Declaration

Composition of this thesis and research for the material presented herein have been undertaken solely by the undersigned.
Abstract

This study examines a range of political attitudes and opinions in Scotland between 1935 and 1939. Attention is focussed on those individuals who might be termed enthusiasts for, or apologists for, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Nationalist Spain. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the views which they expressed formed an integral part of public debate on British foreign policy during the period. Inspiration has largely been provided by Richard Griffiths' Fellow Travellers of the Right (London, 1980), which examines the complex patterns of expression and the interrelationship of comparable views in Britain as a whole. This study is not a critique of Griffiths' work, although some observations on his findings have been made where the Scottish evidence has suggested conclusions that may be usefully applied to the British experience. Its purpose is a parallel study of the Scottish scene, primarily with a view to establishing the extent to which there was a distinctively Scottish dimension to what was a debate on British policy.

Chapter 1 examines the Scottish political context, with particular reference to the apparent trend towards conformity with British political responses. Chapter 2 considers enthusiasm for Fascist solutions in debate on domestic policy during the period 1933-34. Some early pro-German enthusiasts are considered in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the various component parts of pro-Italian and anti-sanctions opinion during the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-36. The emergence of Germany as a major focus of popular debate and the wave of pro-German comment attending the Rhineland Crisis are considered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 deals with attitudes to Germany in 1936, when the expression of pro-German opinion in Scotland entered its most popular phase, while Chapter 7 examines one manifestation of enthusiasm during this period, the Anglo-German Fellowship. Enthusiasm for Nationalist Spain in Scotland, and the activities of the two principal vehicles for pro-Nationalist expression, the Friends of National Spain and the United Christian Front, form the subject of Chapter 8. Pro-German attitudes against a background of deteriorating Anglo-German relations in 1937 are considered in Chapter 9. Chapter 10 explores one particular topic in discussion on Anglo-German affairs which attained prominence during 1937, namely the Colonial Question. The main foreign policy debates of 1938, a year which was dominated by attitudes to appeasement, are considered in Chapter 11. The emergence of new and, in the main, more extreme forms of pro-German enthusiasm during 1938-39, and the isolation of the
extremists in 1939 are examined in Chapters 12 and 13. A summary of the main points to emerge from this study is offered in the conclusion.
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Introduction

This study examines a range of political attitudes and opinions in Scotland between 1935 and 1939. Attention is focussed on those individuals who might be termed enthusiasts for, or apologists for, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Nationalist Spain. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the views which they expressed formed an integral part of public debate on British foreign policy during the period. Inspiration has largely been provided by Richard Griffiths' *Fellow Travellers of the Right* (London, 1980), which examines the complex patterns of expression of comparable views in Britain as a whole. This study is not a critique of Griffiths' work, although some observations on his findings have been made where the Scottish evidence has suggested conclusions that may be usefully applied to the British experience. Rather, it is a parallel study of the Scottish scene.

The primary purpose of this study is to establish the extent to which there existed a distinctively Scottish dimension to what was a debate on British policy. The degree to which Scotland, by the twentieth century, had become a fully integrated part of the socio-political framework of Britain as a whole has been, and remains, the subject of fierce academic and political debate. However, even those who place the strongest emphasis on assimilationist tendencies admit to the continued presence of a range of distinctively Scottish features in Scotland's socio-political make-up. This study endeavours to demonstrate that, whatever the prevailing tendency towards assimilation, Scottish distinctiveness did manifest in one particular set of attitudes towards British foreign policy in the late 1930s. As we shall see, the most important factor in shaping a distinctively Scottish response was the influence of the sectarian divide.

Some Scots do figure in *Fellow Travellers of the Right*. However, despite an extensive range of source material, Griffiths has entirely omitted reference to the pages of the Scottish press or other Scottish sources. Given the immensity of the task which faces any historian seeking to study aspects of "public opinion," as manifested in the press during the period, only the most Scotocentric critic could rigorously condemn such an omission in a study of "British" opinion. The same criticism could be made with equal validity of all existing studies of British attitudes to Germany in the period,\(^1\) and one suspects, of the vast majority of studies of "British" opinion in general. The exclusion of Scottish sources from the remit of Griffiths' study, however, has allowed the views of a large number of individuals,
who contributed primarily or exclusively to the Scottish press, to remain in obscurity. This study endeavours to uncover some of these views.

This study does differ from Griffiths' work in one significant respect, in that the starting point chosen is 1935 rather than 1933. The logic of the later starting date is that it concentrates attention on a period in which foreign policy dominated public debate, and in which attitudes to the three principal European dictatorships of the Right were expressed almost exclusively within the confines of foreign policy debate. Between the Nazi accession to power in 1933, which provides Griffiths with his starting point, and the development of the Abyssinian crisis in the summer of 1935, public debate in Britain was primarily concerned with domestic issues. Debate on foreign policy was largely conducted in the abstract context of rearmament versus disarmament. During this period attitudes towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy largely appeared as tangential components in debates dominated by other issues. The possible threat posed by German rearmament did provide the exponents of British rearmament with justification for their policy. However, the rearmament/disarmament debate was not in essence about attitudes to Germany. Reference to Fascist Italy appeared primarily as part of a debate on the possible application of Fascism, or aspects of the Fascist system, in Britain. However, Britain's relations with Italy were not an inherent feature of that debate.

As in Fellow Travellers of the Right, the principal subject of this study is the expression of views favourable to Nazi Germany. The range of opinions included, aside from those which reflect attitudes essentially peculiar to Scotland, are broadly similar to those surveyed by Griffiths. Following Griffiths' terminology, the word "enthusiast" has been employed to describe those individuals whose views form the main area of study. It should be stressed that, as in Fellow Travellers of the Right, "enthusiast" has been invested with its broadest possible meaning and embraces many whose "enthusiasm" was very far from intense. Viewed in isolation, many of the "enthusiasts" included in this study could more accurately be termed "apologists." "Enthusiasm" came in many guises, and was expressed with varying degrees of intensity. "Enthusiasm" in some cases extended to detailed approval of specific aspects of the methods or the ideology of the Nazi régime. In others it manifested as an endeavour to play down, excuse or justify certain aspects of that régime which could, and did, appear reprehensible to British observers, while simultaneously stressing the more "positive" aspects of the régime. Some sought to clothe the New Germany with "respectability." Others, to minimise the significance
of the new régime. Many were not fundamentally motivated by any real empathy with Nazism per se, but rather by a sincere and genuine desire for friendship with the German people, by an enthusiasm for Germany in abstract, or by a high-minded concern for "justice" for Germany. The range of attitudes and opinions included in this survey, therefore, is extremely broad. While it includes "extremists" with vigorously pro-Nazi or anti-semitic views, they are by no means typical of the enthusiasts as a whole, and at the other end of the spectrum there were many who displayed a considerable degree of ambivalence towards Nazi Germany.

Enthusiasm for Germany was not the sole preserve of the far Right. In terms of domestic politics, the enthusiasts came from all shades of the political spectrum. While many were active supporters of the Conservative Party, a great many also belonged to the broad church of Liberalism. Some were socialists, others adhered to more esoteric political creeds.

Pro-German enthusiasts then were a diverse group of individuals. In no sense could they be considered a unified pressure group. Indeed, many of the positions which they adopted were mutually contradictory. Moreover, few of the enthusiasts maintained any semblance of a consistent position throughout the period under consideration. Under the impact of events individuals were continually changing their views and modifying their stances, in some cases gradually and by degree, in others suddenly and drastically. The vast majority of those who enthusiastically espoused Germany's case in 1936 would fall by the wayside over the following two years. Many, indeed, shifted to outright opposition and provided some of the sternest critics of the Munich settlement. By the same token though, as late as 1939 Germany's cause was still gaining fresh recruits. Moreover, the process of causation which underlay the changing patterns of enthusiasm for Germany was far from simplistic. The factors which led people to temper or abandon their enthusiasm were almost as varied as those which prompted them to embrace it in the first place.

In the preface to Fellow Travellers of the Right Griffiths describes "appeasement" as a "related subject" rather than a core aspect of his study. "Appeasement" attitudes he considers to be part of "the background against which our 'enthusiasts' were acting." Those who supported "appeasement" he defines in the following terms. "The appeasers, in the late thirties, were people who because of the specific political situation, and for varying reasons, were convinced that it was essential to seek an accommodation with Germany; they were not necessarily
friendly towards Germany herself in abstract, or in favour of the Nazi régime." Similarly "enthusiasm" for Germany, not "appeasement" in general, forms the principal subject of this study. Nevertheless, in seeking to place "enthusiasm" for Germany within its historical context, some examination of "appeasement" attitudes is essential, and particular attention has been paid to appeasement attitudes of a uniquely Scottish nature. It should also be noted that in certain areas of opinion the dividing line between enthusiasm for Germany and appeasement attitudes is far from clear cut. An overlapping of attitudes is particularly evident within that broad swathe of centrist opinion which, with its concern for "justice" for Germany, provided the ethical motor for appeasement.

As in Fellow Travellers of the Right, this survey includes two subsidiary areas of study which at first sight might appear closely related to enthusiasm for Nazi Germany, namely enthusiasm for Fascist Italy and enthusiasm for Nationalist Spain. Given the greater significance of pro-Nationalist opinion in the Scottish political dimension, more attention has been paid to this phenomenon than in Griffiths' work. The inclusion of these other "enthusiasms" in a study of attitudes towards Nazi Germany is fairly self-explanatory. For many people in the 1930s the ideological orientation of a foreign power constituted the principal factor on which British attitudes to that power should be based. Germany, Italy and Nationalist Spain could all be regarded as "fascist" dictatorships, and attitudes towards all three were closely interwoven in foreign policy debate. As we shall see, however, the individuals involved, the attitudes they represented, and the opinions they expressed were far from identical in all three cases. Indeed, the complexity of the interrelationships between the three areas of enthusiasm constitutes one of the more fascinating aspects of this study. The range of opinions and attitudes involved in these subsidiary enthusiasms, while arguably not as variegated as those supportive of Nazi Germany, were nonetheless highly diverse.

This is not a study of foreign policy-making, nor of the attitudes of those primarily responsible for that process. It is a study of numerous individuals. Some were representative of certain strains of public opinion. Many, however, held views of a highly personalised nature, which if representative at all, reflected the attitudes of a tiny number of like-minded individuals. They are interesting because they were sufficiently convinced of the veracity of their views to place them in the public domain. Some joined groups to assist in the propagation of views similar to
their own. Others expressed them directly, by writing books or articles, making speeches, or in writing letters to the newspapers. Of necessity, therefore, it is a study of members of society's élites, since for the most part only the more prominent or better-educated members of society had the opportunity or desire to record their views for posterity. Any endeavour to assess the extent to which their views were mirrored in society at large is handicapped by the absence of definitive evidence. Nevertheless, it has been possible to gain some sort of picture of the state of "public opinion" in general from contemporary political analysis, personal observations, as recorded in memoirs, and other pointers, such as the analysis, admittedly somewhat conjectural, of electoral results.

As regards the primary source material used in this study, considerable reference has been made to memoirs and the private papers of leading enthusiasts. However, by the nature of the study much of the primary material has been taken from the pages of the press. Of the Scottish newspapers referred to, the Glasgow Herald, and to much greater extent, The Scotsman, have proved to be fertile sources of material. That this is the case is not due to the editorial qualities of both papers, although both were widely regarded at the time to be the two leading "quality" Scottish papers. Rather it reflects the emphasis which both papers had given to developing their correspondence columns as forums for popular debate, and the quality of the correspondence which they contained. The Scotsman's correspondence columns in particular enjoyed a unique status. Of The Scotsman in the 1940s and 1950s Alastair Dunnett has written, "The Scotsman had a tremendous reputation for authoritative letters, everyone in the country, and a good many outside of it, who had something momentous to say about policy or politics, launching his notions in The Scotsman's 'Letters to the Editor.' Apart from The Times, no other paper had anything like it." This assessment was equally valid in the preceding decade.

Scotland's particular circumstances as a sub-national unit within the British political structure present insuperable difficulties to the precise definition of the confines of "Scottish" debate. Many prominent Scots preferred to present their views to a British, rather than an exclusively Scottish audience, and contributed primarily to "British" vehicles of expression. The views of Scottish MPs and peers, for instance, are largely to be found in the pages of Hansard. In endeavouring to present a comprehensive picture of the "Scottish" debate, therefore, it has been necessary to draw heavily on sources which are not exclusively Scottish.
A further problematic area is that of Scots resident primarily in England. A distinction has been drawn between Scottish politicians who, while primarily resident and politically active at Westminster, were essentially "based" in Scotland and other "Anglo-Scots." Thus all Scottish MPs have been held to fall within the remit of this study. Most "Anglo-Scots," despite the relevance of their views on Germany, have been excluded, although some appear as contributors to "British" debate. Some "Anglo-Scots," and other Scottish exiles, have been included as contributors to the "Scottish" debate. No simple formula has been employed to determine the inclusion or exclusion of such individuals, and in some cases the decision to include or exclude may appear somewhat arbitrary. Lord Lothian, for instance, despite some obvious Scottish connections, has been treated as a "British" politician. In most cases, however, the decision to include "Anglo-Scots" has been based on the continued existence of a strong "live" political, or in some cases economic, connection with Scotland, or the fact that the individual concerned continued to present their views through the medium of the Scottish press.
Introduction

Footnotes

1. Franklin Reid Gannon's survey, *The British Press and Germany 1936-1939*, (London, 1971), contains but two references to Scottish papers, and both are indirect.


4. Many Scottish newspapers of the period, such as the *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, did not possess a regular letters to the editor "spot."

Chapter 1
The Scottish Context

To many Scottish observers, Scotland in the 1930s appeared firmly in the grip of a seemingly inexorable and accelerating process of integration within the socio-political framework of Britain as a whole. Assimilative forces had been at work for centuries, but in the twentieth century their pressure intensified, as economic and socio-political change not only enhanced the gravitational pull exerted by England on her Celtic neighbours, but also eroded aspects of Scottish individuality from within. Perception of this trend was strongest amongst those most antipathetic to such a development, but the existence of such a trend was widely accepted. While by no means concurring with the more alarmist of interwar predictions, contemporary Scottish historians of the twentieth century are essentially united in viewing the 1920s and 1930s as a period in which Scotland shifted strongly towards greater integration within the UK. For Chris Harvie, the interwar years were marked by "assimilation as drastic as that of a century earlier.\(^1\) Commenting on the political dimension, Michael Fry asserts that "by 1930 Scotland had forsaken her own political tradition and collapsed into a depressed and subordinate province."\(^2\)

One of the principal accelerators of assimilative pressure in the interwar years, on both the physical and the psychological planes, was the dramatic slump in Scottish economic performance.\(^3\) Although relatively slower to industrialise than other areas of Britain, Scotland had reaped the benefits of early industrialisation on the world stage and British mercantile dominance. Her export-orientated heavy engineering and textile industries, and the mineral extraction and metallurgical industries which supported them, had grown and prospered in the laissez-faire world economy of the nineteenth century. By 1914 Scotland’s economic output per capita was more impressive than that of the UK as a whole. The chief beneficiaries of this economic expansion were the plutocrats of the thriving industrial and commercial dynasties. Nevertheless, by the standards of the time, Scottish workers were also comparatively better off. Wage rates lagged behind those of the South, and the endemic social problems created by rapid urbanisation, such as poor housing, remained unsolved, but the Scottish work-force contained a higher proportion of skilled workers and unemployment levels were low.
Even in the Edwardian period the long-term weaknesses of the Scottish economy, with its over-dependence on a narrow range of primarily export-orientated industries, were beginning to show through. The iron and coal reserves of Ayrshire and Lanarkshire, which had facilitated Scotland's leap into industrialisation, and which had determined the geographic location of much of her industry, were fast running out. Moreover, although ship-building reached its absolute peak in the immediate pre-war years, handicapped by undercapitalisation and failure to modernise, Scottish heavy engineering in general was increasingly losing ground to foreign competitors. Timely reaction to these indicators, however, was effectively pre-empted by the outbreak of the First World War. The demand for armaments in the abnormal economic conditions of wartime further reinforced the dominance of heavy industry and effectively masked the long-term fragility of Scotland's economic structure. Initially the advent of peace and the short-lived post-war boom maintained the illusion of economic well-being. It also served to tempt more dynamic firms, like Beardmores, into ambitious modernisation programmes, and what would prove to be punitive financial overcommitment. Reality finally dawned with the slump in world trade after 1921. Already facing strong competition from American yards, Clyde shipbuilders found themselves fighting for a declining share of a rapidly shrinking market. A substantial proportion of Scottish industry was traditionally geared to supplying the Clyde yards, and falling shipping orders had severe knock-on effects, not least on a steel industry beset by a legacy of under-investment and exhaustion of local mineral resources. Those sectors of heavy engineering not intimately involved in shipbuilding were also hard hit by the shrinkage of export markets, as were Scotland's textile industries. Nor was the economic malaise restricted to export-dependent manufacturing, as a combination of the effects of a global economy that was far from buoyant and other factors blighted vast swathes of Scottish economic activity. Coal output dropped with falling demand and the run down of the Lanarkshire coalfields. Agriculture languished with the collapse of world foodstuff prices and increased competition from cheap imports. Fishing suffered from declining prices and increased competition. The huge Baltic herring market, lost during the war years, was never regained. The problems which afflicted Scotland's primary producers and older industries were largely shared by their counterparts south of the Border in the straitened economic circumstances of the post-war years. In England, however, there were compensating growth areas, as the "new" industries, like light engineering and the electrical industry, flourished in an expanding domestic market for consumer goods. In Scotland such growth areas were singularly absent.
Scotland now paid the penalty for past failure to diversify, and for the natural tendency for these new industries, now freed from the necessity of proximity to coal reserves by the rapid development of electricity supply, to establish themselves close to the great population centres of the South.

If the Scottish economy of the 1920s was characterised by depressing stagnation, worse was yet to come. With the collapse of international trade after 1929 the problems facing Scotland's export-orientated industries dramatically intensified. Overseas markets for heavy engineering products almost completely dried up and shipbuilding virtually ground to a halt. In areas dependent on the traditional staples unemployment rose sharply. By 1932 unemployment in Scotland overall was running at nearly 28%, significantly above the UK average, and in West Central Scotland levels were very much higher, with conditions roughly comparable with other recession black spots, such as South Wales and the North-East of England. Economic recovery, such as it was, was slower to develop, and only really set in with the stimulus of rearmament in the late 1930s. The psychological impact of the Slump in Scotland was all the greater for the sickly economic performance which had preceded it. To Scottish observers the prosperity of the Edwardian period now seemed very distant. With the economy showing every sign of being in permanent recession, the worsening of conditions after 1929 was greeted with very little optimism about the possibility of future recovery.

Poor economic performance, and consequent financial difficulties, rendered many areas of Scottish industry particularly vulnerable to the dramatic post-war intensification of the existing trend towards corporate integration. Aided and abetted by improvements in administrative and financial organisation, British industry as a whole responded to the straitened economic circumstances of the post-war world by further amalgamation and cartelisation, enabling both economies of scale and the maintenance of profit through the restriction of competition. Scottish concerns were intimately involved in this process. While industrial concentration did in some cases produce Scottish based conglomerates, such as Colvilles, the steel-maker, more commonly Scottish firms were incorporated within the structure of predominantly English and largely London-based enterprises. Much of what remained of Scotland's once great chemical industry was incorporated within the sprawling giants, ICI and Unilever. After the reorganisation of 1921 the operation of Scotland's railway network passed entirely into the hands of London-based firms. This process did not merely result in the erosion of Scottish control of
Scottish industry. Rationalisation within the new conglomerates in many cases led to the contraction of Scottish operations to facilitate concentration on larger industrial units in the South. Scottish locomotive production was a notable victim of this trend.

The assimilative pressure of economic developments was not limited to the direct acquisition of Scottish firms by UK conglomerates. The evolution of larger units was particularly evident in the new industries, such as the manufacture of consumer goods, and in areas of the expanding service sector, such as retailing. Industrial concentration, together with improvements in transport and communications, promoted orientation towards marketing and distribution on a UK basis, and the proliferation of concerns with a physical presence throughout Britain. The growth of high street retail networks, such as Woolworths, was one facet of this trend. Britain as a whole was moving towards greater uniformity in the availability and provision of goods and services. In Scotland industries geared to supplying a local market increasingly found their traditional preserve invaded by powerful Southern competitors. Lack of diversification in an economic structure firmly wedded to the traditional staples also reinforced the increasing bias towards "British" goods, as whole sectors of the Scottish market in expanding areas, like consumer goods, were captured by English manufacturers by default.

The assimilative effect of Scotland's failing economic health was not limited to the physical impact on Scottish economic activity. Economic success had endowed Edwardian Scotland with tremendous self-confidence and pride in Scotland's individuality. At all levels of society there had been intense pride in Scottish achievement, and in particular Scotland's reputation for high quality craftsmanship in engineering, a reputation underlined by the pre-eminence of Clyde yards in shipbuilding. Politically, this national self-confidence had expressed itself in the enthusiasm for Home Rule. The drastic downturn in Scottish economic performance, involving the eclipse of her flagship industries, and the bleakly pessimistic prognostications for Scotland's future economic health had a corrosive impact on the national psyche. Scotland in the interwar years was suffering an acute crisis of national self-confidence. Not only did this generally weaken resistance to assimilative pressures, but in the political and economic spheres it also generated positive enthusiasm for further integration as offering the best hope for the resolution of problems which now appeared beyond Scotland's ability to solve. With the onset of economic stagnation enthusiasm for Home Rule faded. The
laissez-faire economic climate in which Scotland had formerly thrived had manifestly disappeared, and in the unstable and threatening economic conditions of the post-war world greater safety appeared to lie in close membership of a larger economic unit. Moreover, Scotland's hopes for economic recovery increasingly came to be seen as dependent on English assistance.

The appeal of Scottish nationalism was further undermined by the reaction against nationalism in general which developed in Britain after the First World War. Although the joyous jingoism of 1914 had quickly faded, Britain's war effort on the Home Front had been sustained by a fundamental faith in the worthiness of Britain's cause. Above all, it had been a patriotic war. However, while the advent of peace brought victory, it also invoked a sombre reflection on the sheer enormity of the carnage. Moreover, despite the magnitude of the casualties, British society had remained largely unaware of conditions on the Western Front during the war. With the return of the ex-servicemen, a greater awareness of their experience developed, aided by the wave of anti-war literature and films. By the mid-1920s realisation of the sheer horror of trench-warfare, recognition of the equal gallantry and endurance of the enemy, refutation of war-time propaganda's Hunnish atrocity tales, and the growing influence of a liberal historiography which ascribed the outbreak of war, not to German ambition and wickedness, but to the selfish pursuit of national self-interest by all the Great Powers, had not only undermined retrospective faith in the rectitude of Britain's cause during the war, but fundamentally challenged belief in nationalism in general as a beneficent and constructive force in human affairs. As Corelli Barnett has acidly observed, "moralising internationalism preached a great evangelical mission to willing converts." If unfettered nationalism had plunged the world into an orgy of blood-letting, mankind's future would best be served not only by international cooperation, but by the adoption of an internationalist outlook. The faltering performance of the world economic order in the interwar years added fuel to the anti-nationalist reaction, for many observers regarded the "selfish" flight of nations into economic nationalism as the principal obstacle to the restoration of global economic well-being.

Liberal and progressive circles in particular embraced the new internationalism with enthusiasm, but British society as a whole in the interwar years was both deeply pacifistic, and, with the notable exception of the Conservative Right,
strongly drawn towards internationalism. The extent of popular enthusiasm for the League of Nations reflects the depth of this response. There were those, of course, who took the view that nationalism was not intrinsically incompatible with either internationalism or pacifism. Synthesis of these three elements is strongly evident in the Scottish nationalist movement of the period. However, the enthusiasm of the Scottish nationalists ran counter to the prevailing trend.

Scottish nationalism was more grievously affected by the anti-nationalist reaction than its British counterpart. Before the First World War Home Rule could be presented as a progressive measure, part of the further democratisation of society. In the post-war climate its progressive credentials were suspect, tarnished by association with the promotion of narrow nationalist interests. As progressive and liberal circles embraced internationalism, they increasingly came to view Scottish nationalist aspirations as outdated and irrelevant at best, and at worst, positively retrogressive and dangerously introspective. Of particular relevance to Scottish nationalism, too, was the establishment of the Irish Free State. Far from providing encouragement, it furnished a salutary lesson on the disintegrative and violent potentialities which might ensue from the promotion of political nationalism within the UK. Moreover, while certain strands of Scottish nationalist opinion might look to Ireland for inspiration, for many observers the salient features of the Free State after 1922 were chronic economic difficulties and the oppressive influence of a Gaelic-Catholic obscurantism. After 1935 growing international tensions provided further reinforcement of the tendency to view the political aspirations of Scottish nationalism as parochial irrelevance.

Another factor promoting greater integration in the interwar period was the steady expansion of central state activity. Admittedly, direct state involvement in economic management remained embryonic. The command economy structure of the First World War was rapidly dismantled with the advent of peace, and although concern over Scotland's chronically poor economic performance did result in direct intervention through the medium of the Scottish Special Area Commissioner after 1934, his activities, combined with other initiatives, did not impinge to a major extent on Scottish economic activity. Nevertheless, the interwar period did witness the steady growth of central state regulatory functions, not only in the economic field, but in a wide range of social activities. Central state involvement in social provision, in areas such as education, housing, and welfare, also expanded steadily. These developments involved both greater activity by field agencies of
central government departments in Scotland and a substantial extension of the range of functions performed by the state’s principal administrative arm, the Scottish Office.

In itself the collectivist evolution of the state, with its expanding social impact, was likely to promote assimilation. Whether or not this tendency was reinforced or countered by the internal reforms carried out in the Scottish Office during the interwar years remains the subject of current historical debate. The most overtly anglicising of these measures was the elimination of the distinctively Scottish Board system in the rationalisation of the administrative structure in 1928 by Sir John Gilmour. However, later measures, such as the transfer of central direction from Dover House to the purpose-built headquarters on Edinburgh’s Calton Hill in 1939 and the further reorganisation of the administrative structure in the same year, were largely prompted by the vocalisation of concern over the erosion of Scottish individuality, and were presented as aiming at the preservation, or indeed enhancement of Scottish distinctiveness, the term “administrative devolution” being pointedly to the fore. Although he accepts the anglicisation implicit in Gilmour’s reforms, Michael Fry considers the later reforms instigated by Walter Elliot to have “slowed, if not in the long run halted” the anglicising process. He stresses the symbolic value of making Edinburgh a seat of government, and asserts that the reforms both raised the status of the department and secured for it greater independence of operation. James Mitchell, however, regards Elliot’s reforms as primarily a successful PR exercise aimed at allaying Scottish concern. Their actual effect, he further argues, was exactly the opposite of that claimed. Until further research into the internal processes and personnel of the Scottish Office has been carried out, Michael Lynch considers neither view to be substantiated. For the moment, however, his assessment is closer to Mitchell’s position than Fry’s, and he inclines to the view that the interwar period saw “a series of concessions offered by Westminster; each seemed to grant a measure of devolution but in reality made its embrace all the tighter.”

Effective administration of central government’s expanding role in social provision was to a large extent delegated to local authorities. Here too, however, the trend was towards assimilation, with internal reforms encouraging greater conformity to English administrative practice. In 1929 the structure of Scottish local government was drastically remodelled. The new structure drew heavily on Neville Chamberlain’s recent reform of English local government and, most
controversially, involved the abandonment of the parish as the basic unit of local
government, a breach with traditional practice which outraged Scottish sensibilities.

Assimilative tendencies were evident in many areas of Scottish culture in the
interwar years. Since the extinction of a separate legislature in 1707, the
institutional preservation of Scottish national identity had largely been invested in
the Scottish legal system and the Church of Scotland. Both institutions in the
interwar years appeared to be in serious, if not terminal, decline. Throughout this
period the relative importance of Scots law was steadily diminished by the volume
of legislative output from Westminster generated by the expansion of central state
activity. In addition, the existing corpus of Scots law underwent considerable
modification aimed at greater conformity with English practice. Despite the striking
success of the reunion of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church in
1929, which brought together more than 90% of Scotland's presbyterians,
Scotland's "National Church" in the interwar years was pessimistically obsessed
with its declining influence on the life of the nation. The Church's dominance of
Scottish society had been undermined in the nineteenth century by industrialisation
and urbanisation, the Disruption and Catholic immigration, and the transfer of its
welfare, educational and administrative functions to the state, a fact symbolically
underlined by the local government reform of 1929. However, from the beginning
of the twentieth century membership rolls had also been in steady decline, primarily
because of the growing secularisation of society. By the 1920s it was becoming
clear that this trend was irreversible. The Church's response to these developments
was neither imaginative nor positive. Nervously it hit out at those influences, such
as socialism, to which it accredited its decline. Alarmed by the apparent
resilience of Catholicism and Labour's success in capturing the Scots-Irish vote
after 1922, it embarked on a particularly negative campaign against Irish
immigration which lasted until 1938. These campaigns did nothing to stem the
haemorrhage in membership. Declining religious observance was a feature of
Western society as a whole, and in Scotland it was arguably neither as marked nor
as dramatic as in many other Western European countries. Nevertheless, in few
other countries had the national church played such a crucial role as a focus of
national identity.

In popular culture new technology aided and abetted the pressure towards
anglicisation. Although largely the province of enthusiasts in the 1920s, radio
quickly established its place in most Scottish households in the 1930s. In the monopolistic grip of the BBC the culture conveyed through the new medium was dominated by the tastes and assumptions of the London establishment. Part of the BBC's carefully cultivated corporate image was the uniform Southern English, upper middle-class, public-school accent employed by its announcers. Although the BBC provided regional services alongside its national service, resources were firmly directed towards programme production in the metropolitan studios, both for the national service and for regional distribution. Indigenous Scottish culture was also assailed by the rapid interwar development of the cinema. Indeed, Scots were amongst the most avid cinemagoers in Britain. Here the threat was primarily one of Americanisation rather than anglicisation, for only a small proportion of films were British-made. British newsreels, however, were an integral feature of the cinema experience.

Scotland's cultural distinctiveness in the 1930s was rather better served by the national press. However, in this area anglicising influences were also at work. Scotland's two "quality" dailies, The Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald, were both Scottish-owned and unmistakably Scottish in tone and content. Of the two, The Scotsman aspired rather more successfully to speak for the nation. Widely accepted as Scotland's leading newspaper, it enjoyed the status of a Scottish equivalent of The Times. Indeed, while it lacked The Times' immediate proximity to government, its reputation in Scotland for authoritative and independent comment was arguably greater than that of the London paper. Its "truthfulness" and the balance it endeavoured to maintain in its coverage of political controversy came in for frequent praise. Owned by the Conservative grandee, Sir Edmund Findlay, The Scotsman also largely resembled a Scottish variant of The Times in its political stance. Under the editorial direction of George Waters, it reflected a moderate, progressive Conservatism, calculated to appeal to disenchanted Liberals and "middle opinion" generally, and entirely in tune with the prevailing tone of Scottish Conservative politics. Although never servile in tone, its editorial stance was strongly supportive of the National Government throughout the 1930s. Like The Scotsman, the Glasgow Herald, owned by the Glasgow-based firm, George Outram and Co., maintained a national distribution. However, it was more markedly shaped by its city of origin. As one commentator put it in 1946, the paper "on occasion finds difficulty in seeing beyond the rim of the Clyde valley." It was primarily the voice of Glasgow's commercial and professional classes.
Nevertheless, it was still a highly regarded paper, although it lacked the Scotsman's reputation for "impartiality." Politically, the Glasgow Herald stood to the right of The Scotsman, advocating a less diluted version of Conservatism. The London paper it most closely resembled was the Daily Telegraph. Sharply critical of the opposition parties in the 1930s, on most issues it was strongly behind the National Government. 18

Of the two leading provincial dailies, Dundee's Courier and Advertiser, as befitting a D.C. Thomson product, certainly added to the distinctiveness of the Scottish press. Marred by a highly parochial content and idiosyncratic presentation, the paper nevertheless maintained a feisty independence of spirit in its editorial comment. Advocating its own unique brand of right-wing populist Conservatism, the Courier and Advertiser was fiercely anti-socialist. Far from enamoured of Conservative participation in the National Government, it frequently belaboured the party's leadership for its abandonment of "true" Conservatism, and what it perceived as a general lack of drive and determination. The other main provincial paper, the Aberdeen Press and Journal, was, by contrast, anodyne in the extreme. As parochial as the Courier and Advertiser, it lacked the Dundee paper's redeeming idiosyncrasy. At the root of the paper's absence of character was its lack of editorial independence. Mirroring developments in other areas of economic activity, British newspaper proprietors responded to the commercial pressures of the 1920s with a series of mergers and amalgamations, which resulted in a substantial slice of Scottish newspaper production passing into English control. In 1928 the Aberdeen Press and Journal, along with its sister publication, the Evening Express, was acquired by the Berry brothers' London-based Allied Newspapers. 19 It remained under Lord Kemsley's control when the brothers partitioned their newspaper empire in 1937. In the late 1930s the paper's editorial policy was one of obsequious and unqualified support for the National Government.

The populist papers most widely read in Scotland were all English-owned. Although it only went into production for the first time in 1928, within a few years Lord Beaverbrook's Scottish Daily Express established itself as the most popular daily in Scotland, reaching approximately a fifth of Scottish households by 1938. 20 Published in Glasgow, the paper was rather more than a Scottish edition of the Daily Express, but very far from being an independent paper in its own right. It was originally conceived as "helping the effective distribution north of the border of the Daily Express's national campaigns rather than as a specifically Scottish
publication," and it shared many news and features items with the London edition. The Scottish Daily Express's principal rival, the Daily Record, was also both published in Glasgow and English-owned. In 1925, along with its sister publications, it was taken over by the Berry brothers, a development which, according to one observer, rendered it as "colourless and insipid" as the Aberdeen Press and Journal. Like the Aberdeen Press and Journal, it remained under Lord Kemsley's control after 1937. The other main populist dailies read in Scotland were Lord Rothermere's Daily Mail and the Scottish edition of the Daily Herald, the only one of the four to promote a pro-Labour line. Both were published in Manchester. All four of the populist dailies were avowedly Scottish in tone, catering strongly for the national obsession with football. This orientation has led Michael Lynch to conclude that their combined effect was "to keep at bay English influences." Nevertheless, in their editorial policies all four were subject to the dictates of their London masters, and Kemsley, Rothermere and Beaverbrook were all renowned for using the papers they controlled to promote the particular brands of Conservatism they favoured.

In its political preferences, as expressed at the ballot box, Scotland in the interwar years showed a distinct long-term trend towards conformity with the British pattern. During the nineteenth century the divergence of Scottish voting behaviour from the British "norm" had been unmistakable. In the mid-Victorian period Liberalism had exercised an unshakeable hegemony in Scotland, securing 85% of the vote in the elections of 1865. With Tories virtually an endangered species, an effective challenge to Liberal dominance only emerged with the Liberal Unionists after Gladstone split the Liberal Party in 1886. Even after that cataclysm, mainstream Liberalism remained the dominant force in Scottish politics. Up until the First World War the Liberal Party in Scotland consistently and significantly bettered the electoral performances of the party south of the Border. In the general election of December 1910 the Liberals took 54% of the vote in Scotland. The Conservatives and their Liberal Unionist allies secured 44%. Although the election resulted in a marginal Liberal majority, in the UK as a whole 47% of the votes cast went to the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, while only 44% to the Liberals.

In Scotland, as in Britain overall, the root political trend in the post-war years was the development of class as the principal electoral determinant in a political environment radically altered by the extension of the franchise in 1918. With the
emergence of Labour as the party of the working classes and the consolidation of the middle-class vote behind the Conservatives, a new two-party system arose. Liberalism's cross-class appeal, formerly a source of strength, now proved a liability. Weakened by the internal disputes of the wartime and immediate post-war years, handicapped by organisational and financial deficiencies, and deprived of a secure electoral base by its failure to evolve policies appropriate to a radically altered political environment, the Liberal Party suffered decimation at the polls. Given the party's previous dominance in Scotland, its decline in fortune there was all the more striking.

Initially, however, Liberalism in Scotland showed greater resilience. Not only was the split between the Coalition and Independent wings of the party less divisive, but Scottish electors were slower to abandon their traditional loyalties. In 1922 more Scots cast their votes for Liberal candidates than for representatives of any other party. However, the electoral trends of that year were far from promising for the long-term future of Liberalism. 1922 witnessed Labour's electoral breakthrough. Despite its slighter smaller share of the vote, Labour emerged as the majority party in Scotland, taking twenty-nine seats to the Liberals' twenty-eight. A major factor in this achievement was the behaviour of the Catholic vote. Following the establishment of the Irish Free State, the Scots-Irish community largely abandoned its former electoral allegiance to the Liberals and transferred to Labour. For the Liberals, more damaging defections were yet to come. Confronted by the rising socialist tide, the urban middle-class Liberal vote migrated to the Conservative interest with a rapidity which surpassed parallel developments south of the Border. At grass roots level, conservative rather than radical elements had predominated within Scottish Liberalism. An instinctive anti-socialism now proved far stronger than past electoral loyalties, as a pragmatic recognition of the need to avoid splitting the anti-socialist vote combined with a growing perception that the Conservative Party alone offered a secure foundation on which to build anti-socialist resistance. Asquith's decision to support the first Labour government, which outraged many Scottish Liberals, added further impetus to this development. In 1924 the Liberal vote collapsed to 17%. Thereafter, such as it was, Liberal strength was largely confined to the North and North-East. Apart from some isolated pockets, the Liberal Party ceased to exist as an effective force in Scottish urban politics. The elections of 1929 witnessed a last flurry of Liberal support in Britain. However, this was not reflected in Scotland. A marginal increase to 18% of the votes cast compared poorly to the UK average of 24%. It
was a clear indicator of the greater rapidity of the Liberal Party's eclipse in Scotland. The secession of the Simonite wing of the party in 1930, which in essence reflected at an organisational level grass roots middle-class Liberalism's trek to the Right, added further organisational turmoil. In 1931 the combined Liberal share of the vote dropped to 14%. That the comparable statistic for the UK as a whole, following the tardier, but more comprehensive, collapse of Liberalism elsewhere, was an even more dismal 11%, provided cold comfort for a party which had once enjoyed a near monopoly of Scottish political activity.

Due largely to the unique pattern of decay exhibited by Liberalism in Scotland, Conservative electoral fortunes deviated markedly from the British pattern in the early 1920s. The swing to the Conservatives in Britain as a whole in the 1922 election produced a comfortable Tory majority at Westminster. In Scotland, however, in the face of the local Liberal revival the Conservative performance was substantially poorer than in 1918, and the party took only fifteen of Scotland's seventy-four seats. The following year saw a reversal of these trends. While the Conservatives lost their overall majority at Westminster, in Scotland, aided by the slump in support for the Liberals, their percentage share of the vote leapt from 25% to 32%. The impact of Liberalism's unique decline in Scotland on Labour's electoral success is less discernible. From 1918 to 1929 the Labour Party in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, progressively increased its share of the vote. Nevertheless, Labour's ability to win over working-class Liberal voters was crucial to its electoral advance. As we have seen, the adhesion of the Catholic, and formerly Liberal, vote played a major part in Labour's Scottish triumph in 1922, and while the Labour Party in Scotland consistently bettered the party's performance south of the Border throughout the 1920s, the most striking difference occurred in 1924, the year of the Liberal Party's Scottish collapse, when the Labour share of the vote advanced to 41%. In Britain overall the party took 33%.

However singular, these divergences in Scottish electoral behaviour merely reflect an earlier transition to class-based electoral polarisation. The underlying long-term trend in Scottish electoral behaviour was towards convergence with the British "norm." After 1924 no party experienced an electoral swing in Scotland in a contrary direction to that of the UK. The strength of individual party electoral performances also moved generally towards parity with results in Britain. The general election in 1931 marked the establishment of a new equilibrium in terms of
the parties' performances relative to those in the UK as a whole. In what was admittedly a disaster for the party throughout Britain, Labour's previous superiority in Scotland was much reduced. At 33%, its share of the vote in Scotland was only two percentage points higher than the UK average. As previously noted, the extent to which Scottish electors favoured Liberalism, relative to their counterparts in the rest of Britain, was not much more impressive. While the circumstances attending the 1931 election were certainly unique, the elections of 1935 essentially confirmed these relatively low levels of disparity between the parties' electoral appeal in Scotland and the rest of Britain. Given the Scottish electorate's previous relative antipathy towards the Conservatives, this shift towards greater harmonisation with UK voting patterns significantly favoured the Conservatives.27

Scots, like voters in the rest of Britain, responded politically to the economic crisis in 1931 with a dramatic endorsement of the newly formed National Government. With 50% of the popular vote going to the Conservatives, the party secured fifty out of Scotland's seventy-four seats. Benefitting from the geographic concentration of their electoral support, and in the case of the Liberal Nationals, the absence of Conservative opposition, the Liberals and Liberal Nationals took eight seats apiece. Given Labour's more impressive showing in Scotland in 1929, the demolition of the party's Scottish parliamentary representation was all the greater. In 1929 Labour had taken thirty-seven seats in Scotland. After the 1931 election the party emerged with only seven. Of these, four were members of the ILP. To add to Labour's Scottish humiliation they seceded with the rest of the ILP in 1932. For Scottish Conservatives 1931 was annus mirabilis. Only eight of their candidates failed to secure election. Never before had the party achieved an electoral success of such magnitude in Scotland.

Not only was Scotland's electoral behaviour increasingly converging with British patterns, but Scotland's principal political parties also adopted a more "British" orientation in the interwar years. Scotland's Conservatives were the first to move in this direction. In Scotland pre-war Conservatism had been a distinctive alliance of rural Toryism, urban Liberal Unionism and, in the West, Protestant populism. Of its constituent parts, Liberal Unionism had predominated, a fact reflected in the choice of "Unionist" as the official party label following the merger of 1911. This was in marked contrast with the rest of Britain, where the Conservatives had effectively swallowed their Liberal Unionist allies. However, in the post-war years a similarity in electoral requirements brought Conservatives
north and south of the Border on to parallel courses. During the Bolshevik scare immediately after the war fresh efforts were made in Scotland to appeal to the working-classes in general, a drive reflected in the revival of the populist paper, *People's Politics*, in 1919. These, however, were quickly abandoned, as the party shifted its emphasis to more fruitful sectors of the electorate. In the 1920s new electoral target groups for the Conservatives were the newly enfranchised female voters and the rural vote. The latter, in particular, was courted with considerable success. Above all, though, Conservative efforts were directed at attracting middle-class Liberal voters. To that end the party's image was unashamedly middle-class, its policies moderate and progressive in tone. As such, it was entirely in harmony with the avuncular brand of Conservatism projected by Baldwin. Past associations with Protestant militancy were not compatible with the new direction of Conservative politics. With the elimination of Ireland as a live political issue in 1922, Scottish Conservatism largely abandoned its previous overt courting of the working-class Protestant vote. In some constituencies, mainly in the West of Scotland, unofficial connections with the Orange Order, particularly on a personal level, remained strong. Some leading Conservatives were also prone to far from politic references to the Scots-Irish. However, while covert deployment of Protestant populism for electoral purposes continued to occur in some seats, this was very much due to local initiatives and did not have the blessing of official Conservative policy. Although the party machine in Scotland was staffed by able administrators, its parliamentary representation was not over-blessed with talent. The only political heavyweight to emerge from Scottish Conservative ranks in the interwar years was Walter Elliot. This did not encourage independence of spirit. The Conservative Party in Scotland retained its separate organisational structure and its distinctive party label, but it was "firmly under the control of the parliamentary leadership and of Conservative Central Office." 

The Labour Party in Scotland, for different reasons, but possibly to an even greater extent, also sloughed off its distinctive Scottish identity. In 1915 local action, particularly on housing, and Home Rule were more important to the party than its commitment to a British socialist agenda. During the war the example of Ireland's anti-imperialist struggle, propaganda on the rights of small nations, and, among more committed socialists, the growing suspicion that the destruction of capitalism in Scotland could be retarded by lack of militancy amongst the English working-classes, positively strengthened nationalist sentiments within the Scottish Labour movement. The extensive support given by Scottish Labourites to the
Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) in the immediate post-war years reflects this development. However, with the collapse of the Scottish economy after the post-war boom interest in Home Rule rapidly deflated. Against a backdrop of rising unemployment and declining union membership, Scottish trade unions increasingly looked to participation in British federal structures and national collective bargaining to protect their members' interests. After 1923 the STUC lost interest in Home Rule, and finally abandoned it in 1931. The leadership of the political wing of the Labour movement was also moving towards a UK strategy. After 1922 the focus of political activity shifted decisively to Westminster. Intent now on capturing the centre, the Labour Party in Scotland cast off its peripheral heritage. In the 1924 elections it campaigned primarily on housing and jobs, the solutions to both problem areas to be achieved within a British context. This transformation blended harmoniously with the concerns of the leadership of the Labour Party in Britain as a whole. With Scotland in the mid-1920s returning a disproportionately high number of Labour MPs, Home Rule raised constitutional questions with potentially damaging consequences. After the failure of the first Labour government to give its full support to the unsuccessful Government of Scotland Bill in 1924, enthusiasm for Home Rule in Scottish Labour circles became increasingly conspicuous by its absence. By 1928, when the SHRA went into voluntary dissolution, relations between that body and the Labour Party had become decidedly fractious. In the early 1930s admiration for the Soviet achievement drew the British Labour Party towards a policy of centralised planning. There was little in the way of Scottish dissent. Scotland's chronic economic difficulties now appeared beyond self-help. The economic initiatives which Labour in Scotland now deemed necessary for the revitalisation of the economy could only be provided by a strong centralised British state. For the left-wing of the Labour Party, too, the 1930s brought a shift towards a more internationalist outlook. From this perspective Scottish nationalism increasingly came to be viewed as a bourgeois interest.

The erosion of the Labour Party's Scottish identity was not restricted to the abandonment of Home Rule. At the close of the First World War the predominance of the ILP within its ranks gave the Labour Party in Scotland a radicalism, a combative dynamism and an intellectual strength which marked it out from its more conservative and cautious trade union dominated parent organisation. The dramatic arrival of the "Clydesiders" at Westminster in 1922 highlighted the movement's
greater vitality. Even at that stage, however, this distinctiveness was already being eroded. Increasing union involvement steadily reduced the influence of the ILP and brought less imaginative and more conservative individuals to the fore. For the remainder of the interwar years none of the Scottish Labour representatives who found their way into parliament had talent to match the class of '22. Success had also tempered the radicalism of many of the leading figures within the ILP. At Westminster former firebrands, like Tom Johnston, \(^32\) shifted towards more centrist positions. At local level the exigencies of power had a similar sobering effect on successful machine politicians like Patrick Dollan. \(^33\) Nevertheless, had the ILP been content to continue in its principal function of supplying intellectual muscle, the Labour Party in Scotland might have retained both its distinctiveness and its influence within the British Labour Party. However, such a position was too compromising for the purist socialist vision of James Maxton. \(^34\) Under his leadership the ILP’s relationship with the Labour hierarchy deteriorated, a process which accelerated during the course of the second Labour government. The ILP effectively fought the general elections of 1931 as a separate party, and in 1932 it disaffiliated from the Labour Party. The majority of Scottish ILP members were unwilling to follow Maxton into the wilderness. Forming the Scottish Socialist Party under Patrick Dollan's leadership, they remained within the Labour fold. Nevertheless, the psychological damage of the split, coming hard on the heels of Ramsay MacDonald’s "betrayal" and the electoral disaster of 1931, was immense. Thereafter the Labour Party in Scotland was highly distrustful of intellectuals and other free spirits. Non-conformity was shunned as potentially schismatic, with further damaging effect on the legitimacy of Home Rule in Labour eyes. With control of the party falling by default to "the machine politicians, the dullards and authoritarians," Labour in Scotland turned into "the most unionist and rigidly disciplined of all the parties." \(^35\)

An erosion of Scottish identity was evident in other areas of Scottish political expression. John Maclean’s death in 1923 stymied the emergence of a distinctively Scottish extreme Left. The Communist Party in Scotland was very much an obedient and integrated part of the Communist Party of Great Britain. \(^36\) In the late 1930s it adopted a nationalist posture, but this was purely a tactical manoeuvre. \(^37\) With the ILP’s parliamentary representation reduced to a tiny Scottish rump after 1932, Maxton and his colleagues continued to vocalise what could be termed a distinctively Scottish socialist message. That message, however, had largely been
shorn of its overtly Scottish overtones. In the process of the ILP's transition towards Maxton's concept of an uncompromising vanguard of world revolution, nationalism had been abandoned as irrelevant. In any event, Maxton's mastery of parliamentary tactics overstated the importance of an organisation which was little more than a parliamentary caucus. After 1931 Scotland's Liberal Nationals displayed somewhat greater vigour than their counterparts in the rest of Britain. The geographical concentration of their electoral support enabled them to return a disproportionately large number of MPs in 1931 and 1935. In 1935 they also succeeded in wresting temporary control of the Scottish Liberal Federation (SLF) from the Independents. However, like Liberal Nationals elsewhere, during the course of the National Government they became increasingly less distinguishable from their Conservative allies. Of the "main" parties, only the Independent Liberals, following the reorganisation of the SLF in 1937, had a largely autonomous Scottish organisation. They also remained committed to Home Rule, although by the late 1930s senior figures within the party hierarchy were becoming hostile to the concept. However, in its much reduced form, the Liberal Party represented only a small section of Scottish opinion.

The contention that Scotland in the interwar years shifted towards greater integration with the UK is strongly supported by the evidence, particularly where Scottish political behaviour is concerned. However, while historians have tended, on the whole, to stress the factors promoting assimilation, a series of studies by political scientists have stressed the opposite side of the coin. Prompted first by the resurgence of political nationalism in the "Celtic periphery," particularly Scotland, in the late 1960s, and then by the impact of the Thatcher years on "peripheral" voting behaviour, these works have placed the emphasis on the survival of socio-political distinctiveness in these areas. Perhaps the most influential of these studies has been Michael Hechter's Internal Colonialism (London, 1975). In applying the theory of "internal colonialism," derived from Lenin and Gramsci, to a UK context, Hechter challenged the views of those political scientists who maintained that Britain could be regarded as one of the most successfully integrated nation states. In so doing he rejected the "diffusionist" theory of national development, with its assertion that industrialisation and the development of centralised state control lead to the emergence of class-based political behaviour and the "acculturation" of peripheral societies to that of the core, as singularly inadequate where Britain was concerned. In his analysis of British national development during the period 1536-1966, Hechter argues, in essence, that political incorporation of the Celtic periphery
did not lead to integration with the English "core," because of the evolution within the Celtic regions of dependent, colonial economies. These were marked by a "cultural division of labour," in which the socio-political elites were either English or subscribed to English cultural values. This societal division ensured that, despite the assimilative pressures generated by social developments following industrialisation, acculturation of the periphery by the core did not take place. This survival of Celtic identity and cultural distinctiveness, or "malintegration," was expressed in a persistent deviance from the political norm of the English core, which Hechter terms "peripheral sectionalism." Employing an analytical model derived from electoral statistics and designed to eliminate the influence of "structural" variations in societal composition, such as class, Hechter demonstrates the existence of peripheral sectionalism in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales throughout the period 1851 to 1966.42

Hechter's evidence of peripheral sectionalism, in itself, is not incompatible with the evidence deployed in support of an assimilationist historical interpretation of interwar Scottish developments. Not only does Scotland display the lowest level of peripheral sectionalism of the three areas studied, but as Hechter's measurement of peripheral sectionalism is based on the deviation from an English "norm" in pro-Conservative voting, his model shows a steady decline in Scottish peripheral sectionalism during the 1920s and 1930s, leading to a convergence in Scottish and English voting behaviour at two points around the 1951 election.43 Hechter concedes both the existence of this trend, and the relative weakness of nationalism, a potential outcome of peripheral sectionalism, during this period. However, given that the imbalance inherent in the internal colonial structure remained intact, Hechter argues that this phenomenon does not indicate a genuine movement towards integration, but rather a temporary deviation, with political behaviour consistent with the internal colonial model re-emerging after the 1950s. The period of quiescence in peripheral sectionalism, and indeed the failure of Scotland (and Wales) to follow the Southern Irish example, Hechter primarily ascribes to the division of Scottish society between an anglicised industrial enclave and a traditional rural hinterland. This, he argues, militated against the emergence of a unitary nationalist movement on the Southern Irish model. Antipathy towards England, assumed by Hechter to be reflected by non-Conservative voting, was channelled into two separate parties. In the industrial enclave dissent came to be expressed primarily through support for the Labour Party, while the hinterland remained loyal
to the traditional vehicle of dissent, the Liberal Party. Moreover, neither party, in contrast to the Irish Nationalists, was primarily motivated by peripheral interests. While donning the mantle of peripheral defence, they were in reality fundamentally committed to capturing Westminster. Hechter particularly stresses the role played by the emergence of the Labour movement in institutionalising dissent and thus serving to "negatively integrate" the British Isles. For the interwar period Hechter also highlights the importance of stagnation in the specialised economies of the periphery in promoting political quiescence.44

Hechter's influence is strongly to the fore in Jim Bulpitt's Territory and Power in the United Kingdom (Manchester, 1983). Although unconvinced by Hechter's internal colonial theory, he subscribes to Hechter's criticism of diffusionist theory and his assertion that the level of societal homogeneity in Britain is less than was previously supposed. The post-industrial evolution of Britain, he argues, "provided the form but not the substance of a homogeneous, nationalised society," with developments in transport, education, and the mass media merely grafting an additional "national" layer of culture onto existing local cultural layers, rather than displacing them outright. The emergence of a class-based two party system did not indicate homogeneity. "Britain continued to be a highly localised society which 'lived with' a national class-based society."45 Like Hechter, Bulpitt argues that, despite appearances, the interwar period was not characterised by a fundamental shift towards greater political integration. The absence of "territorial" politics in the period 1926-66, he argues, was due to the establishment of a temporary equilibrium in "Centre"-periphery relations to which he ascribes the term "Dual Polity."46

Preoccupied throughout this period by foreign policy and economic difficulties, the Centre made no attempt to establish effective control over the periphery. A strong centralised state administrative machine did not evolve. In return for a free hand in High Politics, the Centre left Low Politics to the periphery. National and local politics were allowed to continue in two sharply differentiated worlds. In the absence of an assertive Centre strategy, no peripheral counter-mobilisation was provoked. In addition, a coalescence of factors produced "a degree of peripheral docility ... greater than ever before, and one highly unlikely to occur again."47 With the exception of Hechter's enclave-hinterland theory, to which Bulpitt also subscribes, the factors which Bulpitt identifies as promoting this docility also underpin the assimilationist historical interpretation. They include external political threat, an intellectual climate which viewed nationalism in general as suspect, and the decline of the principal vehicle of peripheral dissidence, the Liberal Party. He
stresses the conservative impact of the Irish secession, which removed the principal motor for Home Rule all round, namely the Irish Nationalists, and provided a "bad" example of the possible consequences of the pursuit of territorial politics. He also stresses the importance of Labour's conversion to a centralist strategy, which, given the Conservatives' built-in unionism, allowed peripheral politics to be dominated by territorial conservatives.

Lindsay Paterson's recent study of the governmental machine, *The Autonomy of Modern Scotland* (Edinburgh, 1994), also stresses the survival of Scottish socio-political distinctiveness in the interwar period. The Scottish Office, Paterson contends, played a crucial role in maintaining Scottish distinctiveness. While accepting the existence of "a continuing desire for assimilation, the twentieth-century legacy of the anglicising enthusiasm ... prevailing in earlier times,"48 Paterson argues that the structural reforms of the Scottish Office did not in essence represent a victory for centralising or anglicising tendencies, but rather reflected the existence of a consensus in Scottish "middle opinion" on the strategies best suited to Scotland's needs. "Eradicating unemployment or using the state to develop a healthy population were Scottish goals as well as British ones, and if the UK state could be used to these ends, then that mattered more than hanging on to what was coming to be seen in influential circles as the outdated policy of Scottish home rule."49 Moreover, Paterson argues, the policies which the Scottish Office pursued were distinctively Scottish. As a result, "In significant ways, Scottish society was therefore shaped by people and agencies who did differ in their beliefs from their counterparts elsewhere in Europe."50

Whether Scotland in the interwar years was truly moving towards assimilation with the UK, or merely exhibiting a degree of peripheral "docility" which gave the appearance of greater assimilation, in certain areas an overtly distinctive Scottishness was manifestly present. One such was the continued existence of political nationalism, or rather, with the abandonment of Home Rule in the political mainstream, the emergence of a new and more radical nationalism on the political fringe.51 In the 1920s this was strongly interlinked with the Scottish literary renaissance, and like that phenomenon, it was in part a reaction to the perceived erosion of Scotland's cultural distinctiveness. However, in contrast with the European nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, cultural nationalism did not provide the mainspring of Scottish nationalism in the interwar period.
Paradoxically, Scotland's failing economic performance, while largely responsible for the political mainstream's enhanced enthusiasm for the Union, also provided the principal motor for minority nationalism. From a nationalist perspective Scotland's failing economic health could be directly attributed to the process of corporate integration, with its attendant erosion of Scottish control of Scottish economic activity, and, in the prevailing climate of intense economic nationalism, by the absence of a government motivated purely by Scotland's economic interests.

In the mid-1920s nationalist political efforts concentrated on the revival of agitation for Home Rule. The frustration of this endeavour by the Liberal Party's declining fortunes and Labour's demonstrable unwillingness to implement their previous pledges on the subject led in 1928 to the formation of the National Party of Scotland (NPS). The product of a fusion of several political and literary nationalist groups, of which the most important were the left-wingers of the Scottish Home Rule Association and the fundamentalists and Gaelic revivalists of the Scots National League (SNL), the NPS from the start was committed to a more radical goal than mere Home Rule. Scottish sovereignty was regarded as axiomatic. At the same time, however, its aims were far more realistic than the romantic out-and-out separatism of the old SNL. Scotland's future relations with England were envisaged as that of close co-operation between equal partners. In organisational terms the formation of the NPS also marked a break with the past. Nationalist aspirations henceforth were to be promoted not by working through the existing party system, but by the achievement of power through the ballot box. As the vehicle for that purpose, the NPS was self-consciously modernist and politically realist in expression and organisation. As the party evolved, cultural and romantic nationalism was eschewed with an enthusiasm that rapidly drove most of the literary figures, like Hugh McDiarmid, from its ranks, attracting the charge of philistinism from the large body of nationalists who remained in critical watchfulness outside the party.

The NPS developed rapidly. Within a year it had around 5,000 members, roughly the same number as the Scottish ILP, and at its peak in 1934 membership stood at 10,000. After initially poor electoral performances, public support for the Nationalists picked up under the impact of the economic recession. In the general election of 1931 the NPS fielded five candidates, polling on average 12% of the vote. This level of success, while relatively modest, appeared to many
contemporaries to be but the harbinger of things to come. 1932 saw the much publicised launch of an ostensibly more influential alternative to the NPS, the Scottish Party. More of a political lobby group than a political party in the true sense, the Scottish Party consisted in the main of minor luminaries from the Conservative and Liberal Parties, and in contrast with the leftist tendencies of the NPS, was essentially conservative in orientation. Initially, too, devolution rather than independence appeared to be the projected aim of the new party. However, it rapidly moved closer to the NPS position, and the two parties co-operated in the Kilmarnock by-election in 1933. Anxious to secure the political experience and influence of the Scottish Party membership, John MacCormick, the Secretary and effective leader of the NPS, forced through the adoption of a more devolutionary interpretation of official NPS policy as a precursor to fusion, purging the party of his fundamentalist opponents in the process. In April 1934 the two parties merged to form the Scottish National Party.

The events of 1932-34 proved to be a false dawn for the Nationalists. Thereafter public interest faded and membership levels declined. Although Sir Alexander MacEwen, standing for Inverness, took 28% of the vote in the general election of 1935, the result was atypical. SNP candidates in the party's urban heartlands registered a sharp decline in the levels of support given in 1931. Fundamentalist and left-wing nationalists critical of the party leadership ascribed the SNP's declining fortunes to ideological compromises resulting from the fusion with the Scottish Party. The root cause, however, was the economic upswing. For the remainder of the 1930s involvement in political nationalism was confined to the political margins.

With hindsight it is possible to view political nationalism as hopelessly marginalised throughout the interwar period. However, this would be to underestimate its potential. The impact of the economic depression stimulated an interest in the nationalist alternative far greater than the modest electoral successes of the NPS would suggest. Between 1932 and 1934 the case for Home Rule was promoted with considerable vigour by Beaverbrook's Scottish Daily Express. Although its proposals were more modest, the case for devolution in some form was also pushed by Beaverbrook's principal rival in the circulation war, the Daily Record. Even The Scotsman expressed some sympathy for devolution, while the Glasgow Herald also gave considerable coverage to discussion of the devolution debate, if only to negate nationalist arguments. Contemporaries certainly believed
that political nationalism had the potential to take the political centre stage during this period. The response of the Scottish Conservative establishment to the formation of the Scottish Party was a manifesto, signed by 456 Scottish notables, condemning any form of political devolution. "The Ragman's Roll," as it was derisively termed by nationalists, was a clear sign of the seriousness with which the nationalist challenge was viewed. Moreover, while political nationalism retired to the wings after 1934, there remained a substantial body of opinion, which, while mostly unionist in political affiliation, was strongly motivated by nationalist sentiment. The 1930s witnessed a mushrooming of "middle opinion"-inspired bodies promoting nationalist goals. These included The Saltire Society, the National Trust for Scotland and the Association for the Protection of Rural Scotland. The reforms of the Scottish Office, whether genuinely devolutionary in nature or merely presented with a devolutionary gloss, also indicate the need felt in Scottish Conservative circles to cater to nationalist sentiments.

A second, and even more potent, area of manifestly distinctive Scottish political behaviour in the interwar years was the resurgence of sectarianism. In the years immediately prior to the First World War the anti-Catholic and anti-Irish sentiment which had been such a marked feature of Victorian Scotland, while not entirely absent, had largely been overlaid by economic prosperity and the wider vistas offered by Imperial opportunity. The presence of the large and unassimilated Catholic community of Irish immigrant stock had essentially been ignored. With the onset of economic stagnation and the pessimistic introspection of the 1920s, old fears and antagonisms revived. Populist anti-Catholicism, born of competition within a reduced labour market, combined with the perceived decay in Scottish indigenous culture to produce a widespread belief in the "alien menace" posed by the "Irish." To many Protestant observers the Scots-Irish were largely responsible for the moral and economic enfeeblement of the nation.

In contrast with the pre-war period, throughout the interwar years anti-Catholic resentment evoked sympathetic responses from the Church of Scotland. In 1923 the General Assembly formally endorsed a report by its Church and Nation Committee entitled, "The Menace of The Irish Race to Our Scottish Nationality. Twelve years later, following serious anti-Catholic rioting in Edinburgh, the General Assembly approved a report from the Church Interests Committee, drawing attention to "a widespread belief that Roman Catholic labour has an unfair advantage
in comparison with Protestant labour in the matter of employment." The solution to the problem, according to the framers of the report, was "greater care on the part of Scottish employers of labour for the interests of their own fellow countrymen."\textsuperscript{62}

Traditional political channels failed to satisfy this upsurge of anti-Catholic resentment. Although individual members of the Scottish Conservative establishment were sympathetic, the party leadership rigorously maintained an official distance. The Orange Order also failed to provide a suitable vehicle. To many militant Protestant activists it had degenerated into a lethargic social club. The result was the emergence of new political organisations. The short-lived Orange and Protestant Party, founded in 1922, had relatively little impact, and quickly faded away. The early 1930s, however, saw the emergence of the Scottish Protestant League (SPL) in the Glasgow area, and Protestant Action in Edinburgh. Both movements enjoyed substantial, if ephemeral, success in local politics.

Founded originally in Edinburgh in 1920 by Alexander Ratcliffe,\textsuperscript{63} the SPL blossomed when Ratcliffe moved to Glasgow in 1930. Following their leader's election to Glasgow City Council in 1931, the SPL rapidly built up popular support. By 1933 it was taking 23% of the total municipal vote and had secured the election of several councillors. This, however, proved to be the apex of its achievement. The following year, weakened by internal schisms, the SPL took only 7% of the vote, and Ratcliffe himself was ousted by the electoral co-operation of his opponents. Although Ratcliffe soldiered on with his broadsheet, \textit{Vanguard}, the SPL was finished as a political force. The rise to prominence of Protestant Action, led by the fiery and effective street orator, John Cormack,\textsuperscript{64} was even more dramatic, marked as it was by major civil disturbances in Edinburgh in the late spring and early summer of 1935.\textsuperscript{65} That year Protestant Action candidates took 25% of the vote in the Edinburgh municipal election. The movement's fortunes peaked in 1936 when it took nine council seats and 31% of the vote, pushing Labour into third place. At the time Protestant Action claimed to have around 8,000 members.\textsuperscript{66} Its achievements, however, proved to be scarcely more enduring than the SPL's. After 1936 popular support dropped away. Weakened by breakaways and internal disputes, by the end of the decade Protestant Action was a mere rump of its former self.

Although the rise and fall of the SPL paralleled the fate of other alternative parties in the wake of the Slump, Cormack's "late" success in Edinburgh, in
defiance of the economic upswing, indicates that political anti-Catholicism was not necessarily immediately responsive to economic factors. Handicapped by their own fissiparous tendencies, the SPL and Protestant Action failed to effectively canalise the political potential of anti-Catholicism. Their failure, however, belies the fact that anti-Catholicism remained a powerful and volatile element in Scottish politics throughout the 1930s.

For a significant minority within the Scottish nationalist movement the "alien menace" of the Scots-Irish constituted the greatest danger to the survival of a distinct Scottish identity, and nationalists provided some of the most vitriolic attacks on the Scots-Irish to be made in the inter-war years. Hostility to the Scots-Irish and anti-Catholicism were never officially endorsed by the NPS/SNP, and such sentiments were vigorously condemned by the party's left-wingers. Nevertheless, they did not present an insuperable barrier to office within the party. Andrew Dewar Gibb, the principal architect of the Scottish Party, and chairman of the SNP from 1936 to 1940, was well known for his anti-Irish sentiments. Prior to his involvement in nationalist politics, Gibb had been a Conservative parliamentary candidate. Admonishing Baldwin for the Conservative Party's failure to address the Irish "problem," Gibb described the Scots-Irish as "a poor type of citizen, constantly on the increase, hostile to Scottish ideals in religion, politics and domestic life, and mainly responsible for Scottish crime, slums and Socialism." By Gibb's standards this was restrained. In Scotland in Eclipse, published in 1930, he characterises the Scots-Irish as "distinguishable by a veritable will to squalor" and lays at their door responsibility for the majority of "dirty acts of sexual baseness."

Nationalism and sectarianism provided the most distinctively Scottish elements in Scottish political expression in the 1930s. However, Scottish distinctiveness also survived in more subtle forms. The most important of these was the Liberal heritage. The Liberal Party may have been a spent force, but Liberalism itself continued to exercise an influence from beyond the electoral grave. The political, social and industrial leadership of interwar Scotland, although for the most part Conservative in formal party allegiance, was "essentially the old Liberal ascendency rallying under fresh banners." This Liberal heritage was self-evident in the values and principles which guided politicians like Walter Elliot and John Buchan.
During the interwar years a combination of factors conspired to rob Scotland of much of her distinctive political individuality. Chief amongst these was the crippling effect of economic depression, as stagnation afflicted those sectors of industry which had previously formed the power-house of the Scottish economy. By the early 1930s many Scots had come to regard the economic malaise as so intractable as to be effectively beyond self-help. What hopes there were for recovery had come to rest in clinging firmly to the bootstraps of the more dynamic and prosperous economy to the South. Her national ego battered by economic failure, Scotland put up little resistance to the tightening of the knots of Union. Indeed, in influential circles it was positively embraced. Whether Scotland's descent into provincialisation was merely a refuge of convenience, or indicative of a more fundamental shift towards integration, remains the subject of debate. The fact that in many of its outward forms, Scottish political expression displayed a marked convergence with the political behaviour of its southern neighbour, is beyond dispute. With the eclipse of Liberalism as a prime electoral force and the transition to class-based politics, the distinctive electoral pattern which Scotland had exhibited in the past all but disappeared. Following the dictates of their own particular political agendas, the main political parties cast off much of their former distinctiveness, and recast themselves in a markedly more British mould.

Nevertheless, whatever the prevailing trends, Scottish politics in the interwar period were no mirror image of those south of the Border. The rekindling of sectarian tensions in particular provided a potentially explosive and distinctively Scottish ingredient in the nation's political life. Although ostensibly banished from the political mainstream by the power political requirements of the major players, the sectarian issue lurked just beneath the surface of Scottish politics throughout the 1930s. The prairie fires of Protestant Action and the SPL in local politics provided ample evidence of the extent of anti-Catholic resentment in Protestant ranks. As a result, Scottish politicians in the main were far more sensitive to religious implications in their political responses than the majority of their English counterparts. Nationalism too contributed an important and distinctively Scottish ingredient to Scottish politics. Like sectarianism, but to a lesser extent, it had a subterranean quality, for its influence extended beyond the confines of those circles actively engaged in the promotion of political nationalism. As we shall see, nationalism and the existence of the sectarian divide both contributed to the shaping of Scottish attitudes to fascism and the principal European dictatorships of the Right. One, however, would exercise a markedly greater influence than the other.
Chapter 1
Footnotes


10. It also targeted a variety of pernicious secular influences, such as cinemas, ice-rinks and ice-cream parlours. Lynch, op. cit., p. 439.

11. The economy which centralisation offered in part prompted this development. So too did the corporation's pursuit of technical excellence, for the London studios were technically more advanced. However, within the BBC there was also "an implicit assumption that culture emanating from local areas was in some sense inferior to metropolitan culture." W.H. McDowell, *The History of BBC Broadcasting in Scotland, 1923-1983*, Edinburgh, 1992, pp. 34-5.


13. Both papers enjoyed a circulation of over 60,000 in 1938. No British provincial paper, including the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Yorkshire Post*, had circulations as large. Their penetration of the Scottish market significantly bettered that of *The Times* in the UK market. Although the population of the UK was almost ten times larger than that of Scotland, the circulation of *The Times* was only 192,000. Political and Economic Planning (PEP), *Report on the British Press*, London, 1938, p. 48, pp. 114-5.

14. This was by no means restricted to those who shared *The Scotsman's* political stance. In a brief survey of Scottish newspapers written shortly after the Second World War, Duncan Ferguson declared of *The Scotsman's*
allocation of space to the rival political parties, "No other daily of which the writer has knowledge has sought to be so fair." Similarly, a pseudonymous contributor to the *Scots Independent* in 1938 asserted, "Political friend and opponent get equal space in its columns." Both writers were Scottish Nationalists. Duncan Ferguson, pamphlet entitled, *The Scottish Newspaper Press*, 1946, Dewar Gibb Papers (GIB) 217/21; "Newsman," "Revelations: Scotland's Daily Press," *Scots Independent*, December 1938.

15. Sir (John) Edmund Ritchie Findlay of Aberlour, b. 1902. Findlay was elected Conservative MP for Banffshire in 1935. He inherited both the baronetcy and *The Scotsman* on the death of his father in 1930. His father was President of the Scottish Unionist Association in 1927-28. His mother was the president the following year, the first woman to hold that office.

16. George Alexander Waters, b. 1880. Editor of *The Scotsman* since 1924.

17. Ferguson, op. cit.

18. Neither *The Scotsman* nor the *Glasgow Herald* had their own foreign news service. Curiously, given their respective political alignments, *The Scotsman* used the *Daily Telegraph*’s service, while the *Glasgow Herald* relied on *The Times*. Ibid.

19. William Ewart Berry, Lord Camrose, b. 1879, and James Gomer Berry, Lord Kemsley (cr.1936), b. 1883. Joint proprietors of a newspaper group which included the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sunday Times*, the *Financial Times*, and a vast network of provincial papers.


22. Ferguson, op. cit.


24. The electoral statistics in this and subsequent sections are taken from F.W.S. Craig, *British Electoral Facts, 1832-1987*, Aldershot, 1989. Fractions of one per cent have been rounded off. The figures given for the percentage share of the Scottish vote are exclusive of voting in the Scottish universities constituencies.


27. The steady decline in Scotland's anti-Conservative bias continued into the post-war years. In 1945 Scottish voters actually showed a marginally greater propensity to vote Conservative than their English counterparts.

Hutchison's belief that at senior level party policy was dominated by a desire to win over the floating Liberal vote, also places greater emphasis on the survival of links with Protestant populism. He particularly stresses its influence in local politics, and points to the co-operation between the Moderates in Glasgow and the Scottish Protestant League. Mitchell, op. cit., p.10; Tom Gallagher, *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace*, Manchester, 1988, pp. 143-50.


33. Patrick Joseph Dollan, b. 1885. An ex-miner, Dollan had been a Glasgow town councillor since 1912. Chairman of the Scottish ILP from 1920 to 1931. Scottish editor of the *Daily Herald*.

34. James Maxton, b. 1885. MP for Glasgow Bridgeton since 1922. Chairman of the ILP from 1926 to 1931.


36. Scotland did provide the Communist Party with one of its few areas of strength, although this existed essentially in small concentrated pockets. However, one such regional concentration, in the Fife mining communities, did facilitate the CPGB's only electoral triumph after 1922, when Willie Gallacher captured West Fife in 1935.

37. William Knox (edit.), *Scottish Labour Leaders 1919-1939*, Edinburgh, 1984, p. 45. During the May Day celebrations in 1938 Scottish Communists were observed by Oliver Brown carrying banners portraying a succession of nationalist heroes, from Galgacus, Wallace and Bruce through to R.B. Cunninghame Graham. Amongst the slogans held proudly aloft was "We glory in the 'Land of brown heath and shaggy wood'." *Scots Independent*, June 1938.

38. By 1932 Maxton was arguing that "a struggle these days for mere political liberty is out of date, whether it takes place in India, Ireland or Scotland." *New Leader*, 1st July 1932, in Scottish Secretariat MSS, National Library of Scotland. Quoted by Michael Keating and David Bleiman, *Labour and Scottish Nationalism*, London, 1979, p. 114.

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41. Fry, op. cit., p. 179. The Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, was himself lukewarm on the issue. Although he personally favoured a mild form of devolution, he was not convinced that it was a pressing need. Gerard J. De Groot, *Liberal Crusader*, London, 1993, p. 96.


43. Hechter's model is based on electoral data for the elections of 1885, 1892, 1900, 1924, 1931, 1951 and 1966. Scotland actually showed a greater propensity to vote Conservative, relative to England, in the elections of 1945 than it did in 1951.


46. Bulpitt's concept of the "Centre" differs significantly from Hechter's "core." While the latter's concept is a geographical one, embracing essentially London and the Home Counties, Bulpitt defines his "Centre" as "a political-administrative community of Cabinet ministers and their senior civil servants, with opposition parliamentary leaders waiting in the wings." Bulpitt, op. cit., p. 156.

47. Bulpitt, op. cit., p. 142.


49. Paterson, op. cit., p. 106.

50. Paterson, op. cit., p. 130.


54. John MacCormick, b. 1904. A former member of the ILP and founder of Glasgow University Student Nationalist Association, MacCormick was the architect of R.B. Cunninghame Graham's near victorious campaign in the Glasgow Rectorial Election of 1928, an event which both provided the impetus for the formation of the NPS and propelled the fledgling party into public prominence. Secretary of the NPS/SNP until 1942.
55. Hanham estimates that about a fifth of the party was expelled in the 1933 purge. In addition, a substantial number of members resigned voluntarily. Hanham, op. cit., p. 160.

56. Sir Alexander Malcolm MacEwen, b. 1875. One of the founding fathers of the Scottish Party, MacEwen was a solicitor, a Liberal, and a prominent figure in Inverness-shire local government. Provost of Inverness, 1925-31. First Chairman of the SNP.

57. See, for instance, Scots Independent, February 1936, pp. 1-2.

58. See Brand, op. cit., p. 219.


60. By the 1920s the majority of "Irish" in Scotland were Scots-born.


62. Scotsman, 11th May 1935.

63. Alexander Ratcliffe, b. 1888. The son of a Protestant clergyman, Ratcliffe worked as a railway clerk before becoming a full-time Protestant activist. In the 1920s he produced Protestant Advocate, which later evolved into Vanguard/ Protestant Vanguard. Much of this paper was given over to lurid tales of the vile personal lives of individual priests and nuns. In the general election of 1929 Ratcliffe challenged the sitting Catholic Labour MP for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs, standing as a Protestant and Progressive candidate. Although unsuccessful, he took 21% of the vote.

64. John Cormack, b. 1894. The son of a Baptist lay preacher, Cormack joined the army in 1909, subsequently serving on the Western Front and in Ireland. Retiring from the army in 1922 with the rank of corporal, he joined the General Post Office. In the late 1920s Cormack was briefly a member of Ratcliffe's SPL.

65. The most dramatic incident was on June 25th, when a hostile crowd, estimated to be 30-40,000 strong, gathered in the vicinity of St. Andrew's Priory in Canaan Lane to protest against the holding of a Eucharistic Congress. See Gallagher, Edinburgh Divided, pp. 48-54.


67. Cormack's success was all the more remarkable, as Edinburgh in the 1930s was "an oasis of almost southern prosperity." Harvie, No Gods, p. 43.

68. Andrew Dewar Gibb, b. 1888. Appointed Regius Professor of Law at Glasgow University in 1934, Gibb unsuccessfully contested Hamilton (1924) and Greenock (1929), as a Conservative candidate, and the Scottish Universities constituency (1935, 1936, and 1938) for the SNP. Frustration at the Conservative Party's unwillingness to address the Irish "problem" was one of the principal reasons for Gibb's decision to renounce his allegiance to that party. Gibb's principal co-conspirator in the formation of the Scottish
Party was George Malcolm Thomson, Beaverbrook's aide. Like Gibb, Thomson was a vocal exponent of the "alien menace" theme. His *Caledonia or the Future of the Scots* (London, 1927), with its future vision of the eventual subjugation of Scotland by the Scots-Irish, following a Darwinian struggle for racial and religious supremacy, is one of the more alarmist expositions of this theme. The Irish issue occurs frequently in the correspondence between Gibb and Thomson. Both were not only personally committed to addressing the "problem," but viewed it as an issue on which Scots could be rallied to nationalism. See GIB 217/1/3.

69. Gibb to Stanley Baldwin, 23rd June 1930, GIB 217/1/5.


Chapter 2
The Rejection of the Fascist Alternative 1933-34

The survival of marked areas of distinctiveness in the political complexion of Scotland is clearly evident in the relative lack of interest displayed by Scots in the Fascist alternative during the period 1933-34. Given its likely significance for subsequent attitudes towards the European dictatorships, the disparity between Scottish and English responses in this area merits close investigation.

To British observers of the Continental scene, the main significance of Hitler's accession to power in 1933 was the further proof it provided that liberal democracy, as a governmental form, was fast becoming an endangered species. Only fifteen years previously, the Western Allies' victory over Central European autocracy had been hailed as a triumphant vindication of the democratic principle. Now it appeared merely to have ushered in a new age of dictatorship. Driven by the twin dynamics of economic dislocation and fear of Communism, the proliferation of authoritarian régimes of the Right, which had commenced in the early 1920s with Horthy, Mussolini and Mustapha Kemal, had accelerated under the impact of the world economic crisis after 1929 to encompass most of Central and Eastern Europe. Of the fledgling democracies established in the successor states, all but Czechoslovakia's had foundered. With the crisis in France in February 1934 casting doubt on the long-term durability of the Gallic variant, democracy, from a British perspective, showed every sign of being reduced to an Anglo-Saxon peculiarity.

Britain suffered less than most of her European neighbours from the effects of the world depression. However, to contemporaries the recession was severe enough to be viewed at the very least as a major crisis, and at worst as the possible preliminary to a descent into economic Armageddon. From a general level of around 10% of the insured population in the late 1920s, unemployment soared to 23%, or roughly 3 million people, by the beginning of 1933. Although the economy began to show signs of an upswing later in the year, this would not become readily apparent until 1934, and even then recovery appeared to owe little to governmental action. Indeed throughout the crisis, despite its overwhelming electoral victory in 1931 on the basis of a "doctor's mandate" to tackle the situation, the National Government had displayed a singular inability to influence events.
many observers this appeared to indicate that, even in Britain, democracy, as currently constituted, was unequal to the challenges of the modern world.

Amongst those who looked to forms of right-wing authoritarianism for the solution to the perceived inadequacies of capitalist democracy, attention centred firmly on Mussolini’s Italy, as the prime example of a successful benevolent dictatorship. During the 1920s Mussolini had been widely regarded in Britain as the pre-eminent European statesman of his day. To his admirers he had virtually single-handedly rescued Italy from political and economic anarchy, and, through his regeneration of the national spirit, tapped Italy’s latent resources and propelled her into the ranks of the Great Powers. However, except for a few isolated enthusiasts, admiration for the charismatic founder of Fascism rarely extended to the Fascist system itself, and the encomiums heaped on Mussolini by politicians, such as Austen Chamberlain and Winston Churchill, invariably carried the qualification that Fascism, however suitable to the temperament of the Italian people, could have no application to Britain. However, the intensification of interest in Mussolini’s Italy in the early 1930s, which peaked during the period 1933-34, was a very different phenomenon. While adulation of the great man was still strongly in evidence, the theories and principles of Fascism were very much at the centre of public discussion. Above all, attention fixed on the mechanisms of the corporate state.

The main thrust of the intellectual presentation of the case for Fascism was provided by the editorial staff and contributors of the English Review, a political journal representative of High Tory views. Its editor since 1931, Douglas Jerrold, saw his role as providing "a platform for real Toryism as opposed to the plutocratic Conservatism represented by the official party under ... Mr. Baldwin's uninspiring leadership." The individual views held by members of this coterie varied extensively, particularly as regards the extent to which British political institutions could be remodelled on Fascist lines. For some the need for an efficient executive unhampered by the compromises of the democratic system was paramount. Others were Italophiles of long standing. Many were motivated primarily by a high-minded patrician concern for the welfare of the working class. For the benevolent patricians, anti-communism, while implicit, was less important than a belief in the immorality of finance capitalism in prompting an interest in Fascism. Corporatism, through the harmonious adjustment of the interests of capital and labour, was represented as a system of a higher morality, promoting social peace, through the eradication of sectional strife, and a more equitable distribution of wealth in the
This assessment of the achievements of the corporate state closely resembled the social goals advanced by the influential Catholic anti-democratic intellectuals, Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, and their adherents in the Distributist League. Anglo-Catholics figured strongly in the English Review circle, although it should be stressed that Belloc and Chesterton themselves were less than enamoured of Fascism per se. Douglas Jerrold in particular was very much in the Chestertonian tradition, but other members of the group also reflected its anti-materialism, extreme distaste for financiers, and exultation of a supposed pre-industrial utopia.

As an intellectual think-tank addressing itself ostensibly to the propagation of a more dynamic, effective and caring form of Toryism, the English Review circle overlapped at various points with mainstream Conservatism, and attracted leading Conservative politicians to its functions, such as Lord Lloyd and Leo Amery. Its appeals for leadership and action found favour with the Die-Hards of the Far Right, disgusted by Baldwinian "drift" and what they viewed as a dilution of true Conservative principles which verged on socialism. More significantly, its exposition of the case for corporatism appealed to a large section of the party which believed that the days of unregulated capitalism were over, and viewed the work of Walter Elliot at the Ministry of Agriculture as the precursor of further state intervention in the direction of the economy.

While the intellectuals of the English Review were assiduously endeavouring to graft aspects of Fascism on to the ideology of the Tory Party, a Fascist mass party on the continental model had also emerged in the shape of the British Union of Fascists, which Sir Oswald Mosley had founded in October 1932, after the failure of his radical left experiment, the New Party. Mosley himself always asserted that his movement was a unique British variation of a contemporary European phenomenon, rather than a direct copy of the Italian model. In emphasising the stress which Mosley placed on Keynesian economics, Mosley's biographer, Richard Skidelsky, to some extent supports this contention. Nevertheless, there was much in the movement that had been transplanted directly from Italy, including, in the early stages, the use of the fasces. More significantly, a commitment to the creation of the Corporate State formed the keystone of BUF policy. Until late 1934 there is little evidence of Nazi influence on BUF ideology, although Mosley had benefited
from the Nazis' practical experience. After listening to Mosley's exposition on his future movement, one perceptive political commentator, Robert Bruce Lockhart, assessed the embryonic BUF in September 1932 as "Mussolini in policy and Hitlerite in organisation." However, to many of his fellow countrymen the BUF was simply a foreign import and decidedly "un-English."

Initially the BUF made rapid progress, appealing in particular to the young, the unemployed and ex-military men. Despite the violence which its activities attracted from the outset, it managed to retain a degree of public respectability until the much publicised over-zealousness of Blackshirt stewarding at Olympia in June 1934, and even enjoyed a certain vogue in some sections of London's smart set, where membership of the BUF was almost a kind of fashion accessory. During the first half of 1934 Mosley played down the revolutionary aspects of the movement, and stressed its patriotic and Conservative credentials in an endeavour to attract Conservative support. It was a highly successful strategy. Boosted by the favourable press coverage provided by Rothermere's Daily Mail and the parental indulgence emanating from various other Conservative sources, membership rose dramatically, from around 17,000 in February to 50,000 in July.

An integral part of the BUF's policy of wooing Conservative opinion was the formation of the January Club in January 1934. A select society for the intellectual study of all aspects of fascism, in its heyday the Club attracted a fair number of moderately influential Conservative "enquirers." Although the prime mover in this venture was Mosley's deputy leader and PR expert, Robert Forgan, the former Labour MP for Renfrewshire West, the January Club was very much a co-operative venture with the corporatists and Italophiles of the English Review circle, many of whom were in fact far from taken with Mosley or his brand of fascism. Nevertheless, they had no difficulty with BUF participation in the January Club for as long as that body served to publicise the examination of fascism in general.

Olympia was a public relations disaster of the first magnitude for the BUF, with Rothermere's withdrawal of support the following month signalling the end of the honeymoon with Conservative opinion. July 1934 would, in fact, prove to be the apogee of the BUF's aspirations to political significance. As public opinion hardened against the party, rank and file members previously attracted by the image of radical Conservatism took flight. Their departure, moreover, heralded a more
general exodus, for with the economy manifestly if undramatically pulling out of recession by late 1934, Mosley's most persuasive argument for a radical political alternative evaporated. In October 1934, in an endeavour to break out of his increasing political marginalisation, Mosley reversed his previous policy of restraining the movement's anti-semitic tendencies, and planted political anti-semitism firmly at the centre of BUF ideology. This desperate strategy failed to stem the haemorrhage in BUF membership. By October 1935 the BUF's total membership had sunk to a mere 5,000.14

Scotland, as we have seen, suffered to an even greater extent than the rest of Britain from the impact of the Slump. Scotland, therefore, might have been anticipated to show greater interest in the Fascist alternative. However, this was not the case. The only leading Scottish Conservative attracted to the English Review group's functions was Sir Robert Horne, MP for Glasgow Hillhead,15 and his interest Douglas Jerrold somewhat disparagingly referred to as essentially "metaphysical" rather than political.16 Enthusiasm for progressive state interventionism was strongly in evidence amongst younger Scottish Conservatives in the early 1930s, partly because of the poor performance of the Scottish economy over the previous decade, and partly because of the evangelising efforts of Noel Skelton17 and the rise to prominence of his friend, Walter Elliot. This enthusiasm, however, did not extend an embrace of corporatism on the Italian model. Robert Boothby, the highly individualistic MP for East Aberdeenshire, and arguably the most clamant critic of unregulated capitalism amongst the young Scottish progressives, was both socially and politically close to Oswald Mosley during the latter's radical Labour period, and he strongly endorsed Mosley's critique of the second Labour government's economic orthodoxy.18 However, Boothby's enthusiasm for Keynesian economics did not follow Mosley's course. When Mosley turned to Fascism, it marked a decisive parting of the ways.

The only major intellectual contribution to debate on the corporate state to emerge from Scotland came from an Englishman, Hugh Sellon, lecturer in history at St. Andrews University and part-time lecturer on international affairs at the Conservative College of Ashridge. In his first two published works, Whither England? (1932) and Democracy and Dictatorship (1934), and in his contemporaneous contributions to the English Review, Sellon proclaimed the imminent demise of "unrestricted and unregulated private enterprise." There were,
he believed, only two alternatives to economic liberalism. "The one is Communism; the other is an organization of the state on corporative lines." Hugh Sellon personified the intersection of the English Review's High Toryism with progressive state interventionist Conservative thought. With an introduction from Elliot and an acknowledgement of his indebtedness to Skelton, Sellon's advocacy of state control in Whither England? at first sight places the author in the ranks of the young progressives. This impression is reinforced by Sellon's emphasis on the need to develop the Home Market, encouraging the growth of light industry, and most strikingly by his enthusiasm for the concept of a "property owning democracy." On closer inspection, however, Sellon's works reveal him to be much nearer in sympathy to the Anglo-Catholic patricians of the English Review. For Sellon the creation of the corporate state carried a moral imperative, for he could not justify the perpetuation of the existing system, in which "want and even starvation exist at a time when man's mastery over the means of production is so great that there is a glut of almost every commodity." Communism, although in itself a denial both of man's spiritual nature and his natural drive for personal property, was a thoroughly understandable, indeed, "inevitable" product of the "world evil of economic Liberalism." With the elimination of capitalist exploitation through the creation of the corporate state, communism would wither and die. In his ambition to place society on a sounder moral footing, Sellon expected little from the "arrivistes" of the bourgeoisie. Inspired leadership, he believed, would primarily come from the aristocracy, a reservoir of traditional Conservative values.

Sellon's inspiration, like Chesterton's, lay in a pre-industrial and essentially Catholic past, swept away by the twin disasters of the Reformation and the agrarian revolution. While the one had disrupted the spiritual unity of Christendom, the other, by destroying traditional peasant society, had opened the way for capitalism and industrialism, with all their attendant social evils. Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, Sellon believed, provided the ideal definition of the future social goals of Conservative corporatism and like the Distributists, he was a firm exponent of "back to the land." For Sellon the primary task of a future corporate state would be the resurrection of a sturdy peasant class, the foundation stone of his ideal society, partly through the revitalisation of agriculture, but also through the integration of agrarian and industrial activity. Social engineering, rather than economic efficiency, lay behind his demands for the dispersal of industry and encouragement of the small producer.

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Admiration for the corporatist experiment in Italy and for its founder, the "supreme example of modern statesmanship, and a figure of inspiration and hope," is strongly in evidence in Sellon's writings. Fascism, he stressed, however, was "great and noble and successful because it is in accordance with the political traditions of Italy and the temperament of the Italian people," and he was at pains to point out that his enthusiasm for corporatism, which he believed to be "capable of universal application," did not connote a desire for the establishment of political Fascism in Britain. Corporatism, he believed, had to be "adapted to British mentality, and fitted into the constitution." For Sellon Mosley's emulation of continental methods was not only inappropriate, it was also potentially fatal to the corporatist cause, particularly in Scotland, with its legacy of Presbyterian democracy and theocratic past. Any "political adventure such as an attempt to introduce either the Italian or German 'Unitary' State, any fancy uniforms, any appeal to mob oratory or mob coercion, and the chance of Conservatism and of Scotland will be lost for a generation and perhaps for ever."  

The uniqueness of Sellon's contribution arguably reflects the relative weakness of patrician High Toryism in Scotland. Within Scottish Conservatism the Liberal Unionist heritage was much stronger than that of old Toryism. The self-confidence and intellectual energy of England's patrician Anglo-Catholic circles also had no parallel in Scotland. Catholicism was not without its adherents in Scotland's landed classes. Numerically, however, they were weak, and with Scottish Conservatism strongly tarred with Orangeism until the 1920s, their active participation in Scottish Conservative politics had hardly been encouraged. Some members of the Catholic gentry and aristocracy did find their way into politics, although significantly many of those who did chose to stand for English constituencies. More commonly they found an outlet for their energies in the army. Paradoxically, Distributism, so influential in shaping the views of the Anglo-Catholics of the English Review circle, did flourish in Scotland. However, its adherents were primarily drawn from the emergent middle-class of the Scots-Irish community, rather than the Catholic gentry. Founded in 1930, the Distributist Club rapidly became one of Glasgow University's most dynamic political clubs. In this radically different social milieu belief in the ideals of Distributism does not appear to have evolved into sympathy with Italian Fascism. During the early 1930s the members of the Distributist Club were noted, not for their enthusiasm for Fascism, but for their support for Scottish nationalism. Compton Mackenzie's victory in the Glasgow University
rectorial election of 1931 was partly due to their active campaigning on his behalf. Mackenzie's own Catholicism was undoubtedly the principal attraction, but Home Rule for Scotland also blended harmoniously with Distributism's "small is beautiful" outlook.

Given the contemporary European association between nationalist aspirations and fascism, an intellectual interest in Fascism and the corporate state might have been expected to emerge from the Scottish nationalist movement. According to James Young, "With the exception of Edwin Muir, James Barke and Lewis Grassic Gibbon (James Leslie Mitchell), the leading figures in the Scottish literary renaissance movement were devout fascists." Such an assessment, however, requires an extremely liberal interpretation of the term "fascist." With some justification the label might be applied to the elitist and anti-materialist views of Hugh McDiarmid, and during the 1920s McDiarmid enthusiastically promoted Fascism as a suitable vehicle for the regeneration of Scotland. However, McDiarmid's "fascism," in addition to being highly idiosyncratic, was very much of the intellectual and literary variety. It soared untroubled over the confines of political ideology, and he had no difficulty in simultaneously extolling the virtues of Marxism. Moreover, by the 1930s McDiarmid had moved on, and when he stooped to mere political expression, his views were strongly pro-Soviet. The nationalist literary movement contained some writers of decidedly right-wing views, but none espoused the corporatist ideal. Lewis Spence, whose enthusiasm for extremes rivalled McDiarmid's, was outrageously racist, and an impassioned imperialist and monarchist, but he was no Fascist. Ruaraidh Erskine of Marr was equally given to extreme views, but while his ideological blend of Catholicism, Pan-Celticism and Jacobitism, with its oscillation between endorsement of "celtic communism" and "celtic aristocracy," might be viewed as crypto-fascist, he did not champion corporatism or Mussolini's Italy. The Conservatism of novelists Eric Linklater and Compton Mackenzie may not have been to Young's taste, but both men were positively hostile to fascism, whether domestic or continental. Linklater, in particular, was utterly opposed to any political philosophy which constrained the liberty of the individual.

Within nationalist intellectual circles the Social Credit theories of Maj. C.H. Douglas did find numerous adherents, and they were expounded with considerable enthusiasm in the pages of the Free Man, an independent Scottish nationalist
journal. First published in 1932, the Free Man was relaunched in 1935 as New Scotland. After 1934 it served as a rallying point for disaffected fundamentalists, providing a radical critique of the SNP and serving to keep alive the tradition of cultural and literary nationalism from which the SNP had largely recoiled. Contributors to the Free Man included Hugh McDiarmid, whose adherence to Social Credit was life-long, outliving his other political enthusiasms. Like Distributism, the antagonism towards finance capitalism inherent in Social Credit led some individuals towards anti-semitism and/or fascism, and in the late 1930s there was considerable personnel interchange between the Social Credit movement and the BUF. By the outbreak of the Second World War Douglas himself had become violently anti-semitic, although also strongly anti-Nazi. Most advocates of Social Credit, however, did not follow this path, and the Scottish Douglasites, with the qualified exception of McDiarmid, remained free of anti-semitic or pro-fascist tendencies.

The only Scottish Conservative MP to publicly express his enthusiasm for Mosley's movement during the BUF's honeymoon period with Conservatism was the forty-nine year old MP for Ayr Burghs, Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore. An Ulsterman, Thomas Cecil Russell Moore had been educated at Trinity College, Dublin, before embarking on a military career. As a professional soldier he had served in France during the First World War, and had subsequently witnessed first-hand the horrors of civil war, both in Russia and his native Ireland. An experienced parliamentarian, he had represented Ayr since 1925, and was a regular contributor to Commons' debates on foreign policy. His other parliamentary speciality was animal welfare issues, and for many years he was a trustee of the RSPCA. The central tenet of Moore's political faith was a vehement anti-communism, prompted perhaps by his personal experiences of civil disorder in Russia and Ireland, and he took an active part in the activities of the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union.33

Moore was no intellectual advocate of corporatism. However, after personally witnessing Mosley's rally at the Albert Hall in April 1934, Moore enthusiastically acclaimed the BUF in a Daily Mail article entitled, "The Blackshirts Have What the Conservatives Need." Moore had clearly fallen under the sway of Mosley's Conservative rhetoric. In his opinion, BUF policy was to all intents and purposes "part and parcel of strict Tory doctrines." Much of it, he claimed, had "already been initiated by the National Government." With their shared instincts of "loyalty to the
throne and love of country," he could not discern "any fundamental difference of outlook between the Blackshirts and their parents the Conservatives." Moore had obviously been impressed by Mosley's youthful adherents. "The men were fine examples of a healthy and intelligent mind in a healthy and well-made body; the girls, straight-eyed, vivacious and comely, well matched their male comrades." What distinguished the Blackshirts from their elders, Moore believed, was their youthful dynamic, their desire for action.

Although the absence of any reference to the BUF's Fascist heritage in Moore's article, including his exclusive use of the term "Blackshirt" to describe the movement, may be held to betoken a certain wilful misrepresentation, there seems little reason to suppose that his basic assessment of the BUF as enthusiastic Young Conservatives in black sprang from anything other than genuine conviction. There was nothing in the article to suggest an intellectual conversion to the ideals of Fascism. Moreover, the main thrust of Moore's argument was the advantage which would accrue to the Conservative Party, if the energies of this "virile offshoot" could be harnessed in their interests. Close co-operation between the two parties, Moore argued, would see Britain "safeguarded from danger within and made more secure from danger without." Given his concentration on the need to combat the Bolshevik menace, there can be little doubt as to the nature of the danger to which he referred. Significantly, Moore stressed that co-operation between the two parties would give the National Government "a new lease of life." In April 1934 the need to bolster Conservative support was a matter of prime concern to all Conservative politicians loyal to the National Government. With a string of poor electoral performances in recent months, including the dramatic overturning of a substantial Conservative majority at the East Fulham by-election in October 1933, the National Government's capacity to win the next general election was very much in doubt. In the aftermath of Olympia Moore issued a guarded defence of Blackshirt stewarding, justifying the eviction of troublemakers, while admitting that excessive force had been used in some instances. Thereafter he refrained from any further public support of Mosley's movement.

The post-Olympia debate also provoked a certain sympathy for the BUF from F.A. Macquisten, the Conservative MP for Argyllshire and an inveterate anti-communist. Olympia, he argued, had been given "a preposterous amount of importance," for what in effect had been "a kind of juvenile scuffle." Moreover,
Macquisten placed the responsibility for the violence squarely on the shoulders of those who had endeavoured to disrupt the meeting, and he acclaimed Mosley's services to the cause of free speech, which for too long had been threatened by Communist wrecking tactics. Macquisten's exoneration of the BUF for the violence at Olympia did not extend to a defence of Fascism per se. The Fascist movement itself, Macquisten believed, was "misguided ... in many ways" and "led by a man who suffers from megalomania." He did, however, appreciate the Fascist desire for action. For the Conservative Party the real problem posed by Mosley was the fact that "he is declaring that he is going to do all the things they said they would but have not done yet." 37

Although the BUF was slow to establish itself in Scotland, with campaigning only officially commencing in October 1933, a full year after the BUF's London launch, up until mid-1934 it steadily, if unspectacularly, expanded its organisational base. While Scotland on the whole proved decidedly unresponsive to the Fascist message, in the South-West recruitment was brisk, and for a brief period the BUF seemed set to emerge as a serious political force in the region. 38 The extent to which the BUF's Scottish strength was concentrated in this area is reflected in the fact that up until early 1935 the party's Scottish Area HQ was housed in Dalbeattie, home town of James Little, the BUF's first head of organisation in Scotland. 39 This honour reputedly earned the small Kirkcudbright township the soubriquet, "cradle of Fascism in Scotland." 40 Elsewhere the BUF's political impact was slight. Only in Edinburgh, where at one point four branches were reported to have formed, 41 and in Motherwell did the movement show any real signs of vitality.

Like its parent body, the BUF in Scotland went into sharp decline after the summer of 1934. In Glasgow it was literally driven off the streets by its opponents. After a series of physical assaults on its members, the Glasgow branch announced the commencement of an indoor propaganda campaign in November 1934. 42 This in effect marked the end of BUF activity in the city. In its stronghold in the South-West the BUF's demise was only marginally more protracted. In May 1935 Blackshirt announced the relocation of the Scottish Area HQ to Edinburgh, a move which coincided with Little's relinquishment of command. Little's principal deputy in the South-West, the Dumfries Branch Officer, John H. Hone, had already decamped, joining the staff of the London headquarters in November 1934. 43 Blackshirt reported no further activity in the South-West for nine months. Apart
from some flickerings of life in Dundee, by the summer of 1935 BUF activity had effectively been reduced to the Edinburgh area, where the only survivor of the original four branches, Edinburgh West, and the newly formed Leith branch soldiered on until torpor overtook them in the autumn. By the end of the year, what fragments of the BUF's organisation in Scotland survived were all in a state of suspended animation.44

Scotland receives but passing reference in the standard studies of the BUF. Given the movement's singular lack of success north of the Border, this is perhaps to be expected. Nevertheless, the very fact that Scotland proved such unfertile soil merits some examination. Robert Benewick includes Scotland in his hypothesis that the BUF failed to make headway in the Distressed Areas, because of the strength of the organised Left in such solidly working class areas. The relative numerical weakness of the middle classes, he argues, further militated against a party publicly identified as a middle-class movement.45 The contrasting fortunes of the BUF in Glasgow and in more middle-class Edinburgh certainly lend credence to the general thrust of Benewick's proposition. However, the Tyneside/Clydeside equation which he appears to envisage does less than justice to Scotland's greater socio-economic diversity. Moreover, although persuasive up to a point, even in West Central Scotland a purely class based analysis cannot fully account for the BUF's failure.46 Two distinctive features of Scottish politics certainly contributed in no small measure to the BUF's lack of success, namely Scottish nationalism and the sectarian divide.

With its popular support peaking over the period 1933-34, the NPS was to a large extent already in occupation of the political ground the BUF sought to capture. As a new party with a "radical" solution to Scotland's economic ills, it too appealed to those disenchanted by the failures of the "old gang." As a nationalist movement it exercised a similar attraction for those dismayed by sectional politics or motivated by a simple patriotism. Yet at the same time, the NPS's commitment to due democratic process, and the preponderance of reason rather than sentiment in the presentation of its case, anchored the party firmly within the frame of "respectable" politics, endowing it with a breadth of appeal the BUF could never achieve.

From Blackshirt's reports it is evident that the refutation of Nationalist policy played a major part in BUF propaganda in Scotland, a phenomenon reflected in Colin Cross's assertion that the BUF's activities there "tended to degenerate into
squabbles with Scottish Nationalists. However, this was not a political sidetrack, as Cross suggests, but rather, it would appear, a deliberate strategy, aimed at poaching Nationalist support. Far from condemning Scottish nationalists for their narrow parochialism, as might have been expected from such a staunchly British nationalist movement, the BUF stressed the legitimacy of nationalist complaints concerning Scotland's loss of control over her own economy and the drift of industry to the South. The solution to Scotland's problems, however, was not the transfer of "a portion of the talking shop from Westminster to Edinburgh" but the creation of the corporate state, wherein "all the legitimate aspirations of Scots Nationalism would be satisfied in a system which permitted the affairs of Scottish commerce to be discussed and arranged by Scotsmen." In a Fascist Scotland, "We would ... have a form of Scottish self-government in industry." Simultaneously, however, the BUF also sought to exploit unionist fears engendered by the advance of nationalism. Stressing its own commitment to the indivisibility of the Union, it argued that it was "the disintegrating influences of a corrupt and effete democracy which are at present driving the two countries apart." Only the harmonising influences of Fascism could "restore the loyalty of Scotland to the Union."

However opportunist the attitude of the London leadership in the formulation of its Scottish policy, the BUF's embrace of Scottish grievances undoubtedly imprinted a distinct "devolutionist" stamp on its own organisation in Scotland during 1933-35. Local activists, such as C. Bryham Oliver, the Edinburgh Political Officer, expounded the case for corporatist devolution with an enthusiasm that was clearly genuine. This, however, was the policy's only noticeable "achievement." Despite, or perhaps precisely because of, the BUF's patronising declarations of empathy with nationalist aspirations, the NPS took considerable pains to distance itself from Fascism. One of the first acts of the newly constituted SNP was a policy statement declaring "The Scottish National Party is opposed to Fascism and dictatorship in any shape or form, being fully persuaded that it is repugnant to the ancient Scottish ideal of liberty." There is no evidence to suggest a leakage of NPS membership to the BUF. In its ambition to replace the NPS as Scotland's principal radical alternative party, the BUF failed dismally.

The first of the problems which sectarianism presented to the BUF in Scotland was the troublesome legacy of the Scottish Fascist Democratic Party. Formed in

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Glasgow in late 1932 or early 1933, the SFDP was very much the creature of its idiosyncratic founder, William Weir Gilmour, a former mining surveyor from Bellshill, near Motherwell. As a teenager Gilmour had been drawn to the ILP, subsequently serving as the Propaganda Secretary of the Glasgow branch. In 1929, however, he severed his connection with the party, disgusted by what he viewed as the second Labour government's betrayal of working class interests. Like others on the radical Left, he had been impressed by Mosley's Birmingham proposals, and when approached by his old friend and former ILP colleague, Robert Forgan, he agreed to stand for the New Party in Coatbridge at the 1931 general election. After that débâcle Gilmour had struck out on his own, his personal political odyssey leading, like Mosley's, to a new ideological synthesis embracing corporatism and the launch of a "fascist" party. There, however, the resemblance ends, for the amalgam of ideas represented by the SFDP was very different from the ideology of the BUF.52

Gilmour had come to corporatism via the syndicalist ideas of Daniel De Leon, founder of the American Labour Party, and he interpreted the term "fascist" as denoting first and foremost a commitment to industrial government. "Democratic" was included in his party's title to emphasise his lack of sympathy with the authoritarian aspects of Mussolini's régime.53 The "Scottish" component in the title reflected Gilmour's enthusiasm for some form of devolved government for Scotland, which he favoured, not out of nationalist sentiment, but on the grounds that it would provide greater administrative efficiency. Gilmour's preferred title, however, gives no indication of the SFDP's true identity. A major part of Mussolini's attraction for Gilmour was his earlier vehement anti-clericalism. For Gilmour unmasking and combatting the political influence of the Catholic Church was of paramount importance, and the principal stated objectives of the SFDP were the expulsion of religious orders from Scotland, the termination of further Irish immigration and the repeal of Section 18 of the Scottish Education Act of 1918.54 Catholics were specifically excluded, and the predominantly working class membership consisted primarily of people previously attracted to Ratcliffe's SPL55 and the Orange Order.56

The SFDP was not a large organisation. Gilmour estimates that he had about five hundred members. Nor did it survive long. After only three issues the party's broadsheet, *The Commonwealth*, ran into financial difficulties and publication
ceased.⁵⁷ In late 1933 Gilmour wound up the party and departed for London to join Robert Forgan's personal staff. Although he worked at BUF headquarters for the following year, and at one point was acting editor of Blackshirt,⁵⁸ Gilmour claims he never actually joined the BUF. When Forgan resigned in October 1934 Gilmour departed with him. The SFDP was never actually in direct competition with the BUF, as its demise coincided somewhat fortuitously with the latter's commencement of operations in Scotland. Nevertheless, the legacy of the SFDP proved distinctly problematic for its successor. Although the BUF had publicly disclaimed the SFDP because of its anti-Catholicism,⁵⁹ its brief existence appears to have established a popular connection between Fascism and anti-Catholicism which subsequently adhered to the BUF, much to the latter's discomfort. Gilmour claims that his activities proved fatal to the BUF's chances in Scotland, because Catholics "assumed it was anti-Catholic and wouldn't touch it,"⁶⁰ whereas in England the Catholic community was a fertile source of recruitment.⁶¹ Certainly there is no immediately obvious evidence of a Catholic presence within the BUF in Scotland between 1933 and 1935. Indeed, what evidence exists suggests that at a local level the BUF's anti-Catholic reputation may not have been altogether undeserved. Not only were the BUF's strongholds in Edinburgh⁶² and the South-West in predominantly Protestant areas, but in Greenock and Motherwell the party was on sufficiently friendly terms with the Orange Order to use its premises for meetings.⁶³ The Motherwell branch in fact appears to have been Gilmour's organisation relabelled. Although Blackshirt recorded the existence of a two hundred strong branch in Motherwell in March 1933, the wording of the official condemnation of the SFDP three months later contains the implication that at that stage the BUF had yet to organise north of the Border, and the official advent of the movement to Scotland was subsequently stated to be October 1933. Yet in August 1934 Blackshirt gives the inception date of the Motherwell branch as the remarkably early November 1932.⁶⁴ These chronological anomalies suggest that the Motherwell branch started life as part, if not the major part, of Gilmour's SFDP, Motherwell being very much Gilmour's home territory. Initially assumed to be a standard BUF branch, it was then denounced when its deviant tendencies came to light, and finally swallowed wholesale a few months later. The coincidence of Gilmour's "invitation" to London and the fact that shortly before oblivion overtook it, the SFDP renounced its anti-Catholic statutes, also point to a BUF takeover.⁶⁵
In line with the leadership's change of direction, BUF propaganda in Scotland after October 1934 contained distinct anti-semitic references. However, it does not appear to have been much of an aid to recruitment, and Scotland certainly never witnessed the systematic Jew-baiting of the East End of London. Only in Glasgow was there a Jewish presence large enough to sustain a racio-religious populist campaign. There the BUF was never in any position to attempt such tactics, and within the majority Protestant community, those inclined to a belief in the cultural and economic threat posed by an alien people had already identified their enemy, namely the Scots-Irish.

Opportunist exploitation of anti-Catholic and anti-Irish sentiment could have provided the BUF in Scotland with a populist campaign with real potential. Mosley, however, would never have countenanced such a course, if only because of the damage to the movement's interests elsewhere. Official propaganda was therefore at considerable pains to stress the party's "strict impartiality" on sectarian questions. While the BUF's cross-fertilisation with militant Protestantism resulted initially in a small membership gain, this hardly compensated for the effective forfeiture of any Catholic support. Unable to develop it positively, its Scottish organisation's anti-Catholic image could never be other than an acute embarrassment for the BUF leadership. When Willie Gallacher, the future Communist MP for West Fife, asserted that "in Scotland the fascists are not anti-Jewish but anti-Irish," it was arguably an honest assessment of his opponents. However, Gallacher would have been well aware that this was an image the BUF itself was desperately keen to lose.

Assailed initially for its alleged anti-Catholicism, in late 1934 the BUF found itself accused of bias of precisely the opposite nature. Speaking at the annual conference of the Scottish Reformation Society in September, the Rev. F.E. Watson denounced it as part of a greater Catholic conspiracy to gain "mastery of the British people." He had been provided with evidence, he claimed, that "eighty per cent of all the key men in Mosley's Fascist movement are Roman Catholics and stout Irish Catholics." The following month Blackshirt reported similar accusations from a "Red" heckler at a meeting in Edinburgh. The ultimate source of these allegations would appear to have been none other than Weir Gilmour. Gilmour's experiences at the BUF's London HQ had by late 1934 firmly convinced him of Catholicism's controlling interest in the movement, and after his departure
from the BUF with Robert Forgan in October, he embarked on a one man crusade to reveal the hidden Catholic hand in all manifestations of fascism, domestic and continental.

It is impossible to assess how much damage these allegations inflicted on the BUF. The BUF itself certainly took them seriously enough to issue a public repudiation. Within the close-knit world of Protestant militantism they would no doubt have obtained rapid circulation and would undeniably have held a certain attraction for those inclined to Catholic conspiracy theories. Certainly by late 1936 Fascism was widely believed to be a Catholic tool in such circles, but by then "confirmation" of the association had been provided by the Spanish Civil War. At this stage all that can be said with certainty is that the accusations can hardly have assisted the BUF's recruitment from the Protestant community, and were bound to have caused unease among former SFDP members in its ranks. For the BUF sectarianism was a political minefield. As Blackshirt's Edinburgh correspondent plaintively complained, "on no other subject has so much deliberate misrepresentation of the attitude of our Movement been created by the opponents of Fascism."^74

Although Italy was openly acknowledged by many as the source of their inspiration, those who expressed their enthusiasm for corporatism or Fascism in Britain during the period 1933-34 did so very much within the confines of debate on the future shape of government in Britain. Britain's relationship with Fascist Italy was not an integral component in that debate. Olympia not only despatched Mosley and his followers to the political wilderness, it also to all intents and purposes extinguished debate on the possibility of a fascist future of any kind for Britain. Although the more enthusiastic of the English Review's adherents continued to plead the case for corporatism into the late 1930s, their cause had become too closely associated in the public mind with Mosley to survive his fall from grace. After 1934 enthusiasm for Fascism would in the main be expressed, not in terms of its domestic suitability, but as part of the debate on the future direction of Britain's foreign policy.

The blossoming of intellectual interest in Fascism during 1933-34 went largely unnoticed in Scotland. Intellectual circles which might conceivably have been expected to show some flickerings of interest did not. Distributists, Douglasites
and nationalists continued to pursue their own respective interests and were not persuaded of the relevance of the corporate state. Progressive Tory radicals stayed with their own Keynesian vision of state intervention. Fascism was no more successful in street politics in Scotland, and the BUF's achievements were both modest and very temporary. Were Scots more firmly thirled to democratic politics than the English, as Hugh Sellon believed? Perhaps they were. However, other factors were also present. Mosley's protestations notwithstanding, Fascism's Italian origins were unmistakable. From a Scottish perspective the Catholic associations of the Italian model assumed considerable importance. In England an intellectual interest in Fascism flourished primarily in patrician and largely Anglo-Catholic High Tory circles. This class lacked a real counterpart in Scotland. Scotland's Protestant ascendancy, its political antennae far more sensitive to religious overtones than its class counterpart south of the Border, was predisposed to greater caution in any flirtation with the ideals of corporatism. Scotland's greater sensitivity to religious issues also blighted Fascism's appeal at the level of street politics, as the BUF found to its cost. Nationalism too provided an important counterweight to the development of Fascism, both as an intellectual credo, and as a mass party. Democracy's apparent inability to find dynamic solutions to the impact of the Slump provided the crucial motor for interest in Fascism in Britain. Fascism's principal appeal lay in its promise of action. In Scotland, however, those disenchanted with the failings of the existing system could look to the Home Rule or independence options to provide a dynamic alternative to the status quo.

2. Douglas Jerrold, b. 1893. Served with the Royal Naval Division during the First World War. Author of several novels and historical works. Director of Eyre and Spottiswoode, the publishers, since 1929.


6. Leopold Stennett Amery, b. 1873. Conservative MP for Sparkbrook since 1918. Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1924-29, and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1925-29. One of the most eloquent and influential imperialists of the period. Author of The Forward View (1935).

7. In late 1933 the English Review group came close to orchestrating Baldwin's replacement as Conservative Party leader, promoting Lord Lloyd as a suitable rallying point for right-wing discontent.


9. Given that Mosley was receiving substantial funding from Mussolini at this stage, the Italianate nature of his movement was perhaps not surprising. See Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, Oxford, 1987, pp. 136-8.


15. Sir Robert (Stevenson) Horne, b. 1871. MP for Hillhead since 1918. One of the leading Conservative figures in Lloyd George's Coalition Government of
1919-22. President of the Board of Trade, 1920-21, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1921-22.


18. Robert Boothby, b. 1900. Conservative MP for East Aberdeenshire since 1924. Parliamentary Private Secretary to Churchill during the latter's period as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1926-29. Boothby's twin mentors were Churchill and Lloyd George.


20. Sellon was thirty-one in 1932.


22. Ibid., pp. 130, 209-11; English Review, February 1934.


25. As demonstrated by Belloc and Chesterton themselves this linkage was by no means inevitable. According to Ian Bayne, the son of the founder of the Distributist club, John Bayne, membership was first and foremost an expression of Catholic identity in a university environment "which they suspected of being at best apathetic, and at worst hostile, both towards their religious faith and their national origins." The depth of their commitment to the ideals of Distributism, Bayne believes, can be questioned. Tom Gallagher, however, argues that the ideals of Distributism were themselves intrinsically attractive to Catholic students of the period. Ian O. Bayne, Scottish Catholic Observer, 9th May 1980; Gallagher, Uneasy Peace, p. 151.


27. See, for instance, C.M. Grieve, "Plea for a Scottish Fascism," The Scottish Nation, 5th June 1923, and "Programme for a Scottish Fascism," The Scottish Nation, 19th June 1923.

28. (James) Lewis (Thomas Chalmers) Spence, b. 1874. Sub-editor of The Scotsman, 1899-1904, editor of the Edinburgh Magazine, 1904-05 and the Atlantis Quarterly, 1932. Author of numerous books on mythological and occult topics, particularly Atlantis. One of the founding fathers of the NPS and its first Vice Chairman. Spence was violently anti-English. In 1927 he was reported to have declared, "We do not yet advocate taking up the rifle, because that is a course I feel that would hardly appeal to the majority of our fellow countrymen — although it is the method I would prefer. I will not
deny that for a moment. I believe the only way to beat an Englishman is to beat him physically. You cannot drive it into the thick head of a southerner by any other means." Scottish National Convention report, 29th May 1927, p. 13, Muirhead MSS, Acc 3721, Box 81, National Library of Scotland. Quoted by Finlay, op. cit., p. 75. For a personal evaluation of Spence, see Charles Richard Cammell, Heart of Scotland, London, 1956, pp. 27-38.


30. See Finlay, op. cit., p. 33, p. 86.

31. In his memoirs Compton Mackenzie records his attendance at a dinner at Claridge's in 1933 or 1934, where pro-Fascist speeches were delivered by Mosley and an Italian historian. Very possibly this was one of the English Review's functions. Unexpectedly asked to speak, Mackenzie "warned the British Union of Fascists to stay out of Scotland." Mackenzie also expressed hostility to the BUF in a public address in Alexandria in the spring of 1934. Compton Mackenzie, My Life and Times: Octave Seven 1931-1938, London, 1968, pp. 168-9; Glasgow Herald, 20th April 1934.

32. In September 1933 Francis Yeats-Brown, Italophile and member of the English Review circle, took over editorial direction of the influential magazine, Everyman. For a brief two month period the magazine was enthusiastically devoted to the promotion of corporatism. The last issue to appear during Yeats-Brown's tenure contains an article from Linklater entitled, "Scottish Nationalism." However, it does not contain any references to corporatism, and given his subsequent declarations on the subject of fascism, Linklater's decision to submit an article to Everyman at this time is puzzling. In The Lion and the Unicorn, published in 1935, Linklater declared, "I hate Fascism, Communism and all other political or economic systems that cripple and reduce the stature of individual men for the mythical benefit of an imaginary totality ... The individual is all-important, and the function of the State is to safeguard his security, to provide humus for his growth, and to penalize abuse of the liberty it has established." Linklater, The Lion and the Unicorn, London, 1935, pp. 19-20, p. 148.

33. Twenty-Five Years Ago 1908-1933. The Record of the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union, Mount Temple Papers (MT), BR 81.


36. Frederick Alexander Macquisten, b. 1870. MP for Argyllshire since 1924. A former solicitor, previously MP for Springburn, 1918-22.


38. In June Blackshirt reported the existence of full branches in Dumfries, Dalbeattie and Gatehouse of Fleet, and numerous sub-branches in the surrounding countryside. The Dumfries branch alone was said to have "a

39. Little was the town clerk of Dalbeattie and a local bank manager.

40. *Blackshirt*, 1st June 1934. The phrase was attributed to the Scottish press.

41. *Blackshirt*, 22nd June 1934. These included one of the BUF's first all-female branches.

42. *Blackshirt*, 20th July, 24th and 31st August, 21st September and 2nd November 1934. A victim of street violence himself, the Glasgow branch Political Officer (officer in charge of propaganda), Angus Baxter, retreated to the safer climes of Bristol. *Blackshirt*, 8th February 1935.

43. An ex-officer and former civil servant in South Africa, Hone rapidly rose through the ranks after his move to London. In 1940 Mosley listed him as one of the eight top personnel he trusted to act independently in the event of his own internment. *Blackshirt*, 10th January 1936; Benewick, op. cit., pp. 116-7; Thurlow, op. cit., p. 212.

44. In the March 1936 issue *Blackshirt's* branch reports compiler plaintively appealed, "Scotland! Where are your reports? No news is good news, but good news is better. Ye ken?"

45. Benewick, op. cit., p. 112.

46. Thurlow's contention that during the period 1933-34 the BUF's appeal to the politically alienated cut across class divisions further weakens Benewick's thesis. Thurlow, op. cit., p. 125.

47. Cross. op. cit., p. 108.


49. *Blackshirt*, 8th June 1934. Not all self-professed Scottish fascists shared the BUF's ostensible sympathy with nationalist aspirations. To Sir Henry Fairfax-Lucy, a Roxburghshire landowner and habitué of the January Club, there was something of an "irony" in the fact that Scotland should be obsessed with discussion of an extension of the parliamentary system, at a time when a growing number of people, himself included, believed that "Parliamentary Government ... is responsible for a greater part of its ills." Personally he saw behind the Nationalist movement "the insidious hand ... unfriendly to Great Britain, that sees a chance of damaging it at its heart." *Saturday Review*, 8th April 1933. Fairfax-Lucy, however, was not really a fascist or a corporatist, although he was perfectly happy to embrace either description. Rather, he was an old-fashioned anti-democrat longing for the return of pre-universal suffrage days, whose ideas owed more to the first Duke of Wellington than to Mussolini.

50. See *Blackshirt*, 17th August 1934.
51. Minutes of the National Council of the SNP, 1st June 1934. Quoted by Finlay, op. cit., p. 90.

52. Information on the SFDP and its founder in this and subsequent sections is largely derived from interviews with William Weir Gilmour conducted by Robin Macwhirter, Autumn 1989, and Tom Gallagher, 19th December 1986.

53. Gilmour did use the fasces as his party logo. It is also worth noting that although today Gilmour refers to his creation as the Scottish Democratic Fascist Party, contemporary headed notepaper gives the title as the Scottish Fascist Democratic Party, a not altogether unimportant change of emphasis. Gilmour to Andrew Dewar Gibb, 10th June 1933, GIB 217/2/1.

54. Gallagher, Uneasy Peace, p. 154. Section 18 had provided local authority funding for Catholic schools.

55. Ratcliffe himself was for a time a member of the SFDP, and at least one meeting of the party was held in his Glasgow church. Gallagher, Uneasy Peace, pp. 154, 156 and Gallagher, Edinburgh Divided, p. 133.

56. With his charismatic leadership, authoritarian tendencies, identification of a scapegoat minority, and emphasis on street action, Cormack's Protestant Action invites comparison with fascism. One of Cormack's slogans was "Better a Competent Dictatorship than an Incompetent Democracy." The resemblance, however, is superficial, for the movement bore no traces of fascist ideology. Indeed, apart from the elimination of Catholic influence, Cormack had little to offer in the way of a constructive political programme. Gallagher, Uneasy Peace, p. 164.

57. Prior to publication Gilmour estimated the forthcoming circulation of issue no. 3 of The Commonwealth to be in the region of 25-30,000. However, a substantial degree of exaggeration may have been involved. Gilmour to A.D. Gibb, 10th June 1933, GIB 217/2/1.

58. An article under Gilmour's name appears in Blackshirt, 13th July 1934. To his colleagues in BUF headquarters he was known as "the Scottish encyclopaedia."

59. Blackshirt, 16th June 1933. The SFDP was also castigated for going "too far in their ideas of Scottish self-government."

60. Interview with Tom Gallagher.


62. BUF canvassing in Edinburgh during 1934-35 was mainly conducted in
Gorgie and Dalry, a strongly Protestant area and home to Heart of Midlothian F.C.

63. Blackshirt, 21st September 1934, 10th May 1935.

64. Blackshirt, March and 16th June 1933, 1st June and 6th July 1934.


66. Speech in Glasgow by H. McAdam Tiffin, speech in Edinburgh by C. Bryham Oliver, Blackshirt, 2nd November and 21st December 1934.

67. According to Dr. Salis Daiches, Rabbi to the Edinburgh Hebrew Congregation, the total Jewish population of Scotland in 1939 was only 18,000. Given that refugees arriving from Europe in the late 1930s would have contributed to this figure, the Jewish population in 1933-35 would have been substantially lower. Scotsman, 17th February 1939.

68. Blackshirt, 17th May 1935.


70. Bulwark, December 1934.

71. Blackshirt, 12th October, 1934.

72. According to Gilmour, Forgan's departure was prompted by the fact that he had reached similar conclusions as to the BUF's true nature as Gilmour. Forgan was the son of a Church of Scotland minister. BUF historians, however, have ascribed his resignation to his disagreements with Mosley over anti-semitism and violence, plus his organisational failings. Benewick, op. cit., p. 113; Thurlow, op. cit., p. 133.

73. Official repudiation of Watson's charges and the counter-assertion that only 12% of "key" BUF personnel were Catholic were initially delivered by H.M. Upton and subsequently reported by Blackshirt. It was perhaps no accident that Upton, with his Irish Ascendancy antecedents, should have been addressing the Motherwell branch at the time. Arguably his speech was designed for internal rather than public consumption. Not only would he have been reassuring his own members, but his coupled references to the recent public disturbances fomented by Protestant Action, would also have reminded them of their own "neutrality." Blackshirt, 17th May 1935.

74. Ibid.
Chapter 3

Pro-German Attitudes 1935

Britain's relations with Germany during the period 1933-35 were dominated by the question of German rearmament. In the aftermath of the First World War Britain had dismantled her war-machine with a thoroughness unmatched by any of the other victors, with the sole exception of the United States. In the relative tranquillity of the 1920s defence spending had been minimal and bore little relation to the extent of Britain's imperial commitments. By the beginning of the 1920s the Empire was, in effect, "a mass of plunder," with a "shoe-string" defensive capability maintained on the assumed willingness of other Powers to abide by the status quo established by the "sword settlement" of 1918.¹ Even before the rise of Hitler, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria had destroyed this assumption underpinning Britain's defence policy. Germany's simultaneous withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in October 1932, and her subsequent "clandestine" rearmament in contravention of Versailles, raised the possibility of a military challenge to the status quo in Europe as well in the not too distant future. In response to the potential German threat the British government embarked on its own modest rearmament programme.

Considerable public debate attended Britain's tentative rearmament. However, attitudes to Germany per se were not an essential component of that debate. Criticism of rearmament emanated from pacifists or others, usually of Liberal or Labour affiliation, who accused the government of lack of faith in collective security, or encouragement of a European arms race. They were not in most cases motivated by any particular pro-German sentiment. By the same token, the more vigorous exponents of rearmament, most of whom were on the Right of the Conservative Party, were impelled by a belief in the intrinsic necessity for rearmament, and were not acting merely in response to developments in Germany, although these undoubtedly lent urgency to their demands. Concerned with Britain's ability to defend the Empire against any challenger, they regarded military readiness as an essential precondition for an effective foreign policy, and in most cases believed collective security to be a mirage. Although there were some notable exceptions, such as Churchill, most advocates of rearmament portrayed German rearmament as a strong indicator of the potentially hostile nature of world politics, rather than as a specific or immediate threat to British interests. Enthusiasm for
rearmament did not presuppose an anti-German attitude, or a determined opposition to treaty revision in Germany's favour. Many of the more ardent champions of rearmament during the period 1933-35 would subsequently advocate concessions to Germany in the same spirit of "realism."

With Hitler's unilateral abrogation of the Disarmament Clauses of Versailles in March 1935, an action which effectively terminated British hopes of a negotiated settlement to armament levels, foreign policy matters began to assume a greater prominence in public debate. Although the reality of German rearmament had long been recognised, by his use of démarché diplomacy Hitler effectively raised the spectre of future unilateral violations of Germany's obligations under Versailles. The other major powers reacted speedily, if in the long run ineffectually, to this potential challenge to the status quo. April saw Britain, France and Italy participate in a display of mutual solidarity at Stresa which was calculated to deter any future treaty violation on Germany's part. In May France and Russia signed a mutual assistance pact. Although in the case of the Franco-Soviet Pact it would not become evident until very much later, none of these declarations of solidarity proved to have much substance. By June the Stresa Front had effectively been holed below the waterline by the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, as the British government, in its anxiety to pin the Germans to some measure of armaments limitation, took the bait offered in Hitler's "Peace" speech on the 21st May and hastened to make agreement without reference to its Stresa partners. With the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October all semblance of solidarity evaporated.

Despite the intensive diplomatic activity which Hitler's March declarations set in motion, public attention remained concentrated firmly on domestic and imperial affairs. Until the outbreak of the Abyssinian war in October pushed foreign policy to the forefront of public discussion, unemployment was the dominant issue in British politics. The passage of the India Bill through parliament also provided an important focus of attention. Although the threat to the National Government from its right-wing rebels receded as the year wore on, the Wavertree by-election in February had given notice of the their potential to inflict damage. The possibility of a "centrist" realignment behind Lloyd George was a further source of concern to the National Government. Although attitudes to Germany attracted greater attention in political debate after March, they were not of primary importance. Parliamentary debates in the spring and summer of 1935 witnessed a certain amount of isolationist concern that in the event of some future infraction of Versailles, Britain might be
drawn into coercion of Germany by the League of Nations, but attitudes to Germany per se were essentially tangential to the expression of such fears. Some isolationists did express sympathy for Germany. Others voiced deep suspicion, and a few, positive hostility. Public opinion in general was slow to recognise the dawning of a new diplomatic era. There was a quickening of interest in Germany in the summer of 1935. There was also, as we shall see, a remarkable blossoming of enthusiasm for Anglo-German friendship in ex-service circles. In the main, however, attitudes to Germany remained a peripheral political concern. With the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 Germany all but vanished from the public stage. When it dramatically reemerged in March 1936, Mussolini’s adventure had ensured the primacy of foreign policy in political debate. Attitudes to Germany could no longer remain a peripheral issue.

Between 1933 and 1935 active advocacy of Treaty revision in Germany’s favour was very much the prerogative of a limited number of individuals. In the majority of cases a high-minded concern for European peace and "justice" for Germany provided the motivation. For many the espousal of Germany's claims during this period merely represented a continuation of a policy which they had advocated during the Weimar period. Most were far from enamoured of the Nazi régime per se, but believed that Germany's change of régime, however distasteful, did not negate the justice of her claims. Although their numbers were small, their views reflected the concerns of a broad swathe of "centrist" political opinion in Britain, which, to a greater or lesser extent, felt guilt at the punitive nature of Germany's post-war treatment. The touchstone of "centrist" attitudes to foreign policy was commitment to an ethical approach. This was reflected in a deep-seated desire for the preservation of peace, support for the League of Nations, and its concomitant, denunciation of the narrow pursuit of national self-interest as politically incorrect. It also manifested as concern at the "injustice" which Germany had suffered at Versailles. From its inception Versailles had been assailed by vocal advocates of a peace of reconciliation as hate-inspired, immoral, and likely to lead to a war of revenge. Both the Labour Party and many Liberals had been strongly critical of a peace settlement, which, in their eyes, wrongly punished the German people and their infant democracy for the sins of the Kaiser's régime. During the 1920s support for a more conciliatory approach to Germany had spread widely through British society, fuelled by French intransigence, particularly as manifested during the Ruhr episode, and the growing influence of a liberal historiography which ascribed the outbreak of the First World War, not to German wickedness, but to
Great Power rivalry and the armaments race. The assumption of German war guilt had been enshrined in Versailles. It alone provided moral justification for reparations, confiscation of colonies, and territorial revisions in Europe which flagrantly ran counter to the principle of national self-determination and left millions of Germans within the boundaries of the Successor States. By the early 1930s, "Few educated people now believed that the war had been caused by a deliberate German aggression." Continued belief in German war-guilt was largely banished to the ranks of the Conservative Right, educated or otherwise. The advent of Nazism markedly dampened enthusiasm for open advocacy of revision in Germany's favour, particularly in Labour ranks. Nevertheless, a broad-based belief in the injustice of Versailles remained deeply ingrained in British society. Its existence provided a moral foundation crucial to the evolution of popular support for a governmental policy of "appeasement."

While the majority of advocates of treaty revision in 1933-35 might be regarded as essentially "ethical appeasers," several of their more prominent members strayed beyond the bounds of advocacy of treaty revision. A desire for peace and "justice" for Germany "could lead to a belief in Hitler's good intentions and in the possibility of a moderation of the German internal régime if Germany was properly informed of our views of it and if at the same time her just requirements were met." The Liberal peer, Lord Lothian, who had urged that Germany be allowed to rearm by negotiation since 1925, typified the tendency in such circles to evolve from ethical appeaser to apologist for the German régime. Lothian was no pro-Nazi enthusiast, and had a deep-seated aversion to the brutality and illiberality of Nazism. "Like most Liberals," he averred in 1933, "I loathe the Nazi regime." However, to Lothian Nazism was essentially a psychological product of Germany's past ill-treatment. Not only was Britain partly responsible for the creation of this Frankenstein's monster, Lothian argued, but criticism of the Nazi régime would be counter-productive, and any shift towards liberalisation would only be possible after Germany's just claims were met. Moreover, after a visit to Germany in early 1935 Lothian returned strongly impressed by Hitler's personal qualities and utterly convinced by his declarations of commitment to peace. That Hitler was "perfectly sincere," Lothian had "not the slightest doubt." Thereafter, Lothian regularly and uncritically endorsed Hitler's declarations of pacific intent.

In Scotland public opinion appears to have been even slower to respond to the
quickening tempo of European diplomacy. The stimulating effect of proximity to German airfields was a factor absent in the Scottish debate. There is little evidence of a significant intensification of interest in foreign policy in the aftermath of Hitler's March 1935 démarche, and in the three by-elections in Scotland in April and May 1935 foreign policy issues were entirely eclipsed by domestic concerns. The only candidate who elected to make attitudes to Germany a central plank in his campaign was Sir George Paish, the Liberal contesting Edinburgh West, and he was an English carpet-bagger in the time-honoured Liberal tradition. Even then, although Paish's plea for a more conciliatory approach towards Germany reflected liberal guilt at Germany's past ill-treatment, the main thrust of his argument was that German restiveness was due to economic distress, and as such, was primarily employed to buttress his demands for a return to Free Trade.  

Nevertheless, some individuals were active in advocating treaty revision in Germany's favour. Most did so in the language of ethical appeasement. However, many of the more prominent protagonists, to a greater or lesser extent, also shared Lothian's belief in Allied responsibility for the rise of Nazism and/or the veracity of Hitler's protestations of peaceful intent. Several leading Scottish Liberals endorsed these themes in their criticism of Versailles. Andrew Law, a member of the executive committee of the Scottish Liberal Federation, was a survivor of the Liberal radicalism of the nineteenth century, having personally witnessed Gladstone's Midlothian campaign of 1879. At the core of his views on Germany was a deep-seated concern for the preservation of European peace. "All history," he argued, "shows that a peace which is not a peace of reconciliation is never more than a temporary truce." Long-term peace would only be possible when the nations of Europe, "make an end, in its entirety, of the Versailles Treaty and the hateful spirit which animated it." However, like Lothian, he also believed that the punitive treatment of Germany in the post-war years had been directly responsible for the destruction of German democracy and the rise of Nazism. The Germans had turned their backs on their militaristic past at the end of the First World War, but the harshness of Versailles and the failure to alleviate its terms had meant that, "despairing of redress, the German people have once more returned to the worship of the false gods whom they had dethroned."  

Another leading Scottish Liberal to follow in Lothian's footsteps was Sir Daniel Stevenson. An ardent champion of disarmament, Stevenson's contributions to public debate in 1935 entirely excused Germany for responsibility for the escalation
in armaments. It was, he argued, a purely reactive response. Blame for the present situation could be laid firmly at the door of the former Allies for their failure to follow out their pledges at Versailles to limit armament levels. Stevenson, like Lothian, was no pro-Nazi enthusiast, but there was a striking contrast between his vilification of the war-mongering attitude he discerned behind the British government's modest rearmament programme and the "frank and friendly spirit" he perceived in Hitler's "Peace" speech of May 21st.11

The son of a Glasgow engineer, Daniel Macaulay Stevenson had devoted his early years to building up a Glasgow-based coal exporting empire. Now in his 84th year, Stevenson had been chairman of the Scottish Coal Exporters' Association for 18 years and had participated in numerous advisory committees to government on aspects of the coal trade. As a member of the City Council from 1892 to 1914 he had become one of Glasgow's best-known civic fathers, his career in local government culminating in his tenure as Lord Provost between 1911 and 1914, and the award of a baronetcy in recognition of his services. An extremely wealthy man, unmarried and with no heirs, he was noted for his philanthropic interest in education and working-class housing. Thanks to his generosity Glasgow University had gained Chairs in Citizenship, Spanish and Italian.12 Since 1934 he had been Chancellor of the University. Although his late attempt to move from municipal to parliamentary politics had foundered in the general election of 1922,13 he remained a senior and influential figure in Scottish Liberalism, assiduously courted, although not always with success, by the fundraisers of a party noted for its penury.14

Stevenson's sympathy for Germany was of a long-standing nature. Prior to the First World War much of his company's export trade had been with that country.15 After the war he was "strongly in favour of resuming friendly relations," and not merely out of purely commercial considerations.16 Stevenson was largely interested in encouraging cultural links between Scotland and Germany. At the end of 1932 he established the Stevenson Foundation and endowed it with the sum of £17,000. One of the purposes of this body was to finance student exchanges between Scottish and German Universities. In 1926 the Anglo-German Academic Board had been established in London, funded largely by the Rhodes Trust,17 to co-operate with its German counterpart, the Anglo-German Academic Bureau, in
organising a university exchange scheme between Britain and Germany. After 1932 the Stevenson Foundation took over the funding of all Scottish applicants. Stevenson's attitudes were by no means narrowly Germanophile. His desire to broaden Scotland's cultural connections encompassed other nations, and the Stevenson Foundation also financed student exchange schemes with the universities of France and Spain. Like Lothian, he represented that body of high-minded Liberal opinion which had early on recoiled from the punitive nature of Versailles, and had throughout the 1920s and early 1930s advocated a generous and magnanimous approach to Germany.

Enthusiasm for Hitler's "Peace" speech was also displayed by another leading Scottish Liberal — albeit from the other side of the Liberal divide — Lord Hutchison of Montrose. Hitler and the German people, he declared, "honestly mean what they say," and he urged that "the first opportunity ought to be taken to come to an agreement." A former professional soldier, Hutchison was a Germanophile of longstanding. In the late Weimar period he had been a member of the Anglo-German Association, a body formed in 1929 for the purposes of promoting friendship between Britain and Germany. Not only had the advent of the Nazi régime failed to undermine his desire for close co-operation between the two nations, but he was clearly prepared to invest the Nazis with the commendable virtues which he had come to discern in the German people as a whole. He had absolute confidence in Hitler's protestation that Germany would fully honour any international pledges it entered into in the future. "I have had experience of negotiations with German people for years and I have never yet found that those who negotiated with me and came voluntarily to an agreement ever went back on that agreement." The emphasis was clearly on the word "voluntarily." Hitler could not be blamed for breaking the terms of the diktat of 1919. Although nearing the end of his political career, within Liberal National ranks Hutchison was still a major league player. He had been one of the prime movers in the establishment of the Liberal Nationals as a separate party, and his departure from the Independent Liberals had been eclipsed in significance only by that of Sir John Simon and Ernest Brown. In 1935 he was appointed Paymaster General.

While Liberals figured prominently in moderate pro-German expression during this period, a few Conservatives were also prepared to part-excuse Nazism as a product of past Allied policy. Shortly before Hitler's March démarche Robert Boothby reminded the Commons of the recrimination Stresemann cast at the former
Allies shortly before his death. "The youth of Germany, that we might both have won for peace, we have lost. That is my tragedy and your crime." Boothby endorsed these sentiments absolutely. The destruction of German democracy, he declared, was entirely down to the failure to give Stresemann "something which he could deliver to the German people." Boothby had been a regular visitor to Germany during the Weimar period and had been a strong advocate of a policy of reconciliation. Although he now resented that it was necessary "to concede to force what for so many years we were not prepared to concede to reason," he called for a bold initiative to resolve Germany's grievances. "Let us take hold of the Treaty of Versailles and tear it up." By late 1938 Boothby had moved to a somewhat vacillatory opposition to appeasement. In his memoirs, however, he advances his opposition to appeasement to 1934, citing as evidence his support for rearmament and, to a lesser extent, certain anti-Nazi references he publicly voiced in that year. In the circumstances of 1933-35 neither advocacy of rearmament nor distaste for Nazism precluded support for conciliatory concessions to Germany. Nor did it, as in Boothby's case, preclude a preparedness to part-excuse the Nazi régime.

If most pro-German comment at this stage primarily emanated from overzealous ethical appeasers, there were some individuals espousing more vigorous forms of pro-Germanism. Between 1933 and 1935 only one MP expressed consistent support for Nazi Germany. This was Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore, the MP for Ayr Burghs. An enthusiastic champion of Germany's right to "the dignity and honour that an armed status gives," a status he also pragmatically supported on the grounds that Germany was "surrounded by a very menacing wall of steel and hostile groups of neighbours," Moore waged a one-man crusade on behalf of the "beleaguered" German minority in Memel throughout the first half of 1935, and urged "immediate acceptance" of the proposals contained in Hitler's "Peace" speech of May 21st. Moore had returned from a visit to the German Chancellor in September 1933 utterly convinced of Hitler's sincerity and deep commitment to peace. "Peace and justice," Moore declared, were the "key-words of his policy." If Moore's enchantment by Hitler's personal magnetism bore a certain resemblance to that of Lothian, his politics were altogether different. Although his military service had left him with an abhorrence of war as strong as that of any liberal idealist, a prime consideration in Moore's enthusiasm for Hitler was his belief that the only alternative for the German people had been "the anti-Christ of Communism." Moore was also clearly predisposed to a certain admiration for charismatic
authoritarians, as demonstrated by his short-lived enthusiasm for the "vibrant tones" of Oswald Mosley.\textsuperscript{28} His enthusiasm for the "virile and youthful leader" of Germany would prove to be considerably more durable.\textsuperscript{29} Moore was also a Germanophile, and although he did not stress the point unduly in his public utterances, he believed that racial affinity between the British and Germans imparted a degree of "common outlook" which Britain could not share with the "latin nations."\textsuperscript{30} Many Britons of the period would have agreed with such generalised assertions. Moore's Nordic sympathies, however, may have been considerably more developed than his public references, for he was one of the few British visitors to Germany to develop relations with Himmler. In August 1935, prior to visiting the Nuremberg Rally,\textsuperscript{31} Moore joined up with another Himmler protégé, Admiral Sir Barry Domvile,\textsuperscript{32} for private discussions with the Reichsführer. It was a connection he would renew at Nuremberg the following year.\textsuperscript{33}

In 1935 pro-German expression in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, was very much the province of a limited number of individuals. There were a few mavericks, like Moore, but, in the main, they were apologists, rather than enthusiasts, and drawn from the ranks of "centrist" opinion. Most were motivated by a desire for "justice" for Germany and were merely continuing advocacy of a policy of reconciliation and treaty revision which they had adopted during the Weimar period. Their "enthusiasm" manifested as a propensity to part-excuse Nazism as a product of Allied, not German, beastliness, or in a willingness to believe in Hitler's good intentions and desire for peace. Opponents of the National Government and rearmament, like Stevenson, found it easy to believe the best of Hitler, while simultaneously finding evil intent on the part of their own government. Although the belief was no doubt genuine, the contrast blended harmoniously with their general assault on National Government policies.

In one area Scottish responses did deviate from those in Britain as a whole. The most notable growth area of pro-German expression in Britain in 1935 was in ex-service circles. Between 1933 and 1935 German propaganda made considerable efforts to exploit the comradely sentiments which many ex-servicemen in both Britain and France felt for their war-time opponents. Many of the Nazi leaders were war veterans. They could be portrayed as straight-talking simple soldiers, who knew the horrors of war and were therefore deeply committed to peace. In Britain these appeals for fellow soldiers to work together for peace had considerable

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impact, not least because they tapped a rich vein of guilt at the previous failure to establish friendly relations between the two countries' respective ex-service organisations. In the 1920s the British Legion had embarked on an active policy of fraternisation with the ex-service organisations of Britain's war-time allies. This policy had not been extended to include ex-enemy war veterans, and by the early 1930s many British ex-servicemen believed the time for reconciliation to be long overdue. At the beginning of 1935 the National Executive Committee of the British Legion tentatively accepted an invitation from Ribbentrop to send a delegation to meet German war-veterans. This was followed by a policy statement in May, stressing the need for the development of friendly ties with the ex-enemy. In June, a month before the visit was scheduled to take place, the project was strongly endorsed by the Prince of Wales at the Legion's annual conference, and the delegates went on to pass various resolutions, expressing fraternal feelings towards the ex-enemy. In July the visit went ahead as planned. Amidst much mutual protestation of the need for close Anglo-German ties, the Nazi régime was presented with a publicity coup of considerable worth. The visit was the first of many, and inaugurated a policy of fraternisation which the British Legion would vigorously pursue until the Prague coup in the spring of 1939.

In his official history of the British Legion, Wootton stresses that opposition within the Legion to the policy of fraternisation was slight, and largely restricted to its Jewish members. In Scotland, however, the opponents of the fraternisation policy were initially successful in blocking its adoption. At the annual Scottish conference in June 1935 a motion endorsing the fraternal sentiments expressed at the English conference earlier in the month and proposing the participation of Scottish delegates in the forthcoming visit to Germany was defeated. Conference voted by 93 votes to 72 that no action be taken until assurances were given that all ex-servicemen's organisations in Germany, including Jewish ones, would be recognised by the German authorities. For the leadership of the British Legion in Scotland, which was strongly in favour of an active fraternisation policy, the vote was acutely embarrassing. A member of the National Executive stated afterwards that the motion had come as a "complete surprise," and the Scottish President, General Sir Ian Hamilton, portrayed it as an ambush by politically motivated members of the Glasgow Area. As an enthusiastic supporter of the policy of fraternisation, and a vocal advocate of Anglo-German friendship, Hamilton had good cause to minimise the importance of the vote. However, he was not wide of
the mark in claiming that the vote was unrepresentative of feeling within the general membership of the Legion in Scotland. After issuing a public statement declaring their support for the fraternisation policy, the National Executive successfully ensured its adoption by by-passing the recalcitrant branch delegates and conducting a poll of the general membership. Nevertheless, the incident at the very least indicates a degree of resistance to the fraternisation policy amongst Legion activists that had no parallel in the organisation south of the Border.

2. Randolph Churchill's candidacy as an "Independent Conservative" had split the Conservative vote and ensured a Labour victory.


5. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 155.

6. Philip Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, b. 1882. A Milnerite Imperialist. As Lloyd George's personal secretary from 1916 to 1921 Lothian had played a vital functionary's role in the drafting of Versailles. From the creation of the National Government to the Samuelite withdrawal in 1932 he held office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and then as Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the India Office. Lothian's contributions to foreign policy debates in the Lords in the 1930s were usually made in an individual capacity, but he did at times represent official Liberal policy. From 1935 to the outbreak of the Second World War his name was synonymous with moderate, "respectable," pro-Germanism. Although a Scottish peer, with substantial estates in Scotland, Lothian was not a "Scottish" politician. Usually resident in London or at Blickling in Norfolk, Lothian in any event lacked the proprietorial approach to politics displayed by other Scottish peers, such as the Earl of Mansfield or the Duchess of Atholl. Concerned above all with Imperial issues, he was by his own admission "out of touch with Scottish Liberal opinion" and not "acquainted with Scottish local conditions." For the purposes of this study he has been treated as a "British" politician. Lothian to Ranald Findlay, 17th March 1936, Lothian Papers (LO) 315. For the evolution of Lothian's personal views on Nazi Germany, see J.R.M. Butler, *Lord Lothian*, London, 1960.


9. See speeches by Paish reported by *The Scotsman*, 10th and 11th April 1935, and *Scotsman* editorial, 27th April 1935. In the election Paish came in a poor third, with T.M. Cooper retaining the seat for the Conservatives with a much reduced majority.


12. Stevenson also funded a Chair in International History at London University.

13. Stevenson was standing for Glasgow Partick.
14. James Scott, Vice President of the Scottish Liberal Federation, to Lord Lothian, 29th October 1935, LO 314.

15. In December 1914 Stevenson helped to found the Union of Democratic Control, an organisation which subsequently served as a rallying point for dissident radicals and anti-war socialists. Harvie, No Gods, p. 12.

16. Charles Sarolea to Baron Von Mumm, 29th June 1923, SAR 83. Sarolea's reference to Stevenson's wish to improve relations with Germany was made during the Ruhr crisis. Given that the Scottish coal industry as a whole was enjoying an artificial boom during this period, due to the drastic reduction in German coal output, Stevenson's company, at least in the short term, would have been likely to benefit financially from a prolongation of Germany's diplomatic isolation, if it entailed a continued French presence in the Saar.

17. Courtesy of Lord Lothian.


27. Sunday Dispatch, 22nd October 1933. Quoted by Haxey, op. cit., p. 236.


31. Moore appears to have been the only MP in attendance. See the report on the Party Congress, 10th-16th September 1935, by Capt. Hawes, Foreign Office Records (FO) 371/18883/C6861/5013/18. Hawes was a British Legion observer.
32. Vice-Admiral Sir Barry Domville, b. 1878. Director of Naval Intelligence, 1927-30, Commander of 3rd Cruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean, 1931-32, and President of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich, 1932-34. Domville later became one of the most industrious pro-German activists.

33. See Admiral Sir Barry Domville, diary entries for 11th-13th August 1935, Domville Diaries (DOM) 52. During the three day period Moore and Domville were treated to a display of ostensibly unorchestrated and "authentic" Bavarian peasant recreational activity, involving much beer-drinking and choral singing, with considerable "fraternal" SS participation. They were also given a guided tour of Dachau. There they reviewed the camp guard, noted the excellent conditions, and talked to some of the paedophiles who apparently formed the majority of the inmates. Their interviewees showed a remarkable propensity for confessing the full horror of their crimes. Moore and Domville then departed with their souvenir beer-mugs, products of the camp's own workshops.

34. Many former officers had a higher regard for the "gallant foe" than they did for their "untrustworthy" former allies.


37. General Sir Ian (Standish Monteith) Hamilton, b. 1853. One of Scotland's best-known military sons, Hamilton had achieved fame, first as the defender of Ladysmith in the South African War, and then as Commander-in-Chief at Gallipoli. From its inception Hamilton had played a leading role in the British Legion, and since 1924 he had endeavoured to persuade that body to pursue a policy of fraternisation with Germany's ex-service organisations. A former member of the Anglo-German Association, he was also a strong advocate of political reconciliation with Germany. For the purposes of this study Hamilton has been treated, like Lothian, as a "British," rather than a "Scottish" contributor to debate. Although he had been President of the British Legion in Scotland since 1931, the post was an honorific one, and he was much more actively engaged in the work of its sister organisation in England, initially as the President of the Metropolitan Area Council, and after 1936 as National Vice-President.


Chapter 4
The Abyssinian Crisis 1935-36

In the early 1930s public attention in Britain was focussed firmly on domestic matters. Interest in foreign affairs was essentially spasmodic, and foreign policy played a relatively unimportant role in party politics. With the onset of the Abyssinian crisis in the autumn of 1935, foreign policy attained a prominence it would not lose until the outbreak of the Second World War. Thereafter attitudes to foreign policy were a continuous feature of public debate and the central issue in party politics.

On October 3rd 1935, after months of unconcealed Italian military preparations and copious international diplomatic activity, Italy invaded Abyssinia. There had been several international "incidents" since the termination of World War One in which the possibility of Britain being drawn into hostilities had existed but had looked fairly remote. Now, for the first time, she was apparently faced with a strong likelihood of major war. Apart from a temporary diversion of attention in March 1936 with the Rhineland crisis, the Abyssinian war would hold the centre of the international public stage in Britain until July 1936.

The crucial factor in expanding Mussolini's colonial adventure into a full scale international crisis was the involvement of the League of Nations. In January 1935 the Abyssinians had appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant, and two months later they had asked the League to arbitrate in the dispute. Mussolini was more than a little unfortunate in the timing of his African adventure, as it coincided with a determined effort in Britain to revitalize interest in, and support for, the League and its principles. In April 1934 the National Declaration Committee, a body sponsored by the League of Nations Union (LNU), had been set up to conduct the "Peace Ballot." The results of this ballot, published in June 1935, showed an overwhelming degree of support for the League. On all but one of the questions, over 90% of those polled had taken the pro-League option. Even on the controversial question of use of military sanctions against a League-condemned aggressor, over half voted for and only 20% directly against. The concurrence of the much publicised ballot and the development of the Abyssinian crisis maximised public interest in the issues involved. Had the Italian move been made several years earlier, it might have been written off as merely one of a series
of regrettable breaches of international law and order. Now it would be the test case for the League's aspirations to the regulation of international affairs and the maintenance of world peace. Throughout the affair attitudes to the Abyssinian dispute per se and attitudes to the League of Nations would be inextricably interlinked.

Throughout the summer of 1935 popular hostility to Italy's clear intention to use force was stimulated by the press. Leo Amery noted in his diary, "Times still continue to print hysterical letters from people who know nothing about foreign affairs on the iniquities of Mussolini and the necessity of sanctions, etc. The British public is never more dangerous than when it is in one of its moralising moods." The press campaign, and more importantly the Peace Ballot, with its weighty tally of around 11 million signatures, had a decisive impact on governmental policy. Although the defence of British Imperial interests in the area, the desire to stop Italian expansionism, and, for a variety of reasons, the wish to see the League's machinery tried out also played a part, it was the high tide of popular opinion in an election year which ensured the Cabinet's decision to commit Britain more firmly than ever before to the League of Nations. Conservative electoral strategists had previously been concerned by the absence of a policy on which the party could campaign in other than a defensive fashion. Prior to the Italian invasion unemployment had seemed likely to be the most important issue in the forthcoming election, and the appearance of parsimony which the government had acquired through its handling of unemployment relief reform was guaranteed to detract from its electoral performance. They also perceived a need for a policy calculated to appeal to former Liberal voters attracted into the "National" camp in 1931. Support for the League and collective security answered both these problems, effectively stole Labour's thunder, and also provided a principled basis on which to justify modest rearmament.

On September 12th 1935 the Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, addressed the League Assembly in Geneva in unambiguous terms, declaring that "the League stands, and my country stands with it, for collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and in particular for steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." Britain would be "second to none" in its support for the League, and the Abyssinian dispute would be "no exception" to this general line of policy. If there was an element of bluff in Hoare's speech, it signally failed to
work. Mussolini rejected the arbitration plan worked out by the League's Committee of Five, and shortly afterwards the Italian invasion began. Italy was rapidly condemned as an aggressor by the League. On November 2nd agreement was reached by the member states on the imposition of economic sanctions under Article 16. These involved an embargo on Italian imports and some exports to Italy, including armaments, and various financial restrictions. These measures were implemented by the majority of members on the 18th, and discussions were started on the next level of sanctions, which would include the all-important control of oil. Although Baldwin and Hoare might state that Britain would only operate a policy of moving in harness with the League, that no "isolated action" was contemplated and that war was not intended, Britain was undoubtedly providing the driving force behind League action — a point the Italians were not slow to make. To many in Britain the possibility of war with Italy seemed very real.

Daniel Waley contends that the results of the Peace Ballot were somewhat misleading, as they exaggerated the extent of pro-League sentiment in Britain, largely because the questions it posed were skilfully phrased to maximise a favourable response. He also points out that ballots conducted by the Daily Mail and Morning Post prior to the Italian invasion produced directly contradictory results. The readership of these two papers could not be said to constitute a cross-section of the British public. However, it did represent that substantial body of Conservatives who had never liked British commitment to the League of Nations. To them, the League's pretensions to govern international affairs were idealistic nonsense. According to R.B. McCallum, "in any place where what are generally called the upper and upper-middle classes foregather, anyone who asked the assembled company whether they felt personally more secure for the existence of the League of Nations would have aroused laughter." Some simply did not believe that mankind was ready for, or indeed ever would be ready for, the application of such high principles. In international affairs the law of the jungle prevailed. In contrast to the "idealism" of the League of Nations Union, they classified their own viewpoint as one of "realism." To others the League's internationalism was inherently incompatible with the patriotic "nationalism" which lay at the core of their political beliefs. For them full application of League principles involved a diminution of national sovereignty which was unacceptable. Some went still further and saw in the espousal of any international ideas the hand of Soviet Russia, for was not internationalism the creed of communists and their socialist fellow-travellers.
If the philosophy of the League was objectionable to such Conservatives, the practical implications of British support for it were much worse. Application of the coercive Article 16 could land Britain in another war over an issue in which Britain might have no direct concern, simply for the preservation of principles which they held in contempt. The use of sanctions in any form, they believed, was tantamount to war, for what self-respecting nation would tolerate being the victim of such measures without retaliating? Even if there was a slim possibility that war could be averted, why take the risk? The only proper grounds for putting British lives in danger, they argued, were in defence of British and Imperial interests. For years Conservatives such as these had grudgingly tolerated the lip-service paid to the League by successive British governments. Now, following Hoare's Geneva Speech and the invasion of Abyssinia, Britain, at the behest of the League, was being drawn into confrontation with Italy, a first-class Power, and they were seriously alarmed.

In Scotland the onset of the crisis provoked a rash of pseudonymous letters to The Scotsman, largely, one suspects, from retired military men. It was "madness," they argued, to "risk our Empire ... unless British interests were in some way involved." A much used analogy was that of carrying matches in a "powder magazine."\(^{11}\) Lt.-Col. Oswald was a little more blunt. "Sanctions mean war; do we want our sons to be killed or mutilated in the cause of sanctions?"\(^{12}\) Sir Henry Fairfax-Lucy combined contempt for the League with the suggestion that its supporters were working to a hidden agenda. "It is a curious commentary on the Socialist mind that they should prefer to spill the blood of their fellow countrymen in the interests of internationalism, which no virile country on the map to-day is going to support."\(^{13}\) Others were less guarded in their references. The nightmare of the Conservative right-wing was that war with Italy would lead to a "European conflagration,"\(^{14}\) of which "the only beneficiaries would be the Soviets."\(^{15}\)

The Scotsman's willingness to print this flurry of isolationist comment did not reflect the paper's own editorial line, which was one of qualified support for the government's policy. With Italy's guilt "as clear as daylight," the paper believed that the time had come to see if the League's machinery could be used to effect against international law-breakers, although it was itself more than a little dubious that sanctions would prove to be effective.\(^{16}\) Scotland's other quality paper, the Glasgow Herald, was even more vigorous in its condemnation of Italian
aggression and in its enthusiasm for collective security. Isolationism it denounced as a "fundamental and most dangerous heresy." Although noticeably less enthusiastic, the Aberdeen Press and Journal also endorsed the application of sanctions. The opponents of sanctions, however, were not without their supporters in the Scottish press. Although it vehemently denounced Italian aggression, the Courier and Advertiser characterised the application of sanctions as "a dangerous eruption of visionary sentimentality." There were, it claimed, "multitudes of Conservatives" who viewed the government's policy "with acute abhorrence." 19

Those representatives of the Conservative multitude who registered their opposition to sanctions in the correspondence columns of The Scotsman in October carried little or no political weight. A noticeable feature of the anti-sanctionist cause at this stage was its failure to attract many vocal supporters in the House of Commons. During the three day debate on the Abyssinian crisis, commencing on October 22nd, speaker after speaker rose to denounce Italian aggression and commend the Government's policy. Only a handful of MPs voiced criticism. The most powerful anti-sanctions speech was delivered by Leo Amery. Although he had isolationist views, his emphasis was primarily on the strategic dangers of alienating Italy, and thus destroying the recently acclaimed solidarity of Stresa. Italy was a powerful counterweight to German expansionism and the only real guarantor of Austrian independence. "I fear that we have wrecked the whole fabric of European security and given Germany an entirely new power and authority," Amery lamented. 20 For Amery and the group of MPs he represented, the rights and wrongs of the Abyssinian affair paled into insignificance in comparison with the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, that pillar of traditional British foreign policy.

The only Scottish voice to be raised against sanctions during this debate came from a somewhat unexpected quarter. John McGovern, ILP member for Glasgow Shettleston, denounced British policy with all the vigour of pre-First World War anti-capitalist pacifism. "We say that we refuse to stand for, or encourage British workers giving their lives in a war of this kind, a rival controversy that is taking place between imperialist nations, Britain and Italy, and that Abyssinian independence is not in the picture." Of Irish Catholic extraction, John McGovern was born in Coatbridge in 1887. During the First World War he had taken an active
part in the anti-war campaign in Glasgow, and had flirted with Communism before joining the ILP. In his political career McGovern anticipated the ILP's split with the Labour Party by two years. Although by now strongly anti-communist, shortly after winning the Shettleston by-election for Labour in 1930 he had been deselected by his constituency association after a right-wing coup within that body. In the general election the following year he held his seat as an ILP candidate in the face of an official Labour challenger.22

McGovern's speech in the Commons reflected official ILP policy. The decision to oppose sanctions, in marked contrast to Labour Party policy, marked a further widening of the gulf between the two parties. Indeed, with the Communist Party also supporting sanctions, on this issue the ILP found itself in glorious isolation among the parties of the Left. The ILP's membership, however, was by no means unanimous in its support for the line chosen by the parliamentary party, and at the Annual Conference in 1936 the inner executive was outvoted in a motion on sanctions. However, in the face of James Maxton's determination to make the matter a resignation issue the rebels backed down, and throughout the Abyssinian crisis the ILP's official position remained one of opposition to sanctions.23

If there were misgivings in their minds about the wisdom of their leaders' policy, Scottish Conservative MPs generally kept them to themselves.24 Their silence was perhaps in part prompted by political expediency. Given the current of public opinion against Italy and in favour of the League, an anti-sanctions posture would have been most unwise with a general election looming large on the horizon. Apart from the desire not to embarrass the Government at such a critical point, and in so doing incurring the wrath of the party managers, for many of the new members who had been swept into power in the 1931 landslide the knowledge of the slim majorities they were defending would have militated against courting electoral suicide.25

The only notable exception was Sir Patrick Ford,26 the retiring member for Edinburgh North.27 Speaking to his constituents on October 11th, Ford was reported as saying that "the ideal of the League of Nations and of collective security was a very great ideal. But the present League was not a League of all the nations of the world." This being the case, "it was very dangerous for it to set itself up to be a sort of super-State ... laying down decrees as to what one or any nation was to
do." In view of the League's incompleteness, "It seemed to him that this country and France would get the whole of the 'dirty work' to do," and because "our country for its size, was by far the most poorly armed of all the nations ... it was difficult for us to make any effective intervention in the war between Italy and Abyssinia." He therefore urged caution in the application of sanctions, as they were a "great gamble." For the future he recommended that the League be "confined to being a consultative and advisory body, with perhaps a certain executive power in minor matters."  

Ford's speech embodied themes which were common to "moderate" (or more politic) antagonists of sanctions. 1) With Germany, Japan and the United states outside the League, it lacked the "compelling force" envisaged by its creators. Sanctions, therefore, were more likely to provoke war than prevent it and in its present state of development the League should be shorn of its coercive powers and reduced to the level of an advisory and co-ordinating body. 2) In the event of war with Italy, the burden of conducting hostilities would effectively devolve on Britain and France (Soviet assistance, hardly likely to be welcomed in any case, was assumed to be out of the question). 3) In its present state of military weakness Britain was in no fit state to undertake such onerous duties on behalf of the League. Indeed, she was too weak to look after her own interests properly and that should be remedied as quickly as possible.

If the opponents of sanctions in the Commons were backward about coming forward, the same was not true of the House of Lords, to the government's discomfiture. The Earl of Crawford noted in his diary after the Lords' parallel three day debate in October, "I found Hailsham a little non-plussed by the strong pro-Italian sentiment in H. of Lords — much more vocal than in the Commons."  

Several English peers had indeed gone further than criticism of sanctions and had positively defended the Italian case.

A more straightforwardly isolationist speech was given by the Earl of Mansfield. Having spelt out the likelihood of sanctions leading to war with Italy, Mansfield wrote off the vast majority of League members as either "so far removed from the scene of likely hostilities as to be perfectly useless," or "too small to be of any use." Only France could offer tangible support, and she was far from being rock-solid on the subject. Any French Government "which endeavoured to
participate in armed intervention against Italy would have little chance of surviving many days." In the event of war, "95 per cent of the coercion against Italy would have to be carried out by this country." Mansfield went on to dwell at length on the massive destruction of British lives and economic prosperity which war would bring, especially if the conflict with Italy escalated into another full-scale world war. "That," he declared, "would be a price too great to pay for a collective security which has proved to be very largely imaginary."32

Aged thirty-five in 1935, Mungo David Malcolm Murray, 7th Earl of Mansfield and Mansfield, was a recent arrival in the House of Lords. Earlier in the year he had succeeded to the title on the death of his father, inheriting extensive estates, not only in Perthshire, around the family seat of Scone Palace, but also in Dumfriesshire and Clackmannanshire. An enthusiastic amateur ornithologist, he was also greatly involved with the promotion of agricultural interests.33 For Mansfield Perthshire politics was a proprietorial concern. Between 1931 and 1935 he was Conservative MP for Perth. Obliged to step down by his elevation to the Lords, he ensured his continuing influence in the constituency by securing his election as a County Councillor and assuming the presidency of the Perth and East Perthshire Unionist Association.

A staunch Protestant, in the late 1920s Mansfield, or Lord Scone as he then was, had been the President of Alexander Ratcliffe's Scottish Protestant League, but had resigned from that position because of Ratcliffe's decision to run against a Conservative candidate in Stirling and Falkirk Burghs in the 1929 general election. Steve Bruce suggests that the issue was merely a convenient excuse, and that Mansfield had already become alarmed at Ratcliffe's extremist tendencies.34 Nevertheless, Mansfield may well have felt himself to be compromised by Ratcliffe's candidacy, for he himself was standing as a Conservative candidate in nearby North Lanark. His own views on the Scots-Irish were nothing if not robust. They were, he believed, "a completely separate race of alien origin," whose presence in the West of Scotland was thoroughly unwelcome.35 In 1928 he had observed that in the hypothetical event of their repatriation to Ireland, Scotland's unemployment problems would be solved.36

During the 1930s Mansfield was involved with various right-wing groups. These included the British Empire Union and the National Citizens Union,
Conservative Die-Hard societies concerned primarily with the need to resist communism. His principal involvement was with the Imperial Policy Group, of which he was a founding member, a parliamentary lobby group which had developed largely from the executive committee of the National Citizens Union. Mansfield acted as its spokesman in the House of Lords, and together with A.R. Wise and Kenneth de Courcey provided most of the IPG's dynamic. On its inception at the end of 1934, the IPG's policy was stated to be "based on the importance of Imperial development, the strengthening of the Constitution, adequate defences, a progressive housing movement, an Imperial monetary policy and the development and safeguarding of home industry and agriculture calculated to provide a rising standard of living and to reduce unemployment." After October 1935, however, and for the remainder of the 1930s, the IPG's public interpretation of imperial self-interest was almost exclusively preoccupied with the need to pursue an isolationist foreign policy coupled with rapid rearmament.

The French government were indeed unenthusiastic about strong action against Italy. Petrified by the revival of their traditional enemy, the French put much higher store on the value of Italian assistance in containing Germany than the British. In January 1935 the French foreign minister, Pierre Laval, had signed a treaty of friendship with Mussolini, which included concessions to Italy in North Africa. Both parties had agreed to "consult" in the event of a German threat to Austria, and secret talks had been instituted between the French and Italian General Staffs. According to General Gamelin, when he visited Rome in June to see Marshal Badoglio, "We gave each other a guarantee covering the whole of our frontiers: the Alps and Africa." Moreover, during the January discussions Laval signed a secret protocol, expressing French disinterest in the subsequent fate of Abyssinia. Even before the great "betrayal" of the Hoare-Laval Pact, Laval had been dragging his heels, especially over the oil sanction. What support there was in following the British lead was motivated by a desire to avoid a breach with Britain.

Opposition to sanctions or the League of Nations did not presuppose any necessary fondness for Fascist Italy or belief in the justness of the Italian case. Many of the denunciations of sanctions in the autumn and winter of 1935 were prefaced by condemnation of the Italian action and sometimes negative comment on the Italian régime and the person of Mussolini. This could go beyond any possible "window-dressing" to suit the mood of popular opinion. Lt.-Col.
Oswald's anti-sanctionist contribution had also dismissed Italian grievances as "foolish talk," and he recommended that "What the Russians did in 1812 the Negus can do in 1935, so let us send him advisers and helpers." Conversely, exponents of the Italian case were not necessarily opposed to the League of Nations. "Imperative as it is to uphold the Covenant of the League and deal with the lawbreaker, it ought clearly to be realised that Italy's grievances are to a large extent genuine," declared the Conservative student, A.V. Todd. In many cases, however, both views coincided, and themes more identifiable as "isolationist" or "pro-Italian" were juxtaposed. This blend had the advantage of providing a stronger case against sanctions.

This diversity of opinion within the anti-sanctionist groups was further increased by the division in the pro-Italian faction between the "strategic" friends of Italy and the more genuinely "Italophile," who included admirers of Mussolini and the Fascist régime. In justifying their desire for maintaining Italian friendship, both groups tended to use similar arguments. When it came to excusing Italian aggression against Abyssinia, the "strategics" were less enthusiastic. The "Italophiles" also tended to be less concerned with the League of Nations than either the "strategics" or the "isolationists."

The opponents of sanctions in the Lords' debate in October expressed several "Italophile" themes. They pointed to Italy's long-standing friendship with Britain and the war-time alliance, her failure to receive the territorial rewards promised in 1915, and the subsequent sense of grievance after Versailles. They repeated Mussolini's justification of demographic necessity. Above all, though, they stressed the barbaric and lawless state of the "victim." Abyssinian retention of slavery, despite the promise to the League in 1923, the oppression of the non-Amharic peoples, and the Emperor's failure to eradicate banditry and raids on British and Italian territory all came in for criticism. "The sooner Ethiopia is handed over by Mandate to a civilised Power the better for the Abyssinians and for the rest of the world," Lord Hardinge had declared. Italy was the only contender for this civilising mission.

In Scotland Abyssinian backwardness surfaced more often in pro-League comment, highlighting the inequality of the struggle. Although one of the Italophile contributors to The Scotsman found it "incredible" that Britain was "backing a
horde of slave-dealing barbarians against what is perhaps one of the best-governed and most civilised countries in Europe to-day," it was a somewhat atypical outburst.\textsuperscript{53} Scottish Italophiles, like Alistair Todd, were more likely to point out the hypocrisy of condemning Italy for methods of imperial aggrandisement "that were perfectly legal in the 19th century," especially as Britain's own Empire had largely been gained by means which were "often of a far from 'peaceful' kind."\textsuperscript{54} Others defended Italy's contribution to the allied cause in the First World War or reminded readers of previous Italian friendship.\textsuperscript{55}

On the whole, Italophile comment was both rare and restrained, and this included emanations from official Italian sources. Dott. Ferrucio Luppis, the Italian consul in Glasgow, restricted himself to extolling the delights which awaited British visitors to Italy and denied recent accounts to the contrary.\textsuperscript{56} Given the unpopularity of the Italian action, some Italophiles may have deemed it prudent to lend their weight indirectly. Fairfax-Lucy's contribution, already noted, was anti-communist, anti-League and isolationist. He was all of these, but he was also a strong admirer of Fascism.

In late October and early November interest in the Abyssinian war in Scotland died back as attention focussed on the forthcoming general election. Comment on the Abyssinian crisis continued to appear in \textit{The Scotsman}, but the controversy had shifted to the somewhat tangential subject of the Pope's attitude to the war. Protestants eagerly denounced Pope Pius XI's failure to condemn Mussolini's act of aggression, and paraded it as typical of the Catholic Church's long history of subservience to state interest, while Catholics pointed to his previous condemnation of war in general and the papacy's policy of non-partisanship in temporal disputes.\textsuperscript{57} A digression of this nature would not have occurred south of the Border, and it is but one example of the strength of religious differences in Scotland during the period.

Scottish nationalists added a distinctively Scottish facet to the debate on sanctions in Scotland during the run up to the elections. Sympathy for Abyssinia and criticism of Italy's "rabid and unashamed imperialism"\textsuperscript{58} were almost universal features of nationalist comment, and the SNP's official stance was strongly supportive of the League of Nations and, to a lesser extent, of the British government's commitment to the application of sanctions. All seven of the SNP's
candidates in the general election affirmed their support for League action in their election manifestos. However, some nationalists, while sharing the general sympathy with Abyssinia, were strongly critical of a policy which might lead to war. The November issue of the Scots Independent slammed the Labour Party for its bellicosity in declaring its readiness to support military sanctions, and declared, "it is sheer madness to seek to stop war by further war, even under the guise of League sanctions." Labour was not the paper's only target, for the government was also severely lambasted for its inflammatory re-armament policy, a policy which, in the Scots Independent's view, was incompatible with genuine support for the League. This position was not dissimilar to that of the pacifist wing of the Labour Party, and reflected the socialist-pacifist views of the proprietor, R.E. Muirhead. Other nationalists, however, opposed the pursuit of sanctions à l'outrance on the grounds that it might result in Scotland's involvement in a war which was not in her interests. Robert Gray, the SNP candidate for Dumbartonshire, made it clear that, support for the League notwithstanding, he was "only prepared to go to war in defence of Scotland." Until the Abyssinian crisis intruded the very real possibility of war, enthusiasm for hypothetical opposition to Scottish involvement in any future "British" war had only manifested on the fundamentalist fringe of the nationalist movement, in organisations such as Wendy Wood's Anti-Conscription League. Thereafter, however, it became increasingly attractive to the nationalist mainstream.

While the sentiments it expressed were undoubtedly genuine, the vehemence of the Scots Independent's assault on the warmongers of the Labour and Conservative parties owed much to the proximity of a general election, and, in these circumstances, may well have been prompted by the perceived need for a distinctive nationalist position on foreign policy, particularly as the SNP's official position was singularly lacking in this respect. "Keep Scotland out of the Criminal Folly! Save Scotland from the Madness of Militarism! Vote Scottish Nationalist," certainly had a punch lacking in the official party propaganda. As its political opponents were equally, or indeed, even more, guilty of formulating foreign policy in the mirror of domestic considerations, the Scots Independent, if indeed it was primarily motivated by such concerns, cannot be unduly censored for such behaviour.

Baldwin's electoral strategy proved to be a resounding success. Although Labour's share of the vote in Britain as a whole returned to 1929 levels, the
Conservatives retained their grip on much of the centre ground won from the Liberals. With 387 seats to Labour's 154, they emerged clearly once again as the party of government. Although in relative terms their electoral performance was actually better than that of their allies, for the Simonites nothing had changed. They were still the Conservatives' political prisoners. For the independent Liberals the election was a disaster, their parliamentary representation cut in half.  

In Scotland, because of the marginal nature of many of the Conservative majorities in 1931, the swing to Labour in 1935 brought a richer harvest in seats. The number of Conservative MPs dropped to 37, while Labour's representation increased from 3 to 20, the ILP remaining on 4. There was even a Communist victory, with Willie Gallacher capturing West Fife, although this reflected effective local organisation rather than any national trend. Labour's gains in seats, however, belied the relative weakness of the party's recovery in Scotland. Although at 36% Labour's share of the vote was up 5% on its 1931 performance, in 1929 Labour had taken 41%. Scottish voting patterns were converging with those of the rest of Britain. The Liberal Nationals did particularly well in Scotland, returning as many MPs as they had done in 1931, namely eight. Their Samuelite opponents, on the other hand, shared in the general rout of their party. Their electoral difficulties compounded by loss of control of the Scottish Liberal Federation to the Liberal Nationals during the summer of 1935, they were reduced to a mere rump of three.

With the general election out of the way, Parliament reassembled. During the debate on the King's Address the subject of Abyssinia resurfaced. Criticism of sanctions was even less in evidence than it had been in October. John McGovern maintained his eloquent espousal of the ILP viewpoint. One of the few Conservative right-wingers to comment, in a debate which certainly lacked the vigour of October, was Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore. After giving tepid support for the continuation of the sanctions policy, Moore voiced his fears "as to the lengths to which sanctions are to go." Should war result, he warned, it would have little popular backing, for "the country looks to the Prime Minister to keep us out of war. That is why he has the people's trust so completely." Like Mansfield, he emphasised the danger of war with Italy leading to "a great conflagration."

Within a few days interest in Abyssinia had been dramatically revitalised. As a result of a series of talks over December 7th and 8th, Hoare and Laval had reached
agreement on a plan for the partition of Abyssinia to be presented to both the belligerents and the League. The independent state of Abyssinia was essentially to be reduced to the Amharic regions, but with the addition of a corridor to the sea. Italy was to be directly ceded the Ogaden and a large part of Tigré province. In the south and south-west a large area was to be placed under some kind of League control, in which the Italians were to enjoy an economic monopoly.

Before the plan could receive full Cabinet consideration, details were leaked to the French press, and on December 10th the news appeared in the British papers. Hoare had seriously miscalculated. Although the proposals bore more than a passing resemblance to the September plan drawn up by the Committee of Five, he had not taken sufficient account of the effects of three months of warfare and governmental espousal of League action on British public opinion. Mussolini, it appeared, was to be handsomely rewarded for his blatant aggression and defiance of the League. With the exception of papers resolutely opposed to sanctions, like the Daily Express, the press laid down a barrage of criticism, The Times leading the way with Dawson’s scathing editorial, "A Corridor for Camels." Their efforts were matched by the League of Nations Union, which orchestrated its supporters most effectively. MPs were lobbied and a spate of indignant private letters appeared in the papers. Overall, the impression created was one of mass popular revulsion at the proposed betrayal. Cabinet initially endorsed the proposals, wavered, and finally abandoned them, succumbing less to the popular outcry than to the ire of its own parliamentary rank and file and opposition in the Cabinet itself. After a series of critical motions in the Commons had received an alarming number of Conservative signatures, the coup de grâce was delivered at a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on the 17th, when Austen Chamberlain sounded out back-bench feeling and summed up against the plan. Cabinet rejected the plan the next day and Hoare resigned on the 19th.

Analysing the "storm of protest" which greeted the Hoare-Laval proposals, Waley suggests that the extent of popular indignation was exaggerated both at the time and by later commentators, and that the LNU’s "wire pulling" and the greater literary skills of its members produced an effect disproportionate to its numbers, while their opponents suffered from a lack of organisation and articulateness. Waley also suggests that some papers, notably The Times, were highly biased in the selection of letters they chose to publish. Finally, he contends that it was Hoare and Baldwin’s opting for the explanation of "an unexpectedly intractable public" as
the most face-saving excuse for the débâcle and a convenient story for the French, which ensured the survival of this exaggerated version of events.  

The reaction of the Scottish press to the Hoare-Laval proposals generally mirrored responses south of the border. Although it initially gave a cautious welcome to the concept of a brokered settlement, The Scotsman shifted to outright opposition as soon as full details of the plan were released. By the 16th the paper was expressing its astonishment that the government had given the proposals serious consideration. By the end of the crisis it had placed responsibility for the fiasco firmly on the French, and urged that the policy of sanctions should be pursued "to an honourable conclusion." In a rare display of editorial vigour, from the outset the Aberdeen Press and Journal declared it to be "a self-evident fact that this country would not tolerate a peace bought by the dismemberment of Abyssinia." The paper's support for the maintenance of sanctions was constant throughout the crisis, and to an even greater extent than The Scotsman it ascribed responsibility for the proposals to the French. Despite a marked loss of enthusiasm for coercive League action, and more than a little ambivalence in the early stages, the Glasgow Herald also came round to denouncing the plan. It was, the paper argued, "not a product of British statesmanship at all," but an unwholesome creation of French realpolitik. Even the Courier and Advertiser, no friend of the League, was appalled at the possibility of British complicity in a carve-up of Abyssinia, which from the outset it labelled "an outrage upon decency." It was perfectly possible to "withdraw from the whole 'collective' muddle," it argued, "without presenting the bull with another victim."  

Amidst the furore caused by the Hoare-Laval proposals, the opponents of sanctions in Scotland certainly believed themselves to be greatly outnumbered. "A large majority of the British people has rejected the Paris peace proposals and has declared in favour of the continuance and extension of the policy of sanctions," declared Prof. Charles Sarolea, before going on to denounce that policy in depth. Another anti-sanctionist meekly commenced, "At the risk of expressing an unpopular view ..." Nonetheless, the appearance of the Hoare-Laval plan clearly galvanised the anti-sanctionists into renewed efforts. In fact, their contributions to The Scotsman at this period were more numerous than at any previous point in the whole Abyssinian dispute. In contrast with The Times, which after December 16th ceased to publish comment favourable to the Hoare-Laval plan, over the period
December 10th to January 16th The Scotsman printed 22 letters praising the proposals or generally expounding anti-sanctionist themes, as against 41 letters condemning them, or arguing for the continuation of sanctions. Given that The Scotsman, in view of its editorial policy, was hardly likely to be giving undue weight to anti-sanctions comment, this would seem to confirm Waley's contention that bias in the British press minimised the appearance of opposition to sanctions. It should also be stressed that opposition to sanctions was broader than the manifestation of approval for the Hoare-Laval proposals. As the line taken by the Courier and Advertiser during the crisis indicates, it was perfectly possible for isolationist imperialists to oppose active British participation in the dismemberment of Abyssinia. The Glasgow Herald's vacillations during the crisis are also worthy of note, for they suggest that by December some of the government's supporters were only too ready to abandon sanctions at the first opportunity. The Glasgow Herald greeted the first news of a possible brokered settlement with considerable enthusiasm. All traces of the enthusiasm for coercive League action which it had displayed in October had vanished. The League, it declared on the 12th, "cannot set itself up as a guarantor of territorial integrity in a world in which change is not only inevitable but often highly desirable." Although it subsequently concluded that the proposals were unacceptable and endorsed the continuation of sanctions, it did so with manifest reluctance.

Although the plan was abandoned, the tentative embrace which the Government had initially given it cracked the appearance of total governmental commitment to tough League action. Anti-sanctionists, who previously might have felt that there was little point in pressing their views, were now encouraged to come forward. However, they were slower to respond than their opponents, and in the early days of the crisis supporters of the League had an almost free run in The Scotsman's columns. This would seem to reinforce Waley's comments on the lack of anti-sanctionist organisation and the contrasting efficiency of the LNU. It was only really after December 19th that anti-sanctionist contributions started to appear. By then, of course, the plan was already dead, and this militated against indulging in a press battle on the merits of the plan per se. Hoare's motivation might be praised in retrospect as "the commendable purpose and hope of stopping the war and of countering the acute danger of a European explosion," but for the most part anti-sanctionists deployed their arguments in the hope of influencing future British policy, as opposed to drawing attention to an abandoned and discredited endeavour.
Isolationist critics returned to now familiar themes. Collective security was "high-sounding falutin," the League "a huge 'Gunpowder Plot'," and the most likely outcome, that "Europe may yet go up in flames and be devastated, whilst Russia laughs." A noticeable feature of both these and earlier anti-sanctionist commentators is the simple terms in which they put their case. Discourses on the complexity of the issues involved were much rarer than arguments which rested on the use of metaphors which simplified ad absurdum. Certainly they tended to lack the erudition of the liberal professionals who were the backbone of the LNU, a factor which Lt.-Col. Moore was clearly trying to turn to his advantage when he claimed to speak, not for the "theorist," but for "the ordinary man-in-the-street." This relative deficiency in literary skills not only hampered effective presentation of their case, it militated against its expression at all, a point implicit in Moore's comments, and self-evident in Mansfield's description of himself as "the mouthpiece of ... a very large, although up to the present inarticulate, body of feeling in the country." 

Although lack of participation from academia was certainly a feature of the anti-sanctions cause in Scotland in the earlier phase of the Abyssinian dispute, this was not the case after the Hoare-Laval fiasco. Hypocrisy, in various forms, was the main target of Professor H.J.C. Grierson, Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature at Edinburgh University. "It is all very well," he pointed out, "for ... 'unco guid' politicians to talk of our losing the moral leadership of Europe. The question is whether we ever enjoyed it. In the opinion of the German, the American, and the French Press we have been suspect from the outset. We have been accused of using the League to promote Imperial interests." If the British government's motivation was not entirely altruistic, the Labour Party was worse. "It is difficult to read some of their speeches ... without suspecting that their interest in Abyssinia and peace is less than their desire to provoke a revolution, a revolt against Mussolini in Italy." 

The weightiest intellectual condemnation of sanctions and the League to appear at this time came from Grierson's former colleague at Edinburgh University, Professor Charles Sarolea, in the form of two massive letters to The Scotsman. Styling himself as a "practical and realistic pacifist," he poured scorn on the popular rejection of the Hoare-Laval proposals. Effective diplomatic action could never be achieved, he stated, "merely by the display of noble sentiments and by the
continuous repetition of impressive words like the Sanctity of Treaties, the Vindication of the Moral Law, the Integrity of Abyssinia, the Protection of the Weak against the Strong." In his view, "only a settlement by compromise and negotiation on the lines of the Paris peace proposals ... can save the world from irretrievable disaster." Such views, he admitted, "may not appeal to the idealist or the moralist" and "even less to the sentimentalist and the fanatic," but they would convince those motivated by "the passionate determination at all costs to avoid another European war."

Sanctions, Sarolea claimed, were actually negating their own ultimate purpose, namely the preservation of League authority and the strengthening of collective security. They were driving a wedge between Britain and the "wobbly" French, and very soon Britain would probably find herself "in splendid isolation" with "Bolshevist Russia as her only ally amongst the Great Powers." The League hinged on Anglo-French co-operation. If that failed, the League would founder, and with it any possibility of collective security, in view of the existence of a "solid block of Powers which seem determined to achieve their national ends by war, namely, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland." Sanctions were also "economically dangerous and grossly unfair," with some nations suffering heavy trade losses and others not at all. They were also "a shocking perversion of international justice." "For seventeen years Article 16 of the Covenant had remained a dead letter," and he gave an impressive list of infractions of international law committed since 1919 on which the League had failed to act. Italy was being singled out for special treatment.

Having dealt with sanctions, Sarolea moved on to present a complete analytical demolition of the League. With states as important as the USA, Japan, Germany, Brazil, and Egypt outside it, it was "no longer a commonwealth of peoples," but "a mutilated and impotent rump," and "of its 57 member States, probably as many as 25 ought never to have been admitted," as they failed to meet the entry requirements. Sarolea then proceeded to go through all 26 of the Articles of the Covenant demonstrating their flaws or indeed their complete failure. Despite this critique he declared, "I still believe in the League of Nations," but only if the League was radically revised would it be possible to avoid "the end of a great adventure and the bankruptcy of a noble ideal." 86

Charles Sarolea was one of the commanding figures of the Edinburgh
intelligentsia of the 1930s, renowned both as a political commentator and as a host of eclectic intellectual gatherings. Born in Belgium in 1870, his encyclopaedic mind and mastery of many subjects, particularly languages, ensured a rapid academic advancement. At the age of twenty-three he was poised to take over the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Brussels University. His inaugural address, however, coincided with the temporary closure of the university following the outbreak of large-scale socialist demonstrations in the city, and his appointment lapsed in somewhat obscure circumstances. Sarolea later claimed that he had stepped down out of political considerations, and the incident would appear to have been responsible for his decision to pursue his academic career in Britain. In 1894 he moved to Edinburgh University as Professor of French Literature, a post he would hold until 1931.

Academia, however, was never sufficiently encompassing for Sarolea's considerable energies. Although he became a naturalised British citizen in 1912, he served as the Belgian Consul in Edinburgh for 37 years. A gifted publicist, in 1912 he founded Everyman, which over the next five years achieved a national reputation under his editorial guidance. As the editor of the Collection Gallia and the Collection Nelson, he was also successful in producing French literature for a mass market. Sarolea was a prolific author in his own right. His first book, a critique of Ibsen, was published in 1891, and further works on literary and philosophical subjects followed in quick succession. Politics, however, were his life-long passion, and after The Russian Revolution (1905) and The Balkan Question (1906) Sarolea's pre-war writing culminated with The Anglo-German Problem (1912), a prophesy of impending war due to the internal dynamics of Prussian militarism, which established his reputation as a political analyst. During the war Sarolea produced numerous populist propaganda pieces, such as The Curse of the Hohenzollern (1916), and his later works, while overlaid with a veneer of objective analysis, were essentially propagandist in style and purpose. Impressions of Soviet Russia (1924), for instance, is little more than an efflorescent fulmination against the Soviet régime. Despite its academic demerits, however, it was an immense commercial success. Translated into nineteen languages, it was officially distributed by the Polish and Hungarian governments for propaganda purposes.

Sarolea positively revelled in political controversy, whether by book, pamphlet,
letters to the press, or public debate. As a self-appointed champion of the capitalist system, he took part in numerous public debates against opponents such as Willie Gallagher and Fred Douglas, the Edinburgh Communist organiser. In the process he established for himself a reputation as a public speaker, and during the inter-war years he was in fairly constant demand in this role, primarily for his anti-communist oratory. Newspapers, however, were his preferred medium, and The Scotsman in particular regularly carried his articles and letters. In 1931 he resigned from Edinburgh University, characteristically styling his action "a protest against the bolshevisation of our Scottish Universities," and for the remainder of the 1930s devoted himself almost exclusively to his political pursuits.

Throughout his life Sarolea considered himself to be a Liberal, although his self-styled Olympian detachment precluded consistent support for any particular party. In an accolade written at the start of the First World War, probably by himself, Sarolea's politics were described as "an enlightened and generous Liberalism shading into collectivist sympathy and outlook," and he himself viewed the war essentially as a struggle between the forces of autocracy and despotism, represented by Germany and Austria, and the Liberal defenders of liberty and true civilisation, Britain, France and the United States. After the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, however, Sarolea's Liberal credentials grew increasingly dubious. By the 1930s, although he still regarded himself as a Liberal, albeit "an impenitent Liberal of the old school," his sympathies were closer to those of the extreme Right.

The principal component in Sarolea's inter-war political thinking was his preoccupation with the need to combat communism. Initially Sarolea viewed the Soviet régime as a typically Russian despotism, and the support for Polish territorial claims he advanced in Letters on Polish Affairs (1922) largely stemmed from fear of future co-operation between the Soviets and a revived and militaristic Germany. However, Impressions of Soviet Russia, written shortly after a visit to the Soviet Union in 1923, reveals a radical revision of his views. Sarolea was clearly appalled by what he saw and the contrast with the Russia he had visited in 1906. Civilisation, as he understood it, had ceased to exist there. His experiences transformed a studied liberal distaste for autocracy into emotive vituperation against a disease in the body politic. Marxism, he argued, was "in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental laws of human nature," and had brought about "intolerable
tyranny, ruin and starvation — the massacre of two million people, and the death by plague and famine of twenty million more. " Given the internationalist aspirations of communism, similar horrors, he believed, awaited the rest of civilisation. For as long as it survived, the Soviet régime would be "a menace to the security of the country [Britain] and to the peace of the world." 97

Thereafter, Sarolea's attitudes to foreign policy were entirely shaped by the need to contain the communist menace. In the 1920s, with Germany militarily emasculated by Versailles, he embraced the successor states of Eastern Europe as bulwarks against Soviet expansion, and was particularly vigorous in defending the territorial claims of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In opposing treaty revision at their expense and in Germany's favour, he happily combined a residual anti-Germanism with his new desire to erect an effective cordon sanitaire on Russia's Western Marches. 98 Sarolea acclamed the appearance of the new authoritarian states of the Right for the same reason. As early as 1924 he hailed the "ubiquitous Central European phenomenon" of fascism as an "instinctive, inevitable and salutary reaction of the body politic against the disintegrating forces of revolutionary Socialism." 99 Had it not been for Mussolini, he declared five years later, "Bolshevism would have triumphed in Italy, and, if it had triumphed in Italy, might have conquered all over Europe." 100

Sarolea's public enthusiasm for fascist or neo-fascist régimes, however, was restricted to a Continental context, and to those countries where, he argued, parliamentary democracies which had failed to establish firm roots were succumbing to communism. Nevertheless, his own commitment to the British system, and to democratic forms in the abstract, was at best tenuous. His elitist intellectual contempt for the masses was vast. Universal suffrage, he believed, had been a catastrophic mistake, for the ignorant masses now had it in their power to topple governments, with the result that political decisions were increasingly based not on principle or reason, but on the need to court public opinion. Nowhere, he argued in the aftermath of the government's abandonment of the Hoare-Laval proposals, had the deleterious effects of this "vulgarisation" of decision-making been more obvious than in the conduct of foreign policy. Where the diplomatic methods of the past had been "an appeal, to reason through quiet and private negotiations, conducted by independent professional experts, removed from and high above any disturbing outside influences," the mobilisation of public opinion on
foreign policy issues was little more than "an appeal to the emotions and to the passions of the mob." 101

Sarolea's anti-democratic tendencies pre-dated not only the "new diplomacy," but the Russian Revolution as well. His 1914 self-portrait of a man "with heart and head happily allied, in a way too great for divisions of party and the sectional strife which ... we call progress," bears more than a passing presentiment of the fascist vision of the unitary state. 102 With his desire for a harmonised political community, contempt for the political understanding of the masses, admiration for the new Caesars, and anti-communism, Sarolea's views intersected at various points with fascist ideology. The Corporate State, however, held no intellectual attraction for him, and although he had a certain sympathy for Mosley, 103 at no point did he publicly support the BUF. The anti-rationalist strain in fascist ideology would have had no appeal for one who worshipped the cult of the intellect. Above all though, fascism was arguably too vulgar for Sarolea to embrace it personally. A social climber with an inflated view of his own self-importance, he placed inordinate stress on personal contacts, however fleeting, with aristocrats, royals, and major public figures. 104

Sarolea's contribution to The Scotsman debate on sanctions bore no traces of sympathy with Fascism per se, or even of admiration for the person of Mussolini. 105 Although there were hints of Italophile themes in passing references to Italy's past friendship and the repudiation of her wartime promises, he did not concern himself either with the restoration of good Anglo-Italian relations or conditions in Abyssinia. Sarolea was no Italophile, and his lack of reference to these themes reflected a genuine disinterest. The Abyssinian dispute for him was primarily fuel for his demand for League reconstruction. Nevertheless, his elaborate intellectual critique was in large part disingenuous, for he merely hinted at the root cause of his antagonism towards the League of Nations, namely his belief that it was being manipulated to serve the interests of world communism.

Nevertheless, Sarolea's lack of genuine interest in Italy per se did not prevent him from seeking sponsorship from official Italian sources, now that he had established his credentials with his Scotsman articles. Although it later improved, the first wave of Italian propaganda for British consumption had been singularly inappropriate. Its overemphasis on the primitive and barbaric aspects of Abyssinia
had served to draw attention to the inequality of the military struggle. More importantly, the unpleasant photographs used to illustrate the point had "caused indignation against the disseminators of the photographs instead of the perpetrators of the barbarities." Sarolea clearly saw an opportunity to market his own handiwork, which he believed to be immeasurably superior to these "stupid" pamphlets which "cannot possibly be understood by the English mind." He may also have anticipated that under the circumstances the Italians would be likely to be generous patrons. However, in view of his official capacity as Belgian Consul, he felt unable to directly offer his services in writing, and instead pointedly enclosed reprints of his Scotsman letters in a request for information on the Italian viewpoint to the Italian ambassador, Dino Grandi. When this approach failed to yield immediate results, he dropped the broadest of hints to the Italian Consul in Glasgow, Ferrucio Luppis, informing him that he was hoping to bring out his Scotsman letters in pamphlet form. Within days Sarolea received an offer to handle publication from Carlo Camagna, the editor of the British-Italian Bulletin, a propaganda broadsheet produced by the staff of L'Italia Nostra, the journal of the Fascist organisation for Italians living in Britain. Sarolea's Scotsman letters were in fact merely off-cuts from a much larger manuscript on the failings of the League, which he had been working on since September. Having hooked his publisher, Sarolea now persuaded Camagna to take the larger work as well. Despite this promising start, Sarolea's co-operation with the Italian propaganda network proved to be short-lived. Disagreements soon arose over the lay-out of the larger piece, with Sarolea much concerned to avoid it having "a foreign appearance," and when the pamphlet of The Scotsman letters came out containing only one of them, and that in severely "mutilated" form, Sarolea indignantly broke off the connection. Despite pleas to reconsider from Gino Gario, the principal director of Italian propaganda activity in Britain, Sarolea remained obdurrate. His outrage at the mutilation of The Scotsman letters was in all probability simply a convenient excuse to take advantage of a better offer. The larger piece was subsequently published in the spring of 1936 in booklet form by the International Publishing Company, as The Policy of Sanctions and the Failure of the League of Nations.

Advocacy of the Italophile viewpoint also received intellectual support, in the shape of Hugh Sellon, the apostle of corporatism. After praising Sarolea's "admirable" critique, he refuted the sanctionist argument that Abyssinian security
was interlinked with that of the smaller European states. Abyssinian backwardness, he claimed, rendered the comparison null and void. Her entry to the League had been a mistake, now "generally admitted," and conditions in the non-Amharic regions were certainly bad enough "to point to the desirability of their being reorganised by European rule under a League mandate." Italy, of course, was the unspoken candidate for this role.115 Italy's aggression Sellon justified on the grounds that her territorial requirements had not been met by Versailles, and the effective sanctification of that treaty by the League had left Italy with no alternative. "No Power, unless it happens to be permanently satisfied with its territorial conditions, can be expected permanently to observe the Covenant, if that Covenant is, in actual fact, so operated as to preclude all territorial adjustments in the future." The fatal weakness of the League, he argued, was that it primarily served the purposes of those nations which were "satisfied with the status quo and consequently wish to preserve the peace which guarantees that status quo." If Italy were forced to withdraw from Abyssinia, not only would it cause "anarchy and untold suffering in Italy," but "The victory of the status quo Powers, acting through the machinery of Geneva, might divide the world definitely into two hostile groups of satisfied and dissatisfied nations, and the Abyssinian war might be the prelude to a world conflict."116

This critique of the League's composition differed significantly from the arguments of the isolationist imperialist critics. The isolationists stressed its incompleteness, and therefore its weakness and the unfairly heavy burden of responsibility which Britain had to carry. Sellon's argument stressed its injustice, and placed Britain in the role of the guilty accomplice. This "have" and "have not" theory, as reiterated by later commentators, often of Italophile or Germanophile views, was invariably accompanied by calls for concessions to the dissatisfied. Where these demands were at the expense of Imperial interests they were strenuously resisted by the Empire isolationists.

A somewhat idiosyncratic contribution to the anti-sanctions case was that provided by Dr. A.J. Brock. At first sight Brock's views appear to be fairly typical of the "realist" pacifists of the Right. He predicted two possible outcomes to the Abyssinian dispute. Either the League would press on with sanctions, leading to world war and "the destruction of civilisation as we know it," or "Abyssinia is going to be partitioned, the lion's share going to Italy." Hoare's plan he praised as an intelligent choice of the lesser evil. He was also highly critical of the "bellicose"
pacifists of the LNU, claiming that the Abyssinian crisis had demonstrated "that a pacifist crowd may be as dangerous to the world's peace as a professedly militarist one." However, in his development of this theme in analysing the root causes of Europe's apparent slide towards war, Brock markedly parts company with his fellow anti-sanctionists. The problem lay, he believed, in "crowd psychology," and in particular in its developed form of nationalism, or "statism" as he preferred to label it. The League of Nations could not begin to address this problem, for the "cure for too much Statism is not super but sub-Statism." Decentralisation and the reconstruction of society on a basis that "ensures local development and personal development primarily" was his prescribed solution. This process, he urged, "be called positively 'back to the land'," and he meant it literally, as he later called for a mass exodus from the great conurbations. Although Brock's presentation was somewhat idiosyncratic, the content of his contribution was not. He belonged to a Distributist circle and his views reflected the distaste for industrialisation and the eulogies to a mediaeval, rural, and Catholic society to be found in the writings of Belloc and G.K. Chesterton.

During the parliamentary debate on the 19th December which followed Hoare's apologia, the opponents of sanctions in the Commons refrained from comment. They did, however, have a recent convert in their ranks, Katherine Marjory Stewart-Ramsay, the sixty-one year old Duchess of Atholl and MP for Kinross and West Perthshire.

To the outside world Atholl's husband, the 8th Duke of Atholl was a feudal magnate of semi-regal proportions. Covering much of Perthshire, at 202,000 acres the Atholl estate was one of the largest in Scotland. Visitors to Blair Castle, the Atholls' ancestral seat, were still entertained on ceremonial occasions by the mustering of the Atholl Highlanders, the only private army in Britain and a picturesque reminder of a past social order. In reality, however, the Atholls were on their financial uppers. Inheriting massive debts from his father, the 8th Duke had compounded his financial problems with unsuccessful speculative ventures, and by the late 1920s his accumulated debts were almost as large as the total value of the estate. In 1932, alarmed by the sale of land and family heirlooms, Lady Cowdray, a relative of his assumed eventual successor, had stepped in to prevent insolvency, clearing debts of nearly £400,000. The price of rescue, however, was loss of effective control of the estate, which thereafter was managed
as a private company by professional agents. As part of an austerity package the Atholls moved into Eastwood House near Dunkeld while Blair Castle was leased to paying customers.122

Financial distress, however, did not prevent the family maintaining a feudal interest in local politics. Prior to his elevation to the Lords, the 8th Duke had been Conservative MP for Kinross and West Perthshire between 1910 and 1917. Subsequently he became President of the constituency Unionist Association. The Duchess of Atholl followed in her husband's parliamentary footsteps in 1923, successfully defending the seat again in 1924, 1929 and 1931. A capable and diligent worker to the point of being a workaholic, as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education between 1924 and 1929, she did much to compensate for the lack of political acumen of her chief, Lord Eustace Percy. In the process, however, she also acquired a reputation for overly long and somewhat pedagogic parliamentary addresses. Although breaking new ground for women as the first female Conservative to hold ministerial office, socially and politically Atholl was a reactionary.123 Originally opposed to the whole concept of votes for women, in 1924 she voted against the lowering of the age limit for female suffrage.124 Nevertheless, she was not hidebound by convention. After 1929 her investigations, as a member of the Committee for the Protection of Coloured Women in the Colonies, persuaded her to embark on a vigorous campaign to draw parliament's attention to the suffering caused by the practice of female circumcision in Kenya. Her enthusiasm for the subject did nothing to improve her popularity with her male colleagues. It was an augury of things to come. Impelled by a high moral seriousness, Atholl throughout her political career was incapable of concessions to political expediency which involved any sacrifice of principle, and she pursued her chosen line with a complete disregard for any personal unpopularity she might incur.

In the early 1930s Atholl developed an outspokenly anti-communist stance. Initially concerned over the impact of Soviet "dumping" of timber and agricultural produce on British producers, Atholl's chairmanship of a parliamentary sub-committee on Russian Trade prompted her to undertake an investigation into conditions in the Soviet Union in general, and the publication of The Conscription of a People,125 an indictment of conditions in Soviet forced labour camps.126 This in turn led to patronage of the Russian Red Cross, a society catering for
Russian émigrés in distress, \(127\) and involvement, as Joint-President, in the Christian Protest Movement, an organisation formed in 1929 with the express purpose of drawing attention to the communist threat to religion. \(128\) In view of her later championship of the cause of the Spanish Republic, there is a certain irony in the fact that one of Atholl's first initiatives, as a member of the latter body, was an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the executive committee to officially denounce communist involvement in church-burning and other anti-religious activity in Spain. \(129\)

Atholl's increasingly outspoken anti-communism was paralleled by a growing disenchchantment with what she viewed as the socialistic drift of the National Government's legislative programme, particularly where its agricultural policies were concerned. In the summer of 1935 she produced the pamphlet, *The Menace of the Planning Movement*, with the assistance of the Liberty Restoration League. \(130\) She was also strongly opposed to the Government of India Bill, partly because her work, as a member of the Committee for the Protection of Coloured Women in the Colonies, had persuaded her that India was too socially backward to be ready for the degree of self-government under consideration, and partly because she feared the weakening of British rule in India could result in civil strife and the opening of the sub-continent to communist invasion. \(131\) At the end of 1933 she presented her case in the pamphlet, *The Main Facts of the Indian Problem*. Although initially disinclined to join the Conservative rebels in the India Defence League, in the course of 1934 Atholl moved decisively into the Die-Hard camp. In January 1935 she spoke on Randolph Churchill's behalf at Wavertree, and four months later, together with five other Conservative MPs, she renounced the Conservative Whip.

The onset of the Abyssinian crisis, however, persuaded Atholl of the need to demonstrate solidarity with the government, and in September she reapplied for the Conservative Whip. The following month she announced her whole-hearted support for the government's policy of co-operation with the League of Nations, and condemned the Italian invasion as "one of the most cold-blooded actions the modern world has seen." \(132\) By November, however, she had cooled a little, and was reported as referring to "the happy circumstance that the sanctions agreed upon were economic and entirely non-military." \(133\) When the Hoare-Laval proposals appeared, Atholl greeted them enthusiastically. Countering the series of critical
motions which appeared in the House of Commons, she tabled one stating, "That this House approves the declared policy of His Majesty's Government, aiming at the early restoration of peace in Europe." She defended the government's endorsement of the plan as fully in keeping with Baldwin's earlier pledges "to keep us out of war with Italy, and to end the Abyssinian conflict as soon as possible." During the critical meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on December 17th, such was her enthusiasm for the plan that it was effectively counterproductive. According to Harold Nicolson, "The Duchess of Atholl spoke in favour of the agreement in terms that persuaded many to oppose it."

After the repudiation of the proposals Atholl launched an offensive on the whole policy of sanctions. In addition to her parliamentary speeches and letters to the press, she also distributed reprints of Charles Sarolea's Scotsman letters to other right-wing Conservative MPs. Initially Atholl was prepared to assist in the publication of more of Sarolea's material. The project, however, was still-born, partly because of Atholl's insistence on the removal of derogatory references to Baldwin, and partly because of personality clashes between the two. "I am not going to be ruled or overruled by our Dear Duchess," Sarolea fumed.

Atholl's change of mind on the subject of sanctions against Italy did not imply conversion to isolationism. On the contrary, she urged continued participation in the League, but argued that the League should be underpinned by "regional pacts of mutual assistance," which she believed offered "a much more effective form of 'collective security'." Locarno, she pointed out, provided a suitable precedent. In her exposition of this theme the real reason for her change of stance emerges. Regional pacts, "covering, if possible, the whole of Europe," would be "a much more effective guarantee of the continued independence of Austria or other European countries than a policy of sanctions." Like Amery before her, Atholl had concluded that the strategic need to meet "the renewed German menace" took precedence over any other factor in determining policy over Abyssinia. Not only could Britain ill-afford to deplete her strength against Italy, but in her reference to Austria Atholl was hinting at the need to resecure active Italian co-operation in containing German expansion.

Atholl's fears concerning Germany pre-dated the Nazi takeover. In 1932,
despite her public sympathy for the sufferings of the subject peoples of the Soviet Union, she had refused to lend her moral support to Vladimir Korostovetz's Ukrainian Nationalist Committee, because she "felt sure Korostovetz's movement must be backed by Germany." With the advent of Nazism her alarm had grown. Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference at the end of 1933 had prompted her to campaign vigorously for rearmament, and in 1934 she had eschewed opposition to Russia's application to join the League of Nations, because she believed Russia "was probably coming into the League to seek safety from a possible attack on the Ukraine." Atholl's general suspicions of Germany, however, were radically reinforced in the autumn of 1935 by her discovery of the unexpurgated version of Mein Kampf. In 1935-36 the only English language edition available to the public had been severely censored to omit Hitler's more extravagant claims to Lebensraum. The fact that the Foreign Office despatched translations of the offending passages to Atholl five days before the news of the Hoare-Laval agreement broke, gives an indication of the timing of her "enlightenment." In itself this does not explain her volte-face over Abyssinia. She had already cooled in her pro-sanctions line as the threat of war increased. It does, perhaps, explain the vigour of the transformation.

The eclipse of the anti-sanctionists in the Commons on the 19th December was not paralleled in the Lords' debate on the same day. As in October, the English Italophiles spoke up, and Mansfield represented isolationist opinion. Mansfield's IPG had telegraphed support for the Hoare-Laval proposals when they first appeared. Now he lamented that "a bold and constructive effort to obtain peace" had been thrown over simply because the Government had been "hoodwinked and bamboozled by this flood of criticism against them." If only they had persisted in this policy, "perhaps within a few days, they would have found the bulk of the country behind them." When he turned to a general discourse on the Abyssinian dispute, Mansfield's anti-communism was much in evidence. Also, for the first time since the outbreak of the Abyssinian war, Mansfield coupled his opposition to sanctions with positive endorsement of the Italian régime. Should the Italians meet with failure in Abyssinia, it "would mean the end of the régime of Signor Mussolini in Italy." He continued, "I think we should remember that not so many years ago he saved Italy, and indeed a considerable section of Europe, from Bolshevism, and I cannot see that it would be for the interests either of this country or of European peace that his régime should fall in a short space of time with a
resounding crash." Fascism, he claimed, would be replaced by "some form of Red tyranny." Appreciation of the role played both by Italy and Germany in resisting the communist menace would become a recurrent theme on the Conservative Right during the course of 1936. Mansfield was merely one of the first to expound it.

Mansfield also dwelt at length on the dangers to Imperial interests which the defeat by natives "of one of the great white nations" would promote. "It would produce in Japan and in various parts of the globe repercussions which would not be to the benefit of the white races. It would render more difficult the working of our already perilous Constitution in India. It would arouse throughout Equatorial Africa fresh subversive movements ... and it would also mean that our own Empire in East Africa would be menaced long after the conclusion of hostilities by vast numbers of Abyssinian irregulars, for the first time armed with modern weapons." The imperialist camp had initially been divided by the Abyssinian war. While the anti-League isolationists favoured the anti-sanctions cause, those "who saw in the threatened annexation of Abyssinia a menace to British interests in Africa," and believed that the growth of Italian power "was a threat to the Empire's lifeline through the Mediterranean," pressed for tough action against Mussolini. The mouthpiece of this last group was The Times, which "gave its full support to Hoare, so long as he followed his September line, and became his fiercest critic when he abandoned it." In the aftermath of the Hoare-Laval débâcle, Waley contends, these imperialists gravitated to the anti-sanctions side, as "second thoughts suggested that the threat to Britain's prestige in Africa presented by Italian ambitions was less serious than a possibility of a successful defiance by Africans of Europeans."

The abandonment of Hoare's proposals and his subsequent resignation proved to be a hollow victory for the League's supporters. Despite the appointment of Eden as Foreign Secretary and declarations of renewed commitment to sanctions, the dent to British prestige and its own credibility, which the fiasco had occasioned, induced the government to opt for a lower profile at Geneva. Britain would "keep in step with the League" but no more, and as the new French government continued Laval's policy of delay, the sanctions offensive ground to a halt. With Anglo-French resolve on the issue seriously discredited, other countries adjusted their policy accordingly. On January 18th Congress passed a much modified version of

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the neutrality legislation they had been considering, thus declaring their intention not to co-operate on the proposed oil sanction. Deprived of American support, the imposition of oil sanctions was likely to prove ineffectual, and, it was argued, needlessly provocative. At French insistence the matter was deferred, permanently, as it transpired. Existing levels of sanctions were, for the moment, retained, but in view of their obvious ineffectiveness in restraining the aggressor, all they achieved was a none-too-convincing display of moral solidarity.

After mid-January public interest in the Abyssinian war dropped away again. The widely held belief that it would be a long war and the League's procrastination over oil sanctions helped to rob the issue of any real sense of immediacy. With the death of George V on January 20th attention shifted back to domestic affairs.

The House of Commons returned to the subject of Abyssinia on February 24th. As in the October debate, Leo Amery delivered the most telling indictment of the government's policy, concentrating once again on the strategic implications. He was strongly supported by John McGovern, who declared he would rather have "his [Amery's] policy of isolation than the policy of pretence" which cloaked ulterior capitalist motives. McGovern further declared, "When I am told of Hitlerism and Mussolini, I see no difference in capitalism in any part of the world." The claim that there was no essential difference between the fascist régimes and the exploitative capitalism of the Western democracies would resurface regularly in ILP comment on British foreign policy over the next three years. The ILP was not ideologically sympathetic to fascism, for it vehemently condemned all forms of "capitalism." Nevertheless, in continually reiterating this theme, it was pursuing a parallel course to those apologists of the Nazi régime who sought to minimise its more radical or disreputable attributes. It was, in effect, a "negative apologia."

Capt. J.H.F. McEwan, the Conservative MP for Berwickshire, also voiced his fears about a policy which, he claimed, he had always regarded "with anxiety, not unmixed with misgiving." In considering the Abyssinian dispute he urged his fellow MPs not to "be blinded by it or to forget that there are other and potentially infinitely graver issues." Like the Duchess of Atholl, he considered that the threat posed by Germany should be the overriding concern. Germany's rearmament was "very disquieting," and her commitment to "the maintenance of the peace" as questionable as her interest in "the liberty of the subject." McEwen was clearly

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worried about the growth of pro-German sentiment in Britain. "It is not enough to know," he remarked, "as we are assured by a certain Noble Lord who has just returned from having an interview with Herr Hitler, that Germany, for instance, has no aggressive intentions towards this country. We want to be assured rather that she has peaceful intentions towards all countries." He denounced those who had been swayed by German military strength. That line of reasoning, he declared, was "particularly spineless." McEwen did not go as far as to advocate the abandonment of sanctions, and urged continuing British support for "the front which has been assumed in the face of aggression," but with "no less a matter than Western and Christian civilisation" at stake, he spoke strongly against any escalation of sanctions, such as an oil sanction or the closure of the Suez Canal. In the future, he considered it highly probable that Article 16 would have to be put "into cold storage." It was of paramount importance, he argued, that Britain should maintain "the closest possible co-operation with France, because, failing such cooperation, the League of Nations itself ceases to exist." In effect he was saying, "Push too hard for tougher sanctions and you will alienate the French." This was a very different argument from French "wobbliness," as expounded by isolationists such as Mansfield. Although he presented the need for Anglo-French co-operation as necessary for the League's preservation, McEwen was more concerned with the maintenance of an Anglo-French entente for its own sake. The survival of the League, however desirable, was secondary. For McEwen, "the frontiers of civilisation" included "little more than this country and France."

Born in 1894, John Helias Finnie McEwen, or "Jock" McEwen as he was known to his colleagues, was a Berwickshire landowner and one of the rising young men of the Conservative Party. Entering Parliament for the first time in the Tory landslide of 1931, since 1933 he had acted as Parliamentary Private Secretary to R.A. Butler, the Under-Secretary of State for India. A former career diplomat, McEwen was a regular and respected contributor to foreign affairs debates in the Commons. A sensitive and scholarly individual, and something of a poet, his approach to politics was largely shaped by deep religious convictions. Although at this time still a member of the Church of Scotland, he was strongly influenced by his wife's Catholicism, and later in life would himself convert to that faith. Politically McEwen's views placed him on the Centre-Right of the Conservative Party. Although a loyal government supporter, he was also a contributor to the English Review, and was an enthusiastic exponent of the
monarchic principle. "Monarchy," he declared, "is per se, a Christian form of government; Republicanism is equally, per se, anti-Christian." McEwen's enthusiasm for France, however, which stemmed from an abiding passion for French culture and civilisation, was undimmed by any distaste for French constitutional preferences.

McEwen's decision to publicly voice his concern about the possible damage to Anglo-French relations of an overzealous pursuit of sanctions may have been prompted to some extent by the behind the scenes lobbying of another Francophile, Lady Marie Louise Maxwell-Scott, who in January had brought Charles Sarolea's Scotsman letters to his attention. The wife of Maj.-Gen. Sir Walter Maxwell-Scott of Abbotsford, Lady Maxwell-Scott was something of a cosmopolitan character. The daughter of an American professional soldier, she had spent much of her life in France with her first husband, a Walloon millionaire, and had passionately embraced French nationality. To be French, she believed, "is the greatest honour that can be borne on earth ... I have only one point of view on every and any question: Is it for the benefit or harm of France?" Vehemently anti-communist, she was a devout Catholic, believing religion to be the "first essential ingredient" in politics. Prone to paraphrasing G.K. Chesterton and Maurice Barrès, her political views were strongly shaped by the aristocratic and reactionary French Catholic circles in which she had formerly moved, and with which she still maintained contact. She was also regularly in receipt of French right-wing papers, including the xenophobic, anti-republican and anti-semitic Gringoire. Her preference for Catholic régimes of an authoritarian stamp, however, did not presuppose a particular fondness for the vulgarities of fascism, even where a strong Catholic orientation was present, as in the case of the Belgian Rexists. As for the Nazis, they were "horrible fanatics."

Maxwell-Scott's overriding concern was the threat to France from a resurgent Germany, and her opposition to sanctions was based on fears of an Italo-German convergence. To Charles Sarolea she confided, "I'm not afraid of Germany alone this year. But what if Italy can entice her to act with Italy now, in April or May? That would change the fact of her not having sufficient supplies to fight alone yet." However, she may also have had some genuine Italophile leanings, for there are hints in her public contributions to the anti-sanctions campaign of a certain admiration for the person of Mussolini, if not for the Fascist system per se. She
would also later be listed as a member of "Peritalia," an association formed in November 1935 by expatriate Americans and Britons in Italy, "whose sense of justice and knowledge of Italy moved them to challenge the anti-Italian attitude of the world." 169

Maxwell-Scott was a key figure in the anti-sanctions campaign in Scotland. Her importance did not lie in her public contribution to the debate, which was unremarkable, but in lobbying skills which were supported by an extensive social network on both sides of the Channel. In France her list of aristocratic connections included the Comtesse de Chambrun, wife of the French Ambassador to Italy,170 and the Comte d'Ormesson, the foreign political editor of Le Temps and Le Figaro.171 Working in harness with Charles Sarolea after the appearance of his Scotsman letters, Maxwell-Scott facilitated the dissemination of his political tracts, both to politicians and senior members of the Catholic Church.172 Among the more notable recipients were leading anti-sanctions campaigners, Leo Amery, Lord Hardinge, Sir Ronald Graham and Sir Edward Grigg.173 Co-operation between Sarolea and Maxwell-Scott also resulted in a public meeting at Sarolea's house in Edinburgh on May 5th 1936.174 The principal speaker was Maj. E.W. Polson Newman, perhaps the most effective and certainly the most industrious Italophile propagandist.175 The Edinburgh meeting, at which Maxwell-Scott also delivered a speech, was part of a larger Scottish tour by Newman. Addresses to Rotary Clubs in Dunfermline, Dumfries, Stirling and Kilmarnock were also on the itinerary.176

The vigour of Maxwell-Scott's campaigning, and Capt. McEwen's expressed concern over sanctions, reflect the alarm in British Francophile circles at this period over the growing deterioration in relations between the two countries. With memories of the cavalier manner in which Britain had negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement without prior consultation still relatively fresh,177 the unilateral British rejection of the Hoare-Laval proposals caused considerable indignation in France.178 The suspicion that Britain was using the machinery of the League against Italy purely for reasons of Imperial self-interest and a more general distrust of British intentions and dependability were gaining widespread acceptance. The reactionary right in particular was positively effusive in its Anglophobia.179

There was a parallel growth of anti-French feeling in Britain. Many exponents of sanctions felt that the French were letting Britain down by failing to provide
adequate support for the sanctions policy. French reluctance to lose Italian friendship was denounced as gross self-interest. One ardent champion of sanctions referred to "the perpetual stultifying of British generosity by French selfishness." There was also alarm in Conservative circles over the Franco-Soviet Pact. Not only did they fear that too "cordiale" an entente with France could embroil Britain in the event of hostilities in Eastern Europe, they saw the existence of the Pact as indicative of Soviet influence in France. The spread of anti-French feeling in Britain was interlinked with McEwen's other target, the growth of pro-Germanism. The one fuelled the other.

The subject of the Franco-Soviet Pact had appeared in the House of Lords a few days before McEwen's speech, as part of Mansfield's continuing campaign against sanctions. It was, he said, "One of the unfortunate effects of the policy which has been adopted towards Italy ... that the French, seeing their newly-achieved friendship with Italy likely to vanish, have been seeking to establish more cordial relations with Soviet Russia." The result of this had been "to cause great resentment in Germany and to make quite responsible people in that country threaten at no distant date to occupy the demilitarised areas by the Rhine." Europe was in a potentially explosive condition, he argued. A recent tour of European capitals had given him "an impression that the whole of Central Europe is in a state of panic, each country suspecting that war may break out almost immediately." All it needed was a trigger, and the imposition of the oil sanction, he believed, would do just that.

On March 8th Mansfield's prediction concerning the Rhineland was fulfilled. It did not spark off a European "conflagration," but it did postpone any question of further action against Italy as far as the British government was concerned, and buried it from the French point of view. Further consideration of sanctions was overtaken by events. In early April the Abyssinian armies crumbled. On May 2nd Haile Selassie fled the country, and a few days later the Italians entered Addis Abbaba.

The Abyssinian collapse prompted many Conservative MPs, who had hitherto supported sanctions, to conclude that the time had now come to recognise a fait accompli. One such was Robert Boothby. Boothby's lack of enthusiasm for indigenous Fascism extended to its continental varieties. Nor was he an Italophile,
being, in his own words, "essentially, Nordic" in temperament. Boothby had not been in the forefront of demands for sanctions, but he had given them his support, and had opposed the Hoare-Laval proposals in December. Now, however, he declared that "the kindest thing to everybody, and above all to the Abyssinians, would be to face up to it and say that this time at any rate sanctions have failed. The important thing to do now is to bring the war to a close at any cost because no one is going to fight for Abyssinia." An oil sanction at this late stage, he believed, would achieve nothing but a rupture with France. Echoing Capt. McEwen's earlier comments on the undesirability of that eventuality, he stated his belief that "the peace of the world and the state of civilisation ultimately depends on co-operation between Britain and France." 

By May the drift of Government supporters into the anti-sanctionist camp had become a flood. Austen Chamberlain, the Conservative éminence grise in foreign affairs, led the way. On May 6th he queried what the continuation of sanctions would achieve, except "some kind of platonic satisfaction." It was too late. "You cannot rebuild Abyssinia as it was." According to Sir Henry Page Croft, Chamberlain's views "represented 95 out of every 100 back-bench Conservatives in this House." 

During April and early May anti-sanctionist contributions to The Scotsman largely reiterated themes which had been expressed before. Sir Patrick Ford, however, returned to the debate with a new theme, the lack of enthusiasm in the Dominions for the sanctions policy. He quoted an Australian paper, the Sydney Bulletin, as saying, "The Dominions are unquestionably with Britain in any threat to the British Commonwealth, but emphatically not with Britain in the sort of war that British foreign policy has blundered along the crust of in the past seven months." By mid-May anti-sanctionist comment was centring on recognition of the "fait accompli." Mansfield's IPG launched a vigorous offensive. Sanctions, they claimed, had failed. Indeed, they "never at any time came within measurable distance of modifying his [Mussolini's] policy or of stopping the war." Anticipating that the cancellation of sanctions was inevitable, the isolationists were already moving into the final stage of the campaign — the demand for League reconstruction. The recognition of the failure of the sanctions policy, argued Sir Patrick Ford, implied a parallel realisation that the League would have to be rebuilt, shorn of its coercive powers. The IPG also took this line. The call for
League reform was not a new theme. Ford himself had voiced it in October 1935 and it had recurred throughout the Abyssinian war. Now it became the focus of isolationist attention, and they would continue to expound it after the Abyssinian episode had effectively closed.

With pressure building up from the back benches, it was only a matter of time before Cabinet dropped sanctions. Introducing the guest speaker, Neville Chamberlain, at a meeting of the Conservative 1900 Club on June 10th, the chairman, Sir Robert Horne, referred to sanctions. "When there is a corpse in your midst it is better to bury it." Chamberlain was of the same opinion. The continuation of sanctions, he declared, would be "the very midsummer of madness." Cabinet was not of a mind to disown its Chancellor. On June 18th the decision to end sanctions was announced. Although this provoked an indignant response from Labour and Liberal critics, there was general unanimity in the government ranks. The Argyllshire MP, F.A. Macquisten, spoke for the Conservative back-benches when he stated bluntly, "As the Abyssinians are defeated sanctions must go." In the formal vote of censure on the 23rd there were only two Conservative rebels.

The decision to end sanctions sparked off a renewed flurry of correspondence to The Scotsman from supporters of the League and champions of the Abyssinian cause. Outraged clergymen, indignant at what they saw as the immoral betrayal of Abyssinia, were strongly to the fore. The response, however, was much weaker than that which had greeted the Hoare-Laval plan. Within a fortnight comment on Abyssinia had virtually ceased. Curiously, the opponents of sanctions did not trumpet their victory. The only notably exultant contribution came from the Italophile, Hugh Sellon, who proclaimed, "the military and economic strength of Italy has been demonstrated to the world." Conceivably, Conservative critics did not wish to embarrass their Government now that it had chosen to see the light.

The termination of sanctions was followed by severe internal disruptions in the League of Nations Union. Austen Chamberlain's resignation from the central executive of the LNU, on May 5th, had heralded a steady erosion of moderate Conservative support for that body, which paralleled the drift of Conservative MPs into the anti-sanctions lobby. When the central executive resolved to continue the call for sanctions, despite the Government's decision, it triggered a series of
resignations by Conservatives from local branches. Justifying his resignation from the chairmanship of the Scottish Council of the LNU, the Earl of Home declared that the continuation of sanctions "would surely achieve nothing but the intense resentment of the Italian people and the embitterment of the hearts of their children against the children of other nations." A month later Home formally denounced the LNU. "For the Union to continue to criticise and to condemn the League it was formed to support and the British Government for its share in the League's collective responsibility, is ... contrary to its basic thought and its chartered aim." A deeply religious man, who considered "the purpose of life was to give service to other people," Home's personal decision to resign was prompted by an absolute abhorrence of war. Although not an active member of the Conservative Party, Home was fairly representative of those Conservatives whose involvement with the LNU stemmed from religious or high moral principles, and who now found themselves out of sympathy with what was seen as the increasingly belligerent attitude of the central executive. His formal condemnation of the LNU executive was endorsed by an impressive list of Scottish Conservatives who had formerly held office in the LNU.

The coalition of forces which had opposed the sanctions policy had also started to break up, one of the most dramatic examples of this being the bitter clashes between the Duchess of Atholl and members of the IPG over the latter's isolationism, which erupted in June. Although the war in Abyssinia had not ended, and indeed guerilla warfare lingered on until the British conquest of Italian East Africa in 1941, the termination of sanctions brought the Abyssinian dispute to a close as a matter for serious public debate. In the summer of 1936 the Spanish Civil War, which broke out in July, and attitudes to Germany would dominate public discussion. On these issues new alignments would be formed.

In the aftermath of the Hoare-Laval Plan's rejection the Scottish nationalist and Social Credit enthusiast, George Dott, declared his belief that there was a fundamental difference in Scottish and English responses to the Abyssinian war. From the outset, Dott claimed, Scotland's response had been one of "immediate and passionate hatred of injustice, and a warm sympathy with a small nation — a feeling that the small nation must not be abandoned to its fate." While there was "undoubtedly a large 'isolationist' party in England," there was "no such party" in Scotland, although Dott qualified his use of the term "isolationist." He referred, he
stated, to those "who believe in isolation as a principle, not merely as an expediency." Dott was predisposed to "observe" a difference of this kind, since his principal point in raising the issue was to highlight Scotland's inability to express itself as a nation on foreign policy issues. "Scotland," he claimed, "at once felt a sense of international responsibility — and found herself handicapped with a suffocating inability to express it." However, Dott's proclivities aside, was he right? Was there a fundamental difference between Scottish and English responses to the Abyssinian war? Was opposition to sanctions weaker in Scotland?

One possible pointer to a difference between Scottish and English responses lies in the nature of Conservative propaganda during the November elections. Although in the more prosperous parts of England National Government candidates often stressed League commitment, largely as a justification for rearmament, it did not feature so strongly in Scotland. Domestic issues predominated, Government candidates resting their case primarily on evidence of economic recovery and the reduction in unemployment. Rearmament did crop up, but in addition to being defended on the grounds of British security, it was also marketed as a much-needed stimulus for the depressed heavy industries. Neville Chamberlain stressed this theme in an electoral address in Glasgow.207 If the Conservative strategists were accurate in their assessment of their target group, this suggests that Scottish voters, far from being more intimately interested in international affairs than English voters, were on the contrary more interested in bread and butter issues, and if anything inclined to greater indifference as to the fate of Abyssinia.

Evidence of greater indifference, if such it was, does not provide any clues as to the relative strengths of the opposing viewpoints on Abyssinia. None of the Scottish Conservatives who opposed sanctions were exactly political heavyweights. On the other hand, the Conservative Party in Scotland was, as previously noted, somewhat short of political heavyweights in general, and Atholl, Mansfield and McEwen were three of its more distinguished members. McEwen in particular was respected for his views on foreign affairs. The prominence or otherwise of its leading exponents in any event does not necessarily provide much of a guide to the strength of popular anti-sanctions feeling. However, the quantity of anti-sanctions contributions to The Scotsman alone in the December debate does suggest the existence of a substantial body of isolationist opinion in Scotland. Moreover, it is difficult to see any real evidence of Dott's distinction between "principled" as
opposed to "expedient" isolationists. Mansfield and Ford were certainly "principled" isolationists, and unless fear of communism is categorised as an "expedient" factor, a "principled," if frequently unintellectual, opposition to collective security, rather than concern over British defence inadequacies, or other "expedient" motives, was present in the majority of cases.

There were, however, distinctive features to the anti-sanctions campaign in Scotland. Fundamentalist nationalists provided a uniquely Scottish voice. The ILP, in the absence of a parliamentary representation outwith Scotland, by default made a uniquely Scottish contribution to the debates in the Commons. It was also a genuinely Scottish contribution, for the party line on sanctions had very much been dictated by the parliamentary caucus. The most significant aspect of the anti-sanctions campaign in Scotland, however, is the relative weakness of pro-Italian opinion. The principal "strategic" friends of Italy, McEwen and Atholl, bear only a passing resemblance to Leo Amery and his coterie. Both were motivated above all by fear of Germany. In Atholl's case Nazi imperialism was the paramount threat. For McEwen, a passionate Francophile, the Nazi threat compounded an deeply ingrained suspicion of Germany. Amery and his circle were strongly influenced by a desire to maintain Italy as a possible counterweight to Germany, but they were not intrinsically anti-German, and they were also positively pro-Italian in a way Atholl and McEwen were not. In contrast with England there was no significant Italophile camp in Scotland. Isolationists did employ Italophile themes, and some were prepared to make moderately pro-Fascist statements. However, Mansfield's endorsement of Fascism's role in countering the communist menace was about as enthusiastic as they went, and many isolationists were strongly critical of both Italian aggression and Mussolini's régime. Comment from sources with a real ideological empathy with Italy's Fascist régime was remarkably rare. Significantly, the two Scots most intimately involved in the Italian propaganda machine's own efforts, namely Charles Sarolea and Lady Maxwell-Scott, were decidedly cosmopolitan figures, and very far from representative of any particular areas of Scottish opinion. Moreover, although they were perhaps the most active of Scotland's anti-sanctions campaigners, they were not primarily motivated by pro-Fascist sympathies. This parallels the apparent absence of a significant pro-Fascist body of opinion in Scotland during the debate on the domestic suitability of Fascism. As in that debate, the only significant pro-Fascist contribution was made by the English Anglo-Catholic, Hugh Sellon.
Chapter 4

Footnotes

1. Notably Chanak and Manchuria.
2. Article 11 concerned League action in the event of war or threat of war.
5. The total electorate was only around 22 million.
18. The paper was at pains to stress that "League action must either be collective or non-existent." It was also highly critical of the enthusiasm in Labour ranks to face up to Fascist aggression. *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 4th October 1935.


24. Although he did not speak during this debate, Charles Emmott, Conservative member for Glasgow Springburn, participated in the deputation led by Amery, which called on Baldwin on October 15th to express concern about the direction of British policy. See The Times, 16th October 1935.

25. In the general election Emmott forsook his marginal Glasgow seat, which fell to Labour, and was comfortably ensconced in the safe Tory seat of East Surrey.


27. The termination of his parliamentary career, after all, did give him a certain degree of independence to speak his mind.

28. Scotsman, 12th October 1935.

29. John Vincent, *The Crawford Papers, The Journals of David Lindsay, Twenty Seventh Earl of Crawford and Tenth Earl of Balcarras 1871-1940, During the Years 1892 to 1940*, Manchester, 1984, p. 566. The reference is to Viscount Hailsham, the Leader of the House of Lords.

30. Notably Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord Mottistone, the Earl of Cavan, and Earl Peel. Lord Newton had also spoken strongly, but had restricted himself to criticism of the League.

31. He did express "disapproval" of the Italian action and did not cite any mitigating factors in their favour.


33. Mansfield was Chairman of the British Trust for Ornithology. Previously, he had acted as Governor of the Edinburgh and East of Scotland College of Agriculture (1925-30) and Director of the Highland and Agricultural Society (1928-32). In 1937 he would become President of the Scottish Chamber of Agriculture.

34. Bruce, op. cit., pp. 50-1, 59.


37. Formed in 1915, the British Empire Union was an outgrowth of the Anti-German Union. The National Citizens Union had originally been formed in 1919 as the Middle Classes Union. Both groups had flourished in the immediate post-war years, amidst Conservative alarm over the rise of Labour and the perceived communist threat. By the early 1930s they had been reduced to bastions of Die-Hardism. See Benewick, op. cit., pp. 39-42.

38. Duchess of Atholl to Col. A.J.K. Todd, 11th March 1937, Atholl Papers

40. Kenneth Hugh de Courcey, b. 1909. IPG secretary and one of the founding members. The other founders were Lord Phillimore, Vt. Clive, Victor Raikes, MP, and Mansfield. With the exception of Phillimore all of them were young men.

41. Robin Ramsay and Stephen Dorril suggest that this reference implied an interest in the Social Credit theories of Maj. C.H. Douglas. De Courcey, they point out, ran a Social Credit bookshop in the 1930s. Lobster, No. 12, [1986].

42. The Times, 24th December 1934. The letter was signed by the members of the IPG executive committee, which at this stage included Sir Patrick Ford and the Earl of Glasgow. Ford's anti-sanctions stance was entirely compatible with IPG policy, but at no time did he claim to speak on behalf of the group.

43. Subsequently underwritten at Stresa.


47. Scotsman, 23rd September 1935.


49. Alistair V. Todd, Vice-President, Edinburgh University Unionist Association, 1937-38.

50. In addition to frontier incursions, they pointed to the disruption of Italian economic activity in Abyssinia. Italian economic rights in the area had long been recognised by both Britain and France.


53. B.H. Piercy, Scotsman, 25th October 1935. Piercy was resident in Sardinia.


55. See, for instance, "Rigoletto," Scotsman, 21st October 1935.
56. *Scotsman*, 28th October 1935. Scotland's Scots-Italian community appears to have steered clear of participation in debate on the Abyssinian war, at least in Edinburgh. In February 1936 Charles Sarolea delivered an address on the international crisis at a formal dinner held by the Edinburgh Fascio. In replying to his invitation to speak, Sarolea took pains to assure the Secretary of the Edinburgh Fascio, Alfonso Crolla, that the content of his address would be strictly non-political. Given Sarolea's usual preference for a highly partisan approach, this would suggest that Crolla had specifically asked him to be as non-controversial as possible. According to Crolla's nephew, Joseph Pia, who was in charge of the Edinburgh Fascio's sporting facilities, Edinburgh's Scots-Italian community was too busy with its business affairs to take much of an interest in politics. The Edinburgh Fascio's premises served as a recreational and community centre and there was no attempt at political education. Married women in the Edinburgh Scots-Italian community, like their counterparts in Italy, contributed their wedding rings as a patriotic gesture to the war effort. Sarolea to Crolla, 4th February 1936, Sarolea Papers (SAR) 88; "The Recollections of Joseph Pia," introduced by Ian MacDougall, Radio Scotland, 7th April 1993.


58. R.E. Muirhead, speech at Elderslie gathering, reported by the *Scots Independent*, October 1935.

59. Finlay, op. cit., p. 183.

60. Roland Eugene Muirhead, b. 1868. One of the founding fathers of the NPS, Muirhead was a key player in nationalist politics in the interwar years. A wealthy tanner, Muirhead provided much needed financial support for the NPS/SNP. The *Scots Independent* was subsequently outraged by the Hoare-Laval Plan and "England's Betrayal of the League of Nations." *Scots Independent*, January 1936.


62. Wendy Wood, b. 1892. A gifted self-publicist, Wood shot to prominence in June 1932, when she "stormed" Stirling Castle at head of small party of demonstrators from the Bannockburn Day gathering and replaced the Union Jack with the Lion Rampant. Her action was condemned by numerous NPS spokesmen for bringing the nationalist movement into disrepute. Shortly afterwards Wood left the NPS and established her own militantly separatist organisation, the Democratic Scottish Self-Government Organisation (DSSO). The following year the DSSO set up the Anti-Conscription League. The purpose of this body was to organise in advance "to ignore, frustrate, and obstruct on a non-violence plan, the attempt to conscript the Scots." It was "not a refuge for those who do not want to fight, but a regiment of those who believe in Scotland's right to peace, who acknowledge the futility of trying to attain it by military force and have sufficient control and courage to make use of up-to-date and more forceful methods." In 1936 the ACL made the dubious claim to have "thousands" of members. *Scots Independent*, April 1936.

64. The Liberal Nationals were down 2, from 35 to 33. The Samuelites, however, dropped from 33 to 17.


66. A back-handed comment. There is an implicit suggestion that Baldwin’s position depends on Britain not getting into a war.


68. French intransigence over the monopoly of their Djibouti railway made a mockery of the planned Abyssinian outlet to the sea.


71. *Scotsman*, 20th December 1935.


74. *Courier and Advertiser*, 11th, 19th and 18th December 1935.

75. *Scotsman*, 27th December 1935.

76. *Scotsman*, 18th December 1935.

77. Waley, op. cit., p. 57.


82. Herbert John Clifford Grierson, b. 1866. Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature at Edinburgh University, 1915-35. Specialist on 17th century poets, and author of numerous books on this and other literary subjects.


84. 1. French occupation of the Ruhr. 2. Polish invasion of Lithuania. 3. Lithuanian seizure of Memel. 4. Greek attack on Asia Minor. 5. Manchurian Incident. 6. German involvement in the Austrian putsch.


87. Sarolea was also famed for the eccentricity of his domestic surroundings. An
estimated 300,000 books, claimed by their owner to form the largest private library in Europe, bedecked every available wall in his vast double mansion in Royal Terrace. Both of the main staircases had been strengthened with iron supports to take the weight of the bookshelves they carried. The floorspace was similarly crammed, with tables loaded with objets d'art and curiosities of every description filling every room. Sarolea's second marriage to Julia Dorman, a member of the steelmaking dynasty of Dorman Long, had secured his finances and enabled him to amply fulfill his collector's passions. For a cameo of Sarolea and his house, see Camnell, op. cit., pp. 84-5.


89. Given his propensity for political outspokenness, Sarolea's decision may not have been entirely his own. As a personal protégé of the Liberal opposition leader, M. Frère-Orban, he may have fallen foul of the ruling Catholic party. It is also possible that even at this early stage Sarolea's personal brand of Liberalism was sufficiently reactionary to render his appointment politically unwise at a moment of acute political sensitivity. Given his subsequent attitude to the undesirability of universal suffrage, it is perhaps significant that his departure for Britain coincided with the establishment of a qualified form of universal suffrage in Belgium.

90. Sarolea to Lady Houston, 15th October 1936, SAR 60.


92. Between 1929 and 1934 Sarolea showed a "fashionable" interest in Scottish Nationalism, to which he gave strong if somewhat detached support. For the Nationalists his European approach to the subject provided diversity, and he was much in demand as a speaker. The artist, sculptor and right-wing Nationalist, W.G. Burn-Murdoch, was a personal friend.

93. Sarolea to Prof. J. Eggen van Terban, 8th April 1939, SAR 233. Even allowing for Sarolea's tendency towards melodrama in describing his personal life, the flamboyance of his departure from Edinburgh University would appear to have cost him the honorary LL.D which would have marked his retirement. W.P. Paterson to Sarolea, 10th March 1932. SAR 172.

94. *Dr. Charles Sarolea, Author, Lecturer, Cosmopolitan*, Pamphlet issued by the Everyman Belgian Relief and Reconstruction Fund, c. 1914, SAR 223. Ostensibly the pamphlet was compiled by "a student." Sarolea, however, was never one to shrink from self-advertisement, and the source of publication and the literary style both point to his authorship.


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98. For his propagandist services on their behalf the Polish government made Sarolea a Knight Commander of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Sarolea's enthusiasm for Czechoslovakia was partly based on a personal friendship with President Masaryk.


100. English Review, April 1929.

101. Charles, Sarolea, The Policy of Sanctions and the Failure of the League of Nations, London, [1936], pp. 43-4. Sarolea believed that the "mob" was quite literally sub-human. In this he was strongly influenced by the French psychologist, Gustave Le Bon, author of The Crowd (1896), who believed that an individual's intellectual performance was seriously impaired in a large group situation. A champion of rationalism, Le Bon's purpose was to draw attention to human susceptibility to emotional manipulation. In so doing, however, he effectively created a text-book for future fascist demagogues. Sarolea, Impressions, p. 258. For the influence of Le Bon, see James Webb, The Occult Establishment, Glasgow, 1981, pp. 11-12, 14.

102. Dr. Charles Sarolea, pamphlet issued by the Everyman Belgian Relief and Reconstruction Fund. See footnote 89.

103. Of Mosley Sarolea later declared, "I have not much belief in the judgement of Mosley, but I admire his courage." In 1933 Sarolea endeavoured to draw press attention to the marriage of his niece, Pamela Dorman, to Mosley's Chief of Staff, Ian Hope Dundas, at the first "Fascist wedding." Sarolea, however, was clearly only acting out of family considerations. The Blackshirt presence, he argued, would provide "a very interesting and picturesque society photograph." Sarolea to Lady Margaret Sackville, 19th July 1939, SAR 233; Sarolea to Mr. Herries, Chief Reporter for The Scotsman, 18th December, 1933, SAR 231.

104. In his youth Sarolea at one point was private secretary to King Leopold II. Later he acted as political adviser to King Albert, accompanying him in that capacity on state visits to Brazil and West Africa in 1920. Sarolea to Prof. Dr. E. Gamillscheg, 8th January 1938, SAR 174.

105. In April 1929 the English Review published Sarolea's account of a somewhat sycophantic personal interview with Mussolini. In it Sarolea acclaimed the Fascist leader as "a master-mind, a true leader of men, endowed with all the gifts of leadership, with a stout heart, a clear brain, a creative imagination, a high sense of duty, and, above all, a passionate love for his native country." Sarolea's admiration for Mussolini, however, would appear to have faded by the mid-1930s.


107. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 9th January 1936, SAR 64.

108. The Italian Embassy did in fact have substantial funds at its disposal for propaganda purposes. Waley, op. cit., pp. 117-8.

109. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 9th January 1936, SAR 64; Sarolea to Grandi, 27th December 1935, SAR 88.

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110. Sarolea to Luppis, 4th January 1936, SAR 88.

111. Camagna to Sarolea, 8th January 1936, SAR 60; Waley, op. cit., p. 119. Camagna was the secretary of the London Fascio.

112. Sarolea to Camagna, 16th and 20th January 1936, SAR 60.

113. Gario to Sarolea, 21st and 31st January 1936, SAR 60. Gario's Centro di Distribuzione was camouflaged as a "cultural" activity under the aegis of the Società Dante Alighieri. Waley, op. cit., p. 117.

114. Grandi subsequently conveyed Mussolini's personal thanks to Sarolea for his efforts on Italy's behalf. Grandi to Sarolea, 1st April 1936, SAR 88.


116. Ibid. Shortly before the Hoare-Laval talks, Sellon's name had appeared on a joint letter to The Times, complaining that "sufficient attention has not been given ... to the strength of Italy's case." The co-signatories had included his English Review colleagues, Douglas Jerrold and Sir Charles Petrie. The Times, 6th December 1935.


118. Correspondence between George Hope and Charles Sarolea, 1942-43, SAR 139.


121. Neither the 8th Duke nor his heir, his younger brother James, had legitimate offspring. After their deaths the succession would devolve on a distant cousin.


123. See the Duchess of Atholl, Women and Politics, London, 1931.


127. Atholl to Charles Sarolea, 27th January 1936, Appeal on behalf of the Old Organisation of the Russian Red Cross Society, undated, SAR 82.

128. Atholl joined in early 1933. The other Joint-Presidents were the Earl of Glasgow and Viscount FitzAlan of Derwent. The Duchess of Atholl,
Working Partnership, London, 1958, p. 203; The Christian Protest Movement, Review of Work 1929-33, ATH 263. The CPM later changed its name to the Faith Defence League. In view of the fact that several leading CPM members were prominent opponents of the Government of India Bill, the similarity of the new name to that of the India Defence League was not, perhaps, entirely coincidental.

129. Atholl to the Earl of Glasgow, 11th January 1933, ATH 447. The executive committee of the CPM refused to accede to Atholl's request, on the grounds that the Spanish Government was "technically Christian." Maj. J. Knowles to Atholl, 14th January 1933, ATH 447.

130. Capt. Arthur Rogers to Charles Sarolea, 29th March 1939, SAR 232. The LRL was perhaps the most eccentric of the Far Right pressure groups. Initially formed to oppose milk pasteurisation laws, its activities included advocacy of whole-meal bread and a return to the "unsplit, slowly smoked bloater." Jessica Mitford, Hons and Rebels, (Quartet Books edition), London, 1978, p. 29.

131. Atholl's stance on India may also have been influenced by personal factors. Both of her maternal grandparents had been killed in the Indian Mutiny, and one of the treasured possessions in her parents' house at Bamff was the shawl in which her mother had been carried to safety by a faithful ayah. Hetherington, op. cit., p. 142.

132. Speech to constituents in Milnathort, Scotsman, 12th October, 1935.

133. Scotsman, 7th November 1935.

134. Strathearn Herald, 4th January 1936.

135. The Times, 18th December 1935.


138. These included Sir Joseph Nall, Patrick Donner and G.R. Hall Caine. Atholl to Sarolea, 24th January 1936, SAR 60.

139. Atholl to Sarolea, 16th January 1936, SAR 60; Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 9th and 21st January 1936, SAR 64.

140. Scotsman, 31st December 1935.

141. Scotsman, 2nd and 4th January 1936. Atholl's views, however, differed significantly from those of the Amery group. Where they were concerned purely with Western Europe, Atholl's regional pacts would have covered "the whole of Europe." In this respect her opinions were closer to Churchill's.


143. Atholl to Lord Lloyd, 22nd June 1937, ATH 443.


146. Stephen Gaselee, Librarian and Keeper of the Papers at the Foreign Office, to Atholl, 5th December 1935, ATH 26/5.

147. Ironically, *The Scotsman* was contemporaneously carrying an advert, recommending "Crossing the line ... with the Duchess of Atholl." The Duchess in question, however, was a cruise-ship. *Scotsman*, 16th January 1936.

148. Lords Mottistone, Cranworth and Phillimore.


150. Ibid.

151. Ibid.


153. Waley, op. cit., p. 76. Waley's contention rests rather heavily on quotations from Mansfield. Mansfield, however, could not be said to have become anti-sanctionist as a result of "second thoughts." The appearance of the influential imperialist, Lord Lloyd, on the anti-sanctions side in the February debate does lend support to Waley's argument.

154. *House of Commons Debates*, 24th February 1936, Vol. 309, pp. 97-106, 165, 169. This temporary parliamentary alliance between the two prompted Harold Macmillan to denounce "this coalition between two forms of anarchic view, the revolutionary and the reactionary."

155. The reference is to Lord Londonderry.


158. McEwen's wife, Bridget, was the daughter of Sir Francis Lindley (Ambassador to Portugal, 1929-31, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Japan, 1931-34).


160. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 10th January 1936, SAR 64.


162. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 13th October 1936, SAR 64. 163. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 7th February 1936, SAR 64.

164. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 6th January 1938, 2nd July 1939, SAR 64.
165. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 21st October 1936, SAR 64.

166. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 13th October 1936, SAR 64.

167. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 16th January 1936, SAR 64.


169. By-laws of the Association "Peritalia" and press release on the occasion of Mussolini's reception for the society at the Palazzo Venezia, 1st June 1938, SAR 88. The majority of the members were women with Italian husbands. However, several leading British Italophiles, including Lord Phillimore, are also on the membership list.

170. Charles de Pineton, Comte de Chambrun, b. 1873. French Ambassador to Italy since 1933.

171. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 10th January and 13th March 1936, SAR 64.

172. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 20th January 1936, SAR 64.


174. Scotsman, 6th May 1936. The partnership between Sarolea and Maxwell-Scott is fairly representative of the individualistic and informal manner in which most anti-sanctions campaigners chose to operate. Although a group of Italophiles, funded by the Italian Embassy, formed the British-Italian Council for Peace and Friendship in October 1935 with a view to coordinating efforts, this body was ignored by most anti-sanctions campaigners. Charles Sarolea declined to respond to their invitation to join the executive committee. Waley, op. cit., pp. 124-6; Victor Fisher, Director of the BICPF to Sarolea, 17th February 1936, SAR 88.

175. Edward Wilson Polson Newman, b. 1887. A well-travelled journalist and author of numerous books on international affairs, Newman was on the payroll of the Italian Embassy. Between October 1935 and September 1936 he justified his substantial retainer (initially £200 a month, later reduced to £100) with two books, around one hundred articles, and eight months of lecturing to Rotary Clubs and similar bodies. Waley, op. cit., p. 118.


177. The fact that the Anglo-German Naval Treaty was somewhat undiplomatically signed on the 120th anniversary of Waterloo had further inflamed matters. The French had also been irritated by British proposals for territorial
concessions by Abyssinia in June 1935, for which prior French approval had not been sought.

178. Laval's downfall was due more to this affront to French dignity than to his "betrayal" of the Abyssinians.

179. Perhaps the most extreme example of this trend was Henri Béraud, the editor of Gringoire. "I hate England," he fulminated, "I hate her by instinct and by tradition. I say, and I repeat, that England must be reduced to slavery." Shirer, op. cit., p. 269. Shirer does not give the exact date of Béraud's article, but states that it appeared shortly after the Hoare-Laval affair.


181. Signed on 2nd May 1935 but not ratified until 27th February 1936.


183. Boothby, op. cit., p. 71.


186. Sir Henry Page Croft, b. 1881. MP for Bournemouth since 1918. A regular back-bench spokesman for the Conservative right-wing.


188. Scotsman, 6th May, 1936.

189. J.T. Cameron, Scotsman, 13th June 1936.


191. Scotsman, 11th May 1936.


193. The Times, 11th June 1936.


197. Waley contends that the public outcry which ensued over the ending of sanctions was as great as that which had greeted the Hoare-Laval proposals (Waley, op. cit., p. 81). Examination of The Scotsman's correspondence columns for the period 19th June to 18th July suggests that this may not have been the case in Scotland. During this period there were 24 letters to The Scotsman of a pro-League or pro-Abyssinian nature. However, of these a
quarter actually welcomed the ending of sanctions.


201. British support had always been central to the operation of sanctions. After the British decision to withdraw, the League had no option but to call it a day. The official decision was taken in early July.


*Lord Salvesen had been present at the public meeting at Charles Sarolea's house. *Scotsman*, 6th May 1936. Despite her long campaign against sanctions, the Duchess of Atholl had retained her membership of Edinburgh LNU branch until June 11th. *Scotsman*, 12th June 1936.

205. Dott was one of the proprietors of *New Scotland*, the radical Scottish nationalist and pro-Social Credit journal formerly entitled *Free Man*. A well-travelled mining engineer, Dott's personal political philosophy was of the home-spun variety, embracing populist, pacifist, anti-imperialist and libertarian elements, as well as a commitment to Social Credit and a fundamentalist Scottish nationalism. Formerly an activist in the NPS, Dott had played a prominent part in the NPS electoral campaign for fellow Social Credit enthusiast, Rev. T.T. Alexander in Edinburgh East in 1931. Like many other fundamentalists, he had been unable to accept the fusion with the Scottish Party in 1934. In April 1936 he was reported to be a member of the "Free Scots." The size of this "organisation," however, is open to question. Brand, op. cit., pp. 207-8; Hanham, op. cit., p. 175; Cammell, op. cit., pp. 41-3; Dott to A.D. Gibb, 8th May 1933; GIB 217/2/1; *Scotsman*, 20th April
1936.


207. *Scotsman*, 24th December 1935. Dott further utilised the Abyssinian war to promote his case for independence by pointing out that Scotland's claim to national self-determination was at least as strong as Abyssinia's, if not more so. Scotland, after all, was a more "civilised" country.
Chapter 5
Germany Emerges
The Rhineland Crisis March 1936

In the early hours of March 7th 1936, without any attempt at preliminary diplomatic negotiation, German troops crossed into the Rhineland demilitarised zone. By this action Hitler not only cut down another prop in the precarious edifice of Versailles, he also shattered Locarno, the centrepiece of post-war diplomatic endeavours to build a security structure for Western Europe, for the Rhineland's status had been reaffirmed under the 1925 treaty. Later that day in his Reichstag address, Hitler justified his move on the grounds that Locarno had already been rendered null and void by the Franco-Soviet Pact, which had received its final ratification by the French Chamber of Deputies only a few days earlier. Much in the manner of his March 1935 démarche, he simultaneously unveiled fresh proposals for the pacification of Europe. To France and Belgium he offered 25 year non-aggression pacts and the creation of a new demilitarised zone on both sides of Germany's Western frontier. Similar pacts with German's Eastern neighbours were also proposed, along with a limitation agreement on air forces in Western Europe and Germany's return to the League of Nations, subject to consideration of her colonial requirements.

For the French the remilitarisation of the Rhineland not only provided the psychological shock of a German military presence on the border for the first time since the war, it also destroyed a key factor in French anti-German strategy. In its undefended state the Rhineland had given the French army rapid access to Germany's industrial vitals, in the event of a German breakout to the East. Failure to secure a German withdrawal would not only seriously weaken the existing military position viz à viz Germany, it would also cast grave doubts on France's commitment to her Eastern allies. The French government's initial response to the German move was therefore one of noisy sabre-rattling, combined with efforts to secure British assistance in bringing about the eviction of German troops. For the British, however, the Rhineland's demilitarised status was but another questionable aspect of Versailles, and one of the most difficult to justify morally. In government circles the restoration of full German rights in the area was generally considered to be a foregone conclusion in any future negotiated settlement of Western Europe. Despite irritation that a useful bargaining chip should be so abruptly lost, Britain's
diplomatic response was governed by the overriding desire to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis, whatever her formal contractual obligations under Locarno. Left in no doubt that British support for financial, economic, or military sanctions against Germany to restore the status quo pro ante would not be forthcoming, the French backed down, saving face by referring the matter to the League of Nations. By the end of March the crisis had petered out with the Germans left in possession of the field. Hitler had secured his Western flank, scored a personal and national triumph of immense proportions, and dealt a heavy blow to French prestige. En passant he had further weakened the credibility of collective security and the League of Nations.

If Hitler's main aim was to "drive a wedge between the British and the French," in conformity with his 1935 strategy, he was frustrated, at least at a diplomatic level, by Eden's skill and Flandin's lack of nerve. In terms of popular opinion, however, as Griffiths points out, the relationship between the two countries was far from cordial, as an eruption of mutual criticism, at times savage, was directed, on the one hand, at French "belligerence and unreasonableness," and on the other, at British "pusillanimity."

Although in Britain there was considerable condemnation of Germany's diplomatic methods, the principal reaction of press and politicians alike was absolute opposition to punitive action which might lead to war. Speaking for Labour, Hugh Dalton stated quite categorically that his party would not support "military sanctions or even economic sanctions against Germany at this time, in order to put German troops out of the German Rhineland." Dalton's warning was unnecessary, for such action had never received serious consideration. Amongst the general public there was widespread sympathy for the German move. As the German Ambassador, Von Hoesch, reported, the "so-called 'man-in-the-street' generally takes the view that he does not care a damn if the Germans occupy their own territory with military forces, which is a thing all other states do anyway."

Baffy Dugdale estimated that around 90% of the population "feel no anger against the Germans." They had, after all, only marched into their own "back garden." That Germany's action might lead to war was viewed with a mixture of abhorrence and shocked disbelief. Harold Nicolson observed, "the people of this country absolutely refuse to have a war ... We should be faced by a general strike if we even suggested such a thing," while Dugdale noted, "Hardly anywhere does one
meet a person who thinks clear. The horror of war is upon them."

Amidst the anxiety to maintain the peace many ardently embraced Hitler's proposals. In this they were encouraged by the lead taken by much of the press. Although there were a few exceptions, most papers, while generally highly critical of Germany's diplomatic methods, gave a cautious welcome to Hitler's diplomatic overtures. Some, indeed, placed considerably greater stress on the opportunities which his offer appeared to open up, than on Germany's act of diplomatic iconoclasm. "A Chance to Rebuild" was how The Times first greeted the crisis. The Daily Mail was even more enthusiastic. "Germany's latest stroke," it declared, "may be said, indeed, to have cleared the air. Like a fresh breeze from the mountaintops it has swept away the fog and shown exactly where she stands." Of the major papers, only the Daily Telegraph dismissed Hitler's peace offer as diplomatic camouflage. Such sentiments could, and did, encourage the expression of more overtly pro-German comment. Some of this came from already established enthusiasts, like Lord Londonderry, but there were also some dramatic conversions. "What a man!" brayed Lady Houston's Saturday Review, in the first of a series of eulogies to Hitler.

The most significant aspect of the reaction to the Rhineland crisis, however, was the "extensive shift in moderate public opinion from France to Germany," which the Deputy Editor of The Times, R.M. Barrington-Ward, claimed was so great that it was difficult to find "enough letters stating what might be crudely called the anti-German view to balance the correspondence." Within this swing in popular opinion the accent was more heavily against France than positively in favour of Germany. Tom Jones considered the public not so much "actively pro-German," as "rather fed up with France." Von Hoesch, somewhat more emphatically and perhaps more accurately, described the average Briton as "thoroughly angry at the French." Certainly, much of the anti-French comment which appeared was invested with a considerable degree of emotion. Such was the current against France, that those who continued to support the French viewpoint could attract savage criticism. Even a normally detached observer like Bruce Lockhart indicted his pro-French associates, "Attitude of these people very dangerous — Public are fools and know nothing. We know Germany and they cannot be trusted."

Scotland's reaction to the crisis in most major respects mirrored the London
experience. The most obvious popular response was a deep desire for peace, expressed by representatives of all shades of political opinion. Even the most ardent Francophiles stopped short of open advocacy of action likely to lead to war. The desire for peace, however, appeared in many guises, and could be accompanied by varying degrees of enthusiasm for Hitler's proposals, or indeed none at all.

In terms of the diplomatic responses they advocated, Scotland's principal quality and provincial papers were generally in line with those of the London press. However, evidence of sympathy for Germany's actions was less prominent. None rose to the optimism of the Times, or came anywhere close to reflecting the pro-German enthusiasm of the Daily Mail, and there were definite signs of a certain ingrained antipathy towards Germany. There were some variations in emphasis. The Scotsman displayed the most angst at French intransigence, the Glasgow Herald was frostiest towards Germany, and the Aberdeen Press and Journal showed a marked disposition to avoid antagonising anyone in its obvious desire to queer no pitches for the government. However, these were really only shades of difference. On the main issues there was a striking degree of consensus. Only the Courier and Advertiser's willingness to part-swallow Germany's excuse of provocation — the coup was "a direct consequence of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact" — struck a discordant note. Germany's démarche diplomacy was rigorously condemned, and there was more than a little anti-German sentiment in the references to Germany's past diplomatic methods. The Glasgow Herald condemned the use of "pure Machtpolitik," while the Scotsman regarded it as "in the most truculent tradition of Prussian militarism." For the Courier and Advertiser it was a typical example of the tendency of previous German leaders to "attitudinise" for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, while Germany's unilateral breach of Locarno was condemned, and doubts were expressed as to the extent to which Germany could be trusted to respect her treaty obligations in the future, there was no regret for the passing of the demilitarised zone and general agreement that Germany's action did not merit punitive action. In contrast with some of the London papers, there was little explicit emphasis on the moral legitimacy of Germany's actions. Although the Press and Journal stressed that Versailles was now "generally recognised to have been impracticable because it was too penal," recognition that Germany had a moral, if not juridical, case for reoccupation was not so much overtly expressed, as implicit in condemnation of French overreaction. All four were united in giving Hitler's peace offer a cautious welcome. While unacceptable as they stood — as The Scotsman caustically pointed out, the
demolition of the Maginot line implicit in Hitler's envisaged demilitarised zone placed a "heavy draft" on French credulity — they formed a useful basis for discussion. If the *Glasgow Herald* was the least enthusiastic, even it regarded the proposals as "a saving grace," and accepted that "if Herr HITLER'S proposals are rejected out of hand the alternative is a return to a system of alliances on the pre-war model." 18

Established friends of Germany rallied to defend her actions and endorse Hitler's proposals. Attack being the best form of defence, Sir Daniel Stevenson lambasted what he decried as the hypocrisy of the other Locarno Powers, as revealed in their joint declaration of March 19th. "Whose tongue was in whose cheek," he queried caustically, when they formulated the claim that it was an essential principle of international law "that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty except with the consent of the other contracting parties?" The former Allies had no moral right to condemn Germany for her breach of Versailles, for they themselves had "consistently and persistently" disregarded their own undertakings in that treaty to disarm to Germany's levels. Stevenson was also prepared to endorse Germany's claim that she had been freed from her Locarno obligations by the Franco-Soviet Pact. Locarno, Stevenson argued, had been morally, if not juridically, breached by that pact. As for Hitler's peace proposals, he hoped that Europe would "take Hitler at his word," thus enabling the nations to "hammer out a solid and lasting peace." 20

Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore chose to endorse Hitler's representation of Germany's actions as a relatively minor infraction of international law. Versailles had been "broken so often by both sides," that any new infringement was "scarcely noticeable." As regards Locarno, its "spirit" had already been "gravely diluted" by the Franco-Soviet Pact. Germany had merely been "reaffirming its sovereignty over a portion of its own territory," and there could be no possible analogy with Italy's "unprovoked war." The case for sanctions against her, therefore, was unproved. Moore's main emphasis, however, was on the positive side to the crisis, namely Hitler's proposals. Britain had a simple choice to make. She could accept Hitler's offer, and help create a new European settlement based on "self-preservation, common interest, good will, and, above all mutual trust." Alternatively, she could choose support for the French, and with it "the probability of early war." Nirvana or Armageddon. Moore had offered the same alternatives in
May 1935, when he had recommended acceptance of the proposals contained in Hitler's "Peace" speech. His method of dealing with doubts as to Hitler's sincerity had also changed little. Could Hitler be trusted after another breach of treaties? Only time would tell, but "surely it is better to call the bluff — if bluff it be — rather than risk the dread possibilities inherent in the alternative?" Moore would always argue that any course, even the most humiliating, was better than war. 21

Stevenson and Moore were already well-known for their pro-German views. The majority of those who now welcomed Hitler's propositions had no such record. Several, however, were noted for their imperialist or isolationist opinions. Having declared his belief that "the military occupation of German territory by German subjects" could not possibly be regarded as a casus belli, Viscount Elibank urged the government to undertake "the examination of Hitler's proposals" with "every means in their power." A former Milner protégé, Elibank had remained true to Milner's vision. Although he firmly believed that Britain's future security would best be served by strengthening the bonds of Empire, he had not played a prominent part in the campaign against sanctions. The prospect of confrontation with Germany through League coercion, however, prompted him to join the chorus for League "revision." 22

The veteran anti-sanctions campaigner, Sir Patrick Ford, was even more enthusiastic in his desire to come to terms with Germany. Britain, he declared, should "take up Hitler's suggestion and have a real round table conference." By "redressing the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles" and by "mutual concession," an "honourable and permanent stabilisation of the European situation" could yet be achieved. "God grant we can do so," he pleaded earnestly, "otherwise we face hell and chaos." 23 This was the same apocalyptic vision as Moore's.

For isolationist Conservatives, opposition to any League-based action against Germany was to be expected. However, the expression of enthusiasm for Hitler's proposals was clearly not a necessary corollary to their anti-sanctions campaign. The enthusiasm of individuals like Ford indicated a definite shift in isolationist attitudes towards Germany. Not all isolationists were impressed by Hitler's proposals. The Earl of Mansfield ignored them completely. However, he too had shifted towards a more sympathetic position towards Germany. As was to be expected, Mansfield was resolutely opposed to League-based action against
Germany for her Rhineland incursion. He essentially presented the crisis as a typical example of the kind of "quarrels in which we have no direct interest" in which Britain could be embroiled through commitment to a coercive League of Nations. As such, it provided further fuel for his campaign to change the fundamental basis of British foreign policy. Nevertheless, there was a marked change of emphasis in Mansfield's critique of the League. Fear that commitment to the League would lead Britain into collision with a Germany bent on treaty revision, although voiced by other isolationists, had not previously figured in Mansfield's public pronouncements. Now it emerged strongly. It was also coupled with references which inferred the legitimacy of Germany's revisionist drive. Mansfield now maintained that the League's prime purpose was the enforcement of the post-war settlement, a settlement which could not be sustained "ethically, economically or politically," and would inevitably be challenged. There would never be "lasting peace," he argued, until Versailles and Trianon were "radically altered, if not altogether scrapped." Isolationist opposition to British involvement in resistance to German revisionism had in the past primarily been expressed in pragmatic terms. From the Rhineland onwards the moral rectitude of Germany's case would figure much more prominently in isolationist expression. For a section of opinion which, prior to German rearmament, had shown complete disinterest in the matter of "justice" for Germany, it was a striking transformation.

Some of the isolationists' Italophile allies were as antipathetic towards League-based action against Germany and as enthusiastic about Hitler's peace proposals as Sir Patrick Ford. Sanctions, argued Hugh Sellon, would only "rally the people more closely around the Reich Chancellor." Somewhat disingenuously he also argued that since Germany's alleged crime paled into insignificance beside Italy's behaviour, the case for sanctions against her was very weak. However, unlike the isolationists, with their preoccupation with the League, Sellon was much more concerned with exonerating Germany, or at least minimising her sins. While Germany's arguments might be "weak in international law," they were "strong in morality and commonsense." Not only was it natural for Germany to wish to re-occupy German soil, but the "spirit" of Locarno had long ago been "vitiated by France's agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia." Sellon enthusiastically endorsed acceptance of Hitler's peace proposals. In the manner of Lt.-Col. Moore and Sir Patrick Ford, he offered Britain a black and white choice for the future. She could "take a stand on aggrieved legality," a course which would result in European civilisation being "submerged in war." Alternatively, she could "seize this
opportunity of abolishing the last traces of the fatal post-war treaties," and welcome Germany back "as an equal and honoured member of the European family." 26

Enthusiasm for Hitler's proposals was by no means restricted to isolationists and their allies. It was also to be found in the ranks of their principal antagonists, the champions of the League of Nations. The dominant theme expressed by League supporters was concern that "public attention be diverted from Italy's crimes by Germany's petty larceny." 27 The possibility that British soldiers might be expected to march into Germany, "in company with such of his troops as Signor Mussolini can spare from the smoking villages of Ethiopia," was considered utterly scandalous. 28 Many, however, were also lured by the bait of Hitler's peace proposals, and took a more positively pro-German line. Alan Stark had advocated vigorous action against Italy in support of the League. Now he greeted Hitler's "constructive proposals" as offering "real hope of advance in international relations." 29 Other League supporters viewed the prospect of Germany's return to the League of Nations as a "colossal accession to the cause of world peace," and dismissed her merely "technical" breach of Locarno as fundamentally unimportant, since "the Covenant, honestly kept," was "worth all the fleeting pacts that were ever put on paper." 30

Warm endorsement of Hitler's peace proposals was a minority response. Nevertheless, a more generalised expression of desire for the preservation of peace was the dominant theme in public debate. That this accurately reflected the mood of the Scottish people is borne out in the only electoral test of public opinion during the crisis, the Dumbartonshire by-election. Campaigning there had hardly begun when the Rhineland crisis intervened, and throughout the electioneering foreign policy and attitudes to war and peace predominated. From the start Labour played the peace card, lambasting the government for the war-like intent implicit in its rearmament policy. The fact that their candidate, Thomas Cassells, 31 was a Christian pacifist, heavily underscored their presentation of Labour as the Peace Party. 32 To further ram the message home, Labour chose George Lansbury, the veteran pacifist, to provide the main address at the climax of Cassells' campaign. 33 Cassells' Conservative opponent, the Edinburgh lawyer A.P. Duffes, fought a mainly defensive campaign, much of which was devoted to denying rumours that the government was considering reintroducing conscription. Such "cunning falsehoods," he claimed, sprang from "suggestions made from Socialist
Despite an appeal to vote for Duffes by the Liberal candidate who had contested the seat in 1929, Labour captured the seat by 984 votes, overturning a Conservative majority of a little over 4,000. It was a surprise result. In view of Labour successes in Dumbartonshire in the 1923 and 1929 elections, victory for Duffes had never been a foregone conclusion. On both of those occasions, however, the presence of a Liberal candidate had split the anti-socialist vote. In the absence of such a factor most political commentators had predicted a Conservative victory with a reduced majority. Given the extent to which the issue of foreign policy dominated the electoral campaign, it seems reasonable to ascribe the swing to Labour to what was perceived as their less confrontational attitude towards Germany. The Dumbartonshire by-election was the only test of public opinion in Scotland by electoral means during the Rhineland crisis. What the result suggests is that even that limited degree of firmness which the British government felt obliged to show towards Germany was less conciliatory than the general mood of the Scottish public. Such an interpretation would be in accord with contemporary analysis of opinion in London.

One pro-peace response that was manifestly peculiar to Scotland was the joint declaration signed by George Dott, Mary Ramsay, Robert Hurd, Lewis Spence, T. Douglas MacDonald, S. Gifford Ker, William K. Lyon and Stanley Robertson. All of the signatories moved in Scottish nationalist circles in the Edinburgh area. While referring generally to "the perpetual menace to peace and the realisation of justice" posed by "the mutual jealousies and suspicions of the Great Powers," the nationalists' main point was that since Scotland was "virtually absorbed" by one of those Powers, she was unable to make her own contribution to the "striving for peace with justice." Moreover, that self-same Power could and would compel the Scots "to take part in any war in which that Power may be involved." They therefore urged the Scottish people to resist that compulsion in advance, by making it clear that they would not go to war "on behalf of political arrangements or agreements in which Scotland has had no voice." Although expressed in generalised terms, the argument clearly encompassed the present crisis. While there was no overt expression of sympathy for Germany, the signatories were clearly strongly opposed to any action which might lead to war.
This was perhaps the most significant indicator of the rapid proliferation of opposition to involvement in a "British" war within the nationalist movement. Pacifist views were not uncommon in nationalist ranks. "War," as one supporter of the joint declaration pointed out, "diverts national resources from peaceful internal development to wasteful and unproductive expenditure on destruction." The "It's not Scotland's war" argument, however, was not essentially pacifist, although one of the signatories, Mary Ramsay, was herself strongly pacifist. Dott had supported sanctions against Italy and had not jibbed at the danger of war then. However, war on behalf of the League of Nations, and in defence of a small nation against an imperialist aggressor, was a far cry from war against Germany, which simply meant involvement in another capitalist imperialist power struggle on behalf of the oppressor. In no sense could it be said to serve the interests of the Scottish community. As expounded by Dott, the left-wing origins of the argument were usually clearly visible. Its appeal, however, was not limited to the Left of the nationalist movement. Shorn of any unacceptable Leftist terminology or rhetoric, the isolationist aspect of the stance was also attractive to the right-wingers. Lewis Spence's views were well to the Right, as well as being decidedly anti-pacifist. At least three of the signatories to the joint declaration were no longer members of the SNP. Although Spence had been one of the founding fathers of the NPS, and had assumed the Vice Presidency, he had tired of the party's extreme factionalism, and resigned. Dott and Ramsay, as we have seen, had been unable to reconcile themselves to the merger with the Scottish Party. The joint declaration, therefore, was very far from being an official policy statement on behalf of the SNP, and the sentiments it expressed were unlikely to have been acceptable to the majority of SNP members. Nonetheless, the fundamentalist position would subsequently attract considerable support in the Scottish movement, both inside and outside the SNP proper.

As in London, while the expression of a strong desire for peace was the most prevalent Scottish response to the crisis, the outburst of anti-French sentiment which accompanied it ran a very close second. Many moderately inclined Scots, with "no great liking for the present regime in Germany," were alarmed and exasperated by French demands that a German withdrawal precede any negotiation. "Foolish, criminal, dastardly," Hitler's action may have been, but did the French really expect Hitler "to eat humble pie before the whole world." No German government could do that and survive. Nor was criticism restricted to present
French behaviour. One had to remember the "Ruhr adventure" and other examples of French "firmness" to understand how Germany had been "goaded" into the Rhineland invasion. Such sentiments were often combined with the expressed belief that Britain had far too long operated in the shadow of France with regard to Germany, and should not allow herself "to be dragged into any more complications." Now was the time to cut free from the "apron strings of a nervous and suspicious Marianne" and take an "independent stand."

Well to the fore in criticism of France were League of Nations supporters, incensed by the contrast between her new-found "zeal for the security of treaties" and what they viewed as her selfish obstructionism towards the policy of sanctions against Italy. French protests, they argued, might have carried more weight had she "shown the same concern ... for the security of Abyssinia." It was "poetic justice" that the French were now unlikely to benefit from the invocation of collective security. The "ordinary Briton who might in the past have helped them to resist German aggression" would "certainly not do so now." Germany's claim that by concluding the Franco-Soviet Pact the French had brought this crisis upon themselves also struck sympathetic chords with League supporters. Not only was the Pact "independent in its action from the League of Nations," it was also hardly in keeping with the spirit of collective security. Had not a similar pact between the self-same Powers "started the Great War." Germany could not help but view such an arrangement between these "heavily armed Powers ... as directed against herself."

If frustration at French "unreasonableness" and "selfishness" was the primary theme in anti-French comment, French belligerence during the crisis also awakened strong fears that similar behaviour in the future might well result in Britain being dragged into war. This prompted reappraisal of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the motives which lay behind it. As long as the French alliance system in Eastern Europe remained in being, Britain, urged Hugh Sellon, should consider an alliance with France as "out of the question." Sellon's concern was not simply prompted by fears that France might be involved in war through her Eastern European commitments. Clearly he believed that their supportive existence could lead the French to start a war on their own initiative. He had "often" heard in France the argument that since "war between Germany and the Western Powers is inevitable ... a preventive war now, while Germany is still comparatively weak is
Another academic, Professor A.P. Laurie, was even more convinced of French determination to have a war. They had been responsible for the previous one in which "millions of young lives were offered up" in an endeavour which had "accomplished nothing," but had successfully "deceived" the British into believing that Germany was the aggressor. With their present alliances with Russia and Czechoslovakia, the French had arraigned against Germany "the most formidable military combination the world has ever seen." In the next round of their "age-long quarrel," they were determined that Germany would be "utterly destroyed" and would inflict on her a disaster which would "surpass the horrors of the Thirty Years War." Laurie regarded the suggestion that Britain should enter into a military alliance with the French as a "monstrous proposal," for it would make Britain's involvement in a war against Germany "inevitable." Were the British really prepared once again "to slaughter and be slaughtered ... at the bidding of France?" Although his abuse of the French was the more obvious trait in his immediate reaction to the Rhineland crisis, Laurie's pro-German leanings were also clearly visible. No-one, he claimed, expected Germany to endure in perpetuity "the denial of the right ... to defend her own frontier and her beloved Rhine against a foreign foe." While he admitted that Germany had acted "in an impulsive and illegal manner," he believed that she enjoyed "the sympathy of the great mass of the people of this country."

Now in his 75th year, Arthur Pillans Laurie had enjoyed a distinguished career as an academic chemist. His specialist fields were pigmentation and the chemical processes involved in oil painting, subjects on which he had written several books. During the First World War he had chaired the Chemical Inventions Committee of the Ministry of Munitions, and had been intimately involved in the development of gas warfare. When he spoke of the horrors of modern war, therefore, it was with the knowledge that he himself had contributed in no small measure to the evolution of one of its more unpleasant aspects. In Scotland, however, Laurie was perhaps best known as principal of Heriot Watt College, a post he occupied from 1900 to 1928. Although now living in retirement in London, Laurie still took an active interest in Scottish politics, and was a regular contributor to The Scotsman. During the 1920s and early 1930s he had been a familiar, if not particularly influential, figure in Scottish Liberalism, in 1929 unsuccessfully contesting Edinburgh South. The author of an unpublished but "comprehensive and spirited
account" of fifteen years of post-war Liberal politics, marred, in Lloyd George's view, only by unfortunate references to party funds, he had also helped to produce an official Liberal report on smallholdings. An incorrigible Free Trader, Laurie, like Charles Sarolea, would by the 1930s no doubt have accepted that he belonged to an "old school" of Liberalism, for he had no time for the "vagueness of mind" and "semi-socialistic speculations" of the contemporary Liberal Left. Lloyd George's New Deal plans he greeted rapturously, not least because "they are practical they involve no damn theories, and they are based on tradition." They were, therefore, "essentially English." 

Laurie's lodestone in domestic politics was Lloyd George. In the immediate post-war years he had "looked for a leader" and his search had been fulfilled. "We are not Liberal, Conservative, or Labour, we are Lloyd George men," he had proudly declared in 1923. This faith had survived Lloyd George's sojourn in the political wilderness. In 1935 Britain's domestic difficulties were such, in Laurie's view, that a dynamic leader was once more required. He had high hopes, therefore, that the Council of Action would prove to be an effective vehicle for Lloyd George's return to power, and he joined the Executive Committee of that body. The prospect of a resurgent Lloyd George also appears to have rekindled his own parliamentary ambitions, for he endeavoured to secure his selection as Liberal candidate for Edinburgh Central in the run up to the November 1935 elections. Although short-listed, he failed to be nominated, despite his involvement with the Council of Action, which he clearly hoped would swing things in his favour. Undeterred by the political marginalisation of the Council of Action by the 1935 election results, when the Rhineland crisis broke he turned once again to Lloyd George, encouraged by the latter's advocacy of a conciliatory approach to Germany. In a happy marriage of old and new enthusiasms he pressed Lloyd George to step forward to lead a popular campaign for the acceptance of Hitler's peace proposals, offering him "the greatest task of your life, to save Europe from another holocaust." The National Government was out of step with popular sentiment, he argued. Only Lloyd George could "interpret today what the people are feeling." 

For A.P. Laurie the Rhineland crisis was a watershed. Prior to March 1936 his correspondence with Lloyd George reveals little interest in foreign affairs, far less advocacy of Germany's claims. After this date it was almost his only topic of
discussion. For the moment the public exposition of his views in many ways resembled that of Liberals whose sympathy for Germany was of long standing. Like Lothian, he used the argument that while the Nazi régime was a "tyrannical government," it was also essentially "the outcome of the unjust treatment of Germany" in the past, and would only be "strengthened by further unjust treatment." In other respects, however, Laurie appeared closer to the isolationists of the Conservative Right. "The development of the Empire," he argued, "should be our first consideration and main occupation." Britain should "stand clear," and with the notable exception of an understanding with Germany should desist from "meddling with European politics." The League of Nations, he declared, had become "an instrument of war, instead of an apostle of Peace." Although he now joined the anti-sanctions campaign, and subsequently resigned from the executive committee of the Council of Action because of their continuing support for sanctions, Laurie's new found antipathy to the League was fundamentally based on his fears of future League action against Germany. France, he argued, was endeavouring "to bind the European powers under the organisation of the League into an alliance against the German people."

Amid the welter of anti-French and pro-German comment there were still those prepared to swim against the stream. For some who had "lived through the crisis of 1914," the "enthusiastic swing over to Germany" and the "blackballing of France" were simply "not British." There were others, too, who believed that whatever Germany's legitimate grievances, in dealing with a Power devoted to the "glorification of war as a means of national aggrandisement," to yield to force now would mean "the same threat again and again, until we are forced to make a stand under conditions much less favourable than they are to-day."

The opponents of sanctions against Italy, as we have seen, provided some of the most vigorous critics of similar action against Germany. However, two of their more illustrious members, Capt. McEwen and the Duchess of Atholl, took a strongly pro-French line. McEwen was at pains to refute "the dangerously short-sighted views" of those prepared to "condone the violent breach of treaties." He was particularly incensed by the suggestion that France's failure to disarm to some extent justified Germany's action. Germany, he argued, had begun to re-arm the moment the Disarmament Commission withdrew, if not before, and had "been re-arising ever since." That was why France had been "forced" to "maintain her heavy
burden of armaments." McEwen dismissed the Franco-Soviet Pact as a mere "excuse" for the Rhineland occupation. The real reason, he argued, was that Hitler needed a success in foreign affairs to divert attention from Germany's "internal difficulties." The Rhineland venture had been selected in preference to other moves because it was the least likely to alarm the British and the most likely to further "the destruction of Anglo-French understanding," to which goal "the whole of Germany's efforts have been directed for the past fifteen years." For Britain to deny France her support at this critical juncture, McEwen concluded, would involved a repudiation, "not only of Locarno, but of the League Covenant itself." All Britain would gain was an "uneasy peace," based on "suspect" promises, for Hitler's peace plan was nothing but "a number of placatory bribes."61 Given his stance on sanctions against Italy, McEwen's enthusiasm for both League and Covenant might at first sight appear opportunist. There was, however, no inconsistency. McEwen had always stated his adherence to the principles of the League. If the effective application of sanctions could only be achieved by antagonising France, then, in his view, the price was too high. Without a core of Anglo-French co-operation the League would cease to function.

Sympathy for France's predicament was also voiced by the Duchess of Atholl. Choosing this moment to launch what would prove to be a lengthy campaign to educate the Scottish public as to the true content of Mein Kampf, she quoted at length from the unexpurgated version. Hitler, she pointed out, had stated "the overthrow of 'our grimmest hater, France'" to be the first objective of future German strategy. French "annihilation" was to be followed by the acquisition of vast territories in the East, with the eventual goal of making Germany "'Lord of the Earth'." Not only did such statements "amply justify the desire of France for security," they also supported Atholl's belief that "as in 1914," Britain's own security would depend on her "readiness to assist France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression."62

While the majority of those who had previously shown sympathy for Germany rallied to defend her, for Robert Boothby this latest act in contempt of her treaty obligations was the final straw. He now publicly regretted his past acquiescence in Hitler's "repudiation by coups." Like McEwen, Boothby asserted that the Rhineland venture had been prompted by Hitler's need for a foreign policy success to "divert attention" from Germany's economic difficulties. While accepting that public opinion made tough action against Germany on this occasion impossible, he

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felt the time had come to state "at what point we intend to say 'Enough'." For the moment he argued that the French be given "assurance," but rejected any notion of bilateral pacts as too reminiscent of pre-war alliances. Britain had to "stand by the principle of collective security," for only in that path lay any hope of avoiding catastrophe. Like many Francophiles, Boothby sought to play down what he admitted to be a "wave of pro-German opinion." It was, he argued, simply a "reaction against Versailles" and what the British public held to be Germany's "grossly unfair" treatment since the war. He also lived up to Bruce Lockhart's assessment of the elitist attitudes of the Francophiles. The "man-in-the-street," Boothby claimed, had not yet realised "how completely different is the Germany of today from the Germany which existed before the Nazis came into power." 64

The "deep satisfaction," which he perceived "almost everywhere" greeting Hitler's offer to return to the League of Nations, was not shared by the Edinburgh rabbi, Dr. Salis Daiches. 65 Of what worth was such an offer, he asked, when Germany showed nothing but contempt for the principle of non-discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities embodied in the Covenant. 66 Daiches' letter to The Scotsman provoked absolutely no response. Neither supported nor opposed, he was simply ignored. For the vast majority of the Scottish public, the persecution of the Jews, however unpleasant an aspect of Nazi internal policy, was even at the best of times largely irrelevant to the determination of British foreign policy. In times of crisis, with Britain perched perhaps on the brink of war, it was eclipsed absolutely.

Scottish responses to the Rhineland crisis closely resembled the British pattern. The manifest desire for peace was the most obvious feature of public debate. Support for punitive action against Germany was virtually non-existent and there was a violent and decidedly vituperative outburst against the French. In liberal and moderate sectors of opinion, in particular, frustration at French intransigence, past and present, boiled over. Responsibility for the embittered state of international relations was firmly ascribed to France's "selfish" pursuit of national self-interest and there were signs of growing concern over the implications of the Franco-Soviet Pact. Elements of the Conservative Right "discovered" the legitimacy of Germany's post-Versailles grievances, and public opinion in general accepted the reasonableness of Germany's desire to reoccupy the Rhineland, if not the tactics employed to do so. However, the main thrust of public comment, while decidedly
anti-French, was not strongly pro-German. Positively pro-German comment emerged, partly in a willingness to accept Germany's views on the threat inherent in the Franco-Soviet Pact, and more noticeably, in enthusiastic endorsement of Hitler's peace proposals.

Paradoxically, expressions of support for Hitler's plans primarily came from the principal protagonists in the sanctions debate, the right-wing isolationists and the LNU enthusiasts, and both groups were arguably less focussed on Germany and the implications of the Rhineland coup than other areas of opinion. For the LNU's supporters the Rhineland coup was a dangerous distraction. It threatened to fundamentally undermine the successful prosecution of sanctions against Italy, and with it, the concept of collective security. True, from their perspective the survival of the League would be essential to any future need to resist German aggression, but their response to the Rhineland crisis showed a widespread and genuine willingness to take Hitler's protestations of peaceable intent at face value. On the face of it, the isolationists were equally preoccupied with the question of the League, and largely utilised the Rhineland coup to buttress their existing demands for a fundamental reorientation of British foreign policy. However, as their opposition to involvement in the League was increasingly coming to be underpinned by fear of a League-induced collision with a revisionist Germany, their response to the Rhineland crisis was more Germanocentric than that of their opponents.

More vigorous forms of pro-Germanism were decidedly thin on the ground. The Rhineland crisis cannot be said to have provoked an outburst of enthusiasm for Hitler's Germany. There were a few overnight conversions, like A.P. Laurie, but even his enthusiasm at this stage did not stretch to an embrace of the Nazi régime. Overt expressions of admiration for the Nazi régime were notable by their absence. However, the general shift of public opinion towards a certain sympathy with Germany had created a climate of debate which would facilitate their expression. This would become more obvious in the coming months.

There is little evidence of a distinctively Scottish response to the Rhineland crisis. The emergence of a nationalist peace position provided a distinctive Scottish facet to the debate, but public responses in general paralleled those South of the Border. The manifestations of desire for peace and exasperation at the French were certainly as strong. Positive sympathy for Germany was arguably a shade less marked. On balance the Scottish press was somewhat frostier towards Germany
than their London counterparts, and sympathy for Germany's actions, while implicit in the widespread criticism of the French, appears to have received less in the way of explicit expression. There was also a singular lack of the kind of overt admiration for Hitler and the Nazi régime displayed by Lady Houston. However, as Griffiths stresses, this was not a marked feature of the British debate of this period either. 55
Chapter 5
Footnotes

1. On February 27th.

2. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 196.

3. Ibid., p. 201.


5. Hoesch Memorandum, 10th March 1936, Documents on German Foreign Policy, CV, pp. 92-3, quoted by Middlemas and Barnes, op. cit., p. 922.


7. The phrase has been accredited to Lord Lothian. See Butler op. cit., p. 213.


11. See The Times, 12th March 1936. Londonderry had been Secretary of State for Air between 1931 and 1935. During his ministerial tenure he had not displayed any noticeable pro-German leanings. After a visit to Germany at the beginning of 1936 he became a vocal enthusiast.

12. Article by "Kim," Saturday Review, 14th March 1936. The Saturday Review effectively reflected the opinions of its eccentric and reactionary right-wing proprietrix, Lady Lucy Houston. Vehemently anti-communist, Houston was a strong admirer of Mussolini and a vigorous proponent of rearmament. Until March 1936 the Saturday Review had largely displayed an ingrained Die-Hard antagonism towards Germany.


16. Hoesch Memorandum, 10th March, 1936, Documents on German Foreign Policy, CV, pp. 92-3, quoted by Middlemas and Barnes, op. cit., p. 922.

17. Diary entry for 27th March 1936, Bruce Lockhart, Diaries, p. 343.

18. Scotsman, 9th March 1936; Glasgow Herald, 9th, 10th and 11th March.
19. Stevenson accredited this phrase to the former Liberal leader, Lord Rosebery.


22. Gideon Murray, 2nd Viscount Elibank, b. 1877. A former colonial administrator, Elibank's career had mostly been spent in South Africa and the West Indies. Conservative MP for Glasgow, St. Rollox, 1918-22, and Lord Lieutenant of Peebleshire since 1934. Prior to the 1922 election he fell out with his constituency association over the intractability of his opposition to the Irish settlement. Bonar Law advised him to stand for an English constituency, largely because Law himself was concerned about the security of his own seat, and had no desire to be in any way compromised by the proximity of a Die-Hard candidate. Hutchison, op. cit., p. 323.


24. Scotsman, 10th March 1936.

25. House of Lords Debates, 11th March 1936, Vol. 99, pp. 962-5, 8th April 1936, Vol. 100, p. 568. Given his previously recorded hostility to the Franco-Soviet Pact, and his prediction that it might provoke this very eventuality, Mansfield might have been expected to express sympathy for the German move. However, he did not. Germany's citation of the Pact as justification for her behaviour he dismissed as a "flimsy and specious excuse." By no stretch of the imagination did the Pact form part of "an encircling movement" hostile to Germany. This unexpected acidity was perhaps less due to the circumstances of the Rhineland occupation than to the reiteration of Germany's colonial claims which accompanied it. To these claims, as we shall see, Mansfield and the IPG were resolutely opposed.


29. See Scotsman, 12th March 1936. Stark was a member of the Edinburgh LNU branch. By 1938 he had become chairman of the Edinburgh LNU Youth Group. Scotsman, 14th May 1938.


31. Born in 1902, Cassells was a solicitor who specialised in the law pertaining to workers' compensation and employer liability. Since 1926 he had acted as legal adviser to the Trade Union Movement in Scotland. In the 1935 election he had unsuccessfully contested Dunbartonshire.
32. Cassells' message for the Dunbartonshire electors was that "the only way of dealing with international affairs was by the application of sound Socialist Christian principles of renouncing the causes of war." _Scotsman_, 17th March 1936.

33. _Scotsman_, 18th March 1936.

34. Speech reported by _The Scotsman_, 18th March 1936.

35. Dunbartonshire Election Results.
18th March 1936 14th November 1935
T. Cassells (Lab) 20,187 A.D. Cochrane (Con) 24,776
A.P. Duffes (Con) 19,203 T. Cassells (Lab) 20,679
R. Gray (SNP) 2,599 R. Gray (SNP) 3,841
The by-election was caused by Cochrane's appointment to the Governorship of Burma.

36. Analysis of the result is somewhat complicated by the presence of a Scottish Nationalist candidate, Robert Gray. As an electoral variable, however, he had also been present in 1935. His share of the vote had fallen, suggesting that some of his former supporters had agreed with Guthrie's claim that there would be "time enough to discuss the question of self-government for Scotland when the foreign situation was less anxious." The drop in the Nationalist vote, however, was not large enough to explain Labour's success, even if making the highly questionable assumption that Labour was the sole beneficiary. _Scotsman_, 18th March 1936.

37. T. Jones to Lady Grigg, 4th April 1936, Jones op. cit., p. 185.

38. _Scotsman_, 16th March 1936. The letter appeared in the _Glasgow Herald_ the following day.


40. Mary Paton Ramsay, b. 1885. Author of _Les Doctrines Médiévales chez Donne, le Poète Metaphysicien d'Angleterre._

41. A former Scottish Party member and son of the Conservative MP, Sir Percy Hurd, Robert Hurd was also on the Right of the Nationalist movement.

42. Spence had found many of his fellow nationalists to be highly uncongenial company. On his departure he had vented his spleen on republicans, socialists, Catholics, and "the thinly-veiled Communism" of Social Credit enthusiasts. Newspaper clipping, source unknown, c. 1931, GIB 217/25.

43. The _Scots Independent_ gave a tentative welcome to the declaration, pointing out that it was in effect a call for Dominion status. The caution of its editorial approach to the subject on this occasion would subsequently give way to a whole-hearted endorsement of the fundamentalist line. _Scots Independent_, April 1936.

44. A. King, H.A.M, _Scotsman_, 12th March 1936, 14th March 1936.


51. An attempt to produce his own book on Liberal agricultural policy had met with as little success as his history of the party.

52. Laurie to F. Stevenson, 14th July 1935, LG 11/6/50.

53. Laurie to Dame Margaret Lloyd George, 29th May 1923, LG 11/6.

54. Laurie to F. Stevenson, 7th August 1935, LG 11/6/49.

55. Laurie to F. Stevenson, 29th October 1935, LG 11/6/56.

56. Laurie to Lloyd George, 27th March 1936, LG 11/6/59; Laurie to F. Stevenson, 31st March 1936, LG 11/6/61.

57. Laurie to Lloyd George, 3rd June 1936, LG 11/6/74.

58. Typescript, "Europe or the Empire", sent to Lloyd George, 15th April 1936, LG 11/6/65.


63. In the Commons debate in which Boothby made this claim Harold Nicolson took a similar line, arguing that "the present pro-Germanism is a wave and not a tide; that it is only a fluctuation." Diary entry for March 26th 1936, Nicolson, op. cit., p. 254.


65. Rev. Dr. Salis Daiches, b. 1880. Rabbi to the Edinburgh Hebrew Congregation since 1919. Vice President of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland in 1923. Author of *Aspects of Judaism* (1928).


Chapter 6
Olympian Heights
Enthusiasm for Germany 1936

To many contemporaries the Rhineland crisis appeared as but a traumatic interlude in a greater drama. Once the threat of war with Germany had receded, public interest was easily diverted back to the question of the League of Nations and the Abyssinian war by the sudden and unexpected Abyssinian military collapse. There attention would remain until the debate over the decision to end sanctions had finally died away.

In the humiliating aftermath of that decision French credit in British eyes reached an absolute nadir. To a sense of betrayal was added a perception of a nation rent by deep internal divisions, as industrial unrest broke out in the wake of the Popular Front's electoral success at the beginning of May. Perfidious Gaul, it would appear, was also a weakling. To many British Conservatives the election of the Popular Front indicated a sufficiently serious slide to the Left, especially in view of the pact with the Soviet Union, to prompt pleas for caution in attaching Britain too closely to France. To some of their more enthusiastically anti-communist colleagues the French had already succumbed to the Hydra of Communism. This view, however, would only really come into its own after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July.

Perceptions of French weakness and unreliability contrasted unfavourably with Germany's growing military strength and her skilfully projected image of near monolithic social cohesiveness, not only fuelling demands for the pursuit of a British foreign policy independent of France, but also enhancing the apparent desirability of seeking more actively an accommodation with Germany. Italy, however, was also a beneficiary of the decline in French prestige. She emerged triumphant from the successful prosecution of the Abyssinian war, having defied the League of Nations single-handed. Not only had she refuted sceptics of Italian military capabilities, but her civilian population had also shown no perceptible signs of weakness in the face of international ostracism. Despite many predictions to the contrary, the war had served only to strengthen Mussolini's personal authority.

To some observers the realities of power politics were that Germany and Italy
were now the most important Continental powers, as far as the formulation of British foreign policy was concerned, and Britain simply could not afford to antagonise both simultaneously. Whether she liked it or not, "She must choose — or be friends with both!" For those who viewed British options in this light the Austro-German Agreement on July 12th indicated that time was of the essence. Austria was the first of the Central and Eastern European states to draw the conclusion from the Rhineland crisis that French support against a future German challenge was a far from certain eventuality, and that the time had come, therefore, to seek terms from Germany before their bargaining position was eroded. Although the Austrians publicly yielded only notional subordination to Germany in matters of foreign policy, in return for Germany's continuing recognition of Austrian independence, to most external observers the agreement signalled Austria's acceptance of a position of dependency on her powerful neighbour. Moreover, by his tacit acceptance of the arrangement, Mussolini had clearly renounced his previous role as the ultimate guarantor of Austrian independence. With the removal of the only serious bone of contention between the two powers, an Italo-German convergence had emerged as a very real possibility. Such a development would make successful British overtures to either party all the more difficult, and would increase the likelihood of Britain slipping into alignment with the Franco-Soviet bloc by default. Therefore, those who sought closer ties with Germany and their pro-Italian counterparts were encouraged to redouble their efforts.

With the shattering of the "illusion of collective security," argued Hugh Sellon, the more realistic course of security through regional pacts was now open, a formula which for Sellon simply meant a return to the Stresa front. To this end he emphasised Italy's value as a prospective ally. Her victory over Abyssinia in the face of sanctions had demonstrated both her military and economic strength. As "a State organised on corporate lines," she had been "in a peculiarly favourable position to stand an economic siege." The price of Italy's friendship, recognition of her conquests and perhaps some form of Mediterranean pact, would be well worth paying, for the "conclusion of a real entente" between the former Stresa partners would have "the strength to maintain the equilibrium in Central Europe." Since the future crisis which Sellon's proposed alliance might have to cope with were in his view likely to occur "on the Baltic or on the Czech or Austrian frontiers," Germany, although not specifically named, was clearly indicated as the main threat to peace. Although Sellon continued to praise the British government for its "wise and tactful handling of the Rhineland crisis," the sympathy for Germany which he himself
had expressed on that occasion had given way to a barely disguised hostility. Similarly the strongly anti-French sentiments he had evinced then had completely disappeared.

Sellon's change of position, however, was less radical than comparison with his March comments might suggest. His contribution to the anti-sanctions debate had revealed him to be first and foremost an Italophile. During the Rhineland crisis he was to some extent running under a flag of convenience. Nevertheless, he had not previously displayed any positively anti-German bias, and unlike some of his allies in the anti-sanctions campaign, he had not deployed the argument that Italy's friendship was essential if Germany were to be restrained. However, with the growing realisation that an Italo-German accord would seriously impair the chances of a rapprochement with Italy, his comments on Germany became steadily more critical. By early July his references to the German menace had become quite direct, and his earlier optimism about co-operation between Britain, France and Italy had been replaced by a note of worried urgency. Two days before the Austrian accommodation with Germany he warned, "Unless collaboration between London, Paris and Rome can be restored and in a reasonably short time, I fear that the internal difficulties of Germany, seeking an outlet by an attack on Germany's frontiers, may sadly confront Europe with a situation of desperate seriousness."^4

Like Hugh Sellon, Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore also had a tripartite system in mind. However, his encompassed Britain, Germany and France. Germany and France, he argued, "must be friends, for if not they will inevitably exhaust themselves economically, financially and nervously in fighting a danger which need never exist." Mutual self-interest was similarly advanced in favour of the Entente Cordiale, for the coasts of both Britain and France "will only remain inviolate as long as that friendship lasts." Moore's greatest enthusiasm, predictably, was reserved for Anglo-German friendship. That, claimed Moore, dispensing with merely pragmatic considerations, was based on an affinity between the two nations which had its roots in race. Having established these ties, Moore proceeded to demand that the "chief aim" of British foreign policy should be to establish "pacts of mutual assistance between the three countries." From that basis, "we could start a ball rolling which would end in the general settlement and easement, if not the complete pacification of all the problems at present confronting us."^5

Moore had held out equally optimistic prognostications for the pursuit of Anglo-
German friendship alone in 1935. Why now include the French? Moore's past criticisms of the French had admittedly been fairly restrained, and he had certainly held aloof from the general descent into Francophobia of March and April 1936. That, however, was utterly consistent with the image of respectability and measured objectivity with which he assiduously endeavoured to surround his projection of the German viewpoint. At no time previously had he shown any positive enthusiasm for the French. By July 1936 many of Moore's Conservative colleagues, afflicted by the anti-communist scare, were seeking to place as much distance as possible between Britain and France. For one whose anti-communism was not in doubt, Moore's behaviour in moving in an opposite direction appears at first sight almost perverse. The answer lies in Moore's conspicuous rejection of the notion of Italian participation in his mutual assistance pacts. It would be "of no great value", he argued, for Italy had been so weakened by the Abyssinian adventure and its attendant economic blockade that for the next ten years "neither the benefits of exploitation nor the recovery from exhaustion will enable her to take a leading or decisive part in European politics." This anxiety to dismiss Italian worth suggests that Moore subscribed to the belief that Britain would most likely have to choose in the near future between Italy and Germany. Moore's tripartite scheme, if effected, would prevent a return to Stresa, and instead place Italy in an isolated position. The disadvantage of the arrangement from Moore's point of view, namely association with the French, had arguably become easier to bear, for the weaker France became, the easier it would be for her to be pushed into a subordinate role by a strong Anglo-German partnership.

Although by no means sharing Moore's advocacy of mutual assistance pacts, Sir Daniel Stevenson was equally optimistic about the possible fruits of co-operation between Britain, France and Germany. If all three "were agreed on a joint policy the problem of lasting peace would be solved." For Stevenson the period following the Rhineland crisis had clearly been one of intense frustration, as Germany's "friendly" approach of March 7th had failed to result in anything more positive than a diplomatic stand-off. These unpromising developments he ascribed to British policy-making. The views of certain "influential members of the Cabinet," who were animated by a considerably less than generous spirit towards Germany, had prevailed. Calling for an end to "polemical correspondence," Stevenson urged the government to revert to Hitler's original proposals, and "offer, along with France, to meet Germany in a friendly conference." Although arguably simply a late
contribution to the Rhineland debate, Stevenson's proposals noticeably omit any reference to Italy. Clearly a settlement along the lines of a renegotiated Locarno was not what he had in mind. Like Lord Lothian, and indeed many other Liberals, Stevenson was clearly unwilling to forgive Italy her Abyssinian sins.

For perhaps the majority of British observers of the international scene in the summer of 1936, the fundamental issue facing Britain in the near future would be not whether to choose Italian or German friendship, but rather the question of Britain's response in the event of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, an eventuality which the increasing tempo of German anti-Soviet propaganda suggested to be both inevitable and imminent. This issue had first surfaced in 1935 as part of the general discussion of Britain's attitude towards the Franco-Soviet Pact. However, despite the absolute horror expressed by many Conservatives at the prospect of participating in a war against Germany in alliance with Communist Russia, that debate, up to and inclusive of the Rhineland crisis, had revolved largely around attitudes to France and French policy, with Russia cast to a large extent as a much despised henchman in the pay of a Machiavellian France. Although the apparent enfeeblement of France in the early summer of 1936 contributed to the reappraisal of her Russian partner, attitudes to Russia, and indeed to Europe as a whole, were radically transformed by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War on July 18th. From the beginning that conflict was perceived by many in Britain, particularly those on the extremes of Right and Left, not simply as a purely Spanish affair, but as the first round in the impending confrontation between fascism and communism. From this standpoint the nations of Europe could already be seen to be lining up on one side or the other of the ideological divide. War between Germany and the Soviet Union would be the main event in a European civil war. Judging by the Spanish experience, that conflict would be prosecuted with all the ruthlessness of Europe's earlier ideological wars, the wars of religion.

To many in Britain, of all persuasions in domestic politics, there was little to recommend either communism or fascism. Both political systems restricted the liberties of their subjects and had committed crimes against humanity. Democratic Britain, they argued, belonged intrinsically to neither camp, and therefore should steer clear of involvement, for that would only ensure Britain her share of the general destruction. "Nothing ... can be more dangerous," warned Sir Edward Grigg, "than to take sides in the struggle between Fascism and Communism."
Many British Conservatives, however, had no doubts as to which was the lesser of the two evils. For them events in Spain, coming hard on the heels of the Popular Front's success in France, provided conclusive proof that the forces of international communism were making an organised bid for European dominance. The intention of the Soviet Government, warned Sir Francis Lindley, "is to organise, finance and arm those who agree with its social aims in every country in the world ... Spain may well not be the last of the fruits of the peace-loving Soviets." 9

This revival of the Bolshevik scare of the immediate post-Revolution years prompted many British Conservatives to see in Germany a strong bulwark against the Red tide. Germany's burgeoning military strength was self-evident, and her leaders' antagonism towards communism unquestionable. In Lord Queenborough's view, National Socialism had "created a people united in service and determination to oppose the enemies of Christendom by every means in their power." 10

Many Scots shared in the perception of the Spanish Civil War as the first round in a titanic struggle between communism and fascism, and saw no reason why democratic Britain should get involved. The most striking feature of the rival political philosophies, they argued, was that they endeavoured "to solve the same problems, in exactly the same way; by shooting everyone who will not agree with Authority." Such was the almost religious fervour of their adherents, the struggle between the two systems would most likely result in wars "which may extend over the next half-century." For Britain to become allied to either side "could only bring us disaster." 11

Given the widespread anticipation of a European war, isolationist tendencies flourished. Therefore, it was no doubt with a sense of running with the tide that the Earl of Mansfield's Imperial Policy Group demanded government assurances that they would only undertake commitments to Europe, "which are strictly necessary for the safeguarding of our own interests." 12 Such indeed had been the swing to isolationism, that Mansfield now found it necessary to stress that the IPG's policy did not include allowing "a hostile or potentially hostile nation to occupy the Low Countries and the Channel ports." He was at pains to point out, though, that a commitment to keep these vital strategic areas in friendly hands was by no means the same thing as an assurance of automatic assistance to France in the event of

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German aggression, especially if that aggression had been triggered by her "unfortunate liaison with Soviet Russia." 13 It did, however, distinguish IPG policy from the out and out isolationism advocated by Beaverbrook. 14 The comparison between the two "isolationist" positions afforded Mansfield the opportunity to present IPG policy as both the more measured and the more moderate alternative. It was also undoubtedly an attempt to jog Conservative memories of the Empire Free Trade campaign. Beaverbrook, he warned, was tapping a rich vein of popular support, and his "propaganda" was succeeding "to a degree which would have been considered impossible, say, a year ago." 15 By raising the Beaverbrook bogey, Mansfield no doubt hoped to prod the government some way down the road to isolationism, as a means of forestalling any possible leadership challenge. At the same time, however, he was clearly anxious to distance the IPG from Beaverbrook. With events moving in their favour, and, therefore, with rising expectations of influencing government policy, Mansfield could well be expected to regard any appearance of proximity to Beaverbrook as something of a handicap. 16

Isolationism, however, held no appeal for the Duchess of Atholl. Far from it. Even as the anti-sanctions campaign, which she had done so much to support, came to a fruitful conclusion, Atholl set about the resuscitation of the ailing, if not mortally wounded, concept of collective security. With what must have appeared incredible effrontery to her former associates, she now claimed that the failure of mutual assistance in the case of Abyssinia did not "invalidate" it. 17 The League had failed, she argued, because the possible price of Abyssinian independence, a European war, had been too high. Collective security, however, could work within a truncated League restricted essentially to Europe, where there was "a common civilisation to defend." Within this revised League, moreover, mutual assistance would be "underpinned" by regional pacts, which would ensure a swift response to aggression while the League's full strength was being mobilised. 18

Atholl's major concern was to rally support for the small nations of Central and South-East Europe. Left unaided and isolated, they would fall prey to German aggression one by one, to the immense aggrandisement of German power. "If Hitler is allowed to swallow up Tchecko-Slovakia [sic]," she warned, "that will mean so many million more men conscripted for his army and women conscripted to work the land, and will make it possible to swallow up Rumania with her oil-
fields and her coast on the Black Sea." If Britain "evinced no interest in countries further East than the Rhine," although German aggression was "not likely to be directed against the West in the near future," Germany would grow "so powerful that in fifteen years or twenty years time no combination in the West could stand against it." Britain's long-term interests would best be served by stopping Hitler "carrying out the policy stated in Mein Kampf at the beginning."

Initially, despite the rhetoric of collective security, Atholl envisaged British commitment to South-East Europe in limited terms. Britain could not be expected "to give as much help to Austria or Czechoslovakia, if attacked, as to Belgium," and she certainly should "not promise what we cannot perform." Drawing parallels with Britain's successful defiance of Napoleonic dictatorship, she saw British aid to her continental allies as being most likely in the form of "money, arms, blockade." By August, however, she had come to see a "military obligation to prevent aggression in South-East Europe" as the most "effective deterrent." Only by confronting the Germans with an opposition of sufficient strength and determination to persuade them "that the chances of successful aggression are against them," could war be averted.

Atholl's revised scheme for the League bore only a passing resemblance to the League as originally conceived. The sole purpose of Atholl's grand design was the containment of Germany, and even in that she appears to have had greater faith in the practical worth of old-fashioned alliances than in the organisational umbrella to be provided by the League. Why then did she even pay lip-service to League idealism? In part the answer must lie in sheer desperation. Atholl's appreciation of the seriousness of the German threat by the summer of 1936 was such that all other considerations took second place. Both domestically and internationally, Atholl was prepared to countenance allies she previously would have eschewed. Her decision to embrace the League, however, also suggests an awareness of the potency of League idealism. Despite the apparent failure of the League as then constituted, the ideals the League had sought to realise were still deeply rooted in the popular consciousness. Use of the League, even if only in name, could provide both a rallying point, and the ability to invest resistance to German expansion with a sense of moral purpose which recourse to an alliance system on the pre-war model could not hope to match. Churchill appreciated this with his phrase, "Arms and the Covenant." Atholl herself was no internationalist. Her creed was a patriotic belief.
in Britain and Empire. However, she was also clearly astute enough to recognise that an appeal to patriotism alone would not suffice to rally the necessary support for her cause, if only because it was common currency among her pro-German and isolationist opponents.

Atholl had already demonstrated her willingness on the German issue to work with allies not just outwith the Conservative Right, but outside the party altogether. In the late spring she contributed a foreword to the pamphlet, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, produced by the anti-Nazi organisation, The Friends of Europe. As the pamphlet was a compilation of some of the aggressive passages missing from the English language editions of *Mein Kampf*, to which Atholl herself had previously drawn attention, it was a logical extension of her previous campaign. The Friends of Europe was a broad-left organisation under the secretarial direction of former Labour MP and quaker, Rennie Smith. Although Atholl herself was convinced that it was a moderate organisation, it was, nonetheless, unusual company for one of such normally right-wing views. To some of her colleagues and former political allies it was subversive in the extreme.

Atholl's conversion to the League brought her into collision with her erstwhile allies, the Imperial Policy Group. Although their stated policy aims had not changed significantly for over a year, she now condemned them as "dangerously short-sighted." Her attack provoked a furious response. The main thrust of the IPG counter-attack on Atholl was, from the outset, that her policy was pro-Soviet. Although she had studiously avoided any reference to Russia, her policy by necessity involved an "alliance, either within the League or outside, with Soviet Russia," claimed IPG secretary, Kenneth de Courcy. De Courcy's colleague, A.R. Wise, similarly sought to establish that Atholl had acquired a distinct "affection for the Soviet." A particularly heated exchange developed between De Courcy and Atholl, which rapidly degenerated into personal abuse. Only after Atholl had insinuated that De Courcy had fascist leanings and De Courcy had retaliated by effectively accusing Atholl of being a Communist fellow-traveller did the debate peter out.

Clearly the IPG were bound to be enraged by the spectacle of a fellow right-winger and former opponent of sanctions defecting to the pro-League camp, especially as their mutual association went back to well before the anti-sanctions
campaign. Atholl had previously been a member of the National Citizens' Union, the right-wing lobby group from which the IPG had largely emerged. She had resigned from the NCU in July 1934, on the grounds, she later claimed, that "they were tending towards an isolationist policy." The vigour with which the IPG turned on Atholl, however, did not stem from Atholl's change of tack alone. The IPG's own analysis of European conditions had been profoundly affected by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. They now viewed the world as divided essentially into three ideological blocs; the "more or less democratic nations," which included Britain and her Empire, the United States and the Scandinavian countries; the "Nazi-Fascist" group of Germany, Italy, Poland and Japan; and the "Communistic-Socialist" bloc, comprising Russia, France, Czechoslovakia and "other" South-East European countries. The League of Nations, previously condemned merely as a tool of the Franco-Soviet alliance, had now effectively become an agency for the furtherance of world communism. If Britain were to throw her full weight behind the League now, warned De Courcy, "we shall make quite certain of a Communist Europe before ten years are out."

Although the Earl of Mansfield must undoubtedly have agreed with his colleagues' assessment of the European situation, he held aloof from the personal attacks on the Duchess of Atholl. As the only Scot in the IPG trio, he might have been expected to be the one to pursue Atholl the most rigorously. Perhaps personal considerations accounted for his reluctance to engage the Duchess. Perhaps, on the other hand, he felt it unseemly for Perthshire's two leading Conservative politicians, fellow landowners whose families had long played prominent roles in Perthshire society, to savage one another quite so publicly. That spectacle would not have been good for local Conservative morale. Allowing de Courcy his head, however, was altogether more convenient.

During the Rhineland debate Robert Boothby had drawn attention to those Conservative MPs who were quietly hoping "that a day will come when we shall get the Germans and the Russians fighting each other... and then somehow or other, those two great menaces of the world will 'do in' each other." Given Britain's state of military unreadiness, the possibility that her two most formidable potential opponents should direct their energies to mutual destruction was an attractive proposition. At the very least "the belligerents will be so weakened that their future policy will concern no one but themselves."
By the mid-summer there were many isolationist Conservatives who harboured such hopes. More, certainly, than their public utterances might suggest, for while it was perfectly acceptable to advocate a policy which sought to avoid Britain's involvement in a Russo-German war, wishing Hitler "Bon Voyage" was not, if the speaker had a reputation to consider. Even the normally outspoken de Courcy stopped just short of openly stating the unmentionable. The aims of British policy, he declared, should be to "set the two rival systems of Europe against each other to the best of our ability, either economically or diplomatically, but we must not become involved ourselves."

Such sentiments were unlikely to be accompanied by an entirely even-handed attitude towards the two potential belligerents. Given British assessments of the military capabilities of Germany and the Soviet Union, there would not be many who seriously doubted that the former would be the eventual winner. During 1935 isolationists and Germanophiles had found themselves in temporary alliance over specific issues. By the summer of 1936, however, their paths were looking increasingly convergent. Isolationism was largely coming to mean leaving Europe to its own devices, safe in the knowledge that although a Germanic hegemony might result, at least the Communist menace would be laid to rest.

For some isolationists the drift in this direction had been sufficiently marked for them to be more accurately described as pro-German. Like Mansfield, the Earl of Galloway believed that Britain should only guarantee the frontiers of France and the Low Countries against "unprovoked" aggression. France, he declared, should not "count on us if she is involved in war with Germany by reason of any of the pacts or alliances she has seen fit to create in Central Europe, and South-Eastern Europe." However, he also urged the establishment of a "close understanding" with Germany. This understanding was to be strictly confined to Germany's Western borders. Germany, it would seem, was to be left free to strike East if she chose. It was an arrangement, Galloway claimed, by which "both Britain and Germany would have much to gain and little to lose."

The Bolshevik scare engendered by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War provided a powerful impetus to the movement in isolationist ranks towards greater enthusiasm for Nazi Germany. One notable example of this trend was Sir Patrick Ford. The most important difference between Communism, on the one hand, and Fascism and Nazism on the other, Ford asserted in September, was that the latter
did not seek "to impose their system of government on entirely alien nations." Stalin, however, was "still pledged to the imposition of Bolshevism on all other peoples." The triumph of Nazism and Fascism, in Germany and Italy respectively, he continued, had undoubtedly saved Europe from the "red horrors of a Communist-Bolshevik tidal wave" in the past. Ford's audience was clearly meant to draw the conclusion that such services could well be necessary in the future.

The growing convergence of isolationist and pro-German views does much to explain the vigour of the Duchess of Atholl's personal assault on the IPG. The hypocrisy which they accused her of exercising with regard to the Soviet Union was arguably more than matched by the way the "neutrality" of their public statements belied the growing pro-German sentiments in their ranks.

Atholl was keenly sensitive to the charge that she was either pro-Russian or pro-communist. Never, she claimed, had she been "blind to the Russian danger." It was, she reiterated throughout the summer, simply a question of priorities. There could be no question, in her view, that Russia actually constituted a "military danger" to Britain. As for the domestic threat posed by communism, "seventeen years of Communist propaganda ... have not produced more than three Communist MPs and a General Strike which was a fiasco." There could be "no comparison" with the immediate threat posed by German rearmament. Besides, she pointed out, she was not advocating an alliance with the Soviet Union. That charge, she argued, was a "red herring." Collective security under the Covenant was not an alliance.

In the course of August, however, Atholl was drawn into a furious debate in the London press on the comparative virtues and vices of Communism and Nazism per se. Although initially the debate was something of a personal dual between Atholl and Lady Houston, it rapidly became one-sided, with Atholl defending her viewpoint against a series of attackers. To some extent the ground was chosen by Atholl, in that the debate was largely fought out in the papers of her preference, the Morning Post and the Daily Telegraph. Both papers were even-handed in their dislike for Nazism and Communism, and in Atholl's view, allowed a greater degree of "fair" debate on foreign policy than some of their counterparts. After The Times had refused one of her letters in April, Atholl had vowed never to contribute to that paper again. The terms of the debate, however, were effectively set by
Atholl's opponents. Despite her belief in the essential irrelevance of whether "one tyranny is more terrible than the other," Atholl was steadily pushed into defending Communism's record, if only to prove that bad though it had been, Nazism's was even worse. Atholl's decision to pursue her opponents on to this ground cost her dear, for it obscured the main thrust of her argument. Her apparent "defence" of Communism caused a storm among her social and political peers. Reactions ranged from stunned incomprehension to absolute fury. The Patriot, a repository of Die-Hard and anti-semitic views combined, was among the more generous, for it was still prepared to believe that "the excellent intentions of the Duchess of Atholl are above suspicion," even if her judgement was completely out of kilter. Others were far less tolerant.

One of Atholl's contentions during the August debate was that although the oppression of Christianity in Germany did not take the crude form it did in Russia, the Nazi endeavour to "alter the content of the Christian message" was all the more dangerous for its very insidiousness. This view did not find favour with Atholl's fellow members of the Faith Defence League. Col. Todd, a member of the FDL executive committee, charged her with having "made opposition to Atheist and Bolshevik propaganda infinitely more difficult." "As you were so prominent in opposing the work of the brutes in Moscow," he further complained, "your apparent weakening is far more damaging to our cause than it would be if you had never taken so strong a line." Todd's condemnation followed discussion of Atholl's public pronouncements in her absence by the FDL executive, apparently at the instigation of her fellow joint president, the Earl of Glasgow, an inveterate anti-communist, who like so many others of a similar disposition in the summer of 1936, was also developing an enthusiasm for Nazi Germany. Never one to accept censure easily, Atholl counter-attacked, challenging the FDL to "make clear that it defends religion and morality from attacks from any quarter." It was a bold thrust, but given the anti-communist composition of the FDL executive, doomed from the outset. By the end of 1936 Atholl had been quietly "dropped" from the FDL.

The Duchess of Atholl's virtuoso performance in the London press did not go unnoticed in Scotland. In August the controversy spilled over into The Scotsman's correspondence columns, with Atholl, relatively unsupported, once again defending
her views on the relative merits and demerits of Communism and Nazism against a series of opponents.

Where Communism endeavoured to reduce the individual to a mere cog "in the collective process of production," argued Capt. H.W. Luttman-Johnson, Nazism, on the other hand, allowed the individual to "attain through moral strength and conspicuous achievement, to positions of distinction." As a political philosophy, therefore, Nazism sought to elevate rather than abase. While there had been casualties in the establishment of the Nazi régime, he admitted, these had been fairly light compared with the "countless thousands" slaughtered by the Communists in Russia. As for the supposed oppression of religion in Germany, the claims Atholl had made were groundless. From his own personal observations, Luttman-Johnson could report that "the churches were packed" in Germany. While it was true that the German government did not "tolerate pulpits being used as political platforms," he pointed out that there were also many in Britain who viewed clerical involvement in politics "with disfavour." For Communist oppression of the Church, one had only to look to Spain to see the "ghastliness" of which Communism was capable. Unlike some of Atholl's other detractors, Luttman-Johnson was prepared to challenge her argument on Imperial self-interest head on. Communism, he argued, was "the particular enemy of bourgeois, capitalistic, and Imperialistic Great Britain," witness its seditious activities in various parts of the Empire since the War. Nazism, by contrast, was "concerned with its own national affairs." It threatened "no-one but those who seek to make trouble in its own territories." 55

Henry William Luttman-Johnson was forty-four years old in 1936. A former professional soldier in the Indian Army, he had served with the Indian Corps in France during World War One. Like the Earl of Mansfield, he was a near neighbour of Atholl's. His residence, Blackpark Lodge, lay just south of Perth near Luncarty. He was not, however, a member of a long-established Perthshire family. Like many other British officers in the immediate post-war years, he had retired to a Scottish estate. Luttman-Johnson was a close friend of Francis Yeats-Brown, the influential pro-Fascist publicist who, like him, had served in the Indian Army. In 1934 he had acted as honorary secretary for the January Club, the forum for the discussion of fascism set up by the BUF with a view to infiltrating the Conservative Right. 56 At that time he had been a keen enthusiast of the Italian Corporate
experiment, and had written to *Blackshirt* urging its readers to acquaint themselves with works by Mussolini, Harold Goad and Muriel Currey. Intriguingly, in the same letter Luttman-Johnson had also recommended *The Main Facts of the India Problem*, a tract outlining the case against the Government of India Bill. The author was none other than the Duchess of Atholl.  

In his defence of Nazism Luttman-Johnson's corporatist and anti-capitalist proclivities were clearly in evidence. Although he denied that Nazism itself was anti-capitalist, one of his examples of the way in which it concerned itself with the well-being of the individual was in the restrictions it placed on "large business organisations," which otherwise "would threaten the economic survival of the 'small' trader." His evidence, too, for its healthy regard for the bourgeoisie was the fact that it had rejected the concept of the "class war," and in its place was "uniting all classes into one large happy family." Although he denied allegations that he advocated a Fascist or Nazi form of government for Britain, his claim that "The Germans are a people who have become democratised in the best sense of the word," said much for his faith in parliamentary democracy.

Although Luttman-Johnson had retained his connections with the British Fascist movement, he appears, by the summer of 1936, to have not simply extended his fondness for fascist régimes to include the German variant, but to have largely transferred his admiration for the Italian state to Germany. His stress on race certainly suggests this. In July he declared his enthusiasm for Anglo-German friendship, not simply on the grounds that it constituted "the only effective bulwark against Communism," but also because "the Germans are our racial cousins." "Germany has never, prior to 1914, been our enemy," he pointed out. An enthusiastic monarchist, he was at pains to remind the readers of *The Patriot* "that our beloved Royal Family have German blood."  

The Duchess of Atholl's most enthusiastic Scottish assailant, however, was her former ally in the anti-sanctions campaign, Professor Charles Sarolea. Given his ingrained anti-communism, Sarolea was bound to take exception to any attempt to contrast communism favourably with a non-communist system. However, Sarolea had not previously been noted for any pro-German or pro-Nazi sentiment. Quite the reverse. Initially he had been positively antagonistic to the Nazi régime, regarding it essentially as the first phase in a revival of Prussian militarism, and in the spring of 1934 he had visited Germany and Central Europe to gather material for
a book on "the Menace of Hitlerism to International Peace." While there he had struck up a friendship with the young German propagandist, H. Rolf Hoffmann, the assistant head of the Nazi Party's Auslandspresses Büro, whose department monitored comment on Germany in the British and American press. Thereafter the two men were to be in regular correspondence until the outbreak of the Second World War. However, although Hoffmann would subsequently exert considerable influence in shaping his views, Sarolea's 1934 visit did not diminish his belief in the aggressive nature of the New Germany. As late as April 1935 he could still ask, "whether it is Germany that has valid and sufficient reasons to dread an imaginary Russian menace, or whether, on the contrary, it is Russia that has compelling reasons to dread the much more real and much more pressing German peril on her Western frontier." Sarolea's proposed book on the German threat to peace, however, did not materialise. By the spring of 1935 he had become fascinated, albeit in a critical and intellectual fashion, by Rosenberg's racial theories and the pagan-Christian conflict. These were to have formed the subject of a book, tentatively entitled "New German Heathenism," although again this project failed to reach fruition. Despite his unconcealed admiration for the controversial nature of Rosenberg's philosophy, Sarolea's interest in no sense betokened positive sympathy for his subject. Articles extracted from drafts for the new book were sufficiently critical for Sarolea to hawk his wares in anti-Nazi circles.

Sarolea's attitude to Germany, however, had been profoundly affected by the Rhineland coup. That event, he believed, had palpably demonstrated Germany's re-emergence as the foremost military power in Europe. For the Western democracies to clash with her would be a disaster, for it would lay Europe open to the communist flood. If the cost of accommodating German ambition was German hegemony in Europe, it was a price worth paying. In the immediate aftermath of the Rhineland crisis Sarolea wrote privately, "My one hope for peace is ... that Germany will be so strong that at the eleventh hour she will be able to impose her will and assert her dominance over Europe without war, in which case both France and Great Britain will have to pay the price of peace with compound interest." Ideally, Sarolea hoped to see Germany unleashed on the Soviet Union. Not only would that strike at the very roots of communism, but the effort would absorb the dynamic of the New Germany. There was no reason "why Europe should interfere if Germany wants to embark on a Russo-Ukrainian adventure. She would have her
hands quite full.68

Sarolea took no part in the public debate on the Rhineland crisis, an indication perhaps of the suddenness of his reappraisal of Germany. He may also have felt that the intrusion of anything resembling a pro-German viewpoint would prove damaging to his anti-sanctions stance. In any event, the anti-sanctions campaign continued to absorb most of his attention. Sarolea's public reticence on the subject of Germany, however, disappeared after another visit to that country in June and July.69 By then, of course, the anti-sanctions campaign had been brought to a successful conclusion. Public opinion, moreover, had also become more receptive to the expression of pro-German views.

In his contributions to the press in late July Sarolea's views did not appear to have advanced beyond the fatalism of March. He was, he claimed, "possessed and obsessed with the sole idea and purpose of avoiding the threatening world conflagration." Far from revealing any enthusiasm for Nazism, he declared it to be "infinitely more uncompromising and more hysterical than the pan-Germanism and Prussianism of a previous generation." Where Germany's demands for frontier revision were concerned, however, he equivocated, simultaneously decrying "the passionate pan-German aspirations, combined with the brutal Prussian methods in realising those aspirations which are mainly responsible for the present dangerous tension in Eastern and Central Europe," and the "spirit of hatred, revenge and violence" which had animated the framers of the punitive peace of Versailles.70

By August Sarolea had had time to digest the implications of the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. In that month he embarked on a veritable plethora of articles and letters to the press, the Glasgow Weekly Herald alone featuring articles from him in five consecutive issues.71 In these he not only reiterated his violent aversion to communism, but also stated quite categorically his new-found sympathies for Germany.

In part Sarolea restated themes deployed by "respectable" pro-German commentators. He stressed the injustice of Versailles, a peace ostensibly based on the principle of national self-determination, yet one which denied that self-same principle by attaching preponderantly German territories to the successor states for strategic reasons. Conveniently, he neglected to mention that he himself had endorsed those reasons in the past.72 Given this inherent inconsistency in the peace
settlement, German demands for frontier revision, "far from being in contradiction with the Treaty of Versailles," were "the logical outcome of that Treaty." He also declared his belief that Germany's internal affairs were her own business and that external criticism would only prove counterproductive. The Germans had "to achieve their own salvation. We can give little help and can do much harm by tactless interference."  

In contrasting the Soviet and Nazi systems, however, Sarolea also demonstrated a readiness to defend Nazi ideals and methods. The principal aim of Nazism, he argued, was to promote "social unity" through "the voluntary allegiance and cooperation of all citizens." The Nazi régime had the support of the mass of the German people, as had been "proved by one Plebiscite after another." By contrast, the Soviet government could "only rely on the loyalty of the industrial workers," a mere "15% of the population." He also revealed a developing admiration for the person of the Nazi leader. In Mein Kampf, he claimed, Hitler had "expressed more clearly and more eloquently than any other writer the aspirations and ambitions of his countrymen." The German leader now enjoyed "unparalleled prestige and authority," because he had "interpreted more accurately the mind of his people and because he has shown them the way to translate their patriotic dreams into realities."  

As he candidly admitted to the editor of the Glasgow Weekly Herald, the last of Sarolea's articles for that paper, entitled "The 'German Peril' versus the 'Russian Peril'," was designed specifically as a counterblast to the Duchess of Atholl. Atholl, in Sarolea's opinion, was "losing her sense of values and her sense of proportion," and was guilty of "misrepresenting both the Russian situation and the German situation." As recently as June he had extolled her as "amongst the ablest women in London." Now, in the tone of an irate schoolmaster, he scolded his errant pupil for views which were as "dangerous" as they were "erroneous."  

In his enthusiasm to issue a corrective to Atholl's arguments, Sarolea also plunged into the controversy raging in the correspondence columns of the Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post. This intervention resulted in a request from Lady Houston, Atholl's arch-opponent, to contribute in a similar vein for the Saturday Review. Sarolea willingly complied. However, as the Saturday
Review's expositions on world affairs were generally speaking unhampered by the kind of "balanced" historical analysis which Sarolea believed to be associated with his name, he felt obliged to request anonymity for his two articles. "If I identify myself with the Saturday Review," he argued, "the cowardly cautious London Editors may boycott any further contributions of mine whereas hitherto they have invariably accepted my contributions." In contributing to the Saturday Review at all, Sarolea was overriding the advice of Lady Maxwell-Scott. "Don't touch Lady Houston!" she had warned, "She is quite cracked." Given his desire to avoid public association with a paper of "exaggerated style, vulgar exhibitionism and extreme views," Sarolea was therefore "unpleasantly surprised," when the articles appeared under his own name. Whatever the damage done to his academic reputation, however, Sarolea could take consolation from the fact that his articles were highly acclaimed by The Patriot. In any event, the extremely generous fees paid by the Saturday Review prompted him to pragmatically inquire if they would care to consider a third article.

By the late summer of 1936 the Duchess of Atholl's absolute determination to stop Germany at all costs had driven her to adopt an attitude towards the Soviet Union, which, however qualified, was radically at odds with the vehement condemnation she had expressed in the early 1930s. To many of her peers, especially her former colleagues and associates on the far Right of the Conservative Party, her position was barely distinguishable from that of an apologist of communism. She was, in their eyes, a traitor both to her party and her social class, and the level of opprobrium heaped on Atholl reflected in many cases a deep sense of personal betrayal. There were other Conservative MPs, like Vyvyan Adams, whose views on Germany and the Soviet Union, while perhaps not as vigorously expressed, did run parallel to Atholl's. Few of them, however, matched Atholl's impeccable social credentials and past involvement in right-wing causes.

Amongst Scottish Conservative MPs Atholl's position was one of almost complete isolation. She still enjoyed the support of Capt. McEwen, who had backed her earlier campaign to expose the true content of Mein Kampf. In October McEwen reaffirmed his personal solidarity by addressing Atholl's constituency association at Dunkeld. The threat from Germany, he declared, was unmistakable. The Germans "regarded war not only as inevitable but desirable" and Hitler, although "not necessarily a liar," was a "fanatic." On the other hand, while he
accepted that Russia still needed careful watching, there was evidence to suggest that she was something of a reformed character.\textsuperscript{92} McEwen, however, had not taken Atholl's part in the debates on the nature of communism and fascism. Although for the moment he shared her contention that the German menace was more dangerous than the Soviet, his underlying fear of communism would assert itself only three months later when he came out strongly in favour of a Nationalist victory in Spain.\textsuperscript{93}

The level of animosity which Atholl provoked south of the Border was as nothing compared with the rage she inspired amongst Scottish right-wingers, incensed at the discovery of a Judas in their midst. Thereafter, they would pursue her with the obsessiveness of participants in a family vendetta. For those Scots motivated both by anti-communism and a desire for a closer accord with Germany, the exposition of their views would increasingly come to be dominated by a desire to refute and discredit the Duchess.

Even before the late summer debates established Atholl in this role, she had clashed with A.P. Laurie. Laurie had spent the early summer developing the themes he had expounded during the Rhineland crisis, namely that Germany, "isolated and surrounded" by heavily armed foes plotting her "annihilation," was, above all other European nations, the most sincere in her desire for peace. If only, he had pleaded, Britain would hold out to her "the hand of friendship and understanding,"\textsuperscript{94} Germany's enemies would be deterred and "the peace of Europe would be secured."\textsuperscript{95} Atholl had countered Laurie's claims as to Germany's peaceful intent with her, by now, standard references to \textit{Mein Kampf}.\textsuperscript{96} These Laurie dismissed as "all the most purple passages," hardly representative of the work as a whole. Besides, he argued, \textit{Mein Kampf} had to be viewed in its historical perspective. It was "a great human document, a cry of despair" written immediately after Germany had been "dismembered by the sword." It should not be regarded as a future programme for the New Germany. The "more mature Hitler of today" had embraced "a better political philosophy," recognising "the futility of wars of conquest and the necessity of the tightly packed bundle of nations in Europe coming to an understanding." He was, without doubt, "the one genuine advocate of peace today."\textsuperscript{97}

Although the public duel between Atholl and Laurie quickly abated, it had in fact
simply entered a more private stage. To persuade Laurie of the error of his ways, Atholl sent him a copy of The Friends of Europe pamphlet she had prefaced. That publication, countered Laurie, was "grossly inaccurate," for it deliberately exaggerated the aggressive content of the original. Plans were afoot, he revealed, to issue a corrective, showing the original text, the correct translation and the mistranslation by The Friends of Europe. Although he was not at liberty to give particulars, he felt obliged to warn Atholl privately that she might be "careful" in her use of The Friends of Europe translation. "Do you know who these people who call themselves 'The Friends of Europe' are and by whom are they financed?" he asked darkly.

Laurie's inferences as regards The Friends of Europe fell on deaf ears. However, although Atholl's assessment of Laurie was that he was a political lightweight, merely "an ex-Principal of a Technical College," and "a cantankerous man" who could be "very uncompromising in his views and his ways of expressing things," she took his threat sufficiently seriously to hold up publication of the second edition of the pamphlet, while she obtained academic assurances of the validity of Rennie Smith's translations. Only after she had acquired unofficial Foreign Office verification of their accuracy, did she accept that she had been the victim of "a game of bluff." Laurie's exposition of the case for Anglo-German friendship fundamentally altered during the course of the summer of 1936. The appeals to British sympathy for the underdog and concern for international justice, so strongly in evidence in the aftermath of the Rhineland crisis, increasingly gave way to the expression of his belief in the underlying racial affinity between the two nations. Urging his fellow countrymen to study "seriously and sympathetically the new German revival," he reminded them that "we are more closely in touch with the German and Scandinavian mind and character than we are either with Latin or Slav." Lt.-Col. Moore, of course, had expressed similar sentiments. Laurie, however, went well beyond mere belief in a general similarity of outlook between the Nordic peoples. The British, he argued, shared the German concern for "purity of race." This distinguished them from the Latins, witness the decadent French, who had allowed "a widespread infusion of negroid blood." Laurie's theorising assumed, too, the existence of superior and inferior races. The Magyars had
brought "a higher culture and a progressive civilisation" to their subject Slavs, much as the Normans had to the Anglo-Saxons. The Slavs of the successor states of Eastern Europe, deprived of the benefits of Hungarian tutelage by the Treaty of Trianon, had been unable to maintain the levels of civilisation they had previously enjoyed. Although a belief in the racial superiority of the white man still provided much of the ideological justification for the British Empire, even in the diluted form of trusteeship, Laurie's views, with his emphasis on Europe and his utter contempt for the "Slavonic hordes," suggest greater familiarity with German rather than British thinking on the subject.

The emergence of race as the predominant factor in Laurie's views was accompanied by a resolution of the dichotomy which had existed in the spring between his isolationist arguments and his desire to promote Anglo-German friendship as a sure guarantee of European peace. By September Laurie had completely abandoned his isolationist rhetoric. Should war be "forced on Germany," he hoped the British would "support our cousins beyond the Rhine." Laurie, then, was not opposed to British involvement in Europe, or indeed in another European war, provided it was on the right side. The First World War he now presented, not as the product of French intrigue, but as a struggle "between the German people and Slav and Latin for predominance in Europe." In that conflict the latter had triumphed only through the error of Anglo-US intervention. For Laurie there should be no such mistake a second time.

Arguably, Laurie's isolationist stance had been a genuine stepping stone in the evolution of his ideas, or perhaps simply the product of muddled thought. However, as early as April he had privately recorded his belief that a renewed clash between Slav and German was "inevitable," and that personally he "would rather fight for Germany than for the Slavs." Most likely it was a tactical posture, dictated by the need to head off the formation of a League-based grand alliance against Germany. By the late summer, not only had British commitment to the League effectively become a dead issue, but the continuing swing towards Germany in popular opinion had created a much more favourable climate for the outright expression of pro-German views. In June Laurie was still employing the "moderate" argument that while the British might not "approve" of the Nazi form of government, it was, after all, the "affair of the people of Germany." Suddenly, in July, Laurie broke into open admiration for the Nazi régime. Far from being an
aberrant mutation of the body politic, Nazism, Laurie now claimed, was firmly rooted in European cultural tradition. It was "based on a Socialistic conception of the State, and of the duty of the individual to the State, which has its foundation in the Hegelian philosophy." Nazism was building a new society, in many ways superior to the old. German youth had been "inspired" by the virtues of "health, strength and discipline." Through the medium of the labour camp, which was "abolishing class prejudice and ignorance," a new unitary society was being created. It was an achievement, Laurie suggested, which put democracy's failure to address the problems of class division to shame. Nor was this the only area in which democracy compared unfavourably with Nazism. Contrary to popular myth, Nazi Germany was not devoted to "force and the glorification of war," in contrast to peace-loving democracy. Quite the reverse. Democracies, Laurie believed, "have always been peculiarly addicted to war, being more swayed by passion than are more centralised forms of government."114

Like Lothian before him, but to a much greater extent, Laurie, following Hitler's March proposals, had succumbed to the Führer's self-projected image as the Great Peacemaker. Laurie's conversion had seemingly been sudden. "When you grasp the foreign policy of Hitler a great light will land on you like Paul at Tarsus," he apprised Lloyd George.115 By August Laurie's adulation of the German dictator was bordering on hagiographic. "The rulers of the nations need to be born again to grasp the political philosophy of the Führer," he commented contemptuously. Only Hitler had "a clear vision of the future" and could "lead Europe to a real and enduring peace."116 Through his innovative policy of concluding individual non-aggression pacts, Hitler was reshaping the international order single-handedly. Germany, Laurie predicted, would soon be "the centre of an area of established peace including France, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Baltic Provinces."117

Throughout the summer of 1936 Laurie continued to press Lloyd George to head a popular campaign for the acceptance of Hitler's peace proposals. In endeavouring to secure his idol's co-operation, he held out the lure of a possible return to office. "The leadership of the Nation is offered you with both hands," he pleaded, "It is there for the taking."118 Laurie further urged the Welshman to go to Germany for a personal interview with Hitler. He was, therefore, "thrilled," when he discovered in September that such a meeting was imminent. It was, he declared
melodramatically, "the most important event since the Treaty of Versailles was signed." Fortuitously, Laurie was holidaying in Bavaria when the historic encounter occurred, enabling him to provide a breathless, if somewhat distant, eyewitness account of the event. "Looking from my window I can see one peak of the mountains where two men are meeting, of whom one held the fate of Europe in his hands for four years of war, while the other holds the fate of Europe in his hands today ... and from that meeting may come again an understanding between the two great Nordic peoples."

Lloyd George's decision to meet Hitler undoubtedly owed little to the vigorous promptings of his enthusiastic acolyte. Although his secretary, Frances Stevenson, pronounced Lloyd George "always glad" to receive Laurie's views, it was perhaps secretarial licence. Stevenson would later commend Laurie to Beaverbrook as "a very reliable scientist," even if "his politics are not so reliable." He was, she continued, "really quite harmless, though talks a lot." While admittedly this assessment followed Laurie's involvement with the Link and British Union, as the BUF was later known, there is no evidence to suggest that in 1936 Lloyd George held any great opinion of Laurie's judgement. He certainly did not favour him with his confidence. Laurie's first intimation that Lloyd George had definitely decided to go to meet Hitler came from the newspaper reports, following his departure for Germany.

Lloyd George's lack of interest in Laurie was hardly surprising. Laurie was, after all, merely a former minor player on the Scottish political stage, whose aspirations to pursue a parliamentary career had twice been thwarted. Although fairly well known in Scotland, his name had been acquired in fields other than politics. It is also unlikely that any influence Laurie may have wielded in Liberal circles north of the Border would have followed him south, regardless of his participation in the Council of Action. Besides, by the autumn of 1936 Laurie's Liberal credentials were wearing decidedly thin. While he might bewail the "deplorable" fact that the Liberal Party now seemed to be "taking the wrong side on the German question," and beseeched Lloyd George to "make a convert of Sinclair," the divergence of Laurie and the party of his nominal allegiance had less to do with the stiffening of the official party line towards Nazi Germany under Sir Archibald Sinclair's guidance, than with the radical evolution of Laurie's personal politics since the previous March. Laurie had clearly stepped well
beyond the bounds of a sympathetic Liberal approach to Germany, based on a concern for international justice. True, there were also other Liberals who declared themselves impressed by Nazi achievements, especially in areas such as social welfare and public works. It was no doubt particularly galling for Liberal supporters of the Council of Action to witness the apparent social benefits of vigorous state intervention in Germany, while Lloyd George's own New Deal policy went unrealised, with little hope of being implemented in the near future. Laurie's now unrestrained admiration for the Nazi régime and his positive deification of its leader, however, were in an altogether different category from such qualified praise. His evident preference for dictatorial leadership, and enthusiastic criticism of democracy's failings relative to Nazism, cast serious doubts on Laurie's very commitment to parliamentary democracy, far less his loyalty to the Liberal Party. While outspokenly anti-communist, Laurie's anti-capitalist tendencies were also beginning to show. Anti-urban, prone to eulogies on the benefits of peasant life, and obsessed by Nordic race theories, Laurie had become a convert to Nazism in all but name. Of his former Liberal creed, the only tangible remnant, other than his idolisation of Lloyd George, was a lingering faith in Free Trade.

After the Rhineland triumph Hitler's desire to consolidate his gains dictated that efforts be made to soothe world opinion. For the time being there were to be no disruptive diplomatic initiatives. The only major move of the summer, the agreement with Austria, on the surface emphasised Germany's stated aim of seeking conflict-avoiding solutions to any points of difference with her neighbours, with the conspicuous exception of the Soviet Union. In internal affairs there was a brake on radical legislation. While there was no easing up in the anti-Jewish programme, there was also no dramatic intensification. German propaganda aimed at developing a respectable image of the régime abroad, and emphasised its desire to be internationally accepted. This period came to be known as the "Olympic Pause." As Franklin Gannon points out, however, while the Olympic Games did not actually take place until August, the new German propaganda offensive was already well under way by the end of April. Nor did it peter out in the autumn, but ran on into early 1937. The "Olympic Pause" was, rather, "the '1936' pause," and the Games themselves were "merely part of a vast propaganda exercise aimed at the Western World."

The Games drew large numbers of Britons to Germany. Their very numbers
precluded provision for all visitors of those carefully orchestrated guided tours enjoyed by foreign dignitaries, although some of their number would indeed enjoy such facilities. Nonetheless, reality could be doctored. In Berlin notices and graffiti abusing Jews were removed and works by writers banned since 1933 reappeared in the book shops, while in the countryside outside the capital forced labour parties containing political prisoners were kept away from roads. The Games themselves could be counted upon to engage most visitors’ attention anyway. Conducted on a scale lavish enough to dwarf all previous athletic gatherings, they could hardly fail to impress upon the spectators Nazism’s apparent organisational efficiency and dynamism, and its enthusiasm for the physical well-being of the German people. Those who were keenly interested in the development of sport in Britain were particularly susceptible to such imagery.

For their more important guests the Germans provided a great deal of personal attention and, above all, sumptuous entertainment. As Chips Channon noted, "The new régime are masters of the art of party-giving." Among the British dignitaries caught up in the festivities were several MPs. These included three representatives of Scottish constituencies, Kenneth Lindsay, Henry James Scrymgeour-Wedderburn and Douglas Douglas-Hamilton, Marquess of Douglas and Clydesdale, all relatively youthful by parliamentary standards. Kenneth Lindsay, National Labour MP for Kilmarnock, had recently been appointed Civil Lord of the Admiralty. Politically he was both progressive and moderate, and from 1931 to 1935 he had been General Secretary of Political and Economic Planning, a Keynesian ginger group which produced reformist papers on contemporary social issues. In the past Lindsay had not shown any particular partiality either for Germany or for Nazism. Nor would he do so in the future. His presence at the Olympiad can almost certainly be ascribed to an innocent enthusiasm for sport, even if his personal preferences ran to football and cricket. Jim Wedderburn, Conservative MP for Renfrewshire West, was similarly unnoted for any positive views on Germany. A youthful interest in sport and a close personal friendship with Clydesdale seem the likeliest explanations for his attendance at the Games. Clydesdale, the Tory incumbent of Renfrew East, was certainly a keen sportsman. Known as "the boxing Marquess" during his student days at Oxford, for three years he had represented his university in the ring in matches against Cambridge. In 1924 he had won the Scottish Amateur Middleweight Boxing Championship. He was also a devotee of outdoor sports, particularly
mountaineering, ski-ing and gliding. Unlike his companions, however, his presence at the Games was far from straightforward.

As heir to the Duke of Hamilton, Scotland's premier peer, Clydesdale was arguably the most important of the Scottish trio at the Games, Lindsay's junior ministerial appointment notwithstanding. Although the Douglas-Hamiltons were probably not among the richest of Scotland's feudal families, Clydesdale's lineage was certainly sufficient to guarantee entrée to high society, and his marriage in 1937 to Lady Elizabeth Percy, daughter of the 8th Duke of Northumberland, would prove to be the society wedding of the year, certainly as far as Scotland was concerned. As a family, the Douglas-Hamiltons had a strong tradition of close association with the Royal Family, partly because the Dukes of Hamilton were hereditary Keepers of Holyrood Palace. This official tie with the Royal Household had been reinforced in Clydesdale's generation by the marriage of his brother Malcolm to Pamela Bowes-Lyon, a cousin of the Duchess of York. These impeccable social credentials would not have been lost on the Germans, especially as they had a marked tendency to overrate the political influence which such proximity to the throne could generate.

Clydesdale had also established a reputation for himself as a pilot. In 1933 he had been the first man to fly over Everest, an event which at the time attracted a great deal of publicity, as an example, not just of Britain's technical achievement, but of the pioneering daring of her sons. Flight was Clydesdale's passion. Along with his partner in the Everest flight, Capt. D.F. MacIntyre, and with support from De Havillands, he had launched the Scottish College of Aviation in 1935. It was this venture, subsequently known as Scottish Aviation Ltd., which gave birth to Prestwick Airport. He was also the Commanding Officer of 602, City of Glasgow, Squadron of the Auxiliary Air Force.

In politics, however, Clydesdale had yet to make a real mark. Unsuccessful in his bid to capture the Labour stronghold of Govan in the 1929 general election, he had been safely returned in a by-election the following year in East Renfrewshire, a constituency conveniently close to the family seat of Dungavel, in neighbouring Lanarkshire. In the following two general elections he had comfortably defended his majority. Although tipped by some as a rising young star, Charles Sarolea regarding him as a "brilliant and promising parliamentarian," Clydesdale's
occasional interventions in parliamentary debate, other than on constituency matters, had been almost exclusively restricted to aviation matters. During the debates on defence spending in March 1936 he had spoken forcefully on the need to expand the RAF.\textsuperscript{144} He was also one of the principal promoters of the Caledonian Power Bill, a measure he supported, not so much for its possible benefits to Scottish industry as a whole, but because an integral feature of the hydro-electric development envisaged was a carbide manufacturing plant, and from carbide was derived the oxyacetylene necessary for alloy welding in the production of modern military aircraft.\textsuperscript{145} While Clydesdale's parliamentary contributions certainly displayed detailed knowledge of his subject, the attention he paid to what amounted to minutiae suggested a narrowness of focus which would not have augured well for an MP with ambitions of office.\textsuperscript{146} It is open to question, however, that Clydesdale himself ever entertained such aspirations. Far from viewing mastery of a specialised topic as a means of securing a parliamentary reputation, as many MPs did, he appears to have regarded Parliament very much as a vehicle through which he could promote the interests of aviation.

According to his son, James Douglas-Hamilton, Clydesdale had ulterior motives for attending the Berlin Games. "He went ... partly to gain some picture of the direction in which Germany was moving, but mainly to see something of the Luftwaffe." In this latter aim Clydesdale was successful, for Goering laid on for him inspection tours of Staaken and Döberitz airfields. During these his guide, General Erhard Milch, "gave away certain information," which Clydesdale dutifully passed on to the British Air Attaché at the Berlin embassy, Wing Commander Don.\textsuperscript{147} Although Goering took the credit for the creation of the Luftwaffe, Milch, his number two, was the real architect. That Milch should perform the task of escorting Clydesdale round the airfields is a good indication of the latter's importance, as perceived by the Germans.

While there is no reason to doubt that Clydesdale was indeed indulging in gentlemanly amateur espionage, James Douglas-Hamilton's portrayal of his father is too simplistic. He omits to mention that two of Clydesdale's brothers, Lords David and Nigel Douglas-Hamilton, and his sister, Lady Jean Mackintosh, were also in Berlin for the Games. This extensive family presence was noted by the \textit{Glasgow Herald}'s gossip columnist, Pamela Murray, who recorded that the three brothers were each provided with a personal car and chauffeur by the German
government, and that all four "went to all the brilliant receptions given by Herr von Ribbentrop ... Herr Goebbels and General Goering." Clydesdale himself "entered the inner precincts and dined with the Führer." Furthermore, according to Murray, David Douglas-Hamilton had worked in a German labour camp, and after the Olympics finished Nigel intended to visit a concentration camp. "Between them," she concluded, "the brothers know more about modern Germany than most of the experts put together."

At twenty-four, David was the youngest of the Douglas-Hamilton brothers. A recent graduate of Oxford, he shared Clydesdale's enthusiasm for flying, mountaineering and boxing. Nigel Douglas-Hamilton was a successful advocate, turned public administrator. In 1936 he was appointed Commissioner of the Board of Control in Scotland, an administrative arm of the Scottish Office supervising the treatment of the mentally ill. The following year he became Commissioner for Special Areas in Scotland, charged with the channelling of public funds into the revitalisation of Scotland's most industrially depressed regions. It was a task he carried out with imagination and no little success, despite the limited funds at his disposal. Since 1935 he had also served on the Edinburgh Town Council. Like his brothers, he was a keen flyer and an enthusiastic participant in outdoor sports.

Every one of Clydesdale's siblings displayed some degree of pro-German leanings. Although absent from the Olympic party, Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton was a member of the Anglo-German Fellowship, (AGF) as was Lady Jean Mackintosh's husband, Charles Mackintosh. The remaining sister, Lady Margaret Drummond-Hay, attended the Fellowship's social functions, as indeed they all did. A likely explanation for this familial solidarity of interest was the blood tie with the House of Brunswick. Certainly, the Douglas-Hamiltons were keen to further connections with their German kin. As Pamela Murray further observed, "If Princess Fredericia, the pretty daughter of the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick ... attends the Argyllshire Gathering, chaperoned by Lady Jean Mackintosh, I should not be altogether surprised — plans are afoot, among the Douglas-Hamilton brothers, to form a really large party, and I know how much they would like to show the debutante Princess this most picturesque of Highland meetings."
Such social ties were not altogether as innocent as Murray's Tatleresque picture suggests. The noble families of Britain and Germany were considerably interrelated, a factor which the Nazis were keen to exploit. The use of "tame" German aristocrats as ambassadors of goodwill was a noticeable feature of the drive for respectability in 1936 and 1937. The membership list of Ribbentrop's *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft (DEG)*, for instance, positively bristled with the names of German nobility. The Brunswicks themselves visited Britain in July. The dinner in their honour, organised by the AGF, was well attended. Bruce Lockhart noted, "Large crowd; many soldiers." Griffiths speculates that Ribbentrop was behind the visit, since he visited the Brunswicks shortly after his return from Britain in June. It is a hypothesis supported by their involvement with *DEG* activities in Germany. The Brunswicks were an excellent choice as unofficial emissaries. Not only did they genuinely wish to further Anglo-German friendship, but as members of the Imperial family and enthusiastic supporters of the Nazi régime, they conveyed exactly that happy union of Germany old and new which the Nazis wished to project.

The Douglas-Hamilton brothers' addiction to flight provides another possible clue to the family's pro-German leanings. As Griffiths points out, there was a strong undercurrent of pro-German feeling in British aviation circles in the early and mid-1930s, stimulated by memories of the chivalrous duels in the skies in the First World War and sympathy with Germany's plight in suffering an absolute prohibition on the creation of an air force after Versailles. A belief in Germany's right to possess the means of aerial defence was by no means incompatible with enthusiastic support for British rearmament in the air. As in other areas of society, pro-German sympathies among aviators had no difficulty walking hand-in-hand with a vigorous patriotism.

David Douglas-Hamilton's enthusiasm for Germany, however, went beyond mere consanguineous considerations or comradely feelings towards German flyers. A regular attender at AGF functions, he joined the Fellowship even before its official public launch at the end of 1935. In October 1935 he visited Czechoslovakia, where he succeeded in drawing the attention of the authorities, for having "frequented those circles which are antagonistic to the Czechoslovak régime," presumably amongst the Sudeten German population. He had, the Czechs claimed, "succumbed" to these negative influences, and had formed views on
Czechoslovakia which were wholly "prejudicial and inaccurate." The Czech Legation in London subsequently set about gathering information on him. To have caused such a strong reaction, he had clearly been giving vent to some fairly outspoken support for the Sudeten separatists.

Clydesdale, however, was not guilty of any such indiscretions. Indeed, since his reluctance to address issues other than aviation in Parliament was matched by a similar reticence in public speaking elsewhere, there are few definite indications of his views on politics, European or domestic. His involvement in the Everest expedition, although no doubt primarily motivated by a spirit of aeronautic adventure, does hint at a certain sympathy with Die-Hard Conservatism. Lady Houston had funded the venture, for the specific purpose of impressing upon the native population of India the dynamism of Britain's young imperialists. Although after the flight Clydesdale claimed to have regarded it purely as "a serious contribution to the science of Aviation," and denied any knowledge of Houston's political motivation, he was being somewhat disingenuous. In a letter to his constituents, justifying in advance what was to be a lengthy absence from his duties as an MP, he had stated that a successful flight would "do much to dispel the fallacy that this country is undergoing a phase of degeneration," and would "show India that we are still a virile and active race, and can overcome difficulties with energy and vigour, both for ourselves and for India." Clydesdale's marriage to Lady Elizabeth Percy also reinforces this image of a man who, at the very least, moved comfortably in Die-Hard circles. His wife's father, the late 8th Duke of Northumberland, had been responsible for establishing The Patriot, and had been a firm believer in the existence of a Judaeo-Bolshevik world conspiracy. Nonetheless, Clydesdale was not a true Die-Hard. He did not, for instance, oppose the Government of India Bill, despite being hard pressed by Houston to do so. He also visited Russia in 1937, to gain first hand experience of the Communist system in operation. A genuine Die-Hard was unlikely to have felt such an action necessary, before pronouncing judgement on Communism.

Although Clydesdale's speeches reveal little in the way of an intellectualised political credo, his underlying political and social attitudes do emerge, to some extent, through his views on sport. Unusually for members of their social class, neither Clydesdale nor any of his brothers showed any enthusiasm for blood-sports. Rather, they favoured the outward bound activities, which, with the notable
exception of flying, were largely within the financial means of the common man. Clydesdale was something of an apostle of sports for the masses, joining the Scottish Advisory Council for Physical Training in 1937 to assist in its promotion. He was particularly keen to develop sporting facilities for the unemployed. Society, he believed, was failing in its duty to provide the unemployed with both work and a reasonable standard of living. Through the encouragement of sport for the unemployed, their physical and mental degeneration could at least be prevented. He was also eager to further the moral development of the young, through the instillation of healthy sporting habits. An ardent supporter of the fledgling youth hostelling association, in 1938 he took over as treasurer of the Boys Brigade, a position he would occupy for nearly twenty-five years.

Many on the Right shared Clydesdale's concern for the physical fitness of the urban proletariat, largely because they feared the deleterious effects of any degeneration on the armed forces' future efficiency in time of war. Clydesdale's desire to foster the physical development of the nation, however, went deeper than the simple aim of ensuring a healthy reservoir of military manpower. In an article on Scotland's sporting habits, written in 1947, Clydesdale stressed his belief that sport, particularly in the countryside, offered an important palliative to a nation "suffering the attendant ills of a rapid growth in industrialisation." Through "the rediscovery of the hills and all they offer," he declared, "release may be found from the conditions of the work-a-day world, counteracting the artificiality of a town existence, by sports which inevitably bring a close and vitalizing contact with nature." Although such sentiments were, and indeed still are, common currency among enthusiasts of outward bound activities, Clydesdale's article gives more than a hint of regret at the passing of pre-industrial society. He enthusiastically described the Highland Games, "the traditional gathering of local folk around their chieftain," where "the underlying spirit is a family one," and lamented that "modern conditions have to some extent deprived the Highland games of the homeliness and simplicity which characterized them in the days when the contests were almost entirely of a local and parochial nature."

The Highlands and Isles exercised a powerful influence on Clydesdale and his brothers. They were regular attenders at the Highland gatherings, and did most of their mountaineering in the region, sharing a deep-seated love for the landscape which went beyond mere appreciation of its natural beauty. Clydesdale admired not
just the "characteristic athleticism"\textsuperscript{173} of Highland society, but also what he saw as
the wholesomeness and rugged simplicity of its life style, qualities which
harmonised with his own spartan preferences. Indeed, despite the family's entirely
Lowland antecedents, the Douglas-Hamiltons clearly preferred to think of
themselves as Highlanders, in spirit if not in origin.\textsuperscript{174} While many of their
aristocratic peers might don the kilt for ceremonial occasions, the Douglas-Hamilton
brothers wore them with constant regularity.

One facet of Clydesdale's fascination for the Highland way of life was a
mystical attitude to the forces of nature and the land, particularly the mountains,
which expresses itself in the quasi-religious references which abound in his
eulogies to outdoor sport. Man's conquest of the air, he believed, could lead to the
"realization" of a "potent elementary and formative factor." In the youth hostelling
movement he saw a "pilgrimage of youth," in "common quest for that true
recreation which is as much spiritual as physical and which contact with Nature and
the elements alone can provide." In all countries, he believed, contact with the land
had "played a fundamental part in tempering the nature of its inhabitants." In
Scotland it was the hills which were largely responsible for "helping to form the
character of our people."\textsuperscript{175}

In the absence of any definite declarations of political faith, other than
membership of the Conservative Party, the interests Clydesdale pursued and the
roles he chose for himself provide perhaps the best guide to his politics. An athlete,
adventurer, warrior and mystic, a natural leader of society by dint of his noble birth,
but one with a comradely attitude towards the common man,\textsuperscript{176} and a genuine
desire to improve his physical, spiritual and material well-being, it seems reasonable
to speculate that Clydesdale viewed his political and social function in terms of a
twentieth century interpretation of the traditional role of the clan chief.

Such views, coupled with his preference for simple peasant society, his evident
regrets at the onward march of industrialisation and urbanisation, and his devotion
to the development of healthy athleticism in society, particularly among the young,
would undoubtedly have made Clydesdale susceptible to the idealism of the
European Radical Right, especially Nazism, with its mystic overtones of blood and
soil. The asceticism and comradeship of the SS, and the image of personal
simplicity and selflessness carefully cultivated by many of the Nazi leaders, were
bound to impress themselves favourably on one of Clydesdale's nature, as would
the régime's enthusiasm for aviation.

While in Berlin Clydesdale met Albrecht Haushofer, friend and political adviser to Rudolf Hess, and over the next three years the two men developed a close personal friendship. Although Hess himself never met Clydesdale, it was this connection which subsequently led Hess, for reasons that have been substantially explored elsewhere, to consider Clydesdale, by then the Duke of Hamilton, to be the most promising intermediary for setting up negotiations for an Anglo-German détente, and to choose Hamilton's estate at Dungavel as his destination on his desperate mission to Britain in 1941.177 By so doing, Hess drew down on his prospective host allegations of continuing pro-Nazi sympathies. In the circumstances of 1941 such charges were utterly unfounded. The precise nature of Clydesdale's views on Nazi Germany in 1936, however, are not clear. Unlike his brothers, Malcolm and David, he did not join the AGF, although he did attend several of its functions.178 What can be said with certainty is that he did have strong pro-German sympathies, and espionage alone does not provide a plausible explanation for his presence in Berlin. To what extent he sympathised with the aims and ideals of the Nazi régime itself is entirely open to conjecture.

Despite its potential for divisiveness, the Nuremberg Rally in September was not allowed to interrupt the conciliatory tone of German propaganda towards the West in general, and Britain in particular. Fears that there might be an extension of the anti-semitic legislation unveiled at the 1935 Parteitag were not realised. Instead, the main theme of the Rally speeches was the need to combat the Bolshevik menace, a subject clearly calculated to exploit growing Conservative fears in Britain on that score. While Germany's need for colonies was also voiced, the manner in which it was expressed suggested that it was not "a pressing or an anti-British issue."179

For their foreign guests the Germans laid on even more lavish hospitality than in previous years. A specially built Guest House, completed just in time for the Rally, was "Magnificent," according to Admiral Domville. The new quarters, however, served not only to cater for the visitors' creature comforts, but to keep them largely isolated from the native population. Bussed to and from the main events and the social gatherings, they were also provided with "minders" to ensure a correct interpretation of the environment. Even Domville was driven to complain, "we want to meet Germans, not shun them." The prevailing warming of Anglo-German
relations was reflected in the record number of British visitors. "Heaps of friends now," recorded Domvile happily. For the most part, however, they were not of the first rank, either politically or socially. "Mayfair Whitebait and other intellectual small fry," had been the Foreign Office's jaundiced view of the Olympiad visitors. It was a phrase which might have been more appropriately applied to the Nuremberg guests. Nevertheless, they included at least nine MPs and four peers. The executive of the Anglo-German Fellowship was also there in force, safe in the knowledge that there would be no particularly anti-semitic pronouncements.

Scottish visitors included Lord Ronald Graham, the younger son of the Duke of Montrose, and D.M. Mason, the former Liberal MP for Edinburgh East. Neither had previously been noted for pro-German comments. Their presence in the British group was largely unremarkable. Not so the Earl of Glasgow. A man who "takes himself v. seriously," observed Domvile. Glasgow was something of an embarrassment to his former naval colleague. At a reception given by the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick he insisted on making a speech contrary to the official programme. In Domvile's view he simply did not know how to behave correctly when abroad.

Domvile's relationship with that other Scottish visitor, Lt.-Col. Thomas Moore, was altogether more harmonious, even although the two men had not had much to do with each other since meeting in Germany the previous year. Moore had, however, personally relayed the Admiral's invitation to the Rally, the ultimate source being no doubt Himmler. Together with Moore's wife, they attended a select dinner party hosted by the Reichsführer. They were the only Britons there. Moore and Domvile also visited the temporary SS camp erected just outside Nuremberg, where a torchlight tattoo was performed in their honour. Moore could be forgiven for regretting the role he had played in securing the Admiral's presence. Much to Domvile's delight, Himmler was more interested in cultivating his newer friend. "I think M. was rather sick H.H. was being so attentive to me. The great MP!" Moore, however, did not hold it against him. Clearly, Himmler was determined to keep up his British contacts. However, there were to be none of the embarrassing clashes with the Ribbentrop Büro which had marred Moore and Domvile's previous visit. In foreign affairs Ribbentrop's star was firmly in the ascendant, and Himmler did not endeavour to exercise any exclusive claims on his
British guests. For the duration of their stay Moore and Domvile were both accompanied by chaperones who worked for Ribbentrop, Graf von Dohna and Georg von Wussow.190

The summer of 1936 witnessed a positive efflorescence of pro-German expression in Britain. The Rhineland crisis could now be seen to have acted as a curtain raiser. It had revealed a rich vein of guilt over Germany's past treatment, particularly in what might broadly be termed "middle opinion," and a desperate yearning for peace. Frustration at French belligerence had been coupled with a generalised sympathy for Germany. The ground, therefore, had been well prepared for the subsequent German propaganda offensive, projecting images of a régime evolving towards moderation and respectability, and anxious to cultivate friendship with Britain. The campaign was highly successful, particularly amongst the upper echelons of British society. The large numbers of perfectly respectable visitors to the Olympiad, record British attendance at Nuremberg, and the dramatic expansion in the membership of the AGF, all attest to this. High society was acquiring a taste for the Germanic. Reporting on the autumn season, the Glasgow Herald's fashion correspondent reported, "the most vivid of all recollections was the Tyrolean hat. It's ubiquitous! Men and women sport it for all occasions."191

German propaganda's PR presentation, and a receptivity based on guilt over Versailles and a deep-seated desire for peace, were not the only factors involved in the swing to Germany. The Bolshevik scare prompted by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, coupled with the increasingly belligerent tone of Nazi references to the Soviet Union, caused many on the Right to reappraise their attitudes to both Nazism and Germany. For many right-wingers, the prospects of a German drive to the East, and the elimination of the communist menace, were by no means unwelcome. While most merely quietly anticipated this eventuality, several openly praised Nazi Germany's role as civilisation's shield against communist barbarism. Others went further in the pursuit of this theme. The summer debates on the comparative merits of Nazism and communism were no academic exercise in political systems analysis. They reflected fundamental attitudes on where Britain should stand in the event of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Against this backdrop several right-wingers gave voice to outspoken praise of various aspects of Nazi ideology. Prior to the summer of 1936, positive references to the Nazi régime had largely been the province of those moderates of Liberal, Labour
and progressive Conservative views, who were concerned with justice for Germany and the preservation of European peace. They were, in the main, apologists rather than enthusiasts. Fulsome endorsement of Nazism had been extremely rare. Partial excuses for Nazi behaviour or praise for Hitler the Peacemaker had been the order of the day. The new anti-communist recruits to the pro-German lobby were an entirely different breed. In their ranks were several whose enthusiasm for Nazism was vigorous in the extreme.

Attitudes to Germany in Scottish society do not appear to have significantly departed from the British pattern during this period. Scots were well represented amongst the Olympiad and Nuremberg visitors, and many joined the AGF. True, few individuals were as whole-hearted in their enthusiasm for Nazism as Capt. Luttman-Johnson or A.P. Laurie. However, their public displays of enthusiasm brought little in the way of rebuke, and Charles Sarolea's "objective" analysis of Nazi ideology was considered sufficiently "respectable" to be serialised by the Glasgow Weekly Herald, a paper which was no further to the Right than its daily stablemate. By contrast, the Duchess of Atholl was vilified by the Scottish Right for her temerity in advocating association with the Soviet Union to resist future German aggression.
Chapter 6

Footnotes

1. Diary entry for 26th May 1936, Bruce Lockhart, Diaries, p. 344. Bruce Lockhart summarises his joint conclusions with Maurice Peterson.

2. Scotsman, 26th June 1936.

3. Ibid.

4. Scotsman, 10th July 1936. Sellon was by this stage in Berlin.


6. Ibid.

7. Scotsman, 1st July 1936. Stevenson was undoubtedly alluding to Duff Cooper, whose unequivocally anti-German speech delivered in Paris in June had sparked off furious protests in the Commons, especially from the Labour benches. Stevenson's attack would also appear to have been aimed at Eden, since the term "polemical correspondence" clearly refers to Eden's "Questionnaire".

8. Sir Edward Grigg to the Duchess of Atholl, 22nd October 1936, ATH 90/5.


11. J.M. Grey, Scotsman, 7th July and 8th June 1936; Ian Hannah, Scotsman, 14th August 1936.


14. Mansfield resolutely rejected the notion that the term "isolationist" could in fairness be applied to the IPG. "Isolationism" was in his view Beaverbrook's policy. House of Lords Debates, 23rd July 1936, Vol. 102, p. 213. He would later describe IPG policy as "Reasonable detachment." Glasgow Herald, 30th October 1936.


16. Given the highly aristocratic complexion of the IPG, there was also, perhaps, a certain element of not wishing to appear in such "vulgar" company.

17. Scotsman, 30th July 1936.

19. Atholl to Lord Phillimore, 21st August 1936, ATH 93.


22. Atholl to Lord Phillimore, 21st August 1936, ATH 93.


32. Even Baldwin was recorded as stating privately that if Hitler moved East, "I shall not break my heart ... If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolsheviks and Nazis doing it." Baldwin to Re-armament Deputation, 28th-29th July 1936. Quoted by Middlemas and Barnes, op. cit., p. 955.


37. As uncivilised Africans the Abyssinians apparently did not count.


42. These included Admiral Domvile and Lady Redesdale, the mother of Unity Mitford. Domvile, Diary entry for 10th August 1936, DOM 53; David Pryce-Jones, *Unity Mitford*, London, 1976, p. 132.

43. Both papers had also shared Atholl's antipathy to the Government of India Bill.

44. An interesting reflection on Barrington-Ward's claim to have had difficulty in finding sufficient anti-German comment to balance debate. Atholl had also suffered rebuff at the hands of Beaverbrook at this time. Later in the year, much to her irritation, she was also rejected by the *Observer* and the *Contemporary*. Atholl to Col. Todd, 10th October 1936, ATH 93.

45. Ibid.


49. Todd to Atholl, 29th September 1936, ATH 93.

50. Ibid.

51. Patrick James Boyle, 8th Earl of Glasgow, b. 1874. A former naval officer, Glasgow had long been noted for his right-wing views. In the early 1920s he headed the Scottish section of the British Fascists, an organisation notable for its militaristic superpatriotism and anti-communism, rather than any genuine commitment to Fascist ideology. During the General Strike the "moderate" wing of the movement broke away, after the leadership refused to meet the government's prerequisites for association with the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies, namely abandonment of the term "Fascist" and the restructuring of its paramilitary organisation. Glasgow joined the rebels, reforming the Scottish units as the short-lived Scottish Loyalists. In 1931 he resurrected the organisation as the equally ephemeral Union of Scottish Loyalists, in an endeavour to provide strong-arm stewarding for Conservative electoral meetings. Although named in a Labour Party report in 1934 as one of Mosley's financial backers, Glasgow does not appear to have openly declared his sympathies for the BUF until late 1936. As a prominent member of the Imperial Policy group in 1934, Glasgow's views on foreign policy hitherto can fairly safely be assumed to have been those of imperialist isolationism. Certainly he had not previously demonstrated any marked enthusiasm for Nazi Germany. He had welcomed the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935, but in this he only really reflected the general satisfaction prevalent in naval circles. With the Royal Navy's ability to meet the combined strength of the Italian and Japanese fleets already in doubt, from a limited service viewpoint any restriction on the future building programme of a third, and potentially the most formidable, opponent was bound to be appealing. Glasgow's enthusiasm for the Treaty, moreover, had been coupled with the warning that Germany would need careful watching, for she would only keep her side of the bargain "as long as it suits Germany

52. Atholl to Todd, 10th October 1936, ATH 93. Atholl specifically requested alteration of the FDL's official sub-title which only mentioned the communist threat to religion.

53. The presence of Lady Houston and Lord Charnwood, an IPG stalwart, as vice-presidents would not have been to her assistance.

54. Atholl, Working Partnership, p. 203. In this autobiographical work Atholl attributes her dismissal purely to her attempts to get the FDL to publicise Nazi oppression of Christianity.

55. Scotsman, 26th August 1936.

56. Luttman-Johnson joined the BUF in 1933, but resigned after only a month. Press cutting on Luttman-Johnson's internment in 1940, source unknown, SAR 170.

57. Blackshirt, 16th-22nd February 1934. Goad and Currey were both exponents of Fascism on the Italian model. See Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 17ff.

58. Scotsman, 26th August 1936.

59. He was quoting Lord Rennell of Rodd. Scotsman, 5th September 1936.

60. The Patriot, 30th July 1936.

61. Sarolea to Jan Masaryk, 22nd January 1934, SAR 87. It was Hitler's "historical mission," Sarolea argued at this stage, "to pave the way for the return of the Junker, and eventually for the return of the Hohenzollern." Scotsman, 30th July 1934.

62. For Sarolea's relationship with Hoffmann, see the substantial correspondence between the two in SAR 84-85. By pandering to the older man's intellectual vanities, Hoffmann later undoubtedly manipulated Sarolea.

63. Scotsman, 5th April 1935.

64. Sarolea to G.K. Chesterton, 20th March 1935, SAR 54.

65. See Scotsman, 22nd March 1935.

66. Amongst those Sarolea approached were The Friends of Europe. Although they do not appear to have been interested, an American Jewish magazine, the Menorah Journal, did seek permission to reprint Sarolea's "The Religion of Blood," which appeared in the Contemporary Review in October 1935. Sarolea to the Secretary, "Friends of Europe" publications, 20th March 1935, SAR 54; Evelyn Bunting, Assistant Editor of the Contemporary Review, to Sarolea, 22nd October 1935, SAR 54.

67. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 16th March 1936, SAR 64.
68. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 7th March 1936, SAR 64.

69. Sarolea had originally planned to visit Germany in January. The trip had to be cancelled, however, due to the pressure of his involvement in the anti-sanctions campaign. See Rolf Hoffmann to Sarolea, 3rd January 1936, and Sarolea to Hoffmann, 9th January 1936, SAR 64.

70. Scotsman, 18th and 22nd July, 1936.

71. The last three articles for the Glasgow Weekly Herald were entitled "Towards an Understanding with Germany," "Can German claims be satisfied without a War?" and "The 'Russian Peril' versus the 'German Peril'." The first two were primarily concerned with Spain.

72. On the subject of Silesia Sarolea had written, "it is eminently unsafe to leave in the hands of the Prussian militarists such a potential arsenal as the Silesian industries." Sarolea, Letters, p. 53.

73. Sarolea to the Editor of the Sunday Pictorial, 15th August 1936, SAR 54.


76. Sarolea had not always been so impressed by plebiscites. On events in Silesia in 1922 he had commented, "Strictly speaking, the procedure of the plebiscite in a despotically governed country puts a premium on the brutal Prussian methods. First, brutal conquest, then systematic Germanisation and then nationalisation of industries; last as an inevitable result, a plebiscite favourable to the conqueror." Sarolea, Letters, p. 55.

77. Sarolea to the Editor of the Morning Post, 1st October 1936, SAR 201.


79. Sarolea to William Ballantine, 14th August 1936, SAR 54.

80. Sarolea to Rolf Hoffmann, 10th June 1936, SAR 85.

81. Sarolea to Atholl, 17th August 1936, SAR 60.

82. See Daily Telegraph, 23rd August and 30th September 1936. Also Sarolea to the Editor of the Daily Telegraph, 29th October 1936, and Sarolea to the Editor of the Morning Post, 6th October 1936, SAR 201.

83. Houston to Sarolea, 30th September 1936, SAR 60.

84. See Saturday Review, 17th and 24th October 1936.

85. Sarolea to H. Warren Allen, Managing Director of the Saturday Review, 14th October 1936, SAR 60.

86. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 5th October 1936, SAR 64.

88. Sarolea to Maxwell-Scott, 19th October 1936, SAR 64.

89. *The Patriot* reprinted large sections of these articles verbatim. Earlier they had shown the same enthusiasm for his letters to the *Daily Telegraph*. See *The Patriot*, 3rd September, 8th, 22nd and 29th October, 1936.

90. Sarolea to H. Warren Allen, 6th October 1936, SAR 60.

91. Samuel Vyvyan Trerice Adams, b. 1900. Conservative MP for West Leeds since 1931. Member of the LNU Executive since 1933.


93. See Chapter 8.


95. Laurie to Lloyd George, 12th July 1936, LG 11/6.


98. Laurie to Atholl, 22nd August 1936, ATH 265.

99. Laurie to Atholl, undated, ATH 265.

100. Laurie to Atholl 22nd August, ATH 265.

101. Atholl to Sir Charles Grant Robertson, 31st August 1936, ATH 265.


103. Atholl approached Sir Charles Grant Robertson, Principal and Vice-Chancellor of Birmingham University, and Sir Bernard Pares, Professor of Russian Language, Literature and History at London University, and Director of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies.

104. Atholl's contact in the Foreign Office, Ralph Wigram, was keen to impress upon her the need for reticence over his co-operation. If it should become common knowledge, he warned, "as you know, we should get into trouble." Wigram to Atholl, 12th September 1936, ATH 265.

105. Rennie Smith to Atholl, 23rd September 1936, ATH 265.


107. Ibid.

108. A race Laurie believed to be "similar in many ways to the Scottish people." *Scotsman*, 17th September 1936.

109. Ibid.
110. Scotsman, 11th September 1936.

111. Scotsman, 20th July 1936.

112. Laurie to Lloyd George, 8th April 1936, LG 11/6/62.

113. Scotsman, 29th June 1936.

114. Scotsman, 11th July 1936.

115. Laurie to Lloyd George, 12th July 1936, LG 11/6.


117. Scotsman, 14th August 1936.

118. Laurie to Lloyd George, 12th July 1936, LG 11/6.

119. Laurie to Frances Stevenson, 4th September 1936, LG 11/6/82.

120. Scotsman, 11th September 1936.

121. Stevenson to Laurie, 15th July 1936, LG 11/6/76.


123. Sir Archibald Sinclair.

124. Laurie to Lloyd George 6th October 1936, LG 11/6/83.

125. Significantly, Laurie had believed the most important aspect of Lloyd George's New Deal to be what he regarded as "a policy of back to the land." Laurie to Frances Stevenson, 7th August 1935, LG 11/6/49.

126. Scotsman, 14th August 1936.

127. August 2nd-16th.

128. Gannon op. cit., p. 103.


132. Lindsay was 39, Wedderburn 34 and Clydesdale 33.

133. Lindsay certainly held no brief for fascist systems in general. In 1934 he ventured into the January Club to deliver a speech denouncing fascism. As a Zionist he was hardly likely to view the Nazi variant of fascism with any greater enthusiasm. He was, however, interested in "Peace" teaching, and as a National Labour MP may have shared Lord Allen of Hurtwood's concern for peace and justice for Germany. Blackshirt, 29th June 1934; Cowling. op.
cit., p. 410; The Schoolmaster and Woman Teacher’s Chronicle, 7th April 1938, ATH 95/2.

134. A claimant to the Earldom of Dundee, his right to that title was finally recognised in 1953.

135. Wedderburn had previously demonstrated an antipathy to domestic fascism. Appalled by the excesses at Olympia, which he had personally witnessed, Wedderburn, together with two other Conservative MPs, had proceeded immediately to the offices of The Times. Their joint composition, condemning Blackshirt violence in the strongest terms, appeared in The Times the following day. Cross, op. cit., p. 112.

136. It was almost a regional delegation, as Lindsay’s and Wedderburn’s constituencies both abutted on Clydesdale’s.

137. Scotsman, 6th October 1937.

138. Kenneth Lindsay had no discernible ties with Scotland prior to his success in the Kilmarnock by-election of 1933. The previous occupant of the seat, C.M. Aitchison, had been obliged to resign on his appointment as Lord Justice Clerk. Aitchison had sat as a National Labour MP, and Lindsay owed his selection as the official government candidate to the fact that the politics of coalition demanded that National Labour’s tiny representation be maintained. Prospective National Labour candidates were somewhat thin on the ground. It is tempting to suspect, too, that Lindsay owed his early appointment to office to the same political mathematics.

139. Charles Sarolea believed the Douglas-Hamilton family to be on its financial uppers, since he had purchased some of his best furniture at an auction sale of the contents of Hamilton Palace. Sarolea’s evidence, however, needs to be treated with caution, since the sale was occasioned, not so much by poverty, as by the impending demolition of the building. Subsidence caused by the workings of the family’s own coal mines had rendered the structure unsafe. Sarolea to Dr. Kraus, 20th December 1935, SAR 87.

140. The bridal party occupied much of Holyrood Palace the night before the wedding, and on the day itself proceeded in stately fashion up the Royal Mile for the grand ceremony in St. Giles’ Cathedral. The cavalcade then moved on through streets lined with Edinburgh citizenry to the official reception in the Assembly Rooms, where two thousand guests, including much of Scotland’s aristocracy, awaited them. The bride’s brother, the 9th Duke of Northumberland, chartered a special train, pulled by the LNER express locomotive, ”The Percy,” to convey his guests to and from Alnwick Castle, and the press had a field day with the historic union of the Douglas and Percy families. Scotsman, 1st and 3rd December 1937.

141. Intriguingly, Clydesdale’s Berlin companion, Jim Wedderburn, was also Hereditary Standard Bearer for Scotland.

142. A venture into student politics had been somewhat less successful. In the 1935 Edinburgh University Rectorial Election he had been beaten into third place, General Allenby being the winner. Clydesdale might have taken comfort from the fact that he received more votes than Hugh MacDiarmid.

143. Sarolea to Dr. Kraus, 20th December 1935, SAR 87.

145. *House of Commons Debates*, 18th March 1936, Vol. 310, pp. 540-4. This attempt to establish a hydro-electric power scheme in the Highlands was frustrated by the coal lobby and, its supporters claimed, English "sporting" interests. The majority of Scottish MPs who voted, voted in favour of the Bill.

146. As on the occasion when he used parliamentary time to challenge the RAF's decision to opt for brown dress gloves for its officers. Clydesdale personally favoured black. *House of Commons Debates*, 10th March 1937, Vol. 321, p. 1172.


149. Although the Special Areas covered much of the Scottish industrial belt, it is worth noting that they included both the Lanarkshire areas traditionally associated with the Douglas-Hamilton family and Clydesdale's constituency of East Renfrewshire. Glasgow was not included in the scheme, since it was deemed impolitic to declare the Second City of Empire a "distressed area." Harvie, *No Gods*, p. 50.

150. His party ticket was Moderate, the Edinburgh label for Conservative. On one celebrated occasion the town council provided the setting for a demonstration of Nigel Douglas-Hamilton's belief in gentlemanly fair play and the fact that he shared in the family fondness for pugilism. When, in April 1937, Protestant Action councillor, George Ballantine, challenged a fellow councillor to a fight, Nigel Douglas-Hamilton declared, "This man challenges men who are smaller than himself. If he wants to fight, I will go outside and willingly fight with him." This intervention restored calm to the council's proceedings. *Edinburgh Evening News*, 23rd April 1937. Quoted by Gallagher, *Edinburgh Divided*, p. 107.

151. He was Commanding Officer of 603, City of Edinburgh, Squadron of the Auxiliary Air Force and a director of Scottish Aviation Ltd.

152. Lord Malcolm Avendale Douglas-Hamilton, b. 1909. RAF Reserve Officer and Flying Instructor with Air Service Training Ltd. Director of British Flying Boats, 1932-33. Another outdoor sports enthusiast, particularly interested in mountaineering and sailing.

153. For the significance of the Anglo-German Fellowship, see Chapter 7.


155. See *The Times*, 15th July 1936 (Dinner at the Dorchester in honour of the Brunswicks), *Anglo-German Review*, January 1937 (Dinner at the Grosvenor in honour of Ribbentrop), and *Anglo-German Review*, Vol. 1, No. 7, June 1937 (Germany Embassy Reception).
156. The connection, at least in purely genetic terms, was extremely tenuous, for it lay in the marriage of the 11th Duke of Hamilton to Princess Mary of Baden. Clydesdale and his brothers, however, were not directly descended from the 11th Duke. When Clydesdale's father, the 13th Duke, succeeded to the title, he was a distant claimant, who traced his line of descent from the 18th century brother of the 5th Duke.


158. FO 371/18878/C2168/1697/18. See Chapter 7 for the function of the DEG.


160. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 221.


162. The Duchess of Brunswick was the daughter of Kaiser Wilhelm II.


164. Dr. Kraus of the Czech Legation to Charles Sarolea, 18th December 1935, SAR 87.


166. Houston was also genuinely keen to further British aviation. Britain's earlier successful participation in the Schneider Trophy air races had only been possible through her financial support.


169. Ibid., p. 163.


172. Ibid., p. 244.

173. Ibid., p. 244.


176. At one stage Clydesdale worked incognito in one of the family's coal mines,


178. The *Evening Standard* reported in November 1935 that Clydesdale had joined the AGF, but the AGF's own membership lists do not corroborate this. Furthermore, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton states that although his father received a membership application form from the AGF, he did not return it. Most likely the *Evening Standard*’s reporter mistook Clydesdale for his younger brother David. *Evening Standard*, 28th November 1935; Padfield, op. cit., p. 373.


180. Domvile, diary entry for 8th September 1936, DOM 53. See also entries for 9th and 11th September 1936.


182. The MPs were Lord Apsley, Sir Frank Sanderson, Sir Murray Sueter, Sir Arnold Wilson, Victor Cazalet, Wing Cmdr. A.W. James, Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore, W.D. Perkins and S. Russell. The peers were Lord Allen of Hurtwood, Lord Eltisley, Lord Mount Temple and the Earl of Glasgow. Newspaper clipping (source unknown), 10th September 1936, Middleton Papers (MID), LP/ISM (INT), Box 8.

183. Lord Ronald Malise Graham b. 1912.


185. Glasgow was accompanied by one of his daughters. Domvile, Diary entry for 8th September 1936, DOM 53.

186. Domvile, Diary entry for 11th September 1936, DOM 53.

187. Domvile, Diary entries for 9th and 14th September 1936, DOM 53.

188. Domvile, Diary entries for 23rd July, 10th and 12th September 1936, DOM 53. This time they were presented with boxes of chocolates in SS porcelain.

189. See Domvile, Diary entries for 11th to 13th August 1935, DOM 52.

190. Most of the information for this section taken from the Domvile Diaries, entries for 7th to 14th September 1936, DOM 53.

Chapter 7
The Anglo-German Fellowship

One of the most obvious signs of the swing towards Germany in 1936 was the rapid growth of the Anglo-German Fellowship (AGF). The Fellowship had been publicly launched, after a lengthy period of gestation, on December 5th 1935 with a grand dinner at the Hotel Victoria in London. In anticipation of the forthcoming Berlin Olympics, the principal guest of honour was the Reichsminister for Sport, Hans von Tschammer und Osten. A month later, a similar celebration in Berlin marked the inauguration of a sister society, the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft (DEG). From its inception to its demise, such dinners, held in some of London's more select hotels, would be the hallmark of the AGF. During 1936 guests of honour at AGF functions included the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick, the German Ambassador, Leopold von Hoesch, and the academic, Hans Friedrich Blunck. A variety of pro-German speakers delivered formal addresses during the year. They included Lord Lothian and Admiral Domville. The high point of the 1936 programme was undoubtedly the dinner in honour of Ribbentrop at Grosvenor House at the end of the year. Around 700 people attended, mostly members of London's high society. The AGF rapidly established a place for itself on the London social scene. A membership of 187 in the January of 1936 had swelled out to 335 by the following July, a clear indication of the boost to pro-German sympathies provided by the Rhineland coup. Only three members of the AGF suffered second thoughts about the wisdom of belonging to such a society and resigned during this period.

The principal instigator of the AGF was E.W.D. Tennant, director of Charles Tennant & Co., a minerals broker. In 1919 he had been part of a three man mission, charged with monitoring post-war conditions in Germany for Military Intelligence. In particular, their brief had been to report on food shortages and any breaches of the armistice terms. According to Tennant, the suffering he witnessed as a result of the continuation of the Allied blockade made him vow to "do everything I could to help restore friendship between Britain and Germany." It was not, however, until after the Nazi seizure of power that Tennant emerged as a public apostle of Anglo-German friendship. In 1932 his company became closely interlinked with a German cartel in the supply of ferro-silicon to German buyers,
and over the next few years he would be a regular visitor to Germany. Early on he struck up a close friendship with Ribbentrop, and was subsequently involved in the semi-clandestine endeavours to arrange summit talks between Hitler and Baldwin. 7 Tennant supported this circumvention of the usual channels, he later claimed, because of the obstructionism he perceived amongst both British and German career diplomats towards an improvement in Anglo-German relations. In his view, the permanent officials of the Foreign Office appeared "to regard all Germans as nasty smells." 8

According to Tennant, the genesis of the AGF lay in the success of an unofficial trade delegation which he had taken out to Germany in September 1934. So impressed had the delegates been by their reception in Germany, that on their return to London they decided "to form and finance the start of the Anglo-German Fellowship." 9 That the origins of the AGF were essentially British, however, is questionable. Richard Griffiths suggests that the original concept was probably Ribbentrop's, and points not just to Ribbentrop's association with Tennant, but to the fact that the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft was only one of several German societies with twins in other European countries. 10 The Foreign Office was certainly highly suspicious both of Tennant himself and his fledgling organisation. To Ralph Wigram, the Duchess of Atholl's source in the Foreign Office, the AGF was "simply another vehicle for German propaganda and for deluding British opinion." 11 Ribbentrop, as the Foreign Office was aware, had already brought about the atrophy and dissolution, respectively, of those precursors of the AGF and DEG, the Anglo-German Association and the Deutsch-Englische Vereinigung (DEV). These societies had been formed in 1929, loosely under the aegis of Bruning. Not surprisingly, the DEV did not long survive into the Nazi era, being wound up on Ribbentrop's orders on the grounds that it included "'non-Aryan' members." 12 Weakened by the resignation of much of its membership in protest, the AGA was left in limbo. Despite attempts by Goebbels to revive it, 13 the AGA was moribund by early 1935. Ribbentrop, making it clear that no German societies would be permitted to affiliate with the AGA, had successfully thwarted his rival's endeavours to encroach on his territory. 14 When Tennant and his associates presented their plans for the formation of the AGF to the Board of Trade in March 1935, Ribbentrop's successor organisation to the DEV, the DEG, was already up and running. 15 Although the official DEG launch post-dated that of the AGF, this was simply an exercise in diplomatic delay. The Berlin premises ceremoniously
opened in January 1936 had been in the DEG's possession since the previous March.\(^{16}\)

Whoever was the real progenitor of the concept, there can be no denying Tennant's assertion that the motivation behind the AGF at the British end was essentially commercial. Eight companies\(^{17}\) funded the creation of the Fellowship, and representatives of those firms formed a majority on the provisional executive committee, as constituted on March 11th 1935.\(^{18}\) By July 1936 a further thirty-three companies had registered their corporate affiliation.\(^{19}\)

A major factor affecting British trade with Germany from 1934 on was the Nazi drive for autarky. Allied blockade had played a vital role in Germany's defeat in the First World War, and in preparation for the next war Germany's leaders were determined to reduce dependence on raw materials from overseas. German manufacturers, therefore, were strongly encouraged to increase production of ersatz materials, synthetic rubber and petrol, plastics and cellulose fibres, while natural raw materials were increasingly subject to import controls. Two of the AGF's founder firms were East Indiamen, largely concerned with the supply of raw rubber.\(^{20}\) A third, Dunlop, was a large-scale rubber producer, in addition to exporting finished rubber goods. For companies such as these, participation in the AGF signified not so much the wish to increase their penetration of the German market, as a desire to improve their negotiating strength viz à viz the German government, to avoid being squeezed out altogether. Five of the firms which had affiliated to the AGF by July 1936 were involved in the supply and production of textile raw materials or semi-manufactures. Their appearance was clearly not unrelated to the establishment in early 1936 of minimum levels of rayon in cotton and woollen yarns which German textile finishers would be permitted to use. Germany was an important market for British textile companies. In 1935 raw or semi-finished textile goods accounted for almost half the total value of British exports to Germany.\(^{21}\) Like their compatriots in rubber, British textile suppliers clearly had a vested interest in seeking to retard Germany's switch to synthetics.\(^{22}\)

The largest and most influential of the concerns promoting the AGF was the Anglo-Dutch combine, Unilever. For Unilever the Nazi accession to power had been an unmitigated disaster. The promotion of German butter production in the pursuit of autarky, and the consequent restrictions on the importation and use of
edible oils, had hit them hard, both as an exporter of oils, and as the owner of a network of German margarine firms. Even greater difficulties were presented by the exchange controls imposed in 1934 in an attempt to remedy Germany's balance of payments deficit. The creation of a quota system, governing the flow of foreign specie out of Germany, forced British exporters to accept payment for their goods largely in the form of credits issued by the German government. In Unilever's case these measures affected not only payment for exports, but the profits generated by their German operations as well, with the result that much of the company's liquid capital became effectively trapped in Germany. Through membership of the AGF Unilever no doubt hoped to improve their chances of winning concessions in the operation of these currency controls. 23

Although Unilever's circumstances were perhaps uniquely unfavourable, the operation of exchange controls hampered all British firms exporting to Germany. According to Tennant, difficulties in recovering trade debts incurred by German companies had been the principal reason behind the 1934 mission. 24 They were also a potent factor influencing corporate affiliation to the AGF.

Of the manufacturing concerns affiliated to the AGF, several were involved in what, in the 1930s, were high-technology industries. Two were engineering companies, specialising in the casting of aluminium alloys for the automotive industry. 25 Another, Firth Vickers, produced stainless steel, which was only just coming into widespread industrial application. Britain's infant plastics industry was also represented by F.A. Hughes and British Cyanides. Although these companies may have been hoping to develop sales in Germany, it would appear more likely that they were hoping to avert potentially crippling German competition, since German industry tended to be more advanced in such areas. As small firms, F.A. Hughes and British Cyanides were also clearly in no position to compete with the burgeoning plastics output of I.G. Farben.

Merchant banks and other finance houses also figured prominently in the AGF's corporate membership, 26 fuelling contemporary city rumours, angrily denied by Tennant, that the principal purpose of the AGF was to facilitate the flotation of an international loan on behalf of Nazi Germany. These in turn prompted a series of questions in the Commons in the late spring of 1936 from Labour MPs anxious to prove, or at least suggest, the existence of a capitalist conspiracy to finance German
rearmament. Although their suspicions were couched in generalised terms, and no specific reference to the AGF was made, one of the AGF's corporate members, the merchant bankers, Schröders, was so named and the AGF's involvement was implied. These suspicions were not entirely groundless. Schröders were linked, both by close trading association and family ties, with Baron Kurt von Schröder, the Cologne banker who had arranged cover for the Nazi party's debts in 1932.

Largely on this evidence, James and Suzanne Pool have constructed the hypothesis that the Schröders' banking network was a conduit by which British finance houses channelled funds to the Nazis. The overseer of this system they believe to have been Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, whose biographer, Andrew Boyle, considered to be "instinctively pro-German." The Pools' proof of Norman's involvement, however, is far from conclusive, resting, as it does, almost solely on Norman's personal friendship with the German Economics Minister, Hjalmar Schacht, and the presence of Schröders' partner, F.C. Tiarks, on the Bank of England's board of directors. Their evidence against Schröders, however, is persuasive, although they do not link them with financial support for the Nazis after 1933.

In its individual membership the AGF strove, above all, to secure recruits of high political and social standing. As AGF secretary Elwin Wright frankly stated, "It isn't numbers that matter. We want 'Names,' otherwise how can we have any influence with the Government or the Foreign Office?" In this the AGF was by no means unsuccessful. Almost a third of its July 1936 members figured in Who's Who. They included seventeen peers, fifteen MPs and three directors of the Bank of England. This was a far cry from the list of Tennant's associates dismissed as "pretty feeble" by the Foreign Office in November 1935. With the expansion of the general membership the AGF's commercial bias was to some extent diluted. Strongly in evidence was a successful harnessing of pro-German sentiment among ex-servicemen. This social broadening was paralleled within the AGF's governing body, the Council. By March 1936 six members of the original provisional committee had dropped out, their places being taken largely by recruits from outwith the business community. The newcomers included Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore, the academic, Sir Raymond Beazley and Capt. Hawes of the British Legion. These changes helped the AGF to appear representative of more than merely narrow commercial interests, an image which its organisers no doubt hoped
to promote. The change, however, was more apparent than real. Although the general membership by July 1936 divided roughly equally between those with readily identifiable commercial interests and those without, the original founding fathers still controlled the Council.38

The AGF's self-proclaimed aim was simply the promotion of a "good understanding" between Britain and Germany. By facilitating contacts at a personal level, it could help remove those "causes of misunderstanding" which had bedevilled Anglo-German relations. The AGF was, it assured its members, a "non-political" body, and membership did "not imply approval of National Socialism."39 Although there were "a large number of sharks lurking among the shallows," many of the AGF's members were undoubtedly motivated by an innocent desire for amity between the two countries.40 This was, perhaps, especially true of the ex-servicemen, with their nostalgic regard for the gallant foe who had shared their experience of trench miseries and loss of comrades. The businessmen, too, had good cause to be less than enamoured of Nazism per se, motivated, as they mostly were, by a desire to ameliorate the more damaging aspects of Nazi economics. Some no doubt looked further than the limited concessions they could hope to win from the German government. Autarky, from a British perspective, was not preparation for an inevitable war, but merely a more extreme form of the global phenomenon of economic nationalism, which itself was ascribed largely to post-war political tensions. A peaceful solution to the German problem would go a long way towards relaxing those tensions. It might even usher in a return to the Free Trade climate in which Britain's export industries had previously thrived. In such an economic atmosphere autarkic economics, it was assumed, would simply wither away. Anti-semitism, in the crude Nazi form, was also unlikely to appeal to these men of commerce. Several of them, indeed, owed their fame and fortune to partnership with British Jews. In September 1935 E.W.D. Tennant warned Ribbentrop, "Without exception the whole Council is strongly disapproving of Herr Streicher and his activities," and there is little reason to doubt his sincerity.41 For the AGF's leadership Germany's persecution of the Jews was a stumbling block to the improvement of Anglo-German relations, and in some cases a matter of genuine personal repugnance. Forewarned of the anti-semitic legislation which was to be unveiled at the 1935 Nuremberg Rally, the Chairman of the AGF, Lord Mount Temple,42 cancelled his attendance, for he was not prepared to appear to condone such measures.43
Nonetheless, the AGF did step beyond the bounds of merely promoting Anglo-German friendship. The addresses delivered by British speakers at AGF functions might not have contained excessive adulation of Nazi ideology, but they did not contain much in the way of objective criticism of the Nazi régime. Moreover, by inviting German guest speakers, often leading Nazi personalities, the AGF afforded the Nazi régime the valuable opportunity to present a suitably subtle version of the Nazi message to the kind of British audience they most wished to reach. Without doubt, these visitors, however ostensibly apolitical their stature, would have been carefully vetted by the Ribbentrop Büro. The AGF's promotion of German books and films, coming as they did from a society in which all permissible cultural activity, especially that earmarked for export, carried Nazi values and ideals, also served to make the AGF in effect an extension of the Nazi propaganda machine.

Finally, by its assistance of individuals and groups visiting Germany, in coordination with the DEG, the AGF was complicit not only in the political chaperoning of its countrymen, but in its own self-delusion.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the AGF, however, was not so much its dissemination of pro-German views, but the degree of social and moral weight it lent to their expression. True, it singularly failed to attract the politicians who really did count, and many key industrialists, while sympathetic to its aims, remained aloof. In their absence it would never gain the political leverage to which it aspired.

Nonetheless, the participation of so many distinguished and politically moderate members of commerce, industry and high society, imparted to the AGF an image of responsibility and social credibility which could not but enhance, by association, the perceived legitimacy and respectability of the Nazi régime itself.

The vast majority of the firms affiliated to the AGF, including all of the finance houses, were based in London. The principal exceptions were the textile companies in the North of England and the engineering concerns in the Midlands. None of the AGF's corporate members had their headquarters in Scotland, or even maintained a substantial presence there. The only one with strong Scottish connections was E.W.D. Tennant's own firm, Charles Tennant & Sons. In the nineteenth century Tennants, with its great dye-works at St. Rollox in Glasgow, had been one of the giants of the Scottish chemicals industry. By the 1930s, however, the manufacturing side of the company had largely been incorporated within the ICI empire, and Tennants itself had evolved into a London broker, dealing in chemicals, iron, steel, and non-ferrous metals. The firm's Scottish connections had essentially
been reduced to its ownership. E.W.D. Tennant shared control of Tennants with two Scottish members of the family, Christopher Tennant, Lord Glenconner, and his cousin, Lt.-Col. John Tennant. Lord Glenconner, the chairman of the company, had a variety of other business interests, including directorships in Hambros Bank, Mosul Oil Fields and the Glasgow firm, Tharsis Sulphur and Copper Co. In addition, he managed the family estate around Innerleithen, where his aunt, Margot Asquith, had spent her childhood.

Within the general membership of the AGF there were several emigré Scots who had moved south in the pursuit of commercial success. One such was Charles Mackintosh, chairman of the travel agents, Sir Henry Lunn Ltd. Lunns had a direct interest in fostering improved Anglo-German relations. Through their subsidiary, Alpine Sports, they hoped to capitalise on the increasing popularity of ski-ing holidays in Germany and Austria among the upper echelons of British society. Mackintosh himself, however, was perhaps not simply commercially motivated. He had married Lady Jean Mackintosh, daughter of the Duke of Hamilton, and was an integral part of the Douglas-Hamilton brothers' social set.

Most of the Anglo-Scots did not in any way represent Scottish commercial interests. However, their most illustrious member did, at least in part. This was Sir Harry McGowan, chairman of ICI. Born in 1874, McGowan had joined The Nobel Explosives Co. in Glasgow at the age of fifteen as an office boy. Lacking capital, influential connections, or technical training of any kind, he had worked his way up through the company as a professional executive. After the First World War Nobels, under McGowan's chairmanship, had first swallowed most of the British explosives industry, and then, through fusion with Brunner Mond in 1926, evolved into Imperial Chemical Industries. As chairman and sole managing director since 1930, McGowan's control of ICI by 1936 was absolute. Although the company's Scottish operations were now dwarfed in scale by its other activities, McGowan recorded both his own and ICI's Scottish roots when he took the title McGowan of Ardeer, after the Ayrshire explosives works, on being raised to the peerage in 1937. Trade with Germany, or even Europe, did not form a major part of ICI's activities. However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, at McGowan's instigation, the company had buttressed itself against the effects of economic depression with a series of market-sharing agreements with its main competitors, Du Pont and IG Farben. After 1933 the German company had come under
increasing pressure from its own government to export at any price, because of Germany's balance of payments deficit. Its subsequently more aggressive trading methods, particularly in South America, threatened to rupture the network of cartelisation which underpinned ICI's trading strategy. McGowan's presence in the AGF would appear then, like so many of the other businessmen, to have been motivated by a desire to minimise the damage of Nazi economic policy. Although he personally favoured autocratic methods of management, there is no reason to suppose this preference had a political parallel. Certainly, he was no anti-semite, having spent much of his working life in close and highly successful partnership with Sir Alfred Mond.

Scottish indigenous industry was represented on the AGF by A.V. Board and Sir Alexander Walker, directors of the whisky combine, Distillers. Distillers' interest in the AGF, however, appears to have stemmed less from their traditional product than from their growing involvement in industrial chemicals, the area of their operations with which Board was particularly concerned. Quirks in the British excise system meant that in Britain, although not elsewhere, Distillers' main product, industrial alcohol, was the cheapest raw material for the production of the basic building blocks of the modern chemical industry, the heavy organics, acetylene, ethylene and propylene. In addition to supplying the chemicals industry with its basic ingredients, Distillers had themselves moved into chemicals production, establishing a large complex at Hull in 1929 for that purpose. They rapidly became the largest British producer of industrial solvents. Distillers were also moving into plastics. They already controlled Synthite, a small bakelite manufacturer, and in 1937 would acquire British Resin Products.

What Distillers hoped to achieve through the presence of their representatives on the AGF is not immediately obvious. German companies were unlikely to be able to compete on price in the supply of industrial alcohol to the British home market. Nor, on the other hand, was the German chemicals industry geared to the use of industrial alcohol as a base material. Perhaps, like ICI, Distillers did not wish to see the existing market structure upset, particularly in the highly profitable industrial solvents sector. Alternatively, they may have hoped to shelter their plastics subsidiaries from German competition.

Although the presence of two leading company representatives does suggest that Distillers believed that the exercise of influence on the German government could
lead to commercial gain, Walker's personal membership of the AGF was not purely motivated by responses to Nazi autarkic economic policy. His interest in fostering improved relations between Britain and Germany preceded the establishment of the Nazi régime. In 1932 Bruce Lockhart met him at one of the monthly dinners held by the Octavian Club, "an international club of eight members — founded to improve Anglo-German relations." Walker may also have known Ribbentrop personally for some time. Prior to his rise to eminence, Ribbentrop, as a wine merchant, had also acted as the German representative for Johnny Walkers. Not only was Johnny Walkers part of Distillers' whisky combine, it was also Sir Alexander Walker's own family firm.

The only purely Scottish company represented on the AGF was the ailing armaments manufacturer, Beardmores. H.A. Reincke, managing director and, until February 1936, chairman of Beardmores, was a member. Those looking for evidence of the immoral nature of the armaments industry might note that Beardmores, together with the English Steel Corporation and Thos. Firth and John Brown, were the only British companies capable of supplying armour plate to Admiralty specification, and both the English companies also had an indirect corporate affiliation to the AGF. However, as the English steel-makers were represented on the AGF through their jointly owned subsidiary, Firth-Vickers Stainless Steels, it seems probable that Beardmores' involvement was also prompted by its manufacture of stainless steel. Paradoxically, Beardmores actually had a great deal to gain from a worsening of Anglo-German relations, for the company's return to prosperity in the late 1930s would be entirely due to the proliferation of government defence contracts.

Reincke's involvement with the AGF may have had purely personal causes. It is also possible, however, that he was acting as the personal agent of Beardmores' owner, Sir James Lithgow. In 1936 Sir James Lithgow, aged sixty-three, was at the peak of his career, and arguably Scotland's foremost industrialist. During the 1920s, despite the successive slumps in demand which crippled many of his rivals, Lithgow's shipbuilding concern had prospered. By 1932 62% of shipping launched on the Clyde was built in Lithgow yards. In the immediate post-war years most of the Clyde shipbuilders bought into steel to secure their own supplies. Lithgow was no exception, purchasing steel-makers James Dunlop & Co. In his
case, however, the move generated its own momentum. In 1929 he engineered the rescue of David Colville & Co., and subsequently fused them with Dunlops. This was followed, in 1934, by the acquisition of the Steel Company of Scotland. By 1936 the Colvilles' conglomerate, acting in partnership with Lithgow, had swallowed all the major Scottish steel-making companies. The take-over of Beardmores had simply been part of this larger process of rationalisation. A director of Beardmores since 1932, in February 1936 Lithgow gained a controlling share in the company, displacing H.A. Reincke as chairman. The latter was duly dispatched to London to look after the company's interests there. When the AGF was in its early stages of formation in early 1935, Julian Piggott, Tennants principal lieutenant, asked Lithgow to join. As manager of the British Steel Export Association, and a former employee of Colvilles, Piggott must have known Lithgow well, and presumably believed him to be sympathetic to the general aims of the new society. Lithgow, however, declined the invitation. Perhaps, as a senior government adviser on re-armament, he felt that his position would be compromised by membership of the AGF.

Despite his involvement with rearmament, Lithgow by no means believed war with Germany to be inevitable, and clearly felt that the existing tensions in Anglo-German affairs could be peacefully resolved. At Beardmores' annual general meeting in June 1937 he declared, "The future of this country as well as of the Company depends upon how we prepare to carry on when the present exceptional phase has passed, that is to say, when the volume of armament work upon which we are now engaged has shrunk to more modest dimensions." Lithgow's close connection with Montagu Norman is also worth noting. Poor financial planning in the unsettled conditions of the 1920s had, by the end of the decade, left many iron and steel manufacturers, on both sides of the Border, in the hands of their financiers, often Bank of England nominees. Lithgow's schemes for rationalising Scottish steel-making were largely made possible through Montagu Norman's exercise of the Bank of England's financial leverage. In 1929 Norman's rescue package for Beardmores had included early retirement for the Beardmore family old guard and their replacement by "professional" executives. Reincke and his predecessor as chairman of Beardmores, James Frater Taylor, were both effectively Norman's appointees. Norman would also appear to have been involved in financing Lithgow's purchase of the Steel Company of Scotland. Given their close co-operation in the work of economic reconstruction, it seems reasonable to suppose that Lithgow and Norman held similar views on how the future economic
development of Europe would best serve British interests. Norman had been highly critical of the "economic lunacy" of forcing Germany to pay reparations, because of the dislocation it caused in the European economic system. In the early 1930s, in the aftermath of the Slump, he saw German economic recovery, and the political stability necessary to underpin it, as essential to Europe's return to full prosperity.

Scottish agricultural interests were represented in the AGF by Col. Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel. A lifelong Conservative, Lochiel's only attempt to enter the Commons had been thwarted in 1910 when he failed to capture Sutherlandshire. Thereafter, he had settled for a leading role in his constituency association and vigorous participation in local politics. During the late 1930s he was Convener of Inverness-shire County Council. As a landowner himself, and as a representative of the interests of his locale, Lochiel championed the concerns of Highland sheep farmers. Highland wool production was strongly export dependent, the Continent providing its principal market. Prior to the advent of the Nazi régime, Germany had been one of the principal customers for Cheviot wool. Nazi autarkic policies had resulted in a marked drop in exports. In the late 1930s Lochiel strongly supported Chamberlain's appeasement policy, explicitly on the grounds that only with the resumption of friendly relations with Germany would it be possible to recapture a market which he viewed as essential to the prosperity of the wool industry.

Many of the Scottish members of the AGF had no readily identifiable or relevant commercial interests. Several were known "enthusiasts" or would in the future be connected with the expression of pro-German enthusiasm. The remainder were nearly all ex-servicemen, and reflected the comradely sentiments towards the ex-enemy commonly to be found in such circles. Although not of Scottish origins, Col. Sir Theodore Brinckman and Col. Richard Meinertzhagen had both retired to estates in the Highlands on completion of their professional careers in the army. Brinckman was an uncomplicated old soldier of South African war fame. In his retirement he devoted himself largely to hunting and fishing on his Nairnside estate. His only other interest appears to have been the welfare of the Inverness Golf Club. Meinertzhagen, on the other hand, was a much more complex character. He had been Allenby's intelligence officer during the Palestine offensive of 1917-18, and had returned to Palestine as Chief Political Officer after the war. Like Lothian, he had been a member of the British delegation at Versailles.
Although he subsequently refrained from joining the AGF Council, Meinertzhagen had been on the original provisional committee, and he was the only member of that body with strong ex-service connections.  

Traditional Scottish soldiering was represented by the Earl of Airlie. David Lyulph Gore Wolsey Ogilvy, 11th Earl of Airlie, had served with gallantry in the First World War, winning the Military Cross. Since 1934 he had acted as chairman of the British Legion in Scotland. Airlie was an enthusiastic supporter of establishing fraternal contacts with German ex-servicemen. As we have seen, enthusiasm for a policy of reconciliation with the ex-enemy had been slower to gain ground in the British Legion in Scotland than it had been in its sister organisation south of the Border. By 1937, thanks to the efforts of Airlie and other members of the Scottish National Executive, the general membership had been persuaded to fall into line with their English comrades. Airlie's enthusiasm for Anglo-German friendship, however, was tempered by a recognition of the threat Germany posed. Speaking in the Lords' debate on the Defence Services which followed the Rhinelann coup, while admitting it to be a "retrograde" step, he urged rearmament on a scale that assumed the possibility of Britain's involvement in war "within a year." Although he did not name Germany specifically, his prediction that "the internal and economic situation in some country may force that country to go to war — force them ... to burst, internally or externally," clearly envisaged Germany as one of the most likely aggressors Britain would have to face.  

One of the more colourful members of the Scottish military contingent was Lt.-Col. William Stewart Roddie. A fluent speaker of both Gallic and German, he was not unlike a character out of one of John Buchan's early novels. Wounded in the First World War, he was seconded to liaison work between the Treasury and Lord Northcliffe's propaganda machine, the Ministry of Information. At the close of the war he transferred to Military Intelligence and was sent to Germany on the same observation team as E.W.D. Tennant. Although that mission completed its work in February 1919, Stewart Roddie returned to Germany shortly afterwards as a military member of the Interallied Disarmament Commission, playing a somewhat flexible role as official observer cum gentleman spy, until the closure of his department in 1925. Stewart Roddie was a convinced Germanophile. Educated in Saxony, his pre-
war friends included the then young Lieutenant von Tscha
mmer und Osten. An ardent monarchist who claimed to
be on at least nodding terms with much of Europe's
royalty, his record of his time in Germany, Peace
Patrol, largely reads as a
catalogue of social calls on members of Germany's fallen royal houses, whose
straitened circumstances he much lamented. Stewart Roddie clearly moved easily amongst the members of Germany's old ruling élite, and he had a great deal of sympathy for their grievances over Germany's post-war treatment. France's use of black troops to occupy the Ruhr, for instance, he regards as "a barbarous and unworthy policy," deliberately designed to humiliate. Despite his personal role in executing the terms of Versailles, he believed the settlement was "disastrous," and endorsed the view of his friend, Lord Rosebery, that the peacemakers could hardly "have made a greater hash of it." Not only had it been unfairly punitive, but, by creating the festering "sore" of the Polish corridor, it rendered valueless his own work in Germany. "It is absurd," he wrote in 1932, "to think that German militarism can be dealt with effectively by dismantling fortresses, sinking battleships, and destroying guns and ammunition while Germany has thrust upon — or to put it more correctly, into her - a cause which must eventually inflame her 70,000,000 inhabitants to a point when they will inevitably turn to war for relief."

What Stewart Roddie had witnessed in Germany in 1919 had also made him a committed anti-communist. The Spartacists he considered to be "about as evil and destructive-minded a group as can be imagined." Where E.W.D. Tennant's recollection of their mission stressed his horror at the civilian suffering resulting from the continuation of the Allied blockade, Stewart Roddie's version of events makes it clear that at the time he and his companions were more concerned about the political consequences. Maintaining the blockade, he reported, was "not only senseless but harmful to ourselves." Germany was "on the brink of a volcano which may erupt at any moment," and it "would be folly to imagine that the ensuing disaster would be confined to Germany." The Bolsheviks were already "carrying their campaign into Holland, Belgium, France and Britain."

As in the case of their English counterparts, membership of the AGF did not signify that these Scottish ex-servicemen held any particular enthusiasm for Nazism per se. The Earl of Airlie "didn't think much of that feller Hitler," and he strongly disapproved of the activities of his cousin, Unity Mitford, because of the bad
publicity she brought on the family. Col. Meinertzhagen, an ardent champion of Jewish claims to Palestine, was hardly likely to have viewed Nazi anti-semitism with much favour. Nor was Stewart Roddie, for he had recorded his belief that the German Jews were the "kindest-hearted and most generous of people." Stewart Roddie's pro-German sympathies were primarily extended to Germany's old ruling classes. His empathy for the vulgarism of Nazism was likely to be non-existent, and he had a low opinion of Hitler, at least up until 1932. In Peace Patrol Stewart Roddie portrays Hitler during the Munich Putsch as both an extremist and a posturing idiot.

The Scottish membership of the AGF included its share of those whose enthusiasm for Germany did go beyond a desire for improved commercial ties or the comradely sentiments of ex-servicemen. The ubiquitous Lt.-Col. Moore, as we have seen, was a member of the Council. The general membership also included the Earl of Glasgow, the Earl of Galloway, Capt. Luttmans-Johnson, A.P. Laurie, D.M. Mason and the brothers Douglas-Hamilton, David and Malcolm. One of the less prominent members, Maj. Herbert Pullar, would subsequently figure in the Link. The presence of such enthusiasts, however, did not significantly shape the AGF.

The Anglo-German Fellowship was, as Richard Griffiths rightly describes it, "above all, a society of businessmen." From a purely Scottish perspective, however, this was not so obvious. While the general membership was split almost equally between commercial and non-commercial groups, within the Scottish contingent businessmen were heavily outnumbered by a combination of "enthusiasts" and ex-servicemen. This discrepancy becomes even more marked if the Anglo-Scots and those with essentially "British" commercial interests are excluded. The only representatives of purely "Scottish" manufacturing and commercial interests were Reincke and Lochiel.

As the number of individuals involved is so small, any attempt at an analysis of this comparative discrepancy can only be tentative. Nevertheless, some possibilities may be posited. Scotland's distance from London offers a pragmatic explanation. Attendance at the AGF's grand dinners was clearly easier for London-based individuals. For those living outwith London, retired colonels with time on their hands would obviously have found less difficulty in attending, than businessmen
immersed in the day to day running of their companies. Nevertheless, if membership was based on the prospect of solid commercial advantage, and not merely on participation in an enjoyable social display of enthusiasm for Anglo-German friendship, the explanation clearly lies elsewhere.

A combination of Scotland's lack of industrial diversification and the fact that effective control of large areas of Scottish commercial activity had passed to London-based concerns appears to offer a partial explanation. Membership of the AGF undoubtedly exercised a particular attraction for those sectors of commerce engaged in chemicals production and other high technology industries. It was an area of commercial activity in which Scottish-based companies were singularly underrepresented. The Scottish chemicals industry was in contraction, and much of what survived had been incorporated within UK-based conglomerates like ICI. The fact that Distillers' association with the AGF would appear to have sprung not from its Scottish operations, but from the activities of its expanding English division, only serves to underline the failure of the Scottish chemicals industry to compete with the new technologies of Cheshire and Teeside. In an economic structure still dominated by the traditional staples of heavy industry, the development of high technology industries had lagged behind the consumer-durable fuelled growth in the South. Plastics and automotive related firms were strongly represented in the AGF. In Scotland the demise of Argyll and Arrol-Johnson had crippled an embryonic automotive industry. The absence of a volume car manufacturer had ensured the non-proliferation of ancillary components suppliers. Plastics manufacture was also singularly absent from the Scottish economy.

However, chemicals and high-technology industries were only one of the groups of commercial interest represented in the AGF. Many of the individuals and companies involved were engaged in the supply of raw materials to Germany. Their motivation, as we have seen, was a desire to retard or reverse the inroads being made on their exports by Nazi autarkic policies. The absence of representatives of Scottish companies in this group is less easy to explain on purely commercial grounds. Commercial factors would certainly explain the absence of Scottish coal barons from the AGF. Although coal was the principal raw material exported from Scotland to Germany, far from being damaged by German governmental policy, the trade was flourishing. Germany's need for coal to fuel rearmament overrode any considerations of dependency on foreign sources. Imports of coal from Britain had shown a gentle but steady increase since 1933.
Nevertheless, certain sectors of the Scottish economy were undeniably suffering from declining exports to Germany. As previously noted, sheep farmers in the Highlands had been hard-hit by the reduction in German imports of Cheviot wool. Their colleagues in the Borders were also suffering from the same problem. The herring industry, which had been languishing since the loss of the Russian market during the First World War, was also badly hit by shrinking German import quotas. Lochiel excepted, where were the representatives of these industries? Were Scottish businessmen more concerned about the political ramifications of membership than their English counterparts? It is impossible to draw hard conclusions from the limited numbers involved in AGF. The discrepancy could simply be ascribed to personal factors. Nevertheless, if the discrepancy is indicative of something more, then commercial factors provide some of the answers, but are by no means entirely satisfactory.


3. *The Times*, 16th December, 1936.

4. Anglo-German Fellowship: List of Individual Members, January 1936, MID, LP/JSM (INT) Box 8: Anglo German Fellowship: List of Members and Representatives of Firms and Corporate Members, 15th July 1936, Wiener Library.

5. Ernest William Dalrymple Tennant, b. 1887.


15. Documentation supplied to the Board of Trade by the AGF, 14th March 1935, FO 371/18878/C2168/1697/18.


18. The executive committee comprised: F. D'Arcy Cooper (Unilever), Maj. C.J.P. Ball (F.A. Hughes), Paul Rykens (Unilever), J.W.W. Weigall, M.P. Bennett (Bird), C.A. Proctor (Dunlop), Sir Ernest Bain (A.W. Bain), J.P.T.


22. Added to suppliers of other "raw" materials these two groups accounted for roughly a third of the companies affiliated to the AGF.


25. The Birmingham Aluminium Casting (1903) Co. and James Booth & Co.


28. Three of Schroders' senior partners were also individual members of the AGF.


31. Tiarks was a member of the AGF and would later join its Council.


33. 101 out of 335.

34. 14 Conservative and 1 National Labour.


38. Of those members on whom information is traceable, 107 might be termed "Commercial" and 104 "Non-Commercial."


40. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 185.

41. Tennant to Ribbentrop, copy to Lord Mount Temple, 7th September 1935, MT/BR 81.


44. John Tennant, a banker, had served with distinction in the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia during the First World War. In 1929 he unsuccessfully contested his home constituency of Moray and Nairn, standing, as befitted a Tennant, as a Liberal. Glenconner's father-in-law, Sir Richard Paget, was also a member of the AGF.

45. Tharsis and Tennants had had close trading connections for over 100 years. E.W.D. Tennant, op. cit., p. 196. W.P. Rutherford, Chairman of Tharsis, was invited to join the AGF but appears to have declined. Documentation supplied to the Board of Trade by the AGF, 14th March 1935, FO 371/18878/C2168/1679/18.


47. Charles Ernest Whistler Mackintosh, b. 1903. A former Scottish rugby cap.


49. Sir Alfred Mond, 1st Lord Melchett, b. 1868. Head of Brunner Mond & Co. prior to its incorporation within ICI. Chairman of ICI until his death in 1930.

50. Archibald Vyvyan Board, b. 1884.

51. Sir Alexander Walker, b. 1869.


55. H.A. Reincke. Chairman of Beardmores, 1930-36, and managing director, 1930-38. A Glasgow engineering graduate, Reincke had formerly been a senior works manager for John Brown & Co., and had also been director of the Coventry Ordnance Works.

56. Beardmores, however, also manufactured Maybach diesel engines under licence from the German firm.


60. H.A. Reincke was not the only Scot in the AGF with strong Lithgow connections. Alexander Williamson, general manager of steelmakers Steel Pech & Tozer, had been trained by the Lithgows in Port Glasgow. In 1938, when Lithgow acquired sole control of Beardmores, he installed Williamson as the managing director.

61. It was Lithgow's query to the Board of Trade, as to the nature of the society he had been asked to join, which first drew the attention of the Foreign Office to the existence of the AGF. J.H. Magowan to R. Brinsley Richards, 23rd February 1935, FO 371/18878/C1727/1697/18.


64. J. and S. Pool, op. cit., p. 309.

65. Lochiel was, to say the least, enthusiastic about his role as president of the Inverness-shire Unionist Association. On at least one occasion IUA affairs were deliberated at a meeting convened in the trenches. After the war he resigned the presidency in protest at the rapid dismantling of Britain's war machine. In his absence the IUA appears to have ceased to function. Lochiel, however, returned to refound the Association in 1924, and continued as president until 1929. Ward, op. cit., p. 27.

66. *Scotsman*, 6th February 1939. Lochiel's participation in the AGF may also have been part prompted by the kind of pro-German sentiments to be found
amongst ex-servicemen. Like many of his predecessors, Lochiel had been a professional soldier. Called out of retirement by the outbreak of war in 1914, he had amply lived up to the family tradition. He raised and led his own unit, the 5th Battalion, the Cameron Highlanders. Later in the war he commanded the Lovat Scouts, perhaps the most uniquely Highland in character of all the Scottish regiments.

67. The only exception was John Arbuthnott, 14th Viscount Arbuthnott. Lord Lieutenant of Kincardineshire and Convener of the Kincardineshire County Council.

68. Despite the Germanic sounding names, both men had Danish, not German, family connections.

69. As recorded by his obituarist. Scotsman, 10th September, 1937. Brinckman was Lady Houston's first husband.

70. Through Meinertzhagen an invitation to join the Fellowship was extended to General Sir Ian Hamilton of the British Legion. Hamilton, although well-known for his pro-German sympathies, declined to lend his name to the AGF.


73. Where Buchan himself was employed.


76. Stewart Roddie, op. cit., p. 93, p. 95.

77. Ibid., p. 265.

78. Ibid., p. 17.

79. Ibid., p. 22. Stewart Roddie was quoting from one of his contemporary reports.

80. Mitford, op. cit., p. 96.

81. Stewart Roddie, op. cit., p. 204.

82. Ibid., pp. 301-6.


84. The bulk of Scottish coal exports actually went to Scandinavia and the smaller Baltic states. In 1937 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia between them accounted for 64% of Scottish coal exports. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of coal exports made the German
market significant. Coal was the single biggest item in British exports to Germany.

Value of German Imports from the U.K. in 1935:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>256,238,000 Marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>34,541,000 Marks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Scotsman Trade Review*, issued with *The Scotsman*, 26th April 1939; *Manchester Guardian*, 13th March 1936.

85. Coal Exports to Germany from the UK:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>2,360,000 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,541,000 Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,885,000 Tons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 8
The Spanish Civil War 1936-39

The Spanish Civil War has come to be seen as a European war, with Spain, in effect, providing a setting for the confrontation of rival European ideologies. It has been labelled a conflict of progress against reaction, democracy against dictatorship, communism versus fascism, or Christian civilisation versus atheistic barbarism, according to the viewpoint of the observer. The civil war did not achieve this status overnight. From the start of the generals' rebellion on July 18th 1936 until the end of the year, it was largely regarded in Britain as an essentially Spanish affair. Despite the early intervention of foreign powers — Italy and Germany on Franco's side, and Russia and to a lesser degree France for the Republic — the establishment of the Non-Intervention Committee in London in September effectively cast a smoke screen over the war's potential for leading to confrontation between the great powers. The conflict, it appeared, had been successfully localised. The possible divisiveness of the Spanish Civil War in British domestic politics was also partially disguised by the proceedings of the Labour Party Conference in Edinburgh in October. Despite considerable sympathy for the Republic amongst the delegates, Conference endorsed the government's Non-intervention policy, largely because of fears that Spain could be used to further Communist infiltration of the Labour Party.

In its pursuit of Non-Intervention Baldwin's government was motivated primarily by a desire to contain the war in Spain and to prevent the issue from crystallizing the division of Europe into opposed ideological blocs — democracy versus dictatorship — with the Soviet Union donning the mantle of democracy. British Conservatives had already been alarmed by the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. Now French and Russian identification with the cause of the Republic threatened a confrontation with the fascist powers which could drag Britain in as an unwilling participant. For many Conservatives the idea of fighting alongside communist Russia was anathema.

A second reason for the adoption of Non-intervention, with its ostensibly neutral posture, was the need to remain on friendly terms with the ultimate winner in Spain, whichever side that should happen to be. Although the desire to protect British trading interests with Spain and capital investment there played a part, the principal factor in Cabinet's deliberations was Britain's strategic requirements. In wartime a
hostile Spain could severely restrict, if not completely prevent, the passage of British ships into the Mediterranean, while raiders operating from ports on the Spanish northern coast could interfere with the Atlantic shipping lanes. The requirements of *realpolitik*, however, did not figure in the government's public justifications of Non-Intervention. Instead they stressed its contribution to world peace.

As good supporters of their government, Scottish Conservatives acclaimed its role as peacemaker. Sir Robert Horne, MP for Glasgow Hillhead, wholeheartedly supported what he saw as a means of preventing "the spread of a conflict which would be disastrous to the whole civilisation of Europe." According to the Duke of Buccleuch, the government "had earned the respect of all the nations by their policy of non-intervention and impartiality."

To the left wing of the Labour Party such glorious impartiality was hardly the correct attitude to maintain when the "friendly" government of another country was assailed by rebels. Depriving the Republic of its right to purchase arms was not a "neutral" act. Countering such critics, Conservative spokesmen placed the opposing factions in Spain on an equal footing by questioning the validity of the February 1936 elections, which had resulted in the formation of the Popular Front government. Sir Robert Horne declared obliquely, "I shall not question whether that Government was constitutionally elected or not; I shall not dwell upon the fact that there was a majority vote in Spain against the Government, nor shall I refer at any length to the fact that the Government which has been holding office now for some time is entirely different in creed and in performance from what the people of Spain thought they were voting for." Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore was somewhat blunter when he asked, "Were the present Government in Spain actually elected by anyone?" The Republican government was also inaccurately described as communist. As defenders of the Republic pointed out, the Popular Front government at the time of the generals' rebellion was a coalition of Liberals and Socialists. Mere puppets, their Conservative opponents would counter. The real power lay off-stage with the Communists. According to Capt. J.H.F. McEwen, Labour's portrayal of the Republicans as defenders of Democracy was the product of "delusion." The war in Spain, he believed, was "a struggle between the extremes of Right and Left." From this standpoint the government's neutrality was easily defended. As a parliamentary democracy, Britain should have no affinity
with either of the totalitarian extremes.

These lines of argument were anti-Republican rather than pro-Nationalist. For those members of the Conservative parliamentary party who might have wanted to go further, the expression of overt support for Franco was undoubtedly circumscribed by their own government's official policy of neutrality. At this stage outspokenly pro-Nationalist comment came in the main from Baldwin's critics on the far Right, whose anti-communist impulses were not to be constrained by any considerations of official government policy. As in the anti-sanctions campaign, the IPG and Leo Amery's coterie were well to the fore, the latter stressing not only the threat to the Empire's safety which a Communist Spain would pose, but also the desirability of avoiding any collision with Italy over Spain. In the Commons the most vigorous pro-Franco speech was delivered by Amery's acolyte, Charles Emmott, who excused Franco's anti-democratic stance on the grounds that "the parliamentary system has no real foundation in the life of Spain." At this stage, however, none of the Conservative MPs representing Scottish constituencies were prepared to publicly share Emmott's enthusiasm.

Newspaper coverage of events in Spain during the first weeks of the war dwelt largely on the violence in the Republican zone. Reports of atrocities, culled largely from members of the British community and Insurgent sympathisers who had fled to Gibraltar, exaggerated the scale of the violence, in itself by no means small, to massive proportions. In contrast, there was little news of the systematic butchery which followed in the wake of Franco's advance. Supporters of the generals' rebellion could therefore present the struggle as one of morality versus immorality. Correspondents to the Glasgow Herald referred to "the better elements in Spanish life," those who believed in "law and order, safety of life and property, Christianity and culture," and on the other, "the mob, formed of the lower strata of society, led by the professional agitator, the sweepings of the jails, and the few intellectuals who have not already sickened at the mess they were responsible for." The Republic had already received a fair amount of bad press on the subject of law and order prior to July 18th. Pro-Nationalist commentators, therefore, had an established image of chaos and disorder into which this fresh evidence of violence could be incorporated. The time-scale of events was distorted to suggest that the worst excesses had been a prelude to the rebellion, and not, as was the case, a panic...
reaction to it. The Republican government could therefore be condemned for its failure "to perform its elementary function of maintaining law and order." This, according to the Glasgow Herald, was the "determining cause of the rising." 13 Unlike The Scotsman, which throughout the war maintained a certain degree of objectivity, the Glasgow Herald at the start showed a distinct preference for the Nationalists, 14 its "Special Correspondent" describing the opposing forces in August as "a responsible dictatorship of the right and an irresponsible dictatorship of the left." 15 Through the autumn of 1936 the paper ran a remarkable series of complementary features on other right-wing subjects, including Degrelle's Rexists, Salazar's Portugal, and Italian colonisation in Libya, which clearly sought to place the Nationalists within a framework of "progressive" European authoritarianism. 16 The article on Salazar's Portugal, in particular, quite unashamedly contrasted this example of "A Successful Dictatorship" with the disastrous Republican experiment conducted by its Iberian neighbour.

Pride of place in the sensationalist accounts of events in the Republican zone was accorded to attacks on the Catholic Church, and in particular, the massacre of members of the clergy. Many priests were killed during this period, but the numbers involved were grossly inflated, and tales of quite incredible savagery were given serious consideration. Gerald Brenan recounts one rumour being spread by no less a person than Sir Charles Harrington, the governor of Gibraltar, that in Malaga naked nuns had been run over by a steamroller in the main street. Brenan, a former resident of the town, points out that Malaga did not even possess a steamroller. 17

The attacks on the Church, both real and reported, enabled Franco to don the mantle of the Catholic champion. It was not a role he chose for himself. His early justifications for the rebellion stress anti-communism and the need to restore law and order, not the defence of the Church. The hierarchy of the Spanish Church, however, were quick to embrace his cause, and the image of the Catholic Crusade was rapidly adopted as the Nationalists' raison d'etre, providing both a unifying ideological banner for the disparate elements within the Nationalist camp, and the best propaganda weapon for mobilizing support outside Spain.

This crusading theme quickly appeared in Scottish pro-Nationalist comment. To Boyd Cable 18 the opposing sides were "the Franco upholders of Christianity" on
the one hand, and on the other, "the Red Government and forces, whose sole aim is the total destruction of any and all Christianity and the rule of Sovietism and Bolshevism's 'anti-God' beliefs." Rather more succinctly, another pro-Nationalist stated simply, "The issue is: The preservation of the Catholic Church or its extermination." Significantly, many of the exponents of this theme, like Boyd Cable, were at pains to stress their own Protestant faith.

Scottish Catholics looking to the Church for guidance were given an anti-Republican, rather than pro-Franco, lead by the Scottish hierarchy. Archbishop McDonald of Edinburgh condemned the "unspeakable atrocities" which had followed the "appalling outbreak of Communism in Spain." The Archbishop of Glasgow, Donald Mackintosh, similarly denounced the killings, and huge masses of reparation for crimes committed against the Church in Spain were held in his archdiocese at the Lanarkshire shrine of Carfin. At times up to 70,000 people were estimated to have taken part. In adopting this stance, the Scottish hierarchy were following the Pope's pronouncement of September 14th, in which he spoke out against the "satanic" behaviour of the Godless in Spain, but stopped short of open support of Franco. Some priests went further than their archbishops. Mgr. McGettigan spoke of "Atheism, Communism, and Syndicalism on the one hand and the party which stands for law and order, and nationality and religion, on the other — that is, the greater part of the Spanish people." As McDonald's Vicar-General, McGettigan was perhaps purposefully reflecting an enthusiasm for Franco which the Archbishop himself felt unable to declare in his official capacity.

Leading Scottish lay Catholics appear to have been reluctant to commit themselves to open support for Franco. A local issue which drew much attention was the launch of an appeal fund by Sir Daniel Stevenson, to form a volunteer ambulance unit for service in Republican Spain. This venture was attacked as a partisan relief effort by Lady Maxwell-Scott and Lord Colum Crichton-Stuart, brother of the Marquess of Bute. Accusing Stevenson of deliberately misleading the public, they urged Catholics to send money to impartial bodies, such as the Red Cross. Compared to the contemporaneous claim by Alfred Denville, the Secretary of the Catholic Members Group in the House of Commons, that "This is a battle between Christ and the Communist," this level of comment was remarkably restrained.
There was a strongly defensive element in Catholic comment, with much effort devoted to praising the record of the Church in Spain prior to the war. This was a response to Republican protagonists, notably John McGovern, who were seeking to justify the anti-clerical excesses of July and August. In a series of lectures across the Glasgow area McGovern slammed the "greedy, selfish, soulless materialism" of the Church in Spain, which, he claimed, had "used the pulpit for political purposes, to repress the aims and aspirations of the working classes." McGovern's staunchest opponent in the newspaper debate over the Church's record was the Glasgow lawyer, John Campbell. Secretary of the Catholic Union for the Archdiocese of Glasgow, Campbell had already established himself as a champion of Catholic causes by his vigorous demands for civil rights in Northern Ireland. Campbell, however, was not alone in attacking McGovern. In December 1936 Mary McGovern made the news, when she angrily marched out of St. Michael's Church, Parkhead, after the priest had made derogatory remarks about her husband.

With the Nationalists' failure to take Madrid by direct assault in November 1936, and the repulse of the encirclement offensives of the following spring, the war moved into a new phase with the reduction of the Republican northern zone around Bilbao. From now on it would be a battle of attrition in which final victory would hinge largely on the level of external material aid. This metamorphosis of the war was accompanied by an evolution of its perception in Britain. In the first phase of the war the European dimensions had primarily been acclaimed by the extremes of Right and Left. During the course of 1937 the ideological significance and strategic implications of the struggle were taken up by the political middle-ground. Although there were rebels on both sides, the division of opinion on the parliamentary stage was essentially between Right and Left. For the Labour Party and many Liberals the Republic's survival came to symbolize the struggle against fascism. For many Conservatives the extent of Soviet military supplies to the Republic, the widely publicised role of the International Brigades in the defence of Madrid, and the growing power of the Communists within the Republican Government itself, appeared to indicate, as the right-wing of the party had claimed from the outset, that communism in Spain was not simply a Spanish phenomenon, but part of a long-term strategy for the infiltration of Western Europe. Charles Emmott's friend and parliamentary colleague, Patrick Donner, expressed these fears succinctly when he declared, "It was stated publicly at the time of the Russian revolution. If you had
a Communist Russia at one end of Europe and a Communist Spain at the other, the rest of Europe would become like a nut in a nutcracker." \(^39\)

The most outspoken exponent of the communist conspiracy theory in the Commons in 1937 was neither a member of the IPG, nor one of Amery's young firebrands. When Capt. Archibald Henry Maule Ramsay, MP for Peebles and South Midlothian, first drew attention to munitions crossing the Franco-Spanish border in December 1936, it was his first parliamentary contribution on foreign affairs. \(^40\) Since his election to Parliament in 1931, the state of the potato industry in Scotland had been his primary area of concern. Ramsay was no parliamentary debater. However, throughout 1937 and 1938 he tabled a lengthy series of anti-Republican questions, dealing primarily with Soviet military supplies to the Republic and French complicity in their delivery. A "phlegmatic" and "clear-cut" character \(^41\) with a simplistic approach to politics, Ramsay's belief in the Machiavellian tendencies of communism ran deep. In June 1937 he declared that the bombing of the Deutschland by Republican planes had been no accident, but had been deliberately "organised by international Communist agencies with the object of embroiling as many countries as possible in a European war." \(^42\)

Ramsay's antagonism to communism was prompted primarily by strongly held Christian beliefs. \(^43\) Ramsay's beliefs, however, had decidedly political overtones. Christianity he described as "an integral part of the British Constitution," \(^44\) and in 1938 he would introduce the Aliens Restriction (Blasphemy) Bill in an endeavour to hamper attendance at an international conference of free-thinkers in London. The conference, he believed, was part of the communist plot to undermine the moral fibre of Britain. \(^45\) In his views on the threat to organised religion posed by communism, Ramsay may well have been influenced in no small measure by his formidable Catholic wife, Ismay Lucretia Ramsay, who, like himself, was a member of the Christian Protest Movement. \(^46\) Through his wife's brother, R.M. Preston, a director of Rio Tinto, he would also have been well acquainted with the atrocity tales emanating from the British community in Spain.

In his semi-autobiographical account, *The Nameless War*, Ramsay states that in the early 1930s, although concerned by communism's anti-religious tendencies, he had believed it to be a purely Russian problem. His realisation that communism
aimed at the global extirpation of religion occurred in late 1936, as the full significance of events in Spain sank in.\textsuperscript{47} In the light of Ramsay's subsequent realisation that behind the communist conspiracy lay the even more sinister hand of the Jew,\textsuperscript{48} it might be tempting to dismiss him as an eccentric individual. The timing of his conversion, however, fits into a background of general panic in Conservative ranks over events in Spain. Speaking in North Berwick in January 1937, Capt. J.H.F. McEwen shrugged off his earlier neutrality on Spain and came out strongly in favour of Franco, abandoning in the process his previous policy of guarded co-operation with Russia. "It is ... quite clear to anyone who really cares for the Empire's safety," he declared, "that there could be no greater danger to that safety than Soviet domination in the Peninsula."\textsuperscript{49} By July 1937 Harold Nicolson was describing the "enormous majority" of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee as "passionately anti-Government and pro-Franco."\textsuperscript{50}

In Glasgow in the spring of 1937 there were signs of a shift in Catholic circles from the defensive stance of the previous winter to outright support for Franco. On April 5th Douglas Jerrold lectured on "Spain and the Church" at a meeting in the City Halls organised by the Catholic Truth Society. The choice of Jerrold as the Church's defender was a significant one, as Jerrold was an out-and-out supporter of Franco. Involved in right-wing Spanish conspiratorial groups since the birth of the Republic in 1931, Jerrold had been responsible for hiring the plane which flew Franco from the Canaries to Morocco at the start of the rebellion.\textsuperscript{51} General Franco, according to Jerrold, was "a supremely good man, a hero possibly; possibly a saint."\textsuperscript{52} Prior to the meeting the CTS had lobbied all the Catholic working men's associations, including Campbell's Catholic Union, to assist in securing a high attendance.\textsuperscript{53} The results exceeded the organisers' expectations. The meeting was heavily oversubscribed, and a second lecture was hastily organised for the following day.\textsuperscript{54} Heartened by this display of popular interest, the Glasgow CTS Secretary, Alexander McGregor,\textsuperscript{55} organised a follow-up meeting in June, this time in the form of a debate between Douglas Jerrold and John McGovern.\textsuperscript{56}

This swing in Catholic opinion was no doubt helped by two papal encyclicals issued in March, in which Pius XI not only condemned anti-clerical excesses in Spain in even stronger terms, but also stated that in certain circumstances Catholics were justified in taking up arms against their own government.\textsuperscript{57} In the summer of
1937 Catholic reservations were further eased by full papal recognition of the Burgos régime and the final conquest of the Republican northern zone. The adherence of the staunchly Catholic Basques to the Republican cause had always presented an obstacle to the Nationalist claim to represent Catholicism. The elimination of the northern zone effectively resolved that problem.

John Campbell, meanwhile, was rapidly turning the Catholic Union into a dissemination network for Nationalist propaganda, distributing material not only to the Catholic Union's own advisory bureaux, but to Catholic institutions of all kinds in the West of Scotland. Schools, training colleges, and convents were all on his mailing lists, as were all parish priests within the archdiocese. In the late summer of 1937 Campbell was drawn into a fresh newspaper controversy, this time in harness with Col. Rupert Dawson, a Catholic landowner and a prominent member of the Kinross and West Perthshire Unionist Association. The target of their combined criticism was Dawson's local MP, the Duchess of Atholl, who, following a visit to Spain in April, had embarked on a vigorous pro-Republican campaign. To Atholl Franco was a German protégé, and support for the Republic a logical extension of her advocacy of closer co-operation with the Soviet Union to resist the German menace. Although she consistently stressed the strategic motivation behind her policy, she also came to genuinely believe in the moral rectitude of the Republic's cause. Enraged by Atholl's circulation of a pamphlet describing her experiences in Spain, Dawson resigned from the Executive Council of the KWPUA after failing to secure a motion of censure on Atholl's activities. He then promptly launched into a highly personal newspaper assault on the Duchess, which he mounted in combination with Campbell and Atholl's old Perthshire adversary, Capt. Luttmann-Johnson. Dawson also lobbied intensively within the constituency association to have Atholl disavowed prior to the next general election. He already had his own prospective candidate, Major McGregor-Whitton of St. Fillans, waiting in the wings.

Throughout 1937 there was a general upswell of support for the Republic in Britain. Not only did the Labour Party surmount its initial hesitations over opposing Non-Intervention, but the Republic's cause was also attracting prominent Liberals, like Lloyd George. Conservative adherents, like Atholl, were few and far between, but where she led there was the possibility that others might follow. Churchill, for instance, swung away from his earlier pro-Franco position, and in
July joined Atholl in drawing attention to the strategic threat posed by the installation of German long-range guns on either side of the Straits of Gibraltar.\(^63\)

The rising clamour of pro-Republican voices in the Commons tempted some Conservative MPs out from behind the skirts of official government policy. One of these was Sir Nairne Stewart-Sandeman, a rich merchant banker and former proprietor of jute and cotton spinning concerns in Dundee and Perthshire.\(^64\) Stewart-Sandeman's opening gambit was on April 28th, when he declared the reported bombing of Guernica to be "simply a question of rumour."\(^65\) A week later he shifted his ground to ask, "Is it not the case that Guernica is the centre of the small arms manufacture in the Basque country?"\(^66\) He finally settled on the fact that "the mess in Guernica ... was nearly all road mines," but in the meantime he had moved on to the somewhat steadier ground of questioning the Britishness of supply ships running the Bilbao blockade under the British flag.\(^67\)

By April 1937 the effectiveness of Non-Intervention in preventing foreign interference in Spain had clearly been demonstrated to be negligible. If the control scheme functioned at all, it was only to the extent that supplies to the Republic from France had been diminished, and the British government's pursuit of Non-Intervention was increasingly criticised by the Opposition for the assistance it was effectively rendering to the Nationalists. Over the Bilbao blockade the government's "neutrality" was also called into question. Throughout the crisis the government was motivated primarily by a desire to avoid a confrontation with the Nationalists over British ships running the blockade. To achieve this they were prepared to sacrifice traditionally guarded rights of freedom of the seas. With the government's policy operating in a fashion which was generally favourable to Franco, Nationalist supporters in the main limited their contributions to buttressing the government's position.

Any complacency in pro-Nationalist ranks, however, was dispelled in September. Following attacks on British and neutral merchant shipping in the Mediterranean by submarines, tactfully referred to as "pirate," but well-known to be Italian, the Anglo-French conference at Nyon established anti-submarine naval patrols. Eden had for some time been trying to persuade his colleagues in the Cabinet to put some teeth into Non-Intervention, and had finally persuaded them of the need to deliver a sharp warning to the Italians. It worked, the submarine attacks
ceasing immediately.

As it transpired, Nyon proved to be not the first step in a new line of policy, but rather, in effect, Eden's swan song. To Neville Chamberlain, who succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister in May 1937, the Spanish war was merely an obstacle to his courtship of Italian friendship. The sooner Franco won, the earlier Anglo-Italian relations could move on to an even keel. In February 1938 Chamberlain's insistence on immediate progress towards Anglo-Italian détente pushed Eden into resignation. The Anglo-Italian Pact which followed in April effectively condoned Italian intervention in Spain. Although the farce of Non-Intervention was played out to the end, British policy thereafter was increasingly less than even-handed in its dealings with the two sides in Spain.

In the immediate aftermath of Nyon, however, there was considerable alarm amongst Nationalist supporters in Britain, for the prospect of a much tougher policy towards the dictators did not bode well for the Nationalist cause. Their response was the formation of the Friends of National Spain. There had been humanitarian Spanish relief groups with decidedly pro-Nationalist overtones since the beginning of the war. The FNS, however, was the first overtly political propaganda organisation. The moving spirits in the new body were Douglas Jerrold and Lord Phillimore. They were backed by four Conservative MPs, several peers, and an assortment of distinguished writers and other worthies. Based in London, the new group was designed primarily to give cohesion to the existing parliamentary lobbying by individuals.

Shortly after the launch of the London society, Jerrold and Phillimore approached Jerrold's Glaswegian associate, Alexander McGregor, with a view to forming a subsidiary branch in Scotland. This McGregor agreed to do, although it was not until March of the following year that the Scottish group held its first public meeting. The executive committee which McGregor formed was essentially composed of Catholic lawyers and businessmen in the Glasgow area, and included John Campbell. McGregor himself acted as treasurer. The secretary was Arthur Montague. In 1930-31 Montague had been president of Glasgow University's Distributist Club. Retired military men from the Catholic gentry filled most of the honorific positions, the list of vice-presidents including the veterans of the West Perthshire campaign, Col. Dawson and Capt. Luttman-Johnson.
The most prestigious names associated with the Scottish FNS were those of the Honorary President, Lady Maxwell-Scott, and her husband, Maj.-Gen. Sir Walter Maxwell-Scott, who acted as one of the vice-presidents. A bluff old soldier of the ex-colonial type, the general favoured simplicity in political solutions. As he put it, "I am looking forward to the day when every R. Communist will be bumped off!" His role within the FNS was largely decorative. His wife, however, was no mere figurehead, and brought all her formidable lobbying skills to bear for the FNS. Lady Maxwell-Scott was actually in Nationalist Spain when the Scottish FNS held its first meetings, but she sent a suitably stirring letter to the Glasgow Herald to accompany the launch. "Wake up England' and Scotland, to the truth of Marxist doctrine before it is too late — a doctrine of bloodshed and rule by terror ... It must be wiped off the face of the earth if civilisation is to survive. There is no middle road to-day, no longer any fence to sit on above the struggle. We are all in it for the defence of Christianity and country against the Godlessness and internationalism which is Marxism. Nationalist Spain is fighting your battle."

Within three weeks of their inaugural meeting the Scottish FNS made the headlines in the Glasgow papers. They had intended to hold a public meeting on March 21st in the St. Andrews Halls, with Arnold Lunn from the London FNS executive as a guest speaker. However, at the last moment the Glasgow magistrates decided by a narrow margin to revoke the licence for the use of the halls, which were corporation property. Ostensibly, this was on the grounds that the police had advised the magistrates that allowing the meeting to take place could lead to grave scenes of public disorder. In fact it was a fairly transparent attempt by the pro-Republican majority in the Glasgow Labour Party to curtail the activities of their opponents. The move, however, foundered disastrously. At a Council meeting on the 31st March a motion for the repeal of the magistrates' decision was forced on to the agenda and carried by a combination of Labour rebels and Progressives, the Glasgow municipal alliance of Conservatives and Liberals. Since 1933 Labour along with the ILP had held a majority on the Council. For the meeting on the 31st March the Socialist-Progressive division of the Council was sixty-seven to forty-nine. However, despite the application of the Labour whip, only thirty-eight Socialists voted to retain the ban. Twenty-three either abstained or failed to turn up, and six, including the Lord Provost, Sir John Stewart, actively voted for its repeal. It was a remarkable and humiliating display of Labour disunity.
Some of the Labour rebels were motivated by a genuine concern for free speech. "When there is tyranny in the air, no matter from what quarter it comes, I oppose it," thundered Rosslyn Mitchell, the former Labour MP for Paisley, in what was acclaimed as the most eloquent of the rebel speeches. An unrepentant Mitchell subsequently declared that he himself shared the "sincere and passionate antagonism against the Spanish Insurgents" which had motivated his opponents.

Unashamedly middle-class, the former radical Liberal was considered by many of his Labour colleagues to have never really embraced Socialism wholeheartedly. However, as a lay Congregationalist preacher, whose most renowned parliamentary contribution had been in opposition to the revision of the Book of Common Prayer in 1929, Mitchell could hardly be accused of empathy with Catholic reaction.

The mainspring of the rebellion, however, was Catholic. Defeated Labour councillors afterwards complained that a "solid Catholic vote was being held at the heads of the Labour representatives." Reflecting its immigrant origins, the Catholic community in Glasgow and the West of Scotland was essentially working-class. Since 1922 it had effectively been electorally wedded to the Labour Party. By running roughshod over the pro-Nationalist sympathies of many of their Catholic supporters, the Labour Party risked not only severe internal rifts, but possibly electoral suicide. In April 1937 two Labour councillors, James McLaughlin and Alexander McGregor, had been expelled from the Glasgow Labour Party, after voting against a magistrates' decision to permit tramway workers taking a collection for the Republic. McGregor, father of the FNS secretary of the same name, subsequently stood as an Independent Socialist in the municipal elections of November 1938, with some assistance from the FNS executive. Although pushed into third place, he effectively took half the socialist vote, and Labour lost the seat to the Progressives. After the St. Andrews Hall disaster, however, the Glasgow Labour Party adopted a more compromising and certainly less confrontational approach. There were no further attempts to stop FNS meetings, and although Sir John Stewart and the rebels were disciplined for their sins, there would be no further expulsions from the Party over Spain. The official Labour line remained strongly pro-Republican, and the heretics were quietly ignored.

With the ban on the meeting lifted, the FNS went ahead on the very evening of their victory in the Council Chambers. An estimated two thousand people turned up
to hear Lunn deliver his address, while some two hundred and fifty Republican supporters demonstrated outside. There were some disturbances in the Hall, but the police chief's dire prophecies did not prove to be accurate. The *Daily Record* described the affair as "rather a washout" after such a build up, while *Forward* reckoned it was "less rowdy than many a Corporation meeting I have seen." Not all observers, though, were of the same opinion. The *Irish Weekly* correspondent saw "Communists Try To Break Up Lunn Meeting. Police Drive Back Howling Mob." 88

Following the St. Andrews Halls meeting, the FNS embarked on a lawsuit against the Corporation, to recoup the losses incurred by the original cancellation. Had they been successful, damages would have been payable from public funds and not by the individual councillors concerned, and in view of the public odium, which it was believed would accrue from such an outcome, proceedings were dropped. 89 Although the FNS executive continued to grumble about the financial damage, this was easily offset by the propaganda value of the incident. Not only had the organisation leapt into prominence within a month of its inception, but it had been cast in the role of the gallant underdog fighting for freedom of expression. At the same time the pro-Republican enthusiasm of the Labour Party had effectively been tempered.

After this eventful start the FNS settled down to a year of fruitful propaganda activity. Members were kept up to date with regular circulars, press statements were issued, and over two million pamphlets were published and distributed in addition to propaganda material sent up from London. Funds appear to have been something of a problem, although after September 1938 there was sufficient to hire a permanent office in Glasgow. Hitherto, they had operated from the offices of Alexander McGregor Jun.'s solicitors' partnership. Appeals for linen and first aid supplies were more successful, and four shipments were dispatched to Spain. 90 Social events were staged for the benefit of members. There was, for instance, a combined whist-drive and dance, graced by the German and Lithuanian Consuls-General for Scotland, the acting Spanish Consul, and the German Vice-Consul. Amongst the prizes for the various competitions held during the course of the evening was a large framed picture of General Franco. 91 With one of these events the FNS hit the headlines again. On February 2nd 1939 they held a victory dinner in the Grosvenor Restaurant in Glasgow to celebrate the capture of Barcelona. While a pro-Republican crowd, estimated to be between a thousand and two
thousand strong, demonstrated noisily outside, a small party, led by four former members of the International Brigade, broke into the restaurant. The Republican assault group, however, lost its way in the maze of corridors. Gatecrashing the wrong party, they were ejected by the bouncers.92

Fourteen public meetings were held across Scotland before the termination of the war brought FNS activity to a close. Most of the addresses at these events were delivered by guest speakers from the London branch, like Douglas Jerrold and Arnold Lunn.93 Sir Nairne Stewart-Sandeman also helped out with meetings in Edinburgh and his native Perthshire.94 Not only were these bigger names, but the Glasgow executive were essentially organisers rather than public speakers. The best Scottish speakers were Lady Maxwell-Scott and the Glaswegian part-time journalist and school-teacher, Colm Brogan.95 General Maxwell-Scott appears to have been dropped from the roster of speakers after a rather unfortunate incident in Perth, when he referred to hecklers in the audience as "scum" and was forced to make a public apology.96

The only Scottish intellectual of note connected with the FNS was Professor Charles Sarolea. An early convert to the Nationalist cause, in August 1936 he derided the Republican militia as "a rabble of Communist schoolboys, hysterical women and jailbirds."97 In January 1937 he endeavoured to organise a public meeting in Edinburgh for Eleanora Tennant, wife of E.W.D. Tennant and author of the pro-Nationalist polemic, *Spanish Journey*.98 To Sarolea's disgust, he was unable to get any organisation to sponsor the event, and in the end was forced to hold the meeting in his own house.99 Intent as ever on maintaining his image as an independent commentator, Sarolea was careful not to associate himself too closely with the FNS. Although he joined the General Committee of the London FNS,100 he did not take an active part in the deliberations of the Scottish branch, nor did he assist in the organisation of any of their meetings. However, he was not averse to accepting their assistance with his personal campaign against the Republic. The publication of Sarolea's bestseller, *Daylight on Spain*,101 was made possible by financial guarantees from the Earl of Bute,102 obtained through the intercession of Lady Maxwell-Scott,103 and the book's subsequent commercial success was due in no small measure to its promotion and dissemination by the Scottish FNS.104 Only in February 1939 did Sarolea publicly acknowledge any association with the
Scottish FNS, when he graciously appeared at the Barcelona victory dinner as a guest of honour. 105

Scottish conditions necessitated a variation in emphasis in FNS propaganda. Propaganda in England had a strong appeal to middle and upper class interests. There was a great deal of reference to the plight of British capital and trading interests in Republican Spain and to General Franco's respect for private property. 106 This was watered down in Scotland. Arthur Montagu, the Secretary of the Scottish FNS, even went as far as to claim, "Our studied conviction is that in Nationalist Spain the workers are enthusiastically behind General Franco. He has ratified and extended every privilege gained by them since 1931." 107 This could lead to some bizarre statements. The Irish Weekly reported Alexander McGregor Senior as stating, that "If he did not believe that Franco was a democrat, he would not be supporting him." 108 This was a far cry from Charles Emmott's justification of Franco's lack of democracy.

Another variation in Scottish FNS propaganda was the inordinate amount of energy expended on vituperative attacks on the Duchess of Atholl. Indeed, Atholl was hunted with an enthusiasm which bordered on obsession. Lady Maxwell-Scott regarded her as a "public nuisance" 109 and publicly lampooned her in a series of letters to the Catholic Herald, entitled "To Jemima Puddleduck." 110 Charles Sarolea devoted the bulk of Daylight on Spain to the refutation of Atholl's own bestseller, Searchlight on Spain. 111 The Glasgow FNS executive wanted Sarolea's book to be titled "Searchlight on the Duchess," and at one point it was almost called "A Scottish Duchess lost in the Spanish Jungle." The final title was largely due to the saner council of Lord Phillimore. 112

Atholl was loathed, not just because she was one of the most active campaigners for the Republican cause in Scotland, but because she was, in pro-Nationalist eyes, the very antithesis of what a Republican supporter should be, and a traitor to her class. Her former enthusiasm for right-wing causes only served to underline the extent of her betrayal. Lady Maxwell-Scott expressed these feelings when she wrote, "I do not mind Attlee and Ellen Wilkinson going to Spain as it is their job to do so, but the Duchess is an entirely different matter." 113 For some Nationalist supporters Atholl's viewpoint was so incomprehensible there was only one answer.
Atholl’s husband was driven to publicly protest about allegations that the Duchess had been "accepting bribes from the so-called 'Red' side for making certain speeches, which, incidentally, she did not make." Such accusations, he declared, arrived regularly at Blair Castle, in "anonymous letters from Service Clubs."

Despite limited resources, the Scottish branch would appear to have been more industrious than its London counterpart. They certainly held more public meetings. "I wish the 'Friends of National Spain' were in the hands of a business man in London as they were in Glasgow," wrote Lady Maxwell-Scott, "for the support in London could easily be organised where there is real support to draw on." This criticism was aimed at what she saw as the aristocratic dilettantism of Lord Phillimore. This was not entirely fair, for there was a very real difference in the nature of the two societies. The London branch, with its more illustrious membership, was essentially a lobby group aimed at the upper echelons of society. It functioned on a personal contact basis outwith the public eye, in places like White's and the Carlton Club. There was a strong Catholic representation on the executive, but class rather than religion was its determining factor.

In Scotland the FNS executive was a union of Catholic middle-class activists in Glasgow and Catholic gentry outside. Luttman-Johnson would appear to have been the only non-Catholic office-holder. It was a populist organisation, geared to rousing the Catholic sector of the community, which alone was showing a favourable response. According to Lady Maxwell-Scott, "in Glasgow it has been a terrible struggle for, except for the Catholics there is no support." The nature of the Catholic community ensured that this support would also be essentially working-class. Arthur Montague, described its membership as "in the great majority members of the working class, and individuals who have fought for the privileges of that class," and directives were issued, urging members of Trade Unions and Co-operatives to actively campaign within such organisations to prevent the raising of funds for the Republic. The geographical pattern of FNS activity mirrors the strength of Catholicism in the West of Scotland. Nine of the public meetings were held in Glasgow and its environs and only five outside. Of the latter, three were in Perthshire, a tribute, effectively, to the enthusiasm of Dawson and Luttman-Johnson. Middle-class Edinburgh was not a particularly strong source of Nationalist support, and there was only one public meeting there under the auspices of the FNS. Beleaguered by the activities of Protestant Action, the
civic leaders of Edinburgh's small Catholic community may well have felt that they had enough to contend with without running the risk of incurring further animosity.

Throughout the Spanish Civil War the Conservative Party in Scotland maintained a careful distance from the Friends of National Spain. After his failure to secure a sponsor for the Eleanora Tennant meeting, Charles Sarolea bitterly asserted that in Scotland "the conservative organisations ... are all supporting the 'lawful' government of Valencia."\(^\text{121}\) This was manifestly untrue. Scottish Conservatives were not inherently more likely to back the Republicans than their English counterparts. Given that the British government throughout the war was supposedly committed to the neutrality of Non-Intervention, it was hardly surprising that no Conservative association was prepared to tie itself officially with Nationalist propaganda. However, even as individuals, non-Catholic Scottish Conservatives displayed a distinct reluctance to associate with the FNS. Although Sir Donald Cameron of Lochiel did initially accept vice-presidential status within the Scottish branch, he evidently thought better of it and quickly backed out.\(^\text{122}\) The only Scottish MP on the London executive was Sir Nairne Stewart-Sandeman, and he was ensconced in an English seat. Apart from Stewart-Sandeman, the only leading Scottish Conservative to appear on an FNS platform in Scotland was Sir Patrick Ford, and he too was unencumbered by personal considerations of electoral repercussions.\(^\text{123}\)

Scottish Conservatives were undoubtedly influenced by the desire to avoid offending Protestant sensibilities. Although Alexander Ratcliffe and the Scottish Protestant League had largely been eclipsed by 1936, in Edinburgh Cormack's Protestant Action captured 32% of the votes cast in the local elections of that year, pushing Labour into third place. It was not a result which Scottish Tories, especially MPs, could ignore. However much they might have agreed with Lord Salvesen's private assertion, that "no insurrection in history was so well justified as that of General Franco,"\(^\text{124}\) they had good cause to be chary of displaying overt support for the forces of Catholic reaction. That ran the risk of alienating their Protestant electors and encouraging defections to political Protestantism at municipal level. As creatures of their own native environment, with, in many cases, social ties with Ulster, they were themselves likely to be suspicious of, or antipathetic to, Catholic movements. Tory reluctance to associate with the Scottish FNS effectively intensified the Catholic orientation of that body, thus compounding the problem.
The fact that John Campbell had made use of early pro-Nationalist meetings to make pointed remarks about discrimination against Catholics in Ulster can hardly have helped.\textsuperscript{125}

Ratcliffe and Cormack were, from the outset, bitterly hostile to the Nationalists. Ratcliffe referred to "priest ridden Franco and his baby-killers,"\textsuperscript{126} while Cormack expressed his hope that "With the help of the Communists in Spain the clerical party should be overthrown."\textsuperscript{127} Not all ardent Protestants followed this lead. The Earl of Mansfield, former President of the Scottish Protestant League, sent a public message of support to an FNS meeting in Perth.\textsuperscript{128} That, however, appears to have been the extent of his involvement with the FNS. Indeed, despite his firm conviction that the Republican government was an "offshoot of Moscow,"\textsuperscript{129} Mansfield was noticeably reticent about Spain, and his parliamentary restraint on the subject contrasted sharply, both with his own customary outspokenness on foreign affairs and the vociferously pro-Franco line pursued by many of his English IPG colleagues.

There were Scottish Conservatives, who, while eschewing public association with the FNS, expressed strongly pro-Franco sentiments. After a short trip to Nationalist Spain in March 1938, during which he "seemed enchanted with all he saw ... and with the variety of comforting assurances which were given him by various people in Salamanca," the Earl of Glasgow spoke in glowing terms of Franco's social policies.\textsuperscript{130} Appreciation of Scottish Protestant sensibilities, however, may perhaps explain why Glasgow felt it necessary to avow that he was no "partisan" as far as the Spanish conflict was concerned. Such claims, however, were hardly compatible with his accompanying demand for immediate recognition of Franco's régime, and his assertion that Britain should not insist on the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain, "when they have not yet carried out the work they were sent there to do." As it was prompted by a desire "to counteract the Russian menace," German and Italian intervention in Spain, Glasgow maintained, "was justified and understandable."\textsuperscript{131}

At least one Scottish Conservative preferred to engage in covert practical assistance to the Nationalists. An MI5 report on the clandestine sale of British civil aircraft to the Nationalists, compiled in August 1936, names one of the ferry pilots as "Lord Douglas Hamilton." Although the title could loosely have been applied to
any one of the four Douglas-Hamilton brothers, it most probably refers to Malcolm Douglas-Hamilton. Assistance of this kind was invaluable to the Nationalists, for at the start of the war Franco was short of aircraft of any kind.132

For Scottish Conservatives who wished to express support for Franco without the stigma of association with the FNS, there was an alternative propaganda vehicle, the United Christian Front. The genesis of this organisation was a letter to The Times in July 1937 from Sir Henry Lunn, a leading Methodist who had devoted much of his life to the ecumenical movement.133 In it Lunn drew attention to a resolution carried at the recent Methodist conference in Bradford, which had affirmed "that the religious situation in Russia, Germany, Spain, and other countries calls for special intercession at the present time, when the universal church is confronted with a concerted and violent attack upon the faith." Lunn went on to declare that "the world wide campaign against Christians calls for united action by all Christian men." 134

By September 1937 Lunn had succeeded in forming what he later described as "a very representative committee of distinguished members of the Church of England, the Church of Scotland and the Free Churches." 135 The most important member of the new committee was its chairman, Capt. A.H.M. Ramsay, the House of Commons' most persistent if ineloquent opponent of the Republic. In the press release which heralded the inception of the United Christian Front, Ramsay declared that the purpose of the new body was "to co-operate with the Roman Catholic Church with a view to presenting a United Christian Front against the Red Menace to Christianity: to deal with certain fallacies which are diverting the natural sympathy of our countrymen from the victims of the present anti-Christian campaign in Spain." 136 The "fallacies" in question were allegations of persecution of Protestants in the Nationalist zone. As evidence to the contrary, Ramsay cited the personal assurance given to him by the Nationalist representative in London, the Duke of Alba.137

This was a far cry from Lunn's original appeal for all Christians to unite against totalitarian tyranny. There was no mention of Germany, or even Russia, in Ramsay's press release. Spain alone was the issue, and the approach to that problem was quite blatantly partisan. The switch to a purely Protestant orientation is also significant. The UCF was to act in an auxiliary role to efforts by Catholic
bodies. Given that the main thrust of UCF propaganda was still the need for Christian unity, albeit now limited to the support for Christian civilisation in Spain, the participation of Catholics on the UCF executive would perhaps have seemed more logical than their exclusion. By excluding Catholics, Ramsay and Lunn were endeavouring to direct pro-Nationalist propaganda at the Protestant community without incurring the charge of Catholic bias. Ramsay had not wilfully misinterpreted Lunn's original concept for his own purposes. Lunn was fully in approval of the UCF's change of direction. But then he was a member of the FNS London executive, and his son, Arnold, was one of the Scottish branch's guest speakers.

The UCF did not get off to a promising start. It was immediately denounced by eighteen leading clerics, including four bishops of the Church of England, for its "ill-founded" and partisan approach. To compound Ramsay's difficulties, a member of his executive committee, Angus Watson, promptly disassociated himself from the UCF, stating that he had lent his name to what he believed was a purely religious body for the furtherance of Christian unity, as per Sir Henry Lunn's original letter, and had "not the slightest sympathy" with the "political propaganda" in which it was engaging. Ramsay's riposte that he had preserved the non-political nature of the committee by refusing "very pressing invitations to join any Spanish committee of a political character" was hardly convincing.

Despite the bad publicity, the UCF survived, and in the spring of 1938 held its only major propaganda exercise. This was an interdenominational conference aboard a Mediterranean cruise, organised by Sir Henry Lunn's travel company, the Hellenic Travellers' Club. For this event the UCF's strictly Protestant image was waived. Speakers included three Catholics and one representative of the Greek Orthodox Church. If the purpose of the conference was the orchestration of a resounding condemnation of Republican Spain, then it was a complete failure. Only Dean Inge followed Lunn's lead in denouncing the Republic. The other speakers dwelt largely on the theme of Lunn's letter to The Times, namely the threat to Christianity from totalitarianism in general. The Church of Scotland's representatives were more concerned with the sufferings of the Lutheran Church in Germany, and one speaker even spoke strongly in favour of the Republic. As an attempt at promoting united Christian action it also singularly failed, as the division of opinion on contemporary politics in Christian circles emerged as
strongly as did the areas of agreement. What the conference did do, though, was to link the UCF name with a minor galaxy of Christian luminaries. After the adverse publicity of late 1937 it was possibly simply an endeavour to establish credibility and respectability as a religious organisation.144

The UCF was not a major organisation. It did not hold a series of public meetings like the Scottish FNS. It was essentially a lobby group targeted at influential people. Its main propaganda activity was the prodigious letter writing output of Captain Ramsay, although Ramsay does also mention organising parades of sandwich-board carriers "to expose Bolshevik guilt in Spain."145 Despite its somewhat erratic ideological course, the UCF was remarkably successful in attracting prominent individuals. Significantly, the majority of the lay members of the committee were Scottish Protestant Conservatives. Lord Ruthven,146 the Earl of Dalhousie,147 Cameron of Lochiel, and the Earl of Home were all members. So too were Capt. McEwen and another pro-Nationalist speaker from the Commons, Lt.-Col. Charles Kerr.148 Ramsay and Lunn's original scheme appears to have been successful. It enabled those who did not wish to be seen in the company of the FNS to associate their names with the expression of sympathy for Franco's cause, under the less compromising umbrella of Christian solidarity.

There was only one occasion on which the UCF's viewpoint was put to a democratic test. In October 1938 Sir Henry Lunn ran on a UCF ticket in the Glasgow University Rectorial election.149 The main stress of Lunn's campaign was Christian action against totalitarianism, but the pro-Nationalist strand was well to the fore. Copies of Lunn's anti-Republican speech to the UCF conference were issued by the Glasgow University Distributist Club, Lunn's principal promoter within the University.150 Douglas Jerrold and Lady Maxwell-Scott addressed meetings on his behalf, and Charles Sarolea sent a message of support.151

In the ballot Lunn was beaten by the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, but he managed to take second place. The pacifist writer, Lawrence Housman, came third.152 Munich had dominated the contest, especially after the Scottish Nationalists had nominated Eduard Benes, the former Czech President, only to have his candidature disclaimed by the Czech Legation.153 The result was acclaimed by the Presidents of the University's Liberal and Labour Clubs as a protest against

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Chamberlain's foreign policy. However, in the absence of an orthodox Chamberlainite candidate it is difficult to reach any meaningful conclusions as to student attitudes towards Munich, particularly as the University's Conservative Society had refused to endorse Lunn. Munich was praised both by Houseman and Lunn, so it is likely that the vote of the pro-Chamberlain faction would have been split between them. Moreover, with only 28% of students actually voting, The Scotsman's assessment of the result as indicative only of student "indifference," although prompted no doubt by the paper's pro-Chamberlain line, was perhaps not altogether inaccurate. 154

Given this somewhat confusing state of affairs, it would be wrong to assume that the votes cast for Lunn accurately reflected the strength of the pro-Franco lobby. What can be fairly said, though, is that contemporaries did not view the UCF as a "sinister" organisation supported only by the ultra-Right, as it was subsequently portrayed by left-wing writers, 155 but rather saw it as being well within the "respectable" range of Conservative views.

On April 1st 1939 Franco announced the official end of the Spanish Civil War. John Campbell exultantly cabled the conqueror, "Vivat Hispania Domino gloria." 156 However, there would be no scenes of wild jubilation in the street of Glasgow. On March 15th Hitler had swallowed the rump of Czechoslavakia, and the FNS cancelled the public meetings planned for March and April, as they wanted there to be as little opportunity as possible for the press to link the Nationalist victory with Hitler's activities. 157

With the termination of the war the FNS voted to reform itself under the name "Friends of Spain," with the object of pressing for closer relations with the New Spain. 158 For most of its adherents, however, the successful conclusion of the war removed the organisation's raison d'être, and the new body disappeared into political obscurity. The UCF appears to have already dissolved, a victim, effectively, of the shift in public attention from Spain to Central Europe during the Munich crisis. Captain Ramsay was now fully occupied unearthing the Jewish-Bolshevik-Masonic plot to push Britain and Germany into war.

As a result of the living presence of the religious divide in Scotland, support for the Nationalists was to be found in two essentially segregated camps. Amongst
Scottish Conservatives there was a certain reticence of expression, and a distinct unwillingness to be overly associated with Franco’s Catholic supporters in Scotland. Within Catholic ranks a movement of considerable vigour and outspokenness developed under the guiding hand of members of Glasgow’s emergent Catholic middle-class. Scotland’s Catholic community was certainly by no means solidly behind Franco. Patrick Dollan, who succeeded Sir John Stewart in 1938, becoming in the process the first "Catholic" Lord Provost of Glasgow, argued that no dichotomy existed between allegiance to the Catholic faith and support for the Republic, and under his leadership the Glasgow Labour Party campaigned strenuously on the Republic’s behalf to the bitter end. Many Scottish Catholics shared this view, and Catholics numbered among the five hundred Scots who fought for the Republic in the International Brigades. At the close of the war the Scottish FNS had only 342 fully paid up members. However, the extent of pro-Franco sentiment within Scotland’s Catholic community was by no means limited to the membership of the FNS. The fact that Alexander McGregor, standing essentially as a pro-Nationalist candidate, could receive 1,000 votes in one Glasgow ward alone, suggests that support for Franco in Catholic ranks was indeed substantial.

Griffiths points out that in Britain as a whole there was no necessary correlation between support for Franco and pro-German attitudes. This is perhaps even more evident in Scotland. While the Nationalist cause did attract leading pro-Germans, like Charles Sarolea, Capt. Luttman-Johnson, and the Earl of Glasgow, it also numbered amongst its adherents anti-Nazis, like Capt. McEwen and Lady Maxwell-Scott. Amongst the more prominent pro-Nationalists, past participation in the anti-sanctions campaign was fairly common, but by no means universal. Above all, though, for the ordinary Catholics who provided the backbone of Nationalist support in Scotland, Spain was an entirely separate issue, above and beyond the conduct of British foreign policy. Alexander McGregor Sen. reflected the views of many of his co-religionists when he declared, "Franco has nothing in common with Hitler or Mussolini."
Chapter 8

Footnotes


3. British firms held the largest share of foreign investment in Spain, Beevor estimating it at 20% and Edwards as high as 40%. Beevor, op. cit., p. 115; Edwards, op. cit., p. 65.


14. In 1939 the Treasurer of the Scottish branch of the Friends of National Spain claimed to have established a close working relationship with the chief leader writer of the *Glasgow Herald*, J.M. Reid. Alexander McGregor to Charles Sarolea, 27th February 1939, SAR 86.


20. Public address in Glasgow by T.A. Maguire, reported by the *Glasgow Observer*, 26th September 1936, Campbell Papers (JCP), GESPC (Glasgow Elections and Spain Press Cuttings).


32. *Daily Mail*, 7th August 1936, JCP/GESPC.


34. John Campbell, b. 1903. Secretary of the Glasgow Catholic Union since 1925.

35. John Campbell to the Most Rev. Daniel Mageean, 6th April 1937, JCP/CU IV (Catholic Union IV).

36. *Evening Times*, 21st December 1936, JCP/GESPC.

37. Although it remained firmly anti-Franco, as a result largely of the suppression

38. Patrick William Donner, b. 1904. Conservative MP for Basingstoke since 1935. MP for West Islington, 1931-35, and Secretary of the India Defence League, 1933-35. Like Charles Emmott, one of the young imperialists associated with Leo Amery.


43. These may in part have stemmed from an incident during the First World War, when, as a sniper in no-man's land, he was shot in the chest. The bullet was deflected by a copy of the Bible which he carried in his breast pocket, and although severely wounded, Ramsay was convinced that the Good Book had saved his life. Interview with Rev. John Ramsay.

44. *The Times*, 21st June 1938.


46. Daughter of the 14th Viscount Gormanston and widow of Lord Ninian Crichton-Stuart, the late brother of the Marquess of Bute and Lord Colum Crichton-Stuart. A.H.M. Ramsay himself was a staunch Presbyterian and far from attracted to Catholicism. At one stage he was interested in Ratcliffe's movement. He was also given to inviting the parish minister to lunch when his wife was entertaining her local priest. Ramsay's attitude to Catholicism softened, however, after his realisation of the extent of Catholic opposition to Freemasonry. In 1933 Capt. Ramsay was a member of the Executive Committee of the CPM, while Mrs. Ramsay was on the General Council. By February 1939 Capt. Ramsay appears to have severed his official connection with the organisation, which since its transmutation into the Faith Defence League had changed its title again, this time to the Christian Defence Movement. His wife, however, had joined the Executive Committee. Interview with Rev. John Ramsay; The Christian Protest Movement, Review of Work 1929-33, ATH 263; Sydney M. Dawkins, Secretary of the CDM, to John Campbell, 23rd February 1939, JCP/SGH (Spain Glasgow Herald).


48. Ibid., p. 93.


52. Ibid., p. 384.
53. James M. Tonner, Secretary of the CTS, to John Campbell, 13th March 1937, JCP/CU IV.

54. James Tonner to Campbell, undated, JCP/CU IV.


56. *Irish Weekly*, 1st May 1937, JCP/GESPC; J. Cairns, St. Anne's Catholic Union, to John Campbell, 4th June 1937, JCP/CU IV.

57. "Divini Redemptoris," 19th March, and "Firmissiman Constantium," 28th March. Although the latter was aimed specifically at Mexico, the parallel with Spain was plainly evident. See Norman B. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime*, London, 1975, p. 11.

58. Campbell to Mgr. Henry Forbes, (June 1937?), Mailing List for Spain, Nos. 7 and 8, JCP/CU IV; Mailing List for Spain, No. 42, JCP/CUS (Catholic Union Spain). Campbell's personal activity on behalf of the Nationalist cause was prodigious. By February 1939 he claimed to have placed 300 articles with newspapers, sent 1,500 letters, and distributed 200,000 books and pamphlets. Campbell to the Marqués Merry del Val, 25th February 1939, JCP/S (Spain).

59. Rupert George Dawson, b. 1887. A retired professional soldier. Between 1920 and 1924 he had commanded the Scottish Horse, the unit originally raised by the Duchess of Atholl's husband. Dawson had been put in touch with John Campbell by Archbishop McDonald, who was anxious to see Atholl's "pestilential propaganda" answered. McDonald to Campbell, 28th May 1937, JCP/CU IV.


61. See for instance, letters from Dawson, Luttman-Johnson, and Campbell, respectively, in the *Strathearn Herald*, 18th September 1937, and *Perthshire Advertiser*, 29th September and 20th November 1937, JCP/GESPC.

62. Dawson to Campbell, 29th September 1937, JCP/CU IV.


68. Godfrey Walter Phillimore, b. 1879. One of the founding fathers of the IPG, Phillimore had previously played a prominent part in the anti-sanctions campaign.

69. The Conservative MPs were Alan Lennox-Boyd, Sir Henry Page Croft, Victor Cazalet, and Sir Nairne Stewart-Sandeman. Other notables connected with the London branch of the FNS were the Duke of Wellington, Lord FitzAlan of Derwent, Lord Newton, Lord Rankeillour, Maj. Gen. J.F.C. Fuller and Francis Yeats-Brown. Circular issued on the formation of the FNS, JCP/CU IV; Minutes of the General Committee of the FNS meeting, 26th July 1938, JCP/FNS.

70. Alexander McGregor to Charles Sarolea, 27th November 1937, SAR 86.

71. The other Vice-Presidents were Lt.-Col. C.J.E. Cranstoun, John Friel, and W.P. Lavin. They were later joined by Col. J.G. Romanes.

72. Walter Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 23rd June 1939, SAR 64.

73. He did on several occasions send advice and "information" to the Foreign Office. See Maxwell-Scott to Lord Halifax, 9th March 1938, Maxwell-Scott to Sir George Mounsey (Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office), 9th May 1938, FO 371/22609/W6004/9/41; Maxwell-Scott to Halifax, 19th January 1939, FO 371/24139/W1694/72/41; Maxwell-Scott to Halifax, 7th February 1939, FO 371/24152/W2553/1443/41. It is unlikely that his unsolicited mail had the slightest effect. Mounsey declared himself to be "always a bit sceptical of travellers' tales" in his minute on the General's March 1938 missive, which was promptly misfiled and lost for two months.

74. In January 1937 Lady Maxwell-Scott had responded immediately to Capt. McEwen's change of stance on Spain, supplying him with propaganda material from her French sources. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 19th January 1937, SAR 64.


76. Arnold Lunn, b. 1888. Author of numerous books on travel and religion. A convert to Catholicism.

77. *Evening News*, 24th March 1938, JCP/CUPC.

78. Report on the Glasgow Town Council meeting on 31st March 1938, source unknown, Article by "Knight Watchman," *Forward*, 9th April 1938, JCP/CU IV; *Daily Record*, 1st April 1938, JCP/CUPC.

79. Edward Rosslyn Mitchell, b. 1879. A Glasgow solicitor, Mitchell had first joined Glasgow Town Council in 1909 as a Liberal councillor, transferring his allegiance to the ILP in 1918. In the 1924 general election he achieved something of a political sensation by unseating Herbert Asquith in Paisley. Resigning his seat in 1929 for personal reasons, he returned to Glasgow's municipal politics in 1932. A lifelong temperance campaigner.

80. *Daily Record*, 21st April 1938, JCP/CUPC.
81. *Scotsman*, 8th June 1938. Sir John Stewart was also pro-Republican. In late 1938 or early 1939 he was listed as a member of the Glasgow and District branch of the pro-Republican National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief. Appeal for funds and advert for the Spanish Fiesta Day, issued by Glasgow and District NJCSR, undated, JCP/SGH.


83. *Irish Weekly and Ulster Examiner*, 9th April 1938, JCP/CUPC.

84. *Irish Weekly*, 3rd April 1937, JCP/GESPC.

85. Minutes of the FNS (Scottish Branch) meeting on 3rd November 1938, JCP/FNS (Friends of National Spain).

86. Results of the election in Glasgow Exchange:
   - Hugh Fraser (Progressive) 1725
   - William Hannan (Socialist) 1379
   - Alexander McGregor (Ind. Soc.) 1036
   - Joseph Wallace (Ind. Prog.) 619

87. *Evening Times*, 3rd June 1938, JCP/CUPC; *Scotsman*, 4th June 1938.


89. Review of FNS (Scottish Branch) activities, April? 1939, JCP/FNS.

90. Ibid.


93. Review of FNS (Scottish Branch) activities, April? 1939, JCP/FNS.

94. Report on meeting of FNS in Perth City Hall on 12th May 1938, by James Barrie of the Courier, ATH 22/20; *Scotsman*, 18th June 1938.

95. Colm Brogan, b. 1902. Taught at St. Mungo's Academy and St. Gerard's Secondary School in the 1930s. Described by Tom Gallagher as the 'only ... well-known public figure who placed himself unashamedly on the right of politics' to be thrown up by Glasgow's Catholic community. Gallagher, *Uneasy Peace*, p. 21.


99. Charles Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 18th January 1937, SAR 64.
100. Charles Sarolea to Lord Phillimore, 31st July 1938, SAR 86.


102. John Crichton-Stuart, b. 1881. Owner of substantial estates (117,000 acres in 1936) and former Lord Lieutenant for Buteshire, Bute was described by Charles Sarolea as "le plus influent magnat catholique" in Britain, with the possible exception of the Duke of Norfolk. Charles Sarolea to the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, 29th August 1938, SAR 233.

103. Bute agreed to underwrite any possible losses incurred through the publication of *Daylight on Spain*. However, due to the success of the book he was not called upon to fulfil his guarantee. Apart from ideological considerations, Bute had good material cause to favour a Nationalist victory, as he had amassed a collection of paintings in Spain, the export of which was forbidden by the Republican government. At the outbreak of the war the paintings were in store in the British consulate at Algeciras. Charles Sarolea to the Marqués del Moral, 15th March 1939, SAR 86; Edwards, op. cit., p. 9.

104. Marqués del Moral to Charles Sarolea, 9th January 1939, SAR 86.

105. Alexander McGregor to Charles Sarolea, 1st and 3rd February 1939, SAR 86.

106. See, for instance, circular issued on the formation of the FNS, JCP/CU IV.

107. Arthur Montague to FNS (Scottish Branch) members, 24th March 1938, JCP/FNS.

108. *Irish Weekly*, 9th April 1938, JPC/CUPC.

109. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 7th December 1937, SAR 64.

110. H.C. O’Neill to Charles Sarolea, 29th July 1938, SAR 86. Jemima Puddleduck was one of Beatrix Potter’s characters.


112. Alexander McGregor to Charles Sarolea, 10th September 1938, D. McNaughton to Sarolea, 15th September 1938, Phillimore to Sarolea, 7th November 1938, SAR 86; Minutes of FNS (Scottish Branch) meeting on 3rd November 1938, JCP/FNS.

113. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 7th December 1937, SAR 64. Ellen Wilkinson was the Labour MP for Durham.


115. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 21st October 1938, SAR 64.

116. Luttman-Johnson was a member of the Church of England. *Scotsman*, 16th June 1938. The religious affiliations of Lavin and Friel are unknown. The
others were all Catholic.

117. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 21st October 1937, SAR 64.

118. Arthur Montague to FNS (Scottish Branch) members, 24th March 1938, JCP/FNS.

119. Arthur Montague and Alexander McGregor to FNS (Scottish Branch) members, 1st June 1938, JCP/FNS.

120. Nevertheless, around 600 people were present at the meeting in the Usher Hall. A rival Republican demonstration, staged simultaneously on the Mound, was only slightly better attended, drawing an estimated 700-800. Scotsman, 18th June 1937. The organiser of the FNS meeting may have been the Secretary of the St. Andrews and Edinburgh CTS, John Barrie, who was amongst the platform party.

121. Charles Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 20th January 1937, SAR 64.

122. Headed notepaper issued in May bears Lochiel's name scored out in pencil. Arthur Montague to FNS (Scottish Branch) members, 7th May 1938, JCP/FNS.

123. Ford was at the FNS meeting in Edinburgh. Scotsman, 18th June 1938.

124. Lord Salvesen to Charles Sarolea, 9th January 1939, SAR 233. Edward Theodore Salvesen, b. 1857. Son of Christian Salvesen, the shipowner. A law lord, Salvesen had been a judge in the Court of Session from 1905 to 1922. Salvesen may have been influenced by Lady Maxwell-Scott. (See Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 6th January 1938, SAR 64.) He was certainly not motivated by any particular fondness for Catholicism. Salvesen had been one of the eleven lay signatories to the Church of Scotland's infamous 1923 report, "Irish Immigration and the Education (Scotland) Act, 1918."

125. Campbell to Mgr. William Daly, 6th April 1937, JCP/CU IV.

126. The Vanguard, March 1939.

127. Speech reported by "Edinburgh North," Glasgow Observer, 22nd August 1936, JCP/GESPC.

128. Glasgow Observer, 21st May 1938, JCP/CU IV.


130. G.M. Thompson to W.H. Montagu-Pollock, 5th March 1938, FO 371/22684/W3024/2464/41. At the beginning of the Spanish Civil War Sir Henry Chilton, the officially accredited ambassador to Spain, had retreated to Hendaye on French soil. Thompson was a member of Chilton's staff there, Montagu-Pollock, a Secretary with the Southern Section at the Foreign Office. Ironically, Glasgow was initially denied access by the Nationalists, who suspected the White Russian with whom he had been staying at St. Jean de Luz, prior to crossing the border, to be a Soviet spy. Through Thompson Glasgow appealed to the Foreign Office for assistance in clearing up the difficulty. Glasgow perhaps anticipated preferential treatment, for Montagu-
Pollock was his nephew. The latter, however, was unswayed by such considerations, and saw no reason "why we are called upon to obtain facilities for Lord Glasgow, whose visit is purely his own affair." Nor, clearly, did he share his uncle's "extreme right-wing and pro-Fascist views." Nevertheless, he did help secure his passage. G.M. Thompson to Lord Halifax, 25th February 1938, FO 371/22684/W2715/2464/41; Telegramme from Thompson, minuted by Montagu-Pollock, 23rd February 1938, FO 371/22684/W2464/41.


132. Copy of Report, dated 2nd August 1936, sent by Col. Sir Vernon Kell (Director-General of MI5) to C.J. Norton (Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office), FO 371/20527/W7911/62/41. The Managing Director of Airwork Ltd, the company involved in the sales, was F.A. Muntz, Lord Londonderry's son-in-law.


134. The Times, 23rd July 1937.


136. A.H.M. Ramsay to John Campbell, undated, JCP/CU IV.

137. See also The Times, 28th July and 4th December 1937.

138. The Times, 29th November 1937.


140. The Times, 20th November 1937.

141. The Times, 26th November 1937.


144. See Lunns United Christian Front for a description of the conference, including full texts of the speeches delivered.


146. Walter Patrick Hore-Ruthven, b. 1870. A former professional soldier. Retired with the rank of Major-General.


149. The election had been brought about by the death of the previous incumbent, Canon "Dick" Sheppard.

150. John Bayne, Secretary of Glasgow University Distributist Club, to Charles Sarolea, 5th October 1938, SAR 230. Hilaire Belloc was outspokenly pro-Franco. See Beevor, op. cit., p. 177.

151. Lady Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 21st October 1938, SAR 64; John Bayne to Sarolea, 15th October 1938, SAR 234.

152. Results of the Glasgow Rectorial Election, 22nd October 1938:
   Sir Archibald Sinclair 579
   Sir Henry Lunn 314
   Lawrence Housman 303


154. Scotsman, 22nd and 24th October 1938. Sinclair would also have benefited from the traditional strength of the University's Scottish Nationalist Association. Deprived of their chosen candidate, they had thrown their weight behind Sinclair's campaign.

155. Daily Worker, 28th May 1945. Quoted by Young, op. cit., p. 70.

156. Telegramme from John Campbell to General Franco, March 1939, JCP/S.

157. Review of FNS (Scottish Branch), April? 1939, Minutes of the Friends of Spain (Scottish Branch) meeting, 11th April 1939, JCP/FNS.

158. Minutes of the General Committee of the FNS meeting, 14th March 1939, JCP/FNS.

159. Daily Express, 10th January 1938, JCP/CUPC. Dollan himself was not a practising Catholic at this stage. In 1911 he had embraced secularism, and only returned to his former faith during the Second World War.

160. Wood, op. cit., p. 16.

161. Review of FNS (Scottish Branch), April? 1939, JCP/FNS.

162. There were also no doubt many Catholics, who, while antipathetic to the Republic, stopped short of outright support for Franco, for fear of endangering the alliance of interests with the Labour Party.


164. Irish Weekly, 9th April 1938, JCP/CUPC.

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In contrast with 1936, the course of Anglo-German relations in 1937 was not to be punctuated by a serious crisis. On January 30th Hitler announced an end to the "time of so-called surprises," and for the remainder of the year he was as good as his word. The absence of any major diplomatic confrontations has led some observers to portray the year as one of quiescence and relative introversion. Gannon, for instance, draws parallels with 1935, describing both years as ones "in which Britain's wearied gaze was drawn homeward from the depressing sights of international difficulties and dilemmas to the prideful calm and dignity of royal occasions — the Jubilee and the Coronation." However, Germany, while not always in the headline news, was far from forgotten. One of the major controversies of the year was the possible restoration of Germany's former colonies. Although the subject of colonial restitution at no point provoked a diplomatic confrontation, as a topic of domestic debate it smouldered on with occasional eruptions throughout the year. A complex and somewhat self-contained debate, it came closer to forming an adjunct to, rather than an intrinsic part of, discussion of Anglo-German relations. For this reason the subject will be discussed at length in the next chapter. Foreign affairs in general remained at the forefront of public debate throughout 1937, with events in Spain holding the centre stage. In July the Japanese assault on China added to an already gloomy international outlook and heightened existing fears for the future security of British interests in the Far East. Any future war, it was now becoming increasingly clear, could well be on a global scale.

In political circles in Britain discussion of the future direction of relations with the two fascist powers figured prominently throughout the year. With prognostications for the future of world peace remaining pessimistic, many people shared Bruce Lockhart's contention that Britain could not "afford to be anti-Italian and anti-German at the same time." Some, including Leo Amery and Bruce Lockhart himself, as well as many of the senior permanent officials in the Foreign Office, continued to favour a rapprochement with Italy. However, as 1937 progressed, indignation at Italy's sabre-rattling in the Mediterranean, and in particular her barely disguised use of submarine warfare against shipping supplying
the Spanish Republic, rendered advocacy of such a course increasingly difficult.

To a larger body of opinion some sort of accommodation with Germany was a far more attractive proposition. Although her intervention in Spain cast doubts on the sincerity of her oft-repeated claims to be motivated by pacific intent, Germany was regarded as the junior partner in that venture, and, while undoubtedly the more formidable of the two fascist powers, was widely held to be the less belligerent. Moreover, in contrast with Italy's displays of contempt for British opinion, Germany's leadership in early 1937 continued to appear as warmly disposed towards Britain as before, even if the somewhat ingratiating tone of previous years had largely disappeared.

Commenting on the political climate in May 1937, Bruce Lockhart's confidant in the Foreign Office, Rex Leeper, observed a "new wave of pro-Germanism, idea being pal up with Germany and put Italy in her place." Within the Conservative Party enthusiasm for such a course was further strengthened by the escalation of the war in Spain, as growing concern over Soviet intentions there prompted an increasing number of moderate Conservatives to view Germany as an essential bulwark against the westward spread of communism — a concept which many on the right of the party had embraced at the very onset of the war.

This shift of opinion in Conservative ranks formed an important backdrop to the redirection of British foreign policy which Neville Chamberlain set in motion after his accession to the premiership at the end of May. Chamberlain himself had long been critical of the policy of "drift," or, as Vansittart termed it, "cunctation," which he believed had developed through Baldwin's unwillingness to involve himself in foreign affairs. He was determined both to exercise greater personal control over the formulation of foreign policy and to inject greater urgency into efforts to improve relations with Italy and Germany. An accord with Germany was Chamberlain's own preferred option, not least because its achievement would leave Italy little choice but to moderate her behaviour. On June 1st, just four days after Chamberlain's assumption of power, in an address to the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft in Berlin, Britain's new ambassador to Germany, Nevile Henderson, went well beyond the diplomatic platitudes of his predecessor, Sir Eric Phipps, when he praised not just Germany, but "the great social experiment" which the Nazi régime had undertaken. In the absence of any subsequent endeavour on
Chamberlain's part to distance himself from the overzealousness of his ambassador, Henderson's "calculated indiscretion" effectively served notice to the Germans of the new Prime Minister's willingness to do business, provided the terms were right. Although the incident was not to be followed by any diplomatic initiative until Halifax's unproductive mission in November, the intent had been registered. "Cunctation" was clearly at an end. This shift in British policy some historians have defined as the transition between "passive appeasement" and "active appeasement." Where in the past "appeasement" had taken the form of "merely meeting the complaints of Britain's neighbors with a willingness to compromise," it now "became a policy of assuring European peace through isolating the most significant desires and needs of her dissatisfied neighbours and granting them in the interest of maintaining the peace."  

The tenor of Henderson's speech caused considerable surprise and provoked savage criticism from some sections of the British press. He was not, however, without his supporters. In the Commons Henderson was warmly defended by Conservative right-wingers such as Duncan Sandys and Sir Alfred Knox. More importantly his action was greeted with satisfaction by a broader section of the Conservative Party, who, while failing to endorse Henderson's enthusiasm for his subject, shared Chamberlain's belief in the need for a positive indication of Britain's willingness to negotiate. In the view of the Conservative grandee, Lord Derby, the speech "was just the one that we wanted." 

With both government policy and opinion within the Conservative Party apparently endorsing their aims, the Anglo-German Fellowship reached the peak of its popularity and "respectability" in the summer of 1937. By September the number of its members had reached six hundred, nearly double that of July 1936. Of these sixty were MPs. The new recruits included two prominent Scots: Lord Sempill, one of the most famous aviators of the interwar period, and Lord Hutchison of Montrose. Long renowned for his pro-German sympathies, Hutchison had been appointed Paymaster General in 1935. The fact that he did not regard membership of the AGF as incompatible with his status as a government minister is one measure of the "respectability" the AGF had achieved by 1937. 

Throughout 1937 discussion of foreign affairs in the Scottish press closely paralleled responses in the London papers, with the Spanish Civil War and the
question of Germany's former colonies providing the most popular themes. The sense of impending crisis which had lent a measure of desperate urgency to the debate in 1936 had undeniably receded, and at no time did international developments provoke a popular reaction comparable to the avalanche of correspondence generated by the Rhineland crisis. Nonetheless, despite this slackening in tempo, debate on foreign affairs remained both vigorous and constant.

The underlying importance attached to foreign affairs emerges clearly in the by-elections at Glasgow Hillhead in June and Glasgow Springburn in September. During both campaigns the Conservative candidates and their supporting speakers portrayed the elections as referenda on the government's conduct of foreign policy. Rearmament and Non-intervention were cited as the main pillars of a strategy, which, they claimed, offered the best hopes of maintaining the peace. At Springburn they had the added bonus of being able to castigate the Labour Party as warmongers, courtesy of the National Council of Labour's decision on July 27th to abandon its previous policy of qualified support for Non-Intervention. If the electors "desired peace" and the "localising of the war in Spain," argued James Henderson Stewart, the Liberal National MP for East Fife, they should unhesitatingly cast their votes for the government candidate.

At Hillhead Labour chose to do battle head-on, claiming the mantle of the peace party for themselves. As at Dunbarton in March 1936, they emotively charged the government with encouraging "profiteering in death" by the arms manufacturers, and, by promoting an arms race and abandoning collective security, pursuing a course which would lead inexorably to war. The choice before the electors, argued Gilbert McAllister, the Labour candidate, lay between "the war-like policies of the present government and the policy of peace under the League of Nations advocated by the Socialist Party." The Parliamentary Labour Party's decision in July not to contest the Defence Estimates precluded the reiteration of this stance at Springburn. That decision, achieved by a narrow majority and in the teeth of front-bench opposition, destroyed any possibility of presenting a coherent and persuasive position on defence. Labour's supporting speakers at Springburn gamely endeavoured to counter by stressing the party's tougher line on Spain, and spoke of the need to resist fascism and the government's failure "to deal with the gangster tactics rampant in international affairs." This line, however, was largely contradicted by their own candidate, Agnes Hardie, Keir Hardie's sister-in-law. A

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life-long pacifist, she resolutely avoided any reference to international affairs or defence policy in her own speeches. To compound Labour's difficulties, the ILP condemned Labour's re-appraisal of its attitude to re-armament as a betrayal of socialist principles and urged working-class voters to abstain.19

Paradoxically, the coherence of Labour's campaigning at Hillhead was rewarded with failure, while at Springburn Agnes Hardie triumphed, despite the disarray in Labour ranks. Neither result, however, was particularly surprising. Hillhead was a Conservative stronghold, the former fiefdom of Sir Robert Home. Springburn, on the other hand, was one of Labour's safest seats. The previous incumbent, Agnes Hardie's late husband George, had been successfully returned in every election since 1922, with the sole exception of the Tory landslide of 1931, and even then the voting had been very close.

Although neither by-election produced an upset, the voting patterns, when compared with those at Dunbarton, provide clear evidence of a turn-around in the major parties' electoral appeal since March 1936.20 The Dunbarton election had witnessed a strong swing to Labour. On a reduced turnout the Conservative vote dropped to 77% of the figure achieved in the 1935 general election, while Labour held on to 98%. At Hillhead the comparable statistics were 68% and 72%, indicating a much reduced swing to Labour. At Springburn the continued decline in Labour's fortunes produced a marginal swing to the Conservatives, with Labour polling 73% of its 1935 total and the Tories 74%.

At all three elections foreign policy had been the predominant issue. Both parties, with the qualified exception of Labour at Springburn, had appealed to the electorate to vote for the party whose policies offered the best hopes of maintaining the peace, namely themselves, and the voters' perception of which party was indeed most likely to keep Britain out of war was a major electoral determinant. At Dunbarton the Conservatives had been penalised for their greater belligerence, relative to Labour, over the Rhineland crisis. The Hillhead result indicates that by June 1937, through the government's successful evasion of direct involvement in the Spanish conflict, the Conservatives had made up much of the ground they had lost. Labour's poor showing at Springburn can largely be ascribed to the party's loss of credibility on defence policy, but the more confrontational stance on Spain was clearly no vote-catcher either. Chamberlain's more positive approach to securing agreement with Germany, by contrast, had not done his party any harm,
and if anything had improved its electoral appeal. This trend was generally in line with prevailing currents of political opinion in the rest of Britain. Although English by-election results suggest something of a rallying of Labour support in the autumn of 1937, taken as a whole, the performance of National Government candidates throughout the year showed a distinct improvement on 1936.21

However, while foreign policy continued to be perceived as the most important electoral issue, it has to be admitted that popular reaction to the by-election campaigns was decidedly cool, reflecting the absence of a sense of immediate crisis. Both elections were lack-lustre affairs, marked by low turnouts, at Springburn down to 51%. Of Hillhead The Scotsman lamented that it had been "difficult to stir up interest in the contest."22 The only excitement in that campaign had in fact been provided by the participation of the SNP. In the final run up to polling day skilful campaigning by the SNP candidate, John MacCormick, and the energetic lobbying of his supporters, very nearly succeeded in making the pros and cons of Scottish self-government the central electoral theme. In the event, however, the SNP's high profile in the campaign was not translated into ballot-box results.

Another electoral contest in Scotland in 1937 provides further evidence of the strength of popular yearning for peace, at least in one small section of the community. In the Glasgow University rectorial election in October the successful candidate, the Rev. "Dick" Sheppard,23 campaigned on the basis of absolute pacifism in the conduct of foreign policy. Sheppard's opponents included Winston Churchill, who finished "a bad third."24 Churchill was marginally more successful than Professor J.B.S. Haldane,25 whose Popular Front ticket represented an alternative "get tough" approach to foreign policy.26

The result was immediately rubbished by The Scotsman as an example of "what a keen and united minority can accomplish when the majority are apathetic and divided."27 Only a third of Glasgow's students, it pointed out, had actually voted. Much of The Scotsman's enthusiasm to minimise the importance of the result clearly stemmed from the degree of attention previously paid to the Oxford University Union's famous resolution not to fight "for King and Country" in 1933. Parallels between that debate and the Glasgow vote, as The Scotsman readily admitted, were inescapable. Historians who have sought to demythologise the Oxford Union debate have shared The Scotsman's views on the unrepresentative
nature of such proceedings, and have further argued that in any case student politics provide a most unreliable guide to politics in the community at large. Such arguments are indeed persuasive. However, the same people have also claimed that the Oxford Union resolution was possible only in the heady days of the Disarmament Conferences and would have been inconceivable in the later 1930s. The Glasgow rectorial election suggests that that assertion is questionable. At the very least the result demonstrates that pacifism was still alive and well in one of Scotland's universities in 1937.

Those exponents of an anti-war stance peculiar to Scotland, namely the SNP fundamentalists, also enjoyed success in 1937. In May the annual party conference carried a motion censuring the government's foreign policy and its concomitant, rearmament. Proposing the motion, Ewen Traill, the Glasgow University Student Nationalist Association delegate, condemned the government for its betrayal of the League of Nations and its amassing of armaments. It was a policy, he argued, "which could only lead to war." The SNP, he urged, should give a lead to the Scottish people "by refusing to take part in any selfish Imperialistic war." A second motion, registering absolute opposition "to the manpower of Scotland being used to defend an Empire in the government of which she has no voice," was then carried, pledging all members of the SNP of military age to resist any future imposition of conscription "until the programme of the Scottish National Party has been fulfilled."  

Opposition to conscription in the SNP sprang in part from genuinely pacifist sources. A sizeable section of the original membership of the National Party of Scotland had subscribed to a pacifism born of socialist convictions. Although many who held such views had been driven from the party prior to the amalgamation with the Scottish Party in 1933, a considerable element had survived. The driving force behind the anti-conscription resolution, however, was not socialist-pacifist but fundamentalist, as the conditional nature of the resolution reveals. The principal purpose of the 1933 purge had been to silence fundamentalist opposition to the merger with the Home-Rulers of the Scottish Party, and the Left had merely been incidental victims. The anti-conscription resolution, however, bears witness to the resurgence of fundamentalism within the party's own ranks by 1937. In itself the conference resolution is somewhat misleading, for the fundamentalists did not constitute a majority of the party membership. Nor for that matter did it indicate that
the party had reached a firm position on conscription. With hindsight it would prove to be the first round of a continuous internal debate on the subject which would only be resolved by the reduction of the party to a fundamentalist rump in 1942.

The anti-conscription resolution made no reference to Britain's possible opponents in any future war. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of May 1937 the SNP delegates would have been well aware that the likeliest candidates were the two fascist powers. However, the adoption of the resolution in no sense presupposed any sympathy for the fascist régimes. Conference went on to affirm its "unswerving opposition to all forms of undemocratic government." Although the wording of this motion was amended to make it clear that conference was "as much opposed to dictatorship of the left as they were to dictatorship of the right," its principal purpose was to register SNP hostility to fascist dictatorship. In submitting the resolution, the proposer, Dr. John MacDonald, denounced fascism as "a return to the methods of the middle ages." There was no similarity whatever, he argued, between the aims and aspirations of Scottish nationalism and these ostensibly nationalist régimes. Theirs was not true nationalism, he asserted, "but Imperialism in its worse sense."31

Despite some regrets that the opportunity for agreement which Hitler's Peace Plan had appeared to offer had not been realised, the outlook for those who actively sought to promote the cause of Anglo-German friendship remained promising in the first half of 1937. The passage of time in itself had its advantages. By 1937 the pundits who had predicted the early demise of the Nazi régime had been thoroughly discredited. Nazism could no longer be ignored as a passing phase. The task of selling Nazi Germany to the British public also continued to be assisted by the German propaganda machine. Developing the themes established in 1936, it essentially reiterated its portrayal of Nazism as a movement evolving towards greater moderation, its youthful dynamism tempered by the responsibilities of office.

While the main hindrance to German propaganda efforts to attain respectability in the eyes of the outside world had in previous years been anti-semitism, in 1937 foreign criticism of German internal policies centred firmly on the régime's efforts to exercise rigorous state control over the Lutheran Church. Coercion of Germany's Protestant Churches had in fact commenced in 1934. However, the extent of the
repression only really became apparent to foreign observers in 1937, when Hitler ordered the Lutheran Church to provide itself with a new constitution and simultaneously endeavoured to break the core of clerical opposition, a loose confederation of dissidents known as the "Confessional Church." The climax of this campaign came in July 1937 with the arrest of the Confessional Church's leading figure, Martin Niemöller.

Niemöller's detention provoked a chorus of disapproval in the British press, and thereafter some of the quality papers, such as the *Manchester Guardian*, devoted considerable attention to the plight of the Lutheran Church. In general, however, press coverage of the subject, while invariably critical of Nazi policy, was sporadic. The strongest protests came from individual churchmen, notably George Bell, the Anglican Bishop of Chichester, who roundly condemned what he termed "unchecked warfare against the Christian faith." The British public at large, however, could not be said to have been greatly touched by the issue. Most laymen regarded Nazi religious policy much as they did other distasteful aspects of Germany's internal affairs. However reprehensible, it was simply not relevant to Britain's diplomatic relations with Germany.

Given the depth of Scottish Protestantism's pride in its own history of struggle for emancipation from state control, the predicament of the Lutheran Church might have been expected to evoke greater sympathy in Scotland, the more so because of Germany's historic role as the crucible of the Reformation. The extent of unease within the Church of Scotland at events in Germany, however, is difficult to estimate. Although individual ministers had voiced their concerns over the treatment of the Lutheran Church at the General Assembly in 1935, events in Germany did not form part of the deliberations of the General Assemblies of 1936 and 1937. During 1937 English clerics were noticeably more outspoken in their criticism of Nazi policy. At the same time, however, no Scottish clerics matched the enthusiasm for Nazi Germany expressed by Arthur Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester. With the notable exception of the Scots-Irish "problem," Church of Scotland clergymen of the period were considerably more reluctant to voice their views on political issues of any kind than their Church of England counterparts. Their reticence on the subject of the persecution of the Lutheran Church, therefore, is a poor guide to the strength of underlying attitudes. Although not publicly expressed, concern was probably greater than in the Church of England. It is
significant, for instance, that religious oppression in Germany, rather than in Spain, occupied pride of place in the addresses of the Church of Scotland delegates at the UCF conference in the autumn of 1938. Clerical condemnation of Nazi policy towards the Lutheran Church also began to feature in public debate from late 1938 on, the *Kristallnacht* pogrom having apparently galvanised previously unexpressed discontent.

Outside clerical circles the impact of the religious issue on attitudes to Germany is only really apparent in the ranks of militant Protestantism. Concern about the plight of the Lutheran Church has been in evidence there since late 1933. The renewed persecution of 1937, coming on top of German support for Franco, firmly established Nazism's place in the Catholic-fascist conspiracy theory. Conveniently remaining blind to the strained relations between the Catholic Church and the Nazi government, exponents of the theory, such as Weir Gilmour and John Cormack, drew attention instead to the Catholic roots of many of the Nazi leaders, including Hitler.

Not all members of Protestant Action and the Scottish Protestant League, or those who sympathised with their aims, subscribed to such theories. The Earl of Mansfield's strong Protestant sympathies had not proved incompatible with a qualified degree of enthusiasm for Franco. Nor did they detract from his belief in the desirability of being on "friendly terms" with Nazi Germany. German religious policy did to some extent militate against his following other members of the IPG into positive enthusiasm for the régime. Germany, he argued, could not be regarded "as the equal of other civilised nations" for as long as she persecuted "all forms of religion which do not happen to coincide with the extreme form of almost State Theism which the German Government is apparently trying to establish." However, as we shall see, Mansfield's expressions of distaste for Nazi religious policy, however inherently genuine, were largely prompted by reasons that had nothing to do with the sufferings of the German Lutherans.

For the Scottish public in general, however, the religious issue at this stage does not appear to have been regarded as a major factor in relations with Germany, any more than it was in England. In June 1937 *The Scotsman* published an impassioned plea from one Glasgow Protestant urging the Church of Scotland to make some public display of solidarity with their German co-religionists. "Are we
to allow the Evangelical Lutherans of Germany to be crushed ... without a word of protest from the Church of Scotland?" he asked indignantly. His question provoked no replies, clerical or otherwise. In August a further opportunity for comment occurred when German dissidents and official representatives of the Lutheran Church clashed publicly at the World Conference on Faith and Order in Edinburgh. The incident, however, failed to generate any public reaction. In fact the only controversy which the Conference as a whole produced was a long-running debate in The Scotsman's correspondence column as to the greater guilt of Covenanters or Episcopalians in the religious persecutions in Scotland in the seventeenth century. It was a classic example of Scottish Protestantism's capacity for introspection and preoccupation with the past.

Public lack of interest notwithstanding, Germany's Scottish friends still felt the need to counter critical press coverage. The more "respectable" pro-German enthusiasts tended to play down the subject, arguing that by dwelling on sensationalist cases, such as Niemöller's, the newspapers exaggerated the extent of the problem and gave a wholly unrepresentative picture of religious observance in Germany. Lt.-Col. T.C.R. Moore, while admitting that the "trouble" with the Churches was "regrettable," claimed "that 85% of the Protestant and German Catholic clergymen and communicants are devotedly loyal to the Führer and his Government." Morison, a stalwart of the League of Nations Union, had, like other League supporters, assailed French belligerence and defended Germany's actions during the Rhineland crisis. Deprived of its centrist position by the collapse of sanctions and the Conservative exodus in the summer of 1936, the LNU had both rapidly declined in influence and shifted steadily to the Left in the intervening period. For many of its remaining supporters Nazi Germany, by the very nature of its ideology and by its actions in Spain, was as much a potential aggressor as those confirmed transgressors, Italy and Japan. However, although she vehemently opposed suggestions that "totally military" nations, "such as Italy and Japan," should be allowed back into the League, Helen Morison's faith in Germany's pacific intentions remained undimmed.
More enthusiastically pro-Nazi individuals, such as Capt. Luttman-Johnson, positively defended the actions of the German government. It was, he asserted, responding to a popular desire to see an end to "theological bickering and dissensions" of which the German people had had their fill in the past. This, essentially, was the line taken by German propaganda on the subject. The Nazi party, Luttman-Johnson stressed, quoting its programme, was committed to freedom of worship for all denominations, provided they "do not militate against the morality and moral sense of the German race." Those who accused the Nazis of being anti-Christian were fundamentally in error, for Nazism itself was "based on Christian principles." Its motto, "the common interest before self-interest," was but a reinterpretation of "Love thy neighbour as thyself."47 Carrying this theme one stage further, the equally enthusiastic A.P. Laurie effectively acclaimed Nazism as a new improved form of Christianity. To Laurie, the pledge of service to the community made by all young Germans on commencement of their compulsory period of duty with the Arbeitsdienst (Labour Service) encapsulated Nazism. In it, he believed, "the teaching of the Gospel has made a conquest far more profound than the acceptance of a Christian creed, and ... Protestantism has been purified from its main defect, the concentration on personal salvation."48

German propaganda's reassuring picture of religious developments in Germany also reached the Scottish public through the German evangelist, Baron Friedrich von der Ropp. Germany, Ropp assured an audience of Edinburgh Rotarians in February 1937, "is turning away from atheism, which has been the creed for many years of a great part of the German people, and is turning towards God." Although Ropp denied being a National Socialist himself, implicit in his message was the claim that Nazism had been instrumental in this spiritual reawakening, if only because of its success in countering Marxist materialism. Further, by accusing the Confessional Church of theological hairsplitting, Ropp both misrepresented the nature of the Church-State confrontation and laid the blame for any difficulties firmly on the dissenting churchmen. "Our young Germany does not want to become denominational," he declared, "but to become united as a nation."49

Although Ropp's religious zeal is not in doubt, there can be no denying that his primary purpose was political. In June 1936 he had formed the Anglo-German Brotherhood (AGB), an organisation "devoted to understanding between the
clergy and laity of the German and English Churches," which by 1937 had established a small but flourishing English membership. As Griffiths points out, Ropp's motivation for this venture was hardly one of innocent ecumenicalism, since dissident Lutheranism was deliberately excluded from its scope. Indeed the German end of Ropp's organisation appears to have had as little genuine substance as the Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft. In practice the AGB's function was largely the dissemination of Ropp's personal and inherently political propaganda. This, however, appears to have escaped the majority of AGB members. Swayed perhaps by Ropp's ardent evangelism, they were for the most part motivated by a simple desire to promote Anglo-German friendship. The British organising committee of the AGB consisted primarily of Anglican clerics, suggesting that Ropp's social networking functioned largely within the framework of the Church of England. His Edinburgh visit, however, indicates that he was prepared to cast his net more widely. What success he had, if any, in recruiting north of the Border is unfortunately not recorded.

Throughout 1937 Scottish visitors returning from Germany, like their English counterparts, furnished many an enthusiastic report of their personal experiences there. Instead of finding a nation riven by "animosities and feuds," as the British press had led her to believe would be the case, Helen Morison discovered "a perfectly peaceful hard-working people." "There were no beggars," she continued, "there was no touting for tips, and there were no thieves. One may lose one's property in other countries, but not in Germany, and everywhere we met with kindness, not passive kindliness, but an active taking of the initiative in courtesy and consideration." The only immediately visible sign of Nazism which Morison encountered was Hitler's portrait in every hotel. Morison, of course, was no political innocent impressed by a first visit to Germany, but neither, one suspects, were the majority of those who penned such letters to the press. Her account, however, is typical of the genre. With the emphasis firmly on those Germanic social and cultural values which had always appealed to British visitors, she portrayed German society as fundamentally unchanged. Yet at the same time, there are suggestions that these solid virtues, if anything, had been strengthened by the advent of Nazism.

There was much in the New Germany to impress visitors favourably, particularly in the field of material accomplishment. The achievements of the Nazi régime's public works programmes were a major attraction, and persuaded many
visitors that whatever they thought of Nazism per se, there were definitely things to be learned from the Nazi experiment. To those wedded to Keynesian economics, Germany provided evidence both of the stimulating effect of state intervention in the economy and the benefits to be derived from such measures in terms of social improvement. For the Scots amongst them, the contrast between Germany's booming economy and the relative stagnation of their home industry would no doubt have been galling in the extreme, as would any comparison of conditions in Germany's new model housing schemes with the squalor of Glasgow's slums. One returning Scot observed, "I have travelled in Germany and I have not seen any slums there or any signs of poverty. The people are of good physique and fine bearing and the working class are not spurned there as in Britain."55

The most dramatic of the Nazi public works was the Autobahn network. Astounding foreign visitors as much by its sheer scale as by its technical innovation, it formed a potent symbol of Nazi achievement, as Nazi propagandists well understood. In the autumn of 1937 a 200-strong delegation of MPs and other individuals connected with the planning and construction of roads in Britain toured the new road system on the invitation of its creator, Fritz Todt, Inspector of Roads.56 Although there were some notable exceptions, such as Sir Assheton Pownall, the vast majority of the party were not known for their pro-German views and were undoubtedly primarily concerned with assessing the suitability of this radical departure in road construction for application in Britain. They were, nonetheless, willing participants in a contrived, and, it would appear, highly successful propaganda exercise. Not only were the roads universally admired by the British party, but the effusiveness of their carefully orchestrated reception impressed itself most favourably on the visitors. One of the Scots in the party, the Edinburgh City Engineer, W.A. Macartney, subsequently extolled the virtues of these "masterpieces of engineering." However, "the first and last impression" of his visit, he stressed, "was that the German people all seemed to be anxious for friendship with Britain." Even those of his colleagues "who were most antagonistic to the German form of government had to admit the existence of this friendly spirit."57 At least one of delegates, Frank Clarke, Conservative MP for Dartford, returned more than a little impressed by the achievements of the Nazi régime in general.58 Of the three Scottish Conservative MPs on the tour, Professor J.G. Kerr,59 J.C.M. Guy,60 and Thomas Hunter,61 only the last-named had acquired any reputation for pro-German leanings.62 Intriguingly, the other Scottish MP
present was Thomas Cassells, the victor of Dunbarton. Clearly Labour's increasingly anti-fascist rhetoric was no impediment to fact-finding missions to Nazi Germany. 63

Noticeably absent from debate in the Scottish press on Anglo-German relations in 1937 was one of its hitherto most outspoken participants, Professor A.P. Laurie. This, however, did not indicate any slackening of Laurie's enthusiasm for Nazi Germany, but rather a greater level of personal commitment to his cause, for he had merely departed one stage for another. Eschewing his former loyalty to The Scotsman, Laurie now devoted the fruits of his considerably increased literary activity to the more receptive readership of the Anglo-German Review, a magazine created for the express purpose of promoting better Anglo-German relations.

Launched in November 1936, the Anglo-German Review had rapidly achieved a modest degree of commercial success, sufficient at least to sustain a 50% reduction in its cover price by June 1937. 64 From that date until early 1939 it maintained a steady circulation of around 12,000. 65 Initially the review advanced an essentially moderate line, playing down rather than justifying Nazi internal policies, and appeals to ex-service sentiment were strongly in evidence. In the May 1937 number, however, the editor, C.E. Carroll, 66 launched a scathing attack on the activities of "the Jewish element in the British Press." 67 In subsequent issues anti-semitic comments became increasingly discernible, both in the editorials and articles and, more obviously, in readers' letters. There was also a concomitant shift towards more positive endorsement of Nazi policies. Neither development appears to have adversely affected the magazine's sales. Nor for that matter did they discourage more "respectable" exponents of Anglo-German friendship, such as Lord Lothian, 68 from contributing articles and messages of support.

Even before this adoption of a more openly pro-Nazi stance, the views expressed in the Anglo-German Review had prompted official speculation as to the ultimate inspiration behind its publication. To George Lyall, the British Consul-General in Berlin, the magazine's claim to be "an independent, entirely British undertaking" was a nonsense, for it was clearly "the mouthpiece of Herr von Ribbentrop and the Reichs Propaganda Ministry combined." 69 Lyall's superiors in the Foreign Office, however, do not appear to have concurred. They certainly saw no reason to interfere in the magazine's continued publication, one senior official
regarding it as being "in its humble and rather unimportant way an excellent vehicle for anti-Nazi propaganda." Carroll, he believed, could "be safely left to cook his own and the German goose without intervention from us." Lyall, however, was not entirely wide of the mark in his suspicions, for Carroll was in close contact with the German propagandist, Rolf Hoffmann, who regularly contributed articles for the Anglo-German Review. Master of the subtle approach to propaganda, Hoffmann abstained from overt political comment, preferring instead to supply short news items and factual reports, covering cultural, social and sporting events in Germany. These, however, were carefully contrived and conveyed an image of a happy, harmonious, and, above all, peace-loving people.

Hoffmann's technique of using ostensibly apolitical themes to carry an underlying political message was also employed by several of the Anglo-German Review's other regular feature writers. Such subtlety, however, was not in A.P. Laurie's nature, and his contributions to the Anglo-German Review were as enthusiastically pro-Nazi as his letters to The Scotsman in late 1936 had been. Several of Laurie's pieces were in fact merely reworked versions of earlier expositions. However, he also addressed themes more pertinent to 1937, such as Germany's colonial requirements and, more particularly, the damage done to Anglo-German relations by British criticism of Nazi policies. The precise nature of his views on both of these themes will be explored later. Laurie may have lacked the polished style of his co-contributors but his frequency of contribution was surpassed by only Carroll himself. Despite the Anglo-German Review's limited circulation, Laurie's high-profile association with the magazine brought him a degree of national prominence he had not enjoyed as a player on the Scottish stage. In December 1937 H.J. Parker, the Labour MP for Romford, denounced him in the Commons as "perhaps the most persistent pro-Fascist letter-writer to the newspapers in this country."

Laurie's new-found fame was also in part due to his involvement with the Link, a new society for the promotion of Anglo-German friendship. Established in July 1937, the Link's stated objective was "to create a sure foundation for peace between the two nations, based on their mutual knowledge and understanding of each other." The Link was very much the brain-child of Admiral Domvile, who had been concerned by the shortcomings of the AGF for some time. To Domvile the AGF Council was "a useless body," smugly complacent and lacking in
dynamism. More importantly, although interest in the AGF had never been stronger, he believed the organisation as a whole, through its elitism and business orientation, was limiting its effectiveness by failing to harness the pro-German sentiment existing in the country at large.\(^75\)

The Link was Domvile's means of remedying this defect. Organised on a local branch basis and with a low annual subscription,\(^76\) the new society aimed to attract "the many thousands of people — holiday visitors to Germany, ex-Service men, and others — who are in one way or another interested in Germany."\(^77\) Catering for the tastes of the common man, each member was supplied with an enamel button-hole badge, and, as an added incentive for joining, a prize of a fortnight's holiday in Ascona was offered to the thousandth membership application.\(^78\)

In his apologia, E.W.D. Tennant claims that the Germans fostered the creation of the Link because of the AGF's refusal to endorse Nazism wholeheartedly.\(^79\) This is a complete fabrication. Domvile's concept of a button-hole society was entirely his own. He received no German assistance in its formation and was greatly amused to note Ribbentrop's sudden enthusiasm for his company following its inauguration.\(^80\) Nor did he specifically aim to create a more pro-Nazi organisation. When he first conceived of a new society, Domvile intended it to operate under the auspices of the AGF.\(^81\) Although that notion was scotched by Tennant and T.P. Conwell-Evans, the Secretary of the AGF,\(^82\) Domvile still hoped at the time of the Link's launch that the two bodies would work in tandem. The Link, he declared, "will not conflict in any way with the Anglo-German Fellowship. The two organisations will in many ways supplement one another."\(^83\)

Domvile's principal confederates in the establishment of the Link were C.E. Carroll and A.P. Laurie. Domvile records their combined conspiratorial exit from an AGF meeting in early July to discuss the inception of the new body,\(^84\) and they were all three present at the Link's inauguration in the Grosvenor Hotel in London on the 29th of that month.\(^85\) As originally constituted, the Link's formal ruling body, the National Council, included such figures as Lord Redesdale, the father of Unity Mitford, and Sir John Brown, a former chairman of the British Legion. Their presence, however, was essentially decorative, and in practice policy decisions and press releases were determined by Domvile, Carroll and Laurie, a
situation which would remain largely unaltered throughout the Link's existence. Under Carroll's direction the Anglo-German Review took on the role of unofficial bulletin to the new society, announcing and recording the activities of the local branches. Laurie was instrumental in the formation of the first branches in London and acted as the Link's principal public speaker after Domvile himself. His daughter Caroline, also provided much needed secretarial assistance.

Major Herbert Pullar, a professional soldier and member of the Perthshire dry-cleaning dynasty of the same name, was also at the Link's inaugural meeting. His presence, however, did not presage any further close involvement with the Link's direction, a relief perhaps for Domvile, who considered him a "bore..." Domvile himself may have been responsible for Pullar's subsequent exclusion. Although the Link would quickly acquire a more pro-Nazi reputation than the AGF, which with Domvile, Carroll and Laurie as its guiding spirits was perhaps inevitable, at this stage Domvile was anxious that the new society should avoid appearing immoderately pro-Nazi or in any way antagonistic to the AGF. He was, therefore, at pains to keep a public distance from more exuberantly pro-Nazi individuals, particularly those of fervently anti-semitic opinions, many of whom were positively hostile to the leadership of the AGF. In this connection Domvile specifically mentions Captain George Pitt-Rivers, a self-proclaimed expert on eugenics and a committed Jewish-conspiracy theorist. Pullar was an associate of Pitt-Rivers and quite probably held similar views.

The Link's populist format rapidly proved to be a success. By the end of 1937 over a thousand people had joined and four branches had been established — at Southend, Chelsea, West London and Birmingham. A fifth, Aberdeen, was reported to be in the process of formation, largely, it would appear, on the strength of an assurance given to Domvile by one Enid MacDonald. There is no evidence, however, that an Aberdeen branch was successfully established. Two Scottish branches would eventually be formed in Glasgow and Edinburgh in early 1939. These, and the evolution of the Link in general, will be discussed later.

Towards the middle of 1937 the air of guarded optimism prevalent in the pro-German camp at the start of the year began to dissipate, as the realisation dawned that Anglo-German relations were definitely on the decline. Although they
disagreed over the precise causes of this deterioration, most contemporary observers were agreed that it originated in Germany, and by the autumn even the most ardent Germanophiles acknowledged that official German attitudes towards Britain had become distinctly frosty.

To many Britons this development was somewhat mystifying, particularly given Chamberlain's adoption of a more accommodating posture towards Germany. There had been open diplomatic disagreements between the two countries over Spain, but these had largely been resolved amicably and Non-Intervention had provided no serious impediment to the furtherance of Germany's Spanish policy. The only area in which British and German interests appeared to be in direct collision was over the future of Germany's former colonies, and the Germans, as we shall see, were far from demanding immediate satisfaction of their grievances on that issue.

In reality Germany's increasingly uncompromising attitude towards Britain had little to do with Anglo-German relations per se. Rather it reflected the radical improvement in Germany's bargaining position. By mid-1937 German rearmament was proceeding apace and the military weakness so successfully disguised by bravado during the Rhineland crisis had been substantially rectified. German diplomatic isolation was also now a thing of the past. The Anti-Comintern Pact signed with Japan in November 1936, while in no sense a binding alliance, nevertheless held out the prospect of a future ally in the Far East, and one with proven military capability, including the world's third largest navy. More importantly, Hitler's endeavours to cement the Rome-Berlin axis, first hinted at by the Austro-German Agreement, were finally bearing fruit. Mussolini's determination to sustain his Spanish adventure and his pursuit of the dream of "mare nostrum" in the Mediterranean precluded any real possibility of a Franco-Italian rapprochement and similarly hampered the restoration of good relations with Britain, while rendering him increasingly dependent on German assistance, both militarily and diplomatically. After a triumphal tour of Germany in September 1937 had impressed upon him the vigour and efficiency of the Nazi régime and the extent of its military preparations, Mussolini's few remaining doubts as to the wisdom of close association all but disappeared. In November Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. In these changed circumstances British friendship was no longer perceived as an essential component in German diplomatic strategy.
Amongst Germany's more enthusiastic supporters, perhaps the most common response to these developments was to seek to excuse German intransigence as a defensive reaction to ill-considered British criticism of Nazi internal policies. The blame for the deterioration in Anglo-German relations, they argued, therefore lay firmly with Germany's British detractors. By the end of the year this had become a recurrent refrain in the pages of the Anglo-German Review. A.P. Laurie's articles were very much in this vein. The Germans, he argued, "rightly resent attacks on their internal affairs by the people of another nation." Those who vigorously condemned Germany were "like children throwing lighted matches about in a powder mill," blind to the fact that "every written and spoken word attacking and abusing the Italian and German people is bringing war nearer." Although these remarks were made with particular reference to the Labour Party, Laurie reserved his most vehement criticism for Churchill. "No dull fact restrains him," Laurie declared, he "lectures and threatens Germany as if he were a schoolmaster and Germany a naughty schoolboy." Churchill, he argued, was an anachronism, belonging "in spirit to the times of his great ancestor, when an aristocratic oligarchy, divided from the common herd like the Gods of Olympus, regarded politics and the fate of nations as a game." Unlike C.E. Carroll, Laurie did not openly ascribe British criticism of Germany at this stage to Jewish machinations. Privately, however, he may well have been already moving in that direction, for in an article extolling the merits of Nazi financial self-sufficiency he hinted at the hidden and sinister power of International Finance.

By late 1937 it was also becoming increasingly apparent that many who had previously voiced sympathy for Germany were reconsidering their position. Where some now expressed their support in more qualified terms, others faltered and lapsed into silence. Perhaps the most surprising example of this trend, given his earlier enthusiasm, was Lt.-Col. Moore. Moore had acclaimed Nevile Henderson's "indiscretion," and had used the occasion to deliver a recital of the blessings which Nazism had brought to Germany, including "the immense reduction of unemployment ... the almost complete elimination of graft, corruption and unnatural vice ... the enormous social progress in housing, roads, education and public health ... and ... the new born atmosphere of self reliance, self confidence, and self help with which the Leader had imbued his people." Yet by November the speech he delivered to the Commons on the subject of foreign affairs bore no traces of his former enthusiasm and simply advanced an orthodox defence of government
Chamberlain's evident willingness to reach an accommodation with Germany may in part explain Moore's adoption of a low profile. Moore had been given to reticence in the past when the official government line shifted towards his position, most noticeably in the aftermath of the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Treaty. This time, however, he was indulging in rather more than a temporary tactical retreat, for he appears to have taken positive steps to distance himself from his former associations. Although he had been in frequent contact with Admiral Domville in the first half of the year, no references to him appear in Domville's diary for 1937 after July. He was also conspicuously absent from the Nuremberg rally in September. Moore's pro-German sentiments were certainly not extinguished and would resurface in 1938. For the moment, however, he appears to have come to the conclusion that, given the then current state of Anglo-German relations, his previous level of enthusiasm for Nazi Germany had ceased to be appropriate, and, more importantly, that its continued expression would seriously endanger his claims to "respectability."^104

Some of Germany's former friends moved into outspoken opposition, amongst them Lt.-Col. Stewart Roddie. Not only were fascist dictatorships "afflicted with a new imperial mania," he warned, but their hostility towards the Western democracies was inevitable, since the very existence of the latter served as a reminder to the subject peoples of Italy and Germany "that liberty and freedom still existed."^105 Clearly Stewart Roddie's Germanophile sentiments had been subsumed by an appreciation of the threat to British security posed by Nazism. While his expressed distaste for dictatorship per se was no doubt genuine, it had not previously prevented his participation in the AGF.

This slackening of enthusiasm for Germany was most noticeable amongst those whose pro-German views, like Stewart Roddie's, pre-dated the Nazi accession to power, and largely reflected a belated but growing recognition in such circles, that the sympathy they had felt for the defenceless, dispossessed and persecuted victim of French rancour in the 1920s was no longer appropriate in dealing with an increasingly intransigent dictatorship, re-arming on a massive scale.

German intervention in Spain, the true extent of which only began to emerge in
1937, was also an important factor here, for many of those who carried their pro-German sympathies over from the Weimar period held liberal and left of centre opinions, and tended to be pro-Republican, some of them strongly so. While it was one thing for the German people to renounce democracy themselves, aiding and abetting the extinction of democracy in Spain was quite another, particularly as the Insurgents' hopes of victory were so obviously dependent on German and Italian assistance. The ferocity and callousness of German military methods in Spain, as demonstrated by the destruction of Guernica and the bombardment of Almeria, also shocked liberal sensibilities. To Sir Daniel Stevenson, the bombing of Guernica was "terrible, horrible." Stevenson had noticeably abstained from voicing any pro-German sympathies since the beginning of the Spanish Civil War and the commencement of his involvement in humanitarian relief for the Republicans.

The impact of the Spanish Civil War in general on attitudes to Germany, however, was very much a dual process; for despite the worsening in Anglo-German relations, Soviet involvement in Spain continued to attract Conservative opinion to the proposition that Germany was an essential first line of defence against communism. Symptomatic of this continuing trend was the admiration for Hitler and Mussolini's past work in combatting communism, which Lord Stonehaven, former chairman of the Conservative Party Organisation, expressed in November. Although Stonehaven had not previously voiced any great enthusiasm for the dictators, he now hailed them as "great and courageous patriots," who, taking power when their respective countries were "on the verge of chaos, almost overwhelmed by Bolshevism," had "restored self-respect to the citizens ... and restored confidence in the individual and confidence in the nation."

Existing pro-German enthusiasts sought to encourage this trend by playing on Conservative fears that Spain presaged an imminent European conflict on ideological lines. "We have got to line up now with Germany or with Russia," argued the Earl of Glasgow, safe in the knowledge that if push came to shove most of his fellow Conservatives would have considerable difficulty in stomaching an alliance with Russia, "the most tyrannical, the worst ... the bloodiest dictatorship in Europe."

Stonehaven and other Conservatives who enthused openly about Germany's role in stemming the communist tide in effect formed the tip of an iceberg. Beneath
them, submerged and silent, was a large mass of Conservative opinion, which, while appreciative of Germany's function in this respect, saw no reason to enthuse about Nazism, or Germany for that matter. As the extent of German military preparations became increasingly apparent, this negative pro-Germanism combined with the rapidly growing number of "surrenderers,"

110 desperate to avoid incurring German hostility. Harold Nicolson observed in November, "Tory opinion is almost entirely on the run and would willingly let Germany take Russia and overrun the Near East so long as she leaves us alone." 111 To those of genuinely pro-German sympathies had now been added a very much larger number, whose enthusiasm for the "appeasement" of Germany displayed no positively pro-German traits of any kind.

For British visitors participating in the annual pilgrimage to Nuremberg in September, the hardening of German attitudes towards Britain was manifestly obvious. 112 "All v. depressed at the decline in good relations so evident to us all," Domvile noted. 113 The British contingent was much smaller than it had been the previous year, and although the Nuremberg Rallies had never attracted many persons of serious political or social standing, their absence in 1937 was extremely marked, a further sign of the migration of "respectable" opinion away from overly close association with Nazism. The British Consul in Bavaria, Donald St. Clair Gainer, considered "few, if any" of the visitors to be representative of "serious English thought" and adjudged all of them to be lacking "any political or social influence." 114 Gainer also noted the presence of "many eccentrics" and was baffled as to how many of them had come by their invitations. Domvile made the same observation. From his diaries it is clear that these "eccentrics," many of them women, in the main held strongly anti-Semitic views. For Domvile their presence was both embarrassing and infuriating, particularly as they had a tendency to gate-crash select functions attended by the Nazi leaders. 115 Since attendance at the Party rally was by invitation only, the Germans themselves were directly responsible for the greater number of anti-Semites. This, however, may simply reflect an inability to secure more "respectable" acceptances rather than a conscious policy.

One of the more intriguing aspects of Gainer's report is the recorded presence of a group of Scottish nationalists, resplendent in kilts, amongst a larger body of "Nationalists" from various countries invited by Rosenberg. Unfortunately, Gainer gives no clues as to their precise identity. Several Nazi agencies took an interest in
the development of ideologically friendly movements in other European countries. The encouragement of potentially destabilising influences within the boundaries of potential enemies was an integral feature of Nazi foreign policy. For this reason, ethnic minority nationalist movements had a particular attraction. The Germans certainly made some exploratory approaches towards the nationalist movement in Scotland. During 1936 and 1937 several leading Scottish Nationalists were contacted by a young Baltic German working for Goebbels' propaganda ministry, Dr. Gerhard von Tevenar. Tevenar's mission, Chris Harvie believes, was to try and establish a Scottish equivalent to the Parti National Breton, a Breton separatist movement which enjoyed substantial German funding. His advances appear to have been politely ignored. In 1938 similarly informal, and equally unsuccessful, overtures were made to Neil Gunn and Sir Alexander MacEwen. Given the SNP's official party line towards Nazism, Gainer's mystery nationalists were probably not members of the SNP. Uniformed representatives of the BUF were also in Rosenberg's contingent. Possibly Gainer's kilted nationalists were Scottish members of that organisation.

The other Scots recorded as present at Nuremberg mirrored the general trend towards visitors of a more pro-Nazi orientation, with none of the 1936 guests in evidence. A.P. Laurie and his daughter were there, as were Charles Sarolea and Major Pullar. For Charles Sarolea attendance at Nuremberg heralded a return to active involvement in pro-German propaganda after an absence of several months. Sarolea's vigorous campaigning in late 1936 had been brought to an abrupt close following the death of his younger son at the early age of thirty-seven, an event which temporarily quashed his relish for spirited political controversy. Two months later he embarked on a fact-finding European tour, with Nationalist Spain as his first destination. From there he intended to proceed to Italy and then on to Germany, arrangements having been made through Eleanora Tennant for a personal interview with Adolf Hitler. While in Spain, however, he became seriously ill and was forced to cancel the remainder of his trip and return home. Sarolea spent the spring and summer of 1937 quietly recuperating and blatantly fishing for invitations to the forthcoming Party rally. His importunings having been studiously ignored by Ribbentrop and the German Embassy staff, he eventually secured his invitation through Rolf Hoffmann.

Although obfuscated by his customary claims to academic objectivity, Sarolea's
public pronouncements following his return from Nuremberg were markedly more pro-Nazi in content than the views he had expressed in 1936. Like A.P. Laurie before him, he now sought to establish Nazism's firm foundations in the history of European political thought. His choice of respectable antecedents, however, was radically different. With Thomas Carlyle and Houston Stewart Chamberlain as its progenitors, Nazism, he argued, "has been discovered in, and has been exported from, Scotland." Unfortunately, history does not record the reaction of the Scottish Nationalists to whom these remarks were directed. Sarolea denied that such observations implied any "personal opinions on the merits or demerits of the system." His underlying attitudes, however, were self-evident in a subsequent speech to the Edinburgh Carlyle Society. "The anti-democratic ideal is now spreading all over the world," he declared, "and has already conquered three-quarters of the Continent of Europe. When that process of conversion is complete Carlyle will again come into his own ... he stands out as the spiritual leader of the anti-demagogic European reaction and as the master builder of a new constructive philosophy." This prediction of the ultimate triumph of dictatorships of the Right is hardly redolent of fatalistic acceptance. Clearly, Sarolea was far from dismayed at the prospect.122

What Sarolea's public declarations did not reveal was his burgeoning anti-Semitism. In the early 1920s Sarolea had exhibited noticeable anti-Semitic tendencies after his visits to Eastern Europe. In his 1922 defence of the nascent Poland he had sought to excuse Polish anti-Semitism, much in the manner of many later apologists for Nazi anti-Semitism. Poland, he argued, had an abnormally large Jewish population, which dominated trade and the middle-class professions. A strong indigenous middle-class was essential to Poland's evolution from a primarily agrarian economy, and its development was regrettably displacing a certain proportion of Jews. Unlike their co-religionists in Western Europe, Poland's Jews had clung to their traditional way of life and had not been assimilated into Polish society. As Poland was a young nation state, it was difficult for Poles to come to terms with such a large foreign body in their midst, particularly as Polish Jews spoke a German dialect, and were therefore "the natural vanguard of German penetration." It was, he stressed, a peculiarly Polish problem.123

After his visit to Russia Sarolea abandoned this assertion, for he had discovered there "an alarming recrudescence of anti-Semitic feeling," which he ascribed to the disproportionately large number of Jews in the Communist Party. Indeed, Sarolea
had met so many "educated, humane and Christian people" who believed that "the wholesale extermination of the Jewish race ... was an essential condition of the recovery of Russia," that he saw the deportation of Russia's Jews to an independent Jewish state in Central Asia as "the only means of saving the Jewish people from certain destruction." 124

Despite his expressions of humanitarian concern for the plight of Jews in both Poland and Russia, and his assertion that he himself was a "sincere friend of the Jews," Sarolea's true sympathies clearly lay with the "host" nations. Nevertheless, he was at pains to stress what he saw as the virtues of the race, and dismissed out of hand any notion of inherent Jewish wickedness. "Bolshevist Jews did not commit their crimes because they were Jews," he declared, "but because they were Marxian fanatics." He was also, at this stage, contemptuous of Jewish conspiracy theories, and dismissed the much quoted Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion as "documentary evidence of more or less doubtful authenticity." He had no doubts that Jews had played, and continued to play, a leading role in the Communist Party, but this he ascribed to the traditional Jewish emphasis on intellectual attainment, in contrast to their Slav neighbours, and the long-standing Tsarist persecution of the Jewish communities. 125

Sarolea's views on the Jewish question do not appear to have fundamentally altered in the eleven years that followed the publication of Impressions of Soviet Russia. Ironically, as late as 1935 he was hailed as a defender of Jewish interests by the Jewish community itself. Following his intellectual debunking of Rosenberg's Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts, he was warmly congratulated by the Board of Deputies of British Jews, and he was more than happy to encourage the commercial proliferation of his article, "The Religion of the Blood," in the Jewish press. 126 During the course of 1936, however, his interest in Jewish involvement in the Communist Party intensified. In September he asked Rolf Hoffmann to supply him with the original text of one of Rosenberg's speeches and documentary evidence supporting his claim that 80-90% of the Soviet hierarchy were Jews. Subsequently he ordered one hundred English-language copies of the speech for distribution to Conservative MPs and the British press. 127 By January 1937 he was convinced that Jews "cannot help having Communist sympathies." 128 Clearly he was moving towards acceptance of the conspiracy theories he had previously derided.
Although Sarolea’s private correspondence does not supply firm evidence of a belief in the existence of a Judaeo-Bolshevik World Conspiracy until the late summer of 1938, the contacts he fostered during and immediately after his trip to Nuremberg in 1937 suggest that the conversion occurred then. His correspondence with German propaganda agencies devoted to this theme, such as Oberst Fleischhauer’s Weltdienst, commences at this point. So too does his association with Maj. J.H. Davidson-Houston, an intimate of leading Jewish Conspiracy theorists, Arthur Kitson and Lt.-Col. A.H. Lane, and Douglas Chandler, an American journalist then resident in Germany. Apprised of Chandler’s intention to deliver a series of lectures in Britain on the subject of his adopted country, Sarolea invited him to address an audience at his own house in Edinburgh. As Chandler’s stated purpose was to reveal "the serious menace to Western civilisation that exists today through the agency of Jewish Communist activities" to "Jew deluded stay-at-homes," Sarolea can have had few delusions as to the company he was keeping. Clearly the wariness he had shown in 1936 about close involvement with such circles had disappeared.

Despite the absence of a major diplomatic upset, 1937 was a significant year both for Anglo-German relations and for the pattern of pro-German support in Britain. For those who sought to promote Anglo-German friendship, a year that had opened on a note of considerable promise had come to a disappointing close, with the knowledge that the gap between the two countries had definitely widened. Paradoxically, by the end of the year support for some sort of agreement with Germany had never been stronger, even if fear and a belief in realpolitik were the principal motive forces, rather than any genuine desire for friendship. Within the pro-German lobby itself there had been a noticeable tempering of public enthusiasm for Nazism in "respectable" circles and some of Germany’s friends of long standing had fallen by the wayside. Amongst those who continued to acclaim Nazism, anti-semitic leanings were becoming increasingly apparent. Once again the Scottish experience had largely paralleled developments south of the Border. Although the religious question might have been expected to be more of an issue in Scotland, this had not in fact proved to be the case.
Chapter 9
Footnotes


13. In 1934 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the then Colonial Secretary, resigned from the AGA, a far less "compromising" organisation, on Foreign Office advice. As a Cabinet Minister, Cunliffe-Lister's position was admittedly more sensitive than Hutchison's. FO 371/17763/C2650/1345/18.

14. James Henderson Stewart, b. 1897. Victor of the keenly fought by-election of 1933. Eric Linklater's experiences as a disastrously unsuccessful NPS candidate were subsequently fictionalised by the novelist in *Magnus Merriman*. 

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17. The announcement in mid-campaign of a policy statement by the NCL, recognising the irreversibility of the re-armament programme given the current unsettled international condition, went some way towards dispelling the ambiguity, but its tone gave the impression of a party grudgingly and belatedly accepting the wisdom of government policy.


20. **Glasgow Hillhead**
   November 1935
   Sir R. Horne (Con) 18,367 J.S.C. Reid (Con) 12,539
   J. McCulloch (Lab) 8,566 G. McAllister (Lab) 6,202
   J.M. MacCormick (SNP) 1,886 D.J. Black (Ind) 221

**Glasgow Springburn**
November 1935
G. Hardie (Lab) 20,286 Mrs. A. Hardie (Lab) 14,859
J. McNicol (Con) 11,859 A.D.M. Shaw (Con) 8,881

**Dunbarton**
November 1935
A.D. Cochrane (Con) 24,776 T. Cassells (Lab) 20,187
T. Cassells (Lab) 20,679 A.P. Duffes (Con) 19,203
R. Gray (SNP) 3,841 R. Gray (SNP) 2,599


25. Prof. John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, b. 1892. Reader in Biochemistry, Cambridge University, 1922-32; Fullerman Professor of Physiology, Royal Institution, 1930-32; Professor of Genetics, University College, London University since 1933. Brother of Naomi Mitchison and one of the Duchess of Atholl's correspondents. A Communist.

26. Results of the Glasgow University rectorial election, 1937:
   Rev. H.R.L. Sheppard (Pacifist) 538
   Prof. W. MacNeile Dixon (Scot. Nat.) 364
   W. Churchill (Conservative) 281
   Prof. J.B.S. Haldane (Popular Front) 220
27. Scotsman, 25th October 1937.

28. Arguably this is the only conclusion which can be drawn from the result. At the time the Glasgow University Peace Pledge Union hailed Sheppard's victory as an "emphatic condemnation" of the government's foreign policy, largely on the strength of Churchill's poor performance. Their assertion that Churchill represented the Chamberlainite position on foreign policy, however, can be dismissed out of hand. In the absence of a candidate supporting the orthodox government line it is impossible to draw any meaningful conclusions about attitudes to Chamberlain's policy. Scotsman, 25th October 1937.

29. Scotsman, 31st May 1937.


32. The Times, 27th March 1937.

33. For British reactions to Nazi religious policy, see Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 249-51.

34. See the report on Assembly's proceedings, Scotsman, 30th May 1935.

35. For Headlam's views, see Griffiths, op. cit., p. 76, pp. 176-7, p. 250.

36. See, for instance, Bulwark, December 1933, February 1934.

37. Gilmour has maintained his belief in the Catholic inspiration behind Nazism to the present day. Gilmour, Interviews with Tom Gallagher and Robin Macwhirter.

38. Alexander Ratcliffe himself did not share the sentiments which animated so many of his SPL colleagues. Indeed, after a visit to Nazi Germany in the late summer of 1939 he returned thoroughly enamoured of the Nazi régime, and he defended it throughout the war years. By 1940 Vanguard had become as anti-semitic as it was anti-Catholic. Ratcliffe's response, however, was very much that of a maverick. See Gallagher, Uneasy Peace, p. 157; Bruce, op. cit., p. 78.


41. J. Bayers Black, Scotsman, 22nd June 1937.

42. Anglo-German Review, Vol. 1. No. 9, August 1937.

43. H.A.M., Scotsman, 29th June 1937.

44. As with many of Morison's letters to the press, her contribution to that debate in The Scotsman had appeared under the acronym H.A.M. See Scotsman, 14th March 1936.
45. Amongst the departing Conservatives was Morison's mother. See Chapter 4, footnote 204.

46. Scotsman, 10th December 1937.

47. Scotsman, 5th July 1937.


49. Scotsman, 26th February 1937.

50. The Scotsman report of Ropp's Edinburgh meeting describes him as the President of the Christian Brotherhood Federation. It was presumably the same organisation.


52. Ibid., pp. 251-2.

53. Given Ropp's connections it is perhaps not surprising to find that his Edinburgh contact was an Episcopalian curate.

54. H.A.M., Scotsman, 29th June 1937.


56. See Anglo-German Review, Vol. 1, No. 10, September 1937. The Roads Delegation was perhaps the most publicised of such visits. However, Germany's industrial techniques were generally in advance of those in use in Britain, and a desire to learn from German technical innovation was present in many fields. In June 1937 the Scottish Colliery Managers' Association announced the dispatch of a deputation of colliery officials and technical experts to the Essen coal-field, to study German improvements in mechanised coal-cutting. Scottish pits might have been amongst the most efficient in Britain, but their productivity levels compared unfavourably with those in German mines. Scotsman, 26th June 1937.

57. Speech to the Edinburgh Business Club, reported by The Scotsman, 2nd March 1938.


59. John Graham Kerr, b. 1869. A distinguished zoologist and Regius Professor of Zoology at Glasgow University, 1902-36. Perhaps his greatest claim to fame, however, was as the originator of camouflage patterns for warships. President of the Scottish Unionist Association, 1934-35. He was elected as one of the three MPs representing Scottish Universities in 1935.

60. James Campbell Morrison Guy, b. 1894. An advocate, Guy had represented Edinburgh Central since 1931.


63. There were seven Labour MPs in total in the roads delegation.

64. It was reduced from a shilling to sixpence. See Anglo German-Review, Vol. 1., No. 7, June 1937.


74. Domvile, Diary entry for 26th May 1937, DOM 54.

75. Domvile, From Admiral to Cabin Boy, London, 1947, pp. 64-5. In this post-war account Domvile cites the fact that the AGF was "well patronised by Judmas" as being a further reason for his decision to launch the new society. This, however, is very much a retrospective judgement. Domvile was undoubtedly a parlour anti-semite at this stage, but his conversion to Jewish-conspiracy theories occurred at a later date.

76. The fee was 2/6d. See Anglo-German Review, Vol. 1, No. 10, September 1937.

77. Anglo-German Review, Vol. 1, No. 9, August 1937.

78. This was to be spent at Monte Verita, an hotel owned by Edouard von der Heydt, a relative of Admiral Domvile's wife.

79. E.W.D. Tennant, op. cit., p. 204.

80. Domvile, Diary entry for 1st October 1937, DOM 54. However, Walther Hewel, Ribbentrop's aide, was quick to suggest the creation of a German counterpart. Domvile, Diary entry for 2nd October 1937, DOM 54.

81. Domvile, Diary entry for 29th June, 1937, DOM 54.

82. T. Philip Conwell-Evans, b. 1891. Private secretary to Noel Noel-Buxton during the latter's second tenure in office as Minister of Agriculture, 1929-30.
Lecturer at Königsberg University, 1932-34. A well-meaning idealist in the Lothian mould. Conwell-Evans' extensive pro-German activities are well covered in Richard Griffiths' *Fellow Travellers of the Right*. See also T.P. Conwell-Evans, *None So Blind*, London, 1947, for a personal account.


84. Domvile, Diary entry for 8th July 1937, DOM 54.

85. Domvile, Diary entry for 29th July 1937, DOM 54.

86. The council originally consisted of Domvile, Laurie, Redesdale, Brown, Susan Fass of the Anglo-German Kameradschaft and Sir Raymond Beazley. Beazley was mainly concerned with the formation of the Birmingham branch. Carroll did not officially join the Council at this stage. *Anglo-German Review*, Vol. 1, No. 10, September 1937.

87. Pullar was a member of the AGF.

88. Domvile, Diary entry for 29th July 1937, DOM 54.

89. Capt. George Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers, b. 1890. A Dorset landowner and former professional soldier, Pitt-Rivers was something of a pseudo-anthropologist and ethnologist. He was also strongly pro-fascist and played a leading role in the anti-Tithe campaign, contesting North Dorset in 1935 as an Independent Agriculturalist.

90. Domvile, Diary entry for 11th June 1937, DOM 54.

91. In June 1937 Pullar, Pitt-Rivers and Maj-Gen. J.F.C. Fuller hosted a group of visiting *S.A. Gruppenführers*. Fuller, the prophet of mechanised warfare, was also pro-fascist and anti-semitic. *Anglo-German Review*, Vol. 1, No. 8, July 1937.

92. Domvile, Diary entry for 11th December 1937, DOM 55.


94. Ibid.

95. Domvile, Diary entry for 25th October 1937, DOM 54.

96. A phrase first publicly used by Mussolini in November 1936.


98. A description frequently applied to the exponents of sanctions by their opponents during the Abyssinian war.


103. From the evidence of Domvile's diary, Moore would also appear to have cut adrift from the Anglo-German Fellowship. Domvile regularly attended AGF functions throughout 1937 and usually listed those of his associates whom he encountered there. DOM 54-55.

104. It is perhaps not altogether coincidental that Moore's sudden lapse into silence coincided with a knighthood. Conceivably he may have been hoping for eventual inclusion in Chamberlain's government.


112. Although no embarrassingly anti-British speeches were delivered during the course of the rally, the Anti-Bolshevik Exhibition placed Britain, Ireland, India, Canada and Australia on its list of centres of World Communism. *Scotsman*, 8th September 1937. For Admiral Domvile's benefit, Walther Hewel spelt out the new German mood. The deteriorating situation, he argued, "might lead to good," since the British "would have to make their minds up." Domvile, Diary entry for 6th September 1937, DOM 54.

113. Domvile, Diary entry for 7th September 1937, DOM 54.

114. D. St. Clair Gainer to Anthony Eden, 13th September 1937, FO 371/20750/C664/4222. Only two members of the Lords, Earl Beatty and Lord Moubray and Stourton, and three MPs, Sir Assheton Pownall, Sir Arnold Wilson and Robert Grant-Ferris, appear to have been present.


Gibb to Capt. Duff-Taylor, 11th May 1941, GIB 217/19.

117. F.R. Hart and J.B. Pick, *Neil M. Gunn, A Highland Life*, London, 1981, pp. 162-3. Because of their völkisch content, Gunn's works were considered ideologically sound by the Nazi authorities. Translations of *Butcher's Broom* and *Morning Tide* were published in Germany and enjoyed considerable commercial success. Gunn also visited Germany in May 1938 and February 1939. Although both visits were made in innocence by Gunn, — the first was prompted by the German launch of *Morning Tide*, and on the second he went tobogganing in the mountains — Gunn's close friends, Margaret and Malcolm MacEwen, both suspect that he was invited over in a further attempt to exercise influence. Alastair Dunnett, however, suggests that Gunn's visits were simply prompted by the fact that exchange controls prevented him from getting his not inconsiderable German royalties out of the country. Much high-living in sumptuous German hotels thus ensued. Hart and Pick, op. cit., pp. 162-3; Dunnett, op. cit., p. 201.

118. Domville, Diary entries for 6th and 10th September 1937, DOM 54; Douglas Chandler to Charles Sarolea, 5th October 1937, Hoffmann to Sarolea, 28th August and 24th November 1937, SAR 85. Domville does not mention Gainer's Scottish nationalists. He may not have come into contact with them. Gainer noted that Rosenberg's party "held themselves ostentatiously apart from Herr von Ribbentrop's guests."

119. Sarolea to James Brown Scott, 31st January 1937, SAR 60; Sarolea to Jan Masaryk, 27th January 1937, SAR 87. It seems highly probable that the furtherance of the Nationalist cause was not Sarolea's prime consideration when he invited Eleanora Tennant to speak in Edinburgh in January 1937, but rather that he hoped that Tennant, through her husband, could secure for him just such an interview.

120. Sarolea to Rolf Hoffmann, 29th April 1937, SAR 85.

121. Sarolea to Ribbentrop's Personal Secretary, undated, and Sarolea to the 1st Secretary, German Embassy, 13th April 1937, SAR 84; Sarolea to Rolf Hoffmann, 31st July 1937 and Hoffmann to Sarolea, 28th August 1937, SAR 85.


125. Ibid., p. 224, p. 84, p. 115, p. 165.

126. The Board of Deputies of British Jews to Sarolea, 18th March 1935, SAR 231; Sarolea to Dr. Salis Daiches, 30th November 1935; Editor of *The Jewish Chronicle* to Sarolea, 4th December 1935, SAR 54.

127. Sarolea to Rolf Hoffmann, 14th September and 26th October, 1936, SAR 85.

128. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 19th January 1937, SAR 64.
129. See Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 27th September, 1938.

130. Kitson's attack on Jewish control of International Finance, *The Bankers' Conspiracy!* (1933), and Lane's *The Alien Menace* (1928), were virtually prescribed reading for British anti-semites of the period.

131. Douglas Chandler to Sarolea, 5th October and 18th October 1937, SAR 85.
Chapter 10
The Colonial Question 1936-37

Although Spain held the centre of the international stage, the single most important issue in Anglo-German relations throughout 1937, from a British perspective, was not German participation in the Civil War, but the question of Germany's colonial grievances. In 1919 Germany's pre-war colonies had been parcelled out amongst the victors at Versailles. Along with parts of the former Ottoman Empire they were termed Mandated Territories, in theory to be held in trust for the League of Nations and administered by the Occupying Powers on its behalf. To all intents and purposes, however, most of them had effectively been annexed. As Versailles had largely ratified wartime conquests, the majority of these territories had fallen to Britain and her Dominions. German demands for their restitution, therefore, were directed primarily at Britain.

Up until 1936 Hitler had deliberately played down German aspirations in this area, partly because colonies did not figure in his own vision of Germany's destiny, but largely because demands for the return of these territories would have conflicted with his general strategy of securing an Anglo-German accord. By avowing Germany's willingness to exercise self-denial with regards to the creation of a surface fleet, the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty had contained the implicit message that Germany was prepared to set aside her colonial ambitions for the sake of British friendship. Hitler did not renounce Germany's claims absolutely, for their retention provided a useful spur, to be applied as occasion demanded, to encourage the British to accept the proffered hand of friendship. In this fashion the colonial question was gently intruded into Hitler's talks with Simon and Eden in March 1935. These tactics continued into 1936. However, with the British clinging stubbornly to their policy of securing a general European settlement and refusing to be drawn into further bilateral arrangements, Hitler loosened the reins on his own colonial lobby, allowing pressure for restitution to build up in the German press. Official comment on the subject, however, remained rare, the passage in the memorandum issued during the Rhineland crisis being the exception rather than the rule. Even then, reference was made only to Germany's need to resolve her problems of population pressure and access to raw materials.

September 1936 saw a definite change in the official line, with the prominence
given to the colonial question at the Party Rally. Thereafter, not only did the German press campaign intensify, but increasingly leading members of the Nazi hierarchy lent it their public support. Hitler himself made the colonial issue a central feature of his January 1937 address and returned to the subject in a major speech in October. Ribbentrop reiterated the theme throughout 1937. Indeed, the vigour with which he pursued the topic did much to augment his already growing reputation in Britain for arrogance and tactlessness. His speech at the Leipzig Fair in March was widely interpreted as meaning, "We want these colonies — we think we ought to have them, and if you do not give them to us we shall have to take them." Despite the growing clamour, Hitler at no point presented concrete demands for the return of the Mandated Territories. He was, in fact, quite convinced that Britain's relationship with the Dominions simply would not permit her compliance, and he continued to utilise the issue purely for its exploitation value. By late 1937, however, it had ceased to be a means of pressuring Britain to draw closer to Germany. Instead, it was fast becoming a threat to deter Britain from interfering in the realisation of his European plans.

Public debate on the colonial question began in earnest in Britain in the wake of the German March 1936 memorandum. Initially, interest was largely confined to a small but extremely vocal number of enthusiasts on either side. However, with the intensification of German demands the debate escalated in importance. Interest peaked in October 1937 in response to Hitler's speech, The Times having a voluminous correspondence on the subject in that month.

Those who opposed meeting the German demands did so for a variety of reasons. Some exhibited a deep-seated Germanophobia which pre-dated the Nazi takeover. Germany, in their view, had been entirely responsible for the First World War, and as part of the punishment meted out by Versailles, her loss of colonies had been richly deserved. They saw no reason to commute the sentence. Others, mostly on the Left, objected to the supposition that Britain could dispose of these territories as she saw fit. The League of Nations, they argued, was the only body competent to make decisions about their future. Other left-wingers expressed horror at the prospect of native populations being entrusted to the care of a régime founded on extreme racist principles. Acceding to German demands, they further contended, would hand the Nazis a prestige victory which would serve only to strengthen their tyranny over the German people.
The hard core of opposition to colonial transfer, however, was provided by Conservative imperialists, appalled at the very notion of meekly yielding Imperial territory. Germany's former colonies, they pointed out, had enjoyed the benefits of British rule for almost twenty years and now contained a substantial number of British settlers. To most imperialists, not at the best of times noted for their regard for the League of Nations, these territories were for all practical purposes an integral part of the Empire, whatever the legal fine print.

In the early stages of the debate imperialist ire was directed less at German temerity than at their own government's failure to reject the concept outright. They were particularly incensed by Neville Chamberlain's attempt to draw a "clear distinction" between Crown Colonies and the Mandated Territories. Although he denied that the subject was actively receiving consideration, Chamberlain's declaration that it would be "unreasonable ... to predict the action of future governments" appeared to many imperialists to indicate that the government would be open to offers. Such fears were by no means groundless. The possibility of making concessions in Africa in return for German participation in a general European settlement had been under review at the Foreign Office since March 1935. In Vansittart's view Germany's expansionist tendencies had to be accommodated somewhere, since she would "become explosive if it is sought to cramp her everywhere ... If it can't be in Africa, it will be in Europe." He himself had no doubt that Africa, where there were "regions with which we were always well able to dispense," was the preferred alternative.

Once again imperialist dissatisfaction with government policy found its chief spokesman in Leo Amery, aided and abetted in the Commons by the young imperialists around Duncan Sandys, who were assisting him against sanctions. Indeed, it was while these two campaigns were running concurrently, in the early summer of 1936, that members of Amery's coterie were at their most obstreperous on the subject, bombarding their own Front Bench with demands for the decisive and categorical rebuttal of German claims which they felt Chamberlain had denied them. Although their efforts elicited only evasive replies, they did succeed in rallying considerable parliamentary support, securing 120 signatures for a Commons motion declaring "that the transfer of any British Mandated Territory is not a discussable question." Amongst Tory grass roots imperialist agitation was even more successful. At the Conservative Party Conference in September 1936 a
"standfast" resolution sponsored by Amery was carried with a substantial majority.7

The implacable opposition to Germany's colonial demands in imperialist ranks by no means presupposed hostility to Germany per se. Far from it. As we have seen, anti-communism and isolationism generated in such circles a marked tendency to eschew confrontation with Germany over Europe. Several imperialists, while remaining resolutely anti-German on this issue, had shown themselves to be genuinely sympathetic to Germany in other areas. Others, in an inversion of Vansittart's views, were more than happy to see Germany satiated in Europe, if that would deflect her from a colonial challenge. Duncan Sandys was perhaps the most outspoken exponent of this last viewpoint. In his maiden speech in 1935 he declared it to be "the first elementary duty of British statesmanship to see to it that the great energies, ambitions and enthusiasms of the new Germany are directed into channels where they will not clash with the essential interests of Great Britain." If Germany was prepared to renounce her colonial ambitions, he for one could not "too strongly urge His Majesty's Government ... to lend a sympathetic ear to Germany's legitimate claims and aspirations in other fields."8

Those who supported some degree of colonial redistribution in Germany's favour also displayed a diversity of motivation. Richard Griffiths sees them as essentially falling into three main categories. The first consisted of those primarily concerned with the justice of German claims, and included such figures as Lord Noel-Buxton, Viscount Astor and Arnold Toynbee.9 Many of them had previously recorded their sympathy with other German grievances arising from the Versailles settlement. The second group comprised those individuals of firmly established pro-German or pro-Nazi views, for whom the issue provided a further platform for exposition of the German viewpoint. Lastly, there were those who stressed the dire consequences of a stubborn refusal to accommodate German demands. Was war really worth waging, they asked, to defend "the last outstanding blunder of Versailles," especially as many of them believed that "but for this question there is no direct occasion of quarrel between Germany and ourselves."10 This last category noticeably swelled in numbers in late 1937, spurred by the growing awareness of German military strength. A notable convert in October was The Times. While qualifying its support for any scheme of colonial restitution with the rider that it could only take place within some greater scheme of European pacification, it nonetheless promoted the issue with considerable enthusiasm.
Towards the end of 1937 the opponents of colonial transfer were only too aware of the ground they had lost since the summer of 1936. After a meeting of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee in November, Leo Amery lamented that "a great many Members had got a regular attack of fright about the German demand and were all inclined to some sort of surrender to avoid what they feared might be an ultimatum."^11

Prior to the First World War enthusiasm for the Empire was an integral and fundamental component in the zeitgeist of the British people as a whole, but arguably among the Scots it had established its firmest roots. In the intellectualisation of the Scottish sense of dual identity, participation in Empire had come to be seen as the primary justification for the abnegation of nationhood in 1707, providing not only material benefit, but the opportunity to participate in a greater, supranational endeavour. As settlers, adventurers, soldiers and administrators, Scots had played a disproportionately greater role in the creation of the Empire. Scotland's industrial development had been shaped, and her subsequent prosperity buttressed, by the export markets created by imperial development. By the end of the nineteenth century pride in Scottish achievement was inextricably interwoven with pride in imperial achievement. This was particularly obvious in the industrial West. Glasgow's soubriquet, the Second City of Empire, encapsulated an attitude of mind rather more than it recognised mere physical size.\(^1\)

With the territorial spoils of victory the Empire emerged from the First World War covering a greater proportion of the earth's surface than ever before. The imperial dream, however, had undoubtedly faded. Aggression had always been an essential component in the will to empire, and the slaughter of the trenches, in which Scots, true to their stronger militaristic traditions, had taken disproportionately heavy casualties, had sapped the British people's aggressive impulses. Milnerites might cling to their vision of a federated future, and Die-Hards to an unyielding continuation of the past, but for the majority of the populace the imperial idiom had lost its vigour. With the post-war settlement ostensibly founded on the principle of self-determination, the very concept of empire had become for many an anachronism. Others, more sympathetically, saw in the growing self-assertiveness of the Dominions the approaching fulfilment of the imperial tutelary purpose. For the Scots, however, the onset of a post-imperial age appeared all the...
more immediate, as the economic prosperity which had underpinned imperial self-assurance was replaced by economic stagnation, which, by the 1930s, showed every sign of being endemic. Given the strength of her former enthusiasm for empire, and her more abrupt and brutal introduction to the passing of the imperial age, it might be anticipated, therefore, that the colonial debate in Scotland would display a distinctively Scottish character.

The general pattern of Scottish opposition to colonial concessions, however, closely paralleled British responses. Imperialists who regarded the proposition as "unthinkable" and urged immediate rejection of Germany's "audacious" demands were once again in the forefront. From the Left came opposition to an action which would "bolster up" Nazism and was hardly calculated to be in the best interests of the native populations. For others, such as the Duchess of Atholl and Capt. McEwen, resistance to colonial transfer was a natural extension of their desire to oppose German aggrandisement elsewhere.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the "No Surrender" lobby was the eruption of vehemently anti-German comment, reflecting the residual strength of attitudes generated by the First World War. Those who held German war guilt to be absolute declared that, having "asked for trouble," Germany richly deserved forfeiting her colonies, and deeply resented "the gambler" coolly demanding "the return of his lost stake." Such sentiments had to a very large extent lain dormant as Hitler set about dismantling the other constraints of Versailles. The demand for British territory, however, clearly struck a nerve. The character assassination of the German people within the confines of the colonial debate was quite without parallel in discussion of European issues. As might be expected, much of this invective came from strongly imperialist sources.

One of the most savage denunciations of German claims came from Lord Mansfield, speaking as ever not only for himself, but also for the Imperial Policy Group. Germany's former territories, he declared, had been forfeited as "a result of her wilful precipitation of the world into the conflagration of 1914." There was "no ethical reason whatsoever" for returning them. The "atrocities" the Germans had in the past inflicted upon the native populations of their former Empire were already on record, and the present "calculated, cruel, sadistic persecution" of Jews and religious dissidents in Germany itself hardly augured well for any native races placed in their care in the future. Germany was quite simply not "the moral equal"
of Britain. Mansfield had not voiced such hard-hitting criticism of Germany's internal policies in debate on other issues. As we have seen, both Mansfield and the IPG were decidedly soft when it came to opposing Germany's European aspirations, particularly her territorial ambitions in the East. Germany might "oppress Jews and Christians alike," but that, apparently, was only a significant factor when British territory was at stake.17

Imperialist opposition to Germany's claims provided one of the few distinctively Scottish contributions to the colonial debate, in the shape of Lewis Spence. Running parallel with his commitment to Scottish self-government was an equally vigorous endorsement of Scottish participation in the British imperial mission. The left-wingers and fundamentalists within the SNP were strongly anti-imperialist, regarding the Scots as one of the first subject peoples to fall victim to English imperialism, however much they had connived at, and benefitted from, the subjugation of others. For Spence, and other right-wingers in the national movement, an integral feature of the self-government he envisaged was recognition of Scotland's status as a Mother Nation of Empire. The language with which Spence rejected Germany's colonial claims was as absolute any utterance by a more orthodox imperialist, and expressed a belief in the wickedness of the German race, past, present and future, that was without qualification. Since their first appearance in history, Spence claimed, the Germans had "revealed a native passion for strife, conquest and discord." Guilty of "atrocities so monstrous that humanity can never forgive or forget them" during the First World War, the Germans still sought "to overrun Europe and inflict upon it a Teutonic hegemony." The Nazi régime itself was "a rampant tyranny of the most brutal and remorseless kind," but that was only to be expected of a people with a natural preference for harsh and authoritarian government. If the "colony-yielders" hoped to appease the Germans "by throwing them sops, as to Cerberus," they were "woefully mistaken," for it would only be seen in Germany as "a sign of the most fatal weakness" and "add fuel to the already engorged national vanity." The robustness of Spence's comments on this theme makes it crystal clear that his support for the fundamentalist SNP line during the Rhineland crisis had in no sense been prompted by empathy with Germany. It took the colonial issue, however, to reveal Spence's true colours. "We will retain these colonies until they are taken from us," he thundered.18

Many Scottish imperialists, however, while adamantly opposing Germany's
colonial demands, pointedly refrained from tarnishing their arguments with anti-German vitriol. Lord Stonehaven claimed to yield to no-one in his "desire to see far better relations with Germany," yet he viewed her return to Africa as "intolerable" because of the implications for Imperial defence. Although he refused to endorse criticism of Germany's past colonial record, he dismissed her claim to have a moral right to colonies as absurd. No nation had a "right" to colonies as such. Besides, in the pre-war years the Mandated Territories had only managed to supply a "negligible" percentage of Germany's raw material requirements, a mere "decimal of a decimal." The sooner Germany was told that there was no question of getting her colonies back, he believed, the better it would be for Anglo-German relations.19

Some of the imperialist opponents of colonial restitution had shown a marked sympathy for Germany on other issues, and would continue to do so. Viscount Elibank, for instance, put down one of the first "standfast" resolutions in the House of Lords in February 1936.20 A month later he was defending German remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Whatever their private thoughts, no Scottish imperialist was prepared to publicly match Duncan Sandys' frank enthusiasm for cynical horse-trading. Many, however, no doubt shared his belief in the absolute primacy of Imperial self-interest.

The arguments advanced by Scottish advocates of colonial concessions to Germany were essentially identical to those deployed south of the Border. As in England, the issue tapped a deep vein of guilt over Germany's post-war treatment. For some, conscious of the vital role colonies had played in Britain's national development and sense of self, Germany's loss in this sphere seemed particularly harsh. How would Britain feel, they asked, if her colonies had "been wrenched from us as spoils of war?"21 Others saw in some of the arguments advanced by their opponents a recrudescence of the vindictive anti-German spirit of the immediate post-war years. Defending Germany's pre-war colonial record against charges of brutality and maladministration, the journalist, Patrick Balfour,22 denounced "the distorting mirrors of Versailles" for their legacy of myth and untruth.23

A belief in the flawed nature of the Versailles settlement was shared by Arthur Berriedale Keith, probably the most distinguished Scottish exponent of Germany's
colonial claims, and certainly the most determined. Described by an English 
colleague as "the chief ornament of Scottish learning," Berriedale Keith was 
undoubtedly one of Scotland's foremost academics. Born in 1879, he had achieved 
considerable renown as an orientalist, specialising in the Vedic period, and had a 
prodigious list of scholarly texts on the subject to his name. In 1914 he had been 
appointed Regius Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Edinburgh 
University, a post he occupied until his death in 1944. He was, however, better 
known for his writing on British constitutional law, an interest he pursued in 
tandem with his oriental studies, after an early career in the Colonial Office. His 
Subsequently reissued in revised and expanded forms, it gave rise to a series of 
titles in a similar vein, such as The Sovereignty of the British Dominions (1929) 
and The Governments of the British Empire (1935). Though prone to "excessive 
legalism" and "crabbed obscurity," Berriedale Keith was arguably the leading 
constitutional theorist of his day. At the time of his death his legal works were still 
considered to provide authoritative reference and were likely to be "quoted on both 
25 sides in any constitutional crisis within the Commonwealth."

Politically Berriedale Keith was a Liberal. Between 1916 and 1924, as a 
member of the Scottish Liberal Federation, he had been largely concerned with the 
production of Liberal electoral propaganda. Pressed on several occasions by local 
Liberal associations to stand for Parliament, he finally accepted nomination as 
prospective Liberal candidate for Glasgow Central in 1922. His candidacy, 
however, was not endorsed by the Liberal Party's national organisers, amidst 
speculation that an electoral pact was to be concluded with the Conservatives, 
giving Asquith a free run in Paisley and leaving Bonar Law unopposed in Glasgow 
Central. In a confused and acrimonious situation the Liberals did eventually field a 
candidate, but by that stage Berriedale Keith had withdrawn, furious at having been 
placed in what he held to be a humiliating position. The recriminations which 
surrounded this affair perhaps go some way to explaining his subsequent departure 
from the SLF two years later. The reason Berriedale Keith himself gave for this 
decision, however, was that he wished to "be free to address issues without any 
restraint that might come from being an officer of a political party."

Certainly his faith in Liberalism was unaffected by this parting of the ways.

Berriedale Keith's political preferences cast his interpretations of constitutional 
law and theory in a decidedly Liberal mould. During the 1920s he was sharply
critical of the Foreign Office's failure to appreciate the extent to which the Dominions had acquired a greater legal independence. More controversially, in the 1930s he defended the Irish Free State's right to redefine its relationship within the Commonwealth and its decision to adopt Republican status. On India he wished to see "orderly yet speedy transition to responsible government with dominion status," ending his A Constitutional History of India 1600-1935 (1936) with a list of constitutional precedents establishing the case for such a development.

Berriedale Keith was "antipathetic" to the National Government throughout its life, not simply because many of its actions, in his judgement, displayed lack of both courage and wisdom, but because he believed it to be governing in an increasingly unconstitutional fashion. Initially he denounced MacDonald's decision to cling to office, given his lack of a substantial party base, and Baldwin's subsequent exercise of power without the accountability of the premiership, as running counter to the conventions of government established in the twentieth century. Later he came to see the extent of the National Government's electoral successes in 1931 and 1935 as having undermined the democratic process by rendering the Opposition too weak to fulfil its prescribed parliamentary function. In the absence of effective parliamentary restraint, the executive, he argued, was increasingly governing without due regard to the wishes of the governed. This tendency, he believed, was most marked in the direction the National Government was choosing to pursue in foreign policy. Although he first raised this concern during Baldwin's premiership over the government's handling of the Abyssinian crisis, his most trenchant criticisms on this score emerged after Chamberlain effectively assumed personal direction of foreign policy.

Like many other Liberals, Berriedale Keith subscribed to the belief that the First World War had been the product of rival European alliances, rather than wilful German aggression. He therefore considered the punitive peace settlement, "imposed by force of arms," to be of doubtful justice. Reparations had been "patently ill conceived," and had left a legacy of international bitterness and economic disruption. Although a strong supporter of the League of Nations and the concept of collective security, he was sharply critical of the linkage between the Covenant of the League and the Versailles settlement. This had ensured that Articles 10 and 16 would serve to effect a "stereotyping of the status quo," and created a dangerous impasse by giving discontented nations "no method of redress from an
unduly favoured beneficiary of the treaty against the will of the latter, except through a formal breach of the treaty." After the Rhineland crisis Berriedale Keith added his voice to the chorus of those who believed it essential to "bring back Germany to friendly relations with Europe." The alternative to conciliation, he tartly pointed out, "may be seen in defence estimates of £188,167,700."  

Berriedale Keith was no Germanophile, and his vision of German reconciliation with the rest of Europe assumed a rigid adherence by Britain to her existing international obligations, and the revision of Versailles, however "imperfect," through proper international negotiation. The Anglo-German Naval Treaty he denounced as a "serious derogation from international law," which could only lead to "further invasion" of the Versailles Treaty. He was, in essence, an ethical appeaser. However, like so many of the individuals motivated primarily by a concern for European peace and "justice" for Germany, he stepped beyond the bounds of mere advocacy of treaty revision. As a true democrat, he had no intrinsic empathy with the totalitarianism of the Nazi régime. However, he did recognise it as representing "the deliberate will of the German people," and he strongly reproached those who indulged in criticism of Nazi internal policies. Such behaviour was "merely calculated to embitter feeling between the two countries." Germany's internal policies, he argued, were her own affair, and they were "irrelevant" to the discussion of international relations. Another strand in Berriedale Keith's views, which set him apart from other ethical appeasers, was the vigour with which he contended that the indigenous inhabitants of the Mandated Territories would be no worse off under German rule. To assert that transferring the native populations to German administration would be a betrayal of the Imperial "trust," he claimed, was just so much hypocrisy, when there was ample evidence to demonstrate "only too painfully how much we ourselves fall below our theoretical standards." Much in the manner of the ILP, Berriedale Keith's belief in the flawed nature of British imperialism offered a comparative defence of Nazi governmental practice. Nazism might be "bad," but from a native standpoint British imperialism was no better, and Britons were certainly in no position to adopt a high moral tone. This comparative defence he extended to include Nazi racial theory. To those who claimed that the Nazis' belief in the superiority of the "Aryan" race rendered them unfit to govern native people, he recommended study of the white supremacist basis of the South African constitution.
Although he recognised Germany's evident intention to bring about further revision of Versailles in her favour, Berriedale Keith hotly challenged the Duchess of Atholl's contention in the summer of 1936 "that the real danger in Europe is from Germany."\(^{38}\) He had been at the forefront of the Scottish campaign for the resolute application of sanctions against Italy, firmly convinced that should aggression succeed on this occasion, the credibility of collective security would be irreversibly damaged. After sanctions were abandoned he continued to support the cause of the victim through co-operation with the Abyssinia Association and Sylvia Pankhurst's *New Times and Ethiopia News*, and he relentlessly denounced the illegality of any attempt to secure a rapprochement with Italy on the basis of recognition of her conquests. The savage assaults which he directed at Amery and his acolytes in the summer of 1936 were as much due to their desire to heal the breach with Italy as by their parallel opposition to colonial transfer.

Like other supporters of the League during the Rhineland crisis, Berriedale Keith had been disinclined to see attention switched to Germany's misdemeanour. The breach of Locarno, he argued, had been more than matched in the past by the non-observance of treaty stipulations by other powers, particularly France. Above all, though, Germany's sin paled into insignificance alongside the Western powers' "betrayal of Ethiopia"\(^{39}\) despite their "clear obligations under the Covenant." Under the circumstances it was hypocritical "to break faith yourself and denounce others for like action."\(^{40}\)

Not unsurprisingly for one immersed in legal thought, Berriedale Keith viewed international relations in essentially contractual terms, with the interplay of nations regulated and modified by undertakings solemnly entered into and dutifully observed. Breach of treaty he condemned as a crime of almost sacrilegious proportions. Since Versailles, of course, there had been a catalogue of such violations. With retrospect, however, Berriedale Keith judged the Anglo-French failure to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant to have had an effect out of all proportion to the others. Not only had it "destroyed" collective security, but by demonstrating "that public faith could no longer be trusted and that international obligations were all facultative," had effectively shattered confidence in the whole structure of international law upon which civilised dealings between nations depended.\(^{41}\) It was, he believed, the decisive step in the slide to war, for the international anarchy it unleashed both facilitated, and indeed partly provoked,
subsequent German actions.

From the moment he entered the debate on Germany, Berriedale Keith proposed conciliation almost exclusively on the basis of colonial concessions. Although he had sympathy with Germany's economic arguments, dismissing the imperialists' counter claims on that score as both "peculiarly injudicious" and "dishonest," he believed that the core of the problem was that for Germany it was "a matter of national honour." Germany had never accepted the judgement of Versailles that she was unfit to exercise an imperial role, and would not rest until that slur on the nation's name had been revoked. Amelioration of her economic grievances by other means would not in the long run suffice, for Germany would not be "satisfied by anything short of some territorial restoration."

In Berriedale Keith's view there was no moral justification for Germany's colonial proscription. While her past colonial record was not without its blemishes, it stood favourable comparison with that of other powers, and had not been disgraced by "such misgovernment as marked the Congo and the French Congo." Nor, he argued, was Germany's continued exclusion from colonial possessions consistent with Anglo-French acquiescence in Italy's forcible acquisition of Abyssinia. Furthermore, he regarded it as morally indefensible "to cling to these conquests ... if by surrendering them we could make real progress towards European appeasement and disarmament." Given that "the price for appeasement of Germany must be paid," how could Britain and the Dominions justify their apparent insistence that others should make the sacrifices?

Despite his general relief in the excessive harshness and injustice of Germany's post-war treatment, Berriedale Keith held no brief for the rectification of her European boundaries. As a committed champion of the rights of the Spanish Republic, he vehemently condemned Germany's intervention in Spain, while recognising Italy's greater culpability. To an even greater extent than the Foreign Office, he believed fulfilment of Germany's colonial demands could be traded for guarantees of German good behaviour in Europe. Indeed, despite his belief in the inherent injustice of continuing to deprive Germany of colonies, he considered restitution could only be justified "as a means of inducing Germany to abandon her policy of aggression and to co-operate in the reduction of armaments and the establishment of security in Europe." That, he stressed, included "Germany laying
aside her designs in the East."^ 46

Nonetheless, although Berriedale Keith returned to this theme time and again, it was very much a case of extracting benefit from a concession he believed would inevitably have to be made if peace were to be preserved. Not for a moment did he doubt the importance which Germany attached to the colonial question. Far from it. He genuinely believed that Germany would willingly forego her European aspirations if only her colonial grievances were redressed, and viewed her belligerence in Europe as largely inspired by lack of satisfaction on the issue. Hitler's assistance to Franco he asserted to be "patently in revenge for our refusal to consider his colonial claims," since a Nationalist victory would threaten Britain's position in the Western Mediterranean. For as long as Britain refused to discuss the question, she would face "German hostility and willingness to strike at our interests in every quarter."^ 47

The advocates of colonial retrocession included many of those whose concern for peace and "justice" for Germany had led to the expression of moderate pro-German views on other issues. Restoring the colonies "torn away" from Germany in 1918, predicted the Glasgow Liberal, Andrew Law, would "heal the festering sore in the heart of Europe." It would be, he argued in the context of 1937, a final act of contrition, for of the punitive and unjust post-war settlement nothing "remains but the colonial problem."^ 48 Helen Morison stressed the peace dividend of colonial retrocession. If Britain were only to "do the right thing, in justice to ourselves, to Germany, and for the sake of world peace," she would "not only gain the friendship of Germany but the respect of the whole world." Like Berriedale Keith, Morison argued that the indigenous inhabitants of the Mandated Territories would be no worse off under German rule. Her public doubts as to the inherent superiority of British colonial rule presented the same comparative defence of Nazi governmental practice. "Are our own colonies in Africa or Palestine or other places so excellently administered?" she queried. "We are too superior in this regard and should be more ready to acknowledge the organising powers of other nations."^ 49

Germany's colonial claims were also championed by the more ardent Germanophiles. Echoing German propaganda on the subject, they tended to place greater emphasis on Germany's economic need for colonies, though they seldom overlooked the injustice of the Versailles settlement. The German people's fitness to fulfil an imperial role also figured strongly, as did the importance of an amicable
solution to the problem for the future of Anglo-German relations.

Indignant at the endeavours of the "No Surrender" lobby to dismiss or at least trivialise German economic arguments, Capt. Luttman-Johnson railed against the hypocrisy of "the owners of a fifth of the globe" speaking "to the Have-Nots in such a way." Besides, he recalled, had not Wilson's Fourteen Points promised "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustments of all colonial claims"? As for the arguments of those who stressed the strategic dangers of allowing Germany back into Africa, "why should Germany be singled out as a possible aggressor?" In his view, she "desires nothing so much as our friendship, and will draw nearer to us in the future if we will but treat her fairly over the question of her colonies." An agreement on colonies would prove to be the "foundation stone" of future Anglo-German concord. 50

Professor A.P. Laurie voiced similar sentiments. Germany, he claimed, had been "robbed" of her colonial possessions by Versailles. To return them now would be "an act of friendliness" towards a nation whose "strongest desire" was to obtain "friendship and good understanding with us." Their loss would "hardly be felt by us with our vast possessions." Like Luttman-Johnson, he also endorsed German claims concerning problems of access to produce from the tropical regions. 51

The Earl of Glasgow similarly held Germany to be in "urgent need" of colonies. Extensive tariff barriers in the world economy, he claimed, had made raw materials too expensive for her to obtain elsewhere. He personally advocated in particular the return of Tanganyika, easily the most important of Germany's pre-war possessions. For this, however, he expected a "quid pro quo," either in the form of an undertaking not to build military bases there, or a guarantee "to remain neutral if at any time our Colonies in distant parts are attacked by some other Power." 52 On this last point at least Glasgow once again reflected prevailing naval preoccupations. After the Japanese assault on China in July 1937 the navy had become increasingly concerned about the possibility of a strike against British possessions in the Far East.

One of the more notable pro-German enthusiasts, however, displayed a distinct reticence as debate on the fate of Germany's colonies gathered pace in 1937, namely
T.C.R. Moore. This was perhaps surprising, as Moore had taken up the question of colonial transfer long before it developed into a major issue. As early as 1933 he had recommended the return of the colonies on the grounds that they would provide Germany with "an outlet for her energies." By 1937, however, he was content simply to defend Germany's right to air her colonial grievances. It was but another example of Moore's growing tendency to temper his earlier outspokenness on behalf of Germany.

Many of those who advocated returning the Mandated Territories clearly did so not out of any genuine sympathy for Germany, nor through belief in the justice of her case, but simply because they could not accept that their retention justified running the risk of war. Dr. A.J. Brock once again expressed his belief that the price of peace was always worth paying. Given the growing intensity of German demands, he urged the immediate concession of Tanganyika to provide a "breathing space." In the long run, however, Brock believed nothing short of full retrocession would satisfy Germany's "nationalistic amour propre." The alternative was war, "the worst of all possible evils." However, such frank endorsement of the morality of abject surrender was rare. Most of those who shared Brock's willingness to yield at pistol point expressed themselves in euphemisms reminiscent of the language used by the Conservative "Realist-Pacifists" during the anti-sanctions campaign. Those who hoped that Britain might yet "gain a friend by generosity," or stated their belief that the time had come for her to make a positive contribution to the peace process, were, it seems reasonable to surmise, motivated more by fear than by any generosity of spirit.

Debate on the colonial issue did not revolve solely around the return or retention of Germany's former colonies. Many of those who voiced sympathy with Germany's claims to be suffering economic duress, through lack of access to sources of raw materials, saw the solution to the problem, not in terms of territorial transfer, but in a return to a world economy based on Free Trade. Although this theme surfaced at times within Labour ranks, its most vigorous promoters were members of the Liberal Party.

For the Liberals Free Trade was more than just a central tenet of political faith. It
defined their very identity as a separate party. Despite initial prevarication, it had been their inability to endorse the establishment of Imperial Preference at the Ottawa Conference which had driven the Liberals to withdraw from the National Government in 1933. In the years immediately subsequent to that decision, Free Trade provided the only clear-cut ideological differentiator between the independent Liberals and their Liberal National rivals. In Liberal eyes a return to Free Trade was not only viewed as essential for the reinvigoration of an ailing domestic economy, it was also regarded as being the most effective curative for the world's problems, both economic and political. According to the Liberal analysis, the domination of the post-war global economy by tariff barriers and economic nationalism was the root cause of current international tensions. Territorial grievances and ideological differences paled into insignificance beside the economic dynamic. "The tree of Protection and economic nationalism is in flower," declared the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair. "Unless we cut it down it will bear fruit after its kind and the fruit will be war."\textsuperscript{57}

The problem of access to raw materials was central to this analysis. Those nations with extensive domestic resources, such as the USSR and USA, and those able to supplement their needs from overseas possessions, such as Britain and France, were well placed to survive in the current economic climate. These were the satiated powers. Those countries which lacked these advantages, notably Germany, Italy and Japan, as the Secretary of the Scottish Liberal Federation, Ranald Findlay, explained, "either cannot obtain necessary raw materials, or have sound cause for fearing that they will be unable to obtain them in the future, because restrictions of a discriminatory character in colonial markets prevent them from exchanging their own produce in payment."\textsuperscript{58} These "suffocated"\textsuperscript{59} powers could not be expected to endure their predicament ad infinitum, and inevitably they would seek to resolve the problem. Already they had demonstrated by their bellicose actions their intention to change the world order and their willingness to use force in the process.

Carrying the argument one stage further, Findlay held that, while ultimately the fears and insecurities of the "Have-Not" powers could only be assuaged by a full return to global Free Trade, if Britain at this juncture were to throw open her own colonial markets, it would provide immediate relief to the "Have-Nots," and also raise the prospect of further developments in the same direction, thus encouraging these powers to realise that alternatives to war might be possible.
Although Findlay was perhaps the most outspoken exponent of this theme in Scotland, his views were entirely consistent with official Liberal policy, a point he himself was at pains to stress. In May 1937 several leading Scottish public figures endorsed Findlay's stance in a joint declaration. Citing Imperial Preference as "one of the chief obstacles to peaceful international settlement" and the principal cause of other nations' demands for colonies, they called for an immediate return to an Open Door colonial policy. Although the signatories did not claim to speak for the Liberal Party, most were well known for their Liberal sympathies. They included Sir Thomas Glen-Coats, a wealthy and influential figure in the Scottish Liberal hierarchy, G.F. Barbour, Vice Chairman of the Scottish National Council of the LNU and a former Liberal candidate, Sir Daniel Stevenson and Sir Alexander MacEwan. In recent years MacEwan had become better known for his support for Scottish Nationalism, but he had originally established a political name for himself in Inverness-shire local government, serving as a Liberal.

With its empathy for German economic grievances, the Liberal economic analysis at times bore a striking resemblance to the case for colonial transfer as advanced both by the Germans themselves and by more enthusiastically pro-German individuals, particularly those with strongly pro-Nazi views, like Capt. Luttman-Johnson. Even the terminology of "Have" and "Have-Not" powers was common currency in both camps. The similarity, however, lay more in semantics than in substance, with both groups advocating different solutions to Germany's problems. Although several of its advocates displayed pro-German sympathies on other occasions, the Liberal colonial policy was not intrinsically pro-German. It was, rather, a policy of economic appeasement.

Findlay and his Free Trade adherents somewhat pointedly chose to ignore the question of colonial transfer. Given the paramountcy of economic determinants in the Liberal analysis, by tackling the fundamental economic grievances of the "Have-Nots," a return to Free Trade would, by implication, render actual ownership of colonial territories irrelevant. This certainly was the position adopted by the Liberal leadership, including Lothian, for all his pro-German sympathies. It enabled them to castigate the National Government for its negative approach to the problem, and to pour scorn on the "No Surrender" imperialists for their blinkered confrontationalism. Their stance, by contrast, allowed them to appear both positive and conciliatory towards Germany, yet at the same time deny her her imperial
ambitions. A diplomatic veil could thus be conveniently drawn over the issue of entrusting natives to a régime which many Liberals would have declared unfit to exercise imperial responsibilities.

A Liberal commitment to Free Trade, however, did not necessarily preclude consideration of actual transfer of territory. A.P. Laurie combined support for the return of Germany's colonies with calls for the resurrection of the Congo Basin Free Trade Area. Although his Liberal credentials were by now decidedly suspect, his claim that Britain was becoming "an intolerable menace to the world's economy," through her use of "tariffs, quotas, preferential treatment," was in effect merely a hyperbolic version of the views of his erstwhile colleagues. The idiosyncratic Laurie apart, sympathy for Germany's post-war grievances were, as we have seen, strongly rooted in Liberal ranks. This could extend, as in the case of Andrew Law, to support for colonial retrocession, whatever the official party line.

Sympathy for the economic grievances of the "Have-Not" powers and criticism of British "hypocrisy" on the subject was also expressed by LNU activists angered by Anglo-French ambitions to retain "the lion's share" of colonial territory for their own economic exploitation. Unlike Helen Morison, however, most LNU contributors to the colonial debate were also vehemently opposed to handing the Mandated Territories back to Germany. That, they contended, would merely substitute "one imperialist Government for another." Instead, their solution was the renunciation of all colonial possessions, imperialism being "quite inconsistent with the maintenance of any system of international justice," and the establishment of an International Board of Control, under League supervision, to administer all former colonies.

As in England, Scottish debate on the colonial question peaked in October 1937. At the start of the year expressions of opposition to the concept of colonial transfer had markedly outnumbered those in favour in The Scotsman's correspondence columns. By October, however, public opinion had "advanced," and the balance had decisively moved to the opposite camp. Although to some extent this process had been a progressive one, The Times' conversion appears to have greatly accelerated the shift. The Scotsman itself performed a rapid about-face following The Times' lead. As late as early September The Scotsman saw "no reason" why Germany's "appetite for Imperial prestige should be gratified." By the end of
October, however, it was claiming that since "satisfaction of Germany's colonial claims would take away the rankling sense of injustice, and the feeling of inferiority, due to the denial of her colonial rights ... it might be worth doing." The colonial question provided one of the major controversies of 1937 in Scotland, attracting more comment than any other aspect of Anglo-German relations. Indeed, the only international issue to generate a greater volume of correspondence was the Spanish Civil War. The attention paid to the subject, however, belied its true importance within the Anglo-German debate, for it attained prominence only in the absence of a major diplomatic crisis with Germany. Although there would be enthusiasts who continued to pursue the subject well into 1938, for the public at large it was firmly pushed into the background by European developments.

The colonial debate does appear to have excited greater interest in Scotland, a reflection perhaps of past enthusiasms. However, the arguments deployed and the patterns of response were remarkably similar to those of Britain as a whole, and contrary to what one might have expected, there is no hard evidence to suggest that resistance to colonial concessions commanded greater support. In Griffiths' view the colonial question did not significantly affect underlying attitudes to Germany, whatever the position adopted by the participants. The debate, he stresses, was "completely separate, and in no way influential." This analysis is equally valid for Scotland, although it is worth noting the extent to which the debate drew out latent anti-German sentiment, especially among imperialists, and gave sharper definition to the views of those who, like Mansfield, had been largely reticent on the subject of Nazi internal policies. This feature of the debate, however, was not confined to Scotland.

Although the intensification of Germany's demands for restitution provided structure and chronology to the colonial debate, for many of its participants attitudes to Germany, if not irrelevant, were certainly secondary. While the pros and cons of concessions to Germany constituted one axis of discussion, the debate was as much about attitudes to the administration, morality and intrinsic worth of Empire.

The imperialists had no doubts as to the essential value of Empire, both to Britain and her subject peoples, and had no qualms as to the morality of developing colonial territories for the benefit of the Mother Country. Their opposition to
colonial transfer, whatever the arguments they deployed, was based above all on a fierce reluctance to yield territory to any other power, not just Germany.73

Many of the imperialists' most vigorous critics in the debate shared their opposition to returning the Mandated Territories. The rejection of colonial transfer was implicit in the Liberal economic analysis of the colonial problem. The imperialists' commitment to Protection, however, ensured that the main thrust of the Liberal Free Traders' argument would be directed against them. Similarly, because of their vehement opposition to all forms of imperialism, the LNU activists who advocated placing Germany's former colonies under international supervision also viewed the imperialists as their principal antagonists.

There was, too, a strong undercurrent of anti-imperialism, or at the very least imperial self-doubt, amongst those who at first sight were primarily motivated by the justice of Germany's demands for retrocession. For Berriedale Keith, Britain's treatment of her colonial subjects in some cases was so exploitative and lacking in moral foundation, that he could not view Nazi rule, despite its fundamental racism, as likely to be any worse for the inhabitants of the Mandated Territories. Helen Morison took a similarly dim view of Britain's colonial record. Others reflected the anti-imperial views of an earlier generation. Andrew Law's desire to put to rights the last error of Versailles was manifestly genuine, but he would also shed no tears for the loss of the Mandated Territories. An opponent of imperial adventurism in the nineteenth century radical Liberal mould,74 he believed no colony had ever been "directly profitable to the Mother Country."75

This anti-imperialist undercurrent was sufficiently strong for Lewis Spence to assert that advocacy of colonial restitution was "almost entirely confined to persons associated with our Universities or those who affect a lofty and liberal intellectualism."76 Spence no doubt had Berriedale Keith specifically in mind. In typical Spence fashion, it was both a simplification and an exaggeration, truer of the anti-imperial lobby within the debate than the supporters of Germany's claims. Nonetheless, there was more than a grain of truth in Spence's contention, especially during the early phases of the debate before those primarily motivated by fear of Germany added their voices. Apart from enthusiastically pro-Nazi individuals, like Luttman-Johnson and A.P. Laurie, most of Germany's right-wing friends deserted her on this issue, their commitment to imperialism proving stronger than their
sympathy for Germany. In their absence advocacy of Germany's colonial claims devolved largely on those of moderate and liberal sympathies.
Chapter 10
Footnotes

1. The willingness was more apparent than real, since German shipyards' building capacity fell far short of the limits set. See Wilhelm Deist, *The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament*, London, 1981, pp. 76 ff, for German naval ambitions.

2. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 246.


12. For the role of Scots in the creation of the Empire, see Andrew Dewar Gibb, *Scottish Empire*, London, 1937.

13. It should also be pointed out, however, that positive antipathy to imperial adventurism, if not to the concept of Empire itself, was also stronger in Scotland at the turn of the century, due to the greater resilience of Gladstonian radicalism. The degree of Scottish opposition to the South African War was unmatched south of the Border.


20. The motion was not put to a vote. Elibank withdrew it at the request of the Colonial Secretary, J.H. Thomas, after the latter claimed it would cause the government “considerable embarrassment.” See Memorandum by Elibank, 7th February 1936, and J.H. Thomas to Elibank, 4th February 1936, Elibank Papers (ELI) GD 32/25/63.


27. Ibid., p. 228.


29. See *Scotsman*, 4th August 1936.


35. Berriedale Keith's insistence that the native populations of the Mandated Territories were not legally British subjects, and therefore did not possess the rights such status conferred, was seized upon by his opponents to demonstrate that he was both pettily legalistic and callously indifferent to the fate of native people. Although there was certainly truth in the first charge, the second was absolutely unfounded. He had on many occasions expressed his repugnance of racial discrimination, defending the rights of Britain's small black community and condemning the Kenyan government's policy of white preference in the allocation of land. He had also campaigned at length against the South African government's attempts to encroach on the jurisdiction of its enclave Native Protectorates.


37. See *Scotsman*, 13th July 1936.


42. Berriedale Keith, *Causes*, p. 131.


44. *Scotsman*, 20th October 1937, 29th July 1936.


47. *Scotsman*, 3rd July, 26th June 1937.


55. *Scotsman*, 26th and 7th January, 18th February 1937.


58. *Scotsman*, 16th March 1936.

59. Ibid. Findlay attributed the phrase to Lord Lothian.

60. Findlay made great use of quotations from Lord Lothian. See *Scotsman*, 24th April 1937.


62. Sir Thomas Glen Coats, b. 1878. Glen-Coats' forebears had built up the Paisley cotton thread manufacturers, J. & P. Coats. From them he inherited considerable wealth as well as a family tradition of Liberalism. Both Glen Coats and his wife were members of the SLF executive.


64. The other signatories were Edward Campbell, a member of the SLF executive, J. Jehu, Professor of Geology at Edinburgh University, Sir Andrew Pettigrew, and Sir Matthew Wallace.


73. A recurrent imperialist theme was the claim that such a surrender would seriously weaken Britain's hold on the subject peoples of her other colonies, particularly in Africa. Since "the indigenous inhabitants of Africa have not the reasoning power to judge such sacrifices from the ethical point of view ... instead of respecting us, [they] would only consider we were soft fools and unworthy to have an Empire." Denis Lyell, *Scotsman*, 25th January 1937.

74. Law blamed the last of the great Imperial adventures, the South African War, for having driven an isolated Britain into the fatal French alliance, and through that into involvement in the disaster of the First World War.

75. *Scotsman*, 7th July 1936.

Chapter 11
Appeasement's Flower
The Main Debates of 1938

With the forcible incorporation of Austria in March 1938, Hitler ended the relative if uneasy calm which had surrounded Anglo-German relations since the summer of 1936, and effectively set the tone for the remainder of the year. Austria's subjugation was almost universally regarded as the precursor to further aggressive actions. For the remainder of the year, appreciation of this simple, if brutal, reality would be as central to debate on foreign policy in Britain as it was to the policy formulation of Chamberlain's government. Recognition that the net result of any future crisis might well be European war, with Britain once more pitted against Germany, was implicit in that appreciation. This would be starkly underlined by the September crisis.

Against this menacing international backdrop foreign policy debate in Britain throughout the year was dominated by the concept of "appeasement." Given the subsequent use, or misuse, of the term by both political polemicists and historians, some observations on the meaning of the term, as understood by commentators in the late 1930s, are in order. "Appeasement" had of course long been an accepted part of the English language. Editions of the Oxford English Dictionary published prior to 1933 define the original sense of the word as "a natural satisfaction or conciliation of desires," as in the appeasement of one's appetite.\(^1\) In the 1920s the term began creeping into the political vocabulary. C.P. Scott, writing at the time of Versailles, would appear to have popularised its political application with his advocacy of a "peace of appeasement," by which he meant a non-vindictive and non-punitive settlement calculated to reconcile the former belligerents.\(^2\) However, the term did not become part of the everyday language of political commentary until the late 1930s. Paradoxically, Anthony Eden, subsequently of course hailed as an anti appeaser, helped to confirm the political associations of the word. In June 1936 he publicly stated that the ultimate goals of British foreign policy were nothing less than "a European settlement and appeasement."\(^3\) Thereafter, the frequency of the word's use in reference to international affairs dramatically increased, particularly after Chamberlain's accession to the Premiership and his affirmation of the need to take positive action to improve relations with the fascist powers. By early 1938 "appeasement" had become the principal buzz-word of political
commentators.

Precisely what the term implied, however, varied according to the commentator concerned. As used in conjunction with "European settlement" by Eden in 1936, "appeasement" was effectively synonymous with "pacification," and denoted an objective not a strategy. Essentially that objective was the integration of currently disruptive elements on the international stage, primarily Germany and Italy, in a secure framework for international relations, and the arbitrament of outstanding grievances, by negotiation and compromise, within that framework. That the attainment of this objective would involve concessions to the fascist powers to secure their co-operation was nevertheless understood. Although by the beginning of 1938 some political commentators still used the term "appeasement" in Eden's original sense, for most it had come to embrace both the objective of "pacification" and the conciliatory tactics necessary to secure German and Italian co-operation in its realisation. As the degree of emphasis placed on its component parts varied, and opinions diverged, at times sharply, on the precise nature of the conciliatory tactics to be pursued, "appeasement" was at this stage a decidedly nebulous term, with individuals elaborating on their own preferred form.

For many who used the term, however, "appeasement" primarily described the foreign policy aims, general stance, and initiatives of the Chamberlain government. This meaning of the term was more commonly to be found outwith press comment and editorials, in contributions to foreign policy debate from members of the public, and increasingly from politicians. During the course of 1938 use of the term in this sense steadily intensified. The more generalised sense of the term continued, however, to the extent that even in the period of analysis following the Munich settlement it was possible for commentators critical of Chamberlain's policy to enthusiastically advocate "appeasement." After Chamberlain's policy shift in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the identification between "appeasement" and Chamberlain's former, and now discredited, policy direction was further strengthened, although the two were still not universally regarded as identical. Whatever the precise meaning inferred, one quality common to all advocates of "appeasement" in 1938 was the degree of moral rectitude with which they invested the term. The pejorative association of the term with abject and unprincipled surrender required not only Munich on which to build, but also the failure of Chamberlain's policies to maintain European peace. It was very much
the retrospective achievement of subsequent historiography.

As the wholesale popular adoption of the term suggests, 1938 was the year in which popular enthusiasm for appeasement reached its apogee. With the deterioration of the international situation after the Anschluss, belief in the urgent need for an accommodation with the fascist powers, and Germany in particular, reached record levels. However, in an acceleration of a trend which had begun to set in towards the end of 1937, the nature of public support for appeasement underwent a significant transition. Since Versailles, popular support for a policy of reconciliation towards Germany had been firmly rooted in a broad current of British thought which placed a premium on an ethical approach to foreign policy. As Paul Kennedy has stressed, this current of thought had its origins in High Victorian moral earnestness and a belief in the international harmony between peoples. The profoundly anti-war mood of the British people and widespread popular support for the League of Nations, as well as sympathy for Germany's claims for the "just" revision of Versailles, were all interwar manifestations of this current of thought. During the period 1937-39 these ethical or "positive" factors supportive of appeasement were increasingly displaced by "negative" factors: fear of aerial bombardment and military defeat; fear of communism and British and French socialism; Imperial isolationism and Dominion detachment. The ethical component remained crucial to the sustainability of appeasement. Only when the moral case for the appeasement of Germany finally foundered in the aftermath of Prague in the spring of 1939 was the policy irretrievably undermined. Nevertheless, during the course of 1938 widespread disillusionment with Germany afflicted that broad swathe of moderate opinion, which had formerly provided many of her most vocal advocates. Amongst the disaffected were many liberal and moderate pro-German enthusiasts, whose views in essence mirrored those of orthodox "ethical" appeasement, and who were motivated primarily by genuine concern for "justice" for Germany and a desire to establish a stronger foundation for European peace. Indeed, increasingly they began to reappear in the anti-appeasement camp. Assertion of the justice of certain of Germany's claims was part and parcel of the language of appeasement in 1938. However, in contradistinction to the remaining pro-German enthusiasts, the majority of appeasers in 1938 were not motivated au fond by any real empathy for Germany. Indeed, particularly towards the end of 1938, advocacy of appeasement from some quarters would be accompanied not just with scathing indictment of Nazism, but with negative racist comment on the German people as a whole.
A major factor in determining the shape of debate on appeasement in 1938 was the sudden and unexpected resignation of Eden on February 20th. Eden had initially welcomed Chamberlain's accession to the Premiership. Previously frustrated by Baldwinian irresolution, he had correctly anticipated that Chamberlain would favour a more dynamic direction for British foreign policy. However, by late 1937 their views were diverging. Although both were united on the desirability of a forward policy with a view to securing agreements with the fascist powers, Eden favoured a more cautious and tougher line, particularly where Italy was concerned. In January 1938 differences between the two on both policy and personal levels had been exacerbated by the rebuff which Chamberlain delivered to Roosevelt's proposals for an international conference, an initiative which Eden had viewed with greater optimism. In mid-February, in response to Italian feelers, both men had agreed on the desirability of opening negotiations with Italy. However, the time-scale for achieving the proposed agreement provided the final parting of the ways. On February 12th the Austrian Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, having been summoned to Berchtesgaden, was forced to accept Hitler's peremptory demand for the inclusion of Austrian Nazis in his government. For Chamberlain this further evidence of the erosion of Austrian independence provided confirmation of the need for urgency in securing an accommodation with Italy. Eden, however, had always opposed appearing "over-eager" in dealing with Italy, and Chamberlain's insistence on an immediate start to talks prompted Eden to tender his resignation.

Chamberlain had not sought Eden's resignation, as his detractors subsequently alleged, as part of a deliberate strategy to neutralise the Foreign Office and enable direction of foreign policy by personal cabal. Nor was the policy line pursued by Eden prior to his departure as markedly at variance with that which followed as Eden's hagiographers subsequently claimed. Nevertheless, Eden's departure did mark a significant shift in the direction of British foreign policy. Lord Halifax, Eden's replacement as Foreign Secretary, may not have been the compliant tool of anti-appeasement historiography, but he did provide Chamberlain with a supportive colleague, whose views on strategy and policy aims generally concurred with his own. Freed from the constraints which Eden's presence would have imposed, Chamberlain could now pursue a policy of rapprochement with the fascist powers with greater vigour.

To contemporary observers Eden's departure was certainly held to indicate a
major shift in the direction of foreign policy. To an extent which arguably his policies did not support, Eden had symbolised a tough-talking approach to the dictators. Chamberlain, on the other hand, was already known to favour a more active pursuit of conciliation. That the latter's policy would now be implemented more whole-heartedly was taken as axiomatic. This assumption was reinforced by the nature of Chamberlain's new Foreign Office team. With his new Foreign Secretary sitting in the Lords, a greater involvement by the Premier in foreign affairs was assumed. This impression was further strengthened by the appointment of R.A. Butler, a safe and orthodox Chamberlain supporter, as Halifax's deputy. Further pointers to the future direction of policy could be read into the choice of the enthusiastically pro-German social butterfly, Chips Channon, as Butler's Parliamentary Private Secretary, and the appointment of Alan Lennox-Boyd, long noted for his pro-Italian views, as junior minister at the Ministry of Labour.

Eden had also been viewed as embodying commitment to the League of Nations, and his resignation alone would have been enough to suggest a further weakening of governmental enthusiasm for the ideals of the League. Chamberlain, however, left this issue in no doubt. No longer constrained by the presence of the League's champion, Chamberlain took the opportunity to finally remove the icons of League and "collective security" from the altar of British policy. While professing hopes for the realisation of the League's ideals in some utopian future, he declared the League, "as presently constituted," to be "unable to provide collective security for anybody." It was time for the League to "throw off shams and pretensions which every one sees through," and adjust its ordinances to its capabilities. Chamberlain was in reality only throwing off a few shams and pretensions surrounding the presentation of British foreign policy, for the League had ceased to be a central reference point for policy formulation with the abandonment of sanctions, if indeed it had ever held as exalted a status. Nevertheless, formal recognition of this state of affairs was an important event. For the League's supporters it symbolised the final betrayal of the hopes and aspirations of a generation. For the Conservative right-wing it marked a return to a truly "British" foreign policy based on realism. For many, although by no means all, of those who espoused closer ties with the fascist powers, it signalled the removal of a major obstacle to further treaty revision and the attainment of their ultimate aims.

First reactions to Eden's resignation by the press were dominated by a sense of shock and surprise. Even in papers normally loyal to the National Government
there was consternation that the resignation should have occurred at such a critical juncture in international relations. However, in Conservative ranks a rallying of opinion behind Chamberlain's new line quickly set in. Of the main Conservative papers, only the *Yorkshire Post* maintained a pro-Eden line. In parliamentary ranks a similar rallying of support for Chamberlain took place, as moderate Conservative opinion proved to be far more amenable to Chamberlain's change of direction than some observers had anticipated. The debate in the House of Commons which followed Eden's resignation terminated with the defeat of a formal motion of no confidence in the government's foreign policy. Only one National Government supporter, Vyvyan Adams, voted with the Opposition, and around twenty to twenty-five registered their dissent by abstention. Eden and his supporters may have found themselves thrust into co-existence with Churchill's coterie and a few other rebels in Charmley's "Cave of Adullam," but the limited antagonism of this group was more than compensated for by improved relations with the Right of the party. Leo Amery considered Chamberlain's speech to the Commons on February 22nd to be "the first breath of fresh air on the government front bench for many long years." A large number of isolationists and opponents of the League of Nations on the Conservative Right, who had chafed at the bit during Eden's tenure, heartily shared Amery's sentiments. On foreign policy the Conservative party was now more unified than it had been for years.

For Amery satisfaction at the final abandonment of an ostensibly League based policy was mixed with appreciation of Chamberlain's determination to pursue rapprochement with Italy. In his contribution to the Commons debate after Eden's resignation he emphasised the need to "let bygones be bygones" where Italy was concerned, and stressed the strategic desirability of detaching Italy from her Anti-Comintern partners. Many who shared Amery's views on this score took this opportunity to voice similar sentiments, both inside and outside Parliament. Given the circumstances of Eden's resignation this was to be expected. Attitudes to Germany, on the other hand, had not formed part of the immediate context of Eden's resignation, and his departure was not greeted by a marked outburst of pro-German sentiment. Nevertheless, the relevance of Chamberlain's change of tack to relations with Germany was self-evident, and pro-German enthusiasts were not slow to register their satisfaction, as Lord Lothian did in the House of Lords debate which immediately followed Eden's resignation. Having previously divested himself not only of enthusiasm for the League of Nations, but also of his former
tough attitude towards Italy, Lothian could acclaim Chamberlain's efforts "to break through this miasma which has misled the nation" to establish friendly relations with the fascist powers. Germany, as ever, however, was his principal concern. Of the dictators, "Herr Hitler, in particular," he stressed, "genuinely wants peace."16 During the same debate another pro-German enthusiast, Lord Londonderry, declared himself "quite sure we can come to an understanding with Germany." Londonderry's remarks added little to the corpus of his known views on Germany. Indeed, they were highly restrained, even innocuous by his former standards. Their significance lay in the fact that he was making them at all. He was, he claimed, breaking a self-imposed silence, caused by the extent to which hitherto he had been "not altogether in sympathy" with official policy. Such had been the recent climacteric, however, that he now felt free to resume his former enthusiasm in public.17

As in England, in Scotland the Conservative press rallied behind Chamberlain's new policy. Although initially concerned about "possible misinterpretations" abroad of Eden's resignation, The Scotsman shifted rapidly to enthusiasm for the abandonment of a policy which had "brought us nothing but loss and suffering, anxiety and confusion."18 Similarly, the Aberdeen Press and Journal at first considered Eden's loss "unpalatable," and was less than optimistic about the possibilities of success inherent in Chamberlain's new line in its leader on February 22nd. By the following day, however, the paper was displaying considerably greater enthusiasm for a policy which offered "the probability of solid advantage." The jump in share values with which the Stock Exchange greeted developments had ostensibly swayed editorial judgement. No friend of the League of Nations, the Courier and Advertiser from the outset was overjoyed to see the back of Eden. "The time is ripe for a new departure," it enthused, delighted that strong-man Chamberlain could now put his impress on British foreign policy.19 One paper which did not fully share such views was the normally impeccably loyalist Glasgow Herald, which "deplored" Eden's loss and was highly sceptical of the real value of the proposed Anglo-Italian agreement. However, if the paper's support for Chamberlain's policy was lukewarm, the same could not be said of its indictment of the strategies offered by the opposition parties. The two day debate which followed Eden's resignation had revealed "the full bouquet of Labour's Parliamentary ineptitude," proving once again that "there exists no possible alternative to the National Government."20
The government’s Scottish representatives in the Commons embraced Chamberlain’s change of direction as loyally as their English counterparts, if not more so. There was only one Scottish rebel abstention in the no confidence vote in the Commons on February 22nd. Predictably, it was the Duchess of Atholl.21 Robert Boothby may have struck a discordant note in the debate, as he "expressed his dissent in a vigorous and rather effective speech," but he still noted his satisfaction that "at least, at last, we have got direction at the top," and joined his colleagues in the division lobby.22

For one Scottish Conservative MP, however, Eden’s resignation created something of a dilemma. "Jock" McEwen was close to Amery in his belief that "friendship with Italy was not only desirable but eminently practicable."23 However, his conviction of the danger posed by Germany was as strong as ever, and he had no enthusiasm for rapprochement in that direction. He was also wedded to the League of Nations, principally for its utility as a vehicle for Anglo-French cooperation and German containment. Speaking to constituents in early March, he was at pains to stress that there had been no change of policy, merely one of emphasis. Somewhat disingenuously, he declared that "collective security remained the ideal; it had not been jettisoned."24 Although he voted with the government in the February 22nd division, such was McEwen’s discomfort that when the backbench Foreign Affairs Committee met on the 24th, he offered to step down as Secretary. The offer, however, was not taken up.25 It was the closest McEwen came to entering "The Cave of Adullam." Although his antagonism to Germany remained constant, having passed through this crisis of conscience, McEwen dutifully fell into line behind Chamberlain for the duration.

To contemporary political observers Eden’s resignation and the repudiation of the League of Nations signalled a sea-change in British policy. Just as Leo Amery had anticipated in advance a body of resistance within the Conservative parliamentary party to the shift, the expectation of an imminent and powerful manifestation of popular dissatisfaction figured in initial comment from a variety of sources. Scottish commentators were no exception to this phenomenon. On February 22nd Jimmy Maxton claimed that he had "never since 1931 seen anything happen politically in this country that has made such a tremendous difference in public opinion."26 Arguably Maxton, while no supporter of the League, was naturally predisposed to discern swelling opposition to the Chamberlain régime.
However, even a Chamberlain loyalist, like East Fife MP, James Henderson Stewart, felt obliged to admit a few days later that recent events had "shocked the nation." The anticipated storm of protest, however, largely failed to materialise. In Scotland Labour and Liberal spokespersons registered official condemnation, and the now much reduced number of LNU activists hastened to voice their "dismay." There was, too, a brief flurry of pro-Eden and pro-League comment in the correspondence columns of that erstwhile bastion of Tory loyalism, the Glasgow Herald, a phenomenon perhaps not unconnected with the cooling of that paper's editorial enthusiasm for Chamberlain's foreign policy. However, there was nothing to resemble the wave of protest which had greeted the Hoare-Laval proposals or even the ending of sanctions.

In contrast to the relative dearth of protest at Eden's departure to appear in the Scottish press, there was a significant manifestation of support for Chamberlain. Much of this was stated in the language of generalisation and platitude which had been such a marked feature of opposition to sanctions. Chamberlain was praised for undertaking "the first sincere and courageous attempt to get down to realities." His adoption of a "common-sense" approach in "trying to see the other man's point of view," it was hoped, might yet "herald the dawn of a day of bright hope for Europe." Such sentiments effectively reflected the tremendous sense of relief experienced by the Conservative right at the final repudiation of the League after "twenty years of cant and humbug." With that incubus finally buried, something could now be done to address the problem of deteriorating relations with the dictators. As one Chamberlain loyalist put it, "We want peace, and if we back Mr Chamberlain at least we are backing a timeous and wise effort to attain that end."

Strongly to the fore in the chorus of approval for Chamberlain were the out and out isolationists of the Conservative right. For them Chamberlain's reorientation of foreign policy shifted the government's position sufficiently close to their own as to effectively signal an end to their lengthy sojourn in the wilderness. Hopes of influencing governmental policy in the future were significantly improved. It was an occasion, therefore, for both the repledging of fealty and the restatement of their belief in the necessity of avoiding European entanglements. Affirmations that Chamberlain had "the unbiased good sense of the country with him" went hand in hand with declarations that Britain was "not prepared to give its manhood and wealth in another devastating conflict excepting to safeguard its heritage and

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righteous defence." Since the summer of 1936 acceptance of the inevitability of German expansion in Eastern Europe had been a central, though largely unstated, factor in much isolationist thinking. Spurred by the increasing threat from Germany, and encouraged by Chamberlain's policy shift, some isolationists in the early spring of 1938 were prepared to bluntly state the previously umentionable. According to one of The Scotsman’s longstanding isolationist correspondents, J.M. Gray, "The 'German menace' is what we make of it. If anyone dreams that we in this country will lift a finger to prevent Germany from reorganising the frontiers of Europe in some kind of sane and reasonable way, that person is far mistaken." The existing European frontiers, Gray argued, were "indefensible in every way" and "not worth the sacrifice of one single British soldier." 32

For many pro-German enthusiasts Eden's departure and Chamberlain's renewed commitment to a policy of reconciliation with the dictator nations were cause for celebration. Some could not restrain their delight at the turn of events. "Mr Eden has gone, the last, we hope, of the series of types of Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers whose policy consisted in trot, trot, trotting to Paris to get a foreign policy for Britain made in France," trilled Liberal National, John Orr. 33 In marked contrast with the flurry of isolationist opinion, however, the occasion was not seized upon by the enthusiasts for the further presentation of their case. A great many declared their desire for "friendship" with Germany at this time, but in most cases this was merely a platitude, expressed within the confines of orthodox support for Chamberlain. Some pro-Germans, like A.P. Laurie, restricted themselves to adding to the chorus of support for Chamberlain. "It is our duty as citizens," Laurie pronounced didacticly, "to create an atmosphere in which the aims of the Prime Minister will be capable of fulfilment." 34 As had occurred in the past when government policy shifted in their direction, however, the enthusiasts appear to have been largely content to leave the shouting to others. Additionally, on this occasion, particular prudence was encouraged by the extent of press attention to speculation as to the role of Italian or German pressure in Eden's resignation. This factor may also explain the singular death of genuinely Italophile comment to follow Eden's departure. For some pro-Germans, too, the circumstances of Eden's resignation were not an occasion for rejoicing. To Liberals like Andrew Law, any comfort to be derived from Chamberlain's renewed emphasis on rapprochement with Germany was far outweighed by dissatisfaction at the Anglo-Italian agreement, which for Law was "compounding the felony" of the Abyssinian conquest. 35
The dust had hardly settled in the aftermath of Eden's resignation when Chamberlain and his new Foreign Office team were suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with the first major diplomatic crisis of 1938, the Anschluss. Increased German pressure on Austria had been a major factor in persuading both Chamberlain and the Italians to open negotiations for an agreement. Schuschnigg's submission at Berchtesgaden, however, was assumed to have sated Hitler's ambitions for the moment, and further developments had not been anticipated. Indeed, Hitler himself had no immediate plans for the absorption of Austria. Schuschnigg, however, had no intention of acquiescing in Hitler's design for the phased disintegration of his own régime, and on March 9th announced a forthcoming plebiscite on Austrian independence. Hitler's response to such recalcitrance was immediate. On the morning of March 11th German troops began moving up to the border. Later that day Mussolini assured Hitler of his assent to the operation, sealing Austria's fate. Faced with the prospect of invasion and abandoned by his erstwhile protector, Schuschnigg capitulated and stepped down in favour of Hitler's nominee, Artur Seyss-Inquart. The following day, in nominal response to an "invitation" from Seyss-Inquart, German troops entered Austria to "maintain order." Austrian independence was at an end.

The destruction of Austrian independence at no point threatened to involve Britain in war. From the outset it was universally regarded as a fait accompli in Britain. Without Italian co-operation the restoration of Austrian independence could only have been achieved by the total military defeat of Germany, and no British government would have begun to contemplate embarking on such a course of action. The long-term viability of the truncated Austrian state created by the post-war settlement had long been viewed in Britain as highly doubtful, on both economic and political grounds. In 1918 most Austrians had viewed union with Germany as both a desirable and natural evolutionary step following the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire. The proscription on Austro-German union, included in the Treaty of St. Germain at French insistence, had, from a British perspective, been one of the more questionable aspects of the peace settlement. By 1938 most political observers in Britain regarded some form of Austro-German union as virtually inevitable, and British consent to such a development, following due diplomatic process, had long been assumed by British policy makers. The short-term response of Chamberlain's government to the Anschluss was, therefore, fairly predictable. Having registered its protest, it pragmatically accepted the extinction of Austrian independence.
The Anschluss was nevertheless a major shock to Anglo-German relations. Not because of the realisation of Austro-German union, but because of the methods used to attain it. Despite the worsening of relations in 1937, it had still been possible to hope that Germany might yet evolve into a good European, and that negotiation rather than confrontation could resolve Germany's remaining post-Versailles grievances. Germany's unrestrained use of machtpolitik in Austria, however, shattered such hopes. Not only had Germany bullied a small nation into submission, but more importantly she appeared to have embarked on the next stage of a systematic revision of the post-war settlement by force. The quiescence of the previous two years could now be seen to have been merely an interlude in which Germany had prepared the means to carry out her programme. With Czechoslovakia now surrounded by Germany on three sides it appeared only a matter of time before Germany precipitated a crisis over the German minority in the Sudetenland.

Viewed in isolation, the Anschluss bore certain similarities with the Rhineland démarche. A morally questionable provision of the peace settlement had been overturned and German-speaking people incorporated within the frontiers of the Reich. The circumstances of 1938, however, were very different from those of early 1936, and reactions in Britain followed a markedly different course. Popular debate in the aftermath of the Rhineland crisis had essentially been conducted in retrospective. The core of debate had been provided by the legitimacy or otherwise of past events and policies. Appreciation of the significance of the Anschluss as an indicator of future possibilities was immediate, and dictated the entire shape of popular debate in the wake of the German action. If the post-Rhineland debate was primarily about the past, the post-Anschluss debate was in essence about the future.

Pessimistic prognostications as to likely developments, the desirability of some form of National Service, the need to base future British policy on a greater or lesser degree of commitment to Eastern Europe, and attitudes to Czechoslovakia in particular, all figured strongly in the post-Anschluss debate. In these areas opinions varied greatly. On the legitimacy of Germany's action, however, there was more or less general agreement. The outburst of indignation and revulsion at Germany's barely concealed use of force was of massive proportions, and only marginally tempered by recognition of the popularity with which the union was greeted in Austria. Indeed, in this respect British public opinion displayed a degree
of unanimity hitherto unparalleled in debate on Anglo-German relations.

Amongst those who registered their sense of outrage were many who in the past had displayed strong sympathies for Germany's case. For all its considerable pro-German proclivities, The Times was driven to stigmatise the Anschluss as "The Rape of Austria," and even Lord Londonderry felt obliged to "condemn and deplore the method by which the change has taken place in Austria." Some of those who joined the chorus of protest, however, also sought to offer a partial defence of mitigating circumstances. Londonderry himself was at pains to stress the extent to which Hitler's advent had been "welcomed by the great majority of the population." Others highlighted the thwarting of past Austrian desires for union. Some went further still, and sought to lay the primary responsibility for the crisis at Schuschnigg's door. To Viscount Astor the decision to hold a plebiscite had been "a most unwise act, calculated to precipitate some sort of tragedy." Finally there were those for whom Hitler's action was not only entirely justifiable, but actually praiseworthy. Without Hitler's timely intervention, argued Lord Redesdale, Austria had been about to plunge into "bloody civil war." Hitler, Redesdale believed, was due "the gratitude of Europe and the gratitude of the whole world" for "averting a catastrophe of such staggering magnitude without spilling one drop of blood." Such whole-hearted endorsement of German propaganda's version of events, however, was extremely rare.

The Rhineland démarche, as we have seen, provoked an effusion of sympathy for Germany from liberal and moderate sources in the pages of the Scottish press. The overriding response of "centrist" opinion to the Anschluss, however, in Scotland, as in Britain as a whole, was of righteous indignation at Germany's brutal methods. Scotland's quality press led the charge of condemnation. The Aberdeen Press and Journal could offer no excuses for "the dragooning of Austria into subservience," while The Scotsman searched "in vain to find a shred of justification" for Germany's "act of ruthless aggression," and dismissed Hitler's version of events as displaying "nauseating insincerity." The Glasgow Herald lamented that Austria had been "beaten by brute force," while for the Courier and Advertiser the Anschluss was "a monstrous exhibition of treachery, bad faith, and criminal violence." Many who joined the chorus of condemnation had been actively engaged in
promoting Germany's case in the past, in some cases for many years. Alan Stark, the LNU activist, had vocally defended Germany's Rhineland coup. Hitler, he now declared, "tramples on all human and Christian rights ... We do not do justice to Germany by giving him colonies or allowing him to incorporate other German-speaking peoples in the Reich. We only advance the cause of the totalitarian state."41 For many enthusiasts the Anschluss came as a cataclysmic shock, and prompted a decisive parting of the ways. The sense of grief and deep disillusionment which afflicted many of Germany's friends, particularly those of a liberal disposition, is clearly apparent in the following anonymous recantation. "To those who, like the writer, have striven for years past for a close friendship with Germany, the events of the last few days have been a paralyzing blow, and have made us despair of the possibility of ever being on good terms with Nazi Germany. It is not the fact of the union of Austria with the Reich that has shocked us, that was bound to come ... It is the brutal and bullying methods and the complete cynical disregard of solemn promises so recently made that have destroyed our faith."42

Amidst the general outpouring of condemnation, however, there were those who sought to present mitigating circumstances for Germany's action, stressing the legitimacy of the concept of Austro-German union, if not the methods employed. "Austria is now German — and why not? Austria is German in every sense of the name ... We as Britons have no right to interfere," declared one contributor to the Glasgow Herald, reflecting widely held isolationist attitudes to the crisis.43 D.M. Mason, the former Liberal MP and Nuremberg visitor, "while condemning Hitler's methods," emphasised his belief that "it was only a matter of time when the absorption would have taken place."44 A similar line was taken by another pro-German Liberal, Andrew Law. Hitler, he argued, was only "doing what Bismarck might have done after Sadowa in 1866" in "taking the opportunity to rebuild the Empire on a broader foundation."45 As Law and Mason's comments indicate, for some at least, high-minded liberal concern at the injustice of the peace settlement had not entirely been undermined by Germany's bullying tactics.

Eschewing complex political analysis, other commentators chose to dwell on the extent of Austrian jubilation, partly, no doubt, in response to newspaper accounts of anti-semitic excesses in Austria in the immediate aftermath of the Anschluss. Many of the comments in this vein were of the relatively "innocent" travellers' tale variety, with personal observations unaccompanied by any overtly political
message. Political innocence, however, was singularly absent from one eyewitness account of celebrations in Vienna which appeared in article form in The Scotsman. "All the streets were crowded with masses carrying the Swastika or shouting 'Heil Sieg! One Nation, one Führer, one Reich!' Many times I heard a chorus asking, 'Who gave us liberty?' and another chorus answering, 'Adolf Hitler.' 'Who gives us bread?' 'Adolf Hitler.' There was no doubt, the writer concluded, "that Austrians consider Germany as the "fatherland," the bigger Reich of former centuries to which they return by their own will." The author, Dr. Adolf Keller, was not a German propagandist, but a Swiss theologian of international repute, and Keller's status no doubt explains The Scotsman's decision to print the account. Nevertheless, in so doing the paper was, at least on this occasion, providing a platform for the exposition of Germany's case.

Partial defence of the Anschluss was also offered by those who sought to place Germany's action in perspective, or to be more accurate, the perspective of their choice. In another rendition of his theme of the "psychopathology" of the dictator nations, A.J. Brock presented Germany as the "victim." Her act of violence, he argued, was the product of "the extreme of exasperation" to which she had been driven by Anglo-French frustration of her colonial claims. Brock's stress on the colonial factor was endorsed by another advocate of colonial concessions, Arthur Berriedale Keith. Berriedale Keith, however, was less concerned with excusing Germany's action than with redirecting attention elsewhere. In a response strongly reminiscent of Liberal attitudes during the Rhineland crisis, he argued that "the moral guilt of Herr Hitler's action is decidedly less than that of Italy in respect of Ethiopia." The moral issue, however, was secondary to his main point that "the fate of Austria is really of less importance to Britain than the aggrandisment of Italy in the Mediterranean." A consistent critic of Italian intervention in Spain, Berriedale Keith had vehemently denounced Chamberlain's efforts to secure rapprochement with Italy during the Eden resignation debate. Clearly he was now concerned that the Anschluss would strengthen popular support for the accord with Italy which Chamberlain's negotiations appeared about to deliver.

Berriedale Keith was not alone in seeking to keep Italy's sins in the forefront of public awareness. The LNU itself had by early 1938 become strongly identified with a general anti-fascist stance, and the Anschluss provoked considerable criticism of Germany from that organisation. Nevertheless, there were still some veterans of the campaign for sanctions for whom, like Berriedale Keith, the
immorality of Germany's seizure of Austria paled into insignificance in comparison with Italy's track record of aggression. For some, minimising Germany's guilt for the purpose of highlighting Italy's greater sins produced positive justification for Germany's action. To The Scotsman's pseudonymous correspondent, "Footnote," Austrian independence for years had been an illusion. Schuschnigg, he argued, had always been Mussolini's creature, and his régime a mere tool in Italian power-politics. As "Italy's obedient 'yes-man'" in the League of Nations Austria, had helped to frustrate the imposition of sanctions. Of the Anschluss itself, he argued, "the match is better than the manner of the wooing," for in the long run Austria would be far "better in German than Italian hands."49

Although there was considerable reference to Schuschnigg's personal courage in seeking to hold a plebiscite, outwith Catholic circles there was little regret at the passing of Schuschnigg's régime per se. Indeed, many Scottish left-wingers could not restrain their satisfaction at the extinction of Austria's clerical-fascist dictatorship. Memories of the bloody suppression of the Socialist opposition in Vienna in 1934 by Schuschnigg's predecessor, Dollfuss, had not been tempered by the intervening years. Moreover, the treatment meted out to Socialists and other dissidents by the Schuschnigg government itself had not been noted for its concern for civil rights. Schuschnigg, asserted George Buchanan,50 the ILP member for Glasgow Gorbals, had "imprisoned them and cruelly, vindictively treated them ... in a manner just as brutal as that of Hitler."51 Militant Protestants, too, had cause for celebration. Bulwark's first reaction to the Anschluss was to declare, "we rejoice that Austria will be no longer an instrument in the hands of the Jesuits."52 Denigration of the former Austrian system from such sources, however, did not betoken any desire to excuse Hitler's action. This was as true of militant Protestantism as it was of the Left. By 1938 Bulwark regularly carried articles condemning in the strongest terms German neo-paganism and the persecution of the Jews and the Lutheran Church. Nevertheless, whatever its intent, denigration of the Schuschnigg régime did effectively serve to reduce the comparative level of Germany's guilt.

While a variety of partial defences, or mitigating factors, were offered for Germany's action, whole-hearted endorsement was strikingly absent from the immediate post-Anschluss debate in Scotland. Germany's more enthusiastic friends, whom it might have been anticipated would provide such a response,
remained singularly reticent. Sir Thomas Moore, it is true, hastened to praise Hitler's "bloodless revolution" in a watered down version of Lord Redesdale's argument. The Anschluss, he opined, might yet "prove a decisive factor in European appeasement." Moore's, however, was very much a lone voice. Other, and arguably more enthusiastically pro-Nazi, individuals, such as Charles Sarolea, A.P. Laurie and Capt. Luttmann-Johnson, appear to have taken no part in the debate. As their subsequent activities would indicate, the Anschluss itself had not diminished the enthusiasm of any of the above. Personal factors, or, particularly for one as canny as Sarolea, a desire to fully assess the new mood of popular opinion may explain their silence. A more likely explanation, however, is that the sudden onslaught of the crisis and the manner in which Austria was bludgeoned into submission came as a genuine shock to even Germany's most enthusiastic supporters. A stunned silence would have been a most understandable reaction for those who for two years had been proclaiming Germany's pacific intentions.

In Scotland, as in England, the rights and wrongs of Germany's actions took second place to discussion of the future direction of British foreign policy in the post-Anschluss debate. Amongst supporters of the National Government there was a striking assumption from the outset that the event, however dispiriting, would not deflect Chamberlain from his pursuit of active reconciliation of the fascist powers, an assumption which Chamberlain's speech to the Commons on March 14th did nothing to challenge. Although he announced that his government was taking stock of future options, he gave no indication that any radical changes were contemplated. Supporters of the government hastened to assert their belief in the wisdom of this course. As Lord Stonehaven, recently elevated to the rank of Viscount, put it, the Anschluss "had increased the difficulties of achieving the Prime Minister's object, but they had not diminished in the slightest degree the desirability of achieving it." With the notable exception of the Glasgow Herald, which, while unwilling to endorse Opposition or even Churchillian strategies for a Grand Alliance, was considerably less than convinced of the need for "urgency" in seeking an accommodation with Germany, Scotland's Conservative press added their voices to the chorus of support for Chamberlain's policy of reconciliation.

For the most part such assertions of the wisdom of Chamberlain's policy were devoid of specifically pro-German comment, other than expressions of a
generalised desire for "friendship." Many Chamberlain loyalists indeed refrained from analytical comment altogether, preferring merely to affirm their faith in Chamberlain himself, often in the most simplistic of terms. "Trust the 'man at the wheel'," declared H.C. Courtney Clarke, Secretary of Berwickshire Unionist Association, using a much favoured metaphor. In justifying the pursuit of reconciliation, however, some orthodox Chamberlainites did include some measure of laudatory commendation of the régimes with which accommodation was sought. Stonehaven, for instance, was at pains to praise the "courage, genius, patriotism and power of leadership" of Mussolini and Hitler, who had "raised their fellow-countrymen from the depths of despair and from the brink of chaos." Similarly, J.H. Mackie, the Conservative MP for Galloway, declared the progress of Germany since the advent of Hitler to be "one of the phenomena of history, before which one must stand in wonder and with a certain amount of admiration." Comments in this vein had been relatively commonplace in 1937. In the immediate aftermath of the Anschluss, however, their occurrence was very much rarer.

With much of its emphasis on the future of British foreign policy, the post-Anschluss debate effectively provided the first round of a new phase of discussion which would terminate with the Munich Agreement in October. This debate would be dominated by the question of Czechoslovakia, for her potential to provide a future flashpoint for international tensions was unmistakeable. The shape and composition of the Czechoslovak state had long been recognised as one of the biggest anomalies of a peace settlement based ostensibly on self-determination. Geographic and economic considerations, and above all, French insistence on the strategic integrity of the new state, had prompted the peacemakers of 1919 to craft a truly multi-ethnic state. In 1938, in addition to 7.5 million Czechs and 2.5 million Slovaks, Czechoslovakia encompassed 500,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ruthenians and 80,000 Poles. The biggest and most troublesome minority, however, were the 3.25 million ethnic Germans, or Sudetendeutsch, clustered around Czechoslovakia's Western rim. By the standards set by other Central and Eastern European countries during the period Czechoslovakia's treatment of her minorities had been remarkable for its tolerance and relative even-handedness. Nevertheless, relations between the various ethnic groups were at best uneasy, particularly between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech majority. Formerly at the apex of the Hapsburg ethnic hierarchy, the Sudeten Germans had not acclimatised to what they perceived as a position of subordination. The impact of the world depression, which had been particularly severe in the highly industrialised Sudetenland, had
sharpened their sense of grievance. Relations between the two groups had grown steadily more strained since 1933, as the resurgence of Germany heightened both Sudeten aspirations and Czech fears. The canalisation of Sudeten "nationalism" into the crypto-Nazi Sudetendeutsch party of Konrad Henlein after 1935 had further polarised the situation.

The existence of a minority "problem" in Czechoslovakia had long been recognised. The denial of Sudeten demands for union with Germany and their incorporation in the new Czech state had from the outset been regarded in Britain as one of least defensible of the provisions of the peace settlement. During the immediate post-war debate the Sudeten cause had been championed with particular vigour by the Liberal and Labour Parties. Until the Anschluss, however, it had been regarded primarily as an internal affair of the Czechoslovak state. With the Anschluss it assumed the status of an international issue, and one, moreover of prime importance and pressing concern. With Germany now apparently embarked on a course of further forceful revision of the peace settlement, the possibility that Hitler might feel "obliged" to act on behalf of his kinsmen in the Sudetenland seemed highly likely. Although the Sudetenland had not formed part of the pre-war German Reich, Hitler's professed concern for ethnic Germans beyond those boundaries was well established. Moreover, from the moment German troops entered Austria, tensions in the Sudetenland escalated rapidly, a development assiduously fostered by Berlin's tutelage of Henlein from late March on. Even before Henlein's provocative presentation of his "Karlsbad Demands" on April 24th, most British observers concurred in the assumption that, in the absence of a successful resolution of Sudeten and Czech differences, some form of German intervention was only a matter of time.

For those who lent credence to a more cynical appraisal of Hitler's motives, there were sound strategic reasons why Hitler should take the cause of the Sudeten Germans to his bosom. As the most advanced and Western-orientated of the succession states, Czechoslovakia's military potential and strategic position provided the key to the balance of power in Central and Eastern Europe. Her participation was pivotal to the interlocking system of post-war alliances with which France had sought to ensure security through the containment of Germany. In the event of Czechoslovakia's neutralisation the entire system would unravel and Germany's path to the economic and political subordination of South-Eastern Europe would be cleared. The first steps to the attainment of this objective had
already been taken, for the incorporation of Austria left Czechoslovakia surrounded by German territory on three sides, and therefore highly vulnerable to German pressure. Whether Hitler intended to "neutralise" Czechoslovakia by direct aggression, diplomatic pressure, or internal destabilisation, the plight of the Sudetens provided both a pretext and a lever for future action.

The public face of the Chamberlain government's reaction to the perceived threat to Czechoslovakia was unveiled in the Commons declaration of March 24th. It was in effect a carefully crafted exercise in ambivalence. British commitments to existing treaty obligations, and Locarno in particular, were reaffirmed, but no fresh commitments were to be made. No guarantee was to be offered to the Czechs, or indeed to any other Central or Eastern European country. The scope of British policy, however, Chamberlain stressed, would not necessarily be limited to the observation of existing contractual international obligations. In short, Britain reserved the right to keep her options open. Her indifference to events in Central and Eastern Europe could not be assumed. It was a posture calculated to fulfil several functions. It offered reassurance to the French by reaffirming Anglo-French co-operation as the cornerstone of British policy. By evading endorsement of France's Central and Eastern European commitments, however, it avoided compromising Britain's freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre viz à viz the French, and instead promised to act as a curb on any possible Gallic overenthusiasm. This, in turn, would also encourage Czech amenability to Sudeten demands for autonomy. At the same time, by stressing Britain's preparedness to act beyond her treaty obligations, in eventualities of an undefined nature, it was hoped to exercise a restraining influence on Germany. Until the September crisis it effectively remained the official position.

Within the main body of Conservative opinion Chamberlain's March declaration was strongly acclaimed as a masterful exercise in balance, and Chamberlain himself considered his speech to have been an "éclatant success." To Chamberlain loyalists and isolationists alike, there was particular satisfaction that the Premier had avoided giving "a blank cheque to France." The degree of latitude which Chamberlain's position allowed for future involvement, however, did give cause for concern in Conservative isolationist ranks, causing a flurry of correspondence to the press on the desirability of avoiding European entanglements. In the House of Lords the Earl of Mansfield warned, "No war undertaken for the purpose of
teaching totalitarianism a lesson, or even for the purpose of protecting Czechoslovakia, would have the approval of 50 per cent. of this country, let alone the 90 per cent. necessary to make the war a success." The state of public opinion on the matter was not Mansfield's only concern. Many isolationists of a strongly anti-communist disposition saw in the heightening of international tensions over Czechoslovakia the hidden handiwork of communism. In varying degrees Czechoslovakia herself was viewed with suspicion because of her Soviet alliance. Mansfield reflected these suspicions when he warned, "what the Comintern is endeavouring to achieve is war throughout Europe. There can be no doubt of that." 62

The potential for British involvement which Chamberlain's posture appeared to indicate was equally worrying for the "isolationists" of the Left. Chamberlain's statement on British policy provoked a heated response from John McGovern in the subsequent Commons debate. Casting Chamberlain in the role of capitalist warmonger, he categorically stated, "we shall not support any war for the defence of the British Empire." 63 The ILP's socialist pacifist position had not significantly altered since the Abyssinian war. As war could only be detrimental to the interests of the working class, and would only be waged by the ruling elite out of base capitalist motives, any British efforts to contain German expansion in Central Europe which might result in war were to be damned in advance. Such views were not purely restricted to the ILP. They also appeared on the pacifist wing of the Labour Party. Even before Chamberlain's statement on Czechoslovakia, Rob Gibson, MP for Greenock, 64 told delegates at the annual conference of the Scottish Labour Party that "Their job was to urge the class struggle and achieve Socialism internationally, not to be embroiled in the hell's broth that capitalism was brewing all over the world." 65

The language of pacifist socialism was clearly evident in another strain of isolationist thought, namely fundamentalist nationalism. Any future war in which Britain engaged would be an imperialist war waged purely for "the aggrandisement of a few London financiers," argued Archie Lamont. 66 Advocating passive resistance to the conscription of Scottish resources in such an eventuality, Lamont declared, "We need have no fear that in prejudicing England's chances in a war, we will be doing anything to hurt the cause of democracy." The main thrust of Lamont's argument, however, while building on a theme which was also vocalised by the Left, pursued a distinctively nationalist course. The exigencies of the last
war had resulted in centralisation and the erosion of democratic control on a massive scale. In any future conflict, he argued, these forces would be released with even greater intensity. It would mean "the annihilation of the Scottish National Movement, and the submersion of everything democratic and distinctively Scottish." In short, it would result in "the final destruction of our national personality." 67

Similar, though more narrowly nationalist views, were expressed by other fundamentalist advocates of isolationism. The last war, declared Wendy Wood, had "smashed Scotland's natural economic fabric" and "robbed Scotland of the flower of a generation." Neither economic nor demographic losses had been made good in the intervening period. Another war would "shatter her once and for all." Indeed, the state of the nation was so parlous, Wood argued, that "no European dictator would waste his energies in attacking Scotland for her own sake." 68 Scotland would only be involved in another war through her connection with England. The solution was simple. All that was called for was an immediate declaration of independence and neutrality.

Opposition to active Scottish involvement in any future war undertaken by Britain had been one of the main planks of the fundamentalist wing of the nationalist movement for some time. However, many of its most fervent apostles, like Wendy Wood, were not members of the SNP, and despite occasional successes, such as the anti-conscription motion at the SNP party conference in 1937, they did not constitute a majority within the SNP itself. The annual conference of the party in June 1938 endorsed a policy statement reaffirming the party's commitment to the League of Nations and the principle of collective security. Additionally, an anti-conscription motion couched in the language of absolute pacifism was successfully opposed by the party leadership. 69 The Anschluss, however, spurred the fundamentalists to greater industry. Thwarted in their attempts to exercise direct influence on party policy, they increasingly turned to infiltration of the Scots Independent. Over the following eighteen months their views would come to totally dominate its pages.

The vast majority of fundamentalists who opposed participation in a British war effort, including those who, like Wendy Wood, sought to promote Scottish independence by "direct action" rather than by the ballot box alone, advocated some
form of civil disobedience in the event of war. By the early summer of 1938, however, some fundamentalists were beginning to consider more drastic courses of action. One of the Scots Independent's correspondents, John Clark, replied to Lamont's call for passive resistance by urging his readers to "act and act in concert to keep our nation free, to create as much trouble as possible for the usurper of our right to decide our own course of action." Scotland, he reminded them, had "consistently chosen one course for the preservation of her freedom — force of arms ... let us proudly wear the White Feather, but let us rather call it 'The White Cockade'." For Clark, as for most fundamentalists, Nazi Germany, and indeed the European dimension of any future war, appear to have been completely irrelevant. Whatever the motivation, advocacy of armed insurrection in the event of war with Germany arguably could be held to constitute an extreme form of pro-Germanism. It is unlikely, however, that Clark's vision of a re-run of the '45 held much appeal for any but a tiny number of fundamentalists.

Amidst the variety of conflicting views on the best future course for British foreign policy, a more or less general consensus existed on one theme, namely recognition of the legitimacy of Sudeten grievances. Apart from that section of isolationist opinion which, fearful of British entanglement, maintained that Britain had no "moral right ... to meddle with the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia," there was general concurrence on the wisdom of pressing the Czechs to make concessions to their troublesome minority. Most commentators urged the granting of some form of regional autonomy. Switzerland was commonly presented as the shining example of a successful multi-ethnic society, and its cantonal system recommended as a possible model for a reconstructed Czechoslovakia. Many, indeed the majority, of those who supported such schemes in the spring and early summer debates would "advance" to acceptance of the need for frontier revision in Germany's favour in September. Few, however, displayed any signs of genuine sympathy with Germany. Indeed, arguably the most enthusiastic of the exponents of such schemes were those who sought to forestall German aggression against Czechoslovakia by eliminating the pretext for future action. Such reasoning underpinned Arthur Berriedale Keith's enthusiasm for "federal reconstruction with wide autonomy."

There were those, however, who did combine sympathy for the Sudeten Germans with recognition of the legitimacy of Germany's concern for that minority.
One of the most enthusiastic Scottish exponents of Sudeten grievances, or to be more accurate past Czech sins, was Capt. A.H.M. Ramsay. The Czechs, Ramsay declared, had been guilty of "oppression — whose avowed object was the disintegration of the German speaking minority." Ramsay's enthusiasm for Czech injustice at this stage was primarily prompted by a desire to head off any possibility of a British guarantee to the Czechs, with all the potential for British involvement in European conflict which that implied. In urging the British government not to support any settlement in Czechoslovakia "which did not implement to the full the rights of the German, Slovak, Hungarian and Polish minorities in accordance with the Peace Treaty and the Benes Memorandum of 1919," he was at pains to stress "the danger to the peace of Europe" which would result from the non-implementation of minority rights. Nevertheless, while Ramsay's comments were primarily anti-Czech, there were also signs of sympathy for Germany's interest in the matter. The Czech government, he declared, "can surely not crave indulgence or aid when a reconstituted Germany champions the cause of its own cousins," given that it had miserably failed to "conciliate its minorities when there was no threat of 'German aggression'." 74

Although Ramsay, as we have seen, had energetically endorsed Franco's cause for some time, he had not previously shown any signs of sympathy for Nazi Germany. As recently as February he had pointedly referred to the "menace" which the dictator nations posed, and although he had acclaimed the fact that "Friendship with Germany and Italy was once more within reach" in the wake of Eden's resignation, his comments had been made within the confines of an impeccably orthodox, if highly enthusiastic, endorsement of Chamberlain's realignment of British policy. 75 Following his public appreciation of Germany's legitimate interest in the Sudetenland, Ramsay indicated that his sympathies were not solely confined to that issue. At the very end of March, in a late contribution to debate on the Anschluss, he urged his readers, instead of prejudging the issue, to "wait ... until deeds have shown whether or not the union of the two lands is for the greater good of the greater number in Austria as in Germany, and, in so doing, strike a blow in the cause of peace." Peace, however, was not Ramsay's only concern, as he drew attention to the recent declaration by Austrian bishops that "the danger of the all-destroying, Godless Bolshevism has been averted by the effects of the National Socialist movement." 76 Ramsay's discovery of pro-German sympathies in late March 1938 was no doubt partly due to reappraisal of the more threatening European situation which the Anschluss had ushered in. Nevertheless, it was the
possibility of a commitment to the Czechs which actually prompted his change of
tack. Publicly Ramsay did not list the mutual assistance pact with Russia in his
catalogue of Czech sins, but he was a firm believer in the existence of a world
Bolshevik conspiracy, and for devotees of that belief the mere existence of the pact
was proof positive that the conspirators were already secretly directing Czech
policy.

Despite the vigour of his attack on the Czechs, Ramsay stopped short of
advocating frontier revision in Germany's favour. Indeed, during the spring and
early summer of 1938 open advocacy of such a step was fairly rare. However,
there were numerous loaded references to the major error of past failures to allow
for the peaceful revision of the Treaties of 1919 and a veritable plethora of calls for
some sort of international conference to address this issue. In late May Sir Thomas
Moore called for an international "round table conference" of the beneficiaries and
the dispossessed of the First World War to address the issue of frontier revisions
through the implementation of Article 19. Although he made no specific reference
to the Sudeten question, given the evident need to bring that particular problem to a
speedy resolution, its priority on the agenda of any such conference would have
been tacitly assumed. For all his circumspection regarding the Sudetenland, where
his enthusiasm for friendship with Germany was concerned, Moore was
considerably more direct. Germany had "tremendous courage ... tremendous self-
confidence ... and tremendous trust in her leader." It was, he argued, "much better,
if we fear a possible danger in Germany, for us to get on the same side of a friendly
fence rather than spit at each other across it."77

Moore's pro-German enthusiasm was clearly undimmed, but the vast majority of
those who in the summer of 1938 urged the immediate convening of an international
conference to address frontier revision and other causes of international tension
were not primarily motivated by any genuine pro-German sympathy. Nevertheless,
the extensive enthusiasm for the immediate convening of some form of conference
is a good indicator of the extent to which Germany was recognised as having
legitimate grievances, and of the strength of popular support for the resolution of
those grievances by negotiation and concession; in short, of the strength of pro-
appeasement opinion prior to the stimulus of the September crisis.

The continuing importance of the "moral" element in appeasement is underlined
by the extensive clerical participation in calls for an international conference. In addition to the many churchmen who expressed their opinions in an individual capacity, in a rare pronouncement on foreign policy the Church of Scotland officially added its collective voice, although it stopped short of specific reference to frontier revision. In June the General Assembly endorsed the Report of the Church and Nation Committee, a report which declared, "The General Assembly, gravely disturbed by the international situation and by the present weakness of the League of Nations, request His Majesty's Government by means of international conferences steadily pursued, to do all in their power ... to remove the injustices that are the potential cause of discontent in Europe." By tacit assumption the situation in the Sudetenland would have been considered one of the "injustices" which required attention.

Despite a prevailing sense of deep unease, debate on the Sudeten question was not pursued with intensity during the summer of 1938. For much of the time attention was focussed primarily on developments in Spain. However, there was a certain quickening of interest in early August, following the despatch of the Runciman mission. Chamberlain, in an endeavour to prod the Czechs into greater industry in their negotiations with Henlein, had pressed them to "request" the services of an "independent" British arbitrator. Although this merely represented an intensification of existing British policy, the high profile of Runciman's visit appeared to indicate a significant step towards further British involvement in the issue, prompting a further flurry of isolationist concern. Runciman's deliberations, however, were overtaken by events. In early September tensions in the Sudetenland escalated. Within a matter of days the Sudeten problem exploded into a full-scale international crisis, driving all other issues off-stage.

On September 7th Henlein responded to a Czech offer which in essence fulfilled his "Karlsbad Demands" by breaking off negotiations. Thereafter events moved swiftly. Five days later Hitler addressed the faithful at Nuremberg, and in a violent and provocative speech rejected any notion of a federal or cantonal solution to the Sudeten problem. This, as much as Henlein's subsequent demand for the return of his people to the bosom of the Reich, following the short-lived insurrection which Hitler's speech prompted, finally killed any possibility of a negotiated settlement between Sudetens and Czechs. Any peaceful resolution of the problem could now only be achieved by the intervention of external powers. Acting decisively to pre-empt a German move on Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain seized the initiative, and on
September 15th embarked on the first of his dramatic summit meetings with the flight to Berchtesgaden, effectively committing Britain to endorsement of any subsequent settlement. The French, only too anxious to be relieved of their obligations to the Czechs, happily accepted Chamberlain's lead in the subsequent diplomatic developments. By the 20th Chamberlain had secured Anglo-French agreement, and Czech compliance, to the essence of Hitler's Berchtesgaden demands, namely the cession of the majority Sudetendeutsch areas. Returning to Germany on the 22nd, as he believed, to merely finalise details of the settlement, Chamberlain was shocked to be presented with the drastic extension of German demands at Godesberg with their insistence on the immediate occupation of majority German-speaking areas and the inclusion of Hungarian and Polish claims on Czech territory. Neither the British nor the French could bring themselves to positively endorse such draconian terms and the Czechs rejected them outright. Hitler, in the end, was persuaded to graciously accept the peaceful dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and on September 28th signalled his willingness to participate in a four power conference at Munich. Nevertheless, in the intervening period Britain had appeared poised on the very brink of war with Germany.

Debate on the Sudeten crisis in the Scottish papers, as in their English counterparts, began in earnest following the famous Times leader of September 7th, with its provocative presentation of the case for ceding the Sudetenland to Germany. Throughout the September debate in essence the positions adopted reflected in varying degrees advocacy of appeasement of Germany on this issue, or firmness in resisting German demands. The stances adopted, however, were by no means fixed, as the courses pursued by the Aberdeen Press and Journal and The Scotsman demonstrate. Reacting negatively to The Times leader, the Aberdeen Press and Journal stoutly declared, "The vital issue is the political and territorial integrity of Czecho-Slovakia as a sovereign, independent State." By September 22nd any traces of a pro-Czech stance had entirely evaporated. Reflecting its usual loyalty to Chamberlain, the paper vigorously endorsed the Anglo-French plan for the cession of the Sudetenland. The Scotsman followed a similar course in the first part of the crisis. Although it too was initially opposed to the secession of the Sudetenland, and even more critical of The Times leader, branding it both "mischievous" and "irresponsible," by the 20th it had fallen into line behind the Anglo-French proposals for the very practical reason that there was "no alternative" but war. After Godesberg the two papers pursued radically different courses. The Aberdeen Press and Journal shifted away from a strictly loyalist stance and
retreated into isolationism, stressing again and again Britain's lack of formal
commitment to the Czechs. In contrast, The Scotsman responded sharply to what
it considered "drastic and peremptory" terms, reflecting a general shift towards
"firmness" at this time. Although it remained consistent in its support both of
appeasement and Chamberlain personally, from this point onwards The Scotsman
began to display not just an anti-Nazi attitude, but a vigorously anti-German one.
For The Scotsman Godesberg was a perfect example of the German tradition of
"planting a Prussian heel on the neck of a prostrate enemy."

The shifts in editorial policy performed by The Scotsman and the Aberdeen
Press and Journal were as nothing compared with the U-turn conducted by the
Courier and Advertiser. At the start of the crisis the Dundee paper considered the
Sudetens to be the "best treated" minority in Europe, and it was strongly opposed to
allowing Hitler to bully the Czechs into territorial concessions. The Times
leader was "mischievous" and "no such surrender" could be contemplated. Within a
matter of days all traces of firmness had evaporated. By the 19th the paper was
promoting a positively pro-German variant of isolationism. Lambasting the Czechs
for their "crudely imperialist attitude," it declared that should war result, "Hitler
would be right and democratic Europe would be hopelessly in the wrong." The
heightening of tension after Godesberg merely encouraged the paper to denounce
with even greater vigour the "insanity" of waging war for the Czechs. "In no
circumstances," it declared, "should this country make itself a party to a war arising
out of the bitter quarrels of Eastern Europe."

Consistency was arguably easier for the opponents of appeasement. Of those
papers normally supportive of the government, only the Glasgow Herald adopted a
strongly anti-appeasement line. From the outset it urged standing firmly behind the
Czechs, and it was strongly critical of the sell-out involved in the Anglo-French
plan. Towards the conclusion of the crisis its tone grew steadily more militant. By
September 27th it was declaring, "If HERR HITLER chooses war he must have it."

Various arguments were presented by the advocates of appeasement in the
September debate, with not a few stressing that the principal victims of a war
provoked by "firmness" would be the Czechs themselves. Given the strategic
difficulties which faced the effective deployment of Anglo-French military support,
Czechoslovakia, it was argued, faced "certain annihilation." The paramount issue at the core of the pro-appeasement case, however, in Scotland as in England, can be summed up by Bruce Lockhart's simple question, "was Europe to be plunged into war in order to keep 3,000,000 Germans in and under Czechoslovakia against her will?" As we have seen, the original inclusion of the Sudetendeutsch within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia had long been widely regarded in Britain as one of the errors of Versailles. "Why should lives be lost to perpetuate that mistake?" asked the "realists." Moreover, they pointed out, even in the event of a successful war in defence of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia, the problem posed by the Sudetendeutsch would not be solved, but would merely await the attention of future peace-makers. "After unspeakable misery and the loss of millions of lives we may find ourselves agreeing to the arrangements presently under consideration." The main thrust of the argument, however, was a moral one. The status quo in Czechoslovakia was not merely unworkable, it was morally questionable. Few could seriously doubt the manifest desire of the Sudetendeutsch for union with Germany. The principal of self-determination had been enshrined in the post-war settlement. Justice, therefore, demanded that "racial self-determination cannot be denied to the Sudetens." Opposition to their claim alone could be held to constitute "an utter travesty of democracy." For Britain to actively wage war in opposition to a claim for self-determination, and for millions of lives to be lost to perpetuate an injustice, would be "a monstrous iniquity."

In contrast to the widespread affirmation of the Sudeten right to self-determination, the occurrence of overtly pro-German views during the September debate was somewhat subdued. Given that the debate was conducted against a background of possible imminent war against Germany, this was perhaps hardly surprising. Many who had in the past expressed pro-German views, and would express them again in the future, contented themselves with positive endorsement of the Sudeten case. Capt. A.H.M. Ramsay, for instance, although passionate in denouncing the Czechs for "dragooning and exploiting the Sudeten Germans," did not stray beyond the confines of the self-determination argument. Numerous commentators, however, did take a more positively pro-German approach to the pro-Sudeten case in stressing the legitimacy of Germany's concern for her racial cousins. For many of the Glasgow Herald's correspondents the analogy with Northern Ireland proved irresistible. With the Sudetendeutsch cast in the role of Ulster's Protestant community, Germany's concern for her racial kin was paralleled with Britain's determination to keep Northern Ireland within the Union, a decidedly
sympathetic comparison. 88

For some, however, positive justification of Germany's behaviour in the September crisis was not limited to the legitimacy of her concern for the Sudetendeutsch. The anti-appeasement case rested firmly on the power political premise that Germany aimed at the emasculation of Czechoslovakia, for which the liberation of her oppressed kin merely provided a convenient excuse. Power political considerations, however, could also be used to justify Germany's action. Although most criticism of Czechoslovakia was directed at her treatment of the minorities, she was also blamed for bringing the crisis on herself by her "provocative" participation in the French alliance system. While this line of argument was primarily anti-Czech and, still more, anti-French, it effectively divested Germany of responsibility for the crisis. If Czechoslovakia was "a dagger held between the shoulders of Germany" and "The hand holding the dagger is that of France," Germany could hardly be blamed for disarming her would-be assassin. 89

Similar responsibility transference is evident in the closely related theme deployed by that long-term critic of French foreign policy, Andrew Law. Since March 1938 Law had been declaring the inexorable evolution of Germany's economic and political preponderance in South-East Europe, a process which entailed the integration of Czechoslovakia with "the structure to which it naturally belongs." Investing German expansionism with the inevitability of an historical dynamic, and therefore, with the legitimacy of natural law, Law placed responsibility for any conflict over the Sudetenland firmly with those who sought to check this process, namely the French. German military preparations he excused on the grounds that Hitler "suspects that France, conscious of being outwitted, might in desperation provoke war." Britain, he urged, must "restrain the Parisian hotheads in whose nostrils is the breath of war." 90

In sharp contrast with the reaction to the Rhineland crisis, with its powerful criticism of French irresponsibility and intransigence, particularly from liberal and centrist opinion, the manifestation of anti-French opinion in the September debate was extremely muted. Nevertheless, its resurrection, even as a shadow of its former self, indicates that for some strands of liberal opinion the events of the intervening two and a half years had not eroded their fundamental belief in the

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ultimate responsibility of perfidious Gaul for current international tensions, and its concomitant predisposition to excuse German behaviour as reactive. Most of those who held such views would no doubt have shared Law's sentiments when he declared that he had "no sympathy whatever for Hitler and Hitlerism." Nevertheless, their implacable belief in French power political "wickedness" clearly continued to dispose them to a more than a little myopia where its German equivalent was concerned.

For certain sectors of right-wing opinion, of course, the Franco-Soviet-Czech alignment had long demonstrated not just French "wickedness" but the existence of a grand Bolshevik design. From this perspective the Sudeten crisis could be presented as the handiwork of communist conspirators, who sought to further their aims by the deliberate destruction of European civilisation. In this scenario Germany was not only absolved from blame but in effect presented as an innocent victim of the intrigue. This was very much the line pursued by Capt. Luttman-Johnson. Britain, he warned in mid-September, was in "semi-alliance" with "the International Reds and Popular Frontists," whose leaders "want nothing so much as a world war with its attendant misery, and opportunity for anarchy and world revolution." Luttman-Johnson's theme was argued with even greater vigour by Charles Sarolea. In a series of massive letters to The Scotsman Sarolea presented the pro-appeasement case from a variety of angles. Initially the Sudeten case for self-determination dominated his contributions. Lambasting his old friends the Czechs for their "aggression" against the Sudetendeutsch, he quickly turned to their reckless participation in the French alliance system. After Godesberg, however, Sarolea's circumspection weakened and his inherent anti-communism emerged strongly. This was "no time to be silent about fundamental but unpalatable facts." It was a "fact" that "Paris is the seat of the West European centre, and that Prague is the seat of the Central European centre, of the Moscow Comintern." Stalin "has the power, if we let him, to unleash the dogs of war," Sarolea warned, "Moscow not only does not dread a world war, but needs it and welcomes it in order to bring about the world revolution." Sarolea and Luttman-Johnson, of course, were not only anti-communist, they were also extremely sympathetic towards both Germany and Nazism. However, their suspicions of Soviet implication in the Sudeten crisis, and a much broader generalised fear of Soviet intentions, were shared by a good many others on the
Right who did not necessarily endorse their views on Germany. The continuing strength of this sector of opinion, while not strikingly evident during the September debate, would become much more apparent in the aftermath of Munich.

Legitimation of German interest in the Sudetenland and transference of responsibility for the crisis to other more guilty parties accounted for the bulk of pro-German expression during the September debate. However, there were other forms. In the early stages of the crisis, in particular, there were numerous pleas for the cultivation of better relations between the two countries, both for the obvious purpose of avoiding war, but for their own sake as well. Most of these reflected an "innocent" desire for friendship between the two peoples. The Earl of Airlie, for instance, called on ex-servicemen to "do something towards throwing a bridge across to their comrades over the sea, so that the barbed wire which was separating the nations might be cut down." Some, however, also stressed that the attainment of this goal required more positive British attitudes towards both Germany and the Nazi régime. A.P. Laurie called for understanding and tolerance where German political preferences were concerned, and stressed the damaging and dangerous effect of continued criticism of the German régime at such a critical juncture. "Let us agree to differ as to forms of government," he declared. Chamberlain's efforts to maintain peace, he continued, would best be served "by ceasing on public platforms and in books, pamphlets, and newspapers, carping at and criticising the German people, who are very friendly to us." More positive endorsement of the Nazi régime was extremely rare, and essentially limited to its external policies. There were some for whom Hitler was still the great peace-maker of 1936. According to one of the Glasgow Herald's anonymous correspondents, Hitler's "deeds have been benevolent for all those concerned in his foreign policy." He was "the best — that is, the most practical, — champion of peace with justice in our times." Capt. Luttman-Johnson similarly claimed that "no man wants war less than Herr Hitler." Comments in this vein, however, were very much the province of more committed, and more vigorously pro-Nazi, enthusiasts.

In the aftermath of the Munich agreement Scotland shared in the general manifestation of popular emotion at the avoidance of catastrophe. In editorial columns, in speeches by politicians, in correspondence to the press, the predominant response was one of sheer relief that war had been averted. The nation gave thanks for peace: to God, Chamberlain, and the Czechs. Chamberlain, the principal architect of peace, was hailed as "the saviour of youth — the world's
youth." Few responses from government supporters failed to make reference to "the inspired man" who had "brought relief and happiness to mankind." On paper, at least, the Munich Agreement appeared to have obtained some concessions to the Czechs compared to the terms on offer at Godesberg. Nevertheless, Czechoslovakia's humiliation and territorial losses were plain for all to see. While relief was the primary popular response, running a close second, particularly in the correspondence columns, was a strong undercurrent of guilt. This expressed itself both in the many effusive expressions of gratitude to the Czechs for having made the sacrifices necessary for the preservation of peace, and in the plethora of calls for, and offers of support for, British financial assistance to compensate the Czechs for their sacrifice.

On the merits of the Munich agreement itself Scotland was far from unanimous. Although in many cases coupled with calls for speedier rearmament, comment from official Conservative sources was almost universally in favour of the agreement, with prospective Conservative parliamentary candidates in particular indulging in fulsome praise. J.H.F. McEwen's declaration that Munich was not "a diplomatic triumph," but merely the best settlement which could be obtained when confronted by "a lunatic with a loaded gun," was considerably less congratulatory in tone than most. With the Duchess of Atholl out of the country drumming up American support for opposition to appeasement, there were no Scottish Tory rebels in the House of Commons debates which followed Munich. Every National government MP representing Scottish constituencies who was present, with the partial exception of Robert Boothby, registered their support for Chamberlain. The concessions obtained at Munich, coupled with the famous "piece of paper" which Chamberlain bore back in triumph, enabled many of those Conservatives who had advocated "firmness" in the post-Godesberg phase of the crisis to rally to the government's support after the settlement. The Scotsman asserted its belief that "a European war to confirm and repeat the mistakes of the Peace Conference" would have been indefensible, and acclaimed the pledge which Chamberlain had extracted from Hitler as "a truly wonderful outcome of a crisis." Somewhat grudgingly the Glasgow Herald also hailed Chamberlain for having "created a great opportunity for international understanding." Despite a marked absence of enthusiasm for what it branded a "dictate" settlement, a lack of zeal which subsequently earned it a sharp rap over the knuckles by the government's press managers, the paper endorsed Chamberlain's actions as the only feasible course and registered its total
disagreement with the views expressed by the opponents of appeasement. However, amongst grass roots Conservative supporters a small but vocal minority was not prepared to give even qualified endorsement of Munich. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis the Glasgow Herald printed more letters critical of Munich than in favour. Many of these were plainly from disaffected Conservatives.

The majority of Liberal and Labour spokespersons mirrored their respective parties' official condemnation of the settlement. However, in both parties there were rebels who endorsed Chamberlain's achievement. D.M. Mason, the former Liberal MP for Edinburgh East, registered his disapproval of Liberal policy by resigning from his position in the Liberal Party Organisation. Munich, he claimed, had not only been "a great blessing because it avoided war," it had also been "sound" and "just," and an "act of constructive statesmanship." Many of the Liberal rebels, like Mason himself, had previously advocated concessions to Germany. Within the Labour Party support for Chamberlain came from the pacifist wing. In the post-Munich Commons debates the Rev. James Barr, Labour MP for Coatbridge and a committed pacifist, conveyed his "sincere and unstinted" congratulations to Chamberlain.

James Maxton and John McGovern, speaking for the ILP, also endorsed Chamberlain's achievement, and Maxton's speech in the Commons was widely acclaimed as one of the most powerful and eloquent defences of Munich to be made. Maxton's speech was in large part simply an exposition on the horrors of war. Both men, however, primarily reiterated their socialist-pacifist approach to foreign policy. The ILP's socialist-pacifist stance in dealing with the dictators had not fundamentally changed since the Abyssinian war. However, in subsequent speeches McGovern also embraced "standard" appeasement themes, such as his criticism of those who denied the need "to modify and rectify the wrongs of the Peace Treaties." He was also shifting towards a more positively pro-German position. In the past the ILP's insistence on the marginality of the difference between the capitalist régimes of Germany and Italy on the one hand, and those in the liberal democracies on the other, had provided a form of negative apologia for the fascist régimes. Now for the first time McGovern utilised a theme more common to "mainstream" pro-German comment. McGovern had been in Germany during the September crisis. His German contacts, he declared, had argued that if Britain showed more friendship and indulged in less criticism of Germany, "you
would get a modification of the internal brutality." McGovern believed, was well worth trying. McGovern could not be accused of any ideological affinity with Nazism. Nevertheless, this was exactly the kind of advice moderate pro-
Germans, like Lothian, had been giving in 1935 and 1936.

Within nationalist ranks the conflicting moral imperatives thrown up by the crisis arguably caused more soul-searching and confusion than in any other party. The plight of the Czechs had particular resonance for nationalists. The Czechs were a small nation. They had successfully freed themselves from imperialist rule, and they had established, by Eastern European standards, a model democracy. Now they found themselves the victims of imperialist aggression in a settlement determined by the power-political requirements of the Great Powers. No attempt had been made to activate collective security, to which mainstream nationalism had remained enthusiastically loyal. Offsetting these factors, however, was considerable empathy with the Sudeten claim to the right to self-determination, and, above all, a desperate desire for peace and a wide-spread resistance to involvement in England's imperialist struggles. Unable to proffer a constructive foreign policy alternative, the SNP leadership had nothing to offer but criticism of the other parties. Its official policy statement combined "profound sorrow" for the Czechs and condemnation of the government for its abandonment of collective security with an exhortation "to resist all propagandist efforts to march our people to an imperialist war." The party's uncertainties, however, were not shared by the fundamentalists. Munich galvanised their activities. After Munich the Scots Independent vocalised their brand of isolationism with increased stridency. In November the Scottish Neutrality League was formed, dedicated, in the words of its founder, Arthur Donaldson, to "peace and neutrality, no matter what the pretext or the apparent cause of hostilities." Much of the post-Munich debate was a reiteration of the themes deployed in September. Chamberlain's defenders primarily justified Munich on the grounds that "a glaring and obsolete injustice in the Versailles Treaty had been rectified," and that had Britain gone to war to keep the Sudeten Germans under Czech control, "she would have fought for an unjust cause." To others Czechoslovakia had always been "strategically an impossible state" and "a mistake in its formation all along," and several presented the settlement as a blessing for the Czechs, who had been saved from the disastrous consequences of their own intransigence. Without
Chamberlain's intervention they would have suffered "complete annihilation." Realists rejoiced in the fact that Chamberlain had avoided "war against almost impossible odds," while anti-communists, like the Earl of Mansfield, reiterated their belief that war would have resulted in "Soviet rule from the Rhine to Alaska.

Many Conservatives who paid tribute to Chamberlain's achievement hailed it as the first step towards the normalisation of relations between Britain and Germany. There were frequent references to the need for some kind of "modus vivendi" with the totalitarian states. Some pursued this theme with greater vigour than others. The Earl of Home enthusiastically acclaimed Munich as the "foundations" for what might prove to be a "lasting bridge between two great peoples." Most statements to this effect, however, were couched in vague and generalised terms, and did little more than echo the optimism which Chamberlain himself had expressed on his return from Munich. Between such amorphous generalities and Capt. Luttmann-Johnson's exuberant vision of a future, in which "British naval power allied with the military strength of Germany would ensure world peace," lay a veritable gulf. Luttmann-Johnson's flight of fantasy was truly exceptional. A good many, however, also stressed the need for greater tolerance if rapprochement were to be achieved. Home himself called for an increase in "goodwill and understanding" in the spirit of "true Christian brotherhood and sisterhood." Others were more concrete in their references, and urged an end to the constant criticism of the German régime, which, they argued, was doing so much to sour relations between the two countries. In a statement typical of many by Conservative MPs and prospective parliamentary candidates at the time, F.A. Macquisten declared, "It is a great mistake to say anything which will cause ill-feeling." It was "their business and not ours what form of Government they have."

Although a few offered "qualifying circumstances," there was singularly little in the way of justification of the tactics employed by the German leadership during the crisis. Indeed, there was little in the way of positive comment on the German régime even from her more enthusiastic friends, most of whom used arguments and language indistinguishable from that of appeasement. Capt. Ramsay vigorously defended Munich, but confined himself primarily to the immorality of waging war to sustain Czech "tyranny." Sir Thomas Moore similarly dwelt primarily on the essential justice of the eventual outcome. Moore's speech in the Commons debates after Munich bore no traces of his former enthusiasm for Hitler
and his régime. His enthusiasm for Germany remained, but the language he employed would not have been out of place in a speech by James Maxton. Any war against Germany, he argued, would not in reality be waged against Hitler, but against the German people. "Hitler passes and his régime passes, and the world map alters, but it is the people who are destroyed ... let us remember that the people of Germany are just as good, honest, decent and kind as the people of this country." While Moore's ideological affinity with Nazism might have genuinely cooled, the same could not be said of A.P. Laurie and Charles Sarolea. In December 1938 Laurie acclaimed Hitler for having enabled Europe to enter "a new era of peace and prosperity." Hitler, he claimed, would be "known to future generations as Hitler the Peacemaker." However, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis Laurie contented himself with an orthodox Chamberlainite defence of Munich. Sarolea's post-Munich assault on those who indulged in "nagging and snarling at Germany" was similarly devoid of positive references to the Nazi régime. All that differentiated Sarolea's comments from those of appeasers like Macquisten was the venom which he poured on the critics, and his inferences of Soviet complicity in such criticism.

Given the tendency towards restraint in pro-German circles after Munich, the positive effusion of pro-German comment in which the Courier and Advertiser indulged in the immediate aftermath of the crisis is all the more remarkable. Developing its September discovery of the injustice of Sudeten incorporation in Czechoslovakia, it now declared that Hitler "had unchallengeable right on his side." Moreover, while the vast majority of pro-German sympathisers drew a tactful veil over the possibility of future German territorial claims in Europe, the Courier immediately moved to preparation of the ground for the likeliest next move. Much of the paper's post-crisis editorial comment was devoted to denunciation of Poland's opportunist seizure of Teschen. Drawing attention to Poland's post-war track record of aggression against neighbouring states, it also highlighted her oppression of ethnic minorities. Above all there was the question of "that most artificial of all the arrangements of the Treaty of Versailles," the Polish Corridor. "Some day," the paper enthused, "the Germans will wipe out that dividing barrier, and when the day comes there will be precious little sympathy wasted on Poland." While the paper's editorial line might be described as one of extreme isolationism, and only by inference pro-German, the same could not be said of the article which appeared on the paper's women's page on October 5th. Nestling
beside a recipe for "Kipper Scramble," "A Dictator at Home" provided a sympathetic snapshot of Hitler's domestic environment, dwelling primarily on the dictator's taste in soft furnishings and potted plants. Although features in this vein were not uncommon in the press in 1936, by late 1938 they were hardly to be expected outside the pages of the Anglo-German Review. That the Courier and Advertiser should choose to print it within days of the Munich crisis was quite astounding.

For some of Germany's friends Munich brought about a fundamental reappraisal of attitude. The injustice of the treatment meted out to Czechoslovakia triggered further defections amongst those whose tolerance and sympathy had been rooted in the injustice of Germany's post-war treatment. For Helen Morison, Munich was "a negation of all past British traditions."122 Thereafter, she regularly denounced with vehemence both Germany's internal and external policies. Some of Germany's more right-wing supporters were also afflicted by a change of heart. Awareness of the growing threat to British security which Nazi Germany now posed, rather than any particular sorrow over the mutilation of Czechoslovakia, was the prime factor in most cases. The Earl of Glasgow, whose enthusiasm for Germany's resolute resistance to the Bolshevik menace had also extended to more than a little admiration for the German régime itself, was one of the more notable converts. Although he warmly endorsed Munich, he now warned, "Germany, having realised her ambition to be the greatest and the dominating Power in Europe to-day, may possibly decide to launch out for world power."123

With what at first sight might appear undiplomatic haste, some pro-German enthusiasts, like Moore and Luttman-Johnson, returned to the subject of colonial retrocession in the immediate aftermath of Munich.124 They were, however, merely adding their contributions to a substantial flurry of demands for concessions, largely from individuals who had not previously participated in the colonial debate. The Glasgow Herald, which previously had shown no enthusiasm for this theme, now presented colonial concessions as an essential component in the "general settlement" which it now urged Chamberlain to initiate. Such a settlement, and with it real "peace in our time," clearly offered for the Herald the prospect of retrospective legitimation of Munich. "It must not be said of us that the new era of peace secured by the sacrifices from 'a far off country' evaporated ... from any unwillingness of ours to make a contribution."125 Guilt over the abandonment of Czechoslovakia, and what amounted to a desire for a
symbolic act of national atonement, provided the fuel for these demands, rather than any real sympathy for Germany.

The optimism about the future of Anglo-German relations, which many had managed to draw from the Munich settlement, received its first challenge only a month later. On November 7th Ernst vom Rath, a junior German diplomat at the Paris embassy, was murdered by a young Polish Jew, triggering an orgy of organised violence against the Jews in Germany. "Responding" to this display of "popular" discontent, the Nazi government introduced further draconian anti-semitic legislation. The general reaction of the British press and public alike to the Kristallnacht pogrom and its legislative codicil was one of violent outrage. Awareness of the increasing harshness of German anti-semitic policy had been growing throughout 1938. However, it was the events of November which first really brought home to a shocked British populace the extent of the persecution. Many of Germany's remaining "respectable" sympathisers, like Lord Londonderry, hastened to condemn this "most detestable persecution." Lord Mount Temple stepped down as chairman of the AGF in protest at Germany's action. Twenty individual members of the AGF also resigned.

In Scotland the reaction was equally one of profound horror. The intensification of the persecution was denounced in no uncertain terms both in the editorial columns of the Scottish press and by numerous individual correspondents. The Scotsman, in particular, took a strong line, and stressed not only the German government's responsibility for the violence, on which nearly everyone was agreed, but also the complicity of the German people in tolerating such barbarism. After the initial shock, however, passions cooled and the spate of protest died away. Richard Griffiths notes a parallel development within the correspondence columns of The Times. By late November a certain counter-reaction was perceptible. Some sought to exculpate the German people. The Conservative MP for Glasgow Hillhead, J.S.C. Reid, "refused to believe that the ordinary German citizens had any hand in what had been going on in Germany." The vast majority of Germans were "decent, honest, peace-loving Christians." Others endeavoured to minimise the relevance of the persecution to the formulation of British foreign policy. An orthodox Chamberlainite, like Charles de Bois Murray, could deplore the "great pain and misery which has been inflicted on a defenceless minority," while simultaneously asking, "how can it be a remedy for the suffering
of individuals to make all Europe suffer, to avenge the blood of a few by shedding the blood of hundreds of thousands?"  

For Germany's friends the *Krystallnacht* pogrom presented a major problem. Even as zealous an enthusiast of the Nazi régime as Capt. Luttman-Johnson had to admit that "to persecute the Jews shows an un-Christian spirit," although he also claimed that it paled into insignificance compared with the treatment currently being meted out to Catholics in Spain. "Where is our comparison, our humanity? Is it worth much when we can howl at robbery and confiscation of property in one land, and ignore the torture and murder of fellow Christians in another." Most resolved the problem by ignoring the issue. Nevertheless, there were anti-semites who were prepared to offer partial justification for Germany's behaviour. In January 1939 a meeting of the Stirling branch of the National Council of Women was addressed by Lady Muir, the Bulgarian-born wife of local landowner, Sir Alexander Kay Muir. Muir informed her audience that "the Jewish question in Central Europe was entirely different to the one at home. The best Jews were in Great Britain and the next best Jews in Bulgaria. All those who lived in the Middle and who had been persecuted were ones who had for generations usurped the best positions and employments." Others were even more positive in their endorsement of Nazi excess. According to J.A. Macdonald, a member of the Edinburgh branch of the BUF, the pogrom had been a spontaneous reaction by the German people to "the attempts of the World Jewish Congress at Geneva to smash Germany's finances and economics by the power of Jewish gold." It was also, he suggested, the harbinger of further anti-semitic outbursts. "Owing to the growth of national consciousness, Europe must expect an intensification of the Jewish problem, which can only be solved by the justice of a new Europe." Macdonald's new Europe was to be Jew-free, the offending minority having been relocated to "one of the virgin places of the earth." Comments in this vein were extremely rare. Even amongst anti-semites there were many who believed Germany had gone too far. A belief in the international Jewish conspiracy by no means necessarily predisposed individuals to sanction indiscriminate violence against ordinary Jews.

Stressing the rapidity with which protest died away, Griffiths argues that the events of November 1938 did not have a lasting impact on general attitudes towards relations with Germany. For a very large number of people German anti-semitism remained irrelevant to Anglo-German relations. Was this the case in Scotland? Certainly one of the most striking features of the numerous defences of Munich
delivered by government supporters during November and December is the frequent absence of reference, of any kind, to the intensification of the persecution. There was, too, amongst those who condemned the persecution, a remarkable propensity to concentrate on the tangential issue of the pogrom's relevance to possible colonial concessions. According to the Glasgow Herald, as it promptly ditched its newfound enthusiasm for colonial concessions, "The first reaction of a horrified world has been to ask whether a nation which treats fellow-men as the Nazis have treated the Jews can be trusted to treat "inferior" races with any sort of humanity and whether the conscience of the world can allow Germany to have colonies." The Herald was not alone. The issue featured strongly in the Aberdeen Press and Journal's editorial comment and for numerous correspondents the principal significance of the pogrom was the proof positive it provided of Nazi Germany's unsuitability to govern native peoples. 136

This response was not peculiar to Scotland. In the Commons opponents of colonial transfer from all parties mounted a renewed campaign to force the government to clarify its position on the subject. Significantly, many of those participating in the campaign had previously supported concessions. On December 7th the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm Macdonald, delivered the least ambiguous governmental response yet made to such pressure. Territorial transfer, he declared, whether of colonies or of mandated territories, "is not now an issue in practical politics."137 A few individuals did persist with advocacy of retrocession after November 1938. In Scotland they included Arthur Berriedale Keith, A.J. Brock and John Orr.138 To all intents and purposes, however, Krystallnacht effectively terminated popular support for colonial transfer. In this respect, at least, it did have a decisive impact on popular opinion. However, as has previously been noted, the colonial debate was not central to the main debate on attitudes towards Nazi Germany.

For a good many Scots, Nazi anti-semitism, in itself, was not of the first order of importance as regards British relations with Germany. In Scotland, as in Britain as a whole, Nazi perfidy in foreign policy, as demonstrated by the Prague coup in the spring of 1939, had an impact on attitudes towards Germany which Krystallnacht singularly failed to equal. Nevertheless, where Scotland is concerned the evidence suggests that the impact of the pogrom was not as minimal as Griffiths argues to be the case. Krystallnacht undoubtedly had a major impact in
clerical circles. Although there were signs of growing concern within the Church of Scotland about Nazi anti-semitism from early 1938 on, most clerical contributions to the press with a bearing on foreign policy had been concerned either with general appeasement themes or the Church's attitude towards pacifism. The November pogrom provoked a storm of protest from individual ministers. Free Church ministers, who previously had shown little sign of interest in foreign affairs, were strongly to the fore. Although the initial wave of protest subsided, concern continued to show through strongly during the first half of 1939. In January Capt. A.H.M. Ramsay's much publicised references to the existence of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy provoked another outburst from clerical sources, condemning both Ramsay's remarks and Nazi anti-semitism, and at the General Assembly in May Nazi policy was vilified by several speakers. The expressions of outrage which Nazi anti-semitic policy prompted were undoubtedly genuine. Nevertheless, the vigour of the response owed much to the fact that Jews were not the only persecuted group in Nazi Germany. By association, the pogrom also appears to have acted as a catalyst for latent concern over the persecution of the Lutheran Church. In January 1939 The Scotsman printed a host of letters from ministers and laymen condemning Nazi church policy. It is impossible to gauge just how influential this concern was. However, in early 1939 several contemporary observers recorded their belief that anti-German feeling was stronger in Scotland than in the rest of Britain. Greater sensitivity to Nazi anti-semitism, largely by association, may well account for this.

Krystalnacht prompted existing opponents of Chamberlain's foreign policy to intensify their criticism. This in turn provoked a loyalist backlash, notable for the almost hysterical tone with which Chamberlain's critics were lambasted. Critics of Chamberlain were increasingly denounced not just as ignorant and aberrant, but as dangerous warmongers. Many individuals called for a reform of democratic procedures which gave licence to such expression. Dr. J. Graham Kerr, Conservative MP for the Scottish Universities, expressed his belief that "It is ... one of the greatest faults of our Parliamentary system that it permits unrestricted discussion of foreign affairs in open debate." Not a few labelled Chamberlain's critics as near-treasonous, and imputed to them sinister hidden agendas. The most ardent exponents of this theme were the committed pro-German enthusiasts, like Charles Sarolea. Most, however, were simply panicky appeasers.

This was the climate of debate which served as a backdrop to the only electoral
test of popular opinion in Scotland between Munich and Prague, the Kinross and West Perthshire by-election. The cause of this election was the resignation of the sitting MP, the Duchess of Atholl. Discontent over Atholl's pursuit of an independent line on foreign policy, particularly her outspoken support for Republican Spain, had been gathering strength in her constituency association since the spring of 1937. Although Atholl had survived Col. Dawson's flamboyant resignation and subsequent press campaign with little real difficulty, a running sore had developed within the constituency. In October 1937 there were two further resignations from the association's executive committee, those of the Hon. Mrs. Stirling of Keir and Sir Alexander Kay Muir, and a month later the local Conservative association at Dunblane publicly declared that in future Atholl would be denied their co-operation.

Initially, Atholl's most vocal antagonists were both Catholic and pro-Nationalist, or at the very least vehemently anti-Republican. There were also discontented grumblings from isolationist backwoodsmen, irritated by her faith in a reconstructed League. For one of Atholl's irate constituents collective security was "just HUMBUG. As trustworthy as a rotten wading staff in a dangerous river." Increasingly, however, Atholl came under attack from more orthodox Chamberlainites, incensed by her persistent criticism of Chamberlain. In the relatively peaceful atmosphere of 1934-35 Atholl's opposition to the party leadership over India had provoked considerable discontent within the constituency association. With the heightened international tensions of 1938, and the attendant growth of the Chamberlain leadership cult, for many local Conservatives it had become axiomatic "that Unionists owed only one loyalty and that is to the leader of the Unionist party." Others feared that continuing dissension in local Conservative ranks would result in the loss of the seat to the Liberals at the next election, and were pragmatically coming to the conclusion that their only hope of getting "back to a decent-going show without all these internal differences" lay in securing Atholl's replacement.

From the spring of 1938 Atholl's relations with her local association became increasingly acrimonious. On April 28th Atholl resigned the Conservative Whip, ostensibly in protest at the whole trend of the Government's foreign policy, and the recently signed Anglo-Italian Agreement in particular. In part, however, this
move was a direct response to the increased restiveness of her own constituency association. Over the following months a series of battles was fought out within the constituency association. Although initially succumbing to pressure from Scottish Unionist headquarters to move towards deselection, the Chamberlainite majority on the executive committee avoided grasping the nettle until October, when Atholl's refusal to support the Munich settlement finally persuaded them of the futility of trying to bring their rebellious MP to heel. On November 19th Atholl's deselection was formally approved at the Annual General Meeting of the KWPUA by 273 votes to 167. Bowing to their final defeat, most of the remaining Atholl loyalists on the executive committee resigned in protest. Five days later, rejecting the course of inaction counselled by her husband and most of her political advisers, including Churchill, Atholl applied for the Chiltern Hundreds. Impelled by the need to defend her personal honour, and never one to shrink from a fight where principle was concerned, Atholl further saw a by-election campaign as an ideal vehicle for the "reawakening of sturdy public opinion." In any event she was convinced that the pro-Chamberlain opinions of her constituency association did not reflect the views of local rank and file Conservatives, far less the electorate as a whole, and was confident of victory.

Although the Labour Party from the outset chose not to impede Atholl's campaign by fielding a candidate, Atholl's endeavour to appeal to a united anti-appeasement vote initially appeared to have been frustrated by the determination of her former Liberal opponent in the 1935 election, Mrs. Coll McDonald, who immediately announced her intention to stand. Although it had been anticipated that the Scottish Liberal Federation would allow Atholl a free run, the SLF executive committee was reluctant to impose its views on the local association and initially endorsed McDonald's candidacy. This decision provoked a storm in Scottish Liberal ranks. Numerous leading Scottish Liberals expressed their desire to see McDonald step down, or their outright support for Atholl, and McDonald herself was bombarded by telegrammes from Liberals all over Britain to the same effect. After consultation with Sir Archibald Sinclair, McDonald bowed out on December 8th.

With McDonald out of the running the by-election campaign that followed was dominated by the question of foreign policy, as Atholl had intended. Chamberlain's policies, Atholl argued, had been disastrous. The Munich surrender had left Britain
in a seriously weakened strategic position, and one that would be further imperilled by an Insurgent victory in Spain. Her own platform was that of resolute resistance to any further acts of aggression by Italy or Germany, vigorous rearmament, and the need for "the widest possible co-operation with all peace loving countries." Standing as an Independent, she urged all who opposed appeasement, and shared her belief "that this is supremely a moment in which country must come before party," to support her cause. Her campaign in the constituency, although considerably less slick than that of her opponents, was bolstered by a phalanx of anti-appeasement celebrities and organisational support from Lloyd George's Council of Action. She also received strong backing from the Scottish Liberal establishment.

Significantly, several of the Liberals involved in Atholl's campaign, and the interlinked opposition to Coll McDonald's candidacy, had in previous years expressed strong sympathy with Germany's grievances over her post-Versailles treatment. The General Secretary of the SLF, Ranald Findlay, had been the foremost Scottish exponent of the Liberal solution to Germany's colonial grievances in the debates of 1937. He had also strongly supported a conciliatory approach towards Germany during the Rhineland crisis. Incensed by the SLF's initial decision to endorse McDonald's candidacy, he promptly resigned in protest. Another Liberal who had expressed sympathy with Germany's problems of access to raw materials, G.F. Barbour, vigorously assisted Atholl's campaign. An influential figure in Perthshire Liberal circles, Barbour had contested the seat in 1929. His participation was a useful boost to Atholl's endeavours to pull in the Liberal vote. One of Findlay's colleagues on the SLF executive committee, Sir Daniel Stevenson, had been one of the most prominent early advocates of treaty revision in Germany's favour. Angrily accusing his colleagues of impropriety at the crucial meeting at which the decision to endorse McDonald's candidacy was taken, he immediately joined Atholl's team of public speakers.

The behaviour of Findlay and Stevenson was clearly prompted by more than dutiful adherence to the official party line. The positive, and indeed passionate, appearance of such figures in the anti-appeasement camp in late 1938 reflects the extent to which the events of the previous year had alienated many of those whose demands for the revision of Versailles had been founded in a deep moral
earnestness and concern for justice for Germany. In their eyes, Germany, through her actions, had utterly forfeited her case for territorial revision on moral grounds. Some had clearly been uneasy for some time. Stevenson, for instance, had been silent on the subject of Germany since the summer of 1936. Now, however, they shifted to active, and extremely vocal, opposition to appeasement. Whether this was a delayed reaction to Munich, or a response to Krystallnacht is not clear. For a deeply religious individual like Barbour, Krystallnacht may well have been the decisive factor. The moral case for appeasement remained an integral feature of the arguments deployed by those who continued to support Chamberlain's policies. However, with so many of those who had been at the forefront of the presentation of such arguments in 1936 now in opposition, the sincerity of Chamberlain's supporters in continuing to ply this theme is open to question.

Atholl's unexpected decision to call a by-election caught her Conservative opponents unprepared. One of Atholl's long-standing opponents on the executive committee, local farmer William McNair Snadden, was hastily pressed into service. Although he put in a workmanlike performance, Snadden's personal qualities were of little real relevance in the campaign that followed, where he was essentially cast in the role of Chamberlain's proxy. Atholl had ensured that the election would be dominated by the question of foreign policy. However, in the hands of Conservative propagandists the issues involved were reduced to rejection or endorsement of Chamberlain's personal achievement at Munich, and the election essentially presented as a test of the nation's gratitude to the great peacemaker.

For the Conservatives victory in the Kinross and West Perthshire by-election was of prime importance. The preceding post-Munich by-elections, while disappointing, had in the main produced acceptably low swings to Labour. However, the results at Oxford and Bridgewater had been disquieting, for there Independents had harnessed the anti-appeasement vote to the government's embarrassment. Both results had been dismissed as atypical, and the party managers were determined to see that that verdict remained unquestioned. Taken in isolation, a victory by Atholl, a Conservative rebel, would also have been far more damaging to Chamberlain's prestige than the Bridgewater result. Atholl's defeat, on the other hand, would remove an irksome voice of dissent from the Commons. Above all, though, it would serve to demonstrate to the small band of Conservative parliamentary malcontents the political fate which potentially awaited them.
The effort expended on unseating Atholl by the Conservative party machine and their allies in the National Government was prodigious. Such was the gamut of talent pressed into service, that Snadden's electoral agents were able to pick and choose from lists of prospective speakers, and they themselves were hard pressed to cope with the sheer number of electoral meetings. Amid the avalanche of letters of support, perhaps the most striking was that signed by 74 Conservative MPs, mostly backbenchers, twelve of whom represented Scottish constituencies. Indeed of the 44 Conservative, Liberal National and National Labour MPs in Scotland, at least 22 were actively conscripted in the campaign. It was a measure both of the government's determination to rid themselves of Atholl and the extent to which Atholl's activities had incensed the Scottish Conservative establishment.

Atholl's candidacy was also vigorously opposed by the press. *The Scotsman* and the *Aberdeen Press and Journal* both rooted strongly for Snadden. So did the *Glasgow Herald*, for all its doubts over Munich. Admittedly the *Herald*'s position had always been Edenite, rather than Churchillian, but the post-Munich knuckle-rapping may not have been without effect. The proximity of Atholl's constituency to Dundee made the *Courier and Advertiser* a force to be reckoned with in the campaign, and that paper, as was to be expected, was particularly antagonistic towards Atholl.

Among those whose voices swelled the Chamberlainite chorus against Atholl were many whose opposition to Atholl on foreign policy predated Chamberlain's assumption of power. Both the Earl of Mansfield and Sir Thomas Moore took an active part in the campaign. Isolationist or pro-German rhetoric, however, was not a noticeable feature of the campaign. Exponents of those particular viewpoints were in the main content to run under pro-Chamberlain colours. Some of the more enthusiastically pro-Nazi individuals, like A.P. Laurie and Capt. Luttman-Johnson, were indeed conspicuous by their absence, perhaps wisely estimating that their support would be likely to prove counter-productive.

No such reticence, however, afflicted the Friends of National Spain and their pro-Nationalist allies. John Campbell launched a vigorous press campaign against the Duchess, paying particular attention to papers likely to be read in the constituency. Production of Sarolea's *Daylight on Spain* was brought forward
so that its release could coincide with the election campaign, and in addition to sales through the usual retail network, a substantial number of copies was taken up by the FNS itself for private distribution. Two thousand were despatched to Scotland, and many of these must have found their way to Kinross and West Perthshire, where Lady Maxwell-Scott was endeavouring to establish distribution centres at the homes of her aristocratic friends.\(^{171}\)

Two leading sympathisers with the Nationalist cause, namely J.H.F. McEwen and A.H.M. Ramsay, who might reasonably have been expected to play a part in the campaign against Atholl, did not do so. McEwen's absence is perhaps the more striking, for as a respected spokesman on foreign affairs and a loyal parliamentary defender of Chamberlain's policies, his participation would undoubtedly have been favoured by Conservative campaign managers. He certainly would not have been regarded as unduly partisan. McEwen had not publicly expressed views on Spain that the majority of Conservative MPs did not privately hold to be the case, and in any event strong pro-Nationalist sympathies do not appear to have been regarded by the campaign managers as disadvantageous. One of McEwen's UCF colleagues, the Liberal National MP, Charles Kerr, campaigned on Snadden's behalf. McEwen, however, had hardly been effusive in his public praise of Munich, and may well have entertained considerable private doubts as to the wisdom of the settlement. Such doubts, combined perhaps with personal loyalties towards Atholl, offer the likeliest explanation for his reticence. A.H.M. Ramsay, on the other hand, would not have figured highly on any list of preferred speakers drawn up by Snadden's campaign team, if only because of his lack of oratorical talent. Ramsay's public comments on foreign policy, however, while somewhat idiosyncratic, were as yet by no means beyond the pale. The omission of his name from the letter signed by seventy-four Conservative MPs, and the fact that he does not appear to have made any personal contribution to the anti-Atholl campaign, can fairly safely be attributed to personal choice, rather than party pressure. As far as foreign policy was concerned, Ramsay had every ideological reason to promote the political demise of the Duchess. However, he had not previously engaged in the personal vilification of the Duchess favoured by many of his pro-Nationalist allies. Ramsay was an unsophisticated man of simple loyalties and a strong sense of personal honour. To engage actively in the political destruction of a former close colleague, and one, moreover, of the female persuasion,\(^{172}\) was, one suspects, beyond him.\(^{173}\)

When the electors of Kinross and West Perthshire went to the polls on December
21st a close result was expected. To many external observers Atholl appeared the more likely victor, not because her views on foreign policy were expected to command majority support, nor because of the luminance of her supporting speakers, but because the politics of deference were still held to operate in the constituency, and Atholl's personal charisma and local standing were expected to be ultimately persuasive with what was regarded as a somewhat unsophisticated electorate. The result, when it came through, was both a surprise and a tremendous relief to Chamberlain's government and his supporters. Atholl had lost by 11,808 votes to 10,495. Atholl's pro-Nationalist opponents were jubilant. "We were simply amazed," declared Lady Maxwell Scott, "Never in our wildest dreams could we have expected such a result in such a feudal part of Scotland." 174

The pro-Nationalists were quite convinced of the effectiveness of their own contribution to Atholl's downfall. John Campbell certainly believed his challenge to the Duchess had not been without effect. 175 With his customary modesty Charles Sarolea asserted that "as it [Daylight on Spain] was enormously read and discussed in Scotland, especially in the Constituency of the Duchess, it decided the election. If the Duchess could only have had 650 votes more she would have gained, but I took these 650 votes away from her." Blithely ignoring the tremendous effort expended by the Conservative establishment to oust Atholl, he went on to claim, "I am afraid that the Unionist Party itself did absolutely nothing and although we helped to save the seat for the Conservative Party, they seem not in the least to realise it." 176 His judgement had perhaps been coloured by their failure to employ Daylight on Spain as official party propaganda. The real effect of pro-Nationalist campaigning on voting levels in the Kinross and West Perthshire by-election was probably extremely slight. However, given the closeness of the result, it is impossible to deny that their contribution conceivably prevented Atholl from sliding home to a narrow victory.

Other factors, however, bore the real responsibility for Atholl's defeat. Neither the Liberal nor Labour parties were prepared to embrace a "Popular Front" strategy, and in the absence of their official endorsement Atholl's campaign was both morally weakened and handicapped by organisational deficiencies. Atholl's political track record, Spain notwithstanding, may well have deterred many Labour voters, for whom she remained "one of the most reactionary Tories in Britain." 177 Although she was supported by the local Labour association, it was noticeable that
enthusiasm for Atholl's candidacy in Socialist ranks was stronger south of the Border, and of the 21 Labour MPs who signed a joint letter in her support, only one represented a Scottish constituency. Atholl's reactionary outlook and enthusiasm for Protection can hardly have endeared her to Liberal voters either. Moreover, although exaggerated by Conservative wishful thinking, Coll McDonald's seemingly enforced withdrawal had left something of a bitter aftermath, and despite the fact that Atholl's candidacy was supported by prominent local Liberals, many Liberals would appear to have retired to their tents in protest.

The primary cause of Atholl's defeat, however, was her failure to capture a substantial proportion of the ordinary Conservative vote. A self-advertising offer of support from the Communist Party may well have caused damage to Atholl's Conservative credibility, regardless of her rejection of that offer in no uncertain terms. More importantly, despite a message of support from Churchill, Atholl's Conservative credentials were undoubtedly undermined by the absence of any leading Conservative anti-appeaser in her campaign team. Robert Boothby had intended to speak on her behalf, but under pressure from both the Conservative Whips and his own constituency association, Boothby opted for discretion rather than valour. In their absence Atholl could not but appear something of a renegade, and loyalty to party orthodoxy by the Conservative rank-and-file, combined with gratitude to the great peacemaker, in the final analysis determined Atholl's defeat.

The debates of 1938 present a complex pattern of pro-German expression. On the one hand, enthusiasm for appeasement ensured that certain aspects of German claims attracted greater levels of popular support than at any time hitherto. This was particularly evident during the September crisis. On the other, real enthusiasm for Germany reached its lowest level for many years. Indeed, by the end of the year a significant number of individuals who had formerly been strongly supportive of Germany had become actively engaged in opposing appeasement. Although there were many expressions of a desire for "friendship" with Germany, for most appeasers the term merely denoted a state of relations on the basis of a pacified or non-hostile Germany. Semantic difficulties of this kind abound in analysing comment in this year. Views which in previous years would have marked out their expositors as pro-German, in the circumstances of 1938 denoted merely a broadly pro-appeasement position. These complications make it impossible to fully endorse
Griffiths' view that in the course of 1938 "the gap between 'appeasers' and 'enthusiasts' became very clear." To the extent that any positive expression of enthusiasm for Nazism, or other things German, was increasingly becoming the narrow preserve of more committed enthusiasts, it was the case. However, in many areas of expression the language and argument deployment of appeasement and enthusiasm were virtually inseparable. The two camps were by no means readily distinct. Ambivalence in presentation was further complicated by the fact that some enthusiasts had genuinely moderated their views to the extent that they merit being described as appeasers, while others were merely flying flags of convenience.

As the only electoral test of public opinion in Scotland between Munich and Prague, the Kinross and West Perthshire by-election provided a uniquely Scottish focal point to the year's debate on appeasement. It also functioned as something of an emotional climax to the pro-Nationalist campaign in Scotland. In the main, however, the Scottish debate on appeasement closely paralleled debate in the rest of Britain. Although there is some evidence to suggest that anti-German feeling hardened to a more marked extent in Scotland as 1938 drew to a close, general support for Chamberlain's foreign policy remained strong. The Duchess of Atholl certainly fatally misjudged the mood of her constituents. There were some uniquely Scottish contributions to pro-German expression in the debates of 1938. The ILP and fundamentalist nationalists provided their own distinctive perspectives. In response to the heightening of international tension, anti-war convictions led members of both groups to the adoption of overtly pro-German themes. The Anschluss also evoked militant Protestant glee at the destruction of "Jesuit control" in Austria. It was a rare example of pro-German expression from sources strongly influenced by Nazi persecution of the Lutheran Church and a belief in Nazi complicity in the Papist conspiracy, and therefore normally antipathetic to Nazi Germany. For most of the year, however, the expression of pro-German enthusiasm essentially mirrored British patterns. Nevertheless, a significant number of individuals who had formerly been prominent in presenting the case for Germany appeared in the anti-appeasement camp in late 1938. Prague may have been the decisive factor in persuading the majority of moderate pro-German enthusiasts of the error of their ways, but in Scotland their ranks were beginning to look decidedly thin before 1938 was out.
Chapter 11
Footnotes


4. The editorial line pursued by the Glasgow Herald at this time is a case in point.

5. The virtual, if temporary, fusion of "appeasement" with Chamberlain's policies, and Munich in particular, was effectively achieved by post-war historiography.

6. The added definition of craven surrender to threats only appears in dictionaries after 1945.

7. Eden's departure was not entirely uninfluenced by self-interest. As Maurice Cowling has pointed out, for Eden "six years in office were ending in ignominy (in Austria) when resignation enabled him to turn an unsuccessful stewardship into a claim to the Prime Ministership when Chamberlain retired." Cowling, op. cit., p.176.


11. At the meeting of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee on February 24th Leo Amery was pleasantly surprised to find that "the general attitude of the 200 members there was now enthusiastically pro-Neville." Four days earlier, on first hearing of Eden's resignation, Amery had expected a "very real commotion and a great number of our Members, especially the younger ones, will side with Anthony." Amery, diary entries for 20th and 24th February 1938, The Empire at Bay, pp. 458, 456.

12. Estimates of the "real" number of abstentions (i.e. not including absentees) in this debate vary. A.J.P. Taylor gives the number as twenty-five, while Neville Thompson, citing The Times as reference, claims twenty-one. According to a contemporary report by the Glasgow Herald (23rd February) there were fewer than twenty. Taylor, op. cit., p.423; The Times, 24th February 1938. Quoted by Thompson, op. cit., p.153.


21. Atholl subsequently addressed an LNU rally at the Queen's Hall in London, called to protest at Eden's resignation. Hetherington, op. cit., p.193. Two other Scottish government supporters failed to record positive votes in the division, J.C.M. Guy and Thomas Hunter. Both, however, can fairly safely be assumed to have been absent.


25. McEwen's action was prompted by the fact that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Harold Nicolson and Paul Emrys-Evans respectively, had both abstained in the February 22nd vote, and felt honour bound to tender their resignations. The Committee voted almost unanimously against the resignations, largely because acceptance would have provided a possible source of embarrassment for the government. See Harold Nicolson to Vita Sackville-West, 25th February 1938, Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 326-7.


29. Gauging from the result of the Scottish Universities by-election, which took place during the week the news broke, Eden's resignation does not appear to have significantly damaged electoral loyalty to the National Government in Scotland. Analysis of the result is somewhat complicated by the nature of the constituency, the presence of two Independents and an SNP candidate, the absence of official Labour or Liberal candidates, and the fact that the function and purpose of university constituency representation had been a major issue in the campaign. However, two points can be safely noted. Firstly, the National Government candidate, Sir John Anderson, secured victory by a comfortable majority. Secondly, Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell, who had campaigned primarily on the need to stand up to the dictators, came last. At 13.5% Mitchell's share of the vote was only marginally better than the performance of the official Labour candidate at the previous election in January 1936.
Results of the Scottish Universities By-Election:
Sir John Anderson (Nat. Govt.) 14,042
Dr. Frances H. Melville (Ind.) 5,618
Prof. A.D. Gibb (SNP) 5,246
Sir P.C. Mitchell (Ind.Prog.) 3,868


32. Scotsman, 4th March 1938.

33. Scotsman, 2nd March 1938.

34. Scotsman, 1st March 1938.

35. Scotsman, 24th February 1938.

36. The Times, 15th March 1938.


40. Aberdeen Press and Journal, 12th March 1938; Scotsman, 12th and 15th March 1938; Glasgow Herald, 12th March 1938; Courier and Advertiser, 14th March 1938.

41. Scotsman, 19th March 1938.


44. Speech in Edinburgh under the auspices of the Scottish Liberal Federation, reported by The Scotsman, 1st April 1938.

45. Glasgow Herald, 22nd March 1938.

46. Scotsman, 22nd March 1938.

47. Scotsman, 22nd and 16th March 1938.

48. Scotsman, 14th March 1938.

49. Scotsman, 16th March 1938.

50. George Buchanan, b. 1890. A former pattern-maker, Buchanan had acquired a considerable reputation as an ILP propagandist while still a teenager. One of the original "Clydesiders," Buchanan had continuously represented the Gorbals division since 1922. Less committed to the ILP's foreign policy stance than his parliamentary colleagues, he would rejoin the Labour Party in
April 1939.


52. Bulwark, April 1938.


54. Scotsman, 19th March 1938.

55. Glasgow Herald, 12th March 1938.

56. Commander Henry Cecil Courtney Clarke, b. 1890. A retired naval officer. Secretary of Berwickshire Unionist Association since 1937.

57. Scotsman, 19th March 1938.

58. Scotsman, 19th March 1938.


60. Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 8th May 1938, Neville Chamberlain MSS, NC 18/1/1050. Quoted by Charmley, op. cit., p. 69.


65. Speech reported by The Scotsman, 21st March 1938.

66. Archie Lamont, b. 1907. A geologist by profession, Lamont's involvement in nationalism, like John MacCormack's, had begun with student politics at Glasgow University. As president of GUSNA between 1931 and 1932 he had played a major role in Compton Mackenzie's Rectorial election campaign. He also served as the first secretary of the Press and Publications Committee of the NPS. Although he remained a party member, as a committed separatist and republican, he had been banished from the inner councils of the party in the purges which attended the fusion of the NPS and SP. Like other fundamentalists, Lamont maintained his critique of the post-fusion leadership in the pages of the Scots Independent and the Free Man. Vehemently anti-imperialist and strongly influenced by Irish nationalism, Lamont did not regard himself as a Socialist, although he regularly contributed to Forward.

67. Scots Independent, April and July 1938.

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68. "Manifesto — Scotland and War," issued by Wood in her capacity as Hon. Secretary of the Scottish Self-Government Federation, Scots Independent, July 1938. The SSGF was an umbrella organisation set up by Wood in May 1937 to co-ordinate the anti-conscription campaigning of various small nationalist bodies, including other Wood creations, such as the Democratic Scottish Self-Government Organisation and the Anti-Conscription League. See Scots Independent, June 1937.

69. See Scots Independent, July 1938, and Scotsman, 6th June 1938. The SNP's internal debate on war and conscription was complicated by the fact that, while opposed to participation in a "British" war, most fundamentalists were not pacifist in the absolute sense.

70. John Clark, Scots Independent, June 1938.

71. Jack Brand records the existence, or reported existence, of a variety of secret societies on the fringes of nationalism in the 1930s. Some of these, such as the Scots Guard, had para-military overtones. Wendy Wood herself claimed to have briefly presided over "a Scottish defence force", an organisation which she described as having "a few picked officers, a hidden rifle range and intelligence communication." How much substance there was to these organisations, however, is open to question. Brand, op. cit., p. 233; Wendy Wood, I Like Life, Edinburgh, 1938, p. 287.


73. Scotsman, 21st March 1938.


75. Scotsman, 14th February and 12th March 1938.

76. Scotsman, 30th March 1938.


78. Scotsman, 1st June 1938. The report did also call on the government to strengthen the League of Nations. More controversially, it also called on the government, through international negotiation, to "remove economic barriers, and to consider afresh the question of access to raw materials and the whole question of colonies." While the assembled ministers found no difficulty with the request to eliminate European "injustices," this section of the report, with its implication of colonial concessions and criticism of the government's economic policy, encountered substantial opposition. However, the report was adopted without amendment. A similar resolution, urging members to call for a World Economic Conference to examine "economic and territorial grievances" was carried by the contemporaneous General Assembly of the United Free Church. J. Rutherford Hill, Scotsman, 27th June 1938.


80. Scotsman, 8th, 13th and 20th September.

81. Scotsman, 26th and 28th September.
82. *Courier and Advertiser*, 13th, 10th, 19th and 26th September 1938.

83. The editorial line pursued by the *Glasgow Herald* provoked considerable criticism from its own readership, and not just for its opposition to government policy. Several correspondents complained bitterly of its "unfairness" to the German viewpoint. Its use of the term "German-speaking Bohemians" to describe the Sudetendeutsch appears to have been particularly irritating. "Air Guard," *Glasgow Herald*, 24th September 1938; J.C. Dunn, *Glasgow Herald*, 15th September 1938.


87. See *The Times*, 13th September 1938.

88. Some correspondents also drew parallels between Sudeten aspirations and Irish nationalism. This analogy, while equally sympathetic to the Sudetendeutsch, lacked any specifically pro-German overtones.


90. *Glasgow Herald*, 22nd March, 2nd September 1938. Law's anti-French stance was coupled with a Liberal variant of isolationism. The renegotiation of the Ottawa agreement and the reduction in tariff barriers between Britain and the USA he considered "a matter tenfold more important to us" than "the comparatively paltry Czechoslovakian dispute." Although this strain of thought within Law's views had previously been discernible, it took the September crisis to draw it fully into the open. *Glasgow Herald*, 7th September 1938.


93. *Scotsman*, 27th and 29th September 1938. See also *Scotsman*, 16th and 17th September 1938. Publicly Sarolea's enthusiasm for the Nazi régime itself had lost much of its earlier strength. Nevertheless, he was still prepared to offer excuses based on mitigating circumstances. These included that old favourite of guilty liberal opinion, the assertion that ultimate responsibility for the rise of Nazism lay with the "peace-mongers of Versailles." Traces of his former self were also present in his tentative suggestion that "possibly the Nazi Government, being an extreme and undiluted form of Democracy which is immediately responsible to the German people ... is compelled to yield to the irresistible pressure of public opinion and of party opinion." However, the dominant theme in his contributions, as he himself privately confirmed, was that "in the Czech tragedy ... the protagonist has been the Bolshevik conspiracy." Sarolea to Lord Phillimore, 3rd October 1938, SAR 86.
94. Speech to Edinburgh and Lothian Area Branch of the British Legion, reported by the *Scotsman*, 5th September 1938.


98. On October 4th the *Glasgow Herald* reported that it had received so many letters calling for some form of Czech Relief Fund that it could not print all of them.

99. Speeches in his constituency reported by *The Scotsman*, 22nd October and 12th November 1938.

100. Boothby supported the first Opposition censure motion but abstained on the second. Absenteeism accounted for three abstentions by government "supporters," the term being somewhat inappropriate in the Duchess of Atholl's case. On her return from America Atholl promptly registered her dissent. Sir Murdoch Macdonald, Liberal National MP for Inverness, and J.C.M. Guy, the Conservative MP for Edinburgh Central would also appear to have been absentees. Macdonald subsequently indicated his approval of the Munich settlement. Speech by Atholl at Pitlochry, reported by *The Scotsman*, 28th October 1938; Macdonald, letter to constituents reported by *The Scotsman*, 17th October 1938.


102. *Glasgow Herald*, 1st October 1938. The paper's Munich line compounded its earlier lack of enthusiasm for Chamberlain's policy. For their sins the director and editor of the paper were summoned to London to be disciplined by a member of the Cabinet. Perhaps more persuasively, Sir James Lithgow also endeavoured to coerce them into returning to the Chamberlainite fold by threatening them with the loss of substantial advertising revenue. This kind of coercion was by no means unusual during Chamberlain's administration. After April 1938 the British press was increasingly subjected to both direct and indirect pressure to restrain its criticism of Chamberlain's foreign policy, by what had developed into a highly sophisticated press management system. Alastair Phillips, *Glasgow's Herald 1783-1983*, Glasgow, 1983, p. 134; J.M. Reid, op. cit., pp. 186-7. For the Chamberlain régime's press management techniques, see Richard Cockett, *Twilight of Truth*, London, 1989.


104. Rev. James Barr, b. 1862. MP for Coatbridge since 1935. Previously MP for Motherwell, 1924-31. A United Free Church minister, Barr was a pacifist of long standing. He had denounced British aggression during the Boer War and had been a member of the Union of Democratic Control during the First World War. He was also noted for his enthusiasm for Scottish Home Rule and temperance.


110. Speech by Maj. E.G.R. Lloyd, prospective Conservative candidate for Glasgow Camlachie, reported by *The Scotsman*, 13th October 1938; Speech by Miss M.G. Cowan, prospective Conservative candidate for Edinburgh East, reported by *The Scotsman*, 21st October 1938; Speech by Sir Samuel Chapman, Conservative MP for South Edinburgh, reported by *The Scotsman*, 3rd October 1938; Speech by Sir Charles MacAndrew, Conservative MP for Bute and North Ayrshire, reported by *The Scotsman*, 11th October 1938.

111. Speech by Lord William Scott (brother of the Duke of Buccleuch), Conservative MP for Roxburgh and Selkirk, reported by *The Scotsman*, 18th October 1938; Speech by the Earl of Mansfield, reported by the *Glasgow Herald*, 7th October 1938.


114. Speech reported by the *Scotsman*, 13th October 1938.


117. Speech reported by *The Scotsman*, 28th October 1938.


119. "The Back of Hitler's Mind," *Anglo-German Review*, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 1938; *Scotsman*, 9th November 1938. Although it was not reflected in his public statements, Laurie had by this stage become firmly convinced of Jewish responsibility for the deterioration of relations with
Germany. In the aftermath of Munich he asked Lloyd George, "Are we to be pushed into a war by the lies of damned jews and communists who control the World Press?" Laurie to Lloyd George, undated, LG 11/6.

120. Scotsman, 12th October 1938.

121. Courier and Advertiser, 1st and 3rd October 1938.

122. Scotsman, 26th October 1938.


124. Luttman-Johnson, letter to The Scotsman, 11th October 1938; Moore, speech reported by The Scotsman, 19th October 1938.


127. As Griffiths points out, twenty was not a large number compared to the AGF's total membership of nine hundred. Mount Temple also stayed on as an ordinary member of the AGF. Griffiths, op. cit., p. 340; The Times, 19th November 1938.

128. Editorial, Scotsman, 14th November 1938.


130. Speech to constituents, reported by The Scotsman, 26th November 1938.

131. Charles de Bois Murray, b. 1891. An advocate and an authority on the legal system in Scotland (author of How Scotland is Governed, 1938). Murray unsuccessfully contested Glasgow Tradeston in 1922 and North Midlothian in 1923, standing as a Liberal on both occasions.

132. Scotsman, 5th December 1938.


134. Speech reported by The Scotsman, 19th January 1939. Described by Bruce Lockhart as the "first or almost the first lady diplomat" and "Bulgaria's greatest champion in Britain," Nadějda Muir was the daughter of the former Bulgarian Minister to Britain, Dimitri Stancioff. Nadějda Muir was Catholic, anti-communist, and anti-Russian. After an encounter with the Muirs in June 1937 the Duchess of Atholl considered her to be "very pro-German, and stupider than I shld have expected until this last year." Diary entry for 17th July 1936, Bruce Lockhart, Diaries, p. 349; Bruce Lockhart, Guns or Butter, p. 149; Atholl to the Duke of Atholl, June 1937, ATH 54.

135. Lecture delivered at BUF headquarters in Edinburgh, reported by The Scotsman, 14th November 1938.


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138. Writing with the benefit of hindsight in 1940, Berriedale Keith still maintained that "Up to the outbreak of the war the German demand was one which prudence would have rendered Britain ready to consider." Berriedale Keith, *Causes*, p. 130.

139. In presenting the report of the Committee on Jewish Missions to the General Assembly in May, the Rev. George MacKenzie indicted Nazism as "the domination of the Devil." Speech reported by *The Scotsman*, 26th May 1938.


141. Letter declining an invitation to address a meeting on foreign affairs at Glasgow University, reported by *The Scotsman*, 14th December 1938.


144. Sir Alexander Kay Muir, 2nd Bt., b. 1868. Muir's sister was the wife of General Sir Ian Hamilton. Although Muir was a power within the KWPUA, politically he was overshadowed by his wife, Nadejda.

145. *Universe*, 6th November 1937, JCP/GESPC. Col. Dawson, the Muirs, and Mrs. Stirling all lived fairly close to Dunblane. The Dunblane rebellion coincided with Atholl's appearance in the chair at the Scottish Congress of Peace and Friendship with the USSR in Edinburgh. See *Scotsman*, 8th November 1937.

146. Col. T.W.S. Graham to Atholl, 18th June 1938, ATH 95/2.

147. Speech at Pitlochry by Col. Charles Buttar, former Chairman of the KWPUA, reported by Will Hally. Hally to Atholl, 15th August 1938, ATH 95/2.

148. See, for instance, Col. James Dundas to Atholl, 2nd December 1937, ATH 95/2.

149. Speech by W. McNair Snadden at the AGM of the KWPUA, 13th November 1937, *Perthshire Advertiser*, 16th November 1937, JCP/GESPC.


151. Although Atholl had been considering such a move for some time, the immediate cause of her decision was a resolution of confidence in Chamberlain's foreign policy, directly opposed by Atholl, which the
KWPUA executive committee had passed six days earlier and had promptly forwarded to Chamberlain himself. In the face of this "calculated slap in the face," Atholl had felt she had no alternative but to resign the Whip. Minutes of the KWPUA Executive Committee meeting, 22nd April 1938, ATH 22/20; Duke of Atholl to James Paton, Chairman of the KWPUA, 2nd June 1938, ATH 22/20.

152. The meeting of the constituency association executive committee on May 27th was attended by Col. Patrick Blair, Secretary to the Scottish Unionist Whip. Acting on Blair's advice, the committee determined to select a new candidate prior to the next general election, to extend no further assistance to their sitting member, and to undertake a propaganda campaign in the constituency on the wisdom of the government's foreign policy. Blair subsequently denied prompting the executive committee, but according to Will Hally, one of Atholl's partisans on the committee, there could be "no doubt that he did 'lead them up the hill' that day." Atholl herself was firmly convinced that Blair's intervention had been decisive. Resume of the Proceedings of the Executive Council Meeting of 27th May 1938, by Will Hally, ATH 95/2; Blair to the Duke of Atholl, 26th September 1938, ATH 22/19; Hally to Atholl, 25th August 1938, ATH 95/2; Atholl to George Duncan, 21st June 1938, ATH 95/2.

153. Rigg, op. cit., pp. 21-3; Scotsman, 21st November 1938.


155. Labour had not contested the seat since 1929, when they polled 15%. Labour's magnanimity in not fielding a candidate in December 1938 was therefore hardly overwhelming. McDonald, however, had taken nearly 40% of the vote in 1935, and the situation clearly presented the Liberals with an ideal opportunity to capitalise on Tory disunity. McDonald, however, would appear to have been motivated as much by personal ambition, or perhaps personal animus towards Atholl, as by a desire to further the interests of the party, for she initially made it plain to the Scottish Liberal Federation that she would proceed with or without their official backing. Scotsman, 28th November 1938.

156. According to Dr. J. Fraser Orr, the SLF Vice-Chairman, who presided at the meeting endorsing McDonald's candidacy, the SLF's decision was due to a desire to leave matters to the local association. They may not have been aware that the local association was not prepared to back McDonald without the SLF's blessing. Orr himself subsequently sent a message of support to Atholl. The Times, 1st December 1938; Rigg, op. cit., p. 26; Scotsman, 1st and 19th December 1938.


158. Statement reported by The Scotsman, 25th November 1938.

159. These included Viscount Cecil, the President of the League of Nations Union, A.D. Lindsay and Vernon Bartlett. Lindsay and Bartlett had stood as Independents in the recent by-elections at Oxford and Bridgewater. Both had campaigned on an anti-Munich platform. To the government's embarassment Bartlett had been successful.
In March 1938 the Save the Children Fund set up a committee to raise funds for Jewish refugee children coming to Scotland. Barbour was its first president. Scotsman, 14th March 1938.

At Dartford (7th November), Wasall (16th November), Doncaster (17th November), and Fylde (24th November) the swings to Labour had been 4.2%, 3.4%, 3.7%, 7.6%, and 2.4%. Only at Dartford had the swing produced a Labour gain.

At Bridgewater Vernon Bartlett had actually taken the seat from the Conservatives. Formerly a Liberal, Bartlett, like many other Liberals in the anti- appeasement camp in late 1938, had been a strong advocate of treaty revision in Germany's favour during the early years of the Nazi régime.

Atholl also complained that the local papers had "adopted a most violent attitude against me." However, her remarks were manifestly directed at the Courier and Advertiser in particular. The Perthshire Constitutional was certainly likely to have been hostile to her, as its owner was the MP for Perth and Chamberlain loyalist, Thomas Hunter. According to Rigg, the other local paper, the Perthshire Advertiser, took a "fairly dispassionate line." Scotsman, 20th December 1938; Rigg, op. cit., p. 36.

While overseeing a motion of confidence in Chamberlain's foreign policy, fortuitously carried by the Perth Unionist Association two days after Atholl's announcement of a by-election, Mansfield was reported to have told his audience that those who criticised Chamberlain "were doing no good to their country, to the world, or to the cause of peace" and "were not fit to represent them, in Parliament or anywhere else." Mansfield subsequently addressed a pro-Snadden electoral meeting at Balgowan. Moore addressed a pro-Snadden meeting at Milnathort. Scotsman, 28th November 1938, 17th and 15th December 1938.

Campbell's challenge to Atholl on the subject of belligerent rights was despatched to the Perthshire Advertiser, the Strathearn Herald, the Stirling Sentinel, and the Stirling Observer, as well as to the Catholic Times, the Universe, the Evening Times, the Glasgow Observer, the Irish Weekly, the Tablet, the Weekly Review, The Patriot, the Catholic Herald, and the Daily Mail. JCP/CUS.

Charles Sarolea to J. Estelrich, 8th December 1938, Marqés del Moral to Sarolea, 9th January 1939, SAR 86; Lady Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 6th December 1938, SAR 61.

Col. Dawson had earlier experienced difficulties in entering into political controversy with a woman. However, he had been able to overcome his
173. When Atholl and Ramsay severed mutual correspondence in November 1937 they were still on "Dear Jock" and "Dear Kitty" terms. Had their roles been reversed, however, Atholl would not have hesitated to campaign against Ramsay. In the spring of 1937 Atholl had gone out of her way to speak against Linton Thorp, one of her former confederates in the campaign against the Government of India Bill, who was standing as an Independent Conservative in the Farnham by-election. Atholl's action had been prompted by Thorp's isolationist stance. Atholl to Ramsay, 12th November 1937, Ramsay to Atholl, 10th November 1937, ATH 449; Col. A.J.K. Todd to Atholl, 10th March 1937, Atholl to Todd, 11th March 1937, ATH 93.

174. Maxwell-Scott to Charles Sarolea, 23rd December 1938, SAR 64.

175. Campbell to W.P. Toner, 4th January 1939, JCP/CUS.

176. Sarolea to the Marqués del Moral, date uncertain, Sarolea to Alexander McGregor, 28th December 1938, SAR 86.


179. Scotsman, 8th December 1938.

180. Scotsman, 26th November 1938; Hetherington, op. cit., p. 213.

Chapter 12
Pro-German Movements 1938-39

The predominant feature of public debate on foreign policy in 1938 was the dominance of appeasement views and a growing reticence, and in many cases disaffection, on the part of Germany's friends. Nevertheless, in certain areas pro-German enthusiasm continued to flourish. The *Anglo-German Review* and, to a lesser extent, *The Patriot*, continued to provide platforms for enthusiasts to express their views. That bastion of moderate pro-Germanism, the Anglo-German Fellowship, continued to function. However, the vigour which it had shown in former years had largely dissipated. Although membership reached its peak of around 800, this figure arguably overstates the degree of active involvement. As early as January 1938 Admiral Domvile noted at a meeting of the AGF council, "the most prominent feature the large number of unpaid subscriptions." During the course of 1938 and early 1939 new organisations promoting pro-German views surfaced or achieved greater prominence. Apart from the BUF, the only one of these bodies to achieve any numerical significance was the Link, an organisation of considerable diversity, whose members ranged from the most innocent of Germanophiles to enthusiastically anti-semitic pro-Nazis. The other groups were tiny. Most were vigorously anti-semitic. At the very least they were strongly anti-war, and in some cases fervently pro-Nazi. Their emergence was prompted by the catalyst of Munich and the increase in the number of Jewish refugees fleeing Central Europe.

Throughout 1938 the Link expanded steadily. In March 1938 it had 1,800 members. By September membership had risen to 2,600. By the end of the year it had jumped to 3,500. This growth continued into 1939. At the start of March Admiral Domvile happily declared, "We are increasing rapidly now. If I had money for speakers all over the place, I would sweep the country." Two weeks later Hitler annexed the rump of Czechoslovakia, and at the end of the month the Link was publicly denounced by the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, as existing "mainly for the purposes of pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic propaganda." Although there were some resignations, neither event curtailed the Link's expansion. By mid-summer the nominal number of branches had reached thirty-one (three of these were in Germany) and overall membership had risen to 4,300. Geographically the Link was strongest in the suburbs of London and the Midlands. There were also
flourishing branches in the West Country and on the South coast.

Griffiths stresses the multi-faceted nature of the Link. As an organisation it was highly decentralised, and individual branches were very much left to their own devices. The societal composition of branches varied considerably. West Country branches had a decidedly military and "county" flavour and in several branches Naval officers were strongly to the fore, a presence which Griffiths ascribes to Domvile's personal influence. However, in the urban branches the membership was essentially composed of ordinary individuals. A contemporary report by the Labour Party's Research Department considered most of the Link's members to be drawn from the "small middle class — city typists, bank clerks, private secretaries." The organising committees of these branches were usually made up of local worthies. Many were town councillors or clergymen.

Although the Link Council's main organisers were both strongly pro-Nazi and increasingly anti-semitic, the vast majority of the organisation's membership were motivated by an innocent desire for friendship with Germany. Many had family or other personal contacts with Germany. Although Fascists and other extremists were drawn into its ranks, the activities of most branches did not reflect the presence of these individuals. Many were concerned primarily with social events and cultural matters. Nevertheless, addresses by guest "political" speakers, like Laurie and Domvile, ensured that even "innocent" branches served as platforms for the dissemination of pro-German propaganda. Some branches, moreover, were more overtly political than others. The Central London branch, in particular, was noted for the pro-Nazi and vehemently anti-semitic views of its organisers and guest speakers. Formed in January 1939, it quickly became the second largest of the Link's branches. Most Link members, however, remained unaware of the anti-semitic tendencies within the movement. Their ignorance was facilitated by the national leadership's official pronouncements, which persistently affirmed the organisation's non-political nature. At local level, in many areas, the movement managed to retain an image of respectability right up until the dissolution of the organisation at the start of the war. Only at the beginning of August 1939 was the Link's claim to respectability seriously challenged. In a statement in the Commons, Sir Samuel Hoare declared that the Link was "being used as an instrument of the German propaganda service" and strongly hinted that the organisation was financed by Germany. This time Hoare's comments were seized.

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upon enthusiastically by journalists. After a truly inept PR reply by Domvile and Laurie, the Link was subjected to a barrage of vilification by the press. Although the outbreak of war arguably intervened before the full impact of this public relations disaster could take effect, Griffiths believes that the Link emerged relatively unscathed. To the end many members believed that the accusations were unwarranted and that the Link was what it claimed to be, namely a non-political organisation for the promotion of friendship between the two peoples.

The steady expansion of the Link's branch network in 1938 left Scotland untouched. However, on two consecutive days in February 1939 Scottish branches were launched in Glasgow and Edinburgh. On February 24th the inaugural meeting of the Glasgow branch was held in the city's Ca'doro Restaurant. Approximately a hundred and twenty people attended the event, which was graced by the presence of the German consul, Dr. Thomas. Admiral Domvile provided the main address. Local councillor and former Labour MP, Rosslyn Mitchell, also spoke. Embracing Dr. Thomas, Mitchell declared, "This is the way I want our friendship to be; with both hands clasped in common friendship, wiping away all scorn of bitterness among nations." The following day Domvile again provided the main speaker at the Edinburgh branch inaugural meeting, held in a large public room in Charles Sarolea's palatial double Georgian townhouse. Sarolea also addressed the meeting. Around a hundred people were present, including Capt. Luttman-Johnson. The branch organisers were Mrs Norman Ritchie, a member of the Roxburgh gentry, and Miss Mina MacDonald, organiser of the Edinburgh Young Women's Christian Association and formerly secretary of the West of Scotland District Council of the LNU.

Developed from an existing organisation, the Glasgow Scottish German Social Club, and with strong connections with the local Germany colony, the Link's Glasgow branch fits the pattern of suburban innocence commonly to be found in the organisation's urban branches. Although Domvile recognised an old Naval colleague in the audience, Rosslyn Mitchell would appear to have been the only "big name" present, and Domvile was far from enamoured of his overnight stay in the modest suburban home of the organising secretary. Mitchell was certainly no pro-Nazi firebrand, and the recorded activities of the branch confirm its firmly non-political character. In April members were treated to a musical evening with a string
quartet and a talk on Schubert. In May there was a mystery bus tour and a ramble from Milngavie to Blanefield. Despite its connections with a reasonably substantial local German colony, the Glasgow branch does not appear to have developed into one of the Link's larger branches. The Anglo-German Review records an attendance of thirty at a meeting in late March, and full branch membership was unlikely to have been much higher. Although this was probably on a par with many of the Link's branches, and indeed better than some, the most successful branches, Central London and Birmingham, boasted memberships of over four hundred. The Glasgow branch may also have been relatively short-lived. Although initially it was fairly active, with meetings occurring on a fortnightly basis, the Anglo-German Review does not record any further activity after May.20

The launch of the Edinburgh branch was a somewhat more up-market affair than that of its Glasgow counterpart. Domvile recorded the presence of "many Edinburgh celebrities — parsons, professors and so on."21 In short, the sort of people who normally attended Sarolea's gatherings. However, there were also some trade unionists present, courtesy of Miss MacDonald's connections. Their presence was something of a concern to Mrs Ritchie, who clearly had a low opinion of the lower orders. "One must be so careful as to who gains an entrance into that lovely home of yours, full of treasures," she warned Sarolea.22 According to Sarolea, many of those present at the launch subsequently joined the Link. The only names he gives, however, are those of his nephew, John Bartholomew, the cartographer and owner of the map-making concern of the same name, and a Capt. Wemyss, a relative of the Earl of Wemyss.23

The Edinburgh Link branch clearly had the potential to become one of the more politicised branches. The presence of Sarolea and Luttman-Johnson would certainly have tended to push it in that direction. The principal organisers, Ritchie and MacDonald, were also no innocents, motivated purely by friendship for the German people. Ritchie, who appears to have been the prime instigator of the branch, distributed literature for the anti-semitic Militant Christian Patriots (MCP), whom she considered "splendid people."24 Her material included one of the most influential anti-semitic texts of the period, The Rulers of Russia.25 MacDonald, who had lived in Czechoslovakia, had contributed authoritative letters to The Scotsman and Glasgow Herald, indicting the Czechs for their past maltreatment of ethnic minorities and expatiating on the justice of the Munich settlement.26 The
Edinburgh branch, however, does not appear to have developed beyond the embryonic stage. The *Anglo-German Review*, which gave considerable coverage to activities by local Link branches, makes no reference to any events after the original meeting in Sarolea's house. According to Sarolea, a public meeting was subsequently held in June, but it was singularly unsuccessful and "poorly attended."\(^{27}\)

Scotland can hardly be said to have proved fertile soil for the Link. With the launch of the Aberdeen branch in 1937 proving to be illusory, and Edinburgh's inauguration in 1939 equally coming to naught, only in Glasgow did the Link succeed in establishing a fully functioning branch. Even that may have petered out after May 1939, and whatever success the Glasgow branch did enjoy appears to have derived in no small measure from the atypical presence of a sizeable German colony in the city. The timing of the Edinburgh and Glasgow launches was hardly fortunate, with the German annexation of Czechoslovakia following three weeks later, and the Prague coup may have contributed to the Edinburgh branch's failure to get off the ground. It certainly caused Miss MacDonald's defection.\(^{28}\) As her contributions to *The Scotsman* in June 1939 subsequently revealed, MacDonald's enthusiasm for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in October 1938, however genuine her belief in the justice of Sudeten claims, had primarily stemmed from her desire to see Polish territorial claims satisfied.\(^{29}\) Prague clearly persuaded her that Germany's next territorial demand would be presented to Poland, and prompted a decisive parting of the ways. However, overall Link membership continued to rise, and south of the Border fresh branches continued to be formed after Prague, so timing alone can hardly be held to have been decisive in determining the Link's failure to blossom in Scotland. Nor can it be ascribed to a lack of initiative or enthusiasm on the part of the local organisers. Quite simply local support failed to materialise. Arguably this could be ascribed to that tendency towards insularity and tardiness of response to European events which Scotland had displayed in the mid-1930s. However, this seems highly unlikely. The events of 1938 had greatly increased awareness of the significance of European developments. By early 1939 the Scottish environment was arguably more hostile to the overt expression of pro-German views than Britain as a whole. Possibly in part due to a greater sensitivity to the events of November 1938, attitudes towards Nazi Germany in Scotland would appear to have hardened to a greater extent than elsewhere. Charles Sarolea certainly believed that antipathy towards Germany was particularly strong in
Edinburgh in January 1939, and similar impressions were recorded by other contemporaries. However, this would not explain the Link's failure to develop in Scotland in 1937 and 1938. It is also evident that in England Link branches managed to flourish regardless of a growing popular desire for a tougher foreign policy approach towards Germany. Although there were those who discerned a particular "fund of common feeling between the German and the Scot," it is hard to avoid the conclusion that those positive feelings of friendship for the German people, rooted in part in a generalised sense of racial affinity, which provided the prime ingredient in the Link's success, were not as widespread in Scotland as in parts of England.

The Sudetenland crisis and the dramatic increase in the number of Jewish refugees fleeing Central Europe in late 1938 prompted a remarkable upsurge of activity within British anti-semitic circles. Between September 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War some existing organisations, like the MCP, achieved greater prominence. Various new groups also sprang into being. Several of these, like the British Council Against European Commitments and the group associated with the production of the monthly magazine, The New Pioneer, were connected with Viscount Lymington, the founder of the völkisch English Array, and to a greater or lesser extent reflected Lymington's own concern for Anglo-Saxon racial purity. All of these groups saw Jewish influence as the decisive factor in the worsening of Anglo-German relations. Most also subscribed to some version of Judaeo-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy theory and believed in the authenticity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. While some groups were primarily reactionary Conservatives, obsessed with Jewish power-political machinations, others were racial nationalists or racial fascists of decidedly pro-Nazi and violently anti-semitic views. The most extreme and, according to Richard Thurlow, most important group in this latter category was the Nordic League.

Formed in 1937, the Nordic League appears to have been an outgrowth of the White Knights of Britain, an occult and secret society active in 1936-7, which Thurlow describes as "a British 1930s version of the Ku Klux Klan." The occult connection was continued with the Nordic League. Its meetings were held on the premises of the Ancient Order of Druids, an arrangement which ensured a bizarre and colourful backcloth to the proceedings. According to its constitution, the Nordic League was an association of race-conscious Britons, and its aim was to co-ordinate
the activities of existing groups engaged in exposing and combatting the Jewish conspiracy. As such, it attracted a host of "notables" from the anti-semitic and pro-Nazi fringes. Initially the Nordic League was much concerned to preserve the secrecy of its proceedings, and little is known of its early activities. However, by 1939 it had attracted the attention of various unsympathetic infiltrators. The following account has been provided by an investigative journalist working for the Daily Worker. "I did not feel very comfortable in the place ... The meetings of the League are strictly private and everyone had to be vouched for in some way. The stewards (mostly B.U.F.) scrutinise you carefully. Meetings are held in a large room decorated with imitation dolmens. The platform stands under a kind of papier mache Stonehenge. Torch-like fittings give out a dim light. The wildest accusations are made against the Jews ... The audience works itself up into a frenzy of anti-semitism with cries of "PJ" [Perish Judah] and "Down with the Jews." At the conclusion of the meeting all rise, cry "The King" and shoot out their hands in the Nazi salute." According to Thurlow, "festoons of swastikas" were present at Nordic League meetings, and genocidal solutions to the Jewish "problem" were openly advocated by numerous members.

One of the speakers at the meeting attended by the Daily Worker's reporter was Capt. A.H.M. Ramsay. According to another unsympathetic infiltrator in the audience, in the course of a "rabid anti-semitic speech" on the necessity of ending hidden Jewish control of the levers of power in Britain, Ramsay concluded, "If we don't do it constitutionally we'll do it with steel." Although he appears to have become involved with the anti-semitic MCP during his earlier pro-Nationalist campaigning, until the autumn of 1938 Ramsay had remained unconvinced of the existence of a Jewish conspiracy, and had devoted himself exclusively to exposing Bolshevism's sinister activities. However, at some point during the Munich crisis he suddenly realised that the agencies working to foment war between Germany and the Western powers were not solely Soviet-inspired, and that ultimate control lay with a group of international Jewish conspirators. Never one for half-measures, Ramsay threw himself with vigour into the task of unearthing not only the international schemes of the conspirators, but also the extent of their power in Britain. In December 1938 he introduced a private member's Bill in the Commons to amend the operation of the Companies Act of 1929 with respect to the press. The purpose of this Bill was to eliminate the obfuscation caused by the use of holding companies and bank nominees, and thus to disclose ultimate ownership of shares in

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companies involved in the dissemination of news. Although he publicly stated his fear that control of the press "could be used to thrust this country into a war," Ramsay made no references to Jews and justified this measure solely on the grounds that "The British public have the right to know who controls this presentation of news and what influences are at work behind it." In an open vote Ramsay's measure received considerable cross-party support.

Although his new-found concern for hidden influences in the press, the continuation of his efforts to expose the activities of aliens in British political life, and the appearance of pro-Muslim sympathies all gave pointers to the direction he was taking, Ramsay maintained a public silence on the subject of Jewish machinations until January 1939. In that month, much against his will, Ramsay was forced into the open, not by the activities of an investigative journalist, but by his wife. Addressing a meeting of the Arbroath Business Club, Mrs Ramsay declared that "there was not the smallest doubt that there was an international group of Jews who were behind world revolution." Even more damaging from Ramsay's point of view, was his wife's justification of Nazi anti-semitic excess. "They did not agree in this country with Hitler's methods with regard to the Jews, but he must, she said, have had his reason for what he did ... The dictator states had discovered the terrible menace that they were facing at the present time." Mrs Ramsay's comments provoked a stinging riposte from the Edinburgh rabbi, Dr. Salis Daiches. There the matter might have ended, but Ramsay felt obliged to leap to his wife's defence, and allowed himself to be drawn into an extensive exchange with Daiches in the Scotsman's correspondence columns. Although he carefully avoided endorsement of his wife's references to Nazi policy, and claimed that her remarks had not been directed at Jews in general, he fully supported her claims of Jewish domination of the Soviet Union and the Third International. Ramsay's defence drew down a barrage of criticism in the Scotsman's correspondence columns, much of it from clerical sources. The controversy attracted considerable publicity and provoked a storm within Ramsay's constituency, where it provided the local press with their principal story for weeks. Aided by a much publicised protest by eleven Peeblesshire ministers, Ramsay's local political opponents did their utmost to capitalise on his discomfort. According to a Labour source, there were also demands by some of the younger members of the Peeblesshire and South Midlothian Unionist Association for disciplinary action to be taken against Ramsay, some even calling for his immediate...
resignation. Responding to the crisis, the Executive Committee of the PSMUA issued a statement of masterful ambivalence. Although it assured Ramsay of their "loyal and whole-hearted support," its general tenor was such that the "invitation" which it extended to Ramsay to explain his position to his constituents was not to be ignored. Ramsay's local difficulties, however, were relatively short-lived. Ramsay delayed delivery of the obligatory public explanation to his constituents until late March, by which time the affair had largely died a death, and although he reaffirmed his belief in the validity of his previous statements, his speech was a rare display of political adroitness and was sufficiently placatory to appease ruffled Tory feathers. Emphasising his commitment to constituency affairs — local criticism had concentrated on the charge that Ramsay's obsession with fanciful conspiracy theories had led to a neglect of constituency matters — Ramsay played down the significance of the controversy, characterising it as a diversion promoted by his political opponents. He also affirmed in the strongest terms his personal loyalty to Chamberlain and his faith in the Prime Minister's direction of foreign policy. The meeting closed with "a very cordial vote of thanks to Captain Ramsay." Until his internment in the summer of 1940 Ramsay would have no further difficulties with his constituency.

Ramsay was not to be deflected from his crusade. Addressing members of the Montrose Business Club in early April, he publicly reiterated his belief that the Third International, through its "subterranean propaganda," was seeking to promote war "as a prelude to the general bolshevisation of Europe." The existence of "Secret Forces working for War" remained a constant theme in Ramsay's speeches up until the outbreak of the Second World War. However, he had learnt his lesson. The offending "J" word was noticeably absent from his speech to the Montrose businessmen, and Ramsay appears to have steered clear of its use in later public addresses.

Having experienced the consequences of full public disclosure of his views, Ramsay turned increasingly to participation in clandestine or semi-clandestine societies. His involvement with the Nordic League either commenced or intensified in the early summer of 1939, and in May he set up his own secret society, the Right Club. Ramsay had previously been a member of a loose confederation of representatives of various "Patriotic and Christian societies." The organisations involved included the National Citizens Union, the British Empire Union, the
Liberty Restoration League and the Economic League. When they proved unreceptive to his views on the Jewish question, he embarked upon the creation of a new body, which, "while retaining the essential characteristics" of his previous confederation, would be dedicated to "the task of opposing and exposing the Jewish menace." This concept took shape as the Right Club. Geared from the outset to attracting persons of influence, its first object "was to enlighten the Tory Party and clear it from any Jewish control." By September 1939 it had attracted a membership of over three hundred.

In his post-war autobiography Ramsay totally defends all of Germany's pre-war territorial demands. Versailles, he argues, was all part of the Jewish plot to provoke war between Britain and Germany, and he presents Hitler as a man of peace, whose vision of friendship with Britain was thwarted by Jewish intrigue. Quotations from Mein Kampf are supplied to support the latter assertion. However, while such claims clearly form a logical extension to Ramsay's known pre-war position, they may not accurately reflect his position at the time. Although he had vigorously presented Germany's case during the Sudeten crisis, Ramsay made no attempt to publicly justify the annexation of Czechoslovakia. For all his enthusiasm on the subject of hidden conspirators driving the two nations to war, Ramsay's foreign policy statements after Prague were isolationist, not pro-German, and even after Chamberlain's guarantee to Poland Ramsay continued to assert his absolute faith in his leader's direction of foreign policy. Given his recent constituency difficulties, Ramsay's isolationist stance may only have been one of convenience. Nevertheless, the doubt remains. The experience of internment radically intensified Admiral Domvile's anti-semitism. Arguably Ramsay's views, while much more extreme to begin with, were also coloured by that experience. There is no concrete evidence to suggest that Ramsay was influenced by Mein Kampf prior to the war.

In his post-war autobiography Ramsay maintains that he never favoured the creation of a fascist system in Britain, and, despite his favourable references to Hitler, he also claims that he was never pro-Nazi. Quoting statements made at the time of his detention, he states that he was firmly of the opinion that "the Unionist Party, once enlightened, was the body best suited to take the needful counter-measures to the Jewish plan," and declares, "What little I had learned about the Nazi system did not appeal to me." Ramsay's pre-war public posture is entirely
compatible with these claims. However, although he fully concedes Ramsay's undoubted patriotism, Richard Thurlow believes these assertions to be questionable. Ramsay, he argues, was the "guiding spirit" and "dominant personality" in the Nordic League, and, while noting the desire to remain within existing constitutional practice which Ramsay expressed on other occasions, places considerable stress on Ramsay's reported willingness to use force to resolve the Jewish "problem." Ramsay's connection with the Nordic League certainly casts doubt on his post-war claims, for that organisation's pro-fascist and pro-Nazi orientation is beyond question. Nevertheless, other than Ramsay's one-off reference to the use of steel, Thurlow provides no firm evidence that Ramsay shared the pro-fascist and pro-Nazi views expressed by other members of the League. He also provides little evidence to substantiate his conclusion that Ramsay exercised a controlling influence over what appears to have been a fairly unstructured organisation. Arguably Ramsay's obsession with the Jewish conspiracy had reached such an intensity by the summer of 1939 that he was prepared to associate with any and all who shared his conviction.

Most of the organisations engaged in the intensification of extremist anti-Semitic activity in 1938-39 were tiny. Nearly all were London-based and largely sustained by a hard-core of London members. However, a broadsheet circulating in 1939, possibly originating from the Nordic League, does include an Edinburgh-based organisation, the Scottish Front, in its list of "Suggested Advisers on Causes of World Unrest and Reasons for Poverty in an Age of Plenty." The precise nature of this organisation and its ideological stance remain obscure. It was formed in 1938 by Major Edgar Hume Sleigh, a decidedly eccentric ex-cavalry officer with a marked preference for the stream of consciousness approach to the spoken and written word. Fiercely anti-capitalist and anti-communist, Sleigh was a strongly race-conscious fundamentalist Scottish nationalist, who expressed considerable distaste for Anglo-Saxons. His conspiratorial pantheon merged English Imperialism with the "Hydra headed monster, International Capitalism (controlled by Jewry and the Christians) and International Socialism."

The Scottish Front probably had only one member, although a former close associate of Sleigh's, C. Bryham Oliver, may also have been involved. Both were former BUF members. Oliver had played a prominent part in the establishment of the BUF's Edinburgh branch, and had been the main promoter of the Scottish
nationalist heresy prevalent in BUF ranks in Scotland at the time. In July 1936 he resigned from the BUF, citing Mosley's failure to address Scottish interests as his principal reason, and announced his intention to continue to devote himself to "the ideal of the Corporate State of Scotland ... whereby a Scotland, sovereign, free, and independent, may enter into full co-operation with England, and with Ireland too, in the building of the Greater Britain of Fascism." Sleigh also later stated that the primary reason for his departure from the BUF was Mosley's failure to promote Scottish interests. By 1937 Sleigh and Oliver were vigorously engaged in waging a two-man crusade in Edinburgh for an independent fascist Scotland of their devising. The formation of the Scottish Front may have been simply an exercise in relabelling. However, it may also have been a parting of the ways. Both men were strongly anti-capitalist and anti-communist and discerned the existence of world-wide conspiratorial forces. Oliver, however, was also highly critical of the BUF's and Germany's anti-Semitic policies. Their views on Germany and foreign policy are unknown.

Griffiths maintains that the dramatic increase in activity within the extremist anti-Semitic fringe during 1938-39, and the obvious multiplication of groups involved, are not indicative of a real increase in the extent of anti-Semitic attitudes in Britain. The total membership of such groups, he points out, was fairly small, and there was a considerable degree of overlapping. Nevertheless, while the total number remained relatively insignificant, within strongly anti-communist circles there are numerous examples of conversion to the Jewish conspiracy in some form, mostly by individuals with pro-German or pro-Nationalist views. Amongst the Scots involved, Capt. Ramsay, of course, provides a prime example. In February 1938 the pro-German industrialist, Sir Alexander Walker, is reported to have become "a recent convert to the ASIATIC-TERMITE DANGER." In May of the same year Capt. Ramsay's UCF colleague, Lt. Col. Charles Kerr, publicly shared his recent discovery that communist and other anti-God activities in Britain were being secretly orchestrated by men of financial substance, "a great bulk" of whom were "of the Jewish race." As the Chief Liberal National Whip, Kerr was a public figure of some weight. He was clearly quickly made aware that the expression of such views was highly detrimental to the standing of a serious politician. Within days he had issued a grovelling retraction. By August fellow pro-Nationalist, General Maxwell-Scott, had also become convinced of Jewish responsibility for Bolshevik conspiratorial activity. Gallantly he urged Charles Sarolea to enlighten the world.
However, as we have seen, Sarolea was not to be persuaded. The full extent of belief in the existence of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy during this period is impossible to determine. As the more astute of converts were well aware, the public expression of their convictions would be seriously damaging to their political reputations. With the possibility of an alliance with the Soviet Union looming large in the early summer of 1939 the number of conversions in all likelihood increased.\textsuperscript{74} However, by then Capt. Ramsay's experience had provided ample evidence of the reception which might be anticipated.\textsuperscript{75}

To a limited extent the influx of Jewish refugees in late 1938 also triggered latent anti-semitic attitudes of a more populist variety. In the Commons a number of Conservative back-benchers, like Sir Alfred Knox, registered their antipathy towards the incomers.\textsuperscript{76} Although the hostility expressed was towards aliens in general, the anti-semitic undertones were unmistakable. However, only one MP pursued the anti-alien theme with any vigour. This was Capt. W.T. Shaw, the Conservative MP for Forfar.\textsuperscript{77} In a series of parliamentary questions Shaw demanded both the imposition of a limit on the total number of refugees coming into Britain and the monitoring of their activities. He also called for assurances that they would neither be supported at the tax-payers' expense nor allowed to compete with the indigenous labour force for employment.\textsuperscript{78} By coincidence Capt. Ramsay was one of Shaw's constituents. Shaw's enthusiasm, however, can hardly be said to have reflected the immediate concerns of his other constituents, or indeed of Scots in general. In late 1938 suggestions that large numbers of Sudeten refugees might be settled in the Highlands in a deliberate exercise in repopulation prompted a flurry of negative comment from fundamentalist nationalists, the most prominent being Wendy Wood.\textsuperscript{79} However, expressions of hostility towards the influx of refugees were essentially limited to what remained of the BUF and a few isolated individuals.

In line with the movement's national recovery, the BUF in Scotland had staged a modest come-back after the nadir of late 1935. In January 1936 Richard Plathen was appointed Area Administrative Officer for Scotland in what appears to have been a dramatic shake-up of the organisation's Scottish hierarchy. Plathen had previously served as a senior member of Mosley's headquarters' staff and had orchestrated the anti-tithe campaign in Suffolk in 1933.\textsuperscript{80} His appointment was clearly aimed at jump-starting the movement's Scottish operations. It may also have
been part of a deliberate policy of purging the Scottish wing of its deviant nationalist tendencies and militant Protestant connections. Certainly public comment by Scottish BUF members thereafter was entirely in line with the movement's UK policies and also distinctly more anti-semitic. Significantly, when the BUF took part in the municipal elections in Edinburgh in 1937, the two wards chosen were St. Giles and Canongate. Both wards were located in the heart of the old town where Edinburgh's small Catholic community was largely concentrated. Since 1935 Catholics living in the area had experienced considerable intimidation at the hands of Protestant Action, and the BUF's intervention appears to have been an attempt to capitalise on Catholic fears. 81 However, the exploitation of local grievances in one-off campaigns was a common feature of BUF national policy after 1935 and there is no evidence of a more generalised Scottish strategy to attract Catholic support in particular. By 1937 the BUF's Scottish operations were looking markedly more healthy. However, overall its performance remained poor. Activity was essentially restricted to the East Coast. In Edinburgh there were numerous street clashes between the BUF and an unco-ordinated rainbow alliance of Left-wingers, Protestant Action, some Scottish nationalists under Wendy Wood's direction, and a few Liberals, with the BUF invariably coming off worst. The most active branch was Aberdeen, under the leadership of W.K.A.J. Chambers-Hunter, a one-armed, former tea-planter and colonial administrator. 82 However, in frequent street-battles with the local anti-fascist opposition the Aberdeen Blackshirts were as ineffectual as their Edinburgh counterparts. More recent studies of the BUF have argued that there was a gradual overall growth in the organisation's membership after late 1935, accelerating in late 1938 and 1939 under the impact of Mosley's peace campaign. 83 This does not appear to have been the pattern in Scotland. Reports of Scottish branch activity in Blackshirt suggest a peak in 1937 and early 1938, with a marked fall off in late 1938. The analysis is impressionistic, but there is no hard evidence to the contrary.
Chapter 12
Footnotes

1. Domvile, diary entry for 17th January 1938, DOM 55.


3. Domvile to Charles Sarolea, 1st March 1939, SAR 230.


5. C.E. Carroll to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 3rd July 1939, FO 371/23038/C9579; Anglo-German Review, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1939. Some of these branches undoubtedly existed only on paper. Carroll claimed "about half are really active."


7. The researcher was quoting verbatim from an article by the New Statesman and Nation, 23rd July 1938. Labour Party Research Dept. memo, "The Anglo-German Link," 19th December 1938, MID, LP/JSM (INT), Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.

8. Although there were several personnel changes in the Link Council during the organisation's existence, effective control remained firmly with Domvile, Laurie and Carroll throughout. In late 1938 they were joined by the well-known Scottish aviator and member of the AGF, Lord Sempill. His function, however, would appear to have been purely decorative. Anglo-German Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, December 1938; Daily Worker, 4th January 1939, DOM 89.

9. Lord Ronald Graham, former Nuremberg visitor and younger son of the Duke of Montrose, was connected with this branch. Although he joined the Link in March 1938, several months before the Central London branch's formation, he was a close associate of the vice-chairman of the branch, Richard Findlay, a firm believer in the existence of a Judaeo-Masonic-Bolshevik conspiracy. Graham's social contacts included the branch secretary, Margaret Bothamley, as well as Lady Hardinge, Nesta Webster and Dr. C.G. Campbell, all of whom were firm converts to the Jewish conspiracy theory. He also knew William Joyce well. From these contacts it seems reasonable to infer that Graham's political views were of a similar nature. Margaret Bothamley to Charles Sarolea, 3rd May 1939, SAR 229; Richard Findlay to Charles Sarolea, 28th October 1939, SAR 230; Domvile, diary entry for 14th March 1938, DOM 55; Margaret Joyce to Ducky (J.A. Cole), Undated, Margaret Joyce Papers (JOY).

10. Domvile was clearly anxious to preserve the movement's "respectable" image. In October 1938 he reprimanded one of the London branches' activists for handing out anti-semitic literature at a Link meeting. Domvile, diary entry for 21st October 1938, DOM 55.

11. This image of respectability is reflected in the Labour Party's failure to come to grips with the fact that many party members had been drawn into the Link. Labour's national leadership certainly disapproved of the organisation, and by July 1939 pressure was being brought to bear on William Bassett-Lowke,
chairman of the Northampton Link and prospective Labour parliamentary candidate for Northampton, to sever his connection with the Link. However, no definite policy decision appears to have been taken by the NEC on the incompatibility of Link membership with membership of the Party. No such difficulty would have occurred in sitting in judgement on a more overtly fascist organisation. Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 312-3; W.J. Bassett-Lowke to W. Gillies, 29th July 1939, MID, LP/JSM (INT), Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.

12. *House of Commons Debates*, 2nd August 1939, Vol.350, p. 2649. In stating that "money has been received from Germany by one of the active organisers," Hoare was putting a highly sinister gloss on the fact that A.P. Laurie had received £150 from a German publishing house for his book, *The Case for Germany*, which had come out in May. In his defence Laurie claimed that he had been forced to send the manuscript to Germany because he had been unable to find a British publisher, and pointed out that it was a legitimate commercial deal. Unfortunately he also confessed to having recently joined the BUF. Domvile exacerbated the situation by foolishly allowing himself to be photographed in his study beside a photograph of Hitler. The press had a field day with the photograph, and much was also made of the presence of a china statuette of a stormtrooper. Domvile's disingenuous attempts to explain the presence of these items in his home (the stormtrooper was there, he argued, because it was "a work of art — a most beautiful little thing") merely made matters worse. *Daily Herald*, 8th August 1939, DOM 89; *Evening Standard*, 8th August 1939, DOM 89/2.


15. Domvile, diary entry for 25th February 1939, DOM 56.

16. Ritchie was a friend of the Maxwell-Scotts and the Duke of Buccleuch. She was also the mother-in-law of Peake Pasha of Arab Legion fame. Ritchie to Charles Sarolea, 23rd January 1939, 20th June 1939, SAR 232; Domvile, diary entry for 24th November 1938, DOM 55.

17. Charles Sarolea to Andrew Dewar Gibb, 16th June 1939, SAR 230; Mina MacDonald to Sarolea, 11th December 1936, SAR 174.


19. Domvile, diary entries for 24th and 25th February 1939. Domvile's discomfort was due, not so much to his humble surroundings, as to the fact that it was a tee-total household.


22. Ritchie to Sarolea, 4th February 1939, SAR 232.

23. Sarolea to Domvile, 8th March 1939, SAR 230.
24. The original founder of the MCP in Britain was Mrs Leslie Fry, a.k.a. Pacquita de Shishmarova, the American-born widow of a Count or Captain de Shismaroff, a White Russian killed during the Russian revolution. A firm believer in the accuracy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Fry went on to establish an American branch of the MCP. The secretary of the British wing of the organisation between 1936 and 1939 was J.F. Rushbrook, a former member of the Imperial Fascist League. He was also editor of the organisation's broadsheet, Free Press. Louis Bondy, Racketeers of Hatred, London, [1946], pp. 149-52, p. 234; Daily Worker, 22nd July 1939, MID, LP/JSIM (INT) Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.


26. See Scotsman, 16th and 20th December 1938. The same letters appeared in the Glasgow Herald, 16th and 21st December. MacDonald's contributions were made under the pseudonym "Alix Cameron."

27. Sarolea to C.E. Carroll, June 1939, 14th July 1939, SAR 85.

28. As the Prague crisis broke, Admiral Domvile recorded, "Mrs Norman Ritchie rang me up from St Boswell's, — Miss Macdonald giving trouble." C.E. Carroll subsequently declared her to be "certainly a person to be avoided." Domvile, diary entry for 14th March 1939; C.E. Carroll to Charles Sarolea, 17th June 1939, SAR 85.

29. In a blistering reply to a previous letter from Sarolea defending Germany's territorial claims on Poland, MacDonald totally justified every one of Poland's post-war acts of territorial aggrandisement and completely rejected Germany's claims as unjustifiable. Responding to Sarolea's criticism of Poland's treatment of her substantial Ukrainian minority, MacDonald declared that not only were the Ukrainians "still far from self-government," but they were "happy under the easy and good-natured Polish rule." "Alix Cameron," Scotsman, 15th June 1939.

30. Assuring Domvile that he could at least ensure a well-attended meeting for the launch of the Edinburgh Link branch, Sarolea intimated that he was far from optimistic as to the branch's prospects of success. He had already warned Mrs Ritchie, he stated, "that this would be about the worst time to start a Branch of the "Link" in Edinburgh where anti-German feeling is particularly strong at present." Sarolea to Domvile, 26th January 1939, SAR 230.

31. Writing in March, apparently prior to Prague, Andrew Dewar Gibb declared, "In Scotland even more than in England hatred of Hitler is the order of the day." Gibb to A. Rugg-Gunn, March 1939, GIB 217/2/1.

32. Fitzroy Murray, Scotsman, 9th August 1939.


34. Thurlow, op. cit., pp. 78-83.

35. Ibid., p. 81.
36. Report of Meeting at 14 Lambs Conduit Street, July 10 1939, MID, LP/JSM (INT) Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.

37. *Daily Worker*, 22nd July 1939, MID, LP/JSM (INT) Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.

38. Thurlow, op. cit., p. 81, pp. 82-3.

39. Report of Meeting at 14 Lambs Conduit Street, July 10 1939, MID, LP/JSM (INT) Box 8, Germany Nazi Activities Abroad.

40. Ramsay, op. cit., pp. 92-5. According to Ramsay this revelation occurred after reading Fahey's *The Rulers of Russia* and a British White Paper, containing reports submitted by the Dutch Minister in Petrograd during the Russian Revolution.

41. *House of Commons Debates*, 13th December 1938, Vol. 342, pp. 1806-12. The Commons voted to allow the Bill to be introduced by 151 to 104. Ramsay's supporters on this occasion included Clem Attlee.


43. Speech reported by *The Scotsman*, 9th January 1939.

44. *Scotsman*, 12th January 1939.

45. *Scotsman*, 14th, 18th, 20th January 1939.

46. Ramsay's only defender in the *Scotsman* correspondence was the pseudonymous "A White Russian." Desperate for assistance, Ramsay begged Charles Sarolea to provide public support. Sarolea was fully in agreement with Ramsay's views, and urged him to greater efforts in his endeavours to reveal the full extent of the Jewish conspiracy. However, he was also in no hurry to put his own head on the chopping block and declined to take a personal part in the controversy. He did persuade Dr. Fahey to write a long letter of support. However, *The Scotsman* declined to publish it. *Scotsman*, 2nd and 6th February 1939; Ramsay to Sarolea, 9th February 1939 SAR 232; Sarolea to John Arbuthnot, 6th March 1939 SAR 229.

47. Even the Germans took note. On February 11th *Völkischer Beobachter* carried an article on the affair under the heading "Jewish theatrical thunder in Scotland." Bondy, op. cit., p. 147.

48. The *South Midlothian Advertiser* in particular took a great interest in the affair. At the start of the controversy it gave prominence to an interview with Dr. Daiches, and subsequently published several letters critical of Ramsay and none in his favour. In its editorial comment the paper's treatment of Ramsay and his conspiracy theory was essentially one of gentle and somewhat whimsical ridicule. However, it did express its support for Ramsay's earlier protests against the activities of the Militant Godless.

50. Speech by Councillor D. Pryde at a meeting of the Peebles and South Midlothian Labour Party in Bonnyrigg, reported by the Dalkeith Advertiser, 23rd February 1939.

51. Scotsman, 21st February 1939.

52. Speech to constituents in Peebles, reported by the Dalkeith Advertiser, 30th March 1939. Ramsay's fate clearly forms an instructive contrast with Atholl's. The expression of belief in the existence of a Jewish conspiracy was clearly held by the Conservative rank and file of Peeblesshire and South Midlothian to be decidedly politically incorrect behaviour for their constituency representative. However, it was not in the same league as the heresy of persistent opposition to the party leader on foreign policy.

53. Speech to the Montrose Business Club, reported by The Scotsman, 11th April 1939.

54. Title of address to the Central London branch of the Link, 16th June 1939. Anglo-German Review, Vol. 3, No. 8, August 1939.

55. Although the reported contents of his speech to the Central London Link branch leave little doubt as to Ramsay's underlying beliefs, even with such an appreciative audience Ramsay appears to have steered clear of direct reference to Jews.

56. Ramsay, op. cit., p. 95, p. 97.


59. See speech to constituents in Peebles, reported by the Dalkeith Advertiser, 30th March 1939; speech to annual general meeting of the PSMUA, reported by the Dalkeith Advertiser, 4th May 1939.

60. Ramsay, op. cit., p. 105.

61. Thurlow, op. cit., pp. 78-80, p. 82, p.183.

62. In May 1939 Ramsay informed his constituency association that such was the pace of international developments, that "they had now reached a state of bewilderment, finding such conflicting currents of thought, that it was hard for men to know where they stood at the present time." Arguably this is an accurate reflection of Ramsay's own state of mind at the time. Thurlow himself points out that the Security Service believed Ramsay to be mentally unbalanced. Speech reported by the Dalkeith Advertiser, 4th May 1939; Thurlow, op. cit., p. 79.

63. The Jewish Chronicle, 18th August 1939, DOM 89/2.

64. Sleigh to Charles Sarolea, September 1943, SAR 140.

65. Scotsman, 13th July 1936.


69. In 1945 Sleigh unsuccessfully stood as an Independent Scottish Nationalist candidate for Edinburgh Central. A journalist covering one of his campaign meetings provides the following report. "The Major's address was a lengthy one, embracing international finance ("the Gentile Jews are the negroes in the woodpile"), the price of Bulgarian turkeys wholesale in London at 2s 4d, the Highland clearances and the bugs in the Royal Mile." *Edinburgh Evening News*, 21st June 1945.

70. Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 359-60.


73. Charles Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 29th August 1939, SAR 64.

74. By June 1939 a respected Conservative elder statesman, the Earl of Crawford, was beginning to seriously consider the authenticity of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Diary entry for 21st June 1939, Vincent, *The Crawford Papers*, p. 596.

75. Some contemporaries took a much less sanguine view than Griffiths. In October 1938 a memo to the Defence Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews maintained, "within three years we may be faced with anti-Jewish legislation in this country." Gisela Lebzelter, *Political Anti-Semitism in England*, London, 1978, p.35.


79. *Scotsman*, 3rd November 1938. The anti-alien attitudes expressed by Wood were not representative of attitudes within the nationalist movement as a whole. Nationalists were among the principal promoters of the repopulation scheme, partly on humanitarian grounds, partly in the belief that the skills of the incomers would provide economic regeneration.

80. *Blackshirt*, 10th January 1936; Benewick, op. cit., p. 91.

81. Their overtures were firmly rejected by the electorate. Between them the two Fascist candidates secured a dismal ninety-two votes.


83. Webber, op. cit., p.577; Thurlow, op. cit., p. 122.
Chapter 13
Final Stages 1939

On March 14th 1939, bowing to pressure from Berlin, the Slovak Diet declared its "independence" from Czechoslovakia and accepted its new role as a puppet state within the German orbit. The following day German troops crossed the Czech frontier without resistance and the Czechs resigned themselves to the establishment of the "protectorate" of Bohemia-Moravia. As German troops entered Prague, the world was informed that Germany had acted in "response" to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia from within. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist.

The general reaction of the British press and public alike to this latest act of German aggression was one of shock and outrage. Hitler had flagrantly breached his Munich undertakings to respect the territorial integrity of the rump of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, with the enforced incorporation of an overwhelmingly non-German population he completely destroyed the moral case which had previously underpinned British support for the policy of appeasement. The German minority which had remained within Czech frontiers after the partition at Munich had been infinitesimal. Rectification of one of the injustices of Versailles could not be pleaded in its defence. Most Britons shared The Times' view that "no defence of any kind, no pretext of the slightest plausibility, can be offered for the violent extinction of Czech independence."¹ In British eyes it was an act of blatant territorial aggrandisement. For many, Prague provided convincing proof that Germany's previous actions could now be seen as part of a grander aggressive design. The suspicions triggered by the Anschluss had now been confirmed. Germany's ultimate aim, it now appeared, was absolute European dominion. After Prague belief in the inevitability of war became widespread.

Prague effectively ended the expression of enthusiasm for Germany in moderate pro-German political circles. Lord Lothian summed up the outlook of many former enthusiasts when he declared, "One of Herr Hitler's great advantages has been that, for very long, what he sought a great many people all over the world felt was not unreasonable, whatever they may have thought of his methods. But that justification has completely and absolutely disappeared."² Until the outbreak of war in September positive expression of enthusiasm for Germany was essentially limited to "innocent" Germanophiles, typified by the bulk of the Link's
membership, the extremist anti-semitic fringe groups, and a small remnant of hard-core pro-Nazi individuals, most of whom were also anti-semitic.

Prague also brought Chamberlain's policy of appeasement to a close. Condemnation of Germany's action in the press quickly shifted to demands for a re-orientation of British policy. On March 15th the government's policy was severely savaged in the Commons by the opposition parties and a vocal, if still relatively limited, number of Conservative rebels. Pressured by public response, growing unease within the Conservative Party, and, more pressingly, by Halifax's new-found resolve, Chamberlain served notice of a change in governmental direction with his Birmingham speech on March 17th. Following rumours of an impending German swoop on Rumania, at the end of March Chamberlain was bounced into issuing a unilateral guarantee of British assistance "in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces." Similar guarantees to Rumania, Greece and Turkey followed in April after the Italian invasion of Albania. Chamberlain and his advisers were by no means converted to Churchill's concept of a "grand alliance." The negotiations with Russia which followed were not pursued with real vigour, and, while the guarantees in Eastern Europe aimed to dissuade the fascist powers from further acts of aggression, the door had not been firmly closed on the possibility of future territorial transfer by negotiation. Much attention was also given to the possibilities inherent in "economic appeasement." As it transpired, however, Britain and Germany were now set firmly on course for collision.

In Scotland popular reaction to the Prague coup followed a parallel course to that which manifested south of the Border. Germany's action was almost universally reviled. Former champions of appeasement decried it as "a piece of open treachery" and "the beginning of a blatant attempt at world domination." Nevertheless, for a few committed individuals, Germany it seemed, could still do no wrong. As in previous crises, John Orr and A.J. Brock excused Germany's behaviour as reactive. It was "the inevitable fruit" of Versailles and the French were ultimately to blame. Charles Sarolea also provided a reactive excuse, blaming "the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations and the emergence of the Soviet Union as the causes of the present situation." Germany had been driven to respond to the intolerable economic suffocation to which she had been subjected since Versailles. Germany,
he declared, "had to find space and find markets or perish ... When the Germans talked about living space it was not mere rhetoric; it was a stark, almost tragic reality."7

Partial justification of Germany's action, by means of comparison with the greater crimes committed by English imperialism, was also offered by Archie Lamont. "Scots," he declared, "must remember that Hitler has done little in Bohemia and Slovakia that was not done in the past in our own country — and in Wales and Eire — by England ... Morally and economically, Kenya and Nyasaland are under worse tyrannies than Bohemia and Austria."8 Lamont was not alone in nationalist ranks in arguing that Nazi aggression and imperialist exploitation had failed to match the past and present crimes of English imperialism. For the small fundamentalist nationalist clique, whose views now dominated the pages of the Scots Independent, the theme became increasingly attractive in 1939. For one correspondent with Culloden and the Clearances in mind, there had been no "German atrocities, whether against the Jews or Czechs, to equal English atrocities in Scotland."9 Like the ILP before them, for some fundamentalist nationalists opposition to participation in a capitalist imperialist war had led to a form of "negative" pro-Germanism. However, the fundamentalist nationalist version, with its stress on the greater crimes of English imperialism, was more positively pro-German.

In the aftermath of Prague popular opinion in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, rallied strongly behind the government's new foreign policy stance. The vast majority of appeasers recanted, or fell silent. Perhaps the most striking feature of the debate on foreign policy after March was the new reticence of right-wing isolationism. Compared to the flood of Conservative isolationist comment which had manifested in 1938, only a trickle surfaced in the summer of 1939. In such circles dislike for Britain's commitments in Eastern Europe was clearly tempered by recognition of the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the need for national unity. Some isolationists, grudgingly or otherwise, publicly endorsed the new commitments. Even the Earl of Mansfield signified his assent to the new policy direction, accepting that "the time has come when we must prepare to check aggression."10

The prospect of alliance with Russia, however, was another matter. Many Conservatives of strongly anti-communist views did accept the practical necessity of
bringing the Soviet Union into a united front against future German aggression. Others, however, could not bring themselves to accept such an unpalatable step. Given the Soviet Union's ideological commitment to world revolution, the Earl of Mansfield argued, it could never be regarded as "other than at least as much a potential enemy as a potential ally." Within Catholic circles, too, there was shock that Chamberlain could "contemplate such a monstrosity." General Maxwell-Scott was aghast at the prospect of "fighting alongside all the Reds and Pinks of the World, with the Jews and with the Grand Orient and with all the Anti-Gods." However, a strongly felt need for national unity, even on this most sensitive of areas, militated against overt expression of hostility to Chamberlain's negotiations with the Soviet Union. Mansfield's references to the Soviet Union were anodyne by comparison with his past comments on the subject. For all his angst General Maxwell-Scott did not publicly express his antipathy to the project, even in more politically correct terms, and urged his friend Charles Sarolea not to "harass" Chamberlain over the negotiations with Russia.

Prague did not completely stifle advocacy of appeasement. There were still Conservatives who thought their leader had been "perhaps a little hasty" with his Birmingham speech. They included the Conservative grandee, the Duke of Buccleuch, who involved himself in a flurry of personal diplomacy in the last months of peace in an endeavour to find common ground between Britain and Germany on the Polish question. For Buccleuch Germany's desire for the reincorporation of Danzig was "reasonable and natural." Several of the remaining advocates of appeasement were clearly pacifists or at the very least motivated by strongly held Christian principles. Reflecting a standpoint not dissimilar to that previously expressed by his father, Lord Home, William Douglas-Home eloquently challenged the prevailing tide of moral indignation against Germany and restated the ethical case for appeasement in a series of letters to The Scotsman. Others were motivated by fear of future communist domination of a war-torn Europe. For Andrew Dewar Gibb, the SNP chairman, giving Hitler a free hand in Poland seemed "innocuous beside the dreadful prospect of the Great Powers tearing each other to bits, with the Russian vulture standing by, waiting for its hour to come." The "late" appeasers, however, were very few in number. Opposition to
Chamberlain's policies in the summer of 1939 was primarily the province of a somewhat larger, but still relatively limited, number of anti-war campaigners. These included out-and-out pacifists, like the members of the Peace Pledge Union, and "selective" pacifists, like the ILP and the fundamentalist nationalists. Of these the fundamentalist nationalists were perhaps the most vociferous. Until the SNP leadership reasserted control over the paper in the autumn of 1939, the Scots Independent stridently proclaimed the anti-war views of its extreme, and increasingly anglophobic, contributors. However, in more sanitised forms the fundamentalist anti-war message also became increasingly prominent in the correspondence columns of The Scotsman.

There remained, too, a small hard core of extremist pro-German enthusiasts, who soldiered on to the end, and in some cases, beyond. In May A.P. Laurie's The Case for Germany was published in Germany, following his failure to find a British publisher. It displayed the same intensity of enthusiasm for Nazism which Laurie had first shown in the summer of 1936, and was largely devoted to adulation of Hitler the Peacemaker. It also restated Laurie's firm belief in race as the crucial factor in determining international relations. Britain, he argued, "cannot trust the Slavonic peoples because of their racial affinity." As the Polish crisis developed in the summer, Laurie defended Hitler's demands for the return of Danzig and the construction of a link road between East and West Prussia as the epitome of moderation. That the German people had accepted such limited demands, Laurie argued, was a tribute to Hitler's restraining influence, for the Polish Corridor was "burnt into their hearts, as the outward and visible sign of their humiliation under the Treaty." 19

Although somewhat more restrained in his public enthusiasm, Capt. Luttmann-Johnson was also faithful to the very end. Most of his energies were devoted to combatting "the monstrous suggestion that we should be allied with the Soviet murder gang." However, he also defended the legitimacy of Germany's claims on Danzig, declaring, "It may not suit us that Germany should do anything else but lie down and grovel, but for us to be angry with Germans because they are patriotic and nationally-minded savours of hypocrisy." 21

For Charles Sarolea the summer months were taken up in vigorous campaigning. In a series of letters to The Scotsman he first inveighed against the prospective alliance with the Soviet Union, and then, after The Scotsman refused
to publish a follow-up article on this theme,22 switched to condemnation of Polish intransigence as the fundamental cause of the crisis in relations between Poland and Germany. Although he stressed that "Only those who are blinded by their distrust of the German Reich can deny that the Polish Corridor constitutes a genuine German grievance," the anti-Polish content of his contributions was much more prominent than the positively pro-German. In his efforts to debunk the concept of a "democratic" alliance against German "dictatorship," he highlighted the repressive nature of the Polish régime, lambasted its treatment of ethnic minorities, and cited in detail Poland's use of power-politics in its dealings with its neighbours since 1919.23 Acknowledgement of the public mood was no doubt partly responsible for the lack of positively pro-German comment in Sarolea's public statements. It certainly accounted for his failure to mention his fundamental belief in Jewish responsibility for the developing crisis.24 However, it was also partly due to the German Embassy's failure to respond to his urgent requests for information on the German view of the crisis.25 Sarolea's personal enthusiasm for both Germany and Nazism was as strong as ever. In May he joyously accepted C.E. Carroll's offer to be a guest of honour at the next Nuremberg Rally, and the following month he joined the Link Council.26 In early August he joined a party of other Link members for what proved to be the Link's swan-song — a trip to Salzburg in German Austria to celebrate the inauguration of the first branch of a German equivalent of the Link, the Ring.27

On September 3rd Britain declared war on Germany, two days after the invasion of Poland. The Link immediately disbanded. The vast majority of those who had previously voiced enthusiasm for Nazi Germany rallied to support the British war-effort. Those of military age joined the armed services. Several subsequently served with particular distinction and gallantry.28 Enthusiasm for Nazi Germany had often been combined with fervent patriotism, and war simplified the issue for most patriots. Many, of course, had been thoroughly disillusioned with Germany since Prague, if not before.

Only in a tiny number of cases, like that of William Joyce, did an ideological affinity with Nazism prove stronger than loyalty to country. There was opposition to the war, from pacifists and other sources. The ILP stuck doggedly to their pre-war stance. During the winter of 1939-40 John McGovern was intimately involved in efforts to open up negotiations through the German embassy in Dublin. Many
fundamentalist Scottish nationalists continued to oppose Scottish participation in an English imperialist war. A small number of pro-German extremists, most of whom were passionately anti-semitic, also continued their campaigning after the outbreak of war. For them it was a patriotic duty to advocate the immediate negotiation of a peace settlement. During the "Phoney War" period A.P. Laurie and Capt. Ramsay were both strongly involved in efforts to co-ordinate the anti-war activities of the BUF and various fascist fringe organisations. Ramsay also continued his crusade to unearth the hidden hand of Jewish influence, an obsession which led to his internment in May 1940, following his implication in the espionage activities of the American embassy clerk, Tyler Kent. Ramsay's arrest marked the beginning of a general crack-down on individuals whose activities could be considered prejudicial to the war-effort. Four days after his arrest the Dunkirk evacuations began. With France on the verge of collapse panic ensued, and "fifth column" scares were promoted by the more hysterical popular papers. Treachery provided a convenient explanation for the spectacular rapidity of the Allied rout. Government concern for civilian morale led to the wholesale internment of "enemy" aliens and the arrest of other potentially suspect persons under Defence Regulation 18b. The BUF's senior personnel and several of the more prominent members of the fascist fringe groups were detained. Capt. Luttman-Johnson was one of them. Somewhat surprisingly, A.P. Laurie was spared, even although the other two members of the Link's ruling triumvirate were interned. A combination of age, infirmity and political insignificance probably explains his omission, for Laurie was no less involved in anti-war activity than Carroll and Domvile.

Charles Sarolea was not amongst those who lost their liberty. For Sarolea, unlike Laurie and Ramsay, discretion was the better part of valour. Although thoroughly opposed to "this mad, fantastic and suicidal war," after September 1939 he abstained from public comment to that effect and refrained from involvement in the activities of his less discrete former associates. However, he remained utterly unrepentant. Responding angrily to Lady Maxwell-Scott's accusation of unpatriotic sentiments, he declared, "Neither you nor I deserve to be called anti-British because we always denounced Bolshevism, or because we supported Franco, or because we opposed the policy of sanctions, or because we fought for peace in the days of Munich, or because we opposed a cordial and an unconditional alliance with a megalomaniac and chaotic Poland." He never lost his belief in the rectitude of his pre-war position.
Chapter 13
Footnotes


5. Editorial, *Scotsman*, 16th March 1939; M.G. Cowan, speech to meeting of St. Andrew's and District Unionist Association, reported by *The Scotsman*, 21st March 1939.


7. Speech to a meeting of the Link in London, reported by *The Scotsman*, 22nd March 1939.


11. Ibid., p.637. Mansfield primarily justified his opposition to the prospective Soviet alliance on the grounds that the value of Russia's purge-weakened military was questionable, and also highlighted the difficulties of reconciling countries like Poland and Rumania to co-operation with the Soviet Union. However, his opposition to the alliance was firmly rooted in his fundamental anti-communism.

12. Lady Sackville to Charles Sarolea, 14th July 1939, SAR 233.

13. Maxwell-Scott to Sarolea, 19th June 1939, SAR 64.


15. Buccleuch to Sir Horace Wilson, 1st May 1939, FO 371/23018/C6744/54/18. Griffiths is inclined to view Buccleuch as one of the remaining "hard core of positive enthusiasts for Germany." However, Buccleuch's personal and written reports to the Foreign Office in April-May suggest that, while overly prone to accept at face-value the assurances of his German contacts, he was simply a "late" appeaser, pursuing the chimera of "a general reconciliation." Griffiths, op. cit., p. 363; Buccleuch to Sir Horace Wilson, 1st May 1939, FO 371/23018/C6744/54/18. See also R.A. Butler's report on meeting with Buccleuch, 19th April 1939, FO 371/22970/C5804/15/18.


17. *Scotsman*, 25th August 1939. Gibb's contribution appears under the
pseudonym, "Charles Ryswick."


20. Luttman-Johnson to Charles Sarolea, 6th May 1939, SAR 231.


22. Sarolea to C.E. Carroll, June 1939, SAR 85.


24. Sarolea ascribed Polish intransigence to the hidden influence of Poland's substantial Jewish population. "To anyone who is familiar with the internal politics of Poland it is quite obvious that this is not a Polish-German conflict, but a German-Jewish conflict. There are 3,580,000 Jews in Poland, the largest Jewish population in Europe. The Jews control Polish finance, Polish business and the Polish Press. Until recently they had always been attacking the Polish government and proclaiming to the World that they were being persecuted. Now, far from being anti-Polish, they have become passionately pro-Polish because they feel that any permanent understanding between Germany and Poland might prove fatal to Jewish preponderance." Sarolea was also convinced that Britain was lurching towards involvement in catastrophe, because "we are powerless against Jewish domination." Sarolea to C.E. Carroll, 11th July 1939, SAR 85.

25. Sarolea to C.E. Carroll, 15th June 1939, SAR 85.

26. C.E. Carroll to Sarolea, 28th April 1939, Sarolea to Carroll, 1st May 1939, Carroll to Sarolea, 17th June 1939, SAR 85.

27. Sarolea's participation was a source of immense regret to Admiral Domvile, who was "furious at the conceited old man's conduct" and "thoroughly sorry we brought the old boy." Not only did Sarolea insist on attending a function, hosted by Goebbels, for which he had no invitation, but he then proceeded to hog the host's attention. "Vulgar old S. made a fool of himself when we met Goebbels by producing his 6d. book on Spain and breaking into torrents of words whilst we were all waiting in the rear — shocking manners." Sarolea subsequently took umbrage at the German authorities' failure to accord him guest of honour status and refused to give his scheduled address at one of the luncheons. Domvile, diary entries for 2nd and 5th August 1939, DOM 56.

28. Amongst them was Lord David Douglas-Hamilton, who played a prominent role in the aerial defence of Malta. He was killed in action over France in 1944.

29. Laurie, along with Admiral Domvile, joined the British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe, an anti-war organisation headed by Lord Tavistock. Although pacifists were also involved in the BCCS, most of its leading figures had previously been noted for their pro-German leanings. Domvile's diaries record several meetings attended by members of the BCCS, Capt. Ramsay, Mosley and his lieutenants, and other members of fringe groups, in an attempt to produce a co-ordinated anti-war policy. See Domvile, diary
entries for 19th September, 26th October, 22nd November and 6th December 1939, 17th January and 7th February 1940, DOM 56. For a fuller treatment of this period, see Thurlow, op. cit., pp. 178-87.

30. For more on the Tyler Kent Affair, see Masters, op.cit., pp. 76-106, and Joan Miller, One Girl's War, Dingle, Co. Kerry, 1986.

31. Sarolea to the editor to the British Lion, 13th October 1939, SAR 54.

32. Sarolea to Lady Maxwell-Scott, 24th November 1939, SAR 64. Maxwell-Scott, by contrast, was pressing for a vigorous prosecution of the war, preferably starting with the Soviet Union. During the winter of 1939-40 she campaigned for Finnish Relief with the same enthusiasm she had displayed for Nationalist Spain.
Conclusion

During the inter-war years a coalescence of factors, headed by economic failure and the dependency culture it encouraged, brought about a marked erosion in the expression of Scotland's political individuality. Nevertheless, the outward signs of political assimilation arguably overstated the extent of socio-political integration, and in certain areas Scotland manifestly continued to display its political distinctiveness. Sectarianism was a potent factor in Scottish interwar politics. Although the political mainstream gamely endeavoured to let sleeping dogs lie, its existence ensured a sensitivity to the religious implications of political expression quite unparalleled south of the Border, save in enclaves such as Liverpool. Nationalist sentiment was also a distinctive ingredient in the Scottish political matrix, even if vocal proponents of political nationalism were few in number. Between 1935 and 1939 public debate in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, was dominated by foreign policy issues. This study has focussed on certain areas of that debate, namely the expression of "enthusiasm," in its varying intensities, for Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Nationalist Spain. To what extent did Scotland's political distinctiveness manifest in these areas of expression?

Scottish responses by no means exactly mirrored those of Britain as a whole. The divergence was most marked in the case of support for Nationalist Spain. Here Scotland's particular sensitivity to the religious implications of positions on foreign policy had a marked effect on patterns of expression. Scottish Conservatives were no more enthusiastic than their English counterparts to see victory in the Spanish Civil War for what was perceived to be a communist-dominated Republican coalition. However, they showed a distinct reluctance to overtly embrace Catholic reaction in the shape of General Franco. For Scottish Conservative MPs, the electoral consequences of offending Protestant susceptibilities undoubtedly exercised a restraining influence. A few did come out strongly in favour of Franco, but they also sought to minimise their Catholic associations, producing a uniquely Scottish cleavage at an organisational level. Non-Catholics gravitated to the UCF, and the FNS in Scotland acquired a much more overtly Catholic identity than its parent organisation in London. For Scotland's Catholic community, itself the target of considerable hostility from Scotland's Protestant majority, the defence of Catholicism in Spain held a particular resonance. Under the direction of members of an emergent Catholic middle-class, a pro-Nationalist movement of considerable
vigour and populist appeal evolved.

Although the situation was much less clear-cut, religious factors were also clearly present in influencing Scottish variations in the patterns of support for Fascist Italy during the Abyssinian crisis. The campaign against sanctions was waged by an alliance of forces. Although the ILP and elements of the nationalist movement provided some local colour, the driving force behind the campaign in Scotland, as in the rest of Britain, was provided by isolationists, drawn from the Conservative Right, and a combination of pro-Italian elements, some of whom were essentially motivated by the strategic desirability of Italian friendship, and others of a more genuinely Italophile and pro-Fascist orientation. In Scotland, however, the balance between the two groups was heavily weighted in favour of the isolationists, few of whom displayed any particular sympathy either for Italy, or for Mussolini's régime. Moreover, within the pro-Italian grouping the principal "strategic" friends of Italy were driven above all by fear of Germany, rather than any particular regard for Italy. Italophiles with pro-Fascist sympathies were decidedly thin on the ground.

The weakness of pro-Fascist and Italophile expression during the Abyssinian crisis reflected the lack of enthusiasm which Scotland had previously shown for the adoption of Fascist methods of government. The impact of the economic depression, combined with a perception of governmental helplessness in the face of the crisis, prompted considerable interest in alternative governmental forms and economic strategies in 1933-34. Britain was never seriously close to embracing the Fascist alternative, but Scotland proved even less receptive to Fascism's appeal, both at an intellectual and at a street-political level. During the peak period of interest in Fascism, nationalism provided a potent alternative focus in Scotland for those disillusioned by the failings of the existing parliamentary system. The debate on Home Rule attracted far more attention than consideration of the Fascist alternative. However, religious factors also played a major role. In England Italophile sentiments and intellectual interest in Fascism flourished primarily in patrician Anglo-Catholic circles. This socio-political group had no real counterpart in Scotland. For members of Scotland's Protestant Ascendancy, Fascism's Catholic associations proved a fatal disqualification. Bizarrely, Scotland's greater sensitivity to the religious implications of enthusiasm for Fascism also ensured that at street level the BUF managed to incur the suspicion of both sides in the sectarian divide.
By contrast, the nature and pattern of enthusiasm for Nazi Germany was much closer to the British experience. Prior to 1936 Germany attracted little attention in public debate. Positive pro-German expression was the province of a limited number of individuals, motivated primarily by a liberal and idealistic concern for European peace and empathy with Germany's assertions as to the "injustice" of Versailles. They were apologists for the Nazi régime, rather than vigorous enthusiasts.

As in Britain as a whole, the Rhineland crisis witnessed a massive manifestation of popular yearning for the preservation of peace. This combined with frustration at what was perceived as the vindictive and belligerent nature of French post-war policy to produce a widespread if generalised sympathy for Germany. Although this response primarily emanated from "middle" opinion, fear of future involvement in coercive action against Germany at the behest of the League of Nations also prompted many isolationist Conservatives to discover the injustice of Versailles. The Rhineland debate did not witness any marked effusion of admiration for the Nazi régime. However, it did create a climate of opinion conducive to its subsequent expression, and one which proved to be highly susceptible to a vigorous German propaganda offensive which sought to establish the Nazi régime's "respectability" and enthusiasm for Anglo-German friendship.

In the summer of 1936 positive enthusiasm for Germany entered its heyday. While high society acquired a taste for the Germanic, Conservative right-wingers, alarmed by events in Spain, enthused over Nazi Germany's role as an ideological and military bastion against communism. Several individuals openly and exuberantly praised the virtues of the Nazi system.

During the course of 1937 relations between Britain and Germany grew steadily frostier. Although numerous individuals hailed the material achievements of the Nazi régime, enthusiasm for Germany steadily declined, as Germany's increasingly belligerent tone and involvement in Spain alienated liberal opinion. Former friends fell silent and Germany's remaining adherents grew more guarded in their expressions of enthusiasm.

In the course of 1938 enthusiasm for appeasement ensured that certain aspects of Germany's claims attracted more popular support than ever before. Real enthusiasm for Germany, however, sank to a new low. Many enthusiasts retreated
under the umbrella of appeasement. Others went into outright opposition. Increasingly the overt expression of enthusiasm for Germany was restricted to individuals of strongly pro-Nazi and/or anti-semitic views.

Prague effectively terminated enthusiasm for Germany in moderate circles. A few late appeasers pressed for a return to Chamberlain's former policy direction. Various assorted anti-war activists also opposed the new trend in British policy. Apart from the "innocents" of the Link, only a small number of the more ideologically ardent continued to express enthusiasm for Germany up until the outbreak of the Second World War.

While religion played a major role in shaping Scottish attitudes towards Fascist Italy and Nationalist Spain, Scotland's greater sensitivity to the religious implications of foreign policy positions did not produce a major divergence in attitudes towards Nazi Germany. Catholics and Protestants both suffered at the hands of the Nazi authorities. However, for Catholics Germany's religious persecution was not a prime area of concern. Hitler's papal concordat provided a degree of comfort, and after July 1936 the difficulties experienced by Catholics in Germany paled into insignificance beside the epic struggle being waged by their co-religionists in Spain. For nearly three years Catholic attention was riveted on Spain. While this fixation, coupled with appreciation of Germany's role as a bulwark against communism, rendered Catholics particularly amenable to the appeasement of Germany, it did not encourage overt expression of enthusiasm for Germany. Catholic pro-Nationalist campaigners were clearly anxious to avoid their cause becoming linked in the public mind with enthusiasm for the dictators.

For Protestants, German church policy was more alarming. However, although the sufferings of individual Lutheran pastors did receive considerable publicity, the extent of the persecution remained largely unrecognised for much of the 1930s. The Nazi régime was not widely perceived to be hostile to Lutheranism per se. Nor, for the vast majority of Scots, could it be regarded as having a positive bias in favour of Catholicism. The expression of attitudes favourable to the Nazi régime therefore lacked the domestic implications inherent in the expression of similar attitudes towards Italy and Nationalist Spain. Concern over the oppression of the Lutheran Church was stronger in Scotland. However, only towards the end of 1938, following the catalytic effect of the Krystallnacht pogrom, did this become a significant factor in influencing attitudes towards foreign policy.

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Only within the limited world of militant Protestantism was German Church policy regarded as a vital factor in determining attitudes to foreign policy. In such circles the belief that all forms of fascism, including Nazism, formed part of a Jesuitical conspiracy had its adherents as early as 1934. For Papist conspiracy theorists, German assistance to Franco provided positive proof of the linkage. Mavericks like Alexander Ratcliffe excepted, militant Protestantism was thoroughly hostile towards Nazi Germany after late 1936. Only when Germany was in collision with régimes of a more identifiably Catholic orientation, as occurred with the Anschluss, was pro-German comment likely to be invoked in such circles.

Although nationalism played a significant role in undermining the attractions of Fascism as an ideology with domestic application, it had little impact in shaping attitudes towards the fascist powers in the foreign policy debates of the late 1930s. In large part this was due to the marginalisation of political nationalism after 1935. However, the nationalists themselves showed a marked aversion to detailed consideration of attitudes towards the dictator nations. Events in Spain, in particular, were conspicuously ignored. A certain parochialism of outlook was partly responsible. Although the focus of fundamentalist activity after 1937 was a preoccupation with opposition to participation in an English war, to the almost total exclusion of all other matters, consideration of the European dimensions of the debate was minimal. For mainstream nationalists, the reluctance to address foreign policy issues was partly prompted by recognition that the concentration of public attention on international affairs was a major factor contributing to the nationalists’ own political marginalisation.

The nationalist movement proved to be a poor source of pro-German enthusiasm. In contrast with developments in other parts of Europe, a völkisch nationalist movement, looking to Nazi Germany for inspiration, singularly failed to materialise. Mainstream nationalism remained thoroughly wedded to due democratic process in its own ideological stance. The repressive internal policies of the fascist régimes were thoroughly repugnant to the party's essential moderation. There was also considerable sympathy for the small nations which fell victim to the territorial aggrandisement of the fascist powers, and a deep-seated attachment to a toothless concept of collective security, which bore more than a passing resemblance to the Labour Party's stance prior to 1937. The behaviour of the fascist powers was also condemned, not only out of genuine repugnance, but because it was recognised that their activities were bringing the whole concept of nationalism into disrepute. For
the Left, fascist dictatorships were examples of where unrestrained nationalism could lead. They provided a stick to beat Scottish nationalism with which the Scottish Left has continued to employ to the present day. The need to establish a sharp distinction between the healthy non-threatening variant of nationalism which they professed to espouse, and the sickly imperialist mutant forms, which they argued had taken root in Italy and Germany, was of paramount importance if the SNP was to counter such attacks.

Like the ILP, fundamentalist nationalism did provide a uniquely Scottish pro-peace voice in the debate on foreign policy. Like the ILP, a combination of vehement hostility to British imperialism and a deep commitment to peace could lead fundamentalists to a degree of pro-German expression. This emerged strongly in 1939. Some fantasists on the extremist fringes of the fundamentalist wing also toyed with notions of liberation from the English yoke in the cataclysmic destruction of English imperial power at the hands of Nazi Germany. However, only a handful are likely to have subscribed to such views. The extent of extreme anti-English and pro-German sentiments within the nationalist movement in general was greatly overstated by the fundamentalists’ dominance of the Scots Independent.

While Scottish patterns of response towards Nazi Germany essentially reflected the British pattern, there are several indicators that enthusiasm for Germany was to some extent weaker in Scotland. The awakening of enthusiasm in 1935-36 appears to have been somewhat tardier. Although the British Legion in Scotland subsequently endorsed the adoption of a policy of fraternisation with German ex-servicemen, the rejection of that policy by the delegates at the Scottish annual conference in 1935 was a demonstration of resistance quite unparalleled in its sister organisation. The swing towards Germany during the Rhineland crisis was also a shade less marked, and the Scottish press distinctly frostier. Indeed, throughout the 1930s neither of the Scottish quality papers came close to emulating the degree of enthusiasm which the Times displayed towards Germany. While so close to the Times on domestic issues, and a firm supporter of appeasement, The Scotsman never lost an ingrained tendency to give vent to anti-German comment. During the hey-day of pro-German enthusiasm evidence of Scottish back-sliding is not manifestly present, although the underrepresentation of Scottish business interests in the AGF cannot be adequately explained on commercial grounds alone. However, the erosion of support for Germany which took place in 1938 undoubtedly cut deeper in Scotland. Although support for appeasement remained
strong, by the end of the year the evaporation of enthusiasm for Germany which had taken place in moderate or respectable circles had gone further in Scotland. Positive antagonism towards Germany had also developed to a greater extent. By the start of 1939 the general mood of the Scottish public was believed by contemporary observers to be particularly hostile towards Germany.

There were also subtle shades of distinctiveness to the pro-German lobby in Scotland. To a greater extent than appears to have been the case in Britain as a whole, "respectable" pro-German enthusiasm was mainly concentrated around two key areas of opinion, on the Centre-Left and the Far Right. Where support for the revision of Versailles on ethical grounds shaded into moderate pro-Germanism, Scotland was strongly represented. To a marked extent, the leading representatives of this area of opinion in Scotland were Liberals. Andrew Law, Sir Daniel Stevenson, D.M. Mason, Arthur Berriedale Keith — the list is extensive. The Liberal Party may have been a spent force in electoral terms, but there was clearly no shortage of elder-statesmen Liberals with strong views on foreign policy. Most were merely continuing advocacy of a policy they had supported during the Weimar period. Scotland was also well represented on the Far Right by Conservatives who valued Nazi Germany's role as a bastion against the spread of communism — individuals like the Earl of Glasgow, Sir Patrick Ford and Viscount Stonehaven. Between these two poles, in the middle ground occupied by the bulk of the Conservative Party, pro-German expression, while present, was neither as rich nor as varied as was the case in Britain as a whole. Many Englishmen of the period were clearly motivated by a generalised sense of racial affinity with the German people. This sentiment does not appear to have been as strong in Scotland. Enthusiasm for friendship with the German people, independent of attitudes towards Versailles or Nazism, was by no means absent. However, the Link's lack of success north of the Border does appear to suggest that it was not as well developed.

Scots figured prominently in the expression of enthusiasm, in its many guises, for Nazi Germany. Indeed, if Anglo-Scots are added to their number, Scotland appears positively overrepresented in the ranks of prominent pro-German enthusiasts. Lord Lothian and General Sir Ian Hamilton virtually personified the particular strands of pro-German attitudes they were identified with. Sir Thomas Moore was without a doubt the most consistent friend of Nazi Germany to sit in the Commons. Capt. Ramsay was the most famous, or infamous, anti-semit of the
period. No-one surpassed A.P. Laurie's capacity to discern Hitler's finer qualities. However, few truly ardent admirers of the Nazi régime featured in the Scottish debate, and several of the most prominent were by no means quintessentially "Scottish." Sir Thomas Moore spent his formative years in Ireland, Capt. Luttman-Johnson only came to Scotland when he left the Indian Army, and Charles Sarolea never lost his Belgian identity and Continental outlook. It would be a mistake to overstretch this point. In England zealous pro-Nazis only accounted for a small part of the broad church of pro-German enthusiasm. Moreover, they included several Anglo-Scots, some of whom had been drawn south through involvement in the BUF. Nevertheless, a wholehearted embrace of Nazism was comparatively rarer in Scotland.

In the chill winds of the interwar years Scotland drew back under the protective covers of a new Unionism. In the late 1930s one of the most persuasive reasons for drawing that mantle tighter was the increasingly threatening nature of the European situation. Therefore, of all areas of political discussion, the debate on foreign policy is one in which it might be anticipated that Scotland's abnegation of national self-expression would be most evident. Attitudes to foreign policy, however, are inextricably linked to domestic considerations. Where enthusiasm for the principal European dictatorships of the Right was concerned, Scotland's political distinctiveness continued to show through.
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