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US Elite Discourse on the EU as a Security Actor

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2016
DECLARATION

This is to certify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed:

Date: 26th November 2015.
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I would like to dedicate this thesis to my nephew Finn (9) who marvelled at how a book so long could have no pictures at all.
Abstract

Constructivist accounts of the EU’s emergence as a security actor typically focus on changing conceptions of the Union’s role within a European context, at both national and EU levels. But few studies have analysed how significant Others in the international system understand the EU’s evolving role, which is assumed to play an important role in EU identity construction. This thesis analyses the nature of the US elite’s discourse on the EU, assessing the relative influence of factors - internal and external to the elite - in shaping its evaluations of EU security action.

The study adopts a discursive institutionalist approach exploring how differing ideas about the EU are expressed and modifying this framework to examine how agents purposefully shape discourse in line with their preferences. By adapting the framework to focus on competing elite sub-groups, the project seeks to analyse discursive attempts at institutional change in greater detail. The study employed a qualitative content analysis of more than 100 texts produced by an ideologically and institutionally representative group of American foreign policy analysts and officials, in two cases: common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and counter terrorism cooperation. Public and classified official texts in the public domain were analysed to compare coordinative and communicative discourse.

The findings indicate that ideological cleavages are mirrored in distinct narrative accounts of EU, which cross cut the Union’s differing security policy competence levels. While perceptions of European disunity and weakness dominated both conservative and liberal accounts, conservative analysts continued to portray EU security integration as threatening to US interests, a theme which has declined in importance in mainstream official discourse since the early 2000s. Empirically, the thesis provides a rich analysis of discourse on the EU in a context with significance both for scholars and policymakers concerned with external perceptions of the EU as a security actor. It provides a novel assessment of how
American officials’ assessments of the EU differ in public and in private. By analysing the discursive tactics of influential elite sub-groups, it reveals an arena for competing accounts of the EU in which the Union’s differing policy competences are overshadowed by the elite’s ideological cleavages.
Chapter One

Introducing the dissertation

1.1 Rationale

This study explores the US foreign policy elite's discourse on the EU as a security actor, analysing how factors - internal and external to that community – influence the pattern of discourse in two different policy contexts. The project arose from a broad interest in transatlantic relations and perceptions of European integration among influential American thinkers, following successive institutional upgrades to the EU’s foreign policy toolkit. There has been a wealth of constructivist scholarship on the internal identity of the EU, the construction of European identities among national elites, the interplay of national foreign policies, and the conceptualization of its international role (Börzel 1999; Torreblanca 2001; Olsen 2002; Grabbe 2003; Tonra 2003; Tonra and Christiansen 2004; Wong 2005). These works seek to understand the development of the EU's changing role – a keenly contested concept - by looking from the inside out (Manners and Whitman 2010, 232). But there remains a paucity of work on how significant Others, outside the European context, have come to understand the EU’s place in international politics.

The question of how Others think about EU as a security actor demands further attention, particularly since an examination of European discourse on the EU’s international role provides only one half of the social puzzle. Actors are not the sole authors and performers of their international identity. Instead an actor can only act as its identity when a relevant social community acknowledges the legitimacy of that action within a social context. As Hopf argues, the choices available to actors in international politics are “rigorously constrained by the
webs of understanding of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular historical contexts,” (1998; 177). Thus the EU’s ability to deploy international action is contoured by the understandings of Others, expressed in discourse.

The perceptions of powerful and significant Others, such as the US, are especially worthy of examination, because as Wendt argues: “where there are differences in material capabilities, social action will tend to evolve in the way favoured by the more powerful” (1999; 331). In light of the significance attributed to the transatlantic relationship by policymakers and historians, both in the historical development of European integration and in contemporary policymaking, scholars seeking to understand the emergence of EU external action cannot ignore perceptions of Europe held by its pre-eminent ally. The ideas held by the policymaking community in Washington set parameters and expectations for policies pursued by EU officials, and have significant direct and indirect impacts on EU security policies.

As these initial theoretical observations suggest, this line of enquiry springs from constructivist assumptions about the socially constructed nature of state identity. Wendt explored how a state comes to understand its identity, interests and other ideas through a social process of learning, involving interaction with others (1999). Yet this approach neglected the sub-state processes of ideational development in discourse that take place within each party to this exchange. This dissertation opens up these sub-state processes by examining the nature of security discourse on the EU within a significant community of American opinion-leaders. The community is analysed as an institutionally and ideologically diverse set of influential actors – the cleavages between conservative and liberal analysts, between official policymakers and think tanks, and between public official comments and private remarks will be compared to examine which factors play a greater role in shaping discourse about the EU.

The variable nature of EU security policy competences across two case studies is also considered as a factor shaping discourse, allowing us to examine the extent
to which discourse is shaped by differences in institutional capacity for EU-level action, rather than internal factors within the US elite.

These concerns lead to the following questions:

**The research question:**
What is the nature of US Elite Discourse on the EU as a security actor?

**Leading to sub-questions:**
1. To what extent and how does the level of policy competence exercised by the EU in a given security domain affect US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor?
2. To what extent and how does the ideological position of sub-groups of the US foreign policy community influence discourse on the EU as a security actor?
3. How does official discourse on the EU as security actor differ in public and private settings?
4. How does the discourse vary over time?

The focus of this investigation is on both official and non-official elite discourses, in both public and private settings. Dominant themes, language choices and discursive strategies, compared with identified cleavages within the community and policy domains, form the evidence upon which arguments are made in this dissertation.

The study seeks firstly to analyse the nature of the discourse on the EU as a security actor within this community, mapping out the patterns of ideas about EU security action in two case studies: the institutional development of CSDP and PNR negotiations in the framework of counter-terrorism cooperation. It then moves to examine various influences that shape the discourse; the cross case comparison examines the influence of the policy competence exercised (community or intergovernmental) on the pattern of discourse. The embedded case comparison looks at ideological and institutional cleavages within the
community and assesses the degree to which they produce divergent narrative accounts. Finally, a longitudinal analysis examines the changing pattern of discourse over time, in response to key juncture points or significant events.

Although, the notion that the EU's identity is in part constituted by how significant others (such as the US) “mirror” a role onto it through social interactions is a key assumption of this theoretical framework, the aim of this thesis is not to examine the process of mutual identity constitution itself. Nor is it the intention of this thesis to look at US discourse on the EU more generally or on alternative European security actors, like NATO or the OSCE. While the use of the term “Europe” by sources in this study has somewhat blurry edges; being applied to states individually or in various formations, this dissertation focuses narrowly on discourse on EU security action, or on evaluations of EU member states made within a broader assessment of EU security action.

The next section traces the emergence of ideas about the EU as a security actor through its official self-presentation, as well as in academic discourse, revealing an ongoing discursive struggle to define the EU’s role international politics. This brief review serves two purposes:

1. It provides important context for discourse on the EU’s emergent identity, by summarising significant ideas about the EU that have been analysed extensively.

2. Its second purpose is to demonstrate a gap in the literature on external perceptions of the EU, which by contrast with the discourses reviewed, have been relatively neglected by scholars.

The chapter will review the state of the literature on external perceptions, identifying where this thesis can make a contribution. It will then sketch out the novel empirical and theoretical approach this thesis will take, before presenting the structure of the dissertation, chapter-by-chapter.
1.2 EU external action in European discourse

In political discourse

The EU is a unique and unprecedented system of states; a constantly evolving entity; neither state nor international organisation, yet which seeks to present itself through official discourse as a coherent actor in international politics. Institutional developments since 1970 have seen its attempts at foreign policy coordination evolve into more formalized modes of “common” foreign policy making (Wessels, 1982). Already in 1974, EU leaders were pushing for a greater role for the Union internationally and issued a “Declaration on European Identity,” which stated that: ‘Europe must unite and increasingly speak with one voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world’. The institutional innovations of the 1980s and 1990s integrated policymaking further in areas where intra-European policies took on greater external impact (Smith, 1998). The bloc’s enlargement policy developed as a significant tool of norms and institutions promotion within the Union’s neighbourhood (Smith, K, 2004). In recent years, the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of an External Action Service and a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy mimicked the conventional trappings of state diplomacy and demonstrated an aspiration to a global role. The bloc now wields a number of state-like foreign and security policy tools: from a foreign policy “chief,” to jointly organised common military missions abroad. Alongside these institutions are the explicit statements it makes about this role: its stated aim is “to assert its identity on the international scene...” (Article 32, TEU). This identity is said to be rooted in a liberal internationalist conception of universal rights – the treaties proclaim: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities,” (Article 2, TEU). The EU thus presents

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1 Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, December 14th, 1973) p.3, accessed at: http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/2798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2e9-
itself as a post-Westphalian international actor, summoning the combined resources of its members to champion the causes of human rights, dignity and the rule of law on the world stage.

And yet, notable foreign policy failures in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere appeared to support rationalist arguments insisting that power remains vested in national actors, operating within a logic of relative security-maximisation, derived from the structural pressures of anarchy. The empirical record of the 1990s suggested that when international crises struck, the EU's policies were widely criticised, (Everts; 2003). Concerns that the Union had not lived up to its responsibilities in numerous security crises in former Yugoslavia led French and British leaders to commit themselves, in the St. Malo Declaration of December 1998, to the development of an EU military crisis-response capacity, autonomous from the US. The declaration stated that the Union:

Must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis.

- Communique, Franco-British Summit, St Malo 1998.

From St. Malo sprang the beginnings of a common security and defence policy (CSDP), now presented as a means for member states to act collectively by cooperating in resource development and as a rapid response to defence issues: “The CSDP allows EU Member States to pool their resources and to build stronger defence capabilities to act rapidly and effectively.” Today, official communications from the EEAS lay emphasis on the global leadership role that CSDP affords the Union, and present the policy as an effective instrument to advance its interests:

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The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security.³

And yet, the most recent institutional revisions to the EU’s security policies appeared to disappoint senior European politicians, who lamented the continuing lack of unified purpose and resolute action. The Union’s new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy was described as institutionally constrained, rendering the EU’s role on the global stage stunted and diminishing its capacity to project values and advance interests:

The EU must do a better job of asserting its influence and its interest in the World. [High representative] Catherine Ashton must have the tools to fully carry out her tasks and thereby live up to the expectations placed in her. This is of vital importance to Europe’s future position and the success of our common values and interests on the international political stage.

- Bernard Kouchner, statement on the appointment of Pierre Vimont as Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service. Paris, October 25th, 2010.⁴

These complaints underline the preference of many politicians for a more coherent EU role in security politics but they also reveal a perceived mismatch between economic and political relevance. Despite its state-like institutions, actors and declarations, the Union’s foreign policy machine appeared to be less than the sum of its parts. In the view of some politicians, the Union remained an economic giant and a political dwarf:

The European Union, which is the foremost economic power in the World and is home to half a billion people, should be in a position to play a consequential role on the international stage.

- Alain Juppé, interview with “Mondes – Les Cahiers du Quai d’Orsay” No.7. June 2011.⁵

In academic discourse

International relations scholars have struggled to integrate this new and uncertain system of states into orthodox interstate security frameworks based on structural assumptions. The emergence of common foreign and security policies among European nation states may be characterised by neo-functionalists as the result of functional spill over from integration in economic policy fields, by liberal intergovernmentalists as a tool of internal power balance management and by realists as an example of classical balancing against an emergent unipolar actor. For many, the EU appeared to be ‘somehow beyond international relations’ (Long, 1997, 187). Bull’s (1982) description of EU military integration as a desirable but implausible prospect was echoed in Robert Kagan’s (2002) account of Europe as a ‘Kantian paradise’ incapable or unwilling to develop conventional power projection capabilities (Orbie 2006: 124).

The scholarly debate on the nature of the EU’s international role has been flourishing for well over two decades now. Since Duchene’s conception of a civilian power Europe (1972), we have had Manners and Whitman’s (2010) portrait of a “Normative Power Europe” describing the Union, not as an actor, but as an ongoing ‘contestation of complex, multiple … relational identities’ characterized by a principled, pacifist and post-Westphalian nature (397). More recently scholars have sketched the image of Europe as a market power, a hard power, a soft power, a gentle power, a small power, a middle power and indeed, as an entity with no real power of note at all (Damro 2012, Orbie 2008, Toje 2011). Thus the EU’s role is a highly contested concept that not only challenges conventional notions of international politics, but the very nature of what constitutes power itself.

\(^{5}\) Accessed at: http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Alain-Juppe-s-interview-in-Foreign
The highly contested nature of EU external action and its largely discursive nature – most visibly consisting of a daily flurry of declarations and statements - have provided fertile ground for constructivist analysis. CFSP appeared to some as a tool of rhetoric, designed to “personify” an EU identity but without the credibility that comes from commanding external relations (Tonra 2005; 10). Ben Rosamond noted that CFSP is ‘aspirational, declaratory and full of positioning statements’ (2005; 470). This “declaratory” aspect of CFSP reveals its importance as a way for the EU to project itself externally, articulating its significance and coherence as a purposeful international actor. In this perspective, foreign policy statements have ideational purposes – they construct an idea of the EU abroad and they reveal how the Union is “engaged in a continuous discursive struggle to define the substantive ways in which the EU should impact upon the world,” (Baker-Beall 2014; 212).

But who is this performance for? And what is its content? A good deal of constructivist scholarship examines how the official claim for an international role for the Union has been interpreted in domestic contexts, among national and European audiences. Larsen’s (2004) exploration of how the EU is constructed in European public discourse identified a wide spectrum of views; the EU as a capable actor that defends its own interests and acknowledges its international responsibilities or a benevolent experiment in peace building and integration. His analysis also explored a competing Eurosceptic discourse rejecting the concept of the EU as an international actor because it had abrogated the rights of member-states, and taken on powers rightly belonging elsewhere (69). Larsen mapped out the patterns of discourse and compared them with cleavages within European society: the official EU level on the one hand and Eurosceptics in Denmark, the UK, Ireland and France on the other.

By focussing on internal discursive construction, these analyses implied that Europeans were the primary audience for this performance – an orientation that this section will return to. But what kind of role was the Union performing? Karen Smith explored analysis of the Union as an international actor exerting
influence and power beyond its borders, not through conventional military means, but rather by deploying the soft power tools of attraction (Smith, K; 2004). In this account, the bloc’s lack of dedicated armed forces and the institutional obstacles to rapid military responses to crises were not indications of failure but rather outward manifestations of a commitment to peaceful means and multilateralism. The counterweight example of US unilateral foreign policy lurked in the background of many of these accounts, particularly in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Unlike the US, the EU’s enlargement policy could have a transformative impact on its neighbours by offering carrots rather than wielding sticks; by offering political and economic incentives to its neighbours in the service of liberal values and goals:

*Europe brings a unique kind of power, not coercive military power but the power of attraction. The European Union has become a gigantic political and economic magnet whose greatest strength is the attractive pull it exerts on its neighbours. Europe’s foreign policy today is enlargement.*


Critics argued that European efforts to reconceptualise the nature of power in international politics have been “after-the-fact” attempts to create new categories of power that suited the EU’s unbalanced institutional capacities. Was soft power really the key to influence in international politics, in which case the EU could claim to be a post-modern superpower? (Leonard 2005) Or were Europeans deluded in thinking that glaring hard power deficits were less relevant in a new multi-polar world?

These questions are, of course, unresolved within European academic and political circles. But are these debates mirrored in an American context? Do US assessments of the EU as a security actor share evaluations of the EU’s unique offering to international politics? Or is the dialogue sketched out thus far divorced from the discourse in Washington DC? The empirical chapters of this dissertation will explore these issues in detail.
1.3 Theoretical and empirical contribution

Addressing the gap in literature on external perceptions

Despite this flourishing debate on the nature of the EU, its implications for the international system, and its discursive construction among domestic audiences, only rarely have studies analysed perceptions of the EU’s role by key external audiences. Lucarelli (2007) and Holland and Chaban (2010) presented research on the external image of the EU, based on studies of public opinion, elite commentary, media content and non-governmental organisation (NGO) opinion in several countries. A 2007 study report noted “the corpus of literature explicitly dealing with EU’s external image is very small, fragmented and at an early stage,” (Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2007; 326 – 342) and highlighted the relative dearth of analysis of external perceptions of the EU, relative to the significant scholarly attention focussed on internal discursive construction. This gap is problematic in that it precludes any effort to gain an holistic view of the EU's external image: “the existing literature, in assessing to what extent the EU’s self-perception is confirmed by performance, has forgotten to ask the most crucial key informants (i.e. the targeted societies) what they think,” (Fioramonti and Lucarelli 2007, 326). The lack of studies on external perceptions or discourse is particularly striking given the richness of the literature on conceptions of EU power in international relations, as is the disconnect between these two asymmetric fields of scholarship running in parallel. As Larsen (2014) notes: “This is surprising because the views of the outside world would seem to be relevant for the discussion about whether the EU is a special normative power,” (896).

The absence of studies into the perceptions of the EU among external target groups is even more striking given the resources deployed by official actors in ongoing efforts to shape attitudes of the EU among these audiences. A sizeable portion of the work of those officials and diplomats in the EEAS in Brussels,
consists of declarations and statements that seek to communicate ideas about
the EU's role. More specifically, the EU Delegation to the US, a “full-fledged
diplomatic mission” employing 90 people in an office on Washington DC’s K
Street, seeks to shape perceptions by producing leaflets, video clips, policy
events, school trips, study competitions and deploying direct engagement with
senior figures.\textsuperscript{6} The delegation’s mission statement makes clear the strategic
importance of shaping American perceptions of the EU and EU-US relations: “By
engaging with political actors, the media, academia, business, and civil society,
we raise awareness of EU issues and concerns, and promote the importance of
the EU-U.S. relationship among the American public.”\textsuperscript{7} Research on the
discursive terrain on which this actor seeks to tread and indeed, re-shape,
according to its preferences therefore has value for policymakers.

But in the absence of a developed body of literature on external perceptions of
the EU, there are few established theoretical and methodological frameworks to
undertake an analysis of US discourse on the EU. Lucarelli’s study revealed a
degree of confusion about the relevant empirical data studies of this kind should
collect, and concluded by pointing to the need to refine a "stringent method,”
of analysing perceptions among key external audiences, recognising important
contextual differences depending on the subject group. On a basic level, differing
methodological approaches to sampling “elite” perceptions in the limited
literature on external perceptions of the EU, reduce the avenues for
complementary comparative research on the topic (Larsen, 2014; 901). This
commentary points to a need for a theoretically consistent and methodologically
sound method to analyse relevant views among significant external
constituencies. This study responds to that call, developing a novel qualitative
content analysis of the discourse produced by the US elite foreign policy
community, specifically on EU security action. It is hoped that not only will the
empirical findings prove a valuable contribution to this debate but that the
theoretical foundations and methodological approach will suggest further

\textsuperscript{6} Quotation taken from EU delegation website, accessed in September 2015.
\url{http://www.euintheus.org/who-we-are/the-eu-delegation-to-the-united-states/}

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
fruitful enquiries into external perceptions of the EU as an international actor, and discourse analysis approaches more broadly.

**Novel ways of examining discourse**

This thesis employs a discursive institutionalist approach to analyse how the US elite’s ideas on EU security action are expressed in discourse. Discursive institutionalism offers a model for examining not merely ideas as text but also the context for communicative action: the where, when, how and why ideas are expressed in discourse. It provides modes of classification for different types and forms of ideas and reveals how discourses can be analysed as simultaneously structures guiding action and also constructs internal to agents. (Schmidt 2008; 314). By applying this framework to the US elite context, we can examine note only the ideational content of discourse on the EU in this field, but also the context for discursive acts and more significantly, the ways in which agents consciously seek to shape the institutions of discourses.

A criticism of the discursive institutionalist approach is that while the framework proposes an agent-centred model of institutional change, the mechanisms by which agent-level discursive action lead to institutional change, and the power relations involved in this process, remain under-specified (Panizza and Miorelli; 2013). In what circumstances do individual level actions produce institutional change and which agent-level actions have significant consequences? This work modifies the framework by proposing a domestic discursive competition model that analyses how competing sub-groups advance narrative accounts of EU security action, arising from differing ideological standpoints. Significant think tanks, possessing the requisite financial, media, intellectual and political resources to be influential, can thus act as discursive entrepreneurs, advocating particular ideas about Europe in line with their preferences. By comparing the patterns of discourse with ideological cleavages within the community, we can probe the plausibility of this modification in the empirical chapters. This model is an attempt therefore, to bridge the gap
between agent-level action and institutional change in the discursive institutionalist approach.

As the main research question reveals, a significant portion of the work involves performing a constitutive analysis of the discourse itself. Such an enterprise requires the author to make choices about the groups of actors to be included, the kind of documents to be selected and manner in which content is coded for meaning and compared. The study will propose transparent and replicable methods for selecting an ideologically and institutionally balanced corpus of texts relevant to the EU’s security action before submitting this corpus to a qualitative content analysis for themes, forms of expression and ideas.

While the bulk of the thesis focuses on texts produced with a public audience in mind, the study seeks to make a significant empirical contribution by analysing classified State Dept cables and emails, which are now in the public domain. The availability of these documents provide the study with an invaluable opportunity to examine how officials talk about the EU behind closed doors as well as in public. By doing so, the study seeks to further our understanding of the different modes of official discourse in different settings.

This study develops an argument for a narrow elite focus in the US context, by critically engaging with academic literature on the domestic influences of US foreign policy. Whereas some analysts regularly measure public opinion on transatlantic policy issues, such studies lack depth in the binary questions posed to random samples of the public and imply a level of direct and indirect influence by the general public on transatlantic relations, which remains undemonstrated. No US opinion poll has ever even suggested a majority of Americans have even heard of the European Union. Given the informational costs to voters of informing themselves on transatlantic topics, the lack of discernible policy

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8 Cables were made available by the Wikileaks organization, which hosts a searchable database of classified cables at its Plus-D website. While the US government has condemned the leaking of these cables as an illegal act, it has not challenged the authenticity of the cables nor has it proscribed their analysis and review by researchers. Emails were made publicly available by the State Dept in response to Congressional enquiries related to the hosting of Secretary Clinton’s emails on her private computer server.
cleavages between parties on this issue, the generally low salience nature of foreign policy and the sporadic nature of elections, this thesis argues that public opinion studies are of limited utility in understanding the determinants of US policy towards the EU.

**Whose discourse and in what context?**

The literature on the role of ideas in US foreign policy is characterised by differing assumptions about whose ideas matter and how they influence policymaking. Should we look at the attitudes of the general public on a given foreign policy question or actor, or should we instead examine the policy positions of each of the major parties? Perhaps the views of an individual president are consequential for EU-US relations? The answers to these questions are not straightforward, nor are they consistent across policy issues of differing salience and affecting different interests.

This study argues that a narrow elite focus allows us to best understand the ideas of actors who are consequential for EU-US security relations. The empirical analysis focuses on a foreign policy community, comprising official foreign policy makers and influential think tanks. This narrow scope restricts our focus to those actors, which can claim significant influence over the discourse on EU external action, rather than broad elites or mass public opinion. Foreign policy making today is produced by complex interactions between policy makers, decision-makers, experts and, to a lesser or greater degree, public opinion. In the case of transatlantic relations however, the low policy salience of the issue narrows the field of consequential actors.

Furthermore, the dissertation proposes a qualitative content analysis (QCA) method that seeks to provide rich insights into the themes and forms of discourse on the EU, as opposed to more clearly measurable but empirically
simplified binary opinion poll results. Chapter 4 will outline the reasoning behind this particular approach and measures taken to ensure coder reliability and transparency. This analysis will therefore argue that QCA approach, within a narrow elite focus, addressing only those actors with the intellectual, media and political capital to plausibly influence policy in this area, offers the best prospects for qualitatively rich and policy-relevant empirical findings.

**Examining discourse**

As this chapter and chapter three argue, ideas conveyed in discourse, imbue institutions, structures and actors with meaning. An understanding of these discourses can assist in explaining outcomes by highlighting interpretations of the world that function as causal conditions for agents within it. The central objective of this thesis is to examine the discursive battle of ideas within a small group of influential policy actors, comparing various factors that shape that discourse and thus produce a discursive map of EU external action that guides US policymaking. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide us with working definitions for the key concepts at the heart of this dissertation, but chapter 3 will explore these conceptualisations, and their theoretical underpinnings, in greater detail.

**Fig 1.1: Working definitions**

**Discourse:** The interactive process of conveying ideas, including the content, context, structure and agency for discursive action. (Schmidt 2008, 303).

**Narrative:** Stories that order a given set of phenomena into structured, rational and internally consistent accounts of reality.

**Fig 1.2: Defining forms of discourse**

**Coordinative discourse:** The process in which policymakers engage in the creation, elaboration and justification of policy ideas.

**Communicative discourse:** The process in which political actors engage in the
the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public.
Source: (Schmidt 2002, ch. 5)

1.4 Thesis Outline

This section outlines the structure of the thesis, chapter-by-chapter, emphasising the key arguments presented throughout and how the evidence will be marshalled in the service of the overall research design and questions. Chapter two presents an historical argument for the narrow elite focus of the study by briefly reviewing the background of US attitudes towards European integration and the central role played by a select group of influential actors during the post-war period, oftentimes insulated from public opinion and political contestation. The evidence in this chapter is derived from primary historical research conducted using records from the official state department foreign relations of the United States series as well as a critical analysis of secondary literature on this period. The chapter analyses a number of recurrent themes in US elite discourse, which provide valuable context for the subsequent case studies. The recurrent themes in this period provide an important ideational framework for discourse on the EU in the later timeframe of this thesis.

Chapter three provides a theoretical grounding for the narrow elite focus, justifying the analytical focus on a community of foreign policy analysts and officials in Washington D.C, as opposed to broader public opinion approaches employed in other studies. It also identifies the ideological and institutional sub-groups within the policy community, which constitute the embedded cases in the research design. It introduces the interpretive constructivist approach focusing on the role of discourse in creating meaning in the context of
transatlantic relations and by critically reviewing the literature in the field, it argues for particular definitions and understandings of the key concepts: discourse, narratives and the role of ideas in influencing policy.

The chapter argues that a discursive institutionalist approach best allows us to understand how competing ideological and institutional sub-groups within the policy community advance ideas about the EU. This approach enables us to understand the themes and discursive processes that these actors purposefully deploy. But the chapter also addresses some of the criticisms of this approach and modifies the framework by developing a model for explaining how agent-level discursive actions can lead to institutional change.

Building on these theoretical and conceptual foundations, chapter four provides a workable and transparent research design and methodological framework for analysing the discourse in two case studies:

1. The development of CSDP 1992-2012, and
2. Counter-terrorism cooperation and the PNR agreements.

This chapter outlines the qualitative content analysis method selected and sets out the research design, demonstrating how the evidence will be collected and used to address the dissertation’s questions.

Moving from the theoretical and methodological parameters for the study to the empirical sections, chapters five and six analyse US elite discourse in the first case study: the development of CSDP 1992-2012. Chapter five explores the key narratives revealed by the content analysis of public discourse and compares the pattern of discourse with the ideological and institutional cleavages within the elite, examining how sub-groups use rhetorical tools and discursive process to advance a given narrative. Chapter six compares these findings with official discourse in private settings, examining how officials analysed the evolution of CSDP in their internal correspondence and developed strategies in response to events. This analysis allows the study to deepen our understanding of how
official coordinative discourse differs from policymakers’ public comments. The key questions for these chapters are: how is EU portrayed in each of the discourses analysed? What are the main discursive strategies and linguistic devices used? How do these discourses relate to each other? And how closely do different narratives align with ideological and institutional cleavages among the elite?

These key questions are posed again in chapters seven and eight, which address discourse in the second case study: counter-terrorism cooperation and the PNR Agreements. The framework for analysis remains the same: chapter seven analyses public discourse, while chapter eight analyses private official discourse. Each chapter analyses the main narratives, examining how the pattern of discourse maps onto sub-groups cleavages, identifying key language, themes and processes and finally, comparing the coordinative and communicative discourses of official actors. As the second and final case study, these two chapters will present the cross-case comparative findings, revealing the dominant role played by ideological position in influencing discourse on the EU among policy analysts, producing consistent narratives of the EU which cross cut the differing policy competences exercised by the EU in each case.

The ninth and final chapter reviews the empirical findings and theoretical contribution offered by the preceding sections, widening out the perspective to consider the broader significance of the research for research on perceptions of the EU in the US and elsewhere and also the field of discursive institutionalism.

**Conclusions**

This chapter introduced the main research questions, highlighting the relevance and significance of the enquiry and the dissertation’s intended theoretical and empirical contribution. It presented and outlined key concepts in the dissertation, in particular discourse, narratives and the elite chosen for analysis. It also presented themes from European official and academic discourse on the
EU’s emerging security role as a security actor, highlighting ideas for comparison and throwing a light on the gap in literature on external perceptions of the EU in this field.

Performing a content analysis on the nature of EU security action, a dynamic and contested concept, offers the prospect of uncovering the guiding principles and assumptions which direct policy action. But our analysis should not take agents as passive units directed by structure – instead, the dissertation also seeks to examine how individuals and groups, skilled in the arts of policy analysis and communication, can purposefully re-shape the institutions of discourse, which form the ideational map for those assessing the EU’s role. As with any enterprise encountering the role of ideas, this project requires careful theoretical scoping and clear methodological tools, the main outlines of which have been sketched out in this chapter and will be discussed in detail later.

By undertaking this study, the dissertation intends to uncover empirically new and relevant data that can increase our understanding of how the EU’s pre-eminent ally understands its security role and thus its expectations for policy cooperation. Analysing how our subject group assesses, discusses and projects ideas about EU security action involves making considered theoretical choices, developing sound methodological tools and collecting relevant and compelling data. By doing so, this dissertation aims to be both theoretically innovative and empirically informative.

The chapter identified a number of empirical, theoretical and policy-relevant gaps in our understanding of the EU’s role as a security actor. The scope of work outlined in this chapter represents an attempt to address parts of these gaps: empirically, we must analyse and document the nature of the discourse in a theoretically sound and methodologically reliable fashion. Theoretically, the study can contribute to broader scholarship on the role of power relations in discursive change, by revealing how elite groups purposefully seek to reshape patterns of discourse. Finally, the chapter quoted extensively from policymakers who asserted a need for Europe to play a greater role or to lead on the
international stage – the EEAS website claimed the Union already does some of these things through CSDP. Much political commentary on CSDP is vulnerable to accusations of rhetorical aspiration without material commitment or of mere wishful thinking. As policymakers seek to generate compelling narratives about the EU’s role in the World, qualitatively rich analyses of frank external perceptions of this role offer the chance to ground the EU’s security role endeavours in pragmatic understandings of the discursive status quo.
Chapter Two

US Elite Discourse on European Security Integration Since 1945

“It is not the literal past, the 'facts' of history, that shape us, but images of the past embodied in language.”


This chapter reviews US elite discourse on European security integration from the end of the Second World War to the present day. The purpose of the chapter is to identify the dominant themes in accounts of US attitudes to European security integration, thus providing important historical context for the case studies. An analysis of this kind can reveal long-running strands of thought in US elite ideas about Europe, which we can compare with our later analysis to discern whether contemporary attitudes are characterised more by continuity or change with pre-existing paradigms of understanding. Additionally, landmark events and developments from this historical period (post-WW2) form an important ingredient in the construction of the EU as a security actor in US minds today. Modern-day diplomats and analysts base their analysis, at least in part, on interpretations of the past that are transmitted through historical accounts, diplomatic training and contemporary discourse on the roots of integration. Finally, the analysis will provide further support for the dissertation’s narrow elite focus, by illustrating the key role played by small groups of officials and analysts in determining US policy towards Europe in this period, often insulated from public opinion and party politics. Thus analysing this historical period is of value on three counts: by providing valuable thematic...
context and historical comparison for current discourse, by revealing the dominant accounts of relevant historical events that inform contemporary Europe specialists within the foreign policy elite and finally, by supporting the elite-level focus of the project by reference to the historical record.

Two modes of research were employed to analyse American attitudes towards European integration since 1945. Firstly; a selection of the secondary literature on US elite ideas about European security integration in this time period was critically reviewed and analysed, noting differing analytical approaches. This will be combined with the results of primary research into the official records of the State Department’s declassified “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS) series and other select primary materials. Although declassified records of conversations and correspondence between the White House, State Department and US embassies abroad cannot be considered a “complete” historical record and it is likely that particularly sensitive documents have remained classified, the FRUS presents us with a useful historical record of private reflections of elite actors and can assist us in comparing private and public elite discourse on European security integration for this timeframe (Schmidt, 2008).

The aim with both methods is to review the evidence of how US foreign policy elites perceived European integration, with particular reference to security topics, in the period from the end of World War Two to the present day (1945 – 2013). Shifts and differences in US elite discourse in recent administrations can only be fully understood within a broader historical context. Without such context, the study becomes vulnerable to charges of firstly, overstating the importance of contemporary and recent events in shaping elite ideas and secondly, failing to recognise deeper historical and cultural trends that shape contemporary features of US elite discourse on the EU. Without the longer term historical and cultural context for the production of contemporary discourse, its meaning cannot be fully understood (Wodak 1996: 14-19).

Analysis of trends in post-war US elite attitudes towards European integration can usefully be conceived of in three phases as indicated in Fig 4.2 below. Of course this useful classification inevitably simplifies the trends of this period;
American elite attitudes to European integration were never entirely enthusiastic nor indeed entirely sceptical. As a review of the literature reveals, the transatlantic relationship has always been characterised by crises, tensions, disagreements and uncertainty (Kissinger 1965; Steel 1964; Spaak 1967; Daalder 2003; Pond 2004; Gordon and Shapiro 2004; Kagan 2004; Habermas and Derrida 2005; Peterson 2006; Cox 2007, Lundestad 2008). Nevertheless, this framework of broad themes indicates less the presence or absence of crises and more so the relative optimism or pessimism of analysts as to the ability of actors on both sides to overcome these challenges and develop new forms of productive partnership.

**Fig. 2.1: Post-war elite attitudes in three phases**

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**2.1. 1945 – 1956: Enthusiasm – Renewal and Reconstruction.**

In the immediate aftermath of the War, American politics was characterised by a remarkable and unprecedented consensus favouring massive involvement in Europe’s affairs. Not only was it a period of strong consensus, it was also a time of intense enthusiasm and planning by Americans for Europe’s future (Winand, 1993). The aim was to build up a prosperous and functioning Europe as a trade partner for the United States. This new Europe would safely contain Western Germany and act as a bulwark against Communism. The strategy involved stationing large forces abroad, entering into alliances, increasing defense spending and explicitly supporting nascent efforts towards European
integration: “the US favored the creation of a supranational Europe within its own political bodies and accordingly at least the possible development of an alternative political centre” (Lundestad, 2003: 22-63).

The period of pro-European sentiment in Washington immediately after the end of the War is as surprising for the ambitious policies that developed from it, as for its contrast with pre-war isolationism. American politicians, blessed by oceans on the East and West of their nation, had for some time extolled the virtues of an isolationist approach to global politics. Foreign involvements of any kind were seen as potentially costly, in both blood and treasure:

“Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”

(George Washington, Final Address 1796)

Pre-War America was a place without hunger for foreign engagement – with neither allies nor adversaries. The blocking power of water afforded America the luxury of isolation in a 19th century context. Yet the development of long-range air power through aircraft carriers had facilitated more expansive military action during the War and held out the possibility of a longer term American global security strategy. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s dismissal of the Secretary for Commerce Harry Wallace and the later side lining of Senator Robert Taft within the Republican Party had removed potential sources of isolationist dissent in the post War era⁹. By the time war hostilities had ceased, the spectre of Communism in Eastern Europe united actors within the political elite behind the doctrine of containment, which developed out of American diplomat George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” of 1946¹⁰. The office of President had developed greater

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⁹ Commerce Secretary Wallace represented the forces of the political left and favoured greater engagement with the USSR. Taft was a conservative, and the last prominent voice advocating extreme isolationism. This left the political middle ground open for a strategic engagement with European affairs.

¹⁰ Kennan’s telegram was primarily an analysis of the Soviet elite’s mindset and expansionist tendencies. Kennan’s text is more composed of analysis than advice but concludes by exhorting
capacity and executive control and together with the State Department had firm control over the foreign policy process. By 1946, Democrats and Republicans were united behind the President Truman’s foreign policy and the administration was able to get almost all its foreign policy initiatives approved by the Republican controlled congress (Lundestad 2003; 27-63). This was the beginning of a period of remarkably low political contestation of foreign policy, wherein the president, together with the State dept. could set and implement policy without fear of popular backlash or legislative confrontation. This period laid the conditions for an unprecedented state-led investment in Europe’s reconstruction, that was both the policy elite’s most ambitious peacetime undertaking. It would also, in itself, be the making of that elite.

**Elite Planning for a Reconstructed Europe – The Marshall Plan**

The planning, political promotion and execution of the Marshall Plan was an unmistakeably elite-led project. This group was composed of high-level officials, diplomats, politicians and technocrats based in prominent think tanks. Historians have commented that these actors formed a tightly woven web of “the best and the brightest”; wealthy and highly-educated individuals who moved easily between elite settings inside and outside of Government (Winand 1993). These social ties allowed for a fluid group of elite actors in differing institutional settings to collaborate on US policy planning for a reconstructed Europe. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is the most prominent example of think-tank influence on policy towards Europe in this period, although the Brookings Institution also assisted in the development of the Marshall Plan (Medvetz 2012; 96). Tasked by the State Department with developing strategy on major European questions, CFR produced 682 memoranda for State in this period, underwritten by grants from Rockefeller Foundation for $300,000 (Winand 1993; 3). At the highest level, Secretary of State under Truman, John Foster the US Government to provide practical support to weary Europeans who seek security and prosperity rather than abstract freedoms. Kennan was appointed as the first "Director of Policy Planning" within the State Department by Secretary George C. Marshall and enjoyed significant influence in the development of the Marshall Plan and US policy towards the Soviet Union in general. See [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm) for text of telegram.
Dulles and his brother were highly involved with the CFR. Staff from CFR worked side by side with official foreign policy actors; in fact 42% of Truman's senior foreign policy staff were from CFR (Ibid; 3). CFR's involvement with post-War planning provides us with our earliest example of direct think-tank involvement in US policy towards European integration and also the high-traffic exchange of personnel from think tanks into administrations.

But it was not only in the design and planning of the Program that elite influence was crucial, the political promotion and shepherding of the project through the Congress involved a small number of influential elite actors. The massive investment program attracted some criticism due to the scale of expenditure involved – the total was $26bn, or roughly 10 per cent of total US GDP in 1948, if other European aid in the period 1945-1948 is included (Milward, 1984:46). But the Committee for the Marshall Plan, led by Henry Stimson, undertook a significant lobbying campaign that ensured strong bi-partisan support (Hitchens, 1968; 52). The bill passed by a majority of 69-17 in the Senate in March 1948. The program was supported by almost all national newspaper titles, radio networks and over 50 business organisations. The Committee worked to provide congressmen with extensive briefings, analyses, legislative reports and testimony before the house and generated massive pressure on legislators to back the investment program. This form of activity – creating and promoting the intellectual capital for a policy initiative – is not dissimilar from the work of a specialised think tank. But the Committee's targets were not just legislators, they were also focussed on moulding mass opinion. As for the public, initial ambivalence reported in surveys by the New York Times was massaged by favourable news coverage and the Committee's national advertising campaign into enthusiastic support (Ibid). In this account elite influence is tri-furcated; shaping a malleable public opinion to support a major policy initiative, ensuring almost uniformly positive media coverage and simultaneously seeing the legislation's passage through the machinery of Government by influencing decision-makers.
The Marshall Plan was not merely an emergency aid program but formed part of a larger US strategy to fortify and support a struggling Europe. The plan foresaw massive reconstruction and economic planning in Western Europe and it was intended to enable European leaders to integrate into a Western economic and political system, guided by the international institutions sponsored by the US at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks (Hogan 1984, Ikenberry 2001). According to Lundestad, the Marshall Plan helped to stabilise Europe by seeing off internal and external threats from Communist forces, promoted European integration and more broadly mobilised American support for a comprehensive US role in Europe (2008: 44). An economically strong Europe would be a growing destination for American exports and would form a prosperous Western sphere with the US. Eisenhower spoke of shaping Europe into a “third force ... a great power bloc, after which development the US would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat” (Brogi 2002). Although the levels of investment in the Plan could not continue indefinitely, they could lay the groundwork for a stronger, more integrated Continent, which would generate its own prosperity. European unity “would mean early independence from aid from America and other Atlantic countries”. (Ibid: 144). It is clear from their public pronouncements and private documents, that almost all relevant senior administration members under Truman and Eisenhower were strongly pro-integrationist and extremely ambitious as to the scope of integration in economic and security terms. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote that “Germany ought to be integrated within a unified Europe” and believed that that would need “some form of application of the federal solution” (Winand 1993; 7, 11). His Head of Policy Planning, George Kennan promoted the strategy that Germany should be included in a European federation, not divided as had been suggested under the discarded and punitive “Morgenthau Plan” (Ibid, 7).
Support for the European Defence Community

American support for European reconstruction and integration was not limited to the economic sphere. More than most, Eisenhower strongly favoured a politically integrated Europe that could in time have a single defense identity. He was “undeterred in his determination to include a military security component in the European integration process” (Ruggie 1996: 61). In concrete terms this meant explicit support for the French European Defence Community (EDC) initiative. The EDC was an initiative started by French Prime Minister René Plevin to form a 6-country military force including a rearmed West Germany. The force would be divided into national components with the West German component reporting to an EDC command (Ruane, 2000). Eisenhower’s support for this bold defence integration initiative was unflinching and this is clear from his correspondence with European leaders:

“You should remain confident of the continuing wholehearted support of the United States for the EDC concept, which sprang from French vision. It has always been our hope that this great project, which holds the promise of such magnificent permanent benefits for Europe, would come into being at the earliest possible time.”

- President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Correspondence with Prime Minister Laniel of France. September 20, 1953.11

The unity of purpose on the American side in supporting EDC at this time is striking; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described the EDC glowingly as “the panacea for Europe’s difficulties, a symbol of its regeneration and a touchstone of its future” (Winand 1993: 28). However this starry-eyed optimism would later grow somewhat dimmed by disappointing results from the Europeans. By mid 1954, after two years of debate, the Bonn Treaty establishing the EDC had been signed by only four countries. The State Department’s records show almost constant high-level engagement by Dulles and his staff with French

officials to encourage the process and offer support.12 In a joint statement with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Eisenhower reaffirmed strong support for the establishment of the EDC and warned against any further delays by staking the very future of the Atlantic Alliance on its passage: “It is our conviction that further delay in the entry into force of the EDC and Bonn Treaties would damage the solidarity of the Atlantic nations.” (Joint Statement, June 29 1954)13

By mid 1954 it was clear that France was delaying the ratification of the very EDC concept it had initially promoted. The Assemblée Nationale was hostile, with Socialists divided and Gaullists concerned about implications for French sovereignty and German remilitarization. In a letter to the French Foreign Minister, Dulles warned that the Soviet Union was detecting a lack of Western resolve and that French delays to EDC would seriously damage relations with the US:

“Not proceeding promptly with EDC the results would, I think, be grave from the standpoint of Franco-American relations ... I urge in the strongest possible terms that EDC should be brought to a vote before the Easter holidays ... Soviet Russia must know that by obstruction and delay at Geneva it could consign EDC “to the archives” (in Molotov’s phrase) and do tragic, lasting damage to Franco-American relations.”

- Letter from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Bidault, Washington, February 23, 1954.14

In August, the last round of talks to amend the EDC concept to meet French concerns broke down with the Chairman, Paul-Henri Spaak issuing a statement

condemning French intransigence. With the EDC initiative abandoned, West Germany was admitted into NATO and that organisation’s position as the pre-eminent European security organisation was cemented. The 2-year long debacle had disappointed Eisenhower and Dulles and never again would a US administration so enthusiastically support the development of an autonomous European defence framework.

US official became increasingly frustrated with European integration efforts from late 1954 onwards. Delays to currency convertability arrangements, extensions to what were once thought to be temporary troop deployment periods and the UK’s refusal to join in any European integration effort led to American disappointment and a weariness with perceived European free-riding:

“I get weary of the European habit of taking our money, resenting any slight hint as to what they should do and then assuming in addition, full right to criticize us as bitterly as they may desire. In fact, it sometimes appears that their indulgence in this kind of criticism varies in direct ratio to the amount of help we give them”


It would be simplistic to claim that all groups within the US elite shared Eisenhower and Dulles’ early Euro-enthusiasm. The US Atomic Energy Commission and private industry had reservations about Euratom\(^\text{15}\) and while the White House and the State Dept favoured supranational economic institutions, the Treasury Department had concerns about the protectionist nature of the EEC and wanted a more open, multilateral trading environment (Winand 1993; 68, Lundestad 2003, 63-111). For the Euro-enthusiasts, the political ends of European stability justified the integrative means and in a longer term economic perspective, a wealthier Europe would import more US goods. But interests outside the White House and State Department believed that US interests in agriculture and other areas were losing out from European integration. The coming years would see an increasing amount of discord within

\(^{15}\) Euratom was designed as an institution to create a European nuclear energy market for its six member and a means for them to sell excess energy to non-members.
the policy community over European integration, which was somewhat contained by the State Dept’s strong grip on foreign policy, lasting through both the Johnson and Kennedy administrations (Lundestad, 63-111). The years after 1954 however, were characterise by a greater diversity of opinion and a growing weariness with the costs of repeatedly disappointing European integration efforts.

2.2. After EDC – Scepticism and Suspicion

Presidents after Eisenhower rarely exhibited the same level of Euro-enthusiasm as he did, particularly in security matters. The development of the Common Market after the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957 led to growing concerns of European protectionism among US elites (Milward et al, 1992). The continuing high cost of military expenditure in Europe, the negative impact of protectionist EEC’s tariffs on US agricultural interests and the rise of France’s Charles De Gaulle meant that the White House under President Kennedy cooled towards European integration (Lundestad, 2003; 111-142). The period also witnessed a gradual generational shift which was changing the composition of the US policy elite. Stephen Walt – one of the few structural realists who grants elites a role in shaping transatlantic relations16 – points to the fact that Eisenhower, Dulles and Acheson were a dying breed of “East Coast Internationalists” (1998). This group had made an institutionalised transatlantic partnership their enduring professional legacy: “They believed that Europe’s fate was worth fighting - and perhaps dying - for, and they were willing to risk considerable blood and treasure to protect these allies.” (Ibid, 3-11). Yet the new elites of the 1960s did not share this direct emotional and professional connection with the post-War reconstruction project. Nevertheless, the foreign policy establishment which followed in the 1960s and 1970s was committed to

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16 Walt sees elite ties, although waning, as one of three forces keeping the Atlantic Alliance together in the post-War era. The first and most important factor was the structural drive to balance against the Soviet Union and the second is the US’s economic interests in Europe. See Walt, Stephen M. “The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart,” National Interest, no. 54 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 3-11.
European defense within an Atlantic framework and continuing European integration. The logic had remained the same, an integrated Europe would assist in containing Germany and thwarting the rise of conservative movements there, it would deter aggression by the Soviet Union and a more efficient and prosperous Europe would be less of a burden on the US, would be easier to deal with and would be a strong market for American exports and investment.

In spite of this compelling strategic argument, French President De Gaulle’s period in office (1959-69) saw further friction with the US on European security integration. Shortly after blocking British membership of the EEC, De Gaulle concluded a Franco-German Treaty on defence, education, and culture and announced his intention to develop a French nuclear deterrent capability. This provoked irritation in Washington, which perceived these moves together with De Gaulle’s statements on NATO as threatening to the Atlantic structure of defence (Memo of Conversation, 230, 1961.)17 In contrast to Eisenhower’s policy of encouraging exclusively European security institutions, Kennedy saw the move as “an unfriendly act” and demanded Germany make a declaration of loyalty to US and include it as a preamble in the Treaty (Lundestad, 2003: 124). Furthermore, De Gaulle enraged the Americans by making a visit to Moscow and explicitly criticising American policy. Kennedy’s circle swiftly came to the conclusion that De Gaulle’s Government was intent on shutting the British and Americans out of European security matters and leaning closer to the USSR (Mahan, 2002).

The period under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations is also characterised by greater bureaucratic divisions on Europe within the policymaking elite. The State Department remained supportive of the EEC in spite of growing resentment of tariffs in Congress and elsewhere. This resentment erupted into a full scale trade war when, in response to the suspension of EEC concessions on US textiles, protectionist elements in Congress responded with restrictions on wool and chemicals. An internal struggle between Johnson’s National Security

Council (NSC) advisors and hardliners about the public response to France’s withdrawal from military integration in NATO saw NSC advisors Robert Komer and Francis Bator prevail against Dean Rusk, who had long resented De Gaulle’s NATO policy. Rusk’s correspondence with his own department reveal that he viewed French policy towards European security as “nationalistic” and “counter to concept of true integration which US has long supported”:

“The French by various actions have shown their contempt of NATO and UN, both of which are fundamental to US policy. Specifically in NATO they have withdrawn their Mediterranean fleet; denied US nuclear storage rights in France, made integrated air defense system less effective; and more recently refused to give us permission to establish tropospheric scatter link from low countries into nerve center at SHAPE ... their purpose for establishing national strategic deterrent is not to cooperate with US and the Alliance, but to ensure France’s independence of US and Alliance.”

- Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, Athens, May 4, 1962, 5 a.m.18

Rusk’s frustration with France was not allowed to enter into public statements but as time went on, senior figures in successive administrations would grow similarly suspicious of European efforts that appeared to run counter to the “Atlantic” framework. Germany under Willy Brandt was pursuing a more independent foreign policy, exemplified by his “Ostpolitik” initiative. The EEC’s expansion in the 1970s together with the development of the Common Market continued to be a source of grievance. Taken with the US’s own crisis of power in the wake of its withdrawal from Vietnam and the growing oil crisis, US leadership appeared to be weakening and the Nixon administration openly discussed the decline of US power (Lundestad 2003; 168).

**A Frankenstein’s Monster – 1970s**

President Richard Nixon Administration’s unease with European integration is clearly manifested in a number of official documents from the period. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, shared an instinctive suspicion of the EEC and Western Europe in general, which, combined with a more vocal Congress and increasingly influential Departments of Trade, Agriculture, Commerce produced a more Euro-critical perspective than previous administrations. The result of all of this was the waning of the State Dept’s influence on European policy (Interviewee no. 10). In his reappraisal of foreign policy priorities, relations with China and the Soviet Union were listed as Nixon’s first priority. Western Europe came fifth and “only where NATO is affected”. The EC appears nowhere in the index of Nixon’s memoirs. The US now no longer advocated supranationalism, ostensibly because it was an internal matter for Europeans but in fact, Nixon was extremely displeased with the direction European integration had taken and believed it to be contrary to US interests: “I fear we may have created in Europe, a Frankenstein’s monster” he is recorded as remarking to his National Security Advisor (State Dept files quoted in interview no. 10).

In this period, the US continued to meet with individual leaders but certainly not with the president of the European Commission, for whom Nixon had contempt: “that jackass in the European Commission in Brussels” (FRUS, Vol. Xli). The marginalisation of the State Department was felt most keenly in its mission to the EC, where Ambassador Robert Shaetzel wrote that: “in its isolation in Brussels the US mission to the EC might as well have been located on the upper reaches of the Orinoco”. Other diplomats at the time reported that White House – State Department relations were bleak under Nixon’s administration (Hillenbrand 1998; 313).

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At the heart of this more Euro critical perspective was the calculation by Kissinger that the goal of European unity that successive administrations had supported was, to some degree, contrary to American interests: “We have sought to combine a supranational Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic network under US leadership, these objectives are likely to prove incompatible” (Lundestad 2003; 178). Congressmen sympathetic to agricultural interests were increasingly vociferous in their criticism of European protectionism: “The congress is simply not going to tolerate this too passive attitude on the part of our representatives in the negotiations” (Ibid, 179). Congress was also dissatisfied with that regular irritant; the cost of stationing troops in Europe. The unsuccessful Mansfield resolutions from 1966 to 1973 called for troops numbers in Europe to be halved. Although the bill was defeated after a massive lobbying effort by Europeanists, this complaint is still heard in the Houses of Congress today.

The subsequent Ford and Carter administrations saw further personal and political skirmishes over missile deployment among other issues. The US was relieved that the UK had finally been admitted to the EEC in 1973 and although the Community had taken tentative steps towards security integration with the informal European Political Cooperation process in the 1970s there were no formal steps towards security integration in this period. New questions about European security did begin to appear with the collapse of Communism however, and the demise of the bi polar era.

2.3. 1989 - 2004: Uncertainty and Boundary-drawing

It was not until end of Cold War and the development of CFSP/ESDP in the Maastricht Treaty that scholars began to seriously assess the EU’s emergent identity as a security actor. Yet even before Maastricht was signed, leading

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20 By necessity this section is shorter than those which precede it, as it fits within the timeframe of the content analysis that is presented later in the thesis.
analysts were sounding the death knell for the NATO Alliance (Hogan 1992; Keohane, Nye, Hoffmann 1993). Structural Realist scholars such as Mearsheimer (1990) predicted that the absence of a common enemy to unite Europe and the US would lead to the collapse of the NATO alliance and the return of classical balancing behaviour among European states:

“It is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it has headed for forty years may disintegrate. This would bring an end to the peaceful bipolar order that has characterized Europe for the past 45 years.”
- (Mearsheimer 1990: 52)

Not only did some realists predict the end of NATO, several identified the possibility of Europe emerging as an autonomous counter-balance to American power. Writing in 1993, Waltz argued that it would be irrational for a reunited Germany to choose to remain dependant on the US for its security: “A reunited, economically powerful Germany will seek military power and influence to match its economic might” (Waltz 1993: 65). CSDP has also been labelled as an early sign of “soft balancing” behaviour (Pape 2005; Art 2006; Posen 2006). For these writers, CSDP demonstrated a fear of dependence on the US and a desire for security autonomy arising from the pressures of the anarchic system (Jones 2007)21.

Analysts noted increasing alarm in the Bush 41 and Clinton administrations about the risks that a new European defence identity could pose to NATO and US interests.22 Of particular concern to the Americans was the declaration at St.

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22 For official statements of US concern see speeches of William Taft (US Permanent Representative to NATO), February-March 1991; Reginald Barthalmew (Under Secretary of State) memorandum to European Governments, February 1991; US Department of Defence Defense Planning Guidance Memorandum, 18 February 1992; Remarks of US Permanent Representative to NATO on the subject of EU military autonomy (reported by Judy Dempsey in
Malo, which indicated that Britain may support European security integration to an unprecedented degree. US officials were keen to stress that NATO must remain the preeminent forum for European defence cooperation and that the “3 Ds” (no diminution of NATO, no discrimination against non-EU NATO members and no duplication of NATO assets) must govern any such endeavour (Albright 1998). The failure of the EU to respond to the Balkans crises throughout the 1990s undermined any sense of emergent security capabilities however and by the dawn of the Millennium, it appeared that predictions of a European counter balance to American power were misguided.

Any lingering tensions over Europe’s security ambitions were inflamed greatly by the controversy over the invasion of Iraq, which divided Europeans in full public view (Daalder 2003; Pond 2004; Gordon and Shapiro 2004; Kagan 2003; Habermas and Derrida 2005; Peterson 2006; Cox 2007). Irritated by German and French efforts to obstruct the US invasion, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously dismissed their objections as the voice of “Old Europe” and welcomed the eager support of new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. Echoing the sense of rupture, Kagan (2003) wrote of a divergent strategic perspectives on either side of the Atlantic, arising from fundamentally different world conceptions and exacerbated by growing power disparities. More than simply cynically “free-riding” on America’s security guarantee; Europe had created a “Kantian miracle” forming a post-westphalian “paradise” in which the burden of security expenditure could be abdicated or at least subjugated to the demands of the welfare state. This new worldview. The strategic perspective that this new worldview produced, was simply not compatible with America’s:

“Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and certainly not for military power. Europeans over the past half-century have developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international relations ... this is a perspective on power that Americans do not and cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same,” (Ibid; 55).

“NATO urged to challenge European defense plan”, The Financial Times, 17 October 2003.)
Kagan’s analysis was perhaps one of the most memorable from a period that saw a flurry of publications on the state of the relationship; an alliance “under stress” (Andrews, 2005) struggling under “another major crisis.” Some texts sought clues as to the likely trajectory of relations by closely comparing the contents of the EU’s first Security Strategy (published in the wake of the Iraq invasion) with its American counterpart (Peterson and Dannreuther, 2006). Others posed the question of whether the present crisis was driven by personality or by deeper trends (Anderson et al, 2008; Peterson and Pollack, 2003). The central controversies remained the same: was policy divergence inevitable given structural changes, divergent views and European integration? Was Europe doing enough to bolster its military capabilities? Was NATO’s position as the pre-eminent security alliance under threat? And to what factors should we look in determining the causes of conflict and cooperation in transatlantic relations; leadership, elites, public opinions, strategic cultures?

**Conclusions**

This chapter reviewed primary sources and secondary literature on US elite attitudes to European security integration since 1945, building a picture of an elite-driven American project to reconstruct Europe as a prosperous continent within an Atlantic security framework. Employing a review of secondary literature analysis and primary archival research, the chapter presented the dominant themes that have shaped US elite attitudes from the Eisenhower administration up until the present day. Although no period was marked by unfettered enthusiasm or hostility, a pattern of growing scepticism was identified from the Kennedy administration onwards. Bureaucratic divisions became more marked from the 1970s onwards, with the Europeanist State Department struggling to retain its pre-eminent position in foreign policy. The post-Cold War Era saw an intensification of the debate over the future of the transatlantic alliance and the early 2000s saw the most outspoken warnings from US elite actors of the dangers of European security integration.
Throughout the post-War Era, certain themes recur time and again: the burden of supporting European security, the barriers to open trade with the EEC and of most interest for our purposes, the implications of European integration for the NATO Alliance; the institutional symbol of American security leadership. The review of these themes and events demonstrates the influential role of a privileged elite, most notably in the first phase, which conducted transatlantic relations largely insulated from public opinion, critical media comment, political contestation and indeed, sometimes from other arms of government. As well as providing important historical and cultural context for the content analysis case studies that follow, it also strengthens the case for focusing on the discourse of a narrow elite, as opposed to other levels of policy influence.

It is also with the benefits and the burdens of the record of history that current US policymakers encounter the EU as a security actor. The interpretive lens that decision makers apply when engaging with the EU is shaped in part by the experience of their predecessors and the “lessons” that were learned about the European security integration since 1945. The official historical record of this time period therefore is, in itself, a cognitive and normative discursive framework that contemporary officials employ to make sense of European security integration. As Brian Friel wrote: “it is images of the past, embodied in language” that shape us, and our understandings of the World (Friel 1981; 445). Thus it would be foolish to embark on an analysis of contemporary US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor without first of all reviewing the key historical events that inevitably inform current attitudes.
“Very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest”


**Introduction**

Whose ideas matter and in what context? How do elites promote certain ideas of Europe in discourse and what effects do these processes have? This chapter argues that only a narrow elite hold ideas about the EU that are consequential for policymaking. Ideas matter, but not all ideas are created equally. This analysis, based on a critical review of literature on public influences on US foreign policy making, rejects alternative investigations of public attitudes and broad elite opinions in favour of an interpretive discourse analysis of a tightly defined elite community with a plausible claim to policy influence. More broadly, the chapter highlights how the role of ideas in policymaking is neglected within “objective interest” approaches, which take interests as exogenous to ideational factors. Only by employing a thin constructivist
approach can we fully investigate the discursive processes by which sub-groups within an influential policy community exchange ideas and compete for dominance.

Section 3.1 situates the thesis within an interpretive constructivist approach that focuses on the role of discourse in creating meaning in international politics. The section will contrast this approach with objective interest accounts of international politics, which neglect the role of ideational factors in policymaking. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will explain how the study will be conducted using a discursive institutionalist approach, which allows us to interpret and analyse the competition of ideas within the US foreign policy elite. The sections will also show how narratives act as both carriers of ideas that channel behaviour and also as constructs that agents consciously re-mould according to their preferences. It will define and analyse the key concepts introduced in the previous chapter, namely discourse, the forms that ideas take therein and the processes by which they become successfully established. The final section (3.4) provides the justification for focusing our analysis on a tightly defined elite community, rather than alternative levels of policymaking influencers (i.e: broad elite, public opinion, etc.). It also argues against a standard “epistemic communities,” approaches to Washington think tanks by highlighting the ideologically diverse and competitive nature of the think tank community, thus strengthening the case for an analysis of purposeful discursive competition within the elite.

The chapter poses a number of questions: which theoretical school within international relations best explores the relationship between ideas and policy? What theoretical approach best allows us to understand how competing groups advance ideas about the EU through discourse? And how should we conceptualise the US foreign policy elite in a way that focuses our analysis on actors who are significant in shaping US policy towards the EU as a security actor? Rather than adopting a post-structuralist or anti-positivist epistemology, the chapter will argue for an examination of how discourse is shaped within a
specific context, seeking quasi-causal explanations of the discursive outcome and the manner it constrains and empowers policy action.

3.1 Approaching ideas as “quasi-causal” explanations

*Introducing ideas in international relations*²³

Examining the nature of elite discourse implies a number of theoretical steps which should be made explicit, justified and placed within the broader debate on the role of ideas in security studies. A constructivist analysis of the role of discourse at the domestic level of analysis differs from conventional studies that employ structural explanations of “rational” state behaviour. Constructivists argue that we can only access the social world via our ways of categorizing it. Rather than providing mirror images of objective reality, human knowledge is viewed as a socially contingent phenomenon, made up of ideas, identities and interests that vary depending on context (Larsen, 2004). This approach does not assume that interests are self-evident facts, but instead analyses interests as endogenous to ideas, identities and beliefs (Hopf, 1999, Wendt, 1999). Ideational factors are not merely intervening variables, but are analysed as the building blocks of a discursive construction with consequences for ‘real world’ outcomes. Ideas and beliefs matter because they provide meaning for both subjects and objects and thus produce different actions and modes of organization (Checkel, 2004).

The constructivist turn in international relations scholarship challenged the core assumption of mainstream realist and liberal theories: that of exogenously

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²³ Material in this section draws from the author’s earlier work on grand theory approaches to alignment in international relations. (See Andrew Byrne “Conflicting visions: liberal and realist conceptualisations of transatlantic alignment.” *Transworld working paper series* no. 12. March 2013.)
given state interests (Waltz 1978, Mearsheimer, 2001). Constructivists identified two problems arising from this assumption: the first criticism relates to the relationship between interests and ideas, the second relates to the level of analysis. Structural realists view states as unitary actors operating with pre-given interests, derived from self-evident instrumental logic arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. But as constructivists argued, anarchy must be interpreted to have meaning – anarchy is what states make of it (Wendt, 1999). Taking the state as a rational agent creates other difficulties; can states really behave in the economic mode of a self-interest maximising individual? Neo-realists sidestep this by taking states as agents, given that they are assumed to be rational and unitary actors (Waltz, 2001). Secondly, neo-realists, for the most part, adopt a “black box” approach to the state, bracketing sub-state factors, such as competing domestic interest groups, or relegating them to a second-order position. Ideological affinities and political proximity are referred to by some Realist writers as relevant but not decisive in core questions of security (Walt, 1987). This minimalist approach to international politics certainly achieves parsimony – restricting itself to the explanation of “a small number of big and important things' (Waltz, 1986, p. 329). But the assumption of rationality at the state level neglects the role of ideational factors, at the state and sub-state level, in shaping policy choices.

Liberal approaches do better at addressing the level of analysis question by postulating that state foreign policy is a complex amalgam of domestic and international factors. Foreign policy choices are analysed as aggregate outcomes determined by the choices of domestic-level micro-actors, whose preferences are at a later stage mediated by systemic factors, the preferences of other states, so that the generation of interests in single states is as dependent on domestic factors as it is interdependent with the interests of other states (Moravcsik 1997). Policymaking is viewed as a porous process, vulnerable to politicisation by competing domestic interest groups (Chadwick, Alger, 1977). This opens up new units of analysis for IR scholars; regime types, public opinion, political parties, bureaucracies, cross-national coalitions, etc. The 1980s and 1990s saw new moves in Liberalism to theorise patterns of domestic interest formation.
and transmission into national policy - these approaches opened up the black box of the state and thus the debate surrounding the intention and motivation of actors at all levels of the structure.

But on the question of interests, and how they come to be understood, neo-liberal writers continue to view ideas as only intervening variables between states maximizing security in the context in the anarchic system (Waever 2002, 21). Liberal intergovernmentalist writers like Moravcsik remained reluctant to wander down the sociological path and retained state rationality as a core assumption (Moravcsik, 1998). Simplifying policy behaviour by adopting the assumption of rationality provides useful models of behaviour for phenomena but it achieves this at the expense of an ontological simplification. By relying on simplified rational behaviour assumptions, these approaches ignore the intersubjective process by which sub-state actors come to understand their interests and translate them into state policy, in ways that are not materially pre-determined. As Ted Hopf argued, ideational politics in domestic settings constrain identity, interests and actions abroad (1988, 196). Or, put more simply: the social world consists of “facts that are only facts by human agreement,” (Searle, 1995: 12). The structuralists were also overtaken by new models of cognitive complexity in decision-making pursued by sociological and psychological studies of human behaviour in other academic fields, which challenged state-level objective interest approaches.

Some structural and institutional theorists acknowledged this omission as a shortcoming. In particular Keohane (1993) accepted that institutional approaches take states’ conceptions of their interests as exogenously given – an unexplained feature within the framework:

*Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of IR can be fully adequate ... More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system.*

(1993; 285).
Although he encouraged the development of “theories of interests,” Keohane expressed concern at the emerging gap between “reflectivists” – those who addressed ideational issues – and “rationalists” – comprised of the dominant schools of international relations, whose work was predicated on a rationalist epistemology focused upon testing causal hypotheses in the mode of the physical sciences (Keohane 1988). He appealed for reflectivist enquiries to be conducted within a structure compatible with the traditional social scientific method - a scientific middle ground, where epistemological differences could be bridged by shared language and positivist modes of investigation. The next section will briefly review how this dissertation responds to Keohane’s appeal; by foregrounding ideas in a way that seeks to engage with traditional international relations.

**Do ideas matter and how should we analyse them?**

The reflectivist turn in international relations gained momentum from the 1980s as scholars turned their attention to the importance of ideas and beliefs in domestic policymaking. (Axelrod & Keohane 1986, Jervis 1988, Goldstein & Keohane 1993, Katzenstein 1993). In challenging “objective interest” accounts of policymaking, scholars of ideas in policymaking argued that excluding the role of ideas ignored how “actors interpret their interests through ideas which can vary independently from their objective positions,” (Parsons 2002; 50). Excluding social and ideational factors foreclose fruitful avenues of empirical enquiry and theoretical insight that could enhance our understanding of international politics (Katzenstein, 1996; 7). Scholars embracing the turn towards ideas ranged widely over the forms of ideas (programs, doctrines, paradigms, ideologies, philosophy, culture) and their mode of operation (through elites, in discourse, in organizational settings). For neo-liberals Goldstein and Keohane (1993) ideas were switches for interests, road maps or focal points. For Jobert (1989) and Muller (1994) they were “frames of reference”. And for constructivists like Katzenstein (1996), they were the identities of states,
governments and other actors, that shaped in large part their national security cultures.

The central problem faced by scholars attempting to push ideational accounts of policymaking into the mainstream of international relations was the difficulty in accepting objectivist imperatives to mirror the rigour of physical sciences. The problem is acute for ideational explanations given the variable nature of ideas, which can rarely be held constant because they are constantly rearticulated and contested, making it difficult to examine them as variables or explanations (Zehfuss 2001; 336). As outlined by Yee (1996), ideas are usually only “one of many probable and partial causes of policies. Moreover, since ideation and policy are both differentiated, seeking their connections across their differentiations become difficult and even more complex” (p. 70). More fundamentally, reflectivists asserted that “the material world that exists cannot be understood without shared intersubjective frameworks (language, social practices, codes, symbols, etc.) that offer an agreed base for the interpretation and explanation of ‘reality,'” (Tonra. 2006: ch. 1).

Some scholars of ideas sought to bridge the rationalist-reflectivist epistemological divide. Parsons (2003) aimed to demonstrate the role of ideas as causal variables, by demonstrating how a French elite conception of European integration - the Community model - came to shape the European institutions decisively in the period of 1947 – 1997. This outcome could not be explained by reference only to material factors forming “objective interests.” Parson’s theoretical proposition was that in settings where ideas strongly cross-cut lines of shared material interests, we can clearly isolate individuals’ beliefs from objective pressures, thus demonstrating the autonomous effects of ideas (Ibid). But the approach restricts examination of the role of ideas to a small universe of demonstrable cases and precludes an examination of ideas in scenarios where material conditions and patterns of beliefs are not so fortuitously arranged.
More significantly, the price of Parsons’ entry into rationalist terms of explanation was sacrificing the crucial constructivist assumption that the meanings actors attribute to material interests are socially constructed and culturally specific. While there may be a reality of subjects and objects existing outside of socially constructed ideas, it is only through shared intersubjective understandings that subjects, objects and concepts come to be imbued with meaning. This dissertation integrates this assumption in what is best described as a “thin constructivist” epistemological approach, which foregrounds the role of ideas while seeking traditional laws of social reality (Checkel 2004, Wendt 1999). Arising from the acknowledgement that intersubjective ideas shape policymakers’ conceptions of their interests, thus shaping their actions, our objective is to understand how ideas about European security action, conveyed through competing elite discourses, come to gain acceptance as reasonable, or even common sense, explanations for complex aspects for the EU’s behaviour. This approach assumes there are multiple potential competing ideas that simplify the complexity and contested nature of the EU as a security actor, each of them vying to make easily understandable what is essentially a dynamic and evolving object.

The previous sections have traced the debate among scholars of international politics about the role of ideas in shaping policy; from structural theorists bracketing rationality, sub-state policy dynamics and the socially constructed nature of interests to thin constructivist research that has sought to carve out a dialogue with traditional IR approaches on the how ideas and identities can shape policymaking. The following section will outline the theoretical approach derived from these assumptions, outlining a model that acknowledges the role of discourse – as distinct from other forms of ideas - in creating intersubjective meanings, while examining why certain ideas succeed and how they can explain policy outcomes within methodological constraints.
**Embracing meaning: neglecting causation?**

While some scholars sought to examine the influence of ideas through institutions (Sikkink 1999, Goldstein 1993, Hall 1986) and others sought to explore the role of experts as bearers of ideas (Haas 1992), these approaches tend to obscure analysis of the ideas themselves by focusing on institutional context and political conditions. If, as Hall argues, institutions of this kind are “critical mediating variables” while the ideas themselves are “the ultimate motors of political action,” then a theoretical focus on the ideas – as expressed through discourse – can enhance the institutional approach (Hall 1992, 109). An approach that focuses on patterns of ideas as discourse offers the prospect of greater insight into the nature, form and discursive processes of the ideas themselves and not other intervening variables. These observations underpin the theoretical approach of this thesis, which seeks to examine the competition of elite ideas in discourse on the nature of the EU as a security actor. The field of discourse analysis is wide and extends across differing epistemological positions. This section will outline the theoretical assumptions made in this dissertation, distinguishing the theoretical approach selected – a discursive institutionalist approach rooted in a thin constructivist framework – from other discourse theories.

For postmodernists, who emphasise the linguistic construction of reality, language is seen not as a property concept that acts as a tool of a given subject or a constraint on him, but rather “a medium through which the social identity of the subject is made possible” (George and Campbell 1990, 2850). This Foucauldian approach sees discourse as not merely a collection of signs and identifiers but rather as a practice that systematically forms social subjects and their related objects. The approach sprung from the work of French structural linguist Ferdinand de Saussure’s relational theory of language, which posited that language formed a system of relational differences in which a word’s

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24 The term postmodernist is used alongside “poststructuralist”, “critical constructivist” and “thin constructivist” in this chapter. Despite nuanced differences, the terms refer to scholars adopting broadly similar epistemological and ontological standpoints which are discussed at length in the section above.
meaning was not derived from an underlying object (the signified) but by where it was situated within a networked structure of language (Saussure, 1983). Post-structuralists developed these insights by emphasising that these meanings are never permanent or fully structured, but are rather open to constant challenge and intervention. Constructivists – both critical and conventional - attend to how discourses perform numerous functions that give meaning to the way people understand and explain reality. Discourses create boundaries between what is constructed is “real” and “that which, by discursive definition, does not correspond with reality,” (George 1994, 29-30). In particular, poststructuralist discourse analysts seek to unveil the role of hegemonic discourses in establishing “regimes of truth,” that distinguish between truth and falsehood and between reality and nonsense. While post-structuralist or “thick constructivists” and middle-ground “thin” reflectivists share the ontological assumption that our reality is socially constructed, post-structuralism rejects attempts at causal or even “quasi-causal” epistemology, in the absence of an objective external reality against which propositions can be tested. For post-structuralists, there is no reality outside of words, against which theories can be tested.

The post-structuralists’ focus on understanding rather than explaining led many scholars to avoid causal explanations, instead embracing causal indeterminacy and the ambiguity of interpretations. For these scholars, a search for causation is a misguided quest for connections in a world where causation is indeterminate, impermanent and intangible. And yet, acknowledging that objects and policies are imbued with meaning that is outside material form, and that these ideational processes thus play an important role in guiding actions, need not lead us to dismiss all explanatory models of policymaking.
A plausible method for investigating the role of ideas in shaping policy

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences”

- Thomas, D. and Thomas, W. “Thomas Theorem” (1928)

If, at one extreme of this debate, we place behaviouralists such as Parsons (2003), who seek to demonstrate the causal effects of ideas by using semi-controlled experiments within circumscribed contexts and at the other end we place post-modernists, who reject a causal focus entirely, are there any prospects for combining explanatory models with an appreciation of the role of ideational factors in policymaking? This dissertation adopts a pragmatic approach, which rejects the sharp dichotomy between explaining and understanding, instead adopting a framework exploring how ideas and beliefs come to be established as important factors and then shape policy outcomes in discernible ways. Such an approach can be both theoretically coherent and methodologically self-aware.

This thin constructivist approach rejects the anti-positivist epistemology of post-structuralism and seeks to specify a set of conditions under which one can expect to see one pattern of discourse or another. It assumes a significant and observable connection between ideas and action, namely that by understanding the meaning subjects ascribe to objects, or in our case, actors ascribe to the behaviour of the EU, we can approach a better framework for understanding why certain policy responses become more or less plausible, acceptable or valid at certain points in time. Understanding meanings can help explain actions because “interpretations capture states of the world that can function as causal conditions and therefore interpretations can serve as the basis for explanations” (Little 1991, 74) As Larsen (2004) argues: narratives which embody ideas about the identities of others “privilege certain modes of interpreting the behaviour of
Others and policy responses.” Adopting these observations as fundamental assumptions allows us to analyse patterns of discourse as “warranting conditions” for particular policy choices.

This middle-ground approach is an appeal to dialogue between rationalists and reflectivists: neither adopting the positivist presumption that world politics is homogenous enough that universally generalizable rules can be generated in theory, but also rejecting the poststructuralist position that “world politics is so heterogeneous that we should presume to look for only the unique and the differentiating,” (Hopf, 1998: 199). Scholars can acknowledge semantic instability, the multiple and uncertain nature of causation and the indeterminacy of intentional action, while at the same time seeking to demonstrate, within appropriate methodological boundaries, the manner in which ideas come to be accepted and cases where this process shaped outcomes. The concept of “quasi-causal” explanations is an appeal to a shared dialogue between the differing traditions outlined on the role of ideas, recognising that “interpretive indeterminacy can be subordinated to the reasoned assessment of indeterminate causal effects within specified parameters.” (Yee, 103)

Of course, this approach is not methodologically “perfect,” in a positivist sense – it does not meet Parson’s standard for demonstrating an ideational causal effect that cross-cuts “objective” interests. It is a hermeneutic epistemological approach, based on relativist ontological grounds. But it can allow us to show how intersubjective meanings firstly come to be established and then “quasi-causally affect certain actions” by widening or narrowing the envelope of socially acceptable actions. The approach fits within a conventional constructivist middle ground that seeks out how shared understandings within “communities of intersubjectivity,” yield “predictable and replicable patterns of action within a specific context,” (Hopf, 1998: 200). A methodologically self-aware approach in this vein aims therefore, not to derive definitive causal explanations for behaviour but rather to “evaluate the plausibility of the view that ideas matter for policy,” (Yee 1997, 29).
This thesis pursues an analysis that disaggregates the state, identifies significant domestic-level actors and analyses how their beliefs, intentions and language are expressed within a competitive discursive environment. Specifically, the unit of analysis is the discourse of a foreign policy élite on the EU’s role and the factors operating thereon. Once we have analysed that discourse, observing the cognitive and normative ideas that channel political action in particular ways, the task is to analyse why certain narratives came to dominate within that discursive arena. The next section (3.2) will outline how the theoretical considerations discussed so far will be integrated within a workable approach to discourse analysis.

### 3.2 A framework for analysing discourse

This dissertation applies a discursive institutionalist approach in line with the ontological and epistemological positions outlined in the preceding sections. Schmidt’s approach defines discourse as “the interactive process of conveying ideas,” (2008, 303). Additionally, discourse is analysed not merely as ideas in text (what is said) but also context (where, when, how and why it is said). Schmidt's approach presents several advantages over analysts who examine ideas in isolation, chiefly that it makes explicit the interactive processes of discourse that are vital to the generation, discussion and competition of those ideas (Ibid, 306). The approach also clearly conceptualises differing types of ideas (cognitive, normative), forms of ideas (narratives, myths, memories, etc.) and audiences or contexts (coordinative discourse, communicative discourse) (Ibid).

Adopting this framework, with some modifications, allows us to assess discursive models that explain why some ideas, conveyed through narratives, thrive and others disappear. It also means we can distinguish between the different purposes and contexts for discursive acts – in particular
“communicative discourse” which political actors use to convince the public of the necessity and appropriateness of policies, and “coordinative discourse” used between policy actors in the policy development process (Ibid, 310). Adopting this approach, which analyses the form and type of ideas, as well as the discursive process and context, provides us with conceptual clarity and allows us to explore how “institutionalized structures of meaning ... channel political thought and action in certain directions,” (Connolly, 1983).

This approach strips discourse of its post-modernist baggage, analysing it directly as the way people talk about ideas, paying close attention to the interactive processes by which they convey them. It also permits us to approach Yee’s challenge of examining how the terms of particular discourses render certain actions plausible or implausible, appropriate or inappropriate and in that sense, assess how intersubjective meanings “quasi- causally” affect certain actions (Yee, 1997, 97).

**Fig 3.1: Working definitions**

**Discourse:** The interactive process of conveying ideas, including the content, context, structure and agency for discursive action. (Schmidt 2008, 303).

**Narrative:** Stories that order a given set of phenomena into structured, rational and internally consistent accounts of reality.

**The transmission of ideas through narratives**

So how are substantive ideas about actors such as the EU successfully conveyed in discourse? Narratives – or stories - can shape our understanding of the world around us by simplifying what are otherwise complex and nuanced phenomena; creating codes of language that as act as heuristics, or shorthand, for shared ideas about reality, which are inter-subjectively created and re-created.
Observing discourse as the process through which ideas are conveyed, we can identify four functions of narratives as outlined by Bach, providing us with a useful schema for understanding this process. The functions are as follows: To order, to delimit, to perpetuate and to challenge (Bach 1999, quoted in Tonra, 2007).

Firstly, narratives order the world by presenting us with “cognitive ideas” that tell us “what is and what to do,” (Schmidt 2008, 307). These types of ideas – also described as frames - act as templates for understanding a multitude of phenomena and actors. Cognitive ideas order and explain phenomena, and as time goes on, successful narratives incorporate and assimilate new information into these frames. The diversity of Europe and the complexity of its institutional structure are expressed in numerous frames, which we will seek to examine in later chapters.

Secondly, narratives delimit, by adjudicating between many competing understandings or reports of events or facts and producing a manageable set of understandable stories. These stories assert objectivity or “truth claims” (Tonra, 2007), which claim to present reality as it is “in fact”. These discursive constructions assert authoritative interpretations as “truth” or “common sense” and maintain those understandings through discursive practices. Narratives “mark out the range of legitimate possibilities” for actors (Idem, p.10) and in policy settings, they can produce “normative frames” attaching values to policy action and legitimating political programs by reference to their appropriateness (see March & Olsen 1989). In this vein, the approach borrows from earlier works in sociological institutionalism, which addressed cognitive scripts and moral templates that “provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947).

Thirdly, narratives have a self-perpetuating function. Coherent narratives seek discursive dominance through being instantiated or embedded successfully, perhaps even becoming elements of dominant ideologies or identities. This is when a narrative achieves something close to acceptance as “common sense”.

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This process is not static however. Narratives are constructed in inherently social processes, which leave open the possibility for the rise of competing narratives. The process is an ongoing one, where actors – for our purposes, the foreign policy community – employ discursive practices that reinforce, recreate, or in the case of our fourth function: challenge for discursive supremacy.

Fig 3.2: Defining types of ideas.

**Cognitive ideas:** “provide the recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and programs by speaking to their interest-based logic and necessity”

**Normative ideas:** “attach values to political action and serve to legitimate the policies in a program through reference to their appropriateness.”

Source: (Schmidt 2002, ch. 5)

**Agents and Structures**

A key innovation of Schmidt’s approach is to view the institutions of discursive institutionalism not as external rule-following structures but rather as simultaneously *structures* and *constructs* internal to agents. This approach challenges the premise of the “old institutionalisms”; historical institutionalism, rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, that institutions are mostly in stable equilibria. Whereas sociological institutionalists, for instance, describe all-encompassing cultural norms as fixed and unmoving, discursive institutionalism provides a theory of dynamic change. By using their “background ideational abilities” within a given “meaning context” we can see how agents come to understand, and operate within discursive structures. Those structures channel behaviour in line with cognitive and normative frames embedded in narratives (see fig. 3.2). In this sense, the approach treats discourse in a similar fashion to the way sociological institutionalists view the constraining power of cultural and historical norms (Katzenstein, 1996). But agents may also
use their “foreground discursive abilities,” following a “logic of communication,” to challenge and shape narratives according to their preferences, thus explaining how these institutions change or persist. This purposeful behaviour resembles what Habermas describes as “communicative action,” (1996). Thus, discursive institutionalism “simultaneously treats institutions as given (as the context within which agents think, speak, and act) and as contingent (as the results of agents’ thoughts, words, and actions,” (2008, 314). By treating institutions as simultaneously structures and constructs internal to agents, Schmidt’s approach offers a more dynamic and agent-centred approach to institutional change (2008; 304).

The US foreign policy community is engaged in ongoing discursive battles about the nature of the World and its actors. In fact, this community explicitly identifies itself as a group of ideologically diverse, critical analysts. A discursive institutionalist approach best allows us to explore how these agents use foreground discursive abilities to shape the institutions of discourse, reinforcing certain ideas about Europe and reforming others. It also allows to differentiate between different forms of discourse produced by these actors; expressing ideas in communicative and coordinative discourses (see fig 3.3). Our analysis will analyse the types of ideas expressed; both normative and cognitive. It will also examine the discursive strategies of actors seeking to convey ideas by focusing on the construction of imagery, allegory and rhetorical structures. In doing so, the dissertation relies on the author’s interpretive hermeneutic judgments, made within transparent methodological procedures, which will be outlined further in chapter 4.
### Fig 3.3: Defining forms of discourse

**Coordinative discourse:** The process in which policymakers engage in the creation, elaboration and justification of policy ideas.

**Communicative discourse:** The process in which political actors engage in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public.

*Source:* (Schmidt 2002, ch. 5)

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By its nature, an analysis of discourse within the US foreign policy community - an ideologically and institutionally heterogeneous group – provides a lively arena for observing discursive competition on the nature of the EU. The “marketplace of ideas” should offer the discourse analyst a rich and varied set of perceptions of most foreign actors, but especially so in the EU’s case, a much-contested concept (Holland and Chalaban 2010, Manners and Whitman 2010, 232). The next section will lay out the modifications which will be made to the discursive institutionalist approach, which address criticisms that mechanisms of institutional change are underspecified by Schmidt and propose a model for explaining how micro-level agent actions lead to macro-level institutional change.

### 3.3 A Model for Understanding Discursive Change

We have sketched out a picture so far which paints a dynamic relationship between narratives and ideas. Certain cognitive and normative ideas become expressed through narratives, which then can shape the conduct of actors by promoting ideas and ways of understanding the World. The discursive institutionalist framework provides a dynamic model of structural change, owing
to the discursive actions of purposeful agents. But scholars have noted that the
precise ways in which discourses become established, persist and are then
reshaped remains underspecified in Schmidt’s framework. Panizza and Miorelli
(2013) have called for an examination of the intervening steps that connect
agent-level action and institutional change, and more broadly, the power
relations at work in this action. How can we understand how a particular
narrative succeeds where others fail, for instance? Why do actors seek discursive
change and what power resources do they marshal when exercising their
foreground discursive abilities? Discourse theory tells us that successful
narratives (i.e., those that can become instantiated or accepted as common
knowledge) must possess a number of basic qualities to persist (Milliken,
1999)25. But these accounts merely outline the general qualities of sticky
narratives; they neglect explanations of discursive change. How does a particular
narrative among many others – all possessing the same structural qualities –
come to establish itself as accepted wisdom?

While Schmidt’s approach argues that agents may shape discursive structures by
engaging their foreground discursive abilities, the processes by which these
individual-level acts come to shape the pattern of discourse in a wider context
remains an unsolved puzzle. How exactly do micro-level discursive actions
produce macro-level institutional change? This gap requires a theoretical bridge
connecting agent-level activity to structural transformation. This dissertation
seeks to enhance the discursive institutionalist approach by specifying processes
by which agents, US foreign policy analysts and officials, re-shape discursive
structures within a competitive discursive arena.

25 They must simplify a large number of phenomena to produce an easily communicated and
understood story. This story must allow for new events and data to be integrated into the
explanatory framework.
**Purposeful Domestic Discursive Competition**

This dissertation suggests that foreign policy discourse is a product of the competition between elite factions for dominance. According to this perspective, ideological and/or political actors seek to acquire influence in the foreign policy system, through acquiring a direct role in official policymaking, or a position of institutional influence in a think tank with a significant mix of scholarly prestige, financial resources and access to the means of publicity. Having acquired influence of this kind, elite actors promote ideas and perceptions of the international system, its actors and phenomena in line with their political or ideological preferences. As Checkel (2004) argues, the discourse of political elites at the government level matters most, because their ideas are articulated in authoritative institutional settings with strong persuasive power (240). But so too, does the discourse of major think tanks who exercise differing forms of scholarly and political authority in the policy-making system (Medvetz, 2012).

According this competitive view, normative structures – narratives about the nature and desirability of EU action - are themselves being reshaped by the activities of purposeful agents, using their foreground discursive abilities (Schmidt 2008, Checkel 1998, 341). This can happen in a top-down fashion: when leaders or elites utilize their position and re-shape norms or identities. This is more likely to succeed in the absence of public pressure or countervailing domestic forces. It is also possible that certain ideas about external actors could make their way into official discourse from the bottom up: domestic pressure groups could exercise influence on elites to change policy in accordance with these ideas (Sikkink 1999). As will be discussed in section 3.4 however, that is unlikely in matters of foreign policy and particularly when it comes to Europe. More plausibly, elites that establish an influential discursive position by leveraging expertise, resources and access to decision-makers can act as effective and purposeful agents in discursive change (see section 3.4).

It should be acknowledged that proposing a domestic agent-centred model of discourse construction is not an uncontroversial move. For much of the early years of Constructivism, scholars pursued mostly structure-centred approaches
to idea construction, this despite their acknowledgement that agent and structure are mutually constituted. Influential social constructivists – in particular Wendt – explicitly bracket individual agency and domestic factors, leading to a notable gap in Wendtian scholarship (1999).

For our purposes, we can assume that individuals or sub-groups within the foreign policy community act as “belief entrepreneurs”, and motivated by political ideology, affiliation or bureaucratic position, they advocate ideas about Europe, articulated as part of a narrative.\(^{26}\) All of our actors are associated with organizations that form part of the foreign policy establishment, either official or unofficial, and this feature of the community turns what might otherwise be inconsequential individual agents, into larger, more powerful organised sub-groups. Actors in think tanks stake a claim to expertise and sophisticated understandings of complex issues, and use privileged access to foreign policy makers and a toolkit of resources to advance proposals. Thus it seems reasonable to expect that the tools identified by Sikkink and Finnemore might be used by our sources to promote certain ideas about Europe. The expectation is that if any of these particular sub-groups advocate distinct narratives about Europe’s role, then coding the discursive findings for ideology, political affiliation or bureaucratic position should reveal this. Our first examination of the pattern of discourse on the EU will therefore develop a model of domestic political contestation that – if reflected in competing narratives – would provide support for the purposeful discursive competition theory.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) It should be noted that the motivations and preferences of the elite sub-groups examined in this thesis are assumed to derive from their institutional or ideological position as determined by studies on ideology and policy discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. The thesis does not undertake a profiling of the preferences of sub-group actors beyond coding for institution and ideological position. To examine more deeply the competing financial, political and ideological forces at work within each of the relevant think tanks, for example, would require deep investigation of the structures and links of each organization to other political actors and groupings, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus is instead on the content of discourse – ideas – as transparent carriers of preferences and beliefs, and the way in which these ideas are expressed in competing narratives.

\(^{27}\) The pattern of discourse will be discovered employing a qualitative content analysis approach which is explained further in the Methodology chapter of this thesis. At this point, it is merely relevant to note that texts produced by the US foreign policy community on the subject of the EU’s role in global politics will be sampled and analysed to identify key themes and narratives. The texts will be coded according to the following characteristics: Official actor, Unofficial actor, political affiliation, presidential administration, ideological position (in the case of think tanks)
3.4 Conceptualising the US foreign policy elite

This dissertation consists of a domestic level analysis of the factors influencing foreign policy discourse. Yet adopting a focus on the role of ideas and discourse within the domestic sphere is but a starting point. This section builds on the historical evidence presented in the preceding chapter, which illustrated the role of elite groups in shaping US policy towards European integration in the post-war period. The section justifies the dissertation's focus on the foreign policy community, as opposed to other domestic level actors. It specifies the particular elite grouping analysed in the dissertation, arising from a critical assessment of literature on domestic influences on foreign policy. As shown in Fig 3.1, we are faced with a many-layered political community in the United States, presenting us with choices as to which domestic actors are most significant for our purposes. Whose ideas matter? And in which domestic context? This section critically assesses the debate on the relative influence of elites on US policy towards European integration as compared with the impact of mass opinion. The section compares the claims to influence from scholars on both sides of the argument and demonstrates that a narrow elite model of foreign policy influence has greater plausibility in foreign policy matters in general and with regards to EU-US relations in particular. In summation, elites matter more than the public and a narrow elite matters for foreign policy. The arguments in this section therefore, provide the guiding assumption for our qualitative in-depth analysis of the factors shaping US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor.
The Case for Public Opinion

Scholars have long debated the relative influence of mass opinion ideas on foreign policy outcomes, as compared to that of individual decision makers, bureaucracies, elites and parties. In a transatlantic relations context, several scholars identify mass public opinion trends as important drivers of policy outcomes (Asmus, Everts and Isernia 2004). For years, scholars at the German

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Marshall Fund have conducted annual opinion surveys of US public views on European issues and vice versa (Transatlantic Trends 2003 - 2012, German Marshall Fund). These studies focus primarily on opinion poll findings on topics such as transatlantic security, NATO and the rise of other powers and present these findings as “tools” to assist not only analysts but also decision makers in making foreign policy choices:

*The data provided by the surveys have become an invaluable tool for policymakers, the media, think tanks, and academics who have an impact on foreign policy decisions within their respective countries.*

- Craig Kennedy, Foreword “Transatlantic Trends 2012”.

Since 1974, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has conducted regular in-depth public opinion surveys on matters in order to ”provide insights into the current and long-term foreign policy attitudes of the American public on a wide range of global topics” (2002). Works such as “Transatlantic Trends” offer empirical findings from professionally conducted opinion poll research, yet the authors of these reports and their associated commentaries (see Asmus, Everts and Isernia 2004) implicitly take a theoretical position in the debate about the determinants of US foreign policy towards Europe. These reports suggest that public opinion, indirectly at least, shapes foreign policy choices in significant ways by either being of interest to policymakers in their decision calculations, by shaping the contours of the debate or by determining the outcome of elections in which the candidates differ markedly on their approach to European questions. In doing so, such works place themselves within the much wider debate on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy in the United States (Holsti 1996, Sobel 2001). The question is whether it is the views of the public that should be the focus of transatlantic analysts, or whether elites and decision makers are more significant factors in shaping policy outcomes.
Critiquing the assumption of coherent foreign policy preferences in public opinion

Analytically prior to the claim that public opinion shapes foreign policy is the hypothesis that the public can actually form coherent opinions on foreign policy questions. Public opinion studies on foreign policy questions from the 1960s onwards focussed on understanding whether mass opinion beliefs on foreign policy questions aligned with domestic ideological cleavages (Campbell et al, 1964). For these scholars, the question was whether the general public thought about foreign and domestic policy choices in consistent ways and whether ideology determined a larger belief structure. Converse was as withering about the consistency of mass opinion belief structures as he was about the level of knowledge among his subjects, finding no coherent pattern. Campbell and his colleagues (1964: 113) reported: "Across our sample as a whole in 1956 there was no relationship between scale positions of individuals on the domestic and foreign attitudinal dimensions." Partisanship characterized responses to domestic issues but not to foreign policy issues. Key (1961: 158) uncovered a similar finding.

Yet it can be argued that such studies were undertaken in an era of relative calm prior to the Vietnam War, when foreign policy questions were of low salience to the public and politicians alike. Consensus on foreign policy matters was seen as the norm as politics stopped at the water’s edge (Ruggie, 1996). Some analysts found that, beginning with the Johnson-Goldwater election campaign of 1964, ideological consistency among the public did in fact increase (Nie and Anderson, 1974; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). However, aside from noted foreign policy controversies such as the Vietnam War and more recently the 9/11 attacks and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the public rarely pay focussed attention to more quotidian matters of foreign policy. This low level of interest means that executive responsiveness to public opinion on foreign policy matters in general is, unsurprisingly, rather low. Among all policy domains, foreign policy is one of the areas in which public opinion is least well-formed and has least influence on
policy decisions. As Canes-Wrone and Shott note in their study in presidential responsiveness to public opinion:

_**On those matters on which citizens are less likely to be informed or have stable preferences, like foreign policy, presidents are much more willing to be out of step with public opinion.**_


Scholarship has moved on since the early polling days of Converse’s study in 1964 and research acknowledges differences between public opinion on general foreign policy matters and the more salient “crisis” foreign policy questions – which elicit more engagement from the public (Baum and Potter, 2008: 44). Perhaps the period of highest salience for transatlantic relations was in the immediate wake of the invasion of Iraq when surveys detected significant opposition in many European countries to US leadership and a frustration in some US quarters at Franco-German obstruction at the UN. In that year, the Transatlantic Trends study developed a measure of “Atlanticism”: “the desire on either side of the Atlantic to continue close cooperation and work together through institutions like NATO, the U.S.- EU relationship or the United Nations as opposed to seeking greater autonomy to go separate ways” (Transatlantic Trends, 2004). The study’s findings presented support for the argument that the general public had developed polarized views on questions of cooperation and furthermore, that these aligned with deeper ideological cleavages. Atlanticism was stronger among centre-left and Democrat voters. Republicans were more likely to be “hawks”, favouring unilateral military interventions and markedly less Atlanticist. It is important to bear in mind the context for this pattern of public opinion; a post-invasion election year, in a period of unprecedented polarization of public opinion and extremely salient and divergent foreign policy choices. Even the report’s authors acknowledge that such strong differences in opinion on the question of Europe were unprecedented: “While partisan foreign policy differences are certainly not new in the United States, policy toward
Europe has been an area that has historically enjoyed wide bipartisan support” (Ibid; 8).

Yet even if significant cleavages form among the general public on questions of transatlantic politics, are these significant variables in determining policy outcomes? Recent work on the determinants of US economic policymaking examined a unique data set measuring influence variables for 1,779 policy issues, finding little or no impact for mass opinion: “Economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.” (Gilens and Page, 2014: 564). This finding poses a serious challenge to assessments of public opinion as an influence in any policy field, but the link is significantly more problematic in the case of foreign policy. Several structural factors operate to limit the influence of public opinion in determining foreign policy outcomes, firstly; the public’s interest in and access to information on foreign policy and secondly; the limited channels of influence the public holds over policymakers. Hoese and Oppermann’s (2007) principal-agent model suggests that public opinion can never be a substantial driver of US policy towards the EU, given the informational costs to voters to inform themselves and the lack of identifiable cleavages between political parties on most transatlantic matters. Empirical studies of the relative influence of the public on national security choices as compared with that of elites also bear this out, as Flynn and Rattinger note:

*Restrictions on the range of national security options open to decision makers are far more strongly imposed by the positions taken and articulated by political and social elites and counter-elites than by public opinion at large. In terms of popular acceptance, the decision latitude of policy makers still appears to be rather wide.*

(1985; 172)
Elite Manipulation of Public Opinion

To some degree, denying any form of influence for public opinion over policy towards Europe appears simplistic. Public opinion scholarship has engaged with cognitive psychology studies to identify points at which foreign policy issues become salient to voters, yet even still, these issues are always mediated by third parties. The public must engage with these questions as they are mediated by news outlets, expert commentators and the political community itself (Druckman, 2001). Allowing for limited influence, on high salience issues, during periods of high public interest (on matters of war, for instance) the causal link therefore remains complicated by multiple intervening variables. Despite efforts to find a positive relationship between public sentiment and foreign policy, scholars struggle to convincingly present limited correlations as evidence that opinion is guiding policy and not vice versa. Shapiro and Page (1988) reported that public opinion reacts to events “as these matters have been reported and interpreted by the mass media and by policy makers and other elites”. Research since has bolstered the position that opinion is guided more by foreign policy leadership than vice versa, a particularly well documented version of this phenomenon being the “rally around the flag effect”, where public support for military interventions spikes after the operations have been launched (Baum and Potter, 2008: 45). Only after foreign policy choices have been presented by elites, via the transmission belt of the media can the public reach formed opinions on such questions. Opinion leadership of this kind conforms with studies of “cue-taking,”: when citizens use the endorsements of like-minded political elites as “cognitive shortcuts” in reaching their political choices (Lupia 2000).

Therefore, given the complexity of the interplay between elite “framing” and public opinion and the lack of empirical evidence for public sentiment shaping outcomes in matters of transatlantic relations, an elite-focussed approach offers us a number of advantages. Firstly, elite opinions – sourced from elite texts or interviews – offer a significantly more rich and substantial body of ideas expressed through discourse than scant public opinion data. Secondly, in so far as omitting public opinion data sacrifices interesting but not analytically-
required data from our studies of foreign policy discourse, this is ameliorated by the fact that most scholarship accepts that public opinion is led by elite discourse and the presentation of issues more than any other identified factor (Druckman, 2001). In other words, elite discourse shapes views both upwards (to decision makers) and downwards (to the public), meaning that little is lost by omitting what modest data exists on mass public attitudes in this area.

Choosing an “elite group” with a plausible claim to influence

The vast literature on the effects of public opinion on foreign policy is not matched in volume by studies on elite foreign policy influence. For many reasons, particularly the relative difficulty and costs in sampling attitudes among a small, select group of experts, there is a dearth of in-depth qualitative research on the nature of elite opinion on foreign policy. Nor have scholars systematically explored how the discourse of these elites shapes transatlantic relations:

Our understanding of the precise contours and cleavages in contemporary American elite attitudes toward foreign policy is limited. Distinguishing among groups of elite opinion in America and its substantive effects on foreign policy and policy-making continues to be an unfinished quest.

- Rosati and Creed (1997), pp. 583-623

Holsti and Rosenau’s (1996) work over 15 years presented the first comprehensive, empirically-based study of US foreign policy beliefs among elites since the Vietnam War. Their findings on elite belief structure were based questionnaires mailed every four years to a sample of opinion leaders.29 They reported that the Vietnam War had produced three major cleavages, or schools

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29 The Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) has conducted nationwide surveys of American opinion leaders by means of a mailed questionnaire every four years since 1976 – 1996 (See also Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey – public opinion survey every 2 years). The sample for each survey, represents leaders in a wide range of occupations including politics, business, the military, the media, the State Department and Foreign Service, labor unions, churches, academia, law, and health care. Sample is 4000, response rate is typically 58%.
of thought, in the foreign policy beliefs of America’s leaders: Cold War internationalism, post-Cold War internationalism, and semi-isolationism. They referred to this as the three-headed eagle. After a time, Holsti and Rosenau extended this to become a 4-headed eagle, noting a split in the Cold War Internationalist group: between unilateralists and multilateralists (Ibid). Unfortunately, the breadth of issues covered allowed only one question to be posed that might relate to Europe: “Should America’s allies assume a greater burden for their own defence?” All four groups produced strong majorities in favour of the proposition, suggesting no cleavages in opinion at all on the question. The study therefore leaves us no better informed as to how the US foreign policy elite varies in its attitudes towards European security integration.

There are also other limitations with Holsti and Rosenau’s approach. The three or four headed typology results from an a priori classification of beliefs, meaning that subjects were allotted into pre-determined groups using survey responses. This approach eliminated the possibility of alternative schools of thought before the surveys have even been completed and obscures nuance and difference. The approach groups together actors which on a superficial level may hold the same beliefs in relation to an abstract question but this is no guarantee that they would recommend the same or even similar policy responses to a particular policy problem. Finally, the study’s conceptualisation of elite is so wide as to suggest that the respondents are merely a cross section of prominent community members: including church and hospital leaders for instance. This may be considered a form of elite but it’s unclear what such a broad conception of elite offers us over a scientific opinion sample of the public at large.

By contrast, Rosati and Creed (1997) rely on a content analysis of foreign policy journals and national journals of American opinion as the basis for capturing the diversity and complexity of elite beliefs in U.S. foreign policy. This qualitative method enables the authors to engage with complex policy presentations and analyses instead of coding for basic binary policy propositions using a priori classifications of ideology. Rosati and Creed demonstrate the methodological value of opinion journals as the sources for tapping into elite opinion:
First, they are major outlets that American opinion leaders-practitioners, policy analysts, journalists, scholars, intellectuals, and the like rely on to communicate their point of view (see Rosenau, 1961). Second, they are the most common sources of information beyond the popular media (that is television, the newspaper, and maybe a newsweekly) to which the most politically attentive and active members of the elite are likely to turn (see Weiss, 1974; Zaller, 1992). Third, content analysis of the media, including national journals of opinion, is widely used for studying elite attitudes in such fields as comparative politics, sociology, and the study of communications.

- Rosati and Creed (1997; 590)

The authors report considerable support for the theory that the Cold War consensus had broken down but had no significant findings in relations to European security matters. Nevertheless, their study offers useful suggestions as to how we might apply a qualitative content analysis method of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor and furthermore, what sources are likely to provide us with the fullest data on elite foreign policy opinion.

**Elites in Historical Context**

Accepting the advantages of a qualitative study of elite opinion on transatlantic relations, how are we to proceed in identifying this elite and assessing its ideas regarding the EU? In spite of the absence of a qualitative opinion analysis study within a transatlantic context, historical studies of the impact of elites on transatlantic relations and European integration at specific points offer some guidance.
Maier provides a historical argument for the reasons behind the stability of the post-war liberal-economic model in Europe which is firmly in the corporatist elite school (1981: 327-352). Comparing structural economic, political and cultural factors, Maier concludes that the remarkable stability and growth of the post-war period can be explained by the genesis of a pluralist corporate elite comprising trade unions, state economic agencies and bureaucratized pressure groups in twentieth century America who sought to develop an integrated and productive European economy (Ibid: 351). Employing a narrower elite model, Hogan (1985; 44-72) identifies the consensus among American policy planners, as the key factor enabling the massive investment of the Marshall Plan to reshape and reform economic structures in Europe and pave the way for subsequent integration. Within a European context, Parsons (2003) adopts an elite ideational model, demonstrating that a small elite within the French Government was able to impose the “Community Method” of governance on the European integration project and that once implemented, this elite group’s particular governance ideas constrained their successors in the European Community. Parsons, Hogan and Maier do not deny the effects of structural trends in shaping the political forces of integration but rather they demonstrate how, within an envelope of possibilities, entrepreneurial groups and leaders may gain the autonomy to set the policy agenda around their own personal ideas, and to mobilize one of several potential coalitions behind them. Within this context, actors can select from a range of institutional and structural possibilities. How exactly they set the policy agenda through discourse, is the significant puzzle (Parsons 2003: 48).

Yet another group of scholars examined the close relations between European and American leaders as a form of “transnational elite” (Isaacson and Thomas 1986, Halberstam 1972, Schwabe 1999). These writers can be seen as refining the “Great Man Theory” of history (Carr, 1961), where leaders “get together” and through shared historical experience and repeated engagement come to a shared consensus and agenda. The elite transatlantic community has been portrayed as a group of influential actors with close personal and cultural connections to their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic (van der Pijl 1984; Roberts 2004,
Walt 1998). This approach owes much to Deutsch's notion of a security community; a group of elite-led states characterised by a sense of trust, common interests and association, that can achieve peaceful change though collective problem-solving (1957). Adler and Barnett developed the concept in line with the constructivist turn in International Relations, focusing on the ideational content of such groups: shared identities, values, meanings and interests, forged through reciprocal interaction (1998). Risse-Kappen employed the constructivist security community model to assess the remarkable development of NATO and its endurance in a post-Cold War context (1996), challenging structural theorists to explain the persistence of an alliance hitherto explained through structural balance-of-power arguments.

In spite of differences, all of the "elite" focussed works conclude that structural factors alone cannot explain the way in which European integration and transatlantic relations developed in the post-War era and that rather than mass public opinion shifts, economic interest or individual actions, it was the influence of groups of elite actors at pivotal moments that determined the course of integration. The historical studies and the scientific studies on elite opinion differ on three points however: Firstly, how wide should our definition of the "elite" be? Is it merely a group of influential executive actors; a transnational network of leaders, a community of policy experts, or a broader group of senior actors in business, the professions and politics? Secondly, what are the mechanisms by which such a group reaches, or fails to reach consensus? And finally, what are the means by which it exerts influence on policy choices?

A working conceptualisation of the elite

The elite community as conceptualised in this thesis comprises three distinct groups with plausible claims to influence over policymaking. Firstly, senior officials in the US government, specifically the White House and relevant departments (State, Homeland security) are included by virtue of the authoritative role they play in discourse arising from their institutional position. As Checkel (2004) states, political leaders are are the major agents and
interpreters of policy discourse, as they are embedded in institutional settings that are optimised for persuasion (p. 240). Secondly, where relevant for either case, public testimony by political representatives in the legislature was selected and coded. Although congressmen and senators are not officials, in the sense of representing the executive, their institutional position as members of the legislature grants them a platform allowing for authoritative, or at the least, influential contributions to policy discourse. Thirdly, in line with Rosati and Creed’s analysis (1997) of elite opinion, policy analysis texts produced by major think tanks play an important role in the analysis (p. 590). The following paragraphs will lay out the theoretical justification for their inclusion in the analysis.

Scholars have typically viewed foreign policy think tanks through the epistemic communities prism: “a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992: 3). However, the epistemic communities approach implies a level of shared expertise and assumptions that suggest a functional, technocratic consensus group. This understates the political and ideological diversity of the Washington think tank community and its evolution into a broad network of influential policy actors. It also simplifies the nature of “recognized expertise and competence” within this group, which is characterized by differing levels of qualifications, including self-credentialed “experts,” former policy practitioners, and academics from the university sector.

This thesis argues for a broader view of think tanks as ideologically diverse entrepreneurial institutions that seek to maximize influence, often in the service of competing political preferences. This view better allows us to analyse discursive acts and processes produced by these actors, not as merely the outcomes of differing methodological approaches to a supposed shared intellectual enterprise of developing policy “solutions,” but rather as part of a competition for discursive influence among competing elite sub-groups. In order to demonstrate the value of this approach, the following sections will briefly
review the evolution of the modern think tank, its power resources and its objectives, as understood by scholars of the field and by key figures in the community themselves.

**Taking think tanks as ideologically diverse and influential actors**

The term “think tank” entered the English language in 1958, according to the Oxford English dictionary, and was generally used to describe a privileged haven for intellectuals and technocrats, often referring to publicly-funded research institutes established in the mid-20th century (Medvetz 2012, 26). From the 1950s onwards, leading writers within the growing think tank community asserted a claim to sophisticated, specialist knowledge of the field of foreign policy analysis, and obtained an expert status and institutional position that allowed for privileged access to decision-makers and the foreign policy process generally (Hopf 1992, Foley 2008).

In the early days of the community, the field was dominated by publicly funded research institutes such as the RAND Corporation and the Brookings Institution, which often worked on outsourced public policy questions, including in the development of the Marshall Plan (see chapter 2 for further discussion). But the field expanded rapidly in subsequent decades, with the emergence of privately funded and politically linked research institutes. These new forms of analysts led to a view of the field as being populated by competing groups of “hacks” and “wonks.” Scholars noted that think tanks became increasingly activist-oriented from the 1970s onwards: deepening public communication efforts in an attempt to influence ideas from top-down as well as from bottom up (Medvetz 2012, 29). Research on the individuals who founded influential think tanks highlights their motivations to leverage self-credentialed expertise to influence key political actors and policy discourse more broadly. Paul Weyrich, a co-founder of the Heritage Foundation described his vision of the influential conservative think tank thus:
What was needed was an outside operation that could provide timely information to members of Congress from a principled perspective [and] supply witnesses for hearings and experts to privately brief senators and congressmen.

– Paul Weyrich, quoted in Medvetz, 2012; 102.

New think tanks like Heritage prompted an “opening out” by traditional outlets, who sought to broaden the scope of their activities to maximize policy impact. All think tanks seek to maximize political access, although they seek differing forms of access and marshal different strategies and forms of capital to achieve that aim. Nowadays in the US context, the term encompasses a broad range of policy-focused actors, differentiated by logics of academic, political, economic and media objectives. As Medvetz (2012) argues, think tanks in Washington occupy a “liminal structural position,” between universities, the media commentariat, lobby groups, and business and political interests and do so by

Gathering and juggling various forms of capital acquired from different arenas: scholarly prestige and credentials, competence in specifically political forms of expression, money and fundraising ability, quasi-entrepreneurial styles, and access to the means of publicity, (46).

These think tanks are often early predictors of policy developments and articulate a synthesis of public and private debates. They occupy a position of significant influence and authority within the policy community and are said to perform “the deepest and most critical thinking within the policy-planning network,” (Domhoff 2006; 87). The ideological bent of some of these actors can also flesh out the parameters of the discourse. Indeed, political factions within the US Foreign Policy process have often produced their arguments and hypotheses in think-tank settings. Arguably, these sources are a more frank and open articulation of US perceptions on foreign and security matters than public comments made by officials. Policy analysis publications are themselves designed with a view to influencing these other actors, contextualizing myriad complex phenomena and events and presenting them in easily understood analyses supporting policy proposals. Including these actors within our analysis acknowledges their increasingly influential role as sometimes partisan or
ideological opinion shapers within the political class and suppliers of media soundbytes, statistics and arguments, in the present-day era of "organised punditry" (Jacobs and Townsley 2011).

Think tank analysts also influence the process by moving into and out of the official organs of policy making. The movement of personnel between think tanks and White House Administrations also appears to be remarkably fluid, in both directions. At least 18 of the authors sourced in the non-government group held, or went on to hold positions at the highest levels in the State Department, the cabinet and the President’s staff. 62.5 per cent of policy experts in Washington D.C. think tanks reported previous state employment of some kind. These data indicate several points. Firstly, that the sources selected were influential and highly regarded contributors to policy discourse. Secondly, think tank analysts who were formerly involved at senior level in the conduct of US foreign policy had comparable training and access to information as their colleagues who remained in official positions, thus giving them a privileged access to information. Finally, this “revolving door” phenomenon suggests that the think-tank community itself is one of the leading public forums, if not the pre-eminent one, for “expert” foreign policy discourse.

The preceding sections have established a working definition for the US foreign policy community, comprising retired and serving official personnel in relevant departments, political actors and analysts from the think tank community. The chapter argued for an approach to think tanks that moved beyond the standard epistemic communities approach to analyse the think tank community as a ideologically heterogeneous group of actors deploying sophisticated skills and forms of capital (intellectual, political, financial, media) to maximize political access and influence over foreign policy discourse more broadly (Medvetz, 2012).

30 48.9% of policy experts reported past or present employment in federal or international govt while 62.5% in some form of state employment (Medvetz 2012, 238)
This group excludes the wider elite conceptualization used in other elite studies (medical professionals, clergy, etc.) as these actors cannot claim to have a primary professional interest in foreign policy. The section also introduced the think tank dimension of the community, justifying the inclusion of these non-official analysts by analysing the secondary literature on think tank influence in Washington. The specific process for selecting analysts and think tanks that are ideologically representative and institutionally significant will be outlined in greater detail in chapter 4.

Conclusions

This chapter reviewed the debate over the role of ideas in international relations scholarship, highlighting how structuralist models treat interests and ideas as exogenously given. In doing so, the analysis critiqued mainstream approaches that bracket domestic level factors despite the profound effects such factors have on policy outcomes. Turning towards reflectivist accounts of ideational influences on policymaking, it set out the justification for an interpretive constructivist approach that seeks to understand and explain how ideas are expressed, instantiated and have policy impact within a specific context. A discursive institutionalist approach was selected and modified to provide a practical means for analysing how elite sub-groups seek to influence foreign policymaking and how ideas in discourse can privilege certain policy responses within a given context. The chapter outlined the novel theoretical contribution this approach provides: probing whether the purposeful discursive competition model can enhance our understanding of the ways agent-level discursive actions bring about structural effects.

In conceptual terms, the chapter outlined working definitions for discourse, the forms of ideas therein and the processes by which they shape meanings. The elite was defined as a community of foreign policy analysts (in leading think tanks) and foreign policy makers (in official and political settings) who assert a
claim to specialist knowledge and influence over the levers of policy. The text argued for a fuller recognition of the ideologically diverse and competitive nature of the think tank community which moved beyond an “epistemic communities” approach to think tanks as technocratic research institutes operating under shared assumptions of expertise and competence. Instead, these institutes are analysed as influential groups marshalling considerable financial, media, political and intellectual resources to promote ideas about Europe, arising from their preferences, within a competitive discursive arena.

The chapter presented arguments demonstrating the relative influence of elite opinion vis a vis mass public opinion, justifying the overall level of analysis. This approach is inclusive enough to allow for the complexity and ideological diversity of views to emerge, but yet is exclusive enough so as to only study those actors with foreign policy expertise and influence and not merely individuals who are “prominent” by virtue of their positions in other fields or a general public disconnected from the arcane matters of EU-US policymaking.

These arguments have established a conceptual framework and theoretical approach with clear ontological and epistemological foundations. Pursuing this enterprise requires a transparent research design and set of methodological tools that are consistent with the preceding arguments. The next chapter will present in detail the research design and methodological choices made in service of the research questions and theoretical approach outlined. Chapter 4 outlines how this thesis will examine claims of elite influence by employing a qualitative content analysis of a representative sample of elite-authored texts, combined with elite interviews to produce a robust and transparent model of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor.
Chapter 4:

Research Design and Methodology

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed how this study of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor employs a discursive institutionalist approach to explore how discourses are constructed by a diverse foreign police elite, comprised of competing ideological and institutional groups (Schmidt 2008, Connolly 1983). Having outlined the conceptual framework and theoretical approach, the next step is to clearly set out how an analysis will be performed on a representative corpus of texts produced by US foreign policy elite on the EU in two security policy domains. This chapter plays a key role in explaining how the chosen methods of analysis will connect the research questions to the ultimate conclusions. These methods will compare the influence of factors, internal and external to the elite, on the nature of the discourse. An examination of their discursive competition within two case studies can reveal the impact of sub-groups on discourse, whilst the variation in EU competence within each case allows for a further comparison of the influence of EU-related factors on the US discourse.

Section 4.1 begins by presenting the study’s research design, including the case selection strategy and the multi-level comparative approach. Having explained the logic behind the case selection and research design, Section 4.2 will explore the family of content analysis methods used to assess foreign policy discourse before settling on the specific content analysis method employed in this study: a summative qualitative content analysis. Section 4.3 will then present the source selection and coding process employed within each case, clearly setting out how
data was selected and texts analysed in the service of the research questions. Section 4.4 outlines how interview results and coding results will be brought together and the outputs assessed in light of the research questions. The final paragraphs will review measures taken to ensure reliability and an assessment of how findings might be generalized. The objective of the chapter is to outline a workable and transparent framework, which clearly explains how the collection and analysis of data will link the research questions to the expected conclusions in line with the overall theoretical approach.

4.1 Research design

It is clear from the major research question that a significant object of the study involves performing a constitutive analysis of the dependent variable – US elite discourse – itself. By mapping out, coding and interpreting this discourse, the research assumes that the dependent variable – to borrow the language of positivist research - is multi-dimensional. Each case – representing a field of discourse – must be inspected and compared to see how they differ from one another (Becker 2000, 210). The research is not exclusively descriptive however; although a descriptive analysis of this under-examined field of US foreign policy has a significant empirical and theoretical contribution to make, the sub-questions make clear that this preliminary analysis opens the path to a quasi-causal enquiry to be undertaken into the ways in which factors internal and external to the elite shape the discourse produced and a plausibility probing of how the nature of this discourse influenced US policymaking.

Case selection

The case selection strategy employs an analytic generalisation approach (Yin 2013: 30-32). This means that rather than selecting cases which might be presented as representative of the universe of cases – according to the logic of statistical generalisation for survey studies – the two cases are analysed as
separate experiments in which the key research questions can be explored and, if replicated, the findings generalized to theories about discourse on the EU’s security action. Analytic generalisation studies are usually more appropriate for hermeneutic and qualitatively “thick” studies, like discourse analysis projects, which can seek to develop theory by replicating findings that can be generalized to a theory of discourse on Europe for example, rather than generalized to the universe of all comment on Europe (Ibid: 30-32). Approaches based on statistical generalization, surveys for example, are better suited to positivist studies which aim to provide results that are generalizable to the universe of cases based on the selected samples (Blaikie 2010: 192-194, 217). It should be noted that within each of the cases, the text selection strategy was designed to ensure that the analysis covered an ideologically and institutionally diverse universe of texts mirroring, as much as practicable, the full spectrum of opinion within the US foreign policy community, on the specific theme in question. Representativeness is therefore a key objective within the source selection strategy, which is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.

In order to implement a sound case selection strategy, the project must set out criteria for the selection of cases which allow for a clear examination of the influence of the variables on the discourse as set out in the research questions.31 The following three criteria were employed:

1. Significance of the subjects captured by the cases.

2. Variation in each case according to the key external variable (independent variable 1: EU policy competence level).

31 The term independent variable here is used to denote a factor, internal or external, to the US foreign policy which - it is hypothesized – may have a significant effect on the nature of the dependent variable (discourse) in either of the cases. This study is a hermeneutic exercise which does not seek to prove a causal and predictable relationship along positivist epistemological lines, nevertheless, the language of variables can express the relationships being investigated in terminology that is comprehensible to scholars from both positivist and hermeneutic backgrounds.
3. Variation in embedded cases (or sub-cases) according to the key internal variables (independent variable 2: Ideological affiliation of sub-groups, independent variable 3: institutional position of sub-groups).

The two cases selected are:

1. EU CSDP policy reform (Conventional Security).

2. EU Counter-terrorism cooperation and the PNR Agreements (Internal Security)

These two cases capture the two dominant subjects within US elite discourse on the EU in security matters within the selected timeframe (1992 – 2012): the development of common security and defence policies and the role of the EU as a counter terrorism partner. The following sections will outline how the criteria for case selection led to these choices.

The first criterion for case selection was significance. According to Lijphart (1971, 691), the potential contribution of the cases to theory building should be a key motivation for their selection and analysis. In this light, a study of discourse on marginal themes would be of limited utility in broader theory development on US discourse on the EU. Instead, the cases must comprise central concerns of the discourse on EU in security matters. In other words, for the purposes of this study, a case of EU security action could only be taken as a relevant case for discourse analysis if it was a major topic of discussion. As Larsen (2004) argues in his analysis of European discourse on the EU as a foreign policy actor, using discourse analysis to examine the EU’s “actorness” can only be considered worthwhile in subjects where it is constructed as such (p. 69). For the same reason, the cases selected for this study must capture areas of US foreign policy discourse where the EU is constructed as an actor worthy of comment, and not merely topics of interest from an external or European perspective. More practically, a study that focuses on a subject of marginal interest can, by definition, only explore a very limited number of texts, making in-depth qualitative analysis vulnerable to challenges of subjective selection by
the analyst and over-representation of the perceptions of certain marginal groups or even individuals.

An initial quantitative content analysis was undertaken to ensure the cases satisfied the significance criterion. This analysis provided a preliminary evaluation or “map” of subjects related to the EU’s security role which were addressed by four selected US think tanks, without of course, indicating the manner in which the EU’s role was evaluated by these authors. Once a corpus of relevant texts was gathered, the next step was to code each text according to the main subject addressed. A list of themes of EU external relations topics was created with a corresponding figure indicating how many articles addressed each theme. The preliminary analysis indicated that evaluations of the EU’s performance in security matters were most frequently found in texts addressing the two subjects captured by the cases.

The research proposal for the project had originally considered a wider pool of potential cases of EU security action, including the EU’s role in negotiations with Iran on uranium enrichment and its role in negotiations to finalise a binding international agreement on climate change mitigation (so-called “environmental security”). However, the preliminary quantitative analysis found that neither of these topics were addressed by a significant number of texts in the corpus. They were therefore excluded as possible cases as they did not meet the primary criterion of significance. In practice, a hypothetical corpus of texts related to these “insignificant” themes would risk being too small to provide useful insight into broader discourse on the EU as a security actor. While it would be interesting to examine why or in what circumstances, EU external action in fields such as the Iran talks, for instance, are not substantially addressed by the US foreign policy community, that is beyond the realm of this research project, which seeks to provide a qualitatively rich analysis of how US elite discourse on EU security action is shaped by certain internal and external independent factors.
The second criterion for case selection was **variation in the major external independent variable**: policy competence level. This requirement indicates the first comparative dimension of the research design and is the key external variable examined for impact on discourse. CSDP is broadly understood as an *intergovernmental* policy field, whereas counter-terrorism is conducted within the field of Freedom, security and justice; a significantly more supranational policy field. Undertaking this cross-case or *cross-sectional comparison* allows us to examine the extent to which policy competence level shapes evaluations of the EU by the US foreign policy community.

The third criterion for case selection indicates the second comparative dimension of the research design; the requirement for **variation between embedded cases** to allow for a comparison of factors *internal* to the US foreign policy community that might explain variation in discourse. Both cases needed to allow for a comparison of 4 source groups or embedded cases of US elite discourse on each field of security (internal and conventional). These are: Public official US discourse, Private official US discourse, Conservative unofficial discourse, Liberal unofficial discourse. Identifying these embedded cases allows us to examine the impact of ideological (conservative or liberal) and institutional (public, private) factors in shaping the discourse (Yin 2013; 41). Both cases selected allowed for an analysis of a sufficient number of texts comprising each of the 4 source types.

As can be seen from Fig. 4.1, the cases and subcases selected ensure a high degree of variation in both internal and external comparative dimensions. Taking two cases that are most different on the policy competence dimension (cross-case comparison) and four sub-cases or “source groups” that are most different on the ideology and institutional context dimension (comparison between embedded cases) gives us a research design that approximates the “most diverse cases” strategy.

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32 Policy competence levels in EU governance are not simply binary conditions and policymaking in the area of freedom, security and justice retains many intergovernmental traits. For a detailed discussion of the differences between policymaking within each domain and how the chosen cases satisfy this particular criterion of variation, please see sections 5.1 and 6.1.
The final comparative dimension for the research design is a longitudinal comparison within the cases, which allows the study to analyse how the discourse within each case develops over time, with reference to contextual events and landmark moments. The timeframe selected allowed an analysis of how discourse developed in response to the major institutional changes in policymaking in the security domain; 1992 saw the creation of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and starting the analysis in this year allows for an exploration of US responses to institutionalized EU security policies from their genesis, through to the implementation of the most recent institutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty, which was, in part, intended to enhance the EU’s global security role. Taking 1992 as our starting point also coincides with the beginning of the first Bill Clinton White House administration and the 20-year period encompasses both Republican and Democrat White House administrations, which allows for an analysis of how changes in the US executive may have shaped discourse.
The previous section outlined the case selection strategy, with a particular focus on selecting as the units of analysis two cases, which satisfy the requirements for significance and variation in both internal and external comparative dimensions. Both cases capture significant fields of elite discourse on EU security action, and are distinct from each other in the policy competence level of each field. Furthermore, the source groups for each case can be clearly distinguished from each other on both ideological and institutional criteria, enabling the study to separately analyse embedded cases – where the role of internal variables can be examined. Having outlined the key research questions, variables and the case selection strategy, the following section will now outline how the data is to be collected, analysed and coded for key narrative themes.
4.2 Primary Methodology: Summative Qualitative Content Analysis

This dissertation is based on a multi-method research project with five empirical components:

1. I examined 70 texts produced, using NVivo software to qualitatively analyse the content of relevant texts. I selected texts in line with the strategy outlined in section 4.3.

2. I selected and examined 23 secret government cables which were freely circulating in the public domain and accessible via the “Wikileaks” website as well as declassified State dept emails. These were subjected to the QCA.

3. I conducted 21 interviews with individuals, both retired and currently employed, in the elite community. The interview subjects ranged from evaluations of EU security performance to reflexive questions on elite discourse on the subject.

4. I examined archival records from the FRUS to obtain primary records of US opinion on European integration for the historical period leading up to the timeframe of this thesis.

5. I compiled a long-list of relevant think tanks and selected a subset of 2 think tanks for special analysis, based on their outputs (no. of relevant articles), their resources (based on publicly available data) and their ideological position (as described in empirical studies).

The following section presents the primary method employed (1, 2) to analyse texts produced by the US foreign policy to build a map of elite discourse on the EU in the selected cases. It will set out the specific approach taken in this method and the advantages it offers over simpler, more quantitative methods. Section 4.3 will address the coding for think tanks (method 5), while section 4.4 will succinctly outline the approach taken to interviews.

Content Analysis (CA) is not a monolithic research method but is rather best described as “a family of analytic approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to systematic, strict textual analyses” (Hsieh & Shannon 2005: 1277). Ranging from strictly quantitative word count methods to
more interpretive coding of texts for themes and “latent” meanings, it is a highly
diverse group of approaches with varying standards for deducing meaning and
intent by authors. The primary focus of CA scholars is on the characteristics of
language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning
of the text (Budd, Thorp, & Donohew, 1967; Lindkvist, 1981; McTavish & Pirro,
1990). The most suitable working definition of the approach, which captures the
distinction between Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and quantitative content
analysis or merely unsystematic “readings” of texts, is “a research method for the
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh &
Shannon 2005: 1278). This definition acknowledges the inevitable element of
interpretation required on the part of the researcher but lays emphasis on the
systematic nature of the exercise; implying transparent rules of procedure, text
selection and methods to augment the credibility, transferability, dependability
and confirmability of findings.

The origins of QCA lie in classical quantitative content analysis approaches
developed in the mid-twentieth century. Berelson’s text was the first to lay out a
comprehensive methodology for the interpretation of the meanings within texts
(Berelson, 1952). For Berelson, reliability and validity were best assured
through eliminating subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher. He
advocated “A research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative
description of the manifest content of communication” (Ibid, p.489). This
approach employed random sampling strategies and a deductive epistemological
approach wherein coding categories were created in advance and applied
subsequently to texts. The approach is firmly within the positivist research
paradigm; validity, reliability and objectivity are criteria used to evaluate the
quality of research.

Researchers employing content analysis within communication science later
shifted to more qualitative approaches in the late twentieth century, motivated
by a sense that hard quantitative approaches were misguided in attempting to
remove all human inference and interpretation from the research agenda. In the
late 1960s Holsti (1969, p. 14) wrote “Content analysis is any technique for
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. ...Our definition does not include any reference to quantification”. While not abandoning the requirement for “systematic” and “objective” methods of analyzing texts, scholars were coming to acknowledge that in order to obtain rich insights into the themes and ideas of texts, simple word count analyses were not enough; a degree of human interpretation and considered reflection on coding categories was needed. “Classical quantitative content analysis has few answers to the question from where the categories come, how the system of categories is developed: "How categories are defined ... is an art. Little is written about it.” (Krippendorf 1980, p.76).

The interpretivist move in content analysis did not lead to uniform approaches however. The QCA method is generally applied in one of three different ways:

**The Conventional approach** envisions the researcher operating inductively; immersing himself in the text and seeking out new emergent categories. The key concepts are coded, organised into clusters, often with diagrams explaining their relationship with each other.

By contrast, the researcher takes a deductive approach with **Directed QCA**: The aim in this model is to validate an existing theory and the researcher begins by identifying key concepts as *prima facie* coding categories. Operational definitions for each category are created arising from the researcher’s theoretical approach. The researcher then applies this framework to the text to validate or extend the theory in question.

In contrast, the **Summative Approach** – which is employed in this thesis – is a multi-stage mixed mode of analysis which incorporates observations about source context and the inferred meanings of texts. The researcher begins by quantifying certain words or content in a text in order to understand their usage in conjunction with their context. The intention here is not to assess the meaning of these text patterns but rather to explore how they are used (ie: are certain terms more common in texts than others? Are certain groups of words used repeatedly together? Are there repeated co-occurrences of word pairs?). In the second stage the focus is on discovering underlying meanings of the words or the
content (Holsti, 1969). This means uncovering the latent meanings of the text, by going beyond the mere frequency of the words to interpret their meaning in context. The process is a careful exercise in thematic detection, exploration and revision: identifying patterns of words which create narrative meaning but remaining open to unanticipated patterns which might not be present in an a priori coding manual (Babbie 1992; Catanzaro 1988; Morse & Field 1995)

As will be discussed later in this chapter, the advantages of this approach are that it allows us to firstly examine quantitative clues as to what authors focus most attention on. For instance, general security strategy statements can be quantitatively coded to assess how often “Europe” or the “EU” is mentioned in comparison with other powers, such as China or Russia. It also provides an additional reliability check; confirming that the texts selected are relevant to the subject matter. Finally, we can observe and gain insight into discourse on the EU in a non-obtrusive way, mixing inductive and deductive coding approaches.

But there are also disadvantages; chiefly that the researcher must make further efforts to credibly demonstrate that the textual evidence is consistent with the interpretation. The researcher must also take care to set out a transparent and credible strategy for source selection. This is as important as the thematic coding itself as differing criteria for selection could in principle, lead to very different outcomes once the coding process is concluded. Both the selection and coding strategies will now be outlined in section 4.4, which will also present indicators for linking the analysis outputs with the research questions.

### 4.3 Source selection and coding.

This section presents the text selection and sampling strategy and the coding process itself, laying special emphasis on measures taken to ensure the findings are robust, and the method is transparent and replicable. The aim is to familiarize the reader with the discourse analysis process from start to finish: from text selection to thematic analysis, so that the reader is familiar with the strategy, interpretive judgments and the outputs derived from the method.
**Sourcing texts: Who, What and When.**

In order to select a sample of texts that can be credibly presented as representative of US élite discourse on the EU as a global actor, we first must have working criteria for who this group includes (the source of the text) what subjects are deemed relevant (the subject of the text) and when the text should have been produced (the valid timeframe for texts). A scientifically robust and credible text selection strategy requires rigorous and transparent criteria to ensure that the selection process is not arbitrary and that themes or subjects from other settings do not contaminate the sample. By applying these criteria in selecting a corpus of relevant and comparable texts, the study is adopting a *purposive* sampling strategy, rather than a random sampling approach. Being cognisant of these important contextual features of texts (authors, audiences, subjects) and coding accordingly will also be important in the analytical phase, as texts are not merely directly comparable units of coding but also serve different purposes in different contexts (Schmidt 2008; 305).

**The Who – The US Foreign Policy Community.**

In the preceding chapter, the US Foreign Policy Community was defined as a group of heterogeneous officials with a high level of access to and influence over the machinery of US foreign policy and unofficial analysts with influence within think tank discourse by virtue of their institutional position. In addition to official sources (Presidential administrations, government departments, members of Congress) the sample also includes texts from influential foreign policy think tanks. Foreign policy analysts in these organisations are included as they have a major role in shaping foreign policy discourse and indeed in shaping foreign policy decision-making itself. Thus, the elite group consists of policy *makers* and policy *analysts*. The function of this section is to outline the criteria for identifying individual texts from this group to include in the QCA, not to present the theoretical justification for identifying this group as significant (that has been addressed in the preceding chapter).
The text sources can be firstly divided into two groups: texts produced by official actors (policy makers) and non-Government actors (policy analysts). Within each of these two groups there are further sub-groups as outlined below.

**Official sources:**
This group is composed of documents produced by official actors including Congressional hearings and papers, National Security Statements, public pronouncements, opinion articles in national publications and speeches. In all cases the authors are official actors from one of the arms of Government listed in Fig. 4.3. These texts were selected because they were easily accessible and as contributions to public debate, they play an important role in the construction of discourse and identity formation.

It could be argued that in relying mainly on public statements, the study doesn’t penetrate into the “real” beliefs of actors. Any study of the thought processes of decision-makers must struggle with the charge that elites consciously tweak or misrepresent their ideas and beliefs in public settings; for a variety of purposes. To what extent do public pronouncements, minutes and even personal memoirs reflect genuinely held beliefs, and not merely the image or message that these actors wish to present? To address the question of how official discourse changes when moving from public to private settings, a sub-set of internal state department cables and memos were accessed and analysed as an embedded case of private official discourse. These sources were easily accessed in the publicly available Wikileaks “Public Library of US Diplomacy” – an online archive of classified State Dept. correspondence. Of course, official actors are still constrained by procedural, bureaucratic and political factors when discussing any matter in these contexts – particularly when committing these ideas to paper.

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33 The Wikileaks “PLUS-D” library can be accessed at the URL below. These documents were released into the public domain several years prior to the submission of this thesis. As publicly available documents, they offer researchers a valuable opportunity to study private correspondence by US diplomats. This study takes no normative position on the activities of Wikileaks or the publication of these classified documents – the authenticity of which has not been denied by the US government. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/about/
The criticism may still be made that these documents conceal the “true” beliefs of actors. The secondary research method (interviews) goes some way towards probing the beliefs of the subjects further (see Section 4.4.) However this project is primarily interested in the social process whereby images of Europe are constructed and meanings created as part of a shared discourse. The method outlined aligns with the theoretical assumption that language constitutes meaning and thus the focus of the process is on “the productive and transformative nature of the text itself” rather than searching for meaning on some other level outside of language (Larsen 2004).

Comparing public discourse with that found in internal documents can provide valuable insights into how this discursive battle of ideas is conducted in different bureaucratic settings – an analysis of this domain does not guarantee access to “real” beliefs, but it can still provide empirically and theoretically valuable findings. In particular, the results will show whether – in line with Schmidt’s framework (2008; 310) - there is systematic variation between communicative and coordinative discourses produced by officials, indicating the effect of relevant restraining factors pertaining to the public and private communication channels respectively.

Within these sub-groups there is one further dominant cleavage – the party divide between Republican and Democrat administrations, representatives and individuals. The coding process must record this and all other cleavages for each text in order to highlight if there are any significant variations in themes produced by actors arising from their political or organizational affiliation.
Non-Government sources:
To avoid selection bias with think-tank sources, the sample includes a cross section of prominent institutes, representative of the full ideological field of US foreign policy research. Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo’s (2005) work on ideological positioning of research institutes was used to select a balanced sample of institutes. Using the Congressional Record, Groseclose and Milyo coded all citations of research institutes by members of congress between January 1 1993 and Dec 31 2002. The researchers then used the ten-year average ADA scores (an evaluation of the ideological position of each member of congress based upon their voting record) of the members to place the think tanks on an ideological spectrum. The work assumes ideological proximity between the congressman and the source he/she cites – this assumption is verified by the results which conform to generally held wisdom on the ideological leanings of the groups measured. It is also reaffirmed by the groups’ own descriptions of themselves, often as “conservative” or “progressive”. The ADA ideological scores cited were also used to ensure that statements by members of congress were representative of political ideology. Fig. 2 shows the shortlist of think tanks selected, with an ideological score based on a spectrum where “0” is the most conservative position, and “100” is the most liberal position. They are ordered from most liberal to most conservative:
Fig 4.4: Think tanks sampled, listed in order of ideological position (liberal to conservative)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Think Tank</th>
<th>Ideological score</th>
<th>Liberal/Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0= most conservative, 100= most liberal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATO Institute</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookings Institute</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Groseclose and Milyo, 2005.

The institutes selected are well known and Groseclose and Milyo’s study calculated that they were all within the top 20% most cited institutes (including those not focused on foreign policy). This indicates that the sample selected represents the most influential and relevant organizations within foreign policy research.

Finally, I compared public data on assets, staff and expenditure for the shortlist of six Washington D.C. think tanks and used this data as a rough proxy for institutional capacity. Two especially prolific, large and influential think tanks were then selected from the shortlist: Brookings and the Heritage Foundation. These organisations reported the second and fourth-highest levels of expenditure of any US think tank in 2008; and produced more texts on the
subject of transatlantic relations than any of the other organisations sampled.\textsuperscript{34} It should be noted that while there was a balance between liberal and conservative camps in the corpus of unofficial texts, these two institutes were over-represented \textit{vis a vis} their peers, within their respective ideological groupings. In addition to these texts, opinion articles published by foreign policy analysts in leading newspapers were analysed. To control for political persuasion/ideology, the texts were coded according to the ideology of the analyst’s “home think-tank”.

\textit{The What – Clarifying “European” security action}

This study was carried out using qualitative, in-depth documentary analysis of texts produced between 1992 and 2012, addressing EU external action in two settings:

1. Conventional Security (Institutional reform of CSDP)
2. Internal Security Cooperation (Counter-terrorism cooperation and the PNR agreement).

Within these two policy domains, the texts addressed Europe, EU-US relations, NATO-EU relations and the transatlantic relationship more generally. It is important to bear in mind that US foreign policy discourse builds a space which groups diverse European actors in many different contexts together, making the task of identifying texts as either exclusively “NATO-related” or “EU-related” problematic. Many policy memos on security matters, for instance, addressed both organisations in the same text. In these cases, authors examined European security cooperation in both contexts with arguments generalized to apply to “Europe” or “Europeans”. Further complicating matters is the fact that when reviewing CSDP for instance, analysts often examine national defence spending by individual European member states as constitutive elements of CSDP power projection potential. This is hardly unreasonable given that CSDP defence

\textsuperscript{34} Heritage Foundation reported expenditures of $64.6m and assets worth $133.2m in 2008. In the same year, Brookings reported expenditures of $87.9m and assets of $296m. Source: Medvetz, p. 238 (2012).
capabilities are constituted by national defence resources pooled for specific missions (Howorth 2007). It would be unreasonable to exclude texts that made reference to national factors when the author’s intention is to make a point about European defence more generally, and CSDP as a key element of that.

However, this does not prevent the researcher from being selective within individual documents as to which units of analysis (phrases or sentences) are relevant and which are not. Statements on individual countries were excluded as the focus is on these states only when they are considered as part of a “European” group – accepting the terms set by the discourse itself. Statements explicitly regarding NATO activities or capacities were also excluded. In almost every project employing qualitative content analysis, the scholar must exercise his interpretive faculties; what matters is that he is transparent about the choices made and that criteria are applied in a systematic and consistent manner.

**The How - the importance of source context**

When comparing discourse from official and non-official sources, the context and setting of the text must be borne in mind. Conventions of international diplomacy require official actors to moderate their comments to take account of the public nature of the discourse. Actors in think tanks, or indeed former officials now in think-tank settings, can be more frank than their government counterparts in their discussions regarding European allies. Indeed, when discussing EU-US cooperation on counter-terrorism in 2004, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, Senator Allen, explicitly asked contributing Senators to be mindful of sensitivities in their contributions when discussing EU-US Cooperation:

*Senator Biden ... I do want to get from you your sense and maybe it is best that it is not made public because it might harm somebody’s sensibilities [emphasis added]. There is a sense that appeasement or cutting back on the perseverance and the strength and unified resolve against terrorism insofar as some of countries in Europe...*

Discussing the 2004 National Security Strategy, then Secretary of State Colin Powell also underlined the limits decision-makers place on what they will express in public documents:

Of course, a public strategy document cannot be entirely frank [emphasis added] about all the choices that U.S. leaders make; we do ourselves and our allies no favors by telling our adversaries everything that we think and plan.

- Powell 2004.

We should therefore expect significant differences in style and emphasis between public and private official texts and between official and non-official actors, with the latter more likely to employ explicitly critical terms. Nevertheless, it was still possible to code official sources according to the same themes and sub-themes identified in unofficial sources. The embedded case comparison sections in forthcoming chapters will explore how the wording of critical views of the EU varied between public and private statements and between official and unofficial texts.


Once the period of interest has been justified theoretically, the least complicated criterion for text selection is the “when”. Texts produced by sources within the time period 1992 – 2012 were included in the analysis and identifying the date of publication/speech was unproblematic. This period was chosen to allow for a significant corpus of texts to be established, from a wide variety of actors. The advantages of this time frame were several; firstly, the period includes both Republic and Democrat White House administrations, allowing for a longitudinal comparison that spanned both parties’ periods in office (See Fig. 4.4). Secondly, the twenty-year timeframe allowed for personnel changes within the sub-groups, so that no institution’s texts came solely from one particular European expert (but also included successors/predecessors in the same job). Thirdly, the timeframe allowed for the source selection to capture texts produced by
significant individuals over the course of their career – often spanning official and unofficial roles. For instance, texts produced by Philip Gordon, a Brookings Institution fellow and subsequently State Dept official, were included in the analysis and divided into two separate sub-groups (official and unofficial liberal) depending on the position held at the time. By employing a 20-year timeframe, the study can analyse how views expressed by key members of the elite are expressed as they move across the sub-groups within the elite. Finally, the timeframe spans the development of the EU's common foreign and security policy from its inception with the Treaty of Maastricht, through several institutional reforms, ending with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms to EU external actions. It also captures a significant period of institutional evolution in the AFSJ domain, as well as the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, a landmark event in EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation. Thus the timeframe allows for a longitudinal analysis of events during the most significant period of EU security policy integration. The timeframe is restricted enough however, to provide a bounded study that addresses specific policy domains and key milestone events, as opposed to a longue durée study.

This section has outlined the choices made in the source selection strategy, which sets out to build a transparent, robust and replicable corpus of texts on elite discourse on EU security action in two specific cases. The strategy employed to ensure a bounded corpus of texts, representative of the full ideological, political and institutional diversity of the US foreign policy community has been presented with reference to the project’s efforts to address source context, origins, and ambiguous statements. Having outlined the corpus building strategy, the next section will outline the coding process undertaken.

**Fig. 4.4: White House administrations during timeframe (1992-2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Administration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-2000</td>
<td>President William J. Clinton (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>President George W. Bush (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2012</td>
<td>President Barack H. Obama (D)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The coding process:

As discussed, Summative QCA provides several general advantages over other qualitative or quantitative approaches. With particular reference to the texts for this study, the interpretive nature of Summative QCA allows us to deal with a number of issues: Firstly, official evaluations of the EU as an actor may be worded obliquely – to conform with diplomatic niceties for instance. This means that the coder will be required to code for ambiguous statements, rather than clear-cut binary policy positions. Strictly quantitative approaches or a priori coding schemes would undoubtedly miss out on many of these subtleties (Holsti, 1969). Secondly, the texts themselves will be quite heterogeneous: transcripts from congressional hearings, public speeches, opinion articles and research memos will all be included. The variety of texts means that a rigid codebook made up of a priori coding themes would be ineffective.

Stage One: Preliminary analysis.

In contrast to a Classical Content Analysis approach – where decisions on all variables, their measurement, and coding rules must be made before the observations begin – the thesis employed a preliminary exploratory content analysis to identify the most salient topics of discussion. This was done using NVivo Coding software.

Corpus Construction and Sampling Strategy: An integrated corpus was created according to the sampling strategy and criteria discussed above.

Coding: Each document in the sample was coded according to source:

2. Unofficial: broken down by think tank.
3. Ideology.
4. Year.
5. Author.
This allowed for the detection of variation in themes according to these independent variables.

**Analysis:** The NVivo Programme ran a standard analysis of word occurrence and co-occurrence, with an analysis of which co-occurrences were more common among particular sources and in particular years.

The analysis revealed which issues and topics were most salient among the group at large and among each individual source. The clustering of certain terms gave clues as to the key topics and information which sources used to make assessments about the EU’s security role.

**Stage Two: Qualitative Content Analysis**

A second, more in-depth analysis of the texts was undertaken to excavate the themes of the articles, reflecting the author’s beliefs regarding the EU’s external action. The exploratory analysis helped to guide this, as it gave clues as to which topics these authors believe are most salient in a global power analysis and which themes are most important to particular sources. NVivo was also the primary software tool used during this stage. This software is a tool for the researcher but is not in itself a method. The important decisions about text selection, coding categories and themes must be made by the researcher who must then himself go through each of the texts individually and highlight individual phrases that conform with coding categories.

The definition of “code” used was as follows:

... a word or a short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data.

- Saldana, 2012.
The **units of analysis** were individual texts/speeches/hearing contributions and the **units of coding** were individual sentences or quasi-sentences. Only relevant units which expressed an evaluation of the EU’s prior performance or potential capabilities, in the two selected cases were coded. Once the initial coding categories had been identified the coding process continued, using a conventional QCA approach to go over each of the texts and revise the coding schemes in light of new themes that were revealed (Mayring, 2000). The analysis involved expanding the list of themes (or “nodes” as they are described in NVivo) in the light of new ideas and beliefs revealed in the examination of sources.

NVivo allows the researcher to highlight each unit of coding (sentence or phrase) with different colours, depending on the relevant coding theme (or node). This software provides several tools to identify dominant codes or double coding of phrases with repeated patterns (ie: “military weakness” and “low military spending”). This process is the main phase of deducing meaning and conclusions about the texts. It is a qualitative analysis and therefore, to an inevitable degree, requires interpretation. In order to increase the reliability and transparency of the judgments made, select phrases (units of coding) will be presented throughout the discussion of the themes in both case chapters, thus allowing the reader to see a sample of the interpretive judgments made by the researcher at the level of individual units of coding.

This summative QCA approach involves both deductive and inductive analysis – with the more quantitative first phase providing clues or signposts about concepts that repeat throughout the corpus before the researcher then moves to an inductive, qualitative analysis of the texts, sentence-by-sentence. This second phase allows for both the nuance and context of each unit to be considered, as well as allowing an ongoing revision of the coding scheme in light of new discoveries made in the analysis, so that hitherto unforeseen themes can be accommodated within the process.
At the end of the process, the analyst has recorded a database of thematic nodes derived from each of the texts in the NVivo software and can access each unit of coding to reassess the overall coherence of each node. The output records when units of coding overlapped – indicating related themes – and how often each thematic node was recorded. This provides us with a hierarchy of themes, indicates some relationships between them and also tells us which themes occur within each embedded case (ie: official, unofficial liberal. etc.) The analyst must then exclude marginal themes, where only single references occur and group related themes together within overall narratives – that is, generally coherent descriptions of the EU in each domain.

Once the recurrent themes have been established, a further analysis is conducted of discursive strategies employed within the text; recurrent imagery, analogies and rhetorical tools are noted, to discern any clearly identifiable discursive tools used by the sources (Wodak, 2002). Prominent discursive strategies include perspectivation; where the source explicitly describes their perspective and

35 See Annex One for a sample coded text
related to the subjects at hand in order to build “ethos” (i.e., credibility or proximity to the audience), and argumentation; the ways in which the source connects arguments to their conclusions through selective use of data (Wodak 2002a: 74). These are then examined and discussed in the case chapters to provide further insight into how the EU is presented; both the content of thematic representations is noted as well as their form.

**Fig 4.5: The coding process**

1. Sources are selected according to the selection strategy outlined. A representative corpus of texts is composed.

2. Sources are coded according to sub-groups, marking each text according to the embedded case they relate to (i.e., liberal unofficial, conservative unofficial, etc.)

3. A list of preliminary themes are created derived from a reading of secondary literature and an identification of dominant themes in discourse on European security.

4. An exploratory quantitative content analysis tests for the presence of the initial themes identified and flags up additional themes within the corpus.

5. An in-depth qualitative content analysis highlights descriptions of the EU as a security actor, noting descriptions of its capabilities, salient characteristics and its role. These highlighted phrases are the “units of analysis” or “thematic nodes”.

6. Coding categories are updated and revised in light of recurrent themes or incidents that appear as the texts are coded.

7. A hierarchy of thematic nodes is composed, with lists detailing number of occurrences.

8. Marginal thematic nodes (those with only single occurrences) are excluded.

9. Discursive strategies are identified among the units of analysis, with particular attention to perspectivation, argumentation and imagery used.

10. Themes and sub-themes are interpreted and grouped into coherent descriptions or “narratives” which use common reference points to construct images of the EU as a security actor. The outputs form the basis for an interpretive analysis – presented in the case study and comparative chapters – of how various factors influenced the nature of the discourse and how this discourse may have influenced policymaking.
This section has presented the primary method by outlining its distinctive advantages within the broader family of content analysis. The text selection strategy and each stage of the coding process were outlined to provide a transparent summary of the method employed. The next section will present the secondary method – interviews – with particular emphasis on the distinct and complementary benefits offered by the strategy of triangulating QCA results with an autonomous research method.

### 4.4 Interviews and results

Interviews provide a valuable secondary method by which this project can access US elite views on the EU as a security actor. The interviewees are not expected to either confirm or falsify the results of the QCA, rather they act as a means to “triangulate” our initial results; complementing the QCA findings, exploring in depth certain initial findings and highlighting previously unconsidered elements of the discourse.

Twenty interviews were conducted, mainly in two batches in Washington, D.C. in Spring 2011 and Summer 2013 (see Appendix X for list of interviewees). A small number of additional interviews, arranged to suit interviewee schedules, were conducted subsequently. The interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis with guiding questions as indicated in Fig. 4.4.

The objectives were as follows:

- To assess the opinions of interviewees on the nature of the EU as an international actor.
- To ascertain the interviewees’ reflexive opinions as to how discourse on the EU varies across political, ideological and organizational cleavages within the US Foreign Policy community.
- To explore whether discourse on the subject has changed over time in response to political changes in either Europe or the US.
- To compare the results of these interviews with the QCA results as part of a triangulation process to improve the robustness of QCA findings.
The selection of interviewees was conducted with the same principles of representativeness that were employed with the selection of texts. Analysts from across the ideological spectrum were interviewed, as were official actors from government departments. In the case of the latter group, official secrecy and confidentiality places constraints on the willingness of potential interviewees to participate in the study and also on what answers they are prepared to give to the interviewer. There are some modest steps the interviewer can take to allay concerns and encourage participation; the interviews are undertaken on an “on the background” basis, meaning that direct quotes will not be attributed to the interviewee by name and their anonymity is guaranteed. The interview is not normally recorded so as to encourage more fluid and comfortable discussion, though this requires constant note taking by the interviewer.

In addition to the reluctance to participate, there is also the risk – as with interview subjects in any social science research – that the subject may misrepresent views or indeed facts so as to present themselves or their organization in a favourable light. As Howarth and Torfing (2005: 339) put it: ‘we are confronted with the difficulty of validating and corroborating what is said in interviews (...) and of accessing information that remains deliberately or unintentionally hidden’. While the process depends to a large degree on the reliability of the interviewees, this remains a risk. However, given that the interviews serve to confirm our understanding of elite public discourse on an issue of public discussion, we should not expect the interview subject to be any less forthcoming than they would otherwise be in print (ie in the texts sampled in the QCA). Quite the contrary, the on-the-background nature of the interview, conducted on an anonymous basis should encourage a more frank and honest appraisal of the EU as an actor and the nature of the community’s discourse on the topic.
**Interviews as a separate but complementary method**

It is important to note that the interviews were not intended to obtain a verbal account of the same categories of beliefs and opinions analysed in the QCA, which could then be incorporated into the corpus of written texts. Opinions
expressed in the context of a conversational exchange, in which the interviewee is directed through a semi-structured interview and challenged to elaborate on statements or consider countervailing views, produce very different outcomes to solo writing endeavours. When writing a speech, policy analysis or briefing paper, a member of the US foreign policy elite is able to autonomously select particular real-life events or concepts to explore in a certain ideas and serve their particular purposes.

By contrast, in an interview, this autonomy is limited by an outline structure imposed by the researcher. The aim of the interviews is thus to act as a complementary research method, in which members of the elite are encouraged to reflexively consider their own beliefs and experiences regarding the EU as a security actor, as well as those of their broader community/sub-group. These reflections may deepen our understanding of the concepts uncovered in the QCA, point to further avenues of enquiry and test certain interpretations of written texts. For this reason, the coding or interpretation of interview comments does not follow the same strategy as the QCA. Instead, detailed interview notes were taken and where relevant, statements which informed the QCA were selected for inclusion in the results sections of chapters 5 and 6.

4.5 Drawing reliable conclusions

This chapter has outlined a method for selecting and analyzing content produced by a representative sample of the US foreign policy community on the chosen subject. It has further indicated measures to ensure transparency and robustness in this process and a secondary method – semi-structured interviews – which seek to “triangulate” the initial findings, probing their plausibility and further examining certain aspects. These methods address the primary research question: what is the nature of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor;
once this analysis has been completed, we will have a rich, interpretive map of discourse on the topic.

To address the subsequent questions – the factors that influence this discourse – further steps are needed. An in-depth interpretive analysis of the embedded cases will be performed to compare the narrative pattern discovered with the sub-groups participating in the discursive arena (official public/private, unofficial liberal/conservative). To what extent do clear differences in narratives align with ideological or institutional cleavages? Are differences in evaluations, assessments and portrayals of the EU’s role aligned with the sub-group cleavages? This comparison is made possible by the initial coding of texts according to source-type. It will be clearly visible if a large number of texts constructing the EU’s role in a particular model – either effectiveness or weakness, for example – are predominately produced by actors from a particular sub-group. A finding of this kind would indicate a competitive discursive arena, where competing elite sub-groups seek discursive dominance by establishing their narratives as authoritative evaluations of the EU.

Or do certain discursive constructions of the EU crosscut the embedded cases, indicating a level of consensus on the EU’s role which might approach dominance within overall elite discourse? Are significant differences in discursive constructions of the EU more closely aligned with the EU’s policy competence level – as indicated by the case selection? In which case, the findings would suggest that factors external to the US foreign policy community, and internal to the EU itself – its policy competences – are more significant determinants of how it is constructed in discourse. Further interpretive analysis will examine how constructions of the EU have changed over the timeframe of the cases (1992-2012). Do certain lessons or evaluations of the EU become more or less prominent over time, in response to certain landmark events or learning processes?

A final analysis considers whether it can be plausibly argued that “lessons” or consensus points derived by the community within this timeframe and
embedded in discourse shaped policy responses; by marking out the limits of reasonable responses to particular issues or by setting parameters to the EU’s value or effectiveness as a security partner. In light of the methodological difficulties in drawing inferences as to the impact of ideas on policymaking discussed in the previous chapter, and in line with the hermeneutic framework of this thesis, the aim is not to verify a positivist hypothesis as to the impact of a discourse on policymaking. Instead the aim is to probe the plausibility of a quasi-causal inference as to how certain ideas, expressed in narratives, shaped the decision-making approach of policymakers. In drawing these conclusions, the analysis will rely heavily on the testimony of interviewees and their own reflexive views of how discourse shaped policy responses.

Reliability and Generalisability

As outlined, employing an in-depth, qualitative content analysis of a purposively selected corpus of texts can present a rich output of discursive themes that illustrate the contours of discourse on a chosen topic. To ensure the findings are robust however, and not vulnerable to challenges of interpreter or selection bias, a number of measures will be taken to ensure credibility, transparency and robustness:

• Quantitative content analysis tools were used as an auxiliary method to help in selecting relevant thematic nodes and in testing the robustness of the QCA analysis.

• Analysis of narrative themes (nodes) will be presented alongside relevant quotes from texts to render the interpretive process transparent to the reader.

• QCA findings are presented alongside select quotes from the two batteries of interviews conducted with members of the US foreign policy community in April 2011 and June 2013. Where relevant, the interviewees’ reflexive comments on features of US elite discourse are also presented.
Each stage of the coding process was clearly outlined to ensure robustness, credibility and transparency were presented, rendering the process of analysing discourse from text selection to thematic exposition clear to the reader.

As set out in chapter three, this project is based on a hermeneutic epistemology, which relies on the analyst’s interpretations to draw reasoned conclusions as to the nature of discourse on this topic, employing transparent, reliable and credible methodology. The project does not propose a simplified causal model explaining what variables determine particular results in discourse but rather seeks to explain how differing factors within each case produce the pattern of discourse revealed and how this discourse influences the response of policymakers to security cooperation with the EU.

Having outlined the research design and methodology intended to address the research questions in line with the overall theoretical framework, the next chapter begins part two of this thesis by presenting the findings of the first case study; an analysis of US elite discourse on the EU in conventional security matters.
This chapter presents the results of the first of two case studies examining US Elite Discourse on the EU as a Security Actor. The case relates to elite discourse on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the period 1992-2012. This policy field approximates most closely to “conventional security” as defined in the conceptual framework. The key questions for the analysis were: how is EU case 1 portrayed in elite discourses? What are the main discursive strategies and linguistic devices used? How do these discourses relate to each other? How closely do narratives align with ideological and institutional cleavages among the elite?

The analysis will show that elite narratives diverged considerably in this case and that ideology and institutional context provide a useful interpretive framework to explain this diversity of ideas. While all actors shared – to varying degrees of emphasis – a view of the EU as economically, politically and demographically weak and in decline, liberal and official actors were more disposed to describe the EU as a valued and effective partner. By contrast, conservative analysts drew opposing conclusions from the shared starting point of European weakness, instead viewing further European security integration as
menacing to US interests. The themes and language revealed in the analysis echoes some of the long-running concerns of US discourse in the post-war era: low expenditure on military capabilities, a lack of conviction or credibility in security integration efforts and an anxiety that European security integration diminishes US influence.

The institutional reform of CSDP was the focus of intense debate on both sides of the Atlantic at the time, as analysts clashed over whether institutional reforms would lead to significant evolution of EU foreign policy and the emergence of the EU as an effective security actor. More than any other topic related to Europe and security (including negotiations with Iran, Balkans crises, Iraq War or individual CSDP missions), the debate over the significance of institutional reform of CSDP continues to provoke a high volume of detailed analysis by American writers. Therefore, this case provides us with the ideal sources for an in-depth qualitative content analysis of US elite discourse on the EU’s emergent security identity.

**Chapter Outline**

This chapter opens with the legal and policy context for EU action in the field of CSDP (6.1). A review of the institutional reforms introduced since the Lisbon Treaty in this area will be presented with particular attention given to the policy framework for action, which is characterised by strongly intergovernmentalism.

36 For academic discussions on the significance of CSDP reforms in this period see Pape 2005; Art 2006; Posen 2006, Howorth 2007, Burwell et al 2006, Sloan 2000. For official statements illustrating elite concern at CSDP development see speeches of William Taft (US Permanent Representative to NATO), February-March 1991; Reginald Bartholomew (Under Secretary of State) memorandum to European Governments, February 1991; US Dept. of Defence Defence Planning Guidance Memorandum, 18 February 1992; Remarks of US Permanent Representative to NATO on the subject of EU military autonomy (reported by Judy Dempsey in “NATO urged to challenge European defence plan”, The Financial Times, 17 October 2003.)

37 By contrast, more specific policy questions such as the role of the EU in the negotiations with Iran over its uranium enrichment program (a major aspect of CFSP) may be significant topics of interest for analysts in Europe. In the US however, an analysis of 44 articles produced by two leading think tanks found only 12 sentences that referred to EU action in this area. Given that a fundamental requirement of a qualitative content analysis is a significant number of texts which the scholar can analyse, taking the EU’s negotiations with Iran as a case would be highly problematic. Similarly, given the dominance of the CSDP institutional reform debate within US elite discourse on the EU, it would be difficult to justify its exclusion from this research project.
features. This background will give context for the case study - distinguishing it from the legal and policy context of the other case - and also demonstrate its salience as a central topic of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor.

The second, third and fourth sections of this chapter will present each of the three narratives discovered by the QCA (5.2, 5.3, 5.4). Each section will analyse the thematic representation of the EU's conventional security action in the texts examined, with references to constituent sub-themes and key events which sources highlight as noteworthy. The analysis will highlight a number of broad trends during the time period; most importantly a shift away from “Europhobia” that was prevalent among official actors in the early years of CSDP. The primary aims are to understand the ideas and events which sources use to express their perception of the EU as a conventional security actor; how these discourses have changed over time and the key differences in content which create discursive borders between these narratives. Quotations from two batteries of interviews will be used where appropriate: to provide a richer insight into particular themes; or where the interviewees themselves reflexively noted discursive boundaries in perceptions of the EU as security actor.

The conclusions will review the findings, highlighting the key differences and trends to be analysed more deeply in chapters 6, 7, and 8. The variation in discourse across the cases (that is, the way in which discourse varies according to the “internal dimension”: policy competence exercised) and variation between the embedded cases (how discourse varies according to the “external dimension”: conservative or liberal analysts, public or private official communications) will be compared throughout the empirical chapters.
5.1 Policy and legal context – CSDP

Conventional security is taken to refer to matters related to traditional foreign policy and the security of states: what are generally viewed as “high politics” matters, usually the preserve of sovereign states (Keukelaire and MacNaughtan, 2008). CSDP can be seen as a sub-field within conventional security, encompassing joint civilian and military missions conducted by EU member states abroad (Howorth, 2007). The institutional context for CSDP is one where decision-making is monopolised by member states operating on the basis of unanimity and where the autonomy of common institutions is constrained. CSDP’s institutional context is the most intergovernmental of EU policy domains; reflected in its status as a “special” competence, as distinct from an exclusive or shared competence. This section will introduce the place of CSDP within the Union’s policy framework and its intergovernmental nature by employing a legal analysis of the treaty provisions together with a review of recent developments in the institutional framework for action. Because the long-term development of the EU’s security action has been reviewed in some detail in the introductory chapter of this thesis, this section will take the reforms of Lisbon Treaty as its starting point.

CSDP is described by the Treaties as “...an integral part of the common foreign and security policy,”38 Accepting this legal definition of the place of CSDP as a core component part of CFSP, we must therefore relate the development of CSDP to the broader movements in EU foreign and security policy. Indeed, the repetition of the words “common” and “security” in both fields indicate a similar level of ambition and of substantive policy concern. Because this field and sub-field are difficult to isolate from each other in policy discourse and because we cannot understand the genesis of CSDP in a vacuum, the analysis includes commentary on the development of CFSP where appropriate; when sources treat the policy areas as synonymous.

38 Art 42 (TEU)
The original objective of CFSP and CSDP, as stated in the Treaties, was for the Union to “assert its identity on the international scene”\textsuperscript{39}. The treaties further declare an ambition that the policies would lead to a “common defence” and announce that in the implementation of these policies, the objective of the member states is “...that the Union is able to assert its interests and values...”\textsuperscript{40}

These treaty excerpts reveal CSDP as a field with multiple purposes; both practical and ideational. As its title implies, CSDP aims to progressively strengthen modes of cooperation between member states on security and defence matters, leading ultimately to a common defence\textsuperscript{41}. But the treaty articles also mark out CSDP as one of the central tools employed for the EU to project a role for itself internationally. Scholars have identified the cognitive function of foreign policy; as a tool to create or transform national identity. Foreign policy pronouncements therefore constitute: “processes changing sense of self and an evolving set of intersubjective beliefs.” (Tonra 2007; 2). This intersubjective identity-construction function is explicitly acknowledged in the treaty text. The Union explicitly identifies CSDP as performing an identity \textit{assertion} role; “asserting” the Union’s “interests and values” on the World stage. The text suggests that its authors acknowledged that the policy would focus - at least in part - on generating an idea of a European security identity, which other international actors could engage with. The policy is presented as the Union’s own contribution to global discourse on its security identity. The question arises: how did other significant actors perceive or more specifically, talk about, this new security actor?

\textbf{Institutional reforms}

Already by the early 1990s, the failure of the Union to match its grand ambitions of “common” foreign policy with resolute action had led scholars to critique a capability-expectations gap” (Hill, 1993). Despite reforms in the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties, this persistent gap led policymakers to explore

\textsuperscript{39} Ex. Art. 2 TEU (Common Provisions), pre-Lisbon Treaty text.  
\textsuperscript{40} Articles 24 and 32, TEU.  
\textsuperscript{41} The concept of “common defence” has caused significant controversy in public debates about European integration but here remains undefined, arguably reflecting the lack of consensus among member states on what appropriate form such an arrangement might take.
further institutional engineering in the Lisbon Treaty to address the disappointing performance of EU efforts in foreign policy and security. The Treaty made no fewer than twenty-five amendments dealing with CFSP and CSDP (of a total of sixty-two) to the Treaties (Howorth, 2012). Once fully ratified in 2009, the Treaty boosted the position of High Representative, making the holder a vice-president of the Commission as well as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This double-hatting of the position as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and simultaneously Vice-President of the European Commission (HRVP) was designed to ensure seamless coordination of foreign and security policy between the European institutions, as the Council remained in full control of CFSP and CSDP, while the Commission retained control of external policies such as enlargement, development aid and the neighbourhood policy (Helwig, 2012). The HRVP gains the right of initiative in CFSP (Article 18. 2,3 TEU), represents CFSP externally and also participates in the European Council. The HRVP was allocated resources to create an EU diplomatic corps, known as the European External Action Service (EEAS).

In defence matters – narrowly defined - there are three significant reforms included in the Lisbon Treaty (Verola 2010: 47, 48):

1. The use of military as well as civilian means is now foreseen in the pursuit of the Petersberg Tasks.
2. Following a unanimous vote, a sub-group of states can take on a larger role in defence through the provisions for “Permanent Structured Cooperation”.
3. The Treaty introduced a form of mutual defence clause, although the “assistance” requirement it introduces is somewhat vague.

In addition to rebranding ESDP as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Treaty also reaffirms a number of general principles such as; obligations to the United Nations (Art. 3;5, 21;1, TEU), the specific character of member state defence policies (Art. 42;7) and national responsibility for defence
All of these provisions have the effect of delineating CFSP and CSDP as constrained by member-state preferences.

**The persistence of Intergovernmentalism**

In spite of institutional revisions to EU security policy in Maastricht (1990), Amsterdam (1999) and Lisbon (2009) the treaty provisions have been consistent in stating that CFSP and CSDP (the rebranded ESDP) are not “common” in the sense of “first pillar” communitarian policies, rather EU security action takes place within its own “special” form of competence (Bindi, 2009). This “special” form of competence is distinctly intergovernmental in character and this is revealed by the specific rules iterated in the Treaties (Article 24, TEU). Three key features illustrate the intergovernmentalist nature of CSDP:

1. Policy measures are defined and implemented by the European Council and Foreign Affairs Council (composed of member state representatives) rather than by supranational institutions, such as the European Commission. In more communitarian policy areas (such as Trade or the Common Commercial Policy) the Commission has the exclusive right of initiative.

2. The dominant decision-making rule in the European Council and FAC is unanimity, not Qualified Majority Voting, as is the norm in most other areas of EU competence. This gives all states a veto in almost all measures in CFSP or CSDP.

3. Other European institutions have minimal engagement or oversight over CFSP and CSDP. The European Parliament is consulted periodically and must consent to international agreements. The Treaties prohibit the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from ruling on most matters related to CFSP or CSDP, or the application of the “flexibility clause” to matters in this area. (Verola 2010: 47).

These three factors mark out CSDP as among the least integrated and most intergovernmental of EU policy fields. The Treaty provisions reveal the desire of member states to retain a large degree of control over security action and a
determination to prevent any form of competence creep on the part of European institutions in this domain. The lack of autonomy on the part of supranational institutions and the unanimity requirement in decision-making have acted as brakes on the emergence of truly effective and responsive European security action (Peterson, Byrne, Helwig 2012). The essentially intergovernmentalist nature of CFSP and CSDP is clearly acknowledged by scholars in the field, who note that this policy domain is “...clearly subject to different rules and procedures from the other activities of the EU. It therefore remains a second pillar as it was before.” (Piris 2010; 260).

Much of the institutional redesign appeared to have complicated matters. As neither an institution, nor a Commission agency, the EEAS became an arena for turf-battles and institutional wrangles. Confronted by the Commission's prerogatives in the communitarian fields of external relations while CFSP and CSDP remain intergovernmental, the HRVP found her capacities limited by bureaucratic politics and the reluctance of member states to cede authority. After over forty years of institutional experimentation, concerted foreign policy action remained constrained: “reducing the capability-expectations gap is now mainly a matter of Member States' political will to use the potential of institutional innovation” (Helwig 2013, 241).

CSDP also appeared to be hampered by a “political and strategic ambiguity” at the heart of its construction (Bickerton 2011; 61). Critics noted that in spite of general aspirations, the ultimate goal of CSDP had never been spelled out; “a studied imprecision about the eventual destination has ... been essential to the process of ESDP” (Heisbourg, 2000; 5). This ambiguity was identified by some as the reason behind disappointing performance: “ESDP was launched without an agreed concept, without any open discussion on the threats to be faced or the appropriate actions to be taken” (Wallace, 2005: 5). One prominent US think tank analyst, who later became an assistant secretary of state for European affairs, also noted the absence of shared strategic goals and enabling political instruments, remarking that “from an American perspective, CSDP has, so far, been more about process than it has been about results” (Gordon, 2004; 215).
Scholars have therefore identified a number of shortcomings in CSDP’s development: unwieldy and complex institutional structures, strategic ambiguity and divergent political interests. Although successive treaty revisions have endeavoured to reengineer institutional structures to boost performance, the persistence of political and strategic deficiencies appears to have precluded effective EU responses to many real-life security crises.

In spite of these difficulties and shortcomings, the Union had some success stories within these fields. In CSDP, well over 20 missions were launched over the course of 10 years, across three continents - although most of these were civilian in nature (Grevi, Helly and Keohane, 2009). These missions were not confined to the European continent, with CSDP missions deployed in Chad, DR Congo, Somalia, Libya and Afghanistan (Peterson, Byrne and Helwig, 2012). Scholars noted that CSDP had emerged as a surprisingly successful asset in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit, describing it as “One of the rare recent success stories of European integration ... a light in the darkness.” (Keukelaire 2010: 51) and “...one of the most dynamic policy fields of the EU” (Mauer 2013: 371).

**Discourse findings**

Given this policy and legal context, how would the promise of an effective global presence for the EU, buttressed by CSDP, be perceived by the American foreign policy community? Having outlined the institutional reforms and legal developments in CSDP in the timeframe 1992-2012, the chapter will now move on to present the findings of the QCA of US elite discourse on CSDP in this period. As described in the research design and methodology chapter, the robustness of these findings are substantiated by a number of measures:

- Analysis of narrative themes is presented alongside relevant quotes from texts to render the interpretive process transparent to the reader.
- Quantitative content analysis tools were used as an auxiliary method to test the robustness of the QCA analysis.
• Finally, QCA findings are presented alongside select quotes from the two batteries of interviews conducted with members of the US foreign policy community in April 2011 and June 2013. Where relevant, the interviewees’ reflexive comments on features of US elite discourse are also presented.

The analysis of the seventy-four texts in this corpus reveals three distinct public narratives. The manner in which different cleavages map onto this pattern of discourse provides us with an interesting picture of the competing domestic sub-groups, each vying to advance a particular vision of CSDP. The concepts were broadly divided into three narrative accounts of the EU in this policy field (see Fig. 5.1 below) based on an interpretive analysis of the texts, which indicated the prevalence of 59 sub-themes. Themes discovered during the QCA that had only single occurrences (23) were excluded from the analysis, leaving 26 substantive sub-themes, which were then grouped into the three narrative accounts overleaf.
**Narrative 1: EU as weak and in decline**

**Themes:**
1. Political and economic weakness – including criticisms of decision-making, leadership, foreign policy, economic and demographic trends (82 references coded in 27 texts)
2. Weak military capabilities (30 references coded in 19 texts)
3. Disunity (37 references coded in 15 texts)

**Sources:** Themes are prominent in all source sub-groups.

**Narrative 2: EU as a valued partner**

**Themes:**
1. Shared values and interests (48 references in 16 texts)
2. Welcoming Lisbon and supporting integration (59 references in 20 texts)
3. The effectiveness of CSDP (29 references in 17 texts)

**Sources:** Officials, liberal analysts.

**Narrative 3: EU as a menace to US interests**

**Themes:**
1. Safeguarding NATO's pre-eminence (28 references in 12 texts)
2. CSDP integration as threatening to American interests (70 references in 20 texts).

**Sources:** Mainly conservative analysts. Theme 1 found among official sources in the earlier half of the timeframe.

It should be noted that while the second and third narratives appear to present conflicting perceptions of the EU, which diverged along ideological and bureaucratic cleavages within the corpus of texts, the first narrative was prevalent – to varying degrees - among all source sub-groups. This is a notable finding as the expression of particular themes in texts produced by authors in widely differing ideological and bureaucratic positions indicates a high degree of discursive dominance. Such discursive dominance tends to result in beliefs that
actors hold to be “accepted knowledge” or “common sense,” that sets the parameters for policy responses deemed plausible or acceptable.

The comparative chapter will analyse variation in the discourse according to the embedded cases or “external variables”: conservative/liberal analysts, official/unofficial actors, public/private official discourse as well as between the two cases themselves – the “internal variable”: policy competence level. The purpose of the following sections is to present the ideational content of each of the narratives and their constituent sub-themes, as revealed by the qualitative content analysis.

5.2 Discourse 1: The EU as weak and in decline

“The brutal fact is that western Europe, and increasingly central Europe, remains largely an American protectorate, with its allied states reminiscent of ancient vassals and tributaries.”

- Zbigniew Brzezinski, former US national security advisor.42

The dominant narrative within this case presents the EU as growing progressively weaker in several dimensions; decision-making structures, leadership, economic prospects, social models, demographics, military capabilities and unity of purpose. The discourse of weakness therefore encompasses a broad critique of Europe’s economic, political, social and military foundations. It is noteworthy that descriptions of the EU’s security role and CSDP missions are addressed within such wide appraisals of European weakness. The most detailed appraisals of CSDP’s development describe specific CSDP missions, which are compared unfavourably with NATO missions. But European contributions to NATO are also described as insubstantial and unacceptably low. Most of the analysis does not address specific CSDP missions, instead reviewing the record of Europe’s security development and drawing conclusions about the future of European security integration and what this means for US interests.

There are three themes linked with this discourse:

1. Political and economic weakness – including criticisms of decision-making, leadership, foreign policy, economic and demographic trends (82 references coded in 27 texts)
2. Weak military capabilities (30 references coded in 19 texts)
3. Disunity (37 references coded in 15 texts)

**Political and economic weakness**

The National Intelligence Council’s “Global Trends” surveys in 2000 and 2010 introduce the notion of internal weakness as the source of shortcomings in external foreign policy impact. Furthermore, the NIC’s analysis suggests this weakness may even precipitate the dissolution of the EU itself. The NIC’s report in 2000 suggests that demographic trends and “the welfare state” will undermine the EU’s ability to assert itself internationally by 2020:

*Either European countries adapt their work forces, reform their social welfare, education, and tax systems, and accommodate growing immigrant populations (chiefly from Muslim countries), or they face a period of protracted economic stasis.*


The report describes European social welfare models as “unsustainable” and likely to come under further pressure arising from “the lack of any economic revitalization”. These negative trends are directly linked with the likely failure of the EU to pursue its goals in international politics: “these could lead to the splintering or, at worst, disintegration of the European Union, undermining its ambitions to play a heavyweight international role” (ibid). Ten years later, the NIC’s group of analysts expressed similar expectations for Europe's “relative decline” by 2030.

Analysts in liberal think tanks also share a concern for the EU’s economic weakness. In an interview about the EU’s role in security matters in 2013, Fiona Hill, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, said that elite opinion had moved from a fear of European integration
to a fearing “the prospect of the EU’s disappearance,” (Hill 2013). Many analysts see the political elements of European weakness as longstanding and cite important historical events as evidence for these tendencies. As a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution in 1997, Philip Gordon published an article in the journal “International Security” entitled “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy” where he outlined institutional shortcomings and policy disappointments in the early years of CSDP and concluded that the EU would remain a weak and subordinate partner of the US.

Mr Gordon’s examples of European political and institutional weakness are drawn mainly from the period of the Clinton administration, when he served as Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council. His account of elite perceptions of the EU under the Clinton presidency provides an important historical record of the evolution of official views of European security integration within a Democratic administration, at a time of significant change in EU foreign policy. The account is frank and critical: likely owing to Mr Gordon’s position outside of government at the time of writing.

In a description of President Clinton’s leading role in negotiating a peace agreement for former Yugoslavia, Mr Gordon cites what he says was a commonly-held view expressed by one senior official at the time: "Unless the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done." That same official is later quoted during another Clinton-led intervention in a European security crisis - this time in the Aegean – saying that Europeans were "literally sleeping through the night" as President Clinton mediated the dispute on the phone. Mr Gordon’s descriptions suggest that the administration was becoming increasingly disappointed with the EU’s inability to deliver on its foreign and security policy ambitions throughout the 1990s:

43 At the time of writing, CSDP had yet to be formally launched. Mr Gordon’s text was produced shortly after member states agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty to undertake shared security and military duties – known as “the Petersberg Tasks”. Mr Gordon went on to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Obama administration for four years (2009 – 2013).
Five years after the European Union (EU) had signed a treaty announcing the creation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the perception had begun to emerge … that the EU’s efforts had failed. (Ibid)

The EU’s shortcomings in “unity, credibility and military power” had become so widely criticised by the late 1990s, that most pro-Europeans in the administration had lost hope of an improvement: “Those who had hoped in 1991 that the EU's CFSP would be worthy of such a name - and there were plenty of them at the time - have been largely disappointed.” (Ibid)

Mr Gordon’s assessment acknowledges the EU’s effectiveness in trade and humanitarian aid policies but points to a foreign policy that is “weak and fragmented … dependent on US leadership” and exercising “vastly underdeveloped military force projection capability” as cause for scepticism of any claims of foreign policy ability. According to Mr Gordon, these shortcomings mean the EU will continue as “a relatively minor diplomatic actor in the wider world, and unable to deal with security crises even on its own periphery.” (Ibid)

Mr Gordon cites a “culture of security dependency” as a cause for the EU’s lack of military resources and in a final appraisal of institutional considerations, the paper concludes that CFSP has not improved the EU’s foreign policy potential in any significant way:

Judged by any of the possible criteria for “progress” discussed earlier - degree of unity of member states, ability to act globally, ability to intervene militarily, crisis reaction, or even presentation of policy - CFSP has not been significantly better than EPC.

Officials in Republican administrations also expressed similar concerns in later years. Richard Haass, who held a number of positions under President George H.W. Bush and President George W. Bush, wrote an article in the Financial Times in 2010 entitled “Goodbye to Europe as a High-Ranking Power”44. At the time of publication, Mr Haass was President of the Council on Foreign Relations (coded

as liberal). The context for Mr Haass’ article is not the Clinton administration’s disappointment with CFSP in the 1990s but the failure of European leaders to halt the financial crisis which began in 2009.

The European project is foundering. Greece is the most pronounced problem, one brought about by its own profligacy and a weak EU leadership that permitted it to live beyond its means and violate the terms under which the euro was established. But the crisis was made worse by German dithering, and initially timid responses from European institutions and governments. The euro could be one of the casualties.

- Haass, 2010. [emphasis added]

Mr Haass criticises an elite preoccupation with institutional reform in the context of public antipathy: “repeated rejections of the Lisbon treaty demonstrate that a united Europe no longer captures the imagination of many of its residents.” (CFR Haass 2010). Mr Haass sums up the constituent elements of weakness as political, economic and military and offers a pessimistic prognosis for Europe’s world power status:

The combination of structural economic flaws, political parochialism and military limits will accelerate this transatlantic drift. A weaker Europe will possess a smaller voice and role ... rarely, if ever, will the US look to either Nato or the EU as a whole. Even before it began, Europe’s moment as a major world power in the 21st century looks to be over.


Mr Haass’ comments echo closely those of another CFR report from 2007, which highlighted “divided electorates ... weak governments ... shortfalls in unity and military capability” (Kupchan, 2007). A 2004 report for the CFR by several former senior officials warned that the task of forging a common European security policy and the assets required would be sidelined by the need to absorb ten new member states. (Kupchan, Kissinger, Summers, 2007). The recurrent constituent elements of weakness – economic, political and military - are remarkable for their consistency across all the sources in this period.
Finally, a concern with economic weakness and decline led some analysts to speculate that the resulting political tensions would have a “negative impact on [the EU’s] foreign policy” (Vaisse, 2012). Analysts cited the financial crisis as a factor preventing the EU from responding to security crises in North Africa and from investing in falling defence budgets (Ibid). Other analysts spoke openly of a fear of Europe’s collapse. This theme was most evident in the period after 2008, when the debt crisis in the Eurozone became a major topic of public debate. In the light of the negative trends in economics, demographics, politics and institutions described by writers since the 1990s, some spoke openly of the Eurocrisis as the final blow to the EU’s survival: “The US views the EU as an asset and is concerned about the prospect of the EU’s disappearance” (Hill, 2012).

**Military weakness:**

While there are many sides to the narrative of European weakness – economic performance, declining demographic trends, struggling welfare systems – Europe’s military weakness is the most commonly found element across all sources (30 references coded in 19 texts). The primary focus of writers was the relatively low military spending by European countries as a percentage of GDP compared to US defence spending, and the decline in investment since the end of the Cold War. This is not to say writers considered European investment in military capabilities was sufficient before 1989: military spending in Europe was “inadequate, now pathetic,” (Carpenter and Tupy, 2010). Low defence spending, inflexible military resources and small and ineffective missions are at the core of the narrative of weakness in European defence in general and CSDP in particular. These complaints are commonly expressed by conservative and liberal analysts, by officials in Democratic and Republican administrations, in public and in private. The theme’s prominence across all cleavages examined is a notable finding but the conclusions that sources derive from these observations often diverge – this will be explored subsequently in the comparative chapter.

Writers in conservative think tanks use particularly dismissive language to emphasise the shortcomings of CSDP missions in resources and size. CSDP missions are described as “pathetic” (Carpenter and Tupy, 2010), “laughable”
“lacklustre” (McNamara, 2010) or “a flop ... a complete failure” (Ibid). Luke Coffey at the Heritage Foundation refers specifically to the CSDP training mission for Malian armed forces (EUTM Mali): “In Mali, European countries have been able to scrape together only 150 instructors to train the Malian military.” (Coffey, 2013). The same author contrasts the scale of EUTM Mali with NATO’s mission in Afghanistan: “Every 12 hours, NATO spends the same amount training the Afghans that the EU will spend all year on training the Malian Army.” (Ibid.). In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, one Heritage Foundation analyst described the EU's police training mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) as: “a staggering failure”. (McNamara, 2010). The failure of the EU's member states to deploy a CSDP mission in Libya during the Arab Spring is described as “a joke”.

Perhaps in recognition of the fact that CSDP capabilities are a function of member state decisions to allocate military resources between NATO, CSDP missions and elsewhere, the criticism of European weakness is broadened out to include European defence capabilities in general. In his lengthy article entitled “EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Europe's Security”, Luke Coffey criticises the performance of the European countries who “were literally running out of munitions” during the NATO air campaign in Libya (Ibid). European countries participating in the NATO mission in Afghanistan are described as “running for the exit” (Ibid). These individual disappointments are seen as the outcome of poor investment decisions and inflexible armed forces, made by a Europe which is “not pooling its weight”:

*European countries collectively have more than two million men and women in uniform, yet, by some estimates only 100,000—a mere 5 percent—of them have the capability to deploy outside national borders.*

- Ibid.

These shortcomings echo complaints about low defence spending which – as outlined in the literature review chapter – have dominated US discourse on European security since the end of the war. The twin problems of low defence spending and inflexible militaries lead Heritage analysts to argue forcefully
against EU defence integration. In her “backgrounder” note, entitled “EU Foreign Policymaking Post-Lisbon: Confused and Contrived”, Ms McNamara warns: “The construction of EU defense and security arrangements in the absence of genuine credibility and military capacity is a recipe for disaster and an invitation to provocation.” (McNamara, 2010)

Europe's defence expenditure is viewed as an inadequate and rapidly diminishing pool of resources. In this context, spending on CSDP missions is portrayed as wasteful and contrary to the US objective of sharing the burden of defence more equally within NATO: “The CSDP has not resulted in greater defense resources or more troops, however. Rather, it has allowed EU member states to further reduce defense spending on the grounds that pooled resources will go further.” (McNamara, 2011). Not only do CSDP missions consume diminishing resources which would be better spent on NATO, the institutions of CSDP themselves are purported to be incompatible with NATO participation:

The acceleration of EU defense integration encouraged by the Lisbon Treaty should be worrying for U.S. policymakers and leaders, especially in the Department of Defense ... membership of the alliance prohibits EU–NATO cooperation. [emphasis added]

- Coffey, 2013.

Official sources are only marginally less critical than conservative analysts of European defence spending, although not since the late 1990s have any officials identified CSDP per se as a direct threat to NATO. In a much remarked upon speech delivered in Brussels shortly before the end of his term in 2010, US Secretary for Defence Robert Gates, warned of “a dim, if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance”. His objection was to “the demilitarization of Europe: where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it ... an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st [century]” (Gates, 2010)

Secretary Gates’ speech was primarily related to the future of NATO but the central issue was low defence spending and what this means for European
security. Several interviewees referred to the Gates speech as an expression of widely felt frustration at Europe’s unwillingness to spend more on defence (McNamara, Kamgar, Doherty, Wierichs). Secretary Gates’ successor, Leon Panetta, described the speech as “a strong message to Europe about the need to boost its commitment to defense and more equitably share the security burden with the United States” (Panetta, 2011). One conservative analyst said the secretary's speech “made it clear that US taxpayers cannot be expected to foot the bill for Europe’s security in perpetuity, and that eventually patience will run out.” (Interviews, 2013)

Liberal analysts expressed their agreement with Secretary Gates’ speech, adding to the undeniable consensus in Washington that Europe was not investing appropriately in its defence and that its weakness made it a burden on the US. Clara O’Donnell at the Brookings Institute warned that “The latest wave of European military spending cuts is swelling the ranks of Americans who believe that Europeans are not contributing enough to global security” (O'Donnell, 2012). In a subsequent interview for this thesis, Ms O'Donnell confirmed that this belief was viewed as the primary challenge for European security integration within US foreign policy circles (Interview, 2013). Former official Richard Haass, now at the Council on Foreign Relations, repeated the criticisms: “Few European states are willing to devote even 2 per cent of their budgets to defence; and what they spend their money on makes little sense.” (CFR Haass 2010).

According to liberal analysts, the economic crisis only exacerbated the problem of Europe’s military weakness in the years following the Gates speech:

_The exasperation that Washington has expressed with its European partners who ignored former Secretary Gates’ departing exhortation to spend a realistic budgetary percentage on defense – has now turned to resignation._


These analysts also tie Europe’s low defence spending to a lack of capacity and credibility of CSDP missions: “EU member states simply do not have the
personnel and military assets needed to undertake a substantial expansion of their missions abroad." (Kupchan, 2008)

Without exception, all analysts and policymakers identified low defence spending as an obstacle to an effective EU security role and few saw any prospect of this changing. One senior state department official said the key obstacles to “better defense spending” were “outmoded procurement rules, protectionism and competing industrial interests” in the European defence market. (Interview no. 14, 2013). The consistency of American criticism of Europe’s “inadequate” defence spending is striking across the timeframe of this study. It is hard to find substantial differences in tone, content or argumentation between Secretary Gates’ speech and that of Philip Gordon, writing in the late 1990s: “There is no sign, moreover, that Europeans are prepared to do very much about their military dependence on the United States.” (Gordon, 1997). The message is the same from officials in Republican and Democrat administrations. Colin Powell, Secretary of State during the George W. Bush administration, remarked in 2001: “There has been too much of a reduction in European defense budgets in recent years ... they need to increase their investment in defense efforts.” (Powell, 2001).

**Disunity and disarray:**

The third constitutive sub-theme for the narrative of European weakness describes the EU as unable to overcome internal divisions and act decisively on CSDP matters. EU member states are seen as divided along a number of lines: large and small, old and new and generally composed of varying factions, unable to agree on responses to security questions and unwilling to integrate further in this area. Institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are seen as failing to meet expectations, and, according to some, making decision-making more difficult to understand.

As early as 1997, Philip Gordon’s text presented the EU as a “weak and fragmented” diplomatic actor with a “minor” role, “unable to deal with security crises in its periphery” (Gordon, 1997). Analysts from both left and right over the
next 15 years appeared to vindicate Mr Gordon’s view that the EU’s weaknesses would not improve – in American eyes at least. The split between member states during the Iraq crisis is a major landmark event for the theme of disunity. Secretary for Defense, Donald Rumsfeld’s widely reported remarks describing Europe as divided between “old” and “new” member states became a reference point for many who saw NATO and the EU as weak and divided:

Now, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently - what is it? Twenty-six, something like that? - you’re right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem.


Throughout the 2000s, conservative analysts regularly pointed to the Iraq War split as evidence of Europe’s chronic disunity:

The Europeans remain critically divided on the seminal issue of war and peace. Regarding what to do about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the fundamental issue of the past 18 months, one sees a complete lack of coordination at the European level.


A year later, the same writers used almost identical language – describing a “complete lack of coordination” on “the fundamental issue of the past few years” (Hulsman and Gardiner, 2005). These conservative writers argued that strategic unity was impossible without unity among the larger member states: “The notion that Europe has one voice or is united in outlook is a myth ... the great European powers rarely agree” (Ibid).

Much analysis of the EU’s effectiveness in security matters from the late 2000s onwards related to the reforms contained within the Lisbon Treaty. The impact of the Lisbon Treaty reforms to CFSP and CSDP was a major topic within all narratives. The difference in opinion over the effectiveness in Lisbon is therefore a major dividing line between the narratives. During a panel session at the
Brookings Institution, Justin Vaisse summarised the frustrated expectations of liberal analysts regarding the Lisbon reforms:

_In the years leading to the Lisbon Treaty and after the Lisbon Treaty was adopted there was a hope that there would be more unity but also more common action. What we saw in 2011 was not going in this direction._

- Vaisse, 2012.

Mr Vaisse observed that the External Action Service had not had “a very good year”. He noted that the High Representative had been criticised for “her personal lack of interest in all security issues and pushing forward CSDP,” (ibid). Many interviewees said that promises of a “leap forward” in the EU’s international capacity had not materialised after the Lisbon Treaty was ratified and added that this disappointment had created a sense of resignation about Europe’s “decline”. One former assistant secretary of state in a Republican administration described the disappointment in an interview:

“I’m surprised [the Europeans] aren’t more embarrassed by how little has been achieved. You know everyone was going around saying ‘Oh the Lisbon Treaty is coming, everything is going to get better, we’re going to have a stronger voice.’ And you know, clearly very little of that has actually happened.”

- Interview 18, 2013.

More than just a disappointment, one senior advisor in the State Dept under the Obama administration, said Lisbon had made the EU a more complicated and confusing security partner: “Lisbon has made things worse; the institutions are harder to figure out now, it’s more complicated, it’s more difficult to pin down where responsibility lies.” (Interview 15, 2011)

Conservative analysts echoed this private statement by a democrat appointee, arguing that Lisbon exacerbated the EU’s disunity on security questions; “Lisbon delivered bureaucratic confusion rather than continental clarity … Ashton found herself limited both by the demands of member governments and the newly empowered European Parliament” (Bandow, 2010). Much of the conservative
criticism of the EU’s post-Lisbon security capabilities was directed at Catherine Ashton, who faced criticism for her “lack of stature” and inexperience on both sides of the Atlantic (McNamara, EUFP, 2010). The same writer describes EU decision-making on CSDP matters as an area where “confusion remains rife” (McNamara, Congressional testimony, 2010). The Treaty had created “an institutional hydra” which had created “confusion and inaction” (Ibid). Ms McNamara’s description of the post-Lisbon CSDP architecture depicts the policy field as chaotic, incoherent, even monstrous. It should be noted at this point, that while many the discourse of weakness and decline was evident in all sub-groups, the criticism was strongest among conservative analysts. As will be seen in the analysis of Discourse 2, state department officials and liberal analysts were keen to point to Ashton’s successful relationship with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as evidence that Lisbon had brought some benefits.

Several analysts expressed surprise that the creation of new high-level posts in the Lisbon Treaty had not ended the rotating presidency or created a single point of contact at political level. The new structures had not ended what some Americans perceived as a European preoccupation with style over substance. In an interview, one senior advisor described in detail President Obama’s “anger” following the first EU-US Summit in the post-Lisbon environment, held in Portugal:

_The President expected there to be a serious agenda and instead he found himself shaking over thirty different leaders’ hands and posing for pictures. It was a disaster. The President was very unhappy and he made sure that his staff knew that._

- Interview 15, 2011.

Following the incident, the President did not attend the next traditional EU-US bi-annual summit in Spain, citing scheduling commitments. According to the senior advisor, the lack of policy substance at the Portugal Summit gave President Obama the impression than an inability to agree on matters of substance within the EU had made it a venue for superficial summitry: “The White House expects there to be serious work on the agenda and the President isn’t interested in photo opportunities.” (Ibid)
A common starting point but divergent responses:

It may appear strange that liberal analysts and officials should portray the EU as valued and effective on the one hand but also weak and in decline on the other, in a language shared with conservatives (See Fig. 5.1). But holding these two views may not be as contradictory as it might seem. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security advisor, who was quoted in section 5.2 criticising Europe’s security dependence on the US, appears to speak for many US diplomats who lament Europe’s weakness on the one hand but still see potential in transatlantic cooperation on the other.

Acting separately, America can be preponderant but not omnipotent; Europe can be rich but impotent. Acting together, America and Europe are in effect globally omnipotent.


Although Mr Brzezinski wrote these remarks in 2004, arguably in the twilight of America’s “unipolar moment,” his optimism for transatlantic synergies appears to be one in a long-standing strand of liberal American discourse. American transatlanticists in this vein have long complained of European weakness – particularly in defensive terms – while still endorsing a partnership with other values – including legitimacy, shared liberal values and economic ties (Kagan, 2004; 150). While both conservatives and liberals adopt a common starting point in lamenting European weakness and disunity, they diverge on the implications of these shortcomings and the appropriate American response. Section 5.3 and 5.4 explore these two narratives.
**5.3 Discourse 2: EU as a valued and effective partner**

The QCA identified a second narrative within this corpus - primarily identified with liberal analysts, democrat administrations and the second George W. Bush term: the EU as a valued partner. This narrative contains many similar themes to the dominant narrative identified in the QCA of the counter-terrorism cooperation case study:

Sub-themes:

1. Shared values and interests (48 references in 16 texts)
2. Welcoming Lisbon and supporting integration (59 references in 20 texts)
3. The effectiveness of CSDP (29 references in 17 texts)

**Shared values and interests**

Most public statements by US officials on security cooperation with the EU begin by establishing the shared values and interests that underpin the relationship. In referencing this background at the beginning of their speeches, officials are establishing *ethos* with their audience. As a discursive strategy, *ethos* makes an appeal from the speaker’s character – establishing the *locus standi* of the US as a historical sponsor of integration and a trusted partner (Leith 2012; 47). This appeal is the foundation upon which officials can then present criticism or encouragement for specific policy objectives.

Secretary Clinton opened up her speech in 2012 on transatlantic relations with a typical example of this kind of appeal:

*In the democracies of Europe, we find countries with shared strategic and economic interests and with whom we share a long history, deep cultural ties, and cherished values. That makes us natural partners in advancing our interests, both within Europe and throughout the world.*

- Clinton (2012)
Two years previously, Jeremy Shapiro, a senior advisor appointed to the State Dept under the Obama administration told an audience at the Brookings Institution that Europe, more than any other region “shares our values” and “shares our agenda” (Shapiro, 2010).

But US officials in both Republican and Democrat administrations have often had to reassure audiences that US commitment to European integration was not waning. Both President Obama and President Bush stood accused of ignoring or disregarding Europe respectively in their first terms; President Obama was accused of prioritising Asia while President Bush’s commitment was put in doubt by the Iraq crisis. (Levy, Pensky and Torpy, 2005). As a consequence, official discourse is characterised by a “second term juncture” – common to Presidents of both parties - where officials work to convince European partners that they are valued by the White House. As has been noted by John Peterson and Roland Dannreuther, the second Bush term “showed fresh interest in cooperative engagement, particularly with the European Union,” (Dannreuther and Peterson, 2006; 4). As former assistant secretary of state Kurt Volker noted: “It is not an accident that President Bush’s first trip in his second term was to Europe, and the same is true for Secretary of State Rice.” (Volker 2005)

In her European tour soon after the inauguration of George W. Bush’s second term, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice sought to “open a new chapter” in relations with European partners following the strain of the Iraq crisis during President Bush’s first term (Rice, 2005). In a speech before students and staff at the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris, Secretary Rice opened her speech with an emphasis on ethos – this time France and the US’ shared origins: “The history of the United States and that of France are intertwined. Our history is a history of shared values, of shared sacrifice and of shared successes. So, too, will be our shared future,” [emphasis added] (Ibid). The triple repetition, or tricolon, in the use of “shared” uses a common rhetorical tool to establish a sense of commonality and community in the audience’s mind. Finally, the fourth repetition of “shared” in the final sentence places additional emphasis on “the future”, underlining America’s ongoing commitment to transatlantic relations.
This stands in stark contrast with Secretary Rumsfeld’s dismissal of France and Germany as “Old Europe” in his remarks less than two years previously.

Moving beyond the ethos of commonality, Secretary Rice expressed ongoing US support for European integration: “the United States, above all, welcomes the growing unity of Europe. America has everything to gain from having a stronger Europe as a partner in building a safer and better world.” (Ibid). The Secretary underlined that America had “paid dearly” to support “Europe’s transformation and integration - because it was in our interests and because it was so clearly consistent with our values.” (Ibid). The comments suggest that not only does the US share a historic cultural bond with Europe, it has also invested – “paid dearly” – in Europe’s integration project.

Obama’s second term juncture was marked not by disagreement over war but rather European suspicions regarding his stated aim of an “Asia Pivot” – described as realigning “the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests ... towards Asia,” and the conviction “that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly,” (Manyin, 2012). Officials, in particular Secretary Clinton, would repeatedly state that the “Asia pivot” was not a pivot away from Europe and that US support for European integration remained strong. In a speech with striking similarities in ethos to Secretary Rice’s speech seven years earlier, Secretary Clinton opened a seminar by referencing: “shared strategic and economic interests,” and “a long history, deep cultural ties, and cherished values.” (Clinton, 2012.)

This general statement of affinity with “Europe” and “European countries” is almost identical in content to the introductions of speeches on transatlantic relations made in official US texts over all three administrations. The emphasis on commonality and the description of a “natural” partnership implies that both sides are bound by an almost organic or familial connection. The text suggests that the partnership is more than merely political. The partnership is less based on the strategic or instrumental calculations of statecraft and more upon a kind of pseudo-biological bond.
Secretary Clinton directly addresses concerns about shifting US priorities, saying: “let me be clear: Our pivot to Asia is not a pivot away from Europe. On the contrary, we want Europe to engage more...” (Ibid). She references her visits to Europe as a reflection of commitment to Europe: “38 visits to Europe is something that I have been delighted to do because of the importance we place on these relationships,” (Ibid). Liberal analysts speaking at a conference on EU-US relations described the efforts to reassure Europeans in Obama's second term:

*Obama came into office skeptical of Europe. He was supposed to be a post- Atlanticist. There was supposed to be a G2, a condominium with China, and last year he spent a week traveling through Europe giving one message: We love you. You are our main partner.*


Expressions of commitment and general sentiments of commonality in official speeches are usually the prelude to more detailed endorsements of European integration and an explicit welcome for the reforms to CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty. The next section will analyse these more specific statements of integration, which are linked to liberal analysts and most frequently to officials in Democrat administrations, but also to some Republicans.

**Welcoming Lisbon and supporting integration**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a document produced periodically by the White House as a formal expression to Congress of its foreign policy priorities. In practise however, the NSS serves a number of goals including communicating priorities to foreign constituencies, select domestic audiences, creating internal consensus on issues within the executive and shaping the President's approach in both substance and messaging. (Snider, 1995). As such, this document is a landmark statement of strategy, which is drafted as part of multi-departmental process, expresses the considered reflections of the US government on the security issues of the day.

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45When asked whether the number of visits made is an indication of US commitment, state department advisors said that phone calls and personal contacts were a more accurate reflection of US engagement and were keen to point out that Secretary Clinton speaks with HRVP Ashton on a regular basis.
As early as 2002, the NSS expresses support for European security integration. This text garnered controversy for the its elaboration of a doctrine of pre-emptive war, however this controversy distracted many from the robust backing the text gave to CSDP:

_We welcome our European allies’ efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defense identity with the EU, and commit ourselves to close consultations to ensure that these developments work with NATO._

- NSS, Ch. VIII, 2002.

The qualification of support – it is contingent on compatibility with NATO – repeats the policy position staked out by Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright in 1998 (see 6.3). The NSS in later years retains a general support for European security integration, although this is rarely as explicitly linked to CSDP as in the 2002 text: In 2010, the NSS said that the US wished to build on “European aspirations for greater integration” and said that it was “committed to partnering with a stronger European Union to advance our shared goals”. The text linked EU partnership to assisting Eastern European undergoing democratic transition and “pressing issues of mutual concern,” although these remained unspecified. According to at least two interviewees, the diluting of explicit support for CSDP reflected growing scepticism in official circles about the prospects for the EU emerging as a credible security actor in this domain. If we accept this view, 2002 represents a high watermark for explicit endorsement of CSDP by US officials.

Once the Lisbon Treaty had been ratified in 2009, Secretary Clinton’s speeches repeatedly emphasised her support for the newly appointed HRVP, Catherine Ashton. Several interviewees said that the Secretary wished to bolster the HRVP’s position in the face of bitter attacks against Ms Ashton by many European diplomats and commentators (Interviews 7, 8, 12, 15). According to these sources, the discourse of support for HRVP was part of a policy to support the EU’s efforts to boost its international role using the newly formed Lisbon institutions. Clinton’s support was fulsome:
Let me add what a pleasure it has been working with Cathy Ashton. Not only is she a great diplomat and a personal friend, but it is exciting to see the EU becoming a more cohesive voice in world affairs.

- Clinton, 2012.

In her major speech on European security in 2010, Clinton again referenced her close relationship with Ashton and described the EU as “an invaluable and increasingly effective force for global progress.” (Clinton, 2010). In her speech, the Secretary hailed the reforms as bringing “more focus and specific leadership attached to foreign policy, development and security,” and assured her audience that this new leadership would mean “there will be a way to better coordinate” (Ibid). These sentiments were reiterated by the Secretary’s deputy, Philip Gordon, who in a briefing with journalists ahead of her tour, welcomed the Lisbon reforms and drew attention to how politically-invested the Secretary was in her “good working relationship” with “empowered” HRVP Ashton:

The Secretary has had several excellent meetings with High Representative Catherine Ashton, including Baroness Ashton’s visit to Washington, D.C., where she spent a significant amount of time with the Secretary and her other counterparts, and again in London this week. And we look forward to working with her as the empowered High Representative for European Union foreign policy. [emphasis added]


Almost every official serving under the Obama presidency who was interviewed pointed to Clinton’s personal support of Ashton as evidence that the US was committed to engaging with the EU and supporting it in its efforts to be an effective global actor. This strategy is best described by Justin Vaisse in an interview in 2010: “Hillary Clinton has already granted Catherine Ashton consideration and attention, thereby helping to overcome her difficult initial position, and establishing her as an important partner,” (Vaisse, 2010). In public remarks before an audience in London, Philip Gordon described how Clinton and Ashton’s “good working relationship” reflected the EU’s growing role in foreign policy:
Gordon described the pair’s coordination on topics including Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Middle East, Israel and Egypt before telling his audience of the EU’s potential for a global role: “When Europeans put their resources together and have a collective decision-making function they end up playing a major role in the world,” (Gordon, 2013). Throughout his comments to the British press, Assistant Secretary Gordon expressed support for the EU as “an institution which has an increasing voice in the world” and emphasised the importance of continued British membership: “We value a strong European Union … the EU in particular is such a critical partner for the United States on all of these global issues...” (Ibid)

The language used by senior officials on this topic can often be vague – the US values a “strong Europe” which plays a “major role”. Comments about “Europe” can refer to the EU or to NATO or to member states. But in detailed discussions at the Brookings Institution in 2010, State Dept senior advisor Jeremy Shapiro confirmed that the Obama administration supported the EU’s security and defense policies:

“On the question of whether the United States is encouraging - would encourage a common European - by which I take it you mean European Union - defense policy, and the answer is an unequivocal yes.”

- Shapiro, 2010.

Mr Shapiro pointed to the EU’s anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa (EU NAVFOR) as an example of US cooperation with a CSDP mission and confirmed that the US-EU partnership extended beyond “soft” foreign policy issues: “We believe that there’s a very important security dimension to the U.S.-EU relationship, and we hope that there will be more.” (Ibid)
Even opponents of European integration are agreed that the Obama administration supports the development of CSDP – also speaking in 2010, Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation said: “The Obama Administration has given its full backing not just to economic integration - a long-standing U.S. policy - but also to the centralization of defense and security policies,” (McNamara, 2010). Based on the analysis of statements by the Clinton and Bush administrations, it appears that the public support for European security integration expressed by the Obama administration is not the departure from long-standing US policy discourse that McNamara suggests it is. But several analysts described a gradual shift in perceptions - throughout the 1992-2012 period – from official fears of European integration as threatening to NATO, to a belief that security integration, while an uncertain prospect, was in America's interests.

Liberal analyst Fiona Hill described the shift thus: “It wasn’t all that long ago that there was a great deal of fear in the US at the prospect of a United States of Europe. That seems so far-fetched now,” (Hill, 2013). Hill suggested the Obama administration was more concerned by the prospect of “the EU’s disappearance” (Ibid). But this shift in thinking took place gradually over the twenty years covered by the QCA, most notably during the Republican administration where the “Europhobia” of the early Bush years disappeared: “These sort of days of saying all of Europe, don’t get too strong, those are over ... the Bush people came into office skeptical of Europe and they spent their second term as Atlanticists.” (Hill, 2012)

In public, senior officials conceded that US elite attitudes to European security integration had changed from the era of “Europhobia”. In 2003, Secretary Colin Powell described how the early days of ESDI led “some observers” to fear that the US and the EU “would even end up on a collision course” (Powell 2003). Instead, security cooperation had grown: “never has our common agenda been so large and mutually significant - from advancing free trade to joint efforts in counter proliferation,” (Ibid). Six years later, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates –
who had sternly warned against Europe’s low defence spending – suggested that in the context of limited resources, the EU and NATO could cooperate rather than compete on security issues:

> In recent years, there has been a recognition that the EU will not supplant NATO or vice versa – but that both organizations have unique skill-sets that can, if used properly, add up to more than the sum of their individual parts.


Yet the added value of CSDP missions was not unanimously accepted by members of the US foreign policy community, who would disagree – mostly in private – about whether CSDP missions were effective, good value for money, or even threatening to American interests. The next section will explore the third constitutive element of the discourse of the EU as a valued and effective partner: the effectiveness of CSDP.

**The effectiveness of CSDP:**

The third – and least prominent – aspect of this narrative describes the effectiveness of CSDP in detail. Few sources discuss specific CSDP missions in any detail in public comments or texts. It may be that public speeches about European security tend to abstraction and avoid detail, given the audience and purpose of such pronouncements. However it is also possible that even European specialists in the US foreign policy community are simply unaware of these missions or consider them insignificant. When asked in semi-structured interviewees to name specific CSDP missions they thought were effective, only a minority of respondents named a specific mission by name, region or task. However, when officials or liberal analysts mention specific CSDP outcomes or missions in public pronouncements, they are described in positive terms.

> In the Gulf of Aden, an EU naval force protects vulnerable boats from pirates, including the World Food Programme vessels which deliver food to Somali people. In the months to come, the EU will deploy civilians to help the government in Niger reform its security sector (a country where, according to European governments, Islamist militants threaten
EU experts will also soon help improve the security at the international airport in Juba, the capital of newly independent South Sudan.


Interviewees gave more candid and usually less positive impressions of CSDP missions. One State Dept official described her experience working to agree a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, providing the legal and political basis for contributing US civilian personnel to CSDP missions. This was the first attempt at such a personnel transfer and as US military personnel are prohibited from serving under foreign command, a US civilian personnel contribution was a highly significant and sensitive step in EU-US security cooperation. According to the interviewee, officials differed over whether it was valuable for the US to cooperate directly with CSDP missions and were “divided” between EU specialists and NATO specialists (a much larger group in the State Dept) in their attitudes to the FPA. When the agreement was concluded, the first request for US personnel was difficult to fulfil: “They wanted a French speaking American police officer with a specialisation in gender issues and experience in conflict zones. Naturally, this person was very hard to find” (Interview 1). The US did send civilian personnel to EUPOL RD Congo but the interviewee said the experience did not improve perceptions of CSDP in general:

“The entire process of agreeing the memorandum – and many of the delays were on our own side I might add, because there was a lot of scepticism from some quarters about what this would mean – this process was extremely longwinded and it left some people wondering if the outcome justified the effort.”

- Interview 1.

Other officials were more frank in criticising CSDP missions as “not serious” and “not on people’s radar here,” (Interview 19). The same respondent said there was little interest in CSDP among the US foreign policy community in Washington and said leaflets produced by the EU delegation describing CSDP missions were “a waste of ink” (Ibid). Liberal analysts agreed that there was little interest in CSDP missions in Washington – mostly because the scale and size of the missions was seen as insignificant (Interview 21) or because the tasks were
seen as “soft security – things like police training” rather than conflict engagement (Volker). One liberal analyst summed up the view: “When it comes to European defence, the only thing people are interested in is defence spending. Talk about ‘the comprehensive approach’ just doesn’t cut it around here,” (Interview 19). Another senior research fellow said that there were limited career opportunities within think tanks for someone specialised in CSDP missions, or even European security more generally, if they did not have broader interests and expertise (Interview 20). It would appear then, that while officials publicly praise the development of CSDP and are increasingly involved in cooperating in CSDP missions, the results of interviews suggest there is a great deal more scepticism about the effectiveness of CSDP.

5.4 Discourse 3: A menace to US interests.

“For years, the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and particularly the prospects of a robust EU military capability, have constituted a dagger aimed at NATO’s heart.”

- John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN. March 23rd, 2010.47

The third and final discourse discovered during the QCA differs radically from the narrative of the EU as a valued and effective actor on security policy. Instead it argues that security integration in general, and CSDP in particular, pose a threat to American interests. The coherence and compatibility of the range of views expressed within this discourse should not be overestimated. At the moderate ideological end of the spectrum are official sources expressing concern about CSDP, the boundaries between NATO and CSDP and the optimal form that

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security integration should take. These are more commonly found in the earlier half of the timeframe and are less frequently expressed after 2000. On the other, more forceful end are conservative analysts who argue that CSDP is intrinsically hostile to American interests and the NATO alliance. As with the previous discourses analysed, the sources composing this discourse do not all share the same threat-level perception of CSDP and indeed, some welcome its development. The texts have been grouped together within this narrative because the coding process revealed that they articulate a number of common themes and ideas. The following sub-themes compose the narrative:

1. Safeguarding NATO’s pre-eminence (28 references in 12 texts)
2. CSDP integration as threatening to American interests (70 references in 20 texts).

**Safeguarding NATO’s pre-eminence.**

What unites both official and unofficial actors in their comments on CSDP is an overriding concern for the primacy of NATO as the forum for the conduct of transatlantic security. This appears unsurprising, as the US is a member of NATO, and not a member of the EU. NATO has a long track record of dealing with security threats and joint military operations, whereas the EU does not. Word count analysis underlined this preference for NATO regarding security matters; in an article entitled “Advancing Europe’s Security”, Vice-President Joseph Biden referenced NATO 9 times, the O.S.C.E 4 times, and the EU only once (Biden 2010). In a speech given just a few months earlier, entitled “The Future of European Security”, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cautioned that EU military capabilities “should not supplant NATO”, advising that “smarter military expenditure means using the systems we already have in place” (Clinton 2010). While extreme right-wing actors appear to depict the EU threat to NATO in uniquely graphic terms, a concern with the implications of European Security and Defense Policy for NATO’s position as the pre-eminent forum for European security matters is in fact held by almost all the sources analyzed. The variation
therefore seems to arise from differing evaluations of how significant this threat is.

The concern regarding NATO’s primacy, and the threat which European integration might pose, has been to the forefront of US policy towards Europe since at least the 1980s (Smith 2008, Treverton 1985, Joffe 1987). But it received its most memorable expression in an article written by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and published in the Financial Times in December 1998 and in her comments at press conference on December 8th. In an opinion article that would become a touchstone for conservative critics of CSDP, Albright said the US welcomed security integration but cautioned that any such effort within the EU must abide by the “three Ds” principle:

- no duplication of structures that already existed within NATO;
- no discrimination of NATO members that were not EU members;
- no decoupling of the transatlantic link.

Albright’s three-point caution, issued just days after the Franco-British St Malo Declaration - reveals a concern that ESDI might be wasteful at best, and threatening to NATO, at worst. In an interview for this thesis, one former Assistant Secretary of State described the shift from the fear of ESDI in official circles at the time of the “3 Ds” speech to a more sanguine attitude towards security integration:

*In 1997 you know we were really worried about ESDI. You know we were really worried about that meeting in France, in St. Malo. Madeleine was the Secretary of State. We put out this speech you know about the 3Ds. Don’t duplicate, you know, don’t screw this up. We were very concerned about it in 1997, 1998. We were very anxious about NATO, about whether this ESDI would be complementary to NATO.*

- Interview no. 9.

The interviewee was keen to emphasise that these fears dissipated in the following years – in official circles at least:
I would think that today, nobody worries about that anymore. The evolution both in Washington and in Europe is now ‘Please God, more ESDI. Please, more European defence. Please, more European activity on defence,’ I think that what we were worried about in 1997, 1998 really went away with Kosovo. It went away with the NATO summit in 1999 where we got the ESDI piece of this right in the documents, and certainly in the strategic concept.

- Ibid.

However, the QCA revealed that a fear of CSDP as a menace to the US and NATO persisted among conservative analysts, who are strongest in their warnings of the dangers posed and often employed dramatic – even supernatural – imagery to underline their point. At the height of the Iraq War tensions, John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation described “creeping Gaullist attempts” to build CSDP as a gruesome threat: “Like a vampire, European federalist efforts to establish a European defense identity that is separate from and in competition with NATO continue to rise from the dead” (Hulsman, 2003). The following year, Heritage echoed the “3 Ds” terminology used by Albright (McNamara, 2004) and another nine years later, despite widespread disappointment in other sectors about the weak performance of CSDP (See 5.2) Luke Coffey argued that CSDP had “done more harm than good [and] will ultimately weaken the NATO alliance” (Coffey, 2013, Defense Integration).

**CSDP integration as a threat to US interests**

While some liberal analysts expressed disappointment that the Lisbon Treaty had failed to deliver more effective and coherent EU action on security matters (See 5.2), conservative analysts drew the opposite conclusions. According to analysts at the Heritage Foundation, “the supranationalization of defense policy took its greatest leap forward to date with the passage of the Lisbon Treaty.” (McNamara, 2011 “Undercuts”). Commentaries from the conservative think tank between 2010 – 2013, suggest that the Lisbon Treaty reforms move the EU very significantly towards “Federal” security decision-making. In specific terms, the treaty’s provisions for permanent structured cooperation (Art. 42.6, TEU) and the mutual assistance clause (Art 222, TFEU) are highlighted. More broadly, the European Commission gains “a toehold in the area of defense policy” (Coffey,
2012, “Integration”). The Treaty represents “a foreign policy power-grab” (McNamara, 2010) which “consolidates foreign and defense policy power in a way never seen before in the EU.” (Ibid) The ultimate goal of the reforms in the Treaty is to “eventually place EU foreign and defense policy under the control of the EU Commission,” (Ibid).

As outlined in sections 5.1 and 5.2 most liberal analysts and officials identified a shift or “juncture” in US elite perceptions of EU security integration; from the “Europhobia” of the early George W. Bush years - and indeed, on the part of some in the Clinton administration- to a belief that fundamental weaknesses in the EU made its diminished status a greater concern. While it is impossible to pinpoint an exact moment for this shift in mainstream opinion - that is, among most analysts and officials – the beginning of the second Bush administration in 2004 appears to be a general dividing line. After that point, warnings of the dangers of CSDP as a threat to US interests are confined to a marginal narrative from conservative think tanks, most notably the Heritage Foundation. In other words, by the mid-2000s, liberal analysts and official policymakers had broken away from the discourse of CSDP as threatening, leaving a marginal group of conservative analysts isolated in their warnings of CSDP as a menace to NATO.

Analysts from Heritage warn that CSDP represents a “creeping Gaullism”, an “elite-driven centralization tendency” to craft Europe as “a counterbalance” or “rival” to the United States” (Hulsman, 2005; McNamara, 2011). Although there appears to be a contradiction between conservative dismissals of CSDP as “pathetic ... a joke” (Coffey, 2013) and claims that it is also a credible attempt to counter-balance US hegemony, analysts at Heritage moved to portray the EU’s intransigence and military weakness as a drag on US action:

*The purpose behind the project is not a military one, but one of restraining American action on the world stage...the EU is not trying to compete with America in military terms; rather, it is trying to constrain U.S. power by balancing it.*

- Coffey, 2013.
At the very least, CSDP represents an ineffective use of diminishing European defence spending, and as such, is not in NATO’s interests. In her testimony before Congress, Sally McNamara told representatives that CSDP “has provided NATO with little or no valuable complementarity, and the creation of an EU army or a permanent EU military headquarters can only come at NATO’s expense.” (McNamara, 2010). These assessments lead writers in this group to advocate firm opposition to further European foreign policy integration in Washington:

*Those who wish to preserve America’s ability to pursue coalition building must therefore strenuously oppose efforts to increase the level of EU foreign policy integration.*


This narrative strand appears restricted to conservative analysts, and with the exception of former ambassador John Bolton, was not found in texts produced by, or interviews with, any former officials. This narrative strand is therefore best seen as marginal, derived from the broader Eurosceptic perspective of analysts at the Heritage Foundation. Given the influence and resources of the Heritage Foundation however, and its sophisticated lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill, it would be unwise to view this marginal narrative as inconsequential.

### Conclusions

This chapter presented and analysed the results of the QCA on the second case study – US elite discourse on the development of CSDP 1992-2012. The chosen case is a highly relevant area of discussion, encompassing the attempts by European states to increase joint responses and military cooperation in the most conventional forms of state security – often the most controversial area of integration. The analysis revealed three prominent narratives: the EU as weak and in decline, the EU as a valued partner and CSDP as a menace to US interests. Although these narrative accounts appear contradictory in some of their aspects, there were significant overlaps between the sources and each of the narratives. The dominant account of European weakness was found in texts across the embedded cases (officials/analysts, liberals/conservatives) – indicating a level of
acceptance as “common knowledge” that is significant. Despite this common understanding of European weakness, the second narrative explored how mainstream liberal and official sources were able to combine this perception of weakness with an optimistic appeal to EU-US valuable cooperation, continuing a long-running strand in liberal American foreign policy since the end of World War Two. Somewhat paradoxically, although liberals and officials decried European weakness, the early years of this case were characterised by American alarm at EU security integration, arising from a concern for NATO's primacy, given low European defence expenditure.

The third narrative was most evident among conservative analysts but its central concern with the risks CSDP pose to US interests and NATO is evident in many official comments since the late 1990s. Regarding the variation in discourse between Republican and Democrat administrations, discourse varied less between Presidents than between each President’s first and second administration – the so-called “second-term juncture” which was noted in both President George W. Bush’s and President Obama’s period in office.

When compared with the next case study in chapter 7 (public discourse on EU counter-terrorism), it appears that the boundaries between “liberal” Europhile discourse and “conservative” Europhobic discourse are less clearly demarcated in comments on the EU’s conventional security action. Officials have been more publicly critical of CSDP for its ineffectiveness (narrative 1) and have also voiced concern about the policy’s direction (narrative 3) than they have been about EU counter-terrorism policy. As will be seen in the next case, only conservative analysts publicly depict EU security action in counter-terrorism as a threat to US interests and while official actors – both Democrat and Republican – criticised the EU for being ineffective on occasion, none described EU action in this domain as overtly threatening. Before moving to the cross-case comparison (policy competence level) in chapter 7, the following chapter will present the findings of the QCA of private diplomatic correspondence, enabling us to examine how official assessments of EU security action are reformulated in a different institutional context.
Chapter 6

Behind closed doors: Comparing public and private official discourse on case 1 (CSDP)

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, private official discourse will be compared with the public US elite discourse findings on the first case study, as outlined in the previous chapter. Examining the content of declassified State Dept emails and classified US cables circulated within the US government offers a rare opportunity to contrast what diplomats say in public about the nature of the EU as a security actor and how they discuss EU policies and their responses in private. Such a comparison opens our analysis to the possibility of discovering discrepancies between public and private discourse, perhaps arising from diplomatic convention, negotiation strategies or preference falsification. Examining coordinative texts exchanged within a closed network also allows us to “lift the lid” on policy discourse in both cases and explore the cognitive and normative frames officials used to interpret EU behaviour in private settings. Finally, the exercise allows us to assess the extent to which liberal and conservative themes are represented within private coordinative discourse. The chapter approaches private official discourse, with a three-step analysis: narrative themes, strategies and comparisons. This structure will be repeated in chapter 8, which repeats the comparison of public and private discourse for the second case study.

Narrative themes: The first analytical step identifies cognitive frames or ideas used by officials to construct the EU as a security actor and how it has evolved within the given policy domain. Cognitive ideas elucidate “what is and what to
do,” but special attention will also be paid to normative ideas, which indicate “what is good or bad about what is” in light of “what one ought to do,” (Ibid). The cognitive and normative frames are analysed and presented thematically, allowing for comparison with the public narratives. Combining the analysis of private communications with interview testimony from senior officials directly involved with the policy domain and publicly available data about the events, we can piece together the US official policy community’s cognitive and normative map of the EU as a negotiating partner in each case.

**Strategies:** Private correspondence between officials forms the basis of what Schmidt describes as “coordinative discourse” – texts which are concerned with the creation, elaboration and justification of policy ideas and strategies within policy networks (2008; 311). The second step presents an analysis of how the US government developed its policy and negotiation strategy, within a closed discursive arena, as the cases developed. By incorporating basic process tracing with the discourse analysis, we can assess how both events and they way they were interpreted and recorded through discourse, shaped policy responses.

As part of this step, the chapter will assess empirical findings relevant to research on EU-US cooperation in each of the policy domains. In particular section 6.2, “CSDP Strategies”, will present new evidence supporting arguments that the US deflected discussions on privacy protections and bypassed the European Commission in favour of national interlocutors, to whom concessions – in particular visa waiver scheme status – were offered as incentives for data-related counter-terrorism cooperation (see Argomamiz 2010; 127). Section 6.2 will explore how Secretary Clinton deployed a discursive strategy of empowerment, vis a vis HRVP Ashton, which sought to boost the profile of the new post-Lisbon Treaty office holders, in an effort to “strengthen” Europe’s role in security politics.

**Comparisons:** In the third and final step for each case, the findings are assessed with a particular emphasis on divergences between public and private discourse – differences in language, themes, and strategies are discussed. The similarities
and differences between private official discourse and liberal and conservative narratives are also assessed with a view to plausible channels of influence between each of the sub-groups.

This chapter therefore presents the analysis of private coordinative discourse among US officials, with three objectives in mind:

I. To understand how US officials constructed the EU’s CSDP action in a private institutional context, with reference to how cognitive and normative frames portrayed the EU thematically.

II. To determine how the coordinative discourse of officials in this case adapted to significant events; by interpreting developments within pre-existing discursive frames and by formulating new strategies to achieve their policy objectives.

III. To compare and contrast the analytical findings with the other narratives explored in chapter 5, public official discourse.

A note on private texts

Before presenting the findings, it is important to note that diplomatic cables and public speeches are very different texts. It would be unwise to disregard the differing producers, audiences, and motivations at play (Schmidt 2008; 305, Habermas 1989, 1996). Not only are the two forms of texts formulated differently, they are targeted at different audiences. Communicative texts – which are produced by actors involved in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general public are more likely to observe the niceties of diplomatic practice and minimise policy complexity (Schmidt 2008: 311). By contrast, coordinative texts form the basis of policy development and implementation within networks of policy actors (Ibid, 311). In this case, the high level of secrecy associated with these texts (each is classified according to a scale of official secrecy) means the analysis can examine how officials create and coordinate policy responses and cognitive ideas within a closed network. We should expect greater policy detail specification, more explicitly critical
assessments and a greater focus on policy coordination and strategizing, rather than rhetorical justification.

6.1 Themes in private discourse – case 1 (CSDP)

Before applying the three-step analysis (themes, strategies, comparisons) to private discourse on case 1 (CSDP), this section will briefly review the initial QCA findings on public discourse on the subject. In chapter 5, the results of the QCA of public elite discourse on the EU as a conventional actor were analysed, presenting a pattern of discourse as outlined in Fig 6.3. A dominant narrative of European weakness and decline was strikingly evident across all sub-groups (liberal/conservative, official/analyst). Yet mainstream liberal and official discourse parted ways from more conservative analysts in the implications they drew about benefits or costs of EU cooperation (narratives 2 and 3). While there was initial concern about the implications of CSDP for the primacy of NATO in many circles, by the late 2000s, only marginal conservative analysts presented CSDP as a serious threat to US interests. For mainstream liberals and officials, the EU, for all its flaws, remained a valuable partner.
**Narrative 1: EU as weak and in decline**

**Themes:**
- 4. Political and economic weakness – including criticisms of decision-making, leadership, foreign policy, economic and demographic trends (82 references coded in 27 texts)
- 5. Weak military capabilities (30 references coded in 19 texts)
- 6. Disunity (37 references coded in 15 texts)

**Sources:** Themes are prominent in all source sub-groups.

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**Narrative 2: EU as a valued partner**

**Themes:**
- 4. Shared values and interests (48 references in 16 texts)
- 5. Welcoming Lisbon and supporting integration (59 references in 20 texts)
- 6. The effectiveness of CSDP (29 references in 17 texts)

**Sources:** Officials, liberal analysts.

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**Narrative 3: EU as a menace to US interests**

**Themes:**
- 3. Safeguarding NATO's pre-eminence (28 references in 12 texts)
- 4. CSDP integration as threatening to American interests (70 references in 20 texts).

**Sources:** Mainly conservative analysts. Theme 1 found among official sources in the earlier half of the timeframe.

But were official endorsements of CSDP in public merely empty rhetoric? The analysis of private official discourse reveals that a concern for the primacy of NATO vis a vis CSDP persisted at least as late as 2009/2010. As will be explored, these concerns suggested a view of CSDP as a potentially useful development, if adequate safeguards were in place. The following sections compare the three core narratives identified in chapter 5 with an analysis of private cables to assess
how the coordinative discourse of officials in a closed network differed from their public communicative discourse.\textsuperscript{48}

**Overpromising, under-delivering – persistent weakness in CSDP**

“Most attitudes here aren’t hostile to EU security ambitions or exceptionally warm either – they’re indifferent.”

- Interviewee no. 15.

The default rhetorical opening references to “shared values,” and a “shared history” in public discourse on CSDP are conspicuously absent in the private cables; this may be due to the conventions of diplomatic communications. Neither term is mentioned in any of the 17 diplomatic memos related to this case study, although “partnership” is mentioned once and “relationship” occurs in thee of the texts. Overall, the texts are more business-like and concise, underlining their purpose as succinct policy analyses and briefing notes.

Public discourse in both cases, among all sub-groups, framed Europe as ineffective and weak; politically, sometimes demographically but especially in case 1, militarily. Unsurprisingly, these themes are restated in private discourse, but in starker terms. In the year leading up to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, described by one official as “not only the most unambitious treaty in EU history, but also the one that has generated the least excitement,”\textsuperscript{49} a sceptical tone was evident in assessments of the latest institutional changes to CSDP. The underlying weakness of CSDP, particularly although not only, by comparison with NATO, was cited as the cause of a widespread indifference to CSDP among non-EU specialist foreign policy analysts. Those officials tasked with reporting

\textsuperscript{48}The sample of cables is weighted towards the second half of the timeframe, arising from the limited cables available, rather than any selection bias in the corpus construction. Nevertheless, the analysis of cables was supplemented with interviewee responses on the shifts in ideas among officials during the full timespan of the case.

\textsuperscript{49}“EU Reform Treaty: Making the Sausage” Aug. 7th 2007, From USEU: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BRUSSELS2473_a.html
on CSDP development expressed scepticism, as illustrated by one memo recording a meeting with Polish government ministers, discussing CSDP:

_The Europeans have been working on European Security Defense Policy for a decade, and it is unclear that the appointment of an EU Foreign Minister will give the initiative a jump start._\(^{50}\)

On operational matters, officials stated that although the EU was “working hard to make progress,” the “bureaucratic restructuring” associated with the Lisbon Treaty would not result in any rapid evolution in the EU's capacity for crisis management: “EU capabilities and resources in these areas are not commensurate with the EU's economic clout or the political weight of the member states.”\(^{51}\) The memo also noted that the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan “failed to reach its mandate of 400 international officials,” and was characterised by a lack of cohesion, (Ibid).

Officials explained the disappointing performance of CSDP, despite institutional reforms, by reference to two explanations or “cognitive frames”: political disunity among member states and “institutional stovepiping” which prevents the EU from “holistically implementing tools.”\(^{52}\) Paradoxically, the Lisbon innovations, ostensibly designed to “upgrade” the EU's international role, were occasionally interpreted as reaffirming the primacy of member state control; one cable said the UK's insistence that the Treaty acknowledge that CSDP is subject to “specific” procedures and the unanimity requirement for council decisions were intended as “a means to limit the power of the new High Rep by maintaining institutional divisions in CFSP issues”\(^{53}\)

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\(^{50}\) “Poland Seeks to Build CSDP as Credible Partner for Nato,” From: US mission to Warsaw, Poland. December 9, 2009. [https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09WARSAW1204_a.html](https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09WARSAW1204_a.html)


\(^{52}\) “EU Making the “Comprehensive Approach” its Trademark in Crisis Response” Nov. 20th 2009. [https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS1561_a.html](https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS1561_a.html)

Interviewee responses supported this finding of an sceptical attitude to the idea that Lisbon might strengthen CSDP: “The EU has overpromised and under-delivered so much on this stuff that there’s a kind of a jaded reaction in Washington to every new announcement,” said a policy planning advisor to the Secretary of State (Interviewee no. 15). The same interviewee described the first EU-US biannual summit after the Lisbon Treaty was ratified as a key learning moment for US officials, chiefly due to the serious displeasure with the format of the meeting, on the part of the president (see p. 142). In what was described as a snub by some European observers, an interpretation denied by the White House, the president did not attend the following year’s summit in Spain. Several other interviewees referred to the Lisbon summit as a key learning experience for officials, who viewed the event as an indication that the Lisbon Treaty’s promise of transforming the European Council president into a single voice for the Union, had not come to fruition. This interpretation provided evidence that reinforced the pre-existing cognitive frame that the EU was divided, lacking institutional and political focus. One former US ambassador to NATO summed up the “jaded reaction” of US officials to the Lisbon Treaty reforms, describing the experience as evidence of a European tendency to over-promise and under-deliver:

"I'm surprised that Europeans aren't more embarrassed. I'm surprised they aren't more embarrassed by how little has been achieved. You know everyone was going around saying: “Oh the Lisbon Treaty is coming, everything is going to get better, we're going to have a stronger voice.” And you know, clearly very little of that has actually happened."

- Interviewee no. 18.

When asked if the External Action Service needed to increase briefings and awareness in Washington regarding the expansion in CSDP missions since 1999, one official was dismissive: “My advice? Don’t waste the ink. People in Washington have little interest in the EU’s security ambitions, they don’t think it’s going anywhere,” (Interviewee no. 19).

A concern with European weakness and disunity, famously described by Secretary Gates as “the demilitarization of Europe,” has been a longstanding feature of US discourse and one extensively explored in chapter 5. But what of
the interpretive frames officials use to explain this trend? Several officials used similar explanations of a public aversion to military spending, arising from a commitment to increasingly expensive social welfare systems combined with demographic and economic decline.

*European societies have become unwilling to spend on defence because they have these burdensome welfare systems, their economies are in decline, their populations are in decline. And so, it’s hard to see these trends turning around.*

- Interviewee no. 18.

**And yet, officials see value in the EU as a security partner.**

Learning of these criticisms, one might draw the conclusion that US officials see no value in engaging with such a politically, institutionally and militarily weak association of states. Are the public endorsements of the EU as a security actor merely empty rhetoric designed to boost fragile European egos? The analysis of cables suggests otherwise. A common theme in public and private discourse is the effectiveness of EU sanctions when aligned with US objectives. While one diplomat noted that “incoherent organisation,” and political factors were leading to “sanctions fatigue,” common EU-US sanctions, even when largely symbolic, could at least “demonstrate transatlantic political unity.” In particular, joint EU-US targeted financial sanctions are “particularly powerful, since blocking access to the dollar, euro, pound, and other European currencies greatly limits targets' access to the world’s formal financial and trade system,” (ibid). This document portrays sanctions as having both instrumental and symbolic value – an idea that appears to echo the notion of EU-US cooperation as a source of legitimacy for US action (Kagan 2003; 156).

Weakness, ineffectiveness and disunity notwithstanding, EU specialists expressed some optimism that the EU might still develop into a more coherent

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54 Although EU sanctions are implemented using economic and financial tools, decisions on imposition of sanctions are taken with the framework of CFSP, as laid out in the treaties.
security role. One memo sent in 2009 by a chargé d’affaires in Brussels to the wider official network argued that “the EU is maturing as a security actor,” and that current dialogue structures did not reflect the EU’s “emergence as a security actor over the last decade,” (ibid). These remarks are significant for this study as they indicate an increasing awareness and recognition of the Union’s growing relevance in security policy.

In institutional terms, an earlier document, sent just after the text of the Lisbon Treaty was finalised argued that the new provisions would “greatly increase the influence and reach of the new High Representative,” who would “grab even more influence from member state foreign ministers.” Interviewees in Washington echoed the interest in the HRVP’s potential: “We are very supportive of the HR and the EEAS. These [new Structures] facilitate the EU’s ability to reach consensus,” (Interviewee no. 7). The strategies section will explore further the nature of this support for the HRVP, one of the most prominent US responses to the Lisbon reforms.

At the very least, if institutional innovations and the much discussed “comprehensive approach” did not deliver more coherent EU operations, one official memo argued the US could “capitalize on Commission coffers” and also benefit from areas where member states had expertise. This “minimalist view” of the “comprehensive approach” doctrine was echoed in interviews with Washington officials, who said the concept lacked credibility: “When the Commission comes over here and talks about “the comprehensive approach” no one takes it seriously because no one believes there are real resources behind these strategies,” (Interviewee no. 19). But other officials acknowledged an important role for the EU in security crises in secondary arenas, like Africa, for instance: “Obviously there are still obstacles but the EU missions in the Sahel, in

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https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS1669_a.html
57 “EU Reform Treaty: Making the Sausage” Aug. 7th 2007, From USEU: 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BRUSSELS2473_a.html
Africa show that the EU has a strong role to play in that region and we would like to see more of that,” (Interviewee no. 7).

There are a number of plausible interpretations of these comments: they may reflect divisions in the foreign policy elite, where diplomats based in Brussels are more optimistic than non-specialists about the EU's potential. The timing of the documents, before the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, might suggest this early optimism faded into the disappointment and treaty-fatigue in later years, as illustrated by post-Lisbon interview quotes in the preceding paragraphs. Or these texts may arise from a balanced perspective, recognising the Union's limitations but cognisant that an empowered EU might support US objectives. The purpose of this section is not to make a judgment on which of these interpretations represent the “true” beliefs of US officials. But it should be noted that optimism about institutional and operational innovation was expressed in private as well as in public. Some of the cooperative possibilities identified by US officials discussed will be explored further in section 6.5 (strategies).

Where once officials saw a threat to NATO, now some see limited opportunities.

The tension between an emergent CSDP and NATO was a defining feature of US elite discourse on European integration in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see chapter 2). CSDP, described by a former US ambassador as “a dagger aimed at NATO’s heart,” was viewed suspiciously in the changed structural context of the post-Cold War era (Bolton, 2010). Secretary Albright’s “Three Ds” speech laid out a public marker for containing CSDP, but according to interviewees for this project, much of the American anxiety regarding EU security integration had largely dissipated by the early 2000s. Interviewees said the shift was especially noticeable in the wake of NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention, which demonstrated NATO’s continuing pre-eminence and European allies’ military

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59 The potential for greater CSDP action in Africa points to the development of CSDP missions in CAR, Somalia and Congo, among others. These mainly French-led missions have drawn attention to the potential for CSDP to encompass crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa – a region where European powers have colonial ties and the US has minimal strategic interests.
shortcomings. Unfortunately, no cables relating to the pre-2004 period were available to analyse, so we must rely on “on background” interview comments with retired US officials to explore this further. The topic was discussed at length with a former US ambassador to NATO, who described an acute anxiety on the part of Secretary of State Albright and her team regarding the development of ESDI (see p. 158). The anxiety in some ways echoed that of president Nixon, recorded in conversation to Kissinger, that European economic and political integration had created “a Frankenstein’s monster,” (Interviewee no. 10). But the Kosovo War, which revealed a continuing European security dependence on the US and the successive failure of treaty changes to boost defence spending, allowed these fears to diminish among officials, instead leading to a greater openness to security integration, in the hope it might boost Europe’s military capabilities (Interviewee no. 9).

In public comments analysed in chapter 5, little of the pre-Kosovo anxiety around CSDP was evident in later years. But does this shift indicate a greater enthusiasm for CSDP, or simply a diminished anxiety about its potential, seen as over-stated? Are officials eager supporters of EU security integration, or in the words of an official quoted earlier in this section, merely “indifferent”?

CSDP is rarely a topic of interest to most of the foreign policy officials and observers, according to analysts at the Brookings Institution, one of whom noted that it would be difficult to sustain a career with such a narrow specialist focus (Interviewee no. 20). One State Dept official said that the scale of resources allocated to CSDP missions was considered so insignificant by most observers, that it rarely warranted close examination (Interviewee no. 19). A recent Commission delegation initiative to raise awareness of the EU’s “comprehensive approach” was cited by multiple respondents as “a flop” that garnered scant attention (Interviewees 19, 21). Only five interviewees were able to mention any specific CSDP mission (by name or mission location) when asked. These findings undermine the idea that CSDP is viewed as a significant topic of debate for US foreign policy. And if a policy development is not seen as a significant issue, it cannot by definition, be perceived as a significant threat.
A senior EU specialist at the State Dept was more positive about CSDP’s significance, noting that the CSDP mission in Mali had addressed a concerning situation in the Sahel region; an arena where the US had limited ability to act (Interviewee no. 7). However, the message from most interviewees was consistent; CSDP was viewed as a “niche” interest for officials, mostly EU specialists and as previously outlined in chapter 5, cooperative initiatives were viewed as time-consuming, arcane and of limited value (Interviewee no. 1).

The analysis of cables from the late 2000s on this subject suggests that in the rare cases where CSDP does arise as a matter of interest, the issue is usually about ensuring NATO’s primacy. The record of a meeting on CSDP with a Polish defence minister, reveals this concern lives on: “The Poles may have embraced CSDP without fully anticipating possible conflicts with NATO,” an official wrote in 2009 [emphasis added]. The official probed the minister on “whether current plans for CSDP would preserve NATO’s right of first refusal to take part in a given security mission,” underlining this concern as an enduring consideration.

Interviewees confirmed that while fears regarding CSDP had eased, the commandments of the “three Ds” are “still important”: “We are more supportive of the EU's security efforts of late. Of course they should not be duplicative of NATO and there is the broader concern about defence capabilities in general” (Interviewee no. 7). Judging by these comments, the concerns around CSDP have diminished rather than disappeared. Many officials remain concerned that EU security integration risks stretching an ever-diminishing pool of European defence spending across more, potentially less-effective, operational tasks.

Assuming such a bounded nature to US official concerns – as described in interviews for this study – the public conservative narrative of the EU as a more significant threat to US interests – and perhaps even hostile to NATO - appears mainly limited to marginal conservative analysts and some official actors in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This finding supports the conclusions of the QCA in chapter 5. By the late 2000s, the record of twenty years of CSDP missions was
viewed as insignificant and unthreatening, concerns had shifted to encouraging its development in ways that would allocate scarce defence resources efficiently and support NATO's pre-eminence.

6.2 Strategies in private discourse – case one
(CSDP)

“In order to be effective we must be aware of the capabilities and constraints of a most complex partner.”\(^{60}\)

Figure 6.4 outlines four diplomatic objectives of the US vis-à-vis CSDP, as derived from the QCA of classified cables and declassified internal emails. This outline should not be interpreted as a comprehensive outline of the US’s diplomatic approach to CSDP – it is based on analysis of the available evidence; a limited release of classified documents and email correspondence with Secretary Clinton. The timeframe for these documents is 2004-2012 and omits many relevant documents from within this shorter timeframe, which are not in the public domain.

### Fig. 6.4: Outline of US strategy regarding CSDP (2004-2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Key actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empower New institutional actors.</strong></td>
<td>i. Public endorsements.</td>
<td>US: Secretary of State Clinton, Director of Policy Planning Slaughter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ii. High level engagement – directly with HRVP Ashton and also with foreign ministers.</td>
<td>EU: HRVP Ashton, member state foreign ministers.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>iii. Private support.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Instrumentalise EU development funds and member state expertise (judicial training).</strong></th>
<th>Tools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comprehensive engagement with the EU across the whole of the U.S. Government.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Influence EU sanctions policies, pursue joint EU-US sanctions.</strong></th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. “Early, sustained and strategic outreach” to member state capitals, embassies in countries of concern, permanent representations and EU institutions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Sharing technical and political analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>iii. Sharing intelligence or open-source information.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iv. Emphasis on blocking minorities.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ensure a viable CSDP supports a strong NATO</strong></th>
<th>Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. Provide advice and engage closely with key allies (UK, France, Poland).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Shape EU perceptions:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Away from “ideological multilateralism”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Towards shared view of “security environments”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iii. Propose a new civilian-military crisis management dialogue.</td>
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These limitations notwithstanding, the analysis reveals how US officials coordinated a strategy which, among other objectives, sought to boost the
standing of Catherine Ashton, the EU's first HRVP, and identify areas in which the EU could “add value” to US objectives, including development aid, sanctions and supporting NATO. Each of these four objectives is outlined with reference to the content of texts in the section below.

**Empower HRVP through public support**

The first objective listed – empowering the HRVP – provides an interesting insight into how officials pursue policy goals through discursive means and allows us to apply Schmidt’s “foreground discursive abilities” concept to this case. As outlined in chapter 3, actors rely on their background ideational abilities, mainly understanding the cognitive and normative frames in a discursive context, to make sense of a given situation and its ideational rules. Yet actors also have agency in shaping their discursive institutions, by using their foreground discursive abilities “to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them,” (Schmidt 2008; 314). In other words, while discourses act as structures that constrain action and provide meaning for actors, those actors can also reshape those institutions, through purposefully introducing new frames that alter the discourse to suit particular ends. In the case of the diplomatic strategy regarding post-Lisbon CSDP institutions, we can examine how secretary Clinton employed her substantial discursive power and authority as secretary of state to influence elite discussions on the role of the High representative, framing the occupant as a significant interlocutor and a credible partner.

Officials interviewed remarked that Secretary Clinton was implementing a carefully considered policy by publicly praising HRVP Ashton and holding joint press conferences with her on regular occasions (Interviewees 7, 8, 12, 15). According to the officials, these actions represented an attempt to use discourse to bolster the development of the EU’s security capabilities, particularly the new HRVP role, a position officials hoped would “facilitate the EU’s ability to reach consensus” (Interviewee 7). This purposeful use of discourse as a policy tool
supports the discursive institutionalist model outlined in chapter 3, wherein actors use their foreground discursive abilities to reshape institutions in ways favourable to their preferences.

The role of HRVP was perhaps the most prominent symbol of the Lisbon Treaty’s ambitions to upgrade the EU’s role – Clinton’s public embrace of Ashton contrasted sharply with a perceived coldness by some European diplomats. Several emails exchanged between Clinton and her head of policy planning, Anne-Marie Slaughter, reveal their concern for Ashton’s standing among her European counterparts. On January 22nd, 2010, Slaughter wrote to Clinton to emphasise the value of working closely with Ashton: ‘I just want to underline how valuable and important it is for you to be building the relationship with her that you are.’ Several other emails show there was regular direct phone contact between Clinton and Ashton on a range of issues including Libya sanctions preparations, summit agendas, lobbying European foreign ministers and broader sanctions on Iran. In an email on January 28th, 2010, Slaughter forwarded a news article from “The Economist” magazine, outlining “efforts within the EU to discredit Ashton, particularly from the French.” Slaughter urged Secretary Clinton to explicitly endorse Ashton in meetings with other ministers, noting a lack of appreciation among Ashton’s colleagues for her family obligations: “[It] wouldn’t hurt to mention her positively with French interlocutors,” (Ibid). The emails and interviews conducted suggest that Clinton developed a close working relationship with Ashton. She responded to Slaughter’s email within an hour: “What is her family life complexity?” (Ibid). An email from Jacob Sullivan, Clinton’s deputy chief of staff, sent on January 20th 2011, advised the Secretary: “your voice is probably most likely to break through to Ashton.”

The power of regular contact, public praise and private lobbying by Clinton on behalf of EU office holders – current or potential – is a recurring theme. Chapter

5 quoted from press briefings by State officials who noted Ashton’s close working relationship with Clinton – in that case, the target audience for discursive action was the media. But other senior political figures were also targeted privately. Emails from Clinton’s advisors reveal that the objective of boosting the profile and effectiveness of new EU “faces”, including the HRVP, went beyond a personal interest in Ashton. Sidney Blumenthal, a close personal advisor to Clinton, in October 2009 urged her to speak to other leaders or in public about “the need for Europe to have a major figure at its head so that other powers can relate to it.”\(^{63}\) Blumenthal had a preferred candidate in mind for the position of president of the European Council: former UK prime minister Tony Blair. Blumenthal’s endorsement of Blair reveals his strong preference for the EU’s new institutional structures to succeed in endowing the Union with political influence:

If Blair does not become EU president the position will likely be filled by a third rank nonentity in the Brussels bureaucratic mode incapable of realizing the possibilities in the creation of the office, continuing the feebleness of Europe as a political idea and reality. Of course, it is in the US interest to have a strong Europe— and the naming of the first European president might be the most important opportunity for the US to strengthen Europe, to give it actual sinew, for a long time and a long time to come. [emphasis added]

-Ibid

Clinton’s replies to Blumenthal are not available, so we cannot know if she followed this advice. But Blumenthal’s position as a long-standing trusted advisor is well established.\(^{64}\) His advice in this case is an unequivocal endorsement of the strategy of publicly and privately endorsing strong

\(^{63}\) Email from Sidney Blumenthal to Secretary Clinton, Oct 23rd, 2009.
http://graphics.wsj.com/hillary-clinton-email-documents/#/?docid=C05766457

\(^{64}\) Sidney Blumenthal is a long-standing Democratic party advisor, strategist and journalist and is a close personal associate of Hillary Clinton. Early in his career, Mr Blumenthal was an assistant and senior adviser to President Bill Clinton from August 1997 to January 2001 and was an advisor to Hillary Clinton during her 2008 election campaign.
Declassified emails reveal that although senior White House advisors vetoed his appointment as a staff member at the State Dept when Hillary Clinton was appointed Secretary, Mr Blumenthal regularly provided her with advice and analysis on speech writing, press relations and policies related to Europe and Libya in particular. According to press reports, he earned $10,000 per month from the Clinton Foundation for several years during this time.
candidates for the post-Lisbon roles, in an effort to “strengthen Europe.” Both these comments and the texts relating to Ashton indicate a consistent strategy by Clinton and her staff to empower the post-Lisbon CSDP actors, with a specific emphasis on publicly expressing support for high-level EU interlocutors. The impact of Clinton’s foreground discursive exercise in empowering Ashton is evident in the fact that almost all official interviewees currently serving in their posts referenced Clinton’s support of Ashton – in joint appearances and public statements – as a significant indicator of the positive state of EU-US security relations.

**Joint sanctions – sustained outreach can reinforce US objectives**

The next most substantially elaborated objective encountered in the private correspondence relates to how CSDP reforms might create greater opportunities for joint EU-US sanctions. At a minimum joint sanctions “even when largely symbolic, demonstrate transatlantic political unity,” although “effective US [government] influence … requires early, sustained, and strategic outreach to Member State capitals, Member State embassies in countries of concern and missions in Brussels, and the EU institutions.” (ibid). The US ambassador to the EU remarks that the enduring unanimity requirement is but one example of the “cumbersome procedures” restricting the use of sanctions but he suggests four actions to maximise the opportunities the policy framework offers:

(1) stress that sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, (2) encourage greater EU strategic planning, including by strengthening its implementation, enforcement, analytic, and intelligence-sharing capabilities, and (3) press the EU to create a sanctions unit within the nascent European diplomatic service. (4) We should continue to share technical and political analysis of specific sanctions measures where we assess that EU action could reinforce priority U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. (Ibid).

A Washington-based EU specialist at the State Dept volunteered that the US was “particularly happy on sanctions,” reaffirming the recognition of this tool as one

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of the more effective within the CSDP toolkit (Interviewee no. 7). As to how the institutional reforms of CSDP change the equation for the US, there is little discussion, although a memo from the US mission in Brussels opined that the EAS “should create synergies” for certain sectors, including sanctions.66

The strategic analysis on maximising opportunities from sanctions policies encapsulates the view of the remaining policy measures identified in Fig. 6.4. (instrumentalising EU funds, expertise and ensuring NATO primacy) – all require a form of problem-solving approach: identify relevant actors, “engage” strategically and comprehensively, and support like-minded actors at all levels of the EU (ministers, ambassadors, interest groups, Commission officials, etc.) by sharing “advice,” “expertise,” and intelligence – open-source and otherwise.

6.3 Comparisons with public discourse – case 1
(CSDP)

Public and private discourse are broadly aligned in substance

The specification of strategies in the available documents does not permit a deeper analysis of how such efforts might work in practice. However, the texts analysed demonstrate to a large extent how officials were able to reconcile seemingly competing ideas of the EU in public discourse; a narrative of the EU as both ineffective and weak (discourse 1, liberal and official) and the EU as a valued partner (discourse 2, liberal and official). In chapter 5, these narratives were outlined separately and it was posited that, despite initial appearances, liberal analysts and officials may be able to combine both cognitive frames by recognising that an institutionally, politically and militarily weak actor may still offer valuable cooperative opportunities. The analysis of strategies in private

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10BRUSSELS219_a.html
discourse supports this hypothesis, revealing in detail how officials analysed CSDP institutional reforms; noting weaknesses yet seeking out opportunities for the US to shape policy outcomes to suit American goals. The analysis also suggests that the conservative narrative outlined in chapter 5 was marginal and not widely reflected in contemporary official coordinative discourse.

A dominant discourse must be flexible enough to assimilate new information and social proof in ways that support and reinforce the cognitive and normative frames that make up its overall structure. In this case, the robustness of liberal and official discourse is demonstrated by the fact that it can explain both European strength and weakness; the EU can be both in decline and yet deploy targeted sanctions as powerful tools against rogue elements. EU institutional actors appear both hopelessly hamstrung by institutions and stealthy officials, and yet if supported, they can deliver important results in talks with Iran. The plasticity of this discourse helps to explain its endurance – by adapting to differing levels of performance, the discourse allows seemingly contradictory behaviour to be reconciled within a coherent and understandable cognitive framework.

The analysis of private discourse on the EU in case one (CSDP) finds that the EU’s weaknesses and values in this domain are described in broadly similar ways, although tone and emphasis vary. The rhetorical tropes of “shared values” were dispensed with in private cables but nevertheless, the core narrative themes and reference points (the “Three ds” speech, Kosovo as a juncture point) were echoed in both public and in private communications.

CSDP as constructed in private discourse is a niche policy domain with insignificant resources. Yet the EU’s CSDP was viewed by EU specialists as potentially useful in crisis management in secondary arenas. While the primacy of NATO remains a cornerstone of US policy towards European security integration, the fear that CSDP poses a threat to the status quo diminished from 2000 onwards. This analysis suggests that the significant cleavage in opinion is not between the ideas officials communicate in public and the strategies they
coordinate in private. Instead, the longitudinal dimension reveals the greatest shift – between a high threat perception in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the “jaded” scepticism of officials after 2000, who were more likely to call for “please God, more ESDI…” (Interviewee no. 9).

**A marginalised conservative discourse**

Based on the evidence available and arising from analysis outlined in this chapter, the divergences between public and private discourse on this topic are mostly in tone, rather than content. The comparative analysis of embedded cases (official - public, official - private, analyst – liberal, analyst – conservative) reveals a broadly dominant discursive framework in case 1 (CSDP) that encompasses the first three groups. This discourse combines the liberal narrative of the EU as a valued partner with the narrative of the EU as weak and in decline. By reconciling these ideas in a robust discursive structure, this dominant discourse can assimilate evidence about the EU’s behaviour that might otherwise appear contradictory.

By contrast, the fourth sub-group, conservative analysts, was aligned with a marginal narrative of the EU as a threat to US interests. Although high threat perceptions regarding CSDP were once more widely-found, the analysis shows these fears diminished among official actors after 2000 and were dismissed out of hand in contemporary interviews. This provides an interesting contrast with case 2 (PNR), where conservative themes were echoed in private official discourse and also in the discourse of conservative legislators. The key shift in case 1 discourse is longitudinal – three out of the four sub-groups no longer view CSDP as threat, in contrast to the narrative of a marginal group of conservative analysts.
Conclusions

Scholars analysing official discourse are sometimes confronted with the argument that their exploration of ideas in discourse are, by definition, filtered through the medium of actors who may intentionally misrepresent opinion for instrumental ends. To some degree, this criticism fails to appreciate the role of discourse in constructing other actors, shaping opinions and ideas and providing cognitive and normative frames that in turn, shape action. In that vein, intention behind words is not the final objective of the analysis. Nevertheless, this chapter availed of the opportunity to probe the contention that public speech may be merely empty rhetoric, sharply contrasting with ideas expressed in private, internal contexts.

The empirical findings of this chapter, subject to the limitations of available sources, run counter to this contention. Instead, the analysis found that divergences between public and private discourse on this topic are mostly in tone, rather than content. The analysis revealed that seemingly contradictory ideas of the EU as weak yet also offering valuable partnership opportunities, were reconciled within a flexible cognitive framework which recognised that an institutionally, politically and militarily weak actor may still offer valuable cooperative opportunities. The longstanding concern for NATO’s primacy, a feature of historical US discourse post-1954 (see chapter 2) persists in the mainstream today, although greatly diminished. Conservative views of CSDP as posing an existential threat to NATO are restricted to marginal policy analysts and no longer form a central component of mainstream official and liberal discourse.

Among several strategies revealed in this chapter, the most significant one - for our purposes - highlighted how the Secretary of state employed foreground discursive abilities as part of a purposeful attempt to bolster the position of the new emerging post-Lisbon institutional actors, especially the HRVP. Clinton leveraged her discursive power and institutional authority to frame the occupant as a significant and credible partner. The analysis of these strategies supports
the discursive institutionalist model outlined in chapter 3, in particular the purposeful discursive competition modification this dissertation proposes. In Clinton’s case however, the targets for her communicative action are not merely perceptions of Ashton in DC, but also in Brussels and in member state capitals. The importance of this strategy is evident not merely in internal correspondence and cables but also in numerous interviewees with current state department staff – almost all of whom mentioned the strategy, unprompted by the interviewer.

These conclusions point to a dominant longitudinal dimension in shaping discourse on the EU in CSDP. The learning process of several administrations, rooted in key landmark events - such as the 1999 Kosovo war and the Lisbon treaty changes – led to a gradual reduction in threat perception of US officials and analysts. The most prominent cleavage shaping discourse was ideological; conservative analysts’ threat perceptions remained broadly constant in the period in question, unchanged by the learning experiences noted by others.
Chapter 7

Discourse on the EU and Internal Security Cooperation:

Counter-Terrorism and the Passenger Name Record Agreements

Introduction

Do the specific competences EU institutions exercise in a given policy domain matter for US assessments of the Union? Does a changed policy context provide a greater chance for consensus among ideologically diverse commentators? This chapter goes some way to addressing these questions by repeating our content analysis experiment in the second case study, which is marked by a more integrated policy domain.

The case relates to EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation and the Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement. As a relatively recent field of cooperation, EU-US cooperation on counter-terrorism presents us with an area of policy coordination, which has grown enormously since the September 11th attacks of 2001 (Archick 2013). Operating under the Treaty’s provisions for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)67 the EU has successfully asserted its legal competence to negotiate on behalf of Member States on a number of cooperative practices in this field, key among them the PNR Agreements (Occhipinti 2010).

67 Art. 3.2, TEU and Title V, TFEU, in particular, Articles 82 and 87 TFEU which provide the legal bases for action in this field.
These initiatives are significant, in part because they have presented the Union with opportunities to present itself as a security actor to third countries, such as the US: “With a strong agenda on freedom, security and justice ... the EU has sought to articulate and assert itself as a security actor through external governance” (den Boer 2011; 360). Examining US elite discourse on the EU in this area allows us to examine discourse on a specific area of cooperation where – unlike more conventional security or “high foreign policy” areas like CSDP – external policy action is conducted within a broadly communitarized context and the Commission has successfully asserted a position as the pre-eminent interlocutor for the US in a number of cases.

The chapter opens with the policy and legal context for internal security cooperation in section 7.1, before addressing the field of counter-terrorism cooperation and the political process leading to the PNR Agreement in 7.2. This background will give context for the case study and also demonstrate its relevance as a significant example of EU-US security cooperation and EU security action more broadly. In 7.3 and 7.4 the chapter will present and analyse two ideal-type narratives of the EU, discovered during the QCA. Although these narratives have blurred boundaries, and one dominant narrative theme is evident across all sources, the analysis reveals that the liberal and conservative analyst sub-groups divide relatively cleanly into either one of the ideal-type narratives. The official public sources are also closely related with the liberal narrative, suggesting that, as in the first case study, the internal comparative dimension (embedded cases) plays the dominant role in shaping public discourse on the EU.

The final step in the analysis (7.5) draws together the findings of both case studies in public discourse, reviewing what evidence there is to suggest that the external comparative dimension (policy competence level) shapes the pattern of discourse significantly. In selecting a less conventional form of security cooperation within a more supranational policy area of the EU, we should be able to see whether policy competence significantly affects the way in which the US foreign policy community expresses its understanding of the Union as an actor.
The primary focus of this chapter therefore, is on presenting the empirical findings, analysing the pattern of discourse in relation to sub-groups within the community and the policy context in which counter-terrorism is conducted. Figure 7.1 summarises the four key questions the analysis in this chapter seeks to address.

**Fig. 7.1: Key Questions in this chapter.**

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<td>What are the main narrative themes comprising elite narratives of the EU in this policy domain and what cognitive or normative frames do they apply?</td>
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### 7.1 – Policy and Legal Context: Internal Security Cooperation

Intra-European counter-terrorism cooperation has its origins in the establishment of the police working group on terrorism in 1979, which sought to share intelligence and expertise on terrorist groups within the Community (Keohane, 2005). Since then the institutional basis for counter-terrorism cooperation has increased significantly. The attacks of September 11th 2001 and the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, all prompted member states to strengthen the coordination of counter-terrorism measures at EU level through measures such as the European arrest warrant, a counter-terrorism task
force consisting of national police officers, Eurojust (an agency to help national magistrates work together on cross-border investigations) and the appointment of an EU counter-terrorism coordinator (Ibid, 17). In 2005, the EU also published its first Counter-Terrorism Strategy.\textsuperscript{68} Member States have revised and updated their cooperation on counter-terrorism matters and new measures of internal security cooperation have been integrated – to varying degrees – in the external policy of the Union (den Boer 2011; 341). Opinion has been divided on the effectiveness of these measures, with some US diplomats describing the EU’s policy response to the 9/11 attacks as swift and effective (Interviewee no. 14) while others express exasperation with the slow pace of policy development (Rees 2011; 161).

The legal basis for counter-terrorism cooperation emerges from the provisions for AFSJ and is founded on Articles 82 and 87 TFEU. Article 3 TEU presents the Union’s objective to “offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without frontiers... with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”\textsuperscript{69}. It has been noted that this area encompasses a wide range of policies, which do not clearly form a “unified” policy domain. While AFSJ is a supranational policy area in which the Commission has a normative role, member states do not cede responsibility for their internal security measures (Wessel et al 2010; 17). The EU’s mandate here is restricted to cross-border criminal matters, of which terrorism ranks highly\textsuperscript{70}. However many of the internal security measures operate on a patchwork of differing legal instruments, requiring extensive coordination to be effective. This means the EU operates as a form of “hybrid internal security actor” (Rees 2011(b), 397) within a system where member states retain a central role.

It appeared inevitable that nascent preferences for internal security cooperation at EU level would necessitate the adoption of common external measures by the

\textsuperscript{68} Available at: \url{http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST+14469+2005+REV+4}

\textsuperscript{69} Art. 3, TEU.

\textsuperscript{70} The status of EU competence in this area is defined as “shared” between the Union and its Member States under Article 4(2) TFEU.
Union to protect the AFSJ. After the 9/11 attacks, the externalisation of AFSJ measures was given impetus and the Council’s 2005 strategy on the external dimension of AFSJ stated that the EU “should make JHA a central priority in its external relations and ensure a coordinated and coherent approach.” The development of the area of freedom, security and justice can only be successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries.” Furthermore, the EU had asserted an ability to conclude international agreements with third parties and countries. The Lisbon Treaty altered these provisions in some significant ways, chiefly by granting the European Parliament the power to give or withhold consent to such agreements, through co-decision making with the Council. Subject to Parliament consent therefore, the Union has the ability to:

> Conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.

- Article 216 (1), TFEU.

A final innovation of the Lisbon Treaty that should be noted is the abolition of the “pillar system,” which split AFSJ elements across the first and third pillars. By bring the police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC) elements into the community field, the decision-making procedure for AFSJ matters is now firmly supranational, with the Council able to take decisions on a qualified majority basis – limiting the scope for national vetoes - and the Commission free to conduct negotiations for international agreements in this area. Unlike the provisions for CSDP, the ECJ can now adjudicate on legal matters related to AFSJ. The treaty provisions granting three supranational institutions – the Parliament, Commission and ECJ – significant roles mean that the post-Lisbon

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71 The 2005 Council strategy is also commonly known as “the Hague Programme.” It was followed by the “Stockholm Programme,” in 2010, which also referenced the external dimension of the AFSJ.
73 Under articles 24 and 38, pre-Lisbon TEU.
74 Art. 218, 6(a) TFEU.
communitarized AFSJ policy context contrasts strongly with the more traditional CFSP and CSDP, which remain mostly intergovernmental in character. 

EU-US Internal Security Cooperation.

These legal, institutional and political changes have made transatlantic internal security cooperation a significant area of collaboration in itself; a “new and innovative field of security cooperation,” (Rees 2011; 172). The development of new cooperative measures in this field has done more than change the nature of counter-terrorism policies, it has also managed “to underpin the relationship of the EU with third countries and in particular shaped the transatlantic relationship,” (den Boer 2011, 344). These changes have provided the EU with a new and potentially more autonomous capacity to assert itself as an international security actor, in particular, as a “recognized counter-terror actor,” (Argomaniz and Rees, 2013; 232).

The range of EU-US cooperative activities stretch over three significant areas: law enforcement and judicial cooperation, border cooperation and data sharing (Rees 2011; 162 - 169). These provisions and a generally positive attitude by the Commission and Council have fostered a productive partnership on transatlantic cooperative measures on internal security, a trend remarked upon by US Congressional Research Service:

“U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions”

- Archick 2010; 21.

Scholars have noted the increased role for the EU in transatlantic counter-terrorism, with some describing the phenomenon as an asymmetric negotiating process in which the US adopts a forceful norm promotion stance, followed by a period of bargaining with EU officials and ultimately, norm mirroring and imitation by EU authorities (Argomaniz, 2010). For Den Boer and Monar (2002: 25) the EU's role in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 was merely to provide a
legal basis for the application of US-developed measures: “the latest antiterrorist policies are directed by the USA and merely co-produced by the EU.” Argomaniz (2010) argues that the US exploited a first-mover advantage that, together with coercive measures and a logic of appropriateness favouring US cooperation within EU discourse, allowed Washington to impose its preference for “unconstrained and extra-territorial action” on counter-terrorism security measures, even when they applied to EU citizens. The dynamic led to an “impression among EU officials of being rushed into counter-terrorism provisions because of Washington’s unilateral steps” (Argomaniz 2010; 123). From this perspective, the emergence of the EU as an internal security actor has not resulted in a balanced transatlantic partnership, but rather one in which the EU institutions act as passive recipients for US border security norms.

However, as the PNR case shows, civil liberties concerns have created difficulties in this partnership and have stymied several measures, including PNR and the Terrorist Financing and Tracking Program (TFTP), which sought data from the SWIFT banking system based in Belgium. Partially as a result of these difficulties and also arising from more general US diplomatic strategies, the CRS acknowledges that “...at times, the United States continues to prefer to negotiate on some issues—such as the VWP—bilaterally, and observers assert that this disconnect can lead to frictions in the U.S.-EU relationship,” (Archick 2010, 21). This tension was already evident on aviation security matters in 2008, when a senior official in the European Commission publicly objected to the US’s attempts to negotiate new security arrangements bilaterally with member states:

*We don’t negotiate matters which are dealt with in Washington with the state of California - that would be disrespectful and we expect the US to be similarly

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75 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a messaging service that facilitates international financial transfers. All messages processed by Swift (which include names of payers and payees) are recorded for several months. Following the 9/11 attacks, SWIFT complied with a US request to forward this data to the US Treasury Department - this action violated the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive (which applied as SWIFT is based in Belgium). An EU-US interim agreement to allow this data-sharing to continue was rejected by the European Parliament in February 2010 by a vote of 378 to 196. Subsequent negotiations led by the European Commission amended the agreement to allow for redress measures for aggrieved citizens and independent oversight. This revised agreement was approved by the Parliament in July 2010.
It appears that in internal security cooperation, the legal and institutional context for EU action is neither completely constrained – as in intergovernmental settings – nor completely autonomous, as in a fully communitarian policy context. Instead, EU action in this field has evolved from the tentative steps of the 1970s, to a level of significance and prominence in 2001, that won praise for its cooperative spirit from US officials and criticism for uncritical acceptance of US security norms from some scholars. Latterly, in the post-Lisbon context, the Union has demonstrated a number of institutional enhancements, which provide its institutions with a significant level of responsibility and autonomy in internal security matters, derived from its status and form as a shared competence field. And yet, the relationship has experienced difficulties, derived from unanticipated objections from other European actors. This chapter focuses on one such controversy.

For the purposes of comparison, it is clear from the preceding section that in contrast with CSDP, policy action in this area enjoys a level of integration that gives the Commission and parliament significant authority and decision-making power that can be exercised independently from the member-states. In a multi-level policy making system of this kind however, the US can operate as a negotiating partner that engages players at all levels (supranational, national, sub-national), deploying valuable coercive measures in order to obtain a policy outcome that most closely approximates its preferences. These differing dynamics will be explored in this chapter and in chapter 8. The next section provides context for the PNR case study, summarising the significance of the case and the major controversies of the negotiation process.

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76 Quoted in news article “Brussels attacks new US security demands” EU Observer, 14.02.08 http://euobserver.com/justice/25657
7.2 Counter-terrorism Cooperation and the Passenger Name Record Agreements.

The purpose of this section is to provide context for the PNR case study. Outlining the nature of PNR data collection and the prolonged negotiation process leading up to the EU-US Agreement in 2012 illustrate a number of factors that justify its selection as one of three cases:

1. The US’s lengthy efforts to agree a legal basis for PNR sharing with the EU demonstrate its significance as one of the primary goals of US diplomatic activity in the EU in the period 2010 – 2012.
2. The arguments made by US and EU officials in favour of an agreement support the position that PNR data sharing is viewed by these actors as a major element of transatlantic security cooperation and a high priority policy matter.
3. Finally, this contentious debate provides the study with a large corpus of texts produced by the US foreign policy community, thus allowing us to analyse a cross-section of detailed views on a high-priority policy matter.

These factors mark out the PNR case as a uniquely significant example of EU-US security cooperation. The case involves a particularly high-profile debate, offering frank and often contentious arguments about the nature of EU-US cooperation on counter-terrorism measures. The agreement itself was one of the most high priority areas of US transatlantic diplomatic strategy in the last ten years, and is one of the most important external counter-terrorism policies of the EU (Eeckhout 2011; 325). The negotiation process and the accompanying debate can be seen as a major case of the EU’s self-representation as a security actor. Reviewing the background to the 2012 agreement on EU-US PNR Data sharing will provide important justification for the case selection and context for the content analysis and interview findings.
9/11 and the emergence of the EU as a counter-terrorism partner.

As discussed above, the 9/11 attacks provided a compelling argument for the EU to coordinate its counter-terrorism activities and to cooperate with third countries, in particular the US, on combatting international terrorism. Measures taken by the Belgian Presidency of the Council to promote intelligence sharing and the appointment of a counter-terrorism coordinator in the wake of the attacks greatly increased confidence among senior State Department officials in the value of the EU as a counter-terrorism partner (Interview with Official at Under-Secretary of State level, June 2013). For the US, the advantages of dealing with the EU centrally, rather than with 27 differing police and judicial systems appeared strong. A whole series of formal counter-terrorism cooperative agreements were negotiated during the 2000s; the EU–US agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance77 (Wessel 2010; 282), two agreements on operational cooperation between Europol and the US, the Eurojust - US Department of Justice 2006 agreement for information sharing between EU and US prosecutors on terrorism and cross-border criminal cases, the Container Security Initiative, visa document security, SWIFT banking data sharing and the PNR data sharing agreement itself (Faull and Soreca 2008; 396 – 420, Pawlak 2011). The scale of EU-US counter-terrorism initiatives was so great that by 2008, the European Commission’s Director-General for Justice and Home Affairs, Jonathan Faull was able to say:

*The record shows that, while the US has many links with individual member states in the JHA field, it sees considerable added value in the EU’s ability to deliver cooperation with all 27 countries and is therefore happy to work with Brussels.*

- Faull and Soreca 2008; 420.

Among the initiatives launched after 9/11 by the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was the collection of vast amounts of data on air

77 The Union also pursues a number of “externalised” internal security preferences through bilateral relations with third states in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, and through agencies such as Frontex. See Sandra Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’” in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, pp. 680-700.
passengers in order to screen and detect suspicious patterns of behavior. Since 2001, DHS has required airlines to transmit all details they hold on passengers flying to the US, before the plane has landed. PNR data was employed as a major new tool in the US’s counter-terrorism efforts (Byrne 2012). Although data collection is far less extreme than measures to detain and interrogate terror suspects, the practice remains controversial because it subjects millions of civilians to detailed surveillance, even though they are not suspected of any criminal behavior (Brouwer 2009, Guild 2006). Opponents argue against routine data transfers of this kind, claiming that data protection standards in the US are not equivalent to EU standards under the 1995 Data Protection Directive and nor are there adequate provisions for redress for citizens who are mistreated on the basis of PNR screening.78

The problems with PNR have been legal, political and practical: it has taken the EU and the US almost ten years to agree on a durable legal basis for the current data transfers, in part due to rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)79. Opposition from politicians and NGOs in Europe has been forceful (Byrne, 2012). Even with a fully-fledged PNR-sharing system in operation, individuals already known to the US as terror suspects have been allowed to book tickets under their real names, board planes and undertake attacks despite a system designed to detect exactly such behavior (Ibid).

Notwithstanding, DHS officials claim that PNR has been crucial in thwarting potentially devastating attacks. Official secrecy on the details of terrorist monitoring and arrests makes any analysis of the effectiveness of PNR as a tool extremely difficult. However, reaching agreement on a legal basis for PNR

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79 In 2006, the court found a preexisting EU-US PNR agreement was not founded on an acceptable legal basis.
exchange has been a priority for both sides for years, indicating that the activity is of significant value:

\[\textit{PNR data is a critical asset not just to secure the travel of U.S. citizens, but to provide for the safety and security of travelers from Europe and the rest of the world.}\]

**Explaining PNR**

PNR data includes all data registered by airline companies or travel agencies when a traveler makes a booking: the name of the person, seat number, travelling route, booking agent, credit card payment details, IP address, physical address, phone numbers, etc. (Brouwer 2009; 3). The 2007 interim PNR Agreement between the EU and the US allowed for 19 of these data elements for all travelers being automatically “pushed” to the US Department of Homeland Security within minutes of travel. However this practice has been normal procedure since 2001, under bilateral arrangements with EU member states and subsequently under time-limited EU agreements from 2004 and 2007 onwards (de Hurt and de Schutter 2008; 326). For airlines with servers based in the US, the transfer can occur under US law.

What distinguishes PNR agreements from other forms of data sharing is that firstly all individuals, regardless of whether they have had any interaction with police authorities or not, have their data recorded. Secondly, the data is more detailed than standard passport information exchanged through the US’s Advanced Passenger Information (API) system. Assuming full functionality of the US PNR system on all domestic and international flights to or within the US, over 800 million PNR identities must be processed by DHS each year.

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81 The 2004 Agreement allowed for 34 data elements to transferred, this was rationalised to 19 points under the 2007 Agreement (Faul and Soreca 2008; 413)
PNR data can be used in three ways:

1. **Reactively**: After a crime has been committed, PNR can be used to investigate criminals and unravel criminal networks.

2. **In real-time**: Prior to the arrival or departure of passengers, the data can be used to prevent a crime, watch or arrest persons before a crime has been committed or because a crime has been or is being committed. In such cases, PNR data is especially useful for running passenger data against predetermined assessment criteria in order to identify persons that were previously “unknown” to law enforcement authorities but may pose a risk, based on their associations or patterns of behavior.

   In real time, PNR data can also be matched against other databases with the data of those suspected of criminal offences or those who have been flagged as potential risks. This makes it possible to identify suspects and their associates well in advance of their travel to or from a country.

3. **Pro-actively**: The criteria for “suspicious behaviour” can be constantly developed and updated through analysis of PNR so that authorities can learn more about early warnings or suspicious behaviour. (Kirkhope 2012)

   Technology now allows these data activities to be carried out on a larger scale, and on an automated basis. It also allows this data to be shared with a much wider group of actors: everyone from the US Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to local law enforcement officers. Crucially, the value of PNR data can be multiplied when it is crosschecked against any of the many other domestic databases.
EU-US agreements on PNR

Efforts to establish a permanent legal basis for the automated transfer of PNR data on passengers from the EU to the US have faced several hurdles to implementation over the last ten years. In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) annulled the 2004 Council Decision on the transfer of PNR data to the US, ruling that the agreement was not founded on an appropriate legal basis.\textsuperscript{83} This was replaced with the 2006 one-year interim EU-US PNR Agreement. Following much high-level engagement, including an address by US Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to the European Parliament, the Council subsequently approved a new agreement on a different legal basis in 2007; this addressed the objections of the ECJ but opposition among NGOs and MEPs remained. PNR Agreements have also been concluded with other countries; Australia in 2008 and Canada in 2006\textsuperscript{84}.

Recent attempts to ratify a new PNR Agreement with the US foundered in 2010 when the European Parliament (EP) used its newly acquired powers to postpone its vote for consent for conclusion of this agreement\textsuperscript{85}. Proponents, including Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, argued that the new draft agreement concluded in November 2011 to replace the 2007 Agreement included a number of amendments to address civil liberties concerns.\textsuperscript{86} The new draft was the result of extended negotiations between the Commission and DHS, the fourth such round of negotiations on this topic in ten years. Despite the recommendation of the EP Civil Liberties Committee rapporteur, Sophie in ‘t Veld MEP to withhold its consent to the agreement\textsuperscript{87} and repeated

\textsuperscript{84} http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/passenger-name-record/canada/index_en.htm
\textsuperscript{85} Under Art. 218, 6(a) TFEU.
\textsuperscript{87} Comments of Sophie in ’t Veld MEP, at a hearing of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2012.
postponements of the vote, a plenary session of the EP in Spring 2012 approved the plan.

The Significance of the PNR Case

In the crucial period leading up to the EP’s vote in spring 2012, it became clear that a rejection of the Agreement would lead to a significant political and legal crisis. The process received a high level of media and political scrutiny in the US, provoking resolutions in the US Senate and House of Representatives urging swift conclusion of the agreement. The delays also provoked a substantial diplomatic push by the US to press for a European agreement, evidenced by records of intensive bi-lateral lobbying of member state officials by the DHS and the Department of State, as well as lobbying at the highest cabinet level. This included unprecedented addresses to the European Parliament by the Secretary for Homeland Security, and regular references by the US Secretary of State to the necessity of reaching an agreement in virtually all public pronouncements on transatlantic relations. The US made clear that should the vote have failed, there would be no renegotiation of the deal between the Commission and DHS and a legal basis would be found for PNR data exchange through bilateral deals with member states. This would have led to substantial costs for the US, the EU and the aviation industry.

Without a new agreement, the US would seek to negotiate twenty-seven bilateral agreements, each with differing provisions and qualifications, leading to a massively increased regulatory burden for an already overburdened DHS. For the airline industry, a patchwork outcome would have meant additional costs and a greater regulatory burden. European Commission estimates put the total cost for airlines of a standardized EU-US PNR data “Push” system at 24 million

88 Unites States Senate Resolution 174, May 9 2011.
89 See Appendix 5: Official documents analysed
90 Ibid.
91 Comments by European Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström to Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, February 2011.
euro in set-up costs and 30 million euro in annual recurring costs. The costs under a patchwork scenario would have been exponentially higher.92

Finally, the same problems apply for European governments: aside from another lengthy negotiation process, the costs of bilateral arrangements would have pushed the direct set-up costs to member state governments from approximately 60 million euro to well over 220 million euro.93 This estimate did not include recurring maintenance costs. Additional costs arise mainly because each member state would have to establish its own Passenger Information Unit rather than establishing a centralized unit funded under the EU budget. For their citizens, a patchwork outcome would mean unequal levels of data protection depending on country of origin. For all major stakeholders, an EU-US PNR Agreement was seen as the optimal outcome in terms of costs, regulatory burden, effectiveness and simplified data protection requirements.

This section has outlined the emergence PNR as a major controversy in EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation and a major topic of transatlantic security discourse. Senior US officials explicitly marked out PNR as a policy priority for the period in question and the agreement is a significant example of the large and growing number of transatlantic cooperative initiatives in counter-terrorism. The complex political and legal questions exercised during the agreement’s ratification illustrate differing views of the appropriate forms such cooperation should take and the nature of the EU as a security actor in this field. Having provided policy and legal context for both EU counter terrorism cooperation as well as the background to the specific PNR agreements, the chapter will now present the findings of the qualitative content analysis.

7.3 Discourse 1: The EU as valued partner.

Overview of the QCA findings:

A summative qualitative content analysis was performed on thirty-five texts produced by the US foreign policy community, which related to the EU’s role as a partner in counter-terrorism cooperation, with particular reference to the EU-US Agreement on the sharing of passenger name record data\textsuperscript{94}. The texts can be divided into five source sub-groups along the internal comparative dimension (see overview of sources in Fig 6.2, next page), covering private and public texts produced by official actors in the State Department and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and unofficial policy analysts from two major think tanks; the Heritage Foundation (a conservative body) and the Brookings Institution (a liberal body). The fifth group consists of political sources derived from congressional hearings related to PNR. Although there is no comparable source sub-group in case 1, including these political source texts allows for an additional embedded case comparison within this case, highlighting noteworthy chains of political influence between sub-groups.

Fig 7.2: Overview of corpus of texts analysed for case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub groups</td>
<td>State Dept</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (DHS)</td>
<td>Houses of Congress</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation (Conservative)</td>
<td>Brookings Institute (Liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Type</td>
<td>Diplomatic Cables</td>
<td>Public Pronouncements</td>
<td>Senate Resolution Transcript of Hearings</td>
<td>Policy Analysis</td>
<td>Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Texts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of Discourse</td>
<td>Coordinative</td>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>Coordinative &amp; Communicative</td>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>Communicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Themes</td>
<td>High Policy Priority</td>
<td>Valued Partner</td>
<td>Frustration</td>
<td>Obstructionist</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Frustration</td>
<td>Pro-integration</td>
<td>Obstructionist</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
<td>Cooperator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Preference for bi-lateralism</td>
<td>NATO as crucial ally</td>
<td>Threatening to security</td>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>Economic Weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Threatening to security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preference for bi-lateralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Dominant Themes:

This section outlines ideal-type narratives of the EU’s role in counter-terrorism cooperation and the sharing of PNR data, derived from the qualitative content analysis of texts in this case study. The QCA process began with a word count analysis of recurring terms and relationships between words using the NVivo analysis software. This guided the in-depth qualitative analysis process by highlighting terms that appeared to recur in the text. A total of 21 themes or concepts were ultimately coded in this manual process. These themes were categorised as nodes and the researcher electronically coded sections of text for each of the concepts uncovered. Themes with single occurrences were excluded from the final analysis. The most significant of these themes are indicated in Fig. 7.2 together with a catalogue of all texts coded for this case, ordered according to source, audience type and document type.

The concepts coded were broadly divided into two conflicting narrative accounts of the EU as a security actor in this domain:

1. The EU as valued partner – mainly associated with liberal analysts and official sources.
2. The EU as Ineffective and Obstructionist – mainly associated with conservative analysts, although one sub-theme also evident in liberal and official political discourse.

These “ideal type” narratives are presented to demonstrate the central opposing narratives as discovered by the QCA in this case. The first narrative is clearly central to the public communicative discourse of official actors from the State Department and White House, as well as foreign policy analysts in liberal institutes, several of which served in previous administrations. The term “liberal narrative” is used as a shorthand label, although it should be noted that several officials in a Republican administration who would not identify as liberal officials contributed to this narrative. This narrative account appears broadly consistent with narrative 1 as described in the other case study (chapter 5).
The second narrative can be defined as the more marginal of the two, in so far as firstly, most of the narrative themes are not evident in any of the official public discourse from executive sources, thus it lacks the discursive power that comes with access to official channels of communication and governmental influence over mass media (Lebow 2006). Secondly, this narrative is confined to the conservative end of the ideological spectrum, most clearly embodied in the Heritage Foundation. For this reason, the descriptor “conservative narrative” is used as a shorthand label. This account also broadly aligns, in both themes and sources, with the third narrative in the other case study (chapter 5).

In spite of its association with an explicitly ideological think tank outside of Government however, some sub-themes within this narrative reappear in language employed by members of congress, suggesting channels of influence to conservative legislators. As will be assessed in chapter 8, several narrative themes from conservative discourse are also evident in private official discourse, suggesting this narrative is not completely restricted to analysts at the Heritage Foundation. Private coordinative discourse on the EU – the texts exchanged between officials in a closed policy network - for this case study is examined separately in chapter 8.

**The Liberal narrative: The EU as valued partner**

Most official pronouncements and public texts produced by actors from the “Official” sub group begin with references to the valued partnership the US has with the EU, in similar language to that found in case 1. There are three themes composing this narrative, each of which applies cognitive or normative frames that attributes meaning to the EU's features and its development as the US' policy partner.

1. The EU as part of a shared cultural and ideational relationship.
2. EU-US cooperation as a learning experience.
3. The EU as a source of policy opportunities.

This narrative is found in almost all official pronouncements and frequently within analysis from the Brookings Institute.

**A shared cultural and ideational relationship**

In speeches, public comments or policy analysis, officials often sought to establish their *ethos* with a European audience by firstly making familiar references to a common transatlantic cultural experience: the shared values, history, experiences of a western community. This theme holds European audiences in a rhetorical embrace, establishing the US government’s *ethos* as a partner with multiple shared reference points with the EU and implicitly rejecting the arguments of privacy objectors who portray US demands as arising from a weaker commitment to civil liberties.

*We must build on our historic relationship, values, and interests, as we seek action by the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament to finally conclude this PNR Agreement, which is without a doubt better for enhanced security, as well as for improved data and privacy protections.*


The relationship is one rooted in common historical experience: “After 20 plus years of post-Cold War history the resilience of the transatlantic bond should not be underestimated,” (Kupchan 2012). Speaking in Paris on the subject of the draft PNR Agreement, Janet Napolitano, Mr Chertoff’s successor, opened her speech declaring: “The United States and France have a joint history, as old as our republics, of cooperating to protect the security and rights of our citizens.” She added that this history was the basis on which the US and EU “are working

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95 It may be worth noting an apparent error here. The European Council had no formal role in the PNR negotiation process. The Secretary may be referring here to the Council of the European Union, specifically Justice and Home Affairs.
together to fight terrorism and transnational threats.” Only two weeks earlier, Eric Holder, US attorney general, also portrayed the EU’s role as an historically cooperative US partner: “The European Union and the United States have been proud to stand and to work together in the face of common threats.”

This shared history of cooperation is presented as meaningful or relevant because, according to several official sources, it means that the EU and the US “share the same basic values,” “shared fundamental principles,” and “shared values we all have in liberty and privacy.” In his remarks before a European Parliament Committee, Secretary Chertoff referenced “shared” values, principles or ideas nine times. Curiously, the repetition of this phraseology echoes the verb often chosen to describe PNR data transfers – “data sharing,” – despite the fact the transfers are unidirectional (ie: not reciprocal). The choice of this particular verb in both contexts implies community and mutual benefit; it imbues the policy initiative with the familial overtones of the broader discourse.

This account of a shared history of common values and interests is identified as making “Europe” – broadly defined – a unique partner, without equal in its ideational proximity to American values: “We don’t have any partner in the world that is as militarily capable, as prosperous that shares our values and that shares our agenda as we do in Europe.” (Shapiro 2010). This shared historical experience is interpreted as an intergenerational collective project based on shared values: “Our partnership will not only endure but it will thrive and grow stronger, and that we will carry forward the work of every generation of Europeans and Americans alike – to build a more just, more prosperous, more peaceful, free world.” (Clinton 2012). This theme echoes somewhat the notion of a transatlantic security community described by Deutsch et al and reviewed in chapter 2. It implies a cooperative relationship based on a shared “we-feeling” and a solid commitment to the same strategic values and principles.

**EU-US cooperation as a learning experience.**

Moving from the historical perspective to the more political, references were found to the second sub-theme of the narrative: EU-US cooperation as a learning experience. Both President Obama and President George W. Bush were said to arrive in office wary of the EU as a partner. Mr Obama “came into office skeptical of Europe. He was supposed to be a post-Atlanticist.” (Kupchan 2012). The President’s attention was said to be elsewhere: “He was paying more attention to the rise of Asia. But over time, he has come to appreciate Europe.” (Hill 2013).

The view of analysts from the Brookings Institute, one of whom served in the Clinton Administration, was that the President’s view on the EU had evolved: “he really appreciates the EU’s role” (Ibid).

The Bush administration’s learning process was at least as dramatic: “the Bush people came into office skeptical of Europe and they spent their second term as Atlanticists.” (Kupchan 2012). The references here share a great deal in common with the narratives in the CSDP case study, noting the initial hostility to the EU during this early period: “I think that Europhobia was there in the early Bush years, the George W. Bush years. I think that’s gone” (Ibid). Initial fears of the threats of European integration in the late 1990s diminished: “I think these sort of days of saying all of Europe, don’t get too strong, those are over.” (Ibid) This leads most of the commentators within this group to endorse continued “strengthening” of Europe: “a strong and united Europe is in the interest of the United States and is a stronger partner for the United States.” (Shapiro, 2010).

One interviewee told the author that the second Bush term was more accommodating of EU requests for coordination and consultation on counter-terrorism matters, in part because the sense of emergency eased somewhat after 9/11, when there were no significant follow-on attacks on US soil. This interviewee laid the emphasis on patience with EU requests, which it can be argued, indicates a perceived instrumental value in engagement:

*In general, the president was more patient with views of the EU on the security issues in the second term. Partly that reflects, as we went away from 9/11, we went a few years without having a successful attack and*
there was little more kind of patience with taking account of some of these other issues.

- Interviewee no. 5.

**The EU as a source of policy opportunities.**

The increased engagement with Brussels by Washington on counter-terrorism cooperation after 9/11 appears to indicate a growing acceptance of the value of EU-level cooperation on these matters. Scholars have suggested the EU’s response to the 9/11 attacks allowed Brussels to assert a broader security role in international cooperation (See 7.1) and the sources and interviews for this study give support to that contention. One senior homeland security official noted that before 9/11, the EU was simply not seen as a security actor and counter-terrorism cooperation was exclusively “nationally based”: “In the 1990s, in the pre-9/11 era, I don’t think the EU was, I mean, there were trade issues but on security issues it wasn’t much of a big deal.” (Ibid). A senior state department official in an interview confirmed that this view changed after 9/11; a key watershed moment, after which the EU’s reputation as an effective interlocutor on security matters was enhanced:

*After 9/11 there was just an enormous sea change in our counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU. At that stage, I think it was the Belgian Presidency who were in charge and they initiated a whole raft of changes that helped us to better coordinate our intelligence sharing with our European partners. From that point on, we saw the EU as a major asset in coordinating intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism cooperation with European countries and I think that has been quite a success.*

- Interviewee no. 14.

Much of the previous sub-themes within this narrative mirror closely discourse on the EU at large. Accounts of counter-terrorism cooperation itself emphasise the importance of the policy opportunities that cooperation with the EU offers and the important results that such activity has already delivered: “I want to emphasise … the tremendous cooperation that we in the United States have
received from our European colleagues on many fronts in dealing with this
challenge of terrorism in the 21st century,” (Chertoff 2007). This cooperation is
not merely useful – it regularly averts potentially fatal catastrophes: “We have
worked together to disrupt terrorist plots both in Europe and the United States,”
(Ibid). This same account references the wide nature of technocratic initiatives
that compose this expanding field of security cooperation:

_We’ve enhanced our security across our borders, oceans and skies. We’ve
achieved unprecedented cooperation on a host of international initiatives.
From setting standards to sharing information to boosting security at our
airports and our seaports._


Secretary Napolitano also made reference to numerous EU-US policy
cooperation initiatives as evidence of a productive relationship. This form of
cooperation is presented in stark terms, the success and failure of such activity
determines the fate of ordinary people: “It is fundamental to the security of our
citizens that we cooperate” (Shapiro 2010). This theme creates a compelling
normative frame for EU cooperation with US requests on counter-terrorism
measures. Put simply, EU-US counter terrorism cooperation is a matter of life
and death.

The three themes composing this liberal narrative are fulsome with praise for a
productive relationship, based on a solid cultural and ideational foundation and
which only grows more appreciated by US leaders over time. The sources coded
for this discourse are exclusively drawn from liberal analysts and officials,
providing evidence of a strong relationship between these ideological and
institutional sub-groups and the narrative of the EU as a valued partner. This
narrative mirrors that found in the first case on conventional security, suggesting
that the sub-groups that constructed the EU in a positive light in both cases,
made little distinction as to the policy competence level in their assessments.

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99 DHS Press release: “Readout of Secretary Napolitano’s Participation in the U.S.-EU Justice and
Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting,” November 21, 2011
However, as will be seen in the coming sections, the optimism that accompanied increased engagement with Brussels on counter-terrorism cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11 was tempered towards the end of the 2000s by the prolonged negotiation process required to achieve an agreement on PNR. Public, private and interview statements by officials suggest that the PNR negotiations represent another significant juncture point in US elite discourse on the EU. Although an agreement was eventually reached, the effort required and the difficulties encountered by US officials dimmed enthusiasm for EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation, leading to frustration and the development of a competing discourse of the EU as ineffective and obstructionist. This shift in discourse will be described in detail in the following sections – where conservative analysts expressed much more critical views. The shift in attitudes among officials will be explored separately in the analysis of private official discourse in chapter 8.

7.4 The EU as Ineffective and Obstructionist

In stark contrast to the liberal narrative of the EU as a valued partner in counter-terrorism cooperation, the second narrative – broadly termed as “conservative” - framed the EU in a more negative light, through the emphasis on four recurring sub themes:

1. Institutional and operational ineffectiveness,
2. Obstructionist tendencies, in some cases seen as “anti-American”.
3. European integration as threatening to US interests,
4. A preference for bilateral cooperation with member states where possible.

Although the term “conservative narrative” is used as a short hand label for this narrative, the first theme framing of the EU as an ineffective and disunited actor was also evident among officials and liberal analysts. The occurrence of this
theme across the ideological and institutional sub-groups is a significant finding and illustrates a dominant cognitive frame for US elite actors of all backgrounds. More broadly however, taken together with the three other constituent themes, this narrative is most closely identified with unofficial conservative actors. The association between the narrative of the “EU as Ineffective Obstructionist” and the Heritage Foundation is the strongest relationship between a source and themes. This finding is supported by the auxiliary quantitative content analysis. In particular, the word similarity cluster analysis of the corpus of texts. As illustrated in Fig. 7.2, the dominant representation of the EU within this narrative is as obstructionist, with a normative preference for bi-lateral cooperation with member states, rather than dealing with the European Commission.

It is important to acknowledge that this narrative was not the dominant account of the EU within the PNR case, rather this narrative was most strongly correlated with one particular source (high source correlation), and the texts produced by this source expressed a small number of ideas in a highly consistent manner (high thematic consistency). The strongest correlation according to the word cluster analysis is between the Heritage Foundation (the source) and the themes of EU as obstructionist and a preference for bilateral engagement with member states (as thematic nodes -See Fig. 7.3). Ineffectiveness is less closely associated with Heritage and the closely related them of “disunity” is strongly correlated with the Brookings Institution (liberal) and the State dept. These findings, together with those from chapter 5, indicate that the ideological divide between the embedded cases was the most important factor shaping discourse on the EU in both cases.
Fig 7.3: Overview of themes indicated by clustered word similarity
**Ineffectiveness**

This theme, or cognitive frame, is most forcefully articulated by conservative analysts. It begins with its claim that the tools and institutions of EU counter-terrorism efforts are poor, in part because of the EU’s complex structures: “the EU is often a complicating factor in many areas and the multilateral forum for
intelligence sharing is suboptimal,” (McNamara 2007). Institutional actors are seen as pre-occupied with bureaucratic turf-wars and interests, rather than substantial action: “Europol and Eurojust are EU agencies looking for roles to justify their budget lines rather than significantly contributing to counter-terrorism,” (Ibid), “While some policies have aided the fight against global terrorism, many have advanced unnecessary EU programs and created ineffective institutions,” (McNamara 2011). Institutional changes since the Lisbon Treaty have only exacerbated this ineffective bureaucratic structure: “All sorts of tedious rule changes will result, adding yet more layers of bureaucracy and confusion to the behemoth that is the European Union … The promise of a greater, more active European Union with the capacity to be a full partner in counter-terrorism looks likely to be delayed for quite some time,” (Rosenzweig 2011).

Although this theme fits most clearly within a narrative labelled as broadly conservative, the assessment of the EU’s internal security policymaking as an arena for inter-institutional wrangling and turf wars was widely shared among officials and analysts from both sides of the ideological divide. In an interview exploring this theme, one state department official presented the process as a learning experience and identified the newfound prominence of the parliament as an unexpected and under-appreciated change in the decision-making structures:

“We learned that the parliament is now an extremely important actor in the post-Lisbon period and so we had to figure out how to manage that new structure. It was a major undertaking, engaging with MEPs directly in Brussels, addressing their concerns through our mission there and also in national capitals. We’re still in the process of figuring that out – how to deal with the parliament”

- Interviewee No. 7.

But another senior official directly involved in the PNR talks was more critical, saying that when negotiating with the Commission and parliament the US had been “caught in an institutional issue in Europe in which we were essentially bystanders,” (Interviewee no. 5). This senior official said the PNR talks were
plagued by time-consuming and unproductive turf-wars, arising from a desire by actors in the European parliament and Commission to “assert themselves”:

I think what would happen with the US and the EU is we would get caught between the institutional interests of the EU commission versus the member states. And sometimes [the institutions] would exert themselves really more to send a message to member states than because they cared about the actual issue with us.

- Interviewee no. 5.

While analysts and officials varied in their assessment of the severity of this institutional ineffectiveness – all agreed that the Lisbon treaty innovations had not helped matters. Rather, the reforms had exacerbated institutional confusion and unproductive competition between European bureaucratic actors: “Lisbon has made things worse. The institutions are harder to figure out now, it’s more complicated, it’s more difficult to pin down where responsibility lies.” (Interviewee no. 15).

Officials in interviews spoke openly of their “frustration” with the additional “bureaucratic layer” that “diffuse” EU institutions embodied in the process of gaining access to European passenger data. Not only did one official believe these “unaccountable” institutions, were engaging in a competitive struggle for bureaucratic power, they also appeared unable to deliver results as negotiating partners:

“It just added a layer of bureaucracy because they were struggling with the member states about what their jurisdiction was. We were just like you know, 'Figure it out on your own nickel. Don’t make us be the ones who have to sit and wait and negotiate”

- Interviewee no. 5.

Most of these official comments were given in interviews for this thesis –as will be explored in chapter 8, criticisms of this kind were more frequently expressed in private settings, rather than public discourse.
**Obstructionist Tendencies**

The European Parliament’s initial reluctance to consent to the PNR Agreements is the central issue within this narrative, which was not found in any liberal sources. Across all texts, it is argued that the ostensible reason for reluctance – concerns over civil liberties – is unreasonable, even dishonest: “The European Parliament continues to challenge the EU–U.S. PNR deal on the basis of unfounded concerns about U.S. data protection standards.” (McNamara 2011). The head of the Margaret Thatcher Centre for Freedom within the Heritage Foundation leaves no doubt as to the true motivation: “Their objection is simply thinly veiled anti-Americanism” (Ibid). She continues: “as obsessed as it is with advancing European integration, the European Parliament is equally as fanatical about frustrating EU–U.S. cooperation.” This anti-American obstructionism is not merely confined to the PNR issue however. In separate testimony before the House Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasian Affairs, Heritage’s McNamara argues that this trend is evident in most areas of EU-US cooperation on counter-terrorism matters:

*Many EU policies have obstructed U.S. counterterror efforts. For example, Brussels has long opposed U.S. renditions policy and has even threatened to sanction member states for hosting CIA sites in Europe. The EU also refuses to designate Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which would deny the terrorist entity a primary fundraising base. And the European Parliament has legally stalled two vital data-transfer deals—the SWIFT data-sharing agreement and the EU–U.S. Passenger Name Records (PNR) Agreement. Overall, the EU–U.S. counterterrorism relationship has been marked as much by confrontation as it has by cooperation.*

- McNamara (2011)

This narrative draws on central themes from Eurosceptic discourse on the EU as a nascent superstate, intent on acquiring more power (Hawkins 2012): “The EU’s supranational drive is the latest in a protracted power grab for competence over member states’ borders.” (McNamara 2007). It combines this theme with a broader assertion that the EU is, *by its nature*, aggressively anti-American by employing physiological references that anthropomorphise the EU’s tendencies.
“the EU’s instinctively aggressive reflex ... the EU’s combative attitude ... its animosity toward the United States” (Ibid). These pseudo-human tendencies lead to an inevitable conclusion: “The political reality is that the European Parliament is a bastion of anti-American sentiment, determined to obstruct America’s war on terrorism rather than make a meaningful contribution to transatlantic security,” (Ibid).

Not all who described the institutions (both parliament and commission) as obstructionist believed that this tendency arose from the reflexive anti-Americanism portrayed by McNamara. When officials were asked whether anti-American sentiment played a significant role in the resistance to PNR in Brussels, all demurred from such an assessment. Instead, officials pointed to the institutional ineffectiveness outlined previously, misunderstandings about US data protection standards as well as an ideological aversion to data sharing among some parliamentarians as reasons behind the resistance:

“There might have been a little bit of that [anti-American sentiment] but I didn’t get the sense that was a main doubt. I think it was more kind of just a, you know, some of it was more an ideological, real issue you know about privacy, particularly for the Germans, There were some libertarians, you know we have some of those in the US too.”

- Interviewee No. 5.

**Integration as threatening**

In its simplest form, this sub-theme – found only among conservative analysts - argues that the EU’s attempts to enhance its role threaten US security: “full EU integration and supranationalization is not in America’s long-term interests.” (McNamara, 2007). The idea of integration as a threat arises from the sources’ broad objections to supranational decision making, but more specifically integration in AFSJ is seen by these analysts as “leading the European Parliament to dispose of policies that have been essential in fighting terrorism around the world ... more disastrous decisions may well follow — many of which will have a damaging effect on U.S. national security.” (Ibid). If it does not exercise vigilance,
the US “risks letting changes in Europe adversely affect America’s own national security.” (Rosenzweig 2011). The EU’s attempts to increase its power are presented as attempts to expand its writ to the United States: “It is past time for Europe to stop exercising a form of policy imperialism and trying to export their privacy processes to the U.S.” (Ibid). The normative frame applied by this theme is unequivocal – integration in this policy domain is a threat to US interests.

**Preference for a bilateral strategy**

These cognitive and normative frames lead to the policy recommendation that the US should avoid negotiating counter-terrorism initiatives directly with the EU if there are alternative strategies available, chiefly dealing with member states bilaterally:

> The biggest challenge of developing exclusive ties with the European Union has been the risk to the solid and enduring alliances established with individual member states. The United States will find its strongest partners, both in fighting the war on terrorism and in combating Islamic extremism, among its individual bilateral allies.

- McNamara (2007)

In itself, EU-level action threatens the relationships the US has already built up with member states: “the strengthening of the EU is a challenge to the United States’ long-standing bilateral relationships with the sovereign countries of the EU” (Rosenzweig 2011). The EU’s ineffectiveness, its obstructionism and its anti-American instincts mean: “The U.S. is more likely to achieve its political objectives with the assistance of traditional friends than by working with the new EU institutions,” (Ibid). British analysts within Heritage draw special attention to “the contrast between the U.K.’s cooperative and workable approach and the EU’s combative attitude toward the United States.” (McNamara 2007). Where the EU is framed as ineffective, obstructive, threatening and perhaps even anti-American, European countries are framed as cooperative and easy to work with.
Overall, the discourse of the EU as ineffective and obstructionist is characterised by a remarkable consistency among conservative authors across a 5-year timeframe. All the texts produced by Heritage in this period refer to the four subthemes to varying degrees, often using identical phrases in different settings, suggesting a conscious communications strategy to focus on a core set of compelling ideas. The texts are clearly aimed at influencing executive and legislative actors – this is indicated by the inclusion of direct policy recommendations to the White House in the texts as well as the fact that several of the texts are transcripts of testimony given before the US House of Representatives. Retired senior State Dept officials in interviews confirmed they would regularly telephone senior Heritage staff to seek their views on foreign policy matters (Interviewees No. 9, 18). Although this narrative seems entirely divorced from official public discourse and liberal analysis of the role of the EU as a security actor, elements of the discourse are evident in private official coordinative discourse in secret cables (see chapter 8) and resolutions issued by the House and Senate. The mirroring of elements of this discourse in the private correspondence of officials and the public utterances of members of congress suggests that the views of the EU as ineffective and obstructionist are not merely confined to marginal conservative analysts. Evidence for these links is the subject of analysis in chapter 8.

**Conservative influence in the legislature**

Of particular interest are indications that this narrative informs some legislative thinking. Evidence supporting the argument that the narrative of the EU as ineffective and obstructionist informs congressional views is found in a number of clauses in Senate Resolution 174, introduced in May 2011\(^{100}\). The following clause from the resolution directly suggests that the EU was attempting to

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\(^{100}\) The resolution’s full title is: “Senate Resolution 174—Expressing The Sense Of The Senate That Effective Sharing Of Passenger Information From Inbound International Flight Manifests Is A Crucial Component Of Our National Security And That The Department Of Homeland Security Must Maintain The Information Sharing Standards Required Under The 2007 Passenger Name Record Agreement Between The United States And The European Union”.

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modify the agreement in a manner that would obstruct the US’ ability to identify terrorists, and urges DHS to resist this:

...(2) urges the Department of Homeland Security to reject any efforts by the European Union to modify existing PNR data sharing mechanisms in a way that would degrade the usefulness of the PNR data for identifying terrorists and other dangerous criminals;

- Senate Resolution 174, 2011.

The implication here is clear: the EU's negotiators are pursuing a strategy that may damage US security interests. This appears to draw upon some themes identified in the conservative narrative of the EU as obstructionist and ineffective. Furthermore, clause 4 suggests that the EU may attempt to “interfere” with broader counter-terrorism measures the US adopts with third countries. This echoes the conservative narrative’s warning of the EU’s “policy imperialism” and the threat this poses to US security interests:

...(4) opposes any effort by the European Union to interfere with counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing between the Department of Homeland Security and non-European countries.

- Senate Resolution 174, 2011.

Given that the Senate’s resolution draws upon some of the themes expressed in the Conservative narrative on the EU, particularly those included in testimony before Congress from the Heritage Foundation, it seems plausible to suggest that the particular legislators in question are drawing directly from remarks by the Conservative think tank. Even if the Heritage texts were not the origin of this language, the similarity between themes makes the classification of the clauses within the conservative narrative of EU obstructionism compelling.
7.5 Comparisons

Embedded cases / within case comparison

The analytical structure of this chapter has presented the dominant cleavage in discourse – the ideological divide with the US foreign policy elite – in sections 7.3 and 7.4. Analysis of public discourse in this case shows a clear dichotomy between conservative analysts on the one hand and liberal analysts and officials on the other. Although the QCA did not set out to analyse the content of the texts with an a priori classification method derived from the case variation model in Fig. 7.2, the ideal-type narratives discovered mirrored closely the embedded cases of ideological and institutional sub-groups. This indicates that, when both internal and external comparative dimensions were considered, the differing ideological positions of the sources had the strongest influence on the pattern of discourse. Although liberals and officials expressed frustration with the pace of negotiations, few publicly suggested this frustration warranted a pivot towards a bi-lateral counter-terrorism cooperation strategy. None expressed a view of the EU as obstructionist, anti-American or threatening.

It is noteworthy that official sources, in both Republican and Democrat administrations did not appear to diverge from the liberal narrative. Examining motivations behind this consistency across administrations is beyond the scope of this study but plausible explanations might include the low political salience of this subject in broader American political discourse or the relatively technocratic nature of this particular agreement. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the party affiliation of White House administrations, and their political nominees in DHS and the State Dept. did not appear to change the official public discourse in this case.

Cross case comparison

The liberal/conservative dichotomy in US elite discourse is strikingly similar in both cases examined in this study. In both cases, the results of the QCA indicate
that ideologically divergent sub-groups constructed the EU in discourse by employing consistent and competing narratives. These narratives remained consistent in the cognitive and normative frames they applied to EU action, assessing the EU in much the same ways, despite important variations in the policy context for action. Whether assessing EU action in the intergovernmental CSDP domain or the more communitarized AFSJ domain, the conservative and liberal narratives were mostly unchanged in their core narrative themes. Liberal analysts and officials speaking in public portray the EU as an institutionally sub-optimal but valued partner, with whom the US shares a common cultural background. Conservative analysts on the other hand, portray the EU as ineffective, obstructive and threatening. The similar pattern of discourse in both cases, despite the variation in policy competence level, supports a view of ideological and institutional cleavages as the dominant factor shaping discourse.

**Conclusions**

This case study examined a highly relevant form of security cooperation in which EU institutions (the Commission and parliament) exercised supranational policy competences and asserted their roles as primary European interlocutors for the US. This pre-eminence was demonstrated by illustrating the legal provisions, policy developments and the communicative and coordinative discourse of official actors in the US Government. These policy characteristics make the PNR case a useful comparator to contrast with EU action in more conventional security fields (i.e: Case 1 - CSDP).

The narratives discovered by the QCA process were supported by the auxiliary quantitative content analysis and depicted two ideal type accounts of the EU in the counter-terrorism case as a valued partner and the EU as ineffective and obstructionist. The divergence of these two narratives was closely aligned with cleavages among the embedded cases. The “liberal narrative” was highly correlated with public official statements and liberal policy analysis, whereas the
“conservative narrative” was composed of a set of themes consistently expressed by conservative policy analysis and echoed in resolutions from Congress.

Although officials specified a greater number of specific and technical cooperative initiatives in this policy domain, arguably acknowledging a more substantial body of cooperative work, there was little evidence that the community competences exercised by supranational institutions in this field shaped the public discourse in significant ways. Longitudinally, officials noted 9/11 as a historical juncture, marking an expansion in counter-terrorism cooperation. However mainstream commentators, analysts and scholars generally apply this cognitive frame to all counter-terrorism endeavours, multilateral or otherwise, making this finding insignificant. The Lisbon treaty reforms were not identified in the public texts as significantly changing the policy context for action.

A possible shortcoming of this analysis is that many of the official texts analysed were addressed to European audiences, meaning that speakers may have been reluctant to express more critical views. US officials were conducting an intensive communications campaign to win support for PNR among Europeans, so we might expect a greater divergence between official communicative and coordinative discourse in this case than in the previous one. To address this hypothesis, the following chapter will explore whether private, coordinative discourse between officials was closer to the conservative narrative on this and other themes – or whether the views of conservative analysts are as marginal as they appear from the preceding analysis. Chapter 8 presents the final comparative dimension in this study – between public and private official discourse on the second case study.

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101 The text selection process attempted to build as wide a range of texts on the subject as possible and the corpus did include readouts of press statements to the American press corps and interviews given by officials to US media. It should not be surprising that there were more remarks on record from US officials before European audiences as the subject was of a greater salience in Europe than in the US.
Chapter 8:  

A Comparative Analysis of Public and Private Official Discourse in Case 2 (PNR)

Introduction

This chapter compares the findings of the examination of public and private discourse in the second case study (PNR). As in chapter 6, the analysis follows a three-step process: themes, strategies and comparisons. The chapter explores the themes outlined within internal correspondence in this case, revealing a significant divergence between public and private discourse that contrasts with case 1. The analysis reveals how officials coordinated a strategy of denial and deflection in countering European data privacy concerns and also pursued bilateral channels for counter terrorism cooperation. The sections will explore how public and private texts on this topic diverged markedly moreso than in case 1. This analysis will raise questions about the dominance of the ideological framework as an explanatory framework for US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor, suggesting that institutional context also shapes discourse in significant ways.

8.1 Themes in private discourse – Case 2 (PNR)

The significance of EU counter terrorism cooperation and PNR.

Officials at USEU had signalled the EU’s growing competence in internal security matters as early as 2007, with one diplomat noting that the revisions to Justice
and Home Affairs in the Lisbon Treaty may prove more significant than other reforms: “Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) will remain a major avenue for further EU integration over the next decade ...the next frontier is JHA.” 102 More specifically, the cables confirm that reaching agreement on PNR was a major priority for the US in its dealings with European partners. Records from cabinet-level meetings with European ministers from Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria and Portugal show that PNR was the primary item on the agenda103. In these meetings, the Secretary for Homeland Security regularly encouraged ministers to support the PNR negotiations and to seek to encourage national MEPs to vote in favour of consent. In a further round of bi-lateral talks, Secretary Napolitano met with 10 interior ministers to press her “core aviation security message,”104. The cables indicate the aim was to emphasise to MEPs the extreme importance of data sharing in providing security for Americans and Europeans alike:

Embassy will reach out to Romanian members of European Parliament directly to address their individual concerns regarding information sharing and data privacy issues with the United States.

- US Embassy to Bucharest105

Cables from other US missions demonstrated how they sought to allay the fears of MEPs and broader “opinion makers” on data privacy issues:

These events suggest the need to intensify our engagement with German government interlocutors, Bundestag and European parliamentarians, and opinion makers to demonstrate that the U.S. has strong data privacy measures in place.

- US Embassy to Berlin106

103 It may be that interior ministers from the other 20 member states were also lobbied by US officials specifically on the issue of PNR, however the PLUS-D library does not include all classified cables and these were the only specific records of such meetings found.
In Secretary Clinton’s first meeting with EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, the PNR Agreement was also a major priority for the US side:

_The Secretary and Ashton agreed to work closely on data sharing/protection to conclude a binding agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), and secure the passenger name record (PNR) agreement. The Secretary said it was important to get the word out on the value of these agreements and suggested convening a group of experts on the issue._

- US Mission to the EU\(^1\)

It appears likely that the frequent exchange of cables on this subject and the level of senior political investment in PNR they reveal, served to underline for officials throughout the State Dept that the PNR agreement was a major diplomatic priority. This evidence of the high priority given to the US-EU PNR talks underlines the emergence of the EU as a significant internal security actor within US official discourse. Although many of the encounters related in the cables are with national officials (see “Bi-lateral preference” section below) the cables reveal that US officials saw the agreement on PNR as a significant security objective and not merely a symbolic pact.

**Frustration with a “slow” partner**

As one might expect, a more critical tone is evident in private diplomatic cables and indeed in the records of private conversations with European policymakers on PNR, when compared with public comments. In the accounts of meetings with member state ministers there is a clear sense of frustration with the pace of negotiations on counter-terrorism measures and the nature of data privacy

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objections to the PNR agreement. This tone is increasingly evident from 2008 onwards, as talks on replacing the interim 2007 PNR Agreement stalled and negotiators complained publicly about difficulties encountered in the process. This renewed sense of urgency followed on from the enactment of an interim PNR agreement in 2007 and coincided with the launch of the ratification process for the Lisbon Treaty, which would soon grant the European Parliament an effective veto-power over international agreements – including any new PNR Agreement – concluded by the Union. Therefore, for much of 2008 and 2009, when most of the relevant cables were written, the US was operating within a narrowing window of opportunity during which time the European parliament’s approval for international agreements was not yet formally necessary. Although the ratification of Lisbon was delayed by the failure of a referendum on the treaty changes in Ireland, one cable in August 2009 correctly noted that the Lisbon Treaty amendments – which granted the parliament this power - could come into effect by the end of that year.

In an extended record of a meeting between the Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and the Irish ministers for transport and justice, circulated among US diplomats concerned with European affairs, the Secretary’s impatience with the EU process is clear:

“Napolitano stressed that the USG is moving forward with bilateral agreements because the pace of the U.S.-EU negotiations is too slow.”
[author’s emphasis]

- US Embassy to Dublin

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108 See Faull, comments reported in EUobserver, Feb. 2008. Quoted in news article “Brussels attacks new US security demands” EU Observer, 14.02.08
http://euobserver.com/justice/25657

109 The Lisbon Treaty was signed by EU leaders in Oct. 2007 and eventually came into force, after some delays, on Dec. 1st 2009.

Canonical ID: 09USEUBRUSSELS1140_a Accessed at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRUSSELS1140_a.html

111 “DHS Secretary Napolitano Meets Irish Ministers Of Transport and Justice” July 8, 2009.
DUBLIN 00000258 001.2 OF 002. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DUBLIN258_a.html
Secretary Napolitano’s comments reveal a preference for bi lateral agreements and an explicit insistence that EU talks should not delay such deals. This message should be interpreted as having two audiences: the ministers present in the meeting but also the US officials who were sent the notes of the meeting. This bi lateral preference appears to conflict with senior Commission official Jonathan Faull’s claim in late 2007/ early 2008 that US officials had accepted the added value of negotiating directly with the Commission, rather than with 27 different member states. The counter-terrorism partnership was so effective, in fact, that Washington was “therefore happy to work with Brussels,” he wrote (Faull and Soreca 2008; 420). However, we now know from Mr Faull’s subsequent public comments that frustration with the Commission led the US to shift its strategy by early 2008 and as the Dublin cable reveals, the US government was actively seeking counter terrorism cooperation on a bi-lateral basis with member states instead, even on matters he considered to be within the Commission’s purview.\footnote{Faull, comments reported in Euobserver, Feb. 2008 Quoted in news article”Brussels attacks new US security demands” EU Observer, 14.02.08 \url{http://euobserver.com/justice/25657}} For our purposes, it is important to note that the addressee “tags” on the Dublin cable and the others analysed, demonstrate that this policy preference was widely communicated within the US government.

**Data protection standards as threats to US objectives**

A 2009 cable from USEU provides insight into the motivations behind this tactical shift, and reveals a narrative constructing EU data privacy standards as threatening to US objectives: “European privacy and data protection concerns continue to jeopardize our commercial, law enforcement, intelligence and foreign policy objectives,”\footnote{“The Many Sides Of Data Privacy: Managing Rising Tensions With The EU” August 17\textsuperscript{th}, 2009. Canonical ID: 09USEU BRUSSELS1140_a \url{https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USEU BRUSSELS1140_a.html}} The cable noted that EU privacy standards were already impinging on US commercial and law enforcement interests; “we are already encountering problems in these areas,” (Ibid). It further noted that, “for some years”, EU data standards had “damaged” or “delayed” interests including:

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\footnote{Faull, comments reported in Euobserver, Feb. 2008 Quoted in news article”Brussels attacks new US security demands” EU Observer, 14.02.08 \url{http://euobserver.com/justice/25657}}
Europol and Eurojust cooperation agreements, SWIFT record sharing and cargo scanning requirements. The cable reveals an increasing American unease with European data privacy concerns, viewing European insistence on compliance as an attempt to extra-territorialise European standards.

The recipients for this memo included officials in 15 different government departments and agencies – from this we can infer the memo’s purpose to alert actors in all relevant fields of the US government of these dangers.\textsuperscript{114} While European officials insisted they were seeking to protect European citizens’ privacy rights, the cables suggest that US officials were interpreting these efforts as a form of policy imperialism\textsuperscript{115}. Although the frustration had been building for some time, the analysis suggests that 2008 marked a hardening of the US position and a tactical shift to bypassing the Commission and engaging member states directly. This shift came soon after the 2007 interim PNR agreement came into effect and officials began to seek a more durable legal basis for data transfers.

\textit{EU partners: unreliable, unaccountable, ineffective}

In order to further explore the theme of frustration outlined above, the role of EU actors in the negotiating process was discussed extensively in an interview for this study with a former official at the highest level at the Dept. for Homeland Security. The official was centrally involved in the PNR discussions, in advance of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The interview sought to assess how officials viewed the role of the Commission and parliament as supranational institutions in this process and how these views developed. In the interview, the official described the Commission’s role as a negotiator representing member states on

\footnote{\textsuperscript{114} Cable recipients: Central Intelligence Agency | Department of Commerce | Department of Defense | Department of Homeland Security | Department of Justice | Department of the Treasury | Drug Enforcement Administration Washington | Federal Bureau of Investigation | National Security Council | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris) | RUEADRO HQ ICE DRO WASHINGTON DC | RUEAFCC FCC | Secretary of State | U.S. Mission to European Union (formerly EC) (Brussels) | United States Customs Service
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.}
PNR data exchange as “a layer ... that doesn’t deliver anything from our side,” (Interviewee no. 5).

In theory if the EU was a one stop shop where you could do a deal with them and you could cover both what they needed and we needed, in some ways its easier than doing one-offs. But if you can’t get that, why negotiate with you if you can’t deliver anything? ... in the end you’re just adding another layer for them that doesn’t produce any, any benefit from our side. You have to stop there and start all over again. So why not go directly to the folks who are actually capable of negotiating and giving you an answer?

[emphasis added]

- Interviewee No. 5.

This interviewee described the EU – in particular, Commission officials - as unable to reach “deals” on the PNR agreement without consulting member states or other institutional actors. According to the official, Commission negotiators would reach incremental agreements with US interlocutors and then ask the Americans to conduct further negotiations with other actors – presumably the parliament and/or member states:

If the EU says, ‘we want this but then after that, you go make, we can’t do anything for you, you have to now negotiate separately,’ then you have a sense of ‘why am I wasting my time with you? You can’t give me what I want. I want to go to the people who do.’ I think that was the issue.

[emphasis added]

- Ibid.

When asked how the EU’s record on negotiating PNR was viewed by the security community in Washington more broadly, the official said that the slow progress in talks with EU officials was seen as a symptom of the institutions’ lack of clear democratic accountability, leadership and executive power. The official pointed to the lack of an individual actor in the Commission who could “deliver” on agreements in negotiations as a source of frustration:
The EU is so diffuse [that] there is a sense of kind of lack of accountability for results, which created a sense of frustration on our part ... The other thought you do get in the security community is that the EU has been accumulating power but doesn’t necessarily have responsibility.

- Ibid.

[emphasis added]

The same official said that he and his colleagues, who led the negotiations on the US side, gained the impression that even the directly elected European Parliament was operating on the basis of “power disconnected from responsibility.” Unlike members of congress, for instance, MEPs appeared willing to impede valuable counter-terrorism measures without consideration of the potentially lethal risks to their voters:

The parliament was great at putting obstacles down but if something bad happened, no one was going to look at them and say: ‘this was your responsibility and your fault,’ so they had the ability to insist on all kinds of requirements, without really necessarily weighing that against: ‘Is this going to interfere with your ability to protect your people?’

- Ibid.

The official expounded at length on possible motivations for EU institutions to exercise power to delay or obstruct the PNR agreement, despite its potential security enhancing provisions. The responses outlined the cognitive frames the official and relevant staff applied to interpret the behaviour of EU interlocutors in the negotiating process. The official portrayed the majority of objections, requests or delays as the result of factors external to the policy itself, US data standards or any directly related considerations. Instead, objections were seen as arising from a dysfunctional institutional dynamic wherein EU actors competed for supremacy. While the official acknowledged that for some MEPs, data privacy objections were sincerely held, for most (s)he argued the motivations were derived from institutional turf-wars and bureaucratic battles for influence. According to this view, which closely echoes a strand of the
conservative narrative, EU-US counter-terrorism cooperation became the victim of an institutional power struggle:

*I think what would happen with the US and the EU is we would get caught between the institutional interests of the EU commission versus the member states. And sometimes [the institutions] would exert themselves really more to send a message to member states than because they cared about the actual issue with us.*

- Ibid

[emphasis added]

It is striking that this cognitive frame forecloses the possibility for successful engagement with many institutional actors on the substance of the policy proposals. If, to adopt this cognitive frame for interpreting the objections, the difficulty is not related to PNR, or the US’s proposals, then the solutions to objections lie outside the negotiating framework. The manner in which this interpretation deflects principled objections and undermines arguments for substantial revisions to the PNR proposals will be discussed further in section 8.2.

A senior career officer in the state department shared a degree of frustration with the role of the parliament, in particular: “On PNR, we found the unpredictability of the EP hard,” (Interviewee No. 7). Not all officials were as critical of “institutional politics” as the DHS official was – one official said patience was needed to allow the post-Lisbon structures to become more effective in time (Ibid). Additionally, no other official cited a lack of democratic accountability in their assessments of the EU as a counter-terrorism actor, so this view may not be widely held. Nevertheless, it is significant that an official at the most senior level on the US negotiating team identified inter-institutional rivalries and perceived democratic shortcomings within EU structures as primary causes for the delays in the PNR negotiations. Given this individual’s authoritative position within the policy community, and the influential role in
discursive construction such a position grants, their comments warrant special attention (Checkel 2006: 63).

8.2 Strategies in private discourse - Case 2 (PNR)

“Objections are misguided” – coordinating a strategy of denial and deflection.

Other officials interviewed for this study placed more emphasis on the misapprehensions about US data privacy standards described in earlier sections as explanations for European resistance. Many officials noted a sincerely held “ideological” aversion among some MEPs to wholesale data exports. But this view was often dismissed – in interviews and cables – as being misguided or based on “misconceptions,” “myths,” or “misunderstandings,” about US data privacy standards\(^ {116}\). According to one memo produced by USEU and distributed to multiple departments and agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, Dept of Defense and Dept of Homeland Security, US government actors were instructed to deploy a communications strategy with a primary objective to “correct mistaken perceptions of U.S. privacy protection in both the public and private sectors.”\(^ {117}\) The document identified nine high level transatlantic events at which the message could be promoted. The document instructed officials to address privacy concerns in public events and in private bi laterals with decision makers and opinion-formers by attributing principled objections to PNR to misunderstandings or a lack of knowledge on the part of objectors.\(^ {118}\) In many public forums, the complexities of data protection equivalence were difficult to establish and argue in understandable ways; the European Court of Justice had

\(^ {116}\) Ibid.

\(^ {117}\) The Many Sides of Data Privacy: Managing Rising Tensions with the EU” August 17, 2009. Canonical ID: 09USEUBRUSSELS1140_a
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USEUBRUSSELS1140_a.html

\(^ {118}\) Belgium: law enforcement and counterterrorism information sharing and data privacy issues with Europe. February 12, 2010. Canonical ID:10BRUSSELS172_a
not yet ruled, as it did in 2015, that US data protection standards did not provide adequate privacy protections for Europeans’ personal data. By avoiding in-depth discussion of specific provisions and attributing objections to misunderstandings, the strategy effectively forestalled discussion of compromises on data protection standards.

One diplomatic cable reported that a Belgian interior minister rejected the “deflection” argument, insisting that the objectors’ fully understood US data privacy regime and simply did not have confidence in the protections it afforded Europeans:

_Baekelandt opined that the issue on data privacy for Europeans was not lack of understanding of U.S. procedures, but lack of belief that the U.S. is indeed committed to protecting the privacy of European citizens._

Despite these rebuttals and the statements of independent expert agencies, such as the “Article 29 Working Party” – made up of national data protection supervisors - there is no indication that US officials entertained the idea that objectors had well-founded privacy objections to the PNR agreement. In internal communications, US officials portrayed objectors like “Article 29” as “acting outside their formal competence” and complained that their approach of “giving primacy to civil liberties-based approaches” in law enforcement matters had “gone unchallenged” by the Commission. Elsewhere, officials portrayed some of these objections as arising from a peculiarly European mindset – suggesting that, in Europe, respect for privacy is fundamental value which has a different status than elsewhere: “Privacy is also a political issue, connected in European minds with respect for fundamental democratic values.” (Ibid). The statement is open to multiple interpretations, but it seems to frame European data privacy concerns as somehow culturally specific and less fundamental in the rest of the World.

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119 Ibid.
The analysis of coordinative discourse in this section makes clear that, in their response to the unexpected and enduring resistance to data-sharing measures in Europe, US officials did not consider a self-critical examination of US data protection standards. Nor did officials consider developing significant new data protection safeguards to reassure European allies\textsuperscript{121}. Instead, internal memos provided a clear cognitive frame, which bracketed European data privacy objections using one of the three explanations in Fig. 8.1 and coordinated a multi-agency strategy to deny and deflect these concerns\textsuperscript{122}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Fig 8.1: Framing European objections to data-sharing in official discourse} \\
\hline
1. By-products of institutional rivalries between unaccountable actors \\
2. Misunderstandings or “dangerous misperceptions” \\
3. Ideologically-driven complaints by marginal actors \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Implementing a policy preference for bilateralism}

“The problem was not really the member states … it really was a Commission issue.” (Interview no. 5)

The discourse of an obstructionist and institutionally unresponsive Brussels bureaucracy appeared to be more widespread among US officials than the analysis of public discourse would suggest. According to several sources, this frustration led to a new policy of applying pressure to policymakers on the national level, who appeared less opposed to the data sharing measures and more receptive to the tactic of linking agreement on these measures to side-deals.

\textsuperscript{121} Although subsequent PNR draft agreements shortened the period of time that personal data could be held in databases by several years and also anonymized details held in long-term databases, opponents insisted the changes were minor. In a written assessment of the 2011 agreement, the Article 29 Working Party said: “As a general assessment, the Working Party notes (modest) improvements in the draft agreement, but does not see its serious concerns removed.” http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2012/20120106_letter_libe_pnr_en.pdf

\textsuperscript{122} This assessment does not imply officials acted dishonestly or in bad faith in their strategy of deflecting criticism. The question of whether actors truly believe what they say is beyond the realm of this study, which seeks to analyse meaning as constructed in language and not discover “hidden meaning” behind texts.
on visa regulations. The sections below will analyse how this strategy was communicated within official discourse. It will also assess evidence from the cables that the US successfully exported border security norms by bypassing the EU institutions and striking side bargains with national governments, thus undermining community competences in an ostensibly communitarized policy area (see Argomamiz 2010; 127).

A senior DHS official told the author that as the Commission-Homeland Security talks for a draft PNR agreement dragged on during 2008, a perception grew in Washington that the positive attitude of many member state capitals was in contrast to an obstructive approach by EU institutions. The European parliament and the Commission were identified as the obstacles to progress:

*The problem was not really with member states – because most of our counterparts were perfectly happy for us to be doing what we were doing and were very cooperative in this. It really was a Commission issue and more particularly it was the parliament that was very agitated about it.*

[emphasis added]

- *Interviewee No. 5.*

State Department officials acknowledged that the growing opposition to an agreement had taken them by surprise: “The PNR experience was a difficult and long process and we underestimated that at the beginning,” (Interviewee No. 7). The PNR case was the first in which the parliament used its power to delay approval for an international agreement by the EU, and in interviews, officials acknowledged this action had taken them by surprise (Interviewee no. 7, 8). In response, a widespread multi-departmental effort was launched to analyse political risks and win support from MEPs, ministers, commission officials, NGOs and influential figures in national capitals. Embassies reported to numerous government agencies on the implications of national political trends for data-sharing opportunities.\(^{123}\) Rather than merely analysing opinion, embassies also

\(^{123}\)“Data privacy trumps security: Implications of a FDP victory on counterterrorism
actively sought to shape it: a senior State Dept official said that diplomats in national capitals engaged MEPs in their home capitals, often through the national party structures, rather than in Brussels; “We’re still figuring out what is the proper degree of engagement with the EP, that’s still being worked out ... We approach through member state capitals, we’ll support visits to Washington DC by some.” (Ibid) Much of the work involved reassuring MEPs on US data protection standards, in line with the strategy of deflection - “clearing up misconceptions” as another State dept. official put it (Interviewee No. 8).

The cabled reports from US embassies detailing exchanges with national officials on PNR data confirm that by 2009, DHS had shifted attention to national capitals in the search for agreement on new counter-terrorism initiatives. Some of the cables suggest that the frustration with a perceived slowness or inability to deliver on the part of EU officials had led to a pivot away from Brussels towards pressuring national capitals. Pressing for the opening of negotiations with the Irish Government on a data-sharing agreement entitled “Preventing and Combatting Serious Crime” (PCSC), Secretary Janet Napolitano disagreed with two Irish ministers who explicitly favoured negotiations at EU level rather than bi-laterally:

\[
\text{The Secretary said that the U.S. was committed to these data privacy negotiations but they have been going on for some time and "terrorism has not been put on hold." For this reason, the bilateral process needs to move forward.}
\]

- US Embassy to Dublin\(^{124}\).

Whereas MEPs and Commission officials were sometimes described as ideological, unaccountable, obstructive or unable to deliver on commitments by certain US officials, member states’ interior ministers were framed in cables and

\[^{124}\text{DHS Secretary Napolitano Meets Irish Ministers of Transport and Justice, July 8, 2009.}\]

Canonical ID: 09DUBLIN258_a Accessed at: [https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DUBLIN258_a.html](https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09DUBLIN258_a.html)
in interview responses as more reliable interlocutors: “These folks knew that if something happened in their country, that it was on them, so that really got them serious,” (Interviewee No. 5). Secretary Chertoff has described his relationships with interior ministers as “great”, “fantastic” and “cooperative;” “They all had the same responsibility: you are the one ultimately answerable if a terrorist attack occurs in your country. That shared sense of responsibility always kept us pretty much on the same page.” An interviewee for this study confirmed the secretary’s engagement with these ministers increased in frequency post-2009 and on several occasions he met with the interior ministers of an inner core of six EU member states (Germany, France, UK, Poland, Italy and Spain) at informal biannual meetings. In January 2010, Secretary Janet Napolitano, Mr Chertoff’s successor, also lobbied interior ministers, one-on-one, at the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council in Toledo, Spain. Around this time, the US launched a fresh effort to agree new terms for sharing criminal records of potential passengers arriving in the US; the Commission once again expressed concerns, while member states were seen as more accommodating (Interviewee No. 5).

Cables and interviews for this study show that US officials made clear to member states who did not yet have much-coveted visa-waiver agreements with the US, that progress on the new data sharing measures would help them to achieve their aim of an agreement on visa liberalisation. Offering national governments VWP programs as a quid pro quo for adopting border security measures was viewed with increasing frustration by Commission officials, who saw these attempts to by-pass Brussels with bi-lateral bargains as undermining community competences in an ostensibly communitarized policy domain (Argomaniz 2010, 127). Following bi-lateral talks between Washington and national capitals, member states in turn pressured the Commission to abandon its opposition to further EU-US counter terrorism data sharing initiatives, according to interviewee no. 5:

“I’m told there was some harsh words in Brussels and someone from one of the countries that wanted the programmes, basically said you know ‘you guys have been promising us the visa waiver programme for years - If you stand in our way here, we’re out, we’re out of here.’ So they basically forced the issue and the EU backed down.”

[emphasis added]

PCSC Agreements have since been concluded with 18 European governments, with the US regularly linking the granting of attractive visa waiver scheme status to new member states to agreement on PCSC\textsuperscript{127}. This preference for bilateralism was noted with concern in Brussels – senior Commission official Jonathan Faull complained of some approaches to member states as “disrespectful.”\textsuperscript{128} The content and interview analyses show that by employing a set of core negotiation points (see Fig. 8.2) in talks with national governments, MEPs and opinion-formers, the US succeeded in building a coalition behind increased data-sharing with the US for counter-terrorism purposes.

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**Fig. 8.2: Key negotiation points for bi lateral talks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Citing the gravity of the terrorist threat.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Deflecting privacy protections concerns (see Fig 8.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incentivising compliance through offering side bargains, especially on the Visa Waiver programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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This section analysed two key strategies revealed in the coordinative discourse of US officials. In the first strategy, officials were coached in a strategy of denial

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\textsuperscript{127} Report on data privacy issues by German NGO “Data Privacy” \url{http://www.daten-speicherung.de/index.php/leaked-cables-u-s-bullying-europe-into-transatlatic-biometrics-matching/}

\textsuperscript{128} Public comments made in February 2008. As reported by EUobserver: \url{http://euobserver.com/justice/25657}
and deflection of data privacy objections. Memos and cables, circulated among a broad collection of government agencies, framed the motivations and tendencies of data privacy objectors as misguided, using three explanations which did not permit a self-critical examination of US data privacy standards and foreclosed a wider debate on data privacy concerns (See Fig. 8.1). Secondly, the analysis reveals how US officials coordinated a multi-agency effort to further their data sharing objectives by bypassing supranational authorities – framed as “unaccountable” and unreliable by senior negotiators - and instead pursuing a bilateral strategy. The analysis explored how officials in national capitals reported political analysis and negotiated with national political actors using three core negotiation points (see Fig. 8.2). The following section will compare the findings of sections 8.1 and 8.2 with the findings from chapter 7. The comparison will review key divergences between public and private texts and also analyse the recurrence of particular narrative themes from liberal and conservative narratives in the private coordinative discourse.
8.3 Discourse comparisons – case two (PNR)

In private, official assessments are more critical

In assessing the EU's performance in this case, the coordinative discourse of US officials is markedly more critical than the public communicative discourse. In fact, privately, officials echoed certain elements of the conservative analysts' narrative. In particular, private official discourse appeared to align with three themes associated with the conservative discourse of the EU as an ineffective obstructionist: frustration, ineffectiveness and a preference for a bi-lateral strategy. These narrative themes were explored further in interviews with current and former officials involved in the PNR talks - all articulated a view of the post-Lisbon Treaty EU structures as more institutionally complex and complicated to engage with. Interviewee No. 5 echoed the Heritage Foundation's assessments of the EU as unaccountable and preoccupied with internal institutional struggles.

The coordinative discourse constructed the EU's increasingly complex institutional structures and data privacy principles as “problems” that “continue to jeopardize our commercial, law enforcement, intelligence and foreign policy objectives”129. Data privacy concerns expressed by European officials, parliamentarians and activists were portrayed as dangerous “misperceptions” that threatened US interests (Ibid). Commission negotiating partners were described in interviewees as unreliable and ineffective dealmakers. These criticisms of institutional and political complexity mirror similar complaints in conservative discourse on the EU in case 1. While private coordinative discourse acknowledged the EU's emerging action in counter-terrorism cooperation, by 2008, officials viewed this new role warily, mindful that EU institutions were becoming problematic interlocutors for both institutional and policy reasons.

129 "The Many Sides of Data Privacy: Managing Rising Tensions With The EU” August 17th 2009. Canonical ID: 09USEUBRUSSELS1140_a
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USEUBRUSSELS1140_a.html
This finding provides an interesting contrast with case 1; in conventional security matters, American anxieties about CSDP diminished after 2000 and the Lisbon Treaty reforms provoked no new fears among officials in this regard. By contrast, in counter-terrorism cooperation, US threat perceptions grew steadily from the mid-2000s, in particular from 2008 onwards, as negotiations began to foreshadow institutional changes associated with the Lisbon treaty. It is notable that ineffectiveness was a common theme across all discourses, in all sub-groups and in both cases. However, while the perception of the EU as an ineffective actor persisted in the counter-terrorism case, it was nevertheless viewed as potentially damaging to significant US foreign policy objectives. While US officials voiced frustration at what they described as “ineffectiveness” – these complaints were often described as Commission officials “not delivering” or not “giving me what I want,” – these complaints could arguably be rephrased as frustration with Commission officials for being uncooperative or perhaps even non-compliant. The senior negotiator never ascribed this lack of “delivery” as based on strategy or principle however – the EU interlocutors were framed as incapable of negotiating satisfactorily.

What of the tactical shifts revealed by the analysis of coordinative discourse? As their frustration with EU institutions and data privacy objectors grew, officials in both State and Homeland Security shifted their strategy to national capitals, where they employed a series of negotiating tactics – as outlined in Fig 8.2 - to achieve their aims. In both communicative and coordinative discourse, privacy objections were framed as “misperceptions,” that should be “corrected.” Privately, officials elaborated on the reasons behind these misconceptions; arising from institutional unaccountability, a culturally specific preoccupation with privacy or wayward ideological agencies. In neither public nor private texts, did the cognitive and normative frames allow for a self-critical examination of US data privacy standards.

Arising from the analysis of both public and private statements and the revealing comments in interviews for this study, the main motivation for the
shift of focus to national capitals was dissatisfaction with the pace of EU-US negotiations and unease with EU data privacy standards. The cables confirm that key actors in the US foreign policy community expressed growing frustration with the nature of EU-US lengthy negotiations in both bi-lateral exchanges and internal State dept. memos. The cables reveal that even when State dept. officials identified the European Parliament as the key veto player on the PNR Agreement, the diplomatic strategy remained focussed on national capitals. US diplomatic missions led a strategy to influence the voting intentions of MEPs by applying pressure to national governments and seeking to shape opinions among national opinion shapers and organisations.

Furthermore, this strategy used issue-linkage and side-deals; using visa waiver agreements as incentives for national governments to either pressurise the Commission to drop its concerns relating to new counter-terrorism data sharing measures or to assert their role as lead interlocutors with Washington. The cables also show that US officials rejected requests by national officials to conduct data-sharing talks at EU level, adopting a “forum-shopping” approach which sought greater asymmetric advantage by negotiating with capitals rather than the Commission. These findings provide significant support for studies which have argued that the US played a dominant role in border security norm exporting to the EU after 9/11, and that it has succeeded in this objective largely through offering visa-related incentives to national governments for unqualified compliance (see Argomaniz 2010, Den Boer and Monar 2002).

**Where conservative discourse and private official discourse diverge**

This analysis forces us to re-examine the results from chapter 7, which suggested that liberal and official narratives were at one on the EU in this case. The themes analysed in private discourse echo three core frames from conservative discourse: frustration, ineffectiveness and a preference for bilateralism. So did

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130 Interestingly, this appears to correspond with policy advice from the Heritage Foundation to some extent, although the degree to which this can be said to be “influenced” by Heritage is indeterminate.
conservative analysts merely say in public what officials believed in private? The analysis suggests a more complex picture and important differences of opinion between these two groups. In order to examine whether the preference for bilateralism matched the conservative analysts’ resistance to EU cooperation in almost all circumstances and as a rule, officials were asked whether the experience had led to a lasting reluctance to seek EU-US level cooperation through Brussels-negotiated agreements. The senior Homeland Security official said it had not but indicated a scepticism about the capacity of the Commission to act as a final decision-maker: “It’s not so much avoiding the EU as much as seeing who ultimately can do the deal.” (Interviewee No. 5). The State Dept official responsible for the talks portrayed the US strategy as under constant re-evaluation, with no set preference for either national capitals or EU institutions. Instead, the officials said each initiative would require an ad hoc evaluation of the optimal forum for seeking European cooperation: “You know, we are always going to work with member states directly on some issues and with the EU on others. We will work with our European partners on whichever platform is most effective.” (Interviewee No. 7). This differs from the Heritage Foundation’s undiluted commitment to exclusively bi-lateral cooperation as a rule.

Another difference relates to the motivations sources ascribed to the EU for its unsatisfactory behaviour. When asked if European opposition to US proposals were rooted in an instinctive or reflexive anti-Americanism – as argued by Heritage analysts – all official interviewees rejected this assertion. The analysis of private cables also found no evidence to suggest this belief was held in official circles. Official interpretations of EU action in this area portrayed some EU motivations as malign; ideologically driven, arising from unaccountability, ignorance or an inability to deliver. But officials were resistant to the idea that the EU was intrinsically hostile to US interests and certainly not anti-American.

These findings suggest that while private coordinative discourse was more critical of EU action, and indeed borrowed some of the themes of conservative discourse – including a preference for bilateralism in counter terrorism
cooperative measures, officials differed from Heritage Foundation analysts in their portrayal of the motivations for Europeans’ behaviour.

These findings are significant for our within-case comparison, in that they support a view of institutional context as an important shaper of discourse. At a minimum, this divergence highlights the discursive action of officials, seeking to reshape the terms of the debate in the public debate, in ways that differ markedly from their private analyses. The evidence of contrasting patterns of public and private discourse (two of the embedded cases) supports a view of institutional context as an important determinant of discursive patterns. This finding is noteworthy and confirms our expectations that officials will frame ideas differently when addressing the general public. But how can we explain the greater divergence of public and private discourse in this case, when compared with case one? Unlike case one, US officials discussing the PNR case were engaged in complex and long-running bi-lateral negotiations over an agreement with direct commercial and security impacts for both flight operators and the US government. In this context, officials speaking in public were more likely to employ strategies designed to shape opinion, convince interlocutors and prevent potentially damaging public backlash against the measures. In private, the strategies revealed were more specifically targeted to achieve immediate or short-term policy objectives. In case one, these short-term considerations were absent and actors were evaluating institutional developments overseas, with the detached perspective of an interested party, but one not directly involved in the negotiation process.

**Ideological affiliation confirmed as a consistent indicator**

Ideological affiliation once again provided an important indicator of discursive divergence, much as it did in case one. Although the themes of the conservative narrative were echoed in private coordinative discourse, the root cognitive frames employed by conservative analysts to explain EU obstructiveness (reflexive anti-Americanism) were not shared by any of the officials interviewed. Secondly, while officials shared a preference for bilateralism, only conservative analysts eschewed any possibilities of EU-level counter-terrorism cooperation.
These findings reaffirm the conclusion from case one, that ideological affiliation provides a clear indicator of discursive divergence, with core tenets of the conservative discourse remaining marginal.

**Policy competence matters, but only when evaluated for impact.**

The findings are also significant for our cross-case comparison, in that they support a view of policy competence level as an important factor shaping private discourse. In this relatively more integrated policy domain, the threat perception of US officials rose significantly in response to the Lisbon treaty reforms, once it became clear these reforms might obstruct US data access preferences. By contrast, in case one, threat perceptions diminished as officials interpreted the institutional reforms of Lisbon as unlikely to result in significant real-world impact. This finding suggests that diplomatic appraisals of the significance of policy integration in each case acted as an important intervening variable.

The finding does not necessarily suggest that US officials are predisposed to view EU security integration as threatening – by their own words, in public at least, integration is actively encouraged by US officials. Rather, it appears that when integration is seen to bestow veto-like powers on the EU institutions over vital transatlantic security cooperation measures, like PNR-sharing, US officials shift back to a preference for bi-lateral cooperation with member states. In this case study, the shift to bilateralism enabled US officials to achieve negotiation objectives through the use of side deals and issue linkage.

**Conclusions**

This chapter explored how private coordinative discourse differed sharply from public communicative discourse in the context of a complex and long-running negotiating process, which officials viewed as potentially threatening to US interests. In public, officials attempted to win support from sceptical European audiences by employing rhetorically attractive cognitive frames describing a
“shared transatlantic bond” as the basis for cooperation and compelling frames which presented cooperation as a “life and death” security imperative. In private, internal memos employed frames that deflected EU privacy objections by bracketing objections as arising from problems external to the PNR agreement itself. In particular, the pre-existing cognitive frame of the EU as institutionally ineffective and obstructionist featured strongly in this framework. The evidence suggested that a conservative public narrative of the EU as a threat was more closely aligned with elite ideas than the QCA of public discourse in chapter 7 suggested.

Providing a definitive explanation for the reasons behind the divergence of public and private discourse is beyond the scope of this dissertation and such an attempt reaches beyond the epistemological range of the approach this dissertation employs. The findings are also limited by the number of documents coded and officials interviewed. The frustration and criticisms of EU ineffectiveness expressed by the most senior official, a Republican nominee, may indicate a more conservative ideological standpoint, rather than a generalised view among officials. Nevertheless, strategies remained broadly consistent under both Republican and Democrat-appointed DHS Secretaries, suggesting continuity across different White House administrations.

Finally, the community policy context was seen to have important effects on discourse, raising American threat perceptions when US officials perceived the Lisbon treaty reforms as producing a form of European “policy imperialism.” US officials made great efforts to engage supranational actors in the European parliament and the Commission but, ultimately, sought many of their objectives through bi-lateral negotiations with member states. This resistance to collective EU security action warrants further examination. Can we reconcile American officials’ rhetorical endorsement of greater EU security integration on the one hand, with a staunch resistance to the idea that EU institutions may assume veto-like powers over vital transatlantic security cooperation measures, on the other?
Chapter 9

Conclusions

This study has examined the nature of US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor and explored how various factors - internal and external to the US foreign policy community - shaped the pattern of discourse. The study opened up for examination the processes of discursive competition within an influential elite and revealed how ideological and institutional cleavages within that group were mirrored in divergent narrative accounts of EU security action in two policy fields. The analysis also considered how official discourse on EU security action differed in public and in the private diplomatic network. Arising from the outcomes of this research, it is possible to make some general remarks related to the study of international relations.

Discourses on ideas and identities are an important element of international politics. The discourses of significant actors set expectations for the behaviour of other actors within the system – marking out socially constructed parameters for legitimate action, cooperation and conflict. As Wendt (1999) argued, the generation of international identities for actors is an inherently social exercise, involving interactions with Others, who “mirror” role expectations back onto the Self. Scholars (Baker-Beall, 2014) have argued that the EU is engaged in a “continuous discursive struggle” to define its relationship with the world (p. 212). Some have analysed CFSP as a tool of rhetoric designed to personify an EU identity (Tonra 2005), a product of national-level European discursive competition (Larsen, 2004) and a way for the Union to project itself externally, articulating its significance for the World (Rosamond 2005). However analysis of this “discursive struggle” has often neglected the external participants in this social exchange. As Larsen (2014) noted, this absence is striking given the rich seam of scholarship devoted to conceptualising the EU as a normative power – a
school which has not yet blended its approach with an empirical analysis of the discourse of significant others (899). This study has shown that analyses limited to European debates on the EU’s security action miss an important part of the socially constructed discursive puzzle. The EU’s role as a security actor is a highly contested concept, with divergent terms of debate between European actors, but also on either side of the Atlantic. Hence discourse on the EU’s policy conduct and in particular, non-European discourse on this subject, plays a key role in the Union’s identity construction - one which International relations scholars and EU specialists cannot ignore.

Within the generation of US discourse on EU security action, elite sub groups with access to financial, political, media and intellectual resources play an important role. Elite foreign policy narratives matter because in lower profile areas of policymaking, which are characterised by low media salience and public awareness, small groups of specialists, operating from influential institutional positions, can exercise a high degree of influence. Analysing their activity reveals a competitive ideological field of purposeful discursive competition, which has significant effects on US policy and on broader perceptions of the EU's role internationally. Studying the behaviour of these actors, and the pattern of discourse produced in this community is crucial therefore, for understanding the evolution of the EU’s role in global politics.

In particular, this dissertation focussed on role of ideology, institutional context and policy competence in shaping discourse. Divergent narrative accounts, rooted in the differing ideological positions of the elite sub-groups, were expected because these actors consciously seek to reshape the terms of debate on the EU's nature and conduct in line with their preferences. It was also expected that variation in policy competence levels between case studies would be mirrored in differing evaluations of the EU's capacity for action, firstly in conventional security (CSDP) and secondly in counter-terrorism cooperation. The case studies partially confirmed these expectations. But they also showed that ideology provided a more consistent indicator of divergent narrative accounts of EU security action. In order to explain this finding, the thesis argued
that broader evaluations of the EU's role, incorporated within enduring cognitive and normative frames were more significant influences on the sources analysed and that officials had incentives for moderating critical commentary of the EU in public contexts.

The sections below review the main findings and arguments of this thesis, highlighting the broader themes that connect these elements. The sections will draw theoretical and policy-relevant conclusions as to the prospects for the EU's representation in discourse. The chapter will also discuss key limitations of the theoretical and methodological approach as well as further avenues for academic enquiry.

### 9.1 Elite discourse and EU security action – reassessing the research puzzle

This thesis has proposed a novel qualitative content analysis of discourse produced by the US elite foreign policy community, specifically on EU security action. The project was sparked by a recognition of the gap in scholarship on external discourse on the EU’s international role, which stood in contrast to a flourishing debate on European perceptions and discourse on the EU. The study has addressed this research gap and produced a missing piece of the puzzle on the highly contested nature of EU security action, specifically focussing on ideas about the EU’s security role in the US policymaking community.

The study theorised that divergent discourses on EU could be explained using an interpretive framework incorporating ideological and institutional cleavages informed by variation in EU policy competence level. The explanation emerges from discursive institutionalist scholarship that conceptualises discourse as simultaneously an external structure and an internal construct, providing cognitive and normative frames that order phenomena. But the framework also reveals how agents purposefully shape discourse using their foreground
discursive abilities (Schmidt 2008). The study modified the framework by theorising that privileged and influential elite groups can organise individual discursive actions and harness political, financial, media and intellectual resources to shape discourse at the institutional level. The approach thus addresses broader debates on the relationship between agent-level action and structure-level discursive change and the role of power relations in discourse theory (Panizza and Miorelli; 2012).

The formulation of an elite-focussed, competitive discursive model for the analysis of US foreign policy discourse was the study's main theoretical contribution. The application of discursive-institutionalist analysis and the adoption of a qualitative content analysis method for the study of public and private foreign policy discourses were the key methodological innovations of this work. This was the first time – to the author's knowledge - that US elite discourse on the EU as a security actor was analysed to produce a representative map of ideas on the topic. It is also the first analysis which compared private diplomatic correspondence and public official pronouncements on this topic.

**Interpretive frameworks and discursive competition**

The comparison of embedded cases showed that the ideological cleavage between think tanks was the most consistent indicator of divergent narrative accounts of the EU. Although an overarching discourse of EU weakness dominated analysis across sub-groups and policy fields, this cognitive framework was flexible enough to encompass widely differing conclusions. Most notably, conservative think tanks consistently portrayed EU security action in both policy domains as a threat to US security interests, despite the Union's apparent weakness and decline. Within this conservative narrative, the EU was portrayed as obstructionist, ineffective, Anti-American and hostile to NATO. Meanwhile - in public, at least - liberal think tanks and officials consistently described EU security integration as creating valuable opportunities for transatlantic partnership, rooted in shared values and histories. US officials
expressed concern about the risks to NATO posed by EU conventional security integration. But these fears diminished throughout the late 1990s and 2000s.

The shaping effect of ideological affiliation cross cut the variation in policy competence in each case, thus demonstrating the important effects of ideology in the discourse of analysts. Most accounts were responsive to institutional changes, in so far as analysts responded to new signs of deepening integration. The overall normative frames remained consistent, but the analysts widened their field of application to new forms of security policymaking – most notably AFSJ - after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The ideological affiliation of analysts was thus the most consistently useful interpretive framework – among those employed - for the pattern of discourse across both case studies.

The institutional context also provided a useful indicator for the pattern of discourse. Although official discourse in case 1 (CSDP) was broadly similar in thematic content in public and private settings, officials speaking in public were more likely to conceal their threat perceptions of security integration in case 2 (counter-terrorism cooperation). The thesis argued that this tendency arose from the high-stakes negotiation context for PNR, which incentivised public efforts at consensus building, rather than open criticism of perceived European obstructionism.

This finding, which revealed that behind closed doors, officials dealing with the EU in case 2 were more likely to view the Union as obstructing US security interests, provided valuable insights for our cross-case comparison. In the more communitarian policy domain (Case 2: counter terrorism) officials were surprised to learn that the Lisbon reforms could allow “unaccountable” and “ineffective” supranational institutions to restrict US access to transatlantic passenger data. The QCA of private analysis circulated within the State Dept shows a group of officials highly alarmed by the consequences of European integration and the apparently extra-territorial influence of EU data privacy principles. The findings showed that in more communitarian policy domains, such as counter-terrorism, where supranational institutions obtain veto-like
powers, officials shifted their negotiation preferences to bi-lateral cooperation with member states. In case two, the US strategy appeared to unpick the Commission’s negotiating prerogative, and reach around the institutions to make progress in national capitals. Furthermore, by bracketing European data objections as misinformed or rooted in institutional dysfunction, the coordinative discourse of officials foreclosed opportunities for greater compromise with data objectors.

**Think tanks and the competition for discursive dominance**

The finding that liberal and conservative analysts were consistent in their contrasting appraisals of EU security action across time and policy fields supports the central argument that these actors are engaged in purposeful discursive competition. The evidence suggests that elite sub-groups are engaged in a conscious effort to reshape discursive institutions in line with their preferences and thus supports Schmidt’s (2008) theory of dynamic institutional change.

The findings support the arguments outlined in chapter three for the particular elite conceptualisation approach pursued. The thesis rejected an epistemic communities approach to US think tanks, instead highlighting the highly diverse ideological nature of the think tank community and its competitive features. This claim was buttressed by chapter three’s description of the emergence of an ideologically competitive think tank field in the 1970s and 1980s. When Jack Kemp, Republican congressman for New York, wrote that the Heritage Foundation had become “the single most important intellectual ‘bank’ for our growing positive conservatism...” (cited in Medvetz 2012, 111) he was highlighting both the explicitly ideological bent of the organisation and also its significance as a political resource. By this time the liberal analysts in Brookings were already keenly aware that the think tank arena had become ideologically-polarized and characterised by sophisticated methods of lobbying, public and media influence: “One had better be aware of one’s competition. We saw that in certain areas we were not up to speed ... we had to take some lessons from our
more aggressive competition ... in the public affairs field.” (Ibid, 110). Therefore, rather than a Haasian (1992) vision of think tanks as technocratic actors with shared assumptions of expertise, competence and objective knowledge, the image of think tanks that emerges from the empirical findings of this study is one of purposeful and politically savvy operators, marshalling sophisticated techniques and resources to influence the debate on European security in line with their preferences.

Therefore, rather than a Haasian (1992) vision of think tanks as technocratic actors with shared assumptions of expertise, competence and objective knowledge, the image of think tanks that emerges from the empirical findings of this study is one of purposeful and politically savvy operators, marshalling sophisticated techniques and resources to influence the debate on European security in line with their preferences.

This is not to say that these institutions do not produce valuable assessments and critiques of EU policies, nor is it to infer bad faith on the part of any analysts sampled. It is rather to acknowledge that the discursive landscape is characterised by competing actors, with differing ideological standpoints and preferences. Their writings and their communication efforts indicate a sophisticated and highly active field of discursive contestation.

**The role of power relations and the nature of discursive change**

These findings support the theoretical extension proposed in this thesis, which argued for an examination of how changes in discursive institutions are driven primarily by elite level action, in addition to the individual agent level described by Schmidt (2008). This modification responded to two criticisms by scholars in the field; firstly, that the mechanisms connecting agent level discursive action with structure level institutional change had not been specified. Secondly, that the power relations enabling certain actors to be effective in this process were also under-analysed (Panizza and Miorelli, 2013). By virtue of their resources and reputations, Brookings and Heritage afforded the analysts they employed a platform to influence policy discourse that would, in most cases, not have been available to them otherwise. As Heritage founder Paul Weyrich remarked, “We had no real experts. We had a bunch of eager young people who in time became expert. But at the time that I had them, nobody knew who they were,” (Medvetz 2012, 177). It was the influential discursive platform of the think tank that enabled both well-established experts and also “unknowns” with little academic or professional qualifications, to employ foreground discursive abilities in ways
that had consequences for the discourse more broadly. By highlighting how think tanks marshal media, political, financial, and intellectual resources in the service of foreground discursive change, the study touched on the role of power and resources in discursive competition. It is the potent combination of financial, political, intellectual and media power resources exercised by these think tanks that give impact to their analysts’ communicative action. These findings suggest initial bridging points between agent-level discursive action and institutional level discursive change, thus responding to some of the criticisms of earlier discursive institutionalist work (Panizza and Miorelli, 2013).

The analysis also highlighted how individuals, in particular Secretary Clinton, used their institutional standing and foreground discursive abilities to try and reshape the debate on the EU’s role. In Secretary Clinton’s case, the analysis of public and private texts revealed her attempts to support HRVP Ashton’s standing. By employing communicative action before political, media and public audiences, she consciously sought to empower the post-Lisbon officeholder. The public and private documents analysed for this particular example, therefore provide an interesting example of the exercise of both elite sub-group and agent-level discursive abilities for policy ends.

**Public speech and private communication**

The thesis pursued a novel approach by performing a QCA on classified documents and comparing the findings with public discourse. The findings revealed a paradox at the heart of US support for integration outlined in the next section but they also suggested that officials have incentives to shield preferences and criticisms from public view, court favour and influence among opinion shapers and allay fears. The innovative analysis of private coordinative strategies in both case studies enabled the thesis to highlight the quasi-causal impact of discursive frames. In case 2 in particular, US officials interpreted European data privacy objections within the pre-existing frame of institutional dysfunction, rather than as pragmatic and plausible concerns. As a result, the US
coordinative strategy foreclosed any opportunities for further compromise on data protections with the Commission. The strategy was rooted in the dominant discursive map of US officials, which centred on ideas of EU institutional and political weakness. The logical consequence of this narrative was the pursuit of side deals and issue-linkages with member state governments, rather than conducting negotiations exclusively in the US-EU negotiating framework.

The findings indicate that further studies comparing public and private speech can produce valuable insights into how officials analyse and strategise in closed networks and how this differs from public pronouncements. The spread of freedom of information provisions, as well as the unprecedented availability of contemporary classified documents offers scholars of US foreign policy considerable scope for additional studies along the lines explored in chapters six and eight of this thesis (private comparisons).

**9.2 The Paradox of US Support for EU Integration**

The variation in policy competence level in each case study was introduced into the research design to explore whether the differing policy contexts for EU action were reflected in US appraisals of EU security action. Think tank analysts and US officials were cognisant of institutional reforms embodied in Lisbon but the timeframe covered a period of uncertainty about the real-world impact of treaty-based institutional change. As revealed in the case studies, officials were increasingly supportive of CSDP’s role as the much-feared threat to NATO never materialised. Private strategies from 2007-onwards mirrored this public endorsement of a more prominent security role for the EU, suggesting that in public words and private deeds, the Obama administration was consistently supportive of conventional security integration. Recently, support for the EU’s security role is most evident in support of the Lisbon office holders – a policy revealed publicly and in private correspondence. But this enthusiasm appears balanced with a jaded scepticism regarding oft-made European promises that
rarely deliver. Support for conventional security integration may have few costs, if it is unlikely to result in meaningful change.

Yet this official preference for security integration appeared more problematic in case two, when a more integrated policy domain blocked important US security objectives (obtaining European passengers’ personal data). The more integrated nature of AFSJ policymaking was reflected in higher levels of official and conservative analyst threat perception – suggesting that the conservative narrative was not as marginal as it appeared in case one. Rather than viewing the more integrated policy domain as increasing European effectiveness, US officials viewed the Lisbon reforms as empowering European dysfunction. In the post-9/11 world, officials are resistant to any externally imposed negotiation requirementsimpinging on security prerogatives. Such requirements are liable to be portrayed by US officials as a form of “policy imperialism” by over-reaching external partners. In the PNR case, the EU’s resistance to some of the US demands for European passengers’ private data was interpreted through pre-existing cognitive frames. US officials employed the dominant discourse European weakness and ineffectiveness to frame the Commission’s resistance to PNR demands as symptomatic of institutional dysfunction, bureaucratic turf-wars, “dangerous misperceptions” and marginal, ideologically-driven actors, rather than rooted in reasonable concern. The strategies that followed sought to deflect privacy objections and outflank the institutions by dealing with member state governments bi-laterally. US officials incentivised compliance by member state governments, using side bargains on visa waiver programme status, in what was an ostensibly communitarized policy domain.

These findings reveal a paradox that hints at the limits of US support for European security integration. It is, in some ways, similar to the long-running tension at the heart of post-war US support for integration reviewed in chapter 2, where sectional and bureaucratic actors resented European integration that ran counter to US sectional interests. In this case however, supranational institutions appeared to be obstructing vital US national security objectives. Washington publicly insists it supports security integration but in case two,
when this integration appeared to undermine, or at least delay data-sharing objectives, enthusiasm for engaging with Brussels quickly evaporated. The analysis found a significant number of common themes in both conservative, official and political discourse, suggesting plausible chains of influence between Heritage analysts and other sources analysed.

Officials interviewed for this thesis insisted that there was no set preference for dealing with member state capitals over supranational institutions. Instead, they described an ongoing assessment of the European political system as a cooperative puzzle, in which the US seeks to engage actors at all levels, choosing those partners, which can deliver most in a given context. But the impact of the PNR case may leave a lasting impact on US perceptions of the EU as a counter-terrorism partner, particularly given the resurgence of legal conflicts over divergent data privacy standards on either side of the Atlantic. It may also chasten the enthusiasm of pro-integrationists in the US government, now aware that concerted European action may not be consistent with unchallenged US leadership.

Since the analysis for this study was completed, a significant ruling by the European Court of Justice invalidated the European Commission’s finding that US data standards provided adequate protections for Europeans’ private data and required the suspension of the EU-US Safe Harbour agreement, which governs transatlantic data transfers. Implementing this judgment will involve wrestling with enormous commercial and security risks and raise the spectre of another transatlantic data transfer dispute. These challenges have been complicated and further politicised by revelations of mass digital surveillance of citizens by both American and European intelligence services. The PNR case, along with the SWIFT data exchange controversy, should therefore be seen not as isolated spats, but as the first rounds of an unresolved policy puzzle for European and American policymakers. The analysis of official private discourse in case two (PNR) illustrated the ways in which the role of supranational EU

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131 Ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union, September 2015
institutions was interpreted by US officials within pre-existing cognitive frames of institutional dysfunction. The analysis also showed how data privacy objections were deflected within this cognitive framework. These findings suggest further lines of enquiry for scholars seeking to analyse how the unresolved question of appropriate standards for transatlantic data transfers – now set to dominate EU-US relations in the coming years – will be interpreted by US officials.

9.3 A dominant discourse of weakness and decline

Despite the differences analysed across all cases and embedded cases, there were some areas of consensus. The most prominent theme across all sub-groups, policy fields and over time, was the perception of the EU as weak and ineffective: militarily, politically, institutionally, economically and demographically. Although sub-groups drew differing conclusions from this shared starting point, the prevalence of this theme among an ideologically and institutionally diverse group of actors points to a level of discursive dominance that requires further examination. In particular, the flexibility and adaptability of the cognitive frame of European weakness deserves attention. The narrative of European weakness persists, at least in part, due to its ability to serve both classically Eurosceptic and pro-integrationist discourses. Liberals employing the narrative often used it to call for greater integration measures – though with varying levels of optimism. But so too, did conservative analysts, who portrayed EU security integration as a sinkhole for ever-diminishing military resources. For these conservative analysts, a weak Europe could, paradoxically, pose a greater threat than a strong, militarily capable one. This shift in argumentation, occurring in the mid-2000s, arguably allowed analysts who had depicted CSDP as a “dagger aimed at NATO’s heart” to adapt the normative framework to sidestep the reality that CSDP never came to challenge NATO in any real way over the last 25 years. These findings reinforce Milliken’s (1999) theory that dominant narratives survive in large part,
by incorporating new and sometimes countervailing information within a flexible explanatory framework.

But the long-running narrative themes of economic and demographic decline, low defence spending, rooted in differing strategic cultures and welfare state tendencies, displays a level of continuity with earlier discourse on transatlantic relations, reviewed in chapter two. This discourse is rooted in traditional conceptions of power and its projection abroad; perspectives which some scholars engaged in the EU role debate – outlined in chapter one - have sought to replace with post-modern notions of soft power and the power of attraction (Nye 2005, Smith 2003). In stark contrast to the European academic and political debate on the EU’s soft power tools of enlargement, attraction and norms projection, there was scant evidence of soft power acknowledgements in any of the sub-groups analysed. This may support Kagan’s (2004) claim that, arising from differing strategic cultures, and the perception of modern Europe as a “post-Kantian paradise,” Europeans will remain unwilling to increase military expenditure. Alternatively, it may point to a form of wishful thinking among Europeanists, who seek to depict the EU’s lack of significant and autonomous conventional security resources as strength, rather than a weakness. This study did not seek to definitively explain the presence or absence of certain themes. But at the least, this finding suggests a transatlantic divide in the debate over EU security action, in which analysts and policymakers on either side of the Atlantic have not reached shared terms of debate on the preliminary subject of how power itself should be evaluated.

This divide is significant for policymakers seeking to shape US perceptions of EU security policies, and for EU foreign policy more broadly. If, as the early chapters of this thesis postulated, EU foreign policymaking has a significant ideational element, which seeks to establish a role or identity for the EU in global politics, then it must engage with external perceptions as they are. US elite discourse on the EU, as revealed in the limited scope of this thesis, does not share the same terms of debate as European academic and political discourse. The dominant discourse of weakness and decline, which is remarkably consistent across public
discourse in both cases, reveals a major credibility gap. Beyond the EU specialists sampled in this study, an indifference and scepticism characterise US elite views of EU security action. By promoting ideas of the EU’s role, which are rooted in European discourse, policymakers may be guilty of “wasting the ink” as one respondent put it (interviewee no. 19). Instead, EU officials seeking to improve perceptions of EU security action should consider focussing on the handful of policy tools, which sources in this study identified as significant. These included the role of joint sanctions, humanitarian aid, security interventions in secondary arenas (sub-Saharan Africa) and post-conflict expertise. The existing communications strategy, which interviewees described as suffering from a credibility gap, may in fact deepen American scepticism, rather than reverse it.

9.4 Limitations and further enquiries

While the study threw a light on the competitive discursive competition between elite sub-groups in Washington D.C., limitations of time and space prevented a secondary analysis of how and when these efforts produced shifts in policy. The gap between discourse and action remains as old as the field itself, but this study represents a step forward, by illustrating how influential actors try to shift the terms of debate, assert interpretations and frame policy questions. At certain points in each case, the analysis drew attention to common themes across conservative and official discourses, suggesting chains of influence between analysts, policymakers and legislators. The analysis also focussed on cognitive and normative frames that closed off certain policy responses and privileged others, thus exerting a quasi-causal impact on policy action. A more definitive claim to policy impact would require a narrower focus on each individual debate, combined with a close process-tracing analysis of official policy developments. As discussed in chapter three, such an effort would face epistemological challenges in making claims about the effect of ideational factors (i.e.: discourse) on policy.
The study took the preferences of the think tanks as pre-given by their ideological position on the conservative-liberal spectrum as revealed by ideological studies and self-professed mission statements. A more detailed study on think tanks – rather than on their role within a broader discursive competition on EU security action – could examine rationalist explanations for discursive action, including sources of research funding. A sociological institutionalist analysis of the professional training and recruitment procedures in each institute might reveal cultural structures that reproduce consistent discursive accounts. Additionally, although great care was taken in the selection of source groups and the texts themselves, the sample of sub-groups analysed for this thesis was necessarily limited by the scope of the research project. Were the study exclusively focussed on discourse within the think tank community alone, a broader sample of think tanks might have expanded the discursive map of analyses and perceptions of EU security action. On the official side, the texts and interviews sampled a group of EU specialists, mostly from the State Dept. but also from the Dept. of Homeland Security. By the nature of their roles, these officials were highly informed and specialised staff members. Were the study to have taken in a wider pool of officials, some without any experience of EU affairs, the findings may have accentuated a greater level of indifference and lower expertise on the given subject matter. The focus of this study however, was on US elite discourse more broadly, employing a discursive institutionalist approach. In this context, a sample of two of the largest and most influential think tanks - one from each side of the ideological spectrum and of officials dealing closely with topics relevant to the case studies - allowed for a workable analysis within the given constraints.

More broadly, the theoretical model and methodological framework of the study allowed for the study of foreign policy only at the level of discourses - adopting a different approach may have resulted in a more direct analysis of US policy in each of the cases. Rationalist models may have focussed on commercial and security incentives for the negotiating strategy of the US government on the PNR agreements, for example. This is not to say that the theoretical model adopted in the dissertation has less explanatory power than others; it only means that
different approaches highlight different perspectives depending on the focus of the analysis.

The preceding sections have already identified new and alternative lines of enquiry that build upon the research findings of this study and offer the prospect of illuminating insights in discourse analysis and transatlantic relations. The innovative comparison of public and private cables relevant to this topic shows that an analysis of classified documents can expose gaps between public rhetoric and private analysis. In the second case study, it was argued that the negotiation context for PNR created incentives for officials to moderate criticism of the EU’s role. This new field of information throws open new forms of enquiry for scholars of policy discourse and US foreign policy alike – when are differences between public and private speech most likely to arise and how should we interpret them? This approach does not undermine the case for discourse analysis of public speech. Instead it offers the prospect of analysing a different kind of discourse in a complimentary arena. A direct follow-on from the findings of the thesis in this vein relates to the arguments over transatlantic data transfers. As the controversy over data privacy standards increasingly comes to dominate EU-US relations in the coming years, this study’s insights into how the US government coordinated a strategy to deflect EU data privacy objections, offers a starting point for scholarship on differing official conceptualisations of data protection in Europe and the US and the prospects for reconciling these divergent views within treaty-based data transfer frameworks.

The persistence of the European debt crisis, the fracturing of consensus over the influx into Europe of more than one million refugees in 2015 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, following the conclusion of an EU-Ukraine association agreement, may all deepen American perceptions of European weakness. But each of these subjects offers interesting new cases in which the QCA process could be repeated within a broadly similar research design. The Ukraine case presents itself as a particularly interesting case, given that joint EU-US sanctions were eventually imposed on Russia in 2014, despite scepticism in some quarters that all 28 EU member states would support and later renew
these restrictive measures. Given that memos circulated within the US diplomatic network singled out joint sanctions as an area of potentially valuable EU security policymaking, this case offers a policy outcome that may challenge the dominant discourse of the EU as weak and in decline.

**Conclusions**

Although expectations regarding the real-world impact of EU institutional reforms have often been dashed and scepticism about the prospects for a effective EU security action is deep-rooted, Secretary Clinton’s consistent strategy of endorsing and empowering post-Lisbon officeholders through communicative action highlights a liberal Euro-enthusiast strand in official US policy discourse that has endured since the time of Eisenhower. Without the analysis of private cables in chapter six, the presence of this theme in public remarks might have been dismissed as mere empty rhetoric; a healing balm for wounded European egos. But the private strategizing of US officials explored in chapter six suggests this Euro-enthusiasm remains an active source of external goodwill for European security integration.

Nevertheless, the overarching dominant discourse of European weakness and ineffectiveness and the low salience of EU security action, even within the narrow policy elite, suggest expectations that the EU will “run the twenty-first century,” are light years away from US elite thinking (Leonard, 2004). The picture of US discourse that emerges from this study suggests that the Union’s pre-eminent partner views its emergence as a security actor as partial and incomplete, at best. While official support for conventional security integration was consistent in public and in private settings, this support was always set within a broader scepticism or even jaded view of the EU’s capacity to deliver on its integration promises. The view of many officials that, despite one institutional reform after another, “so little of what was promised has been delivered,” suggests that Euro-enthusiasm may be limited to EU specialists, conditional in nature and not seen as involving many world consequences (interview no. 15).
Official US perceptions of the prospects for EU security policies appear therefore to alternate between fragile support and jaded cynicism. The findings of chapter eight reveal that hostility to a greater role for supranational institutions is not limited to marginal conservative analysts and this further underlines the unstable nature of US policy towards EU security integration. At the heart of this instability lies an unresolved paradox in American foreign policy discourse, which ostensibly encourages European security integration, yet is deeply uncomfortable with the consequent exercise of independent authority by supranational institutions, which are regularly seen as unaccountable and ineffective. The broader international context for this unease is the re-emergence of war on the European continent and the rise of powers such as China to challenge the post-war transatlantic dominance of international politics. These features of the new “pacific century” may encourage greater American enthusiasm for the EU’s security role, or alternatively, may cement scepticism about the significance of Europe’s piecemeal and uncertain efforts to integrate security policy.

In this context, the communicative action of influential and well-resourced think tanks has the potential to shape future US policy towards EU security integration in multiple directions; conditional support, passive disinterest, or perhaps even active hostility. For discourse theorists and scholars of the EU’s role as a security actor, these debates have important consequences. In the wide arena of discursive contestation over the EU’s inchoate global role, the struggle focussed on in this thesis will shape the parameters of legitimate EU security action in a global system characterised by new actors, new threats and new forms of power.
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