du Québec 1980a). In part, the No side agrees, claiming that Quebec possesses a French culture and ‘spirit’ that distinguishes it from English Canada (Directeur général des élections du Québec 1980b). The major difference between the two, however, is that while the Yes side argued that the difference predated Confederation, the No side argued that difference developed as a result of post-1867 constitutional accommodation.
Parti Québécois documents from the same decade make the case of Québécois distinctiveness, fulfilling almost perfectly, the requirements for citizenship as established by Geertz (Geertz 1963): "...the political action of the Parti Québécois is founded on the existence of the people of Quebec; a distinct people; a people occupying a clearly identified territory; a people with the right to self-determination" (Parti Québécois 1987). Statements such as "la langue française est au coeur de notre identité (Parti Québécois 1991) and "the education system is the cradle of society ... the sense of belonging to Quebec society [is] shaped within it" (Parti Québécois 1991) further reinforce the message.

The comparison, of nation to State, appears frequently in political documents dealing with Quebec. While campaign literature within Quebec has opted to reinforce the distinct characteristics of Quebecers, constitutional documents commissioned, supported, or in some case written, by the federal government systematically attempt to reinforce the common bonds between Quebecers and other Canadians. The argument that similarities are larger that whatever differences may exist, appears to be the preferred tactic of federal governments from Trudeau to Chrétien. In his 1978 pre-referendum document, former prime minister Trudeau argued that Canadians share a history, sense of national solidarity and democratic values. A new constitution, promised Trudeau, would further encourage Canadians to 'enjoy full pride and satisfaction in belonging and contributing to this great country' (Trudeau 1978). Six years later, the Quebec Draft Agreement on the constitution noted that former prime minister Brian Mulroney argued for a different tactic although the goal of national integration remained the same (Gouvernement du Québec 1985). The constitution, Mulroney argued, must re-establish the bond of trust between Quebecers and the federal government, and therefore must acknowledge the distinct character of the Québécois. The agreement notes that recognition of the existence of a people of Quebec is a prerequisite to the agreement and participation of Quebec. Furthermore, the draft argues that the agreement must be between the people of Quebec and the population of the rest of Canada. Thus, the draft draws a firm distinction between a population - an aggregate of individuals - and a people in possession of a language,
culture and history. Reflecting upon the wrongs caused by the repatriation of the constitution without the consent of Quebec, the agreement argues that Canadian institutions must reflect the particular needs of the Québécois people, influenced as they are by a distinct language, culture and society.

It is worth noting that in its 1991 final report for the Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future, the Citizen’s Forum returned to the Trudeau-iste vision of the Canadian federation, maintaining that “Canadian citizenship is an emotional tie, a sense of shared values and commitments to our country ... [a] focus for unity” (Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future 1991). The report seems to mark a half-way point between the views advanced by Trudeau and Mulroney by adding that ‘being Canadian does not require that we all be alike. Around a core set of values, Canadian citizenship accommodates a respect for diversity that enriches us all’ (Citizen’s Forum on Canada’s Future 1991). The common bonds are characterised by a belief in freedom, dignity, respect, equality, fair treatment and opportunity to participate. The extent to which these values distinguish Canadians from, for example, Americans or Britons, Germans or Norwegians remains open to debate.

History and Progress

If, as Edward Said claims, the process of self-definition is exposed in the practice of writing history, the way in which political parties and constitutional documents view the historical development and progress of the nation betrays certain predispositions in their views on identity (Said 1995). In particular, the documents seek to locate the present with respect to the past, chronicling an increasing sense of empowerment. For Hall, “identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (Hall, 1990). In his examination of Scottish history, Smout agrees: “National identities are constructed out of references to history, or more exactly, to received popular ideas about history that achieve mythic status” (Smout 1994). Interpretations of history, much as with debates about which party best represents Scotland’s interests, degenerate into arguments over who best understands Scotland’s development. Charges that other
providing manufacturing muscle at the centre of a major empire. Now we often appear to be a social and economic backwater, perched on the fringes of a third rate, focused and perpetually wrong footed power (Salmond 1995a)

Several of the documents refer to the need for Scotland to “become a normal nation, playing a normal part in the world” (SNP 1995). Scotland deserves better, argues the SNP, and must “put these wasted, futile years behind ... and be a nation again” (SNP 1992). In their assessments of the union, both Labour and the Conservatives highlight the strong and vibrant partnership that has guaranteed economic success and political voice for an otherwise small nation. “We are Scottish and British – proud to be both and proud of what our partnership in the United Kingdom has achieved over the last 300 years” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1992). Remarkably similar, the Labour party calls for “A vibrant Scotland within a strong Britain working together for a healthy and prosperous Europe where our children can grow up confident and comfortable in their complementary identities: Scottish, British and European” (Labour 1992). A more tempered view of the union appears in Labour’s *New Scotland, New Britain* document: Scotland’s new Parliament “addresses both the wrongs of the past and the challenges of the future” (Brown and Alexander 1998). It is in its assessment of the historical wrongs endured by Scotland that the Labour document testifies to a particular view of national development. On the whole, the paper treats Conservative administrations and negative aspects of Westminster interchangeably. Under Labour, Westminster is seen as a beneficent force in British politics, granting democracy to Scotland. The problem, it would appear, was not the British constitutional settlement but rather Mrs Thatcher. The personalisation of history attempts to direct the critique away from English power within union towards “the constitutional consequences of Mrs Thatcher ... NO second Mrs Thatcher could ever inflict such damage on Scottish civic life again”. Needless to say, the document shies away from the generic applications of this statement - that no second democratically elected and supported English prime minister could ever control Scottish civic institutions again. The extent to which this is a valid critique of history or democratic rhetoric receives attention in the following section.
Assessments of the desired future development of Scotland differ along party lines. For Labour, success lies in the creation of a multinational country. “Can Britain become, as we would like, the first successful multicultural multiethnic multinational country?” (Brown and Alexander 1998). Despite the obvious problems with such a statement, in particular the omission of various other countries possessing charters of rights, multiculturalism policies and higher proportions of immigrants, the document clearly elucidates Labour’s preferred future strategy. The answer, is a renewed democracy, new parliaments for Scotland and Wales, a freedom of information act and charter of rights all under the rubric of “a modern democracy”. Increased fairness - a fair citizenship law, a fair chance - was seen as a definite marker of progress. In its 1992 manifesto, however, the Conservative party expressed its preference for a different plan: “The Union has evolved since its inception in 1707. We have seen the establishment of the Scottish Office and the creation of the office of Secretary of State for Scotland. Most of Scotland’s government is administered by Scots in Scotland ... it is only as a full and equal partner in the Union that Scotland can remain strong” In an effort to undermine the links established by the SNP between self-confidence and independence, the Conservative party claimed “As Scots, we are sufficiently self-confident to be able to share our sovereignty within the United Kingdom, within Europe and in the wider world” (Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association 1992)

Within Quebec, the emphasis of separatist partisan programmes has changed dramatically over the past twenty years. Where once the Parti Québécois attempted to highlight and reinforce the sense of difference dividing francophone Quebecers and other Canadians, party platforms now approach sovereignty and self-determination as a natural, if long-overdue, step in the development of any nation. As the party stated in 1994: “Le peuple québécois existe. Le Quebec comme pays est encore à venir” (Parti Québécois 1994). Or, in an earlier document:

For generations and against all odds, we have maintained an identity that sets us apart in North America ... We must believe that we are mature enough, and big enough, and strong enough, to come to terms with our destiny ... [We have accumulated] all the essential experiences ... The Quebec nation is a family that will soon be four hundred years old. Long before reaching that age, in both the Americas, Anglo Saxons, Spaniards
and Portuguese gained their sovereignty. History has delayed our emancipation for a long time, but it has not prevented Quebec society from maturing and painfully reaching a level where it could progress and administer and govern itself. We Quebecers are a nation, the most firmly anchored nation on this continent. Over the vast expanses of our land, our deep-rooted memories and our vital presence are constant reminders that the Quebec people is at home here, in this, its ancestral home ... this home [is] completely ours ... delays have taken a heavy toll. We have also been left with a strong inferiority complex, which is the only real reason for our hesitations. We have the chance now to get rid of it once and for all and we have no right to let this chance go by ... We will not hesitate, then, at the great crossroads of the referendum, to choose the only road that can open up the horizon and guarantee us a free, proud and adult national existence, the road that will be opened by us (Gouvernement du Québec 1985)

In documents that consistently employ the future tense, national sovereignty is portrayed as an essential prerequisite of Quebec’s social and economic development. Federalism, not in its direct application but as a theory of governance, is portrayed as a barrier to national development. If Quebec were to transcend its present arrangements, the benefits would accrue not only from the security of an internationally-recognised collective identification, but also through an end to feelings of inadequacy and disempowerment (Bloc Québécois 1998). If it is to be an adult and legitimate nation, a step for which it is qualified, Quebec requires independence: “the attainment of sovereignty is a normal process, one that has been undertaken by all nations elsewhere in the world ... As Quebecers, we should be masters in our own house, masters of our destiny” (Parti Québécois 1994)

Those less supportive of the nationalist cause have attempted to interpret destiny in their own way. The 1980 NO pamphlet reminds Quebecers of the strong francophone leaders of their past, men like Lafontaine, Cartier, Laurier, St Laurent and Trudeau, to whom it is obliquely argued, current voters owe their continued Canadian citizenship (DGE 1980). In contrast, the 1980 Yes pamphlet and the 1985 Quebec government report Quebec-Canada: A New Deal chronicle a list of injustices endured by Canada’s francophone population. Beginning with the Conquest, typical lists pass through the Manitoba Schools Question, and Regulation 17 in Ontario. Earlier lists typically end
with anglophone objections to Bills 22 and 101, both of which are portrayed as efforts to maintain a fragile francophone identity. Later depictions, most notably the preamble to Bill 1: An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, decry the wasted efforts of constitutional negotiations in 1982, 1987 and 1992:

We were hoodwinked in 1982 ... The failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 confirmed a refusal to recognise even our distinct character. And in 1992 the rejection of the Charlottetown Accord by both Canadians and Quebecers confirmed the conclusion that no redress was possible” (Gouvernement du Québec 1995)

At the same time, interpretations of the federation often highlight not inconsiderable inequities. In 1990 Ontario received half of the federal government’s research and development funds. That same year Quebec received less than twenty percent of the funds (PQ 1994)

In sum, if Scottish political documents differ in their understandings of the past, political documents in Quebec offer diverse understandings of collective destiny. In part this could stem from the stage and focus of each separatist movement. This is not to deny that Scottish documents deal with future political issues. The Scottish Constitutional Convention outlined the various ways in which devolution could correct the specific injustices of the past. Calls for gender equality, for example, constitute a specific attempt to deal with the present inequitable system and highlight the ways in which a changed future could provide for greater political equality. The difference between Scotland and Quebec stems from notions of destiny. Future political change in Scotland was seen as necessary not because it was owed to Scots but rather because the present situation had to be changed. Separatists within Quebec have argued, in contrary, for the fulfilment of natural and evolutionary step in national development.

**Rights and Democracy**

The third theme running through the public documents is democracy. More specifically, the theme addresses issues of collective rights and self-determination. An examination of each of these themes highlights the ways in which organised groups
have undermined the democracy of the pre-devolution settlement and the current situation in Quebec. In Scotland, one of the most effective critiques of the unitary system of government concerned the ‘absence of democracy’ (Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998, Kellas 1989). Unionism was seen as anti-democratic because individuals were not receiving the governments that they voted for. If one sees a democratic system as the political rule of the majority over the minority, however, the democratic deficit years of 1979-1997 can be understood as unfair, but not necessarily undemocratic. The reason such an argument is made possible lies in the use of Scotland as a meaningful aggregate that deserves its own democratic system. Efforts to link the democratic spirit of Scotland with the anti-democratic political system are on shaky ground for two reasons: one, because the democratic spirit is a sociological construct, and two, because the nature of Scottish representation in Westminster remains largely unchanged.

According to New Scotland New Britain, “Those of use who had consistently supported Devolution had always believed that the absence of democracy in Scotland diminished Scottish civic life” (Brown and Alexander 1998). The report adds that the Scottish Constitutional Convention attempted to preserve all that was good in Scotland. It “did not seek to destroy what was British that was of benefit to Scotland. It was for Scottish democracy, not against British democracy” (Brown and Alexander 1998). While it would be tempting to dismiss such a statement as utter nonsense, a closer reflection reveals an attempt to define Scotland as a collection of constituencies worthy of democracy. It would be a particularly difficult argument to make that the Scots prefer democracy more than their English counterparts, or their French and German counterparts for that matter. That said, the number of constituencies voting against the Conservatives in Scotland remained throughout the 1980s lower than the number of English constituencies supporting Labour. As Kellas notes, in 1983 a 25 percent spread developed between the support for Labour in Scotland and support for the Conservatives in England (Kellas 1989). And yet, constituencies within England continued to vote for the Labour party in the face of Conservative governments. Why then is it accurate to claim that one constituency -
or rather a total of 209 (1983) to 271 (1992) constituencies - voting against the majority is not an affront to democracy while 41 (1983) to 50 (1987) constituencies north of the English border voting against the majority is a sign of damaged democracy? The answer is that Scotland is portrayed as a meaningful aggregate, worthy of self-determination while the disparate Labour-voting constituencies in England are not. Such an argument is not articulated by the political documents in Scotland but rather is an assumed premise.

SNP documents also address the issue of rights, but rather than emphasising the absence of democracy within the pre-devolution settlement, point out that Scots may choose, at any election, to exercise their rights of self-determination (SNP 1983, SNP 1995, Salmond 1996, Salmond 1998). Scots must rise up and “demand what is [their] birth right” (SNP 1987) for “the condition of Scotland is the inescapable responsibility of every adult Scot” (Salmond 1996).

Aligning itself with strong democratic traditions, the Parti Québécois notes that it was the first in North America to elect a leader through universal suffrage (Parti Québécois 1994). Statements such as these not only reinforce the dedication of the PQ to use the existing channels to achieve self-determination but also emphasise the weight of democracy in the national debate. PQ justification for self-determination stems, as stated earlier, from notions of cultural particularity and common destiny. This in itself is not particularly remarkable. The way in which opponents of separatism rebut these claims, however, highlights to relationship between rights and self-determination in Quebec. The anglophone-dominated Equality Party defines itself as a “100 percent Canadian voice” and encourages the voters to move beyond choices offered by the “separatist PQ and the nationalist Liberals” (Equality Party 1994). Promising to reverse “twenty years of provincial economic nationalism which benefits

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20 In part, the answer could lie in the proportion of seats won by parties other than the government. In the United Kingdom as a whole, the percentage of Labour seats 1979 to 1992 ranged from 23% in 1983 to 42% in 1979 and 1992. In Scotland, the percentage of Labour seats ranged from 57% in 1979 to 70% in 1987.

21 Exceptions include the 1997 party manifesto, which stated Scotland “is denied its democratic right to self-government” (SNP 1997)
an educated, privileged French-speaking elite” the Equality Party policy booklet pledges to reject the special status of Quebec, sign the constitution, and declare the distinct society clause as racist given its basis in ethnic origin and mother tongue. Several pages later the party, which at its electoral height held four seats in the National Assembly, pledges its support for self-government for Canada’s Aboriginal people. The ideological link between self-determination for Quebec and self-government for the First Nations properly questions the logical extension of separatism. In arguing that Quebec separatism is unfounded but that Aboriginal self-government is not, the Equality party is attempting to argue that the rights of one group to self-determination, rights which are grounded in a distinct culture, language and history, carry more weight than another collective. This tension, between self-determination and rights, dominates political literature in Quebec.

Conclusion

Although the previous section has provided a comprehensive examination of political literature in Scotland and Quebec, where does that leave constructions of identity and political culture in both case studies? In particular, how might individuals who would consider themselves on the margins of national society, whether because they are new-arrivals to the country or because they possess a particular mix of social characteristics, integrate themselves into the nation? The literature in Quebec makes explicit mention of non-Québécois although the Scottish literature is more circumspect. For Québécois separatists, independence would “clarify the often uncomfortable situation of many new Quebecers who feel a dual allegiance to Quebec and to Canada” (PQ 1994). Both the Quebec Liberal party and the Parti Québécois have described themselves as tolerant and open, welcoming of immigrants and non-francophones. The reaction of individuals, both national members and outsiders, to these claims, forms the focus of chapters four and five.
Contested Identities, Hierarchies of Belonging and Political Attitudes in Scotland and Quebec

Institutional constructions of identity, as examined in chapter three, provide for a relevant sense of distance between national members and non-members who may each use pillars of identity to gauge their levels of inclusion. By ensuring separate processes of socialisation, and by projecting images of the nation that highlight certain markers of belonging, national institutions and political organisations further the debate about collective difference and can ensure the continued political salience of national identity. This chapter examines the ways in which these constructions are internalised by individuals within the population in Scotland and Quebec. To this end it examines how aggregate notions of identity have changed in the last forty years, before examining how individuals understand their own sense of identity and the interaction between the different linguistic, ethnic and political groups in each case study. The chapter argues that constant reference is made by individuals to the expectation of acceptance. Individuals are aware of the markers used to validate claims to belonging and highlight these to reinforce or detract from membership. Statements such as “I wasn’t born here but...” “I’m half-English” and “I’m married to a francophone” betray an awareness of the variable importance of birth, ancestry and language in Scotland and Quebec. Other markers of belonging such as popular values also influence identity claims. The chapter deals with the selection and/or appointment of arbiters of identity – institutions or national groups deemed to have definitive power over the construction of national identity – and their influence on individual perceptions of identity and belonging. Above all, the chapter argues that the perceptions of others matter in our ability to make claims to national belonging and that any acquisition of national identity depends in part on the expectation of acceptance into the nation.
As highlighted in chapter two, most examinations of national identity concentrate on the collective markers of difference rather than the individual process of self-alignment with the nation. This absence clearly by-passes a crucial element of the identity process. Recently examined in a burgeoning literature on social identity, the process of self-categorisation serves as one of the more contested actions of self-definition (Oakes 1996, Tajfel 1982, Turner 1982). Furthermore, as argued in chapter two, the ability of individuals to determine their own membership in collective groups relies on the expected acceptance of claims to belonging. Those lacking the recognised markers of membership will encounter greater difficulty in their bid for membership. The result, potential exclusion from the nation or, most likely, a sense of doubt of place in the nation, depends on the saliency and construction of identity within the nation. This thesis questions the extent to which the perception of alienation within the nation can be redressed by inclusion in the political sphere; whether those who would consider themselves outside the Québécois or Scottish nation can overcome their exclusion by participating in the politics, whether as members of political parties, interest lobbies or civic organisations. This chapter examines subjective understandings of the State, of deference, trust, efficacy, confidence and satisfaction, as they differentially affect those with varying perceptions of national inclusion to determine first, whether values are spread evenly throughout society; and second, whether attitudes symptomatic of political alienation occur more readily in those lacking the obvious markers of national membership. Clearly, the absence of survey questions which engage belonging in more than a cursory manner hinders a purely statistical examination of identity and political culture. With this in mind the chapter builds on understandings of political culture and national identity as promoted by the collective institutions mentioned in chapters three and four. The chapter examines how these collective constructions affect individual perceptions of identity and political community. Similarly, care is taken not to accept, a priori, the direction of the relationship between national and political alienation. The two do not exist in clear opposition and the extent to which individuals see them as separate will determine much of the proceeding analysis. The relationship between inclusion, of
any form, and positive evaluations of politics precede any attempt to determine whether national or political inclusion exerts a greater, or prior, influence.

In the process of its examination, this chapter makes several claims. Primarily, it argues that the perceptions of others matter in our understandings of identity; that in our claims to belonging and attachment we consider how these claims will be perceived. Sometimes, however, our assessment of what other people think, our understanding of their perceptions, is not always accurate. This chapter evaluates the negotiation of these claims to belonging, and their effect on one aspect of political culture in post-referendum Scotland and Quebec, to determine whether hierarchies of belonging exist, whether they are salient, and how they affect the political attitudes and behaviour of all within the boundaries of the nation/province/country. To this end, it examines how aggregate measures of identity in Scotland and Quebec have changed since the 1960s before turning to the qualitative expressions of identity gathered through more than 80 interviews with residents in Scotland and Quebec. Lastly, the chapter uses this understanding of identity to test its theory of hierarchical belonging and the distribution of political attitudes in the two case studies. In short, the chapter focuses on how different groups and individuals in Scotland and Quebec cope with their positions within or outwith the respective nation.

**AGGREGATE MEASURES OF IDENTITY**

Often criticised as blunt instruments of social investigation, aggregate indicators of identity, and the measures used to extract such data, provide a coherent picture of changing patterns of attachment and belonging. The absence of long and involved identity questions on electoral study questionnaires, a result of limited space and different goals for data, prevents a similar availability of individual measures of personal identity. In the absence of comprehensive micro-data, identity research must buttress existing quantitative data with qualitative examinations and surveys of collective measures. Sometimes the availability of survey reports allows for an analysis of these results on the basis of certain social characteristics. For example, publicly available opinion poll data measure identity choices against such factors as
social class, age, sex, housing tenure, and employment activity. Often, preferences for parties or certain constitutional options are included in the analysis of identity questions. The relative availability of this data allows for a fairly comprehensive examination of the relationship between pre-determined identity choices and social characteristics over time. Scottish and Quebec data highlights the changing nature of identity preferences, and indeed, the changing influence of factors such as age and social class, in the last decade. In both cases, the sheer amount of data allows for a comprehensive examination of identity.

Measurement

Part of the problem of measurement stems from the moving ‘target’ of identity. The importance and substance of identity varies both in context and over time. Within the literature, identity has been used as a sense of belonging (Turner 1982, Wetherell 1996b), a particular outlook (Erikson 1974) or a self-ascribed label (Hall 1996). Recent efforts to problematise identity highlight the frustration with existing measurement attempts (Mendelsohn 1999, Bechhofer and McCrone 1998). Criticism addresses issues of definition and measurement, such as the construction of identity scales (Mendelsohn 1999), the operationalisation of identity theory (Hall 1996), and the treatment of identity data in the search for meaningful correlations. In particular, researchers point to the low saliency of political beliefs and the questioned relationship between attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviour. Each of these, when compounded by the questionable ability of individuals to explain their own identities, prove stumbling blocks for any empiricist attempting to capture the true meaning of political culture and national identity.

Evidence from World Values Surveys suggests that in general, individuals are expressing a level of attachment to the nation or State rather than the town or region. Data from the 1981 and 1998 surveys, for example, highlight the dramatic change in allegiance in the United States as well as debunking the long-standing myth that Canadians have an underdeveloped sense of patriotism. The data also point to the lack of a significant continental identity in Europe, notwithstanding the significant political
change occurring there. At first glance, the data appear to detract from claims that political boundaries reinforce a sense of shared identity.

**Figure 4.1: Comparative Identity Support**

Percentage responding to the Question: Which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all? And the next?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The World Values Surveys provide the largest databank of comparative survey data (Nevitte 1996). In its first year, the programme gathered data in twenty-two countries. One decade later forty countries were included in the project. The results shown here allow for a simple comparison among Canada, the United States and Europe over time. The statistics show that a greater affinity for the nation in North America and a decreased affinity to smaller localities such as the region or town. North Americans have not begun to feel a strong continental affinity, despite the integrative efforts of the free trade. That said, a slightly larger percentage of the population indicate that they feel an affinity to the ‘world as a whole’. These results stand apart from European data, which indicate that fewer individuals feel an affinity to the nation and a greater proportion report regional ties. The influence of the European Union, according to this data, does not appear to be any different than the influence of NAFTA as far as identity group membership is concerned. The questions used in the World Values Survey, however, do not provide comprehensive assessments of self-identification. A complete examination of quantitative identity trends in Scotland and Quebec must predate any analysis of qualitative data.

Aggregate measures of identity in Scotland find little consistency prior to the introduction of the Moreno question in 1986 (Moreno 1988). Prior to this, votes for the Scottish National Party served as proxies for measures of increasing Scottish identity at the expense of British allegiance. As stated earlier, Moreno’s scale asks respondents to classify their identity as: Scottish not British, More Scottish than
British, Equally Scottish and British, More British than Scottish, British not Scottish. The equivalent poles in the Canadian version usually require respondents to choose between their Canadian and Québécois identities although questions probing attachment rather than identity prove most popular.

In Scotland, results since the beginning of the decade show a gradual preference for a Scottish identity allowing for a sense of Britishness at the expense of a uniquely territorial visions of self. Complaints that the question itself encourages a false opposition of Scottishness and Britishness find little support from those who accept that the measure, for all its methodological faults, provides as robust a measure as the public is willing to accept. As McCrone states, people seem to understand what the question is getting at (McCrone 1996). This in itself makes the Moreno scale a more valuable measure than other more complicated tests of allegiance or sense of self. An examination of the trends over time highlight the malleability of identity choices in Scotland.

**Figure 4.2: National Identity in Scotland**

The Scottish data illustrates the extent to which identity preferences change over time.
although for the most part the movement occurs within the top three categories. During past two general election campaigns the proportion of individuals who reported that they felt ‘More Scottish than British’ rose from the pre-election period. At the same time the proportion who felt ‘Scottish not British’ decreased. This apparent paradox could stem from the participation of Scots in a British political rite. Thus, the importance of Scottishness was increased because it represented an occasion to speak ‘as a collective’ within the political system, and yet at the same time, the practice of voting demonstrated an affinity to the British polity. For the September 1997 devolution referendum, the proportion of individuals reporting that they felt ‘More Scottish than British’ fell, perhaps because within an electorate composed entirely of Scots, the importance of Scottishness is mitigated.

A comparison of recent data from Scotland, Spain and Quebec points to differing understandings of the identity question. While Scots’ answers tend to cluster at the top of the scale, the more even distribution in Catalonia points to a lack of consensus on identity. Results from the Basque region raise still other issues. The clustering of results at the ends of the spectrum or at the mid-point highlight the lack of support for more nuanced understandings of dual identity. (Brown, McCrone and Paterson 1998) For the most part, Scots appear more likely to prioritise their national, rather than State, identity, than respondents in Catalonia or Quebec.

**Figure 4.3: National Identity in Britain, Spain and Canada**
Percentage agreeing with each statement
x=Scottish, English, Welsh, Catalan, Basque or Québécois

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Wales</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Euskadi</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x not British, Spanish,</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x more than British,</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish, Canadian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally x and British,</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish, Canadian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British, Spanish,</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian more than x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British, Spanish,</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian not x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within Britain, Scots appear more willing to prioritise their national or sub-State identity than those in Wales or England. Residents in the Basque region of Spain appear more likely to self-ascribe regional identities than those in Catalonia and Wales. Within Quebec, the total proportion indicating a preference for a Quebec, rather than Canadian identity illustrates that Quebeckers are second only to Scots in their level of attachment to the nation. It is worth noting, however, that the question asked of Quebeckers differs slightly from the question asked of those in Britain and Spain. Deviating slightly from the Moreno question, individuals were asked about their allegiance, rather than identity. Thus, in Scotland, the identity question taps a label of self-description, whereas measures in Quebec force respondents to assess their attachment to the collective. Asking respondents for their level of attachment or belonging to a State, province or nation is not the same as asking respondents how they feel about themselves. A further gap, between attachment and belonging, has forced at least one researcher to decry the indiscriminating use of opinion poll data to explain sociological phenomena (Mendelsohn 1999). While both the media and electoral study teams opt for the Moreno question in Britain, the division between questions asked by private polling firms and electoral studies further inhibits a comparison over time. For their part, private polling firms have opted for a single identity question over the series of identity scales used by the election teams.

Identity changes in Canada address not only the issue of shared identities, but also the changing self-definition from French Canadian to Québécois. Although the data highlights significant changes in the transfer of identity in the 1980s, this can be interpreted as a delayed reaction to the influence of the Quiet Revolution. The period of modernisation and increasing use of provincial machinery as a guarantor of Francophone rights and cultural vitality is usually seen as the engine of identity change (Martin 1998).

**Figure 4.4: Identity Change in Quebec**

Percentage listing the following in response to the question: How would you describe your identity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Canadian</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As explained in chapter three, the transition of the label, from French Canadian to Québécois, occurred in the 1960s, when the provincial government of Quebec took on a stronger role not only with respect to social and economic provisions but also as a guarantor of the Québécois culture and identity. As a result, the most dramatic change in identity labels may have occurred before the data indicated in this table. And yet within twenty years, an additional forty percent of the Quebec population thinks in terms of their province rather than in terms of the State. This could also stem from the increasing distance between Quebecers and francophones outside Quebec. As the Quebec government became more pro-active it also became titular head of the francophone population within Canada; ensuring that francophones had a voice within Canada and ensuring a strong Quebec became synonymous. As a result, a pan-Canadian identity linked by language, because increasingly irrelevant.¹

More recently, private polling firms have begun employing variations of the Moreno question in Quebec. Although the data stems from a relatively restricted period of time, the results show a small change in identity preferences. As in Scotland, the general election year 1997 coincided with an increased proportion of Quebecers emphasising their provincial, rather than State identity.

¹ The interaction between Quebecers and francophone hors Québec is charted in a number of works (Bonin 1992, Donneur 1975, Laponce 1987).
Although the results display a stronger attachment to the larger entity than data gathered in Scotland, the general trend, of support for a multiple identity that favours the nation, mirrors the British data.

Within Canada, whether as a result of the continued attention to regional identity or a greater preference for quantitative methods, a diverse package of identity questions have been used to gauge allegiance, identity, belonging and attachment over time. In addition, questions have sought not only to track identity changes over time, but to understand the reasons why identity appears malleable. These measures have not been employed in the Scottish case, and thus a direct comparison between the case studies remains, for the moment, impossible. However, an analysis of how these questions relate to one another raises questions about accuracy with which social scientists and private polling firms measure identity. In an adaptation of the identity-poles questions offered by Moreno, the polling firm Ekos sought to compare identity trends throughout Canada. The results, published in the English-language daily Gazette in Montreal show that there is little to distinguish the provincial allegiances of all Canadians, regardless of place of residence. The figure that separates Quebecers
from other Canadians is thus not an inordinately high attachment to the province, but rather, a below-average attachment to Canada.

Figure 4.6: National Attachment in Canada
Ekos Press Release April 1, 1998

Data over a longer period of time display a similar trend. The following table tracks the locus of attachment for Quebec residents.

Figure 4.7: National Attachment in Quebec
Percentage listing the following in response to the question: Who do you feel closer to?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/08</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/03</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/12</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/04</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/11</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mendelsohn 1999

Results from figures 4.6 and 4.7 demonstrate that while Quebecers record similar levels of allegiance to their province as other Canadians in their respective provinces (apart from a high of 87 percent in the referendum year), their sense of belonging to Canada is less than that of other Canadians by an average of 35 percent. Support for autonomy in Quebec appears to stem more from a lack of attachment to the federal entity than a stronger sense of belonging in Quebec. Additional poll results highlight the relationship between attachment to province and attachment to Canada. In a post-
referendum examination of attitudes in Canada, pollster Angus Reid also asked whether individuals felt less attached to Canada than they did a few years ago.

**Figure 4.8: National Attachment in Canada and Quebec**

Percentage agreeing with the statement “I feel…”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Rest of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>profoundly attached to Canada</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profoundly attached to province</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more attached to province than to Canada</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less committed to Canada than a few years ago</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Angus Reid 1996 sample size 3603 (Quebec 650)

As these results indicate, the declining attachment to Canada among one in two Quebecers accompanies a similar decline among one in five Canadians outside Quebec. Similarly, two in five Canadians outside Quebec feel more attached to their province than to Canada. The poll results demonstrate a clear trend of allegiance away from the larger entity towards the nation although at present this trend occupies only one third of Canadians. Dis-aggregated data from CROP gathered for the Council for Canadian Unity displays a similar trend.

**Figure 4.9: Regional Attachment in Canada**

Percentage agreeing with the statement: I feel …

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attached to Canada</th>
<th>Atlantic</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to province</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to City/ Community</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to World</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CROP 1998

This statistics differ from results presented in figure 4.1. In the World Values Survey, respondents were asked to chose from a list of options whether they felt more attached to the world, continent, country, region or city. The CROP study does not require that individuals chose one option over the other, but rather asks respondents to assess each factor on its own. As a result, these statistics provide higher levels of attachment than the World Values Surveys. As other data explains, the level of provincial attachment among Quebecers is indistinguishable from the provincial attachments of other Canadians. Furthermore, attachment to city or community...
compares favourably across the regions of Canada. Just as a smaller proportion of Quebecers report an attachment to Canada, so does a smaller proportion indicate an attachment to the world.

As previously stated, Canadian methodologists have experimented with several questions in an attempt to unpack the identity dispositions of Quebecers and other Canadians. Part of their quest has involved efforts to understand the motivations for different levels of attachment and belonging. In its 1998 examination of attitudes in the Quebec, polling company CROP provided respondents with double-barrelled questions that encouraged individuals to justify their attachment by the second clause.

Figure 4.10: Justification of Attachment in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage agreeing with the statement “I feel ...”</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>French Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Profound attachment to C. I like this country and what it represents</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to C so long as it gives me a good standard of living</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not attached to C but I would prefer that Q remained part of C</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not attached to C and I would prefer that Q stopped being part of C</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CROP 1998

The problems associated with using this data are many and varied. First of all, the pre-determined selection of options severely limits the explanations that can be used. Sovereignists who retain a level of attachment to Canada, either as a nation or as a political jurisdiction, would not find their views expressed in the options on offer. Likewise, those who feel that attachment to a larger entity detracts from personal identity would not be pleased with the options listed above. As will be discussed later, similar issues affect questions offering a majority of answers in reference to dual national identities. In each case, the answers of individuals are limited to preconceived notions of identity.

The distinction between measures of attachment and measures of identity emphasise different aspects of the identity debate. Moreno-type questions tracking identity labels suggest that a smaller proportion in each location feel that they possess solitary
identities as either Scots or Québécois. In addition, a greater proportion express an attachment than prioritise their national identity. The results suggest that a sense of identity does not automatically accompany a sense of attachment but that attachment is more prevalent that identity. This link, between identity, attachment and, later belonging, remains the subject of analysis in later sections.

The plethora of Canadian data on the issues of attachment and belonging suggest that the long standing Canadian identity crisis has led to a level of reflection and measurement that attempts to come to grips with some of the more slippery aspects of identity. Within Scotland, a consistent application of the Moreno question has provided a reliable tool for measuring identity over time. Even with this tool, the data has not been particularly useful in explaining the content and salience of identity. Some of these issues are highlighted in the following section.

ISSUES IN IDENTITY MEASUREMENT

As stated earlier, most survey work using national identity as an independent variable exerting influence over partisan preference or voter turnout rely on a variation of Luis Moreno’s five-point identity scale (Moreno 1988). Developed while comparing national identity in Scotland and Catalonia, Moreno’s scale lends itself to straightforward quantification and cross-national comparison. Despite the importance of creating data to test relationships between variables, what Moreno’s scale gains in applicability it lacks in description. The scale fails to identify the strength with which national feelings are held, what such self-identification actually means to the individual, and leaves hidden the components of identity itself. What, for instance, are the distinguishing characteristics of the Scottish or Québécois national identity? How is the identity of an individual who self-identifies as solely Scottish different from the identity of an individual whose self-definition allows for a minimal sense of Britishness? If used in isolation, Moreno’s categories, while valuable in their ability to demonstrate the effect of national identity on political behaviour, fail to provide a sense of context to national identity, what it is about national identity that affects subsequent behaviour. Although Canadian newspapers have been quick to
commission opinion polls using the Moreno identity scales, the election surveys in Canada rely on a different instrument to measure the varying levels of identity within the country. Asking respondents to indicate their level of attachment to their province and country on two scales of 1 to 100, while avoiding the binary opposition of the British scale, provides little insight into the motivations of belonging. As previously argued, identity is not a thing and should not be treated as such. Within this process nationalist parties encourage the creation and acquisition of a definable identity package that provides citizens with the tools to interpret the past, present and future in an effort to mobilise national identity behind a political project. For those who exclude themselves from national identity, a reluctance to align oneself with the associated values and characteristics of the nation matters as much as the notion of belonging itself.

A second issue concerns the notion of multiple national identities. While Hall has adequately argued that individuals possess multiple social identities (Hall 1992), the proof of multiple national identities comes from the measurement side of the debate rather than from theoretical understandings of identity. The use of scales in which individuals may choose between polarised identity options emphasises the supposedly multiple nature of identity. Students constructing scales for surveys are warned that a five-point scale in which three of the answers are generally positive and two are negative will skew the results in favour of the positive. If, for example, respondents are asked to score their answers according to a scale that runs from excellent, very good, good, poor, to terrible, the results will be biased. The same can be said of identity scales in which three of the five options refer to a shared identity and the remaining two refer to a sole identity in relation to the 'other'. A comparison of the Moreno question and two other identity questions found in the 1997 Scottish election survey proves this point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 4.11: Statistical Measures of Identity in Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage agreeing with the statement &quot;I feel ...&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The two identity questions included in the SES measures ask: Do you feel Scottish?, What is your primary identity? As a result, those who indicate that they feel Scottish, and would consider it their primary identity form 74 percent of the sample. This compares with 64 percent of those asked the Moreno question who indicated that they feel primarily Scottish (Scottish not British, More Scottish than British).

According to these measures, either Moreno underestimates Scottish identity, or the SES questions overestimate Scottishness. Cross-tabulations for these three questions indicate that the distributions for the Moreno question and the two other questions fail to prove that the two bind together perfectly. For those who indicate that their identity is equally Scottish and British, almost sixty percent describe their ‘best identity’ as Scottish and forty percent describe themselves as British. For a measure that seeks to prove that individuals hold both identities in equal regard, the tendency to prioritise a Scottish identity over a British identity should not happen more than fifty percent of the time. Instead, despite claiming under some circumstances that they feel equally Scottish and British, individuals do not include the British label when it is not presented to them in the question choosing instead to describe themselves as Scottish.

**Figure 4.12: Identity-Related Questions in Scotland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scottish not British</th>
<th>More Scottish than British</th>
<th>Equally Scottish and British</th>
<th>More British than Scottish</th>
<th>British not Scottish</th>
<th>Column total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 best identity</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish column %</td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 best identity</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British column %</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total in SES</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 see self as</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish (Y) see self as</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, when not offered the option of combining their British and Scottish identities, fewer Scots suggest they are carriers of dual identities. While the existence of multiple national identities is possible, researchers should be wary of the way in which the questions asked will influence the results. This is not to say that Moreno is incorrect, but rather than it should not be used as a proxy question for identity. Those involved in the Canadian election survey have opted for a different tactic. Perhaps wary of employing questions that combine multiple identity options, the researchers have relied upon two thermometer scales with which to test the identity of Canadians. Thus, respondents are asked to indicate how they feel about Canada, and in a separate question, how they feel about their province, on a scale of 1 to 100. The results for the 1997 general election survey for Canadians were as follows.

**Figure 4.13: Identity in the Canadian Election Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of respondents according to each identity thermometer decile</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>74.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-99</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source CES 1997, n=1034

The results indicate that over half of Quebecers feel a strong attachment to both Canada and to Quebec. The thermometers, while useful in analysing the depth of feeling among respondents, do not allow for a comparison of attachment to Canada and Quebec. The following table attempts to provide such a tool. The results from the Canadian Election Study have been re-coded to approximate the results provided by the Moreno question, for despite the previously mentioned limitations of the tool, the accurate reflection of attachment and identity to nation and to State proves an
essential index in any analysis of identity. For the above data, respondents whose attachment to Canada was greater than that to Quebec were coded as 'More Canada than Quebec' and vice versa for those whose attachment was recorded as greater for Quebec. Those respondents who indicated an equal attachment to both, whether that level was twenty, fifty or eight, were coded as 'Equal to Canada and to Quebec'. Lastly, respondents who listed zero for attachment to either Quebec or to Canada were listed as possessing binary identity, as in the poles of the Moreno question. The following table summarises the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.14 Dual Attachment in Quebec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in each reconstructed identity group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec not Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec more than Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Quebec and Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada more than Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada not Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CES 1997, n=1034, 247 missing values

When compared with data collected by private polling firms the CES thermometers reveal a higher proportion of residents who indicate that their attachment is to Quebec more than Canada. In addition, the data show a very small proportion of individuals whose attachment to either Canada or Quebec is solitary. In chapter five, statistics on political attitudes, behaviour and socio-economic characteristics are analysed within these categories. It should be noted that the question asked by the CES team deals with feelings towards Quebec and Canada - attachment to an entity - rather than self-perception. In each case, a combination of multiple-identity options, or rather, asking about one identity with respect to another, and questions offering only a reflection on national or State identity, would provide for a more robust understanding on identity in Scotland and Quebec.

It is possible that when choosing results emphasising a shared identity, respondents distinguish between an allegiance to nation (Scotland/Quebec) and an allegiance to the State (Britain/Canada). Respondents in different regions of the country may opt for similar answers (for example, 'both Albertan and Canadian') but in this case, Canada
may be seen as the nation, and Alberta as the political jurisdiction. Just because the same words are used by different respondents should not suggest that the words possess the same meaning. So far, identity measurement has failed to gauge the extent to which the identity selection is a meaningful aggregate, or an association with political rights or citizenship. Two individuals within Quebec may each select the option "Quebec first then Canada". For the first individual, Quebec could signify the nation, a meaningful aggregate of shared customs and values, myths and symbols, while Canada refers to the State in which she lives, provides her a passport, currency, and collects taxes. For the second individual, Quebec could refer to the political jurisdiction in which he lives, works, and votes while Canada is the meaningful aggregate of shared history. This tension between meaningful aggregate and salient presence lies, in part, in the tension between static label and dynamic process.

That multiple identities are possible, is without question. It could be argued, however, that they are not the automatic construct of federal or asymmetrical political systems in which individuals can have dual allegiances. An attachment to two entities, yes, two examples of national identity, not necessarily. As stated earlier, just because the option chosen is understood by some as a nation, does not mean that it is understood as a nation, or chosen as a representation of national identity, by all. Identity measurements have failed to capture this notion of a meaningful aggregate and the interactive processes associated with identity. Thus, while the provision of open-ended questions may inhibit quantitative analyses of identity, it may further a greater understanding of widespread changes in identity preferences over time.

**MARKERS OF IDENTITY AND HIERARCHIES OF BELONGING**

Statistical examinations in Scotland and Quebec provide little evidence of a hierarchy of belonging. In part, this has much to do with the methods used to examine identity. In Scotland as in Quebec the available data by its content and its presentable form, limits any examination. The Scottish Election Study (SES) asked a variety of identity questions during the 1997 General Election campaign. Works treating the 1997 SES emphasised the continued preference for a Scottish identity over a British identity.
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 4

(Brown, McCrone, Paterson and Surridge, 1999). In a departure from earlier works the Scottish Election Survey asked individuals about the components of Scottishness.

Table 4.15 Identity components in Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important statement</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important to have been born in Scotland</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to have Scottish ancestry</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to live in Scotland</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SES 1997 n=882

The data in Table 4.15 show a subtle ranking in the minds of respondents with a preference for ethnic rather than civic characteristics. Fewer Scots believe it is important to be living in Scotland in order to be considered Scottish than the proportion who believe that being born in Scotland is important. Despite this view, it is likely that when faced with different combinations of the three previously mentioned components of national-membership, alternative hierarchies could form. An individual who lives in Scotland and was born in Scotland could be seen to have a greater claim to Scottish identity than an individual with Scottish ancestry, despite the weight assigned to ancestry over residence in the previous table. The following tables summarises the relationship among these variables and the Moreno question.

Table 4.16: Relationship among Identity Components in Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>x</th>
<th>y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important to have been born in Scotland</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to have Scottish ancestry</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to live in Scotland</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: SES 1997 n=882

The table shows that the strongest correlation occurs between the two ‘ethnic’ categories. Thus, those who feel that it is important to be born in Scotland are also more likely to believe that ancestry, rather than residence, is important. For those who prioritise ancestry, being born in Scotland is more important than living there. Those who prefer more ‘civic’ notions, tied to residence, feel slightly more strongly that birth, rather than blood, accounts for Scottishness. Perhaps with these correlations in mind, McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhoffer have compiled a table
of possible combinations, ranging from true Scots, to accidental Scots but have not attempted to attach a scale of increased importance to the characteristics (McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998). Whether these categories vary according to self-assigned identity label forms the focus of the following table.

Table 4.17: Moreno and Hierarchies of Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of those within identity group claiming characteristics are 'important'</th>
<th>born</th>
<th>ancestry</th>
<th>living</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SES 1997, n=882

The table shows that those who consider themselves primarily Scottish place less stock in place of residence as a determinant of identity, and more emphasis on birth. At the same time, place of residence as a determinant of identity is even less important for those individuals who are living in Scotland but do not consider themselves Scots. Such data makes sense on an intuitive level: those who live in Scotland but do not consider themselves members of the Scottish nation indicate that residence does not correlate with Scottish identity. Perhaps this group is more aware of the ephemeral ‘other’ characteristics that are necessary to acquire a sense of belonging in Scotland.

The relationship among blood, place of birth and residence appears in other articles by McCrone. In his 1994 *Scottish Affairs* editorial he points to the three possible definitions of being Scottish. The first, based on blood, appears less popular in the 20th century, largely because of the negative connotations of ‘ethnic’ national identity. A second definition grounds Scottishness in place of birth, which he sees as an attempt to “short-circuit the lineage issues” (McCrone 1994a). The third and final definition is based on territory, a seemingly inclusive definition in which Scottishness is available to all within its borders. McCrone notes the pattern of Scots to domesticate potential aggressors and invading forces. The view sits well with Malcolm Dickson’s analysis of the political values of English-born Scottish residents, who show very little deviation from their Scottish counterparts (McCrone 1994a,
Dickson 1994). Recent attempts to measure public perceptions of citizenship regulations devote still further attention to this troika of characteristics. In its survey of Scots, ICM created a hierarchy of characteristics that would determine an individual’s right to a Scottish passport. In broad terms, support decreases when one moves away from place of birth.

### Table 4.18 Scottish Citizenship and Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of People</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Born and live in Scotland</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Scotland but live elsewhere</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not born in Scotland, live in Scotland</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither born nor live in Scotland but one Scottish parent</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither born nor live in Scotland but one Scottish grandparent</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All within the UK</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ICM November 1998, n=1010

That only half of Scottish residents support the provision of a Scottish passport to those who were not born here must appear as a stumbling block to those who claim Scottish nationalism is resolutely civic and inclusive. Civic it may be, but not necessarily inclusive. Although it would be accurate to note that the provision of citizenship on the basis of parentage is more liberal than any other State in Europe, the conditions under which passports would be delivered sufficiently alters the context of these claims. Conditions prompting the very existence of Scottish citizenship would follow a departure from the United Kingdom where, at present, all Scots hold citizenship. Thus, in moving from a situation where all share citizenship to one with divided citizenship would perhaps encourage a more liberal policy than under ‘normal’ circumstances. It would have been interesting to divide the second question into two parts: born in Scotland but live elsewhere in the UK, born in Scotland but live outside the UK. Furthermore, it could be that when asked of individuals who were not born in Scotland but are living in Scotland, most respondents thought of their English counterparts rather than, for example, Americans living in Scotland. The extent to which individuals internalise these seemingly objective determinants as important

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2 The author was present at interviews for the recent Scottish Parliamentary election survey. When similar questions were asked, many respondents appeared unwilling to answer the question until they knew how the existing legislation concerning passports operated. Such information was not divulged by the interviewer.
markers for their own sense of identity, or whether these markers are used as an informal checklist when evaluating the identity of other individuals, receives attention in the following section.

**INTERNALISING HIERARCHIES OF BELONGING**

When seeking to determine how individuals express and understand the functioning of identity and how it affects their interaction within the political system, both with respect to other citizens and with respect to the state, the thesis seeks to offer answers based on the analysis of interviews conducted as fieldwork. Those interviewed include members of each of the major parties operating in Scotland and Quebec - and in the Canadian case, include representatives of federal parties - as well as journalists, and members of civic organisations involved in the constitutional debate. Individuals were asked how they would describe their own national identity, which markers they would use to describe Québécois or Scottish national identity in general, and whether they perceived any real differences between Scots/Quebecers and other Britons/Canadians. Additional questions treating the nature of political culture in both locations receive attention toward the end of the chapter. Quotations were selected that showed an internalisation of publicly-projected markers of difference in Scotland and Quebec. In addition, the quotations seek to provide some depth to the factor analysis listed in the chapter five. While it is not entirely possible to classify all interview subjects by their views on separatism, several, by virtue of their associations or membership, or by statements made in the interviews, made such information known. Where relevant, information on language, partisan preference, ethnicity and support for sovereignty accompany quotations.

The interviews emphasise that individuals do use the popular markers of identity to buttress their own claims to identity. When seeking to explain their own identity, individuals relied on notions of blood, residence and specific values to justify their statements. For example, the previously-mentioned hierarchy of identity is reinforced in the credentials considered worthy as markers of Scottishness by subjects interviewed in 1998.
What we’re concerned about in the [Conservative] party, everyone is harping on “You must be more Scottish and this is the antithesis of being British” which I find quite objectionable really. Although I’m completely Scottish by birth and parentage I have through marriage in the family many English relatives.

Malcolm Rifkind when he was Scottish Secretary he took [Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher] aside and said look, you should really not say “you Scots” so she came out with “we Scots” which was even worse. I mean she had no Scottish blood in her. And that sort of grated on the Scottish psyche.

These quotations highlight the emphasis of blood and ethnic components in determining Scottishness. Such statements would seem to suggest that nationalism in Scotland, despite the political emphasis on civic goals, relies, at times, upon references of blood and belonging. As stated previously, the markers and measures of national identity matter less than the hierarchy that such signifiers create. The hierarchy, rather than the pillars of identity themselves, demonstrate how disparate concepts of birth, values and characteristics hang together to create a meaningful aggregate identity. The following two quotations indicate how individuals with entirely different political views can construct similar notions of Scottishness. The first quotation, by a researcher from the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, highlights the key differences between the Scots and the English. The second, provided by a Church of Scotland minister and SNP supporter, raises similar themes of self belief, democracy and community.

I don’t think Scots are fundamentally different to the English but we are different. I think there’s a ... in Scotland you’d probably find a greater sense of community than in England ... Scots are probably a slightly more religious nation than England. Also, there’s a sense of proportion to things. I would say we don’t like to do well at things but we’re understated. We don’t like to brag about things. I think in England you’d probably find a greater brashness. When people come into money – if you take a Scotsman and an Englishman of similar backgrounds and you gave them a whole lot of money, I think you’d probably find the Scot would be less ostentatious with their wealth than the English person. I think there’s almost a Calvinistic attitude that we don’t rise above our station – that’s not the right phrase – that
we don’t flaunt our wealth. And I think there’s a sense of community. But that’s my impression of it. [Conservative]

Scotland has the infinite capacity to snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory ... that’s been absolutely right. Somehow, and I think that’s probably why we fail to go for a greater measure of independence, there’s a kind of ... self-belief is low. And we counter that by belligerence, the tartan army kind of thing ... The church influence has been a mixed bag ... there has been the Calvinist total depravity thing. You know, “that thou might have plunged me into hell to gnash my gums and weep and wail.” I do Holy Willie’s Prayer at several Burns suppers. But it’s that kind of thing. There’s original sin and we’re all damned and we’re all miserable worms. There’s that side of things, but on the other side there’s the strong democratic tradition ... [SNP Church of Scotland minister]

Both quotations highlight themes raised in the political documents. Despite their divergent political beliefs, and different positions within institutions of national society, the two respondents presented similar views of Scottishness. This suggests that a consensus exists across social groups about markers of Scottish identity.

National institutions, and the values created supposedly created by them, also figure among responses. These values reflect the image of Scots portrayed in party manifestos, media reports and academic literature; the nation as an egalitarian, if slightly defeatist, left-of-centre society. The following quotations, from interviews with social activists, highlight this point.

one of the things about Scots is enquiring minds

[I came to Scotland] out of a conscious preference for the firm belief [in Scotland] in the existence of simple society ... a sense of egalitarianism and social justice not found in England

As a Scot I’m probably biased in saying we’re probably, we’re a very intelligent nation, our education system is such that it brings out people’s best talents. I think Scots the world over are respected people

When Scotland were beaten by England 5-0 or 5-1, it was 5-1, at Wembley in 1975, Stuart Kennedy the Rangers goaltender had a nightmare game, and the story is told that when all the departing English fans were out of the stadium there was a wee guy with a, in the days when
you could bring bottles into a game, a bottle of whisky, tammie, a kind of almost parody of a Scot, and he waved the bottle at the departing English fans and he said, You’s couldn’ score six. Now that’s a very significant statement. To be absolutely hammered into the ground 5-1 but the glorious, almost illogical defiance, you’s couldn’ score six, well we really won because we stopped you from scoring six goals

The value of the education system, a sense of social justice and egalitarianism and a defeatist attitude were all highlighted in political documents detailing the traits of Scottish identity. In other examples, the values associated with Scottish identity refer either to global values, or to isolated examples. As one Conservative MP noted:

I’m sometimes a bit of an agitator. That must be my Scottish ancestry coming out.

The absence of proof characterises most of these statements. And yet for the most party, quotations coalesce around popular visions of the nation. As the quotation above indicates, the ability of individuals to define for themselves how they see ‘Scottishness’ allows for a certain diversity around the concept that does not always permeate popular notions.

For others, attention to popular notions detracts from identity as a self-directed process. Questioning the assumed relationship between left-of-centre values and Scottish identity one academic noted:

This idea of a democratic intellect, lad o’ pairs egalitarianism has a grain of truth but it’s the product of a Scottish political elite. If Glasgow had the same waves of immigration in the 1950s that other part of Britain witnessed, who knows how egalitarian and tolerant it would have been. Scotland hasn’t been exposed to the clashes and crises the way the rest of the country has. And so it’s a self substantiating myth. There’s a terrible history of intolerance in Scotland. In Edinburgh in the 1930s you had an extreme political party, Protestant Action, running on an anti-Catholic ticket even though the Catholic population measured around 6 percent. There’s also the sectarian undercurrent in Glasgow. It’s not as strong as in Northern Ireland but it’s still there.

Thus, Scottish identity appears to be both exclusive and inclusive. Markers attached to identity as a label appear to be fairly restrictive while those associated with
personal attachment rely on self-defined markers of belonging. As another academic noted, the inclusiveness is linked to self-definition.

What makes Scottish small ‘n’ nationalism so compelling is it is not specific to these characteristics. The broadest range of people can identify with it .... it might be anti Victorian, it might be a hostility to England, you can make anything grist to the mill. There are numerous Tories who will identify themselves very assertively and aggressively as Scottish and as Scottish small n nationalists and who deeply resent any suggestion to the contrary.

For this reason, Scottish nationalism in general and the SNP in particular have escaped charges that they support ethnic or exclusive notions of identity. Rather, both are seen to promote civic notions that, for reasons discussed later, are given greater scrutiny in Quebec. While the quotation emphasises that Scottish Conservatives, who are seen to hold values seemingly anathema to Scottish identity, may feel themselves proud Scots, the interviewee does not deny that there are some individuals who would challenge the Scottishness of these Conservatives. In part, this could stem from a series of campaigns conducted by the Scottish National Party to portray the then-government as ‘anti-Scottish’ (SNP 1995). Thus, there appears to be a difference between the right of individuals to call themselves Scots, and a right to express their attachment without challenge, but that the views of others may contradict these sentiments. An additional quotation highlights the potentially exclusive aspects of Scottish national identity.

National identity is a problematic term. The content is ill-defined. When it is defined it includes certain sections of the population to the exclusion of others. Whether that has taken the form of Catholic suppression or the north Britain theory. Recently it’s been connected to a working class heritage. This conception excludes people like highlanders, women... And so, as a concept, national identity is doomed to failure.

While the first quotation argues that Scottish national identity includes everyone, even portions of society that might be considered on the fringes, the second, provided by

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3 Academic literature also charts the increasing alienation of the Scottish electorate with policies that were perceived to be English-driven and enacted by former prime minister Thatcher (McCrone 1992).
yet another academic, argues that all notions of national identity are inherently exclusive. For each quote, different sections of the population find themselves excluded from dominant understandings of Scottish identity. In the first quotation, Scottish Conservatives find their identity under challenge, whereas the second quotation notes that Catholics, highlanders and women may each find their own identity distorted by dominant definitions of Scottishness. Thus, different groups of people may each, at times, feel themselves excluded from popular understandings of the nation. Thus, notions of Scottishness are not by their very nature more inclusive than notions of what it is to be a Québécois. Rather, the pillars normally grounding notions of Scottishness are less visible, and therefore less likely to attract attention than language in Quebec.

Statistical examinations of identity in Quebec tend to use the category as an independent variable exerting influence over sovereignty support and voter preference (Martin 1998, Blais, Martin and Nadeau 1995, Nadeau and Fleury 1995, Lachapelle 1998, Guérrin and Nadeau 1998). Political values, for their part, tend to receive treatment as determinants of voting rather than composite markers of identity. Most agree that support for greater political autonomy and nationalist parties correlates broadly with identity. Little mention is made, however, of any hierarchy of belonging in such studies. For analyses of identity in context, more sociological examinations provide supplementary evidence. In an early work Donald Taylor and Ronald Sigal examine the influence of ethnicity, language and partisan support in defining notions of the ‘true Québécois’ identity (Taylor and Sigal 1982). Taylor and Sigal gave 120 Montrealers booklets containing descriptions of 24 individuals of various ethnic, linguistic and political backgrounds. Asked to determine whether each individual could be classified as a ‘true Québécois’ the respondents indicated that political orientation and language play a greater role in determining identity than ethnic heritage (Taylor and Sigal 1982).

The above data and discussion raise certain questions. How are these relationships understood by the people that are affected by them? How do people interpret or make sense of their negotiated identity? How do the daily identity claims function?
The following quotations from field interviews provide a sense of context to the statistically significant correlations between identity and political attitudes. The inclusion of such data seeks to argue that it is not enough to register a relationship between two variables. Any understanding of why such a relationship occurs relies upon an attempt to understand how identity functions for those who consider themselves outwith the nation. In each case study, the saliency of national membership determines the consequences of a position lower down the hierarchy of belonging. In Quebec, where a nationalist movement has sought to mobilise support on the back of a challenged identity, belonging assumes a role of greater importance (Henderson 1999). Furthermore, language, as one of the markers of identity, is a more visible characteristic that pillars such as values. It is relatively easy to tell if someone is a francophone or not. It is much less simple to determine whether someone supports sovereignty or, in the case of Scotland, how they feel about egalitarian policies. The attention to visible markers such as language, and the tendency to see identity as a right, as expressed in the following quotation, has not yet established itself in Scotland where much of the devolution movement has been motivated by the political inequities of a unitary state. “…ça ce n’est pas une question de tolérance, ce n’est pas quelque chose qui m’est conféré par la société. Ça encore, c’est un droit inhérent qui m’appartient en tant qu’individu” (Gouvernement du Québec 1992).

Recent constitutional submissions suggest that this hierarchy is not only acknowledged, but linked to individual characteristics or personal history. For one member of the Fédération des groupes ethniques du Québec speaking before the Bélanger Campeau Commission: “Un Québécois est celui qui demeure au Québec et l’aime assez pour le considérer comme sa patrie. Pour ce qui est de la patrie, elle n’est pas accessible à ceux qui sont arrivés avec une éducation complétée. Il faudrait se rappeler que la patrie c’est l’enfance.” (Commission nationale sur l’avenir du Québec 1995). This statement corresponds to the data collected by the Scottish Election Survey which demonstrated that those within Scotland attach differing levels of importance to a list of possible personal characteristics. As in Scotland, the claim
to identity is linked to birth or, in the case of Quebec, childhood socialisation within the nation.

The interviews demonstrated support for, or at the very least acceptance of, the markers promoted in political documents. The most significant difference between markers cited by respondents in Scotland and Quebec relates to language. The presence of a separate language, and thus an entirely different sphere of communication, reinforces the importance of national boundaries in Quebec. Language, as linked to cultural survival by agents of socialisation, remains a pre-eminent marker of identity. Language also exerts a day-to-day influence that subtly distances the French population of Quebec from other Canadians. Not surprisingly, the importance of language for Québécois identity surfaced in several interviews.

...the effect of Bill 101, the charter of the French language which favours integration of immigrants to the French speaking community, that makes French a real language of communication of young immigrants, that’s influencing them in their choice of identity as well (francohphone, separatist).

The influence of your parents of schooling is I think fundamental. There’s also the influence of the media, when you listen to French speaking media you hear people being Québécois (francohphone, separatist)

... I think language permeates your way of thinking, of referencing. And I think your references, cultural references are through language. You read in French, you see French films, you see French TV, you read French books and you think in French and that links you to a debate and it gives you an identity where language and nation and identity are linked very closely (francohphone separatist).

Once you speak French it’s all right (francohphone nationalist)

...just the fact that we exist in French, that there is the media, the history in Quebec is quite different than in the rest of Canada. It creates a sense of community (francohphone nationalist)

If you talk to a francophone they’ld say their first allegiance is to Quebec, second allegiance is to Canada. Simple because there’s a strong linguistic, cultural hegemony that exists when you are six million people surrounded by 300 million who speak a different language. There’s a tendency to circle the wagons (anglophone)
Both anglophones and francophones emphasised the role of language as a pillar of Québécois national identity. The assumption made in the last quotation, that all francophones, by virtue of their language, feel a greater attachment to Quebec, underlines the extent to which language is seen as important. The quotation also betrays a tendency among some individuals to assign values, attachments and thus, identity labels, on the basis of language. For this anglophone, francophones feel a greater attachment to Quebec, because they are French. In later sections this chapter deals with the role of perceptions of identity and expectations of belonging such as those mentioned here.

Just as political documents in Quebec make note of certain historical events to explain the contemporary position of the Québécois nation, so too did several interviewees highlight key dates in the formation of a national identity in Quebec. The Conquest in 1759, the repatriation of the constitution without Quebec consent in 1981 and the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 were cited most often. As one anglophone explained:

[French Canadians] were an entity and an identity before the Conquest so they have kind of felt that in their, now ‘myth’, built into their view of history, that the conquest robbed them of this identity (anglophone federalist)

As in Scotland, the sense of being a minority - although in this case not compounded by what some would label as the defeatism of Calvinism - surfaces in popular concepts of nationhood.

you always have a sense in Quebec that you cannot make it, that it’s too small, that the problem is that we’re too small and we need Canada. It’s less than it was of course when I was young (francophone nationalist)

As in Scotland, respondents focused on the values that distinguished Quebec from the rest of the country.

I think that we are more of a social democratic kind of place than the rest of Canada (francophone, separatist)
Each of these quotations clearly emphasises the acceptance of markers, as highlighted by agents of political socialisation. What appears less clear is the distinction between identity as a label, for which individuals must possess definite and objective characteristics, and attachment, which appears more linked to self-defined values. The distinction, between being Scottish and feeling Scottish, or rather being a Quebecer and exhibiting a sense of belonging as a Québécois, surface in the quotations offered by individuals. Thus far, quotations from both Scottish and Quebec interviews prove that individuals are aware of identity packages, coalescing around institutions, characteristics and values. The individual pillars may differ between case studies by the process appears similar in both nations. Whether individuals assess their own sense of Scottishness or Québec-ness, and how they choose to do so, forms the focus of the following section.

**SELF ASSESSMENT OF MARKERS OF BELONGING**

It could be argued that a recognition of certain markers of identity, as highlighted in the previously-mentioned Scottish passport question for example, and the emphasis on certain markers of identity in the literature of political parties, has not infiltrated the efforts of individuals to assess their own identity. Individuals may feel that birthplace and ancestry are important in determining the right to a passport, but do individuals exclude themselves or others from such claims to belonging in the absence of these markers? McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer argue, for example, that however individuals answer questions related to the identity of others, at the level of inter-personal interaction, more inclusive notions of belonging are used (McCrone, Stewart, Kiely and Bechhofer 1998). Such a view is consistent with research charting the often inconsistent relationship between attitudes and behaviour (LaPiere 1934, Minard 1952, DeFleur and Westie 1958, Fishbein and Azjen 1975, Hewstone, Stroebe and Stephenson 1996). While only experimental design would have allowed for a definitive retort to McCrone and Bechhofer’s problematisation of identity, the following section highlights that individuals do use relatively exclusive notions of identity to assess or prove their own level of belonging. The following quotations
chronicle the attempts of interviewees to establish their authenticity by highlighting proof of Scottish or Quebec identity. By highlighting their own markers of identity, or signposting their absence, interview respondents appear to have internalised popularly-held notions of the nation and are using them to emphasise their level of national belonging - or lack thereof.

I would never claim that I'm from Scotland. I am what I am. I was born in England. (English journalist in Scotland)

Although I'm completely Scottish by birth and parentage I have through marriage in the family many English relatives. (Conservative party member)

Speaking as an outsider – because I am completely English ethnically – and working in Scotland the first thing you find is this is a nation more at ease with itself that you would believe if you listened to the chattering classes. (English author living in Scotland).

I can't claim to be a Scot. I wasn't born here. However much I love this place ... [and] I don't want to be a New Scot. It sounds somehow second best. (English civic activist working in Scotland)

... to what degree can you accept someone as being a Scot if the voice they adopt in their fiction is not Scottish. Is the fact that I love this place enough? Does that qualify me? [other writers are more active in social and political life] Am I one of the lines that you need to draw? (French author working in Scotland)

but most of the people who work the Paris-Montreal [Air Canada] route are separatists, more than I am. so I'm very popular with them because we're the only newspaper with a separatist stance (francophone)

I came to Quebec because it was majority francophone, I was born in England, and lived in Ontario, but I came to Quebec, and I happen to be an Anglophile, I'm proud of my culture. But I love the idea of coming to Quebec and speaking - well Westmount is essentially English, but I can enjoy working and living in French if I want. I can speak French in restaurants. (anglophone)

When asked if he felt like a 'Québécois', one of the anglophone interviewees responded as follows:
Oh, increasingly - as I go back to Ontario, Mike Harris made it a lot easier. I find Ontario a very depressing place to be ... and I went to school here in the fifties, so I had a certain experience and shaping that has engendered a view of Canada that does include Quebec and understands Quebec is different and can function well as a different place, can function better as a different place, than as a homogenised region of Canada.

A further example highlights the extent to which those lacking what they perceive to be credible markers feel they cannot participate in debates about identity. During one interview, the subject asked his colleague why Scots feel the way they do. Both individuals work for a tabloid newspaper in Scotland. The ‘subject’, despite growing up in England, has spent the last ten years in Scotland. Both ‘subject’ and ‘colleague’ work with the editorial team selecting letters to the editor for publication and cover local issues for the paper. The ‘colleague’ is a Scot. When asked why Scots respond to the ‘kiling up’ of newspapers in Scotland, the following interaction ensued:

Colleague: Because the Scots are at heart a deeply sentimental, slushy race.
Subject: I couldn’t have dared to say that.

In the subject’s eyes, not being a Scot restricted the amount of criticism that could be levied against the group. That the subject asked a Scottish colleague to verify how ‘Scots’ feel betrays a reticence to speak ‘out of turn’. The view correlates well with the following quotation from an English-resident in Scotland.

As someone who’s not from Scotland it’s difficult to question whether devolution is a good thing without being castigated by polite society.

In each case, membership in the nation provides the perception of voice. Similar statements are made in Quebec, where language is seen as the first step in gaining authenticity. Beyond language, interaction with the dominant linguistic group is seen as proof of belonging.

Having spent a lot of time outside Montreal, in the real hinterland, where most anglophones never dare to venture, I mean, they rarely go east of St Laurent. My plant was in the East of Montreal, the
anglophones that tend to be the most strident about partition are usually the ones who are either not bilingual or don’t know what’s going on.

As the previous quotation highlights, contact with ‘real’ Québécois, in this case those in the hinterlands of east Montreal, provides additional proof of belonging. The following quotation also highlights the different ways in which anglophones may react to identity challenges.

I find it some people like me generally tend to be more sympathetic to the French cause than people who were born here. The people who were born here say, “I was born here, I have a right to speak English da da da da da da, I don’t want my identity to somehow be wiped out.”

The quotations emphasise the extent to which individuals link markers and belonging with authenticity. In particular, those who feel that they belong express greater confidence in discussing political affairs. In contrast, individuals lacking markers of identity tend to highlight this before they discuss nationalism or politics. This was found in academic literature as in the interviews. In his analysis of two recent works on identity in Scotland and Britain, Bernard Crick prefaced his essay with the phrase “As an English incomer” (Crick 1996). The quotation earlier in the page, noting the threat of ‘castigation’ begins with the phrase ‘As someone who’s not from Scotland’.

Thus, exclusion occurring at the national level exerts an influence on notions of political inclusion. The potential effects of questionable - or doubted - political inclusion on perceptions of political efficacy receive treatment later in the thesis. Given the existence of questioned identity, the chapter next examines how individuals evaluate the identity claims of others, and how individuals cope when their identity is challenged.

INTERGROUP PERCEPTIONS: NEGOTIATING IDENTITY

As explained in chapter two, this thesis argues that the application of social identity theory and the use of sociological examinations of national identity inform an
understanding of the potentially exclusive effects of identity. Furthermore, it argues that exclusion occurring at the national level, as affected by the markers of inclusion and the salience of identity, exerts an influence of self-perception within the State political culture. This section examines relevant literature and statistical data before returning to an analysis of interviews.

A recent paper on identity in Quebec examines the negotiation of belonging and perception of integration among visible and non-visible minorities. The survey determined that majority members of Quebec society differentiate members according to a hierarchy of acceptance. Non-visible minorities overestimated their acceptance in society whereas visible minorities tended to underestimate their acceptance. Both, however, were not sure whether they belong in Quebec society (Moghaddam, Pelletier, Taylor and Chepanek 1994). This distance, between self-perception and the level of inclusion assigned by others received additional attention in recent CROP opinion poll data. The survey results, which received minimal statistical treatment in the press, extend the notion of a hierarchy from one based on characteristics to one based on attachment and belonging (CROP 1998 March)

The survey posed three questions related to belonging and national membership:\(^5\):
1. Vous considérez-vous vous-même comme faisant partie du peuple québécois?
2. Croyez-vous que les membres de la minorité anglophone du Québec font partie du peuple québécois?
3. Croyez-vous que les Cris et Inuits du Québec font partie du peuple québécois?

### Table 4.19 Belonging in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Mtl</th>
<th>Q City</th>
<th>M. F.</th>
<th>18-34</th>
<th>35-54</th>
<th>55+ ed</th>
<th>0-12 ed</th>
<th>13-15 ed</th>
<th>16+ ed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anglophones</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) The quotation also highlights how those who are outside the dominant construction of national membership may feel a greater freedom to express themselves outside the confines of the collective group.

\(^5\) In English, the questions read: 1. Do you consider yourself to be part of the Québécois nation? 2. Do you consider members of the anglophones minority to be part of the Québécois nation? 3. Do you consider the Cree and the Inuit to be part of the Québécois nation?
The table contains cross-tabulations according to several social characteristics including city of residence, gender, age, years of education, labour force activity, income, perception of the economy, mother tongue, party affiliation, and reported vote in the 1995 sovereignty referendum. As can be seen from table 4.17, with three notable exceptions, a higher proportion of francophones within Quebec tend to perceive themselves as members of the Québécois people than the proportion who believe that two of the minority groups within society are Québécois. There is also a hierarchy of acceptance; in each case, the proportion convinced of anglophone belonging exceeds the estimated value for Cree and the Inuit within Quebec. Thus, a larger number believe the anglophones belong to the Québécois people, than believe the Cree or Inuit belong. The three exceptions to this trend highlight the process of negotiation between personal and collective identity claims. For anglophones, Allophones and supporters of the Equality Party, the aggregate estimation of English membership in the Quebec people exceeds not only the provincial average, but the proportion who believe that they themselves belong in Quebec. Put another way, the proportions of those feeling a sense of personal belonging (73, 66, 75) lies between the perceived right of the collective group to belong (80, 75, 89), and the view ascribed by others (72). That the resulting statistic for self belonging is much closer to the provincial average than the number ascribed by group members suggests that the perceptions of acceptance matter much more that the perceived right to belong. At the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of those who feel they belong is much higher than the proportions of individuals who feel that either the anglophones
or Cree have a right to belong. It is not the case, then, that these individuals merely possess heightened notions of belonging and extend these to all groups. For PQ supporters, Yes voters, and those with optimistic views of the economy, personal belonging far exceeds that of other groups.

The absence of similar data for Scotland, although preventing a direct comparison, also highlights one of the key distinctions between the two movements. Notwithstanding the attention to characteristics such as blood and birthplace, the identity debate in Scotland does not emphasise the collective acceptance of minorities as in Quebec. Scotland lacks a minority within its borders defined, as the anglophones, by language, or, in the case of the Cree and the Inuit, by ethnicity. This lack of a rival internal nation, or coherent national minority - with its own language, culture and history - individualises the belonging debate in Scotland. Thus, it can be argued that the distinction between the two nationalist movements should not be grounded solely in notions of civic and ethnic nationalism, but rather, in the way each context prioritises either collective and individual belonging. Although the literature avoids direct comparison, the emphasis on the collective nature of Quebec nationalism and collective solutions posited by academics underlines this point (Taylor 1992, Kymlicka 1995, Gignac 1997).

In his examination of the Scots and English in Scotland, Dickson produced a version of the following table from British Rights Survey data.

**Table 4.20 Reasons for Discrimination in Scotland**

Percentage claiming they have “personally ever felt discriminated against in some important matter”

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those, reason for discrimination:

- **Sex**
  - 47.3
  - 43.6
  - 40.6

- **Age**
  - 16.4
  - 15.6
  - 19.1

- **Race**
  - 10.6
  - 4.8
  - 8.6

- **Ethnic background**
  - 7.3
  - 3.1
  - 2.2

- **Religion**
  - 5.5
  - 13.8
  - 8.1

- **Political beliefs**
  - 3.6
  - 8.7
  - 5.6

219
The results show that a higher proportion of English-born residents of Scotland feel they have been discriminated against on the basis of race or ethnic background than their Scottish-born or English-residing counterparts. The results also show that the incidence of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnic background is relatively low compared to the proportion who allege discrimination on the grounds of gender. The table shows that subjective, or less visible, characteristics such as religion and political beliefs are less likely to be the source of discrimination. While the absence of national minority communities within Scotland detracts from the extent to which national exclusion could function according to collective characteristics, that the sampled English-born population in Scotland reports a higher incidence of discrimination points to potential access barriers to Scottish belonging. In their compilation of discrimination statistics, the Commission for Racial Equality note that discrimination on the basis of 'Englishness' forms a small proportion of all complaints brought before the CRE. The visible minority population of Scotland is more likely to suffer discrimination than English-born residents. Different groups are accorded different levels of belonging within the nation.

The emphasis on collective rights in Quebec, and in particular, the lack of belonging for groups such as the anglophones or the Cree, has recently drawn attention from the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs in Canada. In his public speeches Minister Dion has stressed the importance of individual rights and in particular, that national recognition may be linked to individual recognition, in an effort to detract from the collective understanding of identity in Quebec (Dion 1998a). In arguing where the debate should go, or how it should develop, Dion highlights the existing collective nature of the debate. Despite his efforts, however, the debate remains grounded in notions of collective identity. Understandings of belonging in Quebec thus return constantly to group membership, in other words, whether anglophones or allophones

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6 A more complete discussion of the results appears in chapter five.
or members of visible minority communities truly can feel that they belong in Quebec. Largely because of the homogeneity of the Scottish population, the parallels in Scotland extend to those who have recently moved to Scotland and, in some cases, to members of visible or religious minority groups (Jedrej and Nuttall 1995, Ouseley 1998, Rothwell 1998). Thus while it is fair to say that some collective groups may question their belonging as collective members, the lack of minority institutions and cultural coherence detracts from the collective nature of the debate in Scotland. More individualised approaches to identity may be seen in the quotations offered in interviews. These surveys indicate that there is a greater sense of personal empowerment and personal responsibility for belonging in Scotland whereas in Quebec, the issue is more polarised according to group membership. Those who have moved to the province tend to exhibit a much greater sense of self-determination over their level of inclusion than those who were born in Quebec. That these distinctions exist might not surprise observers of political life in Quebec. The way in which they exert an influence over personal belonging and political culture, however, remains an under-explored aspect of identity in Quebec. This section charts this navigation by examining the way in which individuals attempt to form a coherent view of the collective group to which they belong, whether the nation or national minority.

Within the negotiation for belonging, the views of diverse cultural groups and, more specifically, the capacity for misunderstanding between them, play a role in internalised notions of identity. If one acknowledges that individuals take the perceived views of others into account when they gauge their own levels of inclusion, the accuracy with which the views of others are portrayed matters much to the debate. The following section concentrates on the views that group members - divided by language in Quebec and divided by country of birth in Scotland - have of their fellow group members and of the members of other groups. This division finds justification in the collective nature of the debate in each case. In Quebec, the starting point from which one measures one’s level of belonging is tied to language or, in

\footnote{That said, the existence of separate religious schools in Scotland ensures a separate socialisation process for some Catholics within a Protestant nation. The influence of religion on identity and}
some cases, to constitutional preference (Taylor and Sigal 1982). This thesis argues that in Scotland, the collectivised aspect of the debate exerts a smaller impact on understandings of identity. That said, distinctions may be drawn according to place of birth, membership in visible minority communities and, in some cases, partisan preference. For the most part, the inclusion and integration of group members into the dominant national identity form coherent clusters according to the following group alignment: anglophones, francophones, Scots and non-Scottish born. The section begins with an examination of inter-group views to highlight the way in which individuals draw boundaries around the nation. The section then proceeds to examine intragroup perceptions in an effort to underline the divergent approaches to the issue of integration and identity within Scotland and Quebec. The inability of individuals to exercise complete control over the characteristics, tactics, goals and behaviour of the group highlights one of the tensions within linguistic or birth groups in either case study. In both cases, associated quantitative data supplements the qualitative analysis.

Perceptions of cultural communities in Scotland often receive minimal attention, largely because they represent a small proportion of the population. As highlighted in chapter three, the Scottish immigrant population represents approximately one percent of the population. Thus, examinations of visible minorities and immigrants as a whole, tend to receive treatment on a British-wide basis. In his analysis of the 1997 election results conducted for the British Commission for Racial Equality, Saggar presented survey results on perceptions of inter-cultural integration in Britain (Saggar 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.21 Inter-cultural Integration in Britain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage agreeing with the statement The following groups should ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adapt and blend</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saggar 1998. Data from BES 1997

inclusion (Devine 1998, Devine 2000), while of obvious importance, remains outwith the remit of this thesis.
The data demonstrate the varied wishes for different groups to assimilate into dominant British culture. In all but one case, a majority of the population feels that diversity should be suppressed in the name of national coherence. The ability of identifiably different groups to assume dominant characteristics receives attention in Scottish political literature. In contrast to the cultural communities, the English remain one group receiving particular attention in the Scottish identity and political literature. In his analysis of political attitudes Dickson highlights the level of integration enjoyed by English immigrants to Scotland (Dickson 1994). While noting that new-Scots tend to adopt political values and attitudes more in line with political views in Scotland, New Scots represent the closest approximation of a collective and coherent national minority.

In an effort to head off charges of potential exclusion, the Scottish National Party has established two groups, Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence. In spite of these attempts to emphasize the inclusive nature of Scottish nationalism (Denholm 1996), perceptions of exclusion or difference, particularly for those born outside the United Kingdom, necessitate a regular negotiation of identity. In other words, although Scottish nationalism appears civic in its goals, is treated as inclusive by academic literature and political parties alike, perceptions of exclusion within Scotland still exist. The following quotations indicate the extent to which individuals are aware of a hierarchy of belonging, and how they cope with their identity designation.

When our first child was born, his name was Tam. Tamir. All names have meaning and we decided to give our son this name because it’s a pre-Islamic name. Secondly we wanted a name that’s easy to pronounce. Thirdly we wanted a name that when shortened becomes Tam and it’s a very Scottish name. Even then we were trying to negotiate our identity and express a sense of belonging. I know negotiating identity is a fashionable term but if you’re a Palestinian you know what it means. You’re constantly negotiating your identity in concrete terms.
The worst British regiment was the Black Watch. The Black Watch terrorised Palestinian villages. They would mix the sugar with the salt, spill the kerosene. I wear Black Watch trousers and when I go to the loo I want to pee on them.

I do not want to assimilate but I would not want to be outside.

I certainly in many respects feel like a Scot and I didn’t accept British national identity until I felt like I belonged.

Some people question [my belonging] on the basis of the fact that I’m different...I feel different...my face doesn’t fit. I’m annoying in many respects. If you heard my accent you wouldn’t be able to tell where I come from but I’m not from here. But I know more about the Scottish context than some Scottish people do.

The Scots are open-minded and they accept you but up to a point.

I’ve never personally had any sense of being unwelcome here

Some years ago a friend from Budapest said to me, are you happy [in Scotland]? I said, how can a Scot be happy without his own Parliament. I feel very Scottish. That’s our home, our roots. We had many opportunities to go farther afield and I’m still here ... I must confess I voted No.

I’m not Scottish. I’m English. People in Scotland talk about being Scots to a far greater extent than people in England talk about being English. It’s constantly in public life, people almost reminding themselves they’re different from the English, and keen to reinforce the ways in which they’re different, the different ways in which they’d like to see the society go.

The last quotation highlights the tendency of individuals to draw attention to their authenticity, or lack thereof, before making pronouncements on Scottish identity or Scottish politics. In general, the quotations demonstrate a consistent attempt by non-native Scots to acquire a sense of belonging without a loss of pre-existing identity. That assimilation and full acceptance are neither attainable nor desirable suggests that even the most inclusive nation will face internal barriers to integration. That this suggests multiple national identities present a personal barrier to belonging remains an under-explored aspect of existing interpretations of identity.
The view of Scottish-born residents towards English arrivals or cultural communities varied across the interviews. For the most part, subjects mentioned a gentle rivalry with England that did not filter through to inter-personal relations. Perhaps the most oft-quoted example referred to competition on the sports field.

I have a friend with whom I go to the rugby and he’s a lecturer in St Andrews in maths and he always talks about We did well, and We being any team that is playing against England. I said to him the other day, Good Test result for you, and I’m not really a follower of cricket, but the West Indies had just beaten England and he said, Oh fabulous. It’s bizarre. I’m slightly ashamed of it. But the Herald once had a thing about two World Cups ago and England were playing Romania and the team playing England scored a goal and the Herald said the next morning that five million Scots leap out of their seats and sat down feeling slightly guilty. And I was watching and I did cheer and felt slightly bad about it. I was in St Andrews at the time and I used to play five aside in the maths department and I related this and one of the English guys said, five million minus one, that man over there, and that’s the man I just told you about. And [Martin] said I didn’t feel the least bit guilty, I just cheered and I honestly think that if we had independence, and this is my own, we would be able to be less neurotic about that, we would be able to relate to our English neighbours in a much more creative and sensible way.

Still others referred to the influence of social characteristics on perceptions of inclusion. As mentioned previously, the presence of a sizeable west-coast Catholic population has presented an obstacle to those linking Scottish identity with the institutions that survived the Treaty of Union in 1707.

Catholics for a long time have found themselves a bit schizophrenic in identifying with Scotland but also having an Irish identification. I think there’s another factor, there’s the Episcopalians … many people in Scotland refer to the Episcopal church as the English church which annoys many Scots in the Scottish Episcopal church as you can imagine.

…when I was a minister in Coatbridge, my Catholic colleague had a request from a group to use the hall and they were called the Bobby Sands8 Gaelic football club and he said ‘No way’, and they said ‘We just want to have a dinner, we’re just a social club’ and he said ‘You’re

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8 Bobby Sands (1954–1981) died in prison after having led a hunger strike in denial of his own criminal status and in protest of the government of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher. Classified as a political prisoner, IRA-member Sands went without food for sixty five days.
making a statement'. He said, ‘Listen, you are living in Scotland and you ought to identify with Scotland not with Ireland’. Because of course there’s been ...a huge identity with southern Ireland.

Tensions among national identities surface also in Quebec. Based upon an analysis of English media coverage of Quebec Le Devoir columnist Antoine Robitaille emphasised the lack of empathy between French Quebecers and English Canadians outside Quebec (Robitaille 1999). Despite attempts by the current Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs to steer the debate towards a recognition of individual rights, the situation appears to be understood as a debate about collective survival. The problem, according to Robitaille, is that just as English Canadians appear unwilling to acknowledge the profound threat to survival felt by French Quebecers, so too do French Quebecers appear unwilling to acknowledge the frantic fear with which English Canadians view the incursion of American culture into Canadian society. As two interviewees stated

That’s what English Canadians never understand, the visceral fear of French Canadians that they’ll lose their language, and they’ll do anything to do that even have their own country.

... the idea of an identity, of a French Canadian identity or a French Québécois identity is hard for some people outside Quebec to grasp.

There is variable understanding among English Canadians for the potentially destructive presence of almost 300 million anglophones to the vitality of the French language and culture in Quebec. French Quebecers possess a similar inability to understand the fear of English Canadians that their identity will be subsumed by the United States. The sustained popularity of both former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and the Free Trade Agreement among Quebecers, two issues particularly linked to English fears of American influence, highlights the chasm between the two groups. English Canadians grew increasingly resentful of Mulroney, partly motivated by the suspicion that he would deliver Canada to the arms of a welcoming American administration. This dissonance of views extends to the regard with which the different groups hold each other. French Canadians in Quebec feel that they are seen
in an inferior situation by English Canadians outside Quebec. The situation finds a parallel in Scotland with respect to the European Union. Convinced that greater integration with the European Union will aid Scotland economically and loosen the grip of London and public policy Scots appear more favourable to European integration that their English counterparts (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997, Brown, Paterson, McCrone and Surridge 1999, Europinion 1995, Europinion 1996, Europinion 1997). Whether this stems from the stronger economic situation in England, as a whole, or a perception of cultural fragility remains outwith the remit of this thesis. The gap between the way groups are perceived, and the views that others will admit to, must be seen as a significant stumbling block to productive dialogue.

Table 4.22  Inter-group Perceptions in Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage agreeing with the following statement</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>On</th>
<th>AB</th>
<th>BC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English Canadians often have a tendency to consider French Canadians as inferior</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Canadians often have a tendency to consider English Canadians as inferior</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québécois francophones don't get the respect they merit in Canada</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Québécois francophones are dominated in the economic sphere by anglophones</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CROP 1998

As stated earlier, emphasis by Intergovernmental Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion on the individualised aspects of the ‘Quebec situation’ suggests that the Privy Council of Canada has discovered a key element of the debate. Namely, that without the collective aspect of sovereignty, its very justification, and thus support, decreases. *Maitres Chez Nous* has no meaning if the *Nous* does not conjure up a collective resonance. The promise of self-determination does, but that is not the language employed by the sovereignists. Unfortunately for M. Dion, whether the debate really is about individual rights, or whether it should be, is a moot point. The Quebec electorate sees the debate as one grounded in notions of collective national identity.

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9 In their analysis of the 1992 British Election Study Bennie, Brand and Mitchell note that 51% of Scots support the EC versus 43% in England (Bennie, Brand and Mitchell 1997). Brown, Paterson, McCrone and Surridge note, however, that support for the European Union varies across party lines in Scotland. Supporters of the Liberal Democrats and SNP look more favourably on the EU than supporters of either the Labour Party or the Conservatives (Brown, Paterson, McCrone and Surridge 1999).
Although the issue of exclusion presents itself more readily in Quebec, the civic nature of Québécois nationalism confuses the debate. The extent to which membership in the nation is based on ethnic characteristics depends entirely on how one views language. Perhaps predictably, those on either side of the sovereignty divide use opposing definitions. Critics of nationalism claim that the confusion of a nationalist message, a spectrum of opinion that ranges from acceptance to tolerance to forced resignation, accounts for the low sense of belonging that has plagued many anglophones and Allophones in post-referendum Quebec. In pre-referendum submissions to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on a Renewed Canada (Beaudoin-Dobbie Commission) in 1992, representatives of two anglophone-rights organisations expressed their frustration with the mixed messages of Québécois nationalists.

Les tensions constitutionnelles des dernières décennies et les manifestations particulières de ces tensions dans notre province ont miné la confiance des Québécois d’expression anglaise au sujet de leur place au sein de la société québécoise et de la société canadienne (Canada 1991)

One day the government will try to say ‘We want you here. We want to try to find jobs for you’ and all that but the next day other statements are made. It’s a hell of a mess (Canada 1991)

As the following quotations indicate, frustration and confusion have continued throughout the decade. The most striking use of membership markers occurred on referendum night in 1995 when an exhausted Quebec premier indicated that the Yes side, which lost the referendum by less than one percent of the popular vote, had been defeated by money and the ethnic vote. In an effort to repair the relationship, the new premier held a ‘Dialogue with the anglophone community’ in which he promised to safeguard the rights of the minority community (Bouchard 1996). The pattern of events, between exclusionary statements and overtures of co-operation has prompted interviewees to question their acceptance in Quebec society.

It’s a vicious circle. There are some exclusionary incidents and there are some people who feel excluded, and it feeds off each other. It’s not a direct exclusion ... Ninety-five percent of those
who vote federalist have no chance of making any direct impact on decisions in the government. That’s not a direct form of exclusion but it presents a problem … There’s frustration, a sense that we’re dis-empowered from a lot of incidents that occur, whether it’s Jacques Parizeau, the most outstanding one of the 90s, the money or the ethnic vote thing …

Francophones have had a much harder time in the Canadian context because they - as a people, as an identity, as a cohesive identity - have never been properly recognised by the rest of the country either officially in the constitution as more and more of the country was peopled by people who came here from all over the world had absolutely no idea what, you know New France was not something that was part of their consciousness. And they’ve seen the country change very much … But this has been vitally, vitally important to French Quebecers right from the very beginning.

The previous quotations highlight the difficulty of projecting messages of inclusion and ensuring that such messages are received as they were intended. Charges of exclusion in Quebec, and more particularly, attempts to understand them in the face of generally inclusive nationalist messages, have encouraged the development of several survey instruments measuring the level of cross-cultural acceptance in Quebec. The following table, created from data gathered for the Ministry of Cultural Communities and Immigration in 1993 highlights the issues causing particular tension within Quebec.

Table 4.23 Inter-cultural Interaction in Quebec
Percentage agreeing with the statement...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural communities favour economic development</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government measures favour immigrants in regions</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of immigrants contributes to development of values</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural communities favour the cultural enrichment of Quebec</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants and members of cultural communities respect the values of Quebec</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants make efforts to integrate into Quebec society</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am reluctant to be close to visible minorities</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am angry to see visible minorities in the police force</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am angry to see white Québécoises marry visible minorities</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many visible minorities in my neighbourhood</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants impede the use of French in Quebec</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants contribute to rise in population</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Members of cultural communities are expensive to the health system
Immigrants have tendencies to form ghettos
Visible minorities cause the crime rate to rise
Quebec has received too many immigrants
Cultural communities take the new jobs
Immigrants contribute to the deterioration of the economy
Immigrants must learn to use French
Immigrants have a sense of belonging
Cultural communities must adopt the use of French in their private life
The construction of synagogues shouldn’t be tolerated
Religious demonstrations shouldn’t be tolerated
The wearing of scarves or turbans makes me uneasy
Everyone has right to free manifestation
New Quebecers are integrated into French Quebec society
Immigrants have tendency to favour English
The media has unfavourable predispositionss
There is racial discrimination in the health service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Joly and Dorval 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Surveys such as these attempt to determine whether the problem of exclusion stems from genuinely prejudiced values within the majority of the population or with self-driven perceptions of alienation among anglophones or members of cultural communities. The previous statistics demonstrate the value that cultural communities and immigrants bring to Quebec and recognise the efforts made by members of these groups to integrate themselves into society. Quebecers do not blame immigrants for rising crime rates, tolerate the construction of synagogues and support the wearing of turbans. In most respects, the responses portray an open and welcoming society. The differences stem from the use of language. A majority of respondents believe that immigrants still demonstrate a preference for integration within the anglophone community and that French should be the language of private life. For the Quebec government, the integration of allophones into the official language of the province, betrays an effort to accord immigrants equal rights. That which the government identifies as an issue of rights for non-francophones - in other words, the right to participate within the same sphere as the province’s francophones - highlights a marker of belonging from those on the margins of the nation.

Before turning to an examination of political inclusion and behaviour in the next chapter, a brief word about diversity within contested identity groups, highlights the diverse ways in which markers of identity are used to assess voice and authenticity.
While the undermining of opponents on the basis of national membership is rare in the Scottish context, the use of markers to emphasise the right - or more often the absence of a right - to speak for a community figures prominently in post-referendum Quebec.\textsuperscript{10} In particular, the divisions within the anglophone community of Quebec focus on length of residency and language acquisition. Thus, those who seek to undermine Bill Johnson, leader of the hard-line anglophone-rights organisation Alliance Quebec, mention that he was educated in French, by Jesuits. The allusion, is to the education received by both former premier and PQ founder Rene Levesque, and former prime minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau. The following quotations are from interviews with three Quebec sovereignists, two anglophone, one francophone:

\begin{quote}

it happened that as Quebecers politicised I was politicised but I was a minority, and people of my age missed that ... like Bill Johnson. And that’s not fair because Bill’s bilingual but Bill’s got his own schtick

It’s fair play in a way what Bill Johnson is doing because at least Bill knows who we are, and Bill can speak French very well. He’s been educated in French and he knows what he’s talking about so he’s playing his game to inoculate in the people of this province some measure of guilt

I mean, Bill Johnson used to write these columns for the \textit{Vancouver Sun}, the view of Quebec to British Columbia. He was so ideologically biased, all about intolerance and how anglophones are persecuted. I mean, he speaks French and he’d say this stuff ... he’s useless as a bridge builder to the French community though. His supporters don’t speak French.
\end{quote}

Thus, Bill Johnson’s hard-line approach is juxtaposed with his possession of one of the key markers of identity in Quebec. The similar denial of voice occurs with recent arrivals, or sometimes, not-so-recent arrivals. Mentioning a prominent anglophone academic who advocates the support of the ‘distinct society’ clause and Bill 101, anglophone interviewees often made reference to the fact that the academic, although born in Quebec, has spent much of her adult life outside the province, and thus could

\begin{footnote}

\textsuperscript{10} It is entirely possible that this pattern of interaction appeared before the 1995 referendum, but fieldwork dates for this thesis, and an absence of relevant literature would make such a claim untenable.
\end{footnote}
not understand the succession of language legislation that undermined the Anglophone community within the province.

[Name]'s not good to talk to. She came from the outside. She’s not really a good reflection of the average anglophone Quebecer.

She tells everyone she’s from Quebec, but it’s not really true. She only returned here as an adult.

As these quotations show, the markers of identity used to determine membership in a predominantly - and nationally - francophone society are used by individuals who do not always consider themselves inside the nation, as markers of authenticity within their own ‘contested’ group. Markers that originally excluded, or made individuals feel excluded, have been used by members of this outside group to exclude potential members.

This chapter has shown that the influence of national identity on the political debate has led individuals to draw political boundaries around certain national members while -in the views of others - excluding non-members. As stated at the outset, the degree to which individuals feel that they are included depends in part on the level of inclusion or exclusion inherent within the construction of identity and in part on the salience of national identity. The importance of national identity to the nationalist projects in both Scotland and Quebec accounts for the attention paid to constructions and membership. The chapter has also argued that it is unfair to classify identity in Scotland as inclusive and Quebec identity as exclusive. Rather, it is more appropriate to argue that identity in Scotland is individualised whereas in Quebec it relies on collectivised notions of membership. With these conditions in mind, individuals may assess their own level of belonging. The following chapter argues that the co-existing spheres of national and political activity allow individuals to mediate their lack of inclusion at the national level by participating in State-level politics.
Political Inclusion in Scotland and Quebec

The previous chapter examined the ways in which individuals explain their own identity processes and the way in which social scientists have sought to rely on various tools of measurement to track identity changes over time. This chapter adds to this discussion by analysing the relationship between national identity and political culture. Much former examination of identity and political culture, as stated in chapter two, has relied explicitly on quantitative examinations of each concept in an effort to determine whether, for example, those who identify as members of the nation are more likely to support political leaders or the political system (Bluhm 1974, Brown 1979, Dickson 1996, Hill 1990, Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1995, Miller Timpson and Lessnoff 1996, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Pye and Verba 1965, Westle 1993). As that chapter states, however, such a view equates identity with state loyalty and pays insufficient attention to the identity process. In an effort to uncover a more nuanced understanding of identity and political culture this chapter will examine the two concepts in light of quantitative measures before turning to an analysis of the appropriateness of data.

Any examination of the statistical relationship between identity and political attitudes must first establish that the two are separate phenomena. In an effort to test whether feelings of attachment to the nation and views of the State may be distinguished from one another the thesis relies on results from the 1997 election studies in Scotland and Quebec. To this end it employs principal-axis factoring, a method of factor analysis which highlights the existence of internally consistent groups of answers within the larger data-set. Exploratory principal-axis factoring breaks down all the answers provided in the election survey into blocks of data. The reduction of a data-set into a manageable number of data clusters simplifies the analysis of political attitudes. These data clusters are called factors. In the selection of factors, the goal is to encounter the smallest number of factors with the largest amount of variance explained. The
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 5

The number of factors selected depends on a variety of tests, two of which have been employed here. Initially, Kaiser's criterion was used to select all items with Eigenvalues greater than 1 (Bryman and Cramer 1997). Following this, a Scree test, which graphs the amount of variance explained by each of the factors, illustrated the usefulness of each factor (Cattell 1966). This Scree test indicated that the amount of variance explained by the factors decreased dramatically after the fourth factor in the Scottish dataset and after the sixth factor in the Quebec dataset. Finally, it is worth noting that exploratory factor analysis, rather than confirmatory factor analysis was used, and as such, no prior assumptions were made about the way the factors would hang together.

The factors that stand as clusters within the dataset are composed of individual questions. If the items within a factor address similar political attitudes or refer to similar types of questions then the factor can be considered an internally consistent building block within the data-set. Because of the different questions and scaling in the datasets, the results for the factor analysis in Scotland and Quebec offer different views of interaction among political orientation. For this reason, the chapter first examines the results of the principal-axis factoring for Scotland before turning to an analysis of the Quebec election study. A final word about the analysis of exploratory principal-axis factoring: for the most part, the following analysis concentrates on those items that received factor loadings greater than .30. While it could be argued that this unnecessarily excludes items possessing smaller loadings, the following analysis seeks to present a basic view of the results insofar as they affect the relationship between identity and political culture. This is consistent with the aim of identifying the smallest number of factors while maximising the amount of variance explained. A complete investigation that sought to analyse the dataset as a whole would, obviously, devote greater attention to items possessing smaller factor loadings.
Scotland
The Scottish factor analysis reveals the presence of four main factors that account for 46 percent of the variance in the dataset. The first factor, which accounts for 27.6 percent of the variance, includes a combination of personal characteristics and social habits. Items include the respondent's race, language, citizenship and type of education in addition to newspaper readership and party membership. The factor also includes items which tap moral issues - whether lawbreakers should get stiffer sentences, whether life sentences should mean life - and views on nationality, citizenship and the future of Great Britain as a single state. This collection suggests that the first factor is not particularly internally consistent. However, of the 15 items that possess factor loadings greater than .3 for the first factor, 7, or just under half, deal with perceptions of the self and social habits. It is also worth noting, that some items that are present within one factor are also present within another factor. In this case, party membership, extent of political knowledge and views of equal opportunities for women are present in the first factor and in the second factor. One item, whether the respondent sees himself as Scottish or not, appears in the first three factors.

The second factor, which accounts for 8.2 percent of the variance in the dataset, contains 14 items with a factor loading greater than .3. Apart from two questions that probe identity, and two that test views of politicians, most of the items deal with visions of society. Determinants of nationality, whether one must be born in Scotland, live in Scotland or have Scottish ancestry to be Scottish, and equal opportunities within Britain are contained within the second factor. Thus while the factor contains some diverse items, it could be argued that it taps views of society, and particularly notions of inclusion within society. Items tapping views of the self, as found in the first factor, and views of politicians, are only nominally present in the factor.

The third factor contains 7 items with factor loadings greater than .3 and accounts for 5.5 percent of the variance within the dataset. Four of these items deal with views of government. Interestingly, the four deal specifically with the government's spending
capacity. These items are joined by another which refers to the redistribution of income and wealth. Thus, while a first glance might suggest that the third factor contains items that would be considered traditional measures of political culture insofar as they tap attitudes to the government, a closer inspection reveals that they are not just political views of the government, but economic views.

Table 5.1: Exploratory Principal-Axis Factoring for Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality best describes respondent</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.295</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race self-rated</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language spoken at home</td>
<td>0.661</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think of self as Scottish</td>
<td>0.626</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British citizen</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.417</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather be GB citizen than any other</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawbreakers should get stiffer sentences</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life sentences should mean life</td>
<td>0.422</td>
<td>0.297</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should keep GB as single state</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularly read paper</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to have Scottish parents, grand-parents to be Scottish</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to be born in Scotland to be Scottish</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important to be living in Scotland to be Scottish</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party member</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of political knowledge</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to private fee-paying school</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Black and Asian MP can represent Black and Asian</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase out Scottish Catholic schools</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there equal opportunities for women in Britain</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only women MPs can represent women</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust any politician to tell truth</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See self as Scottish or British</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust government to put nation above party</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should spend more money on education</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should spend more money to get rid of poverty</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should put more money into NHS</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income and wealth should be redistributed</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government should give workers more say</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman's place is in the home</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats stand up for Britain abroad</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour stand up for Britain abroad</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Liberal Democrats to act in Scotland's interests</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives stand up for Britain abroad</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are SNP an extreme party</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust SNP to work in Scotland's interests</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Labour party to work in Scotland's interests</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have business and industry too much power</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variance Explained (%)  
27.6  8.2  5.5  4.7
The fourth factor contains 8 items that together account for just under 5 percent of the variance in the dataset. With the exception of one item, which probes views of business and industry, the items all deal with perceptions of political parties. This suggests that the fourth factor contains a relatively consistent measure of parties. The existence of a separate 'party' factor suggests that views of political parties and views of government may be considered distinct.

The exploratory principal-axis factoring does not reveal the presence of a single 'identity' factor, although it does suggest that how respondents feel about themselves, including their national identity, may be distinguished from views of national membership. In other words, how individuals feel about their own identity, and how they feel about the conditions under which others could claim to hold that identity can be considered to be distinct and separate views. To further examine the relationship between identity and political attitudes the factor scores for each of the Moreno categories were produced. In an effort to aid the analysis the four factors have been given names that summarise the main items within the factor. Factor one is referred to as view of self, factor two as view of society, factor three as view of government and factor four as view of parties.

### 5.2: Mean and Standard Deviation for Scottish Identity Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean (St Dev)</th>
<th>Factor 1 View of Self</th>
<th>Factor 2 View of Society</th>
<th>Factor 3 View of Gov't</th>
<th>Factor 4 View of Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British (N=204)</td>
<td>.00 (.33)</td>
<td>-.33 (.59)</td>
<td>.00 (.79)</td>
<td>-.10 (.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish more than British (N=342)</td>
<td>.00 (.52)</td>
<td>-.21 (.55)</td>
<td>.00 (.80)</td>
<td>.00 (.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British (N=228)</td>
<td>.00 (.75)</td>
<td>.00 (.60)</td>
<td>.00 (.90)</td>
<td>.00 (.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish (N=36)</td>
<td>-.50 (.52)</td>
<td>.57 (.44)</td>
<td>.00 (.84)</td>
<td>.16 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British not Scottish (N=31)</td>
<td>-.28 (.23)</td>
<td>.92 (.65)</td>
<td>.22 (1.29)</td>
<td>-.12 (.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N=882)</td>
<td>.00 (.88)</td>
<td>.00 (.85)</td>
<td>.00 (.89)</td>
<td>.00 (.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One-way ANOVA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: SES 1997  **=0.01 significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The previous table contains a list of factor scores for each of the Moreno categories. The factor scores are averages of individual scores within each of the five identity groups. By calculating the mean, standard deviation and standard error such a table highlights whether any of the identity groups possess different orientations for each of the four main factors. Because large groups will possess means that approach zero, both the standard deviation and standard error are required to provide an accurate analysis of the variance within the dataset. The table shows that those who consider themselves more British than Scottish and British not Scottish differ from the other identity groups on the items included in factor 1. This is unsurprising, as some of the constituent items in the first factor include measures of nationality. In addition, those who consider themselves British not Scottish record different means for factors three and four. This suggests that only if an individual considers herself ‘not Scottish’ in Scotland will her attitudes to politics and parties differ from the norm. The small numbers for both these groups will affect the means. This can be seen in the higher standard errors recorded for both these groups. Factor two produced the most varied results, with the four groups on either side of the Moreno mid-point recording varied factor scores. Those who prioritise a Scottish identity have recorded negative means for the items on factor two, while those who prioritise a British identity record positive means. Although a full analysis of these results is contained at the end of this chapter these results suggest that identity has a small effect on political attitudes. In addition, the differences among identity groups imply issues of inclusion within society - notions of national belonging and equal opportunities - cause greater division.

One-way analysis of variance, or ANOVA, reveals F test figures which suggest that there is some variance between one or more of the groups. Although comparisons between two groups may be analysed by using a t test, comparisons between more than two groups rely on a test with less restrictions. The F test allows us to test the
null hypothesis, that the factors do not contain items that produce varying results among the different identity groups. Table 5.3 suggests that each of the factors causes statistically significant variance within the identity groups. These F tests do not, however, indicate where this difference lies. In order to determine which identity groups differ, a further post-hoc or *a posteriori* test is required. For this purpose, a Scheffé test was used. The test is useful for comparisons of groups with uneven numbers. Because the identity groups created by the Moreno question range in size from 31 to 342 a Scheffé test is appropriate. Most importantly, the test provides a conservative estimate of significance, thus reducing the likelihood of incorrectly crediting identity with influence. This test, a conservative estimate of variance, compares the scores of each combination of identity groups for each factor. In so doing it is able to determine which group accounts for the variance recorded in the F test.

**Table 5.3: Summary of Scheffé results for Scotland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Statistically significant comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Scottish not British - More British than Scottish*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Self</td>
<td>More British than Scottish - More Scottish than British *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 2</td>
<td>More Scottish than British - Equally Scottish and British*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Society</td>
<td>More British than Scottish - Equally Scottish and British*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Politics</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 4</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Parties</td>
<td>vice versa pairs have not been included</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *=0.05 significance  ** *=0.01 significance

The results of the Scheffé test for Scotland show that the first factor divides the identity groups at the ends of the Moreno scale. Thus, those who consider themselves Scottish not British, more Scottish than British and British not Scottish possess markedly different responses to the items contained within factor one. This is not a particularly surprising result, as some of the items contained within the first factor address issues that would have a predictable impact on identity. Whether respondents see themselves as Scottish, whether they are British citizens, and how they describe
their nationality are all contained within factor one. Factor two, by comparison, divides the identity groups that form the middle of the Moreno scale. Those who consider themselves Scottish more than British, equally Scottish and British, and more British than Scottish possess statistically significant variations on the items that form the second factor. This suggests that while social characteristics and social habits divide the identity groups at the end of the scale, those who profess equal support for two identities, or do not hold one identity exclusively, are divided more on visions of society. This contrasts with the relationship between identity groups and the items contained within factors three and four, neither of which significantly divided respondents according to their national identity.

**Quebec**

The exploratory principal-axis factoring for Quebec results revealed the presence of six factors which together account for 47 percent of the variance in the dataset. The first factor contains six items with factor loadings greater than .3 and accounts for 14.7 percent of the variance within the dataset. These items tap attitudes to the present political system, and include perceptions of political parties in Canada. These items appear to tap what would be considered traditional measures of political culture, including system efficacy, and satisfaction. In this respect, the factor could be considered to contain internally consistent items. Factor two, however, appears to tap similar issues. Accounting for 8.36 percent of the dataset and composed of six items, the second factor contains perceptions of those in government. The distinction between the first and second factor stems in part from the question wording of items. In the second factor, questions require respondents to evaluate negative views of politics and politicians. Factor one, by comparison, contains five positively worded items. Furthermore, factor one appears concerned with issues of political stability whereas factor two contains items that would gauge political efficacy.

The third factor, accounting for 7.5 percent of the variance in the dataset also contains six items. Here, four of the items deal with issues such as women's interests, minorities, bank profits and national problems. This suggests that the third factor
Ailsa Henderson, PhD Thesis, Chapter 5

deals with contemporary issues rather than views of politics as such. The fourth factor, which accounts for 6.6 percent of variance, contains only two items, each of which deals with attachment. Both are thermometer scales that require respondents to indicate first, how they feel about Canada and second, how they feel about their province. The factor loadings thus show that sense of attachment stands as an independent factor. The fifth factor, which accounts for 5.7 percent of the variance in the dataset contains views on moral issues. The items, which tap attitudes on women in the home, unmarried parents and religion, could be considered an internally consistent factor probing measures of social conservatism or traditionalism. The last factor, which contains four items, accounts for just under 5 percent of the total variance. It is worth noting that two of the items within this factor also possess factor loadings greater than .3 for the first factor. These are the first and second questions probing satisfaction with democracy. The other two items deal with views of Quebec sovereignty. As a result, this could be considered a ‘sovereignty’ factor.

Table 5.4: Exploratory Principal-Axis Factoring for Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parties in Canada care what people think</td>
<td>.672</td>
<td>-.231</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makes a difference who is in power</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>-.121</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties necessary to make system work</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td>-.191</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs know what ordinary people think</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who people vote for can make a difference</td>
<td>-.431</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.179</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not think government cares what people think</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td>.619</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians ready to lie to get elected (1)</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected to parliament lose touch with people</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have a say in what government does</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and government seem so complicated</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians ready to lie to get elected (2)</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>.350</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All federal parties are basically the same</td>
<td>-.157</td>
<td>.162</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solve national problems with grassroots decisions</td>
<td>-.133</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.489</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have sense to tell government doing good job</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.486</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties spend too much time on minorities</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To protect women’s interests need more in parliament</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.445</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profits banks making are a scandal</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Given the items contained within the factors, the following names form useful shorthands for use in future analysis: Factors one and two are referred to as political stability and political efficacy respectively. Factor three is referred to as political issues, factor four as social conservatism and factor six as sovereignty. In an effort to determine whether the identity groups created in chapter four differed significantly with respect to certain factors, the mean, standard deviation, standard error and F test were calculated. The identity categories can not be considered directly comparable to the Scottish Moreno identity groups. In the process of collapsing two groups the resultant attachment variable has created two very small identity groups. This is no doubt due to the absence of any measure which asked respondents to evaluate their identity in terms of nation and State. As a result, it would be safe to conclude that the collapsed attachment variable under-emphasises the number of respondents who hold exclusive identities akin to those at the ends of the Moreno scale. These small numbers affect the amount of further statistical analysis possible. The discussion at the end of the chapter contains an additional analysis of the amended variable.
Table 5.5: Mean and Standard Deviation for Quebec Identity Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>Factor 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability</td>
<td>Political Efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec not Canada (N=2)</td>
<td>-.69 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec more than Canada (N=158)</td>
<td>.00 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec and Canada (N=100)</td>
<td>.00 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada more than Quebec (N=57)</td>
<td>-.19 (.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada not Quebec+</td>
<td>Na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (N=317)</td>
<td>.00 (.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ insufficient numbers* = 0.05 significance **=0.01 significance
Source: CES 1997

As can be seen from the previous table the factor scores for the Quebec results face serious limitations in the small numbers for the exclusive identity groups. Due to small numbers it was not possible to analyse results for the Canada not Quebec identity group. In addition, with only two cases in the Quebec not Canada group, these results must also be questioned. These small numbers do not represent the size of the original identity group but rather the amount of cases with complete answers for the identity question and all the items contained within the factor analysis.

The Quebec results show greater variety in the means recorded for identity groups although the larger groups with more stable means have not differed greatly from the total means recorded for the dataset. The small Quebec not Canada group has differed from the total mean on all five factors although the group has also recorded high standard errors. By contrast the larger Canada more than Quebec identity group has also recorded factor scores that differ from the total means on each of the six factors. Initially this suggests that each of the factors contain items that distinguish the polarised identity groups from one another. The two largest identity groups, those professing an attachment to Quebec more than Canada and to both Quebec and Canada differed from the total mean for the last factor. Indeed factor six produced the most varied results among the identity groups. This result is predictable as the
factor contains two items on Quebec sovereignty. Those professing an attachment to Quebec more than Canada recorded deviant factor scores for the social conservatism factor as well. Although mitigated by the small number of individuals in the two exclusive identity groups the analysis suggests that the issue of sovereignty is characterised by considerable dissent among identity groups. Furthermore, each of the factors appears to contain some items that provoke dissimilar responses among members of different identity groups. The extent to which this stands up to more rigorous statistical testing warrants further attention.

Results of the one-way ANOVA test reveal that only the four last factors provoke statistically significant differences among the identity groups. This ANOVA test is more reliable than the factor scores themselves because the small numbers within one or more of the identity groups will not negatively affect the result. Factors one and two, measuring traditional indicators of political culture, including regime stability and political efficacy, do not produce statistically significant results, suggesting that if one were to take a limited view of political culture, the relationships between identity and political attitudes would appear weak.

As with the Scottish results, a Sheffe test reveals the location of variance captured by the F test. Factors one, two and three, which tap attitudes of political stability, efficacy and issues, fail to provoke significant differences among the adapted identity groups. On factor four, which deals exclusively with attachment to Canada and to Quebec, the identity groups show significant differences. Likely because of the small sample sizes, only the middle categories, those professing equal attachment for Canada and Quebec, or some for both, show significant differences. This too is a predictable result, however, as the two items which compose factor four were used to created the identity categories. Factors five and six also show significant differences among the identity groups. Factor five, which taps attitudes of social conservatism, records significant variance for those who feel greater attachment to Canada, but still feel some attachment to Quebec, and those who feel greater attachment to Quebec but still report a sense of attachment to Canada. Factor six, which contains two
questions on Quebec sovereignty, records significant differences for those who feel attached to Quebec more than Canada, and those who feel an equal attachment to both. This suggests that differing views of sovereignty do not necessarily belong to polarised identity groups.

**Table 5.6: Summary of Scheffé results for Quebec**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Statistically significant comparisons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor 1</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Stability Factor 2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Efficacy Factor 3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Issues Factor 4</td>
<td>More Canada than Quebec - Equally Canada and Quebec*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>More Quebec than Canada - Equally Canada and Quebec*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor 5</td>
<td>More Quebec than Canada - More Canada than Quebec**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Conservatism Factor 6</td>
<td>More Quebec than Canada - Equally Canada and Quebec*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of Sovereignty</td>
<td>vice versa pairs have not been included *=0.05 significance **=0.01 significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Measuring Political Inclusion in Scotland and Quebec**

What then can be said of the quantitative data collected in the 1997 election studies? First of all, the presence of two thermometer scales in the Canadian election study inhibits the comparison with Scottish data. In an effort to make the two datasets more comparable the amended attachment variable seeks to re-create the dual identities contained within the Moreno question. And yet the new Quebec scale cannot be assumed to function as well as the Moreno categories. Individuals classified as having greater or lesser attachment to Canada and Quebec may have answered differently if responding to a question that demanded an explicit comparison of identities, as does Moreno. Individuals who might have indicated an attachment to Quebec not Canada, for example, may have recorded very low thermometer ratings in the initial question probing Canadian attachment. As a result, these individuals would have been recorded as belonging to the identity group More Quebec than Canada. Survey data analysed in chapter four suggests that the amended scale under-estimates the proportion of individuals who profess an attachment to Quebec not Canada (CROP 1998). This limitation co-exists with the use of different question items
probing political attitudes in the Canadian and Scottish surveys. Any comparison must take care to compare the interaction of items within each dataset, rather than compare the two sets of results directly. With this in mind, it is possible to compare the relationship between identity and political culture in each nation.

The factor scores, ANOVA and Scheffé tests for Scotland and Quebec reveal that in each case, identity groups react differently to some of the items contained within the factors. For certain factors, certain groups may record statistically significant variations. Overwhelmingly, however, the evidence suggests that whatever differences do exist are subtle rather than profound. In the majority of cases the statistical analysis present here confirms evidence provided by earlier studies of identity (Brown 1979, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Westle 1993), that identity groups possess dissimilar views on identity issues such as nationalism or sovereignty but possess similar views of the State such as efficacy, deference, satisfaction and confidence.

As chapter one argued, an expanded definition of political culture, one that includes perceptions of relations between individuals and the State and between individuals and their fellow citizens, encapsulates some of the measures that might otherwise have been considered outwith traditional analyses of political culture. Furthermore, with increased attention devoted to the benefits of social networks, as profiled in social capital literature, such a definition of political culture could provide an alternative view of analysing social capital within society.

Perhaps the most striking comparison may be found in the apparent lack of a statistically significant relationship between identity groups and views of the State. Neither the Scottish data, which contains two small factors on political attitudes, and the Quebec data, which contains two larger factors tapping political stability and efficacy, record statistically significant relationships between the 'political' factors and the identity groups. If one excludes the identity factor for Quebec, the items of which were used to create the identity groups, identity groups in both Scotland and Quebec differ significantly on two factors each. For the exclusive or polarised identity
groups, social characteristics and habits, as in the case of Scotland, and views of sovereignty in Quebec, produce divergent results.

In addition, it is not just polarised identity groups that record dissimilar views. The Scottish society factor, and identity and sovereignty factors for Quebec reveal significant differences between the mid-point group and groups on either side of the mid-point. In other words, identities that would appear to be mirror opposites - More Canada than Quebec and More Quebec than Canada - differ less than each of these groups and the mid-point, suggesting that those who claim to hold both identities in equal regard are the odd ones out. Within Scotland, factor two illustrates that those who claim to be equally Scottish and British differ from those prioritising a British identity and those prioritising a Scottish identity on their view of society. By contrast, polarised identity groups in Scotland are distinguished more by their social characteristics than either their views of society or their politics. Within Quebec polarised identity groups are only distinguished by their views of social conservatism. Identity and the issue of sovereignty further divide those who profess an equal attachment to Canada and Quebec and those who prefer one over the other. These results suggest that it is not politics that distinguishes members of identity groups, but rather views of society, and levels of integration within society.

This analysis of the statistical data is supported by qualitative material gathered from the 65 interviews. For the most part, individuals felt that within Scotland and within Quebec individuals shared similar approaches to political life, if one ignores the issue of sovereignty. In addition, the perception of individuals was that politicians were held in similar regard not only across identity groups within each nation, but within the larger Nation-State. The following quotations illustrate this point.

Interviews in Canada, in particular, evaluated the extent of political difference on a Quebec-Canada scale. As one Bloc Québécois MP explained:

...they share the same kind of commitment to democracy, human rights, an area that is of great concern for me foreign affairs, foreign aid for
example. There’s a lot of shared values and I think that is quite understandable. They’ve been living together for more than 300 years and in the federation for more than 130 years now.

The following respondent, a journalist with Le Devoir, took a different view. The comparison, as with the BQ MP, was with the rest of Canada. No distinction was made among attitudes held by different Quebecers.

I think there’s more trust towards politicians. Traditionally politics has more prestige in Quebec. And there’s more trust. But that doesn’t apply across the board. It’s balanced. There’s more trust for those you like but there’s a lot less trust than elsewhere if you’re disliked. And sometimes prestige and trust don’t go together.

These two quotations illustrate not only the perception that within Quebec individuals hold similar views but emphasise also that support for sovereignty, as was the case for these two individuals, does not determine a particular view of shared values such as trust or efficacy. Others, when answering questions about the different views of political culture within Quebec relied on issues of wider authority to explain their point. As this McGill University professor explained:

The Montreal cops are more likely to belt you to get a confession out of you than the Windsor police are, even though they’re quite capable of it. There’s a different set of rules. My experience with cops and soldiers in English Canada is that they obey the small rules but in Quebec police and soldiers don’t obey the small rules. Is that better? Do you want to be stopped for speeding over 10 miles an hour, for jaywalking, all the things Quebecers and Montrealers take for granted? If not, you’ll enjoy Quebec. If you find that frightening, appalling, demoralising, disgraceful, you should stay in Ontario.

This supports the view that while perceptions of political parties and government success continue to bind individuals across identity and provincial boundaries, differences of opinion do exist. Still others stressed different approaches to social issues. As this francophone sovereignist explained:

I would say that the idea of how we deal with social problems, how we develop ourselves economically, there are some differences because I
think for example, Quebecers are really keen on making sure that the social policies of Quebec and everything that relates to social policies are dealt with by the National Assembly and its government and not by the federal government. Whereas I think in Canada there is a willingness to impart the federal government of a very important role, a key major role in those areas and that could even extend to education which could never be acceptable to Quebec. And the economic model which I think does not discard the State, the government as a player, and in some cases as a major player, whereas I think the trend in Canada is to less government because people believe its never government, a bit like along the line of what’s happening in the United States.

Again, though, the distinction is drawn along provincial lines. For most of those interviewed, any difference that existed could be seen between Quebec and the rest of the country, rather than within Quebec. One exception was for a member of the Westmount municipal council, who claimed that francophones and anglophones hold different views of social issues:

Culturally speaking, the English municipalities, there’s a greater interest in municipal affairs, secondly, there’s a much greater sense of bénévol, of voluntarism, which is why there’s a volunteer umpire for the soccer team, for donating money, I think anglos give more to charity than the francophones do, I think because the church took care of that so there was no need for the individual person to do that. The hospitals, for example were run by the Church, and the schools were run by the Church and the politics were run by the church. So there was not a tradition of giving. But in the English community there’s a much greater tradition of giving. So there you’d have people running for council to generally give back to their communities. It wasn’t ulterior motives

Again, however, the qualitative information suggests that for those interviewed, different identity groups would not hold drastically different political or social values. Among those who felt that differences of opinion existed, Quebec as a whole was compared with the rest of the country. The sole individual who claimed that differences of opinion might exist within Quebec pointed to language, rather than national identity, as an explanatory factor.
For Scottish interviewees, there was a similar tendency to mitigate the impact of identity on political values or behaviour. The following quotations, provided by a Labour local councillor and a Sunday Mail journalist capture this view.

The divergence isn’t as big as it’s commonly made out to be.

I don’t think we like government any more than the rest of Britain. It’s not an ideological preference for State action. It’s just that we’re kind of stuck here, things are harder here, and the State better fix things for us.

Equally prevalent, however, were claims that Scottish political attitudes were different from those in England. “Of course they are” was a popular response. As stated earlier, these views do not relate directly to the differential attitudes held by identity groups within the nation, but rather speak to the way we usually talk about difference. This suggests that there is a level of inclusion within the nation, as neither social characteristics nor national identity were identified as a potential source of friction. The exception, however, was in the field of voting. As one political scientist argued:

Politically, Scottishness only comes out in terms of electoral behaviour. By social and political measures, there’s little substantive difference. There’s a degree of difference, but it’s not large, and its not really systematic differences. The natural avenue of Scottishness, politically, was the development of the SNP.... [but] Scots aren’t out in the streets demonstrating about the constitutional issue. There’s no mass agitation.

Unlike in Quebec, however, no one sought to point out the differing views of social relations, voluntarism or inclusion that might exist among different identity groups. As a result, the qualitative data suggests that individuals are neither of the belief that identity influences political views such as efficacy or deference, nor are they in the habit of speaking about social characteristics or identity in such a way that might suggest a level of exclusion within the nation.
These results are consistent with the qualitative information provided in chapter four. For some individuals the inability to demonstrate full possession of the various markers of identity results in an insecure sense of national belonging. For some of the individuals interviewed, a nationalist discourse has provoked feelings of exclusion even in the face of inclusive messages from political parties. In the previous quantitative analysis, factors tapping views of social relations provided some of the sole means of distinguishing identity groups. This suggests that the process of national or nationalist debate heightens our attention to our social relations with our fellow citizens or provides an opportunity for disparate notions of society and social inclusion to be expressed. In either case, the data provides evidence that identity groups possess different attitudes for some of the factors. For those holding exclusive identities, social characteristics and views of sovereignty distinguish group members. For those with equal or prioritised identities, however, the difference lies not with visions of the state, but with visions of society.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined the relationship between national identity and political culture. In particular, the thesis has advanced analyses of the promotion of identity markers, the identity process and the interaction of identity and attitude variables in electoral studies. In so doing it has sought to provide a comprehensive view of national identity and political culture in Scotland and Quebec. First, the thesis has argued that despite the capacity for individuals to self-select their national identities and what they mean, certain political actors consistently promote visions of who is, and what it is to be, Scottish or Québécois. Second, it argued that even in the face of inclusive notions of national identity some individuals may feel excluded from the nation. Third, it argued that quantitative data demonstrates that there is little statistically significant relationship between national identity and political attitudes but that identity groups possess different views of society. In an effort to elucidate several of the conclusions reached by this thesis this chapter will revisit the methodology and research design employed in the work and discuss in turn the key themes mentioned above.

In part this thesis was motivated by the under-explored relationship between national identity and political culture. Recent increased attention to political culture studies and the growth in social capital literature suggests that cultural analyses of the polity have much to offer the field of politics (Guttman and Pullam 1999, Rotberg 1999). At the same time, however, such analyses have often avoided references to national identity. As a result, these two literatures have only rarely crossed paths (Badie and Birnbaum 1994, Bluhm 1974, Hill 1990, Pammett and Whittington 1976, Pye 1965, Westle 1993). This thesis sought to correct this by providing an analysis of the way national identity functions and how the markers and processes of that identity might affect political attitudes held by individuals. Throughout, a wide definition of political
culture was used, one that included the perceptions of relations between individuals and the State, and between individuals and other members of the polity. Such a definition includes attitudes and behaviours and seeks to encompass not just how individuals relate to one another and the State, but also how individuals think they are relating.

While studying national identity and political culture the thesis relied on comparisons between Scotland and Quebec. Each contains peaceful and democratic nationalist movements that seek to use the political process to gain greater autonomy, and thus possess several advantages for any comparative analysis. Both contain current nationalist parties that espouse left-of-centre or social democratic values and gained parliamentary seats in the 1960s. Both contain nationalist movements that claim to be examples of civic nationalism. Both have relied on referenda within the sovereignty debate. Both occupy similar economic roles within the larger State. And yet the components of national and political life in each case are sufficiently different that the comparison is not a needless repetition of similar material. In particular, the absence of a Scottish Parliament before 1999 and the role of language within Quebec distinguish the two case studies. Membership, through Britain, in the European Union and a comparatively small ethnic minority population further differentiate Scotland. By employing two case studies that approximate similar parliamentary designs and yet possess particular national characteristics the comparison aimed to provide some general conclusions about national identity and political culture.

To provide a balanced view of national identity and political culture the thesis relied on a series of integrated research techniques. Party manifestos and constitutional documents provided views of the markers of national identity while interviews with 65 individuals determined how the promotion of certain visions of the nation and national belonging were received. Greater detail on the selection of interview subjects is located in Appendix D. In addition the thesis relied on quantitative data gleaned from private opinion polls and election surveys to provide evidence of the relationship
between the two concepts. The quantitative analysis contained in the last chapter relies exclusively on data from the 1997 election studies in Scotland and Quebec. The goal, then, was to offer a triangulated view of both national identity and political culture to determine how the two concepts fit together. Throughout the research process additional data were gathered. Surveys of activists at each of the four Scottish political party conferences and analyses of Scottish and Québécois newspapers over a four-month period provided a wealth of information but were eventually excluded from the thesis, in large part because of restrictions of space.

**The Identity Process and the Hierarchy of Belonging**

The first theme addressed by the thesis concerns the identity process in Scotland and Quebec. Through manifestos, constitutional documents and academic literature, political parties and political actors have sought to reinforce an inclusive notion of the nation that rests on a holistic view of society and social democratic values. Even parties advocating minimal or no constitutional change contain references to the distinctness of Scotland and Quebec. Overwhelmingly, then, the rhetoric in both case studies suggests an open, and pluralistic nation where residency is more important than ancestry and where distinct social or political values bind the population. In an effort to determine how the messages promoted by political parties and constitutional documents were received by individuals the thesis used material gathered from 65 interview subjects. These individuals, who were members of political parties or ethno-cultural organisations, civil servants or journalists were asked about their visions of identity and their views of political culture. The results demonstrate that the individuals interviewed think of their identity in terms of markers of identity such as birth, residency, ancestry, social or political values. Individuals who feel that they possess a questionable claim to belong use these markers to evaluate their sense of national identity. For these individuals, identity functions as a hierarchy of belonging, in which members who possess ethnic markers of identity feel they belong and those who lack one or more markers occupy the identity periphery. This view contrasts

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1 The difference, of course, is that the Parti Québécois, formed in 1968, contested provincial elections while the Scottish National Party, formed in 1934, contested Westminster seats.
other findings that stress the irrelevance of markers in favour of a more inclusive notion of nationalism. Jonathan Hearn’s recent work (Hearn 2000) argues that the way in which Scottish national identity has become imbued with notions of egalitarianism has served to protect those who might otherwise be excluded from a more ethnic notion of national membership. This thesis does not disagree, but rather points out that even in the face of inclusive messages, some individuals continue to feel excluded from a sense of belonging.

Further research could determine whether such a finding calls into question the division between civic and ethnic nationalism. The results suggest that if inclusive notions of membership characterise civic nationalist movements, then the existence of perceptions of exclusion call into question the extent to which any nationalist movement can claim to be inclusive. This is not to say that such a characterisation of the way national identity functions is accurate but rather that if some individuals feel excluded because the civic markers inadequately present them with a sense of belonging, then the movement faces a considerable challenge in proclaiming its inclusive nature.

**Political Attitudes and Social Attitudes**

If the first key theme of the thesis addresses the identity process in Scotland and Quebec, the second theme examines the way that identity process might affect political culture. The 1997 election studies provide opportunities to measure the relationship between national identity and political culture. Early works on political culture relied on survey data to measure such variables as political efficacy, satisfaction, confidence and trust (Almond and Verba 1963, Marsh 1977). Later works rely on large datasets gathered through election studies, World Values surveys or International Social Survey programmes (Inglehart 1977, 1990, Nevitte 1996). In this respect this thesis follows these studies in their use of quantitative survey material. As with earlier literature on the topic, the election surveys indicate that identity correlates with a small number of attitudes. What the data also show is a significant divergence on social issues for members of prioritised or equal identity
groups. Furthermore, it shows that exclusive identity groups, those that hold one identity only, differ in social characteristics and views of national identity issues such as nationalism or sovereignty. The exclusive groups differ neither on social issues nor on political issues. In this the thesis sits well with social identity theorists who chart the social rather than political influences of identity processes.

The role of social identity theory in articulating a negotiated process helped considerably in the analysis of interview material gathered for this thesis. The process by which individuals define the group by a list of characteristics, establish an in-group and out-group and then seek to ensure the salience of that identity, as advanced by Tajfel and Turner, may be seen in the hierarchy of identity argument advanced in the thesis. Furthermore, the debate within national identity literature, whether the nation exists as a list of characteristics or as a sociological construct, provided an additional tool of analysis. While it can be argued that each position reflects a exaggerated starting point for debate rather than an immovable view of the world, the process of that debate greatly aided the analysis of party documents and interview material. The promotion of markers of identity and the way in which these markers are received suggests that both elements, a notion of the things that bind individuals and the sense of belonging, form an essential part of national identity in Scotland and Quebec.

While the thesis sought originally to advance political culture research it may end by contributing more to the debate surrounding national identity. Political culture research itself, with several notable exceptions (Inglehart 1977, 1990) has recently adopted the mantle of explaining value change within - usually North American - societies rather than explaining how or why such change has occurred or indeed what such change means. Perhaps this absence is understandable given the considerable confusion surrounding the definitions and methods used within political culture research (Lane 1992, Pateman 1989, Reisinger 1995, Welch 1993).

The existence of independent literatures on identity and political culture is reproduced in the thesis. While it proved relatively simple to relate the results of the interviews with academic literature on identity, and furthermore to analysis the quantitative
results in light of contemporary works on political culture, the connection between these two strands of research proves more elusive. The concern of self-excluded individuals that they do not belong within national society is mirrored to a certain extent in the diverse approach of identity groups to social issues. The particular way in which that sense of exclusion might affect political and social attitudes, however, lies outwith the analysis of this thesis. Truly, the link between the hierarchy of belonging that exists within the minds of some individuals, and the resultant effect on political culture remains an under-explored aspect of identity and political culture. Difficulties such as this co-exist with other complications which have both marked and enriched the thesis.

An additional complication was faced in the shifting political system in Scotland. The absence of a Scottish Parliament at the beginning of the research process is in itself a significant feature. Equally, the process by which that parliament was established - the 1997 general election, the 1997 referendum, the Consultative Steering Group, the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary elections, resulting media coverage of the Labour-Liberal Democrat-led Parliament - can be argued to have had a considerable effect on the way Scots view their identity and their political attitudes. All interviews were completed between the referendum on a Scottish Parliament in 1997 and the Scottish Parliamentary elections in 1999. It could be argued that the interview responses were thus a more accurate portrayal of pre-devolution views, despite the successful devolution referendum. The extent to which these views continue to exist after the establishment of a Scottish Parliament could only be established with longitudinal work.

The political situation in Quebec has remained more stable than that in Scotland. That said, the Supreme Court reference case, in which federal government lawyers encouraged the Supreme Court of Canada to elucidate the conditions under which Quebec could separate, in addition to the shifting roles played by individual politicians point to considerable change within Quebec. In addition, the 1998 Quebec National Assembly elections witnessed a second-term for the Parti Québécois government.
Despite a smaller percentage of votes that their rivals. The strength of the Quebec Liberal Party in those elections and decreasing support for sovereignty suggests that views of the nation and the polity are also changing. As a result this thesis cannot claim to represent the views of Scots or Québécois for the unforeseeable future but rather seeks to provide an accurate portrayal of identity and political culture in both case studies at the end of the twentieth century.

**Directions for future research**

This section contains a series of studies and research questions that stand not only as a wish list for the researcher but also as a guide for students of national identity and political culture seeking to begin new research projects. With an additional two years each of these topics would have provided an useful addition to the existing PhD thesis. Instead, however, they offer directions for future research for those interested in the identity process and political attitudes.

For the past year the researcher has been teaching American parliamentary internship students about Scottish Politics. For the class on identity students are asked to approach 20 Scots with a list of ten questions, one of which must be the Moreno question on identity. The use of the Moreno question along with other measures of identity allows student to understand the multi-faceted nature of identity. The project is designed to enable students to speak to Scots about their experiences and their views of identity. Students are then required to report to the class on their findings. While none of the surveys approaches the sample sizes or sampling methods required of a statistical survey the questions created by students have offered an insight into the variety of ways one can study identity. Asking individuals whether they think other people are more Scottish than they are appears to provoke long and varied answers about the relative inclusiveness of Scotland. Any future work on the nature of Scottish identity would do well to include such questions as a way of tapping visions of the identity process.
Identity research would also benefit from studies correlating the differences between varying measures of identity. Thus, it would be useful to create a Canadian survey in which the Moreno question featured alongside the existing thermometer question. Indeed the identity questions used by private opinion polling firms in Canada, as featured in chapter four, would be a welcome addition to the Canadian Election Survey. To supplement existing identity measures the thesis sought to provide a comprehensive view of identity by interviewing 65 individuals in Scotland and Quebec. These interviews produced an abundance of useful material. Future research, however, may choose to concentrate on other methods. In particular, small groups, composed of individuals with different social characteristics and different social views, might produce richer results. Indeed, the negotiation process mentioned in the thesis might appear more visible in the interaction of diverse individuals. This would allow the researcher to compare the way individuals view the ‘right to belong’ of different people and the behaviour of these individuals when faced with those possessing different markers of identity. The role of small group work in capturing the interaction of individuals points to another area for future research. Greater attention to the role of social networks formed around identity issues such as nationalism or constitutional change could explain the motivations behind self-exclusion and the link between identity and political attitudes. In other words, a thesis that seeks to examine cultural approaches to politics would do well to employ more interactive research techniques.

This conclusion has sought to revisit the research choices and research findings contained within the thesis. In so doing it has highlighted some of the complications faced in the research process, and the options available to those embarking on similar research objectives. With these caveats in mind, however, the thesis is designed to stand as an original contribution to research both in its use of two increasingly-studied comparative case studies and in its use of national identity. By design, then, the thesis sought to fill a gap within the academic literature. The findings of the thesis further attest to its originality. The way in which markers of identity are promoted and received in Scotland and Quebec suggests that certain individuals exclude themselves.
from the nation, in large part because they feel they possess insufficient proof of their right to belong. In their minds, this creates a hierarchy of identity in which values, ancestry or birth may grant others a greater right to belong. The markers of identity and the salience of identity within society remain key factors in the articulation of exclusion. The thesis also demonstrates that even those who feel excluded in some way possess similar notions of the nation and the polity. Considerable quantitative data supports this finding. The identity groups listed within the 1997 election studies for Scotland and Quebec tend to differ more on social issues than on political issues. Despite the political implications of nationalism and nationalist movements, identity appears to have a greater impact on views of society and social inclusion. Thus the thesis not only contributes to knowledge of Scotland and Quebec, but seeks to advance our understandings of how identity operates and how, if at all, it affects political culture. The answer suggests that identity does not discriminate between the political attitudes that constitute political culture but that it affects the sense of belonging held by individuals within a culture and the views we have of those around us.
Appendix A

Map of Quebec
Appendix B

Table B.2: Chronology for Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1534</td>
<td>Jacques Cartier sails up St Lawrence River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>Conquest of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>Treaty of Paris, Royal Proclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>Quebec Act protects status of Catholic Church, seigneurial system of land tenure and civil code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791</td>
<td>Constitution Act separates British North America into Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837-8</td>
<td>Rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>as recommended in Lord Durham's report, Upper and Lower Canada are merged into the Province of Canada which is then divided into Canada East (Ontario) and Canada West (Quebec)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>Colonial Laws Validity Act prevents colonies from passing legislation that contradicts British law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Ontario, Quebec, NS and NB join confederation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Red River Rebellion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Statute of Westminster - repeals Colonial Laws Validity Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Quebec Liberal Party comes to power in Quebec, begins programme of legislation referred to as 'Quiet Revolution'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>René Lévesque quits Quebec Liberal Party, Trudeau elected Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>René Lévesque founds Parti Québécois, Official Languages Act (federal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>October Crisis: Front de Liberation du Québec kidnaps Quebec Cabinet Minister and British Trade Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>French official language of Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>Parti Québécois win election in Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Charter of the French Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Referendum on sovereignty, 40% of Quebecers back independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Repatriation of the constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Meech Lake Accord signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Free trade agreement with US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Meech Lake Accord fails, Bloc Québécois formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Oka crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Charlottetown Accord signed, Charlottetown Accord fails in nation-wide referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Liberals elected, Bloc Québécois becomes official opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>PQ win provincial election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Referendum on sovereignty, 49.4% support independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>June: Liberals re-elected, Reform becomes official opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>June: Liberals re-elected, Reform becomes official opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Referendum on sovereignty, 49.4% support independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Reference case, Supreme Court says bound to negotiate if clear majority say yes to clear question</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2000 | Clarity act before House of Commons |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1320</td>
<td>Declaration of Arbroath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>Union of crowns: Scottish King James VI becomes English King James I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1689</td>
<td>Claim of Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>Treaty of Union unites Scottish and English parliaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>Claim of Right II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Scottish Office created, Secretary for Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Scottish Home Rule Association formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>Scottish Labour Party formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Scottish Grand Committee created - composed of all Scottish MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Scottish National Party formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Scottish Office to Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>White Paper on Scottish Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Balfour commission recommends enlarged powers for Scottish Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Scottish Standing Committee created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>SNP win breakthrough by-election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Conservative leader Heath announces support for devolution in 'Declaration of Perth' Scottish Select Committee created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Labour’s Kilbrandon report calls for weak elected assembly in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Oct: in 2nd election of year SNP elect 11 MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Scotland and Wales Act Barnett Formula used to calculate block grant for Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Scottish Act referendum on devolution, 32% support devolution Conservatives elected, Thatcher PM, Scotland Act repealed Campaign for a Scottish Assembly formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Claim of Right III recommends formation of SCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Scottish Constitutional Convention formed, poll tax introduced by PM Thatcher Scottish Constitutional Commission set up by Scottish Constitutional Convention Scottish Constitutional Commission reports to Scottish Constitutional Convention local government reorganisation in Scotland Stone of Destiny returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>May: Labour elected, Sept: devolution referendum, 74% support parliament, 64% support tax-raising powers Scottish Civic Forum created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Scotland Act Consultative Steering Group created Scottish Parliamentary elections, Labour and LD form coalition, Dewar becomes First Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C

**Table C.1: Comparative Table: Aggregate Characteristics for Canada and the United Kingdom**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>30 301 200</td>
<td>59 237 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>9 970 610 km²</td>
<td>242 910 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density</strong></td>
<td>3.04 people/ km²</td>
<td>242.0 people/ km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time zones</strong></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/capita (in US $ 1997)</strong></td>
<td>$19 703</td>
<td>$19 762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average income per week</strong></td>
<td>$618.85</td>
<td>£396.86 (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life expectancy men:women</strong></td>
<td>74.6 : 80.9</td>
<td>74.2 : 80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>education</strong></td>
<td>compulsory to age 16</td>
<td>compulsory to age 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>health care</strong></td>
<td>universal publicly-sponsored</td>
<td>universal, tiered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic minority population</strong></td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td>no state religion</td>
<td>Church of England, state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Catholic 46%</td>
<td>church in England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant 36%</td>
<td>Church of Scotland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>non 13%, Eastern non-Christian 3 %</td>
<td>established church in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Protestant 49% (Ang 46%,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pres 1.5%, Meth 1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Catholic 15%,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language use</strong></td>
<td>English 59.2%, French</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(mother tongue)</em></td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>Gaelic and Welsh &lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese 2.5%, German 1.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official language</strong></td>
<td>English and French</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political regime established</strong></td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>17th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State form</strong></td>
<td>Constitutional monarchy</td>
<td>Constitutional monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Head of state</strong></td>
<td>Queen, governor general</td>
<td>Queen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government structure</strong></td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federal state</td>
<td>Asymmetrical unitary state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 provinces, 3 territories</td>
<td>3 regional assemblies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower House</strong></td>
<td>House of Commons (301)</td>
<td>House of Commons (657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lib 188, Ref 60, BQ 44,</td>
<td>Lab 417, Con 146, LD 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NDP 21, PC 20, Oth 1</td>
<td>Oth 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rlectoral system</strong></td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of last election</strong></td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>May 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper House</strong></td>
<td>Senate (105)</td>
<td>House of Lords (666)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Lib 52, PC 42, Ind 5,</td>
<td>(Con 232, Lab 182, LD 54,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacant 6)</td>
<td>crossbench 161,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>archbishops and bishops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28, other 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method of selection</strong></td>
<td>Appointed</td>
<td>Appointed life peers 548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Remaining hereditary 92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table C.2: Comparative Table: Aggregate Statistics for Quebec and Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Scotland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>7,334,500 (24.2%)</td>
<td>5,500,000 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
<td>1,540,680 km² (18%)</td>
<td>78,133 km² (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Density</strong></td>
<td>4.8 people/km²</td>
<td>70.4 people/km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time zones</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average income per week</strong></td>
<td>$578.06 (93.4%)</td>
<td>£367.4 (92.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic minority population</strong></td>
<td>Roman Catholic 86%</td>
<td>Church of Scotland, Protestant 6%, None 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language use</strong></td>
<td>French 81.2%, English 8.7%</td>
<td>English 93%, Gaelic 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official language</strong></td>
<td>French</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of seats in House of Commons</strong></td>
<td>75 of 301</td>
<td>72 of 657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution of seats</strong></td>
<td>BQ 44, Liberal 24, PC 24, Ind 1</td>
<td>Lab 54, SNP 6, LD 10, Other 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of seats in Upper House</strong></td>
<td>23 of 105</td>
<td>information not collected by House of Lords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution of seats</strong></td>
<td>Lib 12, PC 10, Ind 1</td>
<td>Scottish Parliament (129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-state Legislature</strong></td>
<td>National Assembly (125)</td>
<td>Lab 56, SNP 35, Con 18, LD 17, Oth 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral system</strong></td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
<td>Additional Member System (73 FPTP + 56 list)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of last election</strong></td>
<td>Nov 1998</td>
<td>May 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

( ) refers to percentage of total in Canada and UK

Appendix D

The Selection of Interview Subjects.

Although the first chapter in this thesis addresses methodological issues raised by the research design, a further word on the selection of interview subjects appears useful. The thesis used material from 65 interviews in an effort to understand how individuals view their national identity and political culture. The interviews were conducted in 1998 and 1999. The Scottish interviews took place after the 1997 devolution referendum and before the 1999 Scottish Parliamentary Elections, while the Quebec interviews took place both before and after the 1998 provincial election. The selection of interview subjects was designed to cover a range of political and constitutional views, and sought a range of professions. Individuals who were politically implicated, those who were politically active but not aligned with a political party, and those who chose to participate in social, voluntary or ethno-cultural organisations were interviewed. Within Quebec, interviews with anglophones and francophones sought to provide a balanced view. The 65 interview subjects, 40 in Quebec and 25 in Scotland, were composed of the following types of people.

Table D.1: Interview subjects in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political parties</th>
<th>Social and ethno-cultural organisations</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Government Agencies</th>
<th>Academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Canada</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>Université</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>Gazette</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>d'Ottawa,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Assembly of First Nations</td>
<td>Le Devoir</td>
<td>Privy Council</td>
<td>McGill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Party</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>La Presse</td>
<td>Department of</td>
<td>University,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>Globe and Mail</td>
<td>Inter-governmental</td>
<td>Université</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc Québécois,</td>
<td>Federation of Ethnic Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Affairs</td>
<td>Laval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quebec civil service</td>
<td>Université de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec Liberal Party</td>
<td>Société St</td>
<td></td>
<td>on Human</td>
<td>Montréal,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality Party</td>
<td>Jean Baptiste</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Carleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Council for</td>
<td>University,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>University of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first interviews were conducted with academics from English and French universities in Quebec and Ontario. These interviews provided general information about the state of affairs in Quebec and the diverse views of national identity and political culture among Quebecers. Many of the academics had been, or were at the time, politically active whether with political parties or social organisations. Between one and four individuals were selected from each political party. The higher number was used for parties operating within Quebec. Individuals who were responsible for "the Quebec issue", for federal parties, and those responsible for cultural communities and citizen engagement, for those operating within Quebec, formed the majority of party representatives. In addition, anglophones within the Quebec Liberal Party, and the PQ, and the leader of the Equality Party were consulted to supplement the views of others within the party. Social and ethno-cultural organisations produced representatives of the diverse cultural communities within Quebec. In addition, representatives of Alliance Quebec and the Société St Jean Baptiste were included to offer opposing views of the constitutional settlement. A variety of columnists and editors were consulted for three Quebec papers. Care was taken to balance the views of anglophones and francophones, federalists, nationalists and sovereignists.

Table D.2: Interview subjects in Scotland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Social and ethno-cultural organisations</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>Government Agencies</th>
<th>Academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Labour</td>
<td>Church of Scotland</td>
<td>Scotsman</td>
<td>Edinburgh City Council</td>
<td>University of Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Charter 88</td>
<td>Herald</td>
<td>Scottish Office</td>
<td>University of Edinburgh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>Scottish Council</td>
<td>Daily Record</td>
<td></td>
<td>University of Strathclyde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National</td>
<td>for Minority Rights</td>
<td>Sunday Mail</td>
<td></td>
<td>Glasgow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Arab Social League of Edinburgh</td>
<td>Edinburgh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Caledonian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scottish Council</td>
<td>Evening News</td>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in Quebec, interviews began with academics from such diverse departments as politics, sociology, social anthropology, and media studies. These interviews provided valuable background information and were used to highlight potential tensions within understandings of national identity and political culture. In an effort
to encounter a wide range of people party representatives hailed from different regions of Scotland. As with the Quebec and federal party representatives, between two and four were consulted from each party. An effort was made to consult Members of Parliament and those responsible for policy within the party. Members of social and ethno-cultural organisations were consulted to determine whether length of residency or ethnic background changed the way Scots view their identity. As with the Quebec media representatives, columnists and political editors were sought from the largest broadsheets and tabloid in Scotland. In addition, the letters page editors were interviewed. Fewer representatives of government agencies were consulted within Scotland. In addition to these representatives, two Scottish authors of fiction were interviewed.

As stated earlier, the researcher sought to maintain a balance among the diverse views and social characteristics in each location. Thus, an effort was made to balance views of politics and constitutional preferences, but also to ensure a sense of ethnic and gender balance among the interviews. In addition, the categories for interview subjects were used as guidelines. The views of individuals were not taken as representative of the organisation or institution as such. Often individuals who were, for example, active within a political party were also members of an ethno-cultural organisation or wrote for a newspaper. In circumstances such as these it would be difficult to assume that the attitudes of the individuals were informed primarily by their place of employment. As a result, quotations in the thesis often refer to more than one of the individual’s distinguishing characteristics. Finally, the resulting list of Scottish and Quebec interview subjects does not include those individuals who were contacted but were unable to meet with the researcher. These included members of the House of Lords, party leaders in Scotland and Quebec, former prime ministers of Canada, former premiers of Quebec and authors in both locations.
Appendix E

Publications

Research conducted for the thesis led to the following publications:

In Print


Microfiche


Forthcoming


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Action démocratique du Québec (1998) L’ADQ et le Québec du prochain millénaire

Action démocratique du Québec (1998) La formation universitaire, priorité à l’emploi

Action démocratique du Québec (1998) Un Québec 100% branché


Action démocratique du Québec (1998) Une vision pour le Québec du prochain millénaire


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Alliance Quebec (nd.b) Alliance Quebec achievements. Montreal
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