A DISCUSSION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF J.F. FRIES.

(Degree conferred, July 1921)
So far as the history of philosophy and the philosophical discussion of the past half century have taken any note of the school of thought founded by J.F. Fries, it has been much rather to use it as a kind of foil in order to bring out the merits of the contrasted transcendental school than to assign to it independent value; and it is a reasonable claim that has been made in recent years by the new Friesian school that, its so-called, "psychological" method should be impartially examined and judged on its intrinsic merits. It is the object of this Thesis to enquire into the importance of the philosophical method which was so elaborately expounded by Fries and to consider whether the very considerable revival of interest in his thought and writings possessed any real significance.

Jakob Friedrich Fries was born in the year 1773 at Barby on the Elbe, his father being a clergymen of the community of the Brethren. He studied first at Leipzig and then at Jena at the very period when Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were all connected with the latter university. In 1800 he acquired the right to lecture at Jena and in 1803 he published a polemical treatise against Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling, in which he opposed their method of developing Kant and the critical philosophy. In the years succeeding this his chief works were written: "Wissen, Glaube und Ahnung" in 1805, "Neue Kritik der Vernunft" in - the most complete statement of his system - in 1807. In 1805 he was called to a chair of philosophy at Heidelberg and in 1818 was transferred to Jena in the same capacity. His interest in the movements of patriotic thought, and feeling that were stirring Germany at that time...
led him to direct his energies also towards public life and several of the pamphlets which he then wrote are still read. An injudicious step which he took in 1817 in political affairs led to legal proceedings being taken against him and ultimately to his deposition from his chair. Later (in 1824) he was appointed to a professorship of Mathematics and Physics, but from this time on his activity and the extent of his influence became less. Books which he issued after this time such as "The handbook of Psychical Anthropology", "Handbook of Philosophy of Religion and of Aesthetic", are mainly restatements, enlarging particular points, of the system contained in the earlier works. Besides these he wrote a "History of Philosophy" and several less important works. He died on August 10th, 1843.

His opinions did not impress themselves on large numbers of his contemporaries nor did they have any prominent effect on the thought and writing of the subsequent generations. Yet it would not be true to say that they have been without their influence. Round Fries there did rally a school of like-minded men, who issued a series of philosophical writings under the title of "Proceedings of the Friesian School", and from several of the philosophical chairs in Germany these men continued to teach the Friesian system of philosophy. Such men were E.T. Apelt and J. Schmid, professors in Jena and in Heidelberg, books by both of whom, incorporating essentially Friesian thought, have been reissued within recent years. Apelt's "Metaphysics" is a reasoned statement of the Friesian doctrine for the use of students; and Schmid's "Lectures on Philosophy" is an admirable discussion of the meaning and value of the study of philosophy, written to serve as an introduction to philosophy from the Friesian standpoint. Panek, Jürgen Pona Meyer and Grap-
other engineers are three writers of some importance who were in practical agreement with Fries's method; and within the last generation Fries has had at least a negative value as a typical representative of a position which philosophers of the transcendental school have felt themselves called upon to oppose. Windelband, e.g., directed his criticism against Fries in his article on "Critical or Genetic Method" in his "Präludien," and a number of his pupils have followed out the same subject from a similar standpoint. It is only within very recent years that a real revival of Friesianism has taken place and Fries's own side of the question has again had justice done to it. Headed by Leonard Nelson—a lecturer in Göttingen—a regular Friesian school was again organised and several volumes of "Proceedings" were again issued. Although the number of its members had not become large, it was in the years immediately preceding the war, full of confidence in the cause which it represented and contained several names of influence and distinction. And outside of the school itself the appearance of such a work as Eisesenhans' "Kant and Fries" gave evidence of the wider stimulus to philosophical thought in Germany that had begun to flow from Fries.

In addition to this more purely philosophical stream of influence, there has come from Fries a not inconsiderable influence on theology and on the philosophy of religion. DeWette, who, equally with Schleiermacher, is entitled to be called one of the fathers of modern theology, confessedly derived his philosophical basis from Fries, and there were others such as Tholuck who found their inspiration at the same source. It is true that, except indirectly through the influence of these men, Friesianism does not seem to have played any conspicuous part in the theological life of the past half century, but in this direction also it would seem to have come to new life in
the last few years. Professor Rudolph Otto of Göttingen—one of the ablest of the younger theological thinkers in Germany—has issued a book on the "Kant-Friesian Philosophy of Religion" expressly as an introduction to the study of systematic theology. In it he has declared himself a convert to the system of Fries and, although he was until a few years ago a devoted student and disciple of Schleiermacher, he has renounced that allegiance and has declared his opinion that Fries deserves a higher place than Schleiermacher in the history of thought upon religion. In this view he was followed notably by Professor Bousser but also by a considerable number of men in the rank and file of the theologians of Germany.

Thus the question of Friesianism, whatever be the future before it, is a living question today and calls for consideration. The system is many-sided and is developed to a commendable state of completeness, but it is not necessary in order to form a judgment upon it to follow it into all its details, or to examine very closely the peculiar terms which it uses. It will be sufficient if we confine our attention to three main points, which are the distinguishing features of the system and the particulars in which Fries departs from his close general adherence to Kant. These three points will form the three divisions of this Thesis—(1) Fries's Method, (2) His doctrine of the Ideas of Pure Reason, (3) His doctrine of Premonition or Intuition of the Infinite.
1. **Fries's Method.**

It is round his method that the chief interest, in Fries has gathered and it was here that he himself claimed to have made an important advance on Kant. He disbelieved entirely in the value of the new Idealism of Fichte and Schelling which he held to be only a new kind of Dogmatism, attempting to deduce from an abstract and empty principle - the bare "Ego" - the concrete whole of reality. Along that line it seemed to him impossible for philosophy to advance except into a maze where each man could obscure from himself the light of reality by throwing round him a maze of ideas of his own construction. From mere thought can come only analytic judgments; and Fries maintained accordingly that these Absolute Idealists had really deserted the basis of the Critical Philosophy and gone off in a direction diametrically opposed to Kant's. To seek to construct the system of reality out of merely abstract principles was to fall back into essentially the same error as Kant, had condemned in Leibniz and Wolf. It is in this opposition to the Idealists that the followers of Fries, past and present, find reason for the insignificant part which the Friesian development of Kant has played in the history of the past century. The bolder and more romantic and larger lines of the great Idealist systems have captivated and held captive the imagination of several generations and thus have thrown into the shade the less ambitious programme of the Friesian school. Nevertheless Fries always cherished the expectation that in spite of the neglect which he experienced the time would come when the Hegelian infatuation would pass away and the value of the true critical school would be recognised. For many years there
was no ground for imagining that his faith might be justified. Hegelianism and its developments continued to predominate and, if not directly, then indirectly, to have an all-pervasive influence. This influence has, however, of late years somewhat decayed, and the followers of Fries think that the times are again ready to receive their gospel. Although Hegel has contributed much to philosophical development, and enriched largely the store of constructive ideas, the tendency seems of late to have away from Hegel back to Kant, as though Hegel had been leading up a blind alley. Kant is the common starting point of the Friesian and Hegelian schools and naturally a falling away in the authority of Hegelianism gives an impulse towards an examination of Friesianism. If the one line of development has failed may not the other succeed? It is at least worth considering whether the Friesian method of interpreting and developing Kant does not give more hope of permanent success than has been found to lie in the other.

In the Friesian system the question of philosophical method is central. It is recognised to be a first necessity of philosophical thought, that it should fix upon a valid method of procedure. Nelson and other modern Friesians contend, entirely in the spirit of their master, that philosophy never can reach any adequate results, until like the sciences, it has secured a more or less universal method, which later thought may modify and develop but, which will have a secure basis that will be common to all time. The differences between philosophers have been largely due, they maintain, to the fact that no such common method has been followed; each philosopher has simply constructed his own system out of his own ideas, arbitrarily ascribing reality to the creature of his own brain. The Friesians hold with Kant that, before any such creations can have value, the capacity and nature of
the Reason must be subjected to examination and its limits and possibilities recognised and fixed.

It is from Kant that Fries sets out here as throughout the system. Yet, though in agreement with the general conclusions of the critical method, he differs very considerably and shows considerable independence in restating the method itself in order to reach, as he believes he does, a truer and more adequate result with regard to the nature of the reality with which we come into contact. He criticises Kant for not having properly understood the relations of the different activities of Reason to one another and finds in this defect the source of many of what seem to him Kant's faults. Especially does this affect such questions as those of the existence of the thing-in-itself, of the limitation of knowledge to knowledge of the understanding and of the adoption of sensuous experience as the ultimate criterion of reality. Fries differs from Kant, on each of these questions; he extends the reach of knowledge, developing the thing-in-itself beyond Kant's conception of it, and he denies to sensuous experience any exclusively normative authority. All this he does on the basis that the true method to follow is that of self-examination, which is to be carried out so thoroughly as to be able to reach eventually a complete theory of Reason in which every part will have its place and the powers of the whole will likewise be determined. Kant's fault, he maintains, was that, although he set out with this object in view, he did not carry the examination far enough but abandoned it for a less general principle.

In a sense therefore the method of Fries is avowedly psychological and it is not surprising that the charge of seeking to establish a priori principles on empirical grounds has been brought against him. Of the possi-
ible interpretations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the almost universal opinion has agreed that the psychological is the most superficial and the least true. It has been generally maintained that to confuse Kant's transcendental method with psychology is to deprive the Critical Philosophy of its value. It is not only the actual but the necessary principle of knowledge which it seeks to reveal and establish, and a mere examination of the facts such as psychology undertakes cannot do more than reveal the results and methods of historical development. Psychology is an empirical science and to base our ultimate principles merely on it would be to assign to them no rational necessity.

But, the charge on this ground fails in reference to the Friesian method for the simple reason that Fries himself recognised the necessity of avoiding the charge and deliberately sought to do so. He was under no delusion as to the nature of his method. He was aware that from psychology as a theory of the development of consciousness rational principles cannot be deduced and he did not attempt, therefore, to substitute a merely psychological enquiry for a true deduction. He explicitly stated that his method had nothing to do with the history of Reason. "The necessary truths etc. are grounded in our reason quite independently of the sensuous stimulations and developments and are brought to our knowledge by consciousness in general, not as something now for the first time coming into our possession but simply as our original property". This point is emphasised by him again and again and it was exactly in order to avoid misunderstanding that he adopted the name "Anthropology" to describe his method rather than the name "Psychology", which he recognised to be the property of the one hand of the so-called
rational psychology and on the other of the purely empirical psychology, with neither of which did he wish to have much in common. Fries cannot be dismissed in a sentence simply as one of the misinterpreters of the critical method. Such a judgment can be based on nothing else than ignorance of the explanations which he himself gives. For Fries himself his method was confessedly psychological but only in the sense that it involved as one fundamental part of it an examination of knowledge from the inside.

And from this point of view it is true to say that every theory of knowledge must be psychological. L. Nelson puts this in other words when he paradoxically maintains that "Epistemology" is impossible, that any attempted theory of knowledge must inevitably include a circular argument. He argues rightly that it is of no use setting out to prove the validity of knowledge or to base its validity on something other than itself, since we are always at the end left with the necessity of assuming that the last act of knowledge is a valid one. Whatever method is attempted, whether that of seeking to find an intellectual proof of ultimate principles or that of reducing the necessity of knowledge to an ethical necessity, the attempt either ends in an infinite regress or rests on a circular argument. Every man, be he sceptic or not, is bound to, and actually does, assume even in his doubting that what he says is not merely a phantom of his own brain but something which is true independently of his private judgment and which properly is to be believed by every rational being. That is to say, it is assumed that ultimately it is of the nature of thought to reach reality. Apart from this assumption there would be no possibility of having any knowledge at all or at least the distinction between knowledge and imagination would cease to exist. The activity of knowing is an ultimate one behind which it is imposs-
ible to get to examine it. We can examine knowledge only by means of knowledge itself and however often we may repeat the analysis of the process, the trustworthiness of the faculty remains always an assumption. That what we know is true, is simply a fact without which all thinking would be an impossibility.

Therefore Fries is right in insisting that the true ideal of the critical method is an immanent Critique of Reason and that an independent criticism of the validity of the whole knowing faculty is not possible. A theory of knowledge can be nothing more than an examination of the different factors involved in it and the consideration of the claims of each to the authority which belongs to the whole. This is the true method and it is this which Fries attempted to follow and to which he applied the name "Anthropology". He sought not to justify the various principles of thought by basing their authority on anything outside of themselves, but simply to find for each its place in the whole of Reason in order that the part might share in the validity of the whole. It is true that Fries was not so deeply impressed with the great philosophic demand for unity as his contemporaries of the Idealist school but it is nevertheless equally true that the idea of system lies at the very centre of all his thought. The mere psychological fact of the existence of any particular principle or idea in the mind was not to be in any sense evidence of its validity. The discovery of the fact was only a means to an end and that end was a complete system of the activities and faculties of Reason, each placed in its relation to the whole. It was not a genetic or historical account of the mental processes that he had in view but a theory of the essential nature of the Reason that is at work in every man of every age at every stage of development.
To obtain that theory Fries found it necessary to discuss much that would today be classed along with empirical psychology and into that we need not follow him. His treatment of the truths of Pure Reason is fortunately not fundamentally involved in any particular psychological difficulty. Although it includes some purely empirical discussion, this does not vitiate the method. The empirical enquiry is only the first stage and does not profess to be the whole. It is simply a preliminary examination of the constituent factors actually employed in knowledge, undertaken with the intention of distinguishing those which are based on mere experience and derived from empirical sources from those which cannot be so derived. The latter as well as the former are actually to be found in our knowledge since they form the necessary basis of it all, and careful analysis will be able to distinguish the one class from the other and thus present the philosopher with the facts which he has to seek to co-ordinate and explain.

In Apelt and Schmid this question of fact practically becomes the whole question and obscures the other aspect almost altogether. The importance of a theory of Reason in order to justify and establish the facts is not so central in them as in Fries. Having found by analysis that we are in possession of certain principles which do not have their origin in the senses, they are content to conclude that these principles must be rational necessities without seeking for any further justification of them. Fries, on the other hand, refuses to proceed so easily to this conclusion. The factual enquiry is made by him as by the others, but when he has carried it through he has not finished. It is but a preliminary part of his scheme. Whether these non-sensuous principles revealed to be in our possession admit of proof and in what sense, is a question that is not prejudged by him. He
leaves the way quite open for the consideration of that point; at a later stage. It is only as a first step in his procedure that he takes up the question of fact and develops the method appropriate to its solution.

The actual existence of necessary and ultimate principles in experience is revealed for Fries, just as it was for Kant, in the existence of synthetic judgments a priori—i.e., judgments claiming universal validity which yet do not merely analyse a concept already known and justified. Without such judgments experience would fall to pieces. The whole fabric of it is built upon them and, since this is so, we have only to examine that fabric carefully to find out its basis. That is to say, that there are necessary principles involved in experience is an evident fact: what these principles are may be found by abstracting from all that is empirical in a judgment so that the purely rational element may stand revealed. The ultimate principles will be seen when all that is merely derivative has been stripped off. The method, therefore, which the philosophic enquirer has to follow is in the first instance that of analysis. He must study and distinguish the different factors which enter into the formation of judgments; he must recede from one principle to another until at last he reaches one which admits of no further division. When he has reached that, he will have attained to an ultimate principle of Reason; and by carrying out a complete analysis of all forms of thought, he can obtain a complete statement of all these ultimate principles.

The actual method of analysis which is followed is, however, somewhat disappointing after such promises. For the Friesians the analysis of experience resolves itself into an analysis of the forms of judgment. They follow here almost exactly the line followed by Kant in the Transcendental Logic.
With the judgment, as their clue they reach the same table of categories as Kant reached and state them in the same way, and yet they neglect almost entirely the much more valuable part of Kant's enquiry which is given in the Transcendental Deduction. They do this deliberately, but because of a misunderstanding of the significance of Kant's argument. In the following discussion it will become evident that the Transcendental Deduction is not in opposition to, but essentially complementary to, the Friesian Analysis. Indeed it is only a more adequate way of carrying out the same object.

Meanwhile let us follow the Friesian argument. Clearly, so far the whole result is at the most merely an answer to the question facti. Assuming that such an analysis can be effectively carried out, we can secure by it only a statement of what principles actually are involved in particular aspects of knowledge as we have it. The question juris, the question as to what validity belongs to them either absolutely or relatively, has not been touched. But Fries is under no delusion on this point. He recognises that the question juris is a further one and setting himself to answer it he finds an answer along at least two separate lines. The first answer is based on his theory of "Immediate Knowledge of Reason", which Nelson has enthusiastically declared to be the greatest philosophical discovery since Kant. According to it, Fries finds the authority of the categories not merely incapable of proof but not demanding it. Ultimate principles, he maintains, cannot be proved. Proof means simply that we refer one judgment to some judgment whose authority has a higher degree of validity than itself, but ultimately we are bound to arrive at a principle for whose validity we can find no higher guarantee. Similarly "demonstration" is inapplicable to philosophical principles since they cannot be represented in perceptible form. If there is
such a thing, therefore, as giving a reason for the validity of metaphysical principles it must be of a totally different kind from either proof or demonstration. Hence the distinction which is drawn between the "ground" and the "justification". To give the former for a metaphysical principle is impossible. It can apply only to truths of a secondary nature. But the latter is as necessary for metaphysical as for all knowledge, and it is to be found in this case not in any other truth but in the truth itself as it is known. In being known, it is known by a kind of immediate insight to be certain and universal. This clearly implies the existence of some other source of knowledge than the faculties of perception and reflection, from neither of which can we derive ultimate principles. Sensation gives us new truths but it never gives us anything more than particulars; as Hume proved, it can never rise to the universal or the necessary. Similarly, from reflection no universal truth can come for it merely repeats and reshapes the facts that have been obtained through the senses. Hence we are bound to assume the existence of another faculty whereby these universal truths can make their entry into consciousness. This faculty Fries does not seek to define further but names simply the Immediate Knowledge of Reason. Its only definition is from the result it achieves. It is not "intellectual perception" which by the very act of thinking reaches new truths but it is a kind of insight which recognises even unconsciously the unconditional validity of these fundamental principles of all thought. Its existence is a kind of hypothesis assumed because of the necessity of accounting for the presence of these particular conceptions in the whole of our experience. We can never in the nature of things examine the faculty itself in operation but although our knowledge of it is thus only mediately reached, it itself is as immediate
and as original an element of our rational nature as is the perception of the senses. It is the nature of philosophical truths to be hidden away beneath the more superficial parts of our experience so that most men are ignorant that they possess them. Nevertheless although thus obscured they are present in every rational judgment and may be brought to light in every man by the process of self-examination. Although reflection is not an organ by which new truths are introduced, it is an organ by which we can become conscious of truths of whose existence in the mind we were formerly ignorant. Thus every man possesses this Immediate Knowledge of Reason but not every man is conscious of his possession, since not everyone is sufficiently able or sufficiently well disciplined to be capable of reflecting upon himself with sufficient concentration to make a successful analysis of his own knowledge. The fact that most men are ignorant of the existence of this faculty is no real argument against its existence, since all actually live by the knowledge which it alone is capable of bringing to them.

Although Nelson has called the discovery of this faculty the most important philosophical discovery since Kant, it is difficult to admit that it has any value for a theory of knowledge. It stands alongside the immediate knowledge of perception and is assigned a measure of validity of the same degree of certainty as that. Here, clearly, the psychological bias has caused a real misinterpretation of the metaphysician's task. The immediate knowledge of perception is a psychological fact and in practical life immediate perception and truth are identified, but this identification is logically not more than an assumption which itself requires to be justified. Similarly, even granting that such a faculty as the Immediate Knowledge of
Reason existed, the immediate insight which it is supposed to have into the ultimate validity of the principles which it reaches would be nothing more than another psychological fact. In order to show that these principles spring from Pure Reason - which is doubtless the object of this part of Fries's theory - something quite different from such a hypothesis is required. Questions of the origin of principles have nothing to do with questions of validity.

The answer to this would doubtless be that while that is true in every other case it is not applicable to the case in question since here the psychological fact is of such a nature that it is its own justification. That is to say that in the knowledge of these principles their validity is already implied. That, however, will only drive us back to the recognition of the essentially circular nature of this argument, since at once the question arises as to how these particular principles are to be distinguished from others. They are distinguished ultimately only by the fact that they are purely rational. It is only for this reason that they are assumed to be the objects of the Immediate Knowledge of Pure Reason. And yet it is this very fact that their origin in that faculty seems to be assumed to establish. That is to say, we find certain principles which appear to transcend every empirical source of knowledge; on the assumption that they actually are not empirical but purely rational we postulate a source for these very principles in this Immediate Knowledge of Pure Reason; and then it is argued that this postulated faculty can be used to establish the validity of the principles whose validity is the presupposition of its own existence. Clearly the question as to the validity of the principles must be settled first and independently, before any such faculty can even be established as a fact, and
then it would rank only as one hypothesis among others constructed to show
the origin and growth of such conceptions in the mind.

Although this "Begründung" of the categories fails, the Friesian system
fortunately does not fall with it. There is a second method by which Fries
attempts to establish the validity of the categories. It is recognised that
some Deduction of the principles is necessary and this occupies a more
central position in the system than the Immediate Knowledge which we have
been discussing. It is through the Deduction that the quaestio juris is to
be finally answered, but it is important to distinguish the Friesian Deduction
from the Transcendental Deduction of Kant. The objects of both are the
same — to justify the a priori validity of the categories — but the methods
are different in principle. Fries directly criticises and rejects the method
which Kant deliberately follows. To base the authority of the categories on
the part they play in experience is, according to Fries, a circular argument,
since experience is simply what we make it ourselves and an analysis of it
can give us no more than a statement of what we have already assumed. Indeed,
he maintains, the so-called Transcendental Method is not different from the
Psychological method. From the analysis of experience we find out what are
the presuppositions of the actual experience which we have, but as to the
necessity of any one of these or of the whole of them we have proved noth-
ing. Experience is not an independent criterion of validity but only another
way of stating the factual existence of the categories. To prove that our
experience without the categories would be impossible is merely a method
of emphasising and confirming the conclusions of our original analysis and
further evidence that these principles do lie below all our thought.

To show their necessary validity Fries, carrying
To show their necessary validity Fries, carrying his psychological tendencies one step further, adopts another method of Deduction and aims at showing that from the nature of Reason all these principles must necessarily follow. The fundamental principle here is that of the unity of Reason. Unity Fries maintains to be the ultimate characteristic of everything that is rational. It is involved in the very conception of truth, and is evident in every relation established by mathematical or physical law. All knowledge is the attainment of unities between diverse things, and the complete knowledge will be the knowledge that is perfectly unified. To this sphere Fries transfers the two phrases "Transcendental Apperception" and "Formal Apperception", making a distinction between them. The former is the complete unity of the content of all possible knowledge: the latter is the unity of all the forms of Pure Reason. It is argued that unity in the content implies unity in the forms. "The Transcendental Apperception is itself possible only through such a general and original Formal Apperception which is the source of all unity in our Reason". If we show, then, how this original unity must work itself out in the forms of the categories we shall have given the sufficient justification of the rationality of these forms. And this is what Fries endeavours to do in the Deduction. He attempts to show that cause and effect and the other categories are all indispensable as forms of the necessary unity of phenomena, that in order to unite all the manifold of perception into a unity these are the forms which Reason must use.

This part of Fries's scheme does not seem to have received much consideration from Apelt who omits it altogether from his restatement of the Friesian philosophy. Nevertheless his most recent followers such as Nelson insist on the importance of this as the true safeguard against a
merely "psychological" Metaphysics. But it is notable that important as this is said to be little consideration is given to it. This cannot be because Fries's own account is adequate, for it is neither clear nor convincing. Rather is the reason to be found in the inherent impossibility of what it is proposed to attempt. It is possible to show that certain principles, once we have found them, are rational, i.e. that they help to unify and systematize, but it is not possible to proceed in the different way and show that from the nature of Reason just such principles must proceed. Reason cannot be known in the abstract since it can be known only through the mediation of its own activity. It is only as it actively manifests itself that we are able to say what it is and what its qualities are. And so we find that Fries's Deduction fails entirely of its object. No organic unity is shown to exist; scarcely any attempt is made to show the interrelations of the several forms of thought. Fries is content to show that in each there is an element of the unity which is the characteristic of Reason, but he takes no further steps to enquire into the exhaustiveness of his table of categories or into the question as to whether they are or are not mutually independent, or as to whether each is of a like degree of importance and validity. His procedure is indeed psychological in the same way as the search for the categories is psychological. He starts from the true fact that Reason is a unity and must unite the particulars of experience, perception but the individual principles are not deduced from the nature of this unity alone nor co-ordinated into a rational system. What is done seems to be nothing else than to repeat the previous examination of the facts from a slightly different point of view. Take e.g. space, which the preliminary analysis has revealed to be a form of perception: deduction of this principle consists in
showing that it is the unity in phenomena considered as objective facts; similarly, time is deduced by showing that it is the unity in the phenomena considered subjectively. And so through the whole series: each is "deduced" when it is shown to be a unifying factor in respect of some general aspect of experience. Yet it is clear that this does not really add anything to the ultimate justification of any single principle. It leaves matters practically as they were before. That there is an element of unity in each we know already, since each is a common element abstracted from many particulars: what we require further is to know that all together form a unity. But that is not shown, and consequently, if there was an empirical element in the principles derived from analysis, it still remains here. One can merely say that each of these principles is one actual way in which unity can be introduced into experience and therefore that each is so far rational. That the particular principle is purely rational and therefore necessary is no more proved by the mere fact of its reference to the Transcendental Unity than it was by the mere fact of its discovery by analysis.

Nevertheless, although Fries himself fails to make adequate use of it, the principle which lies at the root of his method is one of the very greatest philosophical importance. It carries us back to the declaration of the object of his enquiry with which he began — to obtain a theory of Reason in which all its manifested activities would find their fitting place; and we see in this "Deduction" an attempt — however unsuccessful — to construct such a theory. Again, in his conception of the Transcendental and Formal Apperceptions, it is the same thought which finds expression. The Transcendental Apperception is no longer, as in Kant, equivalent to the barren Ego — a merely abstract and formal unity — but it is conceived now as a concrete
whole, embracing in itself the manifold content of experience. That is to say, at these several points Fries consistently, even although it be unconsciously, bases his position on the principle that the test of truth is systematic unity. The justification of any particular principle involves the articulation of it along with other principles into a system or unity of the whole of knowledge. The construction of such a system would answer the quaestio juris and at the same time would show the relatively smaller importance of the enquiry concerning the facts. The latter would only be a preliminary analysis, giving material for the real metaphysical enquiry.

After the facts have been surveyed, must come the judging of the facts and the working of the facts into a theory of Reason. The success of the theory as a philosophical conclusion can be tested then by nothing save by its own completeness and its ability to show the fundamental unity of the whole.

Such a method would have a real claim to be considered superior to the methods followed by Kant and Hegel respectively because it would include what is valuable in both. On the one hand it makes clear the limits, of the Transcendental Deduction, which was the kernel of Kant's argument, and supplement this by pointing to the need for a systematic arrangement of the principles of thinking. Hegel really proves no more than is proved by the Friesian analysis of experience and it satisfies the ultimate philosophical demand no better. What it does succeed in showing is simply that certain principles actually are involved in the experience which we have, that e.g. our ordered world possesses order only in so far as such a conception as that of cause and effect is valid. There is nothing mysterious about it. It is only an enquiry into facts. It brings no new principle to bear but works out the implications of an original assumption. Here, therefore, Fries, so far from having misinterpreted Kant, reveals the true significance of Kant's thought and fills in sever-
al of the gaps left by Kant in the argument. He gives in the Self-Confidence of Reason the ground for that original assumption and thus justifies the results of the subsequent enquiry. Indeed it would have been on this ground quite possible for Fries openly to declare that no further justification or deduction of the principles was necessary than their discovery by analysis, for the Self-confidence of Reason implies that a sufficient justification of any principle is the fact that it forms an integral and inseparable part of our thought. That is a thing which careful enquiry can establish, enquiry which it is doubtless difficult to carry through but which is, nevertheless, akin to a scientific enquiry and may gradually approach a final and adequate result. A complete theory of Reason does not appear to be necessary even as a confirmation. The particular categories can be individually established according as one aspect of experience or another is examined. Both "Deduction" and "Immediate Knowledge of Reason" seem only to add needless complications to the procedure and not to give any additional authority to what is indeed already sufficiently certain.

Nevertheless Fries is right in insisting that this is not the satisfaction of the highest object of philosophy. So long as we look only to a particular case, abstracted from other particular cases, and assume that the analysis in this case has been thoroughly carried out, we might admit the validity of the principle thus shown to underlie this form of experience. But the attachment of these two conditions reveals the inadequacy of the method. Its fault does not lie in what it does but in what it may fail to do. A merely mathematical addition of one category to another might be the beginning of an endless process. Nor does it provide for the difficulty which always faces philosophers of the Intuitionist school and which seems
to face Fries no less - that different principles may seem to contradict one another and yet both appear to be ultimate. Both of these defects point to the necessity of a criticism of the categories after the first stage of the enquiry has been performed, in order that the relations of one to the others and, it may be, the limitation of one by the others may be made clear.

It is here that the method of Hegel's logic must be brought in to supplement Fries's first position. It is true that Fries was bitterly opposed to what he believed to be the Hegelian attitude. He held that mere thought was empty and could yield nothing more than abstractions; it could not evolve out of itself even the bare conceptions of the categories did it not find the material for forming these conceptions already given to it in experience; believing that Hegel tended to make men look upon the enquiry into philosophical principles as independent of experience and concerned with pure thought alone, he condemned his philosophy. This again is a valid position and so far as the criticism is applicable to Hegel it must be upheld. It is not possible for the human mind to construct the universe a priori; the universe is for us a fact which we have to accept and which we can only seek to interpret and understand by reflection upon it. This "Self-confidence" of Reason which is the fundamental principle explicitly adopted by Fries is the principle which all must accept as their starting-point, viz. that Reason is trustworthy, that whatever a rational man is compelled to think is true. It is this concrete content of the mind that is the philosopher's only datum. Therefore no adequate system or theory can be merely abstract but must deal with Reason in action; it cannot be separate from experience but is only the correlate in terms of pure thought of what is more concretely present in the facts of life. The first philosophical duty
is criticism and analysis: only after that is theorising justifiable. If Hegel had attempted the latter without the former his method would have been wrong. In so far as Fries makes clear what was undoubtedly left obscure in Hegel, his condemnation of Hegelianism is to be commended. Yet it is in Hegel's method that we see the fulfilment of what Fries seems to have had in view and a real attempt made to construct a system of the rational principles. Hegel follows the method which Fries ought consistently to have followed - that of working from the known facts upwards towards the unity which is to consist in the co-ordination of them all. This is the kind of unity which Fries set before himself at the outset of his discussion - a unity which is a system in which each category will be placed in its true relation to all the others. The credit of having seen its necessity must be ascribed to Fries and also that of having shown its place in the whole enquiry, but he himself did not give any real guidance as to how it was to be found. It must be admitted that he did not sufficiently realise the importance of this part of his own method. As an attempt to construct a system of Pure Reason out of the aspects of it which are learned from its exercise in experience, Hegel's thought represents an undoubted advance on that of Fries, for it is a real contribution towards the fulfilment of that demand which Fries only recognised to be fundamental.
2. The Doctrine of Ideas.

The second aspect of the Kantian philosophy to which Fries attached himself and to which he gave additional significance is the strain of Transcendental Idealism which exists in the Critique of Pure Reason. It may again be said that in laying too much stress on this, just as in giving the Critique a psychological interpretation, Fries was in reality causing Kant to be misunderstood, but here as there he did not merely claim the authority of Kant for his theory but also endeavoured to show that it was the reasonable outcome of the Critical Philosophy. In the Doctrine of Ideas he found a real and satisfying substitute for the larger speculations of other more ambitious systems. It enabled him to break through the limitations imposed on knowledge by sensuous experience and to come into real contact with infinities.

It may be recalled that in Kant's view these Ideas of Pure Reason—the Ideas of God, of Freedom and of the Soul—were from the speculative aspect purely theoretical and subjective constructions. He saw that they arose necessarily in every individual Reason, yet he represented them only as limiting conceptions which the mind could not but form but which had no claim to be regarded as realities. They stood for Kant on quite a different platform from the categories. The latter formed an essential part of actual experience and therefore were valid; but the Ideas by their very nature could never be found in any concrete experience and therefore could never be established on the basis of this—Kant's only criterion. It was only in the Critique of Practical Reason, as postulates of morality, that Kant was able to ascribe to them a certain degree of reality, but the value of this
conclusion greatly lessened by the failure of the Speculative Reason to give to it any firm support. It is this deficiency which Fries was able to do something to meet.

Fries defined an Idea as a presentation which cannot be described in definite statements, but although it was thus ex hypothesi excluded from ever appearing in experience (used in Kant’s sense of the word), yet Fries did not feel compelled to ascribe to it merely subjective importance. It was possible for him to do otherwise because he had abandoned the original criterion which Kant used and no longer accepted experience as an independent and exhaustive test of truth. As we have seen, experience was for him a test—whatever is essential to it is valid—but not the only test; truth may be a much larger thing than we can discover from sensuous experience alone and the Ideas may still represent realities even although they can never be presented in a definite experience. Here the value of the Friesian method and the limitation of the Kantian come out still more distinctly. Fries’s fundamental position enabled him to re-interpret the whole of Kant’s discussion of the Antinomies of Pure Reason and to develop the conclusions in a much more valuable direction.

In the verbal statement of the Antinomies Fries and his followers hold closely to Kant, working out Thesis and Antithesis in almost identical terms, but, as regards the meaning and significance attached to the words, they differ from him fundamentally. They recognise that Kant’s method of stating these antinomies is open to the objection of being little more than a tissae of logical fallacies and that the contradictions which he finds are not ultimately contradictions at all. They are only apparently such; in reality thesis and antithesis are dealing with different things —
the one with things-in-themselves, the other with phenomena—a distinction which has been tacitly introduced into the premises. It is only of things-in-themselves that it may be true to say that the sum-total of the conditions of any given "conditioned" must be complete. Of phenomena it cannot possibly be true, since the complete series of conditions can never be given either in time or in space. There is, therefore, no real problem in the matter of the Antinomies. The whole difficulty seems to vanish in the assumption of the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves.

But the difficulty appears again as soon as we enquire into the authority which Kant had for assuming this distinction. The Friesians maintain with justice that this authority is wholly inadequate. On the one hand it rests on the unjustifiable conclusion from the priority of space and time to the subjectivity of everything that falls under these forms; and on the other hand on the underlying assumption of a causal relation between the object of knowledge and the subjective apprehension of it. The former position is obviously invalid and the Friesians argue that the latter is not less so. Examination of the nature of knowledge will show the impossibility of any causal relation to anything outside of itself, for even if such a relation did exist it could not be known. There is nothing in sensuous experience, considered as such, which gives us any right to say that the objects which we see are not the ultimate realities. They are a necessity of thought and therefore, in so far as they are consistent with one another, their truth is established. Kant has not shown any good reason for affirming that the world of phenomena is different from and subordinate to the world of things-in-themselves, and there seems to remain for him no ground for the introduction of Transcendental Idealism.
As criticism of Kant these considerations are not without their value but their chief importance here is that they define for us the point of view from which Fries takes up the consideration of the antinomies. Before this point in his system there has been nothing to make us think that we have not been dealing all the time with ultimate realities. We have rested on the innate certainty of Reason that it can reach truth and have therefore accepted as true whatever careful enquiry showed to be bound up with the exercise of Reason. And on this ground we have been led to recognise the reality of the forms of sense and of the categories, as well as of the particular facts. At this stage such a theory seems quite adequate and no evidence has been afforded which would lead to a distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves.

The necessity for the distinction arises because Reason cannot rest at this stage but must press on towards the complete unity of knowledge. It is when the attempt is made to reach this that the antinomies appear and they are not now fallacious conclusions of the Reason exercising itself in regions where it has no jurisdiction but represent real contradictions which arise within sensuous experience if it be considered as the highest knowledge that human reason can reach. Reason demands that the ultimate reality, the complete whole of knowledge, should be perfect and self-contained, not dependent on anything outside of itself but entirely self-explanatory and free from conditions. On examination, however, it finds that sensuous experience does not at all correspond with this ideal, that it is impossible to find within it any complete whole whatever but always only a regression from one conditioned being to another. It never is possible to reach either a first cause or the conception of the totality of things.
There is here a contradiction which is real and not illusory between the schematised categories and the principle of "Completeness"; and this is surmountable only if we conclude that in the knowledge which we reach under the forms of space and time we do not obtain the ultimate reality but only an incomplete appearance of it.

This section of the Friesian philosophy is based, therefore, on this "Principle of Completeness", which is brought forward as the highest and most authoritative concept in the whole system. We must, therefore, seek to examine its meaning and the source of this authority which it claims. The ground on which it rests is well stated by Apelt in the following passage. "The Idea of the Absolute is the most fundamental idea in Reason, the highest link in the whole chain of our knowledge. Although in the world of sense no object corresponding to it ever can be given, yet some reality, even if it be still incomprehensible for us, must belong to it. For the proposition that every "conditioned" can have its ultimate ground only in the "unconditioned" is as immediately certain as the one that each "conditioned" must be based on a particular ground. From that, however, it follows that if anything whatever exists as conditioned, the unconditioned must likewise exist. The conviction of the truth and objective validity of this idea is therefore most closely bound up with the faith in the truthfulness of our reason. We must declare our own Reason to be a liar if the Idea of the Absolute is to be nothing else than a phantom. As certainly as we believe in the truth of our perceptions, as certainly as we are convinced of the reality of the things, so certainly must there belong to the Idea of the Absolute a reality, even if it be a supersensual one." The principle of Completeness is ultimately nothing else than the original conception of the Pure Reason applied to the con-
tent of our knowledge". (Apelt - Metaphysik pp. 301-2).

These passages take us back again to the general method which Fries adopted and here, as there, there are two lines along which he may be interpreted. It may be said, on the one hand, that this is a merely psychological consideration which he adduces, or that it is not at all different from the subjective necessity which Kant admitted to exist of seeking for a totality of particular conditions. As such, and as a statement of a merely subjective fact, it would obviously not prove anything as to the validity or authority of the conception. Nor does the statement that the reality of the unconditioned is immediately certain carry weight. The self-confidence of Reason which alone certifies that there is such a thing as certainty is a confidence not in any detached part of its activity but in itself as a whole. Immediate knowledge has been seen already to be a mere hypothesis as applied to particular principles; the only knowledge that is immediately and ultimately certain, that cannot in any way be proved but must be left to the individual conviction of every man, is that he is capable by the exercise of thought of reaching a system of truth.

Put, on the other hand, the argument represented by the above quotation may be interpreted as an attempt to establish an essential connection between the Principle of Completeness and that of the Self-confidence of Reason and it is along this line that its true significance will be found to lie. The fact that the unconditioned must exist if the conditioned exists is not an immediate intuition nor an individual belief, but is "bound up with the faith in our own Reason". Truth must be a necessary unity and the very faith in the existence of truth implies a similar faith in the existence of a complete unity which is the object of true knowledge. If we do not find
this presented to us in experience that does not detract from the reality of the idea, for experience is not an independent and absolute criterion. We may learn from its deficiencies as well as from its positive content. Its philosophical value is simply that it reveals to us the nature of certain necessary concepts of Reason. It does not give to them their necessity but simply reveals them to us as necessary. There may quite well be other means beyond the facts which experience supplies us with, whereby an equally rational necessity may be shown to belong the conceptions which we form of the Ideas or of the Absolute. The unities of Transcendental and Formal Apperception have already brought to view the position which Schmid expressly states and which is a true position, that "unity is the highest law of truth". In accordance with this it is a valid conclusion which is come to that whatever conception is necessary in order to state the unity which is the ultimate object of knowledge must be valid as a statement referring to reality.

The conceptions which Fries finds thus justified are the Ideas of God, of Freedom and of the Soul, but in spite of the objective validity which they are assigned they do not become possessed of any very concrete reality. They are limiting conceptions and can only be stated negatively in terms of finite things; we are able to state that they are but not what they are; we have no positive knowledge of their content but only of what they are not, because all positive statements are confined within the limits of the forms of space and time and it is beyond these that the content of the Ideas lies. The Idea of Freedom e.g. represents the totality of the regression in the causal series which complete truth demands. Somewhere the causal series must end in a cause which is not at the same time an effect; that is
to say, there must exist somehow as the origin of all things a free cause not
determined nor defined by the laws of mechanical causation. As to the nature
of such a free cause we can, however, say nothing. The forms of the judgment
are limited and applicable only to the objects of sensuous experience and
reflection upon them, whereas a free cause is incapable by its very defini-
tion of being presented in experience. It is at variance essentially with the
conceptions both of space and of time; and contradicts the nature of both.
Anything which has temporal limits - a beginning or an end - must be causally
related to its temporal antecedents and consequents. But a free cause has no
causal relation to any antecedent events or states, but is itself an original
beginning; and therefore a free cause is incapable of becoming an object of
sensuous experience which is always at least temporally, if not also spatially,
conditioned. Still less can the Idea of God receive any positive content. It
is indeed nothing else than the abstract, though necessary, conception of a
necessary Being which is the ground and cause of the unity of the world.
Everything that is presented in our experience contains an element of con-
tingency in it that is simply given. The laws of the objective world them-
selves are only abstractions except as they are based in some necessary
Being which is above them and which is their source. It is impossible, there-
fore, that such a Being should be capable of being presented to the mind in a
positive way through these laws or through the sensuous experience. The only
method that we can follow in saying anything about it, is that we should
negate all possible limitations. So also with the third Idea, that of the Soul
as the unity of that is not further divisible. This Fries holds to be necessary
as the totality in the procedure of analysis. The idea of an ultimate
division is a necessary one but is unrealisable in space. Nevertheless there
is a difference between this Idea and the others, in which we can see a suggestion of a further development of the theory. Abstractly the Idea of the soul is only a limiting conception and cannot fall under any of the positive concepts formed by the understanding, but in our own self-consciousness we are said to have actual experience of it as an ultimate unity, individual and self-dependent. It is true that this experience is not real knowledge which we can state in words. Yet, if not knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word, it is clear that it is a certain faculty by which we can reach truth since otherwise we should have no ground for making the identification between the Idea and the simple substance. We shall find that this other faculty of Reason has an important function to fulfil in the development of the system.

In the meantime, however, we have to admit the truth of Fries's position with regard to the general statement that these absolute Ideas cannot be found either in, or in terms of, the world of nature or of the senses. The causal nexus is only a series of relations of particulars to each other and cannot be thought without limitation. Into such a series the absolute or infinite cannot enter. They are in inevitable contradiction the one with the other. And it is true also that this is a sufficient proof, if any were needed, that the world of the senses is not absolutely real, that to space and time and all that is known under these forms only a subordinate degree of reality belongs at the most. Truth must be a unity and anything that is essentially at variance with the idea of unity cannot be the ultimate truth.

It is not unnatural, however, that this conclusion should have given rise to several questions with reference to the legitimacy of ascribing only a subordinate value to sensuous experience. The first is one which
has been raised by Professor Cassirir who argues that by this procedure the fundamental position from which the system set out has been abandoned. It seems that we are no longer able to place confidence in our own Reason. At the outset it was maintained that the intuition of the senses was an immediate source of knowledge, immediately certain because of Reason's confidence in its own powers, whereas now it is maintained that by means of this no knowledge of ultimate reality can be obtained at all. The Self-confidence of Reason seems to have been entirely illusory. The criticism here made is entirely valid if we confine ourselves to the form of Fries's argument. It is undoubtedly the case that he (along with Apelt and Nelson) does maintain that the certainty of the sensuous perception is as great as, though of a different kind from, the immediate knowledge of Reason which gives us the categories and ultimately the Ideas of Pure Reason. The two are species of the one characteristic of Reason, that of being able immediately to reach truth or reality. Hence it is an inconsistency that later these two equally authoritative sources of truth should come into conflict. Nevertheless it does not seem to be a fatal inconsistency since the original belief that the self-confidence of Reason implied the immediate certainty of every sensation was certainly not justifiable on Fries's own principles. In any case it could only be true of the man whose faculties were normal that his sensations were entirely trustworthy. For a colour-blind man, for example, the immediate knowledge of red or of green would not be a truth, i.e. it would not be universally valid. It is true that Fries holds that it is only within the results of reflection that error may appear, that the sensation which is reflected upon is always immediately certain and incapable of error; and so far as this is merely a statement that in all perception some truth or
other is the object of it, it is of course valid; but in any further sense the facts make it plain that there is no such infallible faculty in the human mind. Psychologically it is not, possible except by an arbitrary abstraction to separate sensation and reflection. In all sensation which conveys any meaning to the mind the understanding or reflective faculty has been at work. A pure sensation is a myth and Fries's infallible faculty of knowledge is closely akin to this myth. Nothing that comes to our knowledge has not been shaped and transformed by the activities of the understanding. Although for the content of what we know we are dependent on what comes to us from another source than our own spontaneity, yet the form so interpenetrates the matter that what we perceive is even at the first our own construction. If truth were to be measured merely negatively by the absence of error, there would be some justification for Fries's view but then the greatest abstraction would be as true as the fullest conception of reality. Hence if we have been right in interpreting Fries's own conception of truth as the complete system or unity of things, this criterion of "immediate certainty" is in reality out of place. Truth will lie, in accordance with the truer interpretation, not at the beginning but at the end of our search. That our perceptual knowledge gets somehow into contact with reality we have to assume simply because it is knowledge, but it lies with reflection to reveal to us the degree and the nature of the relation which the particulars bear to the whole.

A similar and parallel misconception is found in the distinction by the Friesians which is drawn between a proposition and its content - a distinction which again is possible only if one is dealing with abstractions. Abstractly it may be possible to say that the proposition "Socrates is a man" is only the
arbitrary union of two concepts and different from "The proposition that Socrates is a man is true", but as a matter of concrete fact an affirmation of reality is an inseparable aspect of every judgment. The origin of both misconceptions is doubtless psychological and serves again to illustrate the fact that in spite of precautions Fries was not able to prevent his psychological method from injuring the purity of his philosophy. There is a possibility of regarding either judgment or perception simply as a fact in the stream of consciousness and of distinguishing from this the importance of the fact as a vehicle of knowledge. But the two are not distinct and separable things which can be set side by side and compared, but are simply the same thing looked at from different points of view; and for the purposes of the second attitude the first is of little value. States of consciousness as such have almost as little to do with metaphysics as has the mechanism of a watch with the significance of the hours. The one point of importance in them is their ability to convey knowledge of the truth and there is no generic distinction between different kinds of knowledge in this respect. As regards the method by which knowledge is obtained large differences are possible — it may come through sensation or through reflection upon sensation — and as regards the form in which knowledge is stated similar differences are possible, but the content is always clearly separable from these psychological accidents and it is always a direct affirmation of reality, comparable only with itself. Immediate knowledge is not an entity but is an attempt to state a logical parallel to the psychological abstraction of sensation. So far from immediate knowledge being the only certain source of truth, it is itself a sheer abstraction; between sensation and reflection the distinction is not of kind but only of degree. Sensation can give nothing to
consciousness except as in it is exercised the same conscious activity as is exercised in reflection - the activity of the understanding or of thought - and therefore the criterion of validity is one and one only, the unity of sensation, reflection and Ideas in one system of the whole of truth. This alone is essential to the method which we have found to be that of Fries.

If we thus restore consistency to Fries's argument and seek to justify his philosophical method, we must face another and larger problem - whether instead of having reached in his Ideas the unity which was sought for we have not rather introduced into knowledge a cleft of such a nature as to produce an absolute dualism. The world of Understanding seems in irreconcilable contradiction with that of the Ideas and the two worlds stand apart, apparently united by nothing that is common to both. The world of Ideas cannot be characterised by anything taken from the finite world nor can any relation of the finite world to that of the complete reality be known. Can both of them belong to the same whole of truth? Between the absolute and the finite there is a gap that we are quite unable to cross by any amount of thought. Instead of reaching a unity we seem rather to have shown that such a unity is impossible of attainment. It is a mere abstract ideal that we have obtained. We can objectify the bare conviction that truth exists, but of the positive content of this object we remain absolutely ignorant with the exception that we can know that no limited conception can be applied to reality. Is not this result the direct opposite of what was aimed at? Instead of finding the unity that will co-ordinate all our knowledge we have learned that there is no unity in the knowledge that we have and that none can be discovered.

It is as the solution of this difficulty that Transcendental Ideal-
ism is introduced and the world of appearance distinguished from the real world. The finite things of which we have knowledge are not ultimate realities. Each of them can be known only as existing both in space and time and each partakes therefore of the "unreality" of these forms. Not because they are a priori forms, but because they involve an essential contradiction, we are bound to deny to space and time and all that is known under them the claim to be things-in-themselves. Yet it is not necessary to say that this knowledge is therefore valueless. It is not wholly illusion but has a certain relation to the "eternal" world. The things that we see and hear are the appearances of the things-in-themselves as they manifest themselves through the veil of space and time. We see only "through a glass darkly", but the glass allows something of the reality to come through.

That this must in some sense be true is clear, for we cannot get away from the original position that we have simply to accept the fact that knowledge is reality. We have seen that this does not imply an assumption that the knowledge of the particular facts is ultimate. It leaves us with perfect liberty to criticise it and point out its limitations, if such exist, but it does imply that no real experience can be wholly untrue. The same Reason which is the source of the Ideas and which demands the existence of an intelligible world is active in every experience that we have. Sensuous knowledge may be very partial and imperfect knowledge; it may be possible to transcend it and reach something more adequate; but just because it is a necessary product of Reason it must in some degree be true. To deny this would be to proclaim Reason itself to be untrustworthy and to fall into the fundamental contradiction which makes not only all philosophy but even scepticism itself impossible.
The language in which Fries describes the significance of this knowledge does little, however, to show its real meaning. It is clearly only the language of metaphor and does no more than say that some relation or other exists between the knowledge of the understanding and the objects in the sphere of the eternal realities. But we cannot rest content with this. The task of philosophy has not been properly attempted unless a serious effort has been made to show the positive relation which must exist between the two spheres. Between the reality of the two there can be no ultimate distinction. In terms of the understanding it is impossible to describe positively the nature of the highest unities of thought but these terms give to us one aspect—even although it may be a subordinate one—of the same reality. Their inadequacy does not exclude the possibility that there may be higher aspects in the world of experience than the spatial or temporal and that these may give the basis for a unity which is still a unity of the positive facts which the senses bring to us and not merely a unity abstracted from them.

Suggestions towards such a solution are given by Fries in the third part of his system which we shall discuss—the doctrine of Annahung and its significance for the philosophy of religion, but before proceeding to the discussion of this we must complete the account of the Ideas by referring to the definitions which they receive from ethical considerations. In the Critique of Practical Reason Fries follows Kant again in the main principles but modifies and develops the scope of their reference. He finds that the supreme ethical law is that of "End" but instead of leaving this a purely negative and abstract conception, he attempts to give it a positive content by identifying the nature of the
content by identifying the nature of that which is an end-in-itself with "personal worth". Again, however, these conceptions cannot, he says, be realised in the finite world; personal value cannot be defined without being adulterated with conceptions that are of purely empirical origin; and the end-in-itself is never actually known in experience except in the abstract way of being recognised as the supreme law of the practical reason and source of the categorical imperative. Both conceptions belong strictly to the world of absolute reality and yet are more than merely negative in their significance for the interpretation of experience. We get through them a positive characteristic of the things-in-themselves which we could not get on theoretical grounds alone. The absolute Idea of God as the unity and source of all things must itself be defined by this law of personal value whose validity is for Reason absolute, and thus the Idea becomes known to us as the highest possible realisation of personal worth, as the Being who is infinitely and eternally good; the Ideas of the soul and of freedom are likewise given a new meaning when they are shown to be positively assumed in the ethical life instead of being, as in the theoretical consideration, only last conclusions.

Without entering into a discussion of the intrinsic value of the ethic of Fries, it may be pointed out that the line of thought which he follows here is at once consistent and justifiable. It avoids, to some extent at least, the cleavage which was made by Kant between the speculative and the practical spheres. The argument that ultimately the practical postulates are identical with the Ideas is calculated to show that one unity runs through all and to prepare the way for a solution of the apparent difficulty of allowing moral acts to find a place in a world that is under the
law of causation. Not that this difficulty is entirely solved, for Fries like Kant tended to believe that the world of moral action was different from the world of cause and effect, but, nevertheless, the justification of the ethical postulates as the law of all being is a large step in this direction. And Fries's justification seems to be a valid one. It is not merely a case of identifying two results drawn from different quarters and possessing a certain similarity, nor is it a case of unduly exalting the authority of the ethical. The ground for the conclusion that the Ethical Idea is the supreme law of reality—practical and speculative—is simply the fundamental principle on which our whole theory of truth is based. The law of "Completeness", of unity or system, must in every aspect of truth be satisfied and as there can be but one rational unity everything absolute must in the end be one. The Ideas of Pure Reason are positive entities which exist as the unity of all that is thought in a speculative or scientific respect and the Ideas of the Practical Reason are the unifying and rationalising factor in the practical experience. The two classes of Ideas demand that certain characteristics should belong to the absolute reality and since it is the one Reason that is at work in both, demands must be valid since truth is nothing more than the unity of all rational thought.

The philosophical problem has now modified itself as a result of these conclusions to something like this form—how this unity is to be shown actually to exist in the experience which we possess. The Absolute Idea is so far largely a negation—it is the unknown and unknowable source and cause of all things which is at the same time the absolute end-in-itself and therefore that which is supremely good. But the relation of
this to the world has been shown to be a problem which cannot remain unsolved without a large gap being left in the philosophical system. What the world of sense is and what is its positive significance is perhaps the question of most practical and also most speculative importance, and this has not been neglected by Fries. He is not content, as we have seen, to leave the matter in the purely negative condition in which it was left by Kant, nor does he leave it in the negative condition of the first section of his own theory. His doctrine of Ahndung (premonition or intuition) gives his account of the relation which exists between the two realms of thought and gives, as seems to us, lines for a satisfactory conclusion.
8. Doctrine of Ahndung.

In this section of his writings Fries again follows Kant in the central principles, while at the same time he attempts to put a wider meaning into them. It is to the Critique of Judgment that he attaches himself here, accepting Kant's analysis of the facts but holding that this gives a basis for large metaphysical conclusions such as Kant did not feel himself entitled to draw. The aesthetic judgment is held by Fries to be the means by which we become conscious of the eternal world behind the world of the senses and ultimately is regarded as a principle of knowledge no less valid than the ordinary judgments of the understanding. This position is, moreover, not merely a theory adopted in order that escape may be found from the limitations of the understanding, but it is, like all his other positions, forced upon Fries by his reading of the facts. The aesthetic judgment - our experience of the beautiful and the sublime - is not merely a subjective feeling: to regard it as such is a purely arbitrary proceeding. In reality, as Fries recognises, it claims objective validity just as the judgments of science do and with just as great a degree of apparent authority. What may be called synthetic judgments a priori exist in this sphere also; canons of taste are formed to which it is agreed that everyone ought to submit their personal judgments; and it is held possible to educate the taste of others - to teach them what actually ought to be approved. Kant refused to ascribe this objective validity to the aesthetic judgment for the same reason as led him to regard the Ideas as merely regulative principles - because they could not be presented as part of a concrete experience - but we have already seen that this reason is insufficient. We cannot lay arbit-
rary bounds to the extent of experience; sensuous experience does not exhaust reality and there may, therefore, be other ways of coming into contact with it. In accordance with Fries's fundamental position that the only critique of reason possible is an immanent one, the actual existence of the aesthetic judgment, as a distinct function of Reason establishes its validity provided that the principles on which a careful analysis finds it to be based are not inconsistent with the other rational principles.

This analysis brings Fries to the conclusion that what is always implied in the aesthetic judgment is the discovery of a peculiar kind of unity existing in different particulars, and this leads to a more far-reaching conclusion. Unities of this kind are unknown in the world of space and time; the very nature of these forms excludes them; and therefore the truths which the aesthetic judgment brings to light cannot be truths about this realm of things. On the other hand, it is the very characteristic which we found to belong to the things-in-themselves which is peculiar to the aesthetic judgment. The conception of end is valid of the ultimate realities and the conception of end includes the conception of unity in difference. Here then is a point in our experience at which the nature of the eternal world touches us. The relation between appearance and things-in-themselves which was formerly but a doubtful and almost unmeaning statement becomes now filled with meaning. It is no longer a mere statement that the two spheres are essentially one but their unity is now realised. In this particular form of consciousness we have a "feeling" or an "intuition" or a "premonition" of the presence of an element of the eternal in the finite, and it becomes clear that so far from the two spheres being in contradiction with each other, they are linked together in an indivisible harmony.
Fries uses the word "feeling" very commonly to describe the experience of the aesthetic judgment and, with his usual psychological bias, he is inclined to look for the explanation of the existence of this faculty in the psychological analysis of the human mind into the three elements of cognition, volition and feeling—two being represented in the speculative and practical activity, the third being the mental element active here. But he finds it necessary in so doing to re-define what he intends to convey by the word "feeling" and consciously differentiates its meaning in the present usage from the significance which is usually attached to it. Thus it comes to lose much of the point of its association with the psychological division of mental activity. Feeling, properly speaking, is either pleasure or pain but Fries explains that it is not, the mere feeling-tone of the conscious state of which he is speaking here. He intends to use "feeling" in a sense to which, as he thinks, the name is more appropriate, and it becomes practically equivalent to a third kind of knowledge.

It is, however, necessary to understand that between this and the other kinds of knowledge there is a fundamental difference. Although, it will be remembered, immediate knowledge was not supposed to come at first into consciousness in the form of definite propositions, it could nevertheless always be put into such forms, and all the knowledge of reflection could similarly be put into adequate statements. But this feeling or intuition cannot be expressed in words. The categories of the understanding are not adequate to contain this experience for they cannot rise above what is limited and particular. Hence, properly speaking, it is not possible to communicate these intuitions from one individual to another. They may to some extent be described by analogies taken from experiences of the finite, but these cannot
convey the true nature of experience. Nothing that can be given external or material shape in the form of words or pictures or in any other way can convey the nature of that which is essentially other than matter. An intuition must itself be experienced to be known. All that words can hope to do is to guide another to look in the proper direction for the experience and to some extent to open his eyes to the existence of the infinite, but until his eyes are opened the words themselves cannot present a reality to him. The reality transcends the words and is in its very nature inexpressible.

Again there seems to be truth in this but it seems also true that in following out this argument Fries has, for the time at least, practically given up his own method of scientific analysis and enquiry and has attacked the subject from the a priori point of view. It is really an unwarranted assumption on his part that gives rise to this doctrine of the inexpressibility of aesthetic judgments or of any judgments other than those about sensible things. The question as to whether such judgments are or are not capable of being expressed does not seem to have been considered. It seems much rather to be the case that the question as to the capacity of human thought, and language as its expression, has been prejudged and that upon an inadequate ground.

The ground upon which the view rests is the conviction that in the logical forms of the judgment exhaust the universal principles which are capable of being formulated. Fries, like Kant, tacitly assumes this. The valid categories are for him simply the forms of judgment. But this assumption is manifestly unjustifiable. It is impossible to conclude from the purely formal analysis of the judgment that the whole of the rational and
universal principles have been discovered through that analysis alone. As we have seen, the test for the validity of any category is in the first instance its actuality, and therefore unless the formal analysis agrees with an analysis of concrete experience its authority is void. The judgment is only an abstraction from the concrete thought and the categories are not primarily its forms but are the various conceptions which the Reason uses in thinking the experience which it has. Hence in itself the logical form has no authority: what gives it authority is the fact that it is fundamentally involved in the experience which we possess so that without it experience in some aspect of it would be self-contradictory or impossible.

From this point of view, therefore, it becomes clear that justice has scarcely been done to the significance of the aesthetic judgment and the intuition of ultimate reality which it conveys. Fries ought to have taken this simply as one aspect of the whole of rational experience which he was engaged in theorising, and ought to have considered it exactly as the other aspects. Had he followed this method he would have been bound to conclude that the categories which he had obtained so far were not adequate to the reality which actually enters within the sphere of rational thought but that there must be some higher category by means of which could be expressed the higher truths. Between the category of end and those of cause, substance etc. there is no difference as regards the degree of objectivity to be ascribed to them, provided that all are alike necessary in order to give full expression to the experience which we have; and it would seem again to have been a psychological preconception that caused Fries to make the distinctions between them. The question for the critical examination of knowledge is whether the categories of cause and of reciprocity are adequate
to describe all that we are compelled to think or whether they fall short and leave something unaccounted for.

The discussion of the antinomies of Pure Reason has shown us that these categories cannot exhaust the content of any particular experience. The contradictions which they reveal to be implied in the attempt to think the world in space and time as an absolute unity prove not only that that world as a whole is not the complete and ultimate reality, but also that no particular thing can at this stage be adequately known, since its place in that ultimate reality remains obscure. After everything has been said about these categories of the understanding can say, there remains something more to be learned, some higher aspect more adequately descriptive of its nature as part of a whole.

In the ethical life we have one illustration or proof of the existence of such higher aspects of reality. Mechanism, properly speaking, is never the nature of mental process but it is easier to see this in the case of the moral even than in that of the intellectual life. The distinction of good and bad, apart from the reality of which our whole experience would be utterly irrational, is impossible unless there be more in self-conscious life than the mechanical interaction of causes and effects. This, however, applies only to persons and, although it prepares the way for the discovery of other methods by which the merely mechanical is transcended, it does not itself provide them. But the aesthetic judgment possesses an authority of the same degree as the moral and scientific judgments - it is a necessity of our experience - and yet it directs itself towards the particular objects of the material world. The higher aspects of their nature which it reaches have exactly the same claim to be considered real as the more purely
sensible aspects. It is impossible therefore to draw a line between the two spheres of reality. If the object of the aesthetic judgment is to be identified with the nature of the eternal realities, it must be identified no less with the nature of particular facts. The same unity is present in both and it is unity which on the analogy of other experience we should expect to be able to state.

Pries, however, holds firmly to its inexpressibility and this indeed is the point most insisted on in his whole account of religion, which finds its place in the system here. The religious experience is the most important and probably the most common case of the aesthetic judgment. It is essentially an intuition of the eternal in and through the finite. The eternal objects to which it looks are realities, as has been established in the Doctrine of Ideas, yet the intuition does not bring any real knowledge of these realities. It is far more nearly akin to feeling than to knowledge. To be known it must be experienced. Beyond the abstract and barren theory of the Ideas there is no part of the religious experience that can become common property. It is always contained in individual feelings which baffle description.

These views may be criticised along two lines. In the first place it may be argued that Pries himself does not consistently hold to his position that the feelings and the objects of them are indescribable and secondly it must be maintained that the conception of religion with which Pries works is not the highest conception. These considerations will lead us to a restatement of the relation of religion to the philosophical position which we have been developing.

The former criticism is justified by the way in which Pries
develops his account of religion. He is not content to leave it merely as something individual and unique but it is the boast of Schmid, for example, that it is possible for Fries to give a much more complete account of religion than Schleiermacher had given. Schleiermacher had reduced all to one unique experience - the feeling of absolute dependence - but Fries, while recognizing the truth of this as one element, had not only denied its adequacy as a complete account of religion but had distinguished other aspects. In particular he found that the religious feelings are three in number, centring not only in dependence on the Infinite but also in the assertion of the independence of the human individual. The individual is not merely passive but also active in religion and this twofold attitude is revealed in the existence of the distinct religious feelings of "devotion", "resignation" or "submission", and "inspiration", where the two factors, the finite and the infinite, are differently related to each other. But in thus admitting that distinctions are possible in such a realm, has the step not been taken which must bring the object of religion within the reach of description and analysis? A difference in the religious feeling implies that a different aspect of the ultimate reality has come into contact with the individual mind, and in the mere statement of the difference some reference to the cause of it is inevitably implied. Where distinction is possible some degree of definition must be possible too. Granting, as Fries does grant, that these types of religious feeling are not due to individual variations in persons but that they are common to every normal rational being, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that at least three characteristics of the Divine are knowable - the facts of His government of the world, of His control of human life and destiny and of His moral supremacy as the ethical ideal over
all that is opposed.

That does not amount to very much but it shows that it is necessary in some way to transform the conception which Fries has formed of religion. The religious feeling is not a blind passivity which merely suffers itself to be aroused irrespective of the nature of that which arouses it, but it is an active state of the mind which lays hold of the object and fashions itself according to that which it finds. This analysis, if it be true, would seem to imply that the religious experience always includes a claim to possess an element of knowledge to which it is in its complete form a personal response. The knowledge may not lie on the surface but its presence is implied. Religion is not, like mere feeling, a purely inward experience. It is far rather true to say that it always looks outward like perception and thought, and claims to reach contact with reality. It is never satisfied with "premonitions" of the Divine but insists on intimate knowledge so that to the typical religious soul the eternal is not only more moving, but nearer and more real, than the things of sense. The religious man always aims at closer and deeper knowledge of the nature and the work of God.

Fries does not attempt to deny that with the advance of the ages the religious ways of describing God's nature have likewise greatly advanced. He admits that there is less falsehood in the Christian conception of God than in any other but he does not admit that there is more truth. Every definition of God that has been formed is for him necessarily only a symbol which plays its part only so long as it serves to arouse in others those feelings of devotion, resignation and guilt that are natural to men when the God whom instinctively they know has been revealed to them.
definition is valuable only as a means to this end. It is only a symbol of the reality which is felt and although vast differences are possible in the degree of adequacy or usefulness of the symbol, from the crude conceptions of the animists to the highly developed and purified Christian ideas, in itself the symbol is of no value. No words or thoughts or forms taken from finite things can apply to anything infinite or give any conception of its nature. The infinite lies beyond all our powers of expression or of thought. Negatively we may know it, may exclude the petty misconceptions which many have formed of it, but positively we can say nothing about it since all our thought is limited to things of sense and reflection upon them.

Once again Fries is partly right. It will be admitted by every religious man that since God is infinite the finite mind is unable completely to comprehend His nature. But, while admitting that our knowledge must always be incomplete, the religious mind would most strenuously maintain that it is positive and ought to be true so far as it goes. It is not exactly true to say that Fries identifies religion and art, but still the two do tend to approximate to one another in his treatment of them. The aesthetic feeling which conveys the premonition of the absolute reality covers both, the difference being that in the merely artistic view of any experience the interest is more directly centred in the particular, while in the religious view it is turned primarily towards the eternal. In the essential content of the two there is no further difference. It would not seem possible from this standpoint to distinguish between a merely aesthetic and a religious view of God. And yet this is a distinction which must be made and the ignoring of it can be due to nothing else than a very defective observation of religious experience. For religion implies far more than does art. In its highest forms it
involves always an ethical relation between the subject and object of worship but even where this ethical relation is absent — e.g. in some forms of mysticism — the central part of the experience is either a direct personal relation or at least the recognition of a supreme irresistible power controlling the individual life. Each of these is so foreign to the merely aesthetic feeling that it seems essential, if we are to discover what religion really is, to enquire whether a distinction between the aesthetic and the religious feelings can be made on the basis of our theory.

In Fries's own system this is not definitely done but the possibility of doing it is not by any means excluded. According to Fries the aesthetic ideas under which religious ideas fall are defined as "a form of perception which as a whole transcends the capacity of concepts"; but he does not seem inclined to admit that there may be large differences in the degree or direction in which different experiences exceed our capacity for expressing them in the categories of the understanding. Some of his followers did more justice to the facts here and realised that religion was something unique, something not so simple as to be capable of construction out of the bare elements of Reason or of reduction to them, but a complex and concrete experience unlike any other. But they did not expressly state the position that seems a direct conclusion from the whole line of argument which we have been following, that religion may have its own categories different even from those of the general aesthetic judgment and that the only test of the validity of these is their necessity to explain the facts of religious experience.

The really crucial question has already been decided if it is admitted that mechanical explanation falls short of complete explanation
and that, as we have seen, must be admitted. Although in one aspect of its nature everything can be shown to be subject to causal laws, nevertheless even after such causal explanation has been completed there remains, not only in the picture, in the organism and in the person, but also in the experience of things generally, a factor unexplained. That means, therefore, that mathematical knowledge is not adequate to the reality which we know and that we actually do possess some knowledge beyond it. The mathematical is only one degree of reality above which we know that there are others because in every experience there is knowledge that is not merely of mechanical sequence and coexistence. As to what this higher degree of knowledge or of reality is, whether it again will submit to analysis and definition is really a smaller problem. The chief position has been won when it is shown that there is knowledge beyond what the mere senses give. From this point of view it is a question simply of fact, as to what the nature of that knowledge is.

In the general aesthetic judgment we have the category common to all grades of intuitive knowledge—that of end, or unity in multiplicity. But this is only the lowest common measure of the intuitive knowledge and we find that other categories are actually in use. For example, the concept of personality is not merely an ethical postulate, nor is it merely a subjective idea transferred to external things, but it is a conception which is required to fit the facts, a conception without which some aspect of these things is left unaccounted for. And is it not a thoroughly consistent procedure to maintain that in that intuition of the eternal in the finite of which Fries speaks, or in the religion with which he identifies it, we have still another category in actual use, that under which man comprehends the infinite? No a priori test can rule this out as impossible or as merely
imaginary, provided only that the experience which gives rise to the conception cannot otherwise be rationalised.

It is here, however, that the difficulty does arise for the religious view of the universe. It is probably true that such a doctrine as the doctrine of Ideas, discussed in our second chapter, is sufficient to prove that an Absolute Unity, ethically perfect, exists which may be the object of religion, but the religious view of things requires much more than this. For religion it is essential that this Being should not only control be ultimately supreme, but should also be active in the guidance and control of the present world and each personal life that is in it. It insists that God should rule in the world and maintains that He actually does direct the course of individual life and the circumstances into which it is set. Yet to the eye of the non-religious observer there is no trace of anything unusual in the facts and he quite naturally sets the contrary opinion down to mere imagination, holding that since it is merely the subjective belief that finds anything else there, it cannot be said to be objectively true. It is a fact that there are many men to whom religion is entirely unintelligible, into whose experience it never enters and to whom, therefore, it must appear altogether imaginary. Nevertheless they are no more necessarily right than a blind man would be were he to declare that there is no such thing as colour. It can only be accepted as a really grave criticism if it can be shown that the religious position is an abnormal one and essentially impossible for some men to reach. Its subjectivity would be proved, for example, were it shown to depend on temperament or other psychological accident. But it does not seem possible to demonstrate this. On the contrary the balance of argument seems clearly to fall on the other side. Not only ought every rational being to recognize that behind all phenomena there is one reality that is the ground and origin of each, but every rational
being logically must do so. It belongs to the fundamental nature of his Reason that he should do so. He cannot rationalise his experience without being led up to this belief. And the belief is in no abstraction but because it is a necessary belief, its object must be a concrete reality or Reason's confidence in itself falls to the ground. Now reality is a unity and all its aspects or parts must be united by some common bond; that is to say, we expect to be able to rise, without any complete hiatus, from the knowledge of the part to the knowledge of the whole and its relation to the parts, and it is this possibility that the religious experience claims to be able to realise. The presumption is that the claim is valid unless the knowledge that religion brings is inconsistent with what we otherwise gain.

Fries does not himself find any inconsistency between the experience to which he reduces the manifold of religious feeling and the knowledge which science gives us of the particular objects of the senses. In his account, however, the opposition is avoided simply because religion is reduced far below the point at which it might be conceived to enter. It consists merely in these classes of feeling: (1) the feeling of worship or devotion—believing confidence and hope in the omnipotence of God, (2) submission—the recognition of guilt, and the desire for salvation and transformation, and (3) inspiration—the feeling that our own personal worth is superior to the whole of nature, that enthusiasm or exaltation which religion brings to men. These, however, do not exhaust religion, essential as they undoubtedly are to all its forms. Even more characteristic than they are is the belief that in the sphere of action the natural and supernatural are inter-related, that the infinite works and manifests its activity in particular events.

The religious experience
ular events. The religious experience includes not only general and indefinite feelings but also knowledge of God as a power actually present in, and not merely behind, finite events.

It is here that the inconsistency might be supposed to enter which would rule religious knowledge out as impossible, but it does so only if the nature of the Divine activity be too narrowly interpreted. As to whether it is or is not conceivable that the sequence of finite causes and effects may be broken by the interposition of some infinite causality, we are not called upon here to decide. That is not, in any case, the essential general characteristic of God's action but at the most only an occasional instance of it. The nature of the Divine activity, on the reality of which the possibility of a living religion depends, is fundamentally the actual and active working of God in certain events more directly than in others, and this does not necessarily come into conflict with mechanical causation at all. It does so only if the mistake be made of exalting this category to be the final and ultimate principle of all being, instead of regarding it as only the highest form of the mathematical arrangement of finite events. We have seen that even a complete account of the antecedents of many events does not exhaust their content but leaves a factor unaccounted for, and this is much truer of certain things than of others. Certain aspects of these demand the use of other categories and it is in these cases that the religious view is justified. The causal connection remains unbroken, but, in addition to that there is in the event and in its origin something more which for the religious man can be characterised only as the immediate presence of the Infinite.

One other consideration confirms to some extent this conclusion
as to the necessity of religious categories. It follows from what appears to be one aspect of the general nature of religious experience - the feeling of personal communion with a higher Power. Although this description would never exhaust its content, nevertheless it forms what is probably the most general and characteristic single statement that can be made about religious experience of the higher types. In the religion of the average man it is certainly the prominent feature and in the more abnormal and extreme types, such as mysticism, something parallel is manifested. That is to say, the particular things of the material world and the forms of these particular things are transcended while person claims to meet directly with person. Now even in the sphere of human relationships this personal relation is an ultimate one which cannot be described in terms of anything but itself but on which it is nevertheless impossible to throw any suspicion of unreality. A similar relationship with the supreme Being has a similar claim to be considered real if only the experience be as necessary; and the category of personality may thus be found to be properly applicable to God.

So also the active presence of God in the finite world may be found to be a true feature involved in this higher knowledge of reality, and other conceptions may be discovered which are applicable to the supreme Being, without an unjustifiable intellectualising of religion. Considered as a generalised description of what religion actually is as an experience, Fries's account of it as an indefinite intuition of something too great for words is entirely true. It is always in the first place an immediate thing, felt to be an intensely personal experience and therefore not primarily of a relating nature. It involves more than knowledge just as ethical relations do, and in
it is the emotional faculties which are especially strongly stimulated. Religion cannot be expressed in merely intellectual terms, but it is a complex mental state and may be analysed into its constituent factors. Though not itself reflective, it may be reflected upon and the conditions under which the experience is possible may be made known. Just as sensuous experience establishes the principles which it involves, so does religion establish the principles which are involved in it and thus add to our knowledge of reality.

It must, of course, be admitted that much that is called religion has its sources no deeper than in the imagination and will not endure the test of examination. There is undoubtedly a temptation in the method we have been seeking to justify for men to claim that if experience be the ultimate test of truth their own experience is sufficient evidence for them; and it is easy under such circumstances to imagine the necessity of an experience established by the intensity of the feeling which it arouses. A man feels himself wonderfully moved and naturally will believe at once that he has come into contact with God. Put so long as it is a mere feeling without any definitely realised basis in the realities external to the individual, it cannot escape the charge of subjectivity, and no matter how real the experience may appear to the man himself at the time, it will not stand the test of criticism. It will not be possible for him to satisfy even himself that it is a necessary experience and not merely voluntarily induced.

The certainty of religion or of religious forms must, like all other certainty excepting that of the ultimate principle of the Self-confidence of Reason, ultimately depend on what is given to the mind—i.e. things and events. Valid religion must be historical. It must be in the actual world
that it discovers other forms and categories to be necessary. The subjective experience must be the product of an objective fact which can be recognised as such. God must be in the world which exists independently of us and in our experience only as a consequence of this.

So it is that religion adds to the conceptions of Pure Reason these conceptions of the personality and ethical perfection and special presence of God, and adds them as conceptions which convey real and definite knowledge to the mind. In doing so it emphasises the necessity which we have already seen to exist of uniting all principles of knowledge into one systematic whole. Religion is not inferior in the certainty of its convictions to the other exercises of reason, but it can only obtain a final and adequate justification when the unity of all the principles of knowledge is discovered and their relations to one another shown to be entirely consistent and complementary. For Fries this unity could be nothing more than a "suspicion" or "premonition", but this seems to have been an unnecessary and unwarrantable despair of the success of the work of analysis and synthesis. If Reason be a unity, it must in the end be a unity which Reason can know.