A Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective on
Citizenship Education

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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the plausibility of grounding citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective without the danger of relativism. This is meant to enrich and allow citizenship education to reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. Most societies require education to develop responsible citizens who have a questioning attitude as well as willing to contribute to the general welfare of society and the environment. However, citizenship education often fails to reach its full potential because it is theorised on a single moral philosophical perspective such as deontic rights. To date there has been little intellectual engagement in the research literature on citizenship education with the question of whether it might be possible, let alone valuable to have a citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective. Drawing from literature in moral philosophy and education, the study follows a philosophical approach to analyse a conceptual framework which includes deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, utilitarian ethics and the capabilities approach. It is argued that teachers may draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education so that we do not only develop citizens with rights, who participate in making and obeying laws, but citizens who are motivated to participate for the right reasons, at the right time and for the right motive, and, at the same time are sympathetic to the plight of others and willing to facilitate the capabilities of others. In particular, virtue ethics and care ethics are essential for personal (moral) and social dimension of citizenship education while deontological ethics and the capabilities approach contribute towards the political dimension. It is also proposed that teacher education should include moral philosophy as well as the
reading of literature in order to promote a broad conception of education which enables teachers to draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective in teaching citizenship education as a theme across the curriculum.
DECLARATION

This thesis was written by me and is entirely my own work. It has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification elsewhere. In addition, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where it has been referenced accordingly.

Charles Silvane
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CHAPTER 1

1.0 Rationale and Justification

Citizenship education may be defined as “education for living in relation to others” (Jessop, 2012, p. 299). This definition is broad enough to accommodate the various perspectives in the debate around the concept of citizenship education. In addition, the definition points towards the importance of citizenship education. Citizenship education is important because “every society needs people to contribute effectively, in a variety of ways, to the future health and well-being of communities and the environment, locally, nationally and globally” (Learning & Teaching Scotland, 2002, p. 9). In particular, the variety of ways in which citizenship education could assist in the well-being of communities is through the development of personal responsibility and, citizenship participation, including justice (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004). Personal responsibility involves the social aspect of citizenship education such as volunteering in a local community project as well as developing a questioning attitude. Citizenship participation focuses on working with other individuals as a collective democratic action. The development of a sense of justice is also important for understanding the interplay among the social, economic and political aspects of citizenship so that students may reflect on change where necessary (Westheimer & Kahne, 2004).

Whether this is explicitly recognised or not, the approach to citizenship education aimed at students becoming responsible and participatory citizens, is always the outcome of a moral philosophical perspective. In particular, citizenship education is often informed by deontological ethics (Carr, 2006a; Kristjánsson, 2004) owing to the influence of citizenship rights. The implication for underpinning citizenship education
in a single moral philosophical perspective is that other moral philosophical perspectives do not seem to be deemed relevant for developing the kind of citizens society needs. Yet, it is unlikely that citizenship rights and duties may develop the kind of citizens who may give and receive care as well as demonstrate certain virtues such as friendship or enhance the capabilities of others through compassionate acts of social justice. Another explanation for choosing a single moral philosophical perspective could include the possible clash between the predominant deontological perspective underpinning citizenship education and other moral philosophical perspectives. However, it is not clear whether the content of citizenship education should be confined within the limits of a single moral philosophical perspective. The question that arises, therefore, is which moral philosophical perspective should underpin citizenship education in order for it to reach its full potential.

1.1 Aim of the Study

In light of the challenge regarding which moral philosophical perspective should underpin citizenship education, this study discusses the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective. In a plural moral philosophical perspective, teachers may draw from various moral philosophical perspectives such as deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, the capabilities approach, and perhaps utilitarian ethics in order to enrich citizenship education with an aim of developing responsible and participatory citizens. In the current research literature on citizenship education, there is very little reference to a plural moral philosophical perspective. Instead, most scholars criticise the deontological perspective while making a case for their preferred moral philosophical perspectives such as utilitarian ethics (Tarrant & Tarrant, 2004),
care ethics (Zembylas, 2009; 2010), virtue ethics (Carr, 2006a), and the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 1997; 2006a; Pfister, 2012). Yet, these scholars fail to explain what a comprehensive citizenship education underpinned by their preferred moral philosophical perspectives would look like. They only offer criticism and suggestions on where their preferred moral philosophical perspectives would be useful. Such information is helpful for citizenship education but requires further research in order to give a complete picture.

In particular, we need to understand how citizenship education may be understood from each of the moral philosophical perspectives. Such information is necessary in order to make a decision on whether a particular moral philosophical perspective is sufficient to develop students to become responsible and participatory citizens. I recognise that it may be difficult to determine the adequacy of a comprehensive citizenship education since any ideal citizenship education may depend on local situations. However, it is possible to argue that citizenship education should develop personal responsibility including concern for the well-being of fellow citizens and the environment. This view is consistent with the definition of citizenship education described above as “education for living in relation to others” (Jessop, 2012, p. 299). In this regard, the development of personal responsibility in citizenship education should not only include obeying the law but should develop a questioning attitude as well, in order to contribute towards personal and communal well-being. What is also implied in this discussion is that ideal citizenship education should encourage collective or democratic action as individuals may have little success in transforming their societies towards social justice without the help of others.
It seems apparent that a single moral philosophical perspective is unlikely to develop responsible and participatory citizens in the manner I have described in the preceding paragraph. The criticism against citizenship education underpinned by deontological ethics highlighted earlier may be an indication of this inadequacy and the need to supplement citizenship education with other moral philosophical perspectives. We might also observe that citizenship education informed by virtue ethics may develop personal responsibility such as friendship towards the elderly or generosity towards the poor. However, such citizenship education may be deemed inadequate in terms of collective or democratic action because friendship and generosity does not require collective democratic action. Similarly, helping people in need as part of citizenship education informed by care ethics may not necessarily translate to policy change. So personal responsibility is a necessary part of citizenship education but citizenship education needs to develop participatory citizens who may engage in collective democratic action as well. A possible way to resolve this challenge is to explore the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective so that citizenship education may be enriched in order to reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens.

To argue that citizenship education should be informed by a plural moral philosophical perspective requires further explanation about the connection between citizenship education and moral philosophy. In this regard, Haydon (2010a) maintains that there is no dispute that “there is a moral element to citizenship education” (p. 205). He explains that the other element involves “learning about social and political structures and about possibilities of action within those structures and possibly to change those
structures” (Haydon, 2010a, p. 205). Haydon’s characterisation of citizenship education is useful in differentiating it from moral education which is mainly concerned with moral thinking and action rather than political education. However, determining what contributes to citizenship education in any system of education is not a simple task. For instance, Carr and Landon (1998) observe that “any meaningful conception of education is in a deep sense an initiation into the sort of qualities of open mindedness that assume proper expression only in democratic circumstances of human association” (p. 174). In this regard, it may be argued that moral thinking is involved in social and political issues. In particular, Aristotle considered individual virtue which is expressed through practical wisdom as necessary for political judgement and action (Curren, 2010).

However, I still need to explain which aspects of citizenship education are implicated in each of the moral philosophical perspectives in order to warrant the kind of citizenship education advocated in this thesis. In this regard, deontological ethics is implicated in the language of citizenship rights where it addresses a range of issues from protection against injustice, provision of health and education, as well as participation rights such as freedom of expression (Raby, 2008). In addition, care ethics is implicated in the human condition of interdependence so that most human beings give and receive care throughout their lives (Tronto, 1993). On the other hand, the capabilities approach is necessary in overcoming social barriers that may prevent individuals from realising their beings and doings. For instance, Nussbaum (2011) argues that the capability of practical reasoning allows individuals to exercise their freedom of expression by participating meaningfully in democratic deliberation.
Similarly, MacIntyre (1999) argues that students need moral and intellectual virtues in order to think about their good and the good of others. The challenge of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education is that each of the moral philosophical perspectives has a different conception of the good life.

Given that each of the moral philosophical perspectives has its own conception of the good life requires that I give an indication of internal consistency that binds the different moral philosophical perspectives together without necessarily integrating them into one perspective. Otherwise, it might be argued that justice within the deontological perspective favours autonomy while care ethics encourages interdependence. Similarly, virtue ethics has a substantive view of the good life rather than the individuality implied in deontic rights. McLaughlin (1992) also recognises the challenge posed by substantive or thick public civic virtues in citizenship education which should be thick or “substantive enough to satisfy the communal demands of citizenship, yet compatible with liberal demands concerning the development of critical rationality by citizens” (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 235), including the demands of justice for diversity. A crucial point for a plural moral philosophical perspective is that without any internal consistency among the different moral philosophical perspectives, citizenship education is likely to descend into relativism where there is no justification for adopting any of the moral philosophical perspectives. I address this issue in Chapter Three of the thesis rather than avoiding the challenge by rooting citizenship education in a single moral philosophical perspective.
Furthermore, even if we were to resolve the issue of internal consistency among the five moral philosophical perspectives, it might still be hard for any teacher to imagine how five moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated into citizenship education. In other words, one has to demonstrate how a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education would look like in order to make it possible for teachers to implement it within the curriculum. For instance, would citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective be offered as a discrete subject or infused as a theme across the curriculum? In addition, would there be any moral philosophical perspectives that stand out more prominently than others if such a conception of citizenship education were implemented? These questions are dealt with through a discussion of three narratives in Chapter Four of the thesis where it is argued that citizenship education should be offered as a theme across the curriculum.

However, there is also the question of what knowledge is necessary for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education? Merely showing that the five moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated is not sufficient without presenting the necessary content including how it differs from existing conceptions of citizenship education. It should be expected that a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education should have content that may be presented from each of the different areas of the curriculum. In this regard, it might be argued that teaching the five moral philosophical perspectives in a primary or secondary school may not be a good idea despite views within the psychology of education on the possibility of teaching philosophy for children. The reason why this may not be a good idea is
because students are likely to learn about citizenship if it is presented from their own experiences rather than philosophical theory. In Chapter Five, I discuss the knowledge necessary for citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective so that it may be seen as practical.

Thus far I have not indicated how a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education tackle the challenge of motivation for citizenship participation. Citizenship participation is one of the major reasons for teaching citizenship education. For instance, McLaughlin (2000) observes that the introduction of the citizenship education curriculum for England is premised on the idea that it could counter the “civic deficit” (p. 543) that exists in society. A civic deficit is understood as a decline in social and moral standards as well as poor political understanding and involvement (McLaughlin, 2000). Ideally, the content offered on citizenship education should resolve the challenge of a civic deficit among young people. However, it is possible that students may possess the necessary knowledge to participate in citizenship but still do nothing about it. What this suggests is that further insight is necessary in order to understand what motivates people to participate in citizenship. In particular, what are the underlying motivations in each of the moral philosophical perspectives which might motivate students to think seriously about participation in citizenship? In addition, what motivates people to participate in social activities such as helping vulnerable people while avoiding participation in politically related matters such as voting?
While I answer the above questions in Chapter Six of the thesis, there is still a possibility that individuals could still feel a sense of powerlessness to participate in citizenship. For instance, a caring person may easily be overwhelmed by the need for help in a very poor community. Righting a wrong through the duty of justice within deontological ethics could also be a challenge when one is dealing with a multinational corporation with large resources of money to buy government support to cover for its pollution. The question that arises, then, is how we sustain motivation for citizenship participation underlying each of the moral philosophical perspectives. The challenge is not that the underlying motivations in each of the moral philosophical perspectives such as a sense of duty are not effective, but how to overcome fear and powerlessness. We need to respond to this challenge because a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education cannot allow complacency or taking the position of the majority whenever it is convenient, although it must remain flexible in order to avoid rigidity. I therefore discuss the role of political emotions in citizenship participation in Chapter Seven.

Lastly, it cannot be taken for granted that teachers need to be oriented towards a plural moral philosophical perspective if they are to initiate students into citizenship education. Teachers who are relative in their conception of moral values might find it difficult to draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective in their teaching. The question that arises, then, is what needs to be done in order to move teacher education towards a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education. Citizenship education is less concerned with theoretical and technical knowledge but practical wisdom. Yet most of teacher education is concerned with theoretical and technical
knowledge rather that the kind of general educatedness that includes moral issues (Carr, 1997) related to personal and communal flourishing (White, 2001). If we want citizens with a sense of personal responsibility, such as those who exhibit certain virtues and care, as well as concerned with citizenship participation and social justice, then, we need a kind of teacher education that develops responsible and participatory citizens among pre-service teachers. Chapter Eight focuses on teacher education while the last chapter summarises the whole discussion of the thesis.

Having described the aim, rationale and justification for the study, the following section outlines the research questions. I then proceed to describe the philosophical thinking and engagement involved in developing this study. Lastly, I conclude the chapter by analysing three broad approaches to citizenship education before tackling each research question in subsequent chapters of the thesis. The discussion in the different chapters arrives at similar conclusions based on different modes of analysis which draw from the same key texts. While this might appear repetitive, each chapter remains distinct and makes a contribution to the overall argument of the research.

Meanwhile, in order to explore the plausibility and implications for citizenship education to be underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective, the following research questions were posed and answered in this thesis:

**1.2 Research Questions**

- How is citizenship understood from different moral philosophical perspectives, and what are the implications for citizenship education? (Chapter Two)
• Is it preferable to ground citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective rather than a single perspective? (Chapter Two)

• What is the plausibility of grounding citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective? (Chapter Three)

• How should we integrate different moral philosophical perspectives into citizenship education in a way that recognises its particularity? Should a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education be offered as a discrete subject or embedded as a theme across the curriculum? (Chapter Four)

• What content would be addressed by a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education? (Chapter Five)

• What assumptions concerning students’ motivation for citizenship participation are implied in each of the moral philosophical perspectives? (Chapter Six)

• What is the role of emotions in motivating students to consider citizenship participation? (Chapter Seven)

• What is the role of teacher education in facilitating a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education? (Chapter Eight)

1.3 Methodology

The approach undertaken for this research is philosophical. Philosophical research involves “the systematic analysis of the conceptual framework within which […] evidence is gathered, with a view of answering certain questions” (Oancea & Pring, 2008, p. 23). In particular, my study analyses a conceptual framework which includes five moral philosophical perspectives including deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, utilitarian ethics and the capabilities approach as they relate to citizenship
education. I argue that citizenship education is enriched when teachers draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective so that citizenship education may reach its full potential in developing responsible and participatory citizens. The argument in each chapter unfolds through a discussion of relevant evidence based on the research questions listed above. What is considered relevant evidence in philosophical research is evidence that has “survived critical scrutiny” (Oancea & Pring, 2008, p. 24) such as ideas from philosophers in the case of this study. In the following paragraphs, I describe four of the five steps identified by Conroy, Davis and Enslin (2008) as the process of philosophical engagement. In the course of the description of the process of philosophical engagement it will become apparent why I chose a philosophical approach for this study.

The initial step in the process of philosophical engagement involves the recognition of a problem, including the use of language, to clarify concepts related to the problem. In particular, Conroy and others (2008) explain that philosophers “contribute to the clarification, analysis and defence of values that do already, and in some cases ought to, underpin policy and practice” (p. 175). For instance, it could be observed that my study analyses the moral philosophical perspectives that underpin citizenship education. The “exposition and clarification” (Conroy, et al., 2008, p. 179) of certain ideas such as the difference between a plural moral philosophical perspective and relativism clears confusion regarding the possibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education. Without being explicit about many of the ideas involved in the study, including subjecting them to criticism, it would be difficult to arrive at a plausible and coherent conclusion about a plural moral philosophical
perspective on citizenship education. However, the process of philosophical engagement in educational research does not end with the logical clarification of an issue. Instead, philosophy is involved throughout the process of educational research from initiation of the problem or issue to the prescription of its solution (Conroy, et al., 2008).

Diagnosis which may be described as a second step in my discussion is concerned with understanding a problem as it is, including the analysis of what causes it (Conroy et al., 2008). For instance, the influence of deontic rights might be considered the reason for other moral philosophical perspectives receiving little attention in citizenship education. Apprehending the problem and what may be the cause for it is necessary for thinking about a sustainable solution such as the plural moral philosophical perspective proposed in this study. Oancea and Pring (2008) observe that most often politicians make the mistake of equating evidence with proof in their rush for certainty and solid foundation for their policies. However, they caution that evidence may be weak or strong, just as it may be invoked with greater or with lesser confidence. What is necessary therefore, is a philosophical approach which can provide critical scrutiny of the problem and the evidence available for resolving it so that the solution obtained is justifiable and sustainable. During the course of my research, the idea of a single moral philosophical perspective underpinning citizenship education was scrutinised thoroughly leading to the conclusion that a plural moral philosophical perspective would be preferable. It is seen as preferable as it leads to improved citizenship education that develops responsible and participatory citizens.
Also linked to the discussion above, is that a philosophical approach needs to weigh evidence in order to make the necessary connections for resolving a particular problem or research question which itself is embedded in philosophical discourse. Conroy and his colleagues (2008) describe this third step as prognosis. They describe prognosis as weighing possible solutions to match the complexity of a problem. In particular, they observe that in Socrates’s dialogues the interlocutor is often “held back from judgement by the careful consideration of a number of possible outcomes and systematic interrogation of likely consequences” (Conroy, et al., 2008, p. 180). Similarly, in my research I make a number of carefully considered connections among different ideas in order to respond to some of the research questions of the study. One of these connections includes the integration of different moral philosophical perspectives within narratives (such as individual life narrative, narrative imagination, and action as narrative) showing how a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education could be taught within a classroom. These connections may still be subjected to criticism if published in a research journal although they provide a solution for the research. Consequently, the solution may be refined and its ideas improved further.

The fourth step in the process of philosophical engagement according to Conroy and his colleagues (2008) is prescription. Prescription may be seen as an effort to deal with the perception that philosophical questions are limited in terms of producing answers for practical questions. Some scholars (Conroy, et al., 2008; Pring, 2007) argue that philosophy needs to provide answers for resolving practical questions in addition to its function of providing logical understanding and clarity among different concepts.
within the stages of educational research. In short, the idea is that philosophy needs to reveal how the results of deliberation would look like in a practical situation. In this regard, Conroy and others (2008) suggest that there are two ways through which philosophy may assist in making practical judgements. One of them is through addressing “epistemological questions that emerge out of possible prescriptions” (p. 181). For instance, in my research I demonstrate how a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education may be offered through narrative. I also describe how information and judgement related to a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education may be taught to students by way of helping them acquire knowledge rooted in certain abilities and skills needed for citizenship action.

The second suggestion through which philosophy may assist in making practical judgements according to Conroy and others (2008) is concerned with ethical engagement rather than epistemological issues. They argue that intended prescriptions have to be subjected to the scrutiny of knowledge and understanding for a “community’s ethical traditions and its vision of a ‘good society’” (p. 181). In particular, within a liberal society “more than one ethical ideal is likely to emerge in the course of our deliberations about proposed prescriptions” (p. 181). Conroy and his colleagues (2008), therefore, suggest that the “philosophic attitude can critically reacquaint policy makers with the resources of their own tradition and in doing so enable them to test proposed prescription against those traditions” (p. 181). Similarly, in my research I suggest that teacher education needs to provide teachers with a general educatedness which includes moral philosophy and literature so that teachers may be oriented towards an educated public. An educated public implies individuals who
understand their social role and engage in rational debate about the common good. So, teachers may scrutinise the type of citizenship education prescribed here through rational debate. In addition, the development of practical wisdom may enable teachers to be sensitive to the traditions of others.

The discussion above illustrates that philosophy is at the centre of the research process from exposition and clarification of concepts within an argument, to diagnosing the nature of the problem in order to suggest an appropriate solution, to weighing solutions in order to make the necessary connections that match the complexity of the problem, to prescription of a solution. In line with Conroy and others (2008), the process of philosophical engagement in this study was not followed as a sequence of steps but as a way of thinking about the study from the development of research questions to the prescription of strategies. A number of scholars in education also agree that philosophy is relevant to educational theory and practice (Griffiths, 2012; Standish, 2007), including policy and research (Pring, 2007; Oancea & Bridges, 2009). In particular, Wilson (2003) describes philosophy as a logical discipline based on reasoned argument while Standish (2007) adds that philosophy may be used to justify value claims according to context. In addition, Oancea and Bridges (2009) observe that philosophy of education “can spring from nurturing democratic conversation about education” (p. 557, emphasis in original), hence its relevance for my research on citizenship education is obvious.
1.4 Key Features of Citizenship Education Explored According to Three Broad Approaches

Having described the thinking process behind the study, in this section I describe three broad approaches to citizenship education. Liberal, communitarian, and republican approaches constitute the political and social aspects of citizenship education. It is necessary to discuss these three broad approaches here because they represent the ‘politics first’ approach to citizenship education rather than the ‘morality first’ approach advocated in this thesis. In order to demonstrate the significance of a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education, there is a need to justify it against the background of other approaches to citizenship education. In this regard, although the three broad approaches are informed by moral philosophical perspectives themselves, there is a possibility that citizenship education may be constrained by political theory (or ideology) within these approaches. In particular, Callan (1997) argues, following Feinberg, that a political theory such as liberalism should indicate the limits of government control rather than the content of education for its citizens. Yet it is difficult to understand how liberal citizenship education could be different from the political theory of liberalism. For instance, citizenship education in Western countries is often theorised according to human rights rather than contextual citizenship rights (Kiwan, 2005).

In adopting a ‘morality first’ approach I am not arguing that the three broad approaches to citizenship education are irrelevant. There are still a lot of references to liberal, communitarian and republican approaches in my discussion of a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education, hence the discussion of the three approaches in this section. My argument is that citizenship education should be
underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective rather than the single moral philosophical perspective which often informs a particular political theory such as liberalism. In short, a plural moral philosophical perspective should transcend the narrow limits of political theory to focus on ethical social relations. However, a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education should still include politics as well as social and economic issues related to justice. To ignore the political, social and economic dimensions of citizenship education would be to reduce citizenship education to a moralisation of students’ behaviour (Audigier, 2000). A plural moral philosophical perspective with its focus on moral, political and social issues therefore, might strengthen liberal democracy; as Nussbaum (2013) argues, liberal democratic principles need the support of emotions such as compassion.

In the following sections, the three broad approaches are described according to McLaughlin’s (1992; 2000) approach which maps citizenship education according to a broad spectrum which stretches from a minimal position on one end to a maximal position on the other extreme. McLaughlin also demonstrates the difference between these two extremes by offering a discussion of liberalism, highlighting what a liberal approach would imply with regards to four core features of citizenship: identity, virtues, participation and social prerequisites. However, other perspectives on citizenship and citizenship education, especially communitarianism and republicanism (Kymlicka & Norman; 1994; McLaughlin, 2000; Sears & Hughes, 1996; Swartz, 2006), may also be described according to these dimensions, as summarised in the following paragraphs.
1.4.1 A Liberal Approach to Citizenship Education

Citizenship identity (status or membership) in a liberal conception is often defined according to a ‘minimal’, ‘thin’, ‘public’ or ‘narrow’ view along formal, legal and juridical lines (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; McLaughlin, 1992; Swartz, 2006). A legal status of citizenship constitutes membership of a country, which then is associated with civil, political and social rights (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) such as freedom of association, voting and perhaps education and health care. In a typical minimalist approach, a liberal conception of citizenship education emphasises rights and equal status (Pfister, 2012). In addition, citizens are conceived of as economic individuals (taxpayers) who may be passive (White, 2013), depending largely on institutions such as the judiciary, parliament and administration for checks and balances to safeguard democracy (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). A common trend for citizenship education in this regard is to socialise students by providing them with information about political events, structures and processes with little or no critical inquiry (McLaughlin, 1992; Sears & Hughes, 2006) on issues of power. It is argued therefore, that citizenship identity in a liberal conception of citizenship needs to be supplemented with a more substantive (maximal) view or approach to citizenship and citizenship education.

A maximal approach is particularly necessary in a representative democracy where citizens may require intellectual virtues such as critical questioning in order to make informed decisions when electing leaders and holding them to account as part of exercising their rights and responsibilities (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). This view demonstrates that citizenship education should not just concern itself with learning about institutions and procedures for political life. Instead, citizenship education
should focus on the development of a range of dispositions and virtues that support
democratic practice (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; McLaughlin, 2000). However, the
challenge with a liberal view is that it emphasises diversity of beliefs, practice and
value (McLaughlin, 1992), which means that acceptance of virtues depends on
individual choice. Individual choice creates the possibility for self-interest such that
only those virtues that require little effort towards others such as respect, tolerance
(McLaughlin, 1992), abiding with the law and deferring gratification where necessary
(Kylicka & Norman, 1994; McLaughlin, 2000) may remain. These virtues do not
extend far enough beyond the individual and may not be sufficient to support a
responsible democratic culture. Liberal citizenship education therefore, requires more
substantive virtues such as compassion.

*Participation* in a liberal view of citizenship education may also be regarded as
minimal. Individuals may opt for an entirely private life with friends and family or
perhaps end with voting since they have the liberty to decide which citizenship
activities they want to engage in (McLaughlin, 1992; Osler & Starkey, 2006). While
not all citizens may choose an entirely private life, there is reason to believe that most
young people are likely to be apathetic about politics judging from the commonly held
view that their participation during voting in elections is usually low. Lack of
motivation to participate in citizenship could be a threat to the continued existence of
democracy if we accept that democracies require democratic citizens whose specific
knowledge and character is well suited to democracy rather than non-democratic
practices (Galston, 2001). A passive or minimalist approach to citizenship education
relinquishes responsibility for political activity into the hands of a few individuals,
such as leaders of political parties in government and business leaders to influence decisions on behalf of the majority. Liberal citizenship education is likely limited to encouraging voluntarism in political participation and protection of the environment among students unless they develop a positive attitude or attachment to the public good.

Regarding *social prerequisites*, a (minimal) view of liberal citizenship education assumes that everyone has equal access to civil and political rights regardless of socio-economic status, gender, ethnic group, level of education and other classification (Tupper, 2009). Yet many ethnic minorities including vulnerable people such as the poor and disabled may feel excluded from the mainstream democratic culture (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Addressing challenges of inequalities through education such as liberal multiculturalism often emphasises commonality among cultures but may appear superficial (Smith, 2003). On the other hand, Smith observes that plural multiculturalism may celebrate cultural differences for its own sake but may be interpreted by others as tokenism. A maximal view of citizenship in this regard requires recognition that justice as equality is not sufficient for active participation unless issues of social disadvantage are addressed (McLaughlin, 1992; Tupper, 2009) in order to increase the opportunities or capabilities of others to exercise their citizenship. Liberal citizenship education with its focus on justice as equality therefore, may require to be infused with the capabilities approach in order to enable people to live successful lives consistent with the dignity of human beings according to their choice (Nussbaum, 2011a).
1.4.2 A Republican Approach to Citizenship Education

Critics of the liberal approach often suggest that citizenship education should be grounded on the republican approach (White, 2013) because in the republican conception of citizenship education the citizen is conceived as political, concerned with the common good rather than individual interest. In this section, I discuss some of the reasons for supporting the republican approach against the liberal approach to citizenship education. Most of the core features of citizenship education in the republican approach such as identity, virtues, participation and social prerequisites lie on the maximal end of McLaughlin’s (1992; 2000) spectrum for citizenship education. One would therefore, expect the republican approach to be the preferred approach to citizenship education as it could counter the ‘civic deficit’ in society, which includes poor political understanding and involvement among young people (McLaughlin, 2000). However, the republican approach is not the most preferred approach in citizenship education.

In terms of identity, the republican approach puts the public good ahead (White, 2013) of “private pleasures of family, neighbourhood and profession” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 362). In a similar manner, McLaughlin (1992) describes a maximal approach to citizenship education as conceived according to “social, cultural and psychological terms” (p. 236). Unlike the liberal tradition which stresses individual rights, emphasis in the republican approach to citizenship education is on responsibilities (Dagger, 2002) to the general welfare of society. Individualism is eschewed for solidarity or collective identity (Pfister, 2012). In order to avoid the possibility of other members becoming second class citizens, a republican citizenship also includes legal rights
(Annette, 2005; Dagger, 2002). However, citizenship is conceived along an ethical dimension in addition to the legal requirement (Dagger, 2002). An ethical citizenship identity refers to the idea of a ‘good’ citizen as one who adheres to the common good. We may therefore associate the republican approach to citizenship education with responsibility towards others. Yet it is also doubtful that a social or collective identity as opposed to individual rights is ideal for acting authentically according to one’s unconstrained choice. Relating to others in a social manner should not necessarily require relinquishing one’s individual identity.

Consistent with the idea of identity which is linked to the social or the common good, the republican approach to citizenship education emphasises the development of civic virtues. These are substantive virtues along the maximal dimension of McLaughlin’s (1992) conception of citizenship education which extend beyond local considerations. The importance of civic virtues in a republican approach to citizenship education is demonstrated in Jessop’s (2012) observation that the ethical life of the state is threatened without the development of civic virtues. Similarly, Kymlicka and Norman (1994) argue that classical liberals used to think that virtuous citizens were not necessary in a democracy because the behaviour of citizens could be regulated through checks and balances from the three arms of government such as administration (executive), legislative and the judiciary. However, they soon realised that the state would not be able to cope with the economic demands of taking care of the environment, public health, including caring for the old aged, without a certain measure of responsibility or civic virtue on the part of the public (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). The republican approach to citizenship education, therefore, aims to
develop citizens who are temperate (White, 2013), public spirited (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) and friendly among other virtues.

It also follows from what I have discussed so far that citizenship participation within the republican conception of citizenship education is dynamic (McLaughlin, 1992; Swartz, 2006), leaning towards the maximal end of the spectrum. For instance, the citizenship education curriculum for England, although characterised as very broad, is acknowledged to contain evidence of ‘maximal’ or ‘active’ elements (Annette, 2005; McLaughlin, 2000; Osler, 2011). Otherwise, the republican approach is described as an extreme form of participatory democracy, where individuals derive intrinsic value from their participation (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). In contrast to the liberal approach which may be characterised as education about citizenship because of the emphasis on democratic procedure, the republican approach may be characterised as education for citizenship because of the focus on participation. In a republican approach to citizenship education, individuals reflect on their participation in the affairs of the state through criticising and debating various laws and policies in order to suggest alternative models of structures and processes for democracy (Arthur & Davison, 2000; White, 2013). In addition, the activities of school councils could be another strategy for engaging students in active participation along the republican tradition.

However, there are indications that schools may not be the ideal places to foster active citizenship participation along the republican approach despite the discourse in citizenship education. For instance, Raby (2008) observes that school rules and
regulations seem to foster “a degree of docility and conformity” (p. 94) because of their top down approach while they may also be applied inconsistently by teachers and administrators. In addition, parents may encourage their children “to ‘suck it up’ so that they can smoothly pass through the system, fostering apathy and strategic compliance over participatory engagement” (Raby, 2008, p. 94). There are also indications according to Jessop (2011) that school councils have limited participation and are often marred by manipulation from teachers such that their existence may be interpreted as tokenistic. So the lack of participation and conformity to rules or rights might suggest an influence of the liberal approach to citizenship. The national curriculum for citizenship education in England is also described as liberal although it has an element of republicanism as one of its three main strands constitutes an active element (community involvement). It seems, therefore, that liberal citizenship education rather than republican citizenship education is the most preferred approach in schools.

In terms of social prerequisites for citizenship participation it is noteworthy that the republican approach defines freedom according to social connections rather than independence from one another as it is the case in the liberal approach. In this regard, social prerequisites within the republican approach to citizenship education may be considered maximal. Advocates of the republican conception of citizenship education, such as White (2013), often make reference to Aristotle’s view that political discussion is an exercise in rational choice of the public good. There is a recognition within the republican approach to citizenship education, therefore, that the equality of human
beings requires attention to the common good rather than individuality in order to facilitate participation in citizenship by the majority of people.

We might also look towards Arendt’s idea of action as a narrative if we want to consider how republican citizenship education is likely to deal with social prerequisites as a condition necessary for participation in the public sphere. For instance, Arendt (1998) considers individuals as unique with the potential to reveal themselves to others through action and speech so that their actions may be recognised as significant. Similarly, the republican approach recognises the plurality (uniqueness) of every individual through telling their story. In contrast, the liberal approach deals with vulnerable individuals as groups such that citizenship education includes a section on multiculturalism in order to accommodate the interests of ethnic minorities. In addition to recognising the plurality of others, the republican approach to citizenship education also encourages students to develop virtues of friendship towards others (for instance, the elderly). However, Arendt did not write much about citizenship education herself although Jessop (2011) interpreted her ideas within the republican approach to citizenship education. In the next section, I discuss the communitarian approach to citizenship education which shares some of the attributes of the republican approach.

1.4.3 A Communitarian Approach to Citizenship Education

McLaughlin (1992) does not identify an intermediate position along the minimal and maximal dimensions of citizenship education, although he recognises that the two positions are not discrete but instead various conceptions of citizenship education could be located anywhere along the continuum. The communitarian approach is one
of the approaches to citizenship education that could be located somewhere along the middle of the minimal and maximal dimensions of citizenship education. However, occupying the intermediate position of the continuum does not suggest that the communitarian approach is the most ideal or preferable approach to citizenship education. In this section, I discuss the characteristics of the communitarian approach to citizenship education as different from the liberal and republican approaches. However, I also observe that ideology as a “system of political ideas” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2014, p. 1) could be a challenge in the communitarian and other approaches to citizenship education which follow the ‘politics first’ approach to citizenship education rather than the ‘morality first’ adopted in this thesis.

In terms of identity the communitarian approach takes an intermediate position between the individual and the state (Arthur & Bailey, 2000; White, 2013). It criticises the individualism of the liberal approach (Arthur & Bailey, 2000) for what is considered the conception of society as a market-based association of competitive individuals (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; White, 2013). On the other hand, it shares with the republican approach the goal of putting the public interest (common good) above that of the individual (Arthur & Davison, 2000). The individual in the communitarian approach, therefore, is defined according to a substantive (thick) view of identity embedded in ties of the community (Delanty, 2002). In particular, Taylor (1991) argues that any attempt to identify ourselves without being trivial requires identification against the background of things that matter (horizons) such as history, nature, society, and the demands of solidarity with others. However, liberal communitarians such as Taylor (1991) recognise that identifying ourselves against
things that matter does not imply that we should conform to the thinking of the majority in society. Instead, individuals may determine their own way of life in light of the ends that are determined by society. On this view, liberals may also accept that human beings are social (Curren, 2006) without accepting communitarianism.

However, there are challenges with regards to students’ thinking about their way of life (or autonomy) in the communitarian view of citizenship education. Citizenship education based on the communitarian approach is likely to constrain students’ thinking within a particular culture or way of life without giving them a chance to choose alternative ways of life. For instance, Lemish (2003) describes the civic education of Israel as based on a collective identity of being Jewish. Similarly, Print and Coleman (2003) observe that a good citizen in the civic and moral education of many Asian countries is identified according to religious values. The conception of citizenship education described in the last two examples is limited within a particular view such as that of being an Israeli Jew. The advantage for such an approach is that individuals may develop civic responsibility that is consistent with the culture of their society. However, Callan (1997) argues that education should transform the life of students “in ways that have large consequences for how they will live beyond the realm of civic responsibility” (p. 51). In other words, citizenship education within a plural society should assist students to make an informed choice in how they should live rather than confining them within a particular way of life which benefits the social and political system.
Similarly, the virtues to participate in a democracy within a communitarian approach to citizenship education are embedded in voluntary community organisations rather than the state or the market (Arthur & Bailey, 2000; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) as it is the case with the republican and liberal approaches. On this view, the virtues within a communitarian approach may be defined as minimal since they do not extend beyond the local context. In particular, virtues in a communitarian approach to citizenship education extend within the boundaries of small communities such as families, churches, unions and cultural groups (Arthur & Bailey, 2000; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Swartz, 2006) rather than larger demarcated communities which include cities or regions. Print and Coleman (2003) explain that the virtues developed by community organisations are important for social capital, which is a feature of social organisations that allows democracy to flourish. For example, the values associated with social capital include trust, cooperation and networking, as well as tolerance and civility (Delanty, 2002; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Print & Coleman, 2003). The communitarian approach to citizenship education therefore, enhances social coherence through the democratic values of trust, cooperation and networking (Print & Coleman, 2003).

In terms of participation, a communitarian approach to citizenship education is mainly concerned with voluntarism and charitable work (Delanty, 2002; Print & Coleman, 2003), within the domain of civil society. For instance, Boyte (2003) observes that “civic education in communitarian terms takes the form of service-learning courses aimed at teaching values, such as responsibility and care for others, to young people” (p. 88). Participation in volunteer organisations develops students’ personal and civic
responsibility. However, such participation may not be described as maximal because individuals participate for the benefits that accrue from membership of associations rather than democratic involvement and participation. This view is shared by some scholars who observe that many people may join associations as a means of avoiding political participation (Boyte, 2003; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Print & Coleman, 2003). In this regard, volunteering at a charity organisation is perceived differently from organising a petition to campaign for policies to help people in need. Kymlicka and Norman (1994) also argue that associations may not be expected to promote a maximal approach to citizenship education because most of them are not established for that purpose.

A communitarian approach to citizenship education may be associated with a minimal social prerequisite because it is grounded in the interests of the dominant group within a community. The interests of minority groups in a communitarian approach to citizenship may be ignored unless communitarianism is informed by justice as is the case in liberal communitarianism. A liberal communitarian approach which is a compromise between strict communitarianism and liberalism recognises cultural communities while maintaining commitment to the liberal principle of equality. In particular, liberal communitarians are keen to defend citizenship rights for particular groups as part of equality while at the same time making it possible for communitarians to continue adherence to their culture (Delanty, 2002). Continued adherence to culture allows individuals to practice their virtues such as trust, cooperation and networking to allow democracy to flourish. The democratic ideas of Dewey may be associated with a liberal communitarian view of citizenship education (Callan & White, 2003;
Wain, 1994). In addition, Arthur and Bailey (2000) observe that “the communitarian liberal position is one that values both individual choice and action, but places it within the context of a rich and worthwhile common culture” (p. 19).

A communitarian approach contributes to citizenship education through the recognition of social ties and history of the people as a complement to the equality of citizens proposed by liberals. In particular, Enslin and White (2003) acknowledge the contribution of communitarianism in creating a sense of shared identity which holds citizens together in a spirit of community. They argue that a sense of community is necessary for active citizenship. In addition, Callan and White (2003) consider nation building as one of the contributions of a communitarian approach to citizenship education. However, nationalism may lead to problems of exclusion for ethnic minorities. For instance, Lemish’s (2003) description of civic education in Israel which is based on Jewish culture and defence of the Israeli state almost borders on indoctrination indicating the influence of political ideology in citizenship education. Kymlicka and Norman (1994) also observe that there is always the problem of deference to one’s group, such as nationality, church organisation, neighbourhood or even family, where attitudes such as sexism, intolerance and prejudice against others may arise within a communitarian approach to citizenship. So while the values of a communitarian approach to citizenship education may promote solidarity, there is a need to recognise the plurality of others through justice.

By way of summarising this section, it may be noted that the conception of citizenship education along the minimal and maximal dimension (McLaughlin, 1992) does not
cover all the details that are necessary to understand citizenship education, and this is so despite its comprehensiveness in applying the four core features of citizenship education. For instance, Enslin and White (2003) observe that citizenship may be considered maximal in terms of participation but it cannot be considered sufficient if it is not gender sensitive. In addition, the discussion of the three broad approaches to citizenship education do not reveal enough information about what motivates individuals to participate in citizenship. A possible answer to this challenge could be obtained by making students appreciate a particular approach as a political theory or ideology (system of political ideas) including the virtues that are necessary for citizenship participation. However, it seems more acceptable to encourage students to reflect on morally justifiable ways of participating in a democracy. Promoting a particular ideology or political theory such as liberalism, communitarianism or republicanism could be perceived as indoctrination. Some of the questions relating to gender sensitivity and motivation of students for citizenship participation are addressed in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter set out the aim of the study, which was to discuss the possibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective as the foundation for citizenship education. It is argued that there is little discussion of a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education in the research literature on citizenship education. Yet current conceptions of citizenship education based on a single moral philosophical perspective, such as the deontological perspective, are not sufficient to enrich citizenship education in order to develop responsible and participatory citizens. The
research questions were developed in order to respond to this gap in knowledge. These research questions, which inform the discussion in each of the following chapters, are grounded within the philosophical discourse of citizenship education. Consequently, the manner in which the discussion unfolds also follows a systematic philosophical approach according to the thinking outlined in this chapter.

The liberal, republican, and communitarian approaches to citizenship education were also discussed as a background to the discussion of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education in the thesis. The analysis of the three broad approaches were organised using a frame of four core features for citizenship education identified by McLaughlin (1992; 2000) which include identity, virtues, participation and social prerequisites (see table below).

Table: Mapping Approaches to Citizenship Education (according to identity, virtues, participation and social prerequisites) Along the Minimal and Maximal Dimension Identified by McLaughlin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Communitarian</th>
<th>Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>Legal, juridical and rights-based</td>
<td>Identity is based on narrative of the community</td>
<td>Collective, based on the common good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Virtues</strong></td>
<td>Respect, tolerance</td>
<td>Trust, cooperation and networking</td>
<td>Public spiritedness, temperance, friendship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td>Voluntary, e.g. voting</td>
<td>Voluntarism and charitable work within civil society</td>
<td>Active participation in the affairs of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social prerequisite</strong></td>
<td>Equal access to civil and political rights</td>
<td>Equity in terms of access to civil and political rights</td>
<td>Rational choice of the public good, social transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, our understanding of these four features of citizenship can be greatly enriched if we analyse them at a deeper level, namely through the lens of different moral philosophical perspectives. The five perspectives selected are deontological ethics, utilitarian ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics and the capabilities approach. I argue in the next chapter that although there are similarities between deontological ethics and the liberal approach, virtue ethics and the republican approach, as well as the communitarian approach and care ethics, a careful analysis of citizenship education from a plural moral philosophical perspective opens up the possibility of revealing differences that may exist not just between but also within the liberal, republican and communitarian approaches.
CHAPTER 2

2.0 Moral Philosophical Perspectives in Citizenship Education

The discussion in this chapter is centred on the first research question which seeks to find out how is citizenship understood from different moral philosophical perspectives, and what are the implications for citizenship education? A response to this research question leads to the discussion of the second question, which is concerned with whether it is preferable to ground citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective rather than a single perspective. It is also recognised that each of the approaches to citizenship education discussed in Chapter One (liberal, communitarian and republican) may be associated with at least one moral philosophical perspective. For instance, most of liberal citizenship education is grounded in deontic rights (Carr, 2006a) while proponents of the republican approach such as Arendt (1998) are inspired by ancient Greek politics associated with virtue ethics. Kiwan (2005) also associates a participatory conception of citizenship education along the republican approach with Aristotle’s view that a human being is a political animal.

Although a political approach to citizenship tends to be associated with a certain moral philosophical perspective, this does not mean that our understanding of citizenship education from a political approach such as liberalism should be the same with a corresponding moral philosophical perspective (deontological ethics). For instance, Callan and White (2003) acknowledge the influence of Kantian deontological ethics in the liberal tradition but observe that “the viability of the liberal tradition does not
stand or fall with Kant’s moral philosophy” (p. 103). So we need to look at deontological ethics, utilitarian ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, and the capabilities approach rather than the liberal, republican and communitarian approaches if we want to determine how citizenship education is understood from each of the moral philosophical perspectives.

If we determine how citizenship education is understood from each of the five moral philosophical perspectives, we may be in a better position to determine how citizenship education could be enriched in order to reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. For instance, we may reason based on the expectations of responsible and participatory citizens (such as having a questioning attitude including concern for others and the environment) whether any of the moral philosophical perspectives is sufficient to inform citizenship education or if there is a need to supplement it with other perspectives. In this regard, the five moral philosophical perspectives are chosen because of their potential to enrich citizenship education as they are occasionally associated with the development of good citizens in the research literature on citizenship education.

This chapter therefore, discusses how citizenship education is understood from each of the five moral philosophical perspectives including the implications for citizenship education which arise from each perspective. The discussion begins with an overview of virtue ethics theory and then proceeds to discuss the implications of virtue ethics on citizenship education. The implications of virtue ethics on citizenship education reveal how citizenship education is understood from this moral philosophical perspective. A
similar approach is followed in the other sections of the chapter each beginning with an overview of one of the other four moral philosophical perspectives before discussing how citizenship education is understood from that particular perspective. The discussion of citizenship education from these five moral philosophical perspectives leads to the conclusion that none of them is sufficient to enrich citizenship education in order for it to reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. It is therefore, argued in this thesis that citizenship education should be underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective. I now turn to the first moral philosophical perspective, which is virtue ethics.

2.1 Virtues Ethics Theory

Virtue ethics is concerned with human flourishing or the common good (eudaimonia), as an end (teleological) of human action (Birsch, 2014; Nussbaum, 1999) rather than conformity to tradition or what is right according to rules. For instance, the position of women and vulnerable people may be improved through the goal of human flourishing if we take virtue ethics seriously. Nussbaum (1988) explains that according to Aristotle “What human beings want and seek is not conformity with the past, it is the good” (p. 38). Flourishing or eudaimonia according to Aristotle (1999) may be obtained through excellence in reasoning because of the quality of human beings to be able to reason. In addition, excellence in reasoning is consistent with flourishing as well as the development of virtues. Virtues may be defined as “states of character concerned with praiseworthy feelings and conduct in specific spheres of human life” (Arthur & Harrison, 2012, p. 489). They involve appropriate human action that aims for the human good as a result of choice between excesses and deficiencies of an action (Carr,
Virtue ethics therefore, is concerned with excellence in reasoning in order to choose an appropriate stable disposition to act in a particular sphere.

As part of the deliberation for an appropriate action, a major condition for the determination of virtues is that the individual needs to produce the right action for the right reasons, at the right time and from the right motives (Carr, 2003a; 2009b; 2011; Kristjánsson, 2013). Producing the right response out of luck or personality traits, without judgement and intent does not constitute virtuous behaviour. Carr (2009b) describes “virtues as more or less equivalent to states of emotion, feeling or appetite ordered in accordance with some deliberative ideal of practical wisdom” (p. 32). According to this view, the function of practical wisdom or phronesis is to serve as the rational form of moral virtue (Carr, 2007) which regulates the affective component of moral commitment. While practical wisdom is sometimes defined as the understanding of specific concrete cases and complex situations (Kessels & Korthagen, 2001), Arthur and Carr (2013) define phronesis as deliberation about what is of intrinsic human value or worth doing for its own sake. According to this view, practical wisdom is not so much about the production of the right action for the common good but about becoming good, such as being just and honest (Arthur & Carr, 2013).

The above discussion focusses on the rational principle of the development of virtue through practical wisdom. However, virtue ethics also uses general principles. For instance, actions such as murder, theft and adultery are always considered wrong (Aristotle, 1999; Birsch, 2014; Carr, 2006a) because there cannot be any intermediate position for murder, theft or adultery nor do these actions contribute to human
flourishing. Aristotle (1999) regarded some forms of conduct as never conducive to human flourishing. A virtuous individual therefore, is guided by the desire for human or social flourishing as opposed to merely using the principle of the mean to calculate the difference between excess and deficiency of an action. In particular, Carr (2006a) illustrates that virtuous agents are guided by whether an action contributes to human flourishing or not when they have to choose between two competing virtue alternatives such as justified anger and loyalty in the case of perceived harm by an individual. He explains that while virtuous agents may choose one option of lesser evil, this does not mean that they see such alternatives as beneficial consequences like utilitarian moral agents but instead they continue to view them as morally wrong and prohibited (Carr, 2006a). This makes virtue ethics a principled theory that guides citizenship behaviour according to the goal of human flourishing.

To summarise the ideas on virtue ethics theory above, a few points are worth highlighting. One of these is that Aristotle (1999) conceives of a human being as a “political animal tending by nature to live together with others” (p. 148). He argues that human beings prefer to live in community with others including friends rather than leading a solitary life even if they had all the necessary goods they needed. Secondly, virtue ethics is not just concerned with individual flourishing but should contribute towards the flourishing of others including the surrounding living conditions. Aristotle argues that “while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good for an individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a people and for cities (Aristotle, 1999, p. 2). Thirdly, virtue ethics is principled in two ways (Carr, 2006a). One of these is through the doctrine of the mean in choosing between excess and
deficiency (Aristotle, 1999; Carr, 2006a). For instance, courage is an intermediate position between cowardice and recklessness (Birsch, 2014). Secondly, virtue ethics has general principles which decree that murder, theft and adultery is wrong (Aristotle, 1999; Carr, 2006a). Based on this brief summary, it could be argued that virtue ethics should become part of any responsible citizenship education, as I explain in the next section.

2.1.1 Virtues and Citizenship Education

The influence of virtue ethics in citizenship education may be traced back to the Greek classical period where living in community with others was considered important. For instance, Carr (2009a) observes that “Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all agreed that virtue is not merely of individual value or benefit but has significant social and civic dimensions” (p. 14). Similarly, Curren (2010) confirms that according to Aristotle, educating individuals is considered training and teaching them to acquire the moral and intellectual virtues, including the development of self-judgement (phronesis), necessary for prudent self-governance and participation in political rule. On this view, we may acknowledge that the development of virtues is linked to participation in the public sphere. While in the ancient Greek period only men and free Athenian citizens participated in democracy, citizenship participation in our modern society includes all citizens. The involvement of all citizens in the affairs of their society makes it necessary to teach citizenship education so that students develop the necessary virtues to participate meaningfully in a democracy. In the following discussion, I explain how citizenship education may be understood from a virtue ethics perspective.
When citizenship education is understood from a virtue ethics perspective, it is concerned with the flourishing of all human beings regardless of attributes such as religion, gender and ethnicity. In this regard, it might also be possible to appeal to other moral philosophical perspectives such as deontic rights, but virtue ethics has a better chance of dealing with social problems such as discrimination because of its regulation of the rational and emotional aspects of human action. Virtues are grounded in appropriate dispositions of self-restraint regulated by practical wisdom in order to contribute to individual or social flourishing (Carr, 2006a). Nussbaum (1999) also observes that moral problems affecting society today such as greed and racial hatred are driven by attitudes and emotions that are not easy to legislate against or uproot by appealing to moral reasoning alone. For instance, students from a poor community which is dominated by crime and unemployment are not likely to pay much attention to human rights as they may consider themselves as victims of government neglect (Carr, 2006a). Such students are likely to be xenophobic towards foreigners who may be accused of contributing to unemployment. However, students may be able to make proper judgement of their attitude towards the misfortune of others through citizenship education informed by virtue ethics, as opposed to merely following a rule.

We might also observe that the contextual nature of citizenship education is consistent with virtue ethics. The development of virtues through practical wisdom is sensitive to local contextual situations while it remains objective. Aristotle (1999) describes virtue as a “state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined according to reference to reason” (p. 25). According to this view, people in different parts of the world may express social associations such as friendship
differently but the account of the virtue of friendship in terms of “mutual benefit and well-wishing, mutual enjoyment, mutual awareness, [and] a shared conception of the good” (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 44) remains objective. In this regard, virtue ethics provides concreteness in understanding local social situations while other objective moral philosophical perspectives such as deontological ethics encourage detachment from contextual situations. At the same time, virtue ethics is also principled in the same way as other moral philosophical perspectives in terms of general principles which consider murder, theft and adultery as wrong (Carr, 2006a). Citizenship education when understood from virtue ethics therefore, is both contextual and objective.

However, while I have described how citizenship education is to be understood from a virtue ethics perspective, I have not explained how it should be taught in citizenship education. One of the approaches for teaching citizenship education is through narratives. Nussbaum (1999) explains that “literary narratives display long term patterns of character, action, and commitment, while investigating the relevant passions with acute perception” (p. 175). What Nussbaum is suggesting here, is that we could learn a lot from the stories of others including their challenges as we get emotionally involved, as well as discern certain alternatives through the exercise of practical wisdom according to situation. Arthur and Carr (2013) also acknowledge that children may learn a lot through the moral examples and sacrifices of important world figures such as Mother Theresa, and Mahatma Gandhi. In addition, students may learn from the virtues and vices of characters that are portrayed in literature stories. The significance of these stories is that they develop practical wisdom among students so that they may learn to act in appropriate ways. Teachers are also encouraged to model
the virtues of good citizenship such as fairness, temperance and compassion in dealing with others so that students may learn the virtues of good citizenship within a context.

It may be observed from this discussion that citizenship education when viewed from a virtue ethics perspective is concerned with justice as the good rather than “notional respect for abstractly conceived rights and responsibilities” (Carr, 2006a, p. 451). In virtue ethics, citizenship education is grounded in appropriate actions of social association such as friendship as well as an appropriate attitude towards the misfortune of others which may lead to compassion and generosity among students. However, it is not clear how much citizenship may rely on the ethical dispositions of its citizens without any expectations of responsibilities or duties in a plural society where everyone has a right to their own way of life. In addition, virtue ethics has a broad conception of an individual whose identity is linked to that of the community. The broad or ‘thick’ view of virtues may be perceived to encroach on the rights of others. These challenges or possible objections to citizenship education underpinned by virtue ethics draw attention to a deontological perspective on citizenship education. Students may develop stable character traits which are necessary for citizenship but they should also recognise the rights of others. In the following discussion, therefore, I turn to how citizenship education may be understood from a deontological perspective.

2.2 Deontological Ethics

In contrast to virtue ethics which is an ethics of character, deontological ethics is a moral philosophy based on doing the right action according to a rule rather than the good. It is commonly described as “an ethical theory that is grounded in actions based
on legitimate moral rules or that focuses on the reasoning that precedes an action” (Birsch, 2014, p. 104). Etymologically, deontology has its roots from the Greek word “deon”, meaning duty (Birsch, 2014, p. 104), where moral agents are obligated to obey the moral law which is described as a rule, regulation or principle that informs people about what they ought to do. Essentially, when seen from a deontological perspective, citizenship is regarded as a relationship between the people and the state, where the state provides certain rights and expects to extract certain responsibilities from its citizens (Bottery, 2003). There is mutual agreement between both parties to perform certain duties as part of commitment to one another. Similarly, citizenship education is concerned with cooperation between the state and its citizens in terms of rights and responsibilities or obligations when understood from a deontological ethics perspective. However, it is not clear whether it is sufficient for citizenship education to encourage students to reflect on cooperation with the state rather than transformation according to social justice.

This section begins with a description of the deontological ethics perspective before analysing the implications of the perspective to citizenship education. In the course of the discussion it will become apparent that deontological ethics is concerned with the democratic aspect of citizenship education. In this regard, the discussion of deontological ethics reinforces the view that the democratic aspect of citizenship education may be discussed from a moral philosophical perspective rather than a political approach such as liberalism. For instance, it may be argued that “many core democratic principles, including tolerance and respect, impartiality and concern for both the rights of the individual and the welfare of the group are grounded in moral
principles” (Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont & Stephens, 2003, p. 15). In particular, many of the democratic principles described by Colby and her colleagues are grounded in moral principles within the deontological perspective discussed in the following paragraphs.

I begin with impartiality as one of the democratic principles associated with the deontological perspective. Birsch (2014) explains that to obey a rule in terms of the duties and obligations within deontological ethics means that one should act rationally without self-interest, personal preference, or an aim to achieve certain results. Deontological ethics is governed by fidelity to reason and doing good actions without any conditions (unconditional good) or dependence on personal characteristics. Dependence on happiness as a moral guide, for instance, is regarded as conditional in that it depends on this or that situation (MacIntyre, 1981), and therefore unreliable. Consequently, people who follow Kantian deontological ethics are duty bound to follow a range of moral imperatives (rules) such as commitment to honesty, promise keeping and altruism, in the name of practical rational consistency (Carr, 2005). Ultimately, “if all persons have the same moral duty, then this makes morality universal and unconditional” (Birsch, 2014, p. 105). The plurality of cultures, for instance, requires citizenship education to encourage students to respect the cultures of other people as a universal and unconditional moral duty for all mankind. As a result, students may be encouraged to keep their feelings about other people’s cultures neutral, especially in public.
In addition, a central feature of deontological ethics is that moral agents or individuals are considered autonomous. This means that they are able to originate or generate moral actions (Birsch, 2014) using reason, according to obligations. In this regard, deontological ethics may be related to liberalism. Liberalism may be broadly defined as the view that individuals are at liberty to express themselves in any particular way they choose, so long as they do not cause any harm or infringe upon the rights of others (Carr, 1993). “Practical reason according to Kant, employs no criterion external to itself” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 53). What this effectively means is that the actions of people are guided by personal rules (also known as maxims). However, because these are conditional (depending on such and such), it is considered proper to act from moral law which is a rule that informs people about what they ought to do (Birsch, 2014). In obeying this moral law individuals are not forced against their will but they use their rational powers as autonomous individuals to understand the rule and choose according to the categorical imperative or unconditional rule (Birsch, 2014). Deontological ethics therefore, places a lot of emphasis on the rational powers of the individual including conformity to general principles, with little attention to the involvement of emotions.

The categorical imperatives or moral laws required by Kantian deontological ethics are universal prescriptions or commands that obligate people absolutely and should be followed without exception (Birsch, 2014). However, this presupposes moral agents as equal and free individuals capable of choosing out of respect for the moral law and respect for their nature as rational beings (Birsch, 2014). In terms of function, one of the categorical imperatives prescribes that individuals should act on a personal rule
that is universal or unconditional (Birsch, 2014). What this suggests is that they should not act on a rule that is premised on certain conditions that need to be fulfilled before it is executed, but act on a personal rule that they will for everyone to follow without conditions. In addition, “the personal rules that could be willed to be universal laws are ones that could be logical for every rational being to follow” (Birsch, 2014, p. 108). In other words, it should be consistent with reason and not contradict with common practice or convention. It should be a rule that the people who originate it should be willing to follow when used against them without much difficulty, as a measure of its consistency with common practice. For instance, when people advocate for people’s rights elsewhere, they should also be willing to grant others the same rights in their own backyard.

The other categorical imperative demands that people should be treated as ends in themselves, rather than a means to an end (Birsch, 2014; Haydon, 2006). To treat people as an end in themselves suggests that people should be respected and not used to fulfil the ambitions or needs of others. For instance, Haydon (2006) explains that to treat people with respect means that we should never judge them from our own perspectives without taking into consideration their values or perspective. In a similar manner, MacIntyre (1981) argues that proposing an action to someone by giving reasons, treats the individual with respect similar to our own so that they have a chance to evaluate the reasons for the proposed action. However, influencing individuals in non-rational ways is to treat them as instruments for our own will, without regard for their rationality (MacIntyre, 1981). Ideally, individuals should not act until they have decided if a reason is good enough for them to act. This moral imperative gives people
the right to self-determination and equality of all citizens, which has implications for citizenship education.

2.2.1 Deontological Ethics and Citizenship Education

When viewed from a deontological perspective, citizenship education is concerned with, among other things, respect and obligation for human rights. For instance, Carr (2006a) acknowledges that “emphasis on rights is associated with deontic perspectives whereby moral and social significance is given to general and universal rational principles” (p. 444). Osler and Starkey (2006), in their review of British and international policy documents concerned with citizenship education, also identify human rights-related issues of global injustice and inequality as one of the six contextual factors that led to considerable growth in citizenship education between 1995 and 2005. They conclude their discussion on this subject by stating that most “countries make strong links between citizenship education and human rights education and there is a growing consensus internationally that human rights principles underpin citizenship in multicultural democracies” (Osler & Starkey, 2006, p. 436). It seems plausible to assume therefore, that most of citizenship education is underpinned by deontological ethics since principles of human rights are grounded in deontological ethics.

However, some scholars have criticised the idea of theorising citizenship education on human rights or deontological ethics. One of the criticisms is related to students’ reflection on motivation for citizenship participation. It is argued that there are moral and social obligations that are not covered by duties to respect rights (Carr, 2006a),
especially with regards to seeking material aid from fellow citizens. Another criticism is related to the contextual nature of citizenship education. On this view, it is argued that human rights because of their universal nature may not be able to cover contextual issues. At the same time, it might also be argued that citizenship education may not reach its full potential without respect to rights which are used to campaign against injustice. In this regard, Kiwan (2005) acknowledges that human rights may not be used to theorise citizenship education but contends that citizenship rights may be suitable for citizenship education because they are sensitive to context. I discuss these ideas further including the use of narratives to teach human rights within citizenship education in Chapter Four.

Furthermore, citizenship education when understood from a deontological perspective may be related to the autonomy of individuals. Autonomy is a central feature of deontological ethics and liberalism. According to this view children have an open future, meaning that they may think for themselves about the kind of life they want to live, and hence the aim of education should be to develop this capacity (Fowler, 2011). When viewed along this perspective which is linked to comprehensive liberalism, citizenship education may be perceived as ‘autonomy promoting’. Curren (2006, p. 463) explains that in contemporary liberal theory this is explained in terms of ‘exit rights’, where children upon maturity may reflect on their life situations and evaluate their chances for a quality life, and if their evaluation demands it they may decide on a different kind of life from the one in which they were born or destined by circumstance. However, Rawls’s (1993) view of political liberalism which also uses deontic rights does not promote moral autonomy. Instead, it facilitates autonomy
(Curren, 2006) unintentionally through its neutrality (Callan, 1997) which requires students to select among a range of possibilities for a good life according to their choice. Selection among a range of possibilities also requires the development of critical thinking.

The development of critical thinking which facilitates autonomy is important for citizenship education because it encourages individuals to hold government to account through quality debate rather than conformity to the status quo. However, autonomy when conceived of as individuality rather than a value may be undesirable because it makes it difficult for people to imagine the plight of others different from themselves according to characteristics such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnic background and disability. Okin (2005) observes that legal equality means very little as long as “the social structures that depend on the gendered division of labour are still in place” (p. 244). What is required in citizenship education therefore, is to encourage students to imagine their possibilities as linked to that of others different from themselves if we want them to show concern for social justice. Citizenship education when viewed from a deontological perspective may encourage cooperation in terms of dialogue and debate (Papastephanou, 2005) but without imagination for the plight of others, social change is very unlikely. Instead, citizenship education may contribute to the socialisation of students to the principles of democracy including the maintenance of the status quo with all the injustices that prevail.

Thus far, I have argued that most of the principles of democracy such as tolerance, impartiality and respect for the rights of individuals are grounded in deontological
ethics. Since democratic principles are grounded in deontological ethics, we might reasonably assume that it would be a good idea to underpin citizenship education in deontological ethics. However, citizenship education when understood from deontological ethics is unlikely to contribute towards social justice for disadvantaged groups. Equality in deontological ethics may neglect social barriers such as gender, poverty, ethnic background and other qualities that often influence people’s access to rights. Legal equality without changing the social perceptions of people such as men becoming more involved in domestic work is unlikely to change the situation of women representation in public office. The implication for this lack of reflection on transformation towards social justice within deontological ethics suggests that we should look towards another perspective to inform our thinking on how to encourage students to reflect on social justice issues. In the following discussion, I turn to the capabilities approach which is closely associated with both virtue ethics and respect for human dignity within the deontological perspective as a possible solution.

2.3 The Capabilities Approach

Nussbaum (2011a) in her book entitled, Creating Capabilities, uses a narrative of an Indian woman to paint a vivid picture of the capabilities approach which she expresses according to the question; “what is each person able to do and to be” (p. 18). In this statement, Nussbaum encapsulates the essence of human dignity as she also explains that “the approach takes each person as an end, asking not just about the total or average well-being but about the opportunities available to each person” (Nussbaum, 2011a, p. 18, emphasis in original). In this regard, the capabilities approach may be described as Kantian for recognising the autonomy of individual citizens as rational
human beings who are deserving of respect. At the same time, the capabilities approach may be described as Aristotelian because of its focus on human flourishing. Nussbaum acknowledges the Aristotelian influence as well, as she argues that Aristotle believed that the job of government was to make all citizens capable of leading a flourishing life in accordance with their choice. Thus the capabilities approach is a set of plural opportunities made available to citizens for a flourishing life that is worthy of the dignity of human beings (Nussbaum, 2011a).

Nussbaum (2001b) explains that although the capabilities approach is Aristotelian in spirit, it departs from the ideas of “Aristotle in many ways, both in the direction of liberalism and in the direction of feminism” (p. xix). She explains that unlike Aristotelian virtue ethics which advocates “functioning according to a single comprehensive conception of the good life” (p. xix), the capabilities approach embraces plurality including reasonable neoliberal forms of living. As I explain in the following sections, the capabilities approach encourages citizens to choose their actions or functionings (as realisation of capabilities) according to the life that is worthy of the dignity of human beings. The centrality of human dignity within the capabilities approach such as the respect of women, people from a low socio-economic background, as well as people outside our territories is attributed to the influence of Stoicism (Nussbaum, 2001; 2011a), rather than Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is necessary to describe the capabilities approach as a distinct moral philosophical perspective here so that we can have a better sense of how citizenship education may be understood from it as different from virtue ethics or deontological ethics.
In the following discussion, I describe the capabilities approach as a theory of social justice before explaining how citizenship education may be perceived from this perspective. In particular, students may be encouraged to develop their agency to facilitate the capabilities (opportunities) of others when citizenship education is understood from the capabilities approach. Agency is built-in within the capabilities approach as a theory of social justice which gives meaning to what it is to live a life that is worthy of the dignity of human beings by asking what each person is able to do and to be. When viewed from a citizenship education perspective, the capabilities approach has the potential to encourage students to reflect on the transformation of society in order to enhance the well-being of others. The discussion of citizenship education from the capabilities approach is therefore, necessary in order to determine whether it enriches citizenship education. In particular, it is contended that citizenship education is enriched through reflection on creating opportunities for overcoming social barriers that prevent people from accessing their rights. In this regard citizenship education may reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. I now turn to the theory aspect of the capabilities approach.

2.3.1 Citizenship and the Capabilities Approach

The concept of capabilities within the capabilities approach does not only refer to personal skills or abilities possessed by individuals but refers to what Nussbaum (2011a) describes as combined capabilities. By combined capabilities, Nussbaum refers to the combination of personal skills or abilities with all the opportunities for choice and action in the individual’s social, political and economic environment. She explains that personal skills or abilities are only the internal capabilities or personal
characteristics which are a result of learned social behaviour or obtained through education. Internal capabilities or personal skills or abilities may include the ability to debate with others, confidence or autonomy to articulate one’s ideas, as well as freedom from fear of violence. In order to form combined capabilities, these personal skills or abilities require opportunities from the social, political, and economic environment so that they may find expression. Otherwise, it is possible to develop internal capabilities (personal skills or abilities) but lack the opportunity to function according to those capabilities due to lack of resources (poverty) or freedoms necessary to practice them. Similarly, it is possible for people to lack the necessary education for critical thinking and expression (Nussbaum, 2006a; 2011a) in order to exercise responsibilities such as holding government to account.

In order to present a concrete view of the capabilities approach, Nussbaum (2011a) offers a list of ten capabilities (pp. 33-34) as a minimum account of social justice. While all the ten capabilities are important, affiliation and practical reasoning permeate through the other capabilities and play an organising role. In particular, practical reasoning which is the ability “to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about planning one’s life” (Nussbaum, 2011a, p. 39) is important in choosing one’s functioning. In order to function according to capabilities, means acting out or realising capabilities in individual lives (McLean & Walker, 2012; Nussbaum, 2011a). Nussbaum differentiates between capabilities and functioning in that the capabilities are the opportunities or freedoms to choose while functioning involves acting out those freedoms or choices (capabilities). Through practical reason, therefore, individuals may choose whether they want to act out a particular capability.
or not. However, what is crucial is that the capabilities should be made available to all people as a minimum standard to live a flourishing life that is consistent with the dignity of human beings. So, facilitating the capabilities of others is concerned with making opportunities for them to choose their functioning according to the life they value.

It might be noted in the above discussion that the capabilities approach is concerned with social prerequisites for people to participate in citizenship. The capabilities approach is not only concerned with people realising their rights or equality. Instead, it recognises that legal equality is not sufficient because there could be social barriers that prevent people from realising their equality. For instance, the right to freedom of speech and political participation is less meaningful without critical thinking or practical reason to enhance the quality of democratic deliberations. In this regard, the capabilities approach substantiates the human rights approach to make it more concrete rather than abstract. In particular, the capability of affiliation permeates through the other capabilities in order to ensure that other capabilities are delivered in a manner that respects human dignity. For instance, Nussbaum (2011a) explains that providing employment without workplace relationships, or health care without privacy does not promote treating people with dignity. In Nussbaum’s view, a recognition of individuals as social beings is part of giving them the dignity they deserve rather than treating them as non-human beings. Bodily integrity is also one of the capabilities in order to include the concerns of women that human rights present a masculine view of citizenship.
2.3.2 Capabilities Approach and Citizenship Education

I argued in the previous section that democratic principles such as respect, tolerance and impartiality are grounded within the deontological perspective. In addition, the preceding paragraph illustrates that the capabilities approach gives meaning and substance to principles of democracy by making them more concrete rather than abstract. From this view we might realise that when citizenship education is grounded in the capabilities approach, it enhances our reflection about human rights as a reality rather than an ideal. The reason why citizenship education when understood from a capabilities approach makes citizenship rights a reality is because it focuses on dealing with social barriers that prevent people from exercising their rights. The capabilities approach, therefore, is useful in underpinning citizenship education in order to make students realise their opportunities as well as assisting other people to flourish. In particular, Nussbaum (2006a) advances a three-part model for the development of students’ capabilities in education through critical thinking, affiliation and imaginative understanding. These ideas resonate with the purpose and goal for citizenship education.

Citizenship education is concerned with the development of practical reason when it is understood from the capabilities approach. Nussbaum (2006a) explains that one of the capabilities in developing democratic citizenship is “critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions” (p. 388). Following Socrates, in what he describes as living an examined life, Nussbaum (2006a) explains that democracy needs citizens who can think for themselves instead of relying on authority and tradition. In particular, deliberative democracy requires citizens who have the ability to think critically in
order to contribute towards quality debate. The aim of education therefore, should be
to enhance the practical reasoning abilities of students so that they may contribute to
democracy whenever they are called upon to do so. In addition, Pfister (2012)
identifies the capabilities approach with radical citizenship because of its emphasis on
what he describes as the politics of voice, difference and justice. Citizenship education
when viewed from the capabilities approach engages students in reflection about the
imbalances that exist in society and how democracy may be used to address these
imbalance. In other words, students may reflect on possible strategies for improving
some of the practices in society if they are found to be ineffective in improving people’s lives.

The capabilities approach also views affiliation which is concerned with the
development of humanity or social relations among people as important in enhancing
the dignity of others. Nussbaum (2006a) argues that people demonstrate their
affiliation as democratic citizens by seeing themselves not just as citizens of a
particular area but above everything else “as human beings bound to all other human
beings by ties of recognition and concern” (p. 389). In this regard, multicultural
citizenship education (Crosbie, 2014) including service-learning may be used to
develop the humanity of students. For instance, McLean and Walker (2012)
demonstrate that a group of engineering students in a South African university realised
that students from poor social backgrounds had high aspirations similar to students
from affluent families after interaction with students from a poor neighbourhood
school where they taught additional lessons in physical science and mathematics.
Affiliation or the cultivation of students’ humanity may be extended to other
experiences as well such as the plight of refugees migrating from war torn countries and even retrenched workers as a result of government austerity measures. Citizenship education underpinned by the capabilities approach therefore, is necessary to develop the humanity of students.

Lastly, Nussbaum (2006a) identifies the capability of narrative imagination as important for democratic citizenship education. Citizenship education when viewed from a capabilities approach may develop empathetic understanding among students such that they may imagine the possibility of others as a possibility for themselves (Nussbaum, 1997). Narrative imagination involves being in the shoes of a person different from oneself (Crosbie, 2014; Nussbaum, 2006a), experiencing their emotions, desires and vulnerabilities (Walker, 2012). Teachers may encourage the cultivation of narrative imagination through the reading of literature. DeCesare (2014) observes that critical literacy is of vital importance to the emergence of one’s democratic existence, including future participation in the socio-political life of the community. On this view, the humanities and art subjects present an opportunity for teachers to incorporate citizenship education underpinned by the capabilities approach.

In summary to this section, I have argued that when citizenship education is understood from the capabilities approach it enhances the capabilities of students such as their practical reason through the examination of oneself and one’s tradition. Practical reason is necessary for improving the quality of debates within a democracy. In addition, citizenship education when viewed from the capabilities approach enables students to facilitate the capabilities of others through social affiliation as part of their
humanity as well as narrative imagination. In contrast to the other moral philosophical perspectives, a unique contribution of the capabilities approach is that it operates as a social prerequisite. In particular, the capabilities approach is necessary for reflecting on social barriers that may prevent citizens from realising their opportunities to participate effectively in citizenship. However, the close association between the capabilities approach and human rights makes it difficult to think about dependence among citizens in citizenship education. While the capabilities approach recognises that human beings are social and that they are likely to encounter vulnerabilities in their lives, it is insufficient in understanding dependence among citizens including power relations that exist between those who receive and give care. I now turn to care ethics.

2.4 Care Ethics

It is necessary to differentiate care ethics from virtue ethics before looking at how citizenship education is understood from this moral philosophical perspective. We should differentiate between care ethics and virtue ethics because there is a debate in the research literature on moral philosophy about whether or not care may be construed as a virtue. In particular, Curzer (2007) recognises Aristotle as the founder of care ethics. He observes that care ethics shares many similarities with virtue ethics such as the emphasis on particularity, which includes relationships such as friendship and the relational nature of human beings, rather than the universality advocated in deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. In addition, care ethics and virtue ethics involve emotions in motivating the actions of citizens. Both care ethics and virtue ethics are also partial when it comes to dealing with citizens. For instance, in contrast
to the impartiality characteristic of deontological ethics, Noddings (1984) highlights caring within circles of care while virtue ethics is commonly understood to involve caring within relationships of friendship (Curzer, 2007). Lastly, Curzer observes that both care ethics and virtue ethics consider justice as separate from caring and nurturing although it is necessary in order to avoid unfairness within caring relationships. In light of these similarities between care ethics and virtue ethics, one might argue that the two moral philosophical perspectives should be fused together into a single moral theoretical framework.

However, Sander-Staudt (2006) argues that despite the similarities between care ethics and virtue ethics, the two moral philosophical perspectives should remain freestanding while collaborating to enhance each other’s strengths. This view reinforces the idea of underpinning citizenship education within a plural moral philosophical perspective so that it is enriched to fulfil its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. Care ethics and virtue ethics should remain comprehensive moral theoretical frameworks on their own in order to provide “conceptual distinctions that facilitate theoretical critique” (Sander-Staudt, 2006, p. 37). For instance, we may begin to imagine that care ethics could lose its feminist critique of virtue ethics when merged together. Virtue ethics is less critical of issues of power and privilege than care ethics because people are expected to exercise virtue from their social position. I will elaborate more on this in the following paragraph. Otherwise, the point advanced here is that merging the two moral theoretical frameworks is likely to be at the detriment and obfuscation of the other (Sander-Staudt, 2006). We should, therefore, think
critically about whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts including how that whole is to be constituted.

So in order to justify the inclusion of care ethics as a freestanding moral philosophical perspective with the potential of collaborating with other moral philosophical perspectives, I outline three ways in which care ethics is distinct from virtue ethics. Firstly, care ethics “scrutinises virtue in the context of how best to achieve the goals of care while VE [virtue ethics] scrutinises care in the context of how best to achieve virtue and a flourishing life” (Sander-Staudt, 2006, p. 35). For instance, Sander-Staudt indicates that when care is construed as a virtue, people who are socially privileged may avoid caring responsibilities that are considered burdensome, dirty or tedious as these responsibilities do not contribute to their good or flourishing. On the other hand, care ethics recognises that all people receive and give care regardless of social privilege. The conceptual difference between care ethics and virtue ethics also leads to the second distinction that care ethics is more pragmatic than virtue ethics (Sander-Staudt, 2006). In particular, we might set unreasonable standards for ourselves and other people if we consider care as a virtue rather than doing what we can within our responsibilities. Thirdly, Sander-Staudt (2006) observes that care ethics and virtue ethics are different in terms of being in the world. While virtue ethics emphasises the development of individual virtue in relation to others, care ethics is relational in a much broader sense which is associated with familial and communal identity (Sander-Staudt, 2006).
Having defined the distinction between care ethics and virtue ethics, it is also helpful to discuss the relevance of care ethics for citizenship education. In this regard, a major feature of care ethics is “the recognition that humans are concrete beings, who exist in mutually interconnected, interdependent, and often unequal relations with one another” (Hankivsky, 2014, p. 253). According to Noddings (1984) the basis for our caring arises from natural caring. Natural caring may be described as an involuntary interaction which arises out of love and inclination (Birsch, 2014), similar to the relationship between a mother and a child. Noddings is interpreted to perceive that natural caring which is rooted in family life “can be transferred to the wider world in order to guide social policy” (Hankivsky (2004, p. 12).

However, there are challenges with considering natural caring as a basis for citizenship education. First, there is an objection on the view in natural caring that women think differently from men on moral issues. It is argued that there is little evidence to suggest that men and women think differently on morality (Hankivsky, 2004; Tronto, 1993). Consequently, although initially associated with feminist ethics, care ethics has evolved to include all citizens (Birsch, 2014; Zembylas, 2010). Secondly, the account of care ethics I have given seems to suggest that there are no principles on how people ought to behave beyond the establishment of close relationships. Questions might therefore be asked about the desirability of citizenship education underpinned by such an account of care ethics. In particular, Carr (2005) argues that “it is hard to get a very clear theoretical handle on care ethics – not least, perhaps, because it seems in itself opposed to any very principled definition of moral association” (p. 139). Indeed, Noddings (1984) rejects moral rules for not being representative of the nature of
human relations since they are formal and stable. In addition, Noddings argues that rules are divisive because those who claim to hold a valuable principle are likely to become self-righteous and feel a sense of having the right to judge others. Following Hankivsky (2004; 2014), I argue that principles can be developed from care ethics and these principles may be used in citizenship education.

The use of principles in care ethics may be understood against the background that care is central to all human life including the private and public sphere. Hankivsky (2004) differentiates between the “first” and “second” (p. 11) generation of theorists in care ethics. She describes the first generation along Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (1984) as focussing on women’s morality such as “mothering, caring, nurturing activities and experiences” (Hankivsky, 2014, p. 253). The second generation of theorists in care ethics, she argues, transcend the focus on women’s morality to establish “care’s importance as both a moral and political concept” (Hankivsky, 2014, p. 253, emphasis in original). In this regard, the second generation is associated with Tronto (1993) and her followers who view the ethic of care and ethic of justice as complementary to one another (Hankivsky, 2004). So while there seems to be a lack of principles which ought to guide human behaviour in the account of first generation care theorists, the second generation embraces general principles developed from care ethics. Citizenship education underpinned by care ethics that is directed by general principles is necessary in order to guide the behaviour of students. In the next section I discuss three principles of care ethics so that we may understand the relevance of care ethics in citizenship.
2.4.1 Principles of Care Ethics and Citizenship

In contrast to the principles of justice which are abstract, impersonal and rigid rules, the principles of care ethics can be “flexible, able to accommodate particular issues, and situations, and be open to different processes of analyses and outcomes” (Hankivsky, 2006, p. 99). The three principles of care ethics include contextual sensitivity, responsiveness, and consequences of choice (Hankivsky, 2004; 2006; 2014). The argument presented in this discussion is that the morality of justice, which is often enacted in the form of laws and conventions, is useful in guiding human conduct, but it is not sufficient to address contextual problems of diversity and difference. Hankivsky (2006) observes that principles of care ethics open up new possibilities for understanding “moral problems, power inequities, and shared responsibilities” (p. 99). The reason why principles of justice are viewed as inadequate in addressing issues of diversity and difference, such as the marginalisation of women, ethnic minorities and the poor is because they are based on narrow abstract, uniform, and universal rules (Hankivsky, 2004; 2006). Principles of care ethics on the other hand are concrete and expansive enough to cater for difference and diversity in order to enrich citizenship education so that it reaches its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens.

We might observe the potential of care ethics to capture contextual problems related to diversity and difference if we consider the principle of contextual sensitivity. According to this principle of care ethics, citizens are considered specific and concrete individuals with a particular history rather than abstract and common beings (Hankivsky, 2004; 2006) who are isolated from one another. In essence, individuals
are perceived to be shaped by their contexts which contribute to who they are within the network of unequal relationships of interdependence they find themselves in. Hankivsky (2004) explains that the principle of contextual sensitivity in care ethics recognises that “people are shaped by their contexts, including their social, economic, political, historical and geographic circumstances” (p. 33). From this view, care ethics may reveal differences in the lived experiences of people such as the poor, women, ethnic minorities and the disabled, rather than generalising differences according to abstract, uniform and universal rules. In particular, contextual sensitivity allows us to ask pertinent political questions such as “whose needs are taken care of, under what circumstances, and by whom” (Hankivsky, 2004, p. 34). These questions allow us to recognise differences of power and marginalisation so that we may respond to social justice.

Responsiveness as the second principle of care ethics involves more than sympathetic understanding which is described by Noddings (1984) as becoming a duality or ‘feeling with’ the other. Instead, it involves engaging with the people cared for in a manner that incorporates their perspectives in resolving contextual social problems such as inequality (Hankivsky, 2004). The principle of responsiveness according to Hankivsky (2006) “constitutes a special form of mutual engagement, a unique and dialogical way of communicating and listening” (p. 102). Responsiveness is a way of making the voice of people such as those who are vulnerable and marginalised to be heard in order to influence policies within the public sphere. Responsiveness serves as a counter to the dominant voice of policy experts and the market within a neoliberal society. Curren (2006) defines neoliberalism as a political movement that is “friendly
to corporate deregulation, privatisation of public services and a general abandonment of the public sphere in the name of “freedom” and “efficiency” (p. 456). In contrast to the neoliberal view of politics, the principle of care ethics requires a variety of voices to be heard in the public sphere so that “important information is derived about the variety and nature of human needs, dependencies and vulnerabilities” (Hankivsky, 2004, p. 36).

Linked to responsiveness is the principle of consequences of choice (Hankivsky, 2004), in which care ethics is concerned with “human flourishing and the prevention of harm and suffering” (Hankivsky, 2014, p. 251). Unlike the principles of justice which may elicit indifference and lack of concern due to impartiality, care is “concerned expressly with the actual outcomes and practical and material effects on people’s lives of making certain choices and decisions” (Hankivsky, 2004, p. 38). There is a certain level of responsibility or commitment towards improving the well-being of people and the environment in care ethics so that according to Tronto (1993) we can live in this world as well as possible. In its consequences, Hankivsky (2006) describes care ethics as similar to utilitarian ethics. However, she explains that unlike utilitarianism, care ethics promotes the well-being of others “in all their diversity, while at the same time striving to prevent harm and suffering” (Hankivsky, 2006, p. 104, emphasis in original). On the other hand, the focus of care ethics on enhancing the capacities and flourishing of individuals, which includes access to health, education and political decision-making (Svenhuijsen, 2000), shares similarities with Nussbaum’s (2011a) capabilities although the capabilities approach is less critical of rights (Hankivsky, 2006).
The above discussion demonstrates that we need to pay attention to principles of care ethics if we are serious about social justice issues in citizenship education. For instance, the principle of contextual sensitivity does not overlook differences in the lived experiences of people which may be determined by race, gender, socio-economic status, and geographic circumstances. These differences may be glossed over if we focus on the criteria of neutrality, abstraction and impartiality in justice. The principle of responsiveness also alerts us to the significance of making the voices of people who are vulnerable and marginalised to be heard within neoliberal societies. The principle of consequences of choice also guides the possible actions of citizens against causing harm and suffering so that they enhance the well-being of others and the environment. These three principles of care ethics are not opposed to rights but complement the deficiencies within principles of justice. For instance, Gregory (2000, p. 447) observes that “a caring person will not always exercise the rights that justice grants her: she sometimes gives others more than they have the right to expect from her”. Recognising the principles of care ethics above, we may now describe citizenship education as understood from a care ethics perspective.

2.4.2 Care Ethics and Citizenship Education

Citizenship education when understood from a care ethics perspective acknowledges the importance of rights but also recognises that beyond rights there is a need for people to give and receive care. Hankivsky (2006) also observes that there is a recognition that a better society cannot be achieved through law, prescriptions and conventions alone. Obeying laws is insufficient without people caring for one another
at both local and global level. While care ethics may be criticised for attention to those who are close to us rather than strangers, there is also a view that this does not mean that we cannot connect with or have an interest in people we may never know personally (Hankivsky, 2004). If we consider caring as a “democratic practice in responding to the needs of marginalised others” (Zembylas, 2010, p. 242) such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, women, and people with disability, then, we are likely to incorporate caring into citizenship education. Zembylas (2010) suggests that the curriculum for education should promote inclusive citizenship through teaching students about other people’s cultures as well as promoting networks of solidarity rather than tolerance. Tolerance is perceived to be less positive because it has to do with putting up with what we do not like (Haydon, 2006) while solidarity is a more positive attitude that is linked to caring for people in distress.

A care ethics perspective on citizenship education is not only inclusive in terms of solidarity with vulnerable and marginalised people but encourages dialogue and personal narratives as well. In line with the principle of responsiveness, Hankisky (2004) explains that an ethic of care should provide the space and opportunity for people to engage in dialogue in a manner that allows others to speak from their perspectives. Similarly, Zembylas (2010) observes that the “ethic of care focuses on trust, social bonds, cooperation, caring relations and responding to needs” (p. 234). What this implies is that the pedagogical approach in teaching citizenship education underpinned by care ethics should encourage students to cooperate with others by allowing them to tell their different stories. The idea is to develop sympathy among students so that they may imagine what it might be like to be different in terms of
gender, race, ability and social status. Caring relations often involve power relations between the cared for (dependent) and the people providing the care (independent) according to Tronto (1993). We should therefore, discourage a situation where students think that they know better than the people who are in need of help. Instead, students should reflect on the stories of the people who are in need when deciding on the kind of help which is necessary.

Citizenship education underpinned by care ethics should also not be understood as concerned with providing charity to people in need, but should make students reflect on social justice policies that improve the well-being of vulnerable people. Social justice according to Hankivsky (2004) is “based on the idea that all members of society have equal access to the various features, benefits and opportunities of that society, regardless of their position or station in life” (p. 30). The goal of social justice is also shared by other perspectives such as justice as fairness (Rawls, 1993) but care ethics is concerned with judgements on social policy that are based on care. For instance, students may be encouraged in citizenship education to reflect on whether policies that are aimed at alleviating poverty are sensitive to contextual situations including improving relationships. Government welfare policies such as access to education and health care are consistent with social justice but may lack sensitivity to contextual issues (including culture) which is necessary in providing a comprehensive solution to people’s problems. Citizenship education that is informed by care ethics should enable students to question structures that perpetuate exclusion, marginalisation, suffering and harm with a view of transforming such structures towards the well-being of people.
In summarising this section, attention to citizenship education underpinned by care ethics encourages reflection on social and political responsibility towards others and the environment. Hankivsky (2004) observes that “When informed by the critical standpoint of an ethic of care, the dynamics and reproduction of a range of human inequalities can be more realistically captured and therefore rendered much more difficult to ignore” (p. 34). The range of human inequalities that may be captured by care ethics include features such as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity and geography (as the North and South global relation may indicate). The idea of reflecting on issues of inequality through citizenship education informed by care ethics is to create a vision of a society without inequality. In this regard, the combination of values of justice and care ethics according Hankivsky (2004) “makes citizens more thoughtful, more attentive to the needs of others and therefore, better democratic citizens” (p. 28). This view is in line with my argument that a plural moral philosophical perspective enriches citizenship education in order for it to reach its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. In the following section I also discuss utilitarian ethics in order to determine how citizenship education may be understood from this perspective.

2.5 Utilitarianism Theory

Utilitarianism is criticised by scholars in education for its singular focus on happiness at the neglect of diversity (Nussbaum, 2011; Tarrant, 1991). In particular, Mill explains that utility or the “Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (p. 121). Utilitarians like Bentham use variables such as
intensity, duration, fecundity, purity and extent to calculate the possible amount of pleasure over pain for the right action (Birsch, 2014; Gibbs, 1986). I will not discuss these variables here since they are not central to my topic except to point out that they contribute to the overall quantity of pleasure over pain in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action. In this view of utilitarianism, the intrinsic value or quality of an action matters very little unless it increases the net amount of pleasure over pain in terms of any of the five variables. Ultimately, the action which produces more pleasure over pain is perceived to be the right action while an action that produces more pain over pleasure is considered wrong action. At the social level, utilitarians aggregate the happiness of each self-interested individual in order to determine the action that is likely to produce the greatest happiness for the majority (Birsch, 2014; Tarrant, 1991).

The above description demonstrates that a democratic citizenship based on utilitarianism requires facts or options in order to calculate and determine the option which is likely to produce the most happiness for the majority rather than engaging in moral debate. The lack of moral debate prompts Tarrant (1991) to argue that Benthamite utilitarianism is more suited to dictatorship than democracy. He argues that the lack of moral debate reduces the majority of people to a position of moral insignificance. While utilitarianism places individuals in a potentially powerful position to hold leaders accountable according to the greatest benefit for the majority, the framework in which individuals operate makes it difficult to achieve this end (Tarrant, 1991). For instance, leaders in a democracy grounded in utilitarianism have no responsibility to encourage dissent from a prevailing culture of happiness. Such leaders may manipulate citizens through lack of information as well as socialisation
through education in order to avoid an alternative form of government or different conception of happiness. Utilitarianism may be deemed unsuitable for democracy (Tarrant, 1991) because to espouse happiness as the sole criterion for government policy invariably excludes other alternatives which may exist within the plurality of ideas in a democracy.

Furthermore, utilitarians may appeal to the ideas of Mill (2015) in order to resolve some of the challenges cited above such as acting without feelings including self-interested calculations of happiness. Mill understands that human beings depend on their intellect, feelings and imagination rather than mere sensations for their pleasure. He argues that the principle of utility recognises that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others” (Mill, 2015, p. 122, emphasis in original). In his view, individuals with higher faculties are most likely to desire higher order preferences (or pleasures) which require more intellectual capacity while those with lower faculties may prefer lower order preferences. However, those with higher faculties are happier compared to others even though they may not be content because their threshold of content is high. In Comparison, those with lower order faculties may have a lower level of happiness but content since their threshold for human desires is low. Happiness according to Mill is not calculated as a surplus of pleasure over pain in order to determine the right action. Instead, when presented with two competing pleasures, we may depend on the feelings and judgement of those who are acquainted with such pleasures to determine the preference of one over the other based on quality rather than quantity.
In terms of citizenship, an appeal to Mill’s utilitarianism encourages the maximisation of happiness in society. In particular, Mill (2015) views the citizen as a sympathetic individual who has the capacity to imagine the situation of others. He argues that a perfect ideal of a utilitarian morality is “To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself” (p. 131). According to this view, a citizen is expected to operate according to laws or rules that maximise the happiness of the individual as well as the majority. He explains that “Genuine private affections, and sincere interest in the public good, are possible, though in unequal degrees, to every rightly brought-up human being” (Mill, 2015, p. 128). A rightly-brought up human being is presumably one who is capable of higher order preferences which is a condition that is liable to discontent but provides a better level of happiness than a lower order preference. Mill believes that poverty and suffering may be eliminated “by the wisdom of society, combined with the good sense and providence of individuals” (p. 128). Similarly, Singer (2002) argues on utilitarian grounds that the problems of poverty and climate change could be resolved if people thought seriously about donating some of their disposable income as well as adjusting their lifestyle to benefit humanity and the environment.

However, the idea that individuals could sacrifice their satisfaction or content in order to accomplish the goals of happiness for the majority may be criticised for neglecting the interests of the individual. I, therefore, should remind the reader that my concern in this section of the discussion is to explain how citizenship education may be understood from a utilitarian perspective. Thus far, I have argued that utilitarianism is concerned with the goal of happiness. In addition, two versions of utilitarianism may
be distinguished: the ideas of Bentham and those of Mill. In particular, Benthamite utilitarianism seems inconsistent with democratic citizenship because the sole value of happiness which is calculated as a surplus of pleasure over pain does not allow for diversity as it might be expected in a democracy. The plurality of ideas within a democracy might include alternative views (such as virtue) which may be opposed to happiness as an end of moral action. On the other hand, Mill’s utilitarianism which includes a hierarchy of preferences (Tarrant & Tarrant, 2004) based on feelings, intellect and imagination, allows for a certain level of diversity in determining happiness. In the following section on citizenship education I consider how citizenship education may be understood from a classical and Millian perspective of utilitarianism.

2.5.1 Utilitarianism and Citizenship Education

It might be difficult to explain how classical or Benthamite utilitarianism could underpin citizenship education given that I have argued that it is not consistent with democracy. For Tarrant (1991), classical utilitarianism is not only incompatible with democracy but with democratic education as well. When citizenship education is understood from a classical utilitarian perspective it seems anything but democratic. On this view, Callan (2004) describes an “anti-ideal” – of self-interested citizenship” (p. 74) where the state may marshal the self-interests of its citizens to act in ways that are likely to contribute to political stability. For instance, the notion of education for its own sake may be labelled by politicians as “a bit dodgy” (Tarrant & Tarrant, 2004, p. 117) in order to channel self-interest towards vocational subjects. Vocational training is associated with utilitarian citizenship education (Tarrant, 1991; Tarrant & Tarrant, 2004) because of the benefits of efficiency accompanied with satisfaction for
individuals in doing their job while it also maximises benefits for the economy. However, Arthur and Wilson (2010) observe that vocational education has made schools “become better focused on the task of making students more response-able, [while] they have given scant attention to the business of helping them to become more responsible and self-aware” (p. 340, emphasis in original).

The challenge for citizenship education when understood from a utilitarian perspective is for students to acquire the necessary skills in order to respond to different tasks in the environment while giving them a broad conception of education to become responsible citizens. In this regard, Tarrant and Tarrant (2004) argue that Mill’s utilitarianism is capable of supporting an eclectic curriculum which encourages critical thinking that is necessary for citizenship participation. An individual who is only satisfied with getting skills for employment through vocational education may be considered to have a lower faculty and basic preferences according to Millian utilitarianism. Such an individual has basic preferences such as being a passive citizen who accepts things uncritically. On the other hand, general education which encourages the individual to question things and acquire more values rather than mere socialisation for work is consistent with developing people’s higher faculties so that they may have better preferences. Mill argued that it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (p. 124). A questioning attitude requires more satisfaction (being Socrates). However, citizenship education is better understood from a Millian perspective because students are not only likely to be happier than their prior state of general education but they are likely to be critical citizens.
It is necessary that students receive general education in order to flourish as citizens. For instance, Winch (1996) observes that “it can hardly be maintained that there is no overlap between the aims of education for citizenship education and the aims of vocational and liberal forms of education” (p. 38). He argues that liberal education that does not prepare people for work or life as citizens would be insufficient. Similarly, vocational education that does not include intrinsic or social aims of education would be intolerable because it only satisfies the utilitarian need of getting a job including income for buying material needs. It is maintained in this discussion that, in addition to preparation for employment, students’ faculties should be developed so that they may choose higher order preferences in a manner consistent with the elevated capacities of human beings rather than satisfaction of simple physical pleasures like animals. HMIE (2006) in Scotland reports that many schools “link charity fund-raising activities to promoting enterprise among young people” (p. 6) as part of developing their skills for responsible citizenship. While this example focuses on social rather than political responsibility, it illustrates the possibility of underpinning citizenship education with utilitarian ethics when citizenship education is offered as a theme across the curriculum.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to discuss how citizenship education is understood from five moral philosophical perspectives, namely, deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics, utilitarian ethics and the capabilities approach. The aim for this discussion in part was to find out if any of the moral philosophical perspectives is sufficient to inform citizenship education so that it is enriched to reach its full potential of developing
responsible and participatory citizens. On this view, advantages and disadvantages for each of the moral philosophical perspectives underpinning citizenship education were discussed but none of them was considered sufficient to inform citizenship education. This view closes a gap in knowledge where scholars criticise other moral philosophical perspectives underpinning citizenship education without a full discussion of how citizenship education could be understood from their preferred perspectives. However, to argue that any of the five moral philosophical perspectives is insufficient to underpin citizenship education does not provide a sufficient rationale for underpinning citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective. In the next chapter I discuss the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.
CHAPTER 3

3.0 The Case for Moral Pluralism in Citizenship Education

This chapter explores research question number three in the thesis, which is concerned with the plausibility of grounding citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective. As it was observed in Chapter Two, moral philosophical perspectives such as deontological ethics, utilitarian ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics and the capabilities approach feature sporadically in the philosophy of education literature on citizenship education. Each of these perspectives has distinct pros and cons with regards to citizenship education, and none of them seems adequate to inform a comprehensive and progressive conception of citizenship education. A progressive conception of citizenship education in this study is loosely defined as good citizenship education that is gender sensitive, encourages empathic understanding, promotes social and political activity, as well as virtuous behaviour.

Given that it is counter-intuitive that effective or meaningful citizenship education is best informed exclusively by a single moral philosophical perspective, it is tempting to combine different moral philosophical perspectives to inform a progressive conception of citizenship education. For instance, Johansson (2009) while following the ideas of Noddings (1984) acknowledges that there are tensions between justice in the form of rights and care ethics but argues that moral pluralism in the form of rights and care is necessary for children as citizens to develop “moral knowledge about the particular and specific in addition to the common and global” (p. 89). What Johansson implies is that students should develop care or moral sensitivity to concrete situations...
within their immediate environment such as the family and neighbourhood, while they approach general moral problems through the principles of right.

However, it is not entirely clear from the above argument about moral pluralism whether care ethics needs to be complemented by the application of principles to achieve a more satisfactory moral philosophical perspective, or whether virtue ethics, for example, would add value as well. It would seem probable that virtue ethics would need to play a role in any plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education because of the importance of character dispositions for living in a democracy. For instance, Nussbaum (2001a; 2013) argues that people running democratic institutions should be informed by compassion. Yet, even if we include the virtues, we would still be left with the challenge of deciding whether the virtues should precede the rules or whether they would be necessary to make people amenable to follow an already existing set of rules in a similar way to liberal citizenship education. These and other issues need to be resolved in order to have a better understanding of the nature of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.

In any case, moral pluralism in citizenship education may be dismissed by others as moral relativism. In this regard, Colby and her colleagues (2003) who support moral pluralism in citizenship education, observe that moral relativism has no valid criteria for distinguishing among different moral positions. They explain that in moral relativism, individuals consider any moral position as having an equal chance of being accepted. On the other hand, a pluralistic view of morality in citizenship education presupposes that “there are two or more incommensurable moral frameworks that are
justifiable [but] cannot be reduced to a single system” (Colby et al., 2003, p. 15). For instance, citizenship education could aim at developing empathy and care among students so that they could deal with particular incidences of suffering, such as poverty. At the same time, students could demand provision and protective rights on behalf of those who are underprivileged, especially where poverty is systemic or endemic. This example illustrates the possible benefits of complementarity between care ethics (sympathy) or perhaps virtue ethics (compassion) with deontic rights.

The current literature on citizenship education, despite the efforts of Colby and others (2003) to defend moral pluralism, fails to provide a persuasive account as to why and how different moral philosophical perspectives must be combined to inform what, in this paper, is called a progressive citizenship education. For instance, Colby and her colleagues (2003) focus on citizenship education in the context of liberal education provided by universities and colleges in the United States. Their account is similar to that of Nussbaum (1997) who follows a philosophy that is concerned with the capacity of people to develop their humanity within an interconnected global world. In her account, Nussbaum develops three human capabilities which include; the capacity for examination of oneself and one’s traditions, narrative imagination (that is, empathetic understanding of the world and other human beings through stories), and the ability for people to see themselves not only as people of a local region but also as human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern. Among the literature on citizenship education we also find a case being made for active citizenship associated with the republican approach (White, 2013), as well as discussions of advantages inherent in citizenship education rooted in virtue ethics as opposed to
deontological ethics or communitarianism (Carr, 2006a). Despite their relevance and importance, all of these accounts fall short of developing a model, let alone a systematic defence of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.

Given the lack of systematic defence for citizenship education grounded in a plural moral philosophical perspective, I argue that different moral philosophical perspectives must be combined to inform citizenship education. This is necessary in order to enrich citizenship education so that it reaches its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. The development of responsible citizens with a questioning attitude that is focused on social justice including participation, requires citizenship education informed by a plural rather than a single moral philosophical perspective.

In the following discussion, I begin by defining the concept of progressive or good citizenship education, making the observation that core issues concerning citizenship education are embedded in debates about the development of autonomy in education. A focus on autonomy assists us in revealing the limits of the conception of an ideal or good citizen and, by extension, good citizenship education. The discussion of autonomy also includes reference to the related notion of authenticity and how both concepts might inform a conception of progressive or good citizenship education. In particular, the discussion looks at how relational authenticity deals with the tension between autonomy and a substantive view of the good life within a plural moral
philosophical perspective on citizenship education. I now turn to the definition of good or progressive citizenship education.

3.1 A Definition of Progressive or Good Citizenship Education

There are certain characteristics associated with the definition of progressive or good citizenship education in the research literature. For instance, most people would expect that students should obtain knowledge on rights and responsibilities in order to participate meaningfully as good citizens. However, it is not clear when citizens need to participate actively or passively in citizenship. Associated with this view of when to participate actively or passively in citizenship, is whether rights should be conceived of as universal according to human rights or contextual in the form of citizenship rights. It matters according to Kiwan (2005) whether citizenship education is theorised in terms of human rights or citizenship rights because this might affect the extent to which citizenship participation is understood and encouraged in education. We might also think about whether citizenship participation in the private and the public sphere needs to be given equal recognition in citizenship education as most feminists would agree. I discuss these issues in the following sections in order to locate a plural moral philosophical perspective in relation to progressive or good citizenship education.

3.1.1 Conception of the Citizen in Progressive or Good Citizenship Education

One of the issues in which a progressive or good citizenship education should take a position is the conception of the individual. In particular, Enslin and White (2003) describe citizenship as “a legal status conferred by the state” (p. 111) regardless of how we think good citizenship is constituted. According to this view, citizenship
confers to the individual citizen the right to liberty which includes freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. In addition, the legal status of a citizen may include welfare rights such as the right to education and health. Audigier (2000, p. 16) also argues that citizenship “is always a matter of belonging to a community, which entrains politics and rights, notably political rights” (p. 16). Citizenship identity according to rights is not opposed to collective participation (Mouffe, 2005). To describe citizenship in terms of practice or political participation is not to suggest that citizens should be stripped of their individual rights. Instead, human rights may be used as a basis for citizenship participation. For instance, Turner (2013) describes human rights as important in promoting the empowerment of women, as well as a source of inspiration for political and other social movements, while they also serve as a basis for the activities of Non-Governmental Organisations.

However, a strict communitarian view might reject the existence of human rights. For instance, MacIntyre (1981) dismisses human rights as fiction, while he accepts “rights conferred by positive law or custom on specified classes of people” (p. 82). Central to MacIntyre’s rejection of human rights is the view that human rights are not based on any substantial facts except intuition. He acknowledges the creation of human rights as a strategy to support the idea of an autonomous moral agent which followed the rejection of social ends (teleology) and hierarchy as sources of authority at the inception of modernity. But his views have been criticised as relativist (Carr, 2006a; Arthur & Carr, 2013) because of the acceptance of different customs and traditions from various communities which may not be easily justified on universal grounds when people’s dignity is violated. In his later work, MacIntyre (1994) denies the
charge of communitarianism. He claims that a practised-based form of Aristotelian community in the modern world can only be small-scale and local. He concludes that “the nation-state is not and cannot be the locus of community” (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 303), as communitarians contend, because of the injustices associated with a nation-state as an all-embracing community. In addition, MacIntyre (1999) accepts that modern philosophy rightly conceives of the individual in terms of respect for individual rights. However, the communitarian view of individuals in terms of their social roles rather than the individuality implied in universal rights illustrates the need to consider whether a progressive or good citizenship education should be contextual or universal.

3.1.2 Citizenship Participation within the Particularity of Citizenship Education

With regards to the above question on whether citizenship education should be universal or not, there are strong reasons to support the view that citizenship education should be conceived of along a contextual rather than universal view. For instance, while we may justifiably consider active citizenship an important aim of good citizenship education, there may be instances where active participation may not be necessary. Kymlicka (1999) observes that, “there will be times and places where a minimal citizenship is all that we can or should require” (p. 83), while at times an active approach to citizenship is necessary. In particular, Kymlicka considers active political participation necessary to defend democratic institutions and to fight injustice within society. This suggests that citizenship participation depends on the particularity of the situation. In other words, students need to be taught to value just democratic institutions so that they may be able to recognise potential threats as well as show
willingness to defend these democratic institutions. In this regard, there may be no reason for maximal citizenship participation during times of stability except exercising vigilance through questioning the existing order to ensure that it is just. Minimal citizenship participation does not imply being apathetic about one’s democratic institutions.

We might recognise from the above discussion that a progressive or good citizenship education requires critical reflection in order for students to make the right decisions for contextual or particular situations. In particular, students need critical reflection in order to discern when a minimal or maximal approach to active citizenship is required. In addition, active political participation itself requires critical reflection in order to determine the most appropriate means of resolving a particular social or political problem. In this regard, we might extend the application of critical reflection to the determination of an appropriate moral philosophical perspective for citizenship participation. For instance, students may need critical reflection or practical wisdom in order to decide whether a situation requires virtue (such as justified anger at injustice) or an appeal to rights. An isolated case of discrimination might require one to exercise mildness of temper while systemic or structural discrimination may require a different approach such as collective political action including an appeal to citizenship rights. In all instances, citizenship education should assist students to use critical reflection in order to act from their own inclination or authenticity. I will have more to say on authenticity in subsequent sections of this chapter.
In the meantime, I may note that dealing with particular or contextual situations does not imply being relative. In relativism, it is considered impossible to reach any specific agreements about moral principles (Turner, 2013). The difficulty in reaching agreement is that any moral position has an equal chance of being accepted. In my conception of progressive or good citizenship education, there is a specific agreement about which moral principles are justifiable for particular actions. Good citizenship education, therefore, is universal only in so far as there is agreement about moral principles to justify actions. Apart from that, it is not uniform but particularist or contextual while it remains connected to universal moral philosophical principles.

3.1.3 Appropriateness of Citizenship Rights over Human Rights in Citizenship Education

While most texts on liberal citizenship education take it for granted that citizenship education theory is informed by universal human rights, some scholars have objected to this assertion. For instance, Kiwa (2005) questions the grounding of citizenship education theory in human rights because of its universality. She argues that “human rights cannot logically be a theoretical underpinning for citizenship because human rights discourses are located within a universalist frame of reference, in contrast to that of citizenship, which is located within a more particularist frame” (p. 37). At the centre of Kiwan’s argument is the distinction between human rights and citizenship rights. She argues that while human rights are informed by the “notion of common humanity based on ethical conceptualisations of the individual”, citizenship rights on the other hand “are defined in relation to a political community based on political conceptualisation of the individual” (p. 37). It was explained earlier that citizenship is
based upon membership in a political community which comes with a range of citizenship rights. It therefore, follows that a conceptual distinction should be made between citizenship as membership in a common humanity (ethical community) and that of membership in a political community, in citizenship education.

It is difficult to disagree with Kiwan (2005) on her view of grounding citizenship education within a particularist framework because of the advantages inherent in it, although ties with the rest of humanity may still persist. In particular, locating citizenship education within a political community has the advantage of presenting a more substantial rather than an abstract universalist view of citizens’ identity. Citizenship education based on a substantive view of people’s identity such as nationality, culture and perhaps history, may enhance empowerment and active participation. For instance, Kiwan asserts that, the conflation of human rights and citizenship in England’s schools, “may obstruct the empowerment and active participation of individual citizens” (p. 47). She argues that, this is because the neutral language of human rights stresses “legal definitions of the individual in universalist terms and does not substantially address or include issues relating to identity” (Kiwan, 2005, p. 47). In other words, human rights encourage a narrow or thin conception of individuals which encourages passive citizenship participation. Citizenship rights on the other hand supports active citizenship because it has a broad conception of the individual along national characteristics such as ethnicity and perhaps religion.

If we agree with Kiwan that citizenship education should be grounded on citizenship rights, according to the manner in which she describes it, this suggests that we should
reject the extremes of individuality expressed in universal human rights on the one hand and the relativism associated with a strict communitarian view of citizenship education (which was described earlier) on the other hand. The individuality in human rights may be observed in Rawls’s (1993) liberal view that individuals exist prior to their social roles because they choose them. In MacIntyre’s (1981) account on the other hand, social roles exist prior to individuals and they do not choose them but they are assumed as part of heritage and history. Good or progressive citizenship education rejects both extremes and advocates a balance between the two positions. In particular, the substantive view of citizenship rights which is grounded in a particular context seems consistent with a plural moral philosophical perspective which requires the accommodation of civic virtues. So while citizenship education recognises the dignity of human beings according to citizenship rights, it should also be substantive enough to accommodate civic virtues.

3.1.4 Universal Human Rights Presented as Narrative in Contextual Citizenship Education

To argue that grounding citizenship education theory in universalist principles of human rights is problematic does not mean that human rights may not be included as a component of citizenship education. Human rights are important in dealing with stereotypes of other people’s history and religion, as well as countering sexist and nationalist tendencies among students, as citizens of the world. Adami (2014) expresses the importance of human rights education as “learning about the ‘other’ in order to improve relations between plural ‘others’ and ‘us’” (p. 293), as part of identity politics in citizenship education. In any case, human rights are practised within a
particular context despite their limitation of describing people as the ‘other’ where everyone is considered different and deserving of respect from ‘us’. This limitation relates to an impersonal or neutral language where the identity of the individual is understood in abstract rather than substantial terms.

While Kiwan (2005) observes that we need to make a conceptual distinction between human rights and citizenship rights in order to address the contextual nature of citizenship education, others, such as Adami (2014), suggest the use of narratives to incorporate human rights within citizenship education. Adami argues that, “narrating human rights in relation to life stories is not concerned with ‘learning about the other’; neither is it concerned with ‘learning from the other’; but rather ‘learning in relations’ through narratives” (p. 295). She describes her approach of the use of narratives as enriching Nussbaum’s (1997; 2006a) notion of narrative imagination which is concerned with ‘learning about the ‘other’ through stories. In narrative imagination, stories are used to develop the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of someone different from ourselves (empathetic understanding of the ‘other’) when making acts of judgement (Nussbaum, 1997; 2006a). Adami’s approach of ‘learning in relations’ through narratives on the other hand is grounded in Arendt’s notion that, “an action, or narration, cannot be seen in isolation or judged through the intentions of the initiator, since actions receive their political significance in how they are received by others” (Adami, 2014, p. 296). I shall say more on narrative imagination and action as narrative in Chapter Four.
So, while the issue of narratives is not the focus of this discussion, the point I am making is that there are ways through which we can incorporate the particularity of human rights within citizenship education. For Adami (2014), learning about the “collective other as a way of achieving a sense of global citizenship through emotions such as empathy” (p. 298) in the form of written stories is not sufficient. Instead, following Arendt’s view of political action, the world should be presented to students in its plurality (uniqueness) and complexities. Presenting the world in its plurality and complexities is possible through “sharing life narratives, urgent for you and me here and now” (Adami, 2014, p. 298), so that students bring something new and unexpected. When the world is presented to students in its plurality (or uniqueness of every individual’s experience) what happens is that narratives and counter narratives play the role of encouraging deliberation and judgement of actions related to human rights. This sharing of narratives and counter narratives may transform classrooms into public spaces characterised by a certain quality of human interaction where students entertain politics among each other as unique individuals. Consequently, this narrative and counter narrative brings out the particularity (or experience) of human rights in citizenship education.

3.1.5 Private and Public Spheres of Citizenship Education

Good citizenship education should also recognise relations between the public and private spheres of citizenship. Recognising relations between the private and public spheres implies the acknowledgement of the important role of both women and men in active citizenship. Greene and Griffiths (2003, p. 84) observe that “the personal is political”, presupposing that what people do at home is part of their activities as
citizens. It is generally accepted among most societies around the world that the involvement of women in the public arena where men are considered to have been dominant for too long, is most welcome. However, to promote active public participation at the expense of the work done in the family is to reject the importance of activities such as raising children as part of active citizenship. Enslin and White (2003) explain that even if citizenship may be maximal in terms of welfare rights, if it is not gender sensitive it may be perceived as minimal. In this regard, Enslin and White perceive maximal (active) citizenship as positive while the minimal (passive) is seen as negative.

The argument I am making concerning the recognition of the private sphere as a participatory platform for active citizenship is not the same as the liberal view of gender neutrality. It is often argued that the language of gender neutrality in citizenship has the possibility of excluding women from fully participating as citizens (Prokhovnik, 1998; Tronto, 1993; J. A. White, 2001). This is mainly because “Gender neutral talk about ‘self-reliance’ is often a code for the view that men should support the family while women should look after the household and care for the elderly, the sick and the young” (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 358). In order to achieve equal citizenship between both gender groups, it is proposed that the proportional amount of work responsibilities within the household needs to change so that men assume more domestic responsibilities than usual (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994). Similarly, in citizenship education, the focus should be directed towards encouraging boys and girls to change the way they understand their roles in the private and public realms (Enslin & White, 2003). In addition, the provision of rights such as child support and publicly
funded day care could assist women to participate in the public domain (Enslin & White, 2003).

To cite the issue of rights here is to acknowledge its importance but this does not nullify the point I am making that in order to minimise the distinction between the public and private aspects of citizenship requires going beyond individual human rights. Minimising the distinction between the two domains of active citizenship demands a change in social attitude which may be achieved through good or progressive citizenship education. A change in social attitude begins with weighing the pros and cons of what would constitute an appropriate platform for active citizenship (Enslin & White, 2003). Ultimately, regardless of whether the two domains are valued equally or differently it would be necessary to facilitate change in the way men and women view their roles between the so called private and public arenas for citizenship participation. Otherwise, gender stereotypes may persist if it is left to each individual to decide according to individual human rights.

Acknowledging the involvement of both gender groups in citizenship is consistent with the view of what I describe as progressive or good citizenship education. Liberalism according to Greene and Griffiths (2003) makes “no assumption about the people who enter the public space” (p. 84). The gender neutral language of liberalism has the potential of destroying the plurality or uniqueness of every individual (Arendt, 1998) because it does not recognise the ‘other’ as different, while it also marginalises one section of the population. Although in some instances human rights may be used to defend the well-being of women, it is argued that, “our social life constructs our
identities for us, and if we want to be free from constructions that are demeaning, condescending or insulting it is collective and not individual action that is needed” (Smith, 2003, p. 167).

3.1.6 Good Citizenship Education and Virtues of the Citizen

A complete picture of citizenship education requires addressing issues related to identity of the citizen, citizenship participation, social prerequisite and virtues of the citizen (McLaughlin, 1992; 2000). These features of citizenship education are implicit in my discussion. For instance, it was noted with regards to identity that good citizenship education should be anchored on citizenship rights rather than human rights, although this does not mean that human rights may not be taught in citizenship education. With regards to citizenship participation, it was observed that good citizenship is sensitive to the particularity of the situation such that active citizenship is necessary during times of instability when democratic institutions are threatened than when the situation is stable. In addition, social prerequisite was discussed in relation to the recognition of both the private and public spheres as platforms for citizenship participation regardless of gender. However, I have only alluded to the virtues of a citizen. In the following discussion, I argue that virtues should form part of a progressive or good citizenship education.

A good conception of citizenship education requires people who possess virtues of character and thought in order to seek their own interests as well as the public good. Most scholars agree that citizenship education requires students to develop certain virtues (Callan & White; 2003; Carr, 2006a; Enslin & White, 2003; Gutmann, 2007),
even though there is little agreement on the extent or substantive nature of these virtues. The lack of agreement about the extent of virtues emanates from differences about the conception of a good life (or autonomy). While liberals in their thin view of what constitutes a good life place rules prior to virtues, communitarians and virtue ethicists see virtues as a prerequisite for any rules to be followed. For instance MacIntyre (1981) in following Aristotelian virtue ethics, explains that, “knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of justice” (p. 178). This is in contrast to Rawls’s (1993) view of justice which conceives of moral virtues as necessary for acting on the basic principles of right.

However, for the purposes of good or progressive citizenship education, it seems plausible to conceive of virtues broadly along the Aristotelian view of human flourishing. Nussbaum (2011a) argues that individual choice is important for Aristotle in that “no action counts as virtuous in any way unless it is mediated by the person’s own thought and selection” (p. 125). She continues to add that Aristotle “did not instruct politicians to make everyone perform desirable activities” (p. 125). On this view, educating students on virtues is consistent with respecting their dignity as human beings since it allows them to make an informed choice about the kind of life they want to live. Virtue ethics is supported in this discussion because individuals do not only concern themselves about the common good but their interests as well (MacAllister, 2015; MacIntyre, 1999). In particular, the development of practical wisdom may allow individuals to make appropriate actions according to their interests and that of the public. Callan and White (2003) also observe that virtues as qualities of character are required by citizens “for critical independence of thought to assess
others’ arguments as well as the moral courage to stand up for their own views” (p. 97). Critical thinking as an element of autonomy is important for constructive debates within a democracy.

3.1.7 Definition of Good Citizenship Education and its Implications for a Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective

In summarising the above discussion on the definition of a good or progressive citizenship education, we may argue that deontic rights in the form of citizenship rights as well as human rights (when conceived of as narratives) must be accommodated within the particularity of citizenship education. Citizenship rights are important regardless of whether we conceive of citizenship education along a participatory citizenship approach or not. The above discussion shows the predominance of rights throughout the discussion, whether it is about identity, participation, or social prerequisites. This is partly because rights are implicated in issues related to justice. However, the predominance of rights does not mean that they are sufficient to inform good citizenship education. Deontic rights are inadequate for understanding issues related to the recognition of the public and private spheres as arenas for citizenship participation.

Given the inadequacy of deontic rights in addressing concrete issues related to caring in the privacy of the home suggests that we could complement it with care ethics. A progressive or good citizenship education should recognise both the private and public spheres as platforms of active citizenship participation. The recognition of both spheres as platforms or arenas of citizenship participation in citizenship education
means encouraging young boys to see themselves playing a more active role in the private sphere than they normally would while girls should also consider a more active role in the public sphere. Personal narratives which recognise the difference or uniqueness of each individual rather than the abstract neutrality of rights is one strategy which teachers may use to promote an inclusive citizenship education as part of care ethics. While care ethics has largely been associated with the feminist agenda (Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984), my interest in this discussion is to advocate the involvement of care ethics in citizenship education rather than to associate it with a particular gender. In particular, care ethics enriches citizenship education through its emphasis on responsibility in concrete situations such as the privacy of the home and providing the needs of others.

The capabilities approach also feature in a progressive or good citizenship education. For instance, the contextual nature of citizenship education requires narrative imagination such as the use of written stories to cultivate empathetic feelings or compassionate understanding in making judgements about people who are different from ourselves. The use of narrative imagination is not relegated as unimportant just because of the use of personal narratives and counter narratives. Instead, personal narratives and counter narratives (or learning in relation to the other) complement narrative imagination (learning about the other). Both narrative imagination as well as personal narratives and counter narratives are important in citizenship education as more will be revealed in the next chapter.
Virtues are also implicated in my discussion of the characteristics of good or progressive citizenship education. In particular, virtues are important in contributing towards personal and communal flourishing. While scholars in liberal citizenship education (Callan & White, 2003; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994) might emphasise the intellectual virtues associated with autonomy or independent thinking, it might be argued that moral virtues such as friendship and generosity are important as well. We need the moral virtues in order for students to think about the common good in addition to their own well-being. The substantive nature of citizenship rights which are grounded in the contextual nature of citizenship education may be perceived to be consistent with the particularity of moral virtues as opposed to the abstract and ‘thin’ view of human rights.

Each of the moral philosophical perspectives involved in my discussion of progressive or good citizenship education plays a specific role, and may be justified according to public reason as I have explained that citizenship education is concerned with education for living with others. The plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education, therefore, is not a melange of moral philosophical perspectives brought together out of convenience. Instead, the plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education discussed in this chapter is a possibility, and is one that can withstand the risk of collapsing into relativism. I explain more on this in the following section where I discuss the resolution of conflicts within a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.
Meanwhile, it may be observed that my view of a plural moral philosophical perspective is consistent with that of Peters (1981) who despite proclaiming to be a rationalist in moral education, accepted that “the most important things to encourage in children were sympathy, compassion, concern for others and the like” (p. 111). Peters (1981) cautions that most of moral development is dominated by “monistic theories” where an attempt is made that “one type of justification can be given for everything which there are reasons for doing or being” (p. 83). In particular, he criticises Kohlberg’s moral development theory for its single moral philosophical perspective which he (Peters) considers not sufficient and unconvincing because it neglects other morally important views.

On the view argued in this thesis therefore, care ethics (sympathy and care), virtue ethics (friendship and compassion), deontological ethics (participation, protective and provisional rights) and the capabilities approach constitute part of citizenship education. To underpin citizenship education on a single moral philosophical perspective, such as deontic rights, neglects other morally important ideas. In this regard, although Peters was concerned with moral education, it was also noted earlier that Colby and her colleagues (2003) acknowledge the need for moral pluralism in citizenship education. However, a question might still arise on the possible conflicts between different moral philosophical perspectives in terms of specific moves within the ideal of citizenship or citizenship education. For instance, it might be argued that while one perspective is better at grounding citizenship education in one particular domain, and another in other domains, there could be conflicts within the same domain.
3.1.8 Resolving Conflicts within a Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective on Citizenship Education

To argue that one moral philosophical perspective is better at grounding citizenship education in one particular domain, and another in a different domain, is consistent with what Nussbaum (2011b) describes as internal pluralism. She explains that “Internal pluralism tells us that there are several distinct, intrinsically valuable elements that can be combined in a single, reasonably unified picture of a good human life” (p. 9). In particular, what unites or organises different moral philosophical perspectives (grounding different domains in citizenship education) in my thesis is public reason. Citizenship education is concerned with public reason (Haydon, 2010a) in the sense that students should have the capacity to differentiate between public arguments in their roles as citizens now or in the future as opposed to personal commitment to beliefs such as religion. Nussbaum (2011b) explains that most “cultures are internal pluralist” (p. 10) such as the overall picture of a single Greek religion (polytheism) which allowed citizens to honour many gods according to different domains. However, there are bound to be conflicts between two moral philosophical perspectives within a particular domain as it was the case with the worshiping of many gods in Greek culture.

In our current citizenship education, the conflict between different moral philosophical perspectives may be illustrated in MacIntyre’s (1984) argument of whether patriotism is a virtue or a vice. He explains that on the one hand the morality of patriotism may be regarded as a loyalty-exhibiting virtue based on reasons relating to merits of one’s country rather than blind loyalty. On the other hand, the morality of liberal
impersonality (associated with deontological ethics) requires us to judge impersonally or as “any rational person would judge” (p. 5) without regard to our interests, affections and social position. According to the morality of liberal impersonality criteria, patriotism is a vice because the love of one’s country is based on partial judgement related to history and ideals of the nation rather than impartiality. In this regard, it seems that we have to choose between the social bonds and ties of the nation which are made possible by the morality of patriotism or risk the danger of “dissolution by rational criticism” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 18) in the morality of liberal impersonality.

However, Carr (2009b) describes some contradictions as more apparent than real. He argues that one can love and hate the same objects or state of affairs but this does not mean that love and hate are contradictory in the same way as believing and disbelieving. He explains that one can hate eating fish for its properties of bones which may be annoying but still love eating fish for its appealing taste. Similarly, MacIntyre (1984) observes that “it does not follow that some version of traditional patriotism may not be compatible with some other morality of universal moral law which sets limits to and provides both sanction for correction of the particularist morality of the patriot” (p. 15). So while he maintains that “the morality of liberal impersonality and morality of patriotism must be deeply incompatible” (p. 18), he acknowledges that there is a possibility that they may be reconciled. He does not explain how these two incompatible moralities may be reconciled except to state that his intention is to illuminate “the political and social history of modern America as in key part the living out of a conceptual confusion” (p. 19). In his view, this confusion requires the modern state to exhibit itself “as liberal in many institutional settings but which also has to be
able to engage the patriotic regard of many of its citizens, if it is to continue to function effectively” (p. 19).

What MacIntyre describes as ‘living out a conceptual confusion’ may not actually be a confusion if we consider that some scholars in liberal citizenship education (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2012; White, 2001) have argued convincingly that we should teach patriotism in citizenship education. I also discuss some of these issues in Chapter Seven of this thesis. However, it must be admitted that there are cases in citizenship education where two equally competing moral philosophical perspectives may not be combined such that citizens may be compelled to prioritise one moral philosophical perspective over the other. For instance, single parents (who may often be women) may be compelled to choose between their duty to participate in the public sphere and the responsibilities of caring or raising their children in the privacy of the home. It is not clear in this case that the two responsibilities may be combined by the same person in a similar way to how we might reconcile particularity in the morality of patriotism and universality in the morality of liberal impersonality. Of course, modern society may be structured in such a way that parents are provided with child support and publicly funded day care, as argued earlier following Enslin and White (2003). However, there are bound to be cases where participation in one area such as attending a meeting at work might result in failure to take care of an important family responsibility such as attending a function for a child at school.

In cases where we are compelled to choose one option rather than another in a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education, it might be necessary to use
practical wisdom. In using practical wisdom, we do not merely follow (impartial) rules that are likely to be assented to by all people who are rational. Instead, our judgement in citizenship participation is for the right reasons, at the right time and from the right motive. In particular, practical wisdom is the preferred option in cases of moral dilemma or conflict such as the one presented above. This is so because individuals would otherwise use rationality to suppress their emotions or pretend not to care about the results of their choices. Suppressing one’s emotions or pretending not to care about one’s choices when faced with difficult decisions does not seem compatible with the kind of action most good citizens who are concerned about their public duty as well as caring for their families would engage in. In addition, ranking our obligations according to practical reason, including suppressing our emotions may be associated with continence (or self-control). Although continence may produce the right action, it is regarded lower than the highest level in Aristotle’s levels of moral excellence.

My argument that we should use practical wisdom when faced with conflict or dilemma is not meant to indicate that priority should trump complementarity in grounding citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective. On the contrary, the crafting of passions and choice through practical wisdom in virtue ethics may complement rationality within Kantian deontological ethics. In particular, Nussbaum (1999) argues that her work on virtue ethics which has moved towards the direction of “passional enlightenment” (p. 555) or the involvement of emotions in politics would be a “welcome supplement to Kant’s ethical theory” (p. 556). She believes that supplementing rationality with emotions is not in deep conflict with Kant’s ethical and political goals although this would require a “major revision of
Kant’s understanding of the relationship between humanity and animality” (p. 556). Practical wisdom is “no sure proof against error and miscalculation” (Carr 2009b, p. 41). However, we may be confident that students will develop the capacity for moral imagination or proper judgement regarding the complexity of a problem through practical wisdom which regulates reason and emotion.

At this point it might be argued that students in citizenship education are not developed enough to exercise practical wisdom or act from their own reason. To respond to this challenge requires a discussion of autonomy and its related notion of authenticity which follows in the next section. Otherwise, we should not overemphasise the possibility of conflict within a plural moral philosophical perspective as conflict is possible even within a single moral philosophical perspective such as virtue ethics or deontological ethics. For instance, Carr (2009b) describes a medieval story of Ximene who is conflicted in a love and hate relationship with Cid, who happens to have killed her father. The discussion of the story is centred on whether Ximene can become a virtuous person given the conflict between the love she has for Cid and the justified anger she holds against him for killing her father. Practical wisdom is also useful in resolving this conflict although it is not a guarantee for lack of error and miscalculation.

Having discussed how conflicts may be resolved within a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education, I now turn to autonomy and its related notion of authenticity. The idea of good citizenship is often reflected in debates about the conception of a good life, which is further associated with the development of
autonomy in education. The aim of this discussion is to reveal a richer conception of good or progressive citizenship education. I shall also consider how conceptions about a good life for individuals link to different moral philosophical perspectives.

### 3.2 Autonomy, Authenticity and Good Citizenship Education

In his article on the classical position of autonomy as advocated, for example, by the British educational philosopher Richard Peters, Cuypers (2010) develops a view of autonomy different from Peters’, namely one whereby authenticity is a component of autonomy; importantly, authenticity is associated by Cuypers with responsibility. The concepts of autonomy and authenticity, including their relevance to citizenship education, are discussed in the following paragraphs. The discussion begins with the definition of autonomy and citizenship education issues related to it before focussing on authenticity.

Two observations are worth noting at this stage because of their relevance to what I describe as characteristics of good or progressive citizenship education. Firstly, Cuypers (2010) observes that due to the conception of autonomy as rationalistic, “the alternative approach of care ethics which brings to bear empathy and sentimentality in the constitution of autonomy should be worked out further” (p. 204). The observation that autonomy should include care ethics is consistent with the view that citizenship education should be enriched through incorporating other moral philosophical perspectives such as care ethics. For instance, care ethics brings with it the dimension of emotions instead of depending on rationality alone. The second observation that Cuypers makes is that, “the social relational aspects of autonomy should be explored
in detail so as to build an educational theory that is viable in the present day context of feminism, multiculturalism and globalisation” (Cuypers, 2010, p. 204). Again, this view illustrates the need to extend the limits of autonomy to include the view of human beings in their social interaction with others rather than the rational independent individual implied in the classical position of autonomy and comprehensive liberal citizenship education.

3.2.1 Autonomy and Citizenship Education

The classical position of autonomy may be divided into three conditions or dimensions. Firstly, autonomy is generally understood as “choosing one’s aims in life” (Winch, 2004, p. 472), or a “picture of worthwhile life” without any compulsion (White, 2003, p. 147). Choosing one’s aims in life suggests that autonomy is an intellectual exercise of questioning and assessing the aims and possibilities available within one’s society. The result of such an assessment is a moral and important decision about how to live one’s life. In making decisions about how to live one’s life, serious reflection is necessary about worthwhile options as well as capabilities the individual possesses to utilise those available options. “Autonomous choices and decisions stand wholly under a person’s voluntary control” (Bonnet & Cuypers, 2003, p. 330) through deliberations and reflections in one’s mind.

Secondly, autonomy implies authenticity as the second dimension or condition. Authenticity as a component of autonomy is described as “adopting a code or a way of life that is one’s own as distinct from one dictated by others” (Cuypers, 2010, p. 193). An authentic choice is one that is characteristic of the individual. Authentic
choices are honest decisions that reflect the genuine motives and interests of the individual as opposed to fake motives and interests. Cuypers and Haji (2007) also describe authenticity as “exemplified by motivational elements, such as the agent’s desires or values, when these elements are, ‘truly the agents’ own and not foreign or alien” (p. 78). Authentic decisions are those that belong to people as defining who they are as unique individuals distinct from others. These are decisions or choices that require to be made without compulsion or coercion.

However, despite the two conditions of intentional choice and authenticity, it is still possible for individuals to make decisions unconsciously as a result of influence from social convention or other forces within the environment. A third condition of autonomy, therefore, is that rational choices should be subjected to rational reflection in order to avoid the problem of uncritical choices or decisions. This rational reflection of choices involves “adopting a code of conduct as one’s own and subjecting it to critical scrutiny” (Cuypers & Haji, 2007, p. 79). In other words, rational reflection serves as a screening process to ensure that the individual does not make unwitting choices or decisions. Ultimately, autonomous agents make choices under their control (intentional), and such choices are considered authentic (one’s own), and have been rationally reflected upon in terms of their principles (Cuypers, 2010; Cuypers & Haji, 2007).

There is a challenge however with regards to this conception of autonomy in relation to citizenship education. This challenge concerns the aim of citizenship education, which is described by Merry and Karsten (2010) as the sharing of a set of values. If
we suppose that individuals should be involved in a process of questioning and evaluating social values, there is a possibility that they might reject such social values for themselves or even for others, as constituting part of their society. For instance, we might envisage citizens of a country such as Saudi Arabia where people might reject democratic justice for themselves while they consider it acceptable for others. Alternatively, people may reject democratic justice completely as unnecessary for society. As a response to this challenge, Fowler (2011) acknowledges that autonomy admits to a matter of degrees whereby according to Winch (1996; 2004) we may talk of ‘weak autonomy’ and ‘strong autonomy’. In weak autonomy, the individual has reasonable independence to choose means towards ends but not the ends themselves. On the other end, with regard to ‘strong autonomy’, the individual is allowed by society to choose ends as well as the means towards those ends (Winch, 1996; 2004).

Given the aim of citizenship education to share a set of values developed by curriculum designers, it would seem that weak autonomy is a reasonable option. Winch (2004) supports the development of weak autonomy in education as well, but adds that, “This does not mean civic education in a democracy should not have, as one of its purposes, the goal of equipping individuals to question whether the ends that society considers worthwhile really are worthwhile” (p. 473). Winch does not explain what weak autonomy would look like. Instead, he argues that “in a democratic society, civic education has to have as a key aim the development of critical rational citizens” (Winch, 2004, p. 478). He sees the role of critical rationality as important for change so that “what is considered worthwhile may be questioned and what is not currently considered worthwhile may be given a chance to be considered worthwhile” (p. 478).
In light of Winch’s (2004) attribution of weak autonomy to the Athenian society and his emphasis on critical rationality, it could be argued that he perceives citizens who possess weak autonomy as performing a social function similar to that of the ancient Greek society. That is, direct participation in democracy. To be fair, while acknowledging the social significance of the Greek system, Winch criticises Plato’s dialectic method as impractical because it required many years of practice. The length of years for practising the dialectic method was to prevent it from being practiced by the majority (hoi polloi) who could use it for their corrupt ends (Winch, 2004). This implies the need to develop discipline through long periods of practice of the dialectical method in order to use critical rationality for moral reasons rather than as a device to deceive other people.

Critical rationality in Winch’s discussion fits the values of democracy very well. It indicates the use of (weak) autonomy for the ends of society such as democratic deliberation. This is consistent with his normative description of education as not just a preparation for life but for a particular kind of life (Winch, 2004). We may, therefore, deduce that weak autonomy is preparation for a particular kind of life, which presupposes sharing a particular set of values in citizenship education.

However, the sharing of a particular set of values or ideas through citizenship education needs to be justified with good reason if we are to avoid the charge of indoctrination which a ‘strong autonomy’ is likely to avoid. In other words, we need to respond to the question of how the deliberate moulding or interference in education
defended by Winch (2004) and Cuypers (2010) may develop authenticity among students. Ideally, authenticity should be associated with genuine motives and interests that are the individual’s own rather than ones that are imposed or coerced. In the above situation, it might seem that students are being coerced or manipulated into sharing common values that are not their own. Similarly, citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective might be seen as ignoring the development of autonomy among students. A response to this challenge requires a description of authenticity as a separate notion from autonomy. Bonnet and Cuypers (2003) also differentiate authenticity as a distinct conception of autonomy with its own implications for education. In the following paragraphs I describe the notion of authenticity and its implications for good or progressive citizenship education.

3.3 Authenticity and Citizenship Education

The ownership of one’s beliefs, thoughts and choices is a key element that differentiates authenticity from autonomy (Bonnet & Cuypers, 2003). Critical rationality is seen as important for authenticity as Cuypers (2010) observes that “whatever happens under the aegis of a person’s own rational reflection is authentic” (p. 198). However, it is also recognised that rational reflection requires an initial period of habituation in rules before students may be able to act from their own reason (Peters, 1981). Students may acquire values, pro-attitudes and principles during the period in which their own critical reflection is not well developed. So it would seem that the challenge is not so much about the sharing of common values in citizenship education, since students may not have developed the ability to act from their own reason at this level. However, what seems important is that the shared values, principles, and pro-
attitudes that students obtain at an early age should not impede the development of their ability to act from reason when they are mature enough to do so. I explain more about this in the following sections but first we need to consider the involvement of emotions in the constitution of authenticity.

3.3.1 Authenticity and Care Ethics in Citizenship Education

Cuypers (2010) criticises habituation in rules as a means of supporting the development of reason among students towards their authenticity. He argues that the use of rules is too rationalistic and ignores “the alternative approach of care ethics, [which] brings to bear empathy and sentimentality in the constitution of autonomy” (p. 198). The reason behind the inclusion of emotions is that they are part of the ‘individuals’ own’ in a similar manner to thoughts and choices, rather than imposed or coerced. For instance, Rousseau’s idea of authenticity is said to promote childhood as a free-standing condition where children have their own “characteristic ways of feeling, willing, thinking, and seeing” (Cuypers & Haji, 2007, p. 79). The idea of a free-standing childhood in Rousseau’s progressivism, however, over-emphasises the abilities of the child. It does not seem practical to expect children to perceive authentically at a young age without any assistance or educational moulding. On the other hand, it is not clear how Cuypers (2010) considers empathy and sentimentality to be constituted in autonomy. He only points towards psychological research which indicates that children develop empathy early in their infant stage, and leaves the idea of the involvement of care ethics in authenticity open for further research.
The involvement of care ethics in the constitution of authenticity is important for inclusive citizenship education. The common view of citizenship education built around the autonomy of the individual is criticised as a masculine conception. For instance, McLaughlin (2000), observes that the conception of citizenship education for England is regarded by some as “essentially a male one” (p. 553) because of “its emphasis on activity in the public sphere” (p. 553). I observed earlier that focusing on the public sphere as the only arena for citizenship participation does not constitute progressive or good citizenship education. There is also a view that “women value emotional closeness and dependence rather than the separate personhood implied in the idea of autonomy” (Smith, 2003, p. 164). Authenticity as a different notion from autonomy, or as enriching of autonomy, plays an important role in opening up our conception of the good life for an individual so that we may extend our view of citizenship education.

3.3.2 Authenticity and the Communitarian View of Identity in Citizenship Education

Authenticity is also useful in resolving the conflict between autonomy and communitarianism. The conception of a good life in traditional societies is linked to pre-existing social culture and historical heritage as opposed to the abstract individualistic view of autonomy. A crucial aspect of authenticity is that the social environmental aspect permeates the personal in defining the identity of the individual. Bonnet and Cuypers (2003) assert that, “it is only within social environments that the notions of the individual and of authenticity are developed to a high degree” (pp, 31-32). The argument is that in order for individuals to define themselves as authentic
they need to identify themselves against things that matter such as society or culture. This is what Taylor (1991) calls the “background of intelligibility” (p. 37) or horizon against which things take on their significance. According to Taylor (1991) we define ourselves in conversations with others and against the background of things that matter. In addition, Bonnet and Cuypers (2003) interpret Taylor’s ideas to mean that the feedback we get through the recognition of others helps us to develop our identity and self-esteem. In other words, the views of our interlocutors and social standards are not an obstruction to living authentically but contribute towards the development of authenticity.

At the beginning of this discussion on authenticity and citizenship education I also posed the question of how deliberate moulding as a process of education may contribute to authenticity. A response to this question requires reference to two dimensions which constitute authenticity according to Taylor (1991). As for the first dimension, authenticity involves “(i) creation, construction as well as discovery, (ii) originality, and frequently, (iii) opposition to rules of society and potentially what we recognise as morality” (p. 66). In our previous discussion of weak autonomy, this first dimension could be construed as the means towards the ends over which the individual has a reasonable amount of control to safeguard against social dependence or conformism. As for the second dimension, authenticity requires “(i) openness to moral horizons of significance […] and (ii) a self-definition in dialogue” (p. 66). In line with our view of weak autonomy we might describe the last two conditions of authenticity as accepting the ends of society. A balance between the two dimensions is considered necessary despite their apparent conflict. However, those who support autonomy in
promoting citizenship would emphasise the first dimension at the neglect of the second.

3.3.3 Authenticity and Responsibility in Citizenship Education

The trend of my argument is that citizenship education may develop values, pro-attitudes and principles among students in citizenship education. However, we also need to consider whether these values, pro-attitudes and principles would not undermine the development of authenticity when a child has fully matured and is able to operate from reason rather than conformity to external rules. This is notwithstanding the argument above which justifies the acquisition of values, pro-attitudes and principles (such as deliberative principles) on the basis that they may form the background against which individuals may identify themselves. The point of this discussion is how we may ensure that focus on the second dimension of Taylor’s (1991) idea of authenticity which emphasises adherence to social ends does not undermine the development of authenticity. Indeed, a balance with the first dimension of Taylor’s idea of authenticity which includes originality and opposition to rules of society may offset negative consequences that may arise from the second dimension. However, it is possible to imagine a case where the acquisition of values and pro-attitudes such as nationalistic ideas may subvert the development of authenticity.

Cuypers and Haji (2007) develop a relational view of authenticity as a response to the possible challenge of common values, pro-attitudes and principles undermining authenticity. The way in which relational authenticity works is that the beliefs and pro-
attitudes of individuals “are authentic or inauthentic only relative to whether later behaviour that issues from them is behaviour for which the agent, into whom the child will develop, can shoulder moral responsibility” (Cuypers, 2010, p. 199, emphasis my own). Cuypers explains that there is “no such thing as plain authenticity” (p. 199) according to this view of relational authenticity; instead deliberate moulding is undertaken with the aim that it will produce moral responsibility in future.

The connection between authenticity and responsibility in Cuypers and Haji’s (2007) theory requires attention to what is instilled in students as well as how it is instilled (as part of deliberate moulding). They explain that, acting from one’s own inclination despite intentional influence is made possible by ensuring that motivational elements which are responsible for the generation of actions are acquired in a manner that does not undermine authenticity. For instance, social conditioning and manipulation are considered subversive to responsible behaviour because the resultant beliefs, desires and values that ensue from them are not the individual’s own (Cuypers & Haji, 2007). Interferences such as coercion, deception, suppression of innate tendencies, failure to acquire relevant moral concepts (such as understanding what is right, obligatory and wrong), implanting pro-attitudes or dispositions implicitly, and limiting the capacity for critical reflection (Cuypers & Haji, 2007), are detrimental to relational authenticity. The reason why these factors fail to meet the relational authenticity criteria is that individuals cannot claim responsibility for actions that issue from (inauthentic) desires or motivations outside their control. On the other hand, appropriate educational interference as opposed to indoctrination ensures that students are able to perceive what is morally right (or responsible).
The development of moral and responsible citizens is an important aim of citizenship education despite the taxing demands of relational authenticity described above. Winch (1996) observes that “Education for citizenship requires that a young person be prepared to play a positive and constructive role in society” (p. 38). Responsibility is an important aspect for all future roles in society regardless of whether we are given those roles as part of our pre-existing social heritage (such as in communitarianism) or whether we choose them ourselves (according to the liberal view). In this regard, relational authenticity may be supported by many people regardless of differences in conception of what constitutes a good life. Moral and responsible citizens are expected to be independently minded (free from external pressures) in order to be useful members of society. The balance between rights and responsibilities is an important aspect for citizenship in the public and private sphere. Cuypers (2010) also observes that the development of an independent mind and responsibility is a major characteristic of human beings as moral agents rather than as members of the human species. Sharing a set of values as an aim of citizenship education, therefore, could be regarded as an important part of developing students’ authenticity.

3.4 Rationale for a Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective on Citizenship Education

Having argued that the teaching of values, pro-attitudes and principles is consistent with the development of relational authenticity raises the question of what this might
imply for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. In this regard, it seems that teachers must draw from deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics and the capabilities approach as long as later behaviour that issues from these moral philosophical perspectives is behaviour for which the former student may take moral responsibility. According to relational authenticity, it matters what is instilled in students and how it is instilled as part of education for a particular kind of life as opposed to preparation for life in general. The four moral philosophical perspectives are complementary to one another in terms of what is instilled or taught to students. A plural moral philosophical perspective is not neutral or relative. Instead, there are specific agreements concerning which moral philosophical perspectives are justifiable for particular actions. Teachers also need to be explicit about the moral philosophical perspectives from which they draw in their teaching. Otherwise, being implicit about the values instilled in students may constitute subverting their authenticity as a different notion from autonomy, or as enriching of autonomy.

Yet the common view of citizenship education is that we need to be neutral about our moral values in citizenship education. This neutrality emanates from the idea of impersonality in deontological ethics. However, I have argued following Cuypers (2010) that we need to consider care ethics which brings emotions to bear on the constitution of autonomy. What the involvement of care ethics which is associated with the authenticity of Jean Jacques Rousseau does in citizenship education is that it recognises the dignity of individuals, but does not elevate their status above that of society. For instance, the national curriculum for citizenship education in England is associated with Jean Jacques Rousseau’s republicanism which is grounded on a
“thick” conception of the individual rather than the “thin” formalist view of individuality associated with Kant (Annette, 2005; Krisjánsson, 2004; McLaughlin, 2000). The substantive conception of the individual in a republican approach is consistent with good citizenship education although it should recognise the public and private spheres as platforms for citizenship participation to avoid being characterised as a masculine citizenship.

3.5 Conclusion

A plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education is plausible given the argument in this chapter. It was observed, for instance, that a citizen has rights no matter how we think good citizenship is constituted. The connection of rights to the dignity of human beings and equality makes it necessary to reconcile rights with our conception of citizenship education. In particular, I argued that rights should be conceived of as citizenship rights to accommodate the particularity of citizenship education. Citizenship rights are considered more substantive than human rights although we may still accommodate human rights through personal narratives and counter narratives. Narratives are necessary in order to demonstrate how different people experience human rights and to extend common relations among different nationalities. However, despite the view that the state often has to exhibit itself as liberal in many institutional settings (MacIntyre, 1984), there is a need for citizenship to be anchored in virtue ethical dispositions such as temperance, justice and compassion. This is necessary for students to use their independent thinking towards the public good. For instance, students may learn that having the right temper suggests putting the interests of others before their own (White, 2013).
It was also argued that citizenship participation may not be considered maximal (progressive or good) if it ignores the issues of women. In particular, citizenship education should influence boys and girls in the manner in which they view their roles in the public and private platforms of citizenship participation. Attention to the needs of others such as women, ethnic minorities and vulnerable people requires citizenship education informed by care ethics rather than the neutrality of citizenship rights which according to J. A. White (2001) might result in neglect and domination. Care ethics brings empathy and sentimentality into the constitution of autonomy (Cuypers, 2010) such that it contributes to inclusiveness or solidarity in citizenship rather than mere tolerance in citizenship rights. On this view, human beings are conceived of as engaged in social relations (interdependence) with others rather than the individuality (independence) implied in comprehensive liberalism. Comprehensive liberalism promotes a strong version of autonomy which is inconsistent with citizenship education informed by care.

Developing the attitudes of students to care for others in citizenship education is necessary because social life is considered to construct our identities through acts of solidarity (or collective action) rather than the individuality implied in human rights. The construction of our identities through social life was explained using Taylor’s (1991) notion of authenticity which bridges the gap between individualism in liberalism and adherence to social ends such as heritage and culture in communitarianism. Taylor’s notion of authenticity represents a shift from a narrow to a much broader view of the individual. This suggests that while we may begin with
the question of what the individual ought to do in deontological ethics, we may end
with the question of how should one live as a citizen in the capabilities approach and
virtue ethics. In this thesis I argue that there is no contradiction between the two
questions. One only has to start from a narrow to a much broader view.

Understanding the complementarity of the moral philosophical perspectives in
citizenship education is to acknowledge the limited conception of a good life
associated with each perspective. Consequently, teachers must draw from a plural
moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. This is necessary to enrich
citizenship education so that it reaches its full potential of developing responsible and
participatory citizens. Each of the moral philosophical perspectives including
deontological ethics, care ethics, virtue ethics and the capabilities approach plays a
particular role in progressive or good citizenship education. A plural moral
philosophical perspective on citizenship education may be reconciled through
relational authenticity in order to avoid relativism and indoctrination of students.
According to relational authenticity, a shared set of values in citizenship education
may be regarded as authentic or inauthentic depending on whether later behaviour that
ensues from them is behaviour for which the individual may take moral responsibility.
However, while I have demonstrated the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical
perspective in this discussion, I have not shown how these moral philosophical
perspectives may be integrated into citizenship education. It is this task to which I turn
in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4

4.0 Citizenship Education Based on Narrative

This chapter discusses research question four, which deals with how we could integrate different moral philosophical perspectives into citizenship education while taking into consideration that citizenship education is contextual. Included, in this discussion is the question of whether citizenship education should be offered as a discrete subject or embedded as a theme across the curriculum. In the previous chapter, it was argued that citizenship education is contextual but not relative. For instance, while virtues such as civic friendship may be part of our everyday life experience, we may appeal to rights in terms of justice. However, to argue that citizenship education is contextual but not relative only gives a rationale for underpinning it in a plural moral philosophical perspective without giving us an idea of how the different moral philosophical perspectives should be integrated. In the present discussion, I consider the view that narratives are defined as “the study of ways humans experience the world” (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990). This definition of narrative is in line with the conception of citizenship education supported in this study because people’s experiences involve actions related to different moral philosophical perspectives such as care, virtues and justice. Erben (2000) also observes that “lives are lived through time but made intelligible through narrative” (p. 383).

If human life (or experience) either individually or socially could be made understandable through storytelling (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Erben, 2000), we might expect narratives to be at the centre of citizenship education. Yet there is very
little discussion of citizenship education based on narrative in the research literature on citizenship education except perhaps a few references to citizenship identity. From the perspective of communitarianism, narrative in citizenship education is associated with citizenship identity where the individual is conceived of according to history and social tradition. Citizenship identity according to history and tradition is criticised by liberals for the view that human life is centred on a single conception of the good, rather than difference or plurality (Higgins, 2011). A focus on the role of narrative based on citizenship identity neglects the importance of narratives in other features of citizenship education such as the development of virtues, citizenship participation and social prerequisites as necessary conditions for effective citizenship. These four features were also used in understanding citizenship education within the liberal, republican and communitarian approaches in Chapter One.

Liberal citizenship which is predominant in citizenship education in schools often neglects the importance of narratives and relegates it to the social or private sphere rather than inclusion in political education. Nussbaum is one of the few scholars sympathetic to political liberalism who recognises the importance of narrative imagination through arts and literature in the development of the “ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of someone different from oneself” (Nussbaum, 2006a, p. 390). She encourages the use of narrative imagination through arts and literature in liberal education to cultivate humanity among citizens of the world. However, it is argued in this chapter that citizenship education based on narrative should be organised as a theme across the school curriculum.
I also argue that further information about citizenship education based on narrative requires relation to ideas such as individual life narratives associated with MacIntyre (1981) as well as action as narrativity linked to Arendt (1998). It is possible to develop a better understanding of citizenship education based on narrative when we link the four main features of citizenship education (that is, identity, virtues of the citizen, participation and social prerequisites) to the three versions of narrative including narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 1997), individual life narratives (MacIntyre, 1981) and action as narrativity (Arendt, 1998). In addition, a discussion of the three versions of narrative (individual life narratives, narrative imagination and action as narrativity) makes it possible to integrate various moral philosophical perspectives into citizenship education so that we may enrich citizenship education to reach its full potential.

The first part of my discussion in this chapter begins by explaining why citizenship education should be conceived of as a narrative. I discuss the relevance of each version of narrative for citizenship education. In particular, MacIntyre’s (1981) notion of individual life narratives is used to argue that citizenship education should be considered as a theme across the curriculum. In this regard, the subjects within the school curriculum are conceived of as practices from which internal goods and virtues necessary for good citizenship may be derived. While practices involve more skill than can be taught within subjects, MacIntyre perceives a situation where students have an eye towards practices where some of the taught skills may find their point and purpose (Higgins, 2011). I also discuss, Nussbaum’s (1997) narrative imagination in developing citizens who understand that the possibilities of others could be a possibility for themselves. Through narrative imagination, individuals may treat others
with compassion because they understand that some experiences are bad. They might also treat others with compassion because they recognise that they are also vulnerable to similar problems. Towards the end of my first part of the discussion I discuss Arendt’s (1998) idea of action (with an emphasis on the notion that it is through action that a story begins). I also discuss the importance of individuals relating to one another as well as developing a common world built on a notion of citizenship that is informed by civic friendship among people who otherwise are different from each other.

The second part of the chapter looks at the interconnections and complementarity of the three versions of narrative with an aim of formulating citizenship education based on narrative. The discussion also focuses on how the citizenship education formulated from the three versions of narrative maps onto the four main features of citizenship education mentioned earlier, citizenship identity, virtues of the citizen, citizenship participation and social prerequisites. In this regard, citizenship identity is defined as respecting human freedoms in the form of capabilities while also recognising the common good. Friendship and justified anger are described as important virtues for the social life of citizens and so is being able to determine when active and passive citizenship is necessary. Empathy is considered necessary as a social prerequisite for effective citizenship. The discussion then concludes by showing that citizenship education based on narrative is informed by a plural moral philosophical perspective rather than a single moral philosophical perspective.
4.1 Why Citizenship Education Based on Narrative?

Narratives are important in encouraging critical thinking and relevance (according to context) in issues relating to citizenship education. The importance of narratives in encouraging critical thinking and relevance may be observed in Greene’s (1982) discussion about public education and the public space where she uses Hannah Arendt’s ideas concerning the development of a common world (a little world of its own). In this discussion, Greene argues that subjects within the school curriculum may be conceived of as forms of knowledge that interpret the lived experiences of human beings. In other words, teaching the subject matter may be viewed as sharing a story. Greene further supports this assertion by referring to Michael Oakshott’s idea that education may be considered an “initiation into a long conversation going on in public and at once within ourselves” (Greene, 1982, p. 7). From this statement we may deduce that students are not only exposed to narratives in the form of subjects that relate the subject matter to their practical experiences but they may reflect on this knowledge in light of their own developing narratives, when citizenship education is conceived of as a theme across the curriculum.

4.2 Individual Life Narratives

4.2.1 Integration of Internal Goods and Virtues into Individual life Narratives

According to MacIntyre (1981) people develop their individual life narratives when they integrate internal goods and virtues from the practices in which they are involved. It is not just that students reflect on the knowledge of the subject but there are goods and virtues obtained within every subject or practice within the school curriculum.
Internal goods are defined as what is worthwhile to have and to achieve in a practice (Higgins, 2011). For instance, careful observation which is crucial in undertaking experiments in science is regarded as an internal good because it constitutes the meaning and purpose of the practice or subject. An internal good may only be attained by practicing in a particular practice. It differs from an external good in that it does not require justification from outside the practice. Obtaining good grades from science may be regarded as an external good because it can be justified according to the desire for further study or perhaps other reasons such as getting a better job which is outside the purpose and meaning of science. Virtues on the other hand are described by MacIntyre (1981) as acquired human qualities or dispositions necessary to achieve internal goods to practices (for instance the patience to observe carefully in an experiment). However, virtues may be regarded as goods as well because they contribute to human flourishing (Higgins, 2003; 2010).

I refer to subjects as practices in this discussion following MacIntyre in his interview with Dunne. According to MacIntyre, “our conception of the school is impoverished if we understand it as merely a preparatory institution within which the students are contained until they are ready to participate in ‘the real thing’” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 9). He explains that in good schools students already engage in some form of practice such as “arts, sciences, and games” (p. 9). Through reading novels and poetry, students develop internal goods, such as critical thinking, in subjects like arts where they analyse and evaluate characters of people and their ideas. Similarly, careful observation may be developed through undertaking experiments in science. In addition, students may make drawings, paintings and music in schools where they
learn not just the skills of the practice, such as precision, but the virtues (such as honesty, fairness and courage) for succeeding in the practice. The significance of narratives in citizenship education as a theme across the curriculum becomes plausible given MacIntyre’s integration of internal goods and virtues into individual life narratives as well as what I discussed earlier as the initiation of students into subjects as part of their lived experiences.

4.2.2 Individual Life Narratives and Citizenship Education

The association of citizenship education with MacIntyre’s ideas is not a new development. Hopkins (2013) links MacIntyre’s moral theory to citizenship education through the apprenticeship and self-help traditions found in further and adult education (FE) in England. Hopkins’s major concern in developing the link between citizenship education and practices is to extend “the idea of crafts, trades and professions beyond the competency based, instrumentalist curriculum” (Hopkins, 2013, p. 5) in further education. He intends to expand the further education curriculum from a narrow focus on skills needed for employment into a broader view along social, cultural and ethical requirements necessary for the achievement and maintenance of excellences within practices associated with MacIntyre (1981). However, Hopkins is not particularly concerned with individual life narratives which is a major focus of my argument in this section. I am principally concerned with the development of individual life narratives among students in citizenship education.

The development of students’ intellectual and moral virtues is a fundamental basis of citizenship education based on narrative. For instance, Vokey (2003) argues from
MacIntyre’s perspective that teachers need to “cultivate the intellectual and moral virtues that are an integral part of realising the overriding human good” (p. 277). He explains that students need to acquire some knowledge of the form of intellectual enquiry through which the vision, that informs the good life for their teachers, is developed and defended against rival moral perspectives if they are to understand the rationale for their own education. In other words, students need to develop practical wisdom (*phronesis*). Higgins (2011) also explains that when teachers work at the level of practices as well as individual life narratives they “help students enter practices and make sense of how the values disclosed in these worlds fit together, how they look in light of communal values and how they might inform a life” (p. 465). Ultimately, students should be able to make appropriate judgements about how to live their lives as individuals and citizens.

Individual life narratives, which are developed by students from integrating internal goods from practices or subjects within the school curriculum, are important for citizenship education because they encourage students to respond to the question of how one should live as a citizen. For instance, students may emulate the integrity of prominent people who form part of their history. Vokey (2003) observes that the study of students’ moral traditions and the biographies of prominent figures within that moral tradition has much potential to inspire students to realise that “the most important story they must learn to tell is of their journey towards fulfilment” (p. 271). It is difficult to imagine any way that could inspire students to think seriously about the fulfilment of their own lives except for narratives. Narratives make each good and virtue within those subjects in the curriculum look significant for completing one’s life successfully.
In his interview with Dunne, MacIntyre explains that it is important for people to answer for themselves the question of what each of those goods and virtues that are internal to practices mean (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). In other words, the virtues and goods from the practices are interpreted in terms of what Higgins (2010) describes as each person’s understanding of his or her own eudaimonia or flourishing.

4.2.3 Individual Life Narratives, Authenticity, Practical Wisdom and Citizenship Education

There are echoes of authenticity in what Higgins (2010) describes as the interpretation of goods and virtues according to each person’s eudaimonia or flourishing at the level of individual life narratives. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011) explains that flourishing is concerned with “what benefits a person, is for her, makes her better off, serves her interests or is desirable for her for her sake” (sic). In answering the question of what each of those goods and practices that are internal to practices mean for oneself, individuals are making authentic choices for themselves. In other words, they are developing a vision of what it is to be a good citizen based on their own vision of a good (flourishing) life. While it is acknowledged that such a vision is partly informed by the goods held in common with others as a society, this does not preclude authenticity. Following Taylor (1991), the definition of ourselves against social standards does not necessarily constitute an obstruction of our authenticity because developing our authenticity requires defining ourselves against things that matter, such as society and culture.
It should also be possible to see that there are linkages between the development of authenticity and *phronesis* or practical wisdom from the above paragraph. Higgins (2010) views the synthesis and integration of goods and virtues from practices at the level of individual life narratives in MacIntyre’s (1981) moral theory as part of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom when viewed according to justice suggests that people judge their actions according to the right motive, at the right time and in right situations (Carr, 2006a). Similarly, practical wisdom in synthesising and integrating internal goods from practices allows individuals to choose the goods and virtues internal to practices according to the appropriate motive, at the appropriate time and in appropriate situations. Ultimately, this should enhance the authenticity of individual citizens in determining for themselves how they should live as citizens.

However, there is a debate about whether MacIntyre’s conception of practical wisdom is consistent with Aristotelianism. The debate about MacIntyre’s practical wisdom is linked to epistemological issues such as the distinction between practical wisdom as *poiesis* (production or making things) and *praxis* which is concerned with action that “has no outcome separable from its practice” (Griffiths & Macleod, 2008, p. 129). Cook and Carr (2014) suggest that practical wisdom in MacIntyre’s moral theory is not consistent with praxis. In particular, they are sceptical about whether the definition of virtues should be concerned with the “capacity to sustain professional and other practices” (p. 95) rather than with individual character dispositions. Fortunately, I do not need to enter into this debate in order to justify the importance of individual life narratives in citizenship education. For my discussion in this section of the thesis it is sufficient to note that there is general agreement that human beings understand their
individual and social selves through narratives (Arthur & Carr, 2013; Carr, 2006a). In addition, there is agreement that virtues are best developed in practices or “contexts of cultural formation” (Carr, 2006a, p. 499).

4.2.4 Limitations of Individual Life Narratives for Citizenship Education

In summary, individual life narratives are important for synthesising and integrating internal goods and virtues from practices in order to allow individuals to live according to their view of a flourishing life as citizens. The conception of one’s good life as a citizen comes about as a result of learning from practices, moral traditions and adopting good qualities from the biographies of prominent figures. In After Virtue, MacIntyre (1981) emphasises learning from the virtues of heroic societies which are portrayed in Greek drama and poetry as well as Icelandic sagas. MacIntyre (1987) continues to emphasise the importance of shared understanding in essential texts to provide the background for rational debate in the public sphere in his idea of an educated public. In his view, it is difficult for teachers to pursue the goal of fitting students for their role in society and encouraging them to think critically at the same time without a shared understanding to essential texts or beliefs and attitudes that constitute the basis of a society.

The challenge with individual life narratives as a basis for citizenship education is the belief in a single conception of the good life. Public life in modern societies according to Higgins (2011) implies difference or plurality. It is necessary therefore to think about substantiating the idea of individual life narrative in citizenship education with
other ideas given that MacIntyre (1981) emphasises shared social beliefs within a community.

Nussbaum’s (1997; 2011a) narrative imagination (empathetic understanding of the world and other human beings through stories) which is discussed in the following section is based on the belief that people should have freedom to lead the lives they have reason to value. Narrative imagination as opposed to individual life narrative focuses on learning about the other. The focus between the two versions of narrative are different although there are similarities. Both Nussbaum (1997) and MacIntyre (1981) share similar interests in learning from Greek literature and drama as well as the virtues and social life that informed citizenship during that period. However, Nussbaum (1997) is concerned with global citizenship while MacIntyre (1981) rejects universalism and focuses on small traditional communities. The main emphasis in narrative imagination is not so much on developing an individual narrative based on shared traditions or culture but understanding our common humanity including our fragility or vulnerability (Nussbaum, 2001a) which requires that we should make acts of judgement by placing ourselves in the shoes of the other.

4.3 Narrative Imagination

4.3.1 Literature as Sources of Narrative in Citizenship Education

Narratives in the form of text (books or literature) besides individual life narratives are important in citizenship education because they inform us about the kind of things that might happen in the personal, social and political lives of human beings. Drawing from the novel of Ralph Ellis (1952) which talks about the invincibility of people of colour
in the United States, Nussbaum (1997) observes that “Narrative art has the power to make us see the lives of the different with more than a casual tourist’s interest—with involvement and sympathetic understanding, with anger at our society’s refusals of visibility” (p. 88). She argues that imagination through reading stories or drama allows children to recognise the possibility of bad things that might happen in a human life before they actually do. She explains that when people become aware of their common vulnerability despite their social status or privilege they may respond with empathy or compassion because that is how they themselves would like to be treated if they were in a similar position. While it may be difficult for people to empathise with people different from themselves, the prospect of citizens without compassion implies that most citizens would act out of self-interest. Narrative imagination therefore, is necessary to develop a sense of citizenship where people care for one another.

Narrative imagination also develops awareness and critical thinking that may lead to social transformation. This is very different from maintaining the status quo by making children adapt to the normal political and social conditions. When students in citizenship education are made to “examine or question the political implications” of their situation in terms of “justice and equality” (Papastephanou, 2005, p. 515) they may realise some of the things that are often taken for granted in their normal everyday life such as the marginalisation of certain groups of people because of social class, gender, poverty or other forms of prejudice. Such realisation may prompt students to think critically about participatory and inclusive ways of thinking about the other (Papastephanou, 2005; Tupper, 2009). For instance, Papastephanou (2005) cites Heraclitus’ maxim that “he would not have had the intellectual quality that
characterised his life if he had been born a slave, or a poor citizen, or a woman” (p. 515). Thinking in terms of narrative imagination where students think about the implications of their own lives in a similar manner as Heraclitus’s maxim may just be the kind of disruption or alteration they need in order to view themselves and others differently. When students learn to see things this way, they are likely to question established ways of doing things and perhaps change the prevailing social conditions.

However, while I agree with the importance of narrative imagination in developing citizens who are empathetic, compassionate and critically aware, the actions of individuals in narrative imagination may remain private. What I mean is that it is possible for individuals to develop their capabilities of empathy, compassion and critical awareness and still do nothing about it. It is also debatable whether it is sufficient to understand about other people’s lives through reading literature. On this view, Adami (2014) criticises narrative imagination saying that it “risks reifying generalised and exotifying characteristics of people” (p. 298) because of the emphasis of learning about the “collective other as a way of achieving a sense of global citizenship” (p. 298). Nussbaum (1997) has a point of course in suggesting that we should not deny the moral worth of sympathy inspired by literary imagining despite the fact that in America as in Athens it has not translated into immediate political change. However, we might ask whether there are ways of enriching narrative imagination to promote good citizens who act “in concert” (Arendt, 1998, p. 245), or in collaboration with others, in the public sphere.
4.4 Action as Narrativity

4.4.1 Action as the Beginning of Narrative and its Implications for Citizenship Education

Citizenship education as narrative could be related to Arendt’s notion of action in the public sphere if we want children to participate actively in citizenship. Actions for Arendt (1998), constitute the source materials for stories but it is not the initiator of the story who tells the story in the end but the storyteller. The initiator of the action is only the beginner of something new which has never been seen before. Arendt (1998) explains that the capacity to initiate or begin something new and unexpected corresponds to the human fact of birth where the new born begins a new life that can never be foretold. She describes action as “the actualisation of the human condition of natality” (Arendt, 1998, p. 178). Benhabib (1990) describes natality or the new beginning as signifying a new narrative rather than continuity from the past.

The idea of action as a beginning or bringing something new and unexpected is important for encouraging young people to bring about change as a result of exposure to citizenship education informed by action as narrativity. Citizenship education viewed as such indicates spontaneity and progress rather than stagnation or adherence to the past. Benhabib (1990) suggests that the future in Arendt’s work is “radically undetermined” (p. 171) because of the idea of action as something new and unexpected. A radically undetermined future is different from MacIntyre’s (1981) notion of individual life narrative which is constrained by moral traditions. Individual life narratives are constrained by moral traditions because the synthesis and integration
of internal goods and virtues from practices is informed by goods held in common with others within society.

It could also be argued that action, according to Arendt, does not only make a break with history but also differs from our universal conception of freedom. Biesta (2012a) describes freedom in Arendt as beginning something new. According to Biesta, freedom as the beginning of something new implies a departure from the liberal view of freedom (strong autonomy or individuality) as thinking or acting against one’s own inclination. Acting against one’s own inclination is associated with universal action through what Kant describes as obeying the moral law. On the other hand, freedom as beginning something new is to act from inclination (that is, from one’s character disposition). It corresponds to authenticity and weak autonomy where the individual reveals who he or she is as a unique individual among others in the public sphere. In this regard, the individual is not so much concerned with universal action but the particularity of the situation. The interpretation of freedom in Arendt could be defined as republican rather than liberal because it is social rather than individually dependent as the following discussion expands.

4.4.2 Plurality and Implications for Citizenship Education

An important aspect in conceiving citizenship education based on narrative along Arendt’s idea of action is that the initiator does not act in isolation but in relation to the other. Arendt describes the actions of the initiator in terms of working in collaboration or “in concert” (1998, p. 245) with others as our human condition of plurality. She explains that plurality is demonstrated in speech with others and
constitutes the world of men (and women). It is present even when we are alone because we also dialogue with ourselves, and as such is regarded as foundational to humanity in its general sense (Arendt, 1990). We might also draw similarities to democratic practice here if we consider the idea of plurality or acting in relation to the other through speech very closely. For instance, democracy requires deliberation or dialogue with one another in a similar manner to the condition of plurality. Dictatorship on the other hand is opposed to the condition of plurality or democracy because citizens are isolated and discouraged from active participation.

Arendt (1998) explains that action and speech reveal who we are as individuals as opposed to what we are. In other words, our moral and political qualities (Benhabib, 1990) are implicit in what we say and do (Arendt, 1998). It is this information that the storyteller uses to piece together information in order to tell our story or narrative. According to Arendt (1998), it is when our actions and speech are recognised by others as significant and truthful that we come out of our shadowy existence. This suggests that our actions (or beginnings) are dependent upon relation to others through speech (or our condition of plurality).

Recalling what I discussed in the earlier section on MacIntyre (1981) about the integration of goods and virtues from subjects or practices into individual life narratives, we might realise that those goods and virtues would come to nothing unless they are used as actions in relation to others in the public sphere. Similarly, there is not much benefit for cultivating empathy, compassion and critical awareness through the reading of literature as contended by Nussbaum (1997) if the individual citizen is not
going to do anything about it. Compassion is only useful if we perform compassionate acts towards others. Nussbaum (2011a) also emphasises the development of both internal and external capabilities in order to allow people to use their learned capabilities such as critical thinking (internal capability) to deliberate with others by using their freedom of speech (external capability). On the view of action as narrative, students may draw from other narratives such as individual life narratives and narrative imagination to inform their action and speech within the classroom or the school environment as I explain in the following sections.

4.4.3 The Public Sphere and Citizenship Education as Friendship

So far I have discussed action in the public sphere as if the public sphere was a physical or topographical space where people meet to discuss public issues. However, the public sphere according to Arendt (1998) is not a physical place but any location where people may act in common or in concert with one another at whatever time they choose to do so. She explains that those who come together have the freedom of beginning something new by telling their stories from their own opinions or perspectives which is implied in who they are. I have already defined the idea of “whoness” (Benhabib, 1988; p. 33) as revealed in action and speech. Arendt explains that the world opens up differently to every man depending on his (or her) position in it and that the “sameness” which is what lies between or is common to all of us “resides in the fact that the same world opens up to everyone and that despite all differences between men and their position in the world and consequently their doxai (opinions) –‘both you and I are humans’” (sic) (Arendt, 1990, p. 80). The significance of the public sphere is that everyone is a unique individual holding a different opinion from others and seeks to
persuade the other to their opinion and yet they are able to create a common world among themselves similar to that of friends.

Arendt’s idea of action might be conceived of as citizenship informed by the virtue of friendship. This is despite Biesta (2012a) describing citizenship based on Arendt’s idea of action as a citizenship of strangers because of the innumerable opinions and perspectives from unique individuals in the public sphere. The idea of citizenship as friendship arises from the view that citizens in the public sphere share similar interests about the common world between them despite holding different perspectives or opinions. Arendt (1990) describes friendship as something that consists to a large extent on talking about something that friends have in common (that is, the world). She explains that what is between friends becomes more familiar when they talk about it as Socrates often used his dialectical method to bring out people’s opinions. She continues to stress that as friends talk about what is between them, it “gains not only its articulateness, but develops and expands and finally, in the course of time and life begins to constitute a little world of its own which is shared in friendship” (Arendt, 1990, p. 82).

The idea of citizenship as friendship is linked to our humanity or condition of plurality. When citizens act in relation to one another in the public sphere, such as through involvement in voluntary action, they are involved in partnership with their beneficiaries. Without this partnership, action would not be possible because it can only be activated in relation to another. Arendt (1998) observes that “to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act” (p. 188). She also describes friendship as
equalisation which is necessary for the development of a community (Arendt, 1990). The development of a community in this case could mean familiarity in terms of creating a common world (a little world) which is shared among members of a group. Arendt explains that the “equalisation in friendship does not of course mean that the friends become the same or equal to each other, but that they become equal partners in a common world—that they together constitute a community” (Arendt, 1990, p. 84). This suggests that action as narrativity according to Arendt is important for citizenship education because it emphasises interrelationships in the public sphere rather than personal or moral responsibility.

4.4.4 Citizenship Education as Narrative and Deliberative Democracy

The idea of collective action rather than self-interest is an important aspect for citizenship education based on narrative that we can draw from Arendt. Biesta (2012a) explains that Arendt “is not interested in plurality as such but in the question of how collective action - acting ‘in concert’ as she puts it - is possible given the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself” (p. 689). Collective action is necessary for deliberative democracy in the current situation where there is a decline of the public sphere as a result of the influence of the market and individualism. Ruitenberg (2009) observes that “both in education and politics the influence of the economic paradigm of neo-liberalism is clearly recognisable” (p. 278). The economic paradigm of neo-liberalism according to Biesta (2012a) is characterised by values of self-interest rather than the public good. For instance, politics in neo-liberalism is dominated by giving citizens choices and public services that are regarded as value for money rather than involving citizens in
influencing those decisions in the first place. Students need to understand that although they may differ in perspective and opinion, the decisions taken in the public sphere should be in the interest of the public rather than self-interest.

Another insight from Arendt revolves on the issue of judgement in decision making as a feature of deliberative democracy. Biesta (2012a) observes that Arendt “rejects pluralism - without - judgement - the mere existence of plurality [just] as she also rejects judgement - without - plurality” (p. 689; emphasis in original). The judgement that Arendt is concerned with here is context specific but also universal. Benhabib (1988) describes it as an enlarged thought or representative thinking which is “realised through a dialogic or discursive ethic” (p. 44). In other words, it is a result of a recreation of shared understanding or dialogue with others in the public sphere. Benhabib (1988) characterises representational narrative (that is, recreating the story from the perspectives of others) as an attempt to combine the particularistic Aristotelian conception of judgement as phronesis and universal thinking in Kant. For instance, Benhabib (1988) explains that civic friendship (see last two paragraphs) bridges the “gap between the demands of justice, as it articulates the morally right and the demands of virtue as it defines the quality of our relations to others in the everyday lifeworld” (pp. 46-47). Adami (2014) also uses narratives in human rights education to make human rights more personal while they remain universal.

However, citizenship education based on narrative according to Arendt requires to be supplemented with other ideas such as narrative imagination because of the lack of emotions. Benhabib (1988; 1990) observes that judgement (enlarged thought or
representative thinking) in Arendt is not the same as empathy or sympathy. Action in Arendt lacks the emotions necessary for students to see the possibility of others as a possibility for themselves although the personalised nature of judgement such as the involvement of friendship and solidarity makes it much more preferred than other democratic deliberative theories that are individualist and exclusively rational. Ruitenberg (2009) considers the development of emotions in politics as an important ingredient for facilitating students’ ability to play the role of political adversary. Playing the role of adversary in politics is different from being enemies but recognises the need for taking a stand between the left and right positions of the democratic dispensation. Otherwise, neutrality in politics and liberal citizenship education, encourages rhetorical skills of competition (Ruitenberg, 2009) at the expense of meaningful debate about clearly articulated democratic positions.

4.5 Three Versions of Narrative and the Formulation of Citizenship Education

It is one thing to show the relevance of each version of narrative but another to demonstrate that there are connections among each of the three narratives for purposes of informing citizenship education. None of the current studies on citizenship education combine all the three versions of narrative. Only two of the versions of narrative have been combined in one study on separate occasions. The following discussion demonstrates the significance of connections among the three versions of narrative. The discussion also indicates how the three forms of narrative, individual life narratives (MacIntyre, 1981), narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 1997) and action as narrativity (Arendt, 1998), together usefully inform the four essential features of
effective citizenship education; citizenship identity, virtues of the citizen, citizenship participation and social prerequisites.

4.5.1 Individual Life Narratives and Action as Narrativity

Higgins (2011) is able to extend the public sphere into the classroom which otherwise should remain a sheltered environment according to Arendt. The reason why the school should be protected or sheltered to the public sphere is because it plays a mediating role between the private sphere of the home and the public sphere. To expose students too early into the public sphere according to Arendt could overwhelm students and jeopardise whatever it is that they could bring as a new beginning.

However, Higgins (2011) uses MacIntyre’s notion of practices to show that the practices in which students are engaged in school already constitute mini-publics. He explains that the school should be conceived of as a home to practices in the same way that I described practices as subjects within the school curriculum. Higgins also adds that practices may be regarded as mini-publics because individuals within practices form a certain bond with each other as they share similar concerns regarding the point and purpose of a practice. For instance, individuals may be concerned with the accuracy of facts in history in much the same way as they would be concerned with the distribution of spatial phenomena in geography. On this view, members of a practice form a public in the sense that they share debates about the improvement of a practice (Higgins, 2011).
The picture of citizenship education that emerges from combining the ideas of narrative offered by Arendt and MacIntyre is that “schools need to become home to practices, and practices constitute mini-publics” (Higgins, 2011, p. 455). If we agree that practices become mini publics, this suggests that students do not only develop individual life narratives within practices in the classroom but are also enabled to exercise public action along the ideas of Hannah Arendt. Yet, authority relations between the teacher and the students in education according to Arendt (2007) are unequal as opposed to that of people in politics where there is equal partnership in the public sphere. In this regard, Higgins (2011) explains that the authoritative figure of the teacher in the classroom is expected to help students answer for themselves the question of how they should live as citizens by revealing to them what each of the goods and virtues found within practices mean for their communities as well as how the goods and virtues could inform an individual life. However, within those practices there is equality in debate about the meaning and purpose of a practice (subject). Individuals are able to appear and reveal who they are among others on an equal basis in much the same way as democratic deliberation.

Nevertheless, one of the challenges in Higgins’s (2011) combination of the ideas of narrative in MacIntyre and Arendt is that there is very little involvement of emotions despite the importance of defining the individual self and the actions of individuals in the public sphere. A view of citizenship education that excludes the involvement of emotions could easily be criticised as masculine citizenship education because of the emphasis on rationality and action in the public sphere at the expense of caring which often takes place in the privacy of the home as a platform of citizenship participation.
In this regard, Nussbaum’s (1997) notion of narrative imagination could be seen as adding an important dimension of developing empathetic understanding among the other two versions of narrative.

**4.5.2 Narrative Imagination and Action as Narrativity**

The influence of emotions in citizenship education informed by narrative may be observed when we consider the relationship between “undoing retributive anger” in Nussbaum’s (1997, p. 97) narrative imagination and forgiveness in Arendt (1998). Nussbaum explains that we may be able to control our anger if we can use our empathetic understanding to imagine why someone acted in a provoking manner. Otherwise, failure to imagine the reasons for other people’s actions might lead to classifying them as evil or inherently bad such that we may respond against them with much force than perhaps is necessary. Arendt (1998) on the other hand recognises that actions within a web of relations with others is likely to result in infringing upon others and hence the need for forgiveness rather than revenge. She describes forgiveness as something unexpected but necessary in order to release “men from what they have done unknowingly” (sic) (p. 240). Forgiveness according to Arendt is not based on empathetic understanding but on using knowledge of what has happened to change our minds against what is expected (revenge) to do the unexpected (forgiving). The choice to forgive (but not to forget) is described as consistent with the inherent nature of action which is unpredictable and capable of bringing something new.

The crucial point in my discussion is that there is much to be gained from considering the influence of the emotions in undoing retributive anger or in forgiving others.
Undoing retributive anger requires one to put oneself in the shoes of the other when making judgements. It implies restorative justice in the sense that once we understand the point of view of the other we may be in a better position to assist them to overcome their bad emotions or prejudices. Forgiveness on the other hand does not require individuals to put themselves in the shoes of the other or to empathise with their point of view. Benhabib (1990) describes judgement according to Arendt as “merely making present to oneself what the perspectives of others involves or could be, and whether I could “woo their consent” in acting the way that I do” (p. 44). So, while forgiveness is important in enticing others to recognise the unexpected or something new, there is little attempt to help individuals overcome whatever they are forgiven for.

Furthermore, attention needs to be paid to what Adami (2014) describes as the manner in which “narratives are told, listened to and shared in education” (p. 301) if narrative imagination is to avoid the problem of categorising the other as a collective group rather than recognising each individual’s uniqueness (or plurality). Adami (2014) explains that the challenge with narrative imagination is not so much that individual groups may be presented in a stereotypical manner (although this is also possible) but that narrative imagination lacks a relational aspect that takes into consideration the uniqueness of one in relation to the other. In an effort to learn about the other, narrative imagination may focus attention on aspects such as what it means to be a woman, a Muslim, an African, an immigrant or a homeless person, rather than who one is as a unique individual on any of these characteristics. Learning about who one is may be possible through individual narratives in relation to the other, rather than about the other, a point to be further developed next.
Following an Arendtian perspective, Adami (2014) observes that “narratives are relational through speaking, writing and listening, and provide unique aspects of a whole that one single person cannot grasp through reason based on autonomy” (p. 298) or individuality. She explains that a relational view of narrative substantiates Nussbaum’s narrative imagination. The relational approach to narrative imagination provides an alternative to individual imagination about the other from merely reading literature. For instance, in the case of compassion, it is difficult to envisage how one may sit in isolation while reading a book and estimate the degree to which the other has suffered misfortune for reasons that he or she is not fully to blame for. What makes the judgement or estimation of one’s feelings of compassion difficult is that Nussbaum (1997) emphasises that our feelings have to be in conformity with those for whom we are feeling compassionate, most of the time. A relational approach to narrative enriches narrative imagination in that personal stories are told from the perspectives of the individuals affected in relation to others. Telling stories in relation to others allows space for individual narratives and counter narratives so that the actions of others may be taken up if considered significant.

4.5.3 The Unity of Narrative and Implications for Citizenship Education

Thus far, I have shown that individual life narratives associated with the moral theory of MacIntyre may be combined with action as narrativity linked to Arendt when we consider practices within schools as mini-publics. In addition, I have demonstrated that there is much to be gained when we consider empathetic understanding in Nussbaum’s (1997) narrative imagination in combination with action as narrativity according to
Arendt. It was also shown that learning about the other is not sufficient but could be carefully complemented by learning in relation to the other.

From this discussion, I argue that citizenship education based on narrative may be taught as a theme across the curriculum in order for students to develop individual life narratives from practices (taught subjects). In this citizenship education, students also engage in action and speech within the classroom because the practices are considered mini-publics. In addition, literature plays a crucial role as a source for drama and debate (action and speech) within the taught subjects (practices) in order to develop empathetic understanding as part of progressive or good citizenship education. Literature is particularly important because it does not only present the life that is already present in the lives of the students as citizens, but also what is possible (MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1997).

Based on the discussion of the relationship among the three versions of narrative I conclude that citizenship education informed by narrative is plausible. The predominance of Arendt’s ideas of action featuring in the other two versions of narrative could be construed as an indication of the nature of citizenship education as praxis. Citizenship education is not just concerned with knowledge of important institutions in a democracy but with social change, which is implied in action and speech.
4.6 Citizenship Education Based on Narrative and the Four Features of Citizenship Education

As noted earlier (and discussed in depth in Chapter One) citizenship education may be described according to four main features, citizenship identity, virtues of the citizen, participation and social prerequisites as necessary conditions for effective citizenship (McLaughlin, 1992). Addressing these four features of citizenship education provides a comprehensive picture of citizenship education based on narrative so that it is not only associated with one feature such as identity. To focus on only one feature of citizenship education at the expense of others makes it difficult to understand citizenship education as a whole. For instance, citizenship participation may not be easily understood if we do not know whether the identity of the individual is conceived of as private or public. In the following discussion, I describe each of the features of citizenship education in the context of citizenship education based on narrative.

4.6.1 Citizenship Identity

Citizenship education based on narrative recognises the dignity of individuals as well as the common good (or social end). In particular, Nussbaum (1997) recounts the story of Sophocles’ Philoctetes to demonstrate the need for human dignity and development of empathetic understanding. In the story, Philoctetes is abandoned by army commanders on a deserted island for ten years because of a debilitating wound from a snake bite. After ten years, the commanders decide to use deceit and lies to lure Philoctetes back into the army because they discovered that they could not win a war without his magic bows. In summarising the story, Nussbaum (1997) observes that good citizenship requires that “although the good of the all should not be neglected,
that good will not be served if human beings are seen as instruments of one another’s purposes” (p. 87). This statement suggests that while narrative imagination considers the dignity of human beings as important, this does not mean that the common good (or social end) should be ignored. In Chapter Three, it was noted that social environmental aspects permeate the personal in defining the authenticity or identity of the individual (Bonnett & Cuypers, 2003). Citizenship identity advocated by citizenship based on narrative, respects individual rights (freedom) but also recognises the common good.

Arendt (1998) also recognises the plurality or uniqueness of every human being while at the same time she argues that “to live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life” (p. 58). Freedom (or we might say authenticity) in Arendt’s view is considered the beginning of something new which comes about as a result of revealing who one is in front of others through a common relationship that recognises each other’s individuality. Similarly, MacIntyre in his interview with Dunne (2002) describes a view of individual life narrative where individuals exposed to goods and virtues within practices or subjects decide for themselves what each of those goods and virtues mean for their individual lives. However, individuals choose goods and virtues within practices with a view of the life held in common with others in society. Earlier in the chapter I described the development of one’s individual life narrative as associated with authenticity (Taylor, 1991) and practical wisdom.
4.6.2 Virtues of the Citizen

In terms of virtues of the citizen, both MacIntyre (1981) and Arendt (1998) in their versions of narrative, identify civic friendship as one of the important virtues of citizenship. For instance, MacIntyre (1981) uses Philoctetes’s exiled situation in Sophocles’s story to justify friendship and the need for social life among human beings. He quotes Philoctetes in the story as saying; “You left me friendless, solitary without a city, a corpse among the living” (MacIntyre, 1981. p. 158). MacIntyre describes friendship as an essential component of humanity which has lost meaning in our modern society because of individuality. His view on the importance of friendship is consistent with that of Aristotle (1999) who insists that we would choose friendship even if we had all the other goods. I have already described the importance of friendship in Arendt (1990) under the heading of the public sphere and citizenship as friendship within this chapter. According to Arendt (1990) friendship is necessary for equalising the relationship among people who are different but united by the common world (a little world of its own) or community they create among themselves. Compassion and justified anger are also some of the virtues that could be developed through narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 1997).

4.6.3 Citizenship Participation

Concerning active participation, narrative imagination develops critical thinking which is essential for a vibrant democratic society. Nussbaum argues that “to produce students who are truly Socratic we must encourage them to read critically; not only to empathise and experience but also to ask critical questions about that experience” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 100). For instance, students might raise questions concerning
why some people depend on the generous acts of others when social policies could be designed to enhance their agency. Nussbaum (1997; 2006a) envisages that students should live according to what Socrates regarded as the examined life. An examined life requires one to develop “the capacity for critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions” (Nussbaum, 2006a, p. 388). According to Nussbaum (2011a), the freedom (or internal capability) to think critically should be accompanied by the freedom (external capability) to express oneself through freedom of speech. Otherwise, the freedom to speak freely is useless if the capability of critical thinking is not cultivated among students through citizenship education. Generally, there is agreement among scholars that the development of critical rationality is a key aim of civic education (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002; MacIntyre, 1999; Winch, 2004) in a credible democratic society.

Leaning on Arendt, one may also argue that solidarity (or acting in concert) on behalf of others may develop as a result of action and speech in citizenship education. Arendt (1998) encourages plurality in citizenship. However, plurality or action and speech should be based on judgement or shared ideas and opinions, possibly among a small group of people rather than mass demonstrations. Kennelly (2006) observes that one of the characteristics of a democratic public sphere is that “it combats our collective tendency to become oblivious to injustice” (p. 548). In this study, Kennelly (2006) discusses the use of drama along the ideas of Arendt in citizenship education to demonstrate the story of marginalised groups, such as the homeless in Canada. She explains that when individuals reveal who they are in the public sphere, “the true nature of their constitutive plurality is revealed” (Kennelly, 2006, p. 556). This
statement suggests that issues that are ignored and considered at the periphery of society may be revealed through drama and stories (action and speech). On this view, if we perceive the classroom as a mini-public (Higgins, 2011), we might realise that stories about the marginalisation of others may arouse interest leading to solidarity (or acting in concert) for a particular course in social justice or even justified anger at injustice from students.

4.6.4 Social Prerequisites

The development of empathy among students is a contribution that narrative imagination can make in terms of the social prerequisites necessary for effective citizenship. The capacity to put oneself in the shoes of a person different from oneself (Nussbaum, 2006a) is necessary to deal with prejudices such as sexism, greed and intolerance of any kind. People who can use their imagination to estimate appropriately what it is like to be in the shoes of someone different from themselves are likely to be compassionate and inclusive in judgement of their actions. Kristjánsson (2007) describes empathy as a capacity that “involves various emotions, sparked off by the perception of someone’s situation (such as suffering) as that person perceives it” (p. 94). Emotions such as compassion, pity, and perhaps even justified anger on behalf of others which may arise from our feelings of empathy are necessary for effective citizenship education when empathy is used appropriately for good rather than bad motives. Sympathy is also considered important for successful dialogue (Winch, 1996) and debate in citizenship education. It is important for two parties to sympathise with the standpoint of the other in order to reach a negotiated settlement where two very strong opposing views are debated.
At this point of the discussion it might be apparent how the research question for this chapter was answered. The research question sought to find out how different moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated into citizenship education while taking into consideration the particularity or contextual nature of citizenship education. In this regard, I have shown that different moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated through individual life narratives, narrative imagination and action as narrative. In particular, it was argued that students may integrate and synthesise internal goods and virtues within practices or taught subjects through individual life narratives (MacIntyre, 1981). Students develop their own narratives according to what each of the goods and virtues found within practices or subjects mean for their own individual lives. For instance, students may engage in intellectual and moral virtues through different activities within the school curriculum. These intellectual and moral virtues are not only necessary to help students in how they should live their individual lives or complete their own narratives but for the common good as well. For instance, democratic deliberation requires independently minded individuals who also have the courage to stand up for their own convictions as well as friendly and agreeable to others.

In addition to virtue ethics, the capabilities approach may be integrated into citizenship education through narrative imagination. In this regard, narrative imagination develops empathetic understanding of the world and other human beings through reading
stories. For instance, students might develop understanding that the possibilities of others could be a possibility for themselves such that they may treat others with compassion (Nussbaum, 1997). Compassion is necessary for a democratic society in order to develop willingness for fair distribution of national resources to benefit the least advantaged. Otherwise, a society in which people were mainly concerned with their self-interests is not sustainable because of the debilitating nature of poverty. The capability for “critical examination of oneself and one’s traditions” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 9) is also important in order for students to think critically about their cultures such as those that discriminate according to gender, ethnicity and religion. Nussbaum explains that students should not read literature uncritically as some of the literature may be biased towards a particular idea or moral philosophical perspective. Instead, students should develop a questioning attitude. The view of developing a questioning attitude including transformation of society where necessary is consistent with the development of responsible citizens.

Deontological ethics may also be integrated into citizenship education based on narrative through written stories in narrative imagination or action and speech. Part of developing students’ critical thinking includes exposing them to a variety of literature including those that promote a particular agenda. For instance, Nussbaum (1997) suggests that we could include books such as those which promote “liberalism in its very form, in the way in which it shows respect for the individuality and the privacy of each human mind” (p. 105). The important point here is for students to reflect on ideas that promote particular moral philosophical perspectives so that they may criticise and analyse them. Nussbaum (1997) and MacIntyre (1981) explain that
narratives do not only present what has happened to human beings but what could possibly happen. From this view, we may observe that citizenship education based on narrative accommodates the particularity or contextual nature of citizenship education. This suggests that students may deal with issues that have happened or are likely to happen in their lives rather than a catalogue of facts about democratic procedures and institutions that may have little relevance in their lives. It was also noted earlier that human rights may be presented through personal narratives and counter narratives.

One might also imagine the development of sympathy related to care ethics through reading literature about the conditions of vulnerable people. While most individuals need care, there are some who need care more than others. Developing sympathy through written stories might require imagination from students. At the same time, when personal narratives are presented through action and speech (or drama and stories), there is a possibility that students may be compelled to think about their privileged positions in order to accommodate the needs of others such as those who are different according to gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity and religion. For instance, students may realise that human rights are experienced differently by different people in the case mentioned earlier about presenting human rights as personal narratives. In particular, they might realise that human rights may lead to neglect and domination rather than the ideal of equality when they are not informed by care ethics. On this view, citizenship education based on narrative deals with concrete situations in a similar manner to care ethics.
Having addressed the main question, I might also respond to the second question of whether citizenship education should be presented as a theme across the curriculum or as a discrete subject. In this regard, citizenship education should be offered as a theme across the curriculum. The reason why citizenship education should be presented as a theme across the curriculum is because internal goods and virtues are integrated through individual life narratives from practices or taught subjects within the school curriculum. In addition, citizenship education should be offered as a theme across the curriculum so that students do not confine citizenship education within a particular subject. Citizenship education is a major aim of education that may not be reduced to a particular subject. Most of the knowledge and understanding acquired through citizenship education may be transferred to other areas of students’ experience within the school curriculum and society. Teaching citizenship education as a subject, therefore, is not recommended since it would limit the scope of citizenship education.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed how different moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated into citizenship education while taking into consideration the contextual nature of citizenship education. In this regard, it was argued that different moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated into citizenship education through individual life narratives (MacIntyre, 1981), narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 1997) and action as narrative (Arendt, 1998). It is held that these three versions of narrative may be taught in the classroom since individual life narratives are developed within practices or taught subjects. At the same time, practices constitute mini-publics (Higgins, 2011) where action and speech or discussion in the form of democratic
deliberation may take place among students including the teacher. Written stories in the form of narrative imagination may also provide sources of information for deliberation. Given the discussion in this chapter, it would seem that a plural moral philosophical perspective as citizenship based on narrative is plausible. For instance, it was argued that citizenship education based on narrative may be understood according to four main features of citizenship education (identity, virtues of the citizens, citizenship participation and social prerequisites). However, I have not discussed what knowledge would be included in a plural moral philosophical perspective. It is to this next task that I now turn.
CHAPTER 5

5.0 Knowledge, Understanding and Judgement in Citizenship Education

This chapter discusses research question number five of the thesis, which is concerned with what content would be addressed by a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. The view that citizenship education should be integrated into the curriculum as it was discussed in the previous chapter does not mean that there should be no content for citizenship education. Instead, content for citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective should be addressed from different areas of the curriculum rather than in a discrete subject. In this regard, teachers need to have a good understanding of the information and judgement to be mastered by students concerning citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective. Otherwise, it would be impractical to expect teachers to deliver citizenship education without the knowledge of what the content entails.

In my discussion of the content entailed in citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective, I begin by explaining that the abilities, skills and action that are used by students in citizenship education are an indication of what they know. I also explain following Oakeshott (1989) that the knowledge students possess is itself a result of a combination of information and judgement developed through teaching (information + judgement = knowledge…action (abilities and skills)). I, therefore, argue that students do not only require instruction in useful
information but to exercise this information so that they may develop the necessary judgement for citizenship education. In particular, I argue that the kind of judgement that should be encouraged among students in a moral philosophical perspective of citizenship education is that which shows concern for other human beings and the environment. In this regard, students should be encouraged to perform acts of kindness for the underprivileged as well as care for the environment while they also reflect on how existing structures that no longer serve the interests of their communities may be transformed. Throughout the discussion I emphasise that the judgement developed by students is their own (authentic), although the teaching itself may align students with the judgement of their teachers.

While other studies in citizenship education may also describe the knowledge, values and skills necessary for citizenship education, my own endeavour is different in that I seek to describe what citizenship education ought to be rather than what it is. In particular, my study emphasises the kind of judgement that allows students to develop what Arendt (1998) calls something new and unexpected. I also recognise that Arendt’s ideas did not focus much on education, although several scholars (Adami, 2014; Biesta, 2011; Todd, 2011) have applied her ideas in citizenship education. My discussion draws on some of these ideas to argue that a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education is not so much concerned with the socialisation of children into the existing social structure but with enabling them to make the best judgement which is in their individual interests but also, that of other human beings and the environment. The discussion avoids following a single moral philosophical perspective, which runs the risk of ignoring other morally important ideas in its
justification. Instead, I consider various moral philosophical perspectives that are important in developing information and judgement for students.

5.1 Information and Knowledge for Citizenship Education

What we call knowledge according to Oakeshott (1989) consists of information as one of its major ingredients. He explains that information is made up of impersonal facts rather than opinion. For instance, students could be instructed on who the British Prime minister is or how many members can sit in each of the British houses of parliament. Information such as when was the declaration for Human Rights, and what is contained in it may be accepted as conventional facts from sources of authority such as textbooks, manuals and encyclopaedias. In the following discussion I argue that information is important although I am not trying to defend political literacy as such. Political literacy within citizenship education is often defined as the acquisition of information about political institutions. What I am arguing in this section is that students require information as part of their knowledge in order to equip them with “political understanding and involvement” (McLaughlin, 2000, p. 543).

Information on citizenship provides students with a basis for knowledge needed to perform. Oakeshott (1989) contends that the value of information is that it provides rules or rule-like propositions related to abilities or skills (that is, “what we may be said to know” (p. 51)). These rules or rule-like propositions inherent in information are like the grammar of language or formulae in mathematics and chemistry which allows the individual the ability to do mathematics or chemistry. He observes that information is useful because it “is composed of facts related to a particular skill or
ability” (p. 51). In this regard, useful information is contrasted with irrelevant information. It is acknowledged that information may be irrelevant or useless to a certain task at hand although it is generally accepted that “there is no inherently useless information” (Oakeshott, 1989, p. 51). For instance, information about who the mayor of a city is when all we require is information about how to send a petition to the local municipality could be deemed irrelevant or useless; but knowing who the mayor is, is useful when needing to contact him.

Given these essential attributes of information, especially its usefulness (or relevance), the question of what information could be regarded as useful on citizenship education is posed in this thesis. In this regard, it could be noted that the discussion in the thesis is that we do not only need citizens with rights (recognising that with rights come responsibilities) who participate in making and obeying laws, but citizens who are motivated by the right reasons for the right motives, as well as are sympathetic to the plight of others, while they facilitate others’ capabilities. In short, the kind of citizenship education that is necessary is one that is informed by a plural moral philosophical perspective. For instance, I have argued in several chapters already that citizenship rights, including virtues such as friendship, and narrative imagination, which encourages compassion within the capabilities approach, are important in citizenship education.

A response to the question of what information may be necessary or included in citizenship education is found in Oakeshott’s (1989) notion of two different ways in which rules or rule-like propositions contained in information relate to abilities or
skills (what we are said to know). One way is that there “may be items of information which must be known as conditions of being able to perform” (Oakeshott, 1989, p. 52). In the following paragraph I use some of MacIntyre’s ideas from an interview with Dunne where he proposes a normative content for citizenship education in schools to illustrate this point.

MacIntyre explains that students need to know everything about the modern state as a “coercive law-maker and regulator, as imposer of burdens, and provider of services, as possessor of resources” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 13) if they are to engage with it constructively at an individual or community level. In addition, Vokey (2003) expands on MacIntyre’s ideas to note that in order for students to identify opportunities for social and political reform they need to identify when “social institutions and policies no longer serve the interests of their communities” (p. 271). In order to identify that some of society’s institutions and policies no longer serve the interests of the community requires that one should have information about how those institutions and policies work in the first place. Otherwise, one would not be able to make the determination that they no longer function properly, and hence the need for reform. MacIntyre also adds that we may need to work through some of the agencies of the state in order to bring about changes within our communities (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). Again, working through state agencies presupposes information about how those institutions work.

From the above discussion we can see that information as a “precept” and “component of knowledge” (Kitchen, 2014, p. 126) is necessary in order for students to think about
their contribution to the social and political situation in a country. It would be difficult to imagine the possibility of thinking about influencing the political system if students lacked information about state institutions and how the democratic process works. So, political literacy becomes useful for students in forming the basis for knowledge related to skills, abilities and action. A close observation of the citizenship education curriculum for England shows that it has political literacy as one of its major components in addition to social and moral responsibility and community involvement (McLaughlin, 2000). However, as was argued earlier in this discussion, this does not mean that the curriculum on citizenship education for England is merely concerned with information about political institutions. Instead, “political literacy is seen as involving not only the acquisition of political knowledge but … pupils learning about and how to make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, skills and values” (McLaughlin, 2000, p. 549).

A closer look at the rules governing different societies also shows that rules or rule-like propositions contained in information are indeed items of information which must be known as conditions of being able to perform. For instance, Audigier (2000) outlines competencies of a legal and political nature in citizenship education in Europe. He describes these competencies as “knowledge about democratic public institutions and the rules governing freedom and action” (p. 21). This suggests that there are rights and responsibilities which regulate the conduct for both groups and individuals including powers and authority for various offices of state institutions. Peters (1981) also observes that “a society is a collection of individuals united by the acceptance of certain rules” (p. 49). While this statement might be related to what I describe as
individual and group rights above, Peters adds that “there are also (leaving aside the law) a number of general rules binding on anyone who is deemed to be a member of the same society” (p. 49). What this statement suggests is that rules or rule like propositions found within information regulating human relations and moral conduct are not only applicable in the form of rights within liberal societies but can be found in communitarian societies as well.

The second way in which rules or rule-like propositions may relate to skills or abilities is that “they may constitute a criterion by means of which a performance may be known to be incorrect” (Oakeshott, 1989, p. 52). For instance, if we know the total number of seats in the house of parliament, then, we can use this information to assist us to work out the correct number of members of parliament that would form a majority during the voting of a bill in parliament. In this manner, rules or rule-like propositions operate in a similar manner as the grammar of a language or a formula in mathematics or chemistry as it was described earlier.

Oakeshott (1989) introduces the notion of language “of history, philosophy, science and practical life” (p. 56) by which a performance may be known to be correct. We may also refer to this as the language of a citizen in education. Similarly, Haydon (2010a) in his analysis of citizenship education in England argues that the message of citizenship education is that one should “be a good citizen, engage in public affairs, make your own contribution towards making society better for all” (p. 208). He contrasts the message for citizenship education in the national curriculum against that of Personal and Social Health Education (PSHE). The message for PSHE is that
students should be concerned with looking after their own well-being “through making informed decisions related to their own interests” (p. 208) so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others. In this regard, Haydon (2010a) is pointing out that the message or “language” of citizenship education in the national curriculum for England is that it deals with issues of public interest while PSHE may deal with similar matters but at personal level.

However, while many people would agree that citizenship education should emphasise a public dimension rather than a personal dimension, there is disagreement concerning the extent to which individuals may separate themselves in terms of these two dimensions. For instance, Haydon (2010a) argues that “it is important for education to remember that private individuals and citizens are not two different sets of people” (p. 208). He therefore advocates guiding students, through citizenship education towards reflecting on the balance between the personal and public dimensions of life.

In light of the moral philosophical perspective of citizenship education advocated in this thesis, I agree with Haydon (2010a) that citizenship education should balance both the personal and public dimensions of life. Virtues, as stable character dispositions found within individuals, may be carried over to other domains of life so that we may have good citizens who are compassionate and friendly towards others. A moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education should encourage the development of individual virtues but not limit them to the private domain of personal character. Virtues should constitute the language or grammar of citizenship education. For instance, Crawford (2010) observes that citizenship education “involves equipping
students with a set of tools (knowledge and understanding, skills and aptitudes, values and dispositions) which enable them to participate actively in the roles and responsibilities they encounter in their adult lives” (p. 45). To develop civically and politically active citizens without good judgement and a strong moral compass would not be advisable (Colby et-al., 2003) because of the potential corruption and lack of moral responsibility that would characterise public life.

So far, I have argued, following Oakeshott (1989), that information contains rules or rule-like propositions relating to abilities or skills which constitute what we are said to know. In the last few preceding paragraphs I explained that rules or rule-like propositions contained in information may constitute the criterion by means of which a performance may be known to be incorrect. In this regard, I argued that the moral aspect (personal dimension) is part of the grammar or language of citizenship education although citizenship education is commonly associated with the public (social and political) dimension. It was also noted that Oakeshott (1989) observes that rules or rule-like propositions found in information may be related to abilities and skills (what we are said to know) in that information must be known as a condition of being able to perform. As a result of this, I argued that information about political institutions and collective rules of life within a country or society are important in citizenship education in order for students to reflect and participate actively in influencing government policy. In the next section, I look at judgement as the component of knowledge that is necessary for students to reflect upon information received through citizenship education.
5.2 Judgement and Knowledge for Citizenship Education

Information in itself does not constitute knowledge but is only a part of it. In order to have knowledge, we require more than just the impersonal facts provided by information. Oakeshott (1989) describes information as an ingredient of knowledge. Most often, facts and rules require to be interpreted (that is, infused with opinion or judgement) in order to form knowledge which is related to abilities, skills and action. Interpretation or judgement of facts or rules is necessary in order to determine how, when and which rule contained in information should be utilised. Oakeshott (1989) defines judgement as the “tacit or implicit component of knowledge, the ingredient which is not merely unspecified in propositions but is unspecifiable in propositions” (p. 54). Without judgement as Kitchen (2014) observes, “a set of rules or governances is insufficient in itself to guide the knower towards appropriate actions and abilities” (p. 126). For instance, information about political institutions including a list of rules about how democracy works requires insight in order to allow us to reflect or deliberate constructively about the existing political system. Facts or rules contained in useful information merely inform us of what needs to be done but they do not make us understand or do what needs to be done. The latter requires the component of knowledge called judgement.

It would seem that judgement is important in the knowledge and practice of citizenship education. Kitchen (2014) explains that “in the absence of judgement we may have access to the rules but have no access to participating in the practice of the art that is governed by rules” (p. 132). The question that arises, therefore, is what judgement is necessary for the moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education advocated
in this thesis? In other words, how do we gain access to what Kitchen in the above statement describes as “access to participating in the practice of the art that is governed by the rules”? In the following paragraphs, I use liberal and communitarian views to illustrate the importance of judgement in a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. The liberal and communitarian approaches are suitable for illustrating the extent of judgement we might expect from citizenship education underpinned by a plural moral philosophical perspective because they are very different from one another.

5.2.1 Judgement and Knowledge in the Liberal Approach to Citizenship Education

Kymlicka (1999) who is one of the most recognised theorists in liberal citizenship education advocates that students should be educated in common schools (mixed) so that they interact with others from different backgrounds in order to develop civility and public reasonableness. He defines civility as the proper way in which we ought to treat people that we are not very familiar with. Public reasonableness also refers to developing the capacity to understand that reasonable people disagree on the merits of different views (Rawls, 1993). Students are not typically concerned with rules contained in information about how to treat other people or merit of their views in the case of civility and public reasonableness. However, they use such information (about civility and public reasonableness) to make the best judgement concerning how to treat others (that is, with civility) or be reasonable (understanding) about differences in opinion wherever necessary. Oakeshott (1989) also observes that “judgement has begun to appear whenever the pupil perceives that information must be used and
perceives the possibility of irrelevance” (p. 59). We might note for instance that through interacting with others from different backgrounds students might realise the irrelevance of their prejudices which they might have picked up from home or their communities.

Civility and public reasonableness are important in a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education because they constitute the minimum level that allows people to exercise their rights such as deliberating freely without repression. Gutmann (2007) explains that a nonrepressive state “must cultivate the kind of character and the kind of intellect that enables people to choose rationally (one might say “autonomously”) among different ways of life” (p. 160). Gutmann does not mean that people should be individualistic. She explains in her article on democracy and democratic education that her intention is to find an alternative to the conflict between the “state of individuals” advocated by some liberals and the “family state” (p. 160) proposed by communitarians. The so called “state of individuals” favours neutrality in education regarding conceptions of a good life whereas the “family state” supports conceptions of the common good. Gutmann (2007) sees nonrepression as not neutral among conceptions of the good because it allows education to teach civic virtues such as “veracity, non-violence, toleration and mutual respect” (p. 161) as a basis for “rational deliberation of differing ways of life” (p. 161) within a pluralistic society.

The challenge, however, with civic virtues such as civility, public reasonableness, veracity, toleration, non-violence and mutual respect, is that they are limited in extent and subservient to the principle of right. I mentioned in Chapter Three that liberals
with their thin view of what constitutes the conception of a good life tend to place rules prior to virtues while communitarians and virtue ethicists conceive of virtues as a prerequisite for any rules to be followed. It seems reasonable to expect that individuals who are good (virtuous) would do the right thing at the right time from the right motives as opposed to people prioritising the right over the good. In addition, a list of virtues such as the ones listed above may be considered as good social manners or etiquette where people are treated with respect so that they may equally respond with politeness. Kristjánsson (2007) notes that there is a debate about the extent to which civility is a moral virtue rather than one of the social manners. However, these virtues provide the social foundation for democracy to thrive whatever we might think of them. They are necessary in citizenship education to facilitate the procedure for democratic deliberation even though they may not constitute the ends of action compared to substantive virtues such as compassion or friendship.

Furthermore, judgement in a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education does more than just support the right for people to express themselves without constraint. Yet from what I have discussed so far concerning the democratic virtues of civility, public reasonableness and a few others it would seem that judgement (at least from the liberal approach) is important for supporting the right for people to express themselves freely without repression or constraint. I have noted, for instance, that this support for people to express themselves freely is described by Gutmann (2007) as nonrepression. However, nonrepression could be considered the moral aspect in so far as the democratic virtues discussed above are concerned.
Otherwise, judgement is implicated in moral reasoning, in issues such as “practices of democratic deliberation and decision making” (Gutmann, 2007, p. 162). The cultivation of “deliberative capacities and social responsibility in students” is described by Gutmann as “democratic reproduction” (p. 162). Democratic reproduction is contrasted with the replication of society. Education functions as the maintenance of an existing form of life in the replication of society. Yet, a static form of life in a modern democratic society is regarded as unacceptable. Therefore, education should encourage dynamism and progress from one generation to the next. Gutmann (2007) explains that students are encouraged to practice their political skills, and assume significant responsibilities in the school through democratic reproduction. For instance, students may participate in student councils in order to influence decision making as part of their citizenship education within the school. Democratic reproduction, however, may not lead to social transformation. This is because democratic reproduction encourages cooperation (communication) or participation within existing structures rather than reflecting on inherent justice or desirability of these structures. I return to this discussion in emancipatory knowledge and citizenship education later in the chapter.

Thus far, I have maintained that citizenship education involves a moral (personal) dimension and a social and political (public) dimension. Gutmann’s (2007, p. 164) notion that “schools must cultivate both moral character (the virtues of veracity, non-violence, tolerance, etc.) and the capacity for moral reasoning (logic, critical understanding, etc.) in future citizens” (sic) is consistent with my argument. To produce citizens out of the school system who are capable of critical thinking and
deliberation but lacking in moral character is not sufficient. A conception of citizenship education lacking in moral character may produce clever business or political leaders who have no ethical social standards and may manipulate citizens for personal ends. Similarly, citizenship education is not a moralising discipline but requires reflection on social and political issues related to influencing policy. A proper balance between moral character and moral reasoning is therefore crucial for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.

I have demonstrated that judgement is implicated in the cultivation of moral character (democratic virtues) and moral reasoning (deliberation, critical understanding) in citizenship education to develop my argument about both dimensions. Oakeshott (1989) also argues that “learning to think is not merely learning how to judge, to interpret and to use information, it is learning to recognise and enjoy the intellectual virtues” (p. 62), which may include practical wisdom. This suggests that if students are to reflect on their moral character including social and political issues related to influencing policy, they need more than just the facts but insight concerning how the facts fit in concrete situations. Kristjánsson (2004) also observes that “citizenship education is concerned primarily with the transmission and inculcation of democratic values, not merely the teaching of facts about what such values involve” (p. 210). Similarly, Gutmann (2007) identifies, “an increase in the willingness and ability of students to reason and argue about politics collectively and critically, respectful of their reasoned differences” (p. 162 emphasis in original) as some of the important results of the democratic education she advocates. The kind of information and
judgement described in the preceding paragraphs, therefore, is essential to a plural
moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.

5.2.2 Judgement in a Communitarian View of Citizenship Education

My next task is to find out whether there is something of value within the
communitarian view of citizenship education that can be added to what I have already
discussed concerning judgement as part of knowledge. The idea, as stated in the
beginning of this section, is to illustrate the importance of judgement in a moral
philosophical perspective on citizenship education. It should be expected however,
that there will be few additions to what I have already discussed given that the ideas
of Gutmann (2007) mentioned earlier mediate between neutrality on conceptions of
the good (individualism) and the common good (social ends) in citizenship education.

One particular area that requires attention when it comes to judgement as part of
knowledge in citizenship education is the issue of tradition or cultural identity.
According to MacIntyre “students need to understand that all answers to the question,
‘What is the ultimate human good?’ are grounded in the thought and practice of some
particular tradition” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 12). He explains that students need
to learn about their tradition including rival traditions so that “they understand how
fundamental disagreements about the human good arise” (p. 12). He rejects the view,
representative of comprehensive liberalism that education needs to be neutral on
conceptions of the good. Instead, he advocates that students should “learn how each
tradition is understood both by those who inhabit it and by those who view it from an
external and perhaps hostile standpoint” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 12).
MacIntyre’s view also does not agree with political liberalism which states that citizenship education should exclude cultural issues in its teaching and focus on political matters. The reason for excluding cultural issues in political liberalism is that citizenship education should not be “seen as promoting any particular conception of the good” (Halstead, 1995, p. 270) among the many that proliferate within a liberal democracy (including neutrality itself).

MacIntyre’s view on moral traditions is criticised by Cooke and Carr (2014) for being constructivist rather than realist and objectivist along the Aristotelian virtue tradition. They reject MacIntyre’s claim that schools should teach rival moral traditions rather than a common moral tradition. Their argument is that teaching several moral traditions in different schools may promote moral relativism that may not be easily discouraged by MacIntyre’s argument that students may learn other people’s moral traditions in addition to their own. In particular, Cooke and Carr (2014) are sceptical that teaching various moral traditions in different schools may reinforce certain prejudices found in some cultures. For instance, some moral traditions may be oppressive to women or people of different religious affiliation. These moral traditions cannot be easily defended on the grounds of Aristotelian virtue ethics or deontological ethics. Teaching such moral traditions within citizenship education, therefore, may be considered unwise. Alternatively, Carr (2006a) suggests that citizenship education should be grounded on virtue ethical dispositions or qualities of character such as compassion, courage, temperance, honesty and justice. These virtues cut across various cultures and are not the preserve or construction of particular groups of society.
I also agree with Cooke and Carr (2014) that MacIntyre’s suggestion to teach particular moral traditions in different schools is not satisfactory despite his argument that students can learn about others’ moral traditions. The reason for my rejection of his argument is that the teaching of moral traditions extends students’ cultural values from the home to the school. MacIntyre has a point of course that there is no neutral standpoint on which we can teach moral traditions (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). However, it is difficult to overlook Callan’s (2007) argument that most of the time parents are likely to reason with their children “inside the framework of the comprehensive doctrines that they favour” (p. 125). It is therefore reasonable to expect that the school should neutralise the comprehensive doctrines brought by students from their parents in the family by introducing a common tradition. A common tradition for all schools has the potential of encouraging students to make their best judgements against some of the comprehensive views from the home such as strong religious beliefs from their parents. It was also argued in Chapter Four that students could develop the capacity to examine themselves, including their traditions (Nussbaum, 1997; 2006a). Criticising oneself and one’s tradition may increase tolerance among different cultures.

The teaching of virtues such as compassion (which is not opposed to what I just described as examining oneself and one’s tradition) is likely to counter some of the prejudices students might bring from the home as part of resolving the problem of various moral traditions. While virtues such as justice may be too abstract for younger students to grasp through reasoning, Peters (1981) explains that “the plight of others is much easier to grasp, and concern for it develops much earlier in children” (p. 106).
Through the cultivation of the concern for others (such as, through narrative imagination), students could develop fairness and tolerance which is necessary for justice. In the previous section, I discussed a number of civic virtues in citizenship education advocated by Kymlicka (1999) and Gutmann (2007). For instance, the virtues of civility and public reasonableness may constitute the minimum condition for democratic deliberation in society regardless of the variety of cultural values or moral traditions that may exist. It would appear therefore that what we require is the teaching of a common moral tradition in virtues rather than rival moral traditions.

We can also observe when we look at the work of Peters (1981) that virtues involve a lot of judgement rather than mere accumulation of information. Peters describes four distinct types of virtue. These include virtues which are motives for action such as compassion, virtues which have to do with rights and institutions such as justice and tolerance, as well as virtues of a higher order “which have to be exercised in the face of counter inclinations” such as courage, integrity and perseverance (p. 94). The fourth category of virtues which are considered highly specific such as punctuality and tidiness are not of particular interest to my discussion partly because they appear to be personality traits rather than virtues, and secondly because they may not involve judgement (but habit). Peters (1981) explains that in order for one to be just, tolerant or prudent requires a lot of thought and assessment of information concerning various considerations. Similarly, to be courageous, to act with integrity, as well as to persevere, requires proper judgement about counter inclinations. In fact, each of the Aristotelian virtues requires proper judgement or regulation through practical wisdom on the part of the moral agent in order to act according to the mean. I raise this point
in order to illustrate that the virtues discussed above involve judgement as part of knowledge in citizenship education.

Judgement in the communitarian view of citizenship education is also necessary for public debate which according to MacIntyre presupposes an educated public (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). I shall not discuss the issue here because it does not add anything new to what I have already discussed as democratic deliberation in the ideas of Gutmann (2007). I only mention public debate in the educated public because it involves the judgement necessary as part of knowledge in a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. For instance, MacIntyre observes that in the absence of an educated public it is difficult to hold anyone to account for the quality of their arguments in public discussions (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). He also warns that where there is lack of logic there is a danger of people being seduced by hope or fear rather than rational persuasion. The argument made by MacIntyre suggests that there is a risk of our democratic institutions being hijacked by a few powerful individuals if we ignore the importance of judgement which supports the quality of public discourse in an educated public. This points towards the importance of judgement in a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education.

Implied in what I discussed in the above sections, is an idea of what kinds of information and judgement are required in order to produce knowledge related to abilities or skills for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. For instance, I noted that information about institutional structures and how the democratic process works provides rules or rule–like propositions which are necessary
to make judgements about what needs to be done in concrete situations. However, I have not explained how teachers are supposed to teach information and judgement in their subjects in a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. It is important, for instance, to consider whether information and judgement should be taught separately or at the same time. It is this task that I turn to next.

5.3 The Application of Information and Judgement in Teaching Citizenship Education

Oakeshott (1989) explains that information and judgement which constitute knowledge should be taught to and acquired by the student at the same time. He argues that the distinction between information and judgement lies in the manner in which information and judgement are communicated rather than “a dichotomy in what is known” (p. 57). Given Oakeshott’s argument, it follows that information and judgement in citizenship education should be taught at the same time but in a different manner. In this regard, Oakeshott (1989) explains that teaching is a twofold activity that involves instruction in information and imparting judgement. For instance, we might instruct students about rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, but we may only impart practical reason in order for them to reflect and deliberate constructively. Oakeshott (1989) further adds that learning for the student is a “twofold activity of acquiring information and coming to possess judgement” (p. 53).

When we think about instruction as the manner in which information should be taught, information should be considered something students need to think with rather than something to accumulate. Oakeshott (1989) explains that we should not recognise
teaching as “a passing on something to be received, nor as merely planting a seed, but as setting on foot the cultivation of a mind so that what is planted may grow” (p. 47). The cultivation of a mind so that what is planted may grow indicates an expectation that the student should use information in order to create new forms of understanding. In other words, instruction is not just a passive exercise for the student but the beginning of an active process for developing ideas. We might also expect that child-centred strategies such as the telling of stories (or narratives) may be included in the teaching and learning process in order to cultivate the mind of the student in developing and communicating ideas. In the following discussion, I explain that instruction in itself is not sufficient in citizenship education because it deprives students of the chance for revealing their uniqueness and plurality of ideas. Instruction therefore, should be considered only a part of the teaching and learning process in addition to the facilitation of stories related to citizenship education.

5.3.1 Knowledge as Narration and a Call for Different Citizenship Education

The narration of stories in the acquisition of information and involvement of students in citizenship education is particularly necessary in order for students to reveal who they are in front of others within a group. For students to reveal who they are in front of others requires what Arendt (1998) describes as action and speech. The significance of action and speech is that every student is able to tell their unique stories as unique individuals. In addition, the actions and speech for every individual has the potential for revealing something new and unexpected when accepted by others as significant. From this discussion we may recognise the risk of treating information as merely planting a seed (or accumulation) through instruction. Biesta (2012a) argues that
instruction is typically oriented towards erasing plurality and difference among citizens. He argues that the erasure of plurality and difference comes about because instruction involves “telling [citizens] what to think, how to act, perhaps and most importantly, what to be” (p. 691). He cites common examples such as where the state instructs its citizens to be law-abiding citizens, tolerant, respectful or active” (p. 691).

The narration of stories in the teaching of citizenship education, as I have consistently maintained throughout my discussion, is required in order to ensure plurality which is demonstrated in action and speech for every individual.

If we accept the argument I am making about the importance of narratives, it should be possible to observe that the teaching of citizenship education advocated in this thesis differs from the common liberal citizenship education. The difference is that the citizenship education advocated here is not so much concerned with the socialisation of students into an existing social and political arrangement but recognises the potential for something new and unexpected to happen. This something new and unexpected arises out of the action and speech of unique individuals. Biesta (2011) explains that education in a liberal view of democratic politics “becomes a process through which ‘newcomers’ become part and are inserted into the existing social and political order” (p. 149). In this regard, emphasis is placed on rational debate including the need to follow procedures for reaching agreement. Todd (2011) also observes that the deliberative model of democracy “centres on the capacity to communicate something to someone, and to respect the rules of discourse in coming into some kind of consensus about the competing articulations” (p. 107). The element for something new and unexpected that comes about as a result of the action and speech for different
individuals is lacking in the current liberal citizenship education common in schools because it reproduces the same order.

It is also possible to see how the use of narratives presents a different citizenship education when we consider how the use of narratives conceives politics as an articulation of conflicting ideas rather than maintenance of order through rationality. Todd (2011) explains that what Arendt demonstrates is that the relational space in-between individuals is “fraught with moments of agonism since each of us is revealed and discloses herself differently” (p. 107). Agonism, which is a concept used by Mouffe (2005), is defined as the struggle or confrontation between adversaries (as opposed to antagonism which is the struggle between enemies). The space which is described by Todd as dominated by conflict or agonism represents the nature of politics. This agonistic space is differentiated from liberal citizenship which is characterised by dialogue. I expand more on this in the following discussion.

Dialogue in liberal citizenship education is considered to minimise conflict or politics in favour of the moral and rational. In particular, dialogue is informed by the values of rationality and impartiality (Biesta, 2011) where individuals are deprived of who they are in favour of what they are. For instance, Todd (2011) demonstrates that dialogue in intercultural education within liberal citizenship is meant to reduce the potential for conflict among different cultures by aggregating individuals to their social attributes and denying the uniqueness of each individual. The non-conflictual view of democracy represented by liberal citizenship according to Todd is not sufficient because it favours diversity rather than plurality. She argues that plurality “requires acknowledging a
unique “who” that emerges in the context of a narrative relation that not only cannot be reduced to social categorisation, but that itself is political” (p. 104).

The point of my argument about the teaching of citizenship education is not to deny that there are shared social values to which students should be introduced through instruction. After all, citizenship education is often conceived of as the necessary antidote to some of society’s problems such as moral breakdown and lack of political activity. However, overemphasis on harmony and order through rationality could lead to minimising the influence of politics which is demonstrated through the uniqueness of individuals (plurality) and articulation of their conflicting ideas in citizenship education. Owens (2007) in analysing the work of Straus and Arendt views the emphasis on rationality in citizenship as the privileging of philosophy over political action, and truth over opinion which began with Plato after the death of Socrates. She argues that the challenge with philosophy is that it “requires withdrawal from the public world” (Owens, 2007, p. 273), which might explain why rationality influences an orderly society that has minimal conflict. Ultimately, we could argue that citizenship education should encourage agonism within a certain degree of order in society as opposed to anarchy. For instance, Edyvane (2011) observes that even Aristotle agreed with Plato that a healthy society requires “a degree of consensus among citizens upon matters of public concern” (p. 87).

What the above discussion regarding plurality also demonstrates is that the influence of judgement is an essential part of knowledge. For instance, action according to Arendt (1998) is only possible in the presence of different others (plurality) so that it
may be recognised by them as significant. Since action requires recognition by others, this implies a certain level of decision making, deliberation and judgement which is required to act in concert. Biesta (2012a) observes that “Arendt rejects *pluralism-without judgement* – the mere existence of plurality- [in as much as] she also rejects *judgement - without – plurality*” (p. 689, emphasis in original). It is also reasonable to expect that students would need to understand the narrative of others including implications for such narratives to their local situations and for themselves before they could adopt those narratives as part of their citizenship. The implication for the teacher here is not only to make students tell their stories but to assist them to reflect on the stories so that the potential for something new and unexpected may be realised.

5.3.2 Emancipatory Knowledge in Citizenship Education

There is also an element of what critical theorists regard as emancipation when we think of information and judgement for the student in citizenship education. Emancipation is defined by Biesta (2012b) as a way of doing things that does not simply accept the given order of the way in which power is used in a society but seeks to change the existing order or imbalance of power so that there is equality. Ordinarily, students need to begin from a critique of ideology (distorted knowledge) so that they are “self-consciously aware of knowledge distortion” (Ewert, 1991, p. 346). This self-conscious awareness of knowledge distortion allows students to understand the way in which power is used in society and subsequently enables them to initiate the necessary action for social transformation. In particular, one of the strategies used by teachers to give students insight into power relations that affect them and their conditions is critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy according to Biesta (2012b) “focuses on the
analysis of oppressive structures, practices and theories” (p. 10). The main purpose for insight into power relations is to enable students to reflect and engage each other on necessary changes in the existing order (the latter described as neo-liberal) so that change towards a fairer and more equal society may be realised.

The prevailing liberal citizenship education which Hyslop-Margison and Thayer (2009) describe as neo-liberal, is not only concerned with socialisation or preservation of the existing social order but perpetuates inequality rather than a fair and equal society. A neo-liberal citizenship education is characterised by White (2013) as market oriented where the role of citizens is replaced with that of taxpayers. The role of taxpayers as opposed to citizens is concerned with the value for money spent by the government rather than any meaningful contribution in terms of the priorities for social and political action. Information within the neo-liberal citizenship education is mainly instrumental. Instrumental knowledge is mainly used in the development of citizenship skills such as voting at periodic intervals of the election. In addition, deliberation is meant to provide communication or decisions within a predetermined democratic framework that is meant to serve the needs of the citizen who is now an economic individual. It is partly because of this reason that students as future citizens require critical pedagogy so that they may be enlightened about their situation and hopefully take political action in order to realise what Ewert (1991) describes as their “unique human potential” (p. 346) of restoring the social world to a fairer condition.

The relevance of critical pedagogy is also evident in Freire’s (1993) concept of false generosity where he argues that “in order to continue to have the continued opportunity
to express their “generosity”, the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well” (p. 26).

What Freire is arguing is that those in the dominant position of power such as the people controlling the market economy and perhaps government may perpetuate dominance by providing some kind of relief to those who are suffering. However, this relief does nothing to change the social structure which causes the condition of people’s suffering or inequality. In other words, for the controllers of the market economy to continue to be generous, they need the existing situation of suffering and inequality to persist. Otherwise, their “generosity” would not be necessary.

Wringe (1992) also demonstrates that voluntary action in citizenship education, such as performing acts of kindness for the elderly and the disabled, may absolve the government from fulfilling its responsibility of providing more reliable forms of relief to those who need it. He also explains that caring for the environment may allow business to trample over what has been preserved if they are not held accountable. Wringe of course contends that there is no problem with performing acts of kindness or caring for the environment so long as it is linked to political action (praxis).

Political action that leads to transformation according to Freire (1993) is a result of reflection or judgement upon the world. Students require to be self-consciously aware of knowledge distortion (ideology) in order to recognise some of the problems of a neo-liberal system such as environmental destruction. Those who are in a dominant position, such as business, have a tendency of reducing everything such as the “earth, property and people themselves” (Freire, 1993, p. 40) to objects of their domination. Freire’s insight that the oppressor’s consciousness tends to reduce everything to the
status of objects is relevant for our current situation in neo-liberalism although he himself did not focus on neo-liberalism.

In citizenship education, Colby et al. (2003) observe that “too often students fail to understand that if they want not only to help a community kitchen feed people but also help to eliminate the need for that kitchen, they must work to change public policy” (p. 8). If students fail to understand that in order to transform the existing structural conditions that cause suffering and inequality, they need to influence policy, it might indicate a lack of reflection on their action. A plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education should help students reflect on their action in order to possibly bring about meaningful and lasting change.

The argument I am making in this thesis shows the importance of cultivating citizenship that demonstrates human concern for others as part of a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. For instance, it was argued in Chapter Four that students need capabilities so that they may imagine and develop empathy, compassion and anger on behalf of others. To argue that students require judgement that leads to emancipation is not so much about citizenship education informed by social critical theory than it is to draw on some of the useful insights from this theory. In this regard, it is possible that most people might agree that a society that considers the misfortune of others as a characteristic of their laziness (as it might be the case in neo-liberalism) is not sustainable. Hyslop-Margison and Thayer (2009) argue that emphasis on human capital theory in education considers labour market and economic underachievement as individual failings rather than a structural problem. Critical pedagogy therefore has
the potential to educate students “so that those students will bring to the activities of their adult life questioning attitudes that will put them at odds with the moral temper of the age and with its dominant institutions” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 3).

The cultivation of criticality and questioning attitudes among students in citizenship education might appear radical, but this is not so different from what I have been arguing all along about the need for students to exercise critical thinking and develop something new and unexpected. If we consider the influence of the uniqueness of each individual and the articulation of their conflicting ideas, which may be recognised by others as significant, it is possible to see how Arendt's action as narrative might result in disruption of the existing order of inequality in favour of equality. What knowledge as emancipation adds to the discussion, perhaps is the emphasis on reflection and action upon the concrete world which may possibly result in transformation of existing social structures. Such knowledge in citizenship education may perhaps appear too radical to people concerned with citizenship education as an instrument of socialisation. Otherwise, Wringe (1992) observes that “obligations of truthfulness and impartiality also entail that we should alert the young to the way in which the underprivileged may be deprived of freedom in all senses, when that of the privileged is insufficiently circumscribed” (p. 32). In this regard, social justice would require that students as future citizens are given the necessary tools for the transformation of such a society.
5.3.3 Moral Responsibility and Knowledge in Citizenship Education

It should also be acknowledged that the judgement that students develop when knowledge is taught in citizenship education is their own rather than that of the teacher. In my argument I suggested that information and judgement found within knowledge are taught together although in a different manner. For instance, students are made self-consciously aware of knowledge distortion within the existing social order while at the same time they reflect on their action upon the world in order to facilitate the transformation of existing structures as part of emancipation. What should be noted here is that the role of the teacher is to plan the order in which information should be taught as well as exercise the pupils in the information that is communicated. According to Oakeshott (1989), it is necessary that the teacher exercises the pupils in the information that is communicated so that they can apply it to different situations. We can say that students have developed judgement when they can recognise when and how the information contained in knowledge may be applied to different situations. In the following discussion I explain how teachers may exercise pupils in their knowledge in a moral philosophical perspective of citizenship education while at the same time pupils develop judgement of their own.

Service learning is one of the strategies through which teachers may exercise students in information within citizenship education so that they develop the necessary judgement. For instance, students may engage in volunteer activities to help vulnerable people such as raising money for a charity organisation as part of business studies in the curriculum. These charity activities may develop skills for responsible citizenship among young people. In addition, these activities could provide opportunities for
teachers to educate students to make a critical assessment of the structural conditions that create the need for such charitable activities. Otherwise, students’ charity may be conceived of as false generosity if teachers fail to develop their questioning attitudes so that they reflect on their actions. Freire (1993) argues that “true solidarity with the oppressed means fighting at their side to transform the objective reality which has made them these “beings for another” (p. 31). It should be possible for students in citizenship education to reflect on how society may be transformed to make it more equal and fair. However, this requires students to look beyond the content of their subject in business studies including service learning.

The judgement that students make in the above cited example is the student’s own even though they are assisted in it through activities by the teacher. Kitchen (2014) describes the judgement that students develop as a result of exercising the information they receive from the teacher as paradoxical. He observes that “This judgement provides the pupil with the ability to think for himself or herself, yet rather paradoxically constrains that pupil’s thinking to align with the judgement that he or she received from the teacher at the point of teaching contact” (p. 139). In developing their judgement, students may imitate the ways of the teacher on how information is used in order to gain insight. However, judgement does not entirely depend on how information may be used but on sensitivity to concrete situations that may be different from those in which information was first received or used. In other words, the student is afforded the ability to be creative and original after having been led out of the darkness of the cave by the teacher’s strategies. Oakeshott (1989) explains that learning is “the ability to feel and to think, and the pupil will never acquire these
abilities unless he [or she] has learned to listen for them in the conduct and utterances of others” (p. 61).

The development of judgement discussed here is consistent with the notion of relational authenticity (Cuypers & Haji, 2007), introduced in Chapter Three of the thesis. In that section it was revealed that a code of conduct, such as beliefs and pro-attitudes, “are authentic or inauthentic only relative to whether later behaviour that issues from them is behaviour for which the agent, into whom the child will develop, can shoulder moral responsibility” (Cuypers, 2010, p. 199). It was noted among other things that failure to acquire moral concepts such as understanding what is right, obligatory and wrong subverts relational authenticity. The reason for this subversion is that individuals cannot claim responsibility for actions that issue from (inauthentic) desires outside their control. It was also discussed earlier in this chapter that virtues such as compassion are motives for action, while virtues such as courage, integrity and perseverance are exercised in the face of counter inclination. Peters (1981) demonstrates that these virtues have a built in reason or judgement for acting in a particular way and therefore may not be described as habits despite the involvement of habit in their earlier formation among children. What the above discussion indicates, therefore, is that students may be assisted towards particular judgements as long as they can claim moral responsibility for their actions.

5.4 Knowledge and a Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective of Citizenship Education

In this discussion I have sought to identify the kind of information and judgement that is necessary for a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. In this
regard, it appears that the information and judgement which constitutes knowledge necessary in citizenship education points towards a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. For instance, I have argued following Wringe (1992) that there is no contradiction between knowledge concerning the performance of acts of kindness (for the elderly and disabled) including caring for the environment in voluntary action and demanding responsibility from the government. Acts of kindness such as befriending the elderly and the disabled promote citizenship that shows concern for other human beings in as much as demanding provisional and protective rights on behalf of the underprivileged does the same thing.

If we follow Nussbaum’s (2011a) capabilities approach we may also notice that both information and judgement are concerned with the development of internal capabilities. In particular, judgement is essential in deciding on the most appropriate choice among competing alternatives in the political, social and economic situation. In other words, internal capabilities such as practical reason are necessary for utilising available opportunities (external capabilities) as part of living successfully as a human being. Similarly, the development of emotions such as compassion through narrative imagination also requires judgement to determine that the person for whom one is compassionate has experienced undeserved misfortune. So, if we encourage narrative imagination within the school curriculum as part of citizenship education, it is possible to help students acquire information as well as possess judgement through knowledge.
5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed the kind of information necessary for teachers to instruct and impart judgement to students in citizenship education. I indicated that a moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education is not so much concerned with the socialisation of students into an existing social order but the development of a critical and questioning disposition that is informed by a concern for other human beings and the environment. In this conception of citizenship education, there is no contrast between the interests of the individual and that of other human beings and the environment. So, while teachers instruct students in information about rights and other social and political institutions, they should also cultivate judgement related to sympathy, compassion, friendship and other virtues. The discussion in this chapter, however, did not address the question of what motivates an individual citizen to be active. The motivation of people to be active in citizenship requires further investigation even though judgement may have something to do with it. The next chapter, therefore, added this question.
CHAPTER 6

6.0 Motivation for Citizenship Participation and Implications for Citizenship Education

This chapter addresses research question number six, which deals with what implications concerning students’ motivation for citizenship participation are implied in each of the moral philosophical perspectives. In the previous chapter it was noted that what we know (which is often embedded in our civic and political abilities and skills) may enable us to participate in citizenship. For instance, the way in which we understand fairness is likely to inform our reaction to injustice wherever it may be found (Colby, et al., 2003). If items of knowledge in the form of civic abilities and skills lead to action, it might be assumed that appropriate knowledge is all that we need in citizenship education in order to motivate students to participate actively in citizenship. However, students may fail to participate in citizenship despite having all the information to make the necessary judgement for action. Colby and others (2003) observe that even people with a capacity for effective action such as advanced levels of understanding for civic and moral issues may lack the motivation to act on their understanding. So while information and judgement are clearly important for citizenship education, we need to gain insight into what motivates individuals to act on their knowledge and understanding.

The common understanding in citizenship education is that liberal citizenship education is passive because individuals may choose between the civic and private life of family and work (Kymlicka, 1999). In this regard, the republican approach which
conceives of individuals as participating in their public life (see Chapter One) is considered ideal for active citizenship education (White, 2013). On the other hand, the communitarian approach combines the advantages of both the liberal and republican approaches. This is notwithstanding that there is “no clear-cut distinction between the private and public identities of citizens” (Habermas, 1995, p. 851) since individual rights do not necessarily exclude people as social beings. Discussions about liberal, republican and communitarian citizenship education focus narrowly on minimal and maximal active citizenship education. It is narrow because the concern on where each of the approaches lie along the minimal and maximal continuum to citizenship education takes our attention away from the important question of what motivates an individual to act in the first place.

What is missing in the current research literature on citizenship education, therefore, is a comprehensive discussion on what motivates citizens to participate in citizenship from each of the moral philosophical perspectives (deontological ethics, utilitarian ethics, care ethics, virtue ethics and the capabilities approach). If we understand what motivates citizenship participation from each of the moral philosophical perspectives, we may be able to determine what motivates people. To add, we might also draw from the strengths of each moral philosophical perspective to inform our citizenship education since people may be motivated by different things. According to Porter (2013) “the extent to which adolescents conceive of the modern political arena as a space where moral injustices are rectified and moral goods are pursued is an open question” (p. 252). In my study, I do not answer Porter’s question about the extent to which adolescents conceive of the public sphere as a place where moral injustices are
rectified and moral goods are pursued. However, I make a case about what might lead young people to think about the public sphere as a space to rectify moral injustices and pursue moral goods. I argue that one of the roles of students in citizenship education is to reflect on what motivates citizenship participation from each of the moral philosophical perspectives.

In my discussion, I begin with the significance of duty in motivating citizenship participation within the deontological perspective. I argue that citizenship rights and their corresponding duties motivate individuals to participate in citizenship. In particular, I discuss three different duties. The first is the duty of justice, which requires citizens to uphold the law as well as inspire citizens to protest against any form of injustice. The second is the duty of material aid, which I identify as a weak motivation for citizens to help those who are in need because citizens can only help others if there is no sacrifice or cost to their provision of help. The third is the duty of civility, which allows citizens to form public reason through the sharing of ideas. However, I note that the challenges involved in incorporating ideas of young people into public reason may discourage young people to participate in citizenship. I conclude the first part of my discussion, focusing on deontological perspective, with implications for citizenship education, noting that teachers may assist students in reflecting on the importance of civil disobedience for unjust laws as well as involving students in decision making in order to encourage them to become active citizens.
6.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Deontological Perspective

The motivation for individuals to participate in citizenship may be linked to the moral obligation or duty to respect the rights of others. Rights according to Carr (2006a) require recognition of their universality and “a corresponding duty to uphold them” (p. 445). To say that people have rights means that they are deserving of respect from one another (Nussbaum, 2000). In addition, if rights correspond to duties, it suggests that one has to treat others with respect in as much as they should respond with similar treatment when called upon to do so. The reciprocal relationship within deontic rights makes them universal. Given that rights correspond to duties, it would seem that there are as many duties as there are rights because the way rights operate is that when one individual legitimately claims a right it is expected that other people have a duty to uphold that right. In the following discussion I analyse the motivation for citizenship participation underlying the duties of justice before turning to the other duties such as the duties of material aid and the duty of civility.

6.1.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Duties of Justice

In a general sense, motivation for citizenship participation in the duties of justice may be attributed to the desire to right a wrong. We may observe the link between the duties of justice and the desire to right a wrong when we consider that the duties of justice are concerned with protective citizenship rights or preventing harm on others. Kristjánsson (2007) explains that according to Kant’s moral philosophy “we have an unexceptional (perfect) duty not to harm others” (p. 127), unless we are provoked by a wrongful act. In addition, Nussbaum (2000) makes an even stronger link between
the duties of justice and the desire to right a wrong when she observes that according to Cicero the duties of justice are perfect duties which are so strict that “failure to prevent an injustice is itself a type of injustice” (p. 182). To describe the duties of justice as perfect duties which should be obeyed without exception gives us an idea of the underlying motivation for citizenship participation. For instance, we may notice that citizens may be held accountable if their citizenship actions cause harm to others. In addition, citizens may also be held accountable for failing to prevent harm on others if it is in their power to prevent that harm from happening. I explain further in the following paragraph.

Protest actions or demonstrations are one form of citizenship participation that may be motivated by the desire to right a wrong as part of the duties of justice. Citizens may protest against an injustice that is perpetuated against themselves or in solidarity with others. When citizens engage in such demonstrations it is part of holding the perpetrators of injustice accountable for the wrongs that they may have done. What motivates the demonstrators is that they have a duty or obligation towards their fellow citizens to right a wrong that has been committed. It is also true that individuals may protest against an injustice that is yet to happen. For instance, citizens may protest against impending policies such as austerity measures that may take some workers out of their jobs or even an impending war against another country. Protesting against a potential wrong is part of the duty of a responsible citizen. Individuals may be held responsible for an injustice that may be committed by others if they do nothing to prevent such an injustice from happening yet it is in their power to do so. Students
therefore may reflect on the duties of justice as a motivation that would lead them to perceive the political arena as a place where moral injustices may be corrected.

To argue that individuals are motivated by the desire to right a wrong does not mean that citizens have to wait for a wrong to happen before they are inspired to uphold their duty of justice. Audigier (2000) observes that for a citizen, the “first right is that of establishing the law; the first duty is that of respecting the law” (p. 17). What this view suggests is that a good citizen is one who obeys a just law. In the case of an unjust law citizens may be justified to disobey it because they have not consented or participated to its establishment. The respect for the dignity of persons requires that they participate or consent to the laws or rights that govern them. Otherwise, laws are meant to safeguard the rights of individuals rather than to force citizens to act against their will. Carr (2006a) also explains that according to Rousseau and Kant, “it is not just that it is practically futile to lay a claim to a right if no law or other agency exists to safeguard that right, it is more crucially that I could not consistently or coherently lay claim to any right that I would refuse to extend to others” (p. 445). What Carr is suggesting here is that it is not so much the enforcing of the right or law that is important than is the responsibility to recognise the reciprocity of rights (as deserving of respect from one another). Respecting the law should inform citizens’ actions as a matter of principle rather than compulsion.

6.1.2 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Duties of Material Aid

The duties of material aid when compared to the duties of justice discussed above have a weak motivation for citizenship participation. The reason why citizens may not find
a strong motivation from duties of material aid which are concerned with the provision of assistance to others is that they are imperfect duties. What is meant by imperfect duties is that they do not bind individuals strictly (Kristjánsson, 2007) to their commitment. For instance, Nussbaum (2000) explains that helping people who are in need according to the duties of material aid is only necessary “when that can be done without any sacrifice to ourselves” (p. 178). In other words, the duty to help people who are in need is only limited to whether we have more than what we need for ourselves. In the event that we do not have more than enough, then, we are not obliged to help others. We could also observe that while citizens may have provision rights to education, health, food and shelter, it is not clear to what extent a homeless person may demand assistance from fellow citizens beyond their legal duty to pay taxes that may contribute towards social welfare. The optional nature of the duties of material aid implies that students have very little motivation to think about their duty to provide the goods of material aid to those who may need the help.

We might also ask ourselves the question why there is little commitment when it comes to the duties of material aid and yet we are more committed to the duties of justice. The reason seems to be that we may not be able to help everyone without impoverishing or harming ourselves, therefore, if we can fulfil our obligation to helping a few people we would have done enough. For instance, Singer (2004) explains that the United Nations once agreed that rich nations could donate an equivalent of 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Product (GNP) to poor countries. It follows from this example that a rich country would not be obligated to help any more poor countries once it had exhausted its quota of 0.7 per cent of its GNP. However,
Singer (2004) demonstrates that countries such as the United States could not fulfil their obligation of giving 0.7 per cent of their GNP to poorer countries. The tendency among many other countries is also to support poor countries that are in line with their national interests. Nussbaum (2000) also explains that there is a tendency among citizens to “prefer the near and dear, giving material aid to those outside our borders only when that can be done without any sacrifice to ourselves” (p.178). The parochial and imperfect nature of the duties of material aid implies that it would be a challenge to get students to consider their motivation to end world poverty by donating to people outside their countries.

6.1.3 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Duty of Civility

In addition to the duties of justice and material aid discussed above, most people in democratic countries would consider voting as a civic duty although they would not participate in voting during elections most of the time. In countries such as Australia, citizens may even be penalised for failing to exercise their civic duty to vote during the national elections. Enforcing the duty to vote during national elections through the law imposes a legal rather than a moral duty. A legal duty makes voting during elections compulsory, in a similar way to paying taxes. A moral duty on the other hand imposes no such restrictions but is based on what we have good reasons for doing or not doing. So what, then, motivates citizens to fulfil their responsibility to participate actively in public politics such as voting during elections when there is no legal duty for them to do so? According to Rawls (1993) “since the exercise of power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty- the duty of civility” (p. 217). So according to Rawls, citizenship participation requires the duty of
civility (not legal duty) on every citizen in order to legitimise power. I explain further in the following discussion.

The duty of civility advanced by Rawls (1993) is a plausible reason for motivating citizens to participate in citizenship when it comes to freedom of speech, representation, and participation in decision making. The right to free speech, representation and participation in decision making is in and of itself meaningless if it does not lead to influencing public reason. Public reason refers to the shared consensus among competing alternative views within the public (Rawls, 1993). Ideally, democratic institutions should derive their legitimacy from the people who contribute to public reason through free speech, representation and participation in decision making. Rawls (1993) argues that the duty of civility is necessary in engaging one another on how the principles and policies advanced and voted for by the public can be supported by the political values of public reason. He explains that civility also involves “a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made” (p. 217). Civility is a moral duty, and therefore, may be considered the underlying motivation for citizenship participation because it encourages citizens to engage one another to form a public consensus through listening and accommodating the views of one another.

Failure to adhere to the duty of civility undermines the political process and has the potential of de-motivating citizens to participate in citizenship. According to Hyslop-Margison and Thayer (2009), an “obvious reason why younger citizens are staying away from political participation is because they realise that their input is simply
unimportant given the limited choices available to them” (p. 18). What this statement is pointing at is that young people are realising that important political decisions are taken without their political influence despite them voting in elections. In other words, there is lack of civility or willingness on the part of political leaders to engage and listen to young people’s ideas in order to incorporate them into public reason. Cooperation in citizenship requires citizens to engage one another in matters of public importance through the duty of civility. In particular, public policies that are concerned with the general welfare of society require the involvement of many people who are affected rather than a small group of influential leaders in government and the market economy. Students need to reflect on their political engagement and willingness to listen and develop fairmindedness about when to accommodate other people’s views in order to see the value in sharing ideas, and possibly develop motivation for citizenship participation.

Thus far I have described the underlying motivations for citizenship participation in the deontological perspective. Although I have alluded to implications for students, I have not discussed how teachers and principals may encourage students to rectify some of the wrongs in society or provide the goods of material aid, as well as engage and develop the willingness to listen and accommodate other people’s views as part of motivation for citizenship participation. Students need to reflect on each of the three duties discussed above in order to be motivated to participate in citizenship. In the following section I turn to the implications for citizenship education that follow from the analysis of motivations for citizenship participation underlying the deontological perspective.
6.1.4 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Duties of Justice, Material Aid and Civility: Implications for Citizenship Education

Students experience deontic citizenship rights (Raby, 2008) and their corresponding duties through rules and regulations in schools. For instance, students’ involvement in decision making such as representation in student councils may be associated with the duty of civility. Some of the rules and regulations such as those that are meant to prevent bullying may be related to the duties of justice which are meant to protect students from harm. From this view, it is possible to observe that students’ experience of citizenship rights through rules and regulations provide opportunities for principals and teachers to motivate students in citizenship participation. However, students’ motivation depends on whether citizenship rights and their corresponding duties are appropriately used rather than abused. At the same time, the curriculum through various subjects offered by the school allows students to reflect on their motivations for citizenship participation as shown in the following paragraph.

Given the earlier point that civil disobedience may be justified in the case of an unjust law, it would seem that there are plausible reasons to encourage students within citizenship education to reflect on the importance of civil disobedience as one of the options available to try and influence change. Wringe (1992) observes that “judicious and controlled disorder may be a necessary and desirable part of a responsible political participation, and should be represented as such in education” (p. 33). Indeed, part of a nation’s history may involve civil disobedience as a struggle against injustice at one point in time. These instances in history such as the civil rights movement in the U.S, apartheid in South Africa, and the recent Arab Spring in North Africa and Occupy
Wall Street Movement in the U.S provide opportunities for teachers to encourage students’ reflection on civil disobedience. Such reflection in citizenship education is also part of encouraging critical thinking in order to ensure that students are able to question whether what is considered worthwhile within a democracy is still working or something new needs to be given a chance.

The recognition that unjust laws may lead to justified disobedience also implies that principals and teachers need to involve students in decision making in order to motivate them to participate in citizenship. Students need to exercise their freedom of speech in matters that affect them directly such as rules and regulations. They may participate directly in classrooms as well as through their representatives in student council in matters that affect students across the school. Students have a right to be listened according to Article Twelve of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). The UNCRC stipulates that, “Every child has the right to express their views, feelings, and wishes in all matters affecting them, and to have their views considered and taken seriously” (Unicef, United Kingdom, 1990, p. 1). The duty of civility requires that students engage and develop their willingness to listen and have fairmindedness about when to accommodate other people’s views. Students are likely to develop motivation to participate in citizenship when they see the value in sharing ideas from their involvement in decision making. In addition, students are likely to obey legitimate rules as part of their duty to uphold justice when they are involved in making the decisions that directly affect them.
However, there is a challenge on how teachers may motivate students to provide material aid to others, especially when it comes to world poverty. This lack of motivation for citizenship participation suggests that we would need to rely on another moral philosophical perspective in order to improve on the limitations of the duties of material aid. In the following part of the chapter, I analyse the motivation for citizenship participation through the perspective of the capabilities approach in order to improve our understanding of citizenship education. The capabilities approach improves our understanding of some of the limitations of the deontological perspective, especially in the area of providing the goods of material aid.

6.2 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Capabilities Approach

Nussbaum’s (2000) capabilities approach provides a convincing perspective for motivation in citizenship participation with regards to the provision of material aid to people of one’s nation and the world. She argues that poverty deforms a human life due to lack of material things despite people’s resilience at times to maintain their dignity even during tough conditions. In her view, there is very little difference between injustices such as cruelty and torture against human beings and denying people the things that they need in order to live a life of human dignity. She agrees with the view in the duties of justice that failure to prevent harm is itself an injustice when it is in the power of one to prevent such harm from happening but does nothing. However, she extends this responsibility to the provision of material aid as well. Her justification is that the material surroundings or conditions of human beings are important in “shaping what they are able to do and to be” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 191). According to Nussbaum, citizens should be motivated by the desire to help others to
live successful lives that are worthy of the dignity of human beings. Similarly, students as citizens of their country and the world need to reflect on their responsibility towards others.

Social justice issues at the centre of the capabilities approach have the potential to motivate students’ interests in dealing with fairness and equality in a neo-liberal democracy. Neo-liberalism favours the free market economy and little interference from government in public issues (Curren, 2006). The capabilities approach on the other hand encourages positive interference in enhancing the capabilities of others (Nussbaum, 2003). It acknowledges that people who are situated in different conditions require different things (Pfister, 2012) in order to live human lives that are of equal worth and worthy of the dignity of human beings (Nussbaum, 2011a). For instance, it recognises that an uneducated woman living in a rural village in India requires different support (capabilities) to participate in politics than a woman who is educated and lives in a city within the same country. The capabilities approach, therefore, does not take civic equality for granted (Pfister, 2012) in the same way perhaps citizenship rights do. It also does not ignore differences in people, such as their democratic freedoms as may be the case in a strict or very conservative form of communitarianism.

The social justice issues addressed by the capabilities approach such as poverty, gender and status deprivation are similar to those addressed by Rawls (1993) as well, but there are differences between the capabilities approach and the political liberalism of Rawls. According to Rawls (1993) the organisation of the structure of society should be such
that it benefits the least advantaged. But Rawls is criticised for regarding gender and family issues as voluntary institutions in the same category as churches and universities rather than placing them at the centre of his political liberal theory of justice (Okin, 2005). The capabilities approach on the other hand focuses on the activism needed to overcome barriers created by society against groups such as women, children and the poor (Nussbaum, 2003). It motivates people to develop their own capabilities and that of others. Kristjánsson (2004) also observes that social virtues such as democratic justice and tolerance in the capabilities approach are seen as necessary in order for citizens to function successfully rather than to justify the good according to rights, such as “the right to be treated justly” (p. 215) or tolerated. Opposition to inequality and other social injustices are an important motivation for students’ reflection on citizenship participation. Next, I shall turn to the implications for citizenship education.

6.2.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Capabilities Approach: Implications for Citizenship Education

From the above discussion it should be possible to see that the capabilities approach gives more meaning and substance to how citizenship rights may be operationalised to enhance the doing and beings of citizens. The association between citizenship rights and the capabilities approach provides opportunities for teachers to present social justice issues as a means to minimise the limitations of citizenship rights. Nussbaum (2003) describes the capabilities approach as “very closely linked to rights, but the language of capabilities gives important precision and supplementation to the language of rights” (p. 37). The capabilities approach motivates citizens to develop agency in
thinking about citizenship participation rather than the passiveness associated with individuality or autonomy within rights according to Kant. The provision of material aid is also conceived of differently in the capabilities approach compared to the duties of material aid in citizenship rights. Nussbaum (2003) also explains that her capabilities approach includes capabilities such as bodily integrity to incorporate demands about “the right to bodily integrity, the right to be free from violence in the home, and sexual harassment in the workplace” (p. 37) advocated by feminists who complained that rights are male-centred. The language of capabilities, therefore, gives deeper meaning to rights and encourages students to go beyond duties in pursuing social justice.

Furthermore, citizenship education informed by the capabilities approach allows students to be motivated in citizenship through the development of social virtues. Virtues such as democratic justice and tolerance are needed in the capabilities approach for citizens to function successfully (Kristjánsson, 2004). Social virtues such as compassion may be developed in citizenship education through narrative imagination while tolerance may be developed through group discussions or democratic deliberation as part of what Nussbaum (1997) describes as living an examined life. Other liberal theories besides the capabilities approach also incorporate social virtues in their approaches but they do so by prioritising the right over the good. The development of social virtues in the capabilities approach shows the influence of Aristotelian virtues for living a flourishing life. Nussbaum (2003) explains that her political conception of the person is “more Aristotelian than Kantian, one that sees the person from the start as both capable and needy - “in need of a rich plurality of life
activities” to use Marx’s phrase, whose availability will be the measure of well-being” (p. 54). Virtues such as compassion are personal character dispositions which motivate the actions of individuals. They may even be used to predict the future actions of citizens.

In summary of this section, it could be noted that the capabilities approach may be associated with caring for others because of the agency involved in assisting people to overcome barriers of inequality created by society. In addition, Nussbaum (2003) advocates a feminist approach towards the caring for children, the sick, the elderly and the disabled within the private sphere of the home. However, the capabilities approach appears confined to the principles of justice because of its association with Rawlsian political liberalism. Noddings (2010) takes a dim view of moral theories such as those proposed by Rawls (1993), which begin with the individual and assume that all people want freedom, autonomy and individual rights. She maintains that this is dangerous because the originators of such theories may be tempted to influence others to convert to their values. Noddings (2010) explains that in care ethics the moral agent cares for both the perpetrator and the victim. In addition, she explains that care ethics does not begin with the collective either, since starting with the collective may blunt our view of the suffering of others who are different from ourselves. In the next section, I discuss care as a relational practice and disposition (Tronto, 1993; 2010) which is necessary in motivating citizens to participate in citizenship.
6.3 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in Care Ethics

Moral motivation for citizenship participation from the perspective of care ethics arises from its relational approach. To say that care ethics is relational is to indicate that human beings are interdependent and they give and receive care from one another. Noddings (2010), Svenhuijsen (2000), Tronto (1993) and Zembylas (2010) agree that care ethics is a relational approach that depends on the disposition of members to help one another. In care ethics, citizens are moved to help by a concern for the needs of the other or perhaps concern for the environment. In this regard, individuals do not think of themselves as having nothing to do with the other (autonomous). Tronto (1993) explains that “While not all people need assistance at all time, it [can be] a part of the human condition that our autonomy only occurs after a long period of dependence, and that in many regards we remain dependent upon others throughout our lives” (p. 162). Tronto does not deny that power relations between the one giving help and the one receiving it is unequal but maintains that even the powerful and wealthy need care some of the time. From the care ethics perspective we may observe that the relational approach of care has an in-built motivation for citizenship participation because it presupposes that individuals are constantly engaged in concerns for the needs of their fellow citizens.

Thus far I have explained that care ethics predisposes us towards caring for others as part of our citizenship. I have not yet explained why exactly we would need to care for this or that individual. Malin, Tirri and Liauw (2015) provide a clue to moral motivations for citizenship participation when they observe that citizenship participation arises from the need to help or the desire to right a wrong. These two
moral motivations identified by Malin and her colleagues (2015) suggest that ‘the need to help’ may be related to care ethics while ‘the desire to right a wrong’ may be linked to what I referred to earlier as the duties of justice. However, it would appear that these two moral motivations to citizenship participation may be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Care ethics requires justice in order to avoid some of its excesses such as ignoring difference and diversity (Tronto, 1993), while institutions of justice may also serve their purposes well if they are informed by care as a foundation. Meanwhile, the need to help as a motivation for citizenship participation may also be observed in Tronto’s (1993) general definition of caring “as a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible” (p. 103, italics in original).

It is possible to see that care ethics is implicated in motivation for citizenship participation within a democracy given the definition of caring and its association with justice outlined in the above paragraph. For instance, the definition suggests that caring is necessary for both the environment and human beings. Oftentimes care is regarded as a personal moral disposition between two people. Tronto (1993) explains that the focus tends to shift towards the emotional rather than the practice dimension when care is perceived mainly as a personal moral disposition. In addition, the social and political function of care is neglected when care is perceived only as a personal disposition. Tronto’s view is that “Care is both a practice and a disposition” (p. 104). She further explains that if we see care as a practice and a disposition we may be able to visualise it as universal because all people need care. Svenhuijsen (2000) also observes that democratic citizenship that conceives care as a democratic practice “presupposes that
everybody would be guaranteed equal access to giving and receiving care” (p. 5). So on this view we may conclude that motivation in citizenship participation from a care perspective implies a social and political practice that is characterised by particularity (caring for) and universality (caring about).

I have argued that our moral motivation to participate in citizenship arises from the need to help others if we take care ethics into consideration. This proposition is true if we assume that citizens are altruistic or good people who are likely to show concern for the needs of others. It might be argued, however, that it is unrealistic to assume that people are altruistic or that they are likely to show concern for the needs of others. It might be shown, for instance, that people may act in selfish or evil ways that were described by Kant as going to the root of humanity (Nussbaum, 2006b). Nussbaum explains that Kant considers human beings as having a propensity for both good and evil which arises from their nature prior to experience. Therefore, arguing that citizens are motivated to participate in citizenship by the need to help others may not be sufficient; at the very least this assumption requires further discussion. In my analysis, I show that there are qualities or values that may motivate people to meet the needs of others. After having shown these qualities or values, I then, discuss how students may be assisted in making the necessary judgements in citizenship education so that they participate in citizenship from the perspective of care ethics.

In the following section I discuss attentiveness and responsibility as the two important values for motivating citizens to meet the needs of others as part of citizenship participation from a care ethics perspective. These two values are chosen from four
ethical elements identified by Tronto (1993) which inform our practices as citizens. The four ethical elements are, attentiveness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness. I have chosen the values of attentiveness and responsibility as the focus of my discussion because they correspond to the distinction between caring \textit{about} and caring \textit{for} identified by Noddings (2010), Tronto (2010) and many others. I acknowledge that responsiveness which is related to the feedback (such as happiness) that one might experience from those who receive our care may motivate us to meet the needs of others. However, beyond the personal level, it does not seem ideal that our meeting the needs of others at a social level should be motivated by the satisfaction we are likely to receive from it. With regard to competence (related to care-giving), I believe that some of its aspects are incorporated within responsibility which I discuss as corresponding to caring \textit{for} the other, while attentiveness corresponds to caring about the other. It seems, therefore, that attentiveness and responsibility are the two important values in motivating citizens to participate in citizenship from the care ethics perspective.

\textbf{6.3.1 Attentiveness to the Needs of Others and Motivation for Citizenship Participation}

Being motivated to participate in citizenship from a care ethics perspective would presume that citizens be attentive to the need to help others. Individuals would not be able to express their “sympathy and concern” (Zembylas, 2010, p. 235) for others if they did not identify the need to help in the first place. Tronto (1993) describes caring \textit{about}, which is related to attentiveness, as defining “who we are as a people and unique individuals” (p. 106). Attentiveness may also be linked to what Porter (2013) describes
as our core selves or moral identity. Moral identity according to Porter (2013) is likely to predict our civic participation such as voluntary action or the identification of the need to help others. Attentiveness requires us to show concern or express our sympathy as a starting position for care. Tronto (1993) explains that “we need to meet the other morally, adopt that person’s, or group’s perspective and look at the world in those terms” (p. 19) as our starting position for care. Human beings have an amazing potential to express sympathy and concern for others, including non-human animals, and the environment. This ability for sympathy and concern for others may be used to express solidarity with people within our territories or outside our national boundaries as part of justice that is informed by care.

It may also be argued that some of the inequalities in society such as poverty, gender, social class and xenophobia may be attributed to what Tronto (1993) describes as inattentiveness to the way in which our activities affect others. For instance, she criticises the feminist movement in the United States as privileging women who belong to a particular social class position and level of education at the expense of women of colour and those in low socio-economic positions. What Tronto (1993; 2010) is indicating here is that power relations among different people and groups is affected by attentiveness or lack thereof. She suggests that inattentiveness is often displayed by people in privileged positions of power through failing to recognise their privilege so that they may accommodate the concerns of the underprivileged. These individuals may use their privileged positions to discriminate against others. Men, for example, may not share domestic duties equally within the family household such that a large portion of domestic work is done by women. When women do most of the work in the
home it may limit their chances of participating in the public sphere. Zembylas (2010) also suggests that inattentiveness may be observed in various restrictions and attitudes which show lack of concern for the plight of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers in their destination countries.

6.3.2 Responsibility for the Needs of others and Motivation for Citizenship Participation

It is possible that most citizens who care for the needs of others are motivated by responsibility in their citizenship participation. For instance, citizens would take the responsibility to welcome immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers into their homes in the example cited above. In particular, responsibility would be triggered by sympathy and concern for the plight of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers who may be regarded by the media and government as a security threat (thus indicating inattentiveness to their needs). What these welcoming citizens’ actions may reveal is that motivation as a result of responsibility is a step further from attentiveness because individuals are moved beyond their sympathy and concern into taking action. Noddings (2010) explains that the “relation is coloured throughout by sympathy - an attitude of solicitude towards the cared for and willingness to listen and be moved” (p. 392). We may recognise motivation for citizenship participation through responsibility because there are people who may care about the plight of others but fail to do anything about it even though we would expect them to act on their beliefs. These individuals may be described as attentive but not responsible. Most often, but not always, caring for is associated with those who are near to us while caring about is related to those who are distant.
Focussing on relational responsibilities along the universal and particular allows us to understand motivation in citizenship participation from a care ethics perspective as a social and political activity. Tronto (1993) explains that meeting one’s responsibilities requires that one understands what those responsibilities are at a general or universal level. It also requires “a focus upon the particular kind of responsibilities and burdens that we might assume because of who, and where, we are situated” (p. 137). We may also differentiate between citizenship rights and their obligations with the responsibilities that motivate citizenship participation from the perspective of care ethics. The individual is connected to his or her social obligations in citizenship rights through questions such as “what, if anything, do I (we) owe to others” (Tronto, 1993, p. 137). On the other hand, individuals are not guided by duties in care ethics “but rather situated questions of responsibility and agency such as, ‘How can I best express my caring responsibility?’, ‘When is it justified for me to be held responsible?’, or ‘How can I best deal with vulnerability, dependency and suffering?’ (Svenhuijsen, 2000, p. 10). These questions indicate the agency that arises from the relational approach of care ethics rather than the connection of individuals to society (Svenhuijsen, 2000) through obligations.

In this discussion I have shown that within the relational approach of care ethics all citizens may give and receive care although some may require more care than others. What perhaps may not be very obvious in my discussion is the underlying purpose of care ethics which is improving the well-being of the cared for. However, I explained that the need to help is our major motivation for citizenship participation. I also identified attentiveness as necessary in motivating citizens to participate in citizenship
when caring about the other. In this regard, it was revealed that power relations and privilege may affect our sympathy and concern to meet the needs of others. In addition, responsibility was discussed as a motivation for citizenship participation in caring for others within concrete situations. In other words, the particularity of relational care ethics allows citizens to be moved beyond their sympathy and concern to take action in concrete situations. Tronto (2010) describes the interrelationship among purpose, power and particularity as elements of good care. I believe that all three elements are included in my discussion of what motivates citizenship participation from a care ethics perspective. These elements of good care also inform the following discussion on the implications of care ethics for citizenship education.

6.3.3 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in Care Ethics: Implications for Citizenship Education

Students should be encouraged to consider care as an approach to human life given that care ethics is a relational approach necessary for citizenship participation and human interdependence. Following Svenhuijsen (2000), it may be argued that since most people require care in their democratic lives and are equally capable of giving care, perhaps we should prepare democratic citizens who can “give both these activities a meaningful place in their lives” (p. 15) if they so wish. In particular, principals and teachers should meet the needs of their students in an effort to improve their wellbeing. In this regard, schools may be informed by an ethos of care where all members of the school organisation are concerned with receiving and giving care. In such schools, it is recognised that members have differences of power and authority but they respect and trust one another in order to make caring possible. Sympathy and
concern for one another allows teachers to pay attention to the particularity or individual needs of students such as problems from the home as well as affirming or praising students for caring behaviour whenever necessary. Ultimately, students are likely to be motivated to meet the needs of others as fellow citizens if the environment in which they are taught is modelled on caring.

In addition, care requires practice in a similar way to virtues if we are serious about motivating students to meet the needs of other citizens. An ethos of care needs to be accompanied by students and teachers practising care within the classroom. Noddings (2010) observes that students should be “given opportunities to care” (p. 395) through practice in group work so that they learn to work in a group and accomplish common tasks together. However, she cautions that the tendency of student groups to outdo one another through competition is not desirable. In her view, competition often leads to students criticising or blaming one another for not contributing enough to the success of the group. Confrontations within a group as a result of competition is more suited to individuality rather than the relational approach of care ethics. Teachers therefore, need to discourage students from competing among themselves so that they learn to work together in a caring manner to accomplish a common task. From this view, students may reflect on their motivation for citizenship participation through care since they are given a chance to practice caring. In addition, students may not perceive caring as only necessary for vulnerable groups such as the homeless, the sick, and the elderly if they are encouraged to receive and give care to all people.
Furthermore, a care ethics approach to citizenship education should teach students to be attentive to the needs of others so that they are motivated by the need to help. The social lives of students including their power and privilege may prevent them from caring about others. An education that sensitises students to the concerns of other people of a different class, gender or culture is likely to develop sympathy and concern for the needs of the other. MacIntyre also observes that one of the best strategies of dealing with prejudice is to make the prejudiced person to “live with those against whom they are prejudiced in circumstances in which they are able to learn how much they need to learn from those from whom they have professed contempt and how much they share with them” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 18). In this regard, studying in multi-cultural schools is consistent with a care ethics perspective so that students are attentive to the culture and social background of different people. MacIntyre therefore, makes a valid point that all of us need help and have the ability to learn from others. In addition, teachers may use students’ comic strips and narratives (Johansson & Hannula, 2014), as well as school organised activities such as sports with students from different parts of a country (Zembylas, 2010) in order to develop attentiveness among students.

There are challenges, however, with students’ reflection on motivation for citizenship participation from a care ethics perspective. The challenge is that students may be motivated to participate in voluntary action but have little interest in political participation (Porter, 2013). Indications show that the desire to help needs to be integrated with “democratic ideals such as justice, freedom and dignity” (Malin, et al., 2015, p. 48) in order for students to be motivated to participate in both voluntary action
and politics. According to studies analysed by Porter (2013), emphasis on personal growth related to character education and service learning encourages voluntarism at the expense of political participation. Teachers are likely to use service learning within citizenship education in order to encourage students’ responsibility to care for others. At the same time, the emotional aspect of care predisposes students towards voluntary action instead of politics. It is also not difficult to see why students would be inclined towards voluntary action when we consider the perception that politics is dirty and much more difficult to influence or make a difference in (Porter, 2013). Teachers, therefore, need to combine justice and the desire to help in teaching citizenship education if students are to reflect on their motivation to participate in politics as well as voluntary action.

To summarise this section, we could say that care ethics is necessary in citizenship education for motivating individuals to become good citizens who are attentive to the needs of others including the protection of the environment. Needs are likely to be placed at the centre of our deliberations when citizenship education is attentive to the needs of others and the environment. However, without citizenship rights as Tronto (1993) reminds us, individuals are likely to “stifle diversity and otherness” (p. 161) because they would see the world through their ‘care-tinted’ glasses. We may therefore say that care needs justice in as much as justice equally needs care (Tronto, 1993). At the same time, we may also notice that the idea of equality and justice in citizenship rights is not sufficient to inform our motivation for citizenship participation. Carr (2007) argues that according to Aristotle “it is no less unjust to treat unequals equally than to treat equals unequally” (p. 375). In other words, some situations require equity
rather than equality. For instance, treating our friends with fairness (which is implicated in friendship) does not mean that we should treat our friends the same (Carr, 2007) but perhaps similar. In the following section, I discuss the notion of practical wisdom which regulates action in virtue ethics in relation to motivation for citizenship participation.

6.4 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in Virtue Ethics

I begin my discussion on motivation for citizenship participation from the perspective of virtue ethics by observing that most virtues are not only necessary for personal moral conduct but serve social and political functions as well. This view emanates from the idea that virtue ethics is “an ethics of character more than of action guidance” (Carr, 2007, p. 378). What is meant by an ethics of character is that individuals who are compassionate are people who act in a compassionate manner. In short, a virtuous person is someone who acts virtuously. Following Haydon (2010a) we should also acknowledge that “private individuals and citizens are not two different sets of people” (p. 208). So the way we think about temperance as a virtue held by an individual should inform us that the individual would be a temperate citizen, and this is similar for all the other virtues.

With regards to motivation for citizenship participation, virtue ethics is implicated through practical wisdom which regulates the rational and emotional aspect of the citizen to produce actions that are consistent with the flourishing of human beings. Virtue ethics according to Carr (2007) “shows precisely how the often distinguished
and separated cognitive, affective, social and motivational aspects of moral life may be coherently reconnected” (p. 373). These different motivational aspects are coherently ordered through practical wisdom which is concerned with performing actions at the right time, for the right reasons and from the right motives. For instance, if I was a generous person by nature (pre-reflective) I would simply give money on the right occasions and on impulse without subjecting my generosity to the judgement of practical wisdom. However, as a generous person by virtue I would need to subject my generosity to practical wisdom which requires that I “must direct my capacities and feelings to the right goals, so that I act from the right desires, for the right reasons, and on the right occasions” (Aristotle, 1999, p. xviii). Citizens act virtuously when they act from a state of character rather than obeying duty such as the duties of justice. In my view, citizenship participation that arises from a state of character or virtue is preferable from acting out of duty.

The reason why virtuous action may be preferable to the principle of duty is that virtuous actions emanate from authentic desires in which the individual takes pleasure in pursuing excellence. Citizenship participation from the deontological perspective is motivated by doing the right action according to duty. If we take rules such as citizenship rights to be justified according to reason we may observe that moral agents may be credited for acting against their inclination. Accordingly, acting with regards to the principle of right may seem disinterested and perhaps unnatural for human beings who sometimes act from their feelings or impulses in addition to reason. A citizen who participates in citizenship out of compulsion or disinterestedness according to Aristotle would not be considered virtuous. He regards someone who
does not enjoy fine actions as not good; “for no one would call a person just, for instance, if he did not enjoy just actions, or generous if he did not enjoy generous actions, and similarly for the other virtues” (Aristotle, 1999, p. 11). What Carr (2007) describes as the virtuous path “of a rationally and emotionally balanced mean between disordered affect and disengaged principle” (p. 375), therefore, is most appropriate for motivation in citizenship participation. However, this does not mean that virtue ethics trumps other moral philosophical perspectives since it may not be effective when it comes to collective political action.

Thus far I have not explained which of the virtues are important for motivating citizenship participation. In this regard, it could be noted that some of the virtues such as compassion have a built-in motivation (Haydon, 2010b). Such virtues which may include generosity in addition to compassion may be classified as motives for action (Peters, 1981). In particular, compassion may be triggered by the awareness of another person’s misfortune. Its significance for citizenship participation may be observed in Nussbaum’s (2001a) view that compassion is “taken to provide a good foundation for rational deliberation and appropriate action, in public as well as private life” (p. 299). What Nussbaum is suggesting here is that citizens may be motivated by compassion to accommodate the views and interests of other people different from themselves in making laws and establishing just democratic institutions. For instance, she identifies Rawls’s original position of imagining an equal society that benefits the most disadvantaged as a paradigmatic example of the use of compassion in organising social and public life. From this view, it could be argued that students may be motivated by compassion to deliberate on the creation of just institutions that cater for the interests
of people different from themselves in terms of gender, social class and other characteristics.

However, even virtues that have no built-in motivation (such as agreeableness) may still motivate individuals to perform their social and public functions. The way things work according to Haydon (2010b) is that a “principle or even a rule, once internalised, can have motivational force, even if the motivation is one that has to be developed socially (or “socially constructed”), unlike compassion, which it can be argued, is biologically given” (p. 181). What Haydon is arguing here is that a virtue does not need to have a naturally built-in motivation as it is the case with compassion in order for it to have a motivational force. Instead, what seems necessary is that a principle such as the doctrine of the mean is internalised and then motivation comes from within as a socially desired character. It is possible to conclude from my discussion, therefore, that a virtue such as agreeableness which has no emotion according to Kristjánsson (2007), may encourage citizenship participation. Agreeable citizens are necessary in improving relationships with others as well as promoting constructive debate among opposition parties.

Furthermore, citizenship participation from a virtue ethics perspective is motivated by justice (the good). We may observe this among other things because “Aristotle takes justice to be nothing else more than the exercise of the other virtues of character” (Irwin, 1999, p. xxii). For instance, Carr (2007) contends that friendship is a form of moral association in which justice or fairness is implicated. Justice is considered the main virtue that is general and focussed on the good of others (Aristotle, 1999;
Haydon, 2010b; Peters, 1981) while the other virtues such as temperance may be self-regarding or even associated with good manners (Irwin, 1999; Kristjánsson, 2007) in the case of agreeableness. Justice is also classified by Peters (1981) along with tolerance in the same category of general considerations that have to do with rights and institutions. However, grouping tolerance with justice does not mean that it is an Aristotelian virtue as tolerance is associated with Locke (Carr, 2006a; Curren, 2006; Nussbaum, 2006b). Comparing justice and tolerance within the same category mainly assists us to notice that justice is concerned with the virtue to do good while tolerance is concerned with the right to be tolerated in deontological ethics. Justice as the good in virtue ethics, therefore, may be taken to offer a similar motivation to that of rights when it comes to citizenship participation.

My aim in this discussion is to indicate what motivates citizens to participate in citizenship from each of the moral philosophical perspectives. In this section, I have demonstrated that rationality and emotions through practical wisdom allows citizens to act for the right reasons, at the right time and from the right motive. I noted that acting from practical wisdom is preferable because citizens act from desires which are authentic rather than acting on duty. I also explained that some of the virtues have built-in motivation to participate in citizenship while others are motivated by the desire for justice or the common good. However, it is not sufficient to discuss the underlying motivation for citizenship participation from a virtue ethics perspective without explaining how these ideas may be integrated into citizenship education. In the next section, I discuss the implications of what has been discussed for citizenship education.
6.4.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in Virtue Ethics: Implications for Citizenship Education

Following the above discussion of virtue ethics, citizenship education may be taken to be the development of virtues in which practical wisdom is directly implicated. In this regard, we may consider Aristotle’s (1999) observation that “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate actions” (p. 19). It follows from this view that teachers should create opportunities for students to do generous acts if they want students to become generous. These acts of generosity could take place in business classes through raising funds for other students in need or assisting communities around the school as part of service learning. Peters (1981), also observes that teachers may begin teaching virtues with less complex ones such as compassion before they proceed to the more abstract virtues such as justice. His view is that children can develop concern for others early in life. Habituation allows students to learn moral virtues in context so that they develop the appropriate discernment to act from the right motives, at the right time and for the right reasons. Vokey (2003) also observes that the “first step in acquiring virtues of character is to follow rules that establish proper habits of moral feeling, perception and action” (p. 270). With the guidance of their teachers, students may develop the motivation to participate in citizenship from reason even if they begin from habit.

Modelling by teachers may also assist students to learn some of the virtues necessary for motivation in citizenship participation. Emulation according to Aristotle is not considered for the virtuous but those who are on their way to becoming virtuous (Kristjánsson, 2007) such as students. It is not far-fetched to imagine that students may
develop the idea of justice by observing the fairness of their teachers in dealing with people within the school. Such an experience may provide students with an opportunity to learn about the virtue of justice through discerning what a virtuous person actually does in social situations (Vokey, 2003). In their emulation, students should concern themselves with the virtues espoused by their teachers rather than idolising or imitating their teachers. Arthur and Carr (2013) explain that “to be fair or just is to be mindful of the needs, claims and rights of others” (p. 30). This view suggests that principals and teachers may exhibit the virtue of justice or fairness through the manner in which they apply rules and regulations or respect the rights of students. The way in which citizenship rights are operationalised in schools including the manner in which rules and regulations are applied is important for the motivation of students in citizenship participation.

Narratives or stories are another alternative method through which teachers may develop students’ virtues necessary for motivation in citizenship participation. Arthur and Carr (2013) observe that “arts and literature can be potent sources of illumination concerning both the virtues and vices of human character” (p. 33). The discussion in the above paragraph assumes that teachers are virtuous in their professional conduct with students as Carr (2007) also argues that it is preferable to have such teachers. However, the reality is that teachers may not have virtuous character to be emulated by students nor can we prevent them from teaching if they lacked a virtuous character disposition. Literature and other stories therefore, become necessary in order for students to develop their own narratives including the virtues needed to become successful individuals and citizens for their country. What I am arguing here is related
to both MacIntyre’s (1981) idea of individual life narratives and Nussbaum’s (1997; 2006a) notion of narrative imagination through written stories. However, the authority of teachers and that of books should not be allowed to impose ideas on students. Students are likely to develop practical wisdom necessary for reflection on citizenship participation when citizenship education allows them to critically engage with others and the literature.

However, the importance of virtue ethics on issues related to world poverty and taking care of the environment is not very clear whereas students should think about citizenship participation beyond their local communities. Virtue ethics with regards to tackling world poverty, is considered by Kristjánsson (2007) as inadequate because helping the poor is concerned with their interests rather than our own. He argues that the self-centredness of virtue ethics makes it unsuitable for addressing world poverty because individuals are concerned with their virtuousness rather than the interests of the other. A similar criticism of virtue ethics may be extended to dealing with the environment particularly with climate change. In the following section I analyse motivation for citizenship participation from the utilitarian perspective in matters related to world poverty and the environment.

6.5 Motivation for Citizenship Participation in the Utilitarian Perspective

In utilitarianism, individuals are motivated for citizenship participation by the obligation to maximise utility. Sigwick (2000) defines utilitarianism as the right conduct that “tends to produce the greatest possible happiness to the greatest possible number of all whose interests are affected” (p. 253). If we take the example of donation
to a charity organisation, individuals who are motivated by utilitarianism in their citizenship action would donate the highest amount they could afford almost to the point of impoverishing themselves. The reason for such a sacrifice is that utilitarians are obligated to maximise benefits or utility. It may be expected in the example cited here that a large donation is likely to increase benefits to recipients of such a donation. The need to maximise utility is also necessary in order for the moral agent to avoid moral guilt and blame (Lang, 2013). Individuals merit moral guilt and blame for failure to meet obligations for right conduct. In the following paragraph I explain that utilitarianism is an inadequate motivation in dealing with world poverty because it requires students to sacrifice their interests at the expense of others.

It is generally acknowledged that utilitarianism is likely to fail in motivating people to contribute towards world poverty relief because of the excessive demands of self-sacrifice (Singer, 2004) imposed upon people. For instance, somebody who follows care ethics could protest that too much sacrifice and failure to look after the interests of those who care may lead to exhaustion (Noddings, 1984). Those in virtue ethics may consider extreme actions such as sacrificing the interests of family and friends for the sake of others as a vice (Aristotle, 1999) or hypocrisy (Kristjánsson, 2007). Similarly, deontologists would consider the actions of a utilitarian as an improper discharge of moral responsibilities (Sunstein, 2005) because it exceeds the demands of the duties of material aid. In deontological ethics, giving material aid should not harm or impoverish the person giving the material aid. Ideally, individuals may provide material aid if they have more than enough for themselves or the cost of giving material aid is negligible.
The criticism against utilitarianism is strong, yet many campaigns on world poverty relief and climate change are justified on utilitarian grounds. In response to the motivational challenge of addressing world poverty in utilitarianism, Singer proposes a policy that rich people in both developing and developed countries could donate at least fifty dollars a year (or about one dollar a week) to the world’s poorest citizens. However, it is not clear how Singer (2004) arrives at this figure or even whether this would solve the problem of world poverty. In my view, the capabilities approach provides a better motivation for the provision of material aid to the world’s poor because it caters for differences in people’s circumstances, and it is also not limited to the near and dear.

Utilitarianism with its obligation to maximise utility is also an unreliable guide or motivation to address issues of inequality. Singer (2004) explains that in “practice, utilitarians can often support the principle of distributing resources to those who are worse off, because when you already have a lot, giving you more does not increase your utility as when you have only a little” (p. 42). In this regard, utilitarianism seems attractive as a motivation for citizenship participation especially in addressing social justice issues. Rawls’s (1993) principle of distributing resources also benefits the least advantaged. However, the challenge with utilitarianism is that it is “indifferent to whom burdens and benefits are distributed so long as the sum of benefits is maximised” (Freiman, 2013, p. 252). What this view suggests is that there is no guarantee that utilitarianism as opposed to Rawls’s position will always favour the poor against the rich in addressing issues of inequality. Singer (2004) also argues that it is only a broad rule of thumb that the greatest overall benefit would favour the less
advantaged. Since utilitarianism may misfire at times, it might be better to ground students’ motivation for addressing inequality on more reliable theories of social justice.

Lastly, utilitarianism is less appealing as a motivation for citizenship action among many citizens. Singer (2005) acknowledges that a “common objection to utilitarianism is that it clashes with our common moral intuitions” (p. 560). For instance, Sunstein (2005) argues that when it comes to policies for climate change, many people are opposed to emissions trading and yet if emissions trading worked well it would ensure the reduction of pollution at the lowest cost. Emissions trading is where a country that produces pollution above the agreed quota is allowed to pay for the extra emissions it produces to a country that is not able to utilise its quota of emissions in a year. Sunstein (2005) observes that people object to emissions trading on the basis that it fails to punish polluters but simply makes pollution a cost of doing business. Baron (2005) also admits that “it is difficult to impose utilitarianism on law and policy when most people do not accept utilitarianism” (p. 546). He therefore, proposes that the best approach to circumvent this problem is to focus on consequences as a main feature of utilitarianism without having a consensus on utilitarianism itself. Baron’s view may also be interpreted to mean that we do not need to be utilitarians to focus on consequences. Rawls’s principle described above as well as the capabilities approach include consequences in their theories without accepting utilitarianism.

Given the situation I have described in this section, it would appear that there is little justification for motivation of students in citizenship participation based on the
utilitarian perspective. Unlike in the other parts of the chapter I shall not discuss any implications arising from my analysis of motivation in the utilitarian perspective for citizenship education. Instead, I shall turn to the conclusion of the chapter.

6.6 Conclusion

My main concern in this chapter was to analyse the underlying motivations for citizenship participation from each of the five moral philosophical perspectives so that we could draw on each of them to encourage students’ reflection on citizenship participation in citizenship education. The analysis shows that we may draw on four of the moral philosophical perspectives (deontological ethics, capabilities approach, care ethics and virtue ethics) if we want citizenship education to achieve its full potential in motivating students for citizenship participation. In particular, the discussion illustrated that the duties of justice may lead students to reflect on righting the wrongs within society as well as pursue the goods of providing material aid through the capabilities approach. It was also observed that students need to be aware that attentiveness and responsibility are necessary to assist us to pursue justice with the understanding that our actions have effects on the need of others less privileged than ourselves. In addition, in their reflection for citizenship participation, students should participate for the right reasons, at the right time and from the right motives. However, in my discussion I have not dealt with the issue of the level of discomfort necessary to motivate students to act for justice, care, virtue or the capabilities of others. Such a discussion requires an analysis of political emotions which I shall focus on in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7

7.0 Political Emotions and Motivation for Citizenship Participation

The research question on which this chapter is based is what is the role of emotions in motivating students to consider citizenship participation? In Chapter Six I discussed the moral motivations of people participating in citizenship, such as having the desire to right a wrong, to help, or to enhance the doings and beings of others as part of the pursuit for social justice. However, there are indications that these moral motivations need to be supplemented by emotions (Callan, 1997; 2006; Hand, 2011; Nussbaum, 2013; White, 2001) in order to enable citizens to overcome powerlessness in their citizenship participation. For instance, fear may prevent people from doing what they ought to do while feelings of indignation, which are incorporated in the virtue of justice (Kristjánsson, 2010), may motivate individuals to persist against the threat of a security force that is armed with an assortment of weapons during a protest demonstration. Most virtues such as compassion including care already incorporate emotions, making them suitable for motivating citizens to participate in citizenship. However, we still need to consider how we may supplement motivation within the duties, so that citizens may be able to do what they ought to do. The provision of reasons such as the desire to right a wrong may not be sufficient on its own to sustain motivation for citizenship participation among students.

However, there is lack of consensus on the involvement of emotions for citizenship participation within the citizenship education literature. In particular, disagreements
on the involvement of emotions are based on the particularity of emotions such as anchoring them on historical narratives, memories and symbols of the nation. It is perceived that anchoring emotions for citizenship participation on a particular nation has the potential danger of clouding students’ judgement about the character of the nation (Archard, 1999; Hand, 2011). Yet those who support the involvement of emotions in citizenship participation and education (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2013) argue that the nation is the best possible alternative on which students could develop the necessary emotions that would make them participate in citizenship at both national and global level. It is not clear though, how the emotions may be extended to the global level if they are attached to the nation as the particular. Brighouse (2006) argues that patriots are partial towards their compatriots such that they may consider people who are near and dear when giving material aid to those in need. Any study that looks at the involvement of emotions in citizenship education therefore, should answer the question of how emotions developed from partial connections at national level could be extended to global level.

Furthermore, the literature on motivating students to participate in citizenship is not clear on which emotions teachers should focus on citizenship education. Callan (1997) identifies the teaching of patriotism (or love of one’s country) as necessary in order to counter the centrifugal forces which discourage active citizenship participation within a plural society that values the autonomy of individuals. But Callan (1997; 2002) does not tell us much about other emotions necessary to support an appropriate patriotism. He only emphasises that patriotism should be informed by justice in order to avoid bias in thinking about the character of one’s nation. Similarly, Nussbaum (2013)
describes patriotism which is based on rationally developed ideals of tolerance and respect for people’s rights. In this patriotism, emotions such as compassion for those in need including anger at injustice are attached to the nation’s ideals in order to develop commitment for citizenship participation while envy and disgust are suppressed. However, Nussbaum (2013) focuses too much on moral issues of compassion and the limitation of envy and disgust while paying scant attention to anger at injustice. In particular, she neglects political power relations that structure society which are described by Ruitenberg (2009) as the object of emotions in dealing with anger at injustice.

In this chapter, I argue that students need motivation that is informed by public reason while supported by emotions for citizenship participation. In particular, feelings of patriotism are necessary in order for students to think seriously about citizenship participation. It is also argued that good patriots do not just participate in citizenship but participate in particular ways such as showing compassion for their fellow citizens through the provision of material aid to those in need as part of the general welfare of society. In addition, good patriots value important ideals of the nation such that they develop anger when these ideals are violated. These three emotions (patriotism, compassion and anger) are appropriate for citizenship participation because they “sustain a decent society” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 15). On the other hand, teachers need to discourage bad emotions of fear, envy, shame and disgust because they cause division and block compassion by making it difficult for students to see the possibility of the other as a possibility for themselves. So this study seeks to identify and defend emotions which should be developed or discouraged by teachers so that students are
encouraged to reflect on their motivation for citizenship participation. The study also acknowledges that teachers need to understand why emotions should be developed and how they should be taught in citizenship education.

My discussion begins by setting the scene through addressing the debate on teaching emotions in citizenship education. I then, discuss the teaching of patriotism as an emotional feeling or attachment to one’s country or nation following Callan (1997). In this discussion, I raise some of the challenges of developing patriotism for motivating students’ citizenship participation including how these problems may be resolved. I also use Nussbaum’s (2013) ideas to discuss the development of an appropriate patriotism that is supported by compassion in order to encourage students to act for the general welfare of society. The discussion of compassion also includes ideas on how citizenship participation developed within a particular nation may be extended to global level as well as how to limit the emotions of fear, envy, shame and disgust which may block compassion. In the last section, I discuss how students may be encouraged to feel anger on behalf of others in less powerful positions than themselves within the political relations of power that exist in society. I also observe that political anger should avoid violence but focus on motivating citizens to rectify the wrongs in society. I then conclude the chapter by responding to the question of what emotions mean for the private and public dimensions of citizenship education.
7.1 Understanding the Rationale of Motivation for Citizenship Participation through Emotions in Citizenship Education

There is a need to consider the objections of those who are opposed to the teaching of emotions if we are to defend it in citizenship education. For instance, political emotions such as the love of one’s country are said to compromise critical reasoning among students (Archard, 1999) because they attach students to particular symbols, the history of the community, as well as its heroes and heroines rather than a general critical reasoning detached from the particular. It is argued that people should be individuals rather than patriots or inheritors of a tradition or identity (such as Britishness) which may be repudiated even if one were born into it. Miller (2007) also argues that the teaching of patriotism in the United States, which is based on a particularistic citizenship, should be replaced with commitment to a global social movement in order to ensure that critical reasoning counters the lack of attention to excesses of American foreign policy. Basically, the general feeling among those who are sceptical about the teaching of political emotions (Archard, 1999; Hand, 2011; Miller, 2007) is that it is difficult to teach emotions with confidence because they cloud students’ judgement about the character of the nation. The view that emotions cloud students’ judgement is held despite acceptance that most emotions are evaluative judgements which can be moderated by thought.

On the other hand, those who advocate the teaching of political emotions (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2013) acknowledge that motivation for students to participate in citizenship is developed through emotions associated with particularity such as the nation’s history, poetry and symbols. The development of these particularised
emotions is not only meant to develop the love of one’s nation but attachment of students’ emotions to the nation’s ideals of equality and freedom (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2013). According to Callan (1994; 1997) the attachment of emotions to rationally developed principles of justice such as equality and freedom minimises the potential danger of clouding students’ judgement about the character of the nation. In addition, the teaching of emotions should be accompanied by critical thinking in order to avoid the development of bad emotions such as xenophobia (Nussbaum, 2013). It is argued that the nation is the most suitable entity for the generation of strong emotions (Nussbaum, 2013) which may then be generalised to the rest of humanity given that emotions are attached to common ideals of freedom and equality. I expand more on these issues in different sections of the chapter including the development of emotions necessary to motivate citizens to sacrifice their self-interests for the sake of the common good.

I also support the involvement of emotions in motivating students to participate in citizenship education. This support for the involvement of emotions does not ignore the concerns raised earlier regarding the distortion of students’ judgement about the character of the nation. Instead, the attachment of emotions to rationally developed principles of justice such as equality and freedom as well as critical thinking in teaching emotions (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2013) addresses bias concerns. For instance, the attachment of emotions to rationally developed ideals of tolerance and people’s rights may guide students when pursuing new ideals for the nation such as those advanced by politicians during an election. In addition, students may guard against bad or inappropriate emotions such as the projection of disgust on minority
groups by populist politicians or students’ peers. Inappropriate emotions lead to division of the nation and social problems such as xenophobia and religious intolerance. The emotional feelings of patriotism, compassion and anger at injustice advocated here are appropriate for motivating citizenship participation in a decent society because they promote an inclusive citizenship that does not marginalise any member of society according to race, gender, religion, disability or any other characteristic.

My discussion considers emotions necessary for students to be excited about pursuing the nation’s goals or doing what they ought to do. Most people are unlikely to solely depend on civic duty in their citizenship participation such as voting during an election. Instead, the emotions associated with political campaigns, including those aroused by the charisma of candidates, may motivate citizens to do what they ought to do which is registering and voting for the elections. It is also precisely because of the possible challenge of being misled by devotion to political candidates and peers that students require guidance in critical thinking as well as focus on the ideals of the nation such as tolerance and respect for people’s rights. According to Kristjánsson (2010), emotions and identity (or moral selves) are regarded in moral psychology as the two motivations responsible for closing the gap between cognition and moral action. The two motivations are combined in the same person in the form of emotional virtues, such as compassion where emotions are infused with reason. However, there is a good chance that we could motivate students to participate in citizenship through emotions even without the character traits (or identity) implied in emotional virtues. The following discussion on patriotism illustrates this point.
7.2 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through the Teaching of Patriotism in Citizenship Education

Patriotism is defined by Callan (2002), as an “active identification with one’s particular nation as a cross-generational political community whose flourishing one prizes and seeks to advance” (p. 468). From this definition we may observe that patriots have an emotional attachment to their nation, and this attachment or identification motivates the citizen to act for the common good rather than self-interest. Peterson (2011) explains that “Moral notions of the common good are moral in so much as they presuppose and involve the existence of essential ties, or bonds between citizens within a particular community” (p. 22). The presupposition of strong ties between citizens may be interpreted to mean that emotions such as the love of one’s community are essential in order to fulfil one’s duties concerned with acting for “the general welfare of society” (Peterson, 2011, p. 25, emphasis in original) as the common good is known in political theory. Despite the association of the common good with citizenship approaches such as republicanism and communitarianism, there is no reason to think that acting in the general welfare of society does not apply to liberalism (especially political liberalism as opposed to comprehensive liberalism). For instance, the national curriculum for citizenship education in England includes community participation as one of its strands (McLaughlin, 2000).

However, there is a lot of debate on the teaching of patriotism despite its relevance for motivating citizens to act for the common good. The reluctance to include patriotism as part of citizenship education arises from the view that it is not clear what situation or feature of the nation actually triggers patriotism (Hand, 2011). In the case of other
emotions such as compassion we may perceive that thoughts concerning the undeserved misfortune of the other may trigger feelings of compassion. However, the love of one’s community is not diminished by situations such as bad actions or history. The lack of this cognitive component in patriotism makes it vulnerable to criticism that it may distort students’ thinking about what they ought to do. So if we are going to justify the teaching of patriotism according to Hand (2011), we may only do so by looking at the benefits that accrue from it such as acting for the common good instead of what actually causes patriotism. We may also observe as some may argue, that we do not need patriotism since it is only necessary to supplement our motivation “to do what we ought to do” (Hand, 2011, p. 335). Citizens may be motivated to act for the common good based on other reasons such as fulfilling their duties.

It is easy to take a neutral stand on the teaching of patriotism given the controversies surrounding it. For instance, Hand (2011) contends that we should teach patriotism as a controversial subject since there are good reasons for teaching or not teaching it. By teaching patriotism as a controversial subject he means that we should alert students to the benefits of patriotism and its dangers so that they may decide for themselves. His position is that patriotism as emotional education should be rational rather than non-rational. He maintains that rational emotional education provides students with good reasons for changing their emotional responses and uses teaching strategies that allow students to make decisions based on good reasons rather than being manipulated. For instance, he rejects the “singing of the national anthem, saluting flags and swearing oaths” (Hand, 2011, p. 331) as non-rational emotional education. In his view of teaching patriotism as a controversial subject, he admits that students will encounter
feelings of patriotism at some point of their lives, and that students may find it difficult to understand most of their history without feelings of patriotism. However, he insists that teachers should approach the subject of patriotism by exploring all possible solutions without endorsing any of them as part of rational emotional education.

My view is that patriotism should be promoted as a good rather than a controversial subject while I also agree with Hand (2011) that we should avoid non-rational forms of teaching patriotism. It is possible for teachers to explore different aspects of patriotism during a history lesson but still bring into focus those things that are valuable for students to love or cherish such as the ideals of equality and freedom. Students are likely to be indifferent about their support for public reason such as justice as fairness which involves the distribution of resources to those in need if we teach patriotism solely as a controversial issue or subject. Patriotism is important for the stability of a democracy including the incorporation of marginalised groups in society. Nussbaum (2013) observes that a good society with good democratic principles and firm aspirations to achieve those good principles needs feelings such as patriotism in order to sustain the stability of a democracy and protect it from being destabilised by self-interest, hypocrisy, greed, anxiety and many other common ills in society. Teaching patriotism as a controversial subject risks the stability of the nation as students may be indifferent about the things that they should be passionate about or simply avoid feelings of patriotism as controversial and dependent on whatever one thinks as an individual.
However, to argue that patriotism should not be taught as a controversial subject does not tell us much about how it should be taught since I have made a case that it should be promoted. Callan (1994; 2002) wrestles with this challenge as well when he observes that teaching the truth about the history of a nation does not always inspire feelings of patriotism. Criticism in the search for an accurate truth particularly in history may lead to an “implacable scepticism” (Callan, 1994, p. 204) which may make students question everything around them but fail to inspire a sense of patriotism. In addition, students may be disappointed by inconvenient truths from history which may reveal their heroes and heroines as imperfect. At the same time, the teaching of a narrative history built on myth such as the omission of actions that could have been taken but were ignored without good reason may be construed as sentimental education (Callan, 1994). Sentimental education according to Callan (1994) is concerned with arousing public emotions that students have not psychologically developed as their own. In other words, they are feelings of patriotism that are inauthentic in so far as they are not developed from students’ reason. Uncritical patriotism may also involve bad emotions due to peer pressure such as the projection of disgust onto others.

7.2.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through Incorporation of Justice into Teaching Patriotism

A possible solution to the challenge described above is to match a nation’s ideals of democracy such as the values of freedom and equality against the narrative of a nation’s history. A “political morality that insists on freedom and equality for all” according to Callan (2002, p. 476) may serve as a useful filter for learning the narrative history of one’s nation. He explains that it is important for students to understand how
ideals of the country they would inherit are enacted and sometimes sacrificed at the 
altar of political expediency by those who are considered the guardians of the nation’s 
principles. If students use freedom and equality as their political morality, they could 
develop patriotism as a result of shame at the nation’s history such as the inequalities 
that may exist in society despite the ideals of justice held by the nation (Nussbaum, 
2013; White, 2001). In this regard, the students develop feelings of patriotism that are 
psychologically their own rather than sentimental public emotions. Students may also 
use their imagination based on the nation’s ideals of justice when considering reasons 
for taking one action over other possible alternatives taken in the past (Callan, 1994). 
Ultimately, the difference between the nation’s ideals of justice and the existing reality 
may inspire students to think about transforming their nation if necessary.

The role of justice in teaching patriotism is central to avoiding what Callan (2006) 
describes as an ‘idolatrous love’ of country in favour of a morally apt patriotism 
(Brighouse, 2006). An idolatrous patriotism, according to Callan (2006), is one that is 
grounded in a mistake about the character of the nation as the beloved object. Any 
patriotism that is not based on the values of justice is likely to be idolatrous. Idolatrous 
patriotism is still love for one’s country but it is loving one’s country badly (Callan, 
2004). Examples of an idolatrous patriotism may include xenophobic patriotism as 
well as other forms of patriotism such as where the good of the nation is described 
according to one particular social group or religious belief (Brighouse, 2006). A 
contrast to idolatrous patriotism is a morally apt patriotism which according to 
Brighouse (2006) “is attentive to the force of other, non-patriotic, moral demands and 
permissions” (p. 550). In other words, a morally apt patriotism is sensitive to justice.
From what I have described here, we may observe that the choice between an idolatrous patriotism and a morally apt patriotism ultimately depends on how patriotism is taught in the classroom. Avoiding the teaching of patriotism is not an alternative either since students might learn idolatrous patriotism from their peers outside the school.

So, what would a morally apt patriotism look like in a school? Thus far I have raised doubts about Hand’s (2011) answer to this question where he advocates that we should teach patriotism as a controversial subject. To teach an important subject such as patriotism as a controversial subject is risky; when it comes to the stability of a nation and a flourishing democracy it is important not to be indecisive and neutral. Patriots as opposed to mere individuals are not apathetic about whether their democratic institutions are just (Callan, 2006) but they engage passionately in the affairs of the state (Brighouse, 2006). If we are to motivate students to think seriously about citizenship participation, we need to develop their emotions in addition to giving reasons for and against patriotism. It would appear, therefore, that we need to adopt Callan’s (1994; 1997; 2002) solution of matching the ideals of justice to the narrative history of a nation in order to answer the question of how to teach a morally apt patriotism. However, Brighouse (2006) observes that a morally apt patriotism is very difficult to develop under any circumstances. He explains that an idolatrous patriotism often finds it easy to develop because of the difficulty in constructing a morally apt patriotism.
One might agree that the morally apt patriotism described by Callan (1997; 2002) is difficult to develop because it is abstract and involves a lot of imagination. Nussbaum (2013) also follows a morally apt patriotism, which is why she argues for appropriate emotions. Both Callan and Nussbaum argue that the teaching of patriotism cannot succeed in motivating citizenship participation without justice because of the danger of descending into an idolatrous patriotism characterised by xenophobia and other forms of discrimination. They also agree that patriotism is necessary in order to motivate citizens to support just institutions in a liberal democracy. Yet Nussbaum (2013) takes on a more practical approach to patriotism by describing other emotions, such as compassion, anger and hope which are necessary to support public reason. Compassion may be related to the duties of material aid while anger may be associated with the duty of justice. Nussbaum’s (2013) practical approach also includes the use of rituals, symbols, memories as well as poetry and narrative history to develop particularised emotions that are necessary to support principles of justice. In the following section I look at some of the emotions that she describes as having “their roots in, or are forms of love” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 15) that are necessary to support public reason.

7.3 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through the Teaching of Patriotism as Part of Public Reason

To begin my discussion in this section of the chapter I focus on motivation for citizenship participation through the attachment of emotions on political norms such as respect for equality. Nussbaum (2006b; 2013) observes that the motivation for people to participate in citizenship requires the attachment of emotions to political
norms such as tolerance and respect for the rights of others. Young people in particular need poetry and narratives in citizenship education in order to develop emotions that are supportive of the political norms of tolerance and respect for the rights of others. Nussbaum (2006b) agrees with Kant that people often behave in ways that militate against toleration and respect for the moral law (or rights) even with good social teaching at times. She therefore suggests that citizens do not only need knowledge on political norms of tolerance and respect for other people’s rights but emotional attachment to these political norms so that citizens may appreciate their importance (Nussbaum, 2006b). She endorses Rawls’s (1993) observation that citizens are likely to sacrifice their interests to secure and maintain the political goals of equality and tolerance if they do not only support the political norms but value or cherish them. Political emotions are therefore, necessary to motivate individuals to support principles of democracy.

It would be difficult to dispute Nussbaum’s view on the attachment of students’ emotions to political norms in order to motivate them to participate in citizenship because her view does not only respect students’ reason but also allows them to guard against inappropriate emotions. Nussbaum (2013) observes that we need to ward off some of the “forces that lurk in all societies and, ultimately, in all of us: tendencies to protect the fragile self by denigrating and subordinating others” (p. 3). Appropriate emotions recognise the humanity of others such that there are no citizens who are considered inferior or second class citizens. In other words, appropriate emotions are exercised in ways that are consistent with rationally developed political norms of tolerance and respect for the rights of others. At the same time, students through the
emotions may be motivated to participate in citizenship in ways that demonstrate the love of the political goals of tolerance and respect for the rights of others. So there is a symbiotic relationship between the emotions and the political norms in citizenship education. While the political norms encourage students to exercise emotions in appropriate ways consistent with the humanity of others such as justice as fairness, the emotions also encourage strong attachment to the political norms of justice so that they are exercised or realised.

7.3.1 Motivation for Citizenship Participation: The Particularity of Patriotism and other Emotions in Citizenship Education

Motivation for citizenship participation develops from the nation state as the particular and extends to the global or universal level when emotions are attached to political norms in the manner described above. In her characterisation of patriotism, Nussbaum (2008) explains that

> although it calls the mind to many aspects of humanity that lead the mind beyond its domestic confines- for example human need or the struggle for justice and equality - patriotism is also reducibly attached to particular memories, geographical features and plans for the future (p. 79).

In other words, political norms such as tolerance and the respect for people’s rights, which may be considered universal, are contextualised through historical narratives, symbols, geography and poetry so that they concretise students’ feelings. Osler (2009) also explains that universal values of “belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, [and] equal treatment for all” (p. 86) are justified as British values in the citizenship education curriculum for England because they tell the British story of how democracy has developed in Britain. In this way, the nation becomes the pillar on which citizens latch their feelings of patriotism but it does not end there. Instead, passions developed
around justice within the nation may be used to fuel similar causes elsewhere beyond the nation.

However, some people think that patriotism narrows the mind to those who are near and dear at the expense of global justice. Brighouse (2006) criticises the morally apt patriotism described earlier as limiting the achievement of global justice. He argues that while he supports the idea of a morally apt patriotism defended by Callan (2006) as opposed to an idolatrous patriotism, the challenge is that patriots tend to be partial to their compatriots when it comes to charity donations. He compares the actions of patriots to members of a family who are likely to be partial to other members of the same family. However, Nussbaum (2013) argues that it does not follow that members of a family should treat others outside the family differently even if we were to characterise the nation as a family. Instead, “we may think that all families deserve a decent level of support and family love can be tethered to that norm” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 212). Given this view, it seems probable that we should ground our motivation for citizenship participation on the nation state because it provides a rich source for our passions rooted in symbols, rituals, memories and geographical features as opposed to the abstract and thin view of humanity. Students in citizenship education may be encouraged to expand their sacrifices and sympathies to global justice from the nation state.

What gives us further incentive for moving from the particular to the universal in motivating students for citizenship participation is that the nation, as described by Callan (2006) and Nussbaum (2008; 2013), is an abstraction based on narrative history
and ideals in addition to its physical attributes. Both Callan and Nussbaum envisage the aspirations and narrative history of a nation to play an important role in fuelling a sense of patriotism for citizenship participation among students. However, they also acknowledge that there could be various interpretations to a nation’s history. These different interpretations to the nation’s narrative may highlight some issues while it obscures others into the background. Nussbaum (2008) therefore, suggests that we should “select from the many versions of a nation’s history the one that makes best constructive sense against the background of the core moral commitments of the decent society” (p. 83). For instance, she argues that a good patriotism should develop compassion for people in need, anger and hope against injustice, as well as repress emotions associated with the projection of shame and disgust onto others which tends to divide or destabilise a nation. In the following paragraph I explain that this is not similar to being selective or biased about the nation’s history but it is consistent with public reason.

Nussbaum’s position on the use of narrative history suggests that it is justifiable in so far as it supports public reason within a plurality of ideas. For instance, she encourages teachers in citizenship education to present the history of the “denigrated group as part of a “we” that suffered together in the past and is working together for a future of justice” (p. 211). Such a view of narrative history promotes an inclusive citizenship that recognises the existence of diversity in society. Osler (2009) also observes that the Ajegbo Report added a strand called “identity: living together in the UK” (p. 86) in the citizenship education curriculum for England. An inclusive citizenship makes it possible to develop altruistic feelings of compassion for people in need including anger.
at injustice against people in less powerful positions within the political relations of power that exist in society. Teachers need to make students appreciate the value of others as part of developing appropriate emotions necessary for motivation in citizenship participation. Nussbaum (2008) considers narratives, poetry, rituals and memories of a nation in citizenship education as “vehicles of public reason” (p. 83). She does not agree that narratives and other methods for developing emotions for public reason should be confined to the background culture of society.

It is also necessary to keep in mind that the use of emotions to support public reason in teaching patriotism does not only reject an enforced homogeneity in terms of culture but encourages critical reasoning as well. Nussbaum (2006b) agrees with Kant that the “vigilant protection of freedoms of speech, press and scholarship” (p. 168) are important in resolving the problem of people acting against toleration and respect for the rights of others. What she means is that we do not only need to attach people’s emotions to political norms of tolerance and respect for people’s rights but we need to defend their freedom of speech, press and scholarship as well. These freedoms which constitute part of public reason are necessary because there is a recognition that while patriotism calls people to sacrifice their self-interests for the sake of the common good, (idolatrous) patriotism may also make people to see themselves differently from others (Nussbaum, 2012) such that those who are considered not patriotic ‘enough’ may be excluded from citizenship participation. The recognition of the freedoms of speech, press and scholarship presupposes a critical public culture and promotion of critical thinking in teaching patriotism. So both critical thinking and the development of emotions can co-exist in citizenship education in the teaching of patriotism.
Thus far, I have added more information on what an acceptable or morally apt patriotism would look like in a school than what I discussed earlier relating to Callan (1997). For instance, a morally apt patriotism would use poetry, narratives, rituals and memories which are embodied in the nation itself in order to develop emotions necessary to arouse students’ interest in citizenship participation. These emotions should promote an inclusive citizenship or patriotism that recognises the humanity of others as well as their diversity. On the other hand inappropriate emotions such as the projection of disgust onto others should be suppressed because they cause division and instability. In addition, citizenship education should not only reflect the diversity of people’s culture but encourage the diversity of opinions and critical thinking. Peterson (2011) also observes that “we would primarily seek to develop within students a willingness to engage in deliberation with others” (p. 28) if we understand educating for the common good within citizenship education in political terms. In the next section I continue the discussion on compassion and other emotions such as anger and hope, which Nussbaum (2013) describes as necessary for good patriotism or what I characterise as inclusive citizenship.

7.4 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through the Development of Compassion in Teaching Patriotism

Compassion is defined by Nussbaum (2013) as “a painful emotion directed at the suffering of another creature or creatures” (p. 142). She explains that there are three conditions necessary for the development of compassion. One of these conditions is that we should think that the suffering of the other person for whom the emotion is directed is serious rather than trivial. If the suffering of the other person is trivial or not important, then, we are not likely to develop compassion. In the second condition,
Nussbaum (2013) explains that we should think that the suffering experienced by the other person is not self-inflicted or caused by their fault. She argues that people generally do not feel compassion for suffering that is self-inflicted or caused by the fault of the person who is suffering. However, there are situations of compassion where assessing the responsibility for causing the suffering is not considered. The third condition necessary for compassion is that the person experiencing the suffering is important for our “scheme of goals and projects, an end whose good is to be promoted” (Nussbaum, 2001a, p. 321). She calls this condition the eudaimonistic judgement because the suffering person is viewed as an important part of our own flourishing.

One might agree with Nussbaum (2013) that the suffering of others is likely to affect our flourishing if we consider citizens as social rather than detached individuals who are concerned with their own self-interests. Human beings have the capacity to take the perspective of the other as their own. Nussbaum (2001a) explains that it is this ability to imagine the possibility of the other person as a possibility for ourselves (or other people we know) which enables us to bridge the gap between ourselves and the other person so that these other people become part of our circle of concern or scheme of goals and projects. Strangers may not become part of our circle of concern simply because they are human like us (Tronto, 2012), the problem is that we are likely to identify with other people’s suffering because of their proximity to us, biological history, historical or institutional ties, and many forms of interaction within our complex human relations. In citizenship education, therefore, we may increase this circle of concern through poetry, music, the nation’s symbols and narrative history to include people who are distant from us. For instance, poetry may enable students to
imagine what it would be like if they were born a slave, a member of the denigrated
group or poor person. Consequently, students may be motivated to think about ways
through which they may transform their societies into equal societies.

To imagine other people as part of our own flourishing is to recognise their humanity
and to join in solidarity with their struggle to enhance their doings and beings rather
than to manipulate them for our own selfish interests. Egoism tends to focus on
individual happiness while it treats other people as a means to an end. Most people
would agree that egoism makes it difficult to live successfully with other people
(Birsch, 2014) because of the motivation by greed and manipulation for personal
benefit. In order to live successfully with other people, one needs to share common
beliefs or a scheme of goals and projects. Callan (1997) also observes that a “world
without generosity and spontaneous altruism would be wretched, and a world in which
people were only motivated by either narrow self-interest or respect for rights would
be such a place” (pp. 86-87). Individualism in citizenship rights does not mean that
citizenship participation should be characterised by greed and manipulation of others,
instead of the general welfare of society. Nussbaum (2008; 2013) argues that many
nations involved in projects such as internal redistribution of resources or substantial
foreign aid need a national sentiment of compassion in order to motivate citizens to
sacrifice their self-interests for the sake of the common good.

However, we might also raise the question of whether sentiments of compassion
should be exercised through the nation rather than the global context or volunteer
organisations. Callan (2002) observes that some students might feel that “the nation is
not something worthy of any civic passion” (p. 474) despite the best intentions of their teachers. Imperfect ideals which may have been followed in the past, including others that were good but were never realised, may make students to lose interest in patriotism that is informed by compassion. Instead, they may participate in volunteer organisations such as Oxfam, World Vision or the local hospice. In this regard, we may acknowledge that motivation for citizenship participation through compassion does not imply an enforced homogeneity. At the same time we might follow Nussbaum’s (2008) observation that the nation is important in promoting people’s well-being and life opportunities rather than depending on charity. She argues that compassion which is necessary for encouraging altruistic actions among students may be hinged on to concrete narratives of the nation such as those of its prominent people (Nussbaum, 2013). In addition, institutions and policies that support compassion require sustenance through emotions which are often grounded in vivid images of geography and memories of the nation.

Given what I have argued, there should be little objection towards motivation for citizenship participation through compassion, especially if we also consider its evaluative judgement. In general, emotional education is “defensible in so far as it consists in offering pupils good reasons and effective techniques for fostering or suppressing particular emotions” (Hand, 2011, p. 328). Compassion is one of those emotions which may be justified on its cognitive component such as judgement of the extent of suffering for the other person. It also includes judgement of fault on the suffering of the other person as well as whether the person constitutes part of our own flourishing in terms of our scheme of goals and projects. Students who are able to
satisfy the three conditions of compassion are able to understand that lack of material things such as poverty, has a debilitating effect on other people including the extent to which a society can achieve its full potential. Students may also understand that social and economic structures contribute to people’s suffering, as in unemployment, so that people’s poverty is not blamed on their laziness or lack of effort. At the same time, students should also appreciate that people are sometimes resilient against suffering and that they have agency to improve their situation rather than perceiving them as passive recipients of charity.

**7.5 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through the Suppression of Fear, Envy, Shame and Disgust in Teaching Patriotism**

Teachers should also understand that other emotions such as fear, envy, shame and disgust need to be discouraged if we do not want the development of compassion among students to be compromised. These emotions may reinforce divisions according to race, ethnicity, gender, social status, disability, religion and other social and physical attributes. Nussbaum (2001a; 2013) explains that fear, envy, shame and disgust differ from each other but they all narrow our circle of concern (eudaimonistic judgement) and perception for similar possibilities (extended sympathy) which make compassion for others possible. Fear, envy, shame and disgust make it difficult for citizens to reach out to one another by creating divisions or enclaves that block compassion. Nussbaum (2013) argues that these emotions which are prevalent in all societies, make it difficult for citizens to see the humanity in others. In the process, they also affect the achievement of the nation’s goals of tolerance and respect for the rights of others. Motivation for citizenship participation in our citizenship education therefore, requires
the right kind of emotions and suppression of undesirable ones such as fear, envy, shame and disgust.

In particular, disgust is characterised by the projection of attitudes related to disgusting properties of bodily waste onto other members of society so that they are described as dirty, smelly and slimy (Nussbaum, 2013). The projection of disgusting properties of bodily waste onto other members of society leads to discrimination whereby the discriminated group is perceived as less human or possessing characteristics of an animal. It is possible to see that there may be little compassion for people who are perceived as less human than ourselves because the suggestion is that they are outside of our circle of concern. Similarly, it might be difficult to imagine sharing similar possibilities with people who are perceived as less human than ourselves. Bridging this gap through sympathy which makes compassion easily attainable becomes almost impossible because of the chasm that is created by the emotion of disgust. Nussbaum (2013) also singles out disgust as the most divisive and dangerous emotion for achieving the nation’s goals of tolerance and respect for people’s rights. It is necessary to discourage the emotion of disgust if we want to motivate students to participate meaningfully in citizenship and avoid the denigration of others into second class citizens.

The other emotions of fear, envy, and shame also have debilitating effects on motivation for citizenship participation but have a few positive attributes as well. For instance, Nussbaum (2013) observes that a “liberal society asks people to be ashamed of excessive greed and selfishness, but it does not ask them to blush for their skin
colour or their physical impairment” (p. 23). From this statement we may observe that some people may be shamed or stigmatised as inferior for characteristics such as race and disability while others are considered normal or superior. The devastating effect of shame is that it reduces other people’s self-esteem thus influencing them to withdraw from citizenship participation. The other emotion which is fear, is associated with certain stereotypes which may segregate people (Nussbaum, 2013) from their fellow citizens. For instance, some people may be perceived as potential terrorists because of their religion while others are suspected to be criminals because of race. At the same time, fear may be useful in prompting people to escape from danger including devising legislation to protect citizens from potential harm (Nussbaum, 2013). Envy also has the disadvantage that people tend to be bitter or hostile towards others “who seem to have things they do not have or who simply enjoy their lives” (Nussbaum, 2001a, p. 344) while it is good for competition.

Some of the emotions discussed here, including fear, shame and disgust, may be picked up by students outside the school while envy is also related to greed within a capitalist society. Teaching patriotism that is informed by compassion may help to suppress some of the elements of bad emotions while retaining the good qualities. White (2001) also defends the teaching of patriotism by observing that “an untutored and malign interest in it may find avenues – in chauvinist/racist groups, for instance, beyond the school” (p. 146). Principles or laws are not sufficient in changing social attitudes so that students may see others as part of their circle of concern or perceive the possibility of others as a possibility for themselves. Nussbaum (2013) also argues that “If the other has been dehumanised in the imagination, only the imagination can accomplish
the requisite shift” (p. 211). In other words, we need to counter bad emotions with an appropriate patriotism which includes the right emotions such as compassion in order for students to recognise others as fully human. For instance, participation in sports has the potential to generate the necessary emotions to boost the confidence of students as well as occupy their minds from envy or want while it teaches them to accept all people as fully human. An inclusive narrative history involving the history of minorities is also important.

We might also recognise that some of the bad emotions raised in this discussion are likely to reflect power relations that exist within the structure of society. For instance, poor people are likely to be perceived as disgusting or shameful because they occupy a less powerful position in society. In addition, the denigrated group often forms part of a minority population which may coincide with a low socio-economic status and less influence in policy decisions. It is also possible that the prevalence of fear for particular groups, envy from the need of essential things, and shame at being stigmatised may eventually breed anger at being discriminated. Some of the most violent political protests in the U.S. may be attributed to anger at injustices related to perceptions of discriminatory attitudes towards certain groups. Political anger within the stock of other democratic emotions is said to “hearten citizens to defend things they love and value” (White, 2012, p. 8). Most people value their human dignity and they are likely to be motivated by anger to demand equality and respect when their humanity is denigrated. In the following section, I argue that we need to teach students about political anger so that they manage it properly rather than resorting to violence which might attract excessive force in retaliation from law enforcement agencies.
7.6 Motivation for Citizenship Participation through the Development of Justified Anger and hope in Teaching Patriotism

Most of us have observed violent demonstrations fuelled by anger and violence on television news. Some of these include student protests against rising fees in South African Universities in 2015, as well as protests against police brutality perceived to be targeted towards African-Americans in the United States in 2013. These protest movements including the popular revolt that took place in the spring of 2011 in parts of the Middle East may be characterised as organised by young people using social media platforms such as Twitter. The above incidents may also be defined as depicting political anger (Ruitenberg, 2009; White, 2012; Zembylas, 2007) which is the main focus of my discussion in this section as opposed to social (White, 2012) and personal anger (Haydon, 1999; Kristjánsson, 2005). In the following discussion, I define how anger may be understood from a cognitive perspective. I then describe political anger as different from social anger or personal anger, although the difference is mainly of the object to which anger is directed rather than the kind or intensity of anger. The discussion also looks at the function of anger in motivating citizenship participation as well as whether anger should be taught in citizenship education given its association with violence.

Most definitions of anger in citizenship education are adapted from the cognitivist view of justified anger attributed to Aristotle. According to this view, anger is a thought about (i) significant damage that has been done (ii) to us, or someone or something we consider to be important, (iii) done by someone deliberately or at least who should have anticipated the damage (Kristjánsson, 2005; White, 2012; Zembylas,
Another aspect of anger that is attributed to Aristotle is that it involves a thought about some kind of (iv) retaliation or revenge for the injustice done to us (White, 2012). White explains that political anger, in particular is accompanied by something that the angry person or group of people want to happen even if that may not necessarily constitute retribution. This view is consistent with Nussbaum (2013) who is sceptical about the idea of vengeance in anger. Instead of retribution, Nussbaum advocates moving anger towards hope for something better in order to improve the situation from its unjust condition. She demonstrates this idea by using the notion of non-violence characterised by Martin Luther King Jr. during the civil rights movement in the USA and Mohandas Gandhi in the Indian movement against British colonisation. From this view, we may observe that anger does not need to be violent as the examples cited above.

In a similar manner to the definition above, political anger is said to be triggered by thoughts of serious injustice against ourselves or someone important to us. The difference among personal, social, and political anger is one of object rather than of kind or intensity if one follows Ruitenberg (2009). What is meant by difference of object is that personal anger is concerned with frustration by another person while social anger is associated with feelings of anger that arise as a result of cultural norms and habits towards what one values (White, 2012). For instance, one may be angered by cultural beliefs that are detrimental to the environment. Political anger on the other hand is associated with a political action which may cause injustice either willingly or as a result of action which we think should have been anticipated (White, 2012). In particular, political anger often arises as a result of the exercise of power against people
of a lower social position (Ruitenberg, 2009; Zembylas, 2007). Power relations that structure society according to Ruitenberg (2009) are the main source of political anger, especially where social justice issues of equality and freedom are concerned. The examples cited at the beginning of this section illustrate this point very well as they relate to equal access to higher education, equal treatment before the law, as well as political and economic freedom.

Having defined political anger, the question is whether we need political anger for citizenship participation. The question is particularly important when we consider that duties of justice, which are concerned with rectifying wrongs in society are regarded as unexceptional, (perfect) which means that they are strictly obeyed and often accompanied by sanction or law to enforce them. In particular, the Stoic position advocated by Seneca preferred this option (Kristjánsson, 2005; White, 2012). However, anger according to White (2012) is considered helpful in overcoming “powerlessness which can afflict democratic populations” (White, 2012, p. 8). An angry person is often one who is looking for something to be done about the perceived injustice. In short, anger helps us to overcome apathy by motivating us to do what we ought to do. In addition, White (2012) observes that anger is preferable because it shows seriousness about what citizens are passionate about when compared to other emotions such as fear and compassion which may indicate submissiveness. People are also likely to open channels of communication when they realise that the other person is angry and serious about rectifying the perceived damage which may have occurred (White, 2012; Zembylas, 2007). So it seems that there are good reasons for students to reflect on anger for citizenship participation.
I also agree with the sentiments expressed by White (2012) on the significance of political anger in citizenship participation as opposed to relying on the duties alone. Duties may operate very well in a harmonious society but democracies can be ridden with conflict at times. Instability might require citizens to express anger in order to normalise the situation as the case of the civil rights movement in the U.S. and decolonisation among African countries would illustrate. It is very unlikely that people would be motivated to fight against a brutal dictatorship including apartheid and colonisation without being driven by a sense of patriotism informed by anger at the injustice perpetrated. Nussbaum (2013) also argues that it would be inconceivable to think that Winston Churchill could sustain motivation in fighting the Second World War if it were not for his rhetoric to stock emotions such as anger among the British population. On this account, Nussbaum (2013) disagrees with Gandhi that non-violent methods would have resolved the conflict of the Second World War. These examples might look extreme but it is also part of political anger that the perceived damage or injustice should be significant rather than trivial.

Anger is also a potential tool for the less powerful in their struggles against oppression. Zembylas (2007) explains that students and teachers may become vigilant or sensitised to other people’s suffering when they hear about other people’s stories of anger against injustice. When both teachers and students become vigilant to other people’s suffering they may “respond to unjust violations of the self and the community” (p. 20) in which they live by raising their voice or taking part in protest demonstrations. Vigilance may be observed in students’ riots and looting which occurred in London in August 2011 (White, 2012). These riots began with the shooting of a youth by police who were
trying to arrest him. However, the situation quickly degenerated into a frenzy which involved large demonstrations including other issues of discontent such as a proposed increase in university tuition fees. An example such as this shows that anger against perceived injustice may be used to challenge power relations including the demand for transformation of existing political structures. Zembylas (2007) explains that anger may not lead to emancipation but it is likely to be subversive. In other words, the powerful may be forced through confrontation or defiance to recognise the inequalities that exist in society so that they may begin negotiation towards improving the conditions of the less powerful.

Given what I have described, it seems that anger should be encouraged in citizenship education. However, there is a challenge that motivating students to express anger may be both destructive and constructive. Zembylas (2007) describes the destructive and constructive nature of anger in citizenship education as ambivalence. On the one hand, anger is important in education for raising students’ individual and collective awareness of oppressive conditions which may have been taken for granted in the past as well as resistance to those oppressive conditions. On the other hand, it is feared that anger may escalate into violence and injury. Zembylas (2007) explains that suppressing anger through strategies such as emotional intelligence, and psychoanalytic approaches which simply channel the anger in different ways in order to de-politicise it is not the solution. Instead, the ambivalence of anger should be recognised in education. Suppressing anger has the potential of causing resentment, rage and violence. In any case, Kristjánsson (2005) is sceptical about following Plato in his idea that the appetites and emotions may be controlled by reason. His view
following Aristotle is that anger should be informed by practical wisdom so that it is exercised at the right time, according to the right things and for the right reasons rather than controlled or suppressed through reason.

7.6.1 Teaching Political Anger for Motivation in Citizenship Participation

So how should teachers approach the subject of motivation for citizenship participation through anger in citizenship education? For White (2012), the answer lies in that we “feel anger when things we cherish are seriously damaged or threatened by someone intentionally” (p. 9). In her view, what we need in citizenship education is to make students cherish or love certain things such as the values of “freedom, equality and a concern for the public good” (p. 9). In addition, we should make students cherish things that are essential to the flourishing of a community such as “a healthy environment” (p. 9). White, argues that if teachers provide appropriate knowledge about important values and those things that are essential to the flourishing of a community, then, students are likely to become angry when those things are threatened. She also observes that students need knowledge about appropriate actions that should be taken to protect the things they love or cherish from those who threaten them. White (2012) has a point that students are most likely to feel anger if the things they care deeply about are intentionally damaged. She also recognises that students should be encouraged to feel political anger although this may not be necessary for the most part if they really care about certain things.

White’s (2012) idea of motivating students for citizenship participation through anger in citizenship education is plausible for three reasons. Firstly, it is consistent with the
definition of political anger. For instance, students would develop anger if valuable or significant things to them, such as the values of freedom and the common good as well as certain goods like a healthy environment, are damaged by someone deliberately or who ought to have foreseen the threat. Secondly, she recognises that teachers should not intentionally seek to cause political anger among students, as Zembylas (2007) also makes a similar observation. It seems tantamount to indoctrination for teachers to deliberately instigate political anger among students, although they may point towards certain aspects where anger is necessary. Teachers should also not suppress political anger either through fidelity to duties (Stoicism) or using reason through emotional intelligence. Channelling political anger differently by using psychoanalysis is also not advisable. Thirdly, White (2012) recognises the other side or destructive element of political anger. It is because of this recognition that she encourages teachers to assist students with knowledge for appropriate action to express their anger within the “moral, political, financial, personal and many points of view” (p. 10) in citizenship education.

However, White (2012) does not tell us much about how teachers should deal with the question of anger that arises out of power relations that structure society. Presumably, we would teach students knowledge about the values of equality and freedom in the hope that they would recognise the abuse of power and develop anger which hopefully would be expressed appropriately. The challenge with this proposition is that students may not recognise how power is exercised if they assume that everyone is equal. For instance, it may be difficult for men to recognise the struggles of women to participate in the public sphere because of their advantage. At the same time, rich people may
think that poor people should be grateful that they at least have employment when poor people are paid a minimum wage that makes it difficult to earn a living. In short, the position students occupy in the social structure may prevent them from judging the significance of the damage or threat to other people. Such an approach to citizenship education may lead to maintenance of the status quo rather than transformation to an equal society where necessary. It is also not clear on White’s (2012) account, how teachers may encourage students to cherish or love certain values and those things that are necessary for the flourishing of a community apart from nurturing their knowledge.

On the other hand, an inclusive narrative history that tells the story of the struggles of people such as the poor, women, and minority groups may draw the attention of students to aspects of political anger within power relations that structure society. Zembylas (2007) explains that drawing students’ attention to aspects of political anger means avoiding the suppression of anger so that it emerges inevitably in class during dialogue and questioning of power relations that are often taken for granted. Such an approach is likely to sensitise students to aspects of political anger so that they are vigilant and motivated to engage in acts of solidarity with the struggles of oppressed people. Ruitenberg (2009) also observes that teachers need to encourage students to develop a sense of solidarity so that they “feel anger on behalf of injustices committed against those in less powerful social positions” (p. 277) rather than in defence of their own personal and community identities. She also recognises that in order to feel political anger at the dominant power relations in society, students require knowledge about “the political relations that structure society as an object of emotions” (p. 277, emphasis in original), which is why narratives are so important. These narratives could
also include the effect of war on civilians and the impact of multi corporations on climate change.

Furthermore, part of motivating students for citizenship participation through political anger is that students should be assisted in how they should express their anger. In particular, students should be encouraged to exercise their anger within certain limits of moral standards such as tolerance and respect for people’s rights. Haydon (1999) argues that our feelings of anger are not self-validating but require something external to our feelings in order to question those feelings. If we follow Haydon’s view we might observe that a number of issues need to be factored into our judgement when expressing political anger. According to White (2012), some of these considerations may include moral issues, political, financial and personal issues. Otherwise, it is unlikely that students may be allowed to let their feelings of political anger dictate their actions so that they become a law unto themselves. For instance, students may not be allowed to loot other people’s businesses and vandalise public property without being held accountable for their expressions of political anger. In short, the judgement which leads to the expression of political anger should be reined in by other factors outside of our feelings of anger. These factors external to our feelings of anger could include moral principles.

Students should also be encouraged to direct their political anger in citizenship participation towards rectifying the wrongs in society rather than punishing perpetrators of injustice. Nussbaum (2008, 2013) explains that political anger should stimulate dialogue in order to rectify injustices that exist in society. She argues that
expressions of political anger should eschew violence and instead offer “possibilities of mercy and reconciliation” (Nussbaum, 2008, p. 85). In particular, she maintains that anger should be accompanied by hope in order to keep our focus on resolving issues of injustice rather than vengeance on the people who caused the perceived damage. Nussbaum (2013) also advises that political speeches such as Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech may be used in classrooms across the United States not only to develop political anger that is oriented towards hope for change but critical as well. She characterises the classroom discussions that may be developed out of this speech as similar to critical pedagogy. For instance, students may be asked questions such as; “Where did America go wrong? What might be good ways of realising the dream inherent in national ideals?” (Nussbaum, 2013, p. 239), and so on. For other countries, similar questions may be raised based on national anthems and other important narratives and songs.

There are also opportunities for role play and expression of political anger which may be utilised by teachers within schools to motivate students for citizenship participation. Nussbaum (2012) suggests that students could be made to play different roles during a class lesson in history in order to imagine the situation of minority groups who may be stigmatised in a multicultural society. Role play assists students in developing emotions such as anger and compassion through habituation or practice (Haydon, 1999; Kristjánsson, 2005; Nussbaum, 2012; White, 2012) in a similar way as all the other virtues. In addition, we could consider the differences in power relations that exist between teachers and students as representing the kind of power relations that structure society. With a certain level of trust according to Zembylas (2007), students
may express their political anger to teachers in school. For instance, we could imagine the school as a mini-community where issues related to the exercise of power such as fairness of treatment, bullying, as well as discrimination according to race, culture or sub-cultures could raise political anger among students. Learning to express their political anger in school is likely to assist students to develop the necessary motivation for citizenship participation.

7. 7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that we need emotions because dependence on duties alone is not sufficient to motivate students’ commitment to rationally developed principles such as tolerance and respect for people’s rights in their citizenship participation. In particular, feelings of patriotism are essential in order to motivate students to care deeply about national ideals of equality and freedom. Emotions also need to be utilised within the moral principles of justice in order to avoid attitudes that cause divisions such as perceiving other citizens as not patriotic enough or classified as second class citizens. So emotions are necessary for our commitment to moral principles or national ideals while moral principles also assist us to ensure that emotions are utilised in appropriate ways that do not cause divisions and derail the national goals of equality and freedom. At the same time, teaching patriotism for motivation in citizenship participation does not imply homogeneity in culture and critical thinking. Students are allowed to engage in dialogue and critically analyse their narrative history so that they develop feelings of patriotism that are psychologically their own rather than sentimental public emotions.
It was also argued that good patriotism requires the development of compassion so that students are motivated to act for the common good. Compassion is necessary to counter greed and self-interest in order to enable students to imagine that their destinies are linked with those of other fellow citizens. Students may imagine their destinies as linked with those of their fellow citizens if they can visualise the possibility of the other as a possibility for themselves. However, teachers also need to suppress bad emotions such as fear, envy, shame and disgust which tend to block compassion by making it difficult for citizens to see the possibility of the other as a possibility for themselves. In addition, political anger was discussed as another emotion which should be encouraged to motivate students to participate in citizenship. In particular, anger is necessary for overcoming fear or powerlessness in order for one to do what one ought to do. In all these emotions, the nation was described as the pillar on which emotions should be anchored because of its abstraction in ideals as well as its potential to make emotions vivid and concrete in the minds of the students. For instance, narrative history, poetry, national symbols and memories were described as important in attaching students’ emotions to the national ideals of equality and freedom. Such emotions may further be extended to the global context because the ideals of equality and freedom are common everywhere.

At this part of the discussion, I should also respond to the question of what emotions mean for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. Basically, emotions may contribute to the development of character such that virtues like compassion and generosity may be considered emotional virtues. The development of students’ character corresponds to the moral dimension of citizenship education which
is concerned with personal responsibility. In this regard, to be generous is to benefit others with our generosity. Care may also be considered an emotional disposition in as much as it is a practice (Tronto, 1993). From a citizenship education perspective, care is both a prerequisite for citizenship participation as well as a necessary condition for practice. For instance, inadequate care which may result from failure to realise how our actions affect the conditions of people less privileged than ourselves may lead to political anger. Both virtue and care ethics may be exercised within the moral and social dimension of citizenship education but they may not necessarily be political. The use of emotions to supplement what people ought to do (or duties within deontological ethics) on the other hand is related to the political dimension of citizenship education. In particular, patriotic citizens take their political participation seriously as opposed to apathetic citizens.

Lastly, what I have said in this chapter about teaching emotions including critical thinking as well as ethical reasoning has implications for teacher education. A teacher who does not understand the role of emotions in citizenship education as well as critical thinking and ethical reasoning would find it difficult to teach the citizenship education advocated in this thesis. In the next chapter therefore, I focus my discussion on the kind of teacher education that is necessary to allow teachers to optimise the citizenship education of students by drawing from various moral philosophical perspectives.
CHAPTER 8

8.0 Preparing Teachers for a Plural Moral Philosophical Perspective for Citizenship Education through Teacher Education

This chapter explores research question number eight, which is concerned with what is the role of teacher education in facilitating a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education? In the last chapter I focussed on the development of political emotions necessary in order to motivate students to think seriously about participation in citizenship. However, much of what I have argued in this thesis, including the development of emotions, hinges on what teachers understand about different moral philosophical perspectives that underpin good citizenship education such as meeting the needs of others (care), obeying laws (deontic), being friendly (virtue) towards others, and enhancing social justice through capabilities.

Carr and Landon (1998) observe that teachers in Scotland tend to agree with values that are acceptable to the majority rather than taking a principled moral position. In addition, teachers in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina acknowledge social-relativist views within society such as perceiving women according to local tradition rather than universal equality (Pantic & Wubbels, 2012). Teachers’ lack of reflection on ethical discussions and consideration of moral dimensions, especially within culturally diverse communities, is blamed by Pantic and Wubbels (2012) on the “absence of ethical discussions in teacher education” (p. 66). We might, then, expect that teachers
are unlikely to draw from justified moral philosophical perspectives that underpin citizenship education if their knowledge in this area is impoverished.

The teaching of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education requires the preparation of teachers to go beyond knowledge and skills to include moral issues in teaching citizenship education within each subject. Going beyond knowledge and skills is consistent with the concept of education which according to White (2001) is not concerned with the acquisition of truth for its own sake but “ethical goods such as personal and communal flourishing” (p. 150) as its final telos. The acquisition of truth is necessary since teachers cannot teach what they do not know. However, truth for its own sake is not sufficient for education. Extending the telos of education to personal and communal flourishing points towards a substantive view of teaching that requires the professional development of teachers to include values such as justice and care in order to produce students who are caring and just citizens. Hedge and Mackenzie (2012) also suggest that “care might usefully feature more explicitly in teacher education and professional development programmes” (p. 202) because it is currently under-theorised and rarely discussed. A similar observation may also be made for all the other moral philosophical perspectives such as virtue ethics and the capabilities approach, except perhaps deontic ethics which emphasises rights.

There are reasons to believe that students may be educated most effectively “in socially acceptable values and virtues by those teachers who most clearly and consistently exemplify these in their pedagogical and private conduct” (Carr, 2006b, p. 178). For instance, it would be difficult to imagine how teachers would model virtues such as
fairness, integrity, temperance and compassion for students if they did not develop these virtues themselves. On this understanding it is useful to conceive of teaching as a professional role that involves the promotion of certain virtues and capabilities rather than an act of giving information which students did not possess prior to receiving instruction. In other words, teaching presupposes a substantive role of the teacher as opposed to a measurable activity (through tests) where a student moves from a state of lack of knowledge to possession of a particular kind of knowledge. In its substantive professional role, teaching requires attention to “the standards and values of a time-honoured human practice that is generally agreed to have significant moral aims regarding (amongst other things) the pursuit of truth and justice” (Carr, 2011, p. 174). It is, therefore, my contention that teacher education should include reflection on moral issues if teachers are expected to promote citizenship with care, virtues and capabilities among students.

The current state of teacher education may be described as predominantly preoccupied with deontic ethics, related to obligations or duties instead of a more substantive role. For instance, teachers are encouraged to honour their contractual obligations of teaching students according to acceptable rules such as following the timetable prescribed for the school curriculum. Teachers are also expected to treat students with respect according to universal human rights regardless of gender, race, social status or religion. In addition, Carr (2005; 2006b) suggests that the deontic character of teacher education may be observed through its preference for rationality and emphasis on technical skills (techne) such as the preparation of lesson plans according to particular objectives, as well as teaching methods that are considered necessary for effective
teaching and efficient classroom management. Some of these practices are necessary such as fulfilling one’s duty to teach, treating others with respect, as well as using various methods of teaching, but they are not sufficient for teaching citizenship education. Citizenship education is less concerned with instrumental efficiency and effectiveness of skill (or techne) but practical wisdom which involves “reflection on the moral worth as such of those ends [such as truth and justice] as goals of human flourishing” (Carr, 2006b, p. 172).

Given the influence of deontic ethics within teaching, including efficient and effective strategies for improving students’ academic performance, my aim in this chapter is to consider what needs to be done in order to move teacher education towards a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. Pre-service teachers within universities and colleges are expected to graduate and proceed to teach students to become responsible citizens who care for the needs of others, including the fulfilment of citizenship duties according to rights, as well as enhancing the capabilities of others. In addition, teacher graduates from universities and colleges are citizens themselves who may need to act according to virtues exercised through practical wisdom so that they act for the right reasons, at the right time and from the right motives. Teacher education that focuses on one moral philosophical perspective, namely deontic ethics, including emphasis on technical skills (techne) may deprive students of a rich source of educational experience from teachers who can draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective in their teaching. In particular, we may note that a single moral philosophical perspective operates within the limits of a particular theory.
However, citizenship education should not be constrained by such limitations but draw from various sources of morality.

In addressing the issue of what needs to be done in order to move teacher education towards a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education, I use the notion of an educated public identified by MacIntyre (1987). The idea of an educated public is used to orient teacher education towards rational debate about the social conditions of modern society so that teachers may reflect on these conditions in socialising and teaching students to think for themselves. I also recognise that MacIntyre (1987) is sceptical about the role of teachers in making an educated public possible within the socio-cultural conditions of modern society. I therefore, utilise ideas from other studies (Carr, 1997; MacAllister, 2015; Mendus, 1992; Wain, 1994) which criticise MacIntyre’s scepticism on the role of teachers in socialising as well as teaching students to think for themselves. In this regard, I contend that an educated public is possible in light of MacIntyre’s later work (MacIntyre, 1999; MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) including contributions from other scholars on the role of university education in citizenship formation (Nussbaum, 1997; White, 2013). I therefore, identify philosophy of education, which includes the teaching of some of the moral philosophical perspectives identified in this study, as well as literature, as necessary for making an educated public possible.
8.1 Teacher Education and the Orientation of Pre-service Teachers towards an Educated Public as Part of Citizenship Education

According to MacIntyre (1987), education should prepare individuals for membership in an educated public. An educated public is described as a large body of individuals in the habit of rational debate whose appeal to one another is on the basis of “a common body of texts, texts which are accorded a canonical status within that particular community” (MacIntyre, 1987, p. 19). These canonical texts are not sacrosanct as in some religious texts, but may be amended on the basis of strong arguments within the shared standards of resolving disputes or argument. In particular, universities and colleges are expected to prepare teachers for their dual role of socialising young people as well as teaching them to think for themselves. However, MacIntyre argues that socialising and teaching students to think for themselves is bound to fail because the two aims are incompatible with each other within the culture of Western modernity. The reason why modern society cannot achieve both aims at the same time, he contends, is because modernity lacks a common background culture which makes it possible to agree on important issues or to have meaningful dialogue. He argues that success in socialising students implies failure in teaching them to think for themselves (and vice versa) because of the absence of an educated public.

A salient observation on the educated public is that teacher education needs to be broadly conceived rather than confined within specialist knowledge. MacIntyre (1987) explains that enlightenment refers to thinking for oneself “but it is a familiar truth that one can only think for oneself if one does not think by oneself” (p. 24). An important attribute of an educated public is that individuals are able to test their ideas within the
social context of existing debates, in a similar way to academic research, so that their ideas are criticised and validated by others in light of the shared standards of resolving debates. The scenario painted by MacIntyre of university education during the Scottish enlightenment is that lawyers, the clergy, and schoolmasters understood their social role such that they engaged each other in frequent debates about the common good. Engaging in debates concerning the public good presupposes what Carr (1997) describes as “general educatedness” (p. 53). An educated public requires a grasp of general issues of importance to the social environment in order to inform rational debate. We might then assume that the preparation of teachers for their social role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves should involve exposing teachers to a broad conception of education to enable the possibility of an educated public as part of citizenship education.

However, a question arises on the method and content of teacher education needed to orient pre-service teachers towards an educated public so that they may fulfil their future role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves. MacIntyre (1987) argues that it is not any study of moral philosophy that may lead to the development of an educated public. Instead, a moral philosophy based on shared commitment to reasonable first principles of common sense rather than dogma or scepticism is required. A shared commitment to first principles excludes the use of reason to doubt everything (scepticism). It also rules out the use of dogma such as religious belief to justify argument. So what is necessary are shared principles of common sense such as: “every event has a cause; that the willing of rational agents is not determined by an external cause; and that duty is a notion independent of interest”
(MacIntyre, 1987, p. 21). It is against the background of these principles of shared reasonable common sense that individuals may navigate their arguments between dogma and scepticism according to MacIntyre. The challenge for my purpose in this discussion, then, is whether a shared moral philosophy of teacher education is possible or even necessary for the development of an educated public as MacIntyre maintains.

8.1.1 The Role of Philosophy of Education in Orienting Pre-service Teachers for an Educated Public as part of Citizenship Education

Thoughts about a shared moral philosophy, which is necessary for an educated public, indicate the need for philosophy of education, which may include some of the moral philosophical perspectives identified in this study. Yet Standish (2007) reveals three issues that are at stake in teacher education. One of these issues is the devaluing of knowledge and understanding in favour of skills and competences such that deep knowledge about the nature of education, and what it is for, is no longer valuable. The second challenge is that of managerialism, which Standish argues, encourages people to think about their careers at the expense of other people. In addition, managerialism is characterised by revolving responsibilities within departments such that there is no development of relational trust and collegiality among departmental staff because management keeps changing all the time. The third challenge is that of performativity, related to efficiency and effectiveness. Efficiency and effectiveness are concerned with accountability or measurement of objectives through tests and other strategies such that citizenship education and other aspects of education, which may not be measured through available methods, may be ignored. In efficiency and effectiveness, teaching is also limited within pre-planned course objectives that are measurable.
One might then observe that the valuing of skill and competence at the expense of knowledge and understanding, as well as managerialism linked to efficiency and effectiveness, precludes the development of an educated public concerned with rational debate on important social issues. MacIntyre (1987) argues that thinking about issues of general concern such as, “thought about goods and the good, about the relationship of justice to effectiveness or the place of aesthetic goods in human life” (p. 25) should not be the preserve of people pursuing a career in specialist disciplines such as political science. Instead, the issues MacIntyre raises should be the concern of general education including pre-service teacher education. In particular, Pring argues that the pre-specification of objectives built around instrumental skills for operating in a business environment makes it difficult for teachers to ask questions about “the sort of society worth striving for” (Pring, 1999, p. 75). Questions about the type of society worth striving for are related to citizenship education such as the distribution of wealth, causes of poverty, as well as the treatment of women, the disabled, children, and minority ethnic groups. These questions are concerned with justice and fairness which suggests that they can be dealt with openly through moral philosophical inquiry.

Philosophy of education remains implicit in most theories of teacher education where it needs to be made more explicit in order to address the diminishing potential of teacher education described above. A number of scholars also maintain that philosophy of education is relevant to educational theory and practice (Griffiths, 2012; Standish, 2007), including policy and research (Oancea & Bridges, 2009). In particular, the intellectual rigour of philosophy of education as a logical discipline based on reasoned
argument (Wilson, 2003) as well as the justification of value claims according to context has the potential of developing practical wisdom among teachers (Standish, 2007). Practical wisdom is necessary in order to deal with what is taken for granted in educational practice so that teachers do things for the right reasons, at the right time and for the right motives. In addition, philosophy of education is also involved in issues related to democracy as a way of life rather than a political system which makes it relevant for citizenship education. In the following section I consider the value of introducing some of the moral philosophical perspectives advocated in this study for the development of pre-service teachers in their future role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves.

8.2 Teacher Education and the Five Moral Philosophical Perspectives of Citizenship Education

Moral philosophy, through the introduction of some of the moral philosophical perspectives discussed here, may constitute part of a broad conception of education that is necessary to make an educated public possible. In essence, “the discourse of education is at heart moral or evaluative rather than theoretical or technical” (Carr, 1997, p. 59, emphasis in original). To argue that education is evaluative or moral is to suggest that it has intrinsic moral value such as developing practical wisdom (Carr, 2009). In particular, moral philosophical perspectives may be implicated in education through discussions about the type of society that is worth striving for. In this regard, striving for a good society presupposes the development of good citizens. For instance, concerns about justice and fairness may not only require understanding the deontic rights of disadvantaged individuals but the social and economic barriers they
experience in achieving their *capabilities* for citizenship participation. In addition, *care* ethics and *virtue* ethics may be implicated in developing responsible citizens with the right temper, who also care for the environment such as recycling their litter where possible. It also follows that teachers need to study moral philosophical perspectives if they are to be able to justify developing students who are responsible, participatory and just citizens as I explain below.

8.2.1 Teacher Education, Virtue Ethics and Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

I need to say more about the value of teaching each of the moral philosophical perspectives to pre-service teachers given what is argued above. In this regard, I begin with virtue ethics which is closely associated with the idea of an educated public. The reason why virtue ethics may be considered closely associated with the possibility of an educated public is that virtue ethics is sensitive to local contextual situations while it also remains universal. Nussbaum (1988) describes Aristotelian virtue ethics as “objective in the sense that it is justifiable with reference to reasons that do not derive merely from local traditions and practices, but rather from features of humanness that lie beneath all local traditions” (p. 33). Similarly, an educated public requires teachers to understand their social role (*telos*) of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves. In addition, virtue ethics is suitable for the development of an educated public because it is grounded on a background culture based in history. However, MacIntyre (1981) explains that while the present may be intelligible through the past, this does not mean that culture or tradition should remain static but it may be “corrected
and transcended in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and
transcended by some yet more adequate future point in view” (p. 172).

It is plausible to suggest that MacIntyre’s (1987) notion of an educated public is built
on virtue ethics even though his paradigm example is based on the Scottish university
education during the enlightenment period in the eighteenth century. We might notice,
for instance, that MacIntyre’s (1981) idea of correcting and transcending the past
including projection into the future suggests a society that is constantly engaged in
rational debate about the worthwhileness and desirability of current values and moral
practices in its tradition. For university education to encourage students to engage in
rational debate about the common good presupposes the development of independent
thinking which pre-service teachers may transmit to students in schools upon
graduation. In addition, an educated public which according to MacIntyre presupposes
rational debate (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) is likely to extend beyond the classroom
to professional as well as social communities where teachers may participate as
citizens. MacIntyre (1999) observes that most often, human beings “cannot flourish
without arguing with others and learning from them about human flourishing” (p. 68).
So virtue ethics is necessary for pre-service teachers to deliberate about the means
towards ends including treating the ends as a means for further ends using practical
wisdom.

However, I have not described how teacher education may foster the virtues of
practical wisdom among pre-service teachers so that they may engage in rational
debate. MacIntyre (1999) observes that teachers need to be independent thinkers
themselves in order to fulfil their role of teaching students to think for themselves. In particular, independent thinkers are characterised by the ability to ask questions about the good of their activities for their own lives and society. These questions may include “whether what we take to be good reasons for action, actually are sufficiently good reasons” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 83). For instance, they may be questions about whether the ends of democratic practice still serve the purposes for which they are meant to serve in our current democracy. The second characteristic of independent reasoners is that they can “imagine realistically possible futures so as to be able to make rational choices between them” (p.83). Imagination here serves as a basis for future action or transformation where necessary. Thirdly, MacIntyre (1999) argues that people who think independently are able to “detach themselves from the immediacy of their own desires” (p. 69). Taking a step back from one’s desires requires regulation of thoughts and emotions in order to make appropriate contextual decisions according to practical wisdom.

Furthermore, we may observe that pre-service teachers do not only need intellectual virtues in the form of practical reasoning but moral virtues as well. MacIntyre (1999) argues that “without developing some range of intellectual and moral virtues we cannot first achieve and then continue in the exercise of practical reasoning” (p. 97). The question that arises, then, is what type of moral virtues are necessary for the development of an educated public? In order to respond to this question we need to understand that according to MacIntyre (1999) the development of independent practical reasoning is dependent upon others such as parents, teachers and community members. His view is that human beings throughout their lives are involved in
relationships of giving and receiving care because our lives are not only characterised by dependence at infancy and old age but may experience affliction and vulnerability at any stage. The moral virtues that pre-service teachers need in their education therefore, are those that require them to achieve individual and common goods. As MacIntyre (1999) puts it; “any adequate education into the virtues will be one that enables us to give their due to a set of virtues that are the necessary counterpart to the virtues of independence, the virtues of acknowledged dependence” (p. 120).

What needs to be acknowledged in this discussion is that what is regarded as our individual and common good (receiving and giving care to others), represents a compromise between a strict communitarian view which subordinates individual interests to social ends, and a liberal view which supports individual interests at the expense of social ends. MacIntyre (1999) argues that dependence upon others in our practical reasoning does not mean that we should conform to the judgement of the majority or those with whom we normally concur. He maintains that independent thinking requires disagreement with the majority when we have good reasons to do so. Independent thinking therefore, is not only necessary for rational debate which presupposes an educated public but directs our inclinations “to what is both our good and the good of others” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 160). Receiving and giving is a good to ourselves and a common good because it expresses our flourishing as human beings within the relations in which we find ourselves. So when I give to others I am neither an egoist nor an altruist (MacIntyre, 1999) but I am expressing my humanity as a virtue or disposition. In particular, the central virtue preferred by MacIntyre (1999) is just
generosity since it captures the relationship of receiving and giving which is not found in either justice or generosity as separate virtues.

In this section I have argued that teacher education should include the teaching of virtue ethics because it constitutes part of a broad conception of education or general educatedness that is necessary for an educated public. So my view is that pre-service teachers need moral instruction in virtue ethics (including other moral philosophical perspectives) while students in schools may learn about the virtues through activities and practices in their subjects as MacIntyre (1999) also suggests. Instruction in virtue ethics is necessary in order to provide the necessary intellectual rigour and confidence for teachers to draw from virtue ethics when teaching citizenship education or preparing students for an educated public. Teachers need to become independent practical reasoners themselves if they are to develop practical reasoning in their students. In addition, teachers need to care for their students and the subjects they teach (MacIntyre, 1999). Giving and receiving care should be a necessary part of demonstrating responsible citizenship so that students may come to appreciate giving and receiving care as part of their good and that of others. In the following section I turn to the teaching of deontological ethics and the challenges perceived by MacIntyre (1987) for developing an educated public in the culture of Western modernity or globalisation in general.
8.3 Teacher Education, Deontological Ethics and Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

In his lecture of the educated public, MacIntyre (1987) describes teachers as the “forlorn hope of the culture of Western modernity” (p.16). He expands on this subject in his conversation with Dunne to explain that teachers are unlikely to fulfil the role for which society has set for them of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). The reason why the two aims of education are incompatible, according to MacIntyre, is that socialising students into the present social system requires them to become compliant workers who provide skills for the market economy without asking questions about the good of the activities in which they are involved (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). He maintains that the social system alienates people who ask important questions such as the point and purpose of the activities they are engaged in, but rewards those who are compliant to the market economy in its partnership with government and the media. In essence, what MacIntyre is arguing is that the role of teachers such as socialising students encourages conformity to the status quo, and this conformity clashes with the other role of teaching students to think for themselves. Ideally, citizens should be able to ask questions concerning their individual and common good for supporting the prevailing social system.

There are similarities between what is described above and the implicit deontic character of teacher education which I described as theoretical and technical at the beginning of this chapter. The professional ethics of teachers may also be linked to duty or deontic rights. So if we follow MacIntyre (1987), we might realise that rational
debate that is consistent with an educated public is very unlikely under a theoretical and technical education that is deontically oriented. The reason why rational debate which is consistent with an educated public may not be possible within the scope of deontic rights is because of the belief that every individual has a right to his or her comprehensive view of life. MacIntyre (1981) describes the state of current moral philosophy as dogged by scepticism such that even if we trace our disagreement to the initial premises underlying them we often arrive at a point where argument ceases, and we engage in assertion against counter-assertion. He dissects the challenge with our moral philosophy as not related to pluralism per se, but the kind of pluralism that is “an unharmomorphic melange of ill-assorted fragments” rather than “an ordered dialogue on intersecting viewpoints” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 12).

The challenge for my discussion, then, is whether there is any value in teaching deontological ethics to pre-service teachers given its supposed association with scepticism which may contribute to all sorts of debates that might fail to reach agreement or intersect in an orderly fashion. In order to respond to this challenge, we need to understand MacIntyre’s position on the provision of a background culture that is necessary to facilitate the intersection of various moral philosophical perspectives in a rational debate similar to that which existed during the Scottish educated public. In deontological ethics, there is no recognition of such a background culture unlike in virtue ethics. MacIntyre recognises of course that there is very little chance of recreating conditions similar to those which existed in the Scottish university education that enabled the development of an educated public. He therefore considers
“the mission with which contemporary teachers are entrusted [a]s both essential and impossible” (MacIntyre, 1987, p. 16). However, fifteen years later he observes:

Without radical changes in our schools we are unlikely to bring an educated public into being. Yet without an educated public we are unlikely to bring about those radical changes. I say ‘unlikely’. What we confront is very great difficulty, not impossibility (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 17).

Now we know that, MacIntyre thinks an educated public is possible, although with great difficulty. For instance, he recognises that modern society would have difficulty deciding which canonical books to read in order to form a background culture for rational debate. In addition, he observes that it would be a challenge for modern society to agree on the interpretation of such canonical books even if we were to agree on which books to read. MacIntyre therefore, proposes that universities should do away with the perceived neutrality of rational debates and adopt a system of rival traditions where rational debates are informed by a particular tradition (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) such as liberal, Catholic, Jewish, Protestant or Islamic tradition. His idea of rival traditions suggests that students could choose which (university) tradition they wish to argue from while they also study the traditions of other people so that they understand how disagreements come about and probably resolve such disagreements or recognise the deficiency of their own thinking. The idea here is that inquiry from a non-neutral perspective is likely to trigger debate from opposing views so that students are well informed from the dissent and intersection of ideas in an orderly dialogue as part of an educated public.
There are challenges, however, with MacIntyre’s proposition of rival traditions, although it may align well with the deontological perspective of allowing people to choose their comprehensive view of the good. One of the challenges is that the demographic characteristics of many university campuses, where pre-service teachers are educated, is not only changing because of migration and other factors, but accommodates individuals with multiple identities which overlap across various traditions. It is difficult to recognise the individuality of each person in MacIntyre’s idea of rival traditions as it treats people according to groups. Mendus (1992) also observes that universities of a similar culture or tradition are likely to exclude divergent beliefs which are necessary for vigorous debates as MacIntyre encourages university lecturers to invite dissent and assent during discussions. There are also concerns that rival traditions may have unintended consequences such as perpetuating traditional views on women (Nussbaum, 1988) including prejudice against minority ethnic groups (Carr, 2006a). MacIntyre of course considers “prejudice [a]s an enemy of education” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 18). So how then, should we justify the teaching of deontological ethics in order to develop an educated public in teacher education given the implausibility of rival traditions?

8.3.1 Teacher Education, Deontological Ethics and Democratic Deliberation: Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

It should be expected that an educated public involves principles of democracy where the views of all citizens are respected. In other words, we should expect citizens to be treated as ends in themselves rather than a means to other people’s ends. We may therefore, justify the teaching of deontological ethics in developing an educated public.
in teacher education on these grounds. MacIntyre (1999) also observes that “Modern moral philosophy has understandably and rightly placed great emphasis upon individual autonomy, upon the capacity for making independent choices” (p. 8). In addition, he observes that “Rule following will often be involved in knowing how to respond rightly, but no rule or set of rules by itself ever determines how to respond rightly” (p. 93) or act appropriately. I therefore agree with MacAllister that the notion of an educated public when viewed in light of MacIntyre’s later work such as Independent Rational Animals “is more outward looking and open to difference” (MacAllister, 2015, p. 1). MacIntyre’s accommodation of rules and autonomy signifies that the criticism levelled at him pertaining to a return to an earlier tradition where differences of people’s conception of a good life were ignored in favour of social ends or the common good (Mendus, 1992; Wain, 1994) are no longer justified unless we believe him to be inconsistent.

However, accepting that MacIntyre’s ideas are open to plurality does not mean that we should agree to his idea of rival traditions in developing an educated public for teacher education at university or college level. Wain (1994) argues that there are other conceptions of an educated public which do not require accepting the notion of rival traditions or fragmented educated publics. He argues that if we consider the ideas of Dewey and Habermas, especially on communicative action, we would realise that an educated public is not different from a democratic public. He maintains that a democratic public “stands for a way of life involving highly communicative and participative citizens” (p. 153) in a similar way to an educated public. According to Wain, a Deweyian democratic public requires the school to move beyond reproduction
(or acquisition of habit and culture) to become “an active agent for the creation of a
new social order” (Wain, 1994, p. 157) which includes the school becoming an
educational community. We could therefore, imagine a democratic public with
students participating in student representative councils as well as various societies
(such as the debate society) while the classroom environment and the whole ethos of
a teacher education institution is informed by a democratic culture.

What is salient in Wain’s (1994) idea of a democratic public is that there are
similarities with MacIntyre’s notion of an educated public. For instance, we could note
that Wain (1994) considers an emancipatory approach as necessary for the idea of a
democratic public by introducing the ideas of Habermas. Wain explains that Habermas
“has no doubt that an educated public is possible even in post-liberal societies, and that
the lifeworld actually throws up emancipatory social movements that take the form of
educated publics” (Wain, 1994, p. 158). Similarly, one of MacIntyre’s reasons for
students to become “reflective and independent members of their families and political
communities” (MacIntyre & Dunne, p. 2) is that they should be critical of the
prevailing social system including the manner in which power is utilised. Vokey
(2003) also contends that civic education according to MacIntyre’s ideal of an
educated public should be informed by social critical theory in order to reveal the
operations of a neo-liberal “‘free market’ ideology” (p. 271). A neo-liberal ideology
undermines democratic debate of the kind of an educated public because important
decisions are taken by a minority of people in government and business with little or
no participation from citizens through rational debate which ensures that decisions are
based on facts or logic.
There are also differences between the democratic public advocated by Wain (1994) and the educated public advocated by MacIntyre (1987) even though both conceptions claim to transform society through rational debate. Wain (1994) argues that a democratic public is likely to lead to a “new social order” (p. 158) rather than reproduction of the existing social system, while MacIntyre reckons that “students will bring to the activities of their adult life questioning attitudes that will put them at odds with the moral temper of the age and with its dominant institutions” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 3), as a result of being taught how to think for themselves by their teachers. Differences between the two conceptions of an educated public are related to differences between deontological ethics and virtue ethics. MacIntyre’s notion of an educated public is ideally an education in virtues where students are concerned with the goods for themselves as well as the goods for the community (MacAllister, 2015; MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002; Vokey, 2003). On the other hand, Wain (1994) finds it difficult to accept the idea of a background culture into the democratic public because of the deontological perspective which informs his views about the condition of plurality or the right of every individual to hold his or her own comprehensive view of life in our society.

However, differences between the two conceptions of an educated public do not mean that they are mutually exclusive. There are indications that similarities in the two perspectives are much closer than their perceived differences. For instance, MacIntyre (1999) contends that individuals should be concerned with pursuing their goods as well as public goods. At the same time, the idea of a democratic public “reformulates rationality in a manner which displaces the source of its authority from the autonomous
subject and locates it in the sphere of communicative action” (Wain, 1994, p. 152). If we also consider Rawls’ (1993) political liberalism we would realise that democratic debate takes place within the background of public reason. However, public reason is informed by the duty of civility rather than the substantive virtue of just generosity proposed by MacIntyre (1999). Both civility and just generosity may be considered virtues despite their differences in terms of their contribution to personal responsibility (moral) and public dimensions of citizenship. MacIntyre’s virtue of just generosity may be related to the personal responsibility dimension of citizenship because of its development of character or responsible citizens who look after their own interests as well as the common good. On the other hand, civility may be related to the public dimension of citizenship which is concerned with the obligation to participate actively in citizenship.

A democratic public in a similar manner to the idea of an educated public requires the education of citizens in order to improve the quality of debates or deliberation in the public sphere. This is partly the reason why society requires teachers in their social role to socialise students as well as teach them to think for themselves. Teacher education therefore, should ensure that pre-service teachers are educated in virtue ethics in order to understand the development of responsible citizens as part of the moral dimension of citizenship education. At the same time, pre-service teachers should be taught on deontological ethics so that they understand the development of participatory citizens as part of the public dimension of citizenship education. To make a distinction between responsible and participatory citizenship is not to suggest that participatory citizens are not responsible citizens or vice versa. In the same way, I am
not suggesting that individuals differentiate between their individual character and the manner they behave in public as if they were two different sets of people. Instead, I am merely making a conceptual difference between responsible and participatory citizenship as they relate to the moral and public dimensions of citizenship. In particular, deontological ethics is concerned with justice as rights within a democratic or educated public.

At this point it could be noticed that I am using the notion of an educated public as a framework for discussing what needs to be done in order to move teacher education towards a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education. The idea of an educated public is useful because it links what happens at university or college level where teachers are educated to the school and social environment. Thus it was the case in MacIntyre’s (1987) description of the educated public that schoolmasters who attended university “provided a link” (p. 23) between the university and the wide public. MacIntyre explains that schoolmasters understood their telos in teaching various subjects in the school such that they introduced students “to the condition of a member of the educated public” (p. 23). Similarly, I am arguing that teachers should prepare students for the ideal of an educated public. However, pre-service teachers need instruction in various moral philosophical perspectives in order to fulfil their role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves as part of the educated public. In the next section, I discuss the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 1997) as one of the moral philosophical perspectives that is necessary to orient pre-service teachers towards an educated public or effective citizenship.
Nussbaum (1997) observes that liberal education at university and college level is essential for students to become effective citizens or to develop the capabilities necessary for participating intelligently in debates within a plural society. In other words, she links the idea of developing the capability for participating intelligently in debates within a plural society with liberal education. Her idea is consistent with MacIntyre who also admits that an educated public requires the kind of broad education that is offered by “a somewhat extended version of what used to be prescribed as a liberal education” (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002, p. 15). MacIntyre explains that the kind of liberal education he is advocating for in an educated public, is one which contributes to an education for the majority rather an elitist minority (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002), as it is sometimes attributed to Plato (Nussbaum, 1997). In the following sections, I explain which of the capabilities are necessary for orienting teachers towards an educated public or effective citizenship as it corresponds to the capability for intelligent participation in debates. This discussion is also meant to justify the value of teaching the capabilities approach to pre-service teachers so that they may be able to fulfil their role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves.

8.4.1 The Capability of Examining Oneself and One’s Tradition: Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

One of the capabilities identified by Nussbaum (1997) for effective citizenship is being able to critically examine oneself including one’s traditions. A major attribute of the
capabilities approach is that it is concerned with what people are able to do and to be, such that pre-service teachers may develop the capability of being effective contributors to rational debate. Critical examination of oneself is likely to enhance the quality of rational debate because of the increased possibilities for compromise or intersection of views. Nussbaum (1997) following Socrates, argues that living an “examined life” (p. 9) allows people to focus on reasons for their differences rather than exchanging claims against counterclaim during a debate. When individuals critically examine their traditions such as their views on women or ethnic minorities, they may be able to deal with social barriers which may prevent others from living a life that is worthy of the dignity of human beings. It is expected that rational debate would be enhanced when marginalised groups such as women and ethnic minorities are treated with respect or given a political voice. Pre-service teachers therefore, need to develop the capability to critically examine themselves and their traditions if they are to teach students to engage intelligently in debates on social justice issues that confront society.

The development of the capability to critically examine oneself and one’s traditions in teacher education is likely to happen in subjects such as philosophy within liberal education. Yet most teacher education institutions emphasise theoretical and technically oriented courses (Carr, 2009a; White, 2013). The result is that teachers may fail to recognise the marginalisation of certain groups of people such as women, ethnic minorities, and people with a low socio-economic status in the curriculum and society in general. Nussbaum (1997) explains that in order to “unmask prejudice and to secure justice, we need argument, an essential tool of civic freedom” (p. 19).
Allowing teachers to engage in intelligent debate such as the limitation of citizenship rights to deal with inequality requires the broad scope of liberal education rather than narrow vocational courses. Carr (2009a) also observes that subjects around philosophy and literature within liberal education are intrinsically valuable because they inform practical wisdom. From this view, we may assume that teachers would develop the capacity for practical wisdom if they are given an opportunity through teacher education. Practical wisdom is necessary for pre-service teachers in order to examine themselves and their traditions including discerning the adequacy of citizenship rights (or rules) to deal with social justice issues.

8.4.2 The Capability of Cultivating Humanity and Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

We might also expect that pre-service teachers should be able to deal with people from a diversity of cultures and ethnic backgrounds in order to participate intelligently in debates within a plural society. For instance, it would most likely improve our debates if we understood people’s history including how they “interpret evidence differently” (Nussbaum, 2006a, p. 390) as a result of their tradition or religion. Citizens need to cultivate their humanity (Nussbaum, 1997) in order to interact with others in a meaningful way. In particular, citizens who cultivate their humanity have the “ability to see themselves not simply as citizens of some local region or group but also and above all, as human beings bound to all human beings by ties of recognition and concern” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 10). The capability to interact successfully with people who are different from ourselves should count among the important capabilities for being a member of an educated public if we consider that our society is plural. In any
case, an educated public requires people who understand their social role which implies general educatedness about one’s society. The capabilities approach therefore, should form part of instruction in teacher education in order to cultivate the humanity of pre-service teachers. Teachers may in turn draw on their humanity in preparing students for an educated public.

In line with developing the humanity of others, MacIntyre (1999) recognises differences among people in what he describes as the virtues of individual and common goods. He also insists that students who are prejudiced against others should be made to live among those to whom they have professed prejudice so that they may realise that there is a lot they may learn from them (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002). Teachers should therefore provide “the appropriate breadth of experience to develop the virtues of common and individual goods” (Vokey, 2003, p. 270) by making students live and play with those against whom they harbour certain prejudices. Similarly, pre-service teachers may dissolve their prejudices through experiences with people different from themselves outside the classroom. However, cultivating the humanity of pre-service teachers through the capabilities approach such as using narratives in liberal education is necessary in order to build the capacity for successful rational debate in the educated public. In any case, there is also concern that MacIntyre’s idea of rival traditions in higher education is relativist (Carr, 2006a; Vokey, 2003) because it does not provide a satisfactory answer on how rational debates anchored on different traditions within universities may be resolved if we fail to determine that one is mistaken or inferior to the other.
8.4.3 The Capability of Narrative Imagination and Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

Also linked to the idea of cultivating our humanity is narrative imagination which is concerned with being able to imagine the possibility of the other as a possibility for ourselves. Nussbaum (1997) explains that we must “cultivate in ourselves a capacity for sympathetic imagination that will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different from ourselves” (p. 85). Without sympathetic imagination, it is possible that we might ignore the concerns and voices of people different from ourselves in terms of characteristics such as gender, ethnic background, religious affiliation, disability and social status. An educated public requires the infusion of emotions such as compassion so that we may extend our circle of concern beyond those who are similar to us or our small communities. If people consider others as outside of their circle of concern, then, they are likely to exclude them in their debates within the educated public. “Differences of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and national origin all shape people’s possibilities” (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 95) despite the equality proclaimed in citizenship rights. Teacher education therefore, should cultivate the capacity for imagination among pre-service teachers so that they may encourage students to see that the principles of equality in citizenship rights are not sufficient without the support of imagination and emotions.

The question that arises, therefore, is how we cultivate imagination among pre-service teachers so that they prepare students to participate intelligently in debate within a plural society. Literature is identified by Nussbaum (1997) as a valuable source for civic imagination. She cites many of the Greek dramas as having a political agenda
that is relevant to democratic debate. Similarly, MacIntyre (1987) identified canonical texts as an essential condition for the educated public. However, we have established that a common background culture would be a challenge in our society because of the condition of plurality. Nussbaum (1997) therefore, suggests that citizenship can be supported by “literary education that adds new works to the well known canon of Western literature” (p. 89). In addition to developing the imagination of pre-service teachers, what makes literature suitable for teacher education according to Carr (1997) is that it provides the possibility for general educatedness that is necessary for an educated public. He argues that “poetry and fiction can be potent sources of moral insight just as much as, if not considerably more than history, or philosophy” (p. 63). In particular, literature allows pre-service teachers to reflect on moral issues within a particular context of human experience and concern, thus connecting individuals to their social roles.

However, we should also be cautious of relativism including being biased towards particular views when using literature to develop the imagination of pre-service teachers. With regard to the tendency to be biased, we may argue that the reading of literature in order to develop imagination should be accompanied by the Socratic teaching of critically examining ourselves including our traditions. However, we might still face the challenge of what Nussbaum (1997) describes as cultural relativism in which individuals may defend the view that all ways of life are equally good for human beings. At the beginning of this chapter, I cited literature regarding teachers who often agree with values that are acceptable to the majority (Carr & Landon, 1998; Pantic & Wubbels, 2012) rather than taking a principled moral position. Similarly, MacIntyre
(1981) is critical of the kind of pluralism in which there is no orderly intersection of views but becomes “an unharmonious melange of ill-assorted fragments” (p. 12). So while democratic debate, which implies an educated public, presupposes a difference of ideas, this does not mean that we should resort to relativism. Instead, we should rationally defend (Nussbaum, 1997) our core principles such as respect for truth, acceptance of dialogue and rejection of sexism and racism (Greene, 1982) if we want to make an educated public a reality.

A question might also be raised concerning whether the capabilities approach could be used in pre-service teacher education in order to develop the capabilities discussed above. In response to this challenge it could be pointed out that most teacher education is concerned with competency in skills and acquisition of knowledge rather than the development of capabilities (Lozano, Boni, Peres & Hueso, 2012). However, Walker and McLean (2013) observe that some South African university departments are making efforts to direct students’ attention to “function as public good professionals oriented to poverty reduction” (p. 31). Their study demonstrates the education of professionals to have a concern for what their clients are able to do and to be (Walker & McLean, 2013). In a similar way, pre-service teachers should be educated such that they seek to expand capabilities in their students through socialising and teaching them to think for themselves. For instance, preparation for an educated public implies that classroom discussions should focus on rational debate as well as imagination for a better society including possible action. In addition, Callan (1997) observes that in a fair debate “I must provisionally suspend the thought that you are simply wrong, and enter imaginatively into the moral perspective you occupy” (p. 26).
The capabilities discussed in this section, such as the ability to critically examine ourselves and our traditions, the ability to develop our humanity, as well as the ability for narrative imagination, improves our understanding of an educated public within a plural society. In particular, the capabilities approach is concerned with agency for social justice or effective citizenship as defined in terms of participating intelligently in democratic debate. In this regard, we might observe that each of the capabilities discussed above is meant to overcome a social barrier that prevents people from participating effectively in rational debate. We need the capabilities approach in teacher education, therefore, in order to enhance the capabilities of pre-service teachers for rational debate (which is implied in an educated public) in pursuing social justice issues. MacIntyre (1999) also recognises the need for developing the humanity of others including critical thinking or practical reasoning but only considers this within the development of virtues of dependence and independence. In the following section I discuss the value of teaching care ethics in teacher education in orienting teachers towards an educated public. In this discussion, I argue that there are similarities between care ethics and the virtues of dependence but care ethics should be considered separately.

8.5 Teacher Education, Care Ethics and Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

I begin the discussion on teaching care ethics in teacher education as part of orienting teachers towards an educated public by observing that care ethics is closely associated with other moral philosophical perspectives. For instance, the view that people need
others to develop their capabilities within the capabilities approach may be used to explain the meaning of needs in a care ethics context according to Tronto (1993). At the same time, Svenhuijsen (2000) argues that the “relationship between rights, obligation and responsibility cannot be theorised in an adequate manner without taking care into account” (p. 6). In her view, care is part of a democratic practice where everybody has the freedom to give and receive care. Similarly, MacIntyre (1999) argues from a virtue ethics perspective that people need to give and receive care as part of their individual and common good. It seems, therefore, that care is a background condition for each of the moral philosophical perspectives such as deontic rights, the capabilities approach, and virtue ethics. Sander-Staudt (2006) also agrees that any attempt to be moral such as fulfilling duties or acting for the common good is unlikely to succeed unless it is supported by care. The question that arises, then, is how we should conceive the value of teaching care ethics in teacher education.

Given the line of my argument here, it seems that care ethics is implicated as an integral part of other moral philosophical perspectives in an educated public. However, care ethics is a moral philosophical perspective in its own right (without serving as a background condition for other moral philosophical perspectives). Care ethics may be strengthened through the support of justice, as is suggested by Tronto (1993). In addition, care ethics may benefit from virtue ethics (Sander-Staudt, 2006), but it needs to play a foundational rather than a background role in orienting teachers towards an educated public. I explain this some more in the following sections. Meanwhile, it could be noted that the inclusion of care ethics in teacher education is necessary to develop sympathy among pre-service teachers for their future role in socialising and
teaching students to think for themselves. Sympathy is an emotion described by Nussbaum (2001a) as similar to compassion in that individuals may be able to judge that the other person’s distress is bad. Within a rational debate we can also recognise that sympathy is necessary to suspend our thoughts and imagine the position of the other person we are involved with in a discussion (Callan, 1997). It is, therefore, my contention that the consideration of care ethics in teacher education is a necessary part of orienting them towards an educated public.

8.5.1 Teaching Care Ethics as a Foundation for Justice in Teacher Education: Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

The link between care ethics and an educated public may be defended on the grounds that engagement in rational debate is part of caring for our society and its people. In other words, the reason why teachers need to socialise and teach students to think for themselves is that we want students to become good citizens who care enough to recognise injustice in their communities to do something about it. Sander-Staudt (2006) observes that care is not only directed towards fellow citizens but may be directed to “politics and principles that make the world a better place” (p. 27). To argue that care may be directed towards politics and principles which make the world a better place is to suggest that care is a disposition and practice which plays a role in supporting just principles and institutions. For instance, Callan (2006) observes that failure to care about one’s country “is to lack one familiar motive for caring whether its political institutions are just” (p. 543). Rational debate which implies an educated public is one way through which democratic institutions and just principles may be supported within the lived experiences of people where care ethics is grounded. Pre-
service teachers therefore, should deliberate on care ethics in order to avoid complacency in their citizenship as well as reflect on their role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves.

The significance of care ethics in dealing with injustice in an educated public may be observed through consideration of the relationship between care and justice. MacIntyre (1999), Svenhuijsen (2000) and Tronto (1993) agree that people receive and give care throughout their lives because dependence is a human condition which requires care. This interdependence among people makes care ethics universal while at the same time the diversity of needs requires their determination within a particular situation (J. A. White, 2001). On the other hand, equality in justice encourages independence rather than interdependence (Tronto, 1993). The contrast between interdependence in care ethics and equality in justice has implications for the development of an educated public. For instance, in care ethics we are likely to anchor our citizenship or participation in an educated public on interdependence rather than equality. An educated public which takes interdependence as its starting position in rational debate is likely to be attentive to the needs of the less powerful, such as those who are dependent, rather than assuming that everyone is independent with the same level of power. Justice in the form of equality therefore, as opposed to interdependence in care ethics, is likely to exclude the interests of other people such as women within a social dialogue.

The manner in which care develops attentiveness to the needs of others such as women, the disabled, and minority ethnic groups who may be neglected in rational debates is
through sympathy. According to Meyers (1998), we may have no immediate experience of what other people feel or how they are affected unless we can imagine how we would be affected or feel if we were in a similar situation ourselves. It is mainly through the “fellow-feeling” (Meyers, 1998, p. 161) developed by sympathy that care is able to recognise the situation of others (Tronto, 2007) within a democracy. For instance, sympathy might enable us to consider the voices of affected people when deliberating on systemic injustices such as gender representation and other forms of discrimination in public. In this regard, policy decisions may not solely depend on the views of experts. Tronto (1995) also observes that incorporating different voices within a discourse may change the debate such that “those who may have a lot to say may not be those who speak the eloquent language of the academy or of the realm of public policymakers” (p. 146). So while vulnerable groups were not part of the educated public in eighteenth century Scotland, it is necessary that teachers should include them in their role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves.

In summary to this section, it can be noted that care plays the role of a disposition while at the same it is a practice or an approach to citizenship. In terms of disposition, care is linked to sympathy for vulnerable people as part of expressing our humanity. At the same time, we may link care ethics to an approach to citizenship in terms of what Tronto (2007) describes as our responsibility for others, which emanates from the idea of interdependence. As an approach to citizenship or politics, care may be considered a foundation for justice. For instance, Sander-Staudt (2006) observes that the “unjust do not care about those they wrong and unjust acts such as rape, abuse or murder damage caring relationships” (p. 31). This statement expresses what J. A.
White (2001) in her review of work in care ethics describes as the overlap between justice and the failure to care. So care ethics needs to promote justice in its approach to citizenship in order to achieve care (Sander-Staudt, 2006). At the same time, care reinterprets equality in justice according to interdependence instead of independence. Pre-service teachers, therefore, should reflect on care ethics and its association with justice so that they may draw from this knowledge in socialising and teaching students to think for themselves within the various subjects they teach. Care ethics is also linked to virtue ethics and yet different from it as was explained in Chapter Two.

8.5.2 Teaching Care Ethics as Different from Virtue Ethics: Citizenship Education for an Educated Public

There is a very close relationship between what MacIntyre (1999) describes as the virtues of dependence in his book entitled *Dependent Rational Animals* and care ethics. While MacIntyre criticises moral philosophers for ignoring the subject of dependence and its connection to vulnerability and affliction, he also acknowledges that feminist scholars (presumably in care ethics) have tried to remedy this discrepancy. He therefore, considers the virtues of dependence such as just generosity as a counterpart to the virtues of independence which involve practical reasoning or intellectual virtue. He explains that the virtues of dependence enable individuals to respond to those in need such as the disabled, as well as the needs of the community. He also acknowledges that individuals may utilise the help of government institutions which may have a better capacity to assist people (MacIntyre & Dunne, 2002) rather than depending on charity from fellow citizens all the time. However, I will not expand much on the virtues of dependence here since the subject was discussed in an earlier
section on teaching virtue ethics in teacher education as part of developing an educated public. My concern in this section is to show that there is value in teaching care in teacher education as a distinct moral philosophical perspective from virtue ethics.

In Chapter Two it was argued that care ethics is concerned with power relations at all levels whereas care as a virtue is limited in that privileged people may not see their caring as contributing to their own flourishing. In this regard the broad relational approach of care ethics differs from the virtues of dependence described above in that it allows vulnerable people to express their condition of dependence through action and speech to those who benefit from their dependence. For instance, workers may go on strike to make their employers, who may deny the fact of dependence, recognise that they too are dependent on the workers’ labour. Women’s movements may also demonstrate that men’s success in the public sphere is dependent on the work done by women in the home. Meyers (1998) describes the expression of dependence through action and speech as the transformation of private suffering into public discourse. The expression of dependence is not concerned with the development of virtue but the demand for responsibility from those who benefit from dependence. In other words, responsibility may be seen as a demand for recognition of dependence and hence the need for complete care rather than partial care. Tronto (1995) observes that the “absence of care, incomplete or disrupted care, creates anger, rage, violence” (p. 146). Pre-service teachers therefore, should understand the contribution of care ethics as different from virtue ethics within the rational debate in an educated public.
In this discussion, I do not claim that care may not be considered a virtue. Instead, I hold that teaching care ethics, in addition to other moral philosophical perspectives, is likely to enrich the understanding of pre-service teachers in their future role of socialising and teaching students to think for themselves. In particular, the moral and epistemological characteristics of care ethics described by J. A. White (2001) in her review of work by Svenhuijsen is necessary for orienting teachers towards an educated public. J. A. White (2001) identifies characteristics in care ethics such as “listening, responsiveness, attentiveness and the commitment to see issues from different perspectives” (p. 494) as necessary to make sound contextual judgements since people have different needs. From this view, we might also observe that care ethics is likely to help reduce problems of domination, neglect and discrimination so that more voices may be included in an educated public. In this regard, we might also agree with Tronto (1995) that most people would “prefer to participate in societies, communities, and institutions where care was complete” (p. 146) rather than where care was insufficient. Teacher education institutions therefore, should promote care among pre-service teachers in order to create a conducive environment for rational debate.

Thus far, I have argued that pre-service teachers require reflection in virtue ethics, deontological ethics, the capabilities approach and care ethics in order to move teacher education towards a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education. In particular, the virtues of independence such as practical reasoning are necessary for asking important questions about what education is for in an effort to counter the effects of theoretical and technical education within globalisation in our democracy. At the same time, the virtues of dependence such as just generosity (MacIntyre, 1999)
were identified as a counterpart to the virtues of independence so that pre-service teachers are concerned with their individual good as well as the common good. In addition, the incorporation of deontological ethics was considered necessary in order to extend the idea of an educated public to recognise the plurality of ideas within our modern society rather than conformity to a teleological background culture. The capabilities approach was also discussed under three main capabilities which encourage intelligent debate or an educated public within a plural modern society. Care ethics on the other hand, was considered necessary for creating conditions conducive for rational debate as well as providing an approach for dialogue that promotes justice in order to improve care.

8.6 Conclusion

I have argued that the teaching of a plural moral philosophical perspective in teacher education is necessary for orienting pre-service teachers towards an educated public. An educated public according to MacIntyre (1987) involves rational debate based on different moral philosophical perspectives. These different moral philosophical perspectives form an orderly dialogue because of their intersecting viewpoints. Similarly, the four moral philosophical perspectives discussed in this chapter raise issues of common sense which intersect with each other to facilitate an intellectual debate that is characteristic of an educated public. However, I have not included the utilitarian moral philosophical perspective because of its association with efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the devaluing of knowledge and understanding in favour of skills and competences which preclude general educatedness. An educated public connects pre-service teachers to their future social roles so that they may socialise and
teach students to think for themselves. Teachers need to be able to reflect on various moral philosophical perspectives in order to encourage students to become good citizens who care for the needs of others, execute their duties, enhance others’ capabilities as well as exercise the necessary moral and intellectual virtues (such as practical wisdom).

Given the discussion in this chapter, I can now address the research question of what is the role of educational professionals in facilitating a plural moral philosophical perspective for citizenship education. In this regard, I have argued that teacher education needs to offer courses in philosophy of education. In particular, such a course could include the four moral philosophical perspectives discussed above. I maintain that these four moral philosophical perspectives may be used by pre-service teachers to develop a vision of their future role in socialising and teaching students to think for themselves. I also recognise that much of the work also depends on lecturers within universities and colleges where initial teacher education takes place. Theoretical and technical education is necessary for pre-service teachers to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for teaching various subjects. However, pre-service teachers should also be given a chance to reflect on moral philosophical perspectives in order to develop practical wisdom as well as understand the moral philosophical perspectives underpinning citizenship education. Strategies for helping pre-service teachers to develop their vision of a philosophical perspective on citizenship education could include writing essays or developing case studies on how to integrate each of the moral philosophical perspectives into lessons for their subjects.
In addition to philosophy of education, I argued that the reading of literature is essential in providing pre-service teachers with the kind of general educatedness that is necessary for an educated public. Literature presents pre-service teachers with the opportunity to reflect on moral issues and democratic practices within a context of human experience and interest. As a result, pre-service teachers may be able to imagine the conditions of inequality, gender bias and other challenges such as poverty which exist in society. Developing a vision of their role in socialising and teaching students to think for themselves requires teachers to think about solutions to existential challenges in their profession. I contend that teachers are unlikely to conceive of teaching as a professional role that involves the promotion of moral virtues and capabilities for democratic participation unless they are given a broad conception of education that includes the reading of literature. The reading of literature may be introduced through a course on literacies in education or a prescription of a few texts which teachers may summarise in essay writing on citizenship education. If teacher education is able to provide general educatedness that is necessary for an educated public, then, teachers are likely to encourage general educatedness in their students as well instead of focusing on knowledge and skills only.

Lastly, I also acknowledge that there is only so much that initial teacher education can do in encouraging teachers to draw from a plural moral philosophical perspective in order to enrich citizenship education and ensure that it reaches its full potential. Some of the work in helping teachers develop a vision of their role in socialising and teaching students to think for themselves depends also on in-service education. The autonomy of teachers to utilise some of the practices they learn in teacher education may be
affected or enhanced by the communities of other teachers they work with in their school. MacIntyre recognises that teachers are at an advantage because not only do they serve the common good but they have their “colleagues with whom they can enquire together how to remedy matters” (MacIntyre & Dunne, p. 2) related to bureaucratisation and economic constraints that affect education and teaching. For instance, teachers may discuss what education is for so that they may recognise whether education is serving the purposes it is supposed to serve. They may also think about strategies for transforming education where it is found that it no longer serves the purposes it is meant to serve as when education focuses too much on efficiency and effectiveness at the expense of citizenship education.
CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to explore the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education given the lack of intellectual engagement in this area in the research literature on citizenship education. In addressing this gap in knowledge, the study analysed a conceptual framework which included deontological ethics, virtue ethics, utilitarian ethics, care ethics, and the capabilities approach in order to enrich citizenship education so that it reaches its full potential of developing responsible and participatory citizens. It may be argued that a responsible citizen is one who has a questioning attitude in order to contribute to the quality of debates in a democracy. At the same time responsible and participatory citizens should be expected to show concern for other human beings and the environment as part of social justice.

The major question in this study, therefore, is which moral philosophical perspective should underpin citizenship education so that it is enriched in order to reach its full potential? It is in the background of this main question that a series of research questions related to the plausibility of a plural moral philosophical perspective were developed and answered in this thesis. The following discussion presents a brief overview of how each of the research questions were answered.

The first question was how is citizenship understood from each of the moral philosophical perspectives, and what are the implications for citizenship education? The idea in this research question was to find out if any of the five moral philosophical perspectives is sufficient to inform citizenship education. In this regard, it was revealed that none of the moral philosophical perspectives is sufficient to inform good
citizenship education. For instance, virtue ethics was described as concerned with appropriate actions of social association such as friendship and appropriate attitude towards the misfortune of others including compassion and generosity. However, citizenship education oriented towards the social aspect is not necessarily political because individuals may be virtuous without involvement in democratic or collective action with others. Westheimer and Kahne (2004) also observe that building character and personal responsibility is inadequate in meeting the demands of educating a democratic citizenry. On the other hand, many of the principles of democracy such as respect, tolerance and impartiality are grounded in deontological ethics. Deontological ethics and its focus on citizenship rights may be associated with political action. However, deontological ethics may be inadequate in dealing with difference, such as poverty, gender, and ethnicity, which may become barriers for people to realise their equality.

The insufficiency of any of the single moral philosophical perspective to inform citizenship education lead to the view that a plural moral philosophical perspective is preferable to a single moral philosophical perspective. This view is a response to a second research question which sought to find out whether it is preferable to ground citizenship education within a single moral philosophical perspective rather than a plural moral philosophical perspective. In particular, virtue ethics seems to enrich citizenship education through the development of personal responsibility while deontological ethics through its emphasis on democratic principles forms the basis for collective democratic action. Democratic action also requires sympathy and concern for the needs of others since most people need care at certain periods of their lives.
although others may need more care than others (Tronto, 1993). In this regard, justice may be complemented with care ethics in order to develop caring justice (J. A. White, 2001). The capabilities approach also substantiates citizenship rights in making them a reality rather than an ideal (Nussbaum, 2003).

However, classical utilitarianism with its single measure of the greatest happiness of the majority does not conform to democratic citizenship education. Democratic citizenship education supports diversity or plurality of values some of which may not be related to happiness. The virtues of a citizen such as the courage of one’s conviction, for instance, may be pursued in the face of danger for its own sake rather than happiness. Similarly, the capabilities approach recognises that people require different things for their flourishing and this cannot be measured by a single measure of happiness alone. What this means, therefore, is that classical utilitarianism cannot be included into the moral philosophical perspectives that underpin citizenship education.

Given the view that a plural moral philosophical perspective is preferable to a single moral perspective, the third research question sought to find out the plausibility of grounding citizenship education in a plural moral philosophical perspective. Central to the systematic defence of a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education is the view that it is not neutral or relative. Instead, there are specific agreements concerning which moral philosophical perspectives are justifiable for particular actions. Each of the moral philosophical perspectives is complementary to the other. However, this conception of citizenship education is not uniform but consistent with the contextual nature of citizenship education. For instance, the identity
of the individual may be conceived of along citizenship rights rather than human rights while the recognition of both the private and public spheres of life as arenas for citizenship participation requires care. In addition to care, citizenship education also requires the development of intellectual and moral virtues in order for students to think critically about their interests as well as the public good (MacAllister, 2015; McIntyre, 1999). The capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 1997) was also considered necessary to develop empathetic understanding so that students may see the possibility of others as a possibility for themselves.

In order to allay fears of indoctrination and manipulation, it was argued that citizenship education grounded in a plural moral philosophical perspective is consistent with relational authenticity and weak autonomy. In weak autonomy, education is regarded as preparation for a particular kind of life which implies the development of common values (Winch, 2004). In a similar manner, the teaching of values, pro-attitudes and principles in relational authenticity is considered authentic or inauthentic depending on whether later behaviour that ensues from such values and principles is behaviour for which the individual assumes moral responsibility (Cuypers & Haji, 2007). In line with this view, I contend that citizenship education may draw from virtue ethics, care ethics, deontic rights, and the capabilities approach as long as later behaviour that ensues from these moral philosophical perspectives is behaviour for which the former student may take moral responsibility. To ignore the teaching of citizenship education informed by a plural moral philosophical perspective would be to subvert the education of the students since they may not be held liable for moral actions they were never
taught. Similarly, students may not be held responsible for wrong actions resulting from indoctrination or manipulation (Cuypers, 2010; Cuypers & Haji, 2007).

Having given a rationale for a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education, the fourth question sought to find out how different moral philosophical perspectives may be integrated into the conception of citizenship education advocated in the thesis. In this regard, it was argued that individual life narratives (MacIntyre, 1981), action as narrative (Arendt, 1998) and narrative imagination (1997) may be used to integrate various moral philosophical perspectives into citizenship education. In particular, individual life narratives enable students to develop internal goods and virtues within practices or subjects in a school curriculum (McIntyre & Dunne, 2002). Since individual life narratives are developed within subjects or practices, this makes it possible to offer citizenship education as a theme across the curriculum. In addition, it was argued in this thesis that individual life narratives may be offered in partnership with action as a narrative. Higgins (2011) also contends that action as a narrative may be incorporated into the classroom because practices constitute mini-publics where students may form bonds of friendship while they debate or engage with the internal good of a practice. Narrative imagination may also serve as a source of information for drama and debate (action and speech) in the classroom.

The moral philosophical perspectives which may be incorporated through the three versions of narrative cited above include deontological ethics, virtue ethics, care ethics and the capabilities approach. For instance, human rights may be incorporated in citizenship education through action as a narrative (or action and speech) in order to
demonstrate the plurality in people’s experiences of rights (Adami, 2014). In addition, individual life narratives may be associated with virtue ethics where students may integrate internal goods and virtues from practices according to their own understanding of what constitutes a flourishing life (Higgins, 2011). At the same time, narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 1997) is associated with the capabilities approach where students may develop capabilities such as compassion as well as practical reason. Compassion is necessary in order to accommodate the needs of people who are different from ourselves in terms of characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status, while practical reasoning is necessary for constructive democratic deliberation. Written stories may include care ethics while the relational approach of care ethics may also be expressed in action and speech to form part of public discourse (Kennelly, 2006; Meyers, 1998).

The fifth research question, sought to find out what content would be addressed by a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education. In this regard, it was shown that citizenship education should include information about the political relations that structure society (Ruitenberg, 2009) including citizenship rights. Information on political institutions was considered necessary as a condition for students to make informed judgements about whether their political institutions serve the purposes which they are meant to serve. In addition to information about institutions, the content of citizenship education should include imparting judgement on democratic virtues such as civility and public reasonableness as well as more substantive virtues such as compassion and friendship. In essence, imparting judgement is expected to lead to action while relevant information provides the facts
upon which actions are grounded (Oakeshott, 1989). Judgement also includes practical reasoning which is necessary for democratic deliberation. So, the content of citizenship education should include a moral or personal dimension in the form of virtues while it also incorporates the social and political dimension in terms of democratic deliberation. Gutmann (2007) also expresses these two dimensions in citizenship education as non-repression and reproduction.

Various approaches ranging from personal narratives, critical pedagogy, and service learning were suggested in teaching the content of citizenship education. In particular, telling stories or personal narratives was seen as a departure from current conceptions of citizenship education which are concerned with socialisation of students into existing structures. For instance, liberal citizenship education encourages deliberation and cooperation without much reflection on inherent justice or desirability of existing structures. Personal narratives on the other hand allow students to tell stories that reveal ‘who’ they are to others so that something new and unexpected may develop when such stories are judged by others as significant (Arendt, 1998). Critical pedagogy is also necessary so that students may be encouraged to think about how power may be used to achieve fairness and equality among all citizens. Consequently, students may not engage in service learning in order to feel good about themselves for helping vulnerable people but to think about ways to influence policies so that citizens may not have to depend on charity. Various moral philosophical perspectives such as caring for people and the environment, including virtues like friendship, and appeal to rights in order to resolve social and political problems also infiltrate the teaching of content in citizenship education.
The sixth research question was what assumptions concerning students’ motivation for citizenship participation are implied in each of the moral philosophical perspectives? In response to this question, it was revealed that the deontological perspective is concerned with righting the wrongs in society. In particular, the duties of justice require citizens to prevent any harm to individuals. As a result, students may be encouraged to reflect on the need for civil disobedience against unjust laws. Unjust laws are perceived to cause harm and they are usually imposed without the consent of the people. The duty of civility also imposes a moral duty on citizens to participate in public debate including voting during an election in order to contribute towards public reasonableness as part of legitimising government. The duty of civility in citizenship education may be encouraged through involvement of students in decision making including participation in student councils. In addition, while the deontological perspective considers the duties of material aid optional (or not to be obeyed strictly), the capabilities approach regards the provision of material aid essential since poverty is perceived to deform human life. Reflection on social justice issues is, therefore, at the centre of students’ motivation for citizenship participation in the capabilities approach.

With regards to care ethics, the underlying assumption for students’ motivation for citizenship participation is the need for help. However, students should develop attentiveness (Tronto, 1993) in order to be motivated to meet the needs of others. Attentiveness makes it possible to develop sympathy and concern for others (or caring about). It is usually associated with power such that privilege may prevent people from
being attentive to the needs of the underprivileged (Tronto, 2010). Part of encouraging students’ motivation for citizenship participation involves recognising people who are different from themselves according to characteristics such as gender, socio-economic status, and ethnic background. Students may also move beyond sympathy and concern for others to develop responsibility (Tronto, 1993) for the needs of others (or caring for) in concrete situations. In virtue ethics, the underlying motivation for citizenship participation is practical wisdom. Practical wisdom makes it possible for people to be sensitive to particular situations so that they participate in citizenship according to the right reasons, at the right time and for the right motive. The underlying motivation for citizenship participation in the utilitarian perspective was identified as the greatest good for the majority although this was considered unappealing since it requires self-sacrifice.

Notwithstanding the underlying motivations from each of the moral philosophical perspectives discussed above, in research question number seven the study sought to find out what is the role of emotions in motivating students to consider citizenship participation? In response to this question, it was shown that appropriate emotions which are anchored on rationally justified principles such as tolerance and respect for people’s rights (Callan, 1997; Nussbaum, 2013) are helpful in promoting inclusive citizenship. In particular, emotions may not only contribute to the stability of a nation by attaching people to the nation’s goals of freedom and equality through patriotism but incorporate marginalised groups into mainstream society through compassion. It is argued in this thesis that true patriots are those who act for the common good rather than self-interest. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine without the emotions such as
political anger how laws and principles in themselves would motivate people to participate in citizenship, especially, in the face of fear and powerlessness. For instance, the narratives of poor people in their low and neglected position by government might develop political anger in a citizenship education class such that some students might lose their inhibitions and organise a demonstration.

It was also discussed in the thesis that emotions such as fear, envy, shame, and disgust constitute bad emotions that should be suppressed because they are likely to cause social divisions according to race, gender, social status, and religion. I agree with Nussbaum (2013) that we should encourage emotions such as patriotism, compassion and political anger on the one hand while we discourage fear, envy, shame, and disgust on the other. The reason why these emotions should be discouraged is because they limit our circle of concern by making us believe that we do not share similar possibilities with certain groups of people. In particular, shame denigrates people’s status such that they may lose their self-esteem and withdraw from participating in citizenship (Nussbaum, 2013). While fear may sometimes motivate us to make laws to prevent people from danger as much as envy may encourage competitiveness, the bad aspect of these emotions may cause social problems such as xenophobia, racism and religious intolerance and, therefore, should be countered through the development of compassion. For instance, inclusive narratives which demonstrate the history of marginalised communities including role play and other strategies such as sports may extend students’ area of concern to accommodate people different from themselves.
The last research question (number eight), sought to find out what is the role of teacher education in facilitating a plural moral philosophical perspective on citizenship education? In response to this question, I used MacIntyre’s (1987) notion of an educated public to argue that teacher education needs to be conceived of broadly rather than narrowly along theoretical and technical knowledge. This view is not just meant to provide a justification for the conception of citizenship education I have defended in the thesis but is consistent with the aim of education which according to White (2001) should include “ethical goods such as personal and communal flourishing” (p. 150) in addition to the pursuit of truth. The idea behind the notion of an educated public (or general educatedness) in teacher education is to prepare teachers for their dual role of socialising young people as well as teaching them to think for themselves. While MacIntyre (1987) is sceptical about the idea of an educated public in our modern society, I argue that the teaching of moral philosophy which includes virtue ethics, deontological ethics, care ethics, and the capabilities approach is likely to extend the idea of an educated public as well as make it possible for teachers to socialise and teach students to think for themselves.

In addition, it was shown that orienting teachers towards membership of an educated public requires the reading of literature. In particular, the reading of literature may be offered as a course in teacher education or perhaps pre-service teachers may be given a set of essays to write based on the reading of a few books. The reading of literature according to Nussbaum (1997) develops the imagination while Carr (1997) also argues that the insight that may be received from poetry and fiction may give moral insight that is similar to that which may be received from history or philosophy if not
considerably more. Literature often provides moral insight or reflection within the realm of human experience. So the reading of literature together with the study of moral philosophy in teacher education has the possibility of developing practical wisdom for teachers (Standish, 2007) such that they may think independently and engage in constructive social debate. Otherwise, it is difficult to understand how teachers may socialise and teach students to think for themselves if they cannot think independently themselves. Similarly, teachers are likely to draw from various moral philosophical perspectives in order to enrich citizenship education if they have broad knowledge which presupposes an educated public.
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