EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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This thesis has been composed by me and is my own work.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes that a genuine European identity may emerge in the Eastern borderlands of the European Union. This perspective is based on two lines of thought: first, with the increasing challenges the European Union is currently facing, such as demands for regionalisation and EU enlargement towards the East, the progressive development of the European integration process can no longer rely on its citizens' permissive consensus, but is in need of a genuine 'European identity'; second, clues for a genuine European identity may be found in the Eastern borderlands of the European Union, because it is here - since the fall of the Iron Curtain - where it has become most evident that the term 'Europe' can no longer be viewed as interchangeable with Western Europe or the European Union (thus also excluding the Western European non-EU countries) and where the crude East-West division may now be replaced by a West/Central/East division. These two dimensions have created confusion about the exact meaning of Europe and the future of the European Union. The changing political geography seems to have left Europe and especially the European Union with a sense of disorientation. The effect has been the appearance of some pressing questions about Europe's core of identity, its geographical limits and the concept of Mitteleuropa.

Within the European Union, the 'Europe 1992' project saw the gradual disappearance of internal frontiers. Together with Schengen, this has enhanced the EU's four freedoms and promoted the idea of the EU as an area open within itself. Free trade, interdependence, communication and transport have contributed to the decreasing importance of internal frontiers and have, in theory, brought the European peoples closer together. But the existence of a European identity still remains questionable. This is also triggered by the fact that the widening versus deepening debate has increasingly challenged the European Union's problem of governance. It suggests that the overall consensus concerning the finalité politique of the European Union is still insufficiently defined. The European Union's attempts to create a European identity - as, for example, through the concept of
European citizenship - have so far only been of symbolic importance and have not yet had the desired impact.

Counter-effective to these inward-looking EU measures, the external frontiers of the European Union have increased their role as a rather defensive and symbolic barrier impermeable to undesired foreign influences. They delimited "us" from "them" - "the other" which lives beyond a certain frontier/boundary and has therefore different social, cultural and political characteristics, traditions and perceptions. Although, the West versus East mentality has not yet been eliminated with the gradual opening of the EU's external frontier, it seems as if the external EU frontier has regained its status as a bridge rather than a barrier. This changing role of the Eastern frontier of the European Union may diminish the need for both sides to define themselves through the other.

In search for answers to the interrelated conflicting queries about Europe's geographical finitude and its core identity, borderlands have increasingly come into focus. After more than forty years of isolation, the present Eastern borderlands of the EU seem once again to be enjoying a revival of the informal contacts, communications and exchanges across the borders that were typical before the start of the Cold War. This can be seen by the several transborder co-operation projects, most of them in the form of Euroregions, that have arisen in and around the Eastern borderlands of the European Union. It is suggested in this thesis that these regional alliances serve as a vital stepping stone to future EU membership. More importantly, they can be seen as a laboratory in which the parameters of a genuine European identity are being evolved.

In this respect, it will be interesting to see the extent to which the planned Eastern enlargement of the EU will vindicate the idea of a European identity which seems to be based on cultural, as well as economic or political values.
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To my parents
1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of European identity is nowadays very much at issue. Over the last few years, it has become increasingly challenged whether the European integration process must be bolstered by creating a European identity, in order to be stable and successful.¹ It seems that issues concerning the development of a European identity can no longer be ignored by European policy-makers. Has, for too long, too much emphasis been put on economic and political considerations? Jean Monnet, one of the fathers of the European integration process is often quoted who, in 1970, stated that he had disregarded the significance of cultural issues: "If I should start it all over again, I would start with culture."²

The lack of cultural considerations in the European integration process seems to have become more accentuated since the end of the Cold War. With the events of 1989/90 - and the challenges of regionalisation and EU enlargement towards the East - it has become accepted that it is no longer possible to take the concept of European identity as synonymous with an EU identity. All of Europe is now on the agenda. Hence, it is implausible to focus solely on Brussels, the EU's democratic deficit, bureaucracy and lack of legitimacy, in order to find the sources for the lack of a European identity.³ Instead, a wider understanding must be sought and, to this end, the concept of European identity has been approached from many different angles. Studying European identity lends itself to a multitude of

² Jean Monnet cited in Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity and what could it be?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The Idea of Europe: Problems of national and transnational identity, p. 68.
interpretations across and within various disciplinary fields. Accordingly, there is uncertainty on how the concept of European identity may be defined. Should it be defined historically, politically, economically, socially, geographically or culturally? The task to define European identity is complicated even further, given the many different political, socio-cultural and socio-psychological theories of identity, and the possible multiple layers of identity.

Concepts of European identity may be linked to the various historic, political, economic, social, geographical and cultural understandings of Europe. These understandings may overlap in part, while the distinctive factors common to an all-encompassing European identity are subject to dispute and controversy. This controversy is two-dimensional: one dimension represents the problem of defining the concept of identity, the other dimension portrays the difficulty of demarcating Europe.

Identity is an abstract, amorphous concept difficult to define. Identity is not static, but a process, even a progressive development. It depends upon the history, culture and territory of people, and a more accurate and coherent account of the concept would also have to take into consideration both the changing nature of these general concepts and the relevant specific and contextual factors. Meanings of the term 'identity' differ widely. On the one hand, identity may mean sameness and imply belonging to a collectivity; on the other hand, identity may indicate uniqueness and distinctiveness from the 'other'. To this one may add the level of

aggregation - individual, local, regional, national or European - from which identity may be approached. This becomes specifically apparent when speaking about concepts of a European identity.

Arguing that some kind of European identity existed in 1957, this European identity and the subsequent creation of the European Economic Community was primarily based on political and security motivations. The fathers of the EEC, marked by the experience of two World Wars, wanted to "put an end to the state enmities which had led to two devastating conflagrations in the twentieth century"\(^6\), and bring peace, stability and a feeling of solidarity to the area. The best way to achieve this was to lock the economies of the six founding member states into an interdependent system of economic co-operation.\(^7\) Often referred to as the Monnet method\(^8\), the European integration process became an elite driven project which discounted the idea of identity, other than national identity.\(^9\) A permissive consensus enabled the introduction of policies necessary to foster the economic and political foundations of the European Economic Community. But with enlargement - from six to fifteen member states - the existing permissive consensus may no longer "be strong enough, or wide enough, to carry the mutual solidarity needed in

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\(^7\) Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the search for legitimacy, p. 71.
\(^8\) For an introduction, see Dinan, Desmond (1994); Ever Closer Union?, pp. 9-37; Laffan, Brigid (1992); Integration and Co-operation in Europe, pp. 22-43; Lodge, Juliet (1992); The European Community and the Challenge for the Future, pp. xiii-xxvi; McAllister, Richard (1997); From EC to EU, pp. 1-40; Milward, Alan and Sorensen, Vibeke (1994); "Interdependence or integration? in Milward, Alan et. al. (eds.); The Frontier of National Sovereignty, pp. 1-32; Pinder, John (1995); European Community: the Building of a Union, pp. 1-22.
\(^9\) See Milward, Alan (1992); European Rescue of the Nation-State, pp. 1-20.
an enlarged Union." Heterogeneity has increased amongst the European member states and consensus has become more difficult to achieve.

By looking at European integration theories it becomes apparent that aspects central to the fostering of a genuine European identity were not relevant at the outset of the European Community. The incongruity between political decision-making and lack of popular involvement, as well as the incongruity between motivations and the outcome of the European integration process is perhaps symptomatic of the EU's problem of governance and crisis of the Monnet method. The EU enjoys formal legitimacy through its fifteen member states, but social legitimacy emanating from the 372 million citizens of the Union is more doubtful and fragile.

With the growth of the European Union, the gradual disappearance of the EC/EU's internal frontiers has enhanced the EU's four basic freedoms of movement, and promoted the idea of the EU as an internally open territory. Free trade, interdependence, communication and transport have contributed to the decreasing importance of frontiers. Co-operation between member states has increased considerably, with new states joining the European project intermittently. Parallel

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10 Fitzgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.


to this, the Schengen agreements were introduced in order to underline the cohesion and free movement of people and to improve immigration controls. Schengen has, in theory, brought the European peoples closer together, but also opened a debate of the potential of a 'fortress Europe', resembling a police state with an external frontier which is a defensive and impermeable barrier against unwanted foreign influences and peoples.\textsuperscript{13}

The increasing politicisation of EU integration gives reason to argue that EU policy makers have been taken aback by the fact that the European project is in need of a European identity, and that it is difficult to construct a European identity from above. Economic objectives and reasons are not sufficient to link the citizen to the European project, nor to grasp the concept of a European identity satisfactorily. The European Union appears to be currently faced with a problem of system design, and has been described as an "ideological and doctrinal muddle"\textsuperscript{14}: will a supranationalist Europe, a 'Europe of regions' or a 'Europe of nation-states' emerge?

In order to develop genuine "community building and [an] affective dimension of integration"\textsuperscript{15}, the European Commission proposed a number of measures oriented to create and foster a European identity. These include European symbols, such as the European flag and anthem, and some cultural policies. Policies such as the four freedoms of movement, the Euro and European citizenship were primarily introduced for economic reasons, but their effect on identity should not be ignored. In the context of this thesis, the right to European citizenship and its connotation with identity seems to be the most interesting policy to look at, since

\textsuperscript{13} For a more detailed account, see Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{Schengen and EU Enlargement}, pp. 29-33; Anderson, Malcolm (1998), "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{The Frontiers of Europe}, pp. 1-10; Bort, Eberhard (1997); "Introduction" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{Schengen and EU enlargement}, pp. 1-12; Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{The Frontiers of Europe}, pp. 91-108

\textsuperscript{14} Woollacott, Martin (1997); "An ideological muddle settles over Europe" in \textit{The Guardian}, May 31, 1997.

citizenship, which guarantees political participation, is an essential cornerstone of democracy.\textsuperscript{16}

The concept of citizenship is traditionally linked to the emergence of the nation-state. During the period of nation-state building in the 18th and 19th century, the European nation-states soon monopolised the various associated political, socio-economic and cultural developments which are also necessary components of a common European identity. Nation-states had important homogenising effects through culture\textsuperscript{17} and began to establish a monopoly on the right to rule over the people in their respective areas. European nation-states fostered national boundaries, introduced passport controls and limited the access to citizenship rights when these were established. This synthesis of political control and cultural identity encouraged national political development, and provided a basis for the principle of inclusion and exclusion. For the European Union, however, the history of the nation-state makes it difficult to gain direct access to the citizens, and to create a European identity. Despite the increasing influence of European governance on the national legislation process, it is probably too early to tell whether European citizenship has more than symbolic importance. Arguably, however, economic and political values alone are insufficient to promote and maintain a sense of identity. According to Benedict Anderson, "in themselves, market zones, 'natural'-geographic or politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will willingly die for Comecom or the EEC?"\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} With the introduction of the right to European citizenship, subjects of the United Kingdom, for example, became citizens in the political sense of the word. For more information, see Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); \textit{Citizenship and the European Community}, pp. 1-35; Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in \textit{Political Studies}, No. 44, pp. 534-552; Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in \textit{European Integration Online Papers}, Vol. 1/No. 17, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/.

\textsuperscript{17} Zetterholm, Staffan (1994); "Introduction" in Zetterholm, Staffan (ed.); \textit{National Cultures and European Integration}, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{18} Anderson, Benedict (1991); \textit{Imagined Communities}, p. 53.
Parameters affecting the development of a European identity can also be found outside and beyond the external boundaries of the European Union. The Cold War, in particular, emphasised a political, socio-economic and cultural division which impacted upon the development of a common European identity and the definition of Europe. The Eastern frontier of the European Union represented a physical and mental barrier which allowed people within the EU to define themselves against the 'other' who lived beyond the EU's external frontiers. This 'other' was geographically distant, and different, since it was determined by particular social, cultural and political characteristics, traditions and perceptions different to those within the EU.

With the end of the Cold War, identified with the crumbling of borders and blurring of boundaries, it looks as if the disappearance of this self/other has left Europe, and specifically decision-makers in the EU, with a sense of disorientation. The term 'Europe' is no longer interchangeable with Western Europe or the EU (more or less overlooking Western European non-EU countries like Switzerland or Norway). With EU enlargement towards the East in sight, the EU can no longer be differentiated from the 'other' across its Eastern frontier in any straightforward, comprehensible manner. It seems impossible to delineate or define Europe's frontiers to the East in the same way as the geographic boundaries towards the Atlantic West, the Mediterranean South and the Polar North.

Europe's internal and external frontiers are changing in status, and new frontiers - "fragile" in Michel Foucher's words - have emerged in Europe, particularly in the Central Eastern European countries. Alternatively, the crude

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19 See Neuman, Iver and Welsh, Jennifer (1991); "The Other in European self-definition" in Review of International Studies, Vol. 17/ No. 4, pp. 327-348.
21 Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontières, p. 475.
22 The split of former Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as the civil wars in Chechnya, Bosnia and Armenia show that despite their 'fragility', these new borders are far more closed than permeable. For a more detailed account, see Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen
East-West division may now be replaced by a West/Centre/East division, and there may be the prospect of a new East/West division emerging between a future, enlarged, EU and the CIS/Russia.

Moving from any attempts at fostering an inward-looking European EU identity to the challenge of creating a wider all-encompassing European identity, the concept of Mitteleuropa, transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, the issue of European identity and the Eastern borderlands of the European Union need to be taken into account. With the end of the Cold War and prospective Eastern EU enlargement, the old concept of Mitteleuropa seems to have again gained in momentum and may be in a process of being re-defined.23

The Central Eastern European countries are presently in the process of democratisation and of consolidating their nation-states. In search of their own national identity, they look westwards, envisaging full Nato and EU membership. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have become Nato members in 1999. For these three countries plus Slovenia and Estonia, negotiations for EU membership have started in March 1998 and EU membership may become reality in the year 2003.

The role of the Eastern border of the EU, along with the transformation processes in the Central Eastern European countries, can be compared to a healing

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23 For a first orientation, see Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union, pp. 27-38; Schöpflin, George (1989); "Central Europe: definitions old and new" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, pp. 7-29; Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, pp. 26-47; Seton-Watson, Hugh (1989); "What is Europe? Where is Europe?" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, pp. 30-46; Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-Dokie, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, pp. 133-144.
process which will possibly leave a scar behind. Whether Western and Central Eastern Europe can grow together again will only be seen in the next century. The Eastern frontier of the European Union has become a meeting point at which EU integration meets the disintegration of Central Eastern Europe, and at which established nation-states in the West face states engaged in a consolidation process of nation-building. Furthermore, the Eastern frontier of the European Union is also a meeting point at which the contradiction between the opening of the Iron Curtain from the East and the hardening of the EU's external Eastern frontier - entailed in the Schengen process - comes to the fore. Despite Schengen, the external frontier of the EU seems to have regained its status as a bridge rather than a barrier - even if the gradual opening of the Eastern frontier of the European Union has not yet entirely eliminated the West versus East mentality. Problems remain: such as economic disparities, the different standards of living on either side of the Eastern frontier of the European Union and the different approaches to national spatial planning.

Transborder co-operation projects seem to contribute to the gradual opening of the Eastern frontier of the European Union and seem to be essential means to prepare the Central Eastern European countries for prospective EU membership. Transborder co-operation projects on the Eastern frontier of the European Union began in 1990 and the 1991 Euroregion Neiße-Nysa-Nisa was the first of its sort.

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24 For a more detailed analysis, see Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie - Empirie - Praxis, pp. 78-97; Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum" in Neuß, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, pp. 48-70; Neuß, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuß, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, pp. 144-161; Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation; Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning of greater Europe in co-operation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe, pp. 73-82; Council of Europe (1998); Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation on http://www.coe.fr/; Conference on Euroregions, Frankfurt/Oder, September 28-30, 1995, Proceedings; European Parliament (1997); Forum: Regions and cities: co-operation beyond the borders of the Union, organised in the
Transfrontier co-operation between the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union may resemble a bottom-up process of integration which is closer to the people. People in the borderlands experience the transformation processes in the wider Europe most directly. Within the framework of Euroregions, they are given the chance to act locally, while thinking globally, or at least thinking in European terms. Having been marginalised and economically depressed during the Cold War, people and economies of these borderlands currently benefit from the revival of informal contacts, communications and exchanges across borders that were typical before the start of the Cold War. Borderlands may become key players in bringing the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries closer together. They are exposed to and influenced by national politics and culture, international pressures from other neighbouring states, as well as the collision between the two European traditions: those of Western and Central Eastern Europe.25

Brought together in a series of Euroregions, borderlands transcend the traditional national frontiers of the state, as well as the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Hence, they may be regarded "as a particular kind of local, politically organised ecology."26 Borderlands are heterogeneous areas and seem to

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26 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border Identities, p. 6; See also Anderson, Perry (1994); "The invention of the region 1945-1990" in EUI Working Paper, 1994/2,
be able to internalise more than one culture and more than one identity, suggesting that different identities and cultures may be able to interact according to time, situation and context. Borderlands may therefore be representative of one of the "most exciting places in the world... [since they] live on the edge, on the boundaries between cultures, places of fusion rather than uniformity." Consequently, borderlands can be seen as "ideal laboratories" in which parameters for a genuine European identity may evolve which incorporates multiple levels of identity, ranging from individual identity via EU identity to an all-encompassing European identity. Can clues for a genuine European identity already be identified in the Eastern borderlands?

In order to embed this multiplicity of identities in a theoretical framework, the theory of Liberal Nationalism seems to be able to bind various different individual, local, regional, national and European identities together. It could act as an umbrella encompassing particularism and universalism, diversity and commonality. It could also become a basis for Jürgen Habermas's 'Constitutional Patriotism' - and Constitutional Patriotism could represent a focal point for the development of a European identity. Constitutional Patriotism seems to stand for global democratic citizenship, which promotes the co-existence of the various approaches to national citizenship, maintained by supranational organisations, such as the European Union. Democratic, civic principles, rather than homogeneous

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28 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalisation" in Nolutshungu, Sam (ed.); Margins of Insecurity, p. 277.

29 See specifically MacCormick, Neil (1996), "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political Studies, No. 44, pp. 553-567; Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, pp. 3-12.

30 Habermas, Jürgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising Citizenship, pp. 255-282; Waever, Ole (1995); "Europe since 1945" in Wilson, Kevin and Dussen van, Jan (eds.); The history of the idea of Europe, pp. 151-214.
ethnic values, seem to be a plausible - if not the only - approach on which a genuine European identity can be built.

Democratic principles are, however, only a foundation for the emergence of a European identity. A genuine European identity will also need to incorporate issues with which the European citizen may identify him/herself directly. To this end, it is necessary to include a cultural scope in the European legislation process. Most European policies - even the economic ones - now appear to have this dimension which goes to the heart of the various different existing identities within Europe. It seems as if European culture is a plausible and essential instrument to foster a genuine and all-encompassing European identity. European culture may be shared by different people in different places at different times.

The difficulty of defining European culture has allowed for a wide understanding of an all-encompassing European culture. European culture has no boundaries, it is fluid. European culture is as diverse as it is unique, since it seems to be the fruit of the many existing different cultures within Europe. There is not just one European culture, but there are many. Paradoxically, it may help to define Europe. It seems impossible to do so geographically, because "Europe as an organised entity will need to maintain a kind of fuzzy or at least blurred geopolitical


32 This argument is also made in European Communities (1997); La Commission Européenne à l'écoute du changement, pp. 23-68; Oberndorfer, Dieter (1996); "Die politische Gemeinschaft und ihre Kultur" in Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 52-53, pp. 37-46; Riekmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schöpflin, George (eds.); Myths and Nationhood, pp. 60-71; Rietbergen, Peter (1998); A Cultural History of Europe, pp. xvi-xx; Wintle, Michael (1996); "Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, pp. 1-8; Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, pp. 9-32.

33 Similar arguments are made in: Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste; Europe: a history of its people, pp. 13-21; Morris, James M.; "Europe: More than a Configuration of Land and Water", http://wwics.st.edu/.

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logic to deal with its new peripheries\textsuperscript{34}; politically, socially and culturally it is also difficult, due to the legacy of the creation of the nation-state and, more recently, the Cold War.

Arguably, European identity must be detached from the traditional understanding of national identity, since European identity, as culture, seems to represent a composite of all co-existing European identities. It therefore seems reasonable to argue that European identity may only be defined through its cultural diversity and "tradition of uncertainty"\textsuperscript{35}. Culture rather than politics tends to be a more helpful means to define Europe.\textsuperscript{36} Is it therefore feasible to suggest that the terms Europe and European identity must remain insufficiently defined? Does the finalité politique of the European Union need to remain an open-ended concept?

The overall aim of this thesis attempts to demonstrate that the long existing discrepancy between an embryonic EU identity and a wider, all-encompassing European identity may and must be overcome in order to give rise to a genuine European identity. Given that there is an abundant literature on the concept of European identity, but only a minority taste in European identity and the Eastern border of the European Union, least its borderlands, this thesis will concentrate on the EU's Eastern borderlands as laboratories in which parameters for a genuine European identity may evolve.

To do this, important English and non-English speaking literature on the topic will be taken into account, in order to accommodate the considerable range of different issues necessary to the analysis. These various topics will be examined individually and contextually, in order to demonstrate a possible comprehensive and extensive approach to European identity. The focus will then be on

\textsuperscript{34} Foucher, Michel (1999); "Europe and its long-lasting variable geography" in Bort, Eberhard and Keat, Russell (eds.); The Boundaries of Understanding: Essays in Honour of Malcolm Anderson, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{35} Fraser, Nicholas (1997); "What state are we in?" in The Guardian, September 13, 1997.
investigating the emergence of possible parameters of a European identity in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Given the multiplicity and interdependence of influential factors, there are structural difficulties and problems of presentation. The thesis, however, attempts to overcome this problem by referring to these issues in different contexts and according to different levels of aggregation.

In order to lay out the framework within which a European identity may be located, and in view of the multiple understandings and ambiguities surrounding the following terms and concepts, chapter two starts with a definition of the terms nation, nation-state, region, border, borderland, Europe, identity, national identity and European identity. Chapter three then discusses issues and factors central to European integration. It addresses the theories explaining the European integration process, as well as the various EU policies and measures oriented to create and foster a European identity, including citizenship. Chapter four will highlight the historic legacy of Mitteleuropa in view of conceptualising the challenges and problems faced by transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. It will then look at the issue of European identity and the Eastern borderlands of the European Union. Given the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of the Eastern borderlands, chapter five will embed the multiplicity of identities in a theoretical framework. Liberal Nationalism and Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism will be taken as useful formats, supported by the dimension of culture as a means to help define the concept of European identity. By way of conclusion, the contextualisation and interpretation of European identity and European culture will be examined and summed up.

10 Münkler, Herfried (1995); "Die politische Idee Europa" in Delgado, Mariano and Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias (eds.); Herausforderung Europa: Wege zu einer europäischen Identität, p. 11.
2 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Difficulties of defining terms perhaps highlight the procedure of defining itself. Defining is a stepping back, an attempt to locate oneself in the environment, with all the security, power and perspective needs that go with it. It is, moreover, a stepping out of the floor which is the sense of action, of change, and of impermanence - the source of the problems for those who define. It is difficult to give exact definitions to words without taking into account the contexts they live in. Various existing definitions of one term are bound together, according to Ludwig Wittgenstein's "family resemblances". Terms are bound together in interaction, interdependence and complementarity. This complexity will become especially clear in this thesis, and specifically in this chapter. In order to assess European identity and the Eastern borderlands of the European Union, we will first look at the definitions of the nation, the nation-state, the region, the border, borderlands, Europe, the social psychological approach to identity and European identity. It will hopefully become clear that the definition of 'European identity' depends largely on one's conception of identity - and, from a more scholarly point of view, European identity depends on the adopted nationalist doctrine.

2. A Definition of nation, nation-state, region, border, borderlands and Europe

The nation

According to Ernest Renan, nations are "everyday plebiscite[s]" which "are not eternal. They have had beginnings and will have ends; and will probably be replaced by a confederation of Europe". Although the argument of this thesis will not go as far as to proclaim the replacement of the nation by a future European

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confederation, the emergence of a European identity does depend upon one's conception of the nationalist doctrine. Our conception of the nationalist doctrine will then have an influence on whether we think that the prospective development of a European society is possible.

Scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds have yet to agree on the exact definition of the 'nation'. The term 'nation' is often taken for granted. It is used widely, with little precision, and sometimes confused or treated interchangeably with nation-state, government, country, ethnie, or peoples living within a state. Not one single feature characterises the nation, although one particular variable may predominate. When attempting to define the nation, one should take into account a complex array of multiple factors. These may be cultural, political or psychological in character. They sometimes overlap and seem ambiguous. They shift according to situational, temporal or contextual circumstances and one's perception of the term 'nation'.

The term 'nation' is relatively new. It was not until 1884 that the term 'nation' appeared for the first time in a Dictionary, the Dictionary of the Royal Spanish Academy. It had primarily a political meaning, following Jean-Jacques Rousseau's writings which emphasised citizenship and sovereignty as cornerstones of the nation. The nation was understood as a political community, "a product of the Enlightenment's understanding of the individual as a rational and free being capable of directing his own affairs without guidance from above." This French conception of the term 'nation' stood in contrast to Herder's interpretation of the nation. In his late writings, towards the end of the 18th century, and specifically referring to the German 'nation', Herder had described the nation as primarily a cultural community. It was held together by a common language and culture and endured any political, economic and administrative fragmentation.

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3 Renan, Ernest (1882) "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 203 and 204.
3 Hobsbawm, Eric (1990); Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 14.
4 Loughlin, John (1996); "Nation, state and region in Western Europe" in Bekemans, Leonce (ed.);
Culture: Building Stone for Europe, p. 233.
5 Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 105-6.
In 1908 the historian Friedrich Meinecke was one of the first scholars to clearly distinguish between the 'cultural nation' and the 'political nation'. He identified the Kulturnation as a largely ethnic, homogeneous and "passive cultural community". The Staatsnation, in contrast, was an "active, self-determining political nation" in which citizenship is more important than ethnic identity. This typology was later taken up by Hans Kohn in his influential book *The idea of nationalism* of 1945. Here Kohn includes his famous typology of Western and Eastern nationalism. He made a clear distinction between the two: Western nationalism was classified as a relatively positive, liberal, civic-territorial and political phenomenon which "was the product of social and political factors" and "arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past"; Eastern nationalism, on the other hand, was portrayed as a violent, aggressive, ethnic-organic and pre-political form of nationalism, tending to politicise culture and tradition, since it is "not rooted in a political and social reality", but was "created out of the myths of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland... expected to become sometime a political reality."

Anthony Smith takes up this typology and goes a little further, categorising the term nation into three broad groups. Each group is subject to a different formation process and will consequently also have a different conception of its national identity:

- The ethnic nation stresses the ethno-cultural characteristics of the nation. Anthony Smith defines the ethnic nation as a "named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity." Given the co-existence of these factors, one may argue that the nation precedes the state, namely the nation creates the state (e.g. Italy and Germany in 1866 and 1871 respectively).

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8 Kohn, Hans (1945); *The Idea of Nationalism*.
9 Kohn, Hans (1945); *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 331 and 330.
10 Kohn, Hans (1945); *The Idea of Nationalism*, p. 330.
The civic nation describes the nation formation via the high elites and their bureaucratic means. Its members show allegiance to civic institutions which represent "a community of shared culture, common laws and territorial citizenship". According to this territorial and political unity, the civic conception of the nation implies that the state creates the nation, regardless of peoples' ethnic or regional background.

- The plural nation is composed by various different ethnic communities. These ethnic communities "give primary allegiance to a public mass culture" and their "residence and ethnic descent are subordinated to an overarching civic religion".

One should note, however, that these types of nations are not mutually exclusive and "[w]e should avoid seeing or defining the civic and ethnic in straightforward either/or terms." The term 'nation' is a far more complex and multidimensional term. Its characteristics are linked to varying degrees. With this in mind, Eric Hobsbawm has identified a collection of multiple objective and subjective variables, in an attempt to define a nation and determine its association with either nationhood or statehood, or both.

According to Hobsbawm, objective criteria include common cultural features, such as ethnicity, language, religion, territory and myths. However, it is rarely the case that all objective variables coincide. Most nations are subject to a great degree of diversity, such as the Swiss nation with its three main national languages. Consequently, objective criteria are not sufficient to define a nation; subjective criteria need to be taken into account as well. Subjective variables refer to the will, choice and consciousness of the nation to be a nation. Each individual

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13 The creation of a civic nation by central authorities is made specifically clear in Eugene Weber's book (1979); Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernisation of rural France, 1870-1914. Weber sets out in how far the French state created "the French" during the Third Republic. It introduced conscription and compulsory school attendance, and built roads and railtracks reaching the periphery of the country. See also Sontheimer, Kurt (1989); "Nation" in Leenhardt, Jacques and Picht, Robert (ed.); 100 Schlüsselbegriffe für Deutsche und Franzosen, pp. 195-198.
14 Anthony Smith cited in Harris, Henry (1995); Identity, p. 152.
nation is a socio-psychological construct which sets itself apart from other existing nations.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition, Eric Hobsbawm describes the nation as an "invented tradition"\textsuperscript{17}, and Benedict Anderson suggests that nations are "imagined communities"\textsuperscript{18}. Both these accounts might point to the assumption that nationalism creates nations, rather than the other way around. Accordingly, nations are artificial and "conscious constructs created over history"\textsuperscript{19}, so that "[w]hat appears (or is claimed) to be a 'nation' at one moment in history can suddenly turn out to be a fabrication."\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, Anderson suggests that nations are mental images "constructed for us through education, the mass media and a process of political association"\textsuperscript{21}. This is close to the orthodox Marxist theory which regards the nation as a construction of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie created a national identity by binding the working class to its power structure rather than to a sense of class consciousness and solidarity.

Similarly, scholars such as Karl W. Deutsch and Anthony Giddens emphasise the political and statist bond of the nation, namely that the state is a form of expression of the nation. For Deutsch, "the nation is a people in possession of a state"\textsuperscript{22}, and for Giddens, the nation "only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed"\textsuperscript{23}. He uses the term nation interchangeably and synonymously with the term 'nation-state' and therefore gives the term 'nation' the meaning of political community. Civic and

\begin{table}
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\textsuperscript{15} McCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 563. \\
\textsuperscript{16} Hobsbawm, Eric (1990); Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 5-9. \\
\textsuperscript{17} Hobsbawm, Eric (1983); "Introduction" in Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (eds.); The Invention of Tradition, pp. 1-14. \\
\textsuperscript{18} Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined communities, pp. 1-7. \\
\textsuperscript{19} Raymond Crew cited in Boerner, Peter (1986); "Introduction" in Boerner, Peter (ed.); Concepts of national identity - an interdisciplinary dialogue, p. 8. \\
\textsuperscript{20} Winichakul, Thongchai (1996); "Siam mapped - the making of Thai nationhood" in The Ecologist, Vol. 26/ No. 5, p. 215. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 107. \\
\textsuperscript{22} Deutsch, Karl W. (1978); "Nation und Welt" in Winkler, Heinrich August (ed.); Nationalismus, p. 50. My translation. \\
\textsuperscript{23} Giddens, Anthony (1994); "The Nation as Power-Container" in Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D. (eds.); Nationalism, p. 34. \\
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political loyalties to the nation state become paramount, whilst sovereignty and the
general will lie within the nation. This statist conception of the term 'nation',
however, should not be confused with the terms 'nation-state' or 'national state'.

**The nation-state**

The term state "refers to the centralised, territorial, sovereign polity which
began to take shape in the thirteenth century and was completed, in its essentials, by
the seventeenth century." The modern state, according to Max Weber, is "that
agency within society that possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence", and
Gellner adds that the "state exists where specialised order-enforcing agencies, such
as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life. They are
the state." Nevertheless, the distinction between the state and the nation is often
blurred, as it

is an important feature of the modern state that it transmogrifies itself into a nation
('an imagined community', as B. Anderson aptly puts it), which is an object of
love, attachment, devotion and even passion, and for which one is prepared to
make the most harrowing sacrifices (including one's life) and commit the most
horrendous of crime (against other nationals or against 'traitors').

Since "the fortunes of nations and states are obviously intertwined and
interdependent", it now seems appropriate to come back to the concept of the
'nation-state'. The perfect nation-state is a state in which a nation's frontiers coincide
with state/political frontiers, in order to form a single societal and politico-
administrative territorial unit. The perfect nation-state would match the state with
its society, or vice versa, and enjoy maximum homogeneity.

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24 Nor does, according to Tilly, "national state... necessarily mean nation-state" in Llobera, Josep
(1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in García, Soledad (ed.); *European identity
and the search for legitimacy*, p. 64.
25 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in García, Soledad (ed.);
*European identity and the search for legitimacy*, p. 66.
26 Max Weber cited in Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle,
Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 104.
27 Gellner, Ernest (1996); *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 4.
28 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in García, Soledad (ed.);
*European identity and the search for legitimacy*, p. 65.
29 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael
(ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 17.
According to the realist school of thought, the formation of the nation-state and nationalism was a result of increasing capitalism, industrialisation, technical advances, advanced transportation methods, the invention of printing, mass communication and education. As a result, these developments led to

the clotting of sizeable collections of people into homogenised communities, sharing the same law, religion, life-style and often language. Large homogenised societies benefit from economies of scale. Standardisation and mass production offer the possibility of the greatest affluence for the largest number of people. It was this reality that made nationalism a viable proposition and gave it mass support.

Mass support, however, does not mean homogeneity. John Stuart Mill already noted in 1861 that "there were major difficulties in implementing the national ideal of a state for each nation, the most prominent being the geographic one." The end of the first World War is a testimony to this statement. Wilson's fourteen points soon revealed "homogeneous nation-states... as a pipedream" and modern nation-states have attempted to blur the fact that they are composed of different national groups by fostering a liberal-democratic definition of the nation. According to this definition, all those who inhabit a particular territory and live under the rule of the same government are members of the same nation, but modern history has time and again refuted the claim that citizenship and membership in a nation are one and the same.

"Mankind is made up of 5,000 ethnic groups with only 190 countries to live in" and according to Walker Connor, only about 12% of existing nation-states are homogeneous. The remaining nation-states are 'multinational' in the sense that they contain subsections of ethnies which aspire to nationhood in the form of a political collective.

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32 John Stuart Mill cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p.142.
33 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p.145.
34 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p.143-144.
35 McKie, Robin (1998); "Flames of conflict in the melting pot" in The Observer, September 20, 1998.
36 Walker Connor cited in Billig, Michael (1997); Banal Nationalism, p. 27, and Connor, Walker (1994); "A nation is a nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." in Hutchinson, John and Smith, Anthony D. (eds.); Nationalism, p. 39.
The nation-state is, however, not only to be seen through the national-territorial lens. The nation-state is also a sovereign state. Traditionally, a nation-state's external frontiers delimit the nation-state's exclusive authority. They thus define its limits to sovereignty. Sovereignty is an essential qualification for states to assert themselves in the international community. The sovereign nation-state should not be subject to any decisions made outwith. All important decisions concerning the affairs of the nation-state are concentrated at one point. The sovereign nation-state could (virtually) override all decisions which affect it, but which are made elsewhere.

For this reason, the European member states are often regarded as being no longer sovereign in this traditional sense. They have surrendered part of their sovereignty to the decision-making bodies of the European Union, since the European integration process promotes unity across the European Union and favours the pooling of national sovereignties. The member states' external boundaries no longer function as hermetic seals, but have become permeable membranes enabling the four freedoms of movement within the EU. In addition to this challenge from above, the European member states are also challenged from below. Most European nation-states face regional demands for subsidiarity and decentralisation from central government. It was Denis de Rougement who created the image of the European nation-state which is "squeezed between regionalism and supranationalism"\(^{37}\). Both developments affect the political, economic and cultural values and national identities of the various European nation-states. Although regionalism and supranationalism have different effects on the European member states, they seem, however, to be complementary. Transborder co-operation on the internal and external borders of the European member states is a good example for this.

\(^{37}\) Denis de Rougemont cited in Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs of Nations, p. 5. Supranationalism refers to the forces from within the European integration process. Regionalism indicates that some of the European regions wish to free themselves from central governments, in order to decide over their own regional affairs and to be able to assert their identity in Europe - such as, for instance the Scottish National Party and its aim to create an 'Independent Scotland in Europe'. The EU tends to represent an opportunity for the co-existence of different nations, regions and minorities.
Nevertheless, one should be cautious about announcing the end of the sovereign nation-state. Challenges by various different forces from above or below, specifically regionalism and the rise of the European Union, may have "weakened the grip of Europe's main nation-states but without threatening to break them up". The nation-state remains the territorial and sovereign form of polity. The nation-state is not isolated, but "exists in a complex of other nation-states". Its demise is still far from imminent, as it continues to remain "a bounded power-container" in international and European politics.

The region

The term 'region' has changed its meaning over time and, being subject to national forces and context, it is also "highly indeterminate". Setting up the complexity of the term 'region' makes it a rich unit to examine, specifically because political analysts have increasingly agreed that "the concept of region... is associated with identity." In the past, the term 'region" was never central in the political vocabulary of the early modern state. Although the term 'region' derives its meaning from the Latin word 'regere' = to govern, the 'region' designated a fairly neutral entity which was mainly defined by its geographical and natural features. During the time of industrialisation, this conception of the 'natural region' then developed into an 'economic region'. In addition, "[t]here was the older

38 The Economist (1997); "Devolution can be salvation", September 20, 1997.
40 Giddens, Anthony (1981); A contemporary critique of historical materialism, p. 190.
41 Giddens, Anthony (1985); The Nation-State and Violence, p. 120.
42 This is especially the case with reference to the European Council of Ministers, the most intergovernmental institution of the European Union, in which the individual member states, rather than the EU as an autonomous entity in itself, decide on EU policies and politics.
43 Anderson, Perry (1994); The invention of the region 1945-1990, p. 6.
44 Éger, György (1996); "Region, Border, Periphery" in Eger, György and Langer, Josef (eds.); Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe, p. 15. See also Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 8 and 18.
46 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1983); "Frontier regions: future collaboration or conflict?" in Anderson, Malcolm (ed.); Frontier Regions in Western Europe, p. 123.
political sense of the term as an administrative unit within a sovereign state - but also the diplomatic usage denoting the area containing several such states."47

With the rise of nationalism at the turn of the 19th century, however, the term 'region' has received another different meaning. The term region began to be distinguished from its mere geographical definition and became identified with today's understanding of 'cultural region'. To the present day, the term 'region' is defined as "a community bounded by either customs and traditions (the weaker version), or language and literature (the stronger version)"48 which has a social dynamic on its own. The 'region' often carries connotations of being a 'sub-national' unit which resides in individual nation-states. The majority of regions are seen as parts of a larger entity49 that stand in relation to their respective nation-states.

This 'dependence' on the nation-state unjustifiably evokes ideas about regional economic backwardness, underdevelopment and socio-economic deprivation. Increasing urbanisation has marked the difference between cities and provinces and gave the term 'region' a negative undertone connected with the term 'periphery' or 'provinciality'.

Within the EU, the concept of 'region' is used differently in each member state. The definition of the 'region' as a socio-cultural, economic and political 'sub-national' entity may be useful in relation to the reality of multi-level governance, or in explaining different conceptions of regionalisation and 'federalism'. Regions vary in size, administrative rights and obligations, national and international status, human and physical geography and economic activity. It is still up to each individual member state to decide how many levels of governance are installed. Regionalisation is closely linked to the individual country's socio-political history.

In unitary states, such as the United Kingdom, the degree of political power enjoyed by regions is low. Although this is changing slowly, the disparity between

49 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 18. The term 'region' varies according to context and may become a problem of scale: the United States encompass regions which are bigger than the whole of Scandinavia. In geographical and international relations literature, Europe, South East Asia or the Maghreb may also be treated as a 'region'.

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centre and 'periphery' is still marked very clearly and 'regions' are dependent on the state. They may be easily overruled by Westminster, since the British government sees regionalisation as undermining the unity of the nation-state. In contrast, federal states, such as Austria, Germany and Belgium, give a large degree of decision-making autonomy to their regions. Each region possesses its own constitutional rights and legislative powers and is not subject to its respective central government's tutelage. Regionalisation in these countries is the result of the federal willingness to advance democracy and to enhance the balance of power. Regionalisation seems essential in maintaining the coherence of the nation-state, since the relation between democracy and region "might seem more like one of completion."50

If a region "seeks to maintain or to alter rules governing the formation of material or symbolic prices related to symbolic expressions of (objective or intentional) social identity"51, the movement behind it is often referred to as 'regionalism'. Regionalism is associated with "mobilisation and action"52. It is expressed in different forms, but is commonly regarded as to include demands for regional autonomy and independence from central government. Regionalism is often condemned as anti-centrist, anti-statist and separatist, specifically since regions have gained in economic and political importance - functions which were once only reserved to the state or, more precisely, central government.

But the revival of (regional) territorial politics is not delinked from the regions' cultural dimension. Regions - even if some may not fall into the traditional definition of the term 'region'53 - have developed their own raison d'etre and may be delimited by intra-nation-state frontiers.54 They have become important alternative

51 Pierre Bourdieu cited in Éger, György (1996); "Region, Border, Periphery" in Éger, György and Langer, Josef (eds.); Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe, p. 18.
53 This is specifically the case with Scotland. Scotland may be referred to as a cultural 'region', but not in the political and administrative meaning of the word. See footnote 49.
54 The creation of intra-nation-state frontiers does not only focus on the geographical dimension. It also includes a socio-cultural and political dimension, as for example the difference between Scottish and English law and the special status of the Free State of Bavaria in Germany, illustrated in the presence of the Christian Democratic Union's sister party, the Christian Social Union.
sources of identity to the nation-state. Regions "carry much emotional charge"\textsuperscript{55}, because they are "small enough to be closer to the people and big enough to organise reliable consensus"\textsuperscript{56}. Regions seem "more coherent and focused"\textsuperscript{57}. This places them in an advantageous position to master their own politics. Problem-solving is quicker, since decision-making processes generally do not need to pass through the national - often complex - bureaucratic machinery, but are dealt with more effectively 'on location'.

Cross-regional co-operation is central to the European Union's political culture and, focusing on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, it is also a fundamental category in the analysis of this thesis. The European Union defines the term 'region' as the administrative unit below the national level of government. For its Structural Funds, the EU categorises each region according to its GDP, rate of unemployment, industrial structure and economic activity. According to the European Commission, a region is part of a

national economic space which is divided into a certain number of territorial units. These engage in complementary and strongly linked economic activities which gravitate around urban centres where important economic functions, especially decision-making powers are located. The region's economic activities emerge from the polarisation structures which are subject to interdependence, geographic, economic and social complementarity.\textsuperscript{58}

Unfortunately, this definition ignores the most important objective of many regionalists: to attain self-government or political representation. It is not an objective definition, since it leaves out the cultural dimension of the 'region'. The definition focuses on the criteria to attain regional funds from the European Union,

ignoring the cultural dimension and other forces within member states which are also essential for defining the term 'region'.

There is not one unified approach to the definition of 'region': "everybody talks about 'region', but everybody means something different"59. This suggests the need for a broad definition of the term 'region' which takes into account minimum standards and thresholds. Different criteria apply to different circumstances. Not all characteristics belonging to a region coincide in such a way that they form a complete homogeneous entity with a distinctive historical, cultural, geographical and economic-political identity, and on the assumption that the 'region' is subject to a mixture of different elements, this thesis will focus on the 'region' as an entity which is diverse and lacks uniformity.

Preserving the diversity of the many European regions proves difficult to the development of a European regional policy and European spatial planning. Subsequently, these difficulties also bear problems for transfrontier co-operation. Governments in Central Eastern Europe regard their national territories as homogeneous entities, divided into quasi regions with little administrative power. The move from these quasi regions to the unclear definition of the region by the European Union will be difficult, as transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union already shows.60

**Frontiers, borders and boundaries**

"Frontiers cannot be separated from the entities which they enclose"61. They have "two faces, one to the interior of the system and the other to the external environment".62 Given this Janus-face, one may describe "borders ...[as] indicators, ...[as] symbols. They signalise the state of relations between two governments, even the nature of the government which administers the border"63. J. Ancel defined

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60 This will be further explored in chapter four.
62 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); *From barrier to junction*, p. 5.
63 Gross, Feliks (1973); "Registering and Ranking of Tension Areas" in Institute of International Sociology; *Boundaries and Regions*, p. 325.
borders as "political isobars". Indeed, borders may be taken as points of references from which to view the consolidation, administration and co-operation processes of the states in question.

The study of borders is multidisciplinary. It includes a number of various forms of discourses: the political, legal, economic, sociological, historical and anthropological. These discourses always "overlap but never coincide". Each school gives the border a different meaning and interpretation. Until recently, border studies concentrated on the historical formation of borders as limits to national sovereignty, rather than on the borders' effects on the organisation and development of territories. Nonetheless, four main functions of borders can be identified according to the Swiss geographer Raffestin. First, the frontier is "the basic political institution [which is] established by political decisions and regulated by political texts." Frontiers are instruments of translation. They determine the beginning and the end of a state. They are the first lines of contact, defence, institutions of social coercion, and symbols of a variety of state powers. From a legal point of view, borders delimit a state's national sovereignty. In either the physical or symbolic sense, borders are a powerful expression of those who create them, since it is the creators who decide on the length, extent and function of the respective borders. Ideally, governments wish to construct, establish and sometimes redraw borders "to secure territories which are valuable to them because of their human or natural resources, or because these places have strategic or symbolic

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64 J. Ancel cited in Renard, Jean-Pierre et al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 47. My translation.
65 Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 2. See also Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 1.
67 Renard, Jean-Pierre et al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 46.
69 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 4.
70 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 10.
importance to the state." The drawing of boundaries is usually done in such a way as to protect the state's national interest and to maximise power and prosperity. Second, frontiers are a means of regulation, to control "much of the traffic of persons, goods and information." Frontiers can act as barriers and protect (or at least attempt to protect) the respective state from unfavourable external influences. Third, frontiers may also be bridges, connecting points. Increasing globalisation has made the majority of frontiers permeable and encourages transfrontier co-operation between neighbouring states. Fourth, frontiers are markers of identity and differentiation. Frontiers may promote a sense of belonging and mark the unity of the people living inside. This is usually materialised in frontier controls which foster the

psychological significance of frontiers because they mark the limits of an authority and define territory which one human group considers as a homeland from that of another homeland.

Frontiers may include by excluding. According to anthropologist Benedict Anderson the non-existence of boundaries would make agglomerations of people vulnerable to outside threats and put their identity into question. Virtually all human groups draw boundaries according to their 'needs' - which explains the existence of many different kinds and functions of boundaries. One may therefore argue that frontiers are artificial, created by man in order to control peoples and territory. Even the most "artificial frontier, the frontier most indifferent to its physical or ethno-cultural human environment, as in Africa and the Belgo-French frontier, creates differences amongst the peoples it divides by the simple reason that it remains" and may become natural over time.

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71 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 9.
72 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "European Frontiers at the end of the twentieth century" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 5.
73 See specifically Barth, Frederik (1970); "Introduction" in Barth, Frederik (ed.); Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, pp. 9-38.
74 Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 31.
75 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 55. My translation.
According to F. Ratzel, there are no good or bad frontiers, but the "quality of the frontier depends as much on the country and its people as on its situation."\textsuperscript{76} In order to better understand the functions of boundaries, Oscar Martinez has identified a model of four types of border interaction. He distinguishes between alienated, co-existent, interdependent and integrated borderlands.\textsuperscript{77} We will see in more detail in chapter four how and to what extent Martinez bases these distinctions on the different "dialectical relationships between borders and their states"\textsuperscript{78}, between border and borderlands, and the respective neighbouring countries. Historically speaking, the location and function of frontiers are not static. Frontiers are "time written in space"\textsuperscript{79} or, according to Michel Foucher "time written in spaces"\textsuperscript{80}. They "are spatial and temporal records of relationships between local communities and between states."\textsuperscript{81} The variables of time and space shift either accordingly or disproportionally.

Differences in the definition of the term 'border' prevail. The terms 'frontier', 'border', or 'boundary' are often used synonymously. However, each of them has a slightly different meaning. They are subject to different linguistic variations. Whereas English distinguishes between the three terms mentioned above, German only uses one word for all three - Grenze. French, in contrast, employs four words, - frontière, front, limite and marche.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{76} F. Ratzel in Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 54. My translation.
\textsuperscript{78} Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{80} Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontières, p. 472. My translation and emphasis.
\textsuperscript{81} Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{82} Anderson, Malcolm (1996); Frontiers, p. 9. Frontière derives from the military term front and determines the limit of a territory's expansion. Front defines the frontier line, that is the position line from which the enemy was to be faced (cf. l'affrontement = confrontation). Limite describes the line.
In English, the term 'frontier' has the widest meaning. It can refer to the exact line at which a state's national jurisdiction supposedly ends, as well as to the 'limes', the territorial frontier zone which extends across or away from the aforementioned line into a state's territory. This frontier zone may have a socio-cultural system at its basis, but should be distinguished from the term 'borderland'. This frontier or frontier zone is also called an imperial border, "forming a corridor between two kingdoms" for defensive reasons. Similar to 'frontier', the word 'border' can also refer to either the line of delimitation or to a zone next to the edges of the nation-state. This zone, however, is much narrower than the area implied by a 'frontier'. It may be a zone acting as a filter or a gateway. As opposed to the frontier's association with limitation and confrontation, shock or rupture, 'borderland' suggests life, animation and creation in relation to the boundary (see below).

Finally, 'boundary' has the narrowest meaning of all three terms, since it has a "linear, one-dimensional quality". In 1895, the German geographer Frederik Ratzel equated the state's boundaries to the skin of a living organism. It defends and controls exchanges passing into and out of the state. Accordingly, 'boundary' limits itself to the line of demarcation alone. It describes the definite barrier per se. Malcolm Anderson, in his book Frontiers, uses the term 'boundary' to demarcate sub-state "frontiers of political and administrative authorities", 'frontier' is used to describe an international boundary, the edge at which states meet.

which separates two territories. Marche refers to a state's frontier region. See also Foucher, Michel (1998); "The geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, 235-236, and for an even more detailed analysis, distinguishing between different types of frontiers, see Foucher, Michel (1991); Fronts et Frontières, pp. 38-47.

83 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 18.
84 Winichakul, Thongchai (1996); "Siam mapped - the making of Thai nationhood" in The Ecologist, Vol. 26/No. 5, p. 216.
85 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 55.
86 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From barrier to junction, p. 18. See also Krämer, Raimund (1998); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 13.
87 Prescott, John R. V. (1987); Political Frontiers and Boundaries, p. 10.
In the United States, the reverse is the case. 'Frontier' refers to a zone, a moving section, "a point where wilderness and civilisation collide." The American usage of 'border', however, usually relates to the international frontier as seen above.

**Borderlands**

The definition of 'region' is, as we have seen, problematic. When it comes to borderlands, the definition is even further complicated. The following questions arise: should the definition of border region be limited to quantitative features, in terms of distance of the region in question from the actual border area? Or, should one rather rely on qualitative terms, that is to say on the natural economic, political, historical and social structure of a region close to the border with a strong sense of regional border identity?

The European Union remains vague about the definition of borderlands. It comes close to defining borderlands when it speaks about transfrontier co-operation on its Eastern frontier. Regulation No. 94/C 180/13, concerning Interreg II, refers to "all areas along the internal and external borders of the Community delineated at administrative level III of the Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical Units (NUTS) III". However, this definition is not satisfactory, since it does not take into account that borderlands are marked by the existence of frontiers, to the extent that "border regions are structured by the frontier; they either reject or live in communion with the frontier."

Given the different interpretative definitions of the term 'frontier', border regions may either refer to "a region lying astride the boundary", namely the line demarcating a state's legal sovereignty, or to "a concept of a marginal or peripheral

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91 Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Le géographe et les frontières, p. 57. My translation.

92 Ratti, Remigio (1993); "How can existing barriers and border effects be overcome?" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 60.
zone"93, that is a 'frontier' or 'border'. Indeed, the centre/periphery relation often justifies the definition of borderlands. Borderlands are often perceived as being remote and isolated, because they are located at the outer edges of nation-states, both the geographical and sovereignty margins of the respective nation-states. As Martinez states rightly:

border zones are distinct within their respective nation-states, because of their location, which in many cases is far from the core, and because of the international climate produced by adjacency to another country.94

In the past,

every state concentrated on the development of its own interior and thought of borders mainly in military terms, as points of possible invasion or as bases for further conquest; in both cases, as possible battlefields. Industrial and civilian development of such areas was often considered unwise; communication infrastructures thinned out and often disappeared in the area close to the border.95

Accordingly, some borderlands may be classified as "strategically important (because of possible conflict), others may be marginalised and 'unimportant' from the point of view of the core areas, both economically and strategically."96 Like the individual region, each borderland is particular. Each has its own history and characteristics. The borderlands' specific problems depend on the region's location, as well as the national economic and social structure. Some border regions may "suffer from economic and social marginalisation.... [T]he existence of frontiers undeniably obstructed the development of the border regions"97. In order to survive, "areas along the border were primarily nationally oriented"98, leading to a strong

93 Ratti, Remigio (1993); "How can existing barriers and border effects be overcome?" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 60.
95 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1983); "Frontier regions: future collaboration or conflict?" in Anderson, Malcolm (ed.); Frontier Regions in Western Europe, p. 123.
97 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Cross-border co-operation and European regional policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries, p. 76.
98 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Cross-border co-operation and European regional policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries, p. 76.
dependency on the centre. As a result, co-operation amongst borderlands "can be seen as an attempt to diminish this dependency and to achieve more autonomy with the help of other regions facing similar circumstances"99.

Other important elements also influence the nature of border regions, such as social, cultural and ethnic factors. Borderlands are exposed to "foreign values, ideas, customs, traditions, institutions, tastes and behaviour"100 and therefore enjoy a high degree of cultural and ethnic diversity. As we will see in chapter four, with the example of the Eastern frontier of the European Union, borderlands may share unique local ethnic and economic characteristics which are more likely to tie them to each other rather than to their respective national culture. Malcolm Anderson takes into account human geography when he defines border region as "an area adjacent to an international boundary, whose population is affected in various ways by the proximity of that boundary."101 Borderlands on either side of a border are often historically and culturally linked and the

unique forces, processes, and characteristics that set apart borderlands from interior zones include transnationalism, international conflict and accommodation, otherness, and separateness.102.

Borderlanders may come to "think of themselves as different from people of interior zones and outsiders perceive them that way as well... People in border regions are frequently closely associated with foreigners, particularly in cases of intense cross-boundary interaction."103 Borderlanders may feel detached from central government's bureaucratic machinery, and may "frequently develop interests that clash with central governments or with mainstream culture"104. In extreme cases, they might even consider to circumvent laws in order to preserve and develop

their own regional interests, such as to maintain the special relationship they enjoy with the respective neighbouring countries.

Increasing trends in globalisation and internationalisation have developed growing interdependence and co-operation between nation-states. The majority of frontiers are losing their traditional roles and are becoming bridges rather than barriers. It is now "the border region which becomes the most pertinent object of study"\textsuperscript{105}, since "[b]orders and borderlands present the image of a typical paradox."\textsuperscript{106} The eradication of frontiers has enhanced the borderlands' stance in the international environment. Borderlands may now be described as

regions and areas in which transborder co-operation projects take place... as concrete areas which are functionally interconnected. Other characteristics for borderlands is the meeting of different national systems and structures, such as legal systems, administration structures, economies, norms, financial systems and cultural communities.\textsuperscript{107}

Frontier regions often seem to be the hinge and motor for increased interaction between nation-states. This was certainly the case in the European Union. According to the 1980 Council of Europe's Madrid \textit{Convention of Transborder Co-operation}, "past experience... shows that co-operation between local and regional authorities in Europe makes it easier for them to carry out their tasks effectively and contributes in particular to the improvement and development of frontier regions".\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{105} Renard, Jean-Pierre et. al. (1997); "Le géographe et les frontières" in Renard, Jean-Pierre (ed.); \textit{Le géographe et les frontières}, p. 52. My translation.

\textsuperscript{106} Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalisation" in Nolutshungu, Sam (ed.); \textit{Margins of Insecurity}, p. 277.


\textsuperscript{108} Council of Europe (1980); \textit{Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation}, Preamble.
Europe

The growth of the European Union and prospective EU enlargement towards the East, has rendered the question of defining Europe more urgent and important.\textsuperscript{109} It has become increasingly evident that Europe is difficult to define, since it has "little geographical coherence: it is not even a continent, strictly speaking"\textsuperscript{110}. Europe can be described in many different ways from as many different perspectives. It carries

political significance and immense symbolic weight, but without clear definition or agreed boundaries. The word 'Europe' has been... freely used in political debate..., though rarely defined,... mixing geographical space with economic and social interaction and with political and cultural identity.\textsuperscript{111}

In the EU member states, the concept of the European Union is often incorrectly perceived as being representative of the term Europe. Already, "[f]rom the outset, the Community had considered itself as synonymous with Europe."\textsuperscript{112} This made the distinction between Central Eastern European and (Western) European countries even more pronounced. Member states of the European Community, together with other liberal democracies lying to the West of the Iron Curtain, were clearly defined as European, or Western European. Western Europe, and specifically the European Union have hence become a \textit{pars pro toto} for Europe. This was enhanced by the slogan "Europe 1992" which referred to the European Union only and blurred Europe's entire common geographic, cultural or social features.

Europe has never had any natural frontiers - such as a mountain range like the Pyrenees which divides France and Spain\textsuperscript{113} - to the East. It may therefore be

\textsuperscript{111} Wallace, William (1991); \textit{The transformation of Western Europe}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{112} Dinan, Desmond (1994), \textit{Ever closer Union?}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{113} It may, however, be suggested that the geographical features determining the present Eastern frontier of the European Union are the Oder-Neiße rivers, as well as the metalliferous mountain range between Germany and Czech Republic; Foucher, Michel (1991); \textit{Fronts et Frontières}, p. 485.
argued that Europe's borders are "a matter of politics and ideology" which takes into account other concepts, such as politics, culture, language and nationhood to define a space. Applying them to Europe, however, is not easy, since Europe is a conglomeration of different nations, ethnic communities, religious and political beliefs which are affected by various economic, societal, political, military and environmental factors. Many attempts to delimit Europe's boundaries have failed, since its various historical, geographical, political, economic and cultural patterns do not overlap simultaneously.

Ancient maps of Europe depict the geographical area of Europe as an homogeneous unified space. With Jerusalem at the centre of the map, ancient maps do not clearly demarcate any boundaries and entities, nor do they show any clear boundaries delimiting Europe from the rest. The names of kingdoms and empires were indicated, but the area was not precisely delineated. In addition, areas beyond Europe were either incomplete or not shown at all. Soledad García argues that these maps were solely "tools for self-location and for expanding knowledge". Similarly, David Leshock argues that these medieval maps helped to define and place the European space within an highly ordered already existing hierarchical space. This abstract depiction of Europe delimited Europe against the unknown 'other'.

The meaning of the term Europe has not always implied the same thing, but it has changed over time and according to contexts and its many socio-cultural, religious, political and economic elements. To the present day, these factors are deeply enmeshed, and one may argue that it is exactly the mixture of these variables which define 'Europe'. Europe remains subject to "mental maps, imagined space".

114 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation of Western Europe, p. 8.
115 For a more detailed account, see Wintle, Michael (1996); "Europe's image: Visual representations of Europe from the earliest times to the twentieth century" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe.
116 García, Soledad (1993); "Europe's fragmented identities and the frontiers of citizenship" in García, Soledad (ed.); European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 6.
117 Leshock, David (1996); To conquer our right heritage, p. 2. "Michel Foucault calls medieval space the 'space of emplacement' because of this need to define where spaces fit within in an already accepted hierarchy."
118 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation of Western Europe, p. 7.
and, as will be suggested in chapter five, Europe is a myth whose "hybrid nature" remains enigmatic and elusive. In an attempt to understand Europe, the juxtaposition of an assumed united 'Europe' against the 'other' - specifically on religious and political grounds - has helped scholars to perceive 'Europe'. But as will be shown later, this 'other' has also changed at different times in history. Historically, the 'other' was generally from the East, namely Asia. The 'other' was feared and thought of being territorially and mentally different from the known 'us'.

\[119\] Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union, p. 35.
2. B Definition of identity, national identity and European identity

When writing about European identity, one should also take into account the social dimension of group identities. Consequently, this section will look at the socio-psychological approach to identity\(^1\), without losing sight of the fact that

the most essential feature of identity is its multiple nature. It is possible to have a single identity, but it will always be made up of several other if not myriad separate identifications or identities, some of which may be contradictory. Some will be stronger than others, and the pattern will change over time. Individuals have identities, as do groups (families, nations, ethnies, classes, age-groups, etc.), and it may be that one has rather more choice about one's individual identity than one does over one's group identity.\(^2\)

Henri Tajfel has referred to this multiple nature of identity as a social toolbox.\(^3\) The Social Identity Theory, as developed by Tajfel, describes the process in which identity is constructed through a number of socio-psychological factors. It is applicable to all sorts of group identity formation, including that of national identity. In fact, Tajfel uses the term 'group' in accordance to Emerson's definition of the 'nation': "The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation"\(^4\). Only the body of people 'A' can feel like nation 'A', and the body of people 'B' as nation 'B'. Each specific kind of group identification belongs and is exclusive to the group in question. Strong group identification, however, does not imply that the group remains isolated from its greater environment. On the contrary. Interaction with other groups must continue, in order to reinforce group identification. In fact, it is widely argued that group identification processes are subject to social interaction.

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\(^1\) Although social psychology is the usual term, this thesis will employ the term socio-psychology, since the prefix 'socio' may imply that there is a wider socio-political awareness to the social-psychological approach.

\(^2\) Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 22.


Belonging to a group "implies a boundary: you belong because others do not."5 Group identification may, in fact, be intensified by contrasting 'us' against 'them'. Since any kind of identity - individual, group, local, regional, national or European - is a jigsaw of different kinds of pieces, characteristics, factors and roles, it often seems easier to juxtapose the identity in question against another identity which may be fictional and invented or even known to be different, foreign or - in the extreme case - malignant and hostile. R. D. Laing even argues that if "[t]here is no external danger, then danger and terror have to be invented and maintained. Each person has to act on the others to maintain the nexus [identity] in them."6 Related, Kristeva argues that the "search for identity is always... a 'hate reaction', a determination to isolate, exclude and oppress others."7 A comparison with this 'other' reinforces 'our' sense of identity, our self-image and self-identification. In return, "[o]ne way of understanding our neighbours better is to compare them with ourselves."8 The distinction between 'us' and 'them' draws a line between insiders and outsiders and determines the inclusion/exclusion criteria for belonging to a specific group. 'They' construct 'us', as much as 'we' construct 'them'.

**The socio-psychological approach to identity**

'Identity' is an amorphous abstract concept difficult to define. The definition of the term may be approached from various different angles: socio-psychology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, politics, culture, history and many other. Nonetheless, not one of these approaches is sufficient enough to define the term in an appropriate and precise manner; none takes into account all the different variables of identity. Hence, there is not one single theory which embraces all the aspects implied by the term 'identity'.

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6 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 74.
Orrin Klapp suggests that members of society are nowadays more and more concerned with questions relating to their personal identity, turning their attention inwards. This turning inwards may be attributed to increasing social welfare and economic abundance, since "it is only as material problems are solved that we get time to sit around and ask questions about ourselves". Jürgen Habermas also asserts that "modernity is the obsession with determining identities, of defining self and other." The central questions we ask ourselves revolve around our distinctive features and characteristics which distinguish 'us' from 'them', 'What am I?', 'Who am I?', 'To what extent am I a product of society or self-created?' and "Why and how do I persist and change?"

Identity is not a determinate, 'whole' thing. It is not fixed, but fluid and under constant transformation. Identity ensures continuity of history and traditions. It is forged over time by different traditions, aspirations and interactions. It is an ever-changing variable which may be constructed by real and fictional political, social and cultural processes. Sometimes the account of the past, claimed to be a true historical record, is invented in its entirety as an "image of the desired present and future". Each generation tends to rewrite its own history with hindsight and in terms of present needs. Memory is very selective.

Identity can be shared. Identity is part of our existence and central to our sense of ourselves, particularly our psychological well-being. An 'identity crisis', for example, easily leads to individual discomfort, depression and sense of loss. Identity both provides us with a sense of belonging and is the result of social interaction. Identity describes the "ways and circumstances in which peoples define

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9 Klapp, Orrin, E. (1969); Collective Search for Identity, p. 4.
10 Jürgen Habermas cited in Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and Other Europeans" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 87. See also Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question of Identity, p. 2.
11 According to Richard Rorty, the "What are we?" is quite different from the traditional philosophical "Who are we?". To him, the "what?" question is scientific or metaphysical, the "who?" is political. Rorty, Richard (1996); "Moral Universalism and Economic Triage" during UNESCO Philosophy Forum, Paris. www.unesco.org/phiweb/uk/2rpu/rort/rort.html, p. 1.
12 Bat Smit de la Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference, Conference in Visegrd, June 1-7, 1994, p. 5.
13 Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p.167.
themselves and are defined by others."\textsuperscript{14} It provides us with the tools to facilitate different interactions with different peoples. These different tools make up the different aspects of identity. The totality of such aspects determines the individual's identity, as much as the individual and his/her environment constructs each of these aspects of identity. Each individual or group may have multiple identities, attachments and loyalties. If we were to take the individual as a receptacle or the actual toolbox\textsuperscript{15} - to remain with the analogy - used above, then the different circles of identity are the content(s). They are the different tools which either lie orderly or disorderly in this social toolbox. It is the toolbox which holds the different tools together and may bring them in relation to each other - and it is the tools which give meaning to the toolbox.

The same may be said about the different circles of identities fluctuating in an individual, as well as the "hybrid nature of Europeanness."\textsuperscript{16} An individual "can hold a number of identities concurrently,... many personal and social identities, which are in a state of flux or development."\textsuperscript{17} In this sense, Anna may have an identity as a woman, French citizen, Catholic, student (sub-section: Ph.D. student), tutor, and so on. It is she who, according to the situation, adopts consciously or subconsciously, the respective identity and goes "shopping for the 'most suitable' identity as we go shopping for our seasonal wardrobes."\textsuperscript{18} To a great extent, then, identity is chosen, but usually, as we will see below, identity is all-pervasive. In extreme situations, Anna might be forced to mediate between conflictual identities.

\textsuperscript{14} MacDonald, Sharon (1993); "Identity complexes in Western Europe" in MacDonald, Sharon (ed.); \textit{Inside European identities}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{15} Philosopher Martin Heidegger has also used the analogy of the actual toolbox, together with its tools, in order to explain his theory on relativism. Similarly, Michel Foucault has made reference to a toolkit.

\textsuperscript{16} Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union}, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{17} Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in personal and social identity?", paper presented during \textit{European Student Chaplain's Conference, Conference in Visegrad}, June 1-7, 1994, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{18} Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); \textit{A Question of Identity}, p. 2.
and settle with one specific identity which will help her act according to the situation.¹⁹

Aquinas and later John Locke have described a state of mind which is untouched by experience or sensation as a tabula rasa, an empty slate. This empty slate suggests that "[w]e enter the world as purely physical beings", and as we grow older, "we labour pridefully to establish identities, selves distinct from our bodies. Not what we are but who we are."²⁰ During this identity formation process, post-Marxists and post-structuralists would argue that different structures and discourses influence, or may even create, our state of mind and formation of personal identity. On the other hand, Marxists argue that Marxist economic determinants are of primary importance to an individual's and, on a higher level, a nation's creation of identity.

This chapter will demonstrate that there is no closure to identity formation. Day after day the toolbox gets filled with more and more tools, with one tool lying on top of the other. Some older tools may lie at the bottom of the toolbox, only to be crushed by other tools. The toolbox will soon contain a collection of multiple tools: often used tools (possibly lying handy on top), improved tools which may incorporate many other tools (such as a Swiss army knife), and new tools which might replace some older tools, because these are broken or unsuitable. Everyday structures and discourses, hence, may engender the individual's identity and multiple sub-identities. According to the situation and the individual's choice, only one of these identities or a set of identities might be dominant and at work. Different parts of identities in such a set of identities may complement each other, overlap or be carried from one context to another, even if often grossly contradictory.²¹ However, it is "[o]nly rarely [that] they come into conflict, and only

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¹⁹ This mediation between conflictual identities is, as will be mentioned later in the thesis, central to the European Union's institutional architecture and its mediation between normative structures emerging from the European integration process.


²¹ Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 82.
rarely... does one allegiance override others. Identity, in other words, is 'situational'.

It is particularly interesting to concentrate on the clash of identities, which, on a European level, is a fundamental aspect of analysis of this thesis. Anna's identity as a student and a tutor would clash, for instance, if she were to meet her supervisor and one of her students at the same time. Such an identity clash may suggest that each individual's identity is an independent field. However, these fields are not always independent, but rather interdependent. They may be accommodated, since they are transcendental independent fields. Robin Cohen has called this the "fuzzy frontiers" of identity - a term which will gain in importance later in the thesis with Michel Foucher's account of the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Cohen's term suggests that depending on the situation, different aspects of identity may complement each other or overlay one another. In how far an overlay can actually change an aspect of identity, or in the extreme case, the entire individual's toolbox, from square to round and blue to red, was at the centre of debate during the Karla Faye Tucker case.

Karla Faye Tucker's change of identity from a drug consuming prostitute to a girl that "had been touched by the Lord and ought to be spared" aroused much controversy in the United States. Should Karla Faye Tucker still be executed for a crime she committed fifteen years ago - when she was a prostitute - although she has now become religiously converted and would not be regarded as being able to commit another such crime? Would Karla Faye Tucker have committed the murder if she had been a believer in 1983? Similarly, would Karla Faye Tucker have become religiously converted if she had not been imprisoned? Karla Faye Tucker

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23 Cohen, Robert (1994); The Fuzzy Frontiers of Identity.

24 Karla Faye Tucker was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1983 by a jury in Texas. At that time, Karla Faye Tucker was a prostitute and under the heavy influence of drugs. She admitted the murder, first robbing and then killing her victim with a pickaxe, each swing of which gave her a sexual thrill (The Economist (1998); "Man, woman, death and God", February 7, 1998, pp. 58-59). Imprisoned, however, Karla Faye Tucker put aside her past and turned to religion. Her religious conversion went as far as to marry the prisoner's chaplain. International pleas for clemency, including one from Pope John Paul II kept pouring into the Texas governor's office - however, in vain. Karla Faye Tucker was executed on February 3, 1998.
would have probably not married the prisoner's chaplain if she had continued to be a drug-consuming prostitute.

The Karla Faye Tucker case is interesting, because it raises the question of how far identities may change - whether it is one single aspect of identity or the individual's entire identity which is able to change? Is it an identity renewal? If it is, then

[Identity renewal and assimilation teach us that individuals can reflect not only about the kind of human beings they would like to be, but also about the kind of communal identity they would like to develop.26]

Although Karla Faye Tucker is an extreme example, it clearly shows how identities may overlay one another and how they sometimes conflict, even if they are part of one and the same person. Karla Faye Tucker may not think that the change from her past to her present personality or identity is an identity overlay or even identity clash - certainly not in the same way as the public perceives it. Karla Faye Tucker is possibly acting and living her dominant identity trait according to the situation and moment in time. It is the public which is suspicious of the sustainability and endurance of her 'latest' dominant identity. Individuals possess a wide variety of different identity cards, each of which may become dominant in specific situations. The environment, thereby, has an important impact on our sense of private and public identity, our "individual identity and... shared identity..., that is some kind of 'social' or 'political' identity."27

Personal identity is often associated with the self as known by the self. This assumes that each individual can be differentiated from all others. It is the sense of our individual and unique sense of biography which makes this possible. Each individual is assumed to have a unique biography, and the "embracing singleness of life line is in sharp contrast to the multiplicity of selves one finds in the individual."28 Personal identity, composed of multiple selves, however, does usually not remain isolated. The individual feels the need to belong to a group, to a

26 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 29.
27 Bryder, Tom (1996); "A contribution from political psychology", unpublished, p. 2.
28 Goffman, Erving (1963); Stigma, p. 63.
community, a social organisation. In it, the individual's personal identity "can and does play a structured, routine, standardised role... just because of its one-of-a-kind quality." Similarly, Tajfel and Turner have argued that this personal identity changes when individuals find themselves in groups. In many situations, personal identity might even give way to social identity. But the translation of the individual identification process is not easily translated to the group level. According to Tajfel and Turner's model, specification about group membership, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness is a three-stage process. This brings us back to the ever-changing content of the above-mentioned toolbox.

At the basis of Tajfel and Turner's model lies the argument that each individual seeks a positive social identity or a positive self-conception in a group. Hence, s/he searches for his/her specific niche in which s/he feels comfortable. In order to conform to special expectations of the group, individuals may even change some aspects of their behaviour and perception of identity criteria according to the identity parameters of the group they wish to belong to. Group members hence become subject to certain social pressures and roles. They may internalise some of the group's aspects, and it is this "reciprocal interiorisation by each of each other... [which has] a primary function as a kind of group 'cement'". Each group has different criteria at its basis and

in order that a group really jell, I must realise that you think of yourself as one of Us, as I do, and that he thinks of himself as one of Us, as you and I do. I must ensure furthermore that both you and he realise that I think of myself with you and him, and you and he must ensure likewise that the other two realise that this We is ubiquitous among us, not simply a private illusion on my, your or his part, shared between two of us but not all three.

Different criteria may present different social significances for different groups and for their feeling of identity. While "people with blue eyes do not

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29 Goffman, Erving (1963); Stigma, p. 57.
30 Tajfel also questioned whether individual behaviour influences group behaviour, or whether group behaviour reflects upon individual behaviour.
31 Turner argues that - in the extreme case - group identification together with its social pressures and roles may lead to a process of depersonalisation, i.e. we might lose sight of our personal identity and stereotype ourselves according to our social identity.
32 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 72.
generally form a social group in distinction from those with brown eyes... people with dark skins (even if their birthplace, language and culture do not distinguish them from others around them) do form a 'group' in a variety of social situations". The social significance of such features may be closely attributed to the question of salience, i.e. the felt identity of group members may shift according to situational and temporal circumstances. In this sense, specific group identities may become salient in specific situations. Protestants in Northern Ireland, for instance, will not think of themselves as having a Protestant identity unless they are in a setting which includes Catholics and 'the other' dimension comes into play. Similarly, a British working man will not think of himself as British in Sunderland, but will do so when he is despised in Eastern Berlin. In the same sense, and an example suggesting a sense of European identity, Neil MacCormick said on one occasion that "when I am in London, I feel Scottish; when I am in Brussels, I feel British; when I am in America, I feel European."

Once in the group in which the individual feels comfortable, s/he hopes that her/his set of beliefs, distinctive characteristics and reference symbols are not a private fantasy, but also shared by other group members. Individuals begin to define themselves by their membership to a group and consider themselves as sharing the characteristics of that group. Social categorisation becomes more important than their individual attributes. Group membership can hence describe the individual as a female, student, Catholic, British, and so on. Social groups present new identity possibilities. Personal identity factors might become particularly salient - or in the other extreme - suppressed in specific situations.

Such 'social behaviour' is central to the question of both individual and group identity. Henri Tajfel defines social identity as the "individual knowledge that he/she belongs to certain groups together with some emotional and value significance to him/her of the group membership". The identity of the group is constituted by the identities of its members. Group identity is not just the sum of its

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constituent parts, but it is more than that. "The group is a reality of some kind or other"\textsuperscript{36} and translating this onto the European level, the same may be said about Europe and European identity.

The constituent parts of a group are at the basis of this group identity, but the interaction between these parts adds a certain dynamic to the group. The group hence disposes of its own dynamic - a new kind of identity emerges for the group - a revised form of the totality of all identities. According to Anselm Strauss, "groups exist as such only because of the common symbolisation of their members"\textsuperscript{37}. Henri Tajfel also suggests that groups are not a thing, but the result of "cognitive construction"\textsuperscript{38}. They are formed out of psychological/symbolic rather than physical reasons. Group formation is often initiated from similarities, such as a common fate, ideologies, beliefs and interests, or even a shared threat. In addition, there are also other visible and invisible common features - such as pigmentation, gender and religion - which enhance interpersonal attraction and liking, and facilitate group behaviour.

But, as Abrams and Hogg argue, "social identity only acquires meaning by comparison to other social groups"\textsuperscript{39}. Just as individuals seek positive social identity, so too groups yearn for positive identification.\textsuperscript{40} To achieve this, groups will tend to compare themselves positively with an out-group. They will emphasise those aspects which they fare well with. The more favourable a group represents itself, the more attractive it will be to individuals. But simply gathering around symbolic points of agreement and taking a certain picture as the picture is not enough. A group's existence needs to be recognised and validated by an 'other'. Individuals, as well as groups, do not want to be ignored, but need awareness, respect, recognition and a sense of validation. Their existence as such (individuals/groups) stands in mutual dependence to the 'other', i.e. they want to see

\textsuperscript{36} Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{37} Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p.149.
\textsuperscript{38} Tajfel, Henri (1982); Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, p. 485.
\textsuperscript{39} Tajfel, Henri (1982); Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, p. 435.
\textsuperscript{40} This urge for validation and liking is a basic human need already analysed in the great classics of political theory: Aristotle and later Hegel, for example, supported the theory that a group attempts to gain recognition by armed conflict. In the case of victory, this kind of competition would boost the group's self-esteem and identity.
and to be seen. On a larger European scale, and as will be analysed below, this may also apply to Europe.

Groups and individuals depend on each other by regarding themselves in the mirror of the 'other' and the others' judgements. There is not just one mirror, but "[i]t is probably better to think of many mirrors..., otherwise identity is assumed to be a single entity." Jean-Paul Sartre explores this 'mirroring' to a great extent in his play No Exit. Here, Sartre looks at interpersonal relationships and describes the ways we perceive ourselves through the thoughts, perceptions and especially the eyes of the 'other'. Sartre concludes that we cannot exist without the 'other', that we are unable to define ourselves by us alone. In fact, we depend on the 'other' to define ourselves. The frustration over this dependency has led Sartre to his famous statement: "Hell is other people".

Indeed, individuals and groups seek to be roughly regarded by the other as 'they' (we) see themselves (ourselves). According to R. D. Laing, we seek to maintain this consensus, since "[w]e seem to need to share a communal meaning to human existence, to give with others a common sense to the world". More importantly, however, it gives a sense to ourselves. However, consensus is not always self-evident, because both perceptions (the self and the other) do not always coincide. Perceptions of us and them about ourselves may in fact sometimes oppose each other. Still, opposites attract and it is in this way that each individual or group attempts to define the self. This is often done through direct positive social comparison. This comparison, however, is only to succeed if I were to emphasise what I am not in relation to the 'other'.

Each of us creates the 'other' by renouncing his/her own identity, in particular the negative aspects thereof. Hardly anybody wishes to be reminded of his/her own mistakes. For some of us, it is already difficult enough to admit our mistakes to ourselves. Nevertheless, we do not mind to point them out in other

41 Bat Smit de la Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference, Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994, p. 6.
43 Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 65.
people. In fact, pointing them out in other people might even help develop our self-evaluation, since we do not expose our, even the same, mistakes at that very moment. Seeing certain aspects of identity in the other sometimes makes us aware of traits that we actually carry in ourselves. We see them clearer, but are nonetheless not as strongly affected by them, because we see them in an indirect rather than direct way, that is not in us, but 'them'. We see them through the 'other' and become observers of ourselves. This observer-status allows us to look upon ourselves as objects rather than subjects. One could therefore argue that we become alienated from ourselves.

This form of objectivity may also be regarded as a form of self-denial, particularly a self-denial of our own mistakes. Such objectivity then, may even help us to control our behaviour vis-à-vis the other. Objectivity also induces us to portray specific aspects of our self in certain situations. It may, for instance, help us to keep up good appearances, because approaching somebody with our assumed infallibility creates a positive image of our selfhood and also makes us stand in a positive light in the eyes of the other. Furthermore, we might seem invulnerable and thus may be viewed as dealing from a position of strength. Our positive appearance, hence, may heighten the level of recognition amongst the other, as well as bolster our self-esteem. For the group, a positive conception of itself is important to the group's continuing existence. In order to uphold this favourable conception of ourselves versus the other, individuals and groups often develop stereotypes of the other.

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44 For a philosophical understanding of assumed infallibility, see John Stuart Mill (1962); *Utilitarianism*, Fontana Press, London, pp. 143-144.

45 Despite having said that individuals and groups define themselves against the 'other' by what they are not, and having specifically focused on an individual's or group's negative traits, positive traits may also have a great influence on our sense of identity, even if not to such a considerable extent.

46 Billig, Michael (1997); *Banal Nationalism*, p. 66.

47 Stereotypes describe "a set of fixed ideas and beliefs held by members of one or more groups about members of another group" (Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.); *Introducing Social Psychology*, p. 427). Stereotyping does not necessarily differentiate between good or bad, but 'determines the dimensions along which the bias of judgement takes place' (Tajfel, Henri (1978); "Intergroup Behaviour: Group Perspectives" in Tajfel, Henri and Colin, Fraser (eds.); *Introducing Social Psychology*, p. 429). Generally, however, stereotypes distinguish between favourable and flattering characteristics of the in-group, and unfavourable demeaning ones for the out-group.
Our quest for recognition, nevertheless, might soon lead ourselves into a never-ending spiral, since the other is also in search of the same quest and uses us as his/her other. As much as other individuals and groups are they to us, we are they to them. R. D. Laing carries this model even further by stating that "[e]ach person is expected to be controlled, and to control others, by the reciprocal effect that each has on the other. To be affected by the other's actions or feelings is 'natural'"\(^48\). "The common bond between Us may be the other."\(^49\) However, this is not always the case. It only seems as if all members of a group may take part in this model of the never-ending spiral, for "members are themselves aware of their belonging to different entities."\(^50\) This brings us back to the toolbox analogy, in which the group is the toolbox and its constituent part are the different tools in this toolbox. A group, in fact, consists of an infinite number of sub-groups or layers. A group may only bond in some situations and contexts, but not in others. The juxtaposition against the other does not always work for the entire group, since a comparison against the 'other' only focuses on a few of the alleged group characteristics.\(^51\)

Overlapping interests of sub-groups from different groups may lead to disputes and conflicts between the different constituent parts of the individual group. In addition, internal mistrust may result in prolonged internal conflict\(^52\) - an important problem inherent to the European Union and its constituent member states. Mistrust may even occur in the smallest of groups. In the extreme case, some sub-groups of group 'A' may become part of group 'B', since they identify with other sub-groups of group 'B'. According to the toolbox analogy then, some sub-groups would probably be better off in another toolbox (as for instance the kitchen drawer).\(^53\) Different parts of a group may hence regard each other as the 'other', although they are members of the same group.

\(^{48}\) Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 75.
\(^{49}\) Laing, Ronald D. (1967); The Politics of Experience, p. 77.
\(^{50}\) Cohen, Anthony (1982); "Belonging: the experience of culture" in Cohen, Anthony (ed.); Belonging: identity and social organisation in British and rural cultures, p. 16.
\(^{51}\) Wetherell, Margaret (1996); Identities, groups and social issues, p. 34.
\(^{52}\) Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 164.
\(^{53}\) Later in this thesis, a similar argument will be made about border regions, which are tied to national politics, law, some common cultural traits and national boundaries, but which may nonetheless share a common identity with border regions on the other side of the frontier. Cultural,
In order to settle these disputes, language is regarded as an important instrument, although

[Our language is only partially adequate to express this state of affairs. On level 1, two people, or two groups, may agree or disagree. As we say, they see eye to eye or otherwise. They share a common point of view. But on level 2 they may or may not think they agree or disagree, and they may or may not be correct in either case. Whereas level 1 is concerned with agreement or disagreement, level 2 is concerned with understanding or misunderstanding. Level 3 is concerned with a third level of awareness: what do I think you think I think? That is, with realisation of or failure to realise second level understanding or misunderstanding on the basis of first level agreement or disagreement. Theoretically, there is no end to these levels.]

But although there might be no end to these levels, there might be a way into these levels, by breaking them up to bring about understanding. Jacques Derrida, the main founder of the deconstructionist movement, proposes that language should not be taken as the ultimate end. Instead, words only become meaningful when put into relation with one another. Meanings of words depend on context. As a result, given the many different possibilities of contexts and relations between words, there is not just one sole way of interpretation of things, but an infinite multiplicity thereof. A word, a text may be interpreted and re-interpreted in many different ways, so as to give a new meaning. Language is hence not static, but has "formative and relational power." More importantly, however, language also has a "social function of co-ordinating diverse social actions."

Language "is amongst the most salient dimensions of group identity," since group life "is organised around communication, which does not only consist in transmissions of ideas but also signifies shared meanings." Language is an essential instrument to create understanding, linguistically and contextually. It

historic and socio-economic forces across the frontier may sometimes be stronger than forces working within the national territory.

58 Strauss, Anselm L. (1969); Mirrors and Masks, p. 148.
defines, delineates and/or denies the existence of particular groups.59 This underlines Karl Deutsch's argument that identity may be forged through the "ability to communicate more efficiently, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."60 Similarly, Ernest Gellner suggests that an effective communication system is able to maintain a nation-state's culture.61 This, however, is not to claim that language is the central factor to identity. Nevertheless, it is an essential tool to understand verbal discourse, such as songs and writing, or to interpret hidden non-verbal signs of communication, such as religion, pigmentation, ethnic dress and ornamentation. Language may act as a bridge between the different emerging identities within a group, so as to avoid radical misunderstanding and opposition and to reach a consensus.

Language helps to categorise the social environment by naming and placing it. This in turn helps us to classify and put 'us' and the 'other' into perspective and relation with each other. It defines 'us' and the 'other' by marking the boundaries of 'us' and 'them'. Language and its respective group are interrelated, because they stand in a two-way process: the group influences the language and the language the group - its apogee being the ethnonomlinguistic identity of a group, namely the institutionalisation of language. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the relation between language and a group's identity is static, because identity is also dependent on other non-linguistic means, such as the economic social development of the respective group.

**Issues relating to national identity**

As we have seen, the socio-psychological approach to identity is the result of social construction and describes the ways in which people define themselves and are defined by others. This social interaction between the individual and the group certainly challenges the idea that identity is 'given' and that identity is solely the result of either the individual will or the volonté générale. "Nationalists stress

the inescapable social aspect of personal identity\(^\text{62}\) and argue that an individual's or group's identity is formed by a multitude of independent and interdependent factors. Nations, in fact, may be subject to the same processes. It seems as if the social aspects or social consciousness of the individual become objectified in the nation.\(^\text{63}\) Indeed, a nation's boundaries, specifically a nation-state's borders are much clearer defined than a group's. They may, in fact, become "unconsciously identified with the boundaries of the individual and the group."\(^\text{64}\)

It is difficult to define all the elements constituting a national identity and to determine how the different identities of an individual, group or nation relate one to another. The

meaning of the term 'national identity' is quite broad, covering all aspects of the nation [territory, population, independence and sovereignty, government and administration, religion,... culture and dignity] to the extent that it may cause some confusion and unclear understanding.\(^\text{65}\)

National identities can be formed in many different ways and the formation of the nation and nation-state does influence its contemporary politics and makes political action possible. The nation-state usually imposes and maintains a certain national identity system, i.e. the ethnic or civic societal model,\(^\text{66}\) and it seems that "[t]o date, the nation-state is the optimal 'identity-securing interpretative system' which man has created for himself."\(^\text{67}\)

Hobsbawm's subjective and objective identity criteria - which have been discussed in the preceding section - may describe a "process of political identification [which] involves generalisation from objective perception to

\(^{61}\) Gellner, Ernest (1996); *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 51-52.

\(^{62}\) Tamir, Yael (1993); *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 17.


\(^{64}\) *Evolution of European Identity and Racism*; http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/GRUPI/Racism2/, p. 1.


\(^{66}\) The former implies a bottom-up process in which culture and the will and consciousness to be a nation determines the overall national identity; the latter, however, presupposes a (political) identity which determines culture, i.e. identity is formed according to the top-down model. See also definition of the nation in preceding section.

subjective wish-fulfilment."68 It may originate from and is nurtured by national history and the ongoing construction of the national 'other'. According to Ernest Renan, "[t]o forget and... to get one's history wrong, are essential factors in the making of a nation"69. Indeed, national identity is often formed and analysed in retrospect and in relation to the nation's real or fictive history. In the extreme case, the formation of national identity might "savagenise 'peripheral' identities."70 Certainly, the formation of a nation does carry with it many implications for future developments, but the selective memory of each nation blurs the actual facts and tends to partly replace the original historical picture with a reinvented one. And as historical situations change, each generation will 'create' its own national identity, adapting it to the current situation. Once framed, this creation or idea of national identity tend[s] to trickle down in society, providing people through education, literature and the media with largely unconscious mental representations (images) of what it means to belong to a particular nation. (Of course the 'idea-makers' themselves were, and are, also influenced by such images).71

Contemporarily, the nation is often associated with a political system, even if the political executive and its subjects do not share the same common values.72 Indeed, "perhaps the most remarkable feature of national identity and feeling is that it can unite sometimes wildly different people into powerful alliances, without them even sharing the same ideology."73 National cultural values and national identity are often used interchangeably and regarded as one and the same thing. There is certainly an important link between these two concepts, because they complement

68 Dittmer, Lowell (1977); "Political culture and political symbolism" in World Politics, Vol. 29/ No. 4, p. 573.
69 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 190.
70 Coulon, Christian (1994); "État et identités" in Martin, Denis-Constant (ed.); Cartes d'identité: Comment dit-on "nous" en politique?, p. 287. My translation.
72 In an equal system, the definition of societal and individual identity roles may not be as clearly defined as in an unequal society, which has great potential for many different identity formations.
73 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 23.
each other. One cannot exist without the other: identity is determined by culture, as much as culture is determined by identity.

It may be argued that the national 'we' is linked to the common cultural political and economic values, whether they are real or not. This set of shared values is assumed to establish a coherent system of political and social beliefs, it binds the national 'we' together and seems to wipe out any potential conflicts which may arise. It reflects the harmonisation between the individual and general will, as well as the relationship between the state, its citizens and the general will.

Ulf Hedetoft in Signs of Nations, explains this process very well in his 'Nationalist Square'. The 'Nationalist Square' describes the transformation process from the individual will to national identity and even national 'obsession'. Once the abstraction of the individual will has been achieved and translated successfully into the wider framework of the state and, subsequently, a collective national identity, the preservation of both state and national identity becomes a prime interest for the individual. The state is then regarded as an end in itself, for which the individual is prepared to sacrifice his/her life (to die for the fatherland). As a result, the individual has become "the instrument of [its] own instrument". The seemingly existing unity between the state and its citizens normally creates a kind of fence which "separate[s] good from bad", or the known from the frightening unknown. The entity living within the national boundaries becomes aware of its identity when it engages with the 'other'. It will also foster "[positive] images of [its] national selfhood", whereas the 'other', living beyond those boundaries, is

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74 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs of Nations, p. 29-34.
75 According to the Realists' argument, life is nasty, brutish and short (Hobbes). For Hobbes, man is born into the world, neither shaping nor creating it. Instead, man is expected to adapt to the existing order and, eventually, the limits of man's passiveness and flawed human nature will be discovered. Given the flawed nature of man, the civic state is reduced to the natural state, in which individuals lead a 'war against all'. The situation in the state of nature is only to be stabilised if each individual relinquishes a part of his/her natural right to property, namely to get ahead of the expense of others, and gives it to an authoritative sovereign. It is this sovereign/Leviathan that is the provider of the 'good' life and that guarantees security as well as physical and economic well-being.
76 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs of Nations, p. 34.
77 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs of Nations, p. 17.
78 see also Barth, Frederik (1969); "Introduction" in Barth, Frederik (ed.); Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organisation of culture difference.
79 Hedetoft, Ulf (1995); Signs of Nations, p. 17.
considered as negative or even frightening. So, "[j]ust as there is no 'me' without a 'you', there is no image of 'the national self' without an image of 'the other'."\textsuperscript{80}

**Issues relating to national identity in the European Union**

Given the increasing European integration process, Alan Milward argues that "the strength of the European Community... lies in the weakness of the nation state"\textsuperscript{81}. This controversial statement immediately gives rise to the question whether the idea of the 'nation state' and the concept of national identity have become obsolete\textsuperscript{82} within the European integration process. It will be argued below that the nation-state and national identity remain relevant for the European project. This is based on the assumptions that both concepts seem to be "key obstacles to European union", and "the formation of European nation-states provides useful parallels, perhaps even a model, for understanding some of the processes involved in European political integration and state-formation."\textsuperscript{83} Despite the fact that most European 'nation states' incorporate areas with a strong regional identity, this section will nonetheless consider the European 'nation state' as a unique entity. It will be suggested that the European 'nation states' do not regard one another as the 'other', but that the image of the 'other' has shifted to the European Union for such notions. Since we will look at border regions in detail later in this thesis, we will here solely focus on the relation between the nation-states and the EU.

Ernest Renan, in his famous speech *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* in 1882, suggested that nations are not everlasting and that they might be replaced by a European confederation. Once the birthplace of the nation-state, it is questionable, however, whether this European confederation was meant to replace the currently existing European 'nation states' or introduce a Europe of the nations or regions.

\textsuperscript{80} Spiering, M. (1996); "National identity and European unity" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 120.
\textsuperscript{81} Milward, Alan (1992); *European Rescue of the Nation State*, p. 446.
\textsuperscript{82} Hoffman, Stanley (1966); "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe" in *Daedalus*, No. 95.
\textsuperscript{83} Black, Annabel and Shore, Chris (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); *The Anthropology of Europe*, p. 277.
According to Alan Milward, in *European Rescue of the Nation-State*, the architecture of the European project was designed precisely to facilitate a regeneration of the nation-state, rather than its demise. Milward argues that the European Community fostered the member states national identities, rather than a Community identity.\textsuperscript{84} With the evolution of the European Community and, in a way, with the unintended outcome of the European integration process, however,

> [t]he politicisation of integration and its expansion into sensitive political space necessitates renewed attention to questions of community-building and the affective dimension of integration.... The legitimacy crisis in the Union demonstrates the limits of the Monnet method at a time when national governance structures are challenged.\textsuperscript{85}

Laffan hitherto argues that the European integration process has moved from low-politics (insensitive issues) to high politics (sensitive issues), but that the principle of transitivity did not follow. Built on the basis of market forces, the concept of European identity was implicit and uncontested. National identity remained uncompromised and was buttressed by the European integration process. This will no longer be the case and, as will be indicated later in the thesis, permissive acquiescence can no longer be taken for granted.

With the growth of the European Union, both the European project and its member states are undergoing important transformation processes. The European Union is faced with new pressures, such as globalisation and Eastern enlargement, forcing its institutional architecture to adapt to new situations and to mediate "between overlapping normative orders"\textsuperscript{86}. Equally, the process of continuous change and adaptation affects the political, economic and cultural values, as well as the national identities of the different European 'nation states'. It is therefore questionable in how far these challenges could bring about a diversification of identity and "point towards an increasing possibility in Western Europe of

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\textsuperscript{84} Milward, Alan (1992); *European Rescue of the Nation-State*, pp. 1-20.


\textsuperscript{86} Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in *European Law Journal*, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 442.
organising political units more pragmatically... instead of from forced national considerations 87.

The European member states' domestic and foreign policies have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent. During this process, member states of the European Union have largely overcome the enemy-like images of the 'other' amongst themselves. The perception of the hostile 'other' has become less paramount, though it has not yet disappeared. The EU member states are still foreign to each other. The different perceptions one European national member state holds vis-à-vis another European member state may vary to a great extent: whereas France and Germany have greatly overcome their historical enmity and now work in close co-operation on many issues and initiate many projects (for instance, school exchange programmes, the bilingual television channel ARTE and Eurocorps), in Britain successive governments believe that the British national interest differs from the national interest of 'other' European member states. Amicable co-operation and the resulting cultural pluralism of the EU has certainly relativised, though not erased, the differences amongst the EU member states' national identities and interests. According to the identity-model used above, then, the member states' multifaceted national identities include areas which are complementary, as well as areas which contest one another. Stereotypes have gradually emerged, in particular if the respective 'other' does not behave in accordance with the rest of the member states, i.e. in an extremely non-European way or an extremely pro-European manner.

Yet, the various national identities of member states live relatively peacefully next to each other. The European Union, considered to be the Brussels bureaucracy rather than the EU's component member states, is perceived as a challenge to the 'nation state'. A number of European 'nation-states', in some respects, international actors with complete sovereignty, feel threatened by the possibility of an emerging supranational EU and fear that a fairly independent and

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87 Buzan, Barry (1991); The European Security Order Recast, p. 56.
supranational European Union could easily override their national interests.\textsuperscript{88} Increasing institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the European Union are perceived to be erosive of national autonomy, sovereignty and identity. European Community Law, for example, already represents an incursion to national sovereignty (because of its superiority to domestic law) and the 1993 Maastricht Treaty seems to touch

\begin{quote}
on almost all the core functions of the European 'nation state': control of the national territory and borders, police, citizenship and immigration, taxation, financial transfers, management of the economy, promotion of industry, representation and accountability, foreign policy and defence.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{quote}

The European 'nation states' wish to preserve their national interests and, in a number of cases, the dominance of member states within the European integration project has "restricted the capacity of the EU to adjust or police common policies, or respond to emerging problems in ways which satisfy the explicit and implicit objectives of European integration."\textsuperscript{90}

There is a vast amount of diverse values and cultural models which underpin the member states. So far, these national interests are substantively different from one country to another - they are deeply-seated in the respective nation state's histories, traditions, cultures and socio-political structures. Contemporarily, a definition of a set of common interests or common values to all nation states would be unsatisfactory as well as impossible. It would be an unachievable task to take each of the national interests into consideration. On the other hand, national identities amongst the EU member states tend to converge when faced with an external threat to the EU, in order to fight for one and the same cause.

Yet, it would be premature to speak of a common supranationalist interest. So far, the architecture of the European Union continues to be built on the

\textsuperscript{88} It should be noted that the integration process of the European Union is perceived differently among the fifteen European 'nation states'. The EU member states' attitudes towards further integration vary. Different member states are willing to pool their national sovereignty to diverse degrees.

\textsuperscript{89} Wallace, William (1994); "Rescue or Retreat?" in Political Studies, Vol. 42/ Special Issue, p. 66 - 67.

\textsuperscript{90} Carter, Caietina and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 429.
assumption that national identity remains inviolable. This sees identity as monolithic and suggests that a supranational Europe does not contest national identity. The roles for both the EU and its member states continue to remain unclear. Whereas national identity is very much linked to the "existence of symbols, rituals, collective representations and political myths... born of shared history and experiences"\(^91\), the European Union remains a nebulous term to many of its citizens. The majority of citizens are still in relative ignorance on the basic issues concerning the EU. Due to this uncertainty, national identity continues to being buttressed by external stimuli, specifically the press and media which selects and often interprets EU information negatively. European integration, as will be analysed in chapter five, is yet unable to replace existing national identities. Even if opinion polls show that some European citizens ally themselves to a European identity, the European identity they proclaim does probably not involve deep emotional issues, since national identities are still too important.\(^92\)

**Issues relating to European identity**

The concept of identity is contextual and situational because, as we have seen, there is not one distinct factor which can be singled out. When one speaks of 'European identity', the search for a prevalent identity factor is even more complicated. The notion of 'European identity' consists of two abstract terms which shift according to the ideological, cultural, historical, political, geographical and national perceptions at hand.

At the beginning of the European integration process, the concept of European identity was implicitly fashioned through market forces, which was, in part, "a product of the peculiarly West European (social) system of governance that has emerged post-1945 and which involved the collective provision of wide range of public services."\(^93\) But with the growth of the European Community (and its

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\(^91\) Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); *The Anthropology of Europe*, p. 291.

\(^92\) This will be explored further in chapter 5b.

\(^93\) Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in *European Law Journal*, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 432.
emphasis on social rather than solely economic policies), the present meaning of European identity diverges from member state to member state, because it is interpreted differently and involves selective, subjective and emotional factors. To the outside, the EU seems to present itself as one actor, and European identity seems to refer to the common European cultural values, as well as to the unbounded economic and political space of the European Union.

In this thesis, 'European identity' does not mean the summation of all European and national identities. Identity factors which apply to personal, local, regional or national identities cannot simply be transferred to the European level. European identity cannot be based on the national identity model. Just how far one can extrapolate from national identity to a supranational European identity in the same model is questionable. European identity allows for a degree of diversity and multiculturalism, and needs to mediate, like Anna, between various, sometimes conflicting, cultural and political identities - even if this seems impossible at times. This brings us back to the toolbox analogy, in which the EU would be the actual toolbox and the different identities its tools.

For this reason, 'European identity' is an umbrella term, in which multidimensional local, regional and national identities, together with individual, political, economic and cultural identities, develop, but are not merged. These identities should co-exist, in order to preserve different values, maintain pluralism and "avoid disempowering homogenisation". Europe is often characterised by its different families of culture, whereby concentration is often put on Europe's divergences and many different 'ways of doing things', giving rise to stereotypes, prejudices and conflicts.

Focusing on Europe's commonalities, one would soon come to realise that the roots may be found in classical antiquity, in Greek civilisation, "the heritage of Roman law, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism and individualism, Enlightenment rationalism and science, [industrialisation,] artistic classicism and...

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romanticism, and, above all, traditions of civil rights and democracy.\textsuperscript{95} Michael Wintle adds two other shared European experiences: language - in spite of being "problematic"\textsuperscript{96} - and the geological and geographical environment.

Indeed, most authors concerned with European identity and Europe's cultural heritage stress that the Greek-Roman civilisations, Christianity and Enlightenment are key factors which influenced Europe's shared historic, cultural, political and social commonalities. To them, the

Roman Empire is really a shorthand for certain values of the Ancients, including especially the Greeks and the Roman Republic. The Roman rule of law survived from the end of the Empire in small pockets, but was rediscovered, together with much of the rest of Ancient civilisation, through the Renaissance, Greek ideas of art, philosophy and politics were transmitted through the Roman experience, together with the more specifically Roman legacy of military, bureaucratic and infrastructural organisation.\textsuperscript{97}

The different historical, political and cultural patterns of Europe are highly intertwined through the development of "complex relationships between tribes and nations, dynasties and social classes, states and Empires which have become refined and increasingly dense through constant change."\textsuperscript{98} They connected the East and West, North and South of the European continent - elements which are visible today and which will gain in importance in view of further enlargement.\textsuperscript{99}

Next to these historical, political and cultural factors, socio-economic factors have also brought the European peoples closer together. Social life improved through economic development, although it created different social classes at the same time. Ironically, this increasing class consciousness gave rise to transnational identification patterns, as may be witnessed by slogans such as 'Workers of the world, unite!'. Although European industrialisation has long been overtaken by other non-European countries, the heritage of Europe's industrial

\textsuperscript{95} Smith, Anthony D. (1991); National Identity, p. 174.
\textsuperscript{96} Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{97} Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{98} Jansen, Thomas (1996); "Comment exprimer aujourd'hui et demain l'identité européenne?", Diskussionspapier für den Carrefour von Coimbra, April 11-13, 1996, p. 1. My translation.
\textsuperscript{99} Jansen, Thomas (1996); "Comment exprimer aujourd'hui et demain l'identité européenne?", Diskussionspapier für den Carrefour von Coimbra, April 11-13, 1996, p. 1-3.
revolution and the exportation of it to other parts of the world fostered Europe's position in the world. Within Europe, increasing trade and exchanges of goods eased and fostered social and cultural contacts among the different European nations and states. It is a basis which even the Second World War could and did not eradicate.

So much for the often quoted common European patterns, which barely take into account Europe's linguistic and environmental features. According to Delouche, there are some forty-three languages and three different alphabets in use in Europe. Most of these languages share Latin, Greek or Slavonic roots. During the first part of the Roman Empire, Greek was the essential "empirical link between most European languages" - only to be replaced by Latin and much later by Italian and French. Possibly since the Second World War, English became Europe's and the world's universal means of communication. According to a survey in *The Economist*, "[o]ne in three" of the European Union's people "now speaks English well enough to get along in conversation, making it the Union's *lingua franca*. French is spoken by 15% of EU citizens (outside France)."

According to Karl Deutsch's method of measuring the intensity of communication among Europe's constituent units, Europeans' communication has certainly increased over the last few years. This may be due to economic and political changes, as well as Europe's relatively compact geographical area and the fact that "most Europeans understand more of each others' languages than they do of non-European ones". More specifically, most EU Europeans understand more of each others' languages than they do of non-EU Europeans.

Lastly, one may argue that Europe shares a unique environment and a particular climate. Compared to America and Russia, Europe seems extraordinarily

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100 Delouche cited in Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 15.
101 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 15.
102 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 15.
104 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); *Culture and Identity in Europe*, p. 15.
coherent and small. "From the plains of Belgium to the plains of Moscow, one cannot point to a geographical feature which interrupts Europe's spatial homogeneity". Europe may also be defined by its relatively mild oceanic climate, its different soil types and, more importantly, its good accesses to the sea. Already in the past, Europe's climate was described as being one of the best and distinctive in the world. In political thought, from Machiavelli to Montesquieu, "personal qualities such as bravery, cunning and political skill" were regarded as deriving from Europe's environmental factors. More recently, W. H. Parker claimed that "Europe's physical geography... made it defensible against the Eastern hordes, [which] led to healthy rivalry, material progress, and civilisation: 'Europe became culturally distinct because it was geographically different.'

Although most European states may be able to identify with these common features, these parameters still do not seem specific or powerful enough to create an over-arching European identity. They lie too far in the past and precede the rise of the nation-state. The modern nation-state has consolidated, and continuously reinforces, legal, political and social norms. Political institutions acquired legitimacy and national identities were able to develop in an arena of political democracy and national sovereignty, recently buttressed by the European integration process. One may therefore argue that "in the past two centuries the nation-state has represented the main place of expression of political identity." Europe, however, cannot (yet) be read within the context of a common history, culture and set of political values or orientations. Instead, Europe is shaped by the long-established divergent national identities and cultures of its member states.

106 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 15.
107 Wintle, Michael (1996); "Cultural identity in Europe: Shared experience" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 16.
If, as Pocock states, "all human cultures... have indeed been constructed by human effort of one sort or another,"\textsuperscript{110} then the European Union seems to be a more artificial construct than its individual member states. Attempts have been made to rewrite European history in its entirety,\textsuperscript{111} but these were partly in vain, since the European Union generally lacks emotional ties. The European integration process, despite the acclaimed surrender of sovereignty of its composite nations, has not yet gained full support of 'its' citizens, in order to be able to claim full legitimacy (this will be analysed further in chapter three). The EU is often defined in political and economic terms, so that "[w]e are to give up being citizens and behave exclusively as consumers. This is why the European Union is ineffective as an empire."\textsuperscript{112}

The EU has not yet created any new values; and even new European common values, such as those placed on environmental issues, often only find expression within national new social movements. The EU lacks a "pre-modern past - a 'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth."\textsuperscript{113} The European Union's attempt to develop a European identity has not yet had the desired success. It only has a limited number of artificially created symbols as points of reference, which, as we will see in the following chapter, are a weak substitute for European identity, since they do not reflect what a European identity might be. This delays the development of a European identity, because without a common European ideology, common cultural values and a lingua franca, a European identity will remain located somewhere "between national revival and global cultural aspirations"\textsuperscript{114}, lacking any clear definition.

So far, the selling of a European identity has been left to the bureaucrats in Brussels who emphasise a common European culture - a European 'high culture', as

\textsuperscript{111} Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people.
\textsuperscript{112} Morris, James M; "Europe: More than a Configuration of Land and Water", http://wwics.si.edu/, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{113} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{114} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 67.
well as Europe's different beliefs, norms, institutions and traditional 'ways of doing things'. The latter, the Europeans' various modes of life, would be a good working instrument to create a European identity and represent a sound foundation on which a European identity could be based on. However, they are often taken for granted, since they are part of everybody's daily life.

Given the co-existence of many different identities, European identity could become a toolbox - a supranational and multicultural umbrella under which the various different tools, or identities, could interact and complement each other - just as a toolbox which holds the different tools together and puts them in relation to each other. In return, the various existing identities would give meaning to a European identity - "based on the cultural diversity of its countries and regions, but at the same time [aware] of its common heritage". European identity would not limit the various local, regional or national identities. It would neither be an alternative to these various identities, but be complementary to them. This awareness and conception of a common European culture and identity still needs to be constructed. However, one must be careful not to limit this term to the European Union only, but to include the wider European continent as well. Europe, as will be indicated in chapter five, is not a clearly delimited cultural entity and "European identity as it is currently codified is simply a cultural reification".

2. C Europe and the 'other': Applying the socio-psychological model to Europe

From the above, we have seen that the delimitation of 'us' versus 'them' generates a strong sense of identity, and that identity is a variable dependent upon time, situation and action. Inconsistencies among the various factors of identity are sometimes ignored, in order to find the lowest common denominator among existing identity factors. Different concentric circles of identity can complement and buttress each other, as we have seen in the example of Anna's different identities. As much as this happens within groups of individuals and communities, this theoretical statement may also apply to nations and Europe. Within the European framework, national identity may be buttressed by the European integration process, while factors that may be common to an all-encompassing European identity have been subject to dispute and controversy. European identity - allegedly based on common historical, cultural, political and social conditions - may acquire "saliency only when pitted against that which is 'non-European'"\(^1\), i.e. against the 'other'.

Given the "endless debates about the ethnographical and historical meanings of the word Europe"\(^2\), the term 'Europe' or the attempts for European integration - there were about 300 in total\(^3\) - have been classified differently at different moments in time. Accordingly, one may suggest that the idea of European identity has also changed respectively. Taking the socio-psychological approach to identity and applying it to Europe might shed some light on this problem of definition.

This section will treat Europe as a cultural entity and look at the European 'other' from a fictional common European perspective. To consider Europe's shared history is conducive to an apparent common identity formation in Western Europe

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\(^1\) Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (1994); "Introduction: The Anthropology of Europe" in Goddard, Victoria A., Llobera, Josep R and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 27.

\(^2\) Boxhoorn, Bram (1996); "European identity and the process of European unification" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 134.

\(^3\) Boxhoorn, Bram (1996); "European identity and the process of European unification" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 134.
against the 'other'. One may even argue that taking this historical approach is the best way to define Europe and a European identity. This is so because the different identity factors important to the definition of Europe such as, for instance, culture, religion and politics, seem to overlap best when taking such a broad historical approach. When looking at Europe's changing historical situations, one should take into account that Europe is "the result of contradictory dynamic cultures... successive consciousnesses, which are born every time a general threat emerged."4

In return, the definition of the 'other' has also changed over history. These various 'others' do not necessarily interrelate one with the other. They are subject to historical developments, and the following should not be a judgement or prioritisation on the respective's 'other' impact on European identity. The historical account should, however, demonstrate how the mirror-image and recognition dynamic mentioned above is maintained. Furthermore, it should point to the fact that this mirror-image has a corresponding effect in the receptive mirror, in Europeans' image of themselves.

It will be argued that from the 14th to the 19th century, Mitteleuropa regarded the Ottoman Empire as a menace. Europe's Eastern borders represented zones beyond which religion was suppressed and within which religion played an important political role. It was only after the Second World War that the definition became increasingly confined to Western Europe's liberal democracies. For most of the 20th century, it seemed as if the definition of Western Europe followed naturally from the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The European Community of the Six faced the Communist threat of Central Eastern Europe and fostered "the gradual emergence of a distinctive European model of society: social-democratic, or social-capitalist, with developments in different national societies learning from one another."5 Arguably, these developments became materialised in the institutional structure of the European Community and its member states.

4 Rougemont de, Denis (1980); "L'Europe, invention culturelle" in History of European Ideas, Vol. 1/ No. 1 p. 31. My translation.
5 Hartmut Kaelble cited in Wallace, William (1991); The transformation of Western Europe, p. 33. Although it is mostly Western Europe which is associated with the values of democracy, peoples of Central Eastern European countries, who lived under non-democratic regimes during the Cold War,
The events of 1989/90 have again emphasised the fact that Europe cannot be defined as a bounded entity. Borderlands on the current Eastern frontier of the European Union are already becoming a social link or bridge between the former Central Eastern European countries and the EU. Certain 'European' economic, political and cultural factors which were thought to belong to the European Union only, are now also openly shared by the Central Eastern European countries. Subsequently, today's Europe is fighting against the 'threat' of immigration. The Central Eastern European countries have already restricted their immigration laws.

The 'other' in the geographically distant lands of Europe/Mitteleuropa

From the 14th to the 19th century, the most significant 'other' to Europe were the Ottomans. During the early years of the Ottoman Empire, it already occupied an important part of Europe, i.e. Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Thrace and parts of Greece. In 1453 it captured Constantinople (Istanbul), and during the 16th century the Ottomans "increased their conquests by both force of arms and diplomacy"\(^6\), culminating in the 1529 siege of Vienna. Although Vienna survived the siege, the Ottomans kept advancing further into Europe. Their threat was not only felt in Mitteleuropa, but also in the Mediterranean area. During the height of the Ottoman rule, Islam religion stretched from India to Spain, enabling the Ottomans to control the Southern shore of the sea.

In effect, not only the geographical body was at stake, but also the European cultural body and soul\(^7\). Europe's Greco-Roman heritage was regarded as a "home-grown European product", and Christianity - although it had its origins in the Near-East - became European by accident and universal by design.\(^8\) As early as during the eighth century, Europe became assimilated with Christianity which "has been the majority religion of the continent... and at times the geographical extent of

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\(^6\) Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people, p. 199.
\(^7\) René Grousset cited in Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people, p. 200.
\(^8\) Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe (ed.) (1994); The Times guide to the peoples of Europe, p. 11. See also Rietbergen, Peter (1998); A Cultural History of Europe, pp. 79-174.
Roman Christianity has closely approximated to the boundaries of what was called 'Europe'.

It was the Frankish king Charlemagne, hailed as the 'king of Europe', who "wanted to magnify his kingship by filling his court with evidence of Christian culture." Charlemagne accepted that his empire had territorial limits, so he did not extend his empire, nor clashed with the Byzantine empire or the Eastern church. Charlemagne's Carolingian empire roughly coincided geographically with the 'Europe of the Six' in 1957; and "it is striking,... how often,... Europe's great unifiers, from Frederick Barbarossa and Louis XIV to Napoleon and Hitler and on to Jean Monnet and Helmut Kohl, have uttered [Charlemagne's] name as they have sought, variously, to emulate his achievement." (Figure 2)

The second attempt to unify Europe under the Christian faith was the Holy Roman Empire. However, it was not until the eleventh century that the European nations united to protect Jerusalem from Muslim occupation. These "'holy wars' served as an occasion for the vast stereotyping and demonising of Muslims, Arabs, and Turks, the effects of which are still perceptible." It was only much later, during the 17th century and the era of Enlightenment, that the conception of Europe and a truly European consciousness is believed to have developed. During this period, Duc de Sully developed his 'Grand Design for Europe', followed by Abbé de Saint Pierre and his 'Project for bringing about everlasting peace in Europe'. The powerful military monarchs grew together into a kind of European confederation, which was, paradoxically, held together by their conflicts and competitions as well as the importance of commerce. More importantly, however, Europe was identified with Christendom which stood against the Islamic Ottoman Empire - Erasmus, in 1526, in *Praise of Folly* and *Of the War*

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13 *The Evolution of European Identity and Racism*, p. 2.
14 The fact that "the Christian world comprise[d] all of Europe" already became clear during the Turkish occupation of Constantinople, when the "filthy Turk [was] occupying the finest part of the world", meaning "Europe,... our country,... our own house,... our domain." Jon Bressarion (1392 -
Belgium
Western Christendom
Luxembourg
in 1500
Fig. 1: Western Christendom in 1500

Charlemagne's Empire 814
Fig. 2: Charlemagne's Empire 814

1472), Ludovico Ariosto (1474 - 1533) and Pope Pius II cited in Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); Europe: a history of its people, p. 200.
to be Fought against the Turks identified Europe with Christendom. Similarly, Edgar Morin suggests that

it was the Arab conquest which, 'islamising' the Orient and Africa, limited, partitioned and shut Christendom into Europe for centuries. One may also say that at the beginning, Islam made Europe by enclosing Christianity into it (seventh century), and that later, Europe made itself in contrast to Islam, by making it retreat at Poitiers.15

Despite explicit and implicit calls for European resistance, a crusade against the Turks never took place. There was no *Europa nostra*.16 This, however, did not imply that Christendom and the idea of a European *Christiana communitas* had vanished all together. During the 15th and 16th century, Christian conscience and solidarity against the Turks continued to hold its ground and, simultaneously, it became confusingly entangled with the raison d'Etat.17 The raison d'Etat did not gain in importance at the expense of the Christian faith, but was a result of conflicting ideologies and competing social, economic and political systems and logic of cultures.

Towards the middle of the 17th century, and more precisely through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the concept of the 'nation state' gained in importance, pushing Christendom into the background. It has been argued that nationalism became essentially a religion-substitute, since "the secularising consequences of Enlightenment caused a form of spiritual *horror vacui"."18 At the turn of the 17th century, Gottfried William Leibniz already demanded an "European peace order as a politically constituted 'artificial' answer to the decline of the 'Corpus Christianum'."19 Nationalism, rather than Christianity, became the pivotal concept for distinguishing between 'us' and the 'other', and hence between states in the West

16 In 1536, Francis I of Spain and the Ottomans had signed a treaty to attack the Italian states. In 1571, only the combined strength of Venice, Spain and the Pope led to the victorious battle in Lepanto against the Ottoman Empire. In 1588, Francis I sought again the alliance with the Ottoman Empire, in order to go to war with England's Charles V.
17 See Machiavelli's writings on the raison d'Etat, which were not based on theological arguments, and laid the foundation for modern political thought.
19 Greven, Michael (1992); "Political Parties between national Identity and Eurofication" in Nelsen, Brian et. al. (eds.); *The Idea of Europe*, p. 77.
and those in the East. Consequently, it was now the diverging conceptions of the state between West and East\footnote{20} which marked the differentiation against the 'other'. The European idea of the state - bolstered by ideas of the Enlightenment and the Western conception of civilisation\footnote{21} - was foreign to Islamic or Eastern political theory.

In the 18th century, Edmund Burke recognised that, in spite of the shift from Christendom to nation-state, a politically fragmented Europe still had a common base, one which certainly rose to force when the Turks threatened. He spoke of a Commonwealth of Europe \[\text{of}\] cultural similitude, because of the monarchical type of government, Christendom, the Roman law heritage, Germanistic customs and feudal institutions, in which no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it.\footnote{22}

Similarly, Voltaire (1694 - 1778) regarded "Christian Europe... as a great Republic, divided into various states, some monarchies, others mixed, some aristocracies, some popular, but with something still in common"\footnote{23}.

During the 19th century, "politicians continued to seek further arguments in support for their political projects in Europe"\footnote{24}. The 1856 Treaty of Paris recognised the Ottoman Empire as an important part of the European balance system and accepted it as such. Nevertheless, Turkey was only partially recognised, since the logic of European culture still continued to hold sway. Europe wanted the Ottomans to renounce Islam and to tailor their domestic realities to European standards in order to be fully included in Europe. Over hundred years later, this demand is still traceable today.

\footnote{20} The Eastern conception of politics regarded the state as a man-made entity that should be adjusted to the already existing community. It was the value system, rather than the political system which bound the community together. Being a peoples' state, thus, encouraged the community to fulfil its obligations to God, rather than to a political system. In contrast, the West generally saw its states foremost - as a result of cultural revolutions - forming the nation within the boundaries of an already existing state. Given this development, Benedict Anderson - as we have seen in the preceding section - has defined nations as "imagined communities". See also Kohn's account of the different forms of nationalism between East and West, which have been discussed in the preceding section.  
\footnote{21} Neumann, Iver and Welsh, Jennifer (1991); "The Other in European self-definition" in Review of International Studies, Vol. 17/ No. 4, p. 341.  
\footnote{22} Kron, Raymond (1976); "The Crisis of the European Idea" in Government and Opposition, Vol. 11/ No. 1, p. 6.  
\footnote{23} Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 56.  
\footnote{24} Kron, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 56. My translation.
Nowadays, religion still seems to play an implicit political role and the historical distinction of Europe's differentiation from Asia "has faded in the subconscious on Europe's Western edge". But a distinction continues to be asserted by the media, which focuses on the worst cases of Islamic fundamentalism. The Muslim faith is taken synonymously with Islamic fundamentalism, which is depicted as violent, expansionist and dangerous. One broadsheet had "mad mullahs, campus jihad and the Islamic hordes" battering at the gates of Europe; whilst another proclaimed that since the collapse of the Cold War, Islam has become "the new menace to the West" and to 'Christian Europe'. Is this Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilisations" between the old rivalries, namely Western Christendom and Islam, come true? Will "the emergence of a new security architecture in Europe... create new frontiers"? Will this frontier "coincide with the most durable religious frontier in Europe, namely the one which separates latin Christianity from the Orient"?

Present relations between the European Union and Turkey reveal this kind of 'West-Islam' depiction very clearly. Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and NATO, and its efforts to join in the EU go as far back as to 1963 (Turkey's most recent wish to be included in the EU enlargement process was in March 1998). The official reason for the Commission's negative opinions on Turkey's EU application is not, heaven forbid, that Turkey is a Muslim country, or that its present prime minister is the leader of an Islamist party. The explanation is that Turkey still needs to improve its treatment of its Kurdish minority and its general human-rights performance.

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25 Wallace, William (1991); *The Transformation of Western Europe*, p. 17.
28 Huntington, Samuel (1993); "The clash of Civilisations?" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72/ No. 2.
To this could be added: "as well as its neighbourly relations to Greece." It could be argued that these arguments serve to distract, rather unsuccessfully, from Europe's past visions of the Ottoman Empire and Europe's cultural notion of Christendom. Despite increasing secularisation during this century,

few Europeans would deny the importance of Judeo-Christian ethics in European civilisation today, and the strength of Christian-Democrat centre parties in European countries and indeed the EU Parliament are further testaments to the lasting influence of Latin Christianity on Europe.

Accordingly, most European leaders believe that Turkey does not conform to Europe's idea of the raison d'État. It seems that its democratic credentials still need to be brushed up if it is to join the EU. Turkey is indeed "often perceived as a country oscillating between military dictatorship and fundamentalism." More directly, six of the European leaders considered the Turks as "too poor, too numerous and too Muslim."

However, a complete dialogue stand-still of Turkish-European relations might generate a number of serious political consequences. It might give Turkey a new consciousness - possibly a consciousness "which does not regard European culture as the only true culture anymore." When the IGC decided in Luxembourg in 1997 not to begin accession talks with Turkey, but to devise a strategy which "would lead to the broadening and deepening of relations with Turkey", Ankara broke off all political dialogue with the European Union. This had serious consequences for the talks concerning Cyprus and nurtured anti-Western sentiments, based on the argument that Turkey was not admitted on grounds of its majority religion. In autumn 1998, however, the diplomatic doors have been re-opened between Turkey and the European Union.

The 'other' on the margins of the European Community

After the Second World War and "throughout the Cold War era political discourses typically emphasised the differences separating eastern and western Europe". Eastern Europe became Western Europe's 'other', and vice versa. As a result of power politics between the two superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, Europe found itself in an unprecedented geo-political situation. The European whole became divided by a formidable military and ideological frontier, giving rise to Western Europe and the 'other' Eastern (Central) Europe. According to some scholars, such as Joseph Joffe and John Mearsheimer, the bipolarity of the Cold War built an indispensable basis for cooperation in Western Europe. The locus of Europe's politics was with the United States and the then Soviet Union. Each superpower set certain rules and norms of state behaviour in their respective sphere of influence. Within Europe, the dividing line between Eastern and Western Europe - running through Germany - became close to a sealed and fixed border. Western and Eastern Europe were fenced off by the Iron Curtain - a development which gave each region on either side of the Iron Curtain a certain kind of economic, political, social, cultural and geographical boundedness.

The Eastern part of Europe came under Soviet influence and the common historical past of Mitteleuropa and its cultural commonalities was soon to be forgotten. Central Eastern Europe's mosaic of different national, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups were suppressed under Communist rule, and the Central Eastern European countries became "peripheral Europe, separate from but dependent upon its Western neighbours. This is as evident in culture, communications as in trade."

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40 Mearsheimer, John (1990); "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" in International Security, Vol. 15/ No. 1.
41 Wallace, William (1991); The Transformation of Western Europe, p. 17.
By contrast, the presence of the United States of America in the West played an important role in the formation of the European Union. The US supported Western European integration in order to overcome historical European conflicts. Since both coal and steel represented the main primary resources for industrial production in the post-war period, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951. It was a means to get the West German economy going again and to make war "between Germany and France not only unthinkable but materially impossible". The 1957 Treaties of Rome embedded the young, liberal democratic West Germany in a close-knit European economic framework, and it was certainly "no geographical coincidence that the European Community was established with the Treaties of Rome, free of protestant, orthodox or unchristian influences." The European Community's external border flowed naturally from the definition of the 1955 Warsaw Treaty.

European economic recovery and prosperity was boosted by the United States' Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. Between 1953 and 1973 there was an unprecedented growth of the Western European economies, and in the "assumingly fixed world order, the peoples of Europe could, of their own accord, devote themselves to the improvement of their well-being." The US definition of the Soviet threat seemed to draw the Western European nations closer together; and just as the United States looked upon the former Soviet Union as a threat, the European Community also identified itself in contrast to a communist totalitarian 'other' which lay beyond its immediate Eastern boundaries. Politically and economically, Western Europe identified with the United States' liberal democratic system and market economy, exemplified in their membership of Gatt, the IMF and Nato. On the cultural side, Tony Judt, however, argues that - despite increasing Americanisation in Europe - "[f]or most of the period 1948-1973, the cultural identity of Western Europe was heavily colored by

42 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the Challenge for the Future, p. xviii.
43 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 57. My translation.
anti-Americanism... many Europeans in the 1960s were sympathetic to de Gaulle's vision of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals\textsuperscript{45}, emphasising that an European identity should be defined against the United States.

Specifically during the major depression of the 1970s and the early 1980s - 'Eurosclerosis' - the establishment and fostering of both an internal and external identity was seen as crucial. Given the relatively stable bipolar world order and the "permanent entanglement of the United States"\textsuperscript{46} in Europe, questions related to a European defence identity - a European external identity - came to the fore. On the one hand, external factors compelled Europe to strengthen and clarify the European identity concept; on the other hand, it was argued that European identity should not become a "by-product"\textsuperscript{47} of Europe's foreign policy affairs. European Community countries should rather demonstrate "their European identity in uniting amongst themselves, that is to say by concrete action."\textsuperscript{48}

Following the breakdown of the Cold War, questions regarding the European integration process and European identity are presently at issue. The disintegration processes in Central Eastern Europe have liberated rather than consolidated various regional and national identities in Western Europe. Steps for future EU enlargement towards the 'East' prove to be difficult, not only because of the political, cultural and security questions, but also because Central Eastern Europe is a "region faced with complex and difficult demands for political adaptation"\textsuperscript{49}. Recent struggles for liberation revealed a deeply rooted nationalism, ancient rivalries and historical disputes, as well as unresolved claims to territories.

\textsuperscript{44} Picht, Robert (1994); "Introduction" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identité Européenne, p. 10. My translation.  
\textsuperscript{45} Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 37.  
\textsuperscript{46} Joffe, Joseph (1984); "Europe's American Pacifier" in Survival, Vol. 26/ No. 4, p. 175.  
\textsuperscript{49} Wallace, William (1994); "Rescue or Retreat?" in Political Studies, Vol. 42/ Special Issue, p. 76.  

To date, democratisation, westernisation and efforts toward economic co-operation in the Balkans, Romania, Bulgaria and the CIS are still in the early stages of development. The rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism in these republics have shown that they do not have many common values. This leads to mutual distrust and the lack of will to co-operate with one another. In contrast, there are only few countries in the 'East', such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia which have become more or less stable liberal democracies. They are the forerunners for European integration and EU enlargement towards the East.

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Within the Central Eastern European countries tensions continue to exist between urban-liberal progressive groups which look towards the EU and rural-parochial groups, inward looking groups which emphasise communist, national and traditional values.

Since the developments of the early 1990s, there have been attempts to move beyond a politically democratic Europe to a culturally united community. It could even be argued that the European Union currently tries to establish its own identity vis-à-vis the United States. It attempts to detach itself from its former high US dependence and to establish a European identity independent of, but economically, politically and military non-conflicting with, the US. Examples which testify the difficulty of this twofold challenge are plentiful: attempts to create a common European Security and Defence Identity, tensions in the GATT negotiations between the EU and US, as well as the emphasis on European culture against Americanisation.

The 'other' outside and within the boundaries of the European Union

Despite the economic recovery of the 1980s, questions about the European welfare state, the European integration process and European identity remain important issues to be addressed. The end of the Cold War, together with the transformation of the former Communist states, changed the long-established status quo of the bipolar international order. Western Europe welcomed these changes, but at the same time began to question its new position in the international sphere: will Europe now lose its security guarantee that it gained during the Cold War, or will it benefit from its newly attained greater freedom and flexibility? Will it be able to establish an economic, political and security dimension on its own? Since the United States' protective wing can no longer be taken for granted, Europe now needs to fend for itself. Questions such as "Who are we? Where do we come from? Where will we go? What do we expect? What expects us?" have come to the fore. More importantly, however, the question has arisen whether the demise of the Cold War threat has brought about an identity crisis for Europe? Has immigration now
become the substitute for the Cold War threat, just as nationalism became a substitute of religion in the 17th century?

Indeed, one could argue that the most striking 'other' for Europe lies both outside and within its boundaries - the 'other' being the various groups of immigrants and immigration communities in Europe. Since 1992, immigration into the European Union has halved, bringing the figure down to 1.5 million.\textsuperscript{51} Europe receives only 5\% of the world's total migration movements, of which Germany has received over 50\% until 1993\textsuperscript{52}. There are currently 6 million non-Europeans resident in the European Union\textsuperscript{53}, numbers increasing.

Immigration is not homogeneous. There are many different kinds of immigrants\textsuperscript{54} coming from all over the world. In addition, the receiving country's historical, political, economic and colonial ties, together with its economic and social opportunities, also shape migration flows. In general, migration into the European Union is mainly perceived as a 'migration to wealth' which mainly refers to a flow from highly politically, economically and socially insecure areas to the EU - an area of considerable security where personal benefits can be maximised and costs reduced. In this respect, "being relatively poor in a rich country [is perceived] as more enviable than being relatively rich in a poor country"\textsuperscript{55}.

When social, economic, demographic and cultural contributions outweigh the costs of immigration, immigration and the resulting influx of many 'others' is, generally, welcome. In this sense, immigration into Europe was even politically planned and promoted during the post-war years. The young and predominantly male immigrants contributed to the expansion of markets as workers. However, with the beginning of recession in the early 1970s, the worsening situation of the

\textsuperscript{50} Bloch, Ernst (1959); Das Prinzip Hoffnung, p. 1. My translation.
\textsuperscript{51} The Economist (1998); "Millions want to come", April 4, 1998.
\textsuperscript{52} This was partly due to Germany's geographically central position in Western Europe, as well as Germany's liberal asylum law, which has been drastically tightened in June 1993. Since then, immigration into Germany has decreased considerably.
\textsuperscript{53} Foucher, Michel (1998); "The Geopolitics of European Frontiers" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 242.
\textsuperscript{54} These include forced/voluntary, economic/political/social, temporary/permanent, regional/transcontinental and legal/illegal migration.
\textsuperscript{55} Entzinger, Han and Carter, Jack (1989); "New Immigration in Eastern Democracies" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.); Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, Vol. 1, p. 4.
labour market and decreasing availability of work made migrants less wanted.\textsuperscript{56} Flagging economies and increasing unemployment showed a drift towards more negative and restrictive immigration policies throughout Europe.

Up to the present day, immigration control is an attempt to prevent the arrival and settlement of unregulated immigration. In some people's view, it is in the national interest to "preserve the culture, [to guard the state] against alien and contaminating influences"\textsuperscript{57} and protect it from hostile 'external' forces. Although most nations always have had national minorities and minority problems which challenged the respective 'nation state', immigration control is a policy based on fear concerning the economic and social order. It addresses questions of national and ethnic identity and seems to ignore that tightening legal entry regulations, makes "illegal channels thrive"\textsuperscript{58}.

The fear and alleged threat of large streams of immigrants give rise to xenophobia and anti-immigrant opinions, especially in times of crisis. Immigrants seem to be portrayed as bearers of cultural contamination who create unfair competition for natives. This can sometimes result in attacks against immigrants as has been the case in Germany - and feeds the electoral successes of some right-wing extremist parties, such as the 	extit{Front National} in France.

A 1997 EU-wide survey "found a third of the 16,000 people questioned openly admitting feeling quite or very racist"\textsuperscript{59}, and in the Central Eastern European countries', "[t]he rising tide of xenophobia,... is emerging as the biggest obstacle... for European integration."\textsuperscript{60} In Frankfurt and Slubice, on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, 38\% of young Germans and 20\% of young Poles believe that foreigners living in their country are a burden to the social system, and nearly a

\textsuperscript{56} Immigrants were soon economically and socially marginalised. The majority of immigrants acquired a permanent working-class status and entered the lowest strata of the labour force, i.e. enduring hard physical labour, and insecure, low paid work. This sets them apart from middle-class society, upward social mobility for immigrants was and is often impossible. Their status as outsiders - of not being part of the majority 'us' - is therefore emphasised.

\textsuperscript{57} Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in 	extit{Survival}, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{58} The Economist (1998); "Millions want to come", April 4, 1998.

\textsuperscript{59} Bates, Stephen (1998); "EU set to accept anti-racism law" in 	extit{The Guardian}, March 15, 1998. See also European Communities (1998); "One in three Europeans claims to be racist" in 	extit{Eur-Op News}, 1998/No. 1.

\textsuperscript{60} Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in 	extit{The Independent on Sunday}, June 7, 1998.
third of those questioned (34% Germans and 33% Poles) think that foreigners are more likely to commit crime than Germans/Poles. In a move to encourage reflection and to combat racism, the member states of the European Union proclaimed 1997 as the European Year Against Racism. In addition, there are currently plans to put Europe-wide anti-racism legislation into force.

The future admission of new member states into the European Community will increase the population movements within its boundaries and thus the number of 'others'. This will challenge the EU in two ways: firstly, to control its outer frontiers vis-à-vis the diverging influx of foreigners without creating a fortress Europe; and secondly, the need to develop a common European immigration and asylum policy applicable to all European member states. It is also important to stress a policy for the immigrants' integration into the host society. Immigration opens up new opportunities for today's European Union and will enrich it with growing racially, ethnically and culturally mixed populations, so that the 'other' gains better prospects for integration with 'us'. In general, the problem of integration is based on national and ethnic identities, thus creating a hierarchy of preference among immigrant groups. The culturally and ethnically most distant cultures are most difficult to integrate and, even if differences can be overcome, race and colour distinctions persist. The perception of the diverse immigrant groups is also partly created by the mass media which portray either a positive or negative image of the ethnic minorities concerned. One must therefore ask whether the media manipulate the image of immigrants as the 'other', and to what extent is the European self-image manipulated as well? Is it really the case that the 'other' ethnic groups tend to be "utilised by European societies as suitable targets of externalisation onto which

61 Klüpper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein Fluß, zwei Städte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.
63 The European Commission "intends to propose an EU law on asylum procedures after the Amsterdam Treaty comes into force". The Commission has already approved a working document which "sets out the different options for such a proposal... it envisages laying down certain procedural safeguards with which all Member States would have to comply to make the processes fair and efficient." European Commission Representative Office - UK (1999); The Week in Europe, March 4, 1999.
the parts that they unconsciously reject as incompatible with European identity are projected\(^64\)?

This chapter has defined the various different variables important to the analysis of this thesis. The terms nation, nation-state, region, border, borderlands and Europe form the cornerstones of the framework within which the concept of identity will be used in this thesis. Identity, it has been argued, is not static, but in a constant state of flux. Identity is multifaceted and different aspects of identity may complement each other, be buttressed by one another or conflict with one another. This model is applicable to the individual, as well as to larger entities, such as the nation-state or Europe/the European Union. There is no closure to identity and external developments may induce transformation and adaptation processes of various identity aspects.

In order to be able to focus on the concept of identity more precisely, imaginative borders of identity are constantly forged in opposition to which either the individual or the larger entity attempts to establish its identity. Creating this border has repercussions on both the outside as well as the inside of the entity in question. It has been assumed that Europe's external border works in the same way too, stimulated by historical, cultural and political developments. By virtue of the argument of this thesis, however, understanding Europe and European identity solely in opposition to something non-European could have severe consequences for Europe's cultural diversity, as well as its global role.\(^65\)

Despite the flaws involved, the following chapter will delimit Europe to the European Union and - in view of further enlargement towards the East - analyse in how far the EU has managed to consolidate and accommodate the various different identities of its member states. In order to do so, the following chapter will first focus on European integration theories and problems of governance, before


\(^{65}\) Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union*, pp. 34-35.
concentrating on how far the European Union has - even if implicitly - attempted to create a European-EU identity.
3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

On the assumption that the concepts of Europe and European identity depend on their juxtaposition against the 'other', this chapter focuses on the EU's attempts to define itself internally, on the basis of an internal, EU-European identity. By looking at the most important European integration theories, it will become apparent that European integration theories do not fully explain the European integration process and that each theory attempts to explain the European integration process differently. The chapter will also highlight that there is no direct link between European integration theories and the concept of European identity. This is mainly due to the fact that European integration theories generally tend to concentrate on the nation-state or federal assumptions of state building via an institutional design. Neither approach is 'in need' of identity. In the former, national identity is collapsed within it; in the latter, identity is assumed to flow from the institution-building mechanism. It will become clear that the Monnet-method has reached its limits.

The emergence of a European identity cannot be explained properly with the existing European integration theories. Only assumptions may be made - assumptions which draw their logic from the factors inherent in the European Union's problem of governance and lack of legitimacy. If one assumes that integration is about governance, governance about legitimacy and legitimacy about identity, then integration and identity may be indirectly linked and overlap in the issue of European governance, specifically the problem of constitutionalism and legitimacy. It is often suggested that the European Union is still, by definition, not democratic or legitimate.

The European Union may be described as a

political arena without fixed boundaries or a centralised political structure,... a multi-level polity, with a weak core... which cannot claim the legitimate monopoly of force over a population within a bounded territory.¹

¹ Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 2.
On the one hand, this multi-level polity ensures that the direct link between citizens and their national polity is not broken. On the other hand, it also creates a symbolic and indirect link between the citizens and the European Union. This, however, is not enough. Instead, one could argue that the European Union's democratic failure is due to the non-existence of a European nation or demos, which is essential to legitimacy, and ultimately necessary for the emergence of a European identity. Since governance is largely about legitimacy, formal legitimacy links the issue of European integration with European constitutionalism, while social legitimacy would constitute the link between constitutionalism and European identity.²

Whereas the European Union already enjoys a considerable degree of formal legitimacy through the membership of its constituent member states, it still lacks the element of social legitimacy through popular consent. In order to bridge this gap, the heads of states and governments of the EU's member states have opted for a number of measures to enhance the feeling of belonging amongst the peoples of Europe, and foster credibility and public support for the European Union. These measures have been introduced without losing sight of the fact that the European Union was not meant to become a nation. However, not one of these policies addresses the issue of identity entirely and fully. European citizenship comes perhaps closest to incorporating most factors which affect the citizens of the European Union directly. Indeed, citizenship, as a traditional cornerstone of democracy, may be the way forward to create a European identity. However, the theory of European citizenship does not yet correspond with reality. So far, European citizenship is only a juridical or political statute which is complementary to and based on national citizenship. The management of European citizenship still remains intergovernmental, and it looks as if European citizenship, as it exists today, is not sufficient to bring about a fully legitimised European supranational citizenship. Even in the near future, the replication of a European citizenship and

identity as a national citizenship or identity is unthinkable. Still, one should note that

[The importance of the TEU citizenship provisions lies not in their content but rather in the promise they hold out for the future. The concept is a dynamic one, capable of being added to or strengthened, but not dismissed.]

Given the multinational and multicultural composition of the European Union, European citizenship could not be based on ethnicity. Instead, it should be based on civic features, in order to be able to hold together the vast array of local, regional and national identities inherent to the European Union. Indeed,

European citizenship did not mean either the sum of the member states' types of national citizenship or, simply adding a new circle of rights. Instead, it meant constructing citizenship of the Union anew and with its own character.

Such a European citizenship would be able to foster the European Union's pluralism, allowing local, regional and national identities to shift around according to circumstances, while at the same time becoming a unifying agency which holds these various identities together. This would be congruent with Habermas's 'Constitutional Patriotism', based on the concept of dual - ethnic and civic - legitimacy. Accordingly, a European identity would eventually emerge and, ideally, be defined as the "coming together' in shared values, a shared understanding of rights and societal duties and shared rational culture which transcends organic-national differences", rather than threaten the existence of cultural pluralism among the EU's nation-states and communities.

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3 O'Keefe, David (1994); "Union citizenship" in O'Keefe, David and Twomey, Patrick (eds.); Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, p. 106.  
5 Habermas, Jürgen (1995); "Citizenship and National Identity" in Beiner, Ronald (ed.); Theorising Citizenship, pp. 255-282. See also Gebhardt, Jürgen (1993); "Verfassungspatriotismus als Identitätskonzept der Nation" in Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to Das Parlament, B 14/93, pp. 29-37.
3.A European integration and governance

3. A. i European integration theories

Although the European Union may be defined as the "most successful example of institutionalised international policy-co-ordination in the modern world", explanations for its development and integration process vary. European integration theories are usually an attempt to help us understand the background to European integration and to help us analyse what integration is all about, its process and expectations, rather than motivations. Integration theories may also shed some light on the decision-making process and governance within the European Union. More importantly, though, they may help us understand the characteristic features of the European Community/Union - is it supranational or intergovernmental? This, however, is far from claiming that European integration is complete. In this sense, one may agree with Walter Hallstein who said in 1969:

The construction of Europe is unfinished. And it will not grow by itself. If nothing is to be done to refine it, even those parts, which are already set up, could be jeopardised too.⁶

There is not one single theory sufficient on its own to explain the whole integration process as such. Each integration theory focuses on different aspects, actors and time periods of the European integration process. Neo-Functionalism, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism and the Domestic Politics Approach mainly focus on the distribution of wealth among the EU member states and stress the importance of economic and political union. Neo-Institutionalism, on the other hand, emphasises institutional factors and the EU's

need to be accountable simultaneously to the member states and to 'the citizens' ('multiple accountability') and its dual function of providing executive government and public administration ('politicised bureaucracy') for the European polity.⁷

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Nevertheless, one should not and cannot dismiss any of these theories, but "admit that different kinds of theories are appropriate for different pieces of the EU puzzle." The 'inconsistency' between the different European integration theories makes the European integration process appear rather dynamic, specifically since the present constitutional and institutional arrangement of the EC is the culmination of a multi-level, multi-faceted process of change and adjustment. As the policy competence of the EC has expanded, so the Community's constitutional and institutional basis has evolved. The transition from sectoral integration to political union has thus been accompanied by the piecemeal consolidation and an ad-hoc extension of the institutional capacities of the Community.

European integration theories are more concerned with the 'practicalities' of the European integration process. They do not explicitly deal with causality, nor do they deliver an explanation on how, and whether, a European identity might emerge from the European integration process. They tend to concentrate on the underlying reasons for the European integration process, rather than the construction of a European identity. The nation-state is pre-supposed and its survival is regarded as essential to the European project. At the outset of the European Community, the concept of identity was not necessary or required for European integration, since it was assumed that identity would follow automatically from the nation-state.

But given the challenges both the European Union and its nation-states are currently facing, European integration theories have become superseded. A gap in the conceptual framework of European integration has emerged and given rise to contradiction, incongruity or even competition between the various European integration theories. This may generate some confusion over the governance of the European Union, and in turn, bring the salience of European identity to the fore.

In this sense, this section seeks to illustrate that the theory which best explains the European integration process is not necessarily the theory which best explains the possible emergence of a European identity. There exists an ambiguity


between the elite-driven European project and popular acquiescence, as well as between a Europe built on a bureaucratic and economic level and a Europe which involves the citizens concerned. However, integration and identity are interdependent. One concept cannot implement itself without the other: "integration presupposes a common identity" 12, and identity must be subject to a minimal degree of integration, in order to be able to refer to a common basis, from which to build a common European identity.

**Neo-Functionalism**

The theory of Neo-Functionalism derives from the theory of Functionalism. After the Second World War, the Functionalist approach suggested that - in order to ensure peace and order - the European nation states' aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for co-operation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition. 13

The Functionalist theory assumed that economic welfare and peace would come about if international disputes were settled in peaceful co-operation. Functionalists did not see the "need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power" 14, since economic or functional co-operation would "set going lasting instruments and habits of a common international life." 15

This view that economic problems could be solved without political interference soon led to criticism, specifically from the supporters of the Neo-Functionalist theory. Although Neo-Functionalists adopt the Functionalists' basic idea of international co-operation, they take the Functionalist integration theory

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13 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 58.
14 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 73.
15 Mitrany, David (1994); "A working peace system" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 58.
further. Neo-Functionalists strongly support the idea that the European integration process is primarily about economic and political factors.

Neo-Functionalism gained momentum as a European integration theory in the 1960s and 1970s. It was mainly developed by Ernst Haas and Leon N. Lindberg. The theory of Neo-Functionalism draws on general democracy theories, general system theories and group behavioural theories.\(^\text{16}\) As seen in section 'b' of chapter two, group behavioural theories describe the way people interact and form groups, in order to accommodate or to put forward their interests and be able to defend these against the 'other'. According to Neo-Functionalism, then, the last stage of this group formation is reached when group members shift their loyalties towards a new supranational decision-making centre.

Applying this general model of group formation to the level of the European Union, one may argue that "the same complexity is likely, over the longer term, to trap governments in a web of unintended consequences spun by their own previous commitments."\(^\text{17}\) Indeed, Haas described Western Europe as a "living laboratory"\(^\text{18}\) in which the European states interact, share interests and are, to some extent, involved in collective activities. Since national governments would soon come to realise that co-operation allows them to engage in mutually beneficial policy-making decisions they alone would not achieve, support for European integration would grow. This would, in some cases, mean a re-orientation of the national interest, but as

the process of integration proceeds, it is assumed that values will undergo change, that interests will be redefined in terms of regional rather than a purely national orientation and that the erstwhile set of separate national group values will gradually be superseded by a new and geographically larger set of beliefs.... Political integration is a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political

\(^{16}\) Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 99.


\(^{18}\) Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting of Europe, p. 4.
integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.19

The emerging new central institutions would become the agents of integration or "honest broker[s]"20. They would facilitate international agreements and ensure that these would lead toward increasing unity and prosperity of the integrated area. National governments would be willing to adapt their current and future policies and expectations according to these institutions "as soon as these are perceived as more efficient and capable of better handling policy-making than the old national institutions"21. The interaction of members and the sharing of the decision-making process would guarantee the international consensus of all member states. Haas did not believe in a European indoctrination. On the contrary: national interests and belief-systems would eventually cede in favour of the common good. Integration would, thus, be the sum of the ideological commitments of the national elites.

According to the Monnet method, national elites would be engaged in the European integration project and the masses would follow their national elites. Given the permissive consensus22, national elites would be able to take mass attitudes and commitments of the European populations for granted. The end product of this could be a new political society, Gesellschaft, different from Gemeinschaft 23 and the member states themselves.

19 Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting of Europe, p. 13 and 16. Similarly, Leon Lindberg argued that political integration is a process in which member states may have "the will to proceed" (rather than being persuaded) to shift their loyalties toward a new centre (Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 100).
20 Haas, Ernst B. (1958); The Uniting of Europe, p. 524.
21 Zetterholm, Staffan (1994); "Introduction" in Zetterholm, Staffan (ed.); European Cultures and European Integration, p. 2.
22 At the time, in 1970, Lindberg and other Neo-Functionlists described public support in terms of Valdimer O. Key's permissive consensus. This meant that "public opinion had not played a decisive role [but] was part of the hostile or congenial context as constraining or facilitating but not determining the growth of the Community system" (Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity" in García, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 133).
23 One should note that Haas and Lindberg differed in their Neo-Functionalist formulations on this aspect: whereas Haas believed that European integration, according to the concept of Neo-Functionalist, would automatically lead to the development of a political community, Lindberg asserted that this might not necessarily be the case. According to Lindberg, European integration
A way of achieving the transfer of legitimacy and national loyalties to these supranational institutions, Neo-Functionalists would argue, is by means of the spill-over effect\(^4\), the "[a]dvancement from one stage to another,... dependent upon achieving... respective targets. All this is to be supervised by institutions specially

might remain subject to collective interaction and a collective conflict and decision making process, in which spill-back rather than automatic spill-over could occur.

\(^4\) Lindberg, Leon (1994); "Political Integration: Definitions and Hypotheses" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), *The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration*, p. 100. There are four components to the spill-over effect, which should not be confused: *First*, functional spill-over describes "the tightly interlinked nature of modern economies, in which government intervention in one sector engenders economic distortions elsewhere" (Moravesik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 475). This means that if member states integrate one sector of their economies, the integration of other sectors - even formerly unrelated or autonomous sectors - would follow automatically. It is a snowball-effect-like process, which "begs its own impetus toward extension to the entire economy even in the absence of specific group demands and their attendant ideologies" (Haas, Ernst B. (1958); *The Uniting of Europe*, p. 297).

According to Neo-Functionalists, the increasing degree of integration, the politicisation of means and the spill-over effect would then enable the transfer from economic integration to political integration. The establishment of the ECSC, for instance, can be taken as a first step into this direction. Although the means were economic and non-political at the outset, the objectives were political and security-oriented. Jean Monnet's assumption was that the integration of steel and coal - two primary resources to the reconstructions of the Western European industries and economies after World War II - would automatically lead to the integration of other industry sectors, and eventually the whole economy. *Second*, political spill-over is the logical consequence of functional spill-over. The close economic co-operation of member states may eventually generate political pressures. These, in turn, would develop the convergence of national interests and push the integration process among member states even further. As a result, national elites would be prepared to transfer their loyalties to new authorities, and these "authorities would inevitably gain a certain measure of autonomous initiative" (Moravesik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 475) and look after the member states' interests better than the individual member states themselves. A *Gemeinschaft*, based on supranationality, might emerge as a result. *Third*, cultivated spill-over refers to the role of central supranational institutions to help with the decision-making processes. In this respect, the "role of leadership of the European Commission as a possible future government is seen as crucial,... the Commission plays a central role in ensuring the success of the negotiations on the timetable for the common market, the level of the common external tariff, and the details of the common agricultural policy" (George, Stephen (1985); *Politics and Policy in the European Community*, p. 27). The Commission was assumed to become the major decision making organ within the EEC. It was to gain great influence in the planning and development of the European integration project, as an "instrument of co-ordination, a catalyst, who animates, and who pulls conclusions from the meetings in which those responsible for economic policy in the six countries participate" (Revue du Marchée Commun (1959); "La Communauté à l'épreuve des faits", No. 20, p. 427. My translation). Given the success of this economically and politically integrated area, the *fourth* element in the spill-over effect is the geographical spill-over. Geographical spill-over describes the situation in which the economic and political co-operation amongst one group of states may easily have effects - positive or negative - on excluded states. As a result, negotiations or association agreements would become necessary, in order to ensure the continued balance and longevity of the integrated group.
set up by the Treaty." Integration via the spill-over effect would start with "small, incremental steps in sectors where the issue of national sovereignty was less contentious than in 'high politics' areas such as defence and foreign policy." It would then end with engrenage, a locking-in process of the various areas. It was assumed that economic union would automatically lead to political union and eventually to a fully integrated European Union. Monnet stated:

We believed in starting with limited achievements, establishing a de facto solidarity from which a federation would gradually emerge. I have never believed that one fine day Europe would be created by some great political mutation... The pragmatic method we had adopted would... lead to a federation validated by the people's vote, but that federation would be the culmination of an existing economic and political reality.

A critique of Neo-Functionalism

Although Neo-Functionalism is a comprehensive European integration theory, it is often being criticised as too "static" and mechanic, since it advances a linear development of the European integration process, which would lead to a "'gradual, 'automatic', and 'incremental' progression toward deeper integration and greater supranational influence." Indeed, Neo-Functionalism failed to explain the empirical reality of the European integration process, since it "lacked a theoretical core clearly enough specified to provide a sound basis for precise empirical testing and improvement." The Neo-Functionalist theory does not take into account national motivations for the European integration process, nor does it pay attention

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26 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 29.
to global trends. Indeed, it focuses too much on economic co-operation within the EC, the European integration process *per se* and its supranational features.

In fact, the European Union is not as self-sustaining as this and cannot "be treated as a *sui generis* phenomenon"\(^{32}\). Instead, Moravcsik depicts Neo-Functionalism as conventional with orthodox international relations theory. The European integration process is dependent on the developments in both domestic and international political economy. International events, such as the oil crisis and recession of the early 1970s, were the first examples which demonstrated the enormous consequences external developments have on the European project. The same may be said of the national states' impact on the European integration process. This was made particularly clear when Charles de Gaulle blocked Britain's EU membership in 1963 and 1967, as well as during the 1965 French 'empty chair' policy and the subsequent Luxembourg Compromise\(^{33}\). De Gaulle's strong leadership of France and his disagreement over CAP showed that the Neo-Functionalist theory did not pay much attention to the role of national governments in both European integration and the EC's decision making processes.

These developments increased the level of criticism of the Neo-Functionalist theory. From within the international relations theory came the criticism that Neo-Functionalism attached too much importance to supranational actors, although national governments still remained politically powerful. Neo-Functionalism seems to ignore that national governments wish to retain their national sovereignty; it did "not ask the crucial question about where the locus of power lay in the post-war period"\(^{34}\). National elites do not automatically transfer their legitimacy to a new, central decision-making centre and are not prepared to give up their position of bargaining that easily. Neo-Functionalist theory underestimates the various forms of policy co-operation among individual member states, which

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\(^{33}\) The Luxembourg Compromise changed the meaning of qualified majority voting. It established a procedure in which decision should either be taken on the basis of unanimity or consensus, so that no member state could be overruled if its national interest was at stake.

\(^{34}\) Milward, Alan and Sorensen, Vibeke (1994); "Interdependence or integration? A national choice" in Milward, Alan et. al. (eds.); *The frontier of national sovereignty*, p. 3.
take place outside the framework of the European political community and its supposedly supranational decision-making centre.

The networks of economic interaction and increased economic interdependence between member states have not yet brought about the desired shift of loyalties, sovereignties and political activities toward a new decision-making centre of an EC wide economic community. In fact, *engrenage* and the locking-in of the various sectors prove to be difficult tasks. The spill-over effect has not yet been able to transcend, nor replace, the nation state. The European Commission has so far been unable to become the major-decision making power amongst the European institutions. It still lacks enough popular legitimacy, and, as will be explained later, it might be claimed that

the Monnet method of integrating the separate economies and polities of (thus far) Western Europe lacked a mechanism for establishing (and constantly renewing) the legitimacy of the process,... that under the Monnet method tension between the nation-state and supranational levels of governance was unavoidable, and that, inevitably, this would trigger a nationalistic response on the part of individual citizens.35

Although one may argue that political and economic consensus is of vital importance for a peaceful coexistence of a community of states, one should not ignore the fact that disagreements emerging out of socio-cultural issues can also have important impacts on political co-operation. Neo-Functionalist theory seems to ignore the influence of socio-cultural issues on member states, as well as the multiple divergences amongst and within the member states of the European Community. Neo-Functionalism presumes the existence of fairly unitary states and a certain degree of homogeneity in their political, economic and social structures and values. Non-state actors barely exist in Neo-Functionalism. Critics of Neo-functionalism would further argue that member states' belief systems are different, and that agreements are sometimes difficult to achieve. In the extreme case, disagreements may lead to "spill-back or disintegration"36, since the impacts of EU

35 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 437.
membership and decisions on member states may be regarded as being to the nation-state's disadvantage.

So far, neither "the pursuit of rational interests, nor the growth of new networks of interaction have translated into that shift of loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre." The Neo-Functionalists' presumption that national elites are able to impose their motivations onto the population has proven wrong. The masses do not necessarily follow their elites and, as we will see later, the European Union has not yet acquired the necessary level of recognition from its peoples.

**Domestic Politics Approach**

As a counterweight to Neo-Functionalism, the Domestic Politics Approach, as the name implies, focuses on the domestic and sub-national forces working within the nation-states. It seeks to explain the "linkages between the domestic and EC tiers" and suggests a model of multi-level governance. Domestic Politics Approach provides scope for feedback and is based on the assumption that "an understanding of the internal domestic politics of the member states [is] crucial to any rounded understanding of the integration process."

This means that the EC's policy making process should be analysed in the same way as the domestic policy making process, because "European policy-making is one facet of national policy-making". European politics is, according to the supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach, made at home. Therefore, they argue, the European Union derives its legitimacy from the member states' national and sub-national actors.

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39 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 50.

40 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, p. xxii.
According to the Domestic Politics Approach, subnational and national forces are the key actors in the European integration process. The Domestic Politics Approach could hence represent a bottom-up model in which sub-national forces actively take part in the European integration process, and where all of the EU's member states' different preferences and politico-socio-economic and cultural sub-national forces are incorporated. This works in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which allows for "alternative arenas for the political activities of domestic actors. Private groups can sometimes bypass national governments by pursuing their objectives in EU arenas."

Furthermore, the Domestic Politics Approach may also be congruent with the concept of policy networks. Policy networks "may be defined as an arena for the mediation of the interests of government and interest groups." According to policy networks, the drafting of legislation, that is the meso-level of decision-making, is important to the policy outcome. Taking other forces into account, the nation state's central "monopoly over European policy in a climate of deeper European integration and growing (subnational authority) mobilisation is unsustainable."

The state no longer monopolises the decision-making process at the European level.

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42 According to Article 3b of the TEU, the principle of subsidiarity describes that "... the Community shall take action... only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty."
43 The principle of subsidiarity is an ambiguous term, because it can be interpreted in two ways: as a means to further integration and identity from below, as well as a means for the supranational institutions to accommodate cleavages within the EU. The principle of subsidiarity regulates what can and should be done at Community level, and what should be left to the various authorities of the member states. The principle of subsidiarity was introduced for the first time in the Treaty on European Union, since the EU bureaucracy is often criticised as too centralist, too independent, too powerful, uncontrollable and not transparent enough. Directing decision-making processes towards the 'bottom' hopes to create more proximity amongst the peoples of the Union and between the peoples and the Union, - eventually giving rise to a future European identity.
Instead, the sovereignty of the state is "diluted" and merged into a multi-level polity. As a result,

one can begin to identify a pattern of interdependence between actors from different national, European and sub-national levels of government in European decision-making, which, though ill-defined and hitherto rather haphazard, has helped to 'transform the nation-state' in the EU.... The result is that instead of a bipolar decision-making process involving member states and Community institutions, one finds a complex, multi-layered process' stretching beneath the state as well as above it.47

One should note, however, that the EU policy outcomes and implementation procedures into the national legislation may induce constitutional, policy or even institutional changes at home, since

on the one hand, national governments monitor the executive powers of the Commission closely, though they do so in conjunction with subnational governments and societal actors. On the other hand, the Commission has become involved in day-to-day implementation in a number of policy areas, and this brings it into close contact with subnational authorities and interest groups. As in the initiation and decision-making stage, mutual intrusion is contested.48

Supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach may hence suggest that it would be foolish to separate the EU policy from its member states' domestic policies - even if this might sometimes lead to the adoption of the lowest common denominator.

A critique of the Domestic Politics Approach

The Domestic Politics Approach bases its analysis on specific stylised situations, such as the assumption that the European member states are true homogeneous nation-states in which regional interests equal national interests. This, however, is not always the case. One needs to look further down the scale and analyse the relationship between the member states' elites and their public in order

to understand the workings of Community institutions and the European integration process as a whole. Indeed, "by definition, the building of a political community means the creation of a sense of community or solidarity among the people of a given region."\(^49\)

So far, however, the national governments of the EU member states have restricted the transfer of their sovereignty to the supranational institutions of the EU. They are not prone to throw away their monopoly over European policy-making. This has certainly hampered the integration process of the European Union. Each member state wants to ensure that its national interest is respected against a possible antagonistic Community interest. It has even been argued that

the Community has increasingly become the stage on which national rivalries are fought out.... During the past decades, the European Community appears to have become increasingly beleaguered by national differences, and the resulting inability to develop common policies.... Thus, the failures of the EC to achieve consensus among its member states should be seen in the context of the serious cleavages that exist in national political systems with regard to government policies.\(^50\)

In addition, supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach seem to ignore that policies regarding European integration issues are often defined as foreign policy matters. As a result, given the member states' different regionalisation and territorial structures, this may allow those sub-national authorities "with a strong constitutional base and embedded in formalised intergovernmental infrastructure,... to claim a far greater share in the fields of competence in European decision-making"\(^51\) than those subnational authorities which do not enjoy such intra-state organisation.

Furthermore, the Domestic Politics Approach does not take into account eventual changes, such as possible constraints external to the respective

\(^{49}\) Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 155.

\(^{50}\) Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 159, 167 and 169.

governments, or a possible emerging gap between a member state's capacities and resources to pursue certain national policies or self-interest. Indeed, the Domestic Politics Approach puts too much emphasis on the domestic harmonious goings within the EU's member states, without taking into account the international political system, cross-national links among the EU member states, intra-state differences, the role of the EU's institutions, the EU's internal dynamics and its treaties.

**Liberal-Intergovernmentalism**

During the 1970s and 1980s, mainly as a result of the Luxembourg Compromise and Europe's stagnating integration process - also called "dark age' or 'Eurosclerosis"52 -, the theory of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism came to the fore. In contrast to Neo-Functionalists, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists do not see the nation-state withering away, and diverging from the Domestic Politics Approach, national governments remain the key political players in international politics in the Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory.

The Liberal-Intergovernmentalists' focus on the importance of national governments follows the Realists' perception of world politics. Realists value the state as the provider of the good life and security; for them, "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power"53. According to this assumption,

interaction between states in a conflictual international environment was central and the balance of power was constantly shifting.... [C]o-operative ventures between nation-states were likely only to constitute a temporary equilibrium, from which the partners were at liberty to withdraw should they no longer feel that their interests were best served by membership.54

For the EU policy-making process, this means that member states remain the central political actors. The "EC governments' importance is institutionalised in

53 Morgenthau, Hans (1964); Politics amongst nations, p. 27.
the Council of Ministers, the European Council and explicitly the intergovernmental machinery of political co-operation."^{55} Liberal-Intergovernmentalists regard the European integration process as being subject to national policy co-operation (namely intergovernmentalism). For them, the "European nation-states seem too small, so that they should organise themselves into a bigger unit."^{56} The European integration process may therefore be characterised as

the result of strategies pursued by rational governments acting on the basis of their preferences and power.... [T]he EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination."^{57}

According to Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, the EC is based on an "institutionalised international policy co-ordination"^{58} model. De Gaulle's 'empty chair' policy and famous statement that "[t]here is and can be no Europe other than a Europe of States - except of course a Europe of myths, fictions and pageants"^{59}, may be examples to support the Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory. A similar thought was also echoed by Margaret Thatcher in her 1988 speech in Bruges, in which she advocated "co-operation between independent sovereign states."^{60} For Thatcher, this voluntary co-operation would not imply "a remote centralised, bureaucratic organisation... [that] would suppress nationhood."^{61} Thatcher insisted that "we should keep power at the national level"^{62}, and Tony Blair, ten years later

^{55} Bulmer, Simon (1994); "Domestic Politics and EC Policy-making" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), *The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration*, p. 142.


^{57} Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 496 and 474.


^{60} Margaret Thatcher cited in Pinder, John (1995); *European Community: the Building of a Union*, p. 228.


and in a more subtle tone, called for "a Europe that works together as a team, in which our countries retain their distinctive identities... but work together to tackle common problems for the practical benefit of all."  

But despite these pledges for the independent nation-state, the Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory also sees "state executives... [as] state arenas that connect subnational groups to European affairs." The interaction and bargaining between each member state and its society is seen as an important aspect in the Liberal-Intergovernmentalist theory. Governments first aggregate their peoples' interests, before translating these into national goals and preferences. They then "bargain among themselves in an effort to realise these interests." This intergovernmental bargaining is done under the watchful eyes of a supranational institution, such as the European Commission. It will hence "be shaped by EU rules."  

Despite the risk of being overruled by the qualified majority vote, the EU member states still regard the seemingly supranational character of the EU as beneficial. In fact, and according to Alan Milward, the European Community came to the rescue of the European nation-state. Although there might be a viable antithesis between strong supranational institutions and intergovernmentalism,

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67 Alan Milward suggests national motivations for the European integration process in Milward, Alan (1992); The European Rescue of the Nation-State, pp. 1-20; also for a brief, but specific account, see Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions européennes et leur contribution à l'émergence d'une identité et d'une politique culturelle européennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identité européenne, p. 69.
Liberal-Intergovernmentalists welcome the EC and its institutions as a "two-level game"\(^{69}\) or a "common negotiating forum"\(^{70}\) in which decision-making procedure, and monitoring of compliance reduce the costs of identifying, making and keeping agreements, thereby making possible a greater range of co-operative arrangements.\(^{69}\) [T]he unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only in so far as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise unachievable... EC institutions strengthen the autonomy of national political leaders \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) particularistic social groups within their domestic polity.\(^{71}\)

Governments consciously evaluate the costs and benefits of economic interdependence, since national self-interests still enjoy priority over supranational impulses. Thus, one should not forget that "recurrent interactions can change official perceptions of [the nation-states'] interests"\(^{72}\), specifically if the outcomes seem to be advantageous to the member states.

Indeed, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists argue that EU policies are a prolongation, and not simply the adoption of the member states' different domestic politics. European integration is therefore regarded as the result of the respective member states' voluntary decision-making, rather than the immediate consequence of the Neo-Functionalist spill-over effects. For this reason, the supranational character of the EU and the existence of the nation-state does not need to conflict. The level of co-operation and bargaining between the member states within the European Union stresses the intergovernmental character of the EU's supranational institutions.

The European integration process is subject to the nation-states' choices and willingness. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists seem to see the Community as a "formal organisation [with] recognised patterns of practice around which expectations


\(^{71}\) Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 507. For a more detailed account of this, see specifically pp. 496-507.

\(^{72}\) Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye cited in Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 50.
converge". It gives expression to national interests and might eventually become "a means to advance selfish national interests." According to Liberal-Intergovernmentalists, then, the nation-state remains 'obstinate' and has not yet become 'obsolete'.

A critique of Liberal-Intergovernmentalism

Liberal-Intergovernmentalism could be seen as an attempt "to combine... a certain reawakening of nationalism and an indispensable internationalism". But as idealised as this may sound, the theory also shows certain flaws in its logic. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists put too much emphasis on states as the central actors in the international arena. As a result, interstate bargaining does not explain sufficiently enough why intergovernmental bargaining leads immediately to integration, rather than to international co-ordination or multi-lateral policies alone. In addition, it tells "us nothing about how the institutional context shapes preferences and EU decision making."

Liberal-Intergovernmentalists assume that the EU's member states are domestically and internationally autonomous. Although Liberal-Intergovernmentalists may take into account some sub-national forces, they seem to eliminate the determining impact domestic politics may have on state activity. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists ignore sub-national forces which may contend national authorities, such as central governments. These subnational forces are, for example, regional differences and - in the extreme case - regional demands for more autonomy, devolution and self-determination.

74 Lodge, Juliet (1993); "Preface" in Lodge, Juliet (ed.); The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, p. xxi.
75 Hoffman, Stanley (1966); "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe" in Daedalus, No. 95.
Moreover, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism does not seem to consider issues of transnational importance, such as the dangers of ethnic conflicts, migration, crime, terrorism and environmental pollution. These factors are often beyond the control of the respective member states and may sometimes only be effectively dealt with at Community level.

Furthermore, the

Liberal-Intergovernmentalism underestimates the important working forces within the EU itself - such as the institutions of the European Union. It "plays down the role of supranational institutions in European integration."\(^8^0\) Although intergovernmental bargaining might be, to a great extent, a voluntary collaboration between member states, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists seem to be blind to the fact that external circumstances might compel nation-states to work together. Hence, Wincott rightly raises the question "why the political institutions of states can have impact, but those of the European Community have not."\(^8^1\) He concludes that Liberal-Intergovernmentalists have "taken for granted the existence of nation-states, and the fact that European treaty negotiations and the more general process of integration in Europe must reproduce and reinforce those states."\(^8^2\)

Given this theoretical separation between the member states and the assuming supranational character of the European Union, Liberal-

Intergovernmentalism could be defined as a "loose approach, based on actual developments rather than theoretical preconditions"83.

**Neo-Institutionalism**

Up to the present day, the European Union differs from state governments in several aspects: its institutions are not built upon a common identity or territorial sovereignty. The working principle of the EU is based on the concept of the functional separation of powers84, which does not follow the traditional concept of the organic separation of powers. This means that there is no clear-cut identification of the three basic organs of public authority - legislature, executive and the judiciary - within the EU. In order to apply an organic principle and to make the Community more transparent, the Community would need to undergo some institutional adaptation. On the other hand, the European Union also differs from other international organisations, because it provides more than just a framework in which interactions between member states can take place. The European Union has an important legal system of its own, which defines the supremacy of European law over national law.

These are only some of the reasons why the European integration process, together with the new and unusual set of European institutions, cannot be analysed on the basis of traditional international relations theories or regime theories. According to Neo-Institutionalists, the European integration process is subject to two major tensions: 'institutional accountability' and 'decisional rigidity'. The former "describes the conflict between member state control, on the one hand, and direct accountability of the European institutions to the citizens, on the other."85 The

83 Bulmer, Simon (1994); "Domestic Politics and EC Policy-making" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 147.
latter refers to the "tension between the political and legal nature[s] of the Union system."86

Neo-Institutionalists, therefore, have taken it upon themselves to concentrate on the study of governance within the European Union. In order to do so, Neo-Institutionalists look at how "institutions affect the ways in which governments, as well as other political actors, perceive and pursue their interest."87 Neo-Institutionalists wish to analyse how institutional interaction "provides an additional crucial element to the process of integration."88 This represents a change from the traditional studies of Community governance which "have tended to focus on, or include, the policy level, paralleling the public policy literature's concentration on the policy or issue level."89

Often, the institutions of the European Union are regarded as being a huge and insurmountable bureaucracy. Neo-Institutionalists, however, do not see the European Union as a bureaucracy. Rather, they see the European integration process as being subject to supranational/intergovernmental institutions, inter-institutional relations, internal institutional organisations and procedures and institutional norms.90 For Neo-Institutionalists, the European Union is a multi-tiered state-like system. Its institutions are not simply conceived as "formal arrangements carrying out assigned functions in political, social and economic life, but are treated as reflections on the development of societal value systems and tensions within them"91. The Neo-Institutionalist theory suggests that "EU institutions may develop

91 Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European Governance" in Journal of European Public Policy, 4:1, p. 74.
their own agendas and act autonomously of allied interest groups.\textsuperscript{92} Neo-Institutionalists claim that institutional interaction has an essential influence on the initiation, formulation and implementation of the decision-making within the European Union. They seek to "demonstrate how EU institutions have influenced the agenda-setting, policy-formulation and implementation processes"\textsuperscript{93}; and in order to understand this circle of interrelatedness between institutions and society, Neo-Institutionalists take into account the following instruments of EU governance: treaties, constituent agreements, international law, EC jurisprudence and political agreements\textsuperscript{94} - all of which form the ground on which the functioning of the European integration process is based. Accordingly, Neo-Institutionalists argue that institutions do not only have governance functions for society but that they also define a style of living... provide symbolic guidance for society... stand for specific values about how political and social life should be organised.\textsuperscript{95}

Political institutions are not only the result of their environment,

but create those environments at the same time.... Political institutions affect the distribution of resources, which in turn affects the power of political actors, and thereby affects political institutions.\textsuperscript{96}

Neo-Institutionalists argue further that the outcomes of EU institutional bargaining may have an impact that goes beyond the traditional boundaries of negotiation. As a matter of fact, interaction between the institutions of the EU can affect political behaviour and outcomes in at least three broad ways. They become partially autonomous political actors, create options for societal actors in their choice of allies and arenas, and induce changes in domestic policies and institutions.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{92} Peterson, John (1995); "Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework of analysis" in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 2/ No. 1, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{93} Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 53.


\textsuperscript{95} Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf and Hålstöm, Pär (eds.); Principles of Justice and the European Union, p. 30. (italics in original)

\textsuperscript{96} March, James and Olsen, Johan (1989); Rediscovering Institutions, p. 162 and 163.

Looking at the European integration process in this way, Neo-Institutionalists argue that the EU institutional interaction is a means to introduce a "multi-tiered"\(^9\) model of governance, in which the EU may alter domestic politics of its constituent member states and the member states themselves may mould the institutional and governance structure of the European Union. Traditionally, institutions are representative of public opinion\(^9\), as well as influence public opinion by reinforcing a sense of identity and belonging.\(^10\) Similarly, and according to Neo-Institutionalists, the European institutions should translate popular expectations, as well as contribute to the development of a European identity.

**A critique of Neo-Institutionalism**

Neo-Institutionalists tend to emphasise too much the institutional aspect of the European Union. They view the European institutions as being too autonomous, since they assume that institutional development would guarantee and enhance the European integration process. According to Neo-Institutionalists, political institutions can

- change the distribution of political interests, resources, and rules by creating new actors, and identities... Institutions affect the ways in which individuals and groups become activated within and outside established institutions, the level of trust among citizens and leaders, the common aspirations of a political community, the shared language, understanding, and norms of the community, and the meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, liberty and equality\(^10\).

The European institutions could, accordingly, become the bearers of rules and certain norms of behaviour, if they had the legitimacy required. However, this is not yet - and may not come to be - the case. Neo-Institutionalists tend to ignore the vitality of integration, together with the 'ups' and 'downs' related to it. These 'ups' and 'downs' may be subject to sub-national, national or even international

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\(^9\) Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions européennes et leur contribution à l'émergence d'une identité et d'une politique culturelle européennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); *L'identité européenne*, p. 62.

\(^10\) Vandamme, Jacques (1994); "La citoyenneté européenne élément de l'identité européenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); *L'identité européenne*, p. 258.

\(^10\) March, James and Olsen, Johan (1989); *Rediscovering Institutions*, p. 164.
forces which interfere with the European integration process either directly or indirectly. It seems that Neo-Institutionalists tend to believe in the "stickiness' of institutional arrangements"\textsuperscript{102}, namely their linear development and unchanging character.

The functional separation of power within the European Union contributes to the fact that the relationship between the European institutions seems unclear. This has led to a lack of "institutional accountability"\textsuperscript{103} between the European Union and its member states, as well as between the European Union and its citizens. Compared to national governance, the European Union disposes of relatively few resources of its own. This includes - compared to the municipal offices in Paris or Birmingham\textsuperscript{104} - a relatively small administration apparatus which is, nevertheless, often described as too bureaucratic, too technocratic, too complex and too remote from the peoples of Europe. In addition, one may also be able to claim that EU governance is still very much subject to intergovernmentalism rather than institutional supranationalism. It seems that heads of governments and states, together with national ministers, are "entrusted with the duty to govern Europe."\textsuperscript{105}

**European integration theories and European identity**

Given the fact that each integration theory places different emphasis on the various aspects of the European integration process, there "is no single dynamic of European integration and, therefore, no single theoretical framework [that] can


\textsuperscript{103} Christiansen, Thomas (1997); "Tensions of European governance: politicised bureaucracy and multiple accountability in the European Commission" in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 4/ No. 1, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{104} The EU bureaucracy is "small, some 20,000 people in all, fewer than the municipal officials in Paris or in Birmingham" (Walker, Martin (1999); "Sniping at Europe's elite" in The Guardian, January 12, 1999).

\textsuperscript{105} Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions européennes et leur contribution à l'émergence d'une identité et d'une politique culturelle européennes" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identité européenne, p. 63. My translation.
encapsulate the totality of European integration."106 One should, however, not
dismiss any theory as non-viable to explain the European integration process.
Rather, the theories are all interlinked and complement each other, despite - or
perhaps due to - their differences, flaws and internal contradictions. Therefore, the
European integration process may be described as

a multi-faceted, multi-actor and multi-speed process.... At different times in the
Community's history, different actors, institutions and pressures have been
influential in either facilitating or limiting the further development of the EC
broadly defined.107

But, apart from assigning different periods of time or aspects of the
European integration process to a theory on European integration, it is also worth
looking at how the concept of European identity might emerge according to each
theory.

The Neo-Functionalists' supranational approach has been criticised as being
too idealistic, predictive and theoretical. This is due to the fact that Neo-
Functionalism only seems to describe in part what is currently happening at EU
level. It tends to limit its "definition of integration almost exclusively to
institutional characteristics of the EC - the scope and institutional form of common
decision-making."108 In order to create a fundamentally political union, the Neo-
Functionalist means are fundamentally non-political. As a matter of fact, Neo-
Functionalists assume that a fully integrated European Union would eventually
come about through the spill-over effect. Following this logic, then, Neo-
Functionalists would possibly explain the emergence of a European identity in the
same way: European identity would be an inevitable consequence of the economic
and institutional spillover, that is an "identity to be constructed"109.

On its own, however, one may claim that Neo-functionalism is an
insufficient theory to explain the eventual emergence of a European identity, since

106 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 25.
107 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.);
European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 25.
108 Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
it underestimates the importance of national governments and the interplay of the various existing identities. Indeed, materialistic measures from the top seem to be insufficient for a European identity to develop. Nor should one take public consent and commitments for the European integration process for granted. The masses have so far not followed the elites. However, one should not be too dismissive of Neo-Functionalism, since the post-war debate on the future of European co-operation was... clearly an issue of 'high politics'; as such, it was dominated by intense, intergovernmental negotiations between politico-administrative elites, whose support (or, in the case of Britain, non-support) for European integration can be explained primarily in terms of perceived national interest.10

After the Second World War, the six founding member states of the EC were primarily concerned with the reconstruction of their own countries and national identities. There was virtually no significance given to the concept of a European identity. It would have been an inappropriate time to focus on the development of a European identity, since "people weren't ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on without telling them too much about what was happening."11 Economic and political factors were prioritised, despite the political relevance of ethnic and cultural issues.

The Domestic Politics Approach stands at the other extreme of the integration theory continuum, namely the Neo-Functionalist approach. It stresses the importance of domestic politics and tends to ignore European or intra-national anti-centric forces. Nevertheless, supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach would claim that the EU is a product of its member states and subnational actors. Consequently, the EU policy making process should also be examined in this way. In return, the Domestic Politics Approach suggests that the European integration process transforms the nation-state without eroding the national arena.

10 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 27.
Supporters of the Domestic Politics Approach would have a potentially strong argument for the emergence of a European identity, since they almost take sub-national, national and European interests as co-termini. Their multi-level model of governance encourages subnational (constitutional arrangements allowing), national and European forces to have their respective share in the shaping and development of the European integration process. These different levels are then melded together into one. Subnational forces see this as an opportunity to circumvent central government, and central government, in return, may be willing to give up part of its sovereignty to supranational authorities. Governments count on the fact that

political benefits may outweigh the costs of losing political control or there may be intrinsic benefits having to do with shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions or insulating decision-making from domestic pressures.\(^{12}\)

Although this multi-level approach may inevitably lead to competitions between the different forces to gain the upper hand in the European integration process, the following section will demonstrate that the Domestic Politics Approach and its multi-level governance might be the most plausible approach to overcome the problem of governance in the European Union.\(^{13}\)

Liberal-Intergovernmentalism can be seen as a compromise between Neo-Functionalism, the Domestic Politics Approach and Neo-Institutionalism - Liberal-Intergovernmentalism may be placed at the middle of the European integration theory scale. Focusing on the differences between Neo-Functionalism and Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravesik points out:

Where neo-functionalism emphasises domestic technocratic consensus, liberal-intergovernmentalism looks to domestic coalitional struggles. Where neo-functionalism emphasises opportunities to upgrade the common interest, liberal-intergovernmentalism stresses the role of relative power. Where neo-functionalism emphasises the active role of supranational officials in shaping bargaining


\(^{13}\) In addition, chapter 4 will show how transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union is congruent with the Domestic Politics Approach and may be taken as an example to explain the emergence of a genuine European identity.
outcomes, liberal-intergovernmentalism stresses instead passive institutions, and the autonomy of national leaders.\textsuperscript{114}

Liberal-Intergovernmentalists strive to describe the EU as a 'two-level game' which allows member states to improve their efficiency during interstate negotiations at European level, and at the same time strengthen their influence and autonomy in their domestic polity.

Indeed, Liberal-Intergovernmentalism may be the most plausible European integration theory to explain the European integration process. Its basis is strong enough to support the emergence of an identification with the European integration process, rather than a European identity per se. This is because Liberal-Intergovernmentalism precludes the concept of European identity if it is congruent with the national interest. Liberal-Intergovernmentalists emphasise the member states' national interest, that is their fear to lose a great degree of loyalty, legitimacy and autonomy to the supranational institutions of the EU. National identities still predominate and will not - in the distant future - give way to the emergence of a European identity.\textsuperscript{115} Consequently, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists attempt to accommodate the member states' national interests with those of the EU integration process. Nevertheless, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists lose sight of the fact that the European integration process is still interpreted and managed through the lens of its constituent national and sub-national actors. Accordingly, the existence of national and sub-national forces, national and regional identities still play an essential part in the European integration process, and they may not be that easily merged into one European identity.

Liberal-Intergovernmentalism may regard - to come back to the analogy used in chapter two - the European integration process as a toolbox. This toolbox is, as we have seen, able to accommodate the many different national identities. In Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, the tools - the member states - rather than the toolbox itself - here, the European Union - remain the key central actors. Both member states and the European Community continue to complement each other.

\textsuperscript{114} Moravcsik, Andrew (1993); "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 4, p. 518.

\textsuperscript{115} This will be further explored in chapter 5b.
Eventually, increasing co-operation between member states may produce a collective identification with the European integration process, supplementary to the existing national identities. In this sense, Liberal-Intergovernmentalists would argue that identification with the European Union does not necessarily need to lead to the loss of national sovereignty and that "[s]overeignty is not virginity, which you either have or you don't". Liberal-Intergovernmentalists do not interpret the European integration process as a zero-sum game, but as flexible and open bargaining - in which the member states continuously evaluate the costs and benefits of their EU membership.

It is difficult to place the Neo-Institutionalist theory within the spectrum of the European integration theories. Neo-Institutionalism does not follow any traditional international relations theory and needs to be examined separately. Neo-Institutionalists focus on the relationship between the European institutions, rather than the relationship between the different possible political forces. Neo-Institutionalism seeks to analyse the relation between the European Union's bureaucratic intransparency and its lack of popular legitimacy. Neo-Institutionalists understand "institutions as mediators between individual action and structural foundation [which] makes them the crucial arena for social change." Neo-Institutionalists recognise that tensions within the European integration process and within the governance of the European Union might emerge; they do not, however, take into account the dynamics of the integration process itself.

Given the EU's complex and often incomprehensible institutional set-up, Neo-Institutionalists would argue that a genuine European identity is not likely to emerge. Instead, supporters of Neo-Institutionalism would claim that a European identity could emerge if a clear insight into the increasing institutional integration process is produced: a European identity could be the result of a clear understanding of European Union governance.

We have seen that Neo-functionalism stresses supranational forces, and Liberal-Intergovernmentalism relies on intergovernmental co-operation to assess the European integration process. As a result, both approaches - although in part true to the European integration process - do not seem to be sufficient enough to explain the emergence of a genuine European identity. On the other hand, Neo-Institutionalism and the Domestic Politics Approach seem to shed some light on the institutional structure of the European Union, which might in turn create a framework in which a European identity could emerge.

Neo-Institutionalists have shown that there is an institutional contradiction at work within the European integration process. Therefore, Neo-Institutionalists tend to concentrate on the institutional interaction within the EU. This seems to demonstrate that the EU is more democratic and transparent than usually described. Indeed, Neo-Institutionalists would argue that the more transparent and comprehensible the interaction between the European institutions, the closer the European citizen will feel drawn to the European institutions. S/he would "be concerned about the functioning of the European institutions, be prepared to participate and therefore identify with them"\(^{118}\), perhaps even be "prepared to make personal sacrifices for European integration."\(^{119}\) Domestic Politics Approach, on the other hand, proposes that European integration is based on multi-level governance. As a result, Domestic Politics Approach may be a plausible approach to explain the governance of the European Union, since it takes into account the various actors of the European integration process. This could then become a basis from which one may explain the emergence of a European identity. Neo-Institutionalism may be pre-conditional to the Domestic Politics Approach, in order to demonstrate that


\(^{118}\) Vandamme, Jacques (1994); "La citoyenneté européenne élément de l'identité européenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); *L'identité européenne*, p. 258. My translation.

\(^{119}\) Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson, Brent et. al. (ed.), *The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration*, p. 158.
subsidiarity, defined as multi-level governance, "links transparency, efficiency and democracy"120.

Whereas the Domestic Politics Approach may be better described as a European integration theory which explains the European integration process, the theory of Neo-Institutionalism is rather a theory which concentrates on some of the fundamental problems central to the European polity, namely European governance. The following section will show that, although it seems necessary to distinguish between the process and causality of European integration, it is also important not to overstate the division between the two.121 To this end, the problem of governance and legitimacy within the European Union will be examined. Supporting the "maxim that as we organise, so we behave"122, the next section will ask in how far the European integration process shapes popular acquiescence? And in how far popular acquiescence also influences the European project and our sense of European identity?

121 Cram, Laura (1996); "Integration theory and the study of the European policy process" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 54.
3. A.ii Governance and legitimacy within the European Union

The problem of governance within the European Union should not be confused with the problem of government or public representation, since the European Union "is plainly not a sovereign state", not a government, "not a traditional alliance of states,... not a confederacy - it is impossible, at least up until now, to define it positively." Although some scholars, such as David Coombes, suggest that "the objectives of public policy in the Maastricht Treaty demand in principle that the European Union be founded with its own government", this section will suggest that

we need to abandon the notion that the Union is evolving towards traditional state or nationhood. The Union is crafted onto existing forms of political order but in turn contributes to the transformations of such forms.

The governance within the European Union

implies that political goals are set intentionally and that sustained efforts are made in order to assure that the behaviour of domestic or international actors is guided by these goals. This general definition does not say anything about the concrete form of governance beyond the state.... the idea of governance beyond the state does not necessarily mean governance above the state.

Indeed, the output of European governance has not transformed the European Union into a superstate. It is rather the case that the problem of governance within the European Union refers to the problems of policy mediation and system design. Both aspects suggest that the EU has no "formal institutions which can facilitate bargaining between interested actors" or involve the public in EU governance. This lack of transparency and lack of public involvement is

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2 Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two Challenges to European Citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 549.
3 Coombes, David (1994); "Problems of Governance in the Union" in Duff, Andrew, Pinder, John and Pryce, Roy (eds.); Maastricht and Beyond, p. 158.
4 Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 18, p. 5.
5 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf and Hallström, Pär (eds.); Principles of Justice and the European Union, p. 40.
directly linked to the problem of institutional frameworks and the problem of legitimacy; it is indirectly linked to the problem of national and European sovereignty, public representation, identity, culture territory and boundaries.

To look at the relationship between the subnational, national and the European dimension, the relationship between the different institutions of the EU, and the effects these have on the EU decision making process, might help to define the problem of governance within the European Union. Depending on the level of aggregation and analysis, the organisation and governance of the EU is defined differently. The intention of this section is not to find a solution to the problem of governance within the EU, but to shed some light on some of the central factors contributing to this existing problem. One may then be able to understand and assess to what extent the problem of governance has had, and will have, an influence on the development of a European identity and the European integration process as a whole.

**The problem of European governance**

European integration theories have so far "tended to focus on the question of degrees of integration"\(^8\) rather than the policy-making and bargaining process involved in the European Union. Furthermore, the issues of identity and culture have largely been ignored in the European integration theories. Public consent was taken for granted, whereas economic factors were prioritised for the restructuring of the individual European member states' economies in the post-World War II period. This gives reason to believe that the European integration process was primarily driven by national interests rather than regional or European interests, and by economics and politics rather than the involvement of citizens. Until 1992, one may argue, the European integration project was an "ideologically neutral programme around which the entire European polity could coalesce in order to achieve the

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\(^8\) Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 5.
goals of European integration." The Treaty on European Union, however, can no longer be qualified as ideologically neutral. The introduction of qualified majority voting, makes it

possible for policies to be adopted within the Council that run counter not simply to the perceived interests of a member state but, more specifically, to the ideology of a government in power.  

Prior to the introduction of qualified majority voting, decision-making processes transcended the traditional Left-Right scale of political party systems, so that "policies verged toward centrist, pragmatic choices,... [t]he tendency toward the lowest common denominator also applied to the lowest common ideological denominator."  

The ideologically neutral approach to the European integration process, as well as the adoption of the lowest common denominator, was prompted by both the initial economic incentives to build the European Community and, more importantly, by the supremacy of European law over national law. The Van Gend en Loos case in 1962 led the European Court of Justice to conclude, in 1963, that the

Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states.... the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights.  

Has the European Court of Justice focused on the level of uniformity across the Community territory, without actually having a preconceived idea of what a political Union should be? Subsequent to the 1962 Van Gend en Loos case, the 1964 Costa case gave the European Community a new important impetus, since it

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became evident that the "EEC Treaty had created its own legal system"\textsuperscript{13}. Accordingly, the Court commenced to refer "to the Treaties as the Constitutional Charter of the Union"\textsuperscript{14}, since it became evident that the Treaties were

distinct both from general international law and from the laws of the member states, that this law had direct effect in conferring rights and obligations directly on citizens of the member states, not only on the states and their organs, and that within the spheres covered by the treaties the law so constituted necessarily had supremacy over the law of member states, for otherwise there would not be a common body of European Community law that would have the same impact everywhere where it was binding.\textsuperscript{15}

The EU's system of judicial review makes the European Union distinguishable from any other international organisation. This 'new legal order' is subject to what Joseph Weiler has called the "all or nothing effect"\textsuperscript{16}. European law is either accepted as being superior to national law, or it is not. European law, in fact, gains its superiority from

a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.\textsuperscript{17}

For Neil MacCormick, this shows that law does not "belong either paradigmatically or only within the framework of a sovereign state; it has other equally important theatres"\textsuperscript{18}, even if these theatres lack the adequate apparatus to implement the law legitimately. EC law is "implemented and enforced through

\textsuperscript{13} Weale, Albert (1995), "Democratic Legitimacy and the Constitution of Europe" in Bellamy, Richard, Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, p. 84.


\textsuperscript{17} European Court of Justice cited in Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1983); "Community, Member States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 21/ No. 4, p. 44.

national courts... [which] is inadequate as a modality for legitimation, for it ignores the domestic... mechanisms whereby national law is made."19

Political integration, on the other hand, is not subject to this 'all or nothing effect'. It is only in some matters that "institutions of the EU take 'collective decisions' which are 'binding' on states and citizens."20 Indeed, EC policies "now affect far more peoples than in the past... [and] are now considered much more seriously by national politicians, interest groups and the general public than in the past."21 As a result, the European Union may be credited with having "acquired for itself at least the policy-making attributes of a modern state, across an increasingly wide range of policy areas"22 - and the tendency of the proportion of policy-making at the EU level (currently possibly 60%23) and the overall fields of policy-making continues to rise.24 This might give reason to believe that the member state "no longer monopolises European level policy-making or the aggregation of domestic interests"25 and that the "European states are losing their grip on the mediation of domestic interest representation in international relations."26 The ratification of the Treaty on European Union, for example, necessitated changes in the traditional constitutional order of the European member states, and in France, for instance, "the European Union became, for the first time, part of the constitution [and altered] the legal definitions of French sovereignty and legitimacy."27 The Europeanisation of

21 Mazey, Sonya (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union: Power and policy-making, p. 36.
22 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
23 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
these traditionally national areas may be regarded as a challenge to the existing national policy processes. The European integration process may even be seen as a zero-sum game. However, this is not entirely the case, since the locus of power has not shifted from the European member states to the institutions of the European Union. National actors are not being substituted by any sort of European supranational actors, since the idea of the European Union rests on the very fact that it does not involve the negation of the state... The idea of community seeks to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors belonging to it, of self-limitation in their self-perception, of redefined self-interest and, hence, redefined policy goals. To the interest of the state must be added the interest of the Community. But, crucially, it does not extinguish the separate actors who are fated to live in an uneasy tension with two competing senses of the polity's self - and committed to search, destined to be elusive, of an optimal balance of goals and behaviour as between the community and its actors.28

As a result, the European Union policy makers' aim is

to create a regime which seeks to tame the national interest with a new discipline.
The idyllic is a state of affairs which eliminates the excess of nationalism. The challenge is to control at societal level the uncontrolled reflexes of national interest in the international sphere.29

The European Union has a complex structure of multi-level policy-making. This, we have seen is congruent with the Domestic Politics Approach. Multi-level governance represents

a continuum from highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks [which] enable us to focus on the possibility of changes in the nature of the policy process over time and from sector to sector.30

According to Dominique Wolton, the model of European governance makes it impossible to describe the European Union as a "Europe of nations, but as a mosaic of governmental models and responsibilities: supranational, regional, local, municipal - where sovereignty is shared between the different levels of

This may be considered as a challenge to the individual member states' national sovereignty, particularly since

[The community vision is... premised on limiting (or sharing) sovereignty in a select (albeit growing) number of fields - on recognising, and even celebrating, the reality of interdependence and of counterpoising to the exclusivist ethos of statal autonomy a notion of community of states and peoples sharing values and aspirations.]

Neil MacCormick refers to member states as "not-fully-sovereign states" and to the European Union as a "not-sovereign Union". Traditionally, sovereignty "has connotations of inalienability, indivisibility and a competence of communities within their territories that is untrammelled by past tradition, the laws of God and, arguably, the laws of nations." In the European Union, however, the principle of sovereignty does not follow this example. If, as Brewin argues,

soverignty is a doctrine of power as well as right, the loss of competence in individual republics has already happened. The political consciousness of Europeans has been transformed in the attempt to recover that power at a higher regional level.

The principle of sovereignty is shared between the European Union and its member states. No party has an absolute sovereignty over the other, and all parties involved in the European integration process need to adjust "to the empirical reality of this situation. They have all 'lost' some power in a common pooling of policy-making sovereignty." As has been asserted in chapter two, this situation gives no reason to write off the existence and influence of the nation-state. Member states still retain a large degree of political authority, a kind of common sovereignty


36 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 3.
which melds member states "gently into a multi-level polity by their leaders and the actions of numerous subnational and supranational actors"37 - "institutional and non-institutional, governmental and non-governmental"38, public and private actors.

Sovereignty has been "subjected to a process of division and combination internally, and hence in a way enhanced externally."39 Therefore, the question is not about sovereignty, yes or no? Rather, it demands a redefinition of the term.

But,

why do states give up sovereignty in the process of European integration?... why do particular actors (party leaders in national governments) change institutional rules (e.g. shift competencies to the European Union)?40

One of the reasons may be that member states sometimes use the European Union as a means to "compel changes [particularly unfavourable ones] at home that they would be unable to achieve through purely domestic processes."41 Indeed, the EU may sometimes be "too convenient a scapegoat"42 when member states try to externalise responsibility, not just claiming that a particular decision was 'the best compromise we could get', but talking about decisions as if they were made by some generalised 'other' of which the national government is no part.43

In order to meet demands of both the member states and the Union - which might eventually lead to a "Europeification of decision-making"44 - it may be argued that the Union needs to be based on a distinct constitution based on some

38 Richardson, Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 5.
common values and a commitment to a collective identity.\textsuperscript{45} So far, the institutional architecture and constitution of the European Union have been taken for granted. It is often believed that the European Union is based on constitutionalism without a constitution, rather than a constitution without constitutionalism.\textsuperscript{46} Given the difference between the notions of constitutionalism and constitution, and assuming that the Treaties represent a Constitutional Charter of the Union, Preuß questions what kind of constitutional model this Union Constitution should be, or is partly, based on. Preuß defines Constitutionalism as including

the key tenets of a polity which is based on the idea that the ruled are not merely passive objects of the rulers' willpower but that the ruled have the status of active members of the political community.... The characteristic of constitutionalism is a horizontal order of state authority, in which a system of careful co-ordination of the functionally specified powers produces a web of mutual and almost circular dependence whereby either one state power can only act on the antecedent action of another or it is subject to subsequent scrutiny and, if need be, censure.\textsuperscript{47}

Taking this statement as a point of reference, the Treaty on European Union resembles a mixed constitution.\textsuperscript{48} It merges, "without replacing one level, several functional, legal and political sources of legitimacy\textsuperscript{49}" and reconceptualises the traditional principle of constitutionalism. A mixed constitution is based on the principle of "[c]ombined and divided state-and-community sovereignty [which] seems [to be] the enemy of popular sovereignty."\textsuperscript{50}

The "enmeshing of the national and the European has neither been smooth nor linear. Rather, it has been partial, patchy and contested."\textsuperscript{51} The legal, political

\textsuperscript{45} Wallace, Helen (1993); "Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy" in García, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the Search for Legitimacy, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{47} Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "The political meaning of constitutionalism" in Bellamy, Richard (ed.); Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 12 and 17.
\textsuperscript{50} MacCormick (1995); "Sovereignty, Democracy and Subsidiarity" in Bellamy, Richard, Bufacchi, Victorio and Castiglione, Dairio (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional Culture in the Union of Europe, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{51} Laffan, Brigid (1997); "The European Union: A distinctive model of Internationalism" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 18, p. 6.
and cultural aspects of European integration do not follow or coincide simultaneously. So far, legal integration is ahead of political integration. This has given rise to a number of problems which are presently at issue. Legal integration does not take into account "popular institution-building and there is no democratic legitimation process in evidence: it is a largely unseen process." But since "law necessarily implicates politics and politics necessarily implicates law," the clash between legal and political integration raises fundamental questions of legitimacy - politics can no longer lag behind law.

As was indicated in chapter two, the Union is moving from issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as a part-formed polity... and... the politics of identity have enormous salience in the new Europe and for the European Union at this juncture in its development."

The European integration project can no longer be driven by national elites, nor can the EU's legitimacy any longer be exclusively derived from its member states, but should be derived directly from the EU-citizens. Arguably, the EU-citizens become increasingly affected by the structure of the European Union, but seem unable to identify or control this power. The Monnet method seems to have lost its ground as the 'period of popular consent' has come to an end. Popular consent can no longer be linked to the European Community's economic benefits. Issues concerning culture and identity should not lag behind politics, as the "growing salience of identity politics takes place against a backdrop of considerable economic and not just political change." It seems as if national identities can no

54 Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 82.
55 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 431.
57 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 429.
longer be buttressed by the European integration project, but they have, as Brigid Laffan suggests, become increasingly challenged by the growing European integration process and its search for 'European identity', political nationalism, specifically correlated with the politicisation of immigration, as well as the revival of territorial politics and regional identities.\(^{59}\)

The intermittent course of integration of economic, legal and political factors has led many scholars to interpret the European integration process differently. There is no blue-print for the constitutional architecture of the European integration process - and even if there were, then this blue-print would possibly be "inspired (voluntarily or not) by an idealised model of the state."\(^{60}\) The absence of a blue-print might explain the reason why the European integration process goes through periods of stability and depression. At different stages during the European integration process, as well as according to the level of aggregation and analysis, the European Community/Union has had the following labels attached to it: pluralistic security community, regime, Zweckverband, Staatenverbund, civitas europea, concordance system, unvollendeter (uncompleted) Bundesstaat, federal union, quasi-state, post-modern, liberal intergovernmentalism, multilevel governance\(^{61}\) or commonwealth\(^{62}\). Since each one of these terms only describes part of the European reality, William Wallace, as has already been mentioned, has settled for the description of the European Union as a political system which is something "less than a federation - more than a regime"\(^{63}\). Along the same lines, Brigid Laffan refers to the "betweeness [sic] of the European Union [which] hovers between politics and diplomacy, between states and markets and between

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\(^{60}\) Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf and Hallström, Pär (eds.); *Principles of Justice and the European Union*, p. 34-35.

\(^{61}\) All terms, together with bibliographical notes, are found in Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35/ No. 2, p. 268.


\(^{63}\) Wallace, William (1983); "Less than a federation - more than a regime: the Community as a political system" in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carol (eds.); *Policy-making in the European Union*, p. 3.
government and governance. These two vague expressions about the 'status' of the European Union describe the ambiguity surrounding the undefined roles for both the national member states and the European bodies within the governance of the European Union.

**The question of European legitimacy**

So far, there has not been one theory which grasps the question of European legitimacy in full. Until recently, scholars contended that the problem of European legitimacy might be solved if the democratic deficit and the problem of European intransparency were to be overcome. Certainly, this is a viable solution - however, it is incomplete. More needs to be done, since the concept of legitimacy refers not merely to the validation of rules and rule making, i.e. legal rights or entitlement, but also to the acceptance of legal decisions by individual citizens, even when their own lives and livelihoods are affected.

While the member states of the European Union may claim to enjoy full legitimacy - if not in the traditional sense, then in the symbolical one - the European Union is still far from being able to make such a claim. As a matter of fact, the European Union derives its legitimacy - little as it may be - from the legitimacy of its constituent member states; and, despite the constitutional characteristics of the Treaties, the EU's constituent nation-states are able to act as nation-states and its individuals as Europeans.

According to Charles de Gaulle, states are the source of identity, plebiscitary democracy and legitimacy - formal and social legitimacy. Both forms

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65 Lodge, Juliet (1994); "Transparency and Democratic legitimacy" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32/ No. 3. According to Annabel Black and Chris Shore, however, "attempts at simplification and solving the 'democratic deficit' have only resulted in the invention of ever more complex procedures" (Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 280).
of legitimacy are necessary, but on their own neither is sufficient. According to Joseph Weiler, formal legitimacy rests "on some democratic foundation, loosely stated as the people's consent to power structures and process". This was particularly the case during Weimar Germany, whose government was based on legal and democratic principles, but it enjoyed little legitimacy. On the other hand, social legitimacy depends on the strength of national consensus over values and the perception of fairness. It

connotes a broad societal acceptance... and is achieved when the government process displays a commitment to, and actively guarantees values that are part of, the general political culture - such as justice and freedom.

This might even be the case if the government is not based on democratic and legal principles, such as during Nationalist Socialist Germany, when legitimacy was an organic concept which "was acquired by an appeal to deeper strata in the human psyche where profound existential needs for meaning and belonging were met with captivating national myths."

If legitimacy is two-fold, then it may be argued that the European Union is subject to a tension between both formal and social legitimacy, since the European Union enjoys formal - or legal - legitimacy, but lacks social legitimacy. However, it is not enough for the European Union to enjoy solely formal legitimacy, since one could then suggest that the crisis over European legitimacy is, in fact, a crisis

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72 Daniela Obradovic adds to this the notion of 'utilitarian support', namely the gain of legitimacy through the appeal to the economic welfare the Union may provide. For a more detailed account, see Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34/ No. 2, pp. 198-201. See also Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, p. 431.
generated by the member states themselves. The European Union needs to acquire social legitimacy. Without social legitimacy, the European integration process could end up in a cul-de-sac.

Although legitimacy cannot be measured according to one strict standard - since it is too diverse and complex, it becomes evident that the problem of legitimacy within the EU goes beyond the problem of the democratic deficit. The democratic deficit usually addresses two dimensions of the European Union: on the one hand, there is the institutional framework. The institutional structure of the European Union is "too bureaucratic [and] too remote from the voting public and too locked in arcane procedures to attract popular interest." This institutional deficit rests on the lack of accountability and legitimation of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the peoples of Europe and its lack of power in relation to the other European institutions. The European Parliament is not yet representative of a European demos, and empowering the European Parliament would therefore not solve the European Union's legitimacy crisis. A strong Parliament would weaken the Council and therefore aggravate the legitimacy crisis within the European Union. On the other hand, the EU is often criticised for its lack of transparency. This may be largely due to its functional separation of powers, which have been explained in the preceding section. In addition, the EU's legislation and policy-making seems too technocratic and too bureaucratic. According to William Wallace and Julie Smith,

74 Markus Jachtenfuchs, however, assumes that there are three broad notions of legitimacy which can possibly make it measurable: first, the legitimacy to a core of fundamental rights; second, the legitimacy of the citizens measurable in public opinion; and third, Habermas' reconstructive notion of legitimacy. Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf and Hallström, Pär (eds.); Principles of Justice and the European Union, pp. 42 - 43.
76 This is due to the fact that the European Parliament does not have the same parliamentary powers as national Parliaments. The turnout at EP election is usually uneven and low, since elections are essentially fought on a national rather than European basis and since there is not a European party-system per se.
Technocratic policy-making was acceptable among six countries, with a limited agenda and within the wider context of American leadership and the external Soviet threat. For the agenda which an enlarged - and still enlarging - EU now faces, without constructive American guidance or the solidarity engendered by any clear or present danger, there can be little hope of generating any comparable permissive consensus.79

The Maastricht ratification crisis is often cited as an example which challenged the EU's 'permissive consensus'. It raised important questions about democracy, legitimacy and identity within the European Union80 and "heralded an important change in the method of the [sic] European integration."81 The ratification crisis is hardly ever taken as an example which showed the peoples' discontent with their national governments.82

The post-Maastricht period demands a "redefinition of political boundaries in Europe"83. Throughout the European integration process, the formal political boundaries of states have remained intact, while functional political boundaries were redrawn. This has led to a clash between the European Union's problem of system design and its problem of territory. The EU is not a state and its territorial boundaries do not correspond to its political boundaries84. With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, it became clear that the

redrawing of political boundaries... can occur only if, and can be ascertained only when, a European people can be said to exist. Since this, it is claimed, has not occurred, the Union and its institutions can have neither the authority nor the legitimacy of a Demos-cratic state.85

Member states, however, remain reluctant to agree to a congruity between the two, since - traditionally - the political boundaries of a state are analogous with

81 Mazey, Sonia (1996); "The development of the European idea" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); European Union. Power and Policy-making, p. 36.
82 Franklin, Mark, Eijk van der, Clees and Marsh, Michael (1995); "Public Support in the wake of Maastricht" in Western European Politics, Vol. 18/ No. 3, p. 114, states that the "legitimacy of the EU was put into question purely as a result of government unpopularity".
political independence, territorial integrity and the very democratic nature of the polity.86

The problem of the European demos

We have so far seen that Maastricht goes beyond a purely institutional framework. Furthermore, it brings the relationship between individuals and the European integration process to the fore. Art. 8 of the TEU, the introduction of the right to European citizenship, is a prime example of this. More importantly, however, Art. 8 was an attempt to bring the European Union closer to the peoples and to create a feeling of belonging amongst the peoples of Europe. We will come back to the concept of European citizenship in the subsequent two sections, as well as in chapter five.

Since a considerable number of citizens still feel alienated from the European Union, let alone represented by the authorities of the EU, the problem of representation may be indirectly linked to the problem of European governance. Representation is, however, directly linked to questions of legitimacy. Representation is usually co-terminus with democracy.

Democracy, according to the Greek meaning of the term, means 'rule (kratos) by the people (demos)', in other words 'people govern themselves'. This concept of self-rule of the people has developed into the concept of representative democracy, a "limited and indirect form of democracy based on the selection (usually by election) of those who will rule on behalf of the people."87 The selection of these people, usually institutionalised in a representative assembly such as Parliament, represents the demos, which is generally taken as being the nation. In return, "the role of citizens assumes a pivotal position in the legitimation and

86 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-Constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 523. We will see in the following chapter, chapter four, how transborder co-operation and borderlands are essential means to achieve this redefinition of national, cultural and political boundaries.
87 Heywood, Andrew (1997); Politics, p. 412.
validation both of the state itself and of the laws enacted therein."88 Citizens are the
demos of the polity and "[d]emos, thus, is a condition of democracy."89

Applying this model of democracy to the European Union, however, could
go horribly wrong, since there is no European demos. Instead, it is important to note
that the

issue about Europe ought not... to be whether it is totally or completely
democratic, but whether it is adequately so given the kind of entity we take it to
be.... Rather, it provides a salutary reminder that merely to point out some un-
non-democratic element in a given constitutional set-up is not eo ipso to damn
it."90

The European Union is composed of the peoples of its constituent member
states - and each member state presupposes a demos which is primarily answerable
to its respective national government. There is "no European demos - not a people
not a nation."91 Hence, Joseph Weiler concludes that, due to the absence of a
European demos, "there cannot, by definition, be a democracy or democratisation at
the European level."92 One should be reminded, however, that the European
Community, from its outset, was not destined to become a self-governing body, nor
to develop into something similar to a European nation-state. On the contrary. The
"origins of the EC lay precisely in an attempt to build hopes of better governance
for (western) Europe through the integration project"93, not to build a nation or
"nation-state aimed at homogenising societies and cultures"94. It is about

Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, p. 78.
89 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers,
Alfred (ed.); The politics of European Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and
beyond, p. 257.
90 MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory of European Integration, ESRC Seminar at
91 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" in Journal of
92 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "The Reformation of European Constitutionalism" in Journal of
Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 116. Neil MacCormick's similar argument can be found
in MacCormick, Neil (1997); "Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the Context of the
European Union", paper presented during Legal Theory of European Integration, ESRC Seminar at
93 Wallace, Helen (1993); "European government in turbulent times" in Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 31/ No. 3, p. 293.
94Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in Journal of Common
recognising and preserving the EU's plurality of cultures and identities. The member states assert this in the preamble of the Treaty on European Union which affirms that it is the object of the European integration process to create an "ever closer union among the peoples [demoi] of Europe".95

If the preamble had referred to a people, the European integration process could be regarded as being analogous to the attempt of creating a European nation, an ethnic demos. This would then bring us back to chapter two and Anthony Smith's ethnicist definition of the nation, "which pre-dates historically, and precedes politically the modern state"96. It is also an indication to Hobsbawm's objective and subjective factors for nationhood, specifically the will of a people or peoples to be a nation. According to this view, then, "[o]nly nations 'may have' states. The state belongs to the nation - its Volk, and the nation (the Volk) 'belongs' to the state."97

For the European Union, however, this concept of an ethnic demos is not feasible. Given the European Union's national and cultural pluralism, a European 'we-feeling' or eventual demos could not be based on the same definition as the national 'we-feeling' or demos, since both objective and subjective elements are missing. Pluralists, in particular, would argue that a "European demos should not be based on the ethno-cultural mode"98, because "the emergence of a European demos in a European polity enjoying legitimate democratic authority would signify... the replacement of the various member state demoi"99. Instead, a European demos would need to include all of the EU member states' different national demoi and

95 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Preamble.
identities. It would have to be decoupled\textsuperscript{100} from the traditional notion that a demos belongs exclusively to a nation-state, in order to give way to two demoi - the national ethno-cultural demos and the European civic demos. In order to achieve this, Neil MacCormick speaks of the European demos as a "civic demos"\textsuperscript{101} or 'thin' demos. This civic demos will "not become a people,... demos and democracy are not synonymous with ethnos."\textsuperscript{102} But in order to give this civic demos some validity, it may rest on Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism which will re-surface in the last section of this chapter and will be explored in greater detail in chapter five. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism, embodies "at the societal and individual, rather than the statal level,... an ideal which diminishes the importance of the statal aspect of nationality."\textsuperscript{103} Constitutional Patriotism, hence, depends "upon pre-existing statehood and membership of the Union only via the member states."\textsuperscript{104} A 'thick' demos, on the contrary, is based on the fusion of demos, state and citizenship.

Basing the European integration process on a civic demos seems to be a good way out of the overall European demos problem. It would in part be congruous to Carl Friedrich's conception of federalism. In 1968, Friedrich suggested that "in a federal system of government, each citizen belongs to two communities - that of the state and that of the nation."\textsuperscript{105} A civic demos would enable to build the European integration process on the idea of democracy - albeit a


\textsuperscript{102} La Torre, Massimo (1996); "L'identité et la citoyenneté européennes [sic]", p. 5 and 6. My translation.

\textsuperscript{103} Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers, Alfred (ed.); The politics of European Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and beyond, p. 268.


representative democracy - in order to preserve the pluralistic character and different identities of and within the European Union. It seems to be a framework able to encompass many different ethnic peoples or demoi.

This civic demos, however, should not be exclusive, since this would go against the principle of the Community itself. It should rather attempt to include the citizen in the European integration process, since the European Union like any other kind of power-structure, must develop policy legitimacy: not so much to function, or even to survive over a period of time, but to achieve the purposes that depend upon the support of its population, and to maintain its political system intact in the face of challenge or serious policy failure.106

Questions concerning the legitimacy and identity within the European Union will remain unsolved until the problem of governance within the European Union and the relations between the many different actors involved in the European integration process are resolved. European governance is still undefinable, loose and "prismatic"107, since "the dichotomy between state and organisation [the EU] is not clear and flexible, but inadequate and misleading."108 It may even be argued that Brussels

has developed into a diversified, atomised and complex political space with many, though not all, national actors. The asymmetry in the involvement of groups of actors as compared to traditional national systems highlights some of the essential features of this new polity.... The EU is faced with fifteen different policy systems, each reflecting national power structures (and national policy networks) and national compromises in determining the 'national interest'. If European integration is to take place, these national policy arrangements must be challenged in some way and new policy settlements agreed.109

As has been argued in this section, there is enough reason to believe that the EU institutions have developed their own dynamics and that the

unification, two German states merged, but the Volk, it seems, remains partly divided, giving rise to the 'Ossi/Wessi' thinking.

109 Wessels, Wolfgang (1997); "An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 2, p. 284; Richardson,
EU could be, and in some senses already is, a catalysing agency for inculcating certain political norms and rights within the EU and enticing non-EU states towards similar values as the price for entering the club.\textsuperscript{10}

On the other hand, member states "no longer serve as the exclusive nexus between domestic politics and international relations."\textsuperscript{111} The interrelationship between member states and the European Union has altered the member states. This was necessary in order to adapt the member states' traditional policy-making processes, constitutional arrangements and conceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy to be congruous with the new polity of the European Union. However, if no further changes take place in the member states' polities, the European integration project will be doomed to fail. The Europe of fifteen can not work under the same conditions as the Europe of six. The European integration process can no longer be driven by its original, initial ideals, since a technocracy and elite-driven process seems no longer an adequate basis for EC governance. The gap between governed and governors within and between countries is serious and has created havoc in the debate about Maastricht to which technical and legalistic devices seem an inappropriate response.\textsuperscript{112}

This has become specifically evident in view of further EU enlargement towards the East, "which could bring the membership of the EU up to between 25 and 30 within the next decade."\textsuperscript{113} Costs for enlargement will be very high on both sides and conditions for a smooth working of the European integration process will have to undergo changes as well. Popular consensus might be even more difficult to achieve, in particular after the January 1999 allegations of fraud and mismanagement in the European Commission.

It is the first time that the European Union prepares enlargement with six member states at once and the \textit{acquis communautaire}, that is "[t]he range of EU

\textsuperscript{10} Jeremy (1996); "Policy-making in the EU" in Richardson, Jeremy (ed.); \textit{European Union. Power and Policy-making}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{111} Laffan, Brigid (1996); "The politics of identity and political order in Europe" in \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol. 34/ No. 1, p. 100.

treaties, laws and regulations that new members must accept has grown hugely since 1986. Worse, existing EU members must reform large chunks of them, specifically CAP, budget policies, benefit cuts and structural funds. More importantly, the European integration process needs to adapt to these new developments. Proposals to reform the internal structure of the Union, such as the introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, to restructure the Commission and to extend the co-decision procedure for the European Parliament are only a few examples the European Union is currently reviewing under its Agenda 2000 programme, in order to adapt its internal structure to the changing international environment.

113 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The frontiers of Europe, p. 92.
3. B European measures and policies oriented towards the creation of a European identity

We have seen that the European Union suffers from a problem of governance and a lack of legitimacy. The institutions of the European Union do not yet have enough representative status and seem to be too remote from the average citizen. The full integration of the European Union into everyday life is often hampered by legal, financial, practical and psychological barriers. It proves difficult to show that the EU is not just about rules and regulations. The integration and involvement of the European citizen is essential to create a veritable Community of Europeans and to reinforce the sense of belonging to the European Union. The EU seeks to get closer to its peoples, in order to be built with citizen support and enthusiasm. To this end, it needs to become part of the citizens' every day concerns and interests\(^1\) - in economics, politics, culture, media or sport.

It was during the Copenhagen summit in 1973 that the notion of a European identity appeared for the first time in the official documents of the European Community. According to the Copenhagen "European Manifesto", European identity was defined as involving "a common heritage,... acting together in relation to the rest of the world,... taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification."\(^2\) This broad definition was mainly the result of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of European identity; the definition of the term oscillated between an external and internal identity.

On the one hand, it was believed that the definition of a European identity was "merely the definition of a series of common policy objectives, objectives which must at a given moment be pointed out and defended with one sole voice"\(^3\).

There was

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\(^1\) Leo Tindemans, in his report to the European Council in 1975, cited that "the construction of Europe is not just a form of collaboration between states. It is a rapprochement of people who wish to go forward, together adapting their actions to the changing conditions in the world while preserving those values which are their common heritage" in Fontaine, Pascal (1991); A Citizens' Europe, p. 5.


fear that the concept of this European identity will be defined because of the
dialogue with the United States, that is to say that it is almost a 'by-product' of this
dialogue.4

On the other hand, and in order to avoid this situation, the heads of
European governments and states became aware that European identity should also
describe a
deep-rooted commitment to pursue a certain policy, even from within each of our
countries. Vis-à-vis ourselves, feelings of identity unite for it is a question of
common and shared characters, interests and objectives.... [T]his definition of
principles of identity should be sufficiently clear and definite for there to be no
room for misunderstandings and ambiguities.5

Nevertheless, the misunderstandings and ambiguities over a European
identity as either an external or internal identity continued. During the 1980s, the
notion of European identity was relaunched in a number of projects, such as
'Citizen's Europe' and the 'Solemn Declaration on the European Union' in 1983.
During both initiatives, cultural aspects and the need to bring Europe closer to the
people were emphasised. The Single European Act of 1987, however, reverted back
to the definition of an external identity when it considered that "closer co-operation
on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the
development of a European identity"6. In the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, both
concepts of identity were taken up again. In the Preamble, the High Contracting
Parties assert that they are

resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a
common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence
in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.7

Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty also includes the member states'

wish to associate the peoples of Europe more closely with the process of European
integration,... reflected, in particular, in the creation of European citizenship... and

6 European Communities (1987); Single European Act, Title III, 30(6).
7 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Preamble.
in the explicit inclusion of new areas within the jurisdiction of the Community (education, youth, culture, public health, consumer protection, etc.).

Given that it is the primary aim of this thesis to locate the emergence of a genuine internal European identity, the following section will look at those European policy-making attempts which consciously intend to promote a European identity, keeping in mind that a European identity "cannot be created by means of diplomatic instruments or in a secret meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs". Attention will concentrate on 'European' symbols and some European policies which affect the European citizen directly. These measures and policies may have a considerable effect - whether positive or negative - on the future development of European society, and consequently of a European identity.

Although these policies are mainly geared towards the area of the EU, they may still be considered as guiding principles on which a genuine European identity - in view of EU enlargement - may be based on. Some non-EU European states already have restricted access to some of these policies - specifically European cultural policies. Central Eastern European countries have hence - to a limited extent - the opportunity to take part in the activities and cultural life of the European Union.

3. B.i Measures and policies for the creation of European identity

The supremacy of European law

Amongst all international organisations, such as for instance NATO, the United Nations and the World Bank, the European Union is unique in the sense that it distinguishes itself from these organisation by its legal status. As we have already seen, the European Union has its own legal system - and since the European Community is a Common Market and not just a Free Trade Area, its legal

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10 These symbols include the European flag, anthem and the 9th of May as Europe Day.
framework is of great necessity. European law, embodied in the four main treaties of the European Community/Union (Rome, SEA, TEU and Amsterdam), distinguishes itself from domestic law in that it is superior to the member states' national legislation. European law derives its supremacy from international law, according to the principle *pacta sunt servanda* (treaties are to be respected).\(^{12}\) All Treaty legislation must be respected by national courts and the Community institutions, and national courts and EC institutions are subject to EC law.

The European Court of Justice ensures that interpretations and application of the Treaty law are observed by both member states and the Community institutions. This uniformity in legislation emphasises that all European member states, together with the institutions of the European Union, are equal before the law. Indirectly, it may also be an attempt to generate a sense of belonging and a 'we are a community' feeling. Depending on whether EU legislation comes in the form of regulations, directives or decisions, member states are generally not allowed to apply the rulings selectively or in an incomplete way. This is underlined in Art. 5 of the Treaty of Rome, which stresses that it is in the "Community context in which national action [must] occur"\(^{13}\).

European law is not retroactive, but applies to the present. Each newly developed law replaces the former, with the aim of building a federal/confederate system in the future. This dynamism of European law has necessitated and produced a vast amount of lawyers who specialise in the various different aspects of European law; it has also attracted scholarship. European law is therefore often identified with professionalism and may hence be criticised as being elitist. The importance of European law is certainly felt at the 'high' level, since it has a

\(^{11}\) These include the issuing of European personal documents, such as the European passport; the introduction of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty; cultural policies, etc. (see section below).


\(^{13}\) Weatherill, Stephen (1994); "Beyond Preemption?" in David O'Keefe and Patrick Twomey (ed.); *Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty*, p. 31.
significant impact on the 'high' economic and political life inside and outside the European Union.

National governments often perceive European law as a threat to their national sovereignty, since it seems to ignore national politico-legal and cultural differences. Indeed, European law is mainly taught in relation to the Union's institutions, emphasising its political and economic norms, rather than stressing moral rights and national cultural differences. Hence, there is still great need for more harmonisation between European jurisprudence and the different national legislations, in order to create a sense of belonging to the Union not just among the elites, but also among the citizens of the European Union.

*Freedom of movement*

Another characteristic of the European Community/Union, and for which the EU is known internationally, is the introduction of the four freedoms of movement for goods, persons services and capital. These freedoms were mainly developed out of economic reasons - the freedom of movement for persons being referred to as the "fourth freedom". The role of borders, and of overcoming borders as obstacles, soon became a key policy area for the European Community. In order to ensure that Europe became a "tangible reality for its citizens", unhindered movement was crucial for the development of a feeling of belonging to the Community. Lord Cockfield's White Paper of 1985 and the 1988 Cecchini Report suggested measures in order to overcome physical, fiscal and technical barriers within the Single European Market. The majority of these measures were accepted by the Council and became the Blueprint for the 'Europe 1992' programme, which was "a new principle in interstate and proximity relations".

'Europe 1992', to be achieved by January 1993, was the first big step to withdraw customs and border controls and formalities at the EU's internal borders.

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It enhanced the freedom of movement for persons, and ensured that citizens could travel without any restrictions from one member state to another, as if moving in one big space. This unhindered movement - which is traditionally restricted to the area within each member state only - was and still is complemented by Schengenland. At the outset, Schengen was to remove all frontiers between the Schengen member states so as to leave one common external frontier. Schengen was primarily regarded as a laboratory which - if successful - would be translated to the Community level. The Schengen agreements were signed in 1985 by, initially, a group of five European member states (Benelux, France and Germany). Schengen came into effect on March 26, 1995. Thirteen EU member states - bar the United Kingdom and Ireland - plus Norway and Iceland (in order to maintain the Nordic free trade zone) are currently signatories of Schengen. However, Schengen is only fully operational in nine states.18 In Greece, regulations are solely operational at Athens airport, since the full implementation of Schengen still creates some problems.19 Delays between the signing and the implementation of the Schengen agreements have usually been due to technical problems, arising for example from the setting up of an international data system, or... legal problems, for example the constitutional changes necessitated in both Germany and France... and political concern about the impact of immigration and other internal security problems.20

With the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU's acquis communautaire, but "there is no provision... to ensure a role for the European Parliament to be involved in the process of incorporating a Schengen acquis."n21 It needs yet to "be determined which decisions under the acquis do not need to be allocated to either the First or the Third Pillar".22 The Treaty further

18 These are: the Benelux, Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. States, in which Schengen is not fully operational are: Denmark, Greece, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway.
19 This refers, in particular, to the myriad number of islands in the Aegean sea, also called Greece's 'blue frontier'.
21 Boer den, Monica (1998); "Introduction" in den Boer, Monica (ed.); Schengen's Final Days?, p. 7.
22 Boer den, Monica (1998); "Introduction" in Boer den, Monica (ed.); Schengen's Final Days?, p. 6.
guaranteed an opt-out provision for both the United Kingdom and Ireland, although both countries may soon allow the abolition of passport controls and accept greater police co-operation.23

Judging by the incongruity between the Schengen signatories and the problems concerning the implementation of Schengen, member states seem to be constantly weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of co-operation in sensitive areas, such as immigration. This incongruity between Schengen-states and non-Schengen states within the EU has led many to believe that "Schengen would be a graveyard instead of a laboratory for the EC."24

The consequences of the lack of cohesion, the overlapping of increasing internal controls, financial complications, etc., will soon be felt [and] a boomerang effect is to be feared, given the already considerable aversion... the European citizen is showing for Brussels.25

Still, one should not dismiss that, together with the introduction of European citizenship, the freedom of movement for persons has supplied European citizens with economic and social rights they did not enjoy before. One must add to this that the free movement of people does not only confine itself to travelling. It also includes the right to residence, work, study26 and stay in all EU member states. To ease the rights of citizens within the internal market, the European Commission has put together approximately eighty recommendations in 1998.27 In addition, the European Commission is also planning "a series of initiatives to facilitate the free

23 Smyth, Patrick (1999); "State is likely to move on Schengen accord" in The Irish Times, March 3, 1999. Both Britain and Ireland are likely to sign up to two of the three elements of the Schengen Information System (SIS), a computer database linking police and immigration forces: the database of stolen vehicles, and the listing of those against whom extradition warrants are being sought. Both states will, however, refrain from linking to the SIS listing of immigrants.
26 Especially concerning the conditions of working and studying in a different member state, the EU has opted for new integration strategies during the 1980s and shifted from the harmonisation of education and training towards the recognition of diplomas and different periods of study. Whether this responds to reality is, however, questionable.
27 European Communities (1998); "Free movement within the EU" in Eur-OP News, 1998/ No. 2.
movement of people within the EU"\textsuperscript{28}, necessary for the feeling of belonging to a common area and to improve co-operation between member states.

\textit{European citizenship}

Although the last section in this chapter will discuss the concept of European citizenship in more detail, a short description of this EU policy will be given here, in order to complement the list of European measures and policies oriented to foster a European identity. The free movement for persons was one of the major reasons to introduce the right to European citizenship for the first time in the Treaty on European Union. Art. 8 of Title II states that "citizenship of the Union is hereby established".

Art. 8 embeds European citizenship in a legal framework and establishes a legal relationship between citizens and the supranational European level. It provides European citizens with economic, political and social rights.\textsuperscript{29} It may even be argued that the Treaty on European Union adds another layer of rights to already existing national rights and therefore "marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and closely as possible to the citizen." (Treaty of Amsterdam, revised TEU, Title I, Art. A).

As will be argued in the following section, the introduction of European citizenship will not automatically bring about a cosmopolitan European identity. European citizenship, as defined in the TEU, means relatively little. So far, European citizenship has only had symbolic value. European citizenship still depends upon the member states' definition of nationality, so that each individual member state retains the right to decide who is to be a national citizen, and thus a European, and who is not. In future, however, a reformed European citizenship may create a common sense of identity and origin which could advance the

\textsuperscript{28} European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); \textit{The week in Europe}, July 2, 1998.

\textsuperscript{29} Social rights are limited according to the third pillar of the TEU, Justice and Home Affairs.
legitimisation and further development of the EU into an "effective post-national political community"\textsuperscript{30}.

**Personal documents**

To underline European citizenship, the European passport became the "symbol par excellence of membership"\textsuperscript{31} of the European Community/Union. The passport came into being on June 23, 1981, after member states' long negotiations about the format, colour, wording and language. Although the European passport still remains, by law, \textit{a priori} a national passport, the passport is an important symbol for the freedom of movement of EC/EU citizens within the EC/EU territory and, specifically, Schengenland. The European passport distinguishes EU citizens from the 'other' non-EC/EU citizens. The differentiation between EU and non-EU citizen is most evident at the external borders of the European Union and the EU/non-EU citizens' channels.

In addition to the European passport, there were also plans to introduce European identity cards. Having a very similar function to the European passport, the issue of European identity cards was nevertheless highly disputed: in four EU member states - the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom - identity cards do not exist. In these countries, the possible introduction of European identity cards was regarded as being a retrograde step for civil liberties and the EU was accused of becoming a big police union.

Another important personal document for EU citizens is the European driving licence. Since January 1, 1986, every driving licence must conform to the Community model. This should - in the true sense of the word - facilitate free circulation within the EU territory and may be an essential tool to improve road safety due to stricter regulations for obtaining a licence.


\textsuperscript{31} European Communities (1987); European File, No. 6/1987, p. 6.
The European flag, European anthem, Europe day

The most distinguished symbol with which the European Union is associated is the European flag. The flag is recognised internationally as representing the European Union. The twelve golden stars aligned in a circle on a blue background were hoisted for the first time on May 29, 1986. In addition, the "twelve-star Euro-totem [also] decorates shop windows, coffee cups, car number-plates, advertising hoardings". The twelve stars represent the peoples of Europe, united in a circle of union, the symbol of unity, consensus, plenitude and perfection. Since the stars do not stand for the member states themselves, the flag does not need to be altered with every accession of a new member state. Although the flag is used at national as well as international occasions, it often only supports the other national flags of the European member states - currently being the complementary sixteenth flag. Each country, of course, keeps its own national flag.

The hoisting of the European flag is often accompanied by the European anthem. It was adopted during the European Council summit in Milan in 1985. The European anthem is the prelude to the fourth movement of Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony 'Ode to Joy'. The text was written by Friedrich von Schiller and was possibly chosen to reflect the construction of the European Union, namely that "All men will become brothers under thy gentle wing." The European anthem is far from replacing each member states' national anthem - each country keeps its own national anthem.

32 The blue and golden flag did exist before. It was used by the Council of Europe since 1955.
33 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 288.
34 The idea of the symbol stems from Paul Lévy, when Lévy walked past a statue of the Madonna. Lit by the sun, the Madonna's garland of stars shone before the background of the blue sky. Alternatively, the number twelve has had a special meaning since the ancient times: twelve is associated with unity, security and the guiding principle. The Egyptians believed in the twelve gates of the underworld, in Greek mythology Herakles had to solve twelve tasks, Jesus chose twelve Apostles and the Romans used twelve slates to write down their rule of law. There are twelve star signs, twelve months in the year, twelve hours in the clock and twelve is the product of three times four - three representing the Holy Trinity and four the four directions of the sky. The garland, usually associated with success and victory, represents woman's invincibility (Pinzka, Thomas (1998); "Der Sternenkranz ist die Folge des Gelübdes" in Die Welt, August 26, 1998).
35 Beethoven's Ninth, text from Friedrich von Schiller.
Next to a flag and an anthem, the European Union also celebrates 'Europe Day' on May 9th. Europe Day is not a bank holiday. On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman held his speech which lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the forerunner to today's European Union. Robert Schuman emphasised that

Europe will not come about at a single stroke, nor as a seamless construction. It will come about through concrete realisations which create first of all a de facto solidarity. Bringing together the nations of Europe demands an end to the many centuries of conflict between France and Germany.\(^{36}\)

Europe Day was only celebrated for the first time 36 years later, shortly before the first hoisting of the European flag. Following the 9th May in 1986, the first two Europe weeks were held as well, as a celebration of the centenary of Robert Schuman's birthday. Which other anniversaries will be celebrated in the future is questionable, but one may argue that if Europe Day were a bank holiday, the public might be more aware of the existing EU symbols and the EU's role in their everyday life.

**The Euro**

Currency is possibly another important symbol with which citizens assert their national consciousness and identity.\(^{37}\) The European Union started with bilateral conversion rates on January 1, 1999. The EU's single currency, Euro notes and coins, will be issued on January 1, 2002. Following this date, the single currency and national domestic currencies will run concurrently, in order to pave the way for the full implementation of the single currency. The Euro is classified as primarily an economic tool which will possibly bring about "profound economic, social and political change, but at different speeds in different sectors."\(^{38}\) It is an essential tool to bring about a smoother economic European integration process, but its seemingly unpopularity suggests that it touches upon psychological aspects and

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37 See Bort, Eberhard (1998); "German Identity after Reunification" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); *A Question of Identity*, pp. 197-211. In this article, Bort argues that the Deutschmark played an important role in the creation of Germany's post-war identity.

questions of identity; in spring 1998, 60% of the European citizens supported the Euro and 28% were against it. On May 2, 1998, the launch of the Euro currency was celebrated with a "collective shrugging of shoulders" which summed up the extent to which popular apprehension and even hostility has characterised the entire project from the start. Huge publicity campaigns are about to be launched. But it is difficult to see how the hearts will be won.

Only 27% people feel well informed about the Euro, and 89% agree on the need for more information campaigns on the Euro. Due to the Euro's "quirky rate", Frenchmen are confused by double pricing and Germans believe that their Deutschmark is only worth half its original value. In order to alleviate this problem, the European Union seeks to distribute more information about the Euro, the latest being an information strategy for the 1999-2002 period: "[p]ractical guidelines to help businesses prepare financial systems for a smooth changeover to the euro," as well as a German children's book called 'The Eurokids'.

The main reasons to introduce the Euro was to lock the Deutschmark in, to "establish a reserve currency to match the dollar and the yen" and to enhance Europe's presence on the international monetary scene. Most importantly, however, the Euro is a means to integrate and intertwine the European markets better and to create a veritable single market. The Euro will save money for traders and tourists, since it eliminates the costs and risks resulting from currency exchange and transactions. This, it is hoped, will make the European Union less vulnerable to international monetary developments and money speculations. However, preparations for the Euro seem slow as some businesses and companies are either reluctant or ill-informed about introducing the necessary legal or technical framework for the introduction of the Euro.

39 The European Central Bank was officially inaugurated in Frankfurt/Main on June 30, 1998.
41 European Commission (1998); Eurobarometer: Report Number 49, pp. 44-60.
43 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 5 February 1998.
45 Editorial (1999); "Challenge of the year of the euro" in The Scotsman, January 1, 1999.
It is not the first time that Europe sees the attempt to create a monetary union. The Romans had

the denarius, the chief silver coin. Then came the gold standard. The French tried a
Latin currency union - which failed - last century. Two attempts at economic
union were made this century; both failed.46

This does not mean, however, that the Euro will fail as well. In a small town in Spain, Churriana, "villagers swapped pesetas for dummy versions of the single currency"47 for three days. Surprisingly, the villagers seemed "to have little difficulty adapting"48 and purchases in Euro increased steadily, from 30% on the first day to 80% on the second day.

European culture

Robert Schuman once recollected that Europe's "common cultural heritage is the soul of Europe"49 and wrote, in 1963, that "[b]efore becoming a military alliance or an economic entity, Europe has to be a cultural community in the highest sense of the world."50 Still, the "Community's emphasis on economic affairs and its generation of elite association, rather than interaction among ordinary Europeans"51 pushed cultural issues aside and devoted "relatively little attention... to the cultural and psychological issues associated with European unification - to questions of meaning, value and symbolism."52 But what exactly is culture?53 Although culture "is undoubtedly an element of the life of citizens"54, the term remains nebulous. The definition of culture

49 Europazentrum Graz (1996); Europa wächst, p. 33.
50 Robert Schuman cited in Riekmann, Sonja (1997); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey and Schopflin, George (eds.); Myths and Nationhood, p. 61.
53 We will come back to this question in chapter five.

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has posed perennial problems for European institutions. At its narrowest it can refer solely to the high visual, literary performing arts, At its broadest it can encompass almost all aspects of human behaviours. Clearly neither is satisfactory for framing policy.\(^55\)

Following the 1983 "Solemn Declaration of the Creation of European Union", which contained proposals to include cultural aspects in future European co-operation projects, the 'Committee for a People's Europe' - also called after its founder the 'Adonnino Committee' - was formed as an ad-hoc Committee in 1984. It "proposed numerous concrete measures aimed at involving the citizens of Europe more determinedly in the construction of the Community\(^56\) and stressed the importance of cultural aspects for the European integration process. In June 1985, the Committee's reports and definition of areas of action were proposed to the Commission and to the national governments, supported and furthered by the European Parliament, and accepted by the European Council. The Committee - today known under the 'Citizens First' or 'Europe Direct' initiatives - works in the interest to "suggest ways how to strengthen the identity and improving the image of the Community\(^57\) among its peoples and the wider world. The Committee wishes to confirm the solidarity of Europe and ensure - together with the European Communities - that the

Community's purpose is to act on behalf of culture rather than on culture and that consequently this action must fully respect the principles of freedom of expression, pluralism and national values which constitute an integral part of the cultural identity.\(^58\)

Since the Treaties of Rome, the 1992 Treaty on European Union is the first document to introduce cultural policies into the legal Community framework, in order to sharpen the cultural dimension of the European integration process. The

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\(^{55}\) European Forum for Arts and Heritage (1996); Cultural Aspects in European Community Action: Article 128(4) of the Maastricht Treaty, p. 2.


\(^{57}\) European Communities (1986); European File, No. 3/1986, p. 3.

TEU states that "Community action with regard to culture will henceforth be of permanent nature and become an acknowledged branch of Community activity."\(^{59}\)

The "drafters of the TEU... were careful enough to talk about cultures in plural\(^{60}\), remaining ambiguous about the 'diversity within unity' principle. Art. 128 of the TEU stresses that it is one of the Community's objectives to make "a contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States"\(^{61}\) while respecting subsidiarity and the national and regional cultural diversities of the member states at the same time. In the decision-making process on cultural policies, the Council has no right to qualified majority voting, but acts according to the principle of unanimity. In addition, Title II expresses the EU's aim to bring the "common cultural heritage to the fore"\(^{62}\) and aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest.... The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and promote the diversity of its cultures.\(^{63}\)

In December 1993, the Canavarro Report of the European Parliament stated that

the achievement of the European Union is inseparable from the demonstration and promotion of Europe's cultural identity, which is the product of interaction between a civilisation and a plurality of national, regional and local cultures.\(^{64}\)

In April 1996, the European Commission's 'First Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community Action' re-emphasised Art. 92 of the TEU by stating that culture must be respected in any other activity fields of the European Union. The report concluded that it


\(^{60}\) European Communities (1995); "Should Europe have a common cultural policy" in *European Dialogue*, September/October 1995, p. 25.

\(^{61}\) European Communities (1992); *Treaty on European Union*, Title II, Article 3 (p).

\(^{62}\) European Communities (1992); *Treaty on European Union*, Title II, Article 128(1).

\(^{63}\) European Communities (1992); *Treaty on European Union*, Title II, Article 92 (3d) and European Commission (1997); *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Article 128/4.

\(^{64}\) European Parliament (1993); *Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media on Community Policy in the Field of Culture* (Pedro Canavarro), Session Document, A3-386/93, 1 December 1993, Motion for Resolution, p. 5.
has been necessary to strike a bargain between the provisions of the Treaty and cultural objectives, and although this bargaining has led to a degree of consideration of the cultural aspects, these have not received the priority treatment that they could expect in certain Member States (for example in respect of book prices, taxation of certain cultural goods and services, or the field of competition).65

More importantly, however, the report saw "that a great majority of the policies implemented by the Community now include a cultural dimension or have an impact on certain cultural fields"66. This was followed by a resolution of the Cultural Council in December 1996 which agreed on "the integration of cultural aspects into other areas of Community policy"67. It certainly fostered the EU's aim to preserve and safeguard the European cultural heritage and to improve the knowledge about European history and culture amongst the peoples of Europe.

As was mentioned earlier, the EC's cultural policies were primarily oriented towards the cultural dimension of the European Community, in order to "affirm the awareness of a common cultural heritage as an element in the European identity"68. With prospective EU enlargement towards the East, however, European cultural policy should shift towards all European countries, since they have all been subject to the same European cultural developments. It would be an essential step to help the new democracies' integration into the European Union's cultural life, and towards rekindling a distinctive European identity in Central Eastern European countries.

The Community and its member states have already introduced agreements which "are committed to the openness of Community cultural programmes."69 It was agreed that

outside the European Union, Community cultural policies must promote an expansion in the cultural influence of European people and the European model of

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67 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1996); The week in Europe, 19 December 1996.
society,... built on a set of values common to all European societies.... Owing to its richness of character and its diversity, culture is a major component part of this European model society. Community action must promote the preservation and enrichment of that which goes to make up the cultural and linguistic identities and realities of the peoples of Europe. It must allow strengthening of citizens' feeling of belonging to one and the same Community.... If it constitutes an integration factor within the Union, for the outside it represents an instrument of co-operation which must be used to promote dialogue between cultures.70

In accordance with Article 128 of the TEU, the EU introduced three sophisticated action programmes to develop and enhance the notion of European culture:

- RAPHAEL acts in the field of cultural heritage and aims at the preservation and restoration of European architectural heritage, monuments and sites. It also provides grants for training schemes in restoration and conservation and supports cultural events revolving around European cultural heritage. In 1997/98, RAPHAEL supported 91 pilot projects on European cultural heritage worth 9.4 million ECU.71

- KALEIDOSCOPE supports cultural and artistic activities, such as the promotion of the European City of Culture (1997 Thessaloniki, 1998 Stockholm, 1999 Weimar) and the European Cultural Month held in primarily Central Eastern European countries, in order to encourage cultural co-operation with the European Union (1997 Ljubljana, 1998 Linz/Valetta, 1999 Plowdiv). During these events, each nominated city represents its country, peoples and culture to the rest of Europe, in order to bring the peoples of Europe - both the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries - closer together. Furthermore, KALEIDOSCOPE also funds the European Youth Orchestra, the European Union Baroque Orchestra, as well as the European Chamber Orchestra.72

- ARIANE promotes books and reading, and the translation of works by European authors - especially into less-widely-spoken languages. ARIANE is also

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71 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 8 January 1998.
72 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1997); The week in Europe, 27 November 1997.
involved in the presentation of the European literature prize and the European translation prize.\textsuperscript{73}

Despite the promising nature of these policies, the cultural sector does not enjoy much priority and is under-funded. RAPHAEL has received 30 million ECU for a 4 year period (1997-2000). KALEIDOSCOPE and ARIANE (26.5 million) will terminate by the end of 1999. All three schemes will then be replaced by the four-year framework programme \textit{Culture 2000}\textsuperscript{74} which will receive a budget of 167 million ECU. In comparison, in 1996, the EU spent a total of 26 million ECU on culture (excluding the audio-visual sector), whereas the agricultural sector received 41.3 billion ECU. An even more striking comparison are the 112 million ECU needed to clean and maintain the buildings of the EU institutions.\textsuperscript{75}

In addition to these cultural programmes, sport is also regarded as a great means of communication among people since the ancient times of the Greek Olympics. The Community's dimension in sport is mainly represented by the EU's EURATHLON programme. This programme supports events such as, for example, the European Yacht Race, the European Tennis Championships and the European Swimming Championships. Football is the most widely supported sport, but the Eurocup still remains an event which is largely organised by the national member states and through UEFA. Sport events make aware of how wide the concept of Europe is, since non-EU countries, such as Armenia and Georgia, take part in them as well.

Furthermore, the EU also supports measures which promote and encourage non-commercial cultural and educational exchanges. These programmes are now also available to the new democracies in the Central Eastern European countries, where "young people... are in favour of the EU [and...] see many advantages in

\textsuperscript{73} European Commission Representative Office - UK (1997); \textit{The week in Europe}, 27 November 1997.

\textsuperscript{74} Within the \textit{Culture 2000} programme, and in line with the \textit{Agenda 2000} guidelines, the EU's First Framework Programme for Culture (2000-2006) is currently being developed.

The programmes' primary aim is to foster the free movement of students and employees (according to Articles 126 and 127 of the TEU), to enable participants to deepen their knowledge of foreign languages, European history and European culture, as well as to gain experience and improve their future employment opportunities.

The youth exchange programme 'Youth for Europe' (YES), for instance, is only one example to increase the awareness of belonging to Europe and to foster a European identity amongst the young peoples of Europe. It caters for 15-25 year olds and is based on the Franco-German youth exchange programmes which started in 1963. The bilateral and multilateral youth exchanges should teach young people more about the political, economic, social and cultural life in the various member states and improve their knowledge about the Community's guiding principles of democracy, social justice and respect for human rights. Young people, specifically, are the main targets to develop a European identity.

Next to the above mentioned YES, the EU also promotes successful educational programmes such as, for example, LEONARDO, SOCRATES and ERASMUS. The first action programme on education was introduced in 1976. LEONARDO supports vocational training programmes and focuses on the acquisition of new skills, promoting investment in human resources and establishing closer links between educational and/or training establishments in both EU and non-EU states. Since 1998, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania and Cyprus are also included. SOCRATES enjoys a great success and has a vital role in furthering co-operation in higher education and

76 European Communities (1998); "Young Europeans Awards" in Eur-Op News, 1998/ No. 4. The young peoples' opinion was reflected "in a competition where students and young professionals... submitted articles on 'What does my country's future EU membership mean to me?'".

77 This is also fostered by the European Union's programme LINGUA which was established to promote language training, in particular of minority languages.

78 Vandamme, Jacques (1993); "La citoyenneté européenne comme élément de l'identité européenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identité européenne, p. 356.

79 LEONARDO is complemented by PETRA which promotes vocational training for young people and persons, by FORCE which supports in-service training and by IRIS which is specifically destined to training of young women.
prepare young people to live and work within the area of the European Union.\textsuperscript{80} YES, SOCRATES and LEONARDO will be replaced by the initiative \textit{Towards a Europe of Knowledge} by the year 2000.

ERASMUS, together with COMETT, is the widest known educational programme. Named after the travelling scholar Desiderius Erasmus, the programme ERASMUS develops and supports higher education exchange programmes.\textsuperscript{81} Currently over 1.600 universities and 20.000 students take part in ERASMUS\textsuperscript{82}. Since the 16th century, educational exchanges such as ERASMUS have already been in place. The rich and powerful of Europe, especially the princes, politicians, noblemen and gentlemen, travelled around the Continent in search of influential contacts, a greater understanding of international politics and in search of new concepts and ideas. The literature, art and architecture of the countries were studied and collected en route, finding expression in literature and art.\textsuperscript{83} In order to promote exchanges between the European Union and the Central Eastern European states, an equivalent to ERASMUS - TEMPUS - has been introduced during the late 1980s. It will extend co-operation with Central Eastern European countries, the New Independent States and Mongolia in 1999.\textsuperscript{84}

It is in the interest of the European Union that the European dimension is incorporated at the member states' level via the national education systems and the dispersal of Community information material and provisions for training and co-operation. This should not, however, lead to a unified European educational or cultural system. On the contrary: it should become a well-tuned European system of

\textsuperscript{80} This is supplemented by the \textit{Fifth Framework Research Programme} (14.960 million ECU for the period 1999-2002) which enables funding for researchers. 
\textsuperscript{81} To this end, Article 126/2 of the Treaty on European Union encourages the mutual recognition of diplomas and qualifications across all member states in order to ensure equal treatment and unhindered access to employment and the labour market. This does not mean that the European Union seeks an harmonisation of diplomas and qualifications across the EU territory, but it seeks to enhance the mutual trust amongst the EU member states (European Communities (1998); \textit{Report of the High Level Panel on the freedom of movement of persons}, March 17, 1998, Executive Summary, point 4).
\textsuperscript{82} European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); \textit{The week in Europe}, 28 May 1998.
\textsuperscript{84} European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); \textit{The week in Europe}, 10 December 1998.
education, which transcends national boundaries and allows the (young) individual to feel at home in different member states.

**Audio-visual, media and information about Europe**

The European Union also lays great emphasis on the audio-visual and media sector. 1988 saw the first European Cinema and Television Year, following a proposal of the Adonnino Committee. The European Union has a wide network of European cinemas which are supported by the MEDIA programme. This programme comprises over 100 cinemas in Europe, reaching from the Edinburgh Filmhouse to the Wanda cinema in Cracow. MEDIA was primarily set up to protect the European film industry against Americanisation, i.e. Hollywood, but also promotes multimedia technology and "offers financial assistance and other forms of co-operation with European cinema industries." In order to promote the European film industry further, Jacques Santer suggested in April 1998 that Europe should launch an European equivalent of the Oscar, in order to make the already existing 'European Film Award' (formerly Felix) "more transnational, commercial and accessible to the public". In addition, Santer also proposed to set "up a mechanism to lever more private sector investment into audiovisual production, [create] a European film and television school; and [strengthen] the EU's MEDIA programme in training, distribution, script development and marketing."

The European Community believes that "the media can have a decisive impact on its audience, and that if the media is directed appropriately, this impact can be one of increased integration." Citizens depend directly on the media for information about the EU, and the European Union regards the media as a chief means to convey information and culture to the European citizen. In 1984, the European Community's 'Television without frontiers' Green Paper stated that  

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86 Pam Murray, Media Antenna Scotland - Glasgow, in conversation with the author, November 25, 1998. The 1998 December awards, according to the German Press Agency, were the second most important international film award. (Rodek, Hanns-Georg (1998); "Ein starker Europa-Jahrgang" in Die Welt, December 4, 1998)
87 European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); The week in Europe, 9 April 1998.
88 Bakir, Vian (1996); "An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 179.

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Information is a decisive, perhaps the only decisive factor in European unification. European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed. At present, information via the mass media is controlled at national level.\textsuperscript{89}

Since the newspaper media usually reflect "a fundamentally national or regional structure"\textsuperscript{90}, the European Union tends to concentrate on the audio-visual media. Accordingly, the EU's 'Television without frontiers' Directive enables the free movement of television broadcasting across the territory of the EU. Broadcasters must comply with the 'Television without frontiers' Directive which establishes a legal framework for broadcasting in the EU. This means that member states are not allowed to create national restrictions against the reception and transmission of broadcasts from their fellow member states. The 1997 'Television without frontiers' directive (97/36/EC) seeks to "ensure that public interest is protected by the co-ordination of national rules in fields such as advertising, sponsorship, tele-shopping, the right to reply, and the protection of minors and human dignity."\textsuperscript{91} Offensive material, such as pornography and gratuitous violence are prohibited according to Article 22 of the Directive.\textsuperscript{92}

At the time of writing, more than 50% "of the television programmes broadcast by most television channels in the EU [were] of European origin."\textsuperscript{93} In addition, the EU also welcomes European-wide television broadcasting, such as the European television channels Euronews and Eurosport which are modelled on the example of the French-German co-operation of ARTE. Furthermore, one should not forget to mention the 'Eurovision' song contest which is not restricted to EU member states alone, but includes a variety of non EU countries (even non-European), such as Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Israel and Morocco.

\textsuperscript{89} European Commission (1984); \textit{Television without frontiers: Green Paper on the establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, especially by satellite and cable}, COM (84) 300 final, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{90} F. Heinderyckx cited in Bakir, Vian (1996); "An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in Wintle, Michael (ed.); \textit{Culture and Identity in Europe}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{91} European Communities (1997); "Television without Frontiers" in\textit{ Eur-Op News}, 1997/ No. 3.
\textsuperscript{92} Similarly, it is also in the EU's interest to restrict and combat the use of illegal activities on the Internet. But according to David Harrison of The Observer, funds to control the spread of child pornography on the Internet are currently being cut in the European Union; "Fight against child pornography set to be victim of EU cuts" in \textit{The Observer}, June 12, 1998.
\textsuperscript{93} European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); \textit{The week in Europe}, 9 April 1998.
In spite of these efforts to support European-wide media and broadcasting, the EU's resources and provisions of information are not as widely spread as they could be. Culture needs information.\textsuperscript{94} Hence, the EU is concerned to improve public access to information and to creating new sources of information about the European Union, since "it is important to understand the system in order to feel close to it."\textsuperscript{95} As we have seen above, the European Union does not possess its own mass media. Other resources of information confine themselves to EU information centres, Commission representative offices and the Internet. Euro Info Centres and the European Commission representative offices in all major cities distribute free information and booklets concerning the EU. The majority of these centres and offices hold most EU legal documents, EU databases and CD-ROMs. In addition, the various institutions, policy areas, activities, events and publications of the European Union, such as the Official Journal (EUR-Lex) can also be viewed on the Internet. The European Union is present on several websites, the main server being EUROPA which, amongst other things, runs an 'Information Programme for Citizens' and 'Europe Direct' which offers an information service to citizens and businesses. Various European Commission representative offices are also accessible via the Internet.

In February 1994, the Commission and Council "have put in place a system which is destined to ensure citizens the access to internal documents"\textsuperscript{96}. The access to these internal documents of the European institutions guarantee the citizen "the fullest possible access to information"\textsuperscript{97} - only documents concerning internal security are excluded. Access to these internal documents may be supplemented by the 'Citizens First' telephone, which enables citizens to obtain free information about the EU.

\textsuperscript{94} Europazentrum Graz (1996); \textit{Europa wächst}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{95} Galloway, David, Secretariat Council of Ministers (1998); "Institutional Architecture of the EU", paper presented at the Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh, March 12, 1998.
In spite of these policies of openness and transparency, "discourses and documents about the European Union are not always known to the exterior"98. On a scale from 1 ("Know nothing at all") to 10 ("Know a great deal"), the spring 1998 Eurobarometer results show that the average score for perceived knowledge about the EU is 4.19. This compares to 23% who feel that they really need to know a lot more about the EU, whereas 29% are happy with what they already know, and 45% of all EU citizens would like to have more information about the EU, specifically about European citizen rights (49%), the European currency (45%), employment policy (42%) and health and social policy (38%).99

But the implications of both the lack of openness and transparency are far more extensive.100 On the one hand, "publicity [about the European Union] is all too often negative."101 On the other hand, the secrecy and lack of information surrounding the EU influence the confidence-building measures of the EU. The lack of information amongst citizens contributes to the EU's unintelligibility, inadequate transparency and democratic deficit. It is nurtured by the relatively low numbers of citizens using the services available: the number of citizens who wished to obtain internal documents increased from 180 in 1994 to 500 in 1996. In contrast, more than 450,000 people across Europe made use of the Citizens First Telephone number during the 1996/1997 period.102 In addition, the EU is interested in further expanding the role of the Internet for its provision of information. As part of the Trans-European telecom networks, the EU's information society is taking steps to do so, including the Central Eastern European countries.

101 Slater, Martin (1994); "Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building" in Nelson, Brent and Stubbs, Alexander (eds.); The European Union: Readings on Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 158.
3. B.ii European citizenship

We have seen in the preceding section that there has so far not been one single comprehensive European policy aimed directly at creating a European identity. Among the many existing policy areas, European citizenship, alongside a European common currency, probably comes closest to affect the European citizen directly. It has become increasingly apparent that developments in the European Union have brought forth the possibility of membership in various overlapping and strategically interacting political communities on supranational, national and subnational levels and have unleashed the potential for rethinking citizenship, community and identity. However, the dynamics of European Union citizenship have not been fully and properly explored.¹

Accordingly, it is the aim of this section to show that the concept of citizenship introduced in the Treaty on European Union in 1992 may be an essential instrument to create a European identity. In order to elucidate this, the following questions demand an answer: how and why was European citizenship introduced in the TEU? Is the concept of citizenship actually powerful enough to create identity? In how far is citizenship divorced from nationality and from notions of national homogeneity? Does the concept of citizenship increase an 'us' versus 'them' thinking? Is the concept of citizenship internally orientated or does it tolerate external factors? Does, as Preuß rightly asks, "our quest for identity set the boundaries to our sense of justice?"²

For the European Union, European citizenship is primarily an economic, political and social tool which relates to the concept of European identity implicitly rather than explicitly. European citizenship was introduced through a "step-by-step, area-by-area, and group-by-group"³ approach. Originally, European citizenship had predominantly economic reasons, since - together with other citizenship-like rights - it accrued around the right to free movement which was necessary for the full

enjoyment of the four freedoms and the completion of the Single Market. Political or cultural dimensions of European citizenship seem to be side-effects of this which promoted "the economically irrelevant people... to the status of persons". The social element of European citizenship, for instance, empowers the individuals' status in the European Union and provides the latter with a greater degree of legitimacy. Ideally, European citizenship should become a supranational bond which binds together the European Union's diversity.

But the discrepancy between diverse national belief systems and nationalities renders the full implementation of European citizenship difficult. The concept of citizenship and identity are understood differently by different people, governments and political theorists. The debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty are evidence to this. The majority of the Danish people, for example, feared that the introduction of European citizenship could threaten their Danish national identity. Similarly, it was argued in the United Kingdom that European citizenship is "almost a contradiction in terms, and undermines national citizenship. It would be counterproductive to push this concept very far.... [It] is not in any way essential to the internal market and other EU policies."5

European citizenship is only bestowed on "every person holding the nationality of a member state."6 European citizenship is not analogous to nationality. Instead, it is complementary to national citizenship and nationality. European citizenship excludes all other non-EU third country nationals resident in the member states and draws a line between 'us' EU-Europeans and 'them' non-EU Europeans. Given that European citizenship has not yet had the desired impact, it has been argued that

the channels at ports of entry separating EU from other nationals is giving a basic, if minimal, sense of common identity to citizens of EU member states. The latter are aware that they enter a EU country as of right and they enjoy certain important

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6 European Communities (1992); Treaty on European Union, Art. 8.
rights of employment, establishment, permanent residence, limited voting rights and social security benefits on a reciprocal basis.\(^7\)

**Concepts of citizenship and nationality**

Lately, a great deal of attention has been given to the idea of citizenship in general. This is due to several factors as, for instance, the dismantling of the welfare state and the growth of both regionalism and globalisation. Citizenship and identity are most strongly flagged when travelling. On entering the European Union, for example, non-EU citizens need to fill out landing cards. However, discrepancies also exist within the EU between the Schengen countries and the non-signatories to the Schengen agreement. Before assessing European citizenship, a more general look at the concepts of both citizenship and nationality may be useful.

In ancient times, the term *citizenship* had two different meanings. In ancient Greece, citizenship related to the citizen, who, "inscribed in a network of community affiliations which constituted the very structure of the city, was characterised by his objective personal status, be it hereditary or quasi-hereditary."\(^8\) This hereditary or quasi-hereditary status has connotations with what we nowadays understand as an ethnic community. It helps to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, i.e. indigenous populations and strangers. Citizens enjoyed citizenship rights, and were able to engage and participate in the development of their respective polity. The citizen was integrated in a political community and became part of the whole, so that "[t]o rule and be ruled in turn means that at least some of the time the governors can be 'us' and not always 'them'."\(^9\)

In ancient Rome, on the other hand, citizenship described the "status of (rational) property-owners who had certain public duties and responsibilities within the city-state".\(^10\) Property was linked to a number of positive rights and the possibility to political participation. Freemen were excluded from these 'privileges' states.

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7 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 33.
8 Balibar, Etienne (1996); "Is European Citizenship possible?" in Public Culture, No. 8, p. 358.
and were forced to work the property-owners' lands for their subsistence. Yet, this social division gradually diminished as Rome started to expand its empire. Rome extended its citizenship rights to all free individuals in the ever-increasing empire. Consequently, citizenship in Rome referred to the ensemble of citizens unified under one single authority. The principles of exclusion and political participation are essential to citizenship.

The congruence of citizenship and nationality came about with the rise of the nation-state at the time of the French Revolution. The nation-state supposedly merged the state with the nation, and seemed to make the concepts of both nationality and citizenship synonymous. The slogan "liberté, égalité, fraternité" was fostered during the French Revolution and has gained in importance ever since. Citizenship and nationality became increasingly fused with the rise of the multinational state. 1789 laid the foundations for the emergence of the nation-state, as well as the development of the concept of citizenship as we know it today. It helped to bring about a change in the relation between the individual and the state. In the 18th century,

only two sets of relations were thought to be important: relations of individuals inter se, governed primarily by contract, and relations of individuals and state, summed up in the notion of citizenship.11

The nation-state was perceived as a national and political unit, able to preserve the cultural and identity homogeneity of its members.12

After the French Revolution, citizenship played a functional role and was a symbol for popular sovereignty. It

became descriptive of the status of the individual as a free man in the state to which he belonged.... The state accorded rights and privileges to, and accepted direct responsibility to support and protect, those whom it regarded as its citizens in return for the loyalty it expected and discharge of duties it imposed.13

10 B. S. Turner cited in O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, p. 5.
12 Martiniello, Marco (1995); "Introduction" in Martiniello, Marco (ed.); Migration, Citizenship and Ethno-national Identities in the European Union, p. 3.
Citizenship described the individual's status in a polity, endowed the citizen with specific rights and duties to the respective polity, and gave the individual's identity political and legal expression. "Rights, access and belonging are therefore termed the three historical elements of citizenship."  

As political participation was extended to a large section of society, the distinction between nationals and citizens became less significant. The nation became a pre-political entity and the source of state-sovereignty. The exercise of civil rights replaced, or at least supplanted cultural and ethnic values as important elements constituting national identity. As a result, the nation defined the national and "political identity of the citizen within a democratic polity". Nationality depicted one's membership of a polity - nationals became citizens who gave their consent to the respective polity. This "signified the transformation of authoritarian into self-legislated power", since political power was founded in civil society, rather than coming from above. The basic elements for this change were outlined in Rousseau's political writing on the 'social contract' in 1762. Rousseau's social contract stressed the need for consensus amongst equal and free citizens of a civil society and implied that everybody was dependent on everybody and everyone was respected by everyone.

The 'us' versus 'them' or 'inclusion' versus 'exclusion' criteria came about later. According to O'Leary,

[the transformation of nationality and/or citizenship as mechanisms for exclusion took some time. The growth of industrial society required states to act in an increasingly protectionist manner in order to protect their economic interests.]

Together with national provisions of welfare benefits, individual nation-states began to foster their national boundaries by introducing border and passport controls. This closure of nation-states limited the access of citizenship rights to

citizens only. At the same time, it promoted the 'us' versus 'them' thinking, and contributed strongly to the fostering of the respective national identity. Non-citizens were generally excluded from most citizenship rights and were thus not treated equally to citizens.

The British sociologist T. H. Marshall described citizenship as 'membership in a community'. Taking England as an example, he divided the notion of citizenship into three different periods of time and into its civil, political and social aspects. Civil rights mainly developed during the 18th century and refer to individual freedom and civil society. They describe the "liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice"\(^{19}\). Secondly, political rights of the 19th century emphasise "the right to participate in the exercise of political power"\(^{20}\), i.e. the right to vote. They find expression in the respective representative democracies, such as the newly emerging Parliaments. Thirdly, social rights evolved during the beginning of the 20th century. They prescribe a minimum standard of welfare and income. Welfare state policies, services and institutions involved "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society"\(^{21}\). This also included the right to education.

Marshall argues that social rights, next to civil and political rights of citizenship, are essential in order to achieve a basic human equality which can be "associated with the concept of full membership of a community"\(^{22}\). After the Second World War, welfare benefits increased and triggered an expansion of state responsibilities towards its respective citizens. Modern society, therefore, began to increasingly rely on the state to organise its moral obligations, and it is still feared that society's moral commitment may diminish as society looks to the state for solutions. In return, this reliance on the state makes its interventionist means more and more legitimate.

\(^{18}\) O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, p. 9.
\(^{19}\) Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 10.
\(^{20}\) Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 11.
\(^{21}\) Marshall, Thomas H. (1950); Citizenship and Social Class, p. 11.
But does this "politicisation of cultural values" - at the expense of individualism and individual freedom - foster a collective identity? The rights, duties and political participation possibilities which citizenship implies have surely contributed to the collectivity's sense of identity. Nevertheless, it is not the single most important factor. Citizenship is socially and politically excluding since it helps to define "you as a member of the polity with full political and civil rights and duties". Non-citizens are excluded. They remain outsiders and become subject to different rights and duties than citizens. This delimitation between citizens and non-citizens engenders the 'us' versus 'them' thinking and contributes strongly to 'our' sense of identity. Citizenship is hence a statal term which carries national connotations with it. It is inward-looking and describes the individual's relationship with the state. Citizenship is, foremost, inclusive rather than exclusive. Citizenship excludes by including. It first creates the 'us' and then compares it to the 'other' which is external to 'us'.

The debate on inclusion and exclusion, 'us' versus 'them' and citizens/non-citizens is closely linked to the relation between citizenship and nationality. Citizenship and nationality are often used interchangeably. They are two sides of the same coin, namely state membership. Both terms define the citizen and the national against the stateless individual and/or the foreigner. The confusion between citizenship and nationality might be the result of the difficulties defining the term 'nation'. The distinction between citizenship and nationality could thus be described as resulting from the distinction between civic nation (citizenship) and ethnic nation (nationality), as well as the distinction between multi-national states and the assumed homogeneous nation-state. Furthermore, "the acquisition of nationality

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and the assignment of citizenship follow... different criteria. According to the legal or historical traditions of different nation states, and the two terms are used to define different concepts, different aspects of the same concept or even the same concept in an interchangeable fashion. The difference in the use of the terms nationality and citizenship reveals a more important difference in the substance of the concepts of national political identity and belonging in Europe.

According to Rainer Bauböck, the term citizenship designates a political status of individuals as well as a particular quality of a political system. As a normative concept citizenship is a set of rights, exercised by individuals who hold the rights, equal for all citizens, and universally distributed within a political community, as well as a corresponding set of institutions guaranteeing these rights.

Citizenship hence describes a rights and obligations relationship between the citizen and the state. The relationship is primarily defined "in terms of individuals". It is an individualistic concept with a social edge, since the relationship between the citizen and the state is so multi-faceted that it also brings citizens in relation with each other. The citizen's entitlements become public and social, because citizens seek, enjoy and exercise particular rights which are granted, guaranteed or might even be enforced by the respective institutions of a polity. But although citizenship relations occur within and between collectivities, it cannot operate through and by organisations. Citizenship "combines in rather unusual ways the public and social with the individual aspects of political life."

26 This refers to the differentiation between the ethnic and the civic nation, which has already been explored in chapter two.
Citizenship "presupposes the capacity of the individual to play a responsible role in
the maintenance and development of the polity."32

Citizenship is a more open and embracing concept than the more narrowly
defined concept of nationality. It can be more easily acquired. It refers to the
citizen's "internally oriented relationship"33 to the state, and is based on fairly
rational and practical values. Nationality, on the other hand, describes one's
belonging to a particular nation rather than state.

Nationality is often associated with descent, ethnicity and territorial
affiliation and does not confer any rights and obligations upon the national. One
may be a citizen without being a national, since citizenship-status is much easier
obtained than nationality. However, in order to enjoy "the full scope of citizen
rights a person must be or become a national beforehand"34. In this sense,
nationality determines citizenship. There are cases, however, where nationals are
not full citizens, where nationals are not eligible to active democratic participation.
In the past, gender, age and property were important criteria determining political
participation in a polity. Nowadays it is primarily age. Also criminals, and
individuals which are considered as insane, are generally stripped of their
citizenship rights, while their nationality remains. In addition, feminists would
argue that states still have a dualistic and patriarchal approach towards gender
issues. They claim that women are disadvantaged in citizenship rights, the
distribution of social resources and in social policies and employment structures -
but this is a different topic which cannot be elaborated here.35

Traditionally, nationality "conveyed a position of passive submission... [it]
had the meaning of being subject to the government of a particular state and thus

32 Preuß, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 118.
34 Preuß, Ulrich (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in
Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.) (1995); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of
Europe, p. 110. My emphasis.
35 European Union efforts at gender equality, though, would undoubtedly promote the sense of
European identity in this - the larger - section of European citizenship.
served as a demarcation against aliens"36. Nationality is automatically conferred upon individuals by birth. This either happens on the basis of the *ius solis* as, for example, in France, or the *ius sanguinis* as, for instance, in Germany.37 The *ius solis* usually defines the adoption of nationality in the civic nation. The *ius sanguinis*, in contrast, presupposes a common descent, a distinctive ethno-cultural and even political history and identity. The individual may, however, change his/her nationality later in life. It then becomes what Habermas calls a "voluntary adhesion"38. Accordingly, one may "gradually absorb cultural forms shared by the native majority."39

Nationality describes the "individual's externally oriented relationship with the state [which] comes into play in the individual's relationship with those nation-states of which s/he is not a national"40. This relationship between individuals and the state apparatus hence becomes most evident in the diplomatic protection and assistance of individuals in other than their own nation-state. Nationality is more exclusive than inclusive. It is an instrument which includes by excluding: 'we' imagine ourselves to be a community41 which delineates 'us' from 'them'.

The inclusion/exclusion principle is twofold in the European Union - and the implications of European citizenship, together with the phenomenon of immigration, are most strongly felt at the internal and external borders and in the

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37 The new Red-Green government in Germany envisages a change of the German citizenship law: a move away from the *ius sanguinis* towards the *ius solis*. This move is regarded as a fundamental change to "the identity of the German nation" (Traynor, Ian (1999); "German right fights citizenship plan" in The Guardian, January 5, 1999. My translation.). According to this bill, which would also make dual citizenship possible, 'foreigners' born in Germany and immigrants who have lived legally in Germany for eight years would be allowed to obtain German citizenship and voting rights. See also Fietz, Martina and Middel, Andreas (1998); "Das neue Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht trägt grüne Handschrift" in Die Welt, October 16, 1998.
39 Portes, Alejandro and Fernández Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.); Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 28.
41 See Benedict Anderson's argument in chapter two, section a.
border regions. It is at the borders - particularly external borders - where the concept of the free movement of Europeans and others is put to the test and the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens is most clearly made; in addition, border regions often carry the consequences of immigrants who settle there, either temporarily or ultimately, in seek of work or asylum.

On the other hand, some internal borders distinguish between European citizens themselves, depending on whether the particular border in question is shared by Schengen signatory countries or not. Although Schengen was primarily regarded as an instrument to guarantee the right to free movement, the incongruous application of the Schengen agreements within the EU area has, in fact, brought about internal divisions - it has created a division between 'us', i.e. Schengen signatories, versus 'them', i.e. non-members of the Schengen agreement. Based on these internal divisions, the Schengen agreements run in part counter to the principle of European citizenship and the right to free movement. Governments are increasingly able "to carry out checks and controls, to store and exchange information, while the judicial protection of the individual is, if anything, weakened." In addition, it is frequently alleged that the Schengen agreements may generate "an increased atmosphere of intolerance and exclusion of others. The focus at Schengen shifted noticeably from free movement to control." In part, this seems to create a fortress mentality within the Community,... the emerging Schengen network [made] governance in the EC... even less transparent than previous to the new border politics... [and] generated an important insight into the problematic link between the three historical elements of citizenship - rights, belonging and access - in the context of the Community as a non-state polity.

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42 Ferry, Jean-Marc (1992); "Pertinence du postnational" in Lenoble, Jacques et Dewandre, Nicole (eds.); L'Europe au soir du siècle, p. 40.
43 David O'Keefe cited in Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and other Europeans" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 82.
44 Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and other Europeans" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 82 and 83.
45 Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the Constructive Potential of Union Citizenship - A Socio-Historical Perspective" in European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 11, 10, 11.
European citizenship as introduced in the 1992 Treaty on European Union

Origins of European citizenship

The 1952 ECSC and the 1957 Euratom Treaties were concerned with the regulation, production, distribution and pricing of steel and coal on the one hand, and with the control and co-ordination of the nuclear power industry on the other. It was only in the Treaty of Rome/EEC in 1957 that the citizen was mentioned for the first time, albeit indirectly. The preamble of the Rome Treaty implies that the project of the European Economic Community must go beyond economics, namely the EEC should work towards "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." To this end, provisions in the Treaty of Rome guaranteed the nationals of member states certain rights and benefits akin to those of nation-states, even if most of these rights and benefits were indirect.

About twenty years later, and partly due to economic crisis and Eurosclerosis, the "[e]arly 1970s marked a turn from the 'Europe of materials' to the 'Europe for citizens'." During the 1972 Paris summit, the Belgian and Italian Prime Ministers sought to include "the European Citizen [in] the construction of Europe" more directly and by means of establishing "a European citizenship which the inhabitants of our countries now possess." It was suggested that "Europe should be personalised." To this end, the 1974 Paris summit introduced a concrete version of the concept of European citizenship for the first time. The heads of states or governments established a "working group to study the possibility of establishing a passport union and, in anticipation of this, the introduction of a uniform passport." Another "working group was instructed to study the conditions and the timing under which the citizens of the nine Member States could be given special rights as Members of the Community." The establishment of both these study

46 European Communities (1957); Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Text of the Treaty. My emphasis.
48 European Communities (1972); EC Bulletin; 11/1972, Vol. 5, p. 37, 39 and 43.

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groups was the first step which contributed to the creation of European citizenship. In 1975, the Tindemans Report on European Union included a section entitled "A Citizen's Europe" which made reference to these 'special rights'.

'Special rights' were not special in themselves, but symbolic and special in the sense that they were an extension to the rights nationals enjoyed vis-à-vis their own state. Special rights were to include civil and political rights, such as the right to vote in municipal and the European Parliament elections. They were based on the EC's basic principle of equal treatment and only to be accorded to nationals of the European Community's member states. This meant that 'special rights' were also applicable to nationals resident in member states other than their own. The Passport Union was to become the ultimate manifestation of these special rights. Nationals of non-member states were thereby excluded; but in order to avoid increasing tension between those included and those excluded of 'special rights', the 1974 Paris Summit contained a clause which provided "for stage-to-stage harmonisation of legislation affecting aliens and for the abolition of passport controls within the European Union". "[P]eople began to speak of a 'Citizens' Europe'."

Since these 'special rights' shed some light on the complex relationship between the right of free movement, the right to access the European labour market and the abolition of border controls, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive on a general right of residence in 1979. The proposal detached the right of free movement from the individual's exercise of an economic activity and hence made the right of free movement and residence independent of economic activity. This was a first step away from the economic domain of the European Community.

A second launch of the concept of European citizenship were the two Adonnino reports in 1985. They addressed issues which would benefit Community citizens directly in their everyday lives, such as the abolition of border controls and formalities. The Adonnino Committee understood that the aim of the

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52 Tindemans, Leo (1975); Report on European Union to the European Council.
European Community/Union cannot be purely based on economic political factors, and that cultural integration will not automatically come about once economic and political union are achieved. As a result, the reports put forward proposals to enhance cultural, educational and communication exchanges. These proposals were substantiated under the many successive Citizens' Europe initiatives and may be characterised as... 'socio-political', for [they] involved Community elites worrying about the degree of public support for their policies and popular identification with European institutions.

Following the Adonnino reports, the Commission published a report on 'Voting Rights for Community Nationals in Local Elections' in 1988. This was an essential breakthrough from the traditional notion that member states' nationals only enjoy full civil and political rights in their own state, while being stripped of their democratic rights elsewhere. The right to vote in local elections was based on the argument that the right of free movement and residence should imply that being a citizen of one Member state confers rights in the other Member state too. Citizenship is thus disassociated from the national limits on rights attached to a given nationality. There is no doubt that Community legislation has had the effect of breaking the link between national territory and legal implications of nationality. The gradual achievement of a Peoples' Europe will consolidate the trend.

The Single European Act of 1986 was to lay the foundations to achieve this 'Peoples' Europe'. Its objective was to establish, by the end of 1992, a frontierless area, within which free movement of goods, people, services and capital was guaranteed. Furthermore, 'Europe 92' aimed at developing the feeling among Europeans that they belong to one great unit, where they can move freely, work, study and live where they wished. To this end, Article 13/8a in Section II of the Single European Act ensured the right to free movement of persons, and not just

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56 Anderson, Malcolm, Boer den, Monica and Miller, Gary (1994); "European Citizenship and Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs" in Duff, Andrew et. al. (eds.); Maastricht and beyond, p. 106.
58 O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, p. 20.
economic actors\textsuperscript{59}. At the same time, however, Art. 8a also began to mark a difference between those privileged by and those excluded from this right. This was further highlighted by the Schengen agreements signed in 1985 and 1990.

However, it was not until the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the concept of European citizenship was introduced into an official text and received a legal basis. Interestingly enough, there is little literature on how the concept of citizenship was actually introduced into the TEU, but abundant literature about the content and effect, the flaws and complexities of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty. Yet, the coming about of the concept of European citizenship may be as important as the manifestation of European citizenship itself. It may provide an explanation for the problem of the current right to European citizenship.

During the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1990 in Dublin, the Spanish government presented a Memorandum on European citizenship. It emphasised that, so far, the European integration process only had had a limited influence on the Community citizens' daily lives. It regretted that the citizens were not actively involved in the progress of the Community since they remained nothing but "privileged foreigners"\textsuperscript{60}. In order to overcome this, the memorandum argued that European citizenship would foster a personal and inalienable status of the citizen of member States, which by virtue of their membership in the Union, have special rights and tasks, inherent in the framework of the Union, which are exercised and protected specifically within the borders of the Community, without this prejudicing the possibility of taking advantage of this same quality of European citizen also outside the said borders.\textsuperscript{61}

Consequently, European citizenship would add a dynamic to the European Community integration process, "overcome the inequalities which subsist between Community citizens because they live in different areas of the Community and through different means reinforce the economic and social cohesion in a concrete framework"\textsuperscript{62}.

\textsuperscript{59} Article 13/8a in Section II of the Single European Act states: "The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."

\textsuperscript{60} Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{61} Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{62} Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
According to the Spanish text, there are three spheres of rights and obligations for Community citizens: those stemming from national citizenship of member states, those stemming from the Treaties and those which make "the citizen of the Community, who is for the moment no more than a 'privileged foreigner', a citizen of the European Union." The Spanish memorandum suggests that European citizenship should be based on these three general rights. Their full implementation would "eliminate the negative effects presently accompanying the condition of foreigner for a citizen of a member state living in another member state." Although some of these rights are already part of other EC Treaties, the Spanish text concluded that they still need to be widened and extended to all European citizens: European citizenship would guarantee the right to the complete freedom of movement, the right to free choice of residence and the right to political participation.

In addition, the Spanish government argued that new policies should be introduced: "social relations, health, education, culture, environmental protection, consumers, etc." The extent and adoption of these policies would depend on the direction political union would take. The report also suggested an 'European Ombudsman' to protect and safeguard citizens' rights. Furthermore, consular protection and assistance to nationals of member states in third countries where their own member state is not represented was proposed.

All of these proposals for a European citizenship would, the Spanish proposal concluded, establish a new relationship between the "European Union as a whole, and the European citizen as a holder of rights derived from his 'status civitatis' and, as such, holder of specific rights of the Union." European citizenship would represent a "qualitative jump which allows an area of essentially economic character to be transformed into an integrated area which would be at the direct

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63 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
64 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 2.
65 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 3.
66 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 3.
service of the citizen." The Spanish memorandum stressed that European citizenship should become

one of the three main pillars of the European Union [since it is] one of the basic elements of the credibility of Political Union in the eyes of public opinion and an essential condition to guarantee the functioning and development of all the constituent elements of the Union, as the European citizen is the basis itself of democratic legitimacy.68

Ultimate reasons for introducing European citizenship in the TEU

As we have seen, the attempts to introduce the concept of European citizenship initially came from 'above' rather than 'below'. According to Martiniello, there are five reasons which explain the introduction of citizenship of the European Union 'from above'69:

The first reason is closely linked to the single market and its principle of the freedom of movement. The mobility of European workers and people in a single market without internal frontiers requires the implementation of social rights at the European level for their public and personal protection. The granting of political rights, such as the right to vote on the local and European level, would be an extension to social rights and the freedom of movement. Although Article 8 of the TEU does not offer much in terms of Marshallian socio-economic and civic rights mentioned earlier, the concept of European citizenship, as the European Union itself, is based on this premise of free movement in an area without internal frontiers.

The second reason is linked to the democratic deficit and the lack of popular democratic participation in the European Union. The European Parliament is the only directly elected body of the European Union. Despite the co-decision procedure introduced in the TEU, the European Parliament still has only limited powers in comparison to the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. European citizenship can be seen as an attempt to overcome this democratic deficit.

67 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 4.
68 Agence Europe (1990); Europe Documents; No. 1653, 2 October 1990, p. 4.
It should develop and increase public participation in the European integration process. However, it is questionable whether the right to vote in local and European elections can actually contribute to a rise in democratic participation in the European Union. The importance of both local and European elections still remains minimal compared to national elections. Local elections have so far not had an important impact on the development or degree of democratic legitimisation of the European Union. European elections, on the other hand, seem to be second-rate national elections to the European citizen. Turnout at European elections is uneven and low - turnout for the June 1994 elections was as low as 56.5%\textsuperscript{70}. Voters tend to express national discontent and disillusionment with national politics rather than vote for European issues. European elections do usually not imply a possible change of policy orientation. Furthermore, the differing national electoral systems, party campaigns and the fact that the outcome of the European elections does not result in the establishment of a government seem to indicate that there is no direct relation between citizens' reaction and (EU) public power\textsuperscript{71}. This is further fostered by the non-existence of a genuine European party system. Transnational manifestos rely on the national parties' campaigns. Their electoral agendas hardly exploit highly visible, salient and common issues of central concern (such as social and green issues, including racism, drugs, AIDS, cancer, the environment, etc.) which would increase credibility and win more votes.

Thirdly, European policy-makers saw the need to bring the European integration process closer to the people and to reduce the elitist and technocratic character of the European Union. The European project is not just about the integration process amongst European member states, but also the European peoples. Economic reasons alone are insufficient to advance the European integration project. Socio-political and cultural factors also play an essential role, in order to achieve a fully integrated European Community/Union. European


\textsuperscript{71} Neunreither, Karlheinz (1995); "Citizens and the exercise of power in the European Union" in Rosas, Alan and Antola, Esko (eds.); \textit{A Citizens' Europe: In Search of a New Order}, p. 12.
citizenship would strengthen the rights and interests of member states' nationals and make them feel part of the European integration project.

The *fourth* reason for the introduction of the concept of European citizenship in the TEU was to create a European identity and a sense of belonging. It is questionable which form of identity would emerge - identification with the Union or identification with other citizens? Irrespective of the form, it is certain, however, that a European identity would be a means to obtain full public support for the European Union. It would provide the European Union with a strong degree of legitimacy, since citizens would be willing to participate in the EU integration process. Popular sovereignty would allow the European Union to be fully accepted as a political actor internally as well as externally. Yet, it is difficult to create a European identity, when local, regional and national allegiances are still strong. The effects of the European symbols - the European flag, passport and anthem - upon the creation of a European identity are limited. Nevertheless, they still remain essential means to increase and foster an awareness for the European Union.

The *fifth* reason incorporates all other reasons, since "it is not possible to conceive of a political Union without an accurate previous delimitation and without defining the persons belonging to the Union". Since the concept of citizenship would be a means to include by excluding, the members of the European Union would need to know who belongs to them and who does not. In this sense, European citizenship

is not so much a relation of the individual vis-à-vis Community institutions but rather a particular socio-legal status vis-à-vis national member states which have to learn how to cope with the fact that persons, who are physically and socially their citizen, are acquiring a kind of legal citizenship by means of European citizenship without being their nationals.

However, restricting European citizenship to the member states' nationals only leads to a great degree of exclusion of immigrants. Only truly European citizens would become beneficiaries of the economic and limited socio-political

73 Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 551.
rights the European Union has on offer. In the extreme case, this conception of "Europeanity" could in future become a strong and dangerous cultural and ethnic-laden value for Union citizens. Current claims of the existence of a European culture are based on the delimitation with the 'others' living beyond the frontiers of the EU. Sadly enough, this also affects the large immigration communities living within the frontiers of the European Union. The reappearance of racism and xenophobia during the late 1980s and early 1990s has been mainly directed against non-Community nationals and migrants. In the extreme case, one could assess these manifestations as signs of exclusion, as "forces moving from 'fortress Europe' towards 'ethnic Europe'".

European citizenship as it exists today

Prior to the Treaty on European Union, the concept of European citizenship was "rudimentary". Citizenship-like rights kept adapting continuously to the historic evolution of the internal market, "whereby citizenship-like rights have gradually been extended to Member State nationals on the basis of Community law". Citizenship rights were scattered around the Treaties, but never to be found - summarised - in one single article (as, for example, the right of economic actors to move, reside and work).

Art. 8 of the TEU seems to be the result of the "Community legal disorder." European citizenship is still not a cohesive concept. The "reference to rights alone does not say enough about the character of this supranational

75 See chapter two.
77 See annex for a more detailed analysis of this.
79 O'Leary, Siofra (1996); The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship, p. 21.
citizenship, since the connection between rights and obligations remains unclear. European citizenship carries virtually no duties with it, and one could argue that European citizenship rights are merely symbolic, since a "right is not effective by itself, but only through the obligation to which it corresponds." The few obligations of European citizenship are indirect - as, for instance, the duty to comply with Community law and to vote in those countries where voting is compulsory.

According to Chris Shore and Annabel Black, European citizenship has become "mandatory" and to become so, the decision and introduction of European citizenship "was taken without reference to the citizen at all." European citizenship is inscribed in the EC pillar, the first pillar of the Treaty on European Union. It has received "further constitutional affirmation with the Treaty of Amsterdam" which confirms that European citizenship is complementary to national citizenship. European citizenship remains dependent on the member states' nationality and passport policies, and is - not by definition, but practically - subject to the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (Title VI), the third pillar of the Treaty on European Union.

This may imply that granting European citizenship is firmly in the hands of the member states and intergovernmental negotiations. European citizenship is not subject to the democratic control of the European Parliament, but given that EC law is superior to national law, European citizens may address the European Court of Justice for individual rights embedded in EC law. Nonetheless, member states may restrict benefits for nationals of other member states. This is probably one of the

82 Weil, Simone (1949); L'enracinement, p. 9. My translation.
83 In the van Gend en Loos case it is made specifically clear that "Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law... not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage". As Weiler states, this "phrase wonderfully sharpens the issue, for here are obligations imposed on individuals independently of the legislation of Member States". Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1996); "European Neo-constitutionalism: in Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional order" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 521.
84 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 275.
reasons - bar Denmark and the United Kingdom - why the introduction of European citizenship was "one of the less controversial topics"\textsuperscript{86} in the TEU. Had European citizenship or the entire Schengen agreements been brought within the first

'Community' structure and procedures, an important element of supranational initiative and control [would have been] introduced into areas of criminal law enforcement, immigration control and asylum - previously regarded as part of the regalian core of the sovereign state.\textsuperscript{87}

Although European citizenship is now embedded within the legislative framework of the European Union, much remains to be done. Co-operation between member states should be improved. The right to residence and access to employment should be facilitated. Language training should be developed in order to advance the free movement of people and cultural exchanges and integration. Overall, European citizens need to become aware of their rights and benefits laid down in the EU’s legal framework\textsuperscript{88}, as well as be capable and willing to accept European citizenship.

\textit{European citizenship and European identity}

If the terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are used interchangeably within the traditional dimension, does this also apply to European citizenship and nationality? The answer is no, since European citizenship does not yet correspond to the traditional concept of citizenship. Nor should European citizenship be misunderstood as a "mere expansion of the traditional concept of citizenship of nation-states"\textsuperscript{89}, which usually describes the direct link between citizens and state, based on faith, allegiance and common values. Although European citizenship is

\textsuperscript{85} Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); \textit{A Question of Identity}, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{86} Anderson, Malcolm, Boer den, Monica and Miller, Gary (1994); "European Citizenship and Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs" in Duff, Andrew et. al. (eds.); \textit{Maastricht and beyond}, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{87} Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); \textit{Schengen and EU Enlargement}, p. 32.

\textsuperscript{88} For further suggestions of reforms to make European citizenship a more genuine concept, see O'Leary, Siofra (1996); \textit{European Union Citizenship}, specifically pp. 105-127.
bestowed on all member states' nationals, it seems to be divorced from nationality and "appears to be inferior in status to that of national citizenship."90 Indeed, "([n]ationalists of the Member States are European Citizens, not the other way around."91 European citizenship still depends on the member states' nationality laws and is not yet a concept per se. Accordingly, and coming back to Neil McCormick's argument referred to in the second part of this chapter, European citizenship is a thin concept as opposed to the thicker concept of nationality or national citizenship. One could add that European citizenship is even thinner, since it needs to respect all of the member states' nationalities. This gives enough reason to believe that European citizenship is based on the lowest possible common denominator.

Since European citizenship attempts to embrace the large array of multiple cultures and identities that exist in the European Union, European citizenship has been defined as

a new kind of citizenship... that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense that identities, rights and obligations... are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions, states, national and transnational voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions.92

Indeed, European citizenship allows nationals of EU member states to claim certain rights as either EU citizens or nationals. European citizenship enables individuals to address the European Court of Justice for issues which are not laid down in national legislation. In the extreme case, individuals may circumvent national legislation by approaching the European Court of Justice.93 European citizenship, understood in terms of a supranational citizenship, helps to abolish the hierarchy between the different loyalties "to look to one another across national

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90 Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 549.
94 As we have seen earlier, this may specifically be the case for women's movements which support the European Union's efforts at gender equality.
boundaries."94 "European citizenship does not mean membership in a European nation."95 The institutional attempt to create a European identity through citizenship is clearly a political elite-led top-down rather than bottom-up project.

Was European citizenship introduced as a means to create a European identity internal to the European Union? The concept of citizenship seemed to be the proper means to create a European identity, because citizenship - as we have seen - has a broader meaning than the concept of nationality, referring to the individual's relation to civic institutions rather than ethnic communities. Therefore, the introduction of European citizenship is plausible, whereas the introduction of a European nationality is not. If the leaders of the European Union had seriously intended to build a European nation, they would have included the narrower concept of a European nationality within the TEU. However, if this had been the case, there would have been an outcry amongst the populations of the European member states. The introduction of a European nationality would have indicated the attempt to build a homogeneous entity, the much-dreaded 'European superstate'.

Still, if one were to take the definitions given above and reduce citizenship as being internal and inclusive, and nationality as being the external and exclusive component to state membership, one may argue that the clash between nationality of the member states and European citizenship has more than one conflictual dimension to it.

On the assumption that the concept of citizenship is inclusive and internal to a specific entity, the introduction of European citizenship should be an effective instrument to create a strong feeling of belonging amongst the citizens of the EU and a strong feeling of European identity within the European Union. However, as has been suggested in chapter two, a European identity has essentially been manifest against an 'other', especially a threatening 'other', such as the Ottoman Empire, Central Eastern Europe during the Cold War, and the current waves of immigration targeting Europe since the end of the Cold War. This suggests that the

term 'European identity' should not restrict itself to citizens holding European citizenship only. European identity, as will be argued in chapter five, goes beyond the boundaries of the European Union and should give way to "forms of blended identity and transnationalism."96

Following this reasoning and the assumption that the concept of nationality is external and representative to the outside, the introduction of a European nationality (rather than citizenship) would actually be more logical; in the sense that a European identity and feeling of togetherness is already detectable towards the non-European 'other'. This kind of identity could have been reinforced even more by the introduction of a European nationality. But at the same time, it would have been incredibly controversial, since nationality still remains at the centre of the nation-state and strikes at the heart of common national social, cultural and political values and identities.

Consequently, the traditional connotations of both the concepts of citizenship and nationality are not yet applicable to the European Union, but restricted to the national dimension. European citizenship "brings about a new level of complexity in relation to the constellation of identities within Europe"97, in particular because European citizenship seems to delink citizenship from nationality. This underlines that the European Union was intent to create a civic polity and a European civil society which, according to Meehan, necessitates actively to involve citizens in the European integration process. It attempts to meld the diverse models of citizenship of the member states into a European one, thereby ensuring that each EU member state maintains its own belief-system and contributes to the EU's multicultural character and diversity.

It has been mentioned above that European citizenship has so far not created a feeling of belonging, which is necessary for the creation and fostering of a European identity. The presence of national differences, particularities and identities is still too strong to allow a European identity to emerge. European citizenship does not yet represent the EU's diversity and multiculturalism, nor is it identified with all three traditional dimensions of citizenship - legal, political and, specifically, social. Instead, it seems that Article 8 of the TEU corresponds to a hasty composition which does not say much about citizenship - at least not about its definitive legal status. It rather constitutes a bundle of options within a physically broadened and functionally more differentiated space. Indeed, one may agree with Joseph Weiler that European citizenship resembles a tourist-carnet with freebies.

Nevertheless, one should not dismiss the concept of European citizenship altogether. Although it is questionable whether a European citizenship is able to create a European identity, one must admit that European citizenship is, in fact, a step into the right direction. Neo-Functionalists like Elizabeth Meehan, for instance, contend that each policy area of the European Union is influenced by the spill-over effect. Taking the area of European social policy as an example, Meehan argues that "social rights, together with civil and political rights, form a triad, which must be regarded as interlocked". Community law can therefore be no longer restricted to market forces, since it also affects the status of the individual in the European Community. No individual is any longer immune to changes in European policy areas, the institutional arrangements of the European Union and the supremacy of European law over national law. The individual in the European Union can no

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98 See Thomas Marshall, mentioned earlier in this section.
101 Ulrich Preuß (1995); "Citizenship and Identity: Aspects of Political Theory of Citizenship" in Bellamy, Richard et. al. (eds.); Democracy and Constitutional culture in the Union of Europe, p. 119. Preuß's argument that citizenship is able to create identity stands in contrast to the argument that citizenship presupposes the existence of a community. This means that citizenship is the consequence of a strong feeling of identity; and those who do not belong to this particular community have no right to claim the status of citizenship.
longer be regarded as a worker only, but needs to be perceived as a citizen. The introduction of European citizenship therefore

coincides with movements towards political union... [a] pattern... of horizontal avenues and a more plural set of institutions through which citizenship, as both entitlements and 'lived' experience, may be realised.103

European citizenship should renew the association between citizenship and nationality in a slightly different way,104 without imposing a false sense of common identity upon the community concerned. In this sense, European citizenship should, by definition, become complementary to national citizenship. This would mean - as we have seen earlier in this chapter - that European citizenship would be subject to a "joint legitimacy"105 - Weiler's two 'demoi' legitimacy - which describes an ethnic legitimacy to the nation(-state) on the one hand, and a civic legitimacy to the European Union on the other. Yasemin Soysal also suggests that European citizenship would disengage the two major components of citizenship - rights and identity.106 European citizenship would cosmopolitise the traditional relation between the citizen and the state, but leave the concept of nationality and identity in tact. Both concepts - nationality and identity - cannot be taken away from the European citizens, but are able to co-exist with a European citizenship and a subsequent European identity.

Similarly, Habermas argues that both European citizenship and national identity may be united under his model of Constitutional Patriotism. According to Habermas (and as we will see in chapter five), Constitutional Patriotism allows European citizenship and nationality, political identity and national identity, to be complementary. Constitutional Patriotism implies that "to be a citizen has not only the meaning of being a member of a particular political community, but of being

102 Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, p. 2.
103 Meehan, Elizabeth (1993); Citizenship and the European Community, p. 147; and Meehan, Elizabeth (1997); "Political Pluralism and European Citizenship" in Lehning, Percy and Weale, Albert (eds.); Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe, p. 73.
105 Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1996); "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance" in Bernitz, Ulf and Hallström, Pål (eds.); Principles of Justice and the European Union, p. 45.
106 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook, Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, p. 18.
part of a common identity of that very community". Constitutional Patriotism may hence be a means to accommodate an individual's multiple loyalties, including national identity, within the supranational sphere of the European Union. Being aware that the question of multiple loyalties is not easy to answer, Weiler proposes a model of variable geometry, or a 'concentric circles' approach'... One feels simultaneously as belonging to, and being part of, say, Germany and Europe; or, even, Scotland, Britain and Europe. What characterises this view is that the sense of identity and identification derives from the same sources of human attachment albeit at different levels of intensity.

This would represent a kind of "social contract' among the nationals of states... [who will] regard themselves as associating as citizens in this civic society." Identities may shift, according to circumstances and context.

Access to this kind of citizenship would be made easier, and the emerging broad identity would be based on 'otherhood' rather than 'brotherhood'. The boundary between 'us' and 'them' would be far lower, and the idea of inclusion rather than exclusion would prevail. European identity would denote a common tradition of thought and culture rooted in that constant interchange over two millennia which has given this part of the world a certain unity of the mind.

Meanwhile, however, "[i]f a European citizenship is to truly emerge in the future, then the very notion of constitutional order will have to change..."
European citizenship should be coupled with openness and equality and not become a "instrument of closure". Both the notions of 'openness' and 'equality' are pre-conditions for a successful European integration process which is supportive of the development of cultural pluralism. Equating European citizenship with "tendencies towards uniformity" is dangerous, since "national identities [could be] articulated in new ways, either in exclusionary narratives, or as search for new national identities."

In order to avoid European citizenship becoming a component for the inclusion/exclusion debate, Ulrich Preuß suggests that European citizenship should be based on a "common European criterion", such as residence rather than nationality. To this end, the Euro Citizen Action Service (ECAS) suggests that European citizenship should be granted to third country nationals if they are legally resident in the European Union for a minimum of five years. This acquisition of European citizenship "may be called the *status path*, because the acquisition of the status of citizenship takes logical precedence over the consequential rights attached to it. Rights are derived from the status." According to ECAS, this *status path* would also be congruent with the TEU's Art. 14 on anti-discrimination and the universal principles of human rights. More importantly, however, it would be the

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112 Tassin, Etienne (1992); "Europe: a political community?" in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.); *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, p. 171.
113 Balibar, Etienne (1996); "Is European Citizenship possible?" in *Public Culture*, No. 8, p. 356.
115 Brubaker, Roger (1992); *Citizenship and Nationality in France and Germany*, p. 31.
117 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook, Mary (eds.); *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, p. 23.
118 Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in *Political Studies*, No. 44, p. 548.
119 Similarly, the new German citizenship law envisages residence of minimum eight years. Fietz, Martina and Middel, Andreas (1998); "Das neue Staatsbürgerschaftsrecht trägt grüne Handschrift" in *Die Welt*, October 16, 1998.
120 Preuß, Ulrich (1996); "Two challenges to European citizenship" in *Political Studies*, No. 44, p. 548.
122 The European Union has not acceded to the European Convention of Human Rights, but only makes reference to it in Article F.2 and in the fourth pillar of Justice and Home Affairs.

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first step to a European citizenship in which European citizens' rights and benefits would be based on a multiplicity of memberships which are legitimated by global ideologies. Rights which once belonged to the national community, would hence become increasingly universal (for instance, human rights), but at the same time allow identities to remain ethnically or territorially bound.

This chapter has shown that European integration theories have paid little attention to the concept of European identity. In general, European integration theories tend to focus on explaining the process of integration rather than the possibility of involving the individual in the EU's new governance arrangements. Nonetheless, European integration theories should not be dismissed altogether, since they shed some light on the EU's problem of system design, problem of governance and lack of legitimacy. It has been argued that the European Union is built on "a formal vertical relationship between the EU structures of government... [and that] we can derive no assumptions... about the... existence of the horizontal relationship... between those citizens which binds them together." The institutional architecture and policy procedures of the European Union are complex and have so far not created a sense of popular identification amongst the European citizens. European citizens feel alienated from the EU's governance structures, and given the growth of the European integration process, citizens' loyalty can no longer be taken for granted.

In an attempt to obtain citizens' loyalty, the European Union has introduced a number of measures that aim at 'Europeanising' the individual beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Moreover, these measures are also aimed at constructing a European identity from the top down. They are similar to statehood symbols and include the introduction of the freedom of movement, the European

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123 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook, Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, p. 22-23.
124 Soysal, Yasemin (1996); "Changing Citizenship in Europe" in Cesarani, David and Fulbrook, Mary (eds.); Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe, p. 18.
126 Carter, Caitriona and Scott, Andrew (1998); "Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the European Nation-State" in European Law Journal, Vol. 4/ No. 4, pp. 441-442.
flag and anthem, the European single currency, as well as the concept of European citizenship. It is possibly too early to tell in how far these measures have been successful. It is for certain, however, that the introduction of European citizenship "is undoubtedly a landmark with implications for the future."^{127} Although European citizenship has so far not spelt out the citizens' duties vis-à-vis the European Union, it summarises and emphasises the citizens' rights within the European Union.

On the assumption that the European integration process is to remain a "dynamic, open-ended"^{128} project, European citizenship is an important stepping stone to foster the citizens' double sense of belonging. European citizenship "could support the development of a European polity based on an open political community,"^{129} possibly with open borders. Despite the present incongruities between the European Union's territorial and political borders which, as we have seen earlier, challenge the traditional definition of citizenship, make it difficult to ascribe a familiar concept of governance or a additional notion of identity to the European Union - one should not dismiss the identity-building project altogether.

In an effort to demonstrate that open borders, particularism and unity may be brought together and reconciled in the European project, the next chapter will draw on the concepts of borderlands and transborder co-operation projects on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, trying to argue why borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union seem to be laboratories from which a wider, inclusive European identity may emerge.

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127 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 285.
128 See also Shaw, Jo (1998); "A Concept of European Citizenship: Problems and Possibilities" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question of Identity, p. 236.
The Eastern border of the EU and its adjacent borderlands are currently undergoing a transformation which has its origin in the events of 1989/90. In view of future EU enlargement towards the East, the current Eastern frontier of the EU is not to remain, but prospective integration of the Central Eastern European countries will push the Eastern EU frontier further towards the East. This process will "overcome the division of Europe in its political dimension", and affect the Eastern frontier of the European Union, its borderlands and Europe as a whole.

On this assumption, this chapter argues that 'Europe' - often incorrectly seen as synonymous with Western Europe - does not end at the Oder-Neiße rivers. In order to demonstrate this, this chapter will first focus on the Mitteleuropa debate, specifically on Mitteleuropa's cultural heritage. With prospective enlargement towards the East, the Central Eastern European countries do not want to revert back to the old concept of Mitteleuropa, fearing that this could generate the return of a Europe in-between, as indicated by Jiri Grusa. Instead, they wish to assert their affiliation to the West.

Since the 1989/90 velvet revolutions, transformation processes have been taking place in and around the Central Eastern European countries, affecting various actors and levels. "In Mitteleuropa", as Krystian Heffner asserts, "these manifestations are most apparent where state structures come into contact, that is in the regions close to the frontier, borderlands and border regions." It seems as if theses processes have given borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union a new meaning. Borderlands on the Eastern

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1 Stihl, Hans Peter, President of the German Chamber of Industry and Trade (1998); "Die EU muß nun für die Osterweiterung fit gemacht werden" in Handelsblatt, December 31, 1998. My translation.

2 Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union, p. 32.
frontier of the European Union may become a hinge for European enlargement; and they can be seen as laboratories in which the parameters of a genuine European identity may crystallise with consequences for the wider European territory.

In order to foster this new two-dimensional status of borderlands, projects of transfrontier co-operation, most of them in the form of Euroregions, have been introduced. There is not one model of transborder co-operation applicable to all borderlands, since each project of transfrontier co-operation has been specifically modelled to the individual border region's political, economic, social and topographical problems, as well as diverse cultural, historical and political understandings. Each project of transborder co-operation has come into existence at a different time and

as social and economic activities spill over the frontiers or their consequences come to be strongly felt across the frontier, different levels of transfrontier political and administrative co-operation become necessary.4

The analysis of each individual transborder co-operation project, including its aims and obstacles, would hence be a difficult task. Instead, and despite the flaws involved, this section will be based on a general approach to transborder co-operation, asserting that the objective common to all projects of transfrontier co-operation is to overcome and to abolish the divisive nature of the frontier5 and "to attempt to solve the problem of regional underdevelopment by taking the opportunities created by... European integration"6.

In general, one may argue that transborder co-operation has been established

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6 Veen van der, Anne and Boot, Dirk-Jan (1995); "Crossborder co-operation and Regional Policy" in Eskelinen, Heikki and Snickars, Folke (eds.); Competitive European Peripheries, p. 78.
to resolve the practical difficulties encountered by people affected by the frontier, to develop good neighbourly relations between people, to obtain remedies for harm and to gain information about decisions and developments which may affect the material interests of neighbouring regions.7

To avoid confusion between transfrontier co-operation and other kinds of co-operation, the definition and development of transfrontier co-operation will be explained first. This will then be followed by an analysis of the challenges and problems inherent in transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Controls along the Eastern frontier of the European Union "had to be strengthened to allow for the dismantling of the EU's internal frontiers."8 Yet, these controls should not be restrictive in character, but foster cross-border co-operation. Accordingly, this chapter will not focus on the Eastern frontier of the European Union as a barrier with its challenges and problems, but also take into account its role as a bridge. Raimund Krämer argues that "borders, by nature, are barriers... At the same time, however, they represent points where political, economic and cultural systems meet and come into contact."9 In this sense, it is in the interest of this chapter to show that borders are not necessarily barriers but can be bridges. Borderlands on either side of the Eastern frontier have common interests, and it seems as if they represent original ways for multi-ethnic societies to co-habit within the framework of European integration. Effective co-operation, according to Jacques Santer, "will stabilise Europe in the long-term... and turn it into a centre of co-operation and togetherness."10

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8 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 94.
9 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 23. My translation.
The term *Mitteleuropa* is difficult to define, since the concept is vague and used too generously. *Mitteleuropa* has no precise geographical existence since there are no clearly delineated geographical boundaries to delimit the area. *Mitteleuropa* is commonly understood as "the fertile mix of lands, tongues, peoples that was once the Hapsburg Empire," stretching from the Polish plains in the north over the Czech Carpathian area towards Austria and Hungary. This definition situates *Mitteleuropa* somewhere between Germany and Russia and gives rise to the following questions: where does *Mitteleuropa* begin and where does it end? Is Germany, even as a member of the European Union, part of *Mitteleuropa*? Is the Western frontier of *Mitteleuropa* delineated by the Oder-Neiße rivers or is it running through the middle of Germany? Will the notion of *Mitteleuropa* diminish once the Central Eastern European countries have attained full membership of the European Union?

*Mitteleuropa* is often used interchangeably with Central Europe or even Central Eastern Europe. Each of these terms has different historical connotations, which is largely a question of semantics. Many Central Eastern European scholars respond negatively to the term *Mitteleuropa.* For Jiri Grusa, the German term *Mitteleuropa* refers to something undefinable which lies in between two defined concepts - East and West (middle=intermediate). Also, from a historical point of view, the term *Mitteleuropa* is associated with German imperialism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, the drive towards the East, aggression and chaos. This association stems from misunderstandings of the concept of *Mitteleuropa* developed by Friedrich Naumann. It has often been

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11 White, Michael (1998); "In which Middle Europe gets to be central" in *Independent on Sunday*, July 5, 1998.
12 See, for instance, Grusa, Jiri (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union*, p. 31.
13 After World War I, Naumann sought a *Mitteleuropa* that consisted of a confederation of states (not a state). According to Naumann, existing states were too small to meet any military threat or compete with larger states. A united *Mitteleuropa*, however, could become a strong competitive force in the world market. In such a confederation, the interests of all states should
condemned as an 'ideal of pan-germanistic imperialism' and given the term *Mittel€uropa*, unjustifiably, a negative meaning.

Instead of describing the area between Russia and Germany as *Mitteleuropa*, the terms Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe are much more acceptable to Grusa (centre=in the centre/essential). The area between the European Union and Russia would no longer be associated with any notion of in-betweenness, but "opting instead for 'Western' Europe, being part of the 'centre' will bring with it the temptation to draw the line towards the East, to erect a new frontier." Central Europe or Central Eastern Europe, according to Grusa, are neutral terms. They come close to describing actual facts: the area in the European centre with its Eastern extensions. Central (Eastern) Europe may even "evoke the idea of bridge", especially since

[accession to the centre actually increases the need to relate to neighbours, to build bridges, particularly as there is the high likelihood of new buffer states caught in-between an enlarged European Union and Russia.]

**Historical legacy of Mitteleuropa**

Since the eleventh century, *Mitteleuropa* has been subject to a wide range of geographical, political, economic and social changes. Due to its

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14 Schubert, Markus (1993); *Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre*, p. 18.


16 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union*, p. 33.

17 Grusa, Jiří (1996); "Ich will die Grenze loben" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Boundaries and Identities: The Eastern Frontier of the European Union*, p. 31. See also Kusy, Miroslav (1989); "We, Central Europeans - Eastern Europeans" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 91; Hanák, Péter (1989); "Central Europe: a historic region in modern times" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 57; Milosz, Czeslaw (1989); "Central European Attitudes" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 116.

18 Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or a Culture Bows Out" in *Granta-Journal* Vol. 11, p. 102.

19 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Gulf or Bridge?" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Schengen and the Southern Frontier of the European Union*, p. 33.
geographical landlocked position at the heart of the European continent, *Mitteleuropa* was often regarded as a useful buffer zone against any outside threat by powers situated to the East (primarily) and to the West. *Mitteleuropa* came under the influence of the Turkish/Ottoman, Tsarist, Austrian/Habsburg, German and, most recently, the Soviet empire. Each empire was a product of force, and the principal aim was to dissolve the many different *Mitteleuropa* states in order to merge them under the empire's strong rule. As a reaction to these aggressive regimes, the different peoples living in the region of *Mitteleuropa* developed a common interest of self-defence, even a wish for integration. They engaged in a "constant struggle against forceful oppressive" powers, but remained unsuccessful.

The constant re-drawing of boundaries in *Mitteleuropa* provoked a hostile reaction by cultural groups which felt that their identities were threatened. The continuous suppression of states under the vast umbrella of the respective supranational empires, ironically, formed the multi-ethnic and multicultural character of the area. Boundaries came under dispute, to the degree that "[t]o reflect on Central Europe is to raise the question of frontiers and centres." In the vast majority of cases, political frontiers did not correspond with ethnic ones, geographical boundaries clashed with cultural ones. Historical, ethnic and geographical claims were incompatible, since they did not coincide. The majority of new states enclosed peoples within their national frontiers who claimed different national allegiances. As a result, *Mitteleuropa* was characterised by a large degree of unrest, so that the countries "never knew stability and quiescence".

During the mid-1930s, the term *Mitteleuropa* allegedly "died with Hitler" and his idea of *Lebensraum im Osten*. *Mitteleuropa* was deeply

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20 Chaszar, E. (1970); "The place of Eastern Europe in Western civilization" in Wagner, Francis (ed.), *Toward a new Central Europe*, p. 105.
21 Matvejčec, Predrag (1989); "Central Europe seen from the East of Europe" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.), *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 186.
22 Macartney, Carlile A. (1944); *Problems of the Danube Basin*, p. 7.
23 Ash, Timothy Garton (1989); "Does Central Europe exist?" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 191.
affected by Hitler's subsequent atrocities, especially by his persecution of Jews. Large Jewish populations used to live in the cities of Budapest, Prague, Warsaw and Cracow. Jews contributed greatly to the political, economic and cultural life of these cities, as well as to Mitteleuropa as a whole. The cities became Mitteleuropa's principal commercial trading centres, since they were ideally located at the heart of the European continent. The German and Yiddish languages were widely spoken. Mitteleuropa attracted many people, especially the German nobility, to its universities. Academic research and exchange of ideas was at a height during the middle of the 14th century. Prague was, in fact, the first German university, founded in 1348.

These facts are often forgotten when speaking of Mitteleuropa, since the region was devastated by Hitler and subsequently "entered into a cultural limbo". The Cold War split Europe into two - East and West - with the divide running right through Germany. Given that East Germany and the Central Eastern European countries came under Russian influence, this situation left no room for the Central European states to develop their own potential and identities, independently of Soviet control.

Mitteleuropa became a "Europe-in between two". In the late 1970s, the former Soviet Union and the United States changed their military policies from long range, strategic, continental missiles to the SS20 and Pershing mid- and short-range missiles. Each superpower deployed these on either side of the Cold War divide. This meant that in the event of a nuclear military conflict between Russia and the United States, Central Europe would have become the superpowers' battlefield.

Paradoxically, this threat of becoming the superpowers' theatre of war helped the Mitteleuropa countries to overcome their paralysis. It brought the peoples of Mitteleuropa closer together, since the "overpowering threat of the

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'other' in East and West [prompted] the peoples of Mitteleuropa [to rediscover]... a sense of a shared and endangered cultural heritage"\(^{27}\). Leading Central Eastern European intellectuals, such as Milan Kundera from Czechoslovakia and György Konrád from Hungary treated such developments in their writings and affected a cultural re-discovery. Milan Kundera's famous statement that "Mitteleuropa is not a state, but a culture, a fate"\(^{28}\) stems from this time. In addition, György Konrád claimed that Mitteleuropa is not traceable on the map, as for instance, Mittelamerika. It is not possible to define Mitteleuropa in terms of an existing nation state, but only as a Kulturnation. By virtue of its political system, Mitteleuropa was attached to the East as part of the Soviet Empire; geographically, however, it lay in the centre, and culturally in the West.\(^{29}\) Mitteleuropa exists in the beliefs of the different cultural communities of Mitteleuropa. Konrád concluded that Mitteleuropa is a matter of Weltanschauung rather than Staatsangehörigkeit\(^{30}\).

Given this cultural definition of Mitteleuropa, both György Konrád and Milan Kundera saw the need to unite the peoples of Mitteleuropa. They supported the idea of a Mitteleuropa federation which aligned itself to the West.\(^{31}\) According to Konrád and Kundera, a Western-oriented Mitteleuropa federation was to bring peace and good neighbourliness to a region of such great ethnic and cultural diversity. It was a means to overcome the differences between the peoples in the Central European countries, to develop a feeling of solidarity and to gain a greater degree of self-confidence, as well as a stronger sense of national identity, independent of any hegemonic power. For Konrád

\(^{27}\) Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 137. See also the socio-psychological approach to identity in chapter two, which indicated that people feel drawn together when they experience a common threat or, as in this case, foreign subjugation.

\(^{28}\) Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out" in Granta, No. 11, p. 106.

\(^{29}\) Kundera, Milan (1984); "A Kidnapped West or Culture Bows Out" in Granta, No. 11, p. 118.

\(^{30}\) György Konrád cited in Ash, Timothy Garton (1989); "Does Central Europe exist?" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, p. 198.

\(^{31}\) This was against the background that such an attempt had already failed at the beginning of the 20th century: the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania under French leadership only lasted from 1920/21 until 1938 because, "instead of bringing together their own forces,... the members of the Little Entente preferred to base their defense on the
and Kundera, *Mitteleuropa* was a means to rejoin the West. Some Polish intellectuals, however, such as Adam Krzeminski and Michal Misiorny, only partly accepted the idea of a *Mitteleuropa* confederation rejoining the West. They pleaded for a third way, a federation of a third Europe between West and East. Poles emphasised the difference between 'us' in Central Europe and 'them' in Western Europe. Due to their close immediacy to Germany, the Poles feared another German hegemonic drive towards the East. Misiorny emphasised that he could not imagine a *Mitteleuropa* in which "Poles would gather around a German hegemon and finally feel good and secure."33

**Mitteleuropa after the end of the Cold War**

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of *Mitteleuropa* has received a new meaning. The "concept of East and West [has lost] its common principium divisoris" and brought the question of *Mitteleuropa* back into the centre of the debate. *Mitteleuropa* is no longer understood in the sense of Naumann's pan-Germanism, nor as an undefined area squeezed between two centres. Resuming its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity of the past, *Mitteleuropa* has become a "region orientated to Western models in an Eastern European medium," or as "precisely that part of Europe which has not been penetrated by those sources which have effectively created 'Europe' (Western Europe): Russia."36

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32 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); *Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe*, p. 43.
34 Kusy, Miroslav (1989); "We, Central Europeans - Eastern Europeans" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); *In Search of Central Europe*, p. 91.
Central European states - in the process of consolidating their own national identity - continuously emphasise their connection to the West, particularly to the cultural movements of "Humanism, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Enlightenment, Classicism, Romanticism, as well as movements of the modern age." They do this, "by habit and necessity, for support (practical if not moral)... in search of confirmation of their European identity... But", Tony Judt continues,

this does not mean that they for one second accept the audience's view of them, or that they define their own identity and existence via that audience's acknowledgment appreciation.

Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has repeatedly stressed, and assured the Central Eastern European countries, that cities like Cracow, Warsaw, Prague, Bratislava and Budapest are at the heart of Europe. Berlin, Germany's new capital in the East of the country, increasingly fosters relations with the Central Eastern European countries. This suggests that the EU's vital triangular axis Bonn-Paris-London might soon undergo changes, as the "centre of gravity of the European continent is moving East. There is no doubt about that. Central Europe is back and well under way to become an integral part of the European Union." 1994 opinion polls in Poland and the Czech Republic, for example, showed that an "overwhelming majority" of their populations are in favour of European integration. In Poland, 65% supported European integration, whereas 24% were against. 48% believed that the European Union's

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37 Seton-Watson, Hugh (1989); "What is Europe? Where is Europe?" in Schöpflin, George et. al. (eds.); In Search of Central Europe, p. 40.
38 Chaszar, E. (1970); "The place of Eastern Europe in Western civilization" in Wagner, Francis (ed.); Toward a new Central Europe, p. 112.
39 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 51, 34, 51.
interest in Poland is genuine, and 31% thought that the European Union seeks to dominate Poland.42 In Hungary, 1993 figures show that 35.4% of the population think that the aims and activities of the European Union are positive (down from 45.2% in 1991), 32.1% gave a neutral response (1991, 28%) and 8.3% believed them to be negative (up from 4.3% in 1991).43

The Central Eastern European countries' "race towards accession to the EU and Nato"44 seems to have brought them closer together, despite the "reluctance to see anyone else go first."45 For Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Nato membership has become reality in 1999. EU enlargement, incorporating these three Nato forerunners, plus Slovenia and Estonia, is envisaged for the years 2002-5 - once the EU has managed its internal reforms and the Central Eastern European countries are economically, politically and legally fit for EU membership. Talks on EU enlargement started in London in March 1998 and ministerial-level negotiations opened in November 1998, affirming that the "enlargement process... is broadly on track"46. Prior to the negotiations for EU enlargement, Associations Agreements with the Central Eastern European states were signed in the early 1990s.

In order to allow these countries to adapt their political, economic and social systems to EU level (and to allow the European Union to reform its internal structure and emphasise the deepening as well as widening aspect of the European integration process), the creation of a Central Eastern European Economic Community first could act as a potential forerunner to the Central Eastern European countries' accession to the European Union. However, such proposals fall on stony ground in the accession countries. The Central Eastern

43 Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 103.
European countries "warn against any kind of 'bloc mentality' in the West with regard to the individual applications of Central Eastern European states." For one, there is a high level of distrust between the Central Eastern European countries. Relations amongst the small Central Eastern European countries hardly existed under Soviet rule, since absolute priority was given to foster relations with the Soviet Union alone. There are still many territorial conflicts and border disputes and "the collective memory of each Central Eastern European country has not forgotten the long list of atrocities and genocides." More importantly, however, the Central Eastern European countries fear that a Mitteleuropa union would isolate them from the European Union and delay their full membership to the European Union. The Central Eastern European countries would then, once again, run danger of becoming the faint and uncertain "zone of small nations" somewhere between Russia and the Eastern frontier of the European Union.

The other extreme of building such a Mitteleuropa union, would be to 'rush' into European Union membership. Due to the Central Eastern European countries' unstable and insecure situation this could be interpreted as undermining their newly gained independence and different national identities. The Central Eastern European states could be transformed from Soviet satellites to European satellites. With EU enlargement towards the East, the Central Eastern European countries will have to accept the EU's acquis communautaire, without having participated in the formulation of its policies. This allows critics to argue that "the East has largely been the property of the West" and that "the

50 Namier, Sir Lewis B. (1947); Facing East, p. 52.
West [does] not intend to learn or adopt anything from the East."\(^\text{52}\) According to another point of view, there already seems a tendency amongst Central Eastern European countries to view the existing EU framework as a perfect recipe for success, with the result that they might not contribute their own input to the larger European project.

Hence, helping the Central Eastern European countries in the transition process should include self-help and an "intensive familiarisation strategy"\(^\text{53}\), in order to foster a positive participation by them in the European integration process. The Central Eastern European countries should make their voice heard, which would enhance their self-confidence and help towards the preservation of their many cultural differences.

The emergence of a strong *Mitteleuropa*, however, still lies in the distant future. But if *Mitteleuropa* "has been quietly reinventing itself, and is now ready to rejoin the European mainstream"\(^\text{54}\), the question arises whether Germany, or at least the territory of the former Democratic Republic of Germany, is part of *Mitteleuropa*? Should one sub-divide Germany into *Westdeutschland*, *Mitteldeutschland* and *Ostdeutschland*? Germany oscillates between the terms *Westeuropa* and *Mitteleuropa*, knowing that it is a key regional power in the latter area with the power to bring about change. So, will Germany, once again, become the driving force within *Mitteleuropa*? Is there any chance of a revival of Naumann's Pan-German *Mitteleuropa*? Is *Mitteleuropa's* historic legacy still traceable today?

At present, it seems as if "Central Europe as a theme has become inextricably interwined with debates over German identity"\(^\text{55}\), and that Germany

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\(^{52}\) Harold James cited in Bort, Eberhard (1998); "German Identity after Reunification" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); *A Question of Identity*, p. 198.

\(^{53}\) Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hila, Peter (eds.); *Grenzübergreifende Zusammenarbeit im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, p. 149. My translation.

\(^{54}\) Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in *The Independent on Sunday*, June 7, 1998.

\(^{55}\) Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (ed.); *Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe*, p. 42.
seems to be unable to escape its historic legacy. Whilst other countries can legiti- 
ately pursue and insist upon protecting their self-interests, for Germany to do so would immediately cause concern, with renewed fears of German hegemony associated with Naumann's *Mitteleuropa.* In addition, "the homogeneous nation-state is the exception" in Central Europe. Central Europe is still composed of many different national and ethnic identities which could again become the source of ethnic conflicts in the area. These conflicts were buried under the Cold War conditions,... the dissent between Hungary and Slovakia over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam system on the Danube, the Italian-Slovenian border frictions over the status of the Italian minority in Slovenia, and the German-Czech dissonances about coming to a final agreement on the Sudeten question.

These kinds of disputes could be heightened by disagreements between national policy and regional interests, and one may therefore ask whether "former injustices can be peacefully corrected by changing frontiers"? The Central Eastern European countries' territorial and administrative organisation remains fairly centralised, and existing plans for regionalisation have not yet been fully translated into action. Policy making happens on a 'national' rather than 'subnational' or 'regional' level. Minorities, regions and borderlands are, therefore, subject to central governments' decisions and good-will.

Since transborder co-operation acts on a subnational level and focuses on the borderlands' specific problems, it can be regarded as a means to strengthen

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56 Britain, France and the Mediterranean countries, for instance, look at these developments with scepticism. France and Britain, in particular, fear a repeat of history. To avoid this situation, and in order to balance out an enlarged European Union and weaken a possible, newly emerging *Mitteleuropa,* France supported Romania's accession to the EU (in vain) during the first negotiations on European Eastern enlargement. Similarly, and with the interest of establishing a 'Baltic Union' as a counterweight to *Mitteleuropa,* the EU's Nordic states attempted to press the EU to accept all four Baltic states as EU member states. Only Estonia's application has been successful; however, the European Commission is stepping up preparations for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania an Slovakia to join the EU (European Commission Representative Office - UK (1999); *The Week in Europe,* March 4, 1999). The Mediterranean countries of the EU might likewise envisage the creation of a Mediterranean Union, in order to balance out Europe's distribution of power and strength.


58 Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-

Dokic, Nada (ed.) (1996); *The Cultural Identity of Central Europe,* p. 137.

the various identities that are part of Mitteleuropa. It will be argued in the following section that borderlands and their organisation into Euroregions are the first step to one important aspect of Naumann's conception of Mitteleuropa - the idea of establishing a confederation, in which the interests of all participants must be respected.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{60} Schubert, Markus (1993); Die Mitteleuropa-Konzeption Friedrich Naumanns und die Mitteleuropa-Debatte der 80er Jahre, p. 8.
4. B Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union

Borders and border crossings are usually associated with passport controls, customs clearance, queues, delays and traffic jams. Hidden behind these symptoms are usually economic, infrastructural, cultural and political problems. They hinder the free movement of persons, goods and services and they may be the cause for the lack of human interaction across the border and the degradation of the environment along the border in question.

In order to alleviate these problems, projects of 'transfrontier co-operation' have been developed. According to the Madrid 1980 Council of Europe Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, transfrontier co-operation is defined as:

any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement necessary for this purpose. Transfrontier co-operation shall take place in the framework of territorial communities' or authorities' powers as defined in domestic law. [Article 2.1]

[T]erritorial communities or authorities shall mean communities, authorities or bodies exercising local and regional functions and regarded as such under the domestic law of each State. [Art. 2.2]

Whereas the above definition of the term transborder co-operation does not focus on transborder co-operation amongst border regions alone, but could theoretically imply transfrontier co-operation beyond any frontier, the Preamble of the Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation emphasises that transborder co-operation should contribute to the economic and social progress of frontier regions. The Convention then implies the need to include other local and regional authorities in the building of Europe, since a decentralised organisation of transborder co-operation would develop "the spirit of fellowship which unites the peoples of Europe".

In order to differentiate transfrontier co-operation amongst border regions from other forms of regional co-operation, Malcolm Anderson points to five main reasons which make transfrontier co-operation between border regions distinctive:

1 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, Preamble.
(i) It gives citizens of one country the voice in the affairs of another country, (ii) The right to participate in this activity, on the part of any group or individual is often unclear, (iii) The territory covered by co-operative arrangements cannot be clearly delineated because the boundaries of the transfrontier regions are often drawn in different ways for different purposes, (iv) The balance of advantages across the frontier has to be either unclear or evenly balanced otherwise groups are likely to invoke the aid of an external actor - their central government - to redress the balance, (v) In populous frontier regions, large numbers of people are using the territory of neighbouring states to work, to live, to participate in leisure activities and to own property. They are not fully enfranchised but nonetheless have extensive legal rights. If their activities are noticeable, they become - willingly or unwillingly - actors in the local political system.

Supporting this argument, Anthony Asiwaju suggests that frontier regions "have always been recognised as ideal laboratories in which one may undertake a comparative measurement of state performance". He further indicates that

the interactions between limitrophe states in terms of the localised impact of their policies (domestic and foreign) are as clearly seen as they would have been if such interactions have had to be placed under a microscope.

For the European Union, this would mean that border regions may be regarded as a barometer from which the degree and level of development of the European integration process is readable.

During the 1960s, the Council of Europe began "working intensively on cross-border questions... which have dealt specifically with this special topic and its problems." In 1972, for example, it held the first symposium on borderlands. Ever since, the Council of Europe has sought to promote the overcoming of frontiers as dividing lines. The Council of Europe represents a setting in which regional authorities and communities can communicate and, in 1980, it adopted the aforementioned Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation. This Convention is based on international law and fills

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6 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of Crossborder Co-operation, p. 15.
a legal gap by offering forms of transfrontier co-operation particularly suited to the needs of territorial communities and capable of providing an additional legal basis for any agreement which such authorities may conclude.7

Given the 1989/90 developments in Central Eastern Europe and their impact on transborder co-operation along the Eastern frontier of the EU, the "Council of Europe's intergovernmental work in the field of local democracy and transfrontier co-operation has taken on greater importance."8 Keeping in mind that the political status of the individual territorial communities or authorities vary greatly from member state to member state, the work of the Council of Europe in this area focuses on: fostering local and regional self-government, analysing the administrative and legal structure of local administration, facilitating transfrontier co-operation of municipalities and regions, and promoting regional cultural diversity.9

Up to the present day, the 'Select Committee of Experts on Transfrontier co-operation'10 constantly develops the Convention and adds protocols to it. The 1995 Protocol signatories affirmed the importance of transfrontier co-operation and confirmed to take further measures to secure transfrontier co-operation between territorial communities or authorities.11 The most recent Protocol was opened for signature in May 1998 "to give interterritorial co-operation an international legal framework"12. The Council of Europe also provides a 'Handbook on transfrontier co-operation for local and regional authorities in Europe'13, which includes the

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7 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remark 10, p. 8.
10 The 'Steering Committee on Local and Regional Democracy' - an advisory committee to the 'Select Committee' - is particularly dedicated to transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union (Bequart, Aygen, Responsible for Transfrontier co-operation - Council of Europe, Directorate of Environment and Local Authorities (1998); Transfrontier and Inter-Territorial Co-operation, information received by fax on August 18, 1998).
11 Council of Europe (1995); Additional Protocol to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, Preamble.
12 Council of Europe (1998); Protocol No. 2 to the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities concerning interterritorial co-operation, Preamble.
13 Council of Europe (1996); Handbook on transfrontier co-operation for local and regional authorities in Europe.
various possible definitions of the term region and gives advice on forms of possible transborder co-operation projects and organisations.

Regional transborder co-operation gained in importance during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The European integration process seemed to go through a period of 'Europessimism' and 'Eurosclerosis'. It was stagnating due to a "decision-making gridlock and a dysfunctional institutional structure"\(^\text{14}\), so that "politicians and academics alike lost faith in the European institutions."\(^\text{15}\) The European Parliament was one of the first EEC institutions which openly supported transborder co-operation. From 1976 to 1986, it argued for the intensification of transborder co-operation and put forward several proposals to formalise transborder co-operation between the various regional authorities and communities. The European Parliament regarded itself as a channel of communication which brings together regional, national and political interests. It endorsed the EEC's accession to the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation and "repeatedly stressed the significance of border regions for the construction of the European Union in 'all its dimensions'"\(^\text{16}\).

Shortly after the signing of the Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, it was suggested that the European Commission adopted the Convention and

\(^{14}\text{Leonardi, Robert (1995); Convergence, cohesion and integration in the European Union, p. 12-13.}\)
\(^{15}\text{Moravcsik, Andrew (1994); "Negotiating the Single European Act" in Nelson, Brent and Stubb, Alexander (eds.); The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration, p. 212.}\)
\(^{16}\text{John Cushnahan cited in Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-Dokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 134. Since the demise of the Cold War, MEPs from the German and Austrian Länder on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, in particular, have endorsed transborder co-operation in their area. Due to the Eastern borderlands' delicate, but also challenging, position, their MEPs are especially interested in taking part in the organisation and direction of the European integration process (Glante, Norbert, MEP Brandenburg, (1995); "Die Rolle des Europäischen Parlamentes zur Vorbereitung des Beitritts der mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten zur Europäischen Union" in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995, Europäische Kommission und Europäisches Parlament, Berlin, pp. 52-3) and to wish develop relationships with the new democracies in Central Eastern Europe (Bort, Eberhard (1996); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-Dokic, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 134).}\)
persuaded non-members to sign as well.\textsuperscript{17} The Commission, however, remained passive and it was only in 1990 that the European Commission drafted a communication on "The living and working conditions of Community citizens resident in frontier regions"\textsuperscript{18} which contained a section on "Co-operation between regional and local authorities"\textsuperscript{19}. This report focused on internal EEC transborder co-operation, possibly taking the first institutionalised Euroregion between Germany and Netherlands - the Euregio Maas-Rhein - as an example. While the European Commission does not offer any universal remedy to the problems addressed by transborder co-operation projects, it encourages the institutionalisation of transborder co-operation projects according to the principle of subsidiarity.\textsuperscript{20}

Both the Council of Europe and the European Commission have established "Joint Programmes for the benefit of several countries of central and eastern Europe"\textsuperscript{21} in 1993. In 1996, both organisations also concluded covenants for thematic programmes, concerning national minorities, the fight against organised crime and corruption.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite these efforts to develop transfrontier co-operation on a 'European'-level, the Council of Europe's \textit{Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation} has not yet managed to eliminate transfrontier co-operation conflicts which may be subject to the conflict between European regional policy and national regional policy. Although the Convention stresses that regions should have the right to choose their adequate forms of transborder co-operation "best suited to their problems"\textsuperscript{23}, it also "furnish[es] States with various means of supervision and control for ensuring

\textsuperscript{17} Krämer, Raimund (1997); \textit{Grenzen der Europäischen Union}, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{18} European Commission (1990); \textit{Communication from the European Commission on the living and working conditions of Community citizens resident in frontier regions, with special reference to frontier workers}, COM(90) 561 final, November 27, 1990.
\textsuperscript{19} European Commission (1990); \textit{Communication from the European Commission on the living and working conditions of Community citizens resident in frontier regions, with special reference to frontier workers}, COM(90) 561 final, November 27, 1990, part I, point 8, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{21} Council of Europe (1998); \textit{Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation}, http://www.coe.fr/.
\textsuperscript{22} Council of Europe (1998); \textit{Local Democracy and Transfrontier co-operation}, http://www.coe.fr/.
observance of the principle of State sovereignty wherever necessary." The latter ensures that transborder co-operation takes place according to the territorial communities' and authorities' powers as defined in domestic law. Differences between national regional policy and European regional policy place transborder co-operation in a potentially awkward position - in a position 'in between' member states, 'in between' possible dividing lines within the European Union and 'in between' the European Union and non-European Union territory.

Many scholars have classified the rise in transborder co-operation within the bottom-up model of European integration, also called the 'horizontal' European integration process: subnational authorities deal with each other directly rather than through the means of central government. Interregional and transborder cooperation is not restricted by national jurisdiction or in need of central government's approval. This perspective of 'horizontal' European integration does not need to conflict with the idea of a top-down or 'vertical' European integration process. The structure of these two processes may differ, but their aims can be considered as complementary. In the vertical integration model, borderlands may engage in transborder co-operation within the European framework, working in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.

We have seen, in chapter three, how the intergovernmental model, which has dominated the European decision-making process so far, appears to be broken up from both above and below. The nation-state's sovereignty and identity seem to be challenged, since the nation-state sees a considerable part of its territorial and political decision-making power exposed to 'foreign' influence. However, as we have seen in chapter two, it may be too soon to proclaim the demise of the nation-state and its sovereignty. So rather than proclaiming that EU governance and

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23 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remarks No. 12.
24 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, General Remarks No. 10.
25 Council of Europe (1980); Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation, Article 2, Paragraph 1.
26 This falls in line with the Domestic Politics Approach, as seen in the preceding chapter.
transfrontier co-operation represent a "potential 'attack' on state sovereignty"\textsuperscript{27}, it is necessary, as was indicated in chapter three, to redefine the traditional principle of sovereignty. The EU's multi-level governance, together with transborder co-operation projects and the institutionalisation of Euroregions, seem to be appropriate and sufficient means to do so.

**Transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union: challenges and problems**

*Eastern borderlands as a hinge for European enlargement*

As was indicated earlier, the events of 1989/90 have given the Eastern frontier of the European Union a new dimension. Before 1989, transfrontier co-operation across the external border of the EU mainly concentrated on EU member states and stable non-EU member states (e.g. Germany, France and Switzerland in the Regio Basiliensis whose origins date back to 1963)\textsuperscript{28}. During the Cold War, any form of co-operation - even communication - between borderlands of former Communist countries and the European Union was difficult if not virtually impossible. Subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, transborder co-operation is no longer confined to internal regional and national frontiers between EU member states or stable non-EU member states, but includes co-operation between regions of member states and those of former Communist countries. To date, "transfrontier co-operation associations... cover all the land frontiers of countries of the European Union and some of the sea frontiers"\textsuperscript{29}. Accordingly, one

\textsuperscript{27} Delli Zotti, Giovanni (1996); "Transfrontier co-operation at the external borders of the European Union: Implications for Sovereignty" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); *Borders, Nations and States*, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{28} These transborder co-operation projects may be classified as models of internal transborder co-operation, since they transcend a relatively 'soft' international border. This is particularly the case of Switzerland where border controls for EU citizens were lifted in December 1998 (bringing Switzerland closer to possible EU membership). Other examples for transboundary associations which transcend the European frontier, but do not face the same problems as transborder cooperation on the Eastern frontier, include EFTA countries like Norway, as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden before their EU accession in 1995.

\textsuperscript{29} Anderson, Malcolm (1998); "Transfrontier Co-operation - History and Theory" in Brunn, Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); *Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie - Empirie - Praxis*, p. 79.
can see a virtually unbroken stretch of transborder co-operation and Euroregions\textsuperscript{30} on the Eastern frontier of the European Union - they stretch from the North of Finland down to Slovenia in the South. (Figure 3) Eberhard Bort argues that the Eastern Euroregions are modelled on their Western examples and he summarises their main objectives under the following three headings\textsuperscript{31}:

\textit{Economic co-operation:} The Euroregions' objective is to strengthen the borderlands' industries and economies by optimising available resources and co-ordinating possible investment and infrastructure programmes. More border crossing points have been opened, in order to diminish bottlenecks, reduce transport times and costs, and meet problems generated by increasing border-crossings for both transport and commuters. Borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union also receive a new meaning with the Trans-European-Networks which attempt to develop an adequately functioning - transeuropean - transport network with appropriate connections, communication and transport systems.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{Environmental protection:} The increasing flow of transfrontier transport may have a damaging effect on the environment if nothing is to be done. Transborder co-operation, therefore, aims at tackling these problems by way of

\textsuperscript{30} A Euroregion is a body in which borderlands on either side the frontier find together, in order to overcome the frontier and resolve transfrontier problems, which are subject to the existence of the frontier. Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union include: on the Finnish-Russian border Kuhmo-Kostamuksha (1992); on the German-Polish border Pomernia (1995), Pro Europa Vlaadrina (1993) and Spree-Neisse-Bober (1993); on the German-Polish-Czech border Neisse-Nysa-Nisa (1992); on the German-Czech border Elbe-Labe (1992), Erzgebirge/Krusnohori (1992), Egrencis (1992) and Sumava/Bayerischer Wald (1993). Other transborder co-operation projects include the Regio Triagonale between Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as the wide reaching Working Community Alpe Adria and the Working Community Danube-countries. See Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzräume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming. For an overview of the German-Polish and German-Czech transfrontier co-operation, see also Nuss, Jean-Jacques and Trautman, Henrike (1995); "Darstellung der Euroregionen" in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der Euroregionen Frankfurt/Oder September 28-30, 1995, Europäische Kommission und Europäisches Parlament, Berlin, pp. 25-33.

\textsuperscript{31} Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzräume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming. See also Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 58.
ecological projects which range from issues concerning sewage and refuse problems to the establishment of nature reserves and national parks. This holds especially true for border regions which attract a large degree of tourism, because of their landscapes or geographical and natural interests. Since pollution does not respect national state borders, Euroregions have set environmental issues high on their agenda.33

*Culture and communication:* Euroregions aim to bring people on either side of the frontier closer together. They wish to promote a mutual understanding which could in time lead to the emergence of a regional consciousness and identity. To this end, Euroregions organise cultural events which celebrate the common cultural heritage of borderlands. Furthermore, they are engaged in the development of tourism or youth meetings, school or university educational exchanges, organisation of sports events or the creation of twintowns.

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33 One would expect that the degradation of the environment and environmental pollution will be likely to concentrate and to be felt most strongly in the Eastern borderlands of the EU. However, and paradoxically enough, the ecological heritage has been preserved in the majority of borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, due to their former peripheral position (Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); *The regional planning of greater Europe in cooperation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe*, p. 74). Environmental conditions are not as devastated as predicted. Nevertheless, the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union witness the EU's attempt to implement EU environmental protection measures and to "ensure the maintenance of environmental standards within the EU itself." (Baker, Susan (1996); "Punctured sovereignty, border regions and the environment within the European Union" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); *Borders, Nations and States*, p. 26). See also European Commission Representative Office - UK (1998); "Greening enlargement plans", December 17, 1998.
Transboundary associations (key to Fig. 3):

1. Nordkalotten (N, S, SF); 2. Mitt Norden N, S, SF); 3. Kjolen-Nordland-Västerbotten (N, S); 4. ARKO (N, S); 5. Östfold-Nordliga-Bokhuslan (N, S); 6. Kvarken (S, SF); 7. Skärgardspjorjeketet (S, SF); 8. Öresund (DK, S); 9. Bornholm-Sydskaen (DK, S); 10. Vestnorden (DK, Faroe Islands); 11. Abenrã-Fransburg (DK, D); 12. Ems Dollart (NL, D); 13. EUREGIO (NL, D); 14. Rhein-Waal (NL, D); 15. Rhein-Maas-Nord (NL, D); 16. Maas-Rhein Euroregion (NL, D, B); 17. Interlimburg Maasland (NL, B); 18. Weert-Noord-Limburg (NL, B); 19. Kemperland (NL, B); 20. BENEGO (NL, B); 21. Nord-Pas de Calais (F, B); 22. Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing (F, B); 23. Eifel and Ardenne European Union (F, B, D); 24. Arlon-Longwy-Esch (F, B, L); 25. Westpfalz Planning Community (D, F); 26. Saar-Lorraine-Luxemburg (D, F, L); 27. Rheinpfalz Planning Community (D, F); 28. Upper Rhine-Alsace (F, D); 29. South Upper Rhine-Alsace (F, D); 30. Moyenne Alsace-Breisgau CFAO (F, D); 31. Hochheim and Lake Constance (D, CH); 32. Regio Basilbenh (F, CH, D); 33. Jurin (F, CH); 34. Lake Geneva Region (F, CH); 35. Ticino (CH, I); 36. Alps Working Community/ARGE Alg (D, A, I, CH); 37. Alps-Adria Working Community (A, I, D, H, SLO, CRO, CH also includes the member states of ARGE/Alg); 38. Valle d'Aosta-Haute Savoie-Valais (I, F, CH); 39. Assoziazone Franco-Italiana delle Alpi (F, I); 40. Alpazur (F, I); 41. West Alps Cantons and Regionie Working Community (CH, F, I); 42. Pyrenees Regional Conference (E, F, AND); 43. La Manche-Dover Calais (GB, F); 44. Northern Ireland (GB, IRL); 45. Euroregion Pomerania (D, PL); 46. Euroregion Pro-Europa Vladrisa (D, PL); 47. Euroregion Spree-Niehhe Bober (D, PL); 48. Euroregion Neehe-Nysa-Nisa (D, PL, CZ); 49. Euroregion Elbe-Labe (D, CZ); 50. Euroregion Erzgebirge (D, CZ); 51. Euroregion Egrensis (D, CZ); 52. Region Triagonale (A, H, SVK).

A (Austria); AND (Andorra); B (Belgium); CRO (Croatia); CZ (Czech Republic); D (Germany); DK (Denmark); E (Spain); GB (Great Britain); H (Hungary); I (Italy); IRL (Ireland); L. (Luxembourg); N (Norway); NL (Netherlands); PL (Poland); S (Sweden); SF (Finland); SLO (Slovenia); SVK (Slovakia).

Fig. 3: Euroregions, Interregional Working Groups and other Border Region Association in Europe (as of December 1995)

So far, it seems as if the practice of transfrontier co-operation along the internal frontiers of the European has been successfully translated onto the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Problems between internal and external transfrontier co-operation practices may vary in degree rather than practice, and while "borders in Western Europe have become increasingly unimportant, those of the [sic] Eastern Europe have evolved into the opposite direction"34. The Eastern frontier of the European Union is still a relatively 'hard', as opposed to 'soft' frontier. Transborder co-operation has made the Eastern frontier 'softer'35 - a bridge rather than a barrier.

On the assumption that transfrontier co-operation projects "go in the direction of providing an 'as if' situation... - as if the adjoining borderlands in the East were already part of the EU"36, one could argue that transborder co-operation represents

a means to prepare the way for the regions outside the European Union to join the Europe of Regions.... [I]t is also a way of making use of the associate membership status... social and economic links can be strengthened, value systems can be acquired and norms and standards employed which all prepare the way towards integration."37

Regions in Central Eastern Europe will need to increase their presence on the transnational European platform, in order to take part in the European decision-making and integration processes38. This may have significant consequences for the Central Eastern European countries' regional planning projects39 - Eastern

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35 Evidence for this may be collected from the increased cross-border interaction on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. See Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, pp. 91-92 for a detailed breakdown of cross-border activities.
37 Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning of greater Europe in co-operation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe, p. 73.
borderlands may serve as prototypes - and the development of regional, national and European identities.

It seems as if this regional context may even become the *deus ex machina* to solve problems and crises within the framework of a 'Europe of regions'. To support this view, Kaisa Lähteenmaki has argued that

state-centric initiative in co-operation has in the post-Cold War era been increasingly replaced by regional initiatives. Thus the direct cooperative ties created across the border have become of growing importance.

So far, however, the decision-makers of the Central Eastern European states do not see regional initiatives - regionalism - as a solution to their instability and conflict. Warsaw, for example, looks at regional ties and organisations with distrust, because in the past they have "often been the cause of... suffering and even a threat to... integrity." Their like have led to Balkanisation. But is it really the fear of regionalism why some Central Eastern European central governments do not support transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union whole-heartedly? The Central Eastern European countries' "self-awareness is still somewhat fragile since complete unity has only come about recently". They wish to preserve their integrity as a state - as one national, democratic, market economy-oriented unity - separate and independent from the former Soviet hegemony. Their focus is primarily set on "decommunisation", national integration, state- and nation-building and the "creation of formal democratic institutions, rights and procedures,... enforced by the vigorous development of civic societies with liberal

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40 Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); *Europas kooperierende Regionen*, p. 15.
42 Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); *Europas kooperierende Regionen*, p. 15.
43 Lasic, Stanko (1992); *Three essays on Europe*, p. 11.
44 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); *Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, p. 54; Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der grenzübergreifenden Zusammenarbeit an der deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); *Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa*, p. 117.
45 Lasic, Stanko (1992); *Three essays on Europe*, p. 10.
and multi-cultural 'civic' concepts of the nation-state. The construction of one
national (ethnic) identity might prove to be difficult in some of the Central Eastern
European states, which experience strong demands for recognition from ethnic
minorities.

Beate Neuss suggests that the Central Eastern European countries have just
attained their national sovereignty, which is now demanded from them. But rather
than putting it into such extreme words, is it not rather the case that the Central
Eastern European countries are not yet willing - possibly unable - to re-define the
concept of national sovereignty? As was mentioned in chapter three, even the actors
within the European Union still have their difficulties with the re-definition of
sovereignty, since they continue to think in 'either/or' terms.

Challenges on the Eastern frontier of the European Union

The Eastern frontier of the European Union can be regarded as an interface
which connects the European Union and its prospective new member states. On the
assumption that the Eastern frontier of the European Union represents a challenge
to both the European Union and its neighbours, this challenge is three-dimensional:

The periphery challenge: For over 40 years, borderlands on the Eastern
frontier of the European Union were at the periphery of their respective nation-state,
and either the European Union or Comecon. The legacy of the Cold War worsened
this situation, since the borderlands were next to the Communist or Capitalist threat.
Both sides were - literally - a cul-de-sac.

47 Bideleux, Robert (1996); "Bringing the East back in" in Bideleux, Robert and Taylor, Richard
(eds.); European Integration and Disintegration: East and West, p. 226.
48 This will be explored further in the following section of this chapter. Also - although Poland is
now almost completely Polish in ethnic composition, since there has been a great mixing of the
Polish population after the Second World War - understandings of Polishness/Poland vary according
to different historical situations for different people: In the 18th century, Poland was divided three
times between its Slavic and Germanic neighbours. In the 20th century, Poland achieved
independence for twenty years between the two World Wars, only to be invaded again, first by the
Germans and then by the Russians. After each invasion, Poland's boundaries were redrawn,
especially affecting its borderlands and the identities of its peoples.
49 Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek,
Peter und Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 150.
Whereas the implementation of the 1992 Single Market programme created new opportunities and challenges for internal borderlands to become an integral part of the European integration process, it accentuated rather than diminished the level of disparity between the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union and the centre of the EU. The Eastern German Länder on the Eastern frontier of the European Union are a case in point. Although Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg and Saxony are often taken as prime examples of how quickly and well they have become an integral part of the European Union, they continue to suffer from characteristics similar to all Eastern borderlands of the European Union (see below). Nevertheless, they still seem to be relatively better off than their Eastern counterparts in the Central Eastern European countries.

The peripheral situation of borderlands within the former Communist countries is largely a legacy of the Cold War. Former Comecon countries which bordered on the frontier of the European Union - for instance the former German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia neighbouring the Federal Republic of Germany - invested in industries near their Eastern frontier rather than in their Western borderlands. This development induced some mobility of labour (Polish workers, for instance, worked in former East Germany's industries on the Eastern border) and co-operation with their respective Eastern neighbours, other Soviet satellites and specifically the former Soviet Union. Spatial planning ensured that these industries, which were essential to national economy and defence, were as far away as possible from the West and as close as possible to the former Soviet Union. It was a strategy to protect these industries in case of conflict with the West, since Western border regions were considered as "prohibited zones due to defence

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50 Compare this situation with the above-mentioned Regio Basiliensis. South Baden is peripheral to the rest of Germany, but its close contacts to Switzerland offsets its national peripheral location, so that it may act as an international bridge between Germany and Switzerland.

51 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 53; Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter und Hilz, Wolffram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 160.

As a result, these economies languished and barracks and Soviet training camps predominated the landscape. Until the Oder-Neiße Treaty, signed on November 14, 1990 between Germany and Poland, Polish authorities remained reluctant to invest in the territories next to the Oder-Neiße border, since they doubted the permanence of this long "contested frontier".

Since 1989/90, however, it often seems as if the Western borderlands in the Central Eastern European countries are privileged, due to their immediate geographical proximity to the West. They tend to profit from transborder cooperation with their Western counterparts, a rise of imports and exports, increasing funds from the European Union and transfer of know-how and expertise, as well as the socio-economic by-effects of it. This, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt. In order to assure their competitiveness with their EU counterparts and in order to be prepared for prospective EU enlargement, the Western borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries need to overcome the great economic and social disparity between themselves and their Western neighbours. "[P]roblems of extreme economic inequality with Western neighbours have caused anxieties about economic and political subordination to them." However, the challenge does not stop there. The Central Eastern European borderlands must also counterbalance their respective national centre-periphery disparity, as well as the increasing East-West borderlands divergence emerging in their own countries.

The economic and social challenge: The Eastern frontier of the European Union "is part of the economic frontier and border of affluence which divides

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53 Council of Europe and European Commission (1996); The regional planning of greater Europe in co-operation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe, p. 73.
54 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontières orientales de l'UE" in Collection DIEM; L'Europe médiane en transition, chapter 10. See also Bafoil, François (1996); "Un conflit de représentations: Le cas de la frontière Oder-Neisse" in Sciences de la Société, No. 37/ February 1996, p. 66.
57 In order to avoid an increasing economic level of disparity between the Eastern and Western borderlands, Poland - once it has joined the EU - wishes to "stop other Europeans from buying land in rural and border areas" (The Economist (1998); "Politics this week", March 14, 1998).
Europe into East and West\textsuperscript{58}. It marks these economic asymmetries between East and West, as well as between centre and periphery. Problems characteristic to all borderlands are: weak and badly integrated economies, poor infrastructure, lower levels of income per head and higher rates of unemployment than the national and general EU average.

Since 1989/90, a considerable number of industries have been relocated from the Eastern to the Western borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries. The Central Eastern European countries' Western borderlands have become attractive locations (\textit{Standorte}). However, this only accounts for the borderlands' urban centres\textsuperscript{59}, as well as those areas which may become subject to the cohesion effect.\textsuperscript{60} Szczecin's harbour, for example, was modernised, and mining

\textsuperscript{58} Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 73. My translation.

\textsuperscript{59} In Poland, the main urban centres are Szczecin, Slubice and Gubin. In the Czech Republic, they include Usti nam Labem, Most and Cheb.

\textsuperscript{60} The European Commission has envisaged four possible scenarios - cohesion effect, draining effect, island effect and exclusion effect - which may emerge in the medium-term on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. The cohesion effect is the most positive (and would fall into Martinez' interdependent and integrated borderlands' categories). It implies the integration of neighbouring borderlands in a 40 to 60 km wide strip, with good topographical and demographic conditions, as well as a lack of attractive centres in the hinterlands. Borderlands will pull in economic, political and social forces from these unattractive hinterlands and become centres of competition. According to the findings of the European Commission, it is suggested that the majority of borderlands situated on the German-Polish border may be subject to the cohesion effect. This is due to the rise in transborder co-operation and the rising importance of this area as a bridge between Western and Central Eastern Europe. Other parts affected by the cohesion effect may be found around the Trieste area and its high economic potential. The draining effect sets in when the borderlands suffer from a low development potential, as well as from the pull effects of larger agglomerations near to the respective borderlands. An example of this would be the borderlands around Görlitz and Dresden. These areas suffer from a high concentration of agricultural activity and, consequently, a low level of economic development. Due to the push-pull effect, these regions are in danger of experiencing migration from rural areas to the urban centres of Görlitz, Dresden and Szczecin. Another underlying factor for the draining effect is the lack of infrastructure and low population density. This is especially the case in mountainous areas, such as between Italy and Slovenia, Bohemia and Saxony, as well as in the south of the Euregio Egrensis between Bavaria and the Czech Republic. The island effect is subject to similar topographical conditions of borderlands on both sides of the frontier which grow together into an economic unit, while each of them remains subject to a different political system. Examples of the island effect are visible on the German-Polish border, where joint projects, such as ferry services on Oder and Neisse, are made impossible due to lack of financial means, the different administrative political structures and "too many incompatible decision-makers"\textsuperscript{60}. The exclusion effect describes the circumstances in which the opening of the border has a positive effect only on one side of the border, exerting a strong pull effect on the other. So far, the EU does not foresee an example for this effect on the Eastern border of the European Union. The European Commission concludes its report that "it is impossible... to definitely classify the regions according to one of the four categories of effects as mixed forms prevail,... of all possible effects the cohesion or draining effects are likely to predominate, island or exclusion effects will probably play a subordinate role." (European Commission (1996); \textit{Impact of
communities, especially those in Silesia and in the Czech area stretching from Usti nam Labem to Most, also underwent modernisation changes. Other areas, however, such as those in which agricultural activities predominate, do not benefit from these developments, but remain fairly isolated, often being abandoned for the nearby urban centres.

Joint ventures and outsourcing currently dominate the economic landscape along the Eastern side of the EU's external border. In the textile and timber industry, for example, products are half-finished on the Eastern side of the frontier and then sent back to the Western side to be finished. Full investment in the Western borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries is still lagging behind, because the questions surrounding the restitution of properties have not yet been settled. Investors remain hesitant and reluctant, since some splinter groups in Silesia and the Sudeten's Landsmannschaften still claim property refunds for these territories.

But despite these economic success stories the economic disparity still remains. The frontier crosser immediately notices a difference in price of everyday goods as well as services. Specifically "bread, sausages and garden gnomes"61, and services, such as hairdressers, are usually cheaper on the Eastern side of the frontier. Eastern borderlanders, on the other hand, cross the border, in search for more pricey quality goods62.

Western borderlanders and Western investors tend to take advantage of the economic disparity, because labour costs and wages are lower on the Eastern side of the frontier. This has given rise to fear of unemployment in the EU-borderlands; in the adjacent borderlands, it has created an increase of employment prospects and opportunities and attracted a migration flow of people in search of work. Population has increased in the Polish Western borderlands, whereas the reverse is true for the

the Development of the Countries of Central Eastern Europe on the Community territory, p. 133-139, p. 138).


German part of the region. The borderlands' rates of unemployment remain higher than the respective national average. In the Euregio Neiße-Nisa-Nysa, for example, the rate of unemployment has reached the 20% mark - whereas "[u]nemployment in Poland and Hungary is... dipping below 10 per cent"\(^64\), and Germany's rate of unemployment is around 12%. This makes the borderlands on either side of the Eastern frontier of the European Union competitors rather than partners. Each borderland wishes to prioritise and act in its own interest, so that joint projects in this area become deeply affected by these different self-interests.

The psychological challenge\(^65\): After the Second World War, population changes took place on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Germans left the borderlands in both Poland and former Czechoslovakia and new populations moved into the area. "In 1950, for example, only 3% of the population in the Polish borderlands came from this same region."\(^66\) The common ties and heritage that had been formed throughout history became distorted. Living together had to be learnt from scratch, not just within the borderlands, but also - where possible - between the borderlands. In addition, the separation of Europe into two blocs overshadowed similarities and emphasised political, economic, social and cultural differences between 'East' and 'West', that is, differences between 'us' and 'them'. Prejudices about the 'other' were quickly formulated, but the discourse of prejudice only vanishes slowly. This is also fostered by the language barrier - at present, there are

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\(^{63}\) Kennard, Ann (1995); "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional Integration" in *German Politics*, Vol. 4/ No. 1, 143.


\(^{65}\) Since it is in the interest of this thesis to look at European identity and the Eastern borderlands of the European Union, the psychological challenge of the Eastern frontier will be considered in more detail in section 4c. It will argue that Euroregions constitute an ideal framework in which personal and social contacts may be fostered.

\(^{66}\) Krämer, Raimund (1997); *Grenzen der Europäischen Union*, p. 70. My translation.
more Central Eastern Europeans learning English, German and French\textsuperscript{67} than EU-
Europeans learning Polish, Czech or Hungarian.\textsuperscript{68}

**Problems inherent to transfrontier co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union**

When speaking about the challenges on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, one should also refer to transfrontier co-operation as an ideal framework which enables Eastern borderlands to co-operate and to receive EU-funding. One should keep in mind, however, that transfrontier co-operation is not a panacea for the borderlands' social and economic problems. It is rather a complex framework which is subject to legal, financial, organisational and bureaucratic problems, explained below.

**Legal problems:** The different legal systems of neighbouring states are often cited as major obstacles to transborder co-operation.\textsuperscript{69} They may conflict with one another and have a considerable impact on transborder co-operation projects and the distribution of EU funding opportunities.

Transborder co-operation may take different legal forms, in private, public or international law.\textsuperscript{70} No legal matter has the same legal validity on either side of

\textsuperscript{67} According to a survey in *The Economist* (1997), 13\% of Poles speak German, 11\% speak English and 3\% speak French. *The Economist* argues that these figures are changing fast and that they are on the increase (*The Economist* (1997); "Euro-tongues wag in English", October 25, 1997). A study in Frankfurt/Oder-Slubice in autumn 1998 suggests that 97\% of Poles are in favour of learning German, compared to 70\% of Germans willing to learn Polish (Küpper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein Fluß, zwei Städte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999).

\textsuperscript{68} This problem was particularly noticeable during the Conference on Euroregions in Frankfurt/Oder in September 1995, during which there was no interpreter from Czech into German. According to the Gazeta Lubuska, the German participants did not understand anything, except that it is high time to learn the language of their Eastern neighbour (Gazeta Lubuska, "Europroblems", September 30/October 1, 1995).

\textsuperscript{69} Beyerlin, Ulrich (1998); "Neue rechtliche Entwicklungen der regionalen und lokalen grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit" in Brunn, Gerhard and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (eds.); Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Theorie - Empirie - Praxis, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{70} According to Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); *Europas kooperierende Regionen*, p. 74 - 78, public, private and international law refer to the following: Public law includes those Euroregions which, due to their different public duties, receive assistance from both public authorities and legal bodies. Private law, however, refers to Euroregions who have characteristics of an association, society or organisation and whose members originate from private organisations, such as Chambers of Industry and Trade. International law touches upon questions of national
the frontier. Recent developments of transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union have shown the need to adopt the Convention - or at least a document similar to it - as a legal basis for all transborder activities involving the European Union. Major problems arise, for example, in Germany where activities of transborder co-operation are primarily in the hands of the Länder, whereas federal government is hardly involved. In Poland, on the other hand, transborder co-operation is managed by central government, the individual voivodships having virtually no say in transborder projects. The German Länder and localities thus face relatively powerless and weak partners - a situation which might change with Poland's prospective regional reforms.

Financial problems: Responding to the challenges posed by the demise of the Cold War, the European Commission has introduced two development programmes, Phare and Interreg, in order to help the Central Eastern European countries with their transformation process. They are the European Union's most important instruments which aim at the support and development of the EU's Eastern border, its borderlands and the Central Eastern European countries in general. Although established for different purposes at the outset, both Phare and Interreg aim to foster the economic development and socio-economic integration of borderlands sharing a common border with the EU. This is done in harmony with the EU's structural policies, in an attempt to ensure coherence and complementarity.

sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. It may be summarized under the 'loi unique' principle which covers both spheres of private and public law. So far it has been impossible to "choose a legal status which [is] valid on both sides, (...) but the 'loi unique' principle) implies that cooperation - even with participation by member from different Member States - can be assessed only within the framework of one legal system. If, however, the system of laws on either side of the border differ, it is not possible to acquire legal personality on the basis of one of the two national legal systems" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Institutional Aspects of Crossborder Co-operation, p. 4).

71 To this end, Title II, title XII, Art. 129b-d, title XIV, Art. 130a-e and title XVI, Art. 130r-t of the Treaty on European Union could be used as a basis to implement transborder co-operation within the Treaty framework.


73 Please note that a small amount of funds are also available for other areas than the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the EU, e.g. the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European...
Emphasis, as was mentioned above, is placed on the elimination of border-crossing bottlenecks, the development and advancement of the transport system, the communication infrastructure, and the environment, which is the foundation upon which future economic development is based. In future, however, it is assumed that there might be a shift from infrastructure and advancement to training and socio-economic related issues.

The *Interreg* initiative was first introduced in 1990 to help the internal borderlands of the European Union to overcome their specific structural and development problems. It "aimed to assist regions on internal borders to... make use of the Single Market"\(^\text{74}\) and to enhance the internal borderlands' economic role in the European integration process. Cultural aspects were then virtually ignored, since it was taken for granted that, once the economic basis was in place, they would follow automatically.

After the end of the Cold War, and with EU enlargement towards the East on the cards, Interreg II came into being in 1994. Its primary aim "is to contribute towards understanding, promoting and making the most of the border regions' endogenous development potential"\(^\text{75}\). Interreg II is a kind of 'Outerreg' which extends the former Interreg initiative to the external frontiers of the European Union, specifically the Eastern frontier of the EU. For the 1994 -1999 period, the European Communities will fund the Interreg II initiative with 29 billion ECU. According to the European Communities' guidelines concerning Interreg II, the initiative should promote the development of the areas [the external borders] so that they can adapt to new situations and encourage co-operation between external border areas of the European Union and border areas of neighbouring non-Community countries. Where appropriate, their planning and implementation should be undertaken on a cross-border basis, in conjunction with cross-border schemes supported in the neighbouring non-Community countries and under other Community programmes, particularly Phare.\(^\text{76}\)

\(^{74}\) Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); *Institutional Aspects of Crossborder Co-operation*, p. 17.

\(^{75}\) Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); *Institutional Aspects of Crossborder Co-operation*, p. 17.

Nevertheless, Interreg initiatives only focus on areas and borderlands within the EU territory. As a result, the borderlands on either side of the Eastern frontier found themselves engaged in an unequal partnership.

*Phare* - an acronym for 'Poland and Hungary-Assistance for Economic Restructuring' - was set up in 1989. Phare is the financial instrument of the EU's pre-accession strategy. It provides non-refundable grants, and its main objective is to support the Central Eastern European countries in their economic and political reorganisation and help them resume their place in 'mainstream' Europe. This includes primarily transport and environmental measures, as well as soft actions, such as communication, education, tourism, human resources and culture. Phare is one of the most important instruments to support and promote the Central Eastern European countries in their transition process to democracy and free market economy.

Since the Council's decision in Essen in December 1994, Phare also devotes a greater share of its funds to transborder co-operation, known as Phare-CBC (Phare-Cross Border Co-operation). It complements Interreg II on the Eastern side of the frontier. From 1994-1999, Phare-CBC has 24 billion ECU at its disposal. This amount was estimated according to the German borderlands' needs for development help, thus ignoring that the Central Eastern European borderlands are subject to distinct problems, usually in greater need of economic support and funding.

Furthermore, Phare member states cannot decide on the distribution of funding according to their national and their borderlands' priorities alone. Other EU member states - especially Germany, together with other states who do not profit directly from transborder co-operation on the Eastern border of the EU - also have a

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77 It is complemented by ISPA, the pre-accession instrument of the Structural Funds, and SAPARD which assists agriculture and rural development in the accession countries.

78 Until 1999, German borderlands will have received approximately 150 million ECU out of the Interreg II budget, whereas Polish and Czech borderlands share a grant of approximately 55 and 25 million ECU respectively (Funk, Albert (1995); "Phare und Interreg" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 8, 1995). Although this takes into account the disparity of purchasing power between either side of the Eastern frontier, it still makes joint projects, as for example the sewage plant in Guben/Gubin, impossible, due to the lack of money on the Eastern side.
great influence on Phare's decision-making process. This greatly reduces the Central Eastern European countries' independence in allocating Phare's economic means.

Payments for EU-borderlands are made in ECU - thus not taking into account any conversion criteria into the national currency of the country in question. As a result, if

there is a devaluation of that currency, then it may be that the payment becomes inadequate; even a revaluation is not helpful, since any extra money which emerges in this way cannot be used, as it was not budgeted for. Also, project sponsors need to reserve monies for the duration of the approval process, which can be anything up to three or four years, and this obviously causes financial difficulties for the authorities concerned.79

Organisational problems: The introduction of Interreg II and Phare has been a vital step in the right direction. The co-ordination between these two programmes, however, poses problems for the actors involved. The programmes seem to treat the symptoms, and thereby ignore the underlying problems. In 1995, only 10 out of the 130 Interreg funding application forms were successful; and out of the 59 Phare proposals only 9 have been successfully translated into action. The rest is managed by separate projects.80 This lack of co-operation is subject to the borderlands' differences in interests and priorities. Polish authorities, for instance, emphasise the need to improve their borderlands' infrastructure and socio-economic situation, whereas German authorities wish to prioritise the development of touristic, environmental and socio-cultural projects. Disagreements may also occur concerning advantages and disadvantages of specific projects, as well as the subsequent distribution of profits and losses resulting from some projects. But the low number of successful joint projects may also be due to the fact that each programme is subject to a different policy area: Interreg is considered as being part of the EU's 'domestic' policy, regional policy, which is under the direction of DG XVI; Phare, on the other hand, belongs to the EU's 'external' policy area and falls under the auspices of DG I. This difficult relationship between European 'foreign'

79 Kennard, Ann (1997); "A Perspective on German-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation and European Integration" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 57.
and 'domestic' regional policies and the two programmes' principle of territoriality has negative effects on the application procedures for funding. There are loopholes in both initiatives and some parts of projects cannot be subsumed under either programme. Furthermore, the separation of the two programmes complicates the decision-making processes and co-operative activities between Phare and Interreg. The monies from Phare's one year plans have been aligned to Interreg's five year projects, but the border which should be overcome with these two main programmes, seems to remain insurmountable for financial resources.

To overcome some of the organisational problems, it has been suggested that the merging of both Phare-CBC and Interreg II to one common programme, for example 'Interreg/External frontier' or 'Outerreg', would alleviate the decision-making procedures considerably. It could ensure that Phare and Interreg aid is used correctly and efficiently, since a closer link between these two initiatives would contribute to a simplification of application procedures, decision-making processes, assistance to reform public administration and a more decentralised management. Furthermore, it would also balance the amounts of monies borderlands on either side of the frontier currently receive. The European Commission, however, affirms that joining the two programmes is not envisaged and impossible because of legal and political reasons.

**Bureaucratic problems:** The programmes' different, difficult and lengthy application and decision-making procedures add another layer of complexity and intransparency to the process. Co-ordination problems exist between the various governmental and administrative actors - localities, regions, central governments

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84 European Court of Auditors (1993); *Co-operation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe*, p. 20.
and European bodies - which are involved in transborder co-operation.\textsuperscript{86} Joint institutions for communication, implementation and programming have been established\textsuperscript{87}, in order to ensure cohesion and complementarity between these two programmes. But deadlines and the many other existing binational frameworks remain, which make the co-ordination of projects and the funding application an even lengthier and more problematic process. As a result,

\begin{quote}
[The entire process takes approximately two years, from the submission of the Operational Programme with its financial plan, approval via the Commission (which may include returning the Programme for modification), distribution of the project sponsors by the co-operating partners, carrying out the work by the project sponsors and finally payment for the projects by Brussels via the central banks of the member states (or associated states in the case of Phare monies) for the regional partners to distribute to the project sponsors.\textsuperscript{88}]
\end{quote}

Despite these complexities, the European Commission still sees a positive side to its transborder co-operation support, because "the dialogue between the relevant border regions has been intensified... [and a] reinforced 'bottom-up' approach is now used involving local actors, and the programmes have become increasingly diversified"\textsuperscript{89}. The Commission therefore concludes that the participation of local actors in devising and implementing cross-border projects is very important for their successful development. The continuous involvement of the regions in the conception and operation of Interreg guarantees that policies are carried out in conformity to the principle of subsidiarity\textsuperscript{90}. It also contributes "to the


\textsuperscript{86} In the Land Brandenburg, for example, the bureaucracy is shared between the Euroregions Pomerania, Viadrina and Spree-Neiße-Bober, three different Länderministries, the federal government and the European Commission's DG I and DG XI.

\textsuperscript{87} For Germany and Poland, for instance, this includes the 'German-Polish Programme Monitoring Committee (1995-1999)' and the 1994 'Convention between the Project Manager responsible for Phare in Poland and the German Federal Ministry for Economy managing the distribution of funding from the European Union for the use of transborder co-operation in the period of 1995-1999'.

\textsuperscript{88} Kennard, Ann (1997); "A Perspective on German-Polish Cross-Border Co-operation and European Integration" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 57.

\textsuperscript{89} European Commission (1996); Phare cross-border co-operation programme, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{90} Operational plans for transfrontier co-operation sometimes include national authorities and various different regional authorities which may by-pass central government. This problem of inconsistency becomes especially problematic at the implementation of different policies.
integration process in dismantling internal frontiers and in many cases... [revives] historical ties".91 One should not forget, however, that on the Eastern side of the EU's external frontier, it is still central governments, rather than the borderlands, which determine the eligible areas for collaboration with the European Union. The administrative environment in the Central Eastern European countries is still in a state of flux, and it is feared that recognising borderlands and their institutionalised transborder co-operation projects could provoke a "crumbling away on the margins."92

These problems will certainly influence the borderlands' role as a hinge for European Union enlargement towards the East. It is questionable, however, to what extent. Judging from the above-mentioned problems, the situation may look grim for borderlands to act as a bridge - a bridge which does not only reach the other shore, but which leads further into the interior93 - to the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries which are "actually facing greater problems now than they did during the Cold War era"94, and which may run the danger of becoming more peripheral.

The following section will look at the Eastern border of an enlarged European Union. In future, the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries will have to share the 'new' border with their Russian counterparts. So far, it seems as if this border will be a

very concrete dividing line... and countries that once were forced to co-operate with each other (within the Eastern bloc) are reluctant to continue this co-operation; at least its role is less important than that of co-operation with the

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91 Baker, Susan (1996); "Punctured sovereignty, border regions and the environment within the European Union" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 27.
92 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 84. My translation.

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Western European countries and the attempt to integrate into its organisations and institutions.95

Some central governments in Central Eastern European countries already tend to re-direct part of the Phare monies to their Eastern borderlands, in order to aid their development and security. Funds - provided under Tacis (the programme for assisting the CIS countries and Mongolia with 4 billion ECU for the period 2000-2006) - are also made available from the European Union to this purpose. Some parts of both Phare and Tacis, for instance, include first approaches which take into account transborder co-operation, such as the Euroregion Carpathia "which is supposed to include administrative units from Southern Poland, Northern Slovakia, Northeastern Hungary, Northern Romania and Western Ukraine."96 In general, these funds are often implemented in coordination with other measures financed by the Structural Funds, such as "local development projects... including business, human resources and socio-economic development."97

Transfrontier co-operation in the wider European context

Since the 1989/90 events, the Central Eastern European countries have, arguably, become a kind of buffer zone of defensive character for the Western European countries and, in some respects, for Nato. The Association agreements between the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries, together with Phare assistance employed at the Eastern borderlands of the Central Eastern European countries, could be represented as being primarily in the interests of the European Union member states. They were a means to create a buffer zone against the feared - but greatly exaggerated - immigration influx from the (farther) East, which was predicted to flood the member states of the EU after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

With prospective Eastern enlargement of the EU, and especially if all the countries of Central Eastern Europe attain EU membership, this buffer zone may be moved further to the East. This process will affect the Eastern borderlands in the Central Eastern Europe countries, as well as the borderlands in South Western Europe. If changes in Central Eastern Europe continue to shift the centre of gravity of Europe further to the East, then the Western borderlands of the EU's Mediterranean member states may run the danger of becoming more peripheral than they already are. Will they inherit the problems of the Eastern borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union? German unification, as was indicated above, together with EU's enlargement towards the North, has already affected the fragile internal balance of the European Union. The need to balance East-West disparities and to close the North-South gap becomes increasingly important in order to maintain a certain degree of cohesion within the European Union.

Transborder co-operation must also be seen in the context of Europe's newly emerging security framework which is "connected to people's perceptions of security and identity". Hegemonies have changed, and "particularly border regions are dependent on shifting hegemonies and all the developments in power structures have clear repercussions on them." The Eastern frontier of the European Union has ceased to be a defence line between the capitalist West and the communist East. However, a fortress Europe with tight immigration controls exercised at the frontier does not seem possible nor plausible... The answer is a plea for co-operative borders that offer each individual enough space for communication and exchange in an open society, borders which guarantee enough democratic accountability not just to protect the individual person.

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99 Martin Walker and Michael White of The Guardian argue that the "price of resolving the North-South split could be paid by the eastern European countries". Martin Walker and Michael White (1998); "Britain off the hook at European summit" in The Guardian, December 12, 1998.


102 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 95. My translation.
The developments on the Eastern frontier of the European Union are of concern to all the EU member states, especially to the signatories of the Schengen agreements, since the Eastern frontier of the European Union has also become Schengen's external frontier and "the former internal border controls are... being transferred to the external frontiers of the Schengen countries."103 Central Eastern European countries, and especially Slovenia whose borders, as one expert argued, had been "more open than the Schengen frontier will be allowed to be", had no doubts that the EU's reinforced external border controls would have negative effects on them104. Governments in Central Europe feared that a new Iron Curtain would emerge and thus become "an affront to good neighbourliness and future common membership of the EU."105

EU enlargement will transfer the major responsibilities of border controls from the present Eastern frontier of the European Union - mainly running along Austria and Germany - to the Eastern border of the Central Eastern European countries. It will enhance the Central Eastern European countries' role to protect the European Union from unwanted immigration, human trafficking and crime. Poland's eastern borders, for example, will become "both the EU's future frontier and a second line of defence against migration into Western European states"106, and "the question of policing what will soon be the EU's... eastern border continues to cause friction."107

At present, the Central Eastern European countries act as a filter for the European Union. The Central Eastern European countries are transit countries for most migrants who wish to reach the European Union for asylum or for economic reasons. Since Germany changed its asylum laws in May 1993, immigrants who come to Germany via so-called 'safe countries' can no longer claim the right to asylum. They are sent back to the last country they passed through: Poland and the

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103 Schlögl, Karl (1997); "Schengen will not mean a new Iron Curtain between Austria and Hungary", in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 15.
104 Gasperlin, Marko (1997); "Schengen needs modification: a Slovenian Perspective", in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 102 and 103.
105 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls", in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 29.
107 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
Czech Republic in particular. This has also enhanced a change in the Central Eastern European countries' immigration policies. Poland and the Czech Republic have already tightened their border controls on their Eastern frontiers, and a "'Budapest process' has been started to stop illegals from such countries as Russia getting into, say, Poland or Hungary." This represents an attempt to meet some of the EU member states' general asylum and immigration criteria, which will increase the openness of the Central Eastern European countries' borders to the European Union.

It is in the Central Eastern European countries' "common interest that no persons cross the eastern borders,... about whom the West assumes that it would not be good if they crossed the eastern frontier of the European Union." But in order to fully attain the necessary standards, the Central Eastern European countries need further financial support. They "rely on the Western countries and organisations to realise that they defend their own countries' interests when they contribute to bringing the technical equipment of... [their] border protection up to a Western level." "Conscious that Poland is still largely just a stop-off point for migrants heading West, the EU has identified the improvement in provisions on Poland's eastern borders as a key priority." New border crossings are planned and, funded by the EU, new technical equipment should also be available soon. The German government, in particular, wishes to alleviate its national Eastern frontier from playing a dual role - national frontier and Eastern frontier of the European Union. Having the Eastern frontier of the European Union further East would alleviate Germany's national Eastern frontier of immigration pressure and other important functions. Similarly, Austria would also profit. Enlargement would place "Austria at the centre of the fastest-growing region of Europe... Austrian firms have profited handsomely from burgeoning trade and investment with the countries pressing for

112 Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzräume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
Adapting the Central Eastern European countries' frontier policies and measures to the average EU level also requires a rethinking and modernisation of Schengen. The Schengen acquis has been incorporated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, and "if Schengen and the enlargement of the European Union are to be processes of unifying, 'Europeanising' Europe, they must not be mutually conflicting." But

[what consequences will [a clash between an enlarged European Union and Schengen] have for the development of both a regional and a European identity in this area and beyond? These new border lines could then become dangerous for the workings of an enlarged European Union, if cross-border conflicts straddling this new frontier are not fully and satisfactorily settled by the time enlargement happens.]¹¹⁶

The Central Eastern European countries wish to maintain their good neighbourly relations with their Eastern counterparts. Poland, specifically, seeks to retain its Eastern frontiers relatively open, despite demands of the European Union to impose visa requirements. So far, citizens of the CIS (excluding Kazakhstan) were not obliged to hold a visa when entering Poland - and as far as former Polish President Kwasniewski proclaimed in 1996, the last thing Poland could imagine, is the appearance of a new Iron Curtain on its Eastern frontiers.¹¹⁷ Similarly,


¹¹⁵ Gasperlin, Marko (1997); "Schengen needs modification: a Slovenian Perspective" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); *Schengen and EU enlargement*, p. 103.


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Hungarians worry that the impositions of visas "could sour one of their greatest post-communists feats: the befriending of Romania."  

Both the EU and Nato have opted for a small enlargement strategy, taking in the strongest countries first. Madeleine Albright argues that this reduces the costs of expansion and, more importantly, the new members would "export stability eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a race to escape westward at the expense of their neighbours". According to President Bill Clinton, "Nato has erased an artificial line drawn across Europe by Stalin after the Second World War" - and former Polish President Kwasniewski proclaimed on several occasions that Poland's membership of Nato and the EU would contribute to Europe's and the Euro-Atlantic security framework. In all these discourses, there is no mention of a new frontier being erected in Europe. An enlarged Nato and European Union should not redivide Europe; no new frontier should emerge between those who are 'in' and those who are 'out' of the European Union or Nato. (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) How far the incongruity between EU enlargement and Nato expansion will have consequences for Europe's security framework is questionable, since it is designed not to 'upset' Russia. Russia, already humiliated enough by having to give way to capitalism and losing its sphere of influence to the West, since Nato attracts most of Russia's former satellites, looks on Nato's eastward expansion with a weary eye.

However, Russia also plays a crucial role in the design of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Without Russia's consent to EU enlargement, and particularly Nato expansion, Central Eastern Europe would remain a permanent source of tension and insecurity between the European Union, Nato and Russia. Russia has to be involved in order to reduce the risk of another Cold War, a new arms conflict and the revival of old fears. If left out, Russia would have a greater incentive to

118 *The Economist* (1998); "Austria and its eastern neighbours", May 9, 1998.
119 Albright, Madeleine (1997); "Why bigger is better" in *The Economist*, February 15, 1997.
120 President Bill Clinton cited in *The Economist* (1997); "Europe changes shape", July 12, 1997.
Fig. 4.1: Nato enlargement

Germany

Hungary

Fig. 4.2: EU enlargement

Existing EU states

Proposed EU enlargement

Source: Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.) (1998); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 97.
interfere with its former satellites immediately to its West. Russia might even "develop closer ties with 'old friends... that are suspicious of, or hostile to, the United States. The list would include China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea... and perhaps Cuba"\textsuperscript{121}. Russia's disagreement with the United States over the United Nations' weapons' inspection team in Iraq could be seen as a first sign of this.

Nato expansion has already provoked hostile reactions amongst Russian leaders. Even Mikhail Gorbachev claimed that an expansion of Nato "would mean that the West's most hawkish, conservative and aggressive (and also most ignorant) circles have gained the upper hand"\textsuperscript{122}. Gorbachev considered it as "a chilling warning that a new Iron Curtain could come crashing down in Europe, reviving old fears and the threat of nuclear conflict."\textsuperscript{123} According to George Kennan, Nato enlargement will stimulate nationalistic, anti-western and militaristic tendencies in Russian public opinion. It will have negative consequences for the development of Russian democracy, revive the atmosphere of the Cold War in East-West relations, direct Russian foreign policy against Nato and it might even make the signing of Start II impossible.\textsuperscript{124}

As a means to accommodate and appease Russia, first steps have been undertaken with EU's 'Partnership and Co-operation Programme' and Nato's 'Atlantic Partnership Council' and 'Partnership for Peace Programme', which reaches out to the Ukraine and Russia. They are an attempt to bring countries outside the EU and Nato closer to the core. According to Javier Solana, Nato's Secretary General, Nato follows the course of history. In this sense, "the alliance is changing beyond recognition, and... it is in Russia's interest to come to terms with the new order rather than look sulkily the other way - and get left out in the cold"\textsuperscript{125}.

\textsuperscript{121} The Economist (1997); "Russia's surly answer to NATO", February 1, 1997.
\textsuperscript{122} Mikhail Gorbachev cited in The Economist (1997); "Russia's surly answer to NATO", February 1, 1997.
\textsuperscript{123} Herbert Pearson cited in Bort, Eberhard (1998); "Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); The Frontiers of Europe, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{125} Javier Solana cited in The Economist (1997); "For NATO, eastward ho!", March 1, 1997.
4. C European identity and the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union

People in the borderlands experience the existence of the frontier most directly, and frontiers are among the first points of contact for border-crossers. Border regions are areas of a constant coming and going which has probably become an important part of the borderlanders' sense of identity. In border regions with relatively open frontiers, border controls are minimal or even non-existent, and people from different nationalities and backgrounds meet regularly, even if only superficially. Closed borders, by contrast, do not permit a high degree of coming and going. They may, however, play an even more important role for the borderlanders' consciousness. The presence of a closed border often has negative connotations, and it is generally associated with exclusion rather than inclusion, as well as division and separation.

As indicated in chapter two, Oscar Martinez has identified four models of border interaction. These may apply to the past, present and future of the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union.

During the Cold War period, the Eastern frontier of the European Union came close to being sealed. "[I]t was the ultimate concept of border" and the strongest (physical) expression of this was the Berlin Wall. Borderlands on either side of the Iron Curtain were relatively "alienated" from the 'other' beyond the frontier, as well as the national centre and - allegedly - from the outside world. Transfrontier cooperation or interaction hardly existed. Warfare, disputes and animosity created a "tension-filled climate" which did not allow for normal interaction between the people on either side of the frontier. Since the opening of the border in 1989/90, however, borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union have seen a tremendous increase in economic and political interaction. The Eastern borderlands

1 Langer, Josef (1996); "New Meanings of the Border in Central Europe" in Eger, György and Langer, Josef (eds.); Border, Region and Ethnicity in Central Europe, p. 49.
may now be labelled as co-existent, since the border is, in principle, open, allowing interaction and people to come together. "International relations are possible"\(^4\), but cross-border co-operation continues to have its difficulties.

The overall aim of the European Union is to achieve interdependent and, even more favourably, integrated borderlands. Some of the internal borderlands of the European Union can already be labelled as interdependent; only a few of them have achieved integrated status. Interdependent borderlands generally have open borders which are only closed to a limited extent. There is a high rate of economic, social and cultural interaction between these borderlands, overshadowed by "[c]oncerns over immigration, trade competition, smuggling, and ethnic nationalism [which] compel the central governments carefully to monitor the border, keeping it open only to the extent that it serves the agenda of the nation-state"\(^5\). Although there is very little evidence to date, interdependent borderlands may witness the emergence of a frontier-transcending regional identity. Finally, integrated borderlands presume an advanced form of European integration. "Barriers to trade and human movement across the [borderlands'] mutual boundary" are eliminated, as "each nation willingly relinquishes its sovereignty to a significant degree for the sake of achieving mutual progress"\(^6\).

By virtue of European integration and prospective Eastern EU enlargement, border regions generally "have to face up to the challenges of integration (whether they want to or not) and to do so they must somehow find a common approach."\(^7\) Future developments in Europe will decide upon the borderlands' 'status' - external and isolated or internal and integrated - and determine the changes or adaptation processes necessary in these regions. Borderlanders may develop a "sense of


\(^7\) Lähteenmäki, Kaisa (1995); "Cooperation of the European Border Regions" in Archer, Clive and Jalonen Olli-Pekka (eds.); Changing European Security Landscape, p. 274.
cultural 'localism'\textsuperscript{8}, focused on a territory that is comprehensible and where borderlanders feel at home\textsuperscript{9}. Borderlanders are often "comfortable with the notion that they are tied culturally [and ethnically] to many other people in neighbouring states."\textsuperscript{10} This "feeling of local distinctiveness"\textsuperscript{11} may transcend state and national boundaries and suggests that the borderlanders' identification with the 'other' on the other side of the frontier might sometimes even be stronger than their identification with the respective national centre. This shows that

\[\text{[t]he discreteness of local experience is all the more important in societies whose communities see themselves as peripheral or marginal, and in which the reality of difference is continually being glossed by the appearance of similarity.}\textsuperscript{12}\]

Thomas Wilson suggests that some borderlands' common historic or cultural affiliation may be a burden to the nation-state building process and national identity. He sees borderlands as "areas of cultural contest and integration, in which national identity and citizenship are often not the same thing"\textsuperscript{13}, but he seems to play down the fact that concepts of citizenship, political representation and civic nationalism continue to tie borderlanders to the culture and national centre of the state. Wilson concludes that "border cultures continue to be important forces in the perceptions, if not the shaping, of regional and national identities"\textsuperscript{14}, and, in a different article, he defines borderlands as

contradictory zones of culture and power, where the twin processes of state centralisation and national homogenisation are disrupted, precisely because most borders are areas of... cultural diversity.\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{9} Engel, Christian (1991); "Regionen im Netzwerk Europäischer Politik" in Bullmann, Udo (ed.); Die Politik der dritten Ebene, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{10} Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{13} Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 200.
\textsuperscript{14} Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{15} Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 26.
\end{flushright}
Borderlanders have usually no say in determining the course of the frontier. They may, however, have witnessed the struggles involving the position of borders and endured the changing nature of frontiers. This seems to be especially the case if a political decision on the frontier's institutionalised role leads "to an artificial interruption"\(^\text{16}\) of former common bonds of either historical, cultural or economic character.

It is mostly central governments that decide what role their national frontiers should assume. It is of the central governments' interest to determine the frontier's role, since smuggling, migration, cross-border shopping and other kinds of trans-border movement occurring within or outside the limits of the law may challenge and even undermine state efforts to define the identities of those who live at the border.\(^\text{17}\)

The role of 'open' borders may not be as clearly defined as the one of 'closed' borders. Whereas the latter borders are closed, 'open' borders may be open for some and closed for other influences. Paradoxically enough then, a formerly closed or hard border might possibly be more easily transcended than a border which has been open for a longer period of time. According to Prof. Hans Weiler, director of the European University Viadrina, "peoples have never accepted borders in their restrictive function only - the most fruitful moments of humanity were its attempts to overcome frontiers."\(^\text{18}\) The East-West sales route across the Oder-Neiße, as well as current developments on the Eastern frontier of the European Union are but two important examples in support of this statement.

On the assumption that there are many different models of hard and closed frontiers and that hard borders may be easier overcome than soft borders, what is the situation of the present Eastern frontier of the European Union? Is the Eastern frontier of the European Union between Poland and Germany actually that hard a


\(^{17}\) Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 21-22.

\(^{18}\) Prof. Hans Weiler cited in Rottenburg, von, Irmgard (1995), "Euroregionen als Brücken über die Grenzen nach Mittel- und Osteuropa" in Jaedtke, Eckard and Pehl, Ernst (eds.); Konferenz der

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border? Until 1989/90, the Eastern frontier of the European Union used to coincide with the dividing line between East and West Germany. It was a relatively sealed border, whereas the frontier between the former GDR and Poland - the present Eastern frontier of the European Union - was relatively open for some co-operation, but remained more closed than the ideology of international socialism would suggest. Co-operation between the two former Socialist countries was not as intense as it could have been and their borderlands only maintained a certain degree of interpenetration. This co-operation could not have taken place if the frontier had been completely sealed; and surely had an implicit - rather than explicit - effect on the borderlands' common identity. But whereas the former GDR and Poland were engaged in bilateral agreements - no visa requirements for example - the former GDR-FRG border remained virtually closed.

Confusion over the changing nature of the Eastern frontier of the European Union, however, leads to the mistaken belief that the current state of affairs between Polish and former GDR borderlands equals the situation of the former GDR-FRG frontier. Although political and economic circumstances seem to imply so, and restrictions continue to apply, the present Eastern frontier of the European Union may actually be classified more as a soft than hard border. This is specifically in view of the opening of new crossing points, massive increases of traffic, border markets and the current transborder co-operation projects.

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19 It was only under Soviet pressure that the former GDR recognised the Oder-Neiße border in the post WW II period. Following the Treaty of Görlitz in 1952, cultural and political co-operation between Poland and the GDR began, only to be troubled by the Polish social movements with the rise of Gomulka in 1957. 1959 marked the end of these troublesome years of social unrest, allowing the two countries to find together again, culminating in the liberation of visa requirements. Poland and former East Germany agreed on a free movement of peoples across the border, resulting in the abolition of visa requirements. This, however, was soon to be restricted again, due to the higher influx of Polish nationals entering the former GDR. Obligation to hold a visa was re-introduced for Polish citizens wanting to enter the former GDR. East Germans, on the other hand, continued to enjoy the relatively free entry into Poland and only required a valid identification card. This partial opening of the frontier gave borderlands on either side of the frontier an opportunity to engage in some form of co-operation projects, such as cultural exchanges, school and business co-operation, as well as local associations, e.g. sport and youth. In addition, co-operation also had a great impact on the tourist industry of the area.
Could this be the underlying reason why the present Eastern frontier of the European Union does not seem to be too difficult to overcome? Has German unification eased Eastern EU enlargement? German unification seems to have absorbed some of the present problems on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, even if differences of affluence continue to exist between the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Yet, the former dividing line in Germany may present a useful example for further developments on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. David Marsh argues that

the economic and social divisions between East and West Germany provide a reflection and a reminder of the large disparities in the organisation of lives, economies and states throughout Europe. Germany is the focus and mirror of a continent united in disunity.²⁰

Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union

On the present Eastern frontier of the European Union, cross-border co-operation is mainly institutionalised and highlighted in the form of Euroregions. As was mentioned above, the development, characteristics and overall structure of these Euroregions are based on their Western counterparts, specifically the Euregio model, which was first established on the German-Dutch border in the mid-1960s.²¹ The Euregio soon became a prototype for the institutionalisation of transborder co-operation projects on the internal frontiers of the European Community - and since 1989/90, Euroregions have been established on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. They represent "an attempt to transfer the experience of the highly developed Western European countries to the Mitteleuropa area external to the European Union."²²

In 1991, the first Euroregion - the Euroregion Neiße-Nysa-Nisa - was founded on the Eastern frontier of the European Union between Germany, Poland

²¹ Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 33. The first Euregio- the Euregio Maas-Rhein - was established on the German-Dutch border between the three communes of Rhein-Ems, Twente-Oost Gelderland and Oostelijk Gelderland.
and the Czech Republic. Other Euroregions followed soon. The roots of some Euroregions reach far back in history, suggesting that "[i]nstitutionalised forms of co-operation represent the 'old' structures that were essential in the former European system where the predominance of states was not contested."23 The Euroregion Pomerania, for instance, is based on historical roots - mainly of German character - which go back to the Middle Ages. Similarly, the Euroregion Egrensis is modelled on the historical and cultural province of the *Regio Egire* of 1135 and the *Provincia Egrensis* of 1218.

As was indicated in the previous section, the principal aim of transborder co-operation projects is to reduce "the problem of marginality and insecurity of European borderlanders who once ranked... as typical examples of marginal populations."24 In line with Asiwaju's assertion that borderlands are ideal laboratories25, Euroregions and transborder co-operation represent an "imaginative attempt to achieve regional integration and a new trans-national identity."26 Since Euroregions tend to be the result of former occasional cultural, educational or sporting contacts and activities between border regions27, they seem to be models for the European integration process at a micro-level, acting as a bridge over the Oder/Neiße rivers. Two objectives are at stake: to develop transparency and to promote democracy.

Euroregions may be good examples to bring the European integration process closer to the people, because "[c]ross-border regionalism seems the best

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24 Asiwaju, Anthony (1996); "Public Policy for Overcoming Marginalization" in Nolutshungu, Sam (ed.); *Margins of Insecurity*, p. 276.
25 See chapter 4b.
26 Kennard, Ann (1995); "The German-Polish Border as a Model for East-West European Regional Integration" in *German Politics*, Vol. 4/No. 1, p. 141.
way forward... to build a bottom-up democratic Europe."\textsuperscript{28} As has been argued before, this approach could, in fact, be another step towards a 'Europe of regions', in which borderlands and regions, including Euroregions, become key players. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, a 'Europe of regions' would be a means for both the European Union and the regions to bypass the nation-state. It would provide room for decision-making at the sub-national and supra-national levels. It would also vindicate the idea of a genuine - diversified and unified - European Union. For regions in the Central Eastern European countries in particular, regional policy may represent an example to break with the traditions and legacies of Communism. European regional policy seems to be a supplement to the EU's Association Agreements with the Central Eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{29}

Regional policy, at first glance, seems to be a paradox within the unitarian and common economic policy of the European Union.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, EU regional policy has been a convenience for the Community, a means of building political coalitions for policies of redistribution which is more widely acceptable than would be policies based on transfers between countries or classes.\textsuperscript{31}

Article 146 of the 1993 Treaty on European Union lays down the opportunity to regional direct participation and Art. 198 a-c establishes the 'Committee of Regions'. The regions welcomed "this greater measure of organizational independence", and it was proposed that the democratic legitimate "Committee of Regions... should become an institution with a fair and balanced representation of local and regional authorities in each member state to ensure its effective contribution to European policy -making"\textsuperscript{32}. However, this is far from enough to ensure direct and efficient regional participation in the European Union. The Committee may address the collective of all regions and is likely to ignore the

\textsuperscript{28} Bort, Eberhard (1997); "Boundaries and Identities: Cross-Border Co-operation" in Švob-Dokić, Nada (ed.); The Cultural Identity of Central Europe, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{30} Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 131.
needs of individual regions. In addition, some of the regions have established representative offices in Europe - "one recent count ended at 54 such offices."  

Notwithstanding, Alfred Grosser warns us that in this 'Europe of regions',  

there exists a risk that regions will act to satisfy their own need. By this, it would follow that we would be missing the opportunity that could make the regions a place where the necessary solidarity to construct Europe could be rediscovered. A Europe of regions will not be creative unless it shows the example of solidarity, beyond the frontiers.  

Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects affect the different people on either side of the frontier directly with their activities and this  

refocusing of development from the national to the regional level also causes a shift in identity, sense of belonging and legal remedy to the transregional and crossborder level.  

Euroregions and transborder co-operation represent a form of European framework in which regional and national interests are respected. They are - as will be indicated below - generally met with enthusiasm at the regional and European level, since they seem to take into consideration the different regional and local economic, political, social and cultural aspects of the borderlands. Common projects are usually developed and adapted according to the borderlands' mutual needs. In contrast to the EU, borderlands generally do not have a large bureaucratic apparatus attached to them, and are therefore seen as being closer to the people.  

In order to maintain this degree of transparency, visibility, and a certain degree of democracy, however, Euroregions and transborder co-operation must not develop, as was indicated in the preceding section, into complicated administrative bureaucracies. Nor should they add another administrative layer to the already existing national and European authorities. Ideally, Euroregions should include all

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34 Alfred Grosser cited in Hingel, Anders Joest (1993); "The prime role of regional co-operation in European integration" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 12.
35 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of border regions, p. 3.
possible models of transborder co-operation projects - regardless of the many different structures. It seems as if Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects are already a challenge to the nation-state as the best provider to the borderlands' welfare. Hence the following statement of Kaisa Lähteenmäki may hold true:

Though the state as an actor is not disappearing from the stage of international relations - in some cases quite the opposite - it is increasingly only one among the many relevant actors, and in the border regions this is strikingly clear.37

The impact of transborder co-operation on national affairs may be illustrated by taking transborder co-operation on the Polish-German border as an example. Here, Euroregions and transborder co-operation projects already seem to have a certain degree of influence on inter-governmental relations and decisions. In return, these relations and decisions also have an important impact on the respective border regions. In his speech to the German Bundestag in November 1990, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl implied that transborder co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union is the most important bilateral arrangement between the German and Polish governments. He emphasised that transborder co-operation projects play an important role for the common future of both the German and Polish nations and suggested that borderlands on either side of the frontier should soon be subject to a balanced development.38

**Euroregions and European identity**

Euroregions break through the traditional institutionalisation of frontiers and seem to "outmode"39 the nation-state, in some respects, a virtually closed system. Euroregions explode the traditional notion of the nation-state, and make national boundaries, even the Eastern frontier of the European Union, porous. It is the aim of

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36 With the exception of Lombardy, Bavaria and Rhône-Alpes, which may be classified as borderlands, but which have more civil servants than the EU.
this thesis to suggest that it is exactly this kind of explosion and surmounting of frontiers which is necessary to create a fully integrated Europe with integrated borderlands and to foster a genuine European identity. Within the European Union, the 'withering away' of frontiers between member states has already become one of the most important expressions of the European integration process - developed and fostered through Schengen and the four freedoms of movement. Internal borderlands have become connecting points between two, if not more, member states. Perhaps the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union may soon find themselves subject to the same development.

But "if borders are becoming irrelevant, what will the future of the European border regions be like?" At present, Euroregions "do not correspond to existing territories", but represent new regions that may be delimited from the rest. Their boundaries can solely be found and traced on maps developed by the European Union or the Euroregions themselves. Euroregions and their borders have not yet found their way into the traditional atlases. But on the assumption that Euroregions may increase their stance in the future European integration process, this might change, since

we must accept that borders must be placed somewhere, and if we eliminate borders between states, local communities will create their own. Experience shows that, as the borders of the state become more open, communities will set up their own.

Euroregional boundaries may then become more apparent and "indicate future territories and correspond to actual tendencies of development within them." Euroregions might even give rise to a new kind of region. They may follow Storm Pedersen's idea of the 'meso-region', describing a region which is subject to

41 Cappellin, Riccardo (1993); "Interregional co-operation in Europe: an introduction" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 2.
42 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 45.
43 Walzer cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 166.
44 Cappellin, Riccardo (1993); "Interregional co-operation in Europe: an introduction" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 2.
regional co-operation based on large transborder co-operation. Euroregions could become melting pots in which subnational culture, inter-regional structural policy (including transborder co-operation) and European integration policy may become complementary. Further, and in order to come back to the analogy used in chapter two, Euroregions could become toolboxes in which various different identities meet. The various cultural, educational and sporting activities - illustrated in the following section - seem to suggest that different values and interests may be shared across a frontier. In future, this may lead to the emergence of a Euroregional identity.

If Euroregions were indeed able to develop a Euroregional identity on their own, based on an amalgamation of many different identities, the transfer of this model to the entire European integration process would present a giant step towards a new European society. Although there is little evidence to date, integrated Euroregions, such as the Euregio Maas-Rhein or the Euroregion Saar-Lor-Lux may serve as a model for a European society with a "deterritorialised" supranational identity. This kind of identity would be separate from the traditional understanding of identity. Euroregional identity would, as Weiler argues, decouple the term nation from the respective state and its boundaries, as it already seems to be the case in the borderlands where

the battle for the hearts and minds of 'the Europeans' must be won if the EU as a sociocultural system is to develop in support of further political and economic union.

This kind of identity may be defined by the coexistence of commonalities as well as differences. It would most possibly be based on an kind of 'differenity' - a

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45 Storm Pedersen, J. (1993); "The Baltic Region and the New Europe" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. (eds.); Regional Networks, Border regions and European integration, p. 143.
46 Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 132.
47 Although the Euregio Basiliensis between Germany, France and Switzerland represents one of Schengen's external frontiers, it may also be considered as an integrated Euroregion, since it has achieved a high level of integration.
49 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 213.
'differentity' in which the 'us' versus 'them' dynamic would still exist, but on a different level: 'we' interiorise 'them' as much as 'they' interiorise 'us'. Translating this model to the European territory would allow the European peoples to continue to think in national or regional terms - such as their language or culture -, since these differences remain essential components of the individual's human psyche, his/her sense of belonging, and perceptions of past, present and future.

**Eastern borderlands as a laboratory for the emergence of a genuine European identity?**

It has been indicated above that each Euroregion focuses on different areas of action. Each project of transfrontier co-operation is subject to different conditions, since "not all border communities have the same characteristics, [and] not all are dissected by the border in the same way." Assessing the success and performance of individual transfrontier co-operation projects is a difficult task - one may either concentrate on the difference between proclaimed objectives and actual performance of Euroregions, or one may solely focus on the Euroregions' individual success stories. There is no uniform standard to which one may compare or measure the Euroregions' achievements or reputation. Someone who crosses the border just to buy a cheap packet of cigarettes will have a different conception of the neighbouring borderland than someone who works on the other side of the frontier.

According to a 1995 opinion poll in the border towns of Frankfurt/Oder and Slubice, only two out of twenty people knew that representatives of either side of the frontier meet in Euroregions to solve frontier problems. This lack of information may also be compared with an opinion poll in 1970 in the Euroregions Basiliensis and Haut-Rhin. In both cases, analysis showed that relatively

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51 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 14.

52 Malchus von, Viktor (1975); Partnerschaft an den europäischen Grenzen, p. 80.

53 Svensson, Birgit (1995); "Pomerania: Die schwere Geburt einer Euroregion" in Märkische Allgemeine October 30, 1995. This lack of information may also be compared with an opinion poll in 1970 in the Euroregions Basiliensis and Haut-Rhin. In both cases, analysis showed that relatively
to the 1996 Czech-German Euroregion Elbe/Labe survey, in which 50% named the Euroregion as a concrete example for transfrontier co-operation projects - Phare-CBC was only known by 33% and Interreg II by 5%. 36% were unable to assess the Euroregions' activities, but 56% of those asked considered the Euroregions' activities as positive. Negative perceptions were mainly based on criticisms about the Euroregions' lack of self-management and possibly their inability to mobilise mass political support. Euroregions' successes may be most strongly felt in the cultural domain, particularly educational exchanges, youth encounters, sport events and cultural activities.

The European University Viadrina in Frankfurt/Oder in the Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina, for instance, is a good example to demonstrate the coming together of both German and Polish academic traditions and relations. However, it is a coming together of the German and Polish traditions, rather than a melting together of the two. There is a higher number of German students attending the University and, linguistically, the German language predominates. As a counterweight to this, a Collegium Polonicum has been founded in Frankfurt's twin town Szczecin, which will be much more oriented towards Polish students and the Polish language. Although both educational institutions pursue a more national than trans-boundary approach, they are nevertheless an important step to bringing both the German and Polish peoples together. Similarly, although not at university level, other Euroregions, such as the Euroregion Neiße-Spree-Bober and the Euroregion Neiße, have bilingual Kindergartens in Görlitz and Guben respectively.

On the cultural side, specifically, the Euroregion Neiße witnesses "regular contacts between various organisations, societies for the elderly, schools and young

few borderlanders were aware of their neighbours' problems and showed little transnational interest. In Malchus von, Viktor (1975); Partnerschaft an den europäischen Grenzen, pp. 81-83.

54 Jerábek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 98.


56 The predominance of 'Western' languages over 'Eastern' languages was already indicated in chapter 4b.
people.57 The Euroregion also supports the German-Polish-Czech orchestra
"Europera" and has organised a steamship on which Polish and German poets read
their poetry. This steamship, however, does not reach the lower part of the Neiße,
which is part of the Euroregion Bayerischer Wald/Böhmerwald, because here the
Euroregion Bayerischer Wald/Böhmerwald has helped to re-introduce the tradition
of the Holzfloßerei58.

In the Euroregion Neiße-Spree-Bober, the old town centre of Görlitz, which
is situated on the German side of the border, was only recently accepted as the
common centre of the double border town Görlitz/Zgorzelec.59 Similarly, the border
towns of Guben/Gubin aim to become a true Euro-city "which will give German
and Polish citizens a new identity and future"60.

The cross-border towns of Görlitz/Zgorzelec, Frankfurt/Slubice and
Guben/Gubin have incorporated border-crossing into their everyday co-existence.
The free movement of goods and persons across the border is still restricted, due to
the existing customs barrier between the European Union and the Central Eastern
European countries. Incredible improvements to this situation, however, have taken
place in order to overcome the Eastern frontier of the European Union as a 'hard'
border.

"Co-operation works best where people with the same interests come
together"61. One should perhaps add that co-operation also works well where people
are subject to the same fate62, as was the case during the Oder floods during the
summer of 1997. After receipt of considerable German donations for the Polish
victims of the floods, the Polish Ambassador in Bonn diplomatically remarked that
"one recognises true friends when one is in need. The Germans have helped in

57 Schweinert, Michael, vice-representative of the Landrat Löbau-Zittau, (1995); "Deutsch-Polnische
58 Holzfloßerei is an old tradition in the Bayerischer Wald/Böhmerwald area. Individual tree trunks
are left floating on the rivers. They are then collected behind weirs and dams, where they might be
used to build big rafts.
60 Kramer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 76. My translation.
61 Marein Zawila, member of the Polish Sejm cited in Markische Oderzeitung (1995); "Europas
62 This falls in line with the argument made in chapter two, the socio-psychological approach to
identity.
solidarity. In reality, however, the effects on German-Polish relations of the floods were more complicated. The Germans were generous in their donations for the victims of the floods, but only "[s]ome donations were earmarked for reconstruction projects in Poland and the Czech Republic,... most were directed at German fellows in the eastern state of Brandenburg," although the Czech Republic and Poland were far worse hit by the floods than their German counterparts. This being so, one may ask whether the neighbours on either side of the Eastern frontier of the European Union are really growing together?

One possible, negative, answer is that some communes next to the Eastern frontier of the European Union, specifically on the Czech and Polish side, do not actually take part in Euroregions. This may either be due to the respective Polish or Czech spatial planning organisation; more importantly, however, it may be linked to their reluctance to work in close co-operation with Germany which may be attributed to the historical fear of a revival of German hegemony and German economic expansionism.

A second negative answer may be based on recent opinion polls in the Polish-German borderlands in Frankfurt/Slubice during autumn 1998. Although 33% of borderlanders feel that their geographical situation is privileged and that the opening of the border has decreased existing prejudices and Feindbilder - 82% of Germans think that Poles are friendly, compared to 86% of Poles who think that their German neighbours are sympathetic - the same opinion polls have also shown that 58% of Germans and 33% of Poles believe that former prejudices towards the 'other' have been strengthened and new ones have been created. In a different survey, 24% of Germans and 35% of Poles assert that their former positive attitude towards the 'other' has changed to negative, 19% of Germans do not like the

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64 Staunton, Denis (1997); "Pfennigs from heaven for Germany's flood victims" in The Guardian, September 27, 1997.
65 Heffner, Krystian (1998); "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit im deutsch-polnischen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurezko, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 54.
66 Kipper, Mechtild (1999); "Ein Fluß, zwei Städte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.
Poles and 26% of Poles do not find the Germans sympathetic. To this, one should add that 29% of young Germans and 4% of young Poles believe that 'the majority of Poles/Germans are criminals'.\textsuperscript{67} In Frankfurt and Slubice, 47% of Germans would welcome Poles 'as citizens of the same city; whereas only 36% of Poles think the same about Germans.\textsuperscript{68} Despite the fact that Görlitz is being praised as the double border town on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, its Mayor Matthias Lechner has only recently referred to Görlitz as the town with two nations.\textsuperscript{69}

The Polish grievances may be attributable to a mixture of disappointment and resentment. On the one hand, the promises made about the flourishing West, wealthy capitalism and Germany as the rich helpful neighbour, have partially remained unfulfilled. On the other hand, the feeling of apprehensiveness vis-à-vis the 'aggressive Germans' was heightened in October 1997, after allegations that German border police had arrested and beaten Polish lorry drivers, because they had protested about the long waiting hours/days at German-Polish border controls. Particularly amongst the younger generation there is a widespread fear that the Poles could become a "nation of waiters and cleaning ladies. Second status citizens."\textsuperscript{70} A young Polish girl already feels that, in Germany, she is "treated worse than somebody who comes from a poorer country... like an inferior."\textsuperscript{71} To this come the problems of economic competition,\textsuperscript{72} smuggling and car theft, as well as

\textsuperscript{67} Küpper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein Fluß, zwei Städte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999. See also Südwestfunk - ARD (1997); "Europamagazin", December 13, 1997, 13:05; Institute for Western Affairs of Poznan (1995); "Otwarta granica, Raport z badan na pograniczu polsko-niemieckim 1991-1993" in Lepesant, Gilles (1996); Géopolitique des frontières orientales de l'Allemagne dans la perspective d'un élargissement de l'Union Européenne et de l'OTAN, Doctoral Thesis, p. 255; According to an opinion poll on the German-Polish border in 1994, 26% of Poles found the Germans sympathetic - this was an increase of 3% from the preceding year (1993), in Holzer, Jerzy (1996); "Polen in Europa: Zentrum oder Peripherie?" in Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (ed.); Europabilder in Mittel- und Osteuropa, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{68} Küpper, Mechthild (1999); "Ein Fluß, zwei Städte - und zwei Blicke auf die Fremden" in Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 17, 1999.

\textsuperscript{69} Lesch, Markus (1997); "Man spricht Polnisch" in Die Welt, April 4, 1997. According to Matussek, Matthias (1996); "Grenze ohne Schatten" in Der Spiegel, No. 41/1996, p. 160, the same may be said about Frankfurt/Oder.


\textsuperscript{72} Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit an der deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 116.
prostitution - for a primarily German clientele - on the Eastern side of the frontier. Germans, on the other hand, may show disapproval towards their neighbours and content themselves with Polenwitze, jokes about the Poles, which are full of prejudices and generally portray the Poles as poor, unorganised, untidy, lazy and avaricious people.

These negative perceptions of the 'other' make the psychological challenge of the Eastern frontier of the European Union and the civil differences between its borderlands more apparent. These differences are possibly nurtured and strengthened by the economic gap and border of affluence. Is it therefore too early to talk about a coming together of people on the Eastern frontier of the European Union? Has the increase of economic and political co-operation on the Eastern frontier of the European Union - praised by politicians as a sign of rapprochement between EU and non-EU member states - not been accompanied by a veritable coming together of people on either side of the frontier?

According to Gilles Lepesant, borderlanders still live back to back and continue to be "in search of security and identity." He attributes this partly to the socio-economic context, such as the gap in standards of living and the fact that borderlands are still dependent on central government and its policies, as well as judicial restrictions. But there are also historical reasons - German hegemony and the expulsions of populations from these areas. To overcome these negative feelings and "the walls in the head", a great deal still needs to be done. Transborder co-operation and Euroregions are not, as was mentioned above, a panacea to resolve the "[r]eally difficult issues of conflict in frontier regions.... The main potential sources of conflict... are of various kinds." Transborder

__73__ Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontières orientales de l'UE" in Collection DIEM; L'Europe médiane en transition, chapter 10. My translation.

__74__ Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontières orientales de l'UE" in Collection DIEM; L'Europe médiane en transition, chapter 10.


associations are vital - but on their own not sufficient- instruments to join the EU and the Central Eastern European countries or to absorb the social economic problems of the borderlands.

Euroregions are first steps to bring the people on either side of the frontier closer together, to intensify personal and official contacts, as well as to correct existing stereotypes and prejudices. Euroregions on the Eastern frontier of the European Union may "minimise conflicts, [but] cannot make them disappear. Cross-border co-operation on paper does not solve the problems on the ground".77 Cross-border co-operation must be complemented by the people's willingness to cooperate. Obstacles to this co-operation continue to be the language barrier, as well as the difference between the currencies' purchasing power and the different national characters. Historical events and insufficient information on cross-border co-operation also play an important role.78 As seen in the section above, borderlands and their respective Euroregions do not yet enjoy the necessary degree of autonomy to handle their own economic and political affairs, but their problems are being bureaucratised by the respective central governments. They "are struggling for national, European Union and even local recognition"79, since they "are often hemmed in and consequently isolated from national - and a fortiori European - decision making centres."80 According to a 1996 Czech opinion poll on the German-Czech border, borderlanders in Bohemia wish to attain more self-governing powers and stronger forms of transfrontier co-operation.81

In addition, more should be done on a European level, particularly in the domain of human resources and the transfer of civil and social rights, namely social

78 Jerábek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 93-98.
80 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of border regions, p. 3-4.
security and related rights, the freedom of movement for workers, social protection and the mutual recognition of diplomas. Extending these rights to the future EU member states would mean the implementation of: "(i) Formal systems of representation of the populations affected by these matters. (ii) Reciprocal citizenship rights. (iii) Special legal rules and courts to deal with conflicts." These rights would constitute a big leap towards enlargement and extension of European citizenship rights. Furthermore, this transfer of rights would also open up new dynamics and opportunities to the borderlanders, as well as to the minorities living in the borderlands of the Eastern frontier of the European Union.

**The role of minorities in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union**

After the Second World War, European border settlements trapped significant minorities inside the 'wrong' states. Specifically, minorities in the Communist Central Eastern European states were either ignored or expelled as a result of the radical homogenisation processes taking place in these regimes. Despite some steps taken towards reconciliation in the post-Cold War period, the minority problems still remain delicate, since "ethnic minorities resist assimilation" with the national culture of the heartland. Minorities' demands for recognition seem to be a pull into the opposite direction of the consolidation process. Minorities have taken it upon themselves to keep issues of ethnicity and identity on the national agenda. They induce central government to loosen control over them and wish to attain some degree of autonomy, in order to secure some degree of local democracy. Brigid Laffan argues that

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81 Jerábek, Milan (1998); "Regionalentwicklung und grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit im tschechisch-deutschen Grenzraum" in Neuss, Beate, Jurezek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 93-98.
82 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen - LACE (1990); Citizen's Europe: the case of border regions, p. 6-7.
84 Strassoldo, Raimondo (1970); From Barrier to Junction, p. 11.
Minority problems are potentially explosive because of the historic weakness of liberalism in this part of Europe. The nation-state link is very different in the two parts of Europe because of radically different stages of development.85

The German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, signed in June 1991, is a "social pact which lays out the conditions for the living together between Poles and Germans."86 The Treaty addresses the Silesian question in particular. Silesia is not directly situated on the German-Polish border, but 200 kms away on the Polish-Czech border. Nevertheless, Silesia is considered as a German-Polish border region, whose complicated status may only be resolved by both the German and Polish governments. The Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation stresses that the German minority question must be approached and worked out in co-operation between the two countries.

The German government has supported the Silesian minority since 1990 by providing financial means to promote the German language and German culture, but the Polish government is still reluctant to follow the German example. The Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation guarantees that the Polish national government will respect the Silesians' sense of identity, under the condition that the minority pays allegiance to the Polish state.87 For some Silesians, this means that they "must accept that they belong to Polish society (as constituted by the state), if not to the Polish nation (in the Herderian sense of the ethnic nation)."88 As a reaction to this, some Silesians are engaged in a struggle for self-determination, demanding a greater degree of autonomy from the Polish government. The 'Movement of Silesian Autonomy', for example, "wants the historical regions of Upper Silesia... to control everything except the police, the

86 Lepesant, Gilles (forthcoming 1998); "Dynamique des frontieres orientales de l'UE" in Collection DIEM; L'Europe médiane en transition, chapter 10. My translation.
88 Dressler Holohan, Wanda and Ciechocinska, Maria (1996); "The recomposition of identity and political space in Europe: The case of Upper Silesia" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.) Borders, Nations and States, p. 165.

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army, the courts and foreign policy." Together with the Polish 'League of Regions', the Silesian Movement advocate a German-style federalism for Poland, as well as the alignment to European structures in order to facilitate Poland's entry into the European Union. The Polish government has already introduced plans to decentralise government and to render it more democratic. It envisages to reduce the present 49 voivodships to 12 or 14 regions and to create two new tiers of government. But according to The Economist,

_the new Poland will not be a German-style federation. Poland is still too twitchy about its newly regained sovereignty to give regions and counties the wide powers that the German Länder (states) enjoy.... Nationalist MPs from Solidarity Electoral Action... fret that devolution will encourage western regions to co-operate more closely with Berlin than with Warsaw._

Similar to the Silesian situation, the Sudeten are also engaged in a struggle for legal and political rights of self-determination. The Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between Germany and former Czechoslovakia was signed in February 1992. The Treaty confirmed the course of the German-Czech border and laid down the foundations for German-Czech cross-border co-operation. Co-operation between the two countries was and - to a certain extent - still is influenced by Sudeten interest groups. It was only in January 1997 that a Treaty on the 'settlement' of the Sudeten question was signed between the Czech Republic and Germany. The Sudeten came from Bohemia to Bavaria after the end of the Second World War. The Czech official text refers to the "deportation of civilian population from occupied territories", but other sources suggest that the

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89 _The Economist_, "Poland: Not so pure?", November 29, 1997.
91 Krämer, Raimund (1997); _Grenzen der Europäischen Union_, p. 78.
92 In Bavaria, however, many cities and towns were destroyed during the war and could not provide any means of accommodation to the newcomers. Rural areas, on the other hand, were not as severely affected by the War, but they also did not offer many job opportunities. A great majority of Sudetendeutsche emigrated from these rural areas to North Bavaria where they founded enterprises. Bohemia itself had been one of the major industrial regions of the world. The integration of the Sudetendeutsche into the Bavarian society was very successful, as there were "no apparent communication problems" (Bäuerlein, Heinz (1970); _Die Bayern in Bonn_, p. 23. My translation). Since the Sudetendeutsche "contributed to the democratic institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany by doing a lot of political and cultural work at the local level" (Habel, Fritz Peter (1984); _The Sudeten Question_, p. 12), the then Bavarian Prime Minister Hans Erhard showed his thankfulness to the Sudetendeutsche by assuming their guardianship on behalf of Bavaria in 1954.
93 Habel, Fritz Peter (1984); _The Sudeten Question_, p. 3.
were expelled from Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1949, with estimates that over 250,000 people died during this 'transfer'.\textsuperscript{94} It was the row over whether the \textit{Sudeten} were expelled or evacuated, together with the adequacy of the subsequent apology, that led to the lengthy procedure of the signing of the Treaty on the settlement of the \textit{Sudeten} question. Yet, the \textit{Sudeten} question seems to remain unsettled, since a "large part of Czechs still opposes a \textit{Silesian} exertion of influence."\textsuperscript{95}

Both minority groups of \textit{Sudetendeutsche} and Silesians were forced to construct an identity on ethnic grounds. Silesia, for example, was "[s]ituated throughout the centuries at the cross-roads of differing political and cultural influences"; Silesia

has never become entirely German or Polish but has generated a mixed identity which is more regional than national.... Silesia nowadays demonstrates a borderland consciousness which is indigenous rather than imposed and which reflects the interaction of the economic, linguistic and political influences of Germany with those of Poland.\textsuperscript{96}

From this account, one may conclude that Silesians have developed an identity which is neither Polish nor German. For Silesians, there seems to be no polarisation between a German or Polish identity, but an interiorisation of both. In an attempt to compensate for the gap between their dual sense of identity and their nationality, Silesians seek recognition from central governments on either side of the frontier. They wish to defend their specific regional identities, which were long suppressed under the communist regime. Turning to the respective central governments has proven difficult, and it seems as if Silesians seek the attention and protection of the European Union. Some experts argue that Silesians support the establishment of a Silesian Euroregion, in which they may accommodate aspects of both their German and Polish identities within a broader European framework:

\textsuperscript{94} Habel, Fritz Peter (1984); \textit{The Sudeten Question}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{95} Jurczek, Peter (1998); "Chancen und Probleme der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit an der deutschen Ostgrenze" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); \textit{Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa}, p. 119. My translation.
One example is the demand for the autonomy of Silesia and for a Silesian Euroregion which is aimed at limiting the sovereignty of the Polish State and putting Upper Silesia under the protection of Europe.... Broad public opinion and many intellectuals considered it to be the first step toward autonomy in the lands acquired after the Second World War. In particular, such plans put to the test the very nature of bonds linking the region to Poland and led some to believe in the gradual incorporation of the cross-border regions into the German state. Some were convinced that entrance into the European fold could be achieved only through alliance with the Germans and by transforming Silesia into an autonomous zone. Many saw in Euroregions a possibility for some countries to extend their influence beyond their borders and to fulfil long-standing territorial claims. In this context, the debate quickly took on dramatic and emotional overtones.97

This chapter has suggested that the Eastern frontier of the European Union is subject to a number of paradoxes.98 The border seems to be a barrier and a bridge, at which various political, economic and cultural systems collide and where co-operation and many personal contacts have resulted and benefited from this coming together (individual transfrontier co-operation projects and Euroregions alike). Yet, cross-border co-operation cannot make the border disappear, but foster border experience.99 Transborder co-operation and Euroregions suffer from a lack of self-management, so that their success remains in the hands of the political atmosphere between national capitals.100 Yet, one should not dismiss that social and cultural transborder activities at local level are important initiatives that offer both borderlanders and minorities a framework, in which they may assert their submerged identities101 and foster their stance in the European integration process.

The increasing number of contacts between borderlands, are primary examples which demonstrate that political and cultural frontiers do not always

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96 Dressler Holohan, Wanda and Ciechocinska, Maria (1996); "The recomposition of identity and political space in Europe: The case of Upper Silesia" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.) Borders, Nations and States, p. 155, 156.
98 For a detailed account of these paradoxes, see Bort, Eberhard (1999); "Grenzen und Grenzräume in Mitteleuropa" in Welttrends, forthcoming.
99 Krämer, Raimund (1997); Grenzen der Europäischen Union, p. 95.
100 Neuss, Beate (1998); "Chancen der Zusammenarbeit in Mittelosteuropa" in Neuss, Beate, Jurczek, Peter and Hilz, Wolfram (eds.); Grenzübergreifende Kooperation im östlichen Mitteleuropa, p. 161.
coincide. They seem to show that cultural frontiers may actually be "just as strong, and... may one day pose a threat to the state's power at its borders or at its core."102 The incongruity of political and cultural frontiers may create porous or fluid frontiers, or, as Michel Foucher argues "a 'fuzzy logic', less rational but allowing historical transition to take place in remote places."103 Assessing the consequences of this 'fuzzy frontiers model' for the emergence of a European identity, fuzzy frontiers seem to strip the term European identity from its traditional meaning of European Union or Western European identity. Acknowledging this could be a step towards bringing Mitteleuropa, specifically the Central Eastern European countries, back into Europe, reasserting the European dynamic in full. Both Euroregions and Mitteleuropa are a "laboratory for the design of the essence of a 'new' Europe."104

Having suggested that Central Eastern European countries may not contribute their own input to the larger European project if they rush into European Union membership - without suggesting that Eastern EU enlargement should rely on a one-to-one reciprocity - prospective members, and specifically borderlands, could set an important example for the emergence of a genuine and diverse European identity. Drawing on what once was "a near-paradise of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic multiplicity and compatibility, producing untold cultural and intellectual riches"105, Central Eastern European countries and borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union have the perfect prerequisites to accommodate inter-ethnic relations within and between states. They seem to represent new models of co-habitation for (Europe's) multi-ethnic societies at the threshold of the new millennium.

102 Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border identities, p. 11.
104 Steiner, M. and Sturm, D. (1993); "Interregional Cooperation and Transborder Activities in a middle European Context" in Cappellin, Riccardo and Batey, Peter W. J. (eds.); Regional networks, border regions and European integration, p. 177.
105 Judt, Tony (1991); "The Rediscovery of Central Europe" in Graubard, Stephen (eds.); Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe, p. 48.
On this assumption, the next chapter will attempt to assess in how far a 'new' Europe may develop a genuine European identity. It will draw on culture, since European culture seems to constitute the basis on which the many different national, regional and sub-regional cultures could co-exist. But why necessarily culture? Why should culture become a primary factor and no longer solely play a compensatory role in the European integration process? Is European culture able to transcend the deep-seated psychological and political Eastern frontier of the European Union?

106 Groß, Bernd and Schmitt-Egner, Peter (1994); Europas kooperierende Regionen, p. 132.
In chapter three, it has been argued that European integration theories, together with EU measures such as the introduction of European citizenship, directed towards the fostering of a European identity, are important approaches, but on their own insufficient to explain the emergence a European identity. The European Union still seems to be a "half-way house" whose objectives and finalité politique remain ill-defined. Efficiency and impact of EU means and policies to define or promote a European identity could become even more moderate, if not negligible, in view of further EU enlargement towards the East.

Therefore, it is high time to adopt a modified, if not altogether different, theoretical framework for the European integration process and European identity. This chapter will draw on the theory of Liberal Nationalism, to demonstrate that local, regional and national identities are able to co-exist with an EU identity and a wider European identity: they are complementary and mutually re-enforcing.

Liberal Nationalism "is predicated on the idea that all nations should enjoy equal rights, and in fact derives its universal structure from the theory of individual rights found at its core". Accordingly, Liberal Nationalism supports the idea that the modern nation-states are composed of different national groups, while being embedded in a network of international relations. For the European Union and Europe, this would mean that Liberal Nationalism acknowledges and gives expression to Europe's plurality of cultures. Liberal Nationalism would secure the member states' individual interests and uniqueness vis-à-vis one another, and set out the framework for a common identity at the same time. It can then be argued that encouraging co-operation among nations is advantageous on three counts. First, it allows members of small nations to lead a full and satisfying national life. Second, it contributes to individual freedom by relieving pressures to assimilate as a way of improving the economic or occupational prospects of members of minorities. Co-operation aims, as far as possible, to equalise the prospects of all national communities regarding their chances of becoming objects of choice. Third, it

1 Wallace, William (1983); "Less than a federation - more than a regime: The Community as a political system" in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William and Webb, Carol (eds.); Policy-making in the European Union, p. 434.
2 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 9.
fosters the idea that developing a prosperous national life is not contingent on closure and isolation but rather on the development of transnational ties, serving to allay the more ethnocentric and xenophobic aspects of nationalism.3

But to ensure co-operation across European countries, and specifically between the European Union and the Central Eastern European countries, transborder co-operation projects - supplementing the Association Agreements - are not enough. What is necessary is an all-encompassing approach which affects the people of Europe directly.

The development of transnational ties would engender a "pluri-appartenance"4 which could be fortified with the concept of European citizenship, based on Jürgen Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism. Since Constitutional Patriotism is not subject to a hierarchical order of identities or membership, but subject to co-operation and mutual recognition, it is often taken as a primary example able to lock the concept of European identity in. Similarly, but on a different level, the previous chapter indicated that borderlands may also represent ideal prototypes, in which parameters for a genuine European identity may evolve.

Combined with the notion of culture, this chapter will detach itself from concentrating on the large amount of traditional literature available on European identity. Instead, it will complement, as well as add a new dimension to the analysis of European identity by arguing that Constitutional Patriotism and the multicultural character of borderlands seem to be useful means to foster a genuine European identity. Culture has soft borders, it is as fluid and abstract as the concept of Europe itself. More importantly, however, one may argue that Constitutional Patriotism and the concept of European culture are based on Friedrich Rücker's idea that

Nicht die Verschiedenheit soll ausgestrichen sein, Doch des Verschiednen Streit soll ausgeglichen sein.5

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3 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 153 - 154.
4 Toulemon, Robert (1994); "Les institutions européennes et leur contribution à la constitution d'une identité et d'une politique culturelle européenne" in Picht, Robert (ed.); L'identité européenne, p. 73. My translation.
5 Friedrich Rücker cited in Sven Papcke (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The idea of Europe - Problems of national and transnational identity, p. 62. "Difference should not be extinguished/Rather the conflict of difference harmonized".

Chapter 5.A - 273
5. A Which theoretical approach is best applicable to the emergence of a European identity?

The answer to this question certainly depends on one's conception of the nationalist doctrine. If one were to consider the creation of a genuine European identity in primarily ethnic terms, then the possibilities for its emergence are fairly slim. On the other hand, a civic perspective on identity, which views the nation as a political community held together by common laws and institutions, would make the assertion of both national and European identities into a common European project much more feasible. National and European identities could then become complementary and, in the unlikely event of conflict between the two, differences would be subject to pragmatic and situational solutions.

It will be a challenge for a genuine European identity to combine both these civic and ethnic conceptions of identity, since every identity "contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized."6

According to Anthony D. Smith, "there can be no collective identity without shared memories or a sense of continuity on the part of those who feel they belong to that collectivity."7 Smith is very pessimistic about the emergence of a European identity, because

[g]iven the multiplicity of language groups and ethnic heritages in Europe, it is reasonable to expect the persistence of strong ethnic sentiments in many parts of the continent, as well as the continuity or periodic revival of national identities, fuelled by the quest for ethnic traditions and cultural heritages of distinctive myths, memories and symbols.8

Smith stresses the importance of strong, well-established ethno-national aspects and traditions of the various existing identities. However, Smith argues, these aspects and traditions are only applicable to the national level and not the

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7 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 58.
European dimension. According to Smith, Europe "lacks a pre-modern past - a 'prehistory' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth." At the same time, however, Smith acknowledges that the future success of the European integration project is in need of a European identity. This identity cannot be created overnight; it must grow. The various European policies, mentioned in chapter three, can be seen as stepping stones into the right direction.

It is difficult to manufacture a common European history and ethnicity. Rewriting history from a European perspective, such as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's *Europe: a history of its people* is tentative, but inadequate, since history and identity evolve "through the age of old mechanisms." Furthermore, it also proves to be problematic to foster a European identity from the top. To take an example, we have seen in chapter three that the introduction of European citizenship as a means to create a European identity is not, on its own, strong or sufficient enough to develop a European identity. To use Smith's words, the concept of European citizenship is the search for "something 'beyond' national identity."

But, even if it were possible to override the various national identities for a European identity, this kind of European identity could imply the creation of a European ethnicity that could come close to the idea of homogeneity. And notions of homogeneity are not only dangerous, but also impossible to achieve, since a political state border

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8 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in *International Affairs*, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 64.
11 Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste (1990); *Europe: a history of its people*.
14 According to Karlheinz Reif, the idea of creating a homogeneous European demos or nation is dangerous, because "Nation Europa was one of Hitler's propaganda instruments during the 1939-45 war" and because "European Political Union' would be and will remain a multinational and multilingual political system for handling affairs no longer manageable at national or regional level" (Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European Identity" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); *European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy*, p. 151).
can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the national and yet also including some non-nationals.\textsuperscript{15}

Smith agrees and argues that "the lack of congruence between the state and the nation is exemplified in the many 'plural' states today."\textsuperscript{16}

\textit{[T]he vast majority of contemporary states are 'plural' in character - that is, they have more than one ethnic community within their borders and so cannot claim to be true 'nation-states' in the strict sense - they aspire to become at least 'national states' with a common public culture open to all citizens. Their claim to legitimacy, in other words, is based on the aspiration of a heterogeneous population to unity in terms of public culture and political community, as well as popular sovereignty.\textsuperscript{17}}

Homogeneity, however, "is not among the requisite underpinnings for a community of Europeans."\textsuperscript{18} Nor does Smith believe in \textit{complete} homogeneity, that is a homogeneity which is based on pure 'cultural homogeneity'. Rather, Smith supports the idea of "unification and identification around core values, myths, symbols and traditions, expressed in common customs and institutions, as well as a common homeland."\textsuperscript{19} In order to illustrate this, Smith refers to the example of Switzerland: the Swiss have resisted cultural homogenisation, but achieved "political unity; they have also retained a clear sense of historical individuality, despite their linguistic, religious and cantonal divisions."\textsuperscript{20}

National identification can thus be "fundamentally multidimensional... composed of analytically separable components - ethnic, legal, territorial, economic and political."\textsuperscript{21} This model of multiple identities may be summarised under the term of 'collective identity\textsuperscript{22}, which, Smith argues, should not be confused with an individual's possession of multiple identities, since individual identity refers to the

\textsuperscript{15} Gellner, Ernest (1983); \textit{Nations and Nationalism}, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{17} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{19} Smith, Anthony D. (1991); \textit{National Identity}, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{20} Smith, Anthony D. (1991); \textit{National Identity}, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{21} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{22} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in \textit{International Affairs}, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 59.
identification with "families, villages or towns, regions, age and sex groups, classes, religious, ethnic and national communities, as well as humanity as a whole."\(^{23}\)

According to Smith, these individual identity factors rarely conflict, since individuals tend to move between them as the situation requires. He states that individual identity is "usually 'situational', if not always optional."\(^{24}\) This means that an individual may identify oneself and be identified by others in different ways in different situations: "when one goes abroad, one tends to classify oneself (and be classified by others) differently from one's categorization at home."\(^{25}\)

At the collective identity level, however, the individual is no longer the focus of attention. Here, "it is not the options and feelings of individuals that matter, but the nature of the collective bond."\(^{26}\) Collective identities "tend to be pervasive and persistent. They are less subject to rapid changes and tend to be more intense and durable."\(^{27}\) An example for collective identities is "national identification [which] has become the cultural and political norm, transcending other loyalties in scope and power."\(^{28}\) The majority of European nation-states enjoy a large degree of legitimacy and popular sovereignty from their respective peoples. The state is usually seen as representing the will of the nation, and the nation seems willed to be represented by the state.

This, however, is not the case for the European Union. The construction of the European Union differs considerably from the development of the nation-state. The European nation-states generally, came about as a result of internal drives, external forces, or even coercion.\(^ {29}\) The European integration process, however, is the result of political and economic choices established by the nation-states. Its fundamental basis was "more rational than passionate, so that it was difficult to gain

\(^{23}\) Smith, Anthony D. (1993); "The ethnic sources of nationalism" in *Survival*, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 49.


the interest of the majority of citizens." It is an economic and political union which is rationally constructed and deliberately created for a particular purpose. The European project may be characterised as a "voluntary association" of European nation-states. Adopting Alan Milward's argument that European integration came to the rescue of the nation-state, the European integration process can be seen as subject to national interests. National identities continue to remain, if not to grow, and "experience suggests that the European Union will not automatically develop into something more than the Zollverein kept together by expectations of profit on the part of individual member states." Furthermore, M. Spiering argues that:

[only if an ideology of Europeanism were to develop, as an ideology of nationalism has developed in the past, would it be possible, after a period of conflict and identity destruction, for a sense of a common European identity to come into being.]

This would suggest that the achievement of full European unity and a genuine European identity could only follow the same development as that of the nation-states and their respective national (ethnic) identities. For Smith, "the only way in which a truly united Europe could emerge is through the slow formation of common European memories, traditions, values, myths and symbols, in the image of the ethnie and the nation." To do so, and according to Hobsbawm, new traditions must be invented, in an "attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historical past."

31 Llobera, Josep (1993); "The role of the state and the nation in Europe" in García, Soledad (ed.); *European identity and the search for legitimacy*, p. 78.
But is this the only solution? The present situation suggests that it is impossible to override, or at least to deconstruct, existing national identities so that they give way to a European identity. A European identity may not be created in the same way as a national identity:

attempts to persuade Europeans to regard themselves as homogenized Europeans are bound to fail. Moreover, there is the widely accepted view in current literature that, at present, it is not possible to speak of a 'European nation'. There is no EU people. When speaking of 'the people', this term is not yet used in its singular form as far as the EU is concerned. It is still the 15 'peoples' of the Member States which constitute the Union.36

Similarly, Anthony Smith argues that "Europeans differ amongst themselves as much as from non-Europeans in respect of language..., territory..., law..., religion... and economic political system - as well as in terms of ethnicity and culture." He agrees, however, that most European traditions are shared to varying degrees. Therefore, he does not advocate the well-known principle of 'unity in diversity', but proposes a model of 'families of cultures', a "rich mélange of cultural assumptions, forms and traditions, a cultural heritage that creates sentiments of affinity between the peoples of Europe." For him, 'families of cultures' "tend to come into being over long time-spans and are the product of particular historical circumstances, often unanticipated and unintentional." Families of cultures do not do away with national identities, but would incorporate them as the bedrock for a European identity - an identity based on 'trans-national' identities, possibly leading to a "post-national" identity.

The continuing co-existence of national identities is seen as necessary, since national identities, together with a sense of belonging, "play an important part in

37 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ No. 1, p. 70.
individuals' self-understanding." National identities are fundamental to each citizen. A Pan-nationalist movement with "popular resonance" would be needed which "overarches but does not abolish individual nations.... The forging of a deep continental cultural identity to support political unification may well require an ideology of European cultural exclusiveness."42

If European identity cannot be defined along ethnic lines and may not yet be defined in civic terms, on what basis could a European identity emerge? How may the uneasy co-existence between the Community and its constituent member states be overcome? Should traditional concepts of identity be abandoned in order to give way to a new or alternative concept of identity? Which theoretical approach accommodates best a newly emerging European identity?

The European Union, it has been continuously stressed, is not a state, nor a nation. Instead, as we have seen in chapter three, the European Union is a new form of governance which incorporates multiple levels of decision-making, as well as various different national identities. Therefore, one of the ways to make the concept of European identity feasible would be to, as Weiler says, decouple the notion of identity from the concept of the nation and, particularly, from the nation-state. What then remains is "man, with his desires and his needs"43, that is the individual who is "the slave neither of his race, nor his language, nor his religion, nor of the windings of his rivers and mountain ranges."44

Nations are certainly not eternal. However, the claim that they will have ends is very far reaching.45 Is it not rather the case that a nation - existing at a certain moment in history - is subject to change, while the core remains? Looking at

41 McCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 565. This has already been explored in chapter two and the significance for the individual's sense of him/herself.
43 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 204.
44 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 205.
45 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 204.
Renan's approach to the nation seems to turn the majority of traditional theoretical approaches on their head. What has become important is to focus on both the individual and the nation. This bottom-up rather than top-down model is also endorsed in Anthony Cohen's idea of "personal nationalism" which sees nations as "socially given". For Cohen, a nation's consciousness is experienced by individuals as persons who know where they belong and do not belong. The individuals' various identities resemble a "puzzle" of partially overlapping ideas and interpretations about the nation-state.

Similarly, the theory of Liberal Nationalism also attempts to attach national identity to personal identity, representing a "new nationalism, an acceptable and perhaps even mandatory nationalism that is intrinsically liberal in character." Liberal Nationalism breaks away from the liberal tendency to describe nationalism as resting merely on irrational... fears of "the stranger", as motivated by a morally irrelevant attraction to what is similar, by an unscrupulous desire for power, or as an excuse to grab advantages for one nation at the expense of others.

Liberal Nationalism relies heavily on the concept of liberalism, in which the human being is seen as an individual, rather than as a member of a social group or community. On the level of international relations, supporters of the Liberal Nationalist theory, like Realists, accept the condition of anarchy as the primary starting point of all relations. They fear that a world of sovereign nations, without any international laws or organisations, would degenerate into a 'state of nature'. Unlike Realists, however, Liberal Nationalists believe in possibilities to maintain order by way of establishing common institutions and organisations. These would help to foster co-operation between states, in order to achieve greater benefits and

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48 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 4.
49 Liberalism is often understood as a political ideology which is heavily based on individualism. In this sense, Liberals seek to create a society - even a national society or community - in which individuals can develop their identity freely and pursue their individual 'good'. To this end, individuals enjoy rights against their respective government, and more importantly rights of equality of respect.
50 According to this view, anarchy gives rise to uncertainty which one tries to overcome by increasing one's power, but, by doing so, one makes others feel insecure.
the common purpose of peace and prosperity. The United Nations and, particularly, the European Union are examples of this.

The creation of peaceful and co-operating communities, is in accordance with Hugo Grotius' idea that interstate relations should be based on the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Similarly, in the 18th century, Kant suggested "rules which may help states continually to live in peace with each other."\(^{51}\) Kant called these rules *permissive laws*, since he believed that

> human beings are possessed of an unsociable-sociability. By this he means that not only do we love to be with others but also we love to separate ourselves from them. Our best qualities develop only in co-operation and competition with our fellow human beings, and to enjoy the warmth and reassurance of others we need their company. Yet we are also fond of our own company.\(^ {52}\)

Similarly, Yael Tamir argues that the "contextual individual combines individuality and sociability as two equally genuine important features."\(^ {53}\) On a practical level, the 'contextual individual' signifies that each

of us occupies a physically distinct human body from every other, each with a unique (identical twins aside) genetic inheritance, and each with a unique (identical twins included) social situation, in the form of a set of relationships to other individuals, and to communities and cultures, and social organisations, associations, and institutions.\(^ {54}\)

On a more theoretical level, and in order to illustrate the theory of Liberal Nationalism better, the 'contextual individual'

allows for an interpretation of liberalism that is aware of the binding, constitutive character of cultural and social memberships, together with an interpretation of nationalism that conceives of individuals as free and autonomous participants in communal framework, who conceive of national membership in Renan's terms, as a daily plebiscite. The concept of the contextual individual thus brings liberal and national theories a step closer.\(^ {55}\)

Since Liberal Nationalism seeks to bring together "personal autonomy and communal belonging"\(^ {56}\), it may be described as being "both universalistic and

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\(^{51}\) Williams, Howard (1992); *International Relations in Political Theory*, p. 84.

\(^{52}\) Williams, Howard (1992); *International Relations in Political Theory*, p. 81-82.

\(^{53}\) Tamir, Yael (1993); *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 33.


\(^{55}\) Tamir, Yael (1993); *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 33.

\(^{56}\) Tamir, Yael (1993); *Liberal Nationalism*, p. 14.
individualistic". Liberal nationalism shows that the development of personal identity does not need to conflict with the universal features of human nature or humankind. In fact, Liberal Nationalism contains one important aspect of Henri Tajfel's Social Identity Theory (as discussed in chapter two), namely the social aspect of an individual's identity, which sees "individuals as rooted in society, and as dependent on communal relations for their moral and personal development." This brings us back to chapter two and the socio-psychological definition of identity - the definition against the 'other' - and the idea that an individual's personal identity may be subject to the context or environment in which s/he prevails. Concepts such as culture, history, myths, language and religion are essential features for the shaping of an individual's personal identity. The individual may undergo changes which make it even more important not to regard the individual as an unchangeable variable, or as totally independent of external circumstances. Accordingly, Clifford Geertz does not believe in the "constant human nature independent of time, place, and circumstance, of studies and professions, transient fashions and temporary opinions", but asserts that human beings are "incomplete or unfinished animals who complete or finish [them]selves through culture - and not through culture in general but through highly particular forms of it." What is sought, then, is a society in which each individual may develop his or her personal identity to the best of his/her abilities. In other words, the development of social relations between individuals should be to the benefit of each individual concerned, so that the individual is "free to develop those aspects of his personality which are bound up with his sense of identity as a member of his community." This sense of individual self-realisation or development is not about upholding my interest against your interest, but about upholding my interest together with your interest without making too large a sacrifice. This comes close to

58 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 19.
59 Geertz, Clifford (1973); The interpretation of cultures, p. 35.
60 Geertz, Clifford (1973); The interpretation of cultures, p. 49.
61 J. Raz cited in Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 9.
the principle of self-determination which is, according to Yael Tamir, central to Liberal Nationalism.

In international relations, the principle of self-determination refers to the universal right to national self-determination. The universal right to national self-determination was specifically developed in the 1966 International Covenant on Human Rights. According to this document, all nations are equal and "(a)ll peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development".63

Within the realm of the Liberal Nationalist theory, however, the right to national self-determination focuses on the cultural rather than political aspects of national life. This cultural definition of national self-determination understands the right to national self-determination "as the right of a nation or, more precisely, the members of a nation, to preserve their distinct existence, and to manage communal life in accordance with their particular way of life." Together then, the cultural and political version of national self-determination indicates that "those who belong to distinct nations ought to have distinct governments based upon their distinctive laws and customs."65

Notwithstanding the question whether each nation has the right to its own sovereign state, the discourse on the right to self-determination begs the question

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62 One should note, however, that the principle of self-determination has been subject to various definitions and interpretations in the past and present. Self-determination has been interpreted as a national principle during the French Revolution, followed by cultural aspirations for the unification of Italy and Germany during the nineteenth century. After the First World War, the Wilsonian principle of self-determination was specifically oriented towards minorities, and during the period of decolonisation the racial aspect of the principle to self-determination was emphasised. Today, the right to self-determination is mainly understood in ethnic terms. However, in all cases, the principle to self-determination has never just meant independence, but the free choice of people to "choose their own political, economic and social system and their own international status" (Cristescu, Aureliu (1981); The right to self-determination, p. 39). This objective has its roots in the Fourteen Points elaborated by American president Woodrow Wilson after the First World War. In 1917, he declared that national aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle in action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril... Peoples and provinces are not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game" (in Wambaugh, Sarah (1933); Plebiscites since the World War, p. 11).
64 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 69.
about 'who' or 'what' is the self in the principle of self-determination? Is it the individual human being or the nation? And if it is the nation, how would this nation be defined? In any case, problems may arise if the recognition of one 'self' entails the denial of the rights of a competing 'self': the altering of political and cultural boundaries in favour for one 'side' might create new problems on the 'other'. Ideally then, as we have seen in chapter two, political and cultural frontiers should coincide.

This brings us back to Anthony Smith's idea that state and nation should ideally be congruent. As we have seen, however, this is highly unlikely. It is rather the case that the right to self-determination applies to a "recognized national majority"66, since the "attempt to match up nations with states, and then to accord sovereignty to each state may be the true source of evils we perceive."67 This is best illustrated by the war in Yugoslavia, when the constituent nations of former Yugoslavia claimed the right to national self-determination and independence as separate independent states. Minorities within the old Yugoslav state structures became the majority within the new state borders, and since every majority and virtually every minority has its own minorities, the demand to the right to self-determination "gets pushed further down the pyramid"68. The assumption that nations are generally homogenous is misleading.

In addition to the definition given in chapter two, and with the theory of Liberal Nationalism in mind, one may again ask, "what is a nation?"69 Renan's famous answer that "the existence of a nation... is a daily plebiscite"70 sees the nation in "possession... of a rich heritage of memories", with "the will to continue to

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67 MacCormick, Neil (1996); "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State" in Political Studies, No. 44, p. 554.
69 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines.
70 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 203.
make the most of the joint inheritance".71 He argues that the nation is a "moral consciousness which... is created by a great assemblage of men with warm hearts and healthy minds".72 Benedict Anderson refers to nations as "imagined communities"73, since "the members of even the smallest nation will never know of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."74 Anderson adds that each community is imagined differently, particularly given "the convergence of capitalism and print technology which... created the possibility of a new form of imagined community"75.

According to Anderson, communities and the belief in similarities amongst members are created through culture, so that individual nations may be described as "cultural artefacts of a particular kind."76 Each cultural artefact is demarcated by a community's boundaries which distinguishes between a community's members and non-members. Human imagination may thus bind communities together and consider them as sovereign. This imagined sovereignty, Anderson argues,

was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.77

In order to preserve their uniqueness, imagined communities tend to draw boundaries - visible or invisible ones - between themselves and the 'other'. On the one hand, this boundary might be a protective measure to enclose or bundle a community's political, linguistic, social and cultural aspects. On the other hand, the

71 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 203.
72 Renan, Ernest (1882); "What is a nation?" in Zimmern, Alfred (ed.) (1939); Modern Political Doctrines, p. 205. My emphasis.
73 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 6.
74 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 6.
75 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 46.
76 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 4.
77 Anderson, Benedict (1991); Imagined Communities, p. 7.
boundary may foster a community's exclusiveness. The community's identity may be forged
out of shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other collective identities. They are in fact often forged through opposition to the identities of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often demonstrates.78

Would therefore the "hardening of the external frontier... gradually promote a sense of solidarity across the EU territory"79, including an enlarged European territory?

If this means a 'fortress Europe' mentality, it seems neither feasible nor desirable. Europe should remain open. Borrowing Neil McCormick's terms 'thin' and 'thick' to describe a civic or ethnic nation80, Europe should be based on the thin concept of the civic nation. Its relative openness allows Yael Tamir's 'contextual individual' to "assimilate, break cultural ties, and move from one national community to another."81 Contextual individuals may "retain their own culture"82 and are "able to exist in a plane of equality with only limited assimilation among them."83 The civic model of the nation is thus a means to accommodate both an individual's personal autonomy and national membership. It seems to be congruent with the theory of Liberal Nationalism which is best suited to explain the reconciliation of local, regional and national exclusivities within the wider framework of the European Union - specifically in view of the fact that it is a fundamental aim of the European Union to preserve the plurality of cultures, as well as to develop a genuine European identity.

78 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/No. 1, p. 75.
79 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls" in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU Enlargement, p. 33.
80 see section 3. a. ii.
81 Tamir, Yael (1993); Liberal Nationalism, p. 32.
82 Portes, Alejandro and Fernández Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.); Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 29.
83 Portes, Alejandro and Fernández Kelly, M. Patricia (1989); "Images of Movement in a changing world: a review of current theories of international migration" in Mercuro, Nicholas (ed.); Immigration in Western Democracies: the United States and Europe, p. 29.
European identity should incorporate all of the existing different identities, in order to be defined as "multiple and potentially integrational"\textsuperscript{84}, a collective toolbox which has different features at its basis. To this end, the following two sections question in how far European citizenship - bolstered by Jürgen Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism - and European culture are essential means to accommodate and reconcile different identities within the overall framework of a European identity?

\textsuperscript{84} Wintle, Michael (1996); Introduction: Cultural diversity and identity in Europe" in Wintle, Michael (ed.), Culture and Identity in Europe, p. 2.
5. B Emergence of a European identity?

Since the Liberal Nationalist theory implies "a right and duty of mutual respect among diverse national traditions, with appropriate political expression of national identities"\(^1\), it has been argued in the preceding section that Liberal Nationalism may be the best theoretical framework to reconcile national identity with European identity. Accordingly, there is

no reason why a European identity should not exist alongside a national one, in the same way the nation already exists alongside gender, race, age, and all the other aspects of identity which we have.\(^2\)

To demonstrate this, European citizenship will be taken as an example to illustrate that the European integration process is not about creating "one European identity as was originally aspired by policy makers in the 1970s"\(^3\); instead, European citizenship "modelled various identities thus adopting a perception of citizens with multiple identities."\(^4\)

This is also suggested by the Eurobarometer public opinion polls\(^5\), whose 1992 figures show that 62% of European citizens regarded "a sense of European identity as being compatible with a sense of national identity." 23% believed their "country's identity [would be] disappearing over time if a European Union came about", while 46% thought that the European Union protected their national identities. 30% saw the European Union as a threat to their national identities and cultures.\(^6\)

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5 Please note that the following figures do not take into account socio-political, socio-structural, socio-economic, socio-cultural, gender or demographic variables or affiliations. In addition, results also vary across countries.
6 The 1992 Eurobarometer survey did not distinguish between questions concerning 'nationality only', 'nationality and European', 'European and nationality', 'European only', but concentrated on questions concerning loss or compatibility of national and European identity in general. European Commission (1992); Eurobarometer: Report Number 38, pp. 44-47.
Four years later, in 1996, the results of the Continuous Tracking Surveys of European Opinion were fairly similar. "In the near future', 12% of Union citizens see themselves as 'European only', 36% still hold on to their nationality only, and one in two claim to identify with both European and national identity." Merging the figures of this 'double identity' (approx. 50%) with the sense of 'European only', one may argue that the figure referring to citizens who see a European identity as being compatible with their national identity has remained the same (62%) as in the 1992 Eurobarometer poll. In contrast to these 1996 figures, the Eurobarometer 1998 results show a decrease of the 'nationality and European identity' category by 4% to 47%. This is accompanied by a 7% downward trend of the feeling of Europeanness from 12% to 5%, as well as an increase of 8% for the nationality only category (44% in total).

Despite these fluctuations, the figures seem to demonstrate a strong correlation between the citizens' sense of identity and whether citizens consider their country's EU membership a 'good' or a 'bad' thing. The 1992 Eurobarometer polls show that 71% were very much or to some extent supporting European unification, whereas opposition was at 20%. During the 1996 and 1998 Eurobarometer surveys, the wording of the questions changed and citizens were only "generally speaking" about their country's membership in the European Union. Accordingly, in 1996, 58% thought that EU membership was a 'good thing', whereas 14% regarded it as a 'bad thing'. The downward trend from 1992 continued in 1998, when only 51% regarded EU membership as positive, but the number of those who perceived it as negative fell by 8% to 12%.

Related to these polls, the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission (FSU) tabled a summary of a survey looking at public opinion and

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8 European Commission (1996); Continuous Tracking Surveys of European Opinion, April 1996, section VI.
government positions in December 1995. Rather than asking samples of populations, the FSU sent out questionnaires to the Commission's representative offices in the EU's member states, asking them to assess the respective government's position, as well as public opinion on the subject of European integration.

Given the relationship between national and European identity, member states were classified into three broad groups, according to the possible level of conflict between national and European identity. Member states with no conflict between national identity and European identity were the three Benelux countries, Spain and Italy. Potential conflict was seen in Austria, Ireland, Finland, Portugal and Greece. In France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, political union and economic and monetary union were regarded as being at odds with traditional views of national identity. In general, the FSU's assessment about the compatibility between national and European identity is congruent with the national populations' breakdown from the Eurobarometer polls - except in the cases of France, Austria, Finland and Greece and, to a certain extent, Germany.

Whereas the FSU study suggests that French national identity might be at odds with European identity, Eurobarometer shows that the French actually feel more European than the overall EU average and that the French regard both national and European identities as compatible. The opposite applies to Austria, Finland and Greece. The FSU study suggests that the national identity of Austrians, Finns and Greeks does not necessarily need to clash with a European identity, although the potential of a clash exists. Eurobarometer results show, however, that these three countries feel far more national than European. The answers given by the Austrians, Finns and Greeks fall below the Germans' answer, whose national identity, according to the FSU study, was seen to be at odds with a European identity.

Due to the fact that access to the formulated questions and the questionnaires of the FSU is limited, one should be careful to draw any firm

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11 Forward Studies Unit (1995); Summary of the replies from the Commission office in Member States to the questionnaire on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.
conclusions. This is, primarily, because identity is difficult to measure. Moreover, *Eurobarometer* 1996 and the FSU study were not carried out within the same time frame. One could speculate that the disparity of the French, Austrian, Finnish and Greek results may highlight a few possible problems: does the disparity signify that the European Commission's representative offices, or even the national governments, attempt to portray their respective citizens according to their own policy approach? Does the disparity illustrate a possible lack of the permissive consensus?

Judging from the Eurobarometer results and considering the general upward trend in 'nationality' which is matched by a decline of 'European' identity, it looks as if the prospects for the emergence of a genuine European identity are decreasing. National identity\(^{12}\) is still predominant and "there are few signs of a European identity emerging to replace old national loyalties."\(^{13}\) It will be "difficult to resuscitate enthusiasm for Europe at this time of declining support\(^{14}\), and reasons for this decline in support may be found in problems concerning unemployment, cuts in the social security budgets and the lack of a credible European foreign and security policy. Unable to find a solution to these problems, the European Union seems to be distant from its peoples. It seems, furthermore, that "[o]lder loyalties to smaller nations also survive, even though these nations - the Welsh, the Basques, the Bretons, the Bavarians - were assimilated inside the larger nation-states."\(^{15}\) In surveys of 1981 and 1990, allegiance to the city and local community was stronger than to the region, the nation-state and Europe.\(^{16}\) However, given the different regionalisation structures among the European member states, it seems that a good proportion of citizens still rather trust their national governments when it comes to problem-solving. These governments seem to be closer to the citizen than the

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\(^{12}\) Local and regional identities are, despite the flaws involved, taken as being part of national identity.

\(^{13}\) *The Economist* (1995); "More-or-less European union", August 26, 1995.

\(^{14}\) Tindemans, Leo (1993); "Séance de clôture" in Economic and Social Committee (1993); *L'Europe des citoyens*, p. 73. My translation.

\(^{15}\) *The Economist* (1995); "More-or-less European union", August 26, 1995.

\(^{16}\) Kerkhofs, Jean (1994); "Les valeurs des Européens" in Picht, Robert (ed.); *L'identité Européenne*, p. 41.
European Union, so that citizens wish that their national governments retain a large
degree of decision-making powers. They dread Brussels becoming an overpowering
machinery able to regulate everything. Instead, the European Union should respect,
if not protect and promote, its various constituent identities and plurality of
cultures. Assuming that citizens with a strong sense of 'nationality' are
Eurosceptics, Karlheinz Reif concludes that


the Europe they [Eurosceptics] do not want, but believe to exist already and to
have been strengthened by 'Maastricht'... never existed. On the other hand, the
'Europe' they are perfectly willing to accept if not actively to support, is more or
less the 'Europe' that currently exists, and - to an ever greater extent - the 'Europe'
defined in the Maastricht Treaty.17

In a related way, and despite the downward trend in the feeling of a
'European identity' and its compatibility with national identity, the above figures
also

show that the EU's cultural goal of fostering multiple identities is not unattainable,
although they give no indication of whether it is something that can be engineered
or must be left to evolve.18

The attempt to engineer a European identity suggests an approach 'from
above'. This may be based on the "existing institutional structure of the Union,
while little attention is given to concepts of political identity and belonging in the
Member States."19 In contrast, leaving a European identity to evolve, may be
congruous with the attempt to create a European identity 'from below'. This would
"take the experiences of political identity in the nation-state as the starting point in
the search for a post-national European political identity."20 Pulling both these
approaches together, does not induce homogenisation, nor the attempt to bind the
different European peoples into one European demos. Arguably, the present trend
in Europe's political landscape - that is the victory for centre-left parties in

17 Reif, Karlheinz (1993); "Cultural Convergence and Cultural Diversity as Factors in European
Identity" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the search for legitimacy, p. 150.
18 Bakir, Vian (1996);"An identity for Europe? The role of the media" in Wintle, Michael (ed.);
19 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National identities and citizenship in the European Union" in
European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 634.
Germany, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and the Czech Republic - has not been reflected in a drift towards homogenisation of national traits and idiosyncracies. According to an Eurostat study of March 1998, national lifestyles remain as pronounced as ever - despite persistent scares over the EU's desire to standardise everything from money to bananas... Even within individual countries there is [sic] lots of diversity. The thing about Europe is that the people all over see the advantages of working together.  

Working together, however, does not seem to be enough to create a European identity. The different European peoples might also need to be bound together under a European telos, held together by European citizenship. Emphasising a European telos, as opposed to demos, 22 would allow citizens to exercise European political civic rights and obligations that have no ethno-cultural implications directly attached to them. As has already been argued in chapter three, European citizenship does not aim to supersede, replace or eliminate national citizenship. Based on the member states' nationality, it complements national citizenship and has evoked multiple identities as citizenship practice involved a growing number of target groups, such as workers, wage earners, students, etc. and created access to certain social rights, new voting rights, a 'European' passport, changed rules of border crossing and practices that would contribute to create a feeling of belonging. 23

This brings us back to the theory of Liberal Nationalism, in which the contextual individual, here the European citizen, may find her/himself belonging to two different demoi simultaneously: the ethno-national one and the civic-European one. To recall the argument made in chapter three, both demoi are "based on

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20 Gamberale, Carlo (1995); "National identities and citizenship in the European Union" in European Public Law, Vol. 1/ No. 4, p. 634. The same point has already been made in chapter five, section a; see specifically Spiering's and Smith's arguments.


22 The idea about a genuine European demos is, as we have seen in chapter three (section 3. b. ii), not feasible, since a European demos, as opposed to a national demos, cannot and should not be based on ethnic-national factors.

different subjective factors of identification." In support of this argument, Weiler argues that

I am, say, a German national in the far-reaching ethno-cultural identification and sense of belongingness. I am simultaneously a European citizen in terms of my transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national diversity. So much so, that in a range of areas of public life, I am willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of decisions adopted by my fellow European citizens in the realization that in these areas we have given preference to choices made by my out-reaching demos, rather than by my in-reaching demos.25

All identities are to be treated as equal, and a European identity could become the expression of the various existing identities. Weiler further suggests that this "would be fully consistent with, say, Habermas's notion of Constitutional Patriotism."26

As has been touched upon in chapter three, Jürgen Habermas argues that the connection between citizenship and national identity is purely socio-psychological and that “[c]itizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity.”27 For him, Constitutional Patriotism would leave space for the development of a transnational and multidimensional identity. Based on, but different to, the American and Swiss models of multiculturalism,

[i]n a future Federal Republic of European States, the same legal principles would also have to be interpreted from the vantage point of different national traditions and histories.... [A] European constitutional patriotism would have to grow out of different interpretations of the same universalist rights and constitutional principles which are marked by the context of different national histories.28

Constitutional Patriotism would imply "to be a citizen has not only the meaning of being a member of a particular political community, but of being part of
a common identity of that very community". And, according to Weiler, there is no antagonism between European and national citizenship, since the allegiance to the nation would be different from the allegiance to the European Union.

But can a European citizenship, based on Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism, provide a shelter for the peaceful co-existence of Europe's plurality of cultures and identities? Will it automatically bring about a European identity? It is for certain that Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism breaks with the traditional idea of citizenship which was "originally tailored to the size of cities and city-states" and which required the citizen to identify "himself 'patriotically' with a particular form of life", or more precisely, a particular political culture.

In contrast to this, Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism derives from the idea that the term nation has changed its meaning over time, suggesting that the ethno-cultural definition of the term nation has developed into what, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, Renan calls a 'daily plebiscite'. Renan's 'daily plebiscite' seems to imply that citizens no longer derive their identity from an ethnic-cultural bond, but from exercising their civil rights and obligations. Accordingly, national identity may be formed through a citizen's allegiance to the principle of liberal democracy and the constitutional state. Habermas argues that the role of the citizen is given an individualist and instrumentalist reading in the liberal traditions and natural law, starting with Locke, whereas communitarian and ethical understanding of the same has emerged in the tradition of political philosophy that draws upon Aristotle. From the first perspective, citizenship is conceived in analogy with the model of received membership in an organization which secures a legal status. From the second, it is conceived in analogy with the model of achieved membership in a self-determining ethical community.

Related to the Liberal-Nationalist theory, Constitutional Patriotism suggests that the citizen is no longer solely seen as part of the whole community. Instead,

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"isolated individuals [are set] against a state apparatus, the two being linked only via a relation of membership that regulates an exchange of benefits for functionally specified contributions." Increasing globalisation contributes to the fact that modern capitalist economies and communication systems no longer bind citizens to their respective nation-state alone. Global markets have developed an integrative dynamic on their own and seem to be beyond the control of the individual actors involved. Moreover,

this system integration competes with another form of integration running through the consciousness of the actors involved, that is, social integration through values, norms, and processes of reaching understanding. Just one aspect of social integration is political integration via citizenship.34

Political integration via citizenship allows, as argued in chapter three, the dissociation - not isolation - of nationality from citizenship and of the nation from the state. However, this new approach to citizenship leads many to believe that "some flattened non-descript unauthentic and artificial 'Euro-culture'"35 would develop. It would be a demos specifically created by the Community - an imagined community - in which the loyalty towards others are feared to "go beyond the immediate 'natural' (blood) or self-interested unit."36 However, sceptics forget that

the conceptualization of a European Demos should not be based on real or imaginary trans-European cultural affinities or shared histories nor on the construction of a European 'national' myth of the type which constitutes the identity of the organic nation.37

The idea that a citizen may be a member of two polities simultaneously and develop a double loyalty - an ethnic and a civic one - stirs some uncomfortable feeling. There is fear that a double loyalty would "come to replace the deep, well-

35 Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1997); "Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance" in Pijpers, Alfred (ed.); The politics of European Treaty reform: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and beyond, p. 271. This point is also raised in chapter three.
articulated, authentic and genuine national version of the same... [and] that either one or both loyalties have to be compromised.\(^{38}\) However, the old moral and ethnic loyalty does not need to recede in order to give way to a new economic and civic loyalty. Both loyalties need not compete with one another, because they are not cast in the same mould. They may reinforce each other and, complementary to Weiler’s above citation on the ‘in-reaching’ and ‘out-reaching’ demos, one could add that

the national in-reaching ethno-cultural demos and the out-reaching supranational civic demos by continuously keeping each other in check offer a structured model of critical citizenship. Maybe, we should celebrate rather than reject with aversion, the politically fractured self and double identity which dual membership involves which can be seen as conditioning us not to consider any polity claiming our loyalty to be \textit{uber alles}. This understanding of the European demos could also constitute an understanding of its deepest telos.\(^{39}\)

On this reading, Etienne Tassin believes that a European identity might emerge in the future. Stressing political rather than traditional identity values, Tassin suggests that

participation in the life of public opinions takes precedence over nationality; that, whatever the citizen’s cultural or national identity, his or her insertion in public space is elective and not ‘native’... A European political community will be born not so much from the idea of Europe as from the idea of a public space of fellow-citizenship which is alone capable of giving meaning to a non-national political community. A community identity cannot give birth to a politically organized public space; rather, a common citizenship of European peoples can emerge from the political institution of this space.\(^{40}\)

We have seen in chapter three that the democratic basis and legitimacy of the European Union’s political institutions are widely questioned. This is, partly, because the European Union has evolved into a complex and sometimes incomprehensible network of bureaucracy and institutions, and partly because European issues are still seen through the national lens. Politics in the European Union seem to be a reflection of the EU’s member states’ political cultures. This


\(^{40}\) Tassin, Etienne (1992); "Europe: a political community?" in Mouffe, Chantal (ed.) \textit{Dimensions of Radical Democracy}, p. 189.
gives rise to the question whether the European Union has a political culture of its own?

Political culture is often seen as "the property of a collectivity - nation, region, class, ethnic community, formal organization, party, or whatever" and a "mind-set' which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible." Similarly, Almond and Verba define political culture as the "attitudes towards the political system and its various parts, and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system." Civic culture is, according to them, a culture in which "beliefs, feelings and values significantly influence political behaviour and these beliefs, feelings and values are a product of socialization experiences." It is a culture in which "political culture and political structure are congruent." Accordingly, and translating David Garland's argument, culture influences politics and politics influences culture. Public opinion and attitudes are - traditionally - inseparable from institutional arrangements and the introduction of new policies. Policy-makers need to take into consideration public opinion and attitudes before introducing new policies or institutional arrangements. This does not mean, however, that culture and structure need to coincide, nor does it mean that all political cultures are the same. In fact, political cultures "differ from one another," since each political culture is subject to different historical events, various class systems, levels of wealth, beliefs of political activists and a number of distinct and sometimes antagonistic sub-cultures.

43 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963); The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations, p. 13.
44 Almond, Gabriel A. (1989); "The intellectual history of the civic culture concept" in Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. (eds.); The civic culture revisited, p. 29.
45 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963); The civil culture: political attitudes and democracy in five nations, p. 31.
47 Woshinsky, Oliver (1995); Culture and Politics, p. 68.
48 Woshinsky, Oliver (1995); Culture and Politics, p. 70-74. Political cultural theorists may be criticised for applying the abstract concept of 'political culture' too uniformly to a collectivity. Instead, a collectivity may contain a multiplicity of units, just as the self has a variety of 'selves'. It
However, assuming that political cultures are "belief and value systems with a coherence of their own"\textsuperscript{49}, one may easily run danger of objectifying\textsuperscript{50} or nationalising\textsuperscript{51} culture and, simultaneously, assimilating culture with attitudes. Opinion polls or referenda are no reflection of a European public opinion. It could even be argued that the European Union has no public opinion\textsuperscript{52}, since the public opinion in question "may be different from the opinion of any of the groups in the public. [It] might be a composite opinion formed out of several opinions held by the public."\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, it is erroneous to take culture as a uniform and "sui generis phenomenon"\textsuperscript{54}, since

culture is a not a monolithic kind of thing which can feature as a simple variable in an explanatory formula. It is, instead, a rich composite of densely interwoven meanings which loses all its content wherever it is discussed in generic terms. Cultures are bric-a-brac ensembles of specifics, local details and peculiarities. . . . When we talk of 'culture' we refer not just to intellectual systems and forms of consciousness but also to structures of affect and what might be called emotional configurations or 'sensibilities'.\textsuperscript{55}

Culture should not just be understood in terms of high culture, but more importantly in 'ways of doing things'.\textsuperscript{56} So far, one cannot speak of one 'European' way of doing things, although cynics would remind us that the EU's intransparency, democratic deficit and the technocratic machinery of Brussels certainly constitute a 'European' way of doing things. Although there might be some truth in this

\textsuperscript{49} Lane, Jan-Erik and Olson, Svante O. (1994); Politics and Society in Western Europe, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{50} Wilson, Thomas and Hastings, Donnan (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Hastings, Donnan (eds.); Border Identities, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{52} Delors, Jacques (1993); "Discours d'ouverture" in Economic and Social Committee; L'Europe des citoyens, pp. 23-29.
\textsuperscript{53} Key, Valdimer O. (1964); Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 10. See also Lane, Robert E. and Sears, David O. (1964); Public Opinion, especially pp. 1-15.
\textsuperscript{54} Keraudren, Philippe (1996); "In search of culture: Lessons from the past to find a role for the study of administrative culture" in Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 9/ No. 1, p. 76.
\textsuperscript{55} Garland, David (1990); Punishment and Modern Society: A study in social theory, p. 200 and 195; see also Gellner, Ernest (1996); Nations and Nationalism, pp. 37-38.
\textsuperscript{56} The difficulties of defining 'culture' have been touched upon in chapter three. It generally refers to "the sum of numerous parts amongst which we can count language, ideas, beliefs, customs, codes, rituals, ceremonies, religion, laws and so on" (Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question of Identity, p. 15).
statement, one should not forget that European governance operates under different conditions, which is, to a large extent, democratically legitimised by national politics. The European Union seems to struggle between its various national political cultures and the need to create a political culture of its own. In how far these two, allegedly opposing, strands may be brought together is questionable. Jürgen Habermas takes an optimistic approach and argues that the increasing mobility between the European member states will set in motion even more extensive horizontal mobility and multiply the contacts between members of different nationalities. Immigration... will intensify the multicultural diversity of these societies. This will give rise to social tensions... for which coordinated solutions are available only at a European level. Given these conditions, communication networks of European-wide public spheres may emerge... In the future, however, differentiation could occur in a European culture between a common political culture and the branching national traditions of art, literature, historiography, philosophy, and so forth.57

If a European political culture will ever emerge, one would expect that this type of European political culture - together with Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism - would set the conditions for a common public opinion. This would be necessary for the European Union to "develop a new political self-confidence commensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty-first century."58 In future, this may also culminate in a shared 'we-feeling' sufficient to persuade groups and citizens to accept recurrent and structural sacrifices of their interests in the furtherance of the interests of others or of the system as a whole.59

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58 Jürgen Habermas cited in Waever, Ole (1995); "Europe since 1945" in Wilson, Kevin and Dussen van, Jan (eds.); The history of the idea of Europe, p. 208.
5. C European culture as a means to foster a genuine European identity?

Jürgen Habermas's Constitutional Patriotism may be a model answer to European citizenship, since it is able to dissociate nationality from citizenship. However, it seems to ignore the strong influence nationality has on the human psyche, the value of belonging and originality.\footnote{Nationality is closely linked to the ethnic understanding of the nation, in the sense that it gives the respective citizen a past and a future - Constitutional patriotism does not do this and would hence be too weak to sustain a demos in the fullest sense of the term. See also Weiler, Joseph (1995); "Does Europe need a constitution? Reflection on Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht decision", European Law Journal Vol. 1/ No 1, pp. 219-258.} Furthermore, it does not seem to deliver an answer to the European citizenship's "problem of inclusion and exclusion among member state nationals and 'other' European residents, namely the so-called third country nationals."\footnote{Wiener, Antje (1997); "Assessing the constructive potential of Union citizenship" in European Integration Papers Online, Vol. 1/ No. 17, p. 13.} And although European Union citizenship may represent "an attempt to replace narrow nationalism with a wider identity,... the preoccupation with what is a European can simply reproduce some of those ancient divisions on a wider stage."\footnote{Jacques, Martin (1998); "Even continents can't buck trends" in The European, January 19-25, 1998.} There is danger, as Weiler argues, that

\[\text{[n]ationality as referent for interpersonal relations, and the human alienating effect of Us and Them are brought back again, simply transferred from their previous intra-Community context to the new inter-community one. We have made little progress if the Us becomes European (instead of German or French or British) and the Them becomes those outside the Community.}... [T]he new Europe must adopt a distinctively post-modern approach to 'otherness', which moves away from established theories of citizenship and human rights, and which is instead based on the kind of 'humane' human rights.\footnote{Weiler, Joseph H. H. (1992); "After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in post-1992 Europe" in Adams, William (ed.); Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after Chapter 5.C - 302}]

So far, the lack of progress is particularly evident at the international entry points into the European Union, such as airports or border crossings. Despite future EU enlargement towards the East, the distinction between EU-citizens and non-EU citizens is still specifically made on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. When it comes to border and passport controls, holders of a European passport...
usually clear the customs area without many obstacles. The queue for non-EU citizens, however, involves long waiting hours, a more thorough investigation of papers of the border-crosser and, if applicable, the goods s/he wishes to take across the border. This unequal treatment of EU and non-EU guarantees discontentment amongst citizens of the Central Eastern European, even a feeling of discrimination and humiliation.

As was indicated in chapter four, the non-conferment of European citizenship rights to the prospective EU member states runs counter to the introduction of the many other economic and political measures which were introduced to ease the enlargement process and to overcome the lack of "authority of local and regional bodies to make contacts, negotiations and decisions with their transfrontier partners." When Neil Smith argues that "it is at the periphery where the contradiction between a pre-national and a post-national Europe is most intensely felt", one may translate this into 'it is at the Eastern frontier of the European Union where the tension between an EU-Europe and a European Europe is most intensely felt' or, as Michael Smith puts it, here "the tension between 'the politics of exclusion' and the 'politics of inclusion'" comes to the fore. The Cold War was close to legitimise this tension, as well as the Eastern frontier of the European Union. As the boundaries within the European Union came down, a boundary between 'us' and 'them', 'us Europeans' and 'them Central Eastern Europeans', was drawn. It seemed to foster Europe's exclusive club membership of member states who attained a specific level

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1992, p. 40; and Ward, Ian (1997); "Law and the Other Europeans" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35/ No. 1, p. 79.
5 Anderson, Malcolm (1997); "The Political Significance of European Union Border Controls", in Anderson, Malcolm and Bort, Eberhard (eds.); Schengen and EU enlargement, p. 29.
7 Dupuy, Pierre-Marie(1983); "Legal aspects of transfrontier regional co-operation" in Anderson, Malcolm (ed.); Frontier regions in Western Europe, p. 57. This problem is specific to the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, where federal Austria and Germany neighbour face centralized Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
of GDP or rate of inflation. Within this 'fortress Europe', the introduction of European citizenship and various other measures were an important medium to promote a European identity and a sense of solidarity amongst citizens of EU member states.

Since the events of 1989/90, however, the European Union has been faced with the challenge of accommodating this exclusive, bureaucratic, technocratic Europe with the wider and more open concept of Europe. It has become apparent that it is difficult to draw a geographical line around Europe and to find Europe's significant 'other'. Michel Foucher's examples of Ukraine and Belorussia show that it is difficult to demarcate the geographical or cultural finitude of Europe - despite the fact that it is geopolitically important that they be defined as European as well. On the other hand, one may argue that because Europe's borders are "fuzzy", they can function as bridges and transitional points at which features, values, identities and definitions flow into one another. On the Eastern frontier of the European Union, Euroregions and border regions are cases in point. By virtue of being in between, and hence close to two or more national cultures, regional cultures are diverse, and "it is this mixture which gives (them their) specific identity rather than any homogeneous and essentialist idea of culture." Within the European framework, then, borderlands seem to incorporate the ultimate requirements for the emergence of a European identity, based on a "cultural identity that will be both distinctive and inclusive, differentiating yet assimilative".

As we have seen in chapter four, intellectual elites of the Central Eastern European countries have continuously stressed their allegiance to Europe, as opposed to Russia. For them, the "postwar division of Europe did not correspond with the long term cultural structures prevailing in Europe." Accordingly, the

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12 Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, No. 68/ Vol. 1, p. 76.
Polish editor and columnist Gerbert describes Poland as a "normal, poorly performing European country, rather than a European wannabe."14 Similarly, the Hungarian writer and journalist François Fejto feels even more European when he travels. "When meeting a Pole, French or English person in either Hong Kong or San Francisco", he says, "one becomes even more aware of being European."15 And, Polish intellectual Jerzy Jedlicki asserts that

intellectual elites from Tallinn to Tirana have for centuries turned to the West for their cultural aspirations, their material products, their scientific or technological knowledge and even for their social institutions... We now feel European, but with a certain hesitation that makes us Europeans of the peripheral type.16

Although this perception of periphery may point to the emergence of a Central European identity in particular, the expression 'Europeans of the peripheral type' carries negative connotations with it. It implies, as was argued in chapter four, the undefined which does not belong to either East or West. To do away with this feeling of periphery, Czech President Vaclav Havel asserted in his 1994 speech to the European Parliament that if the European Union,

this great administrative work, which obviously should simplify life for all Europeans, is to hold together and stand various tests of time, then it must be visibly bonded by more than a set of rules and regulations.17

This indicates, and rightly so, that the European Union must not become an exclusive club and that "European unity cannot safely or effectively be built on an emotional foundation of fears of the world outside."18 Instead, the European Union should rethink itself in the wider European framework, its "solid intellectual basis of shared values."19 Havel suggested that the European Union needs a "charter of its own that would clearly define the ideas on which it is founded, its meaning and the

14 Karacs, Imre (1998); "Coming in from the Cold" in The Independent on Sunday, June 7, 1998.
15 European Communities (1997); La Commission Européenne à l'écoute du changement, p. 58. My translation.
18 Vaclav Havel cited in Fitzgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
19 Vaclav Havel cited in Fitzgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
values it intends to embody." It could be a charter based on the 'Charter of European Identity', drawn up by the Europa-Union Deutschland in 1994, which defines Europe as a community of destiny, values, life and responsibility, as well as an economic and social community. Policies "which strengthen the sense of common purpose while establishing the credibility of the European Union and making its citizens proud to be Europeans" must be brought to the fore, in order to stimulate the redefinition of the European Union and Europe.

Ideally, Europe should be defined "in terms of history, or historical geography;... in terms of observed patterns of social, economic and political interaction; ...in terms of values, culture, and psychological identity —... [a] perceived community."

Compared to the traditional historic or political definitions of Europe, this broad definition seems to leave a lot of scope for the definition of 'Europe'. Political definitions have long been restricted to the European Union alone. Geographical definitions, as we have seen in chapter two, vary according to history. And culturally, Europe is equally difficult to define. This is partly so because the understanding of culture, as was suggested in chapter three and the preceding section, "is so imprecise and changeable a phenomenon that it explains less than people realise." Culture is not an effective marker for Europe's boundaries, since it is not limited to a "single locale", but, according to Renato Rossaldo, "can... be conceived as a... porous array of intersections where distinct processes crisscross from within and beyond its borders." Furthermore, culture is a process, a "product of social interaction". The concept of culture

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21 Europa-Union Deutschland (1994); Charter on European Identity, http://euroleum.org/
22 Europa-Union Deutschland (1994); Charter on European Identity, http://euroleum.org/, Part VI.
can vary from one school of thought to the other, from one society to another and from one era to another. It may include the Fine Arts, literature, etc., but may also include all types of knowledge and features which characterise a society and make it possible to understand the world.28

The vague definition of culture allows French sociologist Alain Touraine to claim that it is impossible to identify a monolithic, clearly defined European culture. He states that

a single European culture does not exist, because - thanks God - there are more than one European cultures. To reduce all these European cultures to one European culture would impoverish Europe. Communication between the different European cultures is important. If there is a European identity, it is the recognition of the other.29

Similarly, Sven Papcke understands Europe as an "unitas multiplex', something of an exercise in variety"30, and José Ortega y Gasset, at the middle of this century, perceived "European culture to be an interconnected system."31 With a common cultural heritage at its basis, a European culture encompasses, and is composed of, many different identities existing within Europe.

There is no intention of squeezing all existing cultures into a single European one. Aiming at "uniformity is as anti-European as those politicians who are still wearing their nation-state-colored spectacles while planning transnational cooperation in Brussels."32 Similarly, "to over-emphasise narrow cultural identity is to work against cross-cultural communication."33 Instead, European culture should be best defined as multiform and open. One cannot single out one determining or outstanding European identity factor, because Europe's "precise scope, nature,

29 European Communities (1997); La Commission Européenne à l'écoute du changement, p. 36. My translation.
30 Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The idea of Europe - Problems of national and transnational identity, p. 64.
32 Papcke, Sven (1992); "Who needs European identity?" in Nelsen, Brian, Roberts, David and Veit, Walter (eds.); The idea of Europe - Problems of national and transnational identity, p. 64.
33 Ethelyn Orso cited in Bat Smit de la, Reynaud (1994); "Change and Identity: can cultural change prompt changes in personal and social identity?", paper presented during European Student Chaplain's Conference, Conference in Visegrad, June 1-7, 1994.
content and distinctive features are not identified.\textsuperscript{34} To be "European means precisely having more than one culture and mediating between cultures, being \textit{intercultural}"\textsuperscript{35}. This allows us, though contradictory at first glance, to describe European culture as being subject to its common heritage and diverse cultures, its distinctiveness and universality. Slogans, such as 'unity in diversity', 'family of cultures' and 'concentric circles of allegiance' would complete the list illustrating the many possible definitions of Europe.

When becoming a member of the European Union, member states accept the \textit{acquis communautaire}, the overall conditions necessary for the European Union's economic, political and social integration process. This does not mean that the future European Union will be based on the idea of a "European 'super-nation' [which might] resemble, in its external as well as internal policies and relations, [...] a] national model"\textsuperscript{36}. Nor does it imply that the recognition of one culture entails the denial of another. European cultures are not "rival cultures"\textsuperscript{37}, but they are mingled and grew together. "Cultures in contact produce varieties rather than mixtures."\textsuperscript{38} They foster transnationalisation\textsuperscript{39}. The "simultaneous interaction and parallelism of different cultural levels within given social formations"\textsuperscript{40} and the political - democratic - framework of the European Union allow cultural freedom.\textsuperscript{41} The idea of democracy is fundamental for the preservation of the different identities in a European 'family of cultures'. It is therefore

no wonder that Central European, and particularly smaller and more vulnerable, nations want to integrate into Western Europe by accepting democratization and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} Obradovic, Daniela (1996); "Policy Legitimacy and the European Union" in \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol. 34/ No. 2, p. 214.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National identity and the idea of European unity" in \textit{International Affairs}, No. 68/ Vol. 1, p. 76.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Young, Hugo (1999); "Why I'm glad to be European" in \textit{The Guardian}, January 2, 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Europe House Zagreb (1996); "Europe of Cultures: Cultural identity of Central Europe", Conference Programme, http://mairmo.irmo.hr/~clink/coming/eucult.html.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Schlesinger, Philip (1991); "Media, political order and national identity" in \textit{Media, Culture and Society}, Vol. 13, p. 306.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Schlesinger, Philip (1991); "Media, political order and national identity" in \textit{Media, Culture and Society}, Vol. 13, p. 305.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Oberndörfer, Dieter (1996); "Die politische Gemeinschaft und ihre Kultur" in \textit{Politik und Zeitgeschichte}, B 52-53, p. 37.
\end{itemize}
observance of human rights. Acceptance of universal European identity limits collective obsessions with state-nation ideology. The interplay of universalism and particularism may be balanced by a strong intercultural communication that helps the full emancipation of cultures and provides for democratization of their relationships.42

This process also allows European culture to remain open, and to be defined as an "open communication field"43. European ideas, values and culture have influenced (and in the extreme case imposed themselves on) other parts of the world, so that "this psychological community of shared assumptions and attitudes spread a good deal further east and west."44 On the other hand, European culture has also absorbed non-European influences and thoughts. These range from influences of immigration to Americanisation, specifically McDonaldisation and the screening of Hollywood films in virtually all European cinemas.

Given the incoherent, and to a large extent undefinable, nature of culture, and specifically European culture,

[the idea of European unity has recently and rightly been called a myth... Its name is taken from an obscure Greek myth with little real connection with the territory and was not commonly used before the eighteenth century.45

Accordingly, Anthony Smith argues that Europe is composed of "unacceptable historical myths and memories... a patchwork, memoryless scientific culture held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change."46 The idea of a myth is perhaps a shaky ground for the European Union to build its legitimacy, because "just as pure geography itself,

44 Margaret Thatcher cited in Wallace, William (1991); The transformation of Western Europe, p. 28.
45 Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (1998 forthcoming); "Introduction" in Bort, Eberhard and Evans, Neil (eds.); Networking Europe, p. 1. This Greek myth refers to the rape of princess Europa by Zeus, the King of Gods. When Zeus looked down and saw Europa, he was infatuated by her beauty. By transforming himself into a grand white bull, Zeus attracted Europa's attention. She climbed onto the bull's (Zeus') back, whereupon Zeus rode off to the island of Crete and made Europa the mother of three of his children.
mythology is unable to give an answer about Europe's nature and frontiers.\textsuperscript{47} Is it precisely the question of European culture which constitutes the principal problem inherent to the European integration process? Hence, any attempts to promote the idea of a distinctive European culture, tradition or set of values, are thus of high political significance - whatever the apparent banality of arguments about the European passports and postage stamps, frontier formalities, car number plates, 'Eurovision' programmes and youth exchanges.\textsuperscript{48}

Since culture has so far been analysed through the national lens, it remains difficult to bring European culture closer to the peoples. Yet, European culture is "probably the strongest link between Europe's different regions."\textsuperscript{49} To make this link more apparent, European culture needs a new approach which reflects the interplay of European social forces which are able to shape a new European socio-political order.\textsuperscript{50} One of these approaches could be found in projects of transfrontier co-operation and examples of transfrontier regionalism. It would show to what extent various aspects of culture are "denationalised"\textsuperscript{51}, but at the same time part of a European "family of cultures"..., through which over several generations some loose, over-arching political identity and community might gradually be forged.\textsuperscript{52} Such a community "will only find its identity in a critical attitude towards its own traditions, and a constant openness towards external contributions."\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, Soledad García reminds us that the

idea of Europe which is being rescued from philosophical and cultural traditions should not be confused with the modern idea of Europe, which results from the

\textsuperscript{47} Münkler, Herfried (1995); "Die politische Idee Europa" in Delgado, Mariano and Lutz-Bachmann, Matthias (eds.) Herausforderung Europa: Wege zu einer europäischen Identität, p. 17. My translation.
\textsuperscript{48} Wallace, William (1991); The transformation of Western Europe, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{49} Rickmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schöpflin, George (eds.); Myths and Nationhood, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{52} Smith, Anthony D. (1992); "National Identity and the idea of European unity" in International Affairs, Vol. 68/ no. 1, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{53} Camps, Victoria (1992); "L'identité européenne, une identité morale" in Lenoble, Jacques et Dewandre, Nicole (eds.); L'Europe au soir du siècle, p. 103. My translation.
political practice of the past 45 years and has involved a strong will to create a peaceful and prosperous environment.\(^{54}\)

A great number of intellectuals draw on Europe's common values, history and cultural aspects in order to identify a European identity, leaving behind "the perennial story of nation- and empire-building"\(^{55}\). Praxis has shown that definitions for a European identity or culture keep revolving around the same narrative of values, such as humanism, democracy, solidarity, civil rights and the aforementioned historical currents. "Nineteenth-century historiography is a historiography drunk with the superiority of 'European civilisation'"\(^{56}\) and its glories of the past; Europe's dark period of colonialism and imperial wars are conveniently ignored. But apart from being selective\(^{57}\), this retrospective approach also seems to ignore that culture and identity are subject to processes and developments. It attempts to ascribe specific features to Europe, rather than take into consideration that Europe's identity is marked through its "changeability and transitoriness"\(^{58}\), its "oscillation between unity and diversity"\(^{59}\). It also fails to take into account that it is not enough to base the idea of a European idea "solely on democracy, liberty, tolerance and social justice".\(^{60}\) One should rather emphasise "the need for a European memory"\(^{61}\), based on Europe's cultural heritage and its mix of ideas which

\(^{54}\) Garcia, Soledad (1993); "Europe's fragmented identities and the frontiers of citizenship" in Garcia, Soledad (ed.); European identity and the search for legitimacy, p. 3.

\(^{55}\) Riekmann, Sonja (1996); "The Myth of European Unity" in Hosking, Geoffrey, and Schöpflin, George (eds.); Myths and Nationhood, p. 61.

\(^{56}\) Pieterse, Jan (1994); "Unpacking the West: How European is Europe?" in Rattansi, Ali and Westwood, Sallie (ed.); Racism, Modernity and Identity, p. 130. In addition to this, Chris Shore and Annabel Black argue that it is rarely addressed what the list of common European features and "historical currents amounts to, or what makes them exclusively European" in Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 294.


\(^{58}\) Nolte, Josef (1991); Wir guten Europäer, p. 10. My translation.


\(^{60}\) Urbain, Robert in "Séance de clôture" in Economic and Social Committee (1993); L'Europe des citoyens, p. 74. My translation.

\(^{61}\) Polish Foreign Minister Mr Geremek cited in Fitzgerald, Garret (1999); "Getting to the heart of our European identity" in The Irish Times, March 6, 1999.
interact differently and partially in different situations, contexts and moments in time.

Given Europe's evolutionary and, to some extent, incoherent character, one should note that "[t]here is no historically homogeneous Europe, and those who look for it are on the wrong track."\(^6^2\) The concept of European identity in the post-Second World War period, for example, should not be confused with the Cold War European identity or the post-Maastricht notion of European identity. Whereas the first was an attempt to "foster a more distinctive 'European identity', to replace the warring national identities which had brought the states of core Europe into repeated conflict"\(^6^3\), the second concept of European identity may be classified as a European Community identity which sought to manifest itself to the outside. The post-Maastricht notion of European identity, in contrast, may describe the effort to incorporate all European peoples via primarily social and cultural factors, in addition to the economic political ones. It is an attempt to combine the various internal and external aspects of identity, in order to reinforce the "parallel development to the construction of a European Union - a development... which could give the European project the internal and external legitimation that it so sorely needs.\(^6^4\) More importantly, however, it is an attempt to look into the future, because

being European cannot simply be defined in terms of a single legal nationality or even a constitution guaranteeing equal rights to all citizens and all cultural groups, important though that is.\(^6^5\)

\(^{62}\) Hobsbawm, Eric (1997); *On History*, p.226.
\(^{63}\) Wallace, William (1991); *The transformation of Western Europe*, p. 30.
6 CONCLUSION

It has been argued throughout the thesis that the concept of European identity can no longer be taken synonymously with an EU identity. The concept of European identity incorporates more than just the European Union. It reaches further than that - how far? And how may a European identity be defined? It has been suggested that Europe is strong because of its political, economic and cultural diversity. Yet, Europe also seems weak, since it lacks a genuine European identity. Europe is in need of a European identity, in order to be able to legitimise its future European integration process vis-à-vis its citizens and the wider international community.

Since 1989/90, Europe seems to be in a state of flux. Given the assumption that 'as internal borders of the European Union dismantle, external ones rise', the effect of the present transformation processes within Europe has been the emergence of some pressing questions about Europe's geographical limits, and its core sense of identity. With the changing nature of the Eastern frontier of the European Union from a hard to a soft border, Europe's political division has been overcome. However, it has given rise to new problems, since it looks as if the disappearance of the 'other' beyond the Eastern frontier of the European Union has left Europe, and specifically the European Union, with a sense of restlessness1 - an identity crisis. In view of prospective EU enlargement towards the East, population movements within and into Europe will increase, so that the Community can no longer rely on its exclusive club membership. Its definition of identity - as far as such a thing exists - can no longer be solely outwards looking towards something non-European. Such an approach might invoke the future 'Europe' to keep everything non-European out and to "slide into Euro-protectionism or Euro-racism."2 Instead, it has become increasingly evident that the concept of European

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1 Fenet, Alain (1994); "L'identité européenne: variations contemporaines sur une interrogation ancienne" in Chevallier, Jacques (ed.); L'identité politique, p. 397.
2 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 297.
identity faces the challenge of having to define itself by finding a balance between internal and external perspectives, in order to be unique and universal at the same time. Characteristics for such a European identity may be found in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union.

Due to its potential multiplicity of different identity layers, as well as the many possible ways from which the concept may be approached, identity is a term difficult to define. This poses perennial problems for the definition of European identity, since one is confronted with the double question: what is Europe and what is identity? Acknowledging that identity is procedural, the definition of Europe and European identity changes as well. A multifaceted picture of Europe emerges which, on a smaller scale, is also applicable to the European Union.

But what kind of Union is this? Traditional European integration theories seem insufficient for the definition of the European integration process. Each European integration theory explains the European integration process differently, adding to the confusion over the European Union’s system of governance and legitimacy. Is the European Union subject to a supranationalism, intergovernmentalism or a multi-level governance? Is it legitimate? It seems that the European Union’s legitimacy is an extension of the legitimacy of its member states, rather than its citizens. To the majority of its citizens, the European Union still represents a bureaucratic and remote apparatus.

Even the EU’s various policies and measures directed towards fostering a European identity have not yet been able to change this. These policies seem artificial and insufficient. So far, their influence is reduced to symbolic significance only, specifically since it seems difficult to graft "a political and cultural unity to an economic union" from the top down. However, one should not dismiss these policies altogether. Although European citizenship is not the ultimate policy to create a European identity - since flaws and problems inherent to the concept of European citizenship remain, in particular, because European citizenship has been
'imposed' from above, without any "social input from the bottom up"⁴ - once reformed and developed, the concept of European citizenship could provide a basis for a European identity, in which citizens would feel a double sense of belonging - a national and a supranational one.

Moving to the European Union's Eastern frontier, the thesis has drawn on the historical and multi-cultural concept of Mitteleuropa, preparing for the subsequent discourse concerning the effects of transborder co-operation in the Eastern borderlands. This transborder co-operation has already led to a great number of interregional partnerships and regional alliances. This has allowed a regional tie-in into the structures of EU governance and impacted greatly on the traditional role and understanding of (nation-) states. Arguably, transborder co-operation has transcended and blurred the boundaries of sovereignty, as well as geographical, economic, political, social and cultural boundaries - even if gradually and slowly.

Transborder co-operation projects seem to underline the "linkage between the internal EU and the development of the broader European and international arenas"⁵, and it looks as if Europe's destiny and the emergence of a European identity are to manifest themselves most clearly in the borderlands on the Eastern frontier of the European Union. Considering borderlands as laboratories, it has been suggested that these borderlands already possess a number of collective multi-cultural identities. Borderlands may become a prototype for the co-habitation of Europe's various multi-ethnic societies, since it is here where cultures and identities come together, co-exist and "cross-fertilise"⁶. Emphasising the multi-cultural aspect of borderlands, one may argue that "borders of states still stand as simultaneous

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¹ Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); The Anthropology of Europe, p. 296.
² Kershen, Anne (1998); "Introduction: A Question of Identity" in Kershen, Anne (ed.); A Question of Identity, p. 10.
⁴ Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (1998); "Nation, state and identity at international borders" in Wilson, Thomas and Donnan, Hastings (eds.); Border Identities, p. 11.

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markers of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Perhaps the external borders of the EU function in this way too".7

By virtue of the borderlands' and Europe's multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character, the European Union's politics of inclusion and exclusion seem to fade away and give way to a pattern of identity politics which is "patchy and confused as states, nations, regions, cities and individuals come to terms with a changing political and economic order and their place in it."8 Given the changing nature of frontiers, specifically the different transformation processes taking place on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, and the diverse economic, political and socio-cultural developments which vary from country to country, the Central Eastern European countries seem to lie in different time zones9. The resulting patchiness and confusion - even insecurity and doubt - enables a wider and open definition of the concept of Europe and European identity. It allows, according to José Ortega y Gasset's argument in the 1950s,

European civilisation to doubt about herself. Luckily this is so! I cannot remember one civilisation which died from a crisis of doubt. However, I think to remember civilisations that died because of their petrification of their traditional faith, because of their arteriosclerosis of their beliefs. Today, we should repeat the Cartesian principle, reformed: 'I doubt, therefore I am.10

But is, one may rightly ask, "European self-reflection... already the index of its non-self-identity"11? Is Europe's non-self identity a result of Europe's multi-identity12? Paradoxically, doubt seems to give strength and seems to be able to bind people together. Self-confidence or, rather, self-centredness and impertinence, may

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7 Wilson, Thomas (1996); "Sovereignty, identity and borders: Political anthropology and European integration" in O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. (eds.); Borders, Nations and States, p. 206.
9 The Economist (1998); "Good Fences", December 19, 1998. Indeed, the Estonian-Russian border, the future Eastern frontier of the European Union, marks two different time zones.
12 Jacques Delors cited in Massart, Françoise (1993); L'Europe et ses Etats, p. 223.

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ignore fundamental central issues. In the case of the European Union, the strength of its internal social and cultural richness and diversity seems to have long been neglected for political and economic values necessary for the definition against the 'other'. Recently, however, it has increasingly become evident that these political and economic considerations are no longer sufficient for the development of a European identity.

European integration is a process of the future\(^1\) and European identity would therefore represent a kind of shell which contains multiple senses of identity - including ethno-national ones. Speaking from a French perspective, Jacques Delors, concluded that the "larger project is to assert oneself as a citizen of the world, a convinced European, while remaining fully faithful to France, to its heritage."\(^1\) This brings to the fore what has been ignored for long: the essential role of the citizen. The European Union's legitimacy has been vested in its member states' political-economic sphere, rather than the European citizens. Economic and instrumental benefits outweighed any affective considerations. This has led to a problem of governance and legitimacy within the European Union, exemplified by the Maastricht ratification crisis. Indirect democracy, the shift from "democracy in the national state to democracy in the transnational state"\(^1\), has been unsuccessful, and has not been accompanied by a shift of allegiance from the national state to the European Union. Multilevel governance may be a new concept for the average European citizen. For the borderlander on the Eastern frontier of the European Union, where the planning and implementation of various transborder co-operation projects depends on multiple administrative and governmental bodies and levels, it is less so.

Acknowledging the plurality and transcendence of political, social and cultural boundaries, it has been argued that the theories of Liberal Nationalism and Constitutional Patriotism offer a workable framework for a European identity. At

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this stage of the European integration process, national identity does not yet seem to be fully complementary with a European identity. Since Constitutional Patriotism is primarily based on democratic principles, it may be best suited to accommodate and to preserve the European citizens' multiple loyalties.

However, Constitutional Patriotism only represents one important aspect of the emergence of a European identity. In order to ensure the emergence and fostering of a wider and *genuine* European identity, the dimension of European culture must be added. European cultural events and titles, such as the European city of culture or the patrimony of historic buildings, seem to be more sophisticated and successful than is apparent at first glance. They are held in high esteem and in the field of education, Jo Shaw asserts that "funding programmes have proved exceptionally popular and have encouraged widespread mobility of students and staff in universities". It seems that the young enjoy education in other countries, and that their cross-cultural contact rather than the memory of the "second world war is... a touchstone for shared experience." Ultimately, 71% of young people support the European integration, suggesting that "the desire for true [European] integration lies with the young."

Since there is not just one European culture, but a European 'family of cultures', the search for a common and homogeneous European culture and identity can only be bound to fail. Identity factors which apply to personal, local, regional and national identities cannot simply be transferred to the European level. Accordingly, European identity cannot be based on the national identity model, nor is European identity or culture the summation of the various existing identities. European culture and identity reach further than that. European culture is a term as porous, open and diverse as identity itself. Developing a European identity on such a concept of European culture would ensure that the concept of European identity is

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17 Woollacott, Martin (1999); "Goodbye to all that" in *The Guardian*, January 2, 1999.
18 1998 Eurobarometer results cited in European Communities (1998); "Do young people support the Union?" in *Eur-OP News*, 1998/ No. 2.
19 Shore, Chris and Black, Annabel (1994); "Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity" in Goddard, Victoria, Llobera, Josep and Shore, Chris (eds.); *The Anthropology of Europe*, p. 296.
based on the 'unity in diversity' principle, encompassing "not just variations but especially - contradictions"\textsuperscript{20}. It would allow Europe to become both: coherent, unique and united, and open, diverse and assimilative.

\textsuperscript{20} Vignon, Jerôme (1996); "What does it mean to be a European?" in Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission (ed.); Carrefours: European Science and Culture, p. 3.
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APPENDIX

Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union, Article 8

Article 8: Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.

Art. 8 defines who Union citizens are. The definition of Union citizenship is based on the member states' nationality. European citizenship does not (yet) exist per se. The recent 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam underlines the thin concept of European citizenship by adding to the Treaty on European Union that "[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship".

The dependence of European citizenship on the member states' nationalities allows the member states to preserve their unique relationship with their nationals, rather than losing it to the European Union. So far and despite the introduction of European citizenship, one may certainly argue that individuals still have a stronger allegiance to their respective nation-state, rather than to the European Union.

The importance of member state nationality for European citizenship also underlines the exclusionary nature of European citizenship. Non-Community nationals cannot benefit from most rights which Union citizens enjoy. Further complexity is added, when one considers that member states nationality laws are not unilateral, but remain subject to each member state. Nationality laws strike at the core of each member state and attempts to homogenise them on an European level have failed. National laws must remain in accordance with the objectives of the Community, in order to avoid conflicts of interest.
Article 8a: Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by measures adopted to give it effect.

This article attempts to create the right of free movement and residence within the area of the European Union in the same way as it exists in the member states themselves. Nevertheless, the veritable right to free movement and residence in the European Union is restricted to citizens, namely member states' nationals only. Furthermore, the freedom of movement and residence is also subject to secondary legislation which is not specified in the Treaty. This secondary legislation particularly refers to the economic inactive Union citizens, such as students and retired persons. It allows each member state to determine the minimum level of subsistence (that is, financial resources and sufficient medical insurance) necessary for the individual to enjoy the right to free movement and residence in that particular member state. In this way, member states can ensure that individuals and their families do not become a financial burden to their social welfare systems.

Consequently, one could say that Article 8a creates three different categories of Union citizens (which are not clearly defined in the Treaty): first, those EU and EFTA citizens who are allowed to move freely within the borders of the European Union, second, those (economically active) Union citizens who can benefit from the full range of Union citizenship rights, and third, those (economically inactive) Union citizens who cannot benefit from the full range of Union citizenship rights, since they are subject to the limitations and conditions of Directives.

1 European Communities (1997); Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 8(1), section "Citizenship, Travel, Regions and Animals".
**Article 8b/1:** Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. These arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.

**Article 8b/2:** Without prejudice to Article 138(3) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. These arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.

Since the term citizenship traditionally describes the relationship between citizens and their respective polity, Article 8b/1 underlines the association of European citizenship with political rights in the European Union. This ignores, however, the fact that in some member states non-Union citizens have nonetheless the right to vote and stand for election during local elections.

Since the degree of decentralisation within each member state is not the same across the territory of the European Union and levels of autonomy, competence and decision-making power still vary from member state to member state, the Community defines municipal governments as administrative units, which, in accordance with laws of each member state, contain bodies elected by universal suffrage and are empowered to administer, at basic level of political and administrative organisation, certain local affairs on their own responsibility.  

The prospects of harmonising the organisation and composition of regional and local government is slim, since Article F/1 in the TEU states that

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"[t]he Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy".

Despite these national restrictions, the right to vote in local elections is a step towards detaching the notion of political participation and citizenship from nationality. Even if municipal elections are of minor importance for the Union's legitimacy and transparency, the symbolic importance of the European Community to legislate over the right to vote in the municipal elections - which in some countries, as in France, has led to constitutional changes - should therefore not be ignored.

Article 8b/2 again emphasises that political participation plays an important role in the definition of citizenship. It is reserved to European citizens only, but should not the same rules apply to European elections as do to some local elections? The right to vote in elections to the European Parliament has more symbolic rather than practical value.

**Article 8c:** Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State.

If citizenship is a concept which is traditionally understood as being internal to a national polity, then Article 8c contributes to the detachment of citizenship from nationality. Article 8c is a complementary factor to the principle of equal treatment which lies at the basis of the European Community. The main problem, as with many other Community rights, is though, that the member states' nationals are not aware of the fact that they can seek assistance from any other EU member state if their own is not represented in the respective third country. Up to the introduction of this
clause, this mutual assistance guarantee was based on a bilateral basis between member states. But can a EU member state act unilaterally on behalf of another member state? In principle yes, since intergovernmental negotiations are allowed according to the TEU. The main problem is, however, whether third countries accept diplomatic protection by another state than the individual’s own.

**Article 8d:** Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the European Parliament in accordance with Article 138d. Every citizen of the Union may apply to the Ombudsman established in accordance with Article 138e.

Article 8d codifies, rather than introduces the right to petition. The right to petition exists since 1987 and has been institutionalised in the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament. It applies to all natural and legal persons resident in the Community and is therefore not a right exclusive to the holders of Union citizenship only. However, the right to petition only applies to all those individuals who are directly affected by the respective petition they specifically put forward. Furthermore, the right to petition is only limited to the Community’s field of activities rather than the Union’s.

Similar to the right to petition, the right to complain to an Ombudsman is also open to all. The Ombudsman is independent from any government, organisation or body. He attempts to "secure the position of the European citizen by promoting good administrative practices and enhancing relations between the Community institutions and citizens."³ Indeed, the major task of the Ombudsman is to solve problems related to Community institutions or bodies in order to eliminate instances of mal-administration. He vindicates the rights of Union citizens before judicial bodies and secures a degree of openness in administration.

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Article 8e is a monitoring clause which describes the way legislation should be implemented. Article 8e is not binding and should be in accordance with the constitutional requirements of each respective member state. Member states still have discretion over the implementation of Article 8e, since citizenship is such a sensitive topic which lies at the heart of each member state.

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