
Simon McGrath

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University of Edinburgh
1996
DECLARATION

I declare that Learning to Work? Changing Discourses on Education and Training in South Africa, 1976-96 is my own work, that it has not been presented in whole or part for examination for any degree and that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by complete references.

Simon Andrew McGrath

25th June 1996
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Finally, my thanks go to my wife, Alison. As occasional transcriber of interviews, as proof reader and as first reader of draft and final chapters, her involvement with the work presented here has been important throughout. In many other ways too she has enriched the time spent writing this thesis as well as the final product.
ABSTRACT

Two years after the beginning of the Mandela Presidency and the end of minority rule in South Africa, the emergent model of education and training provision has still to take on a definite form. This thesis seeks to explore this emergent model. To do so, it considers the developments of the two years between the establishment of the Government of National Unity in May 1994 and the National Party’s decision to quit this coalition in May 1996 within two crucial contexts. First, whilst the focus is squarely on South Africa, trends within that country are related to those in other countries. Of particular relevance in this regard is the move in other Old Commonwealth countries towards the integration of education and training, a parallel of South African policy debates. Second, the need to see present policy debates within their historical context is reaffirmed. As well as providing an overview of the education and training developments of the past century, there is a detailed focus on the twenty years since the Soweto Uprising of 1976.

The focus of the thesis is on policy discourses, seen primarily through the exploration of major reports on education and training and, where possible, through the background documents that shaped them. Much of this data has not been subject to widespread analysis and debate in educational circles, yet is of great importance to an understanding of current debates. For the period since the 1994 elections this data has been supplemented by a series of interviews with stakeholders influential in the development of policy and practice in education and training.

In order to get analytical purchase on these documents and interviews, and on the broader debates they represent, the focus throughout the thesis has been on the principal meta-narratives which can be discerned in such debates. Four such meta-narratives are shown as having become influential in the policy debates of the last twenty years: the pro-equity vision of People’s Education; the New Right market-oriented approach; the trade-union driven New Times version of Post Fordism; and Lean Production, the pro-employer alternative to New Times. An understanding of the nature of these four meta-narratives allows a detailed reading of the current, contested policy discourse and points to the very real possibility of a rather narrow version of the integration of education and training emerging in South Africa.
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<tr>
<td>AACCF</td>
<td>Anglo-American Corporation Chairman’s Fund</td>
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<td>ABE</td>
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<td>ABET</td>
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<td>AEU</td>
<td>Amalgamated Engineering Union</td>
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<td>AMITB</td>
<td>Automobile Manufacturers Industry Training Board</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>AWB</td>
<td>Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging</td>
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<td>Building Industry Training Board</td>
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<td>CATS</td>
<td>Credit Accumulation and Transfer System</td>
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<td>CBMT</td>
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<td>CEPD</td>
<td>Centre for Education Policy Development</td>
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<td>CMESA</td>
<td>Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>DE</td>
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<td>DNE</td>
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<td>EAP</td>
<td>Economically Active Population</td>
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<td>ECSA</td>
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<td>EDUPOU</td>
<td>Education Policy Unit (Urban Foundation)</td>
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<td>ESKOM</td>
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<td>FE</td>
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<td>FEDSAL</td>
<td>Federation of South African Labour Unions</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>GNVQ</td>
<td>General National Vocational Qualification</td>
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<td>HLM</td>
<td>High Level Manpower</td>
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<td>HRD</td>
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<td>HSE</td>
<td>High Skill Equilibrium</td>
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<td>IEB</td>
<td>Independent Examinations Board</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Office/Organisation(^1)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMWG</td>
<td>Inter-Ministerial Working Group</td>
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<td>IPET</td>
<td>Implementation Plan for Education and Training</td>
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<td>IQ</td>
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<td>ITB</td>
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<td>JWG</td>
<td>Joint Working Group</td>
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\(^1\) There is a distinction between the Office, a secretariat based in Geneva which produces research documents and advises countries, and the Organisation, the body whose meetings bring together tripartite representatives of countries in order to pass resolutions.
LSE  Low Skill Equilibrium
MEC  Member of the Executive Council
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLM  Medium Level Manpower
MP   Member of Parliament
NACTU National Council of Trade Unions
NAPTOSA National Professional Teachers Organisation of South Africa
NCVQ National Council for Vocational Qualifications
NECC National Education Crisis Committee (later National Education Coordinating Committee)
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council
NEPI National Education Policy Investigation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIV  New Improved Vocationalism
NP   National Party
NQF  National Qualifications Framework
NSB  National Standards Body
NTB  National Training Board
NTS  National Training Strategy
NTSI National Training Strategy Initiative
NUM  National Union of Mineworkers
NUMSA National Union of Metalworkers, South Africa
NZQA New Zealand Qualifications Authority
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PETA Provincial Education and Training Authority
PETL Paid Education and Training Leave
PITB  Plastics Industry Training Board
PRISEC  Private Sector Education Council
PRP  Participatory Research Programme
PTSA  Parent Teacher Student Association
RDP  Reconstruction and Development Programme
RPL  Recognition of Prior Learning
RSA  Republic of South Africa
SA  South Africa
SABN  South African Business Network
SABRA  South African Bureau for Racial Affairs
SACHED  South African Committee for Higher Education
SACLA  South African Confederation of Labour
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADTU  South African Democratic Teachers Union
SALB  South African Labour Bulletin
SAQA  South African Qualifications Authority
SCOTVEC  Scottish Vocational Education Council
SETO  Sector Education and Training Organisation
SGB  Standards Generating Body
SRC  Student Representative Council
UF  Urban Foundation
UK  United Kingdom
UP  United Party
USA  United States of America
USWE  Using Spoken and Written English
WC 2  Work Committee 2 (of the NTSI)
Civilized Labour Policy A policy established in the 1920s which gave preference to white employment in the public sector and encouraged a similar preference in the private sector.

Co-determination Wide-ranging cooperation and joint decision-making between employers and employees. See Employee Involvement and Employee Participation.

Colour Bar The de facto or de jure prevention of certain racial groupings becoming employed in a particular job. See Job Reservation, Scheduled Person.

Competency Based Modular Learning A model of learning in which the curriculum is built up of modules and where the focus of assessment is on a measurement of skills through competencies rather than the traditional educational focus on knowledge.

Corporatism A mode of political and economic organisation in which a wide range of decisions are based on negotiations or understandings between organised labour, organised capital and the state. See Strategic Unionism.

Credit Accumulation and Transfer System A method of assigning particular values to courses of learning so as to facilitate student movement between courses and institutions.

Department of Education This came into place on 1st January 1995, replacing the Department of National Education. The Department of Education consists of the corps of civil servants employed in the national education bureaucracy. See Ministry of Education.

Discourse A storyline emerging out of a particular text or group of texts. See Meta-Narrative.

Dual System A system, especially associated with the German Federal Republic, which maintains discrete education and training tracks but offers high quality and status of provision in both and permits limited movement between the two tracks.

Economic Fordism A stage of South African Fordism during the late 1970s and 1980s in which the economic logic of mass production was recognised but the political implications, such as universal suffrage were resisted.

Effluxion of Time The term used to denote that an apprenticeship has been successfully completed through the passage of the fixed time period rather than through the passing of a trade test.
Employee Involvement A mode of industrial relations in which workers are encouraged to provide suggestions for the better functioning of the firm but are excluded from real decision-making. See Employee Participation, Co-determination.

Employee Participation A mode of industrial relations in which workers are widely involved in the management of the firm. See Co-determination, Employee Involvement.

Fast Capitalism A model of economic organisation which responds to the crisis of Fordism through the intensification of Fordist production whilst developing new areas of market penetration and new market niches. See Lean Production.

Flexibility A stress in the literatures of Fast Capitalism and Lean Production on the need to make all aspects of economic activity more adaptable to changing market conditions. In practice, flexibility is often synonymous with Work Intensification and Multi-Tasking.

Fordism A Regime of Accumulation common across Europe and North America during the middle part of the twentieth century in which mass production and mass consumption were in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Universal suffrage, political bipartism and massified state education systems were other aspects of this regime. See Economic Fordism, Mature Fordism, Neo-Fordism, Post-Fordism, Pre-Fordism, Racial Fordism.

Free Rider The firm which chooses not to train, preferring to poach trained workers from other firms, thus depressing the amount of training offered.

Globalisation The notion that national economies are increasingly interrelated and that international competitiveness has become centrally important to economic performance.

Group Rights A phrase used by the National Party to mean the preservation of white privilege in any new dispensation.

High Skill Equilibrium A self-reinforcing range of institutions, structures and practices that cause a particular economy to have a predominance of high skill employment. See Low Skill Equilibrium.

Industrial Education A model of education developed in the Southern states of the USA in the late nineteenth century based on the assumption that African Americans would benefit from a predominantly practical rather than academic education.

Influx Control Policies designed to limit the number of Africans entering urban South Africa.
**Integrated Approach** A model of education and training integration in which sub-systems retain a large degree of autonomy but are subject to an overall set of guiding principles. See *Integrated System*, *Unified Education and Training System*.

**Integrated System** A model of education and training in which the different sub-systems are considered to be only relevant as modes of delivery within a strongly convergent overall system. See *Integrated Approach*, *Unified Education and Training System*.

**Job Reservation** The limitation of certain jobs to members of particular racial groups. See *Colour Bar*, *Scheduled Person*.

**Just-in-Time** A model of production in which buffer stocks are eliminated at both ends of the process. This means that work is intensified and kept at a constant high pace. See *Work Intensification*.

**Lean Production** A means of production in which more output is achieved in less time and with less resources. Also used here to denote a *Meta-Narrative* which represents the *Neo-Fordist* ideological position. See *Fast Capitalism*.

**Legitimation Crisis** A situation in which the state has lost the support or obedience of the bulk of the populace.

**Low Skill Equilibrium** A self-reinforcing range of institutions, structures and practices that cause a particular economy to have a predominance of low skill employment. See *High Skill Equilibrium*.

**Market-Oriented Meta-Narrative** The *Meta-Narrative* stressing the pre-eminence of market forces in the allocation of resources. Those decisions still resting with the state are held to be technical and value-free. See *Technicism*, *Technocratic Rationality*.

**Mature Fordism** A position not reached in South Africa under the National Party in which both the political and the economic logic of *Fordism* are recognised. See *Economic Fordism*.

**Meta-Narrative** An over-arching storyline which draws together the arguments of a series of individual discourses in a relatively coherent manner. See *Discourse*.

**Ministry of Education** This refers to the Minister, Deputy-Minister and their special advisors. Such advisors are not civil servants but are employed as consultants to the Ministerial office holders. See *Department of Education*.
Mode of Regulation  An inter-related series of institutions and structures which shape economic and political practices. See Regime of Accumulation.

Multi-Skilling The increasing of a worker's responsibility and range of activities through the accretion of additional skilled tasks. A multi-skilled worker would maintain the level of self-direction of the artisan. See Multi-Tasking.

Multi-Tasking The increasing of a worker's range of tasks to include low skilled tasks such as cleaning of the work area or other non-artisanal activities as directed by superiors. See Multi-Skilling, Work Intensification.

Native The term officially used to refer to the African element of the population before the 1950s. See Bantu, Black.

Neo-Fordism A mode of economic and political organisation which seeks to respond to the crisis of Fordism through the adoption of more flexible production and marketing techniques but in which control of the production process and profit allocation remains firmly in the hands of the employers. See Fast Capitalism, Lean Production, New Times, Post-Fordism.

New Improved Vocationalism An emergent model of educational provision in which the mass system of delivery is organised around the interests of industry through the use of competencies and an integration of education and training in which training philosophies predominate. In such a model, the elite system is private and largely aloof from such pressures. See New Vocationalism, Vocationalism.

New Times The term used here for a Meta-Narrative based in a Post-Fordist vision of an economic and political system. This replaces the mass modes of organisation of Fordism with more diverse and niched systems in which class conflict in the economy and politics has been overcome. See Fast Capitalism, Lean Production, Neo-Fordism, Post-Fordism.

New Vocationalism An educational trend which emerged in England in the late 1970s and which entered South Africa soon after. It stressed the need to make the school more relevant to the economy and the importance of vocationally oriented subjects but did not envisage the abandonment of the education-training division. See New Improved Vocationalism, Vocationalism.

Old Commonwealth Great Britain and the countries which were settled by large populations of English speakers and which had Dominion status in the early twentieth century: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.
Paid Education and Training Leave The right of workers, enshrined in ILO Resolution 140, to attend relevant education and training courses during work time and whilst being paid to be at work.

People's Education A movement arising in South Africa in the 1980s which called for a transformation of education. Here used to refer also to a Meta-Narrative extolling the chief elements of the People’s Education message.

Portability Used in the National Training Strategy Initiative to denote the degree of ease of movement within a sub-system of education and training. However, it is more commonly used to refer to all horizontal movement across both within and between sub-systems, thus incorporating Articulation. See Progression.

Post-Fordism Used to denote a Regime of Accumulation in which a social democratic model of economics, politics and society emerges out of the demise of Fordism. However, the term is also used by some to denote any model which moves beyond Fordism and thus can be taken to subsume Neo-Fordism. See New Times.

Pre-Fordism Used here to refer to the structure of the South African polity prior to the Second World War in which the country had yet to adopt the logic of mass production and mass consumption across even the bulk of the white population. See Fordism.

Progression A measure of the ease of movement vertically through education and training sub-systems. See Articulation, Portability.

Racial Fordism The adaptation of Fordism to South African conditions by the Nationalist Party after 1948 which sought to limit mass production and mass consumption to the white population.

Recognition of Prior Learning A method of accrediting learning achieved by an individual before entrance to a programme of study or to employment. Typically, but not exclusively, taken to mean informal learning.

Regime of Accumulation A Mode of Regulation which has achieved dominance over rival modes in a particular country. Racial Fordism can be thought to have been such a regime in the 1950s whilst there is no obvious regime presently.

Scheduled Person A person whose racial classification allows them to become employed in a reserved job. See Colour Bar, Job Reservation.

Skill-Training-Grade-Wage Nexus The model, pioneered by COSATU, which views an individual’s skill level, training needs and history, appropriate grade and wage level as tightly inter-connected.
Strategic Unionism An approach proposed by elements of COSATU in the early 1990s by which trade unions would seek to cooperate more closely with a future ANC government and employers in order to develop Post-Fordism. See Corporatism.

Taylorism A mode of training and work organisation intimately associated with Fordism in which tasks are divided up into simple, repetitive elements allowing for the minimum of worker intelligence and self-direction.

Technicism The tendency, associated with the Market-Oriented Meta-Narrative, to use large number of commissions comprised of experts in the policy making process. See Technocratic Rationality.

Technocratic Rationality The mode of reasoning under a Market-Oriented approach which treats all governmental decisions as purely technical and value-free exercises. See Technicism.

Total Strategy A policy under the Botha government (1978-89) which sought to use all aspects of daily life and culture as well as external propaganda and military force to defeat the ANC.

Unified Education and Training System A model in which divisions between education and training are eradicated and both form part of a new system. See Integrated Approach, Integrated System.

Vocationalism A mode of education provision in which a number of technical schools are established in order to provide vocational preparation for skilled work within the school system. See New Improved Vocationalism, New Vocationalism.

Work Intensification The increasing of the pace of work and the accretion of tasks typical of Lean Production/Fast Capitalism. See Just-in-Time, Multi-Tasking.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCHING POLICY DISCOURSES

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

Education and training reform is at the centre of the political agenda internationally. This is particularly true in South Africa. Prior to the withdrawal of the National Party (NP) from the Government of National Unity (GNU), Renier Schoeman, the then Deputy-Minister of Education, had stood out from his NP colleagues in Cabinet as a result of his public clashes with his minister, Sibusiso Bengu. One of the most contested elements of the new constitution proposed in May 1996 was the issue of educational medium of instruction. Even prior to this, both Gauteng Province and national education policy had been the subject of appeals to the constitutional court system. The opening of universities in both of the years since the 1994 elections has been accompanied by student and staff protests, occasionally turning to rioting and in June 1996 another spate of unrest hit universities, technikons and teachers’ colleges. The return to school in 1996 saw political, physical and legal conflict as a small number of Afrikaans-medium schools continue to try to block admissions of African pupils.1

1 In the time-honoured fashion of writing on South Africa it is necessary to explain the usage of racial terms, which are still necessary regardless of questions of their broader validity. I will use African, white, Indian and coloured as the preferred terms to refer to the four principal groupings in South Africa. Black will be used to refer to “peoples of colour” collectively. Other terms have been used historically in South Africa, such as Bantu, Native and Kaffir. These are used here within the context of their contemporary discourses.
The international and local focus on education and training as a key site of political struggle arises out of three claims that are conventionally made about or for education and, to a lesser extent, training. First, education and training are seen as central to the economic competitiveness of nations. The belief in links between education and training and skills and productivity is a long-standing one.2

However, this has become sharpened in recent years due to the prevalence of notions of globalization. These operate in a dual manner. On the one hand, the argument that national economies are increasingly linked into a global economy, characterized by increased competition in both domestic and foreign markets, leads to a heightened concern with themes such as skill and productivity. On the other, the belief that technological change within this global economy is increasingly rapid leads to a stress on human skills as the most central to national competitive advantage (Reich 1991). Education and training therefore become ever more important.

These concerns can be seen to be operating in South Africa. In a relatively fragile and grossly unequal economy such as South Africa’s, strong economic growth is identified as a necessary element of redistribution and poverty alleviation. South Africa also has been heavily influenced by two sets of countries. On the one hand, South Africa’s industrial policy pays reference to the East Asian “tigers” and sees the challenge in terms of catching up with these strongly growing and industrializing economies. On the other, white South Africa still sees the

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2 However, this was certainly not a linkage that was held to be self-evident in Britain during the 19th century. Indeed, in the first industrial nation there was a widely-held belief in the negative effects of education on commerce and industry (Wiener 1980; Barnett 1985). This of course has come down to the present day as a concern about inappropriate forms of education: a theme that will recur throughout this thesis.
"Old Commonwealth" countries: Australia, New Zealand, Scotland\(^3\), England and to a lesser extent, Canada, as its principal cultural reference points. As we shall see shortly, elements of South African education and training policy can be viewed as part of a broader Old Commonwealth trend.

The second claim commonly made for education is that it is a central device in the development and protection of cultures. The link between education and the need to develop national cultures of course has been a fundamental theme of education across Africa since independence. In South Africa too the perceived link between education and culture has been apparent throughout the history of education policy. British governors such as Somerset and Milner saw Anglicization through the schools as the way to bring Afrikaners under closer state control. Equally, Christian National Education arose out of Afrikaner attempts to resist this continuing legacy and to protect and develop their own culture, language and religion. Missionary and Bantu Education can be seen at their heart as schemes to use education to shape indigenous cultures.

This theme of education and culture remains at the root of many of the current educational contestations in South Africa. All three major political parties have strong and conflicting views about the ideal education for the ideal culture and some of the current disputes on this terrain have already been mentioned above.

\(^{3}\) When considering South Africa's historical and continuing ties with Britain it is very important to note the distinct Scottish influence. Although for a century South Africa was governed in the final instance from London, in education, as in law and religion, the system reflects the often more pervasive impacts of Scots missionaries, teachers and administrators.
The third central claim regarding education, and increasingly training too, is that it is a basic human right. In South Africa this has particular resonance given the legacy of the Apartheid system which systematically denied this right to large sections of the population on racial grounds. That denial was not simply passively endured at the grassroots level but was responded to in a variety of ways in the 46 years of National Party rule and before. Moreover, the aspirations created by educational deprivation are also an important factor in current political debates.

What then is the importance of studying the South African education and training system? Firstly, and most crucially, it is related to the centrality of that system to the more than 40 million people engaged in a variety of ways with creating their new South Africa.

The significance of South African policy extends beyond national boundaries, however. South Africa is a regional and continental force, in economic, military and political terms. The success or failure of South African policies thus has likely impacts across Africa (Adedeji 1996).

Finally, South African policy on education and training does show strong resonances with those of other Old Commonwealth countries, particularly with regard to this thesis's concern with the interfaces between education and training, and learning and work. New Zealand has undergone the most thorough policy implementation in this regard; Scotland, Australia and England are following broadly similar paths. South African policy successes and failures, therefore, also have potential implications for those countries.
RESEARCH CONCERNS

The above considerations lead on to a series of research questions that will be addressed in the course of an exploration of South African education and training policy from 1976 to 1996, but particularly from the establishment of the Government of National Unity in May 1994 to the withdrawal of the National Party from the GNU in May 1996.4

When considering the historical development of education and training in South Africa between 1976 and 1994 two principal questions emerge. First, what was the nature of the evolving policy discourse of this period? Second, what were the origins, both local and global, of this evolving debate?

Moving on to the two years between the April 1994 elections and the NP quitting of the GNU, similar concerns are at the heart of the research task. First, it is important to consider what model of education and training appears to be evolving for post-Apartheid South Africa. Second, the factors which explain this emergence must be analysed.

Subsequent to these core concerns, which respond directly to the data gathered, a series of further questions will be briefly addressed which reflect back to the discussion above. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the emergent model? What are the longer term prospects for the proposed integration of education and training in South Africa? What alternatives, if any, are likely to emerge at the level of

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4 Deciding upon a cut-off point for research with a contemporary focus is difficult, particularly when there are such rapid changes occurring. I have decided to make the date of the announcement of the National Party withdrawal from government (9th May 1996) the end-point of this study. This closes a particular chapter in the development of the South African political system. It also neatly marks two years of post-election developments in education and training policy ending with the replacement of Renier Schoeman as Deputy Minister of Education by Smangaliso Mkhatshwa.
policy discourse? What does the experience of South Africa to date suggest for other Old Commonwealth countries embarked on similar programme?

Finally, a series of more research-oriented issues will also be addressed. I will seek to explore what this research tells us about the principal policy research challenges for the future, at the theoretical and methodological levels, and in terms of appropriate subjects for research. Before these issues can be considered, however, a better grasp of what is meant by policy in this thesis is required.

RESEARCHING POLICY

One of the more striking insights gained from the literature reviews that underpin this thesis is that for all the thousands of pages written about education policy, there are very few sentences, let alone paragraphs, which address the question of what is meant by "Policy". Indeed, it is typical to find authors launching into long discussions of a particular policy without ever considering what policy is at the meta-level.

In this thesis I will follow the lead of Britain’s principal policy-sociologists of education in seeing policy as “a set of claims about how the world should and might be, a matter of ‘authoritative allocation of values’” (Bowe, Ball and Gold 1992: 13).

Such a view of policy highlights two major generic research questions. First, whose values are authenticated by education (and training) policy? Second, what ideal picture of education (and training) is being projected by the policies under study (Ball 1990)?
There has been a long-standing tension in policy research regarding the question of whether the relevant focus should be on policy-as-pronouncement or policy-as-practice (Samoff 1995). In the first view, policy studies should focus on things such as policy statements and documents, e.g. acts of parliament, rather than on the form the policy takes when implemented, as in the second view.

The viewing of policy documents as ideological tracts in need of decoding (Codd 1988) places this thesis firmly within the critical (rather than functionalist) part of the first camp. Such a location is justified by the timing of the research (1993-6) in relationship to the post-Apartheid policy cycle. Given the enormous challenge of restructuring the Apartheid education bureaucracy, there is still relatively little that can be said about policy-as-practice two years after the first democratic elections in South Africa.

If we follow Badat (1991) in seeing policy as a circular process, then the concerns of this thesis become more apparent:

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Agenda

Evaluation       Formulation

Implementation   Adoption

(after Badat 1991: 21)
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In the subsequent discussions of this thesis the focus will be on the stages from the setting of a policy agenda to the adoption of a particular policy position. However, as policy is being treated as an iterative process over
an historical period of twenty years, it is of course the case the way in which earlier policies have been implemented and evaluated does feed back into such concerns, as the diagram illustrates.

The focus on the ideological domain of policy research, as intended here, conventionally has resulted in a case study approach in the British Sociology of Education tradition. One significant exception, however, has been that of Ball’s *Politics and Policy Making in Education* (1990) which used a stronger focus on discourses explored through the medium of interviews with elite stakeholders. A similar approach will, in part, be followed by this thesis, particularly in its exploration of education and training policy discourse in the first two years after the 1994 elections.

However, this study is far more grounded in an historical context than Ball’s work. This has resulted in a far greater emphasis on policy documents as texts to be decoded. Whilst there will be use of both documents and interviews for the period 1994-6, for the years between 1976 and 1994 the primary focus will be on policy documents.

Much of the critical policy research of education and training in the Old Commonwealth countries has traditionally been couched in terms of Marxist political economy. By coincidence, the seminal text in this regard was published in the year with which this study starts (Bowles and Gintis 1976). Since then there has been considerable effort, not always successful, to move beyond the rather determinist constraints of the correspondence theory model Bowles and Gintis provided and to

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5 However, in international education research there has also been an important strand of research arising out of historical methodology, e.g. King (1971).
6 In essence correspondence theory argues that the capitalist education system, as part of the superstructure, is shaped by the economic base in such a way as to reproduce the capitalist system. In this process the hidden curriculum is as important as the official curriculum in shaping attitudes and reinforcing class locations. As Willis (1977) shows,
develop positions which take account of factors beyond simple class locations.

Authors such as Apple in America and Dale in England (and latterly New Zealand) have shown that the state is not simply a tool of capital and that, indeed, there is no such thing as the position of capital, labour, etc. (e.g. Apple 1989; Dale 1989). The use of discourse and meta-narrative in this thesis is a way of building upon these insights to move beyond the conventional political economy approach of the left. It builds upon Apple's arguments that external ideological pressures shaping what can be said and thought operate both alongside and across materially-based class positions (Apple 1989). Although class positions strongly influence which ideological positions are adopted by individuals and how those individuals mediate them, they do not determine how individuals respond to prevailing ideological currents.

Therefore, the study in this thesis of the ideological positions presented by individuals and texts is rooted both in personal, organizational and class positions and struggles on the one hand and in the impacts of external ideological trends upon local realities on the other. By focusing primarily on what in educational policy research terms is the uncharted methodology of critical hermeneutics7, rather than on the well-mapped path of political economy, this thesis hopes to illustrate elements of the

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7 Thompson (1981) uses the term critical hermeneutics to describe his attempt to bring together the philosophical positions of Ricoeur and Habermas. When he talks about the methodological implications of this synthesis he prefers the term depth hermeneutics, as we shall see subsequently. I have chosen the former term to refer to an approach which shares the hermeneutical concern with interpretation through contextualisation but which allies this to a social science-derived preoccupation with notions such as power which are absent from the mainstream hermeneutical concern with symbolic forms.
policy process which otherwise would remain opaque to a more traditional mode of study.

Generating a Reading

At this point it is necessary to clarify two key technical terms that I will employ in this analysis of ideological positions. The term discourse is used to signify an ideological story-line that emerges from a particular text or group of related texts, e.g. an edited collection. The second key term used is meta-narrative. This refers to over-arching ideological patterns which exist both within and beyond individual documents and discourses. The discourse found in a particular text may reflect one meta-narrative in particular but will often be built up from elements of different meta-narratives.

Whilst I am concerned to explore discourses I wish to move beyond the methodology of discourse analysis which carries connotations of a Post-Modernist ultra-relativism. Equally, I have no intention of producing causal explanations which deny the multiplicity of possible readings of the discourses and meta-narratives encountered and instead impose a singular narrative as the only possible reading. Rather, whilst acknowledging the multiplicity of possible meanings, I will seek to provide the reading of the data which appears to be the most plausible and analytically robust. As Thompson argues:

while a text may allow of several interpretations, it does not follow that all of these interpretations are of equal

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8 This could of course lead on to a discussion of what constitutes a text. This would however be rather tangential to the concerns of this thesis for which such a common-sense definition suffices. Anyone wishing to explore that issue further could consider Foucault (1972) as a starting point.
status; and the elimination of inferior interpretations is not an empirical matter of verification and proof, but a rational process of argumentation and debate. (Thompson 1981: 53)

In Thompson’s view, such a process of argumentation and debate, which he terms “depth hermeneutics”, requires a three-fold analytical process, the stages being conceptually rather than sequentially distinct. First, socio-historical analysis must be carried out in order to locate the discourses spoken by texts in their specific social, intellectual and historical contexts. Second, discourse analysis is required to explore the plausible meanings of the texts being considered. Third, interpretation and re-interpretation take place in order to move beyond deconstruction towards an analytical synthesis (Thompson 1990).

Through what I term critical hermeneutics, I will follow a broadly congruent approach to that of Thompson. However, the decoding of texts will be in a manner that goes beyond the literary model of discourse analysis with its focus on symbolic forms. Furthermore, I prefer to see the three elements of the analytical process as being repeated in a spiral as readings of socio-historical context, text and synthesis build up iteratively towards the goals of greater plausibility and rigour.

Socio-Historical Context

The first element of this analysis is central to the contribution of this thesis. The principal reasons for the study are to understand the present and to develop a way of conceptualizing the future. Nonetheless, there is a danger in sociological studies that they freeze reality in a snap shot of a particular moment in time. This is perhaps impossible to avoid totally.
An historical focus helps to stress the passage of time during the policy process. Without such a focus, many of the more subtle but vital shifts in policy can be lost.

A history of South African education and training is also crucial to the study in a further way. As a transitional state, South Africa is particularly influenced in its development of current policies by readings of the past. By providing such a reading, this thesis seeks to provide a vital dimension absent from much of the contemporary analysis of South African education and training policy.

An historical focus, grounded as it is in a reading of the South African past, also provides an important balance to the second element of the context explored in the thesis: the intellectual. This thesis is not an attempt to produce an intellectual history of South African education and training, nor is it concerned with developing a comprehensive story of the influences which international intellectual trends have had on South African thinking. However, both these accounts will be drawn upon throughout the thesis. They are important resources as they stress the need to see policy as a response to beliefs as well as events.

The critical hermeneutical approach this thesis adopts is grounded in the contention that the creation of a plausible reading is founded on the exploration of meta-narratives which both inform and are constructed from the discourses to be found in texts such as policy reports. These meta-narratives are used throughout the thesis as heuristic devices which permit better analytical purchase on what might otherwise quickly become a morass of documents and interviews, each presenting a somewhat different perspective.
The meta-narratives exist as ideal types\(^9\) which are not perfectly recreated by any individual text. Rather, they are indicative of trends and emphases within individual discourses. Furthermore, as intellectual trends they are largely globalized. That is to say, they are influenced by formulations from outside South Africa as well as from inside. Indeed, given the relatively recent emergence in South Africa of some of the ideas explored, much of the outlining of the nature of these meta-narratives in the thesis has necessarily relied on the more extensive literatures of the Old Commonwealth countries and elsewhere.

The exact degree of influence of such meta-narratives and international versions of them is very difficult to prove. Even citation of a particular source begs the question of whether it is being used in a way that appears in keeping with a particular meta-narrative. It is far more typical to come across an argument that may appear reminiscent of a particular text without any citation. It is not the concern of the thesis to prove or disprove such influences. Rather, resemblances to external texts and arguments are taken as an indicator of the intellectual context within which a particular piece of data can best be understood. Thus, the many references to external arguments have a heuristic intent.

External texts and intellectual trends were constructed in different local contexts than those which pertain in South Africa. Therefore, there is a danger in reading these accounts into South Africa in an uncritical manner. As noted earlier, it is the dual use of the historical and the

\(^9\) The notion of ideal types derives from the work of Max Weber (e.g. 1968). Weber's argument in essence appears to be that there are certain concepts which have a general form but which describe phenomena that do not have all their characteristics strictly in common. For example, it is possible to have a concept of bureaucracy, which is useful in analysing the operations of various governments but which does not perfectly capture all the characteristics of any single case nor imply that all cases are perfectly identical.
intellectual context which helps to reduce this danger, bringing together as it does the global and the local, the real and the constructed.

**Textual Analysis**

The second element in the generation of a reading is the analysis of the data itself. In order to produce a plausible reading I have employed two major types of data resource. First, I have made use of a series of texts, primarily the findings of official commissions and other policy-related documents. Second, I have made use of interviews and comments by a variety of individuals.

The use of texts raises a number of methodological issues. Their selection was not a question of collection of all possibly relevant data nor of construction of a random sample. These techniques are simply not relevant to such a study. In reality selection was shaped by both choice and circumstance.

First, decisions regarding relevance, arising both out of reading the texts and the contextualization process, discussed earlier, led to the privileging of some texts over others. Thus, as the research developed and the spiralling of the three stages of analysis progressed, the exploration of some texts was dropped from the thesis and that of others included.

Second, it would probably be impossible to know either the whole list of relevant texts or to acquire access to them. Thus, selection was also dependent on the availability of texts. As Scott (1990) reminds us, it is impossible to be certain how representative a collection of texts really is. Those documents acquired may have become available to the researcher
by chance. This is difficult to ascertain in a situation in which many were in fact acquired second-hand through resource centres, as is the case here. Equally, there is generally no way of knowing conclusively whether the documents considered are the most important or the least sensitive.

This is of course the case with much of the grey material acquired, both via secondary sources and direct from organizations contacted. However, most of the key documents considered in this thesis are official reports in the public domain to which such arguments do not apply. Moreover, through the use of official, publicly available documents, grey material and secondary accounts, it is possible to produce a plausible reading, notwithstanding any such problems.

The reading of texts, even recent ones, brings the further danger that an inappropriate present reading is being placed on a text from the past. This, however, is a danger the contextualization process is designed to address. Moreover, some cross-checking was possible through interviews and conversations with several of the authors of texts considered in the thesis. Nonetheless, such cross-referencing in itself does not totally solve the problem of being ahistorical as individuals are prone to both selective and defective memory.

These problems make textual analysis difficult. However, it remains a vital analytical tool. In the context of research on South African education and training policy there is quite a large and respectable tradition of textual analysis (e.g. Buckland 1982; Kraak 1993b; Christie 1994). However, there are large gaps in this research field which I am seeking to fill in.
Such analysis hitherto has been almost entirely of education policy rather than training policy, Kraak's (1993b) consideration of the National Training Strategy report being a rare exception. Given the focus on vocationalism in the 1980s and the recent preoccupation with the integration of education and training policy, it is essential that a reading of major training policy documents be attempted, as is the case in this thesis. Moreover, the reluctance of intellectuals from the left to engage with official documents in the 1980s, lest they be accused of giving them legitimacy (Bennell et al. 1992), has resulted in a large gap in historical analysis. Thus, for the Wiehahn Report in Chapter Three I can find no evidence of any critical analysis from an education and training perspective.

Even in the case of African National Congress (ANC)-aligned documents there has been little analysis. For instance, the documents through which the policy of integrating education and training was developed, as far as I am aware, have not yet been submitted to a critical and dynamic reading.\footnote{Kraak (1993b) refers to them but uses them to develop a composite picture of ANC-COSATU policy rather than treating them sequentially in order to critique that policy.}

Textual analysis is also used to refer to utterances and even acts (Bleicher 1980). Here I will use it as referring both to the documents explored above and to a series of interviews and discussions held in South Africa during 1995.

The first element of these oral texts is a series of 40 interviews conducted with individuals employed in stakeholder organizations or key projects. These included the national Departments of Education and Labour; the National Training Board and a number of Industry Training Boards; a
provincial education department and a Presidential Lead Project; representatives of federations of labour and capital, and of individual companies and trade unions.

Again, issues of representativeness arise. Selection was based upon notions of which organizations, and in some cases individuals, were important in shaping policy. Such a process is of course subjective. It was also influenced by the comments of others, both academics and some of those interviewed, who made suggestions as to suitable informants. Often eloquence rather than influence appeared to be behind recommendations.

Unwillingness to be interviewed can also affect representativeness. Three of those approached were not interviewed. In each case this was the result of an arranged meeting being cancelled and an alternative time proving impossible to arrange. In two cases some evidence of the individual's viewpoint could in any case be constructed from documents they had written.\(^\text{11}\)

The reliability of data gathered from interviews is also often subjected to criticism. The interviews were designed to be semi-structured, based around the contextual understanding already gleaned, and there was no attempt to ensure that data from different interviews was perfectly comparable. In reality the structure of each interview depended on a variety of factors, such as time available, location, personality and areas of interest and expertise. Data gathered at one interview helped to shape subsequent interviews, thus providing some degree of cross-checking.

\(^{11}\) The exception was the training officer of the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU).
This is in part a response to the other major question to be asked of such a
technique: can the data collected be trusted? The validity of data given by
interviewees is difficult to establish and this is especially the case with
elite respondents, more skilled at dominating interviews. However,
these interviews were intended to explore discourses not facts and are less
prone, though not immune, to such problems. As with the documentary
analysis, such an approach precludes scientific proofs, but it does facilitate
the production of a complex and sophisticated reading.

The concern with discourses rather than with more concrete data also
makes it less important to consider whether those interviewed are
speaking as individuals or as representatives of their organizations. This,
however, is a question which needs to be kept in mind when the focus is
on explaining rather than analysing shifts within and between the meta-
narratives.

At certain points in the text some individuals appear to loom large. The
focus on meta-narrative also makes the question of whether these
individuals gain their influence from individual charisma or
organizational authority relatively unimportant. Equally, it does not
lend itself to a great person view of history and the references to
individuals should not be read in such a way. As with the choice of
documents examined, the focus on individuals is essentially a heuristic
aid to telling the overall story.

In addition to the interviews with stakeholder representatives, oral data
was also gathered from a variety of other commentators, largely from
academia and journalism. Some of the former group have also been
involved directly in the policy process as consultants and task team
members. However, here they were reflecting primarily on the broader picture as commentators. The nature of these interactions was particularly varied. Some were fairly formal interviews; others were spread over a number of occasions and organized around social interactions such as coffee or dinner.

The data collected cannot be viewed as scientifically rigorous. Nevertheless, the wealth and variety of information gathered permits great insight into the topic being considered and provides a rich resource for the generation of a plausible and arguably unique reading through the use of meta-narratives. It is the creation of such a reading through a hermeneutical process and its heuristic power that is at the heart of the methodological approach of this thesis.

**Synthesis**

The reading generated is shaped then by historical, ideological and textual elements which have been woven together to provide an overall account of shifts in education and training policy. The relationship between these three elements is complex and influences do not simply run monodirectionally. Just as a reading of the historical context, for instance, shapes the understanding of a particular text, so the understanding of that text can itself shape the reading of the historical context. Neither element of analysis is sufficient in itself for the generation of a plausible reading.

As already noted the methodology employed here is quite unusual for a work of educational sociology. Equally, the use of education and training documents is also rare. Nonetheless, the thesis is more in keeping with
convention, in Britain at least, in its treatment of the balance between providing critique and policy intervention.

**Critique and Policy**

The focus throughout the thesis will be on laying bare the ideological underpinnings of policy-as-pronouncement in its various manifestations during the period being studied. There has been something of a rush away from such critique in South African education and training circles in the context of the very pressing needs of the present to construct policy. It is true that South Africa has a massive negative legacy in education and training which necessitates prompt remedial and transformatory action. However, it is equally true that such action must be based on a thorough understanding of the realities and possibilities of past, present and future. Moreover, in so far as South Africa is a society pledged to participatory and transparent governance, it is essential that a vibrant and informed debate on policy takes place. This thesis is intended to be a contribution to these vital processes through the provision of important analysis with which to inform the debate.

A consideration of the current stage of education and training policy development in South Africa also reinforces the need to focus on doing critique. As policy moves increasingly into the implementational phase, and as that leads to greater interaction between policy-as-pronouncement and policy-as-practice, so the contours of policy will be re-formed. That will be the moment at which broad participation in policy and practice development will be most vital. However, even then there will continue
to be an important role for the exploration of meta-narratives and other tools of critique.

Before proceeding to consider the organization of the thesis, there is one further issue that must be referred to. The use of meta-narratives as a heuristic device and the selection of the documents and interviews as data sources leads to considerable selectivity of both themes and voices in the rest of the thesis. Together the documents and interviews reflect the voices of the powerful in South African society: employers, bureaucrats, politicians, and, relatively speaking in the context of that particular society, trade unionists.

Conversely the voices of rural, female, informal sector and disabled populations, to name but four, often overlapping, groupings are rarely present. Moreover, teachers, parents and pupils: three groups of traditional subjects and/or objects of research in the sociology of education, are likewise excluded, a function of their relative unimportance for policy-as-pronouncement.12

Any attempt to get at policy-as-pronouncement inevitably brings the researcher towards the major documents, such as official commissions, explored in the subsequent chapters. Equally, in the context of a study of the post-election period, it necessitated the focusing of interviews on those stakeholders who, through their positions of power and influence, have most impact on the emergent policy debate.

12 Such an absence is necessary for the focus of this thesis. However, as Chapter Six will argue, research focused on these constituencies would form an important corollary to this project.
The International Dimension

As was already noted (page 13), this thesis makes considerable use of the international debates which the specific debate of South Africa is a part of. The intention, however, is not to produce a work of comparative educational analysis, although some consideration of cross-national issues will be provided in the final chapter. Rather, the intention is to point to the importance of international trends (as well as local realities) in shaping the dynamics of the South African policy debate.

As these international influences appear at various points in the text, it is perhaps worth foregrounding them here in order to provide a sense of their range. As will be noted in Chapter Two, the South African education and training systems were influenced by external systems from the first. White education and training bore the imprint of British practice, a Scottish influence being particularly apparent in the education sphere. African education too showed external influences as a result of the vital missionary role in early formal education developments. In the first half of the Twentieth Century American influences became particularly important in the system of African education. As Chapter Two again indicates, this came through the general influence of the American model of industrial education, but more specifically through the role of Charles Loram and the Phelps-Stokes Commission in spreading knowledge of such a model.

The period of the National Party ascendancy resulted in increasing, but never complete, South African isolation from the rest of the world. In education and training policy too there was a strong sense in which South African policy sought to ignore the lessons of international
developments. The crisis of the early to mid 1970s (discussed in Chapters Two and Three), however, brought education policy in particular back into a closer relationship with international trends, albeit in a uniquely South African way. Large elements of the de Lange Report (1981), discussed at length in Chapter Three, reflected on the one hand the donor fascination with non-formal education and, on the other, the English stress on policies of New Vocationalism (see page xiv). Official education policy thus looked to both the developed and the developing world for models to draw upon.

Oppositional thinking too was influenced by external debates. Academics drew extensively on Northern critiques of capitalist education and training whilst activists looked to Latin America in particular for alternative practices.

As Chapter Four indicates, in the 1990s borrowing continued apace with new Northern developments on the left in the light of the collapse of state socialism, and industrial responses to the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, also beginning to shape policy formulations in the run up to the 1994 elections. With the current plethora of international donor visits to South Africa and international fact-finding missions from Pretoria, such international influences continue to be of importance, as Chapter Five will indicate.

As is argued frequently in this thesis, those international influences with which I am primarily concerned are caught up with notions of how the education system can be altered or transformed in order to better reflect the needs of the economy. As the above paragraphs illustrate, this was a major concern of policy makers in the Old Commonwealth throughout
this period. In Britain, and particularly England, the “Great Debate” on education-economy links is conventionally dated to 1976, the same year as the Soweto Uprising. Emerging out of the crisis of Western European Fordism of the early 1970s, this debate was concerned both to blame education for economic failings and to look to education for solutions to the collapse of the golden era of post-war affluence. Under the model of New Vocationalism, an attempt was made to strengthen school-industry links and to make education “more relevant”.

In the 1980s, continued economic weakness across the Old Commonwealth led to attempts by increasingly conservative governments to strengthen still further the education-economy relationship. By the end of the decade, competency-based approaches had spread from training to further education and were beginning to encroach into both secondary and higher education.

A more radical reading of the same problems was also emerging on the political left in these same countries as the 1980s reached their close. Perceiving a reorganisation of the economy from its previous Fordist trajectory to a new Post-Fordist path, researchers and trade unionists, in particular, began to develop notions of a unified education and training system, which echoed some of the governmental concerns but had a broader vision of learning.

As subsequent discussions in this thesis will show, these debates have been central to the broader South African education and training policy debate of the past two decades.
As noted already, this thesis is concerned with the understanding of current and future policy properly located in its historical context. This contextualization will begin in Chapter Two which seeks to provide a brief account of South African education and training policy over the last one hundred years. Although historically focused, this chapter is not intended to be a work of mainstream academic history. This is illustrated in particular by two characteristics of the chapter. First, it will make some use of primary sources but far less than would be expected in a historian’s account. Second, the intention is very explicitly that of using the past as a heuristic device for understanding the present.

The chapter will focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the first eighty of those hundred years, the last twenty being covered in far greater detail in subsequent chapters. The concern will be to show the changing nature of thinking at the level of policy about the proper form and focus of education and training. Through it, important themes of subsequent chapters, such as instrumentalism and vocationalism, and the hermeneutical use of external meta-narratives will be introduced.

Chapter Three is vitally important as it marks the beginning of the central methodological and heuristic task of the thesis: the detailed analysis of policy documents. This chapter opens with the Soweto Uprising of June 1976 and ends with the unbanning of the African National Congress, and other organizations, in February 1990.

It charts the growing perception amongst sections of the Afrikaner elite, mirroring longer held views of sections of English-speaking capital and its allies, that Apartheid was an unworkable ideological system. The
reinforcement of such arguments by the international economic crisis of the mid-1970s and the concomitant ideological concerns with accumulation and legitimation crises will also be considered.

The South African response to the crisis of the mid-1970s came first in training rather than education, and that will be where the first sustained discourse analysis will be directed. The text in question will be the Wiehahn Report, commissioned in 1977. At the start of the 1980s attention shifted to education and the de Lange Report was commissioned. This will be the second focus of this chapter. Its exploration will chart the movement from contestation amongst the stakeholder members of a highly politicized commission (Wiehahn) to contestation between the technocratic views of a commission of experts (de Lange) and the more politically concerned state. As well as this beginning of technocratic policy making, exploration of the de Lange Report will also introduce important themes related to the ever more direct influence of industrial views on education policy debates.

The development of a new market-oriented meta-narrative, which was to eventually bring together large sections of capital, technocrats and the dominant group in the ruling party, continued through the 1980s and will be explored further through three reports produced jointly by the Human Sciences Research Council (the key organ of Afrikaner technicism in the social sciences) and the National Training Board. Through the developments from the Wiehahn Commission to the third of these reports, the National Training Strategy, a powerful pro-market account of education and training had emerged, which continues to have major impacts and influences on the policy debate in the mid-1990s.
The 1980s also saw the emergence of a new and influential strand of oppositional thinking regarding education. At the height of the state of emergency and school boycotts of the mid-1980s when seizure of state power appeared genuinely possible, the People’s Education movement appeared from black communities. This too will be explored as a central intellectual and practical home of the second major meta-narrative (which I term People’s Education) present in current education and training policy debates. Its concerns were with the transformation of education, including radical notions of shifts towards greater access and equity, democratic governance and curriculum overhaul.

Chapter Four considers the radically different climate of the 1990s, transformed by the process of negotiations towards the elections of 1994 (the terminal point of the chapter), but also by changes in international ideological trends associated primarily with the collapse of state socialism, on the one hand, and the growth of globalization, on the other.

Although there was a new domestic and international political and ideological climate, Chapter Four will also point to the continuities with the past and the survival of the two meta-narratives introduced in Chapter Three. The further evolution of the meta-narrative of the market will be charted through an analysis of the major state policy documents of the early 1990s: the Education Renewal Strategy and the Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa, which further developed vocationalist notions whilst greatly expanding the vision for marketization of the education system, in ways parallel to trends in countries such as England and New Zealand.
However, the period also saw the emergence of new meta-narratives. The need for the ANC alliance to move towards policy rather than critique resulted in the development of a vision (which I term New Times\textsuperscript{13}) which sought to transform education and training, industry and the linkages amongst them and which claimed to offer a more thorough, global reading of the crisis of the mid-1970s than previously provided. Central to this account was a call for the integration of education and training.

This new meta-narrative will be encountered initially in an exploration of the National Education Policy Investigation, in which these new ideas appeared alongside People’s Education traditions in a process of developing policy options.

This development of options naturally led into the creation of a tighter policy agenda as the ANC sought to move towards manifesto positions. The Post-Fordist credentials of this process will be considered through a reading of a series of documents, several of which point to the emergence at the centre of the policy stage of a new major player: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

A fourth meta-narrative also emerged towards the election period as elements of business began to re-work the Post-Fordist model to develop a more business-friendly version of integration of education and training: Lean Production. The origins of this will be considered before the four

\textsuperscript{13} There are several variants of utopian Post-Fordism that could be selected as emblematic. I have decided to choose New Times, the title of a book arising out of attempts at the end of 1980s by the Communist Party of Great Britain to develop a post-soviet model of an ideal future political economy. Perhaps the other most influential version of Post-Fordism is the early account of Piore and Sabel (1984) which uses the term Flexible Specialisation. This, however, is a model which is weaker in its focus on cultural and political dimensions of Post-Fordism than on the economic domain.
meta-narratives are brought together for a reading of the crucial National Training Strategy Initiative, the document that most clearly sets out the education and training compromise that was envisaged for the Government of National Unity.

In Chapter Five the focus changes from the past to the present, and, subsequently, to a consideration of the probable future trajectory of education and training. Whilst some documents such as the draft and final versions of the Education and Training White Paper (Department of National Education 1994; Department of Education 1995a) are important, the principal data for this chapter comes from the series of stakeholder interviews, supplemented by conversations and interviews with academic and journalistic commentators. This chapter will show the balance of power between the meta-narratives at the point at which the National Party left the Government of National Unity and will suggest ways of reading the new system so as to chart future developments.

Such future developments will be considered in Chapter Six. A concern of this chapter will be with the crucial shift in the policy phase from a focus on pronouncement towards the development of practice. The implications of the evolving constitutional settlement regarding national and provincial powers will also be dealt with here.

Such concerns lead naturally on to certain issues pertaining to further research. Most notable here will be issues surrounding questions of implementation and the likely growth of provincial educational studies in South Africa in the late 1990s.

Finally, this chapter will also consider the lessons which the South African attempt to integrate education and training provides for other
countries embarked upon such policies, for example Scotland, or countries contemplating them, as is the case for England and Wales.
CHAPTER TWO

A CENTURY OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING

INTRODUCTION

The current and future dynamics of the South African education and training system cannot be understood without a prior understanding of that system's history. The centrality of this historical focus is reflected in the essentially chronological structure of this thesis, as outlined in the previous chapter. Chapters Three to Six are concerned with developments in education and training policy over the past two decades. In this chapter that focus will be broadened to consider the longer trajectory of education and training in South Africa.

There are three reasons for embarking on such a survey in the context of this thesis. First, just as the present cannot be understood without reference to developments since 1976, so those developments themselves must be put in a broader historical framework. Second, when the policy documents and meta-narratives of the past two decades are discussed subsequently, the prior development of a chronological frame of reference will greatly assist the argument.

Third, there have been few contributions to the development of a critical history of South African education and training since the volume Apartheid and Education (Kallaway 1984a) over a decade ago. That was produced in the context of a crisis in the Apartheid system. Today’s
context is very different both politically and in terms of the focus on viewing education and training collectively. The need to produce a new history of education and training is as pressing as the need which has already been noted in other areas of South African history (Beinart and Dubow 1995a; Marks 1996). This chapter is intended to be a contribution to the development of that new history of South African education and training.

The framework of this chapter is shaped by the heuristic use of Regulation Theory. This school of thought is concerned with viewing the economic, political and social systems as being intimately interlinked through an overall organizing principle, or mode of regulation (Boyer 1989). When one such mode is operating in a dominant manner, a regime of accumulation is said to exist (ibid.). It is argued that for much of the twentieth century the regime of accumulation across the industrialized world was that of Fordism. Although mass production is a central part of this notion, Fordism is far more than that. Under Fordism, the mass production system was mutually reinforcing with a system of mass consumption, built largely on the higher wages offered to workers in compensation for submitting themselves to the working practices of the assembly plant. In the political sphere, Fordism was also associated with universal suffrage and national parties, largely differentiated by their class positions.

This chapter postulates a number of variants to Fordism resulting out of the particular dynamics of the South African political economy and a variety of paths subsequent to the crisis of Fordism which began towards the beginning of the 1970s. Before these are considered, it is necessary to consider first what form the South African system took prior to Fordism.
PRE-FORDISM AND SEGREGATION: BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

For over half a century after Britain seized control of the Cape,¹ the South African economy remained largely insulated from the great tide of industrialization in the metropole. This began to change in the second half of the nineteenth century as the discovery of, first, diamonds and then gold sparked the Mineral Revolution.

The new mining industries developed their own labour system. Large numbers of skilled and experienced miners were imported from areas in Britain such as Cornwall and Lanarkshire. Unskilled labour was provided by Africans who were brought to the mines both from distant areas of the four provinces and the broader region. These migrants were seen as temporary and homogenous.

Although the balance was to shift towards a greater use of local white labour, this essentially Pre-Fordist system of skilled white labour and unskilled, short-contract African labour was to stand at the centre of work organization in South Africa for decades to come.

The need for local white skilled labour soon became apparent as mining and related industries expanded. The apprenticeship scheme of the Natal Railways started in 1884 and spread to South African Railways by 1890 (HSRC/NTB 1984: 14; Behr 1988: 139). Tertiary level training of mine engineers was instituted in Cape Town in 1894 (Behr 1988: 139). The following year, technical/practical education for whites began to be provided formally in schools (Behr 1988). The need for locally-produced skilled white labour became even more pressing after 1914 when new

¹ Captured from the Dutch 1795; ceded formally 1806.
supplies of British miners dried up. Whereas in 1914 Afrikaners made up 40% of the white mine labour force, by the end of the First World War they accounted for 75% (Rafel 1987: 267).

This replacement of highly skilled British miners with lower skilled but still relatively expensive Afrikaners led mine owners to rethink the efficacy of keeping Africans unskilled. This can be seen by their actions after the First World War in attempting to overthrow the pre-war codification of the colour bar, limiting certain occupations to whites. In 1920 the Native Recruiting Corporation, the internal recruiting agency of the Chamber of Mines, argued for the training of some African workers to semi-skilled positions and their eventual use to replace white workers (Innes 1984).

In 1922 a concerted attempt was begun by the mines to substitute Africans for whites, even in skilled jobs "reserved" for whites under the 1911 Mines and Works Act (Rafel 1987; Stadler 1987). The following year, Mr. Hildick-Smith, the manager of Crown Mines, was taken to court by the Department of Mines for allowing an African to drive an electric locomotive underground. He was acquitted, the court ruling that job reservation was *ultra vires*. This judgement was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court (Rafel 1987).

Tension between white mine management and white mine workers, exacerbated by this attempt to subvert the colour bar, exploded soon after into the bloody Rand Rising, during which the United Party (UP) government used aeroplanes to bomb the defensive positions of the white strikers.2 Although they quelled the rising, the government and

2 Although led by Afrikaners such as Smuts, the United Party was generally sympathetic to the views of large, predominantly English-speaking big business.
the mine owners quickly lost any advantage so gained as the 1924 elections removed the UP government. In their place, the electorate returned a coalition government with the mineworkers'-dominated Labour Party as the junior partner of the Afrikaner-dominated National Party. The scene was set for a retreat from the limited reformism of the United Party since the end of the war.

The new government quickly began work on legislation that would subvert the Hildick-Smith Judgement and reflect the views of the white miners as an important political constituency. This resulted in the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 which introduced the concept of a “scheduled person”: one permitted to carry out jobs reserved for specified races. As well as whites, such persons included “Cape Coloureds or Malays, Mauritian Creoles or St. Helenas (or their descendants born in South Africa)” (cited in Rafel 1987: 269).

The previous government had introduced the Apprenticeship Act in 1922. This did not specifically exclude Africans from apprenticeships. However, few Africans had the necessary qualifications for entry (Lever 1986). The Apprenticeship Act’s role in developing the colour bar was strengthened by the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924. This legislated for the registration of trade unions but excluded “pass bearing natives” from the definition of employee (ibid.). The two acts, together with the post-1924 political climate, gave white unions a strong representation on, and considerable influence over, the Industrial and Apprenticeship boards. This power was used to create de facto racially closed shops (Lipton 1985).

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3 This was largely anti-English and anti-big business.
4 All these “racial” groupings would normally be subsumed under the heading of coloured.
From 1924 the state also embarked upon a "civilized labour policy". This gave whites preferential access to jobs, and higher wages for the same work as other population groups. Statutory colour bars did not yet extend to manufacturing and commerce. However, under the 1925 Customs Tariff Act the benefits of protectionism were made subject to, *inter alia*, "the employment of a reasonable number of civilized workers" (cited in Lipton 1985: 19).

This policy must be seen in the context of the rapid urbanization of Afrikaners and their difficulties in competing in the labour market against either higher skilled and educated immigrants or cheaper Africans. The need to address this issue became a huge political imperative in the face of the emergence of the "poor white problem" which resulted from the living conditions experienced by many of the new Afrikaner city dwellers. Racist beliefs (see below) and political necessity thus reinforced and extended a policy which was to set the terrain for many of the political and economic contestations of the post-Second World War era.

The response to the poor white problem operated in two ways. First, African labour was consigned to cheap, unskilled work whilst white labour was protected from competition for better skilled and paid jobs. Second, a huge bureaucracy, staffed primarily by Afrikaners, was developed as a job creation scheme of mammoth proportions.

This huge growth in urban, formal sector employment for whites required a concomitant rise in the provision of vocational preparation. In the second half of the 1920s alone, the post-secondary level saw six new technical colleges for whites opened to add to those in Cape Town and
Durban (Chisholm 1992: 7). This expansion was linked to a focus on improving the training of apprentices, a concern reflected in four pieces of apprenticeship-related legislation between 1918 and 1930 (HSRC/NTB 1984).5

These economic and political trends also had major impacts on the education and training of Africans. Prior to the Mineral Revolution, what little formal education there was provided for Africans had come from missionaries and was modelled on the European academic curriculum. In the latter part of the nineteenth century this came to be increasingly challenged by white South Africans who felt that it was inappropriate for what they perceived to be the needs and aptitudes of Africans. An alternative model of industrial education began to be developed in a number of schools.6

The greatest popularity of this idea was in the 1920s. Towards the end of the First World War the doctoral thesis of C. T. Loram, a young inspector of native education in Natal, was published (Loram 1917).7 The arguments of this thesis were also given powerful reinforcement by the publication in 1922 of the report, Education in Africa (Phelps Stokes Fund 1922). This was the first of two hugely influential reports by the Fund in the 1920s and was based on visits to a number of West and Southern African countries by a group of experts in what constituted an appropriate

5 Regulation of Wages, Apprenticeships and Improvers Act (1918); Apprenticeship Act (1922); Wages Act (1925); Apprenticeship Amendment Act (1930).
6 This was modelled on a version of education provision for Negroes in the Southern States of the USA. For American industrial training and its broader influence on Africa, see King (1971).
7 In 1918 he was promoted to Chief Inspector.
education for American Negroes and Africans.⁸ For the South African leg of the Commission’s tour, Loram was made a member.

Both Loram and the *Education in Africa* report argued that the European academic curriculum favoured by the missionaries should be adapted to African needs. This adapted curriculum should be constructed around the skills and knowledge essential to operate within African society. Sanitation, home management and agricultural improvement would be central elements of the new syllabus along with the most rudimentary level of basic academic education.

Such notions were very much in keeping with a long-standing concern amongst white South Africans, many of whom held that academic education for Africans brought with it the potential problem of the “educated kaffir”:

> apeing the European, they were yet without the manners or the traditions of the white man. They had lost their own tribal traditions and had not been able to replace them with any others. Soon the term “an educated kaffir” stank in the nostrils of the European. They were a tragic achievement. (Pells 1938: 140)⁹

This notion of “educated kaffir” can be read as indicating a belief that Africans were culturally backward rather than inherently racially inferior in a biological sense. This is in essence the South African liberal position of the time which sought a middle position between assimilation (as for example in the Portuguese colonies) and the strict segregationist position (the theoretical formulation of Apartheid) [Loram 1917; Dubow 1995]. Whilst such a notion would bring with it the long-term potential for

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⁸ As with South African racial terms, Negroes is employed here simply to reflect a contemporary usage.

⁹ Here it was clear that South Africa was paying little heed to earlier debates in the Indian sub-continent on the subject of “native” education.
uplift and even assimilation, it was the alleged current inferiority of Africans that was stressed by Loram and many other liberals. In practice their stance seemed to come close to the biological position they criticized.10

This racialized notion of difference was reflected particularly sharply in the skills component of industrial education. The technical skills offered in Loram’s vision were hardly industrial in the artisanal sense that we might expect. Instead, they were geared towards a predominantly rural focus. The main offerings included carpentry, cooking, gardening and housework (Loram 1917).

The craft skills were taught at pre-artisanal level and had almost no theoretical component (Hunt Davis 1984). This was justified by a belief in the incapacity of Africans for artisanal level training:

it will take many generations before the African artisan can become skilled in the European sense. He lacks initiative, persistence of purpose, sense of fitness, and what may be called an industrial conscience; and these qualities cannot be rapidly evolved.11 (Dr. Willoughby, Principal of Tigerkloof12, cited in Loram 1917: 158)

Other factors were used to justify this adapted education for Africans. At the heart of these was the belief, part of the South Africa Liberal meta-

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10 There was a great deal of interest in liberal circles surrounding the question of IQ and race. Loram saw IQ differences as being very great at present whilst Hoernlé (after whom an annual lecture of the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations was to be named) argued that they were small enough to invalidate any claim regarding fundamental racial difference (Hoernlé 1937). Interestingly, Professor Eiselen, later to be a founder member of the strict segregationist South African Bureau for Racial Affairs and the architect of Bantu Education, was of the opinion that the evidence was inconclusive (Dubow 1995).

11 Given the powerful influence of Social Darwinist thinking on South African intellectual currents at the time (Dubow 1995), the use of the word evolution here is perhaps significant. I am grateful to Rodney Orr (New College, Edinburgh) for this point.

12 Tigerkloof was one of the earliest and most famous missionary schools to offer industrial education alongside academic schooling (Gustafsson 1987).
narrative, of which this vision of education formed part, that racial segregation was desirable. It was argued by Loram that it would have been better if the races had never come into contact. As this had not been avoided, it was now essential that cross-contamination be minimized. Here the liberal position often blurred into the more populist fear of miscegenation and concerns with racial purity that highlight its continuities with the biological notion of race (Dubow 1995).

Loram believed that Africans should be educated for service in their own communities. The technical component of industrial education was not intended to lead graduates into urban employment. Such employment was not only undesirable on the grounds of increasing racial interaction. Conscious of the poor white problem, Loram foresaw the potential for conflict with white workers if there was inter-racial competition for employment: "it would be highly undesirable to flood the towns with numbers of black skilled workmen. Such a proceeding would only precipitate race conflict" (Loram: 155).

Loram believed that the South African economy was likely to remain predominantly agricultural for the foreseeable future. This provided another justification for the rural emphasis of his proposed model of African education, which he argued was in the economic interest of both Africans and whites (ibid: 234). This assumption about the economy's trajectory was the core of Loram's Pre-Fordist understanding. Although he had been based in New York for his doctoral studies, Loram's conception of the United States seemed to owe more to his research visits

13 Although the poor white problem is most strongly associated with the 1920s, it had already been the subject of a Transvaal Commission in 1908 (Legassick 1995).
14 Beinart and Dubow (1995b) argue that segregation was in part a response to the perceived dangers of modernity. One element of this response was a romanticised ruralism. This perhaps helps explain Loram's position.
to the Southern states for examples of industrial education in action. This influenced him to postulate a future in which limited industrial production would be based on white artisanal labour, with Africans only entering the white core economy as "hewers of wood and drawers of water"\(^\text{15}\): unskilled temporary labour on the mines and farms of white South Africa. Otherwise they would remain in native reserves where even the agricultural and mineral revolutions would have little direct impact.

This characterization of the South African economies, white and African, seemed to suggest that the tension in white thinking between a desire for segregation and a willingness to use Africans to service the white economy as domestics and labourers could be reconciled. However, in spite of the drive towards the civilized labour policy under the National Party, by the early 1930s there were those such as Senator Edgar Brookes who argued that the future of South Africa lay in what amounted to Fordism.\(^\text{16}\) This Fordism could only hope to succeed if it was built upon the development of an African working class:

industrially, the only hope of South Africa lies in the civilisation of the native proletariat, whose increasing wants would provide the economic stimulus for the development of our secondary industries. Where lies the market for our manufactured goods? Do we imagine that we shall be able to compete in Europe against Germany, in Asia against Japan, in America against the United States? Our only hope of considerable industrial expansion lies in the black masses of South, Central and East Africa. Those masses will not purchase our goods while they remain in the lethargic and

\(^{15}\) Although this biblical phrase is more commonly associated with Hendrik Verwoerd, Loram used it in his 1917 book in such a way as to imply that it was already a well-used phrase.

\(^{16}\) He did not express it in those terms but the quotation makes clear the Fordist nature of his comments.
unambitious contentment of savagery; and the best means to bring them out of it is education (Brookes 1930: 15).17

This argument appears more in keeping with the overall stress of the most important education conference held in South Africa during the 1930s, on “Educational Adaptations in a Changing Society”.18 There it was argued that Africans were in a changing society and education would have to adapt to help them cope with change rather than help them (against their wishes) to resist it.

Such a view came more clearly onto the political agenda after 1939 as Smuts and the United Party sought to develop an economy which would both help to win the war and provide for a prosperous peace time. However, Smuts and the South African liberals still seemed largely wedded to their previous segregationist stance and certainly did not see Africans as anything like equal partners either in the economic or the political spheres. Nonetheless, a series of commissions set up by the new government pointed towards a Fordist future and a consequent reordering of race relations. The Fagan Commission (Union of South Africa 1948), for instance, was concerned with influx control19, the pass laws and migrant labour. It argued that South Africa could not be insulated from global trends towards industrialization and urbanization. The migrant labour system was held to be uneconomic and it was

17 According to Dubow (1995), Brookes had previously closely followed the Loram line in his own doctoral thesis of 1924: “The history of native policy in South Africa from 1830 to the present day”.
18 This conference, organised by the New Education Fellowship, was held in 1934 and the speakers included John Dewey, A.V. Murray, the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski and the psychoanalyst Fritz Perls, as well as a host of the leading figures in South African education, including Welsh (head of the Cape Education Department), Verwoerd and Eiselen (Malherbe 1937).
19 The controlling of African access to urban areas through mechanisms such as the pass laws.
recommended that the new goldfields in the Orange Free State should be allowed to stabilize their African labour force if they so desired.\textsuperscript{20}

However, the report maintained the argument that it was possible to balance segregation and African involvement in the economy. Those Africans to whom it would allow the rights of urban residence were to be kept in their own segregated suburbs. African political involvement in the running of South Africa was to remain almost non-existent.\textsuperscript{21}

How far the Smuts government would have been able and prepared to act on these and other proposals is unclear given the huge ideological challenge involved in successfully reconciling segregation and industrialization. Before much progress could be made in turning pronouncement into practice, the 1948 elections saw a surprise victory for the National Party, which had its own views on how these two impulses should be managed.

\textbf{APARTHEID AND RACIAL FORDISM}

Rather than develop an African urban proletariat as suggested by Fagan, the new National Party government restrengthened many of the obstacles to African urban settlement and employment. The civilized labour policy was reaffirmed for the public service and hundreds of Africans were replaced by more expensive whites (Lipton 1985).

\textsuperscript{20} These arguments very closely prefigure those of the East Africa Royal Commission a few years later (Colonial Office 1955).

\textsuperscript{21} Until 1960 there was indirect representation of Africans in parliament by white Native Representatives (Ballinger 1969: 13).
Influx control regulations were enforced more rigorously. The new Group Areas and Population Regulation Acts (both 1950) not only reiterated past practice but reinforced it. They were followed by a sharp increase in prosecutions under the pass laws. In 1952 the requirement to carry a pass was extended to women. Influx control was also strengthened through the establishment of a series of labour bureaux in recruiting areas through which potential new workers would be expected to apply for urban employment.\(^22\)

The colour bar was also extended, although serious opposition made this a slower process. In 1951 it was applied to the construction industry and in 1956 to manufacturing and commerce. Opposition from industrial councils led to further legislation in 1959 to ensure better enforcement (Lipton 1985).

Whilst it was obvious that industrialization was accelerating in South Africa, the National Party seemed convinced that a model of Racial Fordism could be developed (Gelb 1991). Helped by the huge post-war influx of white immigrants and by high economic growth rates, the government pursued a policy by which mass consumption/production was extended across the white population. Though African labour was used increasingly in industry, African wages were not intended to allow this still limited working class to enjoy the benefits of mass consumption.

Since the beginning of commercial mining it had been argued that African male wages could be kept below subsistence levels as workers and their families acquired supplementary subsistence through agricultural plots held in the native reserves. This argument was behind the

\(^{22}\) This practice had long existed in the mining industry.
Chamber of Mines' failure to raise African wages over a sixty year period (Stadler 1987: 40). Thus, the regime of accumulation remained partially, but crucially, based on cheap African male labour (Wolpe 1972).

In the political sphere, Fordism is associated with universal suffrage and mass parties which largely reflect class locations (Rustin 1989). In this South African form there was no intention of giving the franchise to Africans (or coloureds and Indians for that matter). What was proposed instead was a transformation of the native reserves into a series of independent homelands. However, the Tomlinson Report which investigated the feasibility of this proposal made it appear rather expensive. As a result, greater self-government rather than full independence seemed to be what the policy amounted to in practice.

The attempt to achieve both segregation and industrialization naturally had an impact upon education and training. In 1951 the Native Education Commission produced what is more commonly known as the Eiselen Report (Department of Native Affairs 1951). This was to be the basis of education policy towards Africans for another thirty years.

In many ways the Eiselen Commission’s recommendations amounted to little more than a restatement of Loram’s ideas. The latter had only been partially implemented by a government reluctant to reform African education if it meant bearing the costs.23 The earlier stress on adaptation of education to meet African needs was equally at the centre of the new proposals. This theme of adaptation was reflected in the establishment of a new national Department of Bantu Education which centralized control of schools at the expense of both the missions, which had largely run

23 This was of course in keeping with the norm in the British colonies to the north.
them, and the provinces, which had largely supervised them. This time the increased financial burden of greater state involvement was to be lightened by a reliance on community funding for a large proportion of any new expenditure (Verwoerd 1954).

Bantu Education stressed the need for cultural appropriateness in the context of the continued segregation of the economic and political system. It was designed to fit Africans for service to their own communities in the homelands (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs [SABRA] 1955). This meant a reiteration of the Loram stress on education for rural community development, now focused and crystallized by the homelands policy:

The main motive behind the Government's vocational and technical training programme for bantu was to make its policy of separate development viable in the homelands. (Malherbe 1977: 196)

As in the 1920s, such “vocational and technical training” amounted to little in the way of real skills. It was at sub-artisanal levels and directed specifically at rural needs. The undesirability of preparation for urban employment was restressed by the Minister for Native Affairs:

Education [of Africans] should stand with both feet in the reserves. .... There is no place for him [sic] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community, where he cannot be absorbed. (Verwoerd 1954: 23-4)

Verwoerd also reiterated the earlier critique of the excessively academic nature of missionary education provision:

By blindly producing pupils trained on a European model, the vain hope was created among Natives that they could
occupy posts within the European community despite the country’s policy of “apartheid”. This is what is meant by the creation of unhealthy “White collar ideals” and the causation of widespread frustration among the so-called educated Natives. (ibid: 7)

The principal focus of both the Eiselen Report and the statements of Verwoerd was on practical education for rural community development. However, the continuing and expanding African role in the white industrial economy could not be ignored.24 As a result it is possible to find a greater stress on literacy and numeracy in Bantu Education than in Loram’s writings (Kallaway 1990). Such skills were deemed to be of limited importance in a rural context but were seen as crucial for industrial or commercial employment, even at unskilled levels.

The state’s stress on the benefits of increased education for rural development (and hence the homelands strategy) was reinforced by industrial demand for more and higher educated workers. The demand for more education was also heard from the African population. All these forces combined to increase primary provision and this in turn led to greater demand for secondary education.

In increasing secondary provision the state was reluctant to see over-academicization. This dove-tailed neatly with industrial concerns and, thus, secondary education was primarily directed at meeting perceived needs for African manpower. The increasing use of Africans as industrial workers also led secondary provision to stress better socialization towards the workplace. According to a former senior figure in the African

24 Afrikaner organisations were divided over the practical implications of apartheid. The pragmatic position of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the representative of Afrikaner business, that segregation should not be extended to the point at which it would have a negative effect on the economy, was the de facto stance of the government. This contrasted strongly with the absolutist position of cultural organisations and the theoreticians of SABRA (Posel 1995).
education bureaucracy, this stress was reflected in the 1957 junior secondary syllabus with its emphasis on correct behaviour when employed; loyalty to the employer; the importance of punctuality, neatness, strict honesty, courtesy, modest demeanour, etc. (cited in Hartshorne 1992: 72)

In spite of Verwoerd’s association with the phrase, Africans were not in practice viewed simply as “hewers of wood” in the Apartheid meta-narrative. Rather, there was a realization that large numbers of Africans were needed as the factory hands of an increasingly industrialized economy. The education system came to reflect this emphasis alongside the more explicit focus on rural development. This led it to stress the need to integrate Africans into the capitalist ideological system. The success of this integration was judged by Kallaway (1990) to be the most significant legacy of Bantu Education.

In the white education system the concept of Christian National Education was stressed. Moral and ideological control seemed more important than vocationalism. As white prosperity increased, so university education became the norm for whites. The service sector also expanded so that academic education was indeed more vocationally rewarding than the pursuit of technical subjects.

There were changes in the training system, but these were piecemeal and reformist. In 1951 day release was extended across a wider range of occupations (HSRC/NTB 1984: 17). Apprenticeships were still time bound and graduation was dependent on the “effluxion of time” rather than any competency criteria. However, in 1955 optional trade tests were

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25 Even where they were classed as unskilled, such factory workers required literacy, numeracy and work discipline at levels previously not required under an agrarian system.
introduced (ibid.). In 1963 their importance was enhanced by new legislation, the Apprenticeship Amendment Act, which allowed a trade test to be taken in the penultimate year of the apprenticeship, thus permitting those who passed to qualify ahead of time (Hutt 1964: 74). It was also required that those who failed a trade test at the end of their time should spend a further year at 70% wages before achieving artisan status (ibid.). The Registrar of the National Apprenticeship Board was given the power by the act to grant certification to those who had not had artisanal training but who, through their experience or through passing a trade test, could prove their competence to work at the artisanal level (HSRC/NTB 1984: 18).

The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s was part of a global “golden age” of Fordism. In South Africa this was reinforced by the continued inflow of skilled labour from Europe. The combination of economic growth and immigration growth seemed to show that the Racial Fordist regime was sustainable. However, as the 1960s progressed, so the earlier arguments that a broader base for Fordism was required began to resurface.

Through pass laws, influx control, denial of trade union rights and access to inferior education, the Apartheid state had helped to create and maintain a large and predominantly docile surplus army of African labour. However, whilst the cheap labour system so produced might have been in the interest of employers individually, it was not unequivocally in their interest when viewed collectively.

As technologies developed and economic growth outstripped the importation or development of new white skilled labour, so a number of
employers began to view the labour of the other races as more than a simple undifferentiated mass and a cost of production. Increasingly Indian and coloured labour was allowed into previously exclusively white occupational domains.

As early as the opening of the new Orange Free State goldfields at the beginning of the 1950s there had also been the stirrings of a renewed questioning of the efficacy of the migrant labour system. The geological difficulties present in exploiting this field had led to new technologies and labour processes. These resulted in a new division of labour with a larger emphasis on semi-skilled African labour (Innes 1984). Such semi-skilled labour was not viewed as an undifferentiated mass in the same way as unskilled labour. Therefore, mine management sought to reduce labour turnover and, hence, overthrow the migrant labour system (as had been foreseen by Fagan).

The increasing development of the tertiary sector also highlighted problems with the migrant labour system. As white collar employment opportunities grew so whites abandoned heavy industrial work in ever larger numbers. Over the course of the 1960s the mines saw a 15% fall in the number of white artisans and a 46% decline in white semi-skilled workers (James 1992: 129). The fewer whites left in heavy industry became concentrated at the top of the occupational ladder. Coloureds, Indians and, increasingly, Africans were brought into more skilled positions.

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26 The designation of a worker's skill level is a reflection of far more than their repertoire of relevant techniques. All workers have skills and often those who are "semi-skilled" may have far greater workplace-related skill and knowledge than those at higher levels. This appears to be particularly true in the case of South African mining.
In the face of white trade union opposition, the more skilled parts of artisanal jobs were kept for white workers with the more routinized elements being allocated to Africans. There were also several agreements in which it was promised that Africans would be retrenched first in the advent of a recession (Lipton 1985). Nonetheless, by the start of the 1970s many employers had gone further and were employing Africans in traditionally artisanal posts whilst officially designating them “artisans' aides” (James 1992). The employment of such labour further undermined the basis of the migrant labour system.

This increased importance of African labour in the economy at higher skill levels was reflected in business concerns about African education. In 1961 a group of academics, headmasters, professionals, business leaders and scientists was convened by the Witwatersrand Council of Education (Hartshorne 1985). This Education Panel, as it came to be known, had Michael O’Dowd, later to serve on the de Lange and first HSRC/NTB Commissions, as its secretary and Harry Oppenheimer, Chairman of Anglo-American, as its most famous member.

It produced two reports, the first in 1963 and the second in 1966 (Education Panel 1963 and 1966). These argued that the transformation from a primary producing to an increasingly mature industrial economy had brought about great changes in skill needs; changes which could not be satisfied through increased utilization of white labour as this was already near capacity. Instead, it would be necessary to rely increasingly on African labour and this would require African access to technical education (Education Panel 1963).
This was still essentially a view which saw Africans in terms of their service to the white economy. There was no consideration of African rights to the same education as whites, nor were more fundamental questions about the legal and political contexts of the changes in the economy.

The trends of the 1960s continued and intensified in the 1970s. Indeed, before the latter decade was over, many South Africans, of all races, were talking of a crisis of the Apartheid state. The cheap labour/racial Fordism regime of accumulation appeared to be no longer tenable (Cassim 1987).

FORDISM AND APARTHEID: THE INTERSECTION OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL CRISES

In the early 1970s Fordism in the developed world went into crisis and South Africa began to feel the pressures of the global recession, albeit in nationally specific ways. For 1975 and 1976 gross domestic product showed negative growth. The balance of payments also became progressively unfavourable in the early 1970s as export growth failed to keep pace with increases in the imports of ever more expensive machinery, parts and fuel (Price 1991). Domestic consumption was still on too narrow a base to make up for poor export performance. Unemployment rose dramatically, particularly in the homeland labour reserves where the level grew by 252% between 1972 and 1976 (Price 1991: 53).  

27 Such a figure for unemployment is highly problematic on at least two grounds. First, the population statistics for the homelands were hugely inaccurate. Second, the meaning of the term unemployment in rural society with no social security system is questionable. However, in so far as the figure indicates a sharp increase in those unsuccessfully applying
The African urban population was particularly badly hit as organizational changes in township administration led to sharp rent increases. In the West Rand, for instance, rents rose by 25% in 1972 alone (ibid: 56). Coupled with the massive shortage of township housing due to influx control measures, such increases greatly increased urban unrest.

Unrest was evident in the first half of the 1970s in the industrial relations field. In 1973 the most serious African labour militancy for a generation\(^{28}\) broke out as a wave of strikes hit the Durban area. In contrast with previous disputes, the end of the strikes did not result in serious reverses for African labour. Instead, the militancy marked the beginning of a new wave of labour organization, largely because the new breed of more highly skilled African worker was less dispensable than those of earlier generations.\(^ {29}\)

As well as economic and industrial relations crises, the state also found itself facing new and serious political challenges. Changing economic circumstances and occupational patterns amongst Afrikaners were putting increasing strain on Afrikaner unity as the bedrock of National Party power (Charney 1984).

As “independence” of the first homeland, Transkei, neared in 1976, African political unrest became more pronounced (Hartshorne 1992). At the same time, the Portuguese Revolution further inflamed the situation.

to labour bureaux in the homelands it is indicative of the greater difficulty in securing employment at this time.

\(^{28}\) Since the miners’ strike of 1946.

\(^{29}\) The role of whites, coloureds and Indians in helping build the fledgling unions should not be forgotten. Alec Erwin, now Minister of Trade and Industry, is one prominent example of these activists. Equally, the influence of the Black Consciousness Movement, led by Steve Biko, should not be underestimated.
In 1974 the Portuguese military, weary of their colonial wars, staged a coup in Lisbon. By the end of 1975, Angola and Mozambique, part of the colonial cordon sanitaire to the North (with Rhodesia and South West Africa), were both independent and pro-Marxist states. The Angolan situation was particularly serious as South African interference and invasion had resulted in Cuban troops coming to the new government’s aid. Instead of defeating communism, South Africa had strengthened the Marxist presence in Southern Africa. The example was a dangerous one, as we are about to see.

It was in the education system that the crisis finally erupted. The increased need for better educated African labour, along with continued parental pressure, was to result in a major expansion of African secondary and tertiary education at the beginning of the 1970s (Price 1991). The new students were inspired by the Black Consciousness Movement which was a major influence on the emergent African intelligentsia at the time (Wolpe 1988). In 1976 two government decisions were to turn this growing intellectual rejection of Bantu Education into open revolt, followed by repression.

In what seemingly represented a further stage of the Afrikaner struggle to free themselves from perceived English cultural domination, it was decreed that English would no longer be the dominant medium of instruction in the township schools of the Department of Education and Training (DET). Instead, Afrikaans would be given equal status and would become the medium of instruction for mathematics, social studies,

30 The fear of communism had long exercised the official and popular white imaginations in South Africa. This seems to be due to a number of factors including the presence of Africa’s only communist party, which raised the spectre of a multi-racial and class-based attack on the political economy.
history and geography (Brooks and Brickhill 1980). To African parents and students, however, Afrikaans was seen as politically and economically less acceptable than English, and opposition to this policy began.

The situation was made worse by the decision to reduce DET schooling from 13 to 12 years (Brooks and Brickhill 1980; Hartshorne 1992). This led to a bulge of two years of students entering junior secondary school at the same time. Between 1974 and 1976 the number of students entering junior secondary rose from 82 351 to 214 454, a 160% increase (Hartshorne 1992: 75). This huge expansion in intake brought with it overcrowding, temporary classrooms and the use of primary teachers in secondary schools.

Finally on June 16th 1976 violence erupted. A peaceful march by secondary students to Orlando Stadium in Soweto for a protest rally was fired upon by police, killing two students. Three days of rioting followed as the protests spread beyond the medium of instruction and the shootings to the broader structures of oppression experienced by the students and their communities. This uprising against the Apartheid state was to spread across the country and was to keep smouldering for the rest of the year (Brooks and Brickhill 1980).

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31 Equal status of Afrikaans and English had been the official policy position theoretically since the start of Bantu Education, but had neither been stressed in policy statements not enforced in practice.

32 Lodge puts the death toll of the whole Soweto Uprising at 515 (Lodge 1983: 330).
REFORMING APARTHEID AND BROADENING FORDISM: THE RISE OF MARKET FORCES

As Chapter Three will show in greater detail, in the face of the global crisis of Fordism and the triple crisis in accumulation, education and legitimation (Moyo 1995) of its racialized manifestation in South Africa, the state responded by appointing a series of official commissions. The most important of these were the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation [Wiehahn Commission] (Wiehahn 1982) and the Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower [Riekert Commission] (Republic of South Africa 1979).

Riekert reported in 1979 and the first of the six volumes of the Wiehahn Report appeared in May of the same year. Both reports marked the stirrings of a new official recognition that a paradigm shift in thinking was required. They were concerned primarily with providing the enabling environment in the labour market and industrial relations that would allow transformation of training and hence the economy. Although it was not explicitly stated, it was also recognized by leading elements of the Afrikaner establishment that these changes would ultimately affect the political system (Wiehahn OI 199533).

Riekert recommended increased freedom of movement and security of status for those Africans who possessed Section 10 rights permitting them to stay in urban areas (Republic of South Africa 1979: 168). On the other hand, the report reaffirmed influx control and recommended increased fines against illegal entrants to urban areas (ibid: 155).

33 OI will be used in this and subsequent chapters to denote data from oral interviews.
Essentially, this was another attempt to reconcile the tensions between segregation and industrialization. The recommendations sought to better incorporate already urbanized Africans into the core economy, so as to utilize them more effectively for industrial purposes, whilst reinforcing separate development for those still in the homelands. Indeed, a reading of this report must place it in the context of the government's continued adherence to the strategy of homeland independence.

Amongst the key recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission were the legalization of African trade unions, the ending of job reservation and the indenturing of African apprentices (Wiehahn 1983). These six reports are significant not just for their recommendations, but for the insights they provide into the rationales for reform and the counter-arguments used by more conservative elements.

The Wiehahn Report stressed the importance of skills shortages\(^ {34} \), training failure and structural and technological change in driving the

\(^{34} \) There has been a long debate on the South African left regarding the reality of skills shortage arguments. This appears to have begun in 1979 with a disagreement between Davies and Meth; the former arguing for the reality of skills shortage and the latter maintaining that the skills shortage argument was an ideological tool of employers. De Clerq (1980) showed that white unions followed the Meth line (and we shall see this repeated when the Wiehahn Commission is considered in Chapter Three), quoting an official of the Iron Moulders Society: "We believe that the argument of an economic recession and shortage of skilled labour is a kind of psychological warfare waged by employers against all workers to frighten them and make them work harder if they want to keep their jobs" (de Clerq 1980: 34). Chisholm (1984) pointed to the endemic problem of misclassification of skills in South African industry and employers' emphasis on attitudes not skills in their training programmes as further evidence to back up the Meth position. Kraak (1989b) attempted to produce a corrective which maintained that there were both real and ideologically-driven elements to the skills shortage arguments. However, Webster and Leger (1992) returned to the theme of misclassification and stressed the tacit skills possessed by all workers. It appears that Kraak is correct on one level that skills shortages, as commonly defined, have at times been present. Nonetheless, as will become evident in the next chapter, the data upon which claims have been based has frequently been spurious or even totally absent. Moreover, the counter argument about the social and ideological construction of skills (which Kraak does acknowledge) is valid at a more fundamental level, and should be emphasised as a crucial element of the rethinking of both learning and work currently taking place in South Africa.
policy rethink. It was argued that the old system was no longer relevant and a new approach was necessary (Wiehahn 1982: 30-2). The threat to stability from inaction and the need to control African trade unions were used as further justifications for change in an attempt to convince more conservative elements.

Strikingly, the report made very great use of pro-market arguments. Whilst these were somewhat offset by use of “group rights”35 rhetoric at the other points in the report, this marked a highly significant shift in emphasis from previous usages. Economic rationales were seen as more important than ideological and racial ones. This shift was indicative of the increasing adoption by the state of the market-oriented meta-narrative of big business.

Many large business corporations moved swiftly to put the Wiehahn Commission's recommendations into practice.36 The legalization of African apprenticeship was accompanied by a wave of corporate investment in technical and vocational education and training (Chisholm and Christie 1983; Swainson 1991). Many corporations accompanied this with affirmative action programmes to bring Africans into managerial posts (Smollan 1988).

The state's education policy also witnessed a major re-evaluation at the hands of a new commission. Convened in 1980 after another wave of unrest in the schools, the HSRC Investigation into Education [de Lange Commission] (HSRC 1981a) was the first major report to address African education since the Eiselen Commission’s three decades earlier.

35 The favoured National Party code for white minority rights which would have to remain inviolate in any constitutional reform.
36 I can find no evidence of a similar trend amongst smaller enterprises. This would be in keeping with the international trend for “progressive” to mean large in the business world.
In keeping with the Wiehahn Report, race and culture were played down and the role of the market emphasized. This was evident in both of the two principal strands of the report’s recommendations: privatization and vocationalization.

The primacy of the market was upheld through a series of recommendations calling for greater private sector funding, increased parental choice and a thorough-going decentralization of power to school boards. All of these recommendations served to lessen the amount of control the state could exert on schooling. They also reflected the market-oriented meta-narrative’s preoccupation with the primacy of market forces. As many decisions as possible were to be taken out of the control of the state. Such market-led decisions were then portrayed as value-free. Similarly, those decisions which the state would still make would be based on the technical advice of experts and would also be claimed as value-free (Buckland 1982).

The increased corporate interest in the vocational aspects of education was mirrored in the de Lange Commission’s recommendations regarding the “proper” educational focus. The traditional model of vocationalism internationally has been one in which large and costly technical high schools or technical departments within mainstream schools have been developed. De Lange called for a new emphasis on this form of education and big business showed itself willing to fund its provision, particularly for Africans previously excluded from this mode of delivery (Chisholm and Christie 1983; Swainson 1991). The Report supported this but also concentrated on a position reminiscent of the New Vocationalist approach of England (Kallaway 1989). This English approach, as adopted in South Africa, was focused on attitudinal preparation for the workplace
within all elements of education and closer links between school and work, but had a reduced emphasis on technical preparation.

Loram, Verwoerd and the Eiselen Commission all criticized educational provision for Africans because of its alleged academic bias. In arguing that education was failing to prepare children of all races for the workplace as a consequence of its excessive focus on the matriculation examination and university entrance, the de Lange Report appeared to be extending this analysis to the education of all races. The Report argued that this problem had to be tackled through a greater concentration on orientation, preparation and socialization for the world-of-work.

By stressing the market over race and through its criticism of academic education for all races, the de Lange Report appeared to be advocating a non-racial, Fordized education system and economy. However, this deracialization was limited and the class divisions of the Fordist system reinforced the racial differentiation of Apartheid.

In the first place, the Commission noted that educational expansion to achieve universal provision at historical white standards would not be financially feasible. Therefore, much of the proposed expansion of provision would be through cheaper (and lower status) non-formal education. Secondly, it recommended that the academic route should be limited to the small number going to university, the rest of students being given a more vocational provision. Thirdly, “environmentally handicapped” students (a euphemism for those still “tribalised”) would be the first to be guided down vocationally-oriented paths. Fourthly, the system would not be desegregated at the school level and a

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37 A problem that still haunts post-apartheid attempts at educational expansion (see the 1994 draft white paper and the 1995 white paper for this debate).
recommendation that a single national department for all races be established was dropped before the resultant White Paper (Republic of South Africa 1983).

Taken together, these elements of the new dispensation suggested that educational provision was likely to remain highly segmented. Whilst the majority of white students would still proceed down the academic route to tertiary education, the majority of Africans would continue to find themselves either out of schooling or channelled down vocationally-oriented tracks.38

Following on from the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, a National Training Board (NTB) was established. Between 1984 and 1991 it also produced a trilogy of reports which built upon the analysis of the Wiehahn and de Lange Reports and showed the ever-greater influence of market-oriented thinking on the official discourse.

The new policy of the 1980s seemed to recognize the integral role of urban Africans in the Fordist economy. Advertising agency interest in African consumption increased and ever larger numbers of Africans accessed skilled and even professional employment. However, the class stratification of Fordism was reflected in and reinforced by continuing racial disparities in the school and the workplace that ensured that Africans remained predominantly at the bottom of the pile.39 At the same time, the political logic of Fordism was still rejected by the white

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38 As in other countries, vocational education was strongly perceived as being inferior to academic education.

39 The additional impact of segmentation by gender ensured that African women were at the very bottom of the occupational pile.
polity, even as the parliamentary involvement of Asians and Coloureds was addressed (however inadequately) by the National Party.40

This Economic Fordism was also limited to the extent that it was still only intended to apply to “white” South Africa. The permanent African proletariat of the metropolitan areas were now accepted as part of the Fordist core economically, but the homelands policy was still on the agenda. This policy would essentially fordize South Africa by virtue of redrawing its boundaries.

The growing dominance of official discourse by the market-oriented paradigm did not go unchallenged. Conservative white elements still clung to the old thinking and the National Party lost a significant percentage of its support to parties on its right as the 1980s progressed. Of greater long-term significance, however, was the growing challenge to the marketized vision from those who opposed both Apartheid and capitalism. This challenge was to develop around the notion of People’s Education.

PEOPLE’S EDUCATION

In the mid 1980s radical critiques of the existing education system emerged from academic and community-based sources. From academic sources came a powerful argument about the ways in which the existing education system was functional to the interests of capital. From the grassroots, the establishment of the National Education Crisis Committee

40 In 1983 a tricameral parliament was proposed by the government and approved by a whites-only referendum. Under this system a coloured and an Indian chamber would be added to parliament and these would have jurisdiction over certain areas of legislation deemed “own affairs”.
(NECC) in 1985 led to a debate on the nature of alternative schooling. The NECC saw the need to develop critical thinking, to see learning as a collective exercise and to break down the divide between the mental and the manual aspects of learning (NECC 1985).

The meta-narrative which emerged from this phase of radical reflection also emphasized the importance of transforming school governance. In particular, the importance of Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) was stressed as a means of bringing the relevant constituencies together to discuss school management. Given the legacy of limited access to schooling of many communities, People's Education also stressed the need to “open the doors of learning to all”. Related to this was the issue of equity. Not only had black students experienced lower levels of access to schooling than whites, but the quality of their education, measured in terms of expenditure per capita, was also far inferior. In order to overcome the legacy of this, People's Education was also about redress of past inequalities.

By international standards, Bantu Education, Christian National Education and the schooling provided to Indians and coloureds were particularly ideologically laden and this was reflected very strongly in the syllabi of individual subjects. An important strand of People's Education, therefore, was curriculum transformation. English and History were subjects which received particular attention.

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41 This widely used slogan was a paraphrasing of the Freedom Charter. A readily available source for the Freedom Charter is Lodge and Nasson (1992).
42 Indian access was typically good but coloured access to schooling was in some cases as poor as African.
43 CNE stood for the reaffirmation in white education of Christian (Calvinist) values; of morality; and of a strong sense of loyalty to folk and fatherland.
The People's Education vision of educational transformation was predicated on the assumption of political transformation arising out of the overthrow of the South African state. At the start of the 1990s it became apparent that such an overthrow was not about to happen. Instead the National Party had decided on negotiations, a strategy symbolized by the release of Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC and other organizations in February 1990. Negotiated reform rather than forced transformation now became the order of the day.

INTO THE 1990s: REFORMING OR TRANSFORMING FORDISM?

Mature Fordism

The new era of negotiations saw the National Party attempt to continue down their path of extending the reach of Fordism. The incorporation of all racial groups into the political system was now acknowledged as inevitable. However, the challenge was to manage this in such a way as to maintain the privileged position of the white elite within the new Mature Fordist regime.

In education policy this was reflected in two further important documents, the Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa (Department of National Education 1991a) and the Education Renewal Strategy (Department of National Education 1992). These were essentially elaborations upon the privatization and (new) vocationalism of the de Lange Report.
Post-Fordism

For the ANC-aligned opposition, the development of policy strategies was more problematic. Whilst critique of the existing system and slogans about a revolutionary future were in abundance there was a paucity of analysis of policy options for education subsequent to a negotiated settlement. There was also a huge lack of policy-related capacity. An attempt to overcome these dual impediments was undertaken by the NECC, with the help of major external funding. The National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI) brought together over 300 researchers to engage in a discussion of possible policy options.

Although the Framework Report (NEPI 1993) and the twelve thematic reports reflected a strong legacy of the People’s Education meta-narrative, a new paradigm was emerging, particularly in the Human Resource Development thematic report (NEPI 1992b).

This report showed a more strongly Social Democratic stance which seemed heavily influenced by trends within Australian and Northern European socialism. In particular, through the role of Andre Kraak as one of the three authors, the report was influenced by popularizing versions of the Regulationist account which saw a model of Post-Fordism as the answer to the global crisis being experienced since the early 1970s. It was argued that the cheap labour strategy of Racial Fordism had led to a

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44 Now a “coordinating” rather than “crisis” committee.
45 The Canadian Embassy, Interfund, the Swedish International Development Agency and the United States Agency for International Development were all principal funders (NEPI 1993: 64).
46 As part of his doctoral studies, Kraak spent time attached to the London research unit headed by Michael Young, co-author of the British Baccalaureat and leading expert on Post-Fordist models of education and training. Kraak’s thesis (Kraak 1993b) is replete with references to Post-Fordist literature.
situation of Low Skill Equilibrium\textsuperscript{47} which entrenched South Africa in a globally uncompetitive position.

This cheap labour strategy could not be sustained in the face of the increased competitive pressures of the global economy and the legacy of Apartheid. A Post-Fordist strategy, however, could answer both these challenges and deliver on economic development and equity simultaneously (NEPI 1992b). This new paradigm would be built upon the transformation of the workplace, towards a system of flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel 1984); and the education and training system, through the overthrow of the divide between academic and vocational (Finegold et al. 1990). The divisive, conflictual, class-based model of Fordist capitalism would thus be replaced by a consensual model: the New Times thesis (Hall and Jacques 1989).\textsuperscript{48}

Although only one strand of the NEPI deliberations, this new meta-narrative was to become ever more prominent in ANC-aligned thinking as the pre-election period progressed. The adoption of this paradigm by key elements of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was crucial in this regard. The research efforts of the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) and the COSATU Participatory Research Programme (PRP) fed into ANC deliberations on education manifesto positions during 1993 and helped shape the final ANC position of early 1994 along Post-Fordist lines. In the ANC's education policy document,

\textsuperscript{47} Finegold has developed the notions of Low Skill Equilibrium (LSE) and High Skill Equilibrium (HSE) to characterise the nexus of institutional cultures and relationships which combine either to make an economy one in which skill is held in low esteem or valued (e.g. Finegold and Soskice 1988). A Post-Fordist economy would be one in which a HSE would be present. South Africa, like Britain, is characterised as an LSE economy (Kraak 1993b).

\textsuperscript{48} This will be explored at greater length in Chapter Four.
known as the “Yellow Book”, education and training were to be integrated through a National Qualifications Framework (ANC 1994a).

**Neo-Fordism**

Between the state position which sought to expand Fordism and the ANC-COSATU vision of Post-Fordist transformation, a middle way began to emerge not long before the 1994 elections. This arose out of business circles and, like the other two approaches, owed much to external influences. From the mid-1980s a number of management theorists had talked of transformations which paralleled the New Times, except that they were managerially controlled (e.g. Peters 1987). Another group of more academic commentators also began looking at the ways in which Japanese business was out-performing competitors and postulated a model of workplace reform, from which I take the term Lean Production (Dertouzos et al. 1989) to describe the emergent meta-narrative. As far as education and training were concerned, this meta-narrative was also informed by the shift towards Competency-Based Modular Learning (CBML) taking place in countries such as England, New Zealand and Scotland.

Mainstream regulationist thinking suggests that the transformation from Fordism to a model of Post-Fordism, in which class conflict is dead, cannot be assumed. The term Neo-Fordism is used to describe the possibility of an intermediate model such as Lean Production. Although

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49 The origins of the notion of integration in earlier ANC and COSATU documents will be discussed further in Chapter Four.

50 Gee (1994) and Lankshear (1996) use the term Fast Capitalism to refer to similar phenomena.
it uses much of the progressive language of New Times, it is argued by critics that this is a model in which managers still manage in their own interests: "Neo-Fordism, like Fordism itself, is based on an organizing principle of the forces of production dictated by the needs of capitalist management" (Aglietta 1979: 122). Workers, not employers, bear the brunt of being flexible. This flexibility does not amount in practice to the ability of the multi-skilled artisan to move from one meaningful task to another as in the COSATU vision. Rather, it is about semi-skilled workers being moved between routinized tasks and subjected to ever-greater surveillance and work intensification as the need to compete in the global market squeezes profits ever further (Lloyd 1994).

THE POST-ELECTION CONSENSUS: FORDING THE WATERS OF DIVISION?

Immediately prior to the elections of April 1994 the National Training Board published a document which appeared to represent a consensus between the conflicting meta-narratives. This National Training Strategy Initiative [NTSI] (NTB 1994) is the basis on which the policies of the first two years of the post-election period have been constructed. An integration of education and training was proposed in this document. However, the NTSI document was very short on important details about the nature of the proposed integration, whether it would be competency-based and whether it would be voluntary.

The presence of the four meta-narratives which have achieved prominence over the last two decades and the contested nature of the transitional period have meant that this broad consensual position has
been the subject of constant re-working by a variety of forces and constituencies. That re-working is the heart of the story of this thesis and will be the focus from Chapter Five. However, to understand the contestations of the present it is necessary to explore the four meta-narratives and the policy developments of the past two decades in far greater depth than has been possible in this chapter. That will be the task of the next two chapters. However, before turning to them a brief summary of what has been a very quick overview of the past century is in order.

SUMMARY

In the period before the Second World War, South Africa was an essentially Pre-Fordist society with mining and agriculture predominant. There was a dual economy with Africans involved in the white economy as migrant labourers and in the native reserves in small scale, and often subsistence, agriculture. The predominant Liberal view was that education should be adapted to the needs and abilities of Africans. In essence this meant a focus on low-level practical education for rural activities.

There was an inherent tension, however, between the rural focus of this education and the demand for African labour in the urban areas. In the 1920s and 1930s the Apartheid position of stressing white employment in manufacturing, commerce and the public service and seeking to exclude Africans from such work was adopted by Afrikaner-dominated governments. However, the coming of the Second World War and the return to power of Smuts at the head of a business-friendly government
led to a strong stress from liberals on the need to bring African workers into the mainstream economy whilst limiting their political role.

After 1948, however, an Afrikaner ascendancy was established under the National Party. Although the policy of Bantu Education restated the focus on rural development for Africans, the government proved unable to deal with the growing industrial demand for African labour. As the 1970s began, African political opposition to the state began to acquire renewed dynamism. First in the wave of industrial unrest centred on Durban in 1973/4 and then in the student protests of 1976, the system seemed to be faced by challenges which pointed, with the economic pressures noted above, to multiple underlying crises. It is the response to these crises in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising that will be the focus of the next chapter.
META-NARRATIVES OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING, 1918-94
CHAPTER THREE
REFORM, CRITIQUE AND CHALLENGE:
EDUCATION AND TRAINING FROM THE SOWETO UPRISING TO THE UNBANNING OF THE ANC

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I sketched out an overview of South African education and training policy in the century since the beginning of industrialization. In this and the subsequent chapter the intention is to explore the developments and policy debates of the period between 1976 and 1994 in order to better historicise the current policy debate discussed in Chapter Five.

This chapter is bounded by two of the most important events in South African history. It starts in the aftermath of June 16th 1976, the first day of the Soweto Uprising. These events, chronicled in the previous chapter, sparked a transformation of South Africa across a wide range of spheres, including education and training. This transformation was itself reordered by the unbanning of the African National Congress on February 2nd 1990 and this date marks the other boundary of the chapter.

The chapter’s first major focus will be on a series of official texts. These have been previewed in the previous chapter: the Wiehahn, Riekert and de Lange Reports and the HSRC/NTB trilogy. The last part of this trilogy was commissioned in 1989 but did not report till 1991. It would not make sense, however, to separate it from its two predecessors or from the earlier reports. This reminds us that such boundaries as those of this
chapter are of course permeable as history is not so easily compartmentalized. Where particularly pertinent, the resultant legislation and other state responses will be considered.

The chapter will go on to consider the views of employers, both through influential texts and through important programmes sponsored out of corporate funds. The voices of opposition also will be explored, both those of academics and of the broader community.

After a description of the changing nature of the policy debate, the focus will shift to explanation. Three elements will be evident. First, there will be an exploration of external discourses. Second, there will follow a discussion of the crisis facing South Africa during the period under scrutiny. Third, the focus will shift to a brief consideration of the impact of wider South African social actors on the formulation of policy.

REFORMING AND TRANSFORMING BANTU EDUCATION: THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE

The Initial Response: Wiehahn and Riekert

The economic, educational and industrial climate after Soweto appeared to have been transformed and responses to the perceived new challenges became imperative. The first major official response to these challenges came in 1977 with the commissioning of two reports which looked at the future of the economy and, more particularly, the role therein of African workers. The Riekert Commission (Republic of South Africa 1979) was charged with the task of investigating manpower utilization and the role of influx control in its operation. The Wiehahn Commission was given
the broader task of looking at labour legislation, including that relating to training (Wiehahn 1982).

**Influx Control: Riekert**

The Riekert Commission actually was comprised of a single person, the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister.¹ He proposed greater freedom of movement and security of status for those who already had urban rights. However, this was coupled to a reaffirmation of the need for influx control, with new Africans only to be allowed into urban areas when appropriate housing was available and when there was a shortage of suitable labour in the area. Moreover, it was recommended that the penalties for infringement of influx control legislation be made steeper. The probability of a long-term dependence on commuter populations from the homelands also was acknowledged.² In short, a controlled number of urban Africans were to be made insiders of the system, whilst the vast majority, primarily those in the rural areas, were to be kept outside the Fordist core economy.³

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¹ He did have the support of Professor van der Merwe, a Wiehahn commissioner, as Secretary.
² For an insight into the realities of the commuter system see Lelyveld (1986) or Badsha and Wilson (1986)
³ This amounted to the acceptance of a position proposed some forty years before and till this point rejected by the Nationalists.
Labour Legislation and Training: Wiehahn

Recommendations

To consider the wider question of labour policy and legislation, the government appointed a commission of civil servants, trade unionists, employers and academics headed by Professor Wiehahn of the University of South Africa, a leading industrial relations theorist. Although the Wiehahn Commission was concerned with the broader issue of labour legislation, in the course of its six volumes its deliberations covered several areas pertaining to training policy. The debate over the issue of work reservation⁴ clearly was one such area. The decision whether or not to scrap work reservation inevitably shaped future training policy and provision. An abandonment of the policy implied a massive shift in training provision towards the black population, particularly Africans. Such a decision also implied the possibility of radical shifts in the division of labour with increased job fragmentation being used as a means to maintain a de facto colour bar.

Part Two of the Report was concerned explicitly with training. In particular, African apprenticeship was addressed. However, the commission had a much wider training mandate than this:

The Commission's terms of reference, in so far as training is concerned, cover a very wide field, and in fact extend over the whole spectrum of human resources development outside the system of formal education. (Wiehahn 1982: 99)⁵

⁴ Work reservation refers to the statutory limitation of access to particular occupations on the basis of race. Only scheduled persons, i.e. whites and coloureds, could be employed in an occupation for which a reservation order was in place. See Chapter Two for further discussion of this.

⁵ All subsequent references in this section of the chapter will be to the Wiehahn Report, unless otherwise stated, and will be in the form of page number alone.
The Report decided that job reservation should go. It also recommended action to eradicate racial discrimination by law and the segregation of workplace facilities. The principle of equal pay for work of equal value was upheld. Non-racial trade unions were to be recognized in law and brought into the industrial council system. In the field of training, African apprentices were to be allowed and a new National Manpower Commission was to be appointed to address the problems inherent in the existing training system.

All the above changes pointed to a new emphasis, in the official sphere, on the need to embrace reforms. Whilst this reflected a shift away from an Apartheid mentality, the Report also restated more conservative views. Indeed, as the series of minority recommendations made clear, there was a very clear ideological struggle going on between the commissioners.

The more conservative views were reflected in the decision to retain the closed shop, thus increasing the power of white trade unions to block African entry to the workplace in practice. Moreover, whilst job reservation was to be scrapped, in the case of the mining industry this would only take place through agreement between unions and employers. Given the Mineworkers Union’s (MWU) reputation for extreme conservatism, such an agreement looked far off.6

Obstacles were still placed in the path of the new trade unions. Registration was subject to a wide range of conditions and was at the discretion of the state, which was still reluctant to allow multi-racial

6 The ultra-conservative Mineworkers Union (MWU) should not be confused with the COSATU-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which was to emerge in the 1980s as the largest trade union in South Africa.
unions. Moreover, existing unions sitting on industrial councils had the right of veto over new membership. Although the Wiehahn Report was painted as a response to the need to train Africans, it amounted to legalization rather than active and concrete encouragement of such a shift.

Notwithstanding the conservative elements of the Wiehahn Report, the overall findings should be seen as representing the beginnings of a fundamental shift in the official discourse of training. Therefore, the key elements of the Report’s rationale for change should be explored in some detail.

Skills Shortage

The argument that past legislation and practice had led to increasingly severe constraints upon economic development was one of the most important themes of the Report as a whole. This message had an even wider significance as it was possible to infer that such an analysis could be extended to wider areas of Apartheid legislation. Indeed this appears to be the central, coded message of the Wiehahn Report: that Apartheid was causing severe economic constraints which, together with related legitimation problems, were threatening the future of the existing South African system of political economy.7 To this extent, the Report seems to reflect some degree of capture of official discourse by business discourse, a theme that will be explored in greater detail later in this chapter.

7 This was acknowledged by Professor Wiehahn in an interview (Wiehahn OI 1995). However, it is possible that hindsight is operating here.
In the text of the Wiehahn Report, the notion of economic constraints was linked intimately to that of skills shortage. In keeping with business arguments of the 1960s (see the previous chapter), it was argued that the rapid economic development of the post-war period brought about such shortages which now threatened future economic progress (1). This argument, strengthened by the series of exemptions to and relaxations of job reservation seen in Chapter Two, was a central plank in the case for African apprenticeship (101-3), the end of job reservation (76-7) and the abolition of scheduled status in the mines (709-22).

The related argument of skills shortage, the principal one used to justify reforms, was used from the very first page of the Report. It was argued that economic development, particularly in the late 1960s, had led to increased industrialization. This in turn had led to a greater demand for skilled labour. This had been met in the main by using whites (including a large number of immigrants), but demand was also experienced at semi- and un-skilled levels for African labour (1).

The economic downturn of the 1970s seemed to indicate that the shortages were worsening. In Part One of the Report they were seen as being both a current and a future threat (101). In this part of the Report the concern was primarily with shortages at artisanal levels. Such shortages, the Commission argued, were most acute in certain key sectors: metal, electrical, building and motor (102). Skills shortages were seen as extending across white South Africa, and into the townships and homelands and were advanced by the commissioners as the prime reason for allowing Africans to be indentured into real apprenticeships, rather than simply into the inferior training to which they already had access (101).
In the White Paper responding to this part of the Report, the government also showed its belief in such arguments. Indeed, it used skills shortage arguments to justify its acceptance of the minority rather than the majority recommendation on the issue of the closed shop (Department of Labour and Mines 1979).8

Skills shortage was introduced as a key concept at the beginning of Part Two also (159). It was argued that this was a problem that South Africa shared with other developing countries:

South Africa, in common with many industrialising and developing countries, is confronted with two major manpower problems, namely a shortage of skilled manpower in the modern sector of the economy and a surplus of unskilled manpower in both the modern and the traditional sectors of the economy. (171)

Whereas Part One pointed to skills shortage at artisanal levels in certain sectors, the second part argued that there were shortages across the economy at both high and medium levels of personnel requirements (178). It was also admitted that discrimination in the provision of training had been at the heart of the problem:

The industrial training system has up to now, in many instances, differentiated between population groups, affecting in particular the position of Blacks.9 Often this has not been as a result of training legislation itself, but of policy, precedent and peripheral measures. The most serious consequence has been an increasing shortfall in the country’s manpower resources. (231)

The theme of skills shortage was returned to in Part Six of the Report. Indeed, it formed the central terrain upon which the fight over work

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8 In its most readily available form the Wiehahn Report's six volumes are reprinted together with an introduction by Nic Wiehahn and the resultant five White Papers. Subsequent references to the White Papers will be to page numbers in Wiehahn (1982).

9 In the Wiehahn Report Blacks has replaced Bantu as the term used for Africans.
reservation in the mines was waged between the more progressive and the more conservative elements of the commission. Whilst it was admitted that there was insufficient statistical evidence to back it up, the majority view on the commission maintained that there were both current and future acute skills shortage problems (722). Indeed, it was claimed that such shortages would worsen over time unless remedial action was taken.

There is already a serious shortage of suitably qualified workers in the industry which cannot be met from the ranks of available Whites. Although available statistics in this regard are not entirely instructive, it is clear that total demand will undoubtedly increase as technology advances, and that, although temporary balances between supply and demand may occur, the skill shortage is eventually most likely to become a severely limiting obstacle to increased production and growth. (721-2)

In particular, the majority view regarding the mining industry was that there was a shortage of blasters and that this could only be tackled by the ending of scheduled status (709). The existence of a wide number of exemptions to scheduled status that had arisen over the past decade (and which were included in annexes to the Report on pages 725-33) was taken as evidence that such skills shortages were occurring, and that the current legislation was inadequate for dealing with the problem.

In essence the exemptions entailed that suitably trained and reliable non-scheduled Black persons\(^\text{10}\) could, subject to certain conditions, perform certain tasks under the supervision of a certificated miner. The exemptions, which were granted for one year with the proviso that they might, if necessary, be withdrawn or amended, covered the preparation of explosives charges; the conveyancing, handling and temporary supervision of explosives; the disconnection of firing cables and the examination and making safe of work places; the

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\(^{10}\) As already stated, Africans were necessarily non-scheduled as a result of their racial classification.
examination of misfired holes and sockets; the marking of drilling or blast holes and other types of holes; and the driving of locomotives for the conveyancing of scheduled persons.11 (709)

As this list makes clear, exemptions were already striking at the very heart of the scheduling system. The majority view was that the existing legislation, therefore, was unworkable and harmful.

The fact that improved utilisation was achievable only by exemption from the regulations also demonstrates the adverse effect these have on productivity and the organisation of work. (711)

The minority view, however, rejected this skills shortage justification. Contrary to the majority of their colleagues, Commissioners Neethling and Nieuwoudt maintained that there was no skills shortage in the mines and that there were sufficient white workers who were either trained or trainable.12 They argued that it was a shortage of training facilities rather than suitable people to train that was at the heart of the problem (723).

The twin concepts of structural and technological change underpinned the argument that South Africa was experiencing a skills shortage. Although both were referred to in passing by both the Report (159) and the second White Paper (283), they were not subject to further development, nor was their significance explored. This is suggestive of

11 This last exemption was a de facto return to the Hildick-Smith Judgement over half a century earlier (see Chapter Two).
12 Arthur Nieuwoudt, as the president of the South African Confederation of Labour (SACLA), was the representative of the most conservative section of white trade unionism. He was the most outspoken critic of the majority view of the commission and threatened to resign from it during its deliberations (Friedman 1987: 163). Townsend Neethling was from the Confederation of Metal and Building Unions. As was noted in the previous chapter, there was a perception amongst white trade unionists that skills shortage arguments were an excuse by employers to force unwelcomed changes in working practices upon their members.
the fact that technological change was for the present seen as a relatively gradual process. This can be contrasted with the more dramatic view of technological change in the 1960s (Education Panel 1963), which was returned to in the 1980s, as I shall demonstrate subsequently.

A related theme to that of skills shortage was the argument that the training system was suffering from considerable weaknesses. This argument formed a significant element of the analysis in Part Two of the Report. The need to improve both the quantity and the quality of apprentices was highlighted (221). The existing provision for African training under the Black Building Workers Act, 1952, was held to be even worse, particularly in terms of its theoretical input (225). The Commission dwelt at length on the advantages of trade testing\(^\text{13}\) (221) and contrasted this with the “lack of formal procedures for the assessment of training needs at industry and national level” (231). In particular, the presence of “effluxion of time” procedures next to trade testing was seen as leading to a confused system (231).\(^\text{14}\)

In the mines the problems of the scheduling system had led to severe problems of misarticulation between training and employment, which even the formal system of exemptions had failed to tackle.

The Commission in fact found that the regulations are often violated with non-scheduled, and hence non-certificated, workers doing certified work. This reduces safety and overall productivity because these people are not formally trained, officially examined and certificated and are not accountable in terms of the Act. (709)

\(^{13}\) The differences in the racial composition of the artisanal class between South Africa and other British colonies such as Kenya may explain the long time gap from compulsory trade testing in the other colonies and its introduction in South Africa.

\(^{14}\) As noted elsewhere in this thesis, “effluxion of time” refers to the principle adhered to in South African apprenticeship training that qualification as an artisan was dependent upon completing a specified training period and not on success in a trade test.
The Unworkable Existing System

Another major theme of the Report was that the old ways of organizing the workplace were no longer relevant, but that new realities required a new dispensation. The Report treated past legislation and the rationales for it sympathetically. Considerable space, for instance, was taken up by an examination of the arguments used by the Botha Commission of 1948 to find against African trade unionism (30-2). The Wiehahn Commission noted that such sentiments were still held by many white South Africans but maintained that they were now outdated:

The Commission is indeed prepared to accept that the line of reasoning submitted by the aforementioned witnesses may have had some justification at earlier stages in South Africa’s industrial history, but is of the opinion that many points of argument recorded by the Botha Commission have been invalidated by developments in the intervening three decades. (31)

Similar arguments were advanced against the retention of work reservation: “its existence is no longer tenable in view of the developments on the labour front affecting black workers” (77).

The Commission went further than this in arguing that there were some pieces of legislation which were not only outdated but were in fact now unworkable. This was particularly true in the mines with the system of exemptions, as seen above. As a result, a dichotomy between legislation and practice was argued to have been emerging at several points in the industrial system. A further argument advanced in the Report was that certain elements of the existing legislation were doing more harm than good and were in need of urgent replacement.
It was held that the system had become too complex due to the discrimination inherent in its treatment of the different population groups. Early in the Report the dualistic system of labour legislation which separated Africans from other population groups was highlighted (2). With the increasing use of higher skilled African labour, the Commission pointed to the anomalous nature of a dispensation in which two workers employed in the same job in the same factory could be subject to different systems of wage determination (33).

The provision of training under existing legislation was also argued to have been affected adversely by differentiated legislation. As a result of the separation of training by population group, training provision had become highly fragmented in the view of the Commission (231). In keeping with the case of collective bargaining and union rights, here the Report recommended that an attempt be made to harmonize existing legislation so as to build on best practice (226).

A significant element of the Report’s argument that the old dispensation was no longer tenable was the claim that there had been major advances in African education levels over the preceding years.15 This advance, it was maintained, meant that Africans were now able to perform the skilled tasks for which the economy was experiencing a shortage of suitable workers. Moreover, higher African education levels meant that the new generation of African labour market entrants would increasingly expect such training and employment. African educational advancement was also used explicitly as a justification for the abandonment of the Botha Commission’s opposition to non-racial trade unions (30-1).

15 Although Bantu Education was criticised in the previous chapter on the grounds of its inferiority to white education, it is true that African access to education rose rapidly under state control.
Implicit in the Commission’s arguments seems to be a rejection of any fundamental right of African workers to have equal access to skilled employment. Instead it appears that it is their recent “rapid development” which has made them suitable to be employed in such areas.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, the report at times hints that issues of legitimation were at the heart of the reform agenda.\textsuperscript{17} The growing numbers of educated African youth appeared to be a particular concern of the Commission (102). Such a concern in the immediate aftermath of the Soweto Uprising was not coincidental (Wiehahn OI 1995).

Nonetheless, taken in the light of the Verwoerdian vision of Apartheid and the intention that Africans should receive “appropriate” education for employment “suitable” for them, the sentiments of the commission can be seen as a radical departure from the grand Apartheid vision.

Although it was argued that much of the existing legislation was either outdated, unworkable or dangerous, the Report maintained that change should be slow and evolutionary (5) and this point was accepted by the government (125). This fitted well with the argument, seen above, that the aim should be to harmonize the existing legislation so as to base the new dispensation on existing best practice.

Such an argument can be read as part of the Report’s concern with the need to placate white opposition, particularly amongst the trade unions and the bureaucracy. Equally, however, it can be seen as in keeping with the calls of English-speaking business for incremental change as a largely

\textsuperscript{16} In the context of the debates of the inter-war years discussed earlier, it appears that a view of cultural rather than biological difference is operating here in the economic sphere. Whilst some Africans may now be advanced enough to do skilled work there is still no sign of a wish to assimilate them into the white polity.

\textsuperscript{17} The theme of legitimation crisis will be dealt with at greater length later in this chapter.
technical solution to South Africa’s problem, a point that will be returned to subsequently.

Threats to Stability

The threat to the stability of the South African political and economic systems of a failure to reform was a third major element of the Report. This appeared to arise out of the realization that the previous arguments could be strengthened significantly by the proposition that the very existence of white rule was threatened if reform was not attempted. In particular, this was a powerful argument against the resistance of white trade unions who could be portrayed as both selfish and unpatriotic as a result of their opposition to reform.

A key element of this argument was that the dangers inherent in reform were considerably less than those present in a maintenance of the status quo (32). It was concluded also that the threat of African unrest was likely to be as great as the dangers posed by a potential white reaction. Indeed “the frustration of Black career ambitions could pose as much of a threat to industrial peace as the prospect of a ‘White backlash’” (712).

The Commission made a direct link between labour unrest and township unrest (2). They also argued that both would continue to grow if non-racial trade unions were not unbanned (36). Furthermore, the dangers inherent in the increasingly high levels of African youth unemployment were seen as a significant reason for the introduction of African apprenticeships (77). The Report also saw the success of homeland and
township policy as largely dependent on the successful reorientation of labour legislation (101-2).

The Commission appears to have found itself in a dilemma. It was convinced of the need to reform labour legislation to reflect the increasing African industrial presence, but equally was concerned with the potential power that this would give to the predominantly African, non-racial trade unions and their members. Such a concern must have been greatly strengthened by the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Soweto Uprising of 1976. These fears led to a perceived need to encourage capitalist principles amongst the African workforce and to expose their trade unions

more directly to South Africa's trade union traditions and the existing institutions, thus inculcating a sense of responsibility and loyalty towards the free market system. (35)

The Commission thus recommended an increased emphasis on industrial relations training (115).

The concern that a new breed of politicized workers and union officials were shaping the new unions into a formidable political force in opposition to the state was another element of growing white fears regarding the dangers of a failure to reform. This concern seems to have been generated primarily by the events of 1973 and 1976. The need to control the non-racial unions for security reasons also complemented the need to appear to be strict with them in order to defuse the opposition of white unions to the Commission's proposals.

18 Those new unions which came together as first the Federation and then the Congress of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU/COSATU) were open to all races. However, their membership tended to be predominantly African, although many officials were white or Indian. In official parlance they were described as Black unions, although occasionally the focus was on their unregistered status.
The theme of the need to control non-registered trade unions thus became a recurrent one throughout the Report. It was argued that these unions were able to act in a political nature as a result of their non-registration:

Black trade unions are subject to neither the protective and stabilising elements of the system nor its essential discipline and control; they in fact enjoy greater freedom than registered unions, to the extent that they are free if they so wished to participate in politics and to utilise their funds for whatever purposes they see fit. (33)

These trade unions were also argued to have been subject to external political interference which was held to have increased after 1973 (29-30). Non-registered unions were not subject to financial scrutiny and could receive income from external sources (33).

They were also claimed to be enjoying unfair advantage due to their non-registered status, although there was little attempt to advance evidence in favour of this proposition. Nonetheless, it formed part of the broader argument that the power of non-racial unions would be successfully kept in check if they were brought within the registration system. This again appears to have been an attempt, in part, to sell the reforms to white conservatives, particularly in the trade unions.

The argument that it was better to have Africans within the system where they could be controlled can also be found in the debate over the elements of the African population to which union rights should be accorded. Whilst the minority view, consistent with the Apartheid fiction of the homeland system, was that only permanent residents of (white) South Africa were entitled to union rights, the majority view was that migrants and commuters should also be brought within the system.
The argument here was clear: such workers could be more easily controlled within the system.

The Commission does not accept that, even if there were any justification for the fear that migrants might disrupt industrial peace, the problem could be forestalled or solved by barring them from unions. On the contrary, it is strongly felt that workers from elsewhere who might pose a threat to industrial peace should be subjected to the disciplines of the country’s industrial laws, not exempted from them. (39)

The majority view also found against the likelihood that migrants would swamp the new unions, arguing plausibly that they would be harder to unionize than more stabilized workers (47).

The Commission seemed intent on pressurizing the non-racial unions to register. Non-registration was to be made unattractive and, if possible, untenable. Non-registered unions would not be recognized for the purposes of collective bargaining. Moreover, they would be disallowed from using stop orders (72). The right of unions to have employers subtract union dues from wages through such orders was seen by the Commission as being central to the financial well-being of a union.

However, this was but one element of a flawed policy of control which stemmed from a failure to either consult or understand non-registered trade unionism, which differed significantly from its established counterpart. The non-registered unions did not use the stop order system and, therefore, could not be hurt through it (Friedman 1987). Registration was also hampered by the industrial council veto and the retention of the closed shop, referred to above. Moreover, there was widespread union expectation that registration would be refused in any case (ibid.)
Free Market Principles

The Wiehahn Report has been identified as marking the start of a shift in the official South African discourse towards a market ideology (Kraak 1993b) and a reduced state role in the economy. It is possible to overstate such arguments. Nonetheless, adherence to free market principles was a frequently rehearsed theme of the Report and the accompanying White Papers. It also can be found in Wiehahn’s own introductory notes to the Report (xxv-xxvi). Moreover, Part Two, the report on training, invoked the memory of Adam Smith as the founder of human capital theory in its very first sentence (159).

Throughout the Report, free market principles were advanced as a measure of whether a particular policy was justified. Indeed, several policies and proposals were criticized for their non-adherence to such market principles. These included the proposal to ban the non-registered trade unions (36) and the policy of work reservation in non-mining sectors (77-8). The market forces argument was also advanced by the recommendation that training should be primarily the responsibility of employers rather than the state (228).

This did not mean that there should be no role for the state. Rather, the Report argued that the state should have a responsibility for overcoming any barriers to the market and for the amelioration of the negative effects caused by any distortions (6). This would allow, for example, a complementary training role for the state, an argument which received support in the second White Paper (227; 278).19

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19 This view was to become internationally orthodox during the 1980s, largely through the efforts of the World Bank.
The majority view on the Commission showed a greater emphasis on market principles than had previously been represented in official discourse in South Africa. However, the argument that the Wiehahn Report was a thorough-going pro-market tract easily can be overstated. Certainly, the serious limitations of the Report’s pro-market sentiments and recommendations should not be overlooked.

It is significant, for example, that a recommendation to end the closed shop received only minority support from the commissioners. Indeed, the minority recommendation of Botes, Du Toit, Mokoatle, Steenkamp and Sutton on this matter contained a strong denunciation of the anti-market stance of the majority:

Perpetuation of the closed shop practice and its statutory sanctioning stands in direct contradiction to principles stated as being fundamental in this Part of the report. It derogates from the notion of minimal state intervention in a private relationship; it constitutes an intrusion on freedom of association (with its corollary of the freedom not to associate, which is an essential part of the Commission’s recommendations in regard to trade union membership and trade union structure); and it conflicts with the principles of a free-enterprise economy. (70)

The state was often even more reticent than the Commission and White Paper 2 in particular suggested that the role of the state was to continue to be much greater than that consistent with a strong pro-market stance:

The Government again wishes to state clearly that the manpower objectives mentioned are pursued within the broad framework of a free market system but with due regard to other national objectives, the special circumstances in South Africa and events and developments that make it necessary for the Government to influence the system. (274)

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20 This group amounted to the business lobby on the Commission.
The claim that the Report led to a decline in the state’s role in the industrial relations system is hard to sustain. The new discretionary powers given to the Minister and the Industrial Registrar, and the introduction of the National Manpower Commission and the Industrial Court, served to increase the scope that the state and its proxies had for intervention in the system. It was possible, for instance, that a political appointee, the Industrial Registrar, would be able to decide which unions would and would not be accorded bargaining rights regardless of any agreement that employers and trade unions might make. Such a decision would inevitably be open to charges of political motivation.

The Report itself qualified its adherence to market principles with a continued preoccupation with the maintenance of “group interests” (87; 105). At several points in the Report this had the effect of undermining pro-market, anti-discrimination sentiments. The Report claimed that equal access was the fundamental principle in deciding to end job reservation. Nonetheless, the subsequent qualification of this point largely negated this argument:

However, the frequently stated fear of the displacement of Whites by “cheap labour” cannot be dismissed as sheer wilfulness or obstinate protection of privilege by White unions .... [Therefore] the Commission is firmly of the opinion that it would be in the interests of orderly and peaceful industrial relations reform if adequate provision were made for feelings of insecurity evidently being experienced by white workers. (713)

This reticence about the market and continued adherence to group rights/interests was a result of the Report’s contested nature and the political climate of uncertainty within which the Commission was located. The Commission was positioned so as both to have to advance solutions to crucial elements of an apparent crisis of the South African
system of political economy and to satisfy conservative opinion. Both the presence of conservative trade unionists on the Commission and the government’s attempt to keep the Report at arm’s length appear to have tempered the more free market preferences of Wiehahn and the employer commissioners. Nonetheless, the Report should be read as marking the beginning of a fundamental shift in the dominant official meta-narrative from an Apartheid ideology to a market-oriented ideology.

The Educational Response: de Lange

It had been judged better to start the reform process in training rather than education. This in part was due to the economic nature of the challenge faced, as a result of the accumulation crisis that was at the heart of the breakdown of Fordism.\textsuperscript{21} It was also influenced by the perception that reform would be easier to start in the training sector rather than the education sector, as the former was less politically and culturally sensitive (Wiehahn OI 1995). However, both the underlying ideological shift and the specific recommendations of Wiehahn had inevitable implications for education. For, as the racialized organization of work changed, so that of education had to change also in order to respond. Moreover, the educational crisis, reflected in the Soweto Uprising of 1976 and reinforced by the renewed wave of school boycotts in 1980, required a systematic official response. As noted in Chapter Two, it was at the height of this latter boycott that the de Lange Commission was established under the

\textsuperscript{21} This accumulation crisis will be discussed later in this chapter.

As with the Wiehahn Commission a chairman was found from the Afrikaner academic community, in this case the Rector of the Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit. This Commission differed from that of Wiehahn, however, in that it was comprised more of experts than stakeholders. Moreover, it was decided that individual members would have a veto over recommendations. This had the effect of eliminating the plethora of minority recommendation which infested the Wiehahn Report. The use of the HSRC, a parastatal research institute, and a number of technical working committees also furthered the feel of the de Lange Report as a scientific, technical, value-free document based on research rather than vested interests.

Recommendations

Chapter Two noted that the HSRC Investigation into Education (HSRC 1981a) was the first major government-sponsored examination of education since the Eiselen Report almost thirty years earlier. Given the huge changes, politically and economically, during that period, the de Lange Commission's recommendations were for a massive overhaul of existing education objectives and organization.

The principal thrust of the Report was that a more explicitly vocational focus should be introduced throughout the education system. This is most clearly seen in the first recommendation of the technical and

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22 Thus the Wiehahn and de Lange Commissions can be seen in large part as responses to black pressure manifested in protests.
vocational education sub-committee, later endorsed by the main committee, that

the system for the provision of education be urgently and drastically changed to establish a differentiated system for the provision of education in which 50 to 80% of the pupils will receive vocational education before Standard 10. (HSRC 1981b: 35)23

This target was to be achieved through two principal methods. First, through the introduction of senior vocational high schools, allied to increased use of technical colleges. Second, for "environmentally handicapped" (and the rest of the text makes clear this means African24) students such canalization could take place as early as the primary school. Such students could hope for a semi-skilled occupation at best (HSRC 1981b: 20).

Even in "academic" streams, vocational subjects would be introduced at junior secondary level (HSRC 1981b: 25). The process of vocationalizing education also was to operate at tertiary level where quotas for less vocational subjects were proposed (HSRC 1981b: 27).

It was recommended further that all education should come under a single ministry, although this did not amount to an explicit call for desegregation of schools. The key focus here was on the equalization of educational quality across the diverse sub-systems. This is indicative of a marketized view of equity rather than a radical one.

23 Many of the recommendations of the technical and vocational education sub-committee were in fact repeated verbatim in the Main Report. Thus, citation here of the sub-report simply reflects the original source.
24 The text stresses South Africa's nature as a developing country and the particular problems of those populations which are not Westernised in becoming part of the Westernised economy and culture. Students from a non-Westernised background are not genetically backward but suffer from environmental handicaps. Thus, we see a reworking of the debates of the inter-war years (see Chapter Two) regarding race and culture.
Such an equalization of quality implied a huge resource increase for African education in particular. This was seen as impractical within the existing state-driven formal education structures. Therefore, the de Lange Commission made two further key proposals. First, non-formal education should be the route to increased educational access for an expanding number of learners. Here again it is evident that this meant primarily Africans, given that they were the population most likely to be impacted upon by an educational expansion. Second, the private sector should be encouraged to contribute to the financing of education. Linked to the drive towards greater vocationalization, one element of this call was directed at the establishment of private vocational schools (HSRC 1981b: 32). State assistance for existing private schools was also recommended.

Skills Shortage

The de Lange Report agreed with the Wiehahn Commission in seeing a skills shortage as a fundamental reason for addressing the transition between learning and work. The technical and vocational education subcommittee’s research showed a shortage of skilled workers at artisan, technician and engineer levels (HSRC 1981b: 8-9). This was seen as leading to problems of international competitiveness as it raised the cost of production. Even the widespread reliance on fragmentation of skilled jobs was held to be an inadequate solution, there being too few skilled workers even to cope under such a system. This emphasis on education

25 The development of such schools is highly expensive. As noted in Chapter Two, it was possible for the state to privatise much of this expenditure given the interest of several major corporations in funding such provision.
as a response to economic imperatives is again indicative of the growing power of the market-oriented meta-narrative.

Educational Failure

The Wiehahn Report, with its focus on training, had located the origins of the alleged skills crisis in Apartheid legislation and outmoded work practices. From its educational perspective, the de Lange Report shifted the focus of blame onto the education system, arguing that "the neglect of vocational education at the secondary level .... is singled out as the direct cause of the labour shortage" (HSRC 1981b: 36).

This forms part of a wider critique of education as failing industry that seems to have been influenced by New Vocationalism from England.26 De Lange’s 1980 visit to the Manpower Services Commission in England provides some evidence of such an influence (Kallaway 1995).

There had been a tradition of criticizing academic bias in the education of Africans in the past. The de Lange Commission, however, appeared to extend such a criticism to the education of all races:

The South African system for the provision of education has always been aimed mainly at the preparation of pupils for university study, regardless of whether or not pupils will continue their academic training after Standard 10. A large part of the white population consequently enters the world of work without any occupational qualifications, skills or appropriate value systems. (HSRC 1981b: 36)

26 It is worth reiterating Chapter Two’s explanation that New Vocationalism was more concerned with developing better school-industry links and ideological preparation for industry than with the technical preparation characterised by technical high schools. In its critique of present provision, the de Lange report was strongly reminiscent of New Vocationalist arguments. The recommendations contained both Vocationalist and New Vocationalist elements, although the privatisation strand meant that much of the former focus was to be left to industry to fund.
The inappropriateness of an academic-oriented education system could be seen as operating in terms of the three themes of orientation, preparation and socialization. In the Commission’s view, the focus on attending university, which was at the centre of the system, oriented students away from productive occupations and vocational subjects. The academic skills provided by the school system and the universities were not the same skills that the economy required for productivity and international competitiveness. Moreover, as the last quotation indicates, the school system failed to socialize students to the workplace. Students were held to lack a “sound value system” (HSRC 1981b: 39). In the technical and vocational education sub-committee’s opinion, such a system would include “high morals, a religious concept and a vocational code incorporating diligence, accuracy, promptness, etc.” (ibid.). These arguments implied that education for all races should better reflect economic needs, in keeping with Market-Oriented thinking.

Free market Principles

The de Lange Report also took the pro-market sentiments of the Wiehahn Commission further by extending them into education, a more integral and extensive state function than training. It was recommended that “the greatest possible degree of autonomy should be given to the institution that is ‘closest’ to both parents and teachers- ‘the school’” (HSRC 1981a: 201).
School governing bodies would be able to influence staffing and to localize the curriculum, subject to broad criteria. The importance of parental choice was also acknowledged, although this too would have to be bounded by other considerations (ibid.). As noted earlier, private sector initiatives in schooling, and particularly in technical and vocational education, were encouraged.

The subsidization of private schools by the state represented a break from past practice as the Afrikaner-dominated state had a history of opposition to these institutions which traditionally had been predominantly English-speaking (whether white or black).

The Government’s Response to de Lange: The Interim Memorandum and the White Paper

The official response to the recommendations of the de Lange Commission was indicative of the highly sensitive nature of education policy. Instead of allowing the publication of the Report and then responding to it, the Report was released by the government at the same press conference as a well-prepared rebuttal of several of its key recommendations: The Interim Memorandum on the Report of the Main Committee on the HSRC’s Inquiry into Education (RSA 1981). This memorandum amounted to a reaffirmation of several of the most dearly cherished tenets of Apartheid education: Christian National principles in white education, separate departments of education and segregated schools. It also highlighted the extent to which the discourse of the

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27 This positioning of the South African debate in favour of some degree of localization of curriculum is still of relevance in the contemporary context of debates both around provincialization and a national curriculum.
National Party attempted to reflect simultaneously both the old Apartheid and the new market-oriented meta-narratives.

Rejection of the proposal for a single department of education was reinforced by the new tri-cameral constitution, approved by a whites-only referendum in 1983. Under its provisions, education was an "own affair" for whites, Indians and coloureds, African education still being subject to the white-controlled Department of Education and Training in "white" South Africa and to homeland authorities elsewhere.

De Lange was asked to continue work on his proposals and in 1983 a bill was presented to parliament, becoming law the following year. This legislation reflected the recommendations of the Commission regarding greater devolution of power to lower level education authorities and communities, and greater private sector involvement in education.

As regards the vocational aspects of the de Lange Report, a subtle reshaping of the recommendations was effected. The Report had implied that a more strongly vocational orientation of education would be introduced for all racial groups, whether through canalization into non-formal or vocational education for the (overwhelmingly black) majority or through a greater vocational orientation of academic education for the (predominantly white) elite. In response, the White Paper argued against tilting the balance too far towards vocational rather than general education. Moreover, it reiterated the need to have elite academic education for some:

Just as career-oriented technical and vocational education is the most suitable path for a large number of learners and the way in which they can best develop their abilities, aptitudes and interest, academic education, which is directed mainly at university entrance, is the ideal path for
an important, if smaller, group of learners. (RSA 1983: para. 7.10.2.b.)

The subsequent paragraph shifted to a consideration of the paucity of vocational education for Africans. As a result, it is possible to argue that a highly racially segregated model was being proposed, particularly in the light of the rejection of the other de Lange Commission recommendations. The vision here seemed to be one of academic education for all whites, with the majority of Africans (and to a lesser extent coloureds and Asians) being consigned to a narrow form of vocational education and training.

The parallel strand of privatization permitted white schools to have greater autonomy. As a result it furthered this new segregation which can be seen as reflecting a more sophisticated attempt on the behalf of the state to unite both market forces and the maintenance of race and class privilege into a single discourse.

Training Through the 1980s: The HSRC/NTB Trilogy

Recommendations

Whilst the implementation of many of the specific recommendations of the de Lange Commission was avoided by the state, many of the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations showed a greater direct impact. One of these recommendations had been for an investigation into the training of artisans. This was taken up by the newly formed National Training Board (NTB), which commissioned the HSRC to produce The HSRC/NTB Investigation into the Training of Artisans in
the RSA in 1982 (HSRC/NTB 1984). This in turn recommended a broader HSRC/NTB Investigation into Skills Training in the RSA commissioned in 1986 and reporting in 1989 (HSRC/NTB 1989). This was followed immediately by a third report, The HSRC/NTB Investigation into a National Training Strategy for the RSA, which was published in 1991 (HSRC/NTB 1991).28,29 Like the de Lange Report, these were very much technocratic documents, dominated by bureaucrats and experts and supported by a large number of work committees.30 This belief in experts itself is often seen as an aspect of the market-oriented meta-narrative. Whether through the market or through such expert deliberations, decision-making and resource allocation are portrayed as value-free.

This trilogy of reports should be seen as marking the further evolution of the ideas that appeared in the Wiehahn Report. They should also be seen in conjunction with the de Lange investigation.31 Although they are reports which are about training and not education, a strong element of critique of education can be detected, as will become clear presently.

The principal recommendation arising out of these reports was for a decentralized system of accredited industry training boards. The second investigation also stressed the notion of industry-based levies to fund their operation in the search for increased training provision. The state role in funding was clarified in the same report as being principally

28 All three investigations were chaired by Alan Pittendrigh, Director of Natal Technikon.
29 Subsequent references to these three reports will be to abbreviated names without dates for convenience. The first report will be called “Artisans”, the second “Skills” and the third “NTS”.
30 In keeping with the left’s relative lack of interest in training during the 1980s (discussed below), this section contains only one reference to a critique of the reports, and that to the third alone. No other critical commentaries were identified.
31 The first two reports indeed were described as part of the on-going de Lange research project.
directed at the problem of youth unemployment. The third investigation explored this further, calling for a training partnership with even greater private sector responsibility for funding.

Training methodology was also addressed. The first report recommended the universal adoption of competency-based modular training (CBMT). Effluxion of time was finally abolished by the Manpower Training Amendment Act of 1990, the legislative response to the first two reports.

Here again, I am more concerned with the evolution of official discourse apparent in the reports rather than in the actual provisions. In these reports we see a continuation of the Wiehahn Commission’s argument as regards skill shortage and the related issues of technological and structural change and training failure. However, its concerns with irrelevant legislation and threats to stability have largely disappeared. In their place comes the de Lange Report’s concern with educational failure. The three reports also mark the further evolution of official attitudes towards free market principles.

Skills Shortage

The perceived significance of this theme was clear from references in the prefaces of the first two reports and on the first page of the third. Indeed the very first sentence of this trilogy highlighted skills shortage as one of South Africa’s most serious problems.

As we approach the end of the twentieth century, one of the most pressing needs in the RSA, plagued by many large economic, monetary and political problems, is a reasonable supply of trained manpower from all
population groups in order to improve productivity.  
(Artisans xi)

Skills shortage, resulting from technological change and the failures of the education and training systems to cope with such change, was the fundamental reason suggested for why reforms were necessary. The concept, moreover, was linked to notions of competitiveness, efficiency and productivity, all major concerns in a marketized ideology.

The importance of the theme of skills shortage to the overall argument of the reports is illustrated through the reporting of evidence contrary to the conclusions in such a manner that it appeared to become supportive. For example, the data provided in the NTS investigation to show the relative levels of manpower supply and demand according to level of training contradicted the argument that skills shortages were increasing at High Level Manpower (HLM) and Medium Level Manpower (MLM) levels. From a 47% shortfall of HLM in 1970, the shortfall had been reduced to 30% in 1980 and was projected to fall to 15% by 2000. The case of MLM is a more serious rebuff to the arguments of the text. From a deficit in 1970 of 46%, the deficit stood at 26% by 1980. Significantly, by 2000 there was to be a projected surplus of 2% (calculated from table 5.15, page 165). Thus the data appears consistent with existing skills shortages but not with the claim that skills shortages were accelerating.32

It is important to note that the second report showed signs of a new view about skills. In a brief section it argued that there was a need to think of skills as being broader than the usual technical dimension. This may have been more indicative of a continued influence from England, now

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32 Previous discussion (see especially the footnote on page 54) has already pointed to the theoretical problems with the notion of skills shortage which make such measurements as these hugely problematic.
through the National Council for Vocational Qualifications, rather than widely spread local concerns. For the moment, however, it remained only partially developed.

**Employer Attitudes and Training Failures**

As in the case of the Wiehahn Report, notions of skills shortage were closely related to a reading which saw inadequacies in the existing training system. The first report in particular seems to have been influenced by a perception that industry had not made enough progress in the training arena since the Wiehahn Commission had reported. Indeed early in the report there was a coded attack on the persistence of racist attitudes among employers which was having a negative effect on the number and type of people applying for and receiving apprenticeship places (Artisans 3). This report also criticized the failure to provide facilities for blacks and women (Artisans 159).

All three reports contained a series of criticisms of the training system arguing that “training in all its facets is generally not satisfactory in a large group of industries” (Skills 103). It was alleged that many employers of all sizes lacked adequate training facilities (NTS 114). Smaller employers were seen to be particularly poor at providing a full range of learning experiences for their trainees (Artisans 108).

The methods of training used were also criticized. Most employers, in the eyes of the investigation, still depended largely upon lecture and observation as the means by which trainees learned (Skills 190). This was

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33 The NCVQ was referred to in both this and the third report.
held to be a consequence, at least in part, of a shortage in numbers of trainers (Skills 91; NTS 114). Moreover, many of those trainers who were employed were found to be lacking in academic, trade and teaching qualifications (Skills 189).

Trade tests in accredited centres were not yet compulsory and little testing of trainees took place in the work environment (Skills 190). Indeed, it was argued that there was rarely any real objective basis for evaluation of either the performance of individual trainees or of training programmes as a whole:

Too little attention is given to evaluation of training in terms of better work performance after training. Training should set clear goals such as higher productivity and increased profitability. (Skills 193)

Decisions over the final structure and content of training courses were found to be rarely in the hands of training managers (Skills 190). This was exacerbated by a "communications gap between trainers and top management" (Skills 220). Moreover, managers were seen typically to lack trade training or technical knowledge (Skills 89). Even some employers acknowledged negative managerial attitudes to training (Skills 191). It was complained that many managers were unwilling and/or unable to motivate their staff regarding training (Skills 191).

The second report complained that training was too often treated as a cost rather than an investment: "employers still see training in relation to short-term profit goals and not as a long-term investment in human capital" (Skills 218). Most companies lacked formal training policies or systematic career structures (Skills 190). The investigation was led to conclude that
It seems that employers give a low priority to training and particularly skills training in their budgets. In the RSA on average less than 2% of expenditure is allocated to training, while the average allocation in other countries is 5%. (Skills 197).

The reports also found that the problems were not just at the level of individual companies but existed at industry level too. Here again, it appeared to the HSRC/NTB investigators that the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission had not been carried out with any rigour. The Industrial Council system had only achieved patchy operation by the late 1980s (Skills 189). Similarly, neither Industry Training Boards nor training funds had been set up in most industries (Skills 189). Equally, few industries had a system of grants for training (Skills 189). Lack of cooperation characterized a system where rivalry and fear of free rider problems34 were considered to be more important than the potential economies of scale to be gained from joint action (Skills 189; NTS 114-5). The fragmentary nature of the system was made even more serious by the failure of most training programmes to register with the state (Skills 188).

The NTS document made clear the seriousness with which the failings of industry were viewed.

(a) There was a lack of commitment to training by employers.

(b) Many employers were production orientated. They felt that training employees meant that less production would take place.

(c) A lack of awareness among employers of the benefits of training made them reluctant to send workers for training.

34 The free rider is the company which lets others do the training and then poaches their newly trained workers. Such behaviour leads other employers to be more reluctant to train.
(d) Employers had trouble in identifying the actual training needs in their companies.

(e) When employers evaluated training, they often thought it had been ineffective because they confused training and what it was worth with issues related to poor management, supervision and planning.

(f) It was possible to poach trained workers from other companies, thus making some employers reluctant to train their workers.

(g) It seemed to some respondents that in many companies the development of human resources enjoyed a low priority. (NTS 111-2)

These criticisms are indicative of an important point. Although employers and managers tend to operate within a market-oriented paradigm at a theoretical level, their practices are often inconsistent with such a stance. Moreover, the above criticisms illustrate the Fordist thinking of many employers for whom labour remained a cost to be minimized rather than an investment to be maximized.

Educational Failure

I have already noted that the first two reports were designated as part of the de Lange research programme and made considerable use of the de Lange Commission’s analysis. The focus on the failures of the education system as a principal constraint upon training and, hence, economic performance, however, was most pronounced in the final report. This was influenced no doubt by the concurrent research for an Education Renewal Strategy\(^3^5\) (see Chapter Four) and the growing recognition of the fact that much of the de Lange recommendations had not yet been

\(^3^5\) Work on the Education Renewal Strategy (ERS) was commissioned in May 1990. Therefore there is a degree of overlap with the NTS process.
implemented by either a National Party mindful through the 1980s of vote loss to the right or by a highly conservative educational bureaucracy (Hartshorne OL 1995).

The first report made it clear that a mismatch between the education system and the needs of industry was at the root of the problems of the economy:

One of the most important reasons for the acute shortage of technically and technologically trained workers in the RSA can be attributed to the present education systems. It is contended that education does not succeed in creating harmony between the pupils that it educates on the one hand, and society's needs for manpower on the other. (Artisans 178).

In keeping with the views of the de Lange Report, the school system was seen as being too academically focused and uninterested in the world of work. As a result of this, pupils were channelled towards further academic study rather than useful work. The education system was also criticized for its alleged failure to prepare students adequately with the skills and knowledge that employers expected. A frequent complaint of employers was that education standards were too low (Skills 190). The system was criticized by them for being deficient in both quality and quantity of output (NTS 46; NTS 47; NTS 112).

In particular, the reports focused on the low literacy levels of many students and workers. It noted that “complaints about blue-collar workers being functionally illiterate and about the lack of a command of language among clerical workers are commonplace” (Skills 192).

The school system was held to have failed in preparing students with functional literacy in the “commercial languages” of English and
Afrikaans (Skills 178). Levels of numeracy were also seen as inadequate (NTS 112). As a result of these deficiencies, school leavers were characterized as having little ability to communicate in the workplace (NTS 235).

The quality of education in the other priority areas of the curriculum, mathematics and science, was also criticized, it being claimed that "mathematics and science education is absent or not of the required standard" (NTS 234).

The combined effects of the poor access of certain population groups and poor quality across the system were seen as major obstacles to effective training (NTS 235). Indeed, it was argued that "mainly on the account of educational shortcomings, employees do not generally have the potential to be trained in the relevant skills" (Skills 103). The shortcomings of the education system were also held responsible for the high rate of failure of trade tests (Artisans 140).

As well as failing to encourage students to follow vocational paths and to provide them with the necessary skills and knowledge for effective performance in the work place, the education system was also charged with an inability to inculcate students with the necessary attitudes and values for participation in the world of work.

The second investigation reported that employers were complaining about the "little interest" and "antisocial conduct" of trainees (Skills 190).

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36 Throughout this critique of education it was presumably African education that was the primary focus of complaints. This, however, was not made explicit.
37 Although not compulsory until the Manpower Training Act of 1990, trade tests had been taken (and up to half of them failed) by many artisans in the fifty years prior to that. The more common reason advanced for trade test failure was that success or failure made no apparent difference to wages.
In response to this, the third report showed a strong stress on social and personal skills and work ethics (NTS 263). Again, this argument is striking. Although a reading of the earlier critique of training suggests that employers and managers have to shoulder much of the blame for poor skills levels, here the blame is transferred to, rather than shared with, workers and the education system.

**Free Market Principles**

The NTS has been described by Kraak (1992: 1) as “the triumph of market ideology”. Several strands of pro-market argument can be found across all the reports. The need for industry based systems of accreditation for training has already been identified as the principal recommendation of the reports. This can be set firmly within a context of shifting hitherto state responsibilities onto the private sector.

This was true equally of the recommendation that training policy should be set at industry level (Skills 179). Decentralization, privatization and voluntarism were also recurrent themes (e.g. Skills 245-6). An over-large state role was identified as a principal factor in the failures of the existing system.

This antagonism towards a significant state role in training could be seen most clearly in the third report with its stress on the “training partnership” (NTS 9; NTS 67). It was argued that the private sector and the state should participate in training as equal partners, cooperating on a voluntary basis (NTS 9). Significantly, the stress on tripartism and the
importance of the role of trade unions was much reduced in comparison to Wiehahn.

An increased market focus can also be seen in the “discovery” of the informal sector in the second report. In the light of the South African state’s traditional animosity to the informal sector, the decision to devote a chapter of this report to the informal sector was significant. This was linked explicitly to concerns with deregulation and the promotion of entrepreneurship, further elements of the market-oriented meta-narrative.

The effects of cyclical fluctuations on levels of training is a theme of all the reports which stands against an excessively libertarian view, however (Artisans 70; Skills 176; NTS 128). This concern was particularly acute in the case of the second report:

It has often been stated that training is the responsibility of the employers and that financial assistance by the state should only be seen as a temporary measure. This view cannot, however, be supported as the state cannot divest itself of responsibility to sponsor training in order to achieve national goals such as higher productivity, universal literacy and full employment. It cannot distance itself from the problems arising in the work situation owing to the inadequacies and inequalities of the education system. (Skills 178)

This suggested a continued state role, especially due to educational failure. Unemployment was also seen as requiring state action towards retraining (Skills 180).

38 The impossibility of owning urban property, including shops, pushed many Africans towards the informal sector. However, in combining usual international tactics to keep the informal sector off the streets with the full force of apartheid repression, the South African state made progress in the sector particularly difficult.
39 A further HSRC/NTB investigation was subsequently carried out which was solely concerned with the informal sector (Hirschowitz, Acutt and Koch 1991).
The critical importance of training to economic well-being, the inequalities and inadequacies of education, and the shortcomings of the training system were all seen as necessitating state intervention:

It has been stated that the economy of a country depends to a large extent on the skill of its labour force and consequently it can be anticipated that an increase in the skills level of the labour should heighten the chances of development of the economy. In view of this fact it can be claimed that the state has a responsibility with regards to the training of its citizens even when an ideal educational system exists. In the RSA with its inequalities in education, the state has an additional compensatory role to play in skills training. (Skills 172)

As suggested above, the concern with unemployment at the time of the second report, and its focus on the failures of training, led it to be pessimistic about the role of the private sector. Such fears do not appear to impinge overly on the NTS report. Rather its whole tone was one of business and managerial science in particular. Schools were compared to strategic business units (NTS 30) and the nation was held to be a profit maximizer like private enterprises (NTS 18). The shift towards a dominant position for the pro-market meta-narrative seems to have been largely realised.

UPGRADING BLACK EDUCATION AND TRAINING: THE EMPLOYERS’ RESPONSE

Although employers’ representatives had an important role in shaping official policy directly through participation on and submissions to these investigations, they also increasingly used other methods to advance their interests regarding education and training. As this section will show there was a major increase in corporate investment in this field
both as a means of developing human resources to satisfy business needs directly, and as a way of influencing state policy through best practice.

Corporate Educational Investment

The concern some employers had been showing with regard to the education system in the 1960s (see Chapter Two) was heightened by the events of 1976 in Soweto. Education became seen increasingly as a crucial arena in the struggle to continue capital accumulation. In the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising, Anglo-American (the largest English-owned\textsuperscript{40} company) and Rembrandt (the largest Afrikaner-owned) came together with other business interests to form the Urban Foundation (UF) as a means of channelling corporate social investment into African (and, to a lesser extent, other black) communities.

The central focus of this expenditure, at least in the case of the largest corporation, Anglo-American, was on education. Along with the other mining houses, Anglo-American invested heavily in literacy and numeracy of workers (Chisholm 1984).

There was also major corporate investment in formal vocational education. From 1977 the Jabulani Technical High School in Soweto was funded by the Anglo-American Corporation Chairman's Fund (AACCF) and the UF (Swainson 1991). In 1980 the PACE Commercial College was established, also in Soweto, with funding from the United States, in order

\textsuperscript{40}The "English" in South Africa refers primarily to language of business. The Oppenheimer family of Anglo-American, were originally German. As the name of the corporation indicates, American interests were also a significant element of the group's resources (Innes 1984).
to produce African managers (Danaher 1984). In 1981 the Mangosuthu Technikon, the first for Africans, was opened in Kwa-Zulu with AACCIF as the principal funders (Swainson 1991). On the East Rand, the Isidingo Technical College was opened two years later after donations amounting to R13 million from the same source (Swainson 1991).

Investment in institutions was coupled to other corporate strategies. In many leading companies programmes of African advancement began to bring Africans into managerial positions for the first time. These built on the human resource development investments noted above, but also entailed further in-house training expenditures.

Concern with in-house training of blacks also reached the lower rungs of the corporate ladder. In addition to expenditure on basic education noted above, companies increasingly began to spend money on programmes that would better socialize their workforces. The most prominent of such programmes was the 6M scheme of the National Institute for Personnel Research, a widely used attempt to educate workers about the beneficent operation of capitalism (Chisholm and Christie 1983; Kraak 1991).

Policy Interventions

Swainson (1991) argues that companies such as Anglo-American tried to use these projects as a way of levering policy changes. Certainly, the business community continued the tradition of the Education Panel

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41 See Kraak (1991) for an account of the failure of this experiment.
42 Smollan (1988) contains a discussion of such programmes and company evaluations of their own efforts.
through think tanks which produced policy papers. In the 1980s the most prominent of these was SYNCOM.43

SYNCOM placed great stress on the need to increase the market's penetration of education. Vouchers and local negotiation of salaries were two elements of such an approach (SYNCOM 1986). A more instrumentalist view of education was also in evidence. It was argued that universities should become solely training institutions for the professions and should be reorganized to have sandwich courses as the basic degree structure (ibid.). This instrumentalist view was also present in Anglo-American and UF calls for greater expenditure by the state on technical and vocational education (Swainson 1991). These two principal employer themes of privatization and vocationalization largely mirror government policy as represented by the de Lange Report and the 1987 Privatization and Deregulation White Paper [Republic of South Africa 1987] (Kallaway 1989).

Reasons for Concern

The employers' concern with educational provision and performance also paralleled that of the state. Kraak (1989a) has identified a perception of skills shortage as being behind this concern with African vocational education. This of course was tied to a reading of educational failure. Orientation and preparation failures were parts of the SYNCOM critique, whilst programmes such as 6M pointed to a concern with socialization.

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43 SYNCOM was a futurist think-tank chaired by the Niko Stutterheim, Chairman of the University of Witwatersrand Council. It was at the forefront of advocacy for privatization at the time of National Party's shift in that direction during the mid-1980s (Benadé 1988).
Indeed, as the following quote from a leading trainer makes clear, for some, attitudes rather than technical skills were the most pressing problem:

It is quite true to say that our black workers need better education and training. If, however, they are to play a meaningful role as members of industrial society, they will need much more than purely technical ability. They will have to accept the value systems of this society and must be willing and, indeed, eager to contribute socially to the formal and informal organisation in a company. This means learning a range of social skills. Management must thus ensure that the climate is encouraging so that it develops workers who are technically able, want to achieve well, and want to participate in the industrial society and have the skills to do this. (Horner 1980 cited in Kraak 1991: 416-7)

In the 1960s, companies such as Anglo-American had sought to overcome the dominant Apartheid meta-narrative. Now in the 1980s they acted to reinforce the state’s often tentative moves towards replacing it with big business’s preferred pro-market ideology.

CRITIQUING AND CHALLENGING THE OFFICIAL PROJECT: THE OPPOSITION RESPONSE

The focus of this chapter so far has been on the increasingly harmonized discourses of state and capital. However, the post-Soweto period marked the growth in volume and clarity of other discourses: notably from left leaning (predominantly white) academics and, more significantly, from black communities. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is important to see these oppositional responses to the programmes of state and capital during the 1980s as having two phases with somewhat different ideological and practical characteristics. The first to gain some
degree of prominence was located principally in academic circles and drew heavily on Northern intellectual trends in order to critique policy. The second arose more out of grassroots experiences and concerns and sought to construct a pro-active educational response to official policy. I will now look at these in turn.

Critique: the Apartheid and Education Debate

The critique of Apartheid education, and the de Lange era attempts to change it, was most notably contained in the edited volume: Apartheid and Education (Kallaway 1984a). However, this discourse has a much wider provenance.

It responded critically to the two major elements of the discourses seen above: skills shortage and educational failure. Skills shortage, as noted in Chapter Two, was seen as being ideologically driven (Meth 1979; Chisholm 1984). Such a view was based in part on Braverman’s (1974) argument, and South African evidence, that job fragmentation was taking place resulting in many skilled jobs being either divided into semi-skilled ones or automated. Moreover, as skill was seen as socially constructed, so the racialized South African economy was argued to have chronically misclassified skill levels according to race. Through these two lines of analysis, it was argued that skills shortage must be seen as an element of an employer attempt to justify changes which would shift the balance of accumulation in capital’s favour (Chisholm 1984; Nkomo 1990). The deskilling of workers would tend to both depress wages and weaken organizational ability. In this view, training reform was more about containing labour militancy than developing absent skills
(Chisholm 1984). This was reflected in the alleged emphasis of employers on social rather than technical skills.

The clamour regarding educational failure was also seen as part of an ideological and economic struggle between the state and big business on the one hand and the working class on the other. At its heart was an educational parallel to the arguments about training of Chisholm. This centred on a perception of an attempt to better socialize workers to serve the capitalist system (Azanian Peoples Organization [AZAPO] 1984). This was viewed also as part of the broader strategy, reflected clearly in the Riekert proposals and the UF projects, to co-opt an African middle-class (de Clerq 1979). The attempt by the de Lange Commission, and those who followed, to shift to market and technocratic solutions was seen by critics using Habermas (1976) as part of an attempt to depoliticize the educational arena in order to preserve the current balance of power (Nasson 1990). Education thus became perceived as a central element of the Total Strategy of the Botha regime during the 1980s (Moyo 1995).

As Wolpe and Unterhalter (1991) argue, this view of education and training was closely related to notions that education reflects the needs and structures of capitalism, and so to the correspondence theory of Bowles and Gintis (1976), mentioned in Chapter One. In such a view, education in a capitalist society does not lead to social mobility but to reinforcement of class divisions and “reproduction of the capitalist relations of production” (Wolpe and Unterhalter 1991: 6). That such a view had spread beyond the university was evident from the following

44 The principal inheritors of the Black Consciousness Movement’s legacy.
45 The Total Strategy was a concerted plan of the South African state to crush local, regional and global opposition through such means as military force, diplomacy, propaganda, and economic, educational and political reform.
quotation taken from the deliberations of the AZAPO-aligned National Forum:

Education cannot be seen as separate from the wider society. In South Africa education is part and parcel of a racist and capitalist system. Schools reproduce class, colour and gender inequalities. The main aim of the educational system for the oppressed is to create a cheap black labour force, with the skills and attitudes that will benefit capitalism. (National Forum 1986: 272)

This focus on education as an element of the broader system of political economy, whilst justified, led to a tendency to see solutions to educational problems purely as a part of the transformation of the political economy. Overthrowing capitalism, not transforming education, appeared to be the most obvious solution.

**Challenge: People’s Education**

The second strand of opposition thinking regarding education in the 1980s emerged out of the school boycotts of 1985 (Muller 1987), although it built in many ways on the longer tradition of Charterist opposition of Bantu Education.46 Concerned with the continued disruption of schooling, the Soweto Parents Crisis Committee convened a National Consultation Conference to discuss black education. Meeting at the University of Witwatersrand in December 1985, the conference sought to counter the call from radical student elements for “Liberation Now, Education Later” with the alternative slogan of “People’s Education for People’s Power” (National Education Crisis Committee 1985).

46 The ANC-aligned education tradition may also be described as Charterist, building as it did on the educational statements of the Freedom Charter.
The conference, which marked the establishment of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), began developing this new model of People’s Education. The ideas agreed upon at the first NECC conference can be divided into four principal areas. First, there was a reiteration of the long-standing call for universal access to schooling. In the context of the widespread boycotting of classrooms in the previous decade, this should be seen partly as a reaffirmation of the importance of education. This call was allied to the reiteration of calls for equity in education opportunity and provision. Again this has a specific context, that of the de Lange Report with promotion of non-formal education as a means of disassociating access and equity.

Second, there was a concern with transforming school governance. Here the two most important calls were for democratic parent-teacher-student associations (PTSAs) and for student representative councils (SRCs) recognized and free from intimidation by state or school authorities (NECC 1985).

Third, there was a strong concern with curriculum reform, so as to remove the biases in syllabi introduced by Bantu Education. As noted in Chapter Two, the subjects which received the most attention were English (Johnson 1991) and History (Muller 1987), two of the most culturally sensitive.

Fourth, this intention to reform the curriculum was linked to wider notions of a transformed philosophy of education. This is reflected in a number of calls for a shift of emphasis in the underpinnings of education.
Critical thinking, rather than recitation of the “facts” hitherto presented by a pro-capitalist, pro-Apartheid education, was held to be necessary for the creation of the active citizens needed for a post-Apartheid settlement. In the meantime, critical thinking would also be valuable in the development of student resistance to those “facts” and to the broader structures of oppression (NECC 1985).

Collaborative learning was identified as a way of moving beyond the competitive, atomistic and individualistic logic of capitalist education. Diagnostic testing, focusing on the identification of student weaknesses for remedial purposes, rather than the pass-fail logic of the competitive examinations of the existing system, was seen as a further necessary move away from capitalist educational philosophy and practice (NECC 1985).

The People’s Education movement drew on the established tradition of alternative education in South Africa⁴⁷, as the keynote speech to the conference by the Secretary of the [Catholic] Bishops’ Conference made clear (Mkhatshwa⁴⁸ 1985). It at times showed an almost Freirean belief⁴⁹ in the integral role of education in the liberation process (Mkhatshwa 1985; Sisulu 1986). The shift was one from protest to challenge (Muller 1987). However, grounded as it was in a broad alliance of black grassroots protest rather the Marxist-influenced academic critique, People’s Education focused on the links between education and politics rather than between education and the economy, as in the academic critique

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⁴⁷ One notable period of alternative education provision was in the aftermath of the introduction of Bantu Education when the ANC called for popular schools to be established. See Lodge (1984) for further details.
⁴⁸ As of June 30th 1996 he has taken up the post of Deputy-Minister of Education.
⁴⁹ Paolo Freire is a Brazilian radical adult educator, whose Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972) in particular has been of great influence on radical educational thinking internationally.
above (McKay and Romm 1992; Wolpe 1992). If the economy featured at all it was as a provider of resources for education (Greenstein 1995a). As a result, People’s Education was even weaker than the academic account on the subject of training policy (Wolpe OI 1995).  50

To construct a view of People’s Education as a coherent ideological force, or meta-narrative, is difficult, however (Levin 1991).  51 In part this is due to unresolved tensions between and within the parent, student and teacher constituencies (Naidoo 1990). It owes something also to the belief of some proponents that People’s Education represented an invitation to discourse and therefore should avoid being too dogmatic (McKay and Romm 1992). Equally, the twin forces of repression and cooption are crucial. The state acted harshly against the NECC, imprisoning leaders of both it and affiliated local organizations before the process of consultation with those grassroots organizations and communities could flesh out the initial conference ideas (Muller 1987; Mashamba 1990; Wolpe 1991; Wolpe and Unterhalter 1991).

At the same time, liberal and professional support for some of the notions of People’s Education began to grow (Wolpe and Unterhalter 1991). Given the weakening of the NECC by repression in the period before 1990  52, there was a space created for the sanitization of People’s Education. In so far as curricular and pedagogical reform became prominent, there was a delinking of the practices of progressive educational reform from the broader liberation struggle (Wolpe 1991).

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50 There was some interest in Education with Production as a result of local Southern African trends. This, however, does not amount to a policy on mainstream training.
51 This is particularly true when a reading, as here, is based on the rather limited published material.
52 The NECC was able to rebuild itself quite successfully after the unbanning of opposition organisations in early 1990, as we shall see in the next chapter.
This was seen particularly in the operation of the "Open Schools" movement. At this time a number of white private schools, particularly in the Catholic sector, began to admit black students in ever larger numbers (Christie 1990a and b). The state eventually decided to acquiesce in this and the subsequent attempt to produce a new multi-racial curriculum. This process of curriculum reform resulted in the establishment of the Independent Examinations Board (IEB), which we shall encounter again in Chapter Five.

More seriously, Wolpe argues that the space provided by the state's attack on the NECC structures led to a more general tendency "to equate access to 'good' education, to the universities, to skills (such as reading and writing) with 'People's Education'" (Wolpe 1991: 81). As we shall see in the next chapter, this reformulation of People's Education was to be accelerated after the ANC's unbanning.

MAKING SENSE OF THE RESPONSES

Summarizing the Principal Trends

There is both continuity and progression running through the official education and training responses to the challenges facing South Africa in the period between the Soweto Uprising and the unbanning of the ANC. The concern, which surfaces with the Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, regarding the need to expand the production base of the

53 Catholic schooling for all races had chosen to maintain its independence (and hence be self-funding) when the reforms of the 1950s led to other denominations abandoning their educational provision for Africans.
economy through greater African incorporation is one such theme which developed through the subsequent investigations.54

The Wiehahn Commission’s concerns with skill shortages is another theme which was repeated by later reports. Equally, a stress on the market rather than race as an allocative principle received its first major introduction into National Party discussions through the Wiehahn Report. The contested nature of this move was strongest in this its first rehearsal, although it did become evident again when the government responded to de Lange Report.

Whereas this tension between race and market surfaced on the pages of the Report itself in the case of Wiehahn through the medium of minority recommendations, the structure and operation of the de Lange Commission proved far more suitable for keeping dissent out of the final report (Hartshorne OI 1995). Indeed, the de Lange Report has far more of a technical rather than a political feel. However, the official response to the Report’s recommendations again showed the huge problems faced in moving away from Apartheid rationales.

The de Lange Report also stressed one theme absent from the Wiehahn Report but destined to become central to all discourses of the 1980s: educational failure.55 In the de Lange Commission’s formulation this was to be highly instrumentalist with a very heavy vocational emphasis. The de Lange Report also developed the pro-market vision further, expanding its scope from the largely privately-organized training system to the state-controlled education system.

54 This concern mirrors that of the spate of United Party-established commissions in the 1940s, such as the Fagan Commission referred to in Chapter Two.
55 Evidence for the argument was not particularly apparent in the report, however.
Although the three HSRC/NTB reports were concerned with training, they frequently strayed into the arena of education. In so doing they tended to reinforce strongly the notions of the de Lange Report about the nature of educational failure and of the most suitable remedies for it. The feel was also more like that of the de Lange Report, as statistics and technical committees multiplied. By the time of these reports, discussion of Apartheid rationales and reasons for their replacement no longer appeared to be necessary. The exact relationship of market and state, however, was still a subject of debate. The high unemployment levels of the mid-1980s led to a relatively pro-active view of state training involvement in the second report. However, this concern had given way to the most explicitly pro-market vision yet by the time the third report reached publication.56

It is necessary to make the distinction between these official reports and the views of the state. Here it is evident that the state found it far easier to accept recommendations from the later HSRC/NTB reports than from the Wiehahn and de Lange Commissions.

In this chapter I have also looked at two other areas of account generation. In the case of the views of business, as represented by the proposals of SYNCOM and the programmes of organizations such as Anglo-American and the Urban Foundation, there appears to be a fairly consistent stress on many of the same themes as contained in official reports.57 In particular, concern with educational failure and a belief in greater vocationalization as a response to it, permeate both accounts.

56 The extent to which the findings of this report were changed by the political climate after the unbanning of the ANC cannot be discounted.
57 Which of course were influenced in part by long established positions emanating from big business.
Belief in the role of the market and the problem of skills shortage are also evident across official and business accounts.

More oppositional discourses were divided into two broad schools earlier in the chapter. What the division points to is largely a difference between stances of critique and challenge. It must be remembered, however, that many of those who have been identified earlier as providing critique were also supportive of, and often active in, the process of challenge. For example, Peter Kallaway, the editor of the Apartheid and Education volume, was to play an important role in the development of an alternative curriculum and textbooks for People’s History.58

What both schools also had in common was a strong belief in the need to link educational transformation with broader transformation of the South African political economy, although they differed in emphasis between the political and the economic. This led them to stress the democratization of learning, in terms of curriculum, governance and pedagogy.

Explaining the Trends

It is important to produce a description of the development of the various meta-narratives of South African education and training policy in this crucial period. However, this should be but a step on the road to an explanation of why these meta-narratives developed, or declined, in

58 This is notwithstanding the implicit contrasting of Apartheid and Education, seen by McKay and Romm (1992) as based on an inappropriate Marxist structuralism, with a true, non-structuralist, People’s Education approach.
the ways outlined already. That will be the task of this part of the current chapter.

Three types of influence on the policy debate can be identified. First, the role of international, sometimes global, discourses in shaping South African thought and expression. Second, the local reality of the triple crisis of accumulation, education and legitimation faced by the South African state which contextualizes all the discussions of policy and practice that this chapter has outlined. Third, the ways in which subsequent policy formulations were affected by social actors reshaping earlier policy formulations during the implementation phase.

The Influence of Global Discourse

The period under consideration in this chapter saw a fundamental ideological shift on the part of many of the powerful in South Africa. The convention of Afrikaner state using Apartheid rationales, in indirect collaboration with English capital reliant on liberal capitalist ideology, underwent a transformation in the post-Soweto environment. In its place came a far closer ideological, and frequently practical alliance, built upon elements of the market-oriented meta-narrative, so pervasive in such circles internationally during the 1980s.

The call for greater reliance on market forces described in detail in this chapter cannot plausibly be read as occurring in isolation from the rest of the world. Rather, the Thatcher/Reagan influence appears to loom large in legislation such as that on privatization (Kallaway 1989). In the education sphere this influence was particularly evident in many of the
recommendations of the de Lange and the HSRC/NTB Reports which reflected similar themes in the more developed Anglophone countries. The increasing stress on parental choice and state-private sector collaboration are two examples of such themes.

A second strand of the New Right agenda as it affects education is what has been called New Vocationalism by British commentators. This policy was based in a powerfully instrumentalist notion of the role of education and stressed a greater emphasis on orientation, preparation and socialization of students to be better workers, coupled with a greater prioritization of vocational courses. Such elements were clearly present in the reforms outlined above. Moreover, Kallaway (1989) has reported that de Lange travelled to England in 1980 to visit the principal agent of this policy, the Manpower Services Commission. Furthermore, the NTS openly acknowledged British influence on its ideas for new youth training programmes which would:

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\begin{align*}
&\text{take cognisance of schemes in other parts of the world such as the Youth Training Programme of the United Kingdom, .... the English National Vocational Qualification. (NTS 263)}
\end{align*}
\]

A third element of the New Right’s ideological influence on South Africa was the growth of technocratic rationality. Habermas (1972) argued that advanced capitalist states find that their power comes to be questioned as a result of their manipulation of market forces. Part of the solution, as we saw above, is to re-emphasize the market. However, it is impossible for the state to divest itself of many of its functions. Therefore, it seeks to portray its deliberations in those areas as scientific and non-ideological.

Such a trend does seem to have been occurring in the countries Habermas considered (in Western Europe and North America). It was
also evident in South Africa in the 1980s. Earlier I argued that the de Lange Commission was better able than the Wiehahn Commission to produce a report that portrayed itself as neutral and technical. Furthermore, I noted the use of statistics and technical sub-committees. Together with jargon and acronyms such as MLM (medium level manpower) and EAP (economically active population), such modes of discourse helped this technicist portrayal.

International influences on radical academics also are easy to discern, not least through the sojourn of many of them in places such as London and Brighton during post-graduate studies. From citations lists in books and articles it is possible to get a sense of the influence in South Africa of critiques such as the New Vocationalism, already noted.\textsuperscript{59} From America, I have already noted both Braverman’s (1974) arguments concerning the fragmentation of skilled work and Bowles and Gintis’s work on education as reproduction. These were more explicitly Marxist, influences. As with the adoption of New Right thinking above, such borrowings put elite discourses very much in a Northern rather than an African context.

Through its focus on education as part of a process of liberation, the People’s Education meta-narrative moved away from these Northern influences. Instead, inspiration was more readily available from Southern struggles. This is exemplified by Mkhatshwa’s keynote address to the first National Consultative Conference where the two writer-activists quoted with approval were Freire and Cabral (Mkhatshwa 1985).\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} See Kallaway 1984b and 1989 for a flavour of this.
\textsuperscript{60} Amilcar Cabral was the leading figure in the movement for independence in Guinea-Bissau. Latin American influences, represented here by Freire, were also important in
The Influence of the Triple Crisis

The global crisis and the role of international discourses was only one element of the context of education and training reform. The importance of the local must also be affirmed. In Chapter Two I introduced the notion of the triple crisis (in accumulation, legitimation and education) which the Apartheid state experienced in the mid-1970s. It is necessary to return to that crisis here and to show how its continuation into the 1980s also impacted upon attempts to reformulate education and training policy.

Accumulation Crisis

A major influence on the changing emphases of education and training policy from the Wiehahn Report to the NTS was the accumulation crisis facing the South African economy. The profitability of South African industry was seriously affected by a downturn in most major economic indicators in the mid-1970s in the wake of the First Oil Crisis. Gross domestic product and the balance of payments declined, whilst unemployment and inflation increased (Price 1991). Production, and hence profitability, were also adversely affected by the wave of strike activity in 1973-4.

Such phenomena were repeated in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1985 profits and productivity again fell, whilst in 1985 inflation

South Africa at this time. Lodge (1992) argues that Dependency Theory from Latin America, a Third World strand of Marxism, was a major influence on student activist thinking at this time. The popular education tradition of Freire et al. can also be seen as highly influential in the vision of People's Education.

61 The crisis of Fordism referred to in the previous chapter.
reached its highest level since 1919 (Moss and Obey 1987: xvii). On several occasions the economy looked to be recovering only for recession to set in again. This led Kaplan to conclude in 1987 that “recessionary conditions have become the South African norm and periods of expansion only limited and temporary aberrations” (Kaplan 1987: 525).

This persistent recession seemed to political economists to be a fundamental crisis. Awareness of regulation theory notions led some commentators to link the South African crisis of accumulation with a broader crisis being experienced in the advanced capitalist states. In such a view the crisis facing South Africa arose out of its structuring around a system of Racial Fordism, in which both the production and consumption base was only massified for whites. Increasingly, it was argued, this was contrary to continued capital accumulation (Cassim 1987).62

The responses to this crisis were seen as characterizing an attempt to transform the South African economy onto a broader Fordist basis.63 The Wiehahn-Rieker proposals of greater access to training for urban blacks along with greater security of urban residence can be read as a strategy to this end. Programmes by the Urban Foundation to develop and coopt an African middle class also fall within such an analysis.

The calls for greater marketization, which reached a crescendo around the 1987 Privatization and Deregulation White Paper, have also been seen as part of this strategy. Kallaway (1989) argues that one of the principal

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62 Significantly, Hobsbawm (1995) notes that the similar levels of income inequality in Brazil are generally considered to have been at the root of that country’s failure to develop a sustainable Fordist economy.

63 As noted in Chapter Two, this was conceived of as operating in the economic not the political sphere. Of course the challenge in the advanced economies was in moving beyond Fordism.
elements of the privatization strategy was to reduce taxation so as to increase profitability. Equally, in so far as privatization represented the transfer of profitable elements of state enterprise to the private sector at sub-market rates, potential for private sector capital accumulation was enhanced further.

The core reform proposals regarding education and training have also been seen in the light of this crisis. The increased instrumentalism of education policy debates was logical given the perceived accumulation crisis of capital, manifested particularly through the stress on skills shortages. The increased emphasis on academic bias and the need for better technical, attitudinal and basic educational preparation for work can be read as being indicative of such accumulation fears. Equally, the stress on socialization may have been related to the need to encourage worker docility in the light of attempts to reweight allocation of profit shares further in the favour of capital.

This broadly regulationist account seems persuasive as regards the accumulation crisis faced by South Africa. Most importantly, it highlights the need to view the political and economic domains as having complex inter-relationships in a way that narrower Marxist models such as correspondence theory fail to capture. Attention will now turn to the political, or legitimation, crisis of the state.

Legitimation Crisis

In a manner somewhat analogous to the regulationist approach, Habermas (1976) argued that the legitimacy of the advanced capitalist state
is supported by a complex system of structures and institutions. However, the contradictions of such states as both mediators of capital accumulation and producers have a tendency to induce crises of legitimacy.

Here the intention is not to try to read Habermas into South African experiences. As will be clear from the discussion of the accumulation crisis above, South Africa is somewhat different from Habermas’s advanced capitalist states as a result of its different point of insertion into the world economy. Rather, the concern is with using a broad notion of legitimation crisis as indicative of the manifestations in the political sphere of a systemic crisis. The South African state’s belief in the interconnectedness of the triple crisis is to be seen in Botha’s development during the 1980s of the Total Strategy aimed at addressing all elements of the perceived threat, internally and externally.

A central element of this response was the drive to depoliticize as many areas of social and economic activity as possible. Privatization was one of the two strategies through which this was attempted, as noted above when I considered borrowings from international discourse. Innes argues that for South Africa:

> the privatisation strategy aims to "depoliticise" society by transferring social regulation from the state to market forces which regulate both the economy and social life. (Innes 1987: 561)

He also considers this strategy in the arena of education. He suggests that the school crisis after 1976 was a major element of the broader legitimation crisis of the state and that educational reforms, such as greater parental choice, should be seen as an attempt to depoliticize the school:
The privatisation lobby .... argues that if the state hands over certain state-run services to the private sector, such as education, these will be depoliticised. They will no longer be run according to the dictates of apartheid ideology and nor will the content of school courses be ideologically determined. .... According to this argument, the whole system will thus be shifted from a racially determined base to a “non-ideological” one. Consequently, the battle in the schools will cease. (Innes 1987: 558)

Innes makes a crucial point here. It would be erroneous to view the drive to privatization as purely a state attempt to protect its legitimacy. Such a concern with the state’s ability to appear apolitical was of course also a pressing concern of many leading corporations. Much of their drive towards social responsibility expenditure after Soweto appears to have arisen out of a belief that such spending by the private sector was essential given the illegitimacy of the state in the eyes of many in black communities.

The second strategy was the use of technicism (again referred to above). In a well-known article, Buckland (1982) analysed the de Lange Report as a technicist text. I have shown above that this reading can be extended to the three HSRC/NTB Reports as well. Held argues that technicism operates in the following way:

Practical issues, underpinned by particular historical class interests, are defined as technical problems; politics becomes the sphere for the technical elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten “the system”. (Held 1982: 181)

Both state and capital also sought to limit what was predominantly African opposition through a broader strategy of cooption and control. The recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions regarding permanent settlement rights and training, together with the
corporate social responsibility and African advancement programmes, sought to give a larger number of Africans an economic, if not a political, stake in the system. Moreover, the state often proved adept at taking on board and sanitizing liberal and radical ideas. Legalization of non-racial trade unions and even adoption of some of the language of People's Education (Levin 1991) can be seen as an attempt to co-opt reform in order to better control it.64

The state's legitimation problems were not simply related to opposition from black communities. The tensions in the Wiehahn Commission and the state's response to the de Lange Report's recommendations have already been mentioned. These arose out of difficulties the National Party found itself faced with in dealing with its own traditional constituencies.

Barker (1990) argues that one typical element of a legitimation crisis is the inability of a state to produce ideological messages which reflect the different expectations of diverse societal groups. This appears to have been a major phenomenon of this period in South Africa. Increasingly, the state got ideological messages right for big business, and even for elements of black South Africa. However, it proved very difficult to combine such successes with messages for large sections of traditional National Party (NP) support.

In 1969 the Herstigte Nasionale Party split from the NP (Hyslop 1987). In the 1981 elections they achieved their best showing to date: 14,4% of total votes. Perhaps more significantly, they attracted 33% of all Afrikaner

64 Levin quotes a 1986 speech by Gerrit Viljeon, then Minister of Development Aid and Education: “in terms of the basic terminology of 'People’s Education', there are also positive aspects which has [sic] been part of our approach and which should be further emphasized and given effect.” (Levin 1991: 11).
votes (Schrire 1991: 44). The right-wing threat to the NP was even greater, however, as many who had stayed loyal in the 1969 split were increasingly unhappy. The focus of this unrest was Andries Treurnicht, NP leader in the Transvaal and former head of the Broederbond. In February 1982 Botha brought the disagreement to a head and seventeen MPs, including Treurnicht, were expelled from the party. The following month, the Conservative Party was launched with Treurnicht as its leader (Schrire 1991: 46).

Although the new party had few parliamentarians, it could draw on large numbers of supporters amongst small farmers, blue collar workers and minor bureaucrats, the groupings most threatened by the Botha reforms. The economic crisis of the early 1980s served to increase the disquiet of these groups. Between 1981 and 1986 white unemployment grew by over 500%. At the same time bankruptcies of small business quadrupled and white real wages fell (Hyslop 1987: 395). The reforms and the recession were also reinforced by fears generated by the wave of resistance occurring in the townships in the mid-1980s (ibid.).

The effect of this crisis can be seen in the response to the de Lange Report where the state appeared to be trying to play to the right-wing audience in its response to what was, in South African terms, a broadly liberal report. It also was reflected in the tendency of the Botha government to veer between reform and repression. In the educational sphere, repression impacted most clearly on the development of People's Education, when arrests, bannings and harassment seriously affected the development of a coherent and generally agreed upon model. As a result, the official

65 A secret organisation aiming at the preservation of Afrikaner cultural, economic and political dominance.
discourse had to balance often conflicting elements of both the Apartheid and the market-oriented meta-narratives in an attempt to deal with the multiple threats it faced.

Education Crisis

It has already been argued that it was an event in the educational sphere that provided the trigger for the cycles of resistance, repression and reform of the past two decades. We have already seen the interconnectedness of the education crisis with the accumulation and legitimation crises but some further points should be made.

The splits in Afrikanerdom, not least between senior reformers and junior conservatives in the education bureaucracy, lent a sense of confusion to much of the state’s education policy during the period. Nonetheless, the influence of big business and, indirectly, the black population does help to give educational discourse a fairly clear shape.

If Bantu Education had ever been functional to the interests of state and capital, this no longer appeared to be the case. As the shift to greater African economic involvement continued, so concerns about the quantity and quality of African education spread from African communities to business and government circles. As we have seen, educational failure became a major motif of the de Lange and

66 The question of whether Bantu Education was functional to the interests of capital may be seen as part of a broader debate regarding the relationship between capitalism and Apartheid which has formed a principal line of cleavage between Liberal and Marxist historiographies in South Africa (e.g. Fransman, Graves and Simelane 1983). It is worth quoting Hobsbawm here: “the point about really big business is that it can come to terms with any regime that does not actually expropriate it, and any regime must come to terms with it” (Hobsbawm 1995: 129). This points to the futility of such a debate.
HSRC/NTB investigations and a rationale for the huge corporate social responsibility programmes of big business after Soweto.

These concerns were translated into a highly instrumental view of education, largely driven by the accumulation crisis and, to a lesser extent, legitimation fears. Education increasingly came to be seen as social investment rather than social consumption (Kallaway 1989). This instrumentalist view explains the vocationalization tendency evident in the 1980s.

Vocationalization messages are popular with elite groups as employers but not as parents. Through continued segregation, increased devolution of power from the central ministry and privatization the state sought to reconcile this tension by allowing elite education to remain aloof from the vocational trend. Whilst the first of these strategies was still a racial one, reflecting the need to placate right-wing white opinion, the latter two were indicative of the attempt officially to deracialize discrimination, whilst still in practice allowing both race and class to strongly shape individual educational opportunities.

The development of educational discourse in the period after Soweto cannot be understood outside the context of black resistance. The events of 1976, and the subsequent school boycotts of 1980 and 1985, were crucial factors in the timing and nature of the state’s response of reform and repression, and in the corporate social investment programme. The nature of the relationship between resistance and official response naturally changed with the new challenge of People’s Education but the fact remained that official policy formulation was, at least in part, reactive to grassroots opposition.
The Influence of Social Actors

This short analysis of the factors shaping the policy debate has pointed to the necessity of seeing the inter-connectedness of three principal trends in the domestic macro-environment: the economic, the political and the educational. It has also pointed to the further inter-connectedness of the local reality and global intellectual trends as they helped generate discourses and shift the balance of power between conflicting meta-narratives. However, there is another important element to be considered. As the previous paragraph indicated, the discourses, and meta-narratives, which achieved prominence, official or otherwise, were also influenced by the actions of social actors who sought to resist, reshape or replace them.

This thesis is concerned primarily within the changing shape of powerful and visible discourses and meta-narratives. As a result it has tended to look in directions where such ideological phenomena can be found and illuminated: policy documents and interviews with policy formulators. Therefore, the methodology permits less to be said with certainty about the voices of the less powerful. Nonetheless, their impact must at least be the subject of some comment.

Reference has already been made to the role of black communities in resisting education and training policy. First through students boycotting schools and then through wider community involvement in movements such as People's Education, these communities were increasingly able to articulate a view of education provision which did begin to influence official policy.

67 This very important issue was raised in Chapter One and will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter Six.
As we shall see in the next chapter, this influence carried on into the period after the unbanning of the ANC as the power of COSATU to shape policy, particularly on adult education, increased and as the state accelerated its policy of cooptation and sanitization of popular educational demands. The latter response points to one of the principal results of popular demands internationally: the tendency for their hijacking and reworking as official programmes.

I have also referred to white opposition to reform and its influence on National Party policy. The agenda of progressive Afrikaner forces and of large corporations has also been evident. The role of those who were responsible for policy implementation equally was crucial. Teachers, head-teachers and educational bureaucrats all shaped the implementation of policy formulations. This in turn influenced the next round of formulation as past themes were either reiterated or dropped according to progress in their implementation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to explore the transformation undergone by South Africa education and training policy discourse between 1976 and 1990. It has considered the major official documents of this period: the Riekert, Wiehahn and de Lange Reports and the HSRC/NTB trilogy, and the legislative responses to them. It has also studied discourses emerging from business, academic and community sources.

Central to the changes seen in this period was the increased economic involvement of Africans, which, though beginning earlier, came into the
official policy arena at this time.68 This was inseparable from changes in training and industrial relations legislation, such as legalization of non-racial trade unions and African access to apprenticeships.

Equally, it was at the heart of reforms in the education system. The long-standing stress on socialization of African students was updated to take account of their new role in training and employment, as concerns of segregation finally lost out to concerns of industrialization and the need to respond to African unrest. The de Lange Report appeared to mark the extension of instrumentalist views on education to all races. However, the new stress on privatization allowed white education an escape route. Concerns with the continuing schools boycotts saw a third strand introduced to education policy: technicism.

These trends in education and training, and the broader role of Africans in the South African economy, cannot be viewed outside the framework of the triple crisis of economics, politics and education. This in turn was linked to the crisis of the system of Racial Fordism.

The changing debate was characterized by the pressures of local contestations, from black and white communities, and from employer interventions. Here the most noticeable change was the emergence of an oppositional discourse of challenge, where protest and critique had been previously dominant.

The debate also saw heavy borrowings from international intellectual trends. In the case of the official discourse there was a paradigmatic shift during the period to a position which closely resembled that of the

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68 As noted in the previous chapter, this issue had been on the policy agenda of the United Party government in the 1940s.
international New Right ideology. In doing so the state moved away from the Apartheid meta-narrative as the cornerstone of the official ideology, although the market-oriented meta-narrative which replaced it allowed divisions along race and class lines to remain largely intact.

There was also a noticeable change in the nature of the operation of official policy formulation between the Wiehahn Report, representing the first stirrings of the new approach, and later reports. Whilst the Wiehahn Report was full of internal contestations which highlighted the political nature of the formulation process, later reports far more successfully portrayed the technical dimension of such activity. This too can be seen in the light of a new dominant ideology which was also shaping practices.

The changing debate of the period after 1976 also can be seen as part of an attempt to think through the process of allowing Africans a significant economic role in South Africa whilst denying them political space outside the homelands. This attempt proved untenable, however, and on February 2nd 1990, de Klerk acknowledged this by unbanning the ANC. The struggle to define and control a future African political role now came to the fore. In the next chapter I will consider the education and training dimensions of that struggle.
POST-SOWETO META-NARRATIVES, 1976-90

**Notes**
- APARTHEID, MARKET-ORIENTED = dominant meta-narratives
- LIBERAL, CHARTERIST, PEOPLE'S EDUCATION = other meta narratives
- Italicised text (e.g. Triple crisis) = influences on policy
- Text in boxes = important documents/conferences
CHAPTER FOUR

THE ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS:
FEBRUARY 1990 TO APRIL 1994

INTRODUCTION

The unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 fundamentally altered the policy process in South Africa. The period between then and the elections of 1994 became almost an interregnum as the state seemed largely unwilling and/or unable to make and implement policy. Instead, it moved towards a strategy of agenda setting designed to create a negotiating position through which it could minimize the impact at the levels of both policy and practice of what seemed to be an inevitable ANC victory at the polls.

The ANC and its allies too moved into a similar phase of agenda setting. The oppositional tendencies of the People’s Education movement no longer seemed entirely relevant in the face of the need to make policy with an ever closer eye on being in power. At the same time, the shift towards policy and away from small innovative projects¹ saw the emergence of new participants in the policy discourse, most notably the ANC Education Department and COSATU.

The first part of this chapter will explore this move towards research-based agenda setting which characterized state and opposition policy discourses between 1990 and 1992. In so doing, it will analyse the nature

¹ This ranged from the more ambitious such as Khanya College, a bridging year before university run by the South Africa Committee for Higher Education (SACHED), to the many literacy projects and fewer literacy-supporting magazines, often funded by churches.
of this new phase of opposition discourse in which the stress at the level of meta-narrative moved increasingly from socialist transformation, linked to the violent overthrow of the state, to Post-Fordist economic reorganization, based on the ever-increasing likelihood of a peaceful assumption of power.

There was a change of gear between this phase, 1990-2, and that of the following two years. In the latter phase, 1992-4, the focus was more sharply on the development of policy formulations. This was to take place both internally within organizations and in national policy fora. This latter period also saw the emergence of a new meta-narrative amongst segments of the business community. This, in part, was a reaction to the changing policy environment and to business and intellectual trends domestically and internationally. Its effect was to produce a rival, pro-capital version of Post-Fordism.2

The National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) of 1994 was to see the attempt to bring together the two new Post-Fordist meta-narratives with the market-oriented meta-narrative and People’s Education of the previous chapter. It is to the emergence of the first of the two new discourses in opposition circles that attention will first be directed.

THE NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY INVESTIGATION (NEPI)

In December 1990 the NECC launched the NEPI process (NEPI 1993: 1). This two year programme of research arose as a result of three principal

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2 As noted in Chapter Two, in regulationist terms this would be characterised as Neo-Fordist. However, given the widespread use of the term Post-Fordist to refer to both pro-capital and pro-labour versions, I have chosen to use Post-Fordist as a generic term for narratives about a regime of accumulation which arises after the demise of Fordism.
dynamics: the arrival of the era of negotiations earlier that year\(^3\); the development of new state policies for education (the Education Renewal Strategy - see below); and the need to coordinate the NECC-affiliated Education Policy Units at a number of South African universities (Kraak 1993a: 1). The programme brought together over three hundred researchers into 12 work groups. These in turn were supported and monitored by a series of structures which included representation by the NECC as well as other organizations such as the ANC, COSATU and student and teacher bodies (NEPI 1993).

For many of those involved, NEPI represented a first entrance into the world of policy (Wolpe 1994). However, strictly this was not into policy formulation but into the agenda setting phase. This distinction arose out of a strong awareness that policy formulation should be the task of mass democratic structures.\(^4\)

The 12 sectoral or thematic reports and the overall framework report were to be informed by five underlying principles, which strongly reflected the People’s Education tradition of the NECC: non-sexism, non-racism, redress, democracy and a unitary system (NEPI 1993: 6-7). The concerns of People’s Education with regard to the democratization of school control were also strongly evident in the focus of one report on Governance and Administration (NEPI 1992a).

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\(^3\) Although negotiations in the political arena, principally around unbanning of organisations and release of political prisoners, predated February 1990, it was de Klerk’s announcement of that month which gave greatest impetus to negotiations across a wide range of subjects.

\(^4\) See Chapter One for a brief discussion of notions of a policy cycle. It was in this concern (not always put into practice, however- Appel 1993) to place their findings before the people for them to then decide policy that marked the distinction between the NEPI researchers’ methodology and that of the more technocratic research carried out by the official commissions of the 1980s and early 1990s.
However, as the NEPI process continued, it became evident that the new era of negotiations was bringing with it a perceived need to move beyond established NECC concerns. The imperative to think about policies for when the ANC assumed power led to an increasing stress on efficiency, feasibility and affordability (Greenstein 1995a).

The emergence of a new meta-narrative was most evident in the debate that appeared around the question of whether there was a tension between equity and development (Wolpe 1992). The 1960s globally had seen a great faith in the inevitability of economic development of the South and in the trickle-down of the fruits of development to the poorest sections of society. However, in the 1970s there had been a widespread realization that both these assumptions were rarely justified by the evidence. As a result a counter-emphasis on basic needs and equity-based strategies emerged.5 Whilst structural adjustment appeared ascendant in the 1980s, there was still a powerful left critique which saw any economic benefits that were likely to accrue as being offset by negative implications for equity.

In the NEPI process this debate centred around the report on Human Resource Development (NEPI 1992b), although it also permeated both the Framework Report (NEPI 1993) and the Adult Basic Education (ABE) report (NEPI 1992c).

Two strongly divergent positions emerged on the equity-development question during the NEPI process. The overall view of the HRD report, although even it contained tensions, was that equity and economic

5 The chief propagators of this view in educational circles were the International Council for Educational Development (Coombs and Ahmed 1974; Ahmed and Coombs 1975; Coombs 1980).
development could be achieved simultaneously. The way to bring this about was through a model which borrowed heavily from international (largely British) notions of New Times and of thinking about a High Skill Equilibrium (NEPI 1992b). Through reductions in learning and workplace disparities; through improving both of these environments; and through greater international competitiveness, South Africa would be both more prosperous and less inegalitarian.

The HRD report called for a high participation-high skill education and training system which would encourage larger numbers to partake of good quality learning and which would be linked to an industrial focus on high skilled, and therefore high waged, labour (NEPI 1992b). Such a model would be built upon a national qualifications system which would do away with the previous divisions between academic and vocational domains. In any case vocational education was roundly condemned, with much of the criticism reading like a rather simplified version of World Bank arguments regarding the desirability of general (academic) over vocational education (World Bank 1988). The newly unified education and training system would be based on the notion of broad generic competencies (NEPI 1992b).

This position was subjected to considerable criticism from other elements within the NEPI research community. On the subject of competencies, the Framework Report noted the big gap between employer and trade union conceptions and the danger that a competency-based approach might lead to a narrowing of learning (NEPI 1993: 81). This was part of a

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6 Introduced in Chapter One, this meta-narrative will be explored at greater length later in this chapter.

7 The World Bank position is, in summary, that general education is cheaper, easier to manage and more efficient than vocational preparation which, whenever possible, should take place in the workplace.
broader acknowledgement that COSATU were key movers behind the proposed model. Indeed, there was some concern expressed that narrow COSATU interests were being served:

The model will accentuate the differences between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' because only employed workers will benefit, with substantial working time and resources committed to learning. The model does not cater directly for women or for those in rural contexts. (NEPI 1993: 81)

The feasibility of the high skill approach was also questioned. It was argued that the model would need to build upon a range of factors. These included a strong economy; a strong civil society; a strong state; and strong corporate relations (NEPI 1993: 24-5). The Report argued that these were untenable and, in particular, the likelihood of the COSATU-inspired link of education and training to jobs via career pathing8 was questioned (NEPI 1993: 81)

However, the intellectual underpinnings of this model, and its central assumption that equity and economic development were compatible, were not so clearly questioned in the final texts. Although this issue of compatibility was raised by one of the NEPI editorial group (Wolpe 1992), his critique is hardly mentioned in the published results of the investigation.

The high skill, national qualifications model was but one alternative that arose out of the NEPI process. Nonetheless, it soon became clear that it was effectively the new policy of the democratic movement. The reasons for this success will now be examined.

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8 Career pathing will be discussed later in this chapter. It is essentially the notion that instead of a working life consisting of a series of discrete and uncoordinated jobs, it is better to conceptualise such a working life in terms of a path from one level of skill and responsibility to another and to structure work accordingly.
The importance of the new era of negotiations in shaping new policy thinking from the democratic movement has already been identified. To this must be added the effect that the collapse of state socialism had on thinking in such circles. The perception that there was no longer a radical socialist alternative to be found, coupled to the need to think concretely about implementable policies, largely channelled NEPI thinking down pragmatic social democratic thought paths. This was reinforced by the influence of international intellectual trends, themselves in part a response to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The New Times version of Post-Fordism offered both an alleged solution to the equity-development dilemma and a "new left" pedigree. Although originating from the artisanal democracy idyll of Piore and Sabel (1984) and the more pessimistic structuralism of the Regulationists (e.g. Aglietta 1979), it was the popularization of such notions as New Times by authors aligned to the then Communist Party of Great Britain (Hall and Jacques 1989) and Post-Fordism by elements of the Australian trade union movement (Mathews 1989) that appeared to have the greatest influence on South African intellectuals.

This is seen most clearly in the work of Andre Kraak (e.g. Kraak 1993b), who as one of the three authors of the HRD report played a central role in the introduction of the progressive version of Post-Fordist thinking into the South African education and training policy arena.

In Kraak’s work, and in its broader application to education, this progressive Post-Fordism is built upon by reference to British notions about a low skill equilibrium and how it could be transformed through a unified education and training system. Here again, it is worth noting that the borrowing in this case was largely from work which was politically
affiliated: the British Baccalauréat published by the Labour Party think
tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (Finegold et al. 1990).

The dominance of the new model over People’s Education thinking was
reinforced by the shift in oppositional power brought about by the
unbanning of the ANC. Partly as a result of disorganization and
continued state repression and partly out of an apparent willingness to
cede the initiative to the “authentic voice of the masses”, NECC’s
importance declined after NEPI (Samoff et al 1994).

As the NEPI process had not really led to the levels of feedback and
grassroots selection from policy options initially intended, there was no
popular mandate for any of the options generated.9 As a result, it was
possible for the ANC to move towards the selection of options which
reflected its need to negotiate its way to power. This process of ANC
structures accumulating power over policy formulation was furthered in
1993 by the establishment of the Centre for Education Policy
Development (CEPD). This think-tank was not to be headed by a
NECC/NEPI stalwart, but by long-term exile Trevor Coombe, then based
at the University of London.10

The nature of the democratic movement’s policy discourse after the
establishment of the CEPD will be examined shortly. However, first it is
necessary to explore the equally crucial role of COSATU in ensuring the
adoption of the New Times meta-narrative of NEPI as the principal
strand of the democratic movement’s policy discourse.

9 A lack of organisational capacity seems to have been at the root of this failure (Appel
1993; Samoff et al 1994).
10 He was not simply an academic, however, having been an educational planner in
Zambia during the 1970s.
COSATU’S ROLE IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

COSATU’s role in the NEPI process has already been alluded to in the reporting of criticisms of the New Times line. COSATU directly influenced the NEPI process, both through papers presented to research groups (e.g. Bird 1992a) and through membership of key NEPI overview committees (NEPI 1993). However, it was through the parallel programme of research in the union movement that COSATU was most influential nationally as an agenda setter.

The first major intervention in the research process by the unions was by one of the largest affiliates, the National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA). A few months prior to NEPI it had begun work on its NUMSA Vocational Project, which reported in 1991 (NUMSA 1991). After research visits to Australia, Britain, Italy, Sweden, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, a model for reformed training, and its links to education, was proposed.

This again showed considerable Post-Fordist influences, particularly from the Australian trade unions, whilst at the same time being grounded in the aspirations of union members and the obstacles to advancement they faced. These two came together most clearly in an interest in multi-skilling, seen in part as a way of increasing members’ earning potential.\textsuperscript{11} The project’s findings stressed the need for a system of paid education and training leave (PETL) and recognition of prior learning (RPL) as central

\textsuperscript{11} It was here particularly that the policy was a NUMSA one rather than belonging to COSATU as a whole. Although the distinction between NUMSA and COSATU policy has often been blurred, this area engendered some tension between NUMSA and the other largest affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). NUM members tended to be less educated and less likely to benefit from the changes offered by the New Times vision. For NUM, issues of Paid Education and Training Leave (PETL), Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) and Adult Basic Education (ABE) were more pressing than multi-skilling and career-pathing.
underpinnings of a shift towards lifelong education and training. The document also developed the notion of a nexus between training, skills, grading and wages which would provide the framework through which both career paths and closer linkages between formal education, adult basic education and training would be stressed.

The NUMSA project was followed up by COSATU’s commitment to an on-going Participatory Research Programme (PRP). Through this and other formulations, a COSATU position developed further. The need to link education and training with economic development was made in a presentation by NUMSA Education Officer, Adrienne Bird, to one of the earliest meetings between the unions and the state training bureaucracy (Bird 1991). The related imperative to improve linkages between education, training and adult education was also strengthened by the PRP into a call for a national qualifications framework [NQF] (COSATU PRP 1993b). It was also recommended that “all education/training and assessment must be determined on the basis of competency” (COSATU PRP 1993a). This represents an early (in the South African context) and very clear call for competency-based modular learning (CBML), a key element of the current debate, as we shall see subsequently.

The COSATU position, grounded as it was in both workplace strategies and a belief in a shift towards a Post-Fordist economy, also led the movement in other non-learning oriented directions which, though not central to the concerns of this thesis, are in need of brief consideration for their impacts upon such concerns.

Part of the New Times vision for the economy was for high-skilled production to lead to greater export earnings which, in turn, would act as
an engine of further economic growth (NEPI 1993). The identification of suitable niches to be developed as part of this vision became an element of the work of the Industrial Strategy Project carried out by ANC-aligned economists (Joffe et al. 1993). In so far as the new education and training system would be expected to answer economic imperatives, this focus becomes highly significant.

The New Times vision was also one of industrial harmony, with collaboration in the work-place replacing confrontation (Mathews 1989; Kraak 1993b). Moreover, in its South African form it was argued that the radical restructuring of interlocking institutions in order to facilitate a paradigm shift from low-skill to high-skill production could only be achieved if there was a high level of cooperation between capital, labour and state (Baskin 1993). As a consequence, elements of the COSATU leadership began to argue for a policy of “strategic unionism” (ibid.). Just as much as the educational policy proposals, this represented a paradigm shift in thinking from the radical and confrontational stance of the late 1980s to a new pragmatic and collaborative stance for the early 1990s.

Other union officials saw the danger in such a policy that it might lead to a narrow corporate compromise (Bird and Schreiner12 1992). Such a fear seemed particularly justified given the claim by some leaders that COSATU represented the broader masses of South Africa and not just a unionized elite (SALB 1993 [interview with Ebrahim Patel13]; Baskin 199314).

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12 Both were NUMSA officials.
13 General Secretary of the South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union and chief COSATU negotiator on the National Economic Forum.
14 Jeremy Baskin, Director of the National Labour and Economic Development Institute, nominally independent but located in COSATU House, maintained this position in a 1995 interview with the author and argued that there was research data to back up this claim.
Such a stance is of significance to the education and training debate. The fear of a COSATU-driven policy was raised by some commentators during NEPI, as I showed above. However, through the joint preference of both the ANC and COSATU for a vision which accorded well with the New Times meta-narrative, this danger was effectively heightened rather than avoided as the policy process continued to evolve.

Just as NEPI, and the parallel work of NUMSA and COSATU, marked the development of a research-based agenda for negotiations from the democratic movement, so a similar process was occurring within the state, as we shall see now.

THE STATE AGENDA

In the previous chapter I examined the National Training Strategy, which, though commissioned prior to the unbanning of the ANC, reported in the era of negotiations. With its focus on a strongly market-led strategy, this amounted to the National Party negotiating position on training. Two subsequent reports, commissioned in 1990, were to constitute the official educational agenda. These were the Curriculum Model for Education in South Africa [CMESA] (DNE 1991a) and the Education Renewal Strategy [ERS] (DNE 1992).15

These documents contained the principal market-oriented strands already evident since the de Lange Commission: an explicit claim to be legitimate; a heavy dose of technocratic rationality; a strong stress on

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15 A draft ERS appeared in 1991 (DNE 1991b) and will also be referred to.
privatization; and a powerful reworking of the relationship between education and the economy.

Nonetheless, the new context of the 1990s meant that the state was more squarely behind such notions, as elements of a strategy to maximize the continuation of white power and privilege. This new stance was perhaps most evident in the treatment of race. The draft ERS was representing the voice of the state in a way that the de Lange Report never did when it argued that "race should not feature in the structuring of the provision of education" (DNE 1991b: 21).

Legitimacy

The claim to be legitimate was based in both reports on the assertion that all viewpoints were sought out in the consultation phase. The fact that ANC-aligned organizations and individuals refused to respond to calls for their participation was treated as unimportant. A more implicit claim to legitimacy also was present in the continued attempt to coopt oppositional discourse.

The weakness caused by the lack of legitimacy present in state organs had not been successfully tackled by the twin tracks of reform and repression in the 1976-89 period and the decision to unban the ANC had continued to foreground this problem. This lay at the heart of the explicit claims to have consulted before producing documents and in the largely gestural attempts to cooperate on education policy through organs such as the
Joint Working Group. It was also evident in the intensified usage of highly technicist language and a technocratic rationality.

Technocratic Rationality

This permeated both these two important reports as well as the NTS. The education reports, like their training counterparts in the 1980s, were compiled by bureaucratic commissions and based on the more detailed work of expert committees (Bennell et al. 1992). In the ERS process, for example, the focus was very much on the production of management solutions. This was in sharp contrast with the NEPI approach’s focus on providing options to a popular constituency for it to make final decisions.

Curriculum reform was also seen as a technical process in the CMESA Report: “curriculum reform is an extremely complex process which must take place in a scientifically responsible manner and on an evolutionary basis” (DNE 1991a: vi).

Such a view served a triple purpose. First, it mystified the process of reform so as to limit critique. Second, it portrayed it as value-free in an attempt to deflect accusations of political bias. Third, by stressing the evolutionary nature of change, it sought to derail calls for radical, transformatory change.

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16 For a period of just over a year in 1991-2 a forum between the state and the ANC alliance met occasionally to discuss immediate educational problems such as textbook shortages and to consider the possibility of negotiations on educational transformation. The JWG was not binding on the state and made little headway in recommendations for change (Christie 1994).
Privatization

The attempt to reduce the state’s presence in the education sector, begun in the 1980s and analysed in the previous chapter, continued in the ERS. Decentralization from the national department and greater managerial autonomy for schools were frequent themes of that Report. Moreover, the principle of freedom of association was used to justify the right of communities to establish their own schools.

This was reflected in the one real attempt during this period to act rather than to agenda set. Through the Model C system, most white state schools by 1992 had come under the control of their existing parent communities, who could set admissions policy and, in the light of increased cost-sharing, fee levels (Christie 1994). This effectively controlled the desegregation process and limited black access to white schools, albeit on a class, rather than strictly racial, basis.

Other elements of the international debate regarding the marketization of education were also evident in the ERS formulation. Cost-sharing has been noted above, and this was particularly to be encouraged at post-compulsory level, a strong echo of World Bank policy (World Bank 1988).17 Parental choice was stressed, echoing government rhetoric in Britain and elsewhere. Finally, provider capture (the notion that the education system often comes to serve the interests of educationalists rather than parents and pupils) entered the discourse, in a reflection of debates emanating from England, the United States and New Zealand (e.g. Chubb and Moe 1990; DNE 1992; Gordon 1992).

17 The degree to which there was direct World Bank influence appears unresolved. However, it is possible that the strong resonances with Bank views might arise from the large numbers of World Bank sabbaticals granted to South Africans during this period. I owe this point to Kenneth King.
CMESA in particular represented a very strong attempt to further vocationalize South African education. This of course can be seen, at least in part, as a result of the limited degree of implementation of the de Lange Report’s proposals of a decade earlier. Along with the ERS, the CMESA proposals shared the 1980s view that education was failing in the orientation, preparation and socialization processes involved in transforming learners into workers. Lack of relevance and academic bias were central elements of such an analysis (DNE 1991a: 3-4).

In response to these failings, CMESA called for a “paradigm shift from predominantly university-oriented education towards vocationally-oriented education” (DNE 1991a: vi-vii), an almost direct copy of the de Lange Report’s conclusions on this issue. This shift was to be effected by curriculum reform at all levels of schooling. At junior primary level economic education and vocational guidance would be introduced (ibid: 26). There would be a heavy emphasis on socialization, with students being expected to learn how “to be acceptable to others” (ibid: 15). From this stage until the end of schooling, vocational orientation would be a cross-curricular theme permeating all subjects (ibid. vii; 33). At senior primary level would be added a specific focus on the inculcation of “positive attitudes to work and the development of a work ethic” (ibid. 15-6).

The junior secondary school would see the emphasis on the “development of economic literacy and entrepreneurial skills” (ibid: 16-7), the former in spite of the previously stated focus on economic education since the beginning of schooling. This level of schooling
would also include the introduction of a focus on six vocationally-oriented themes, although it was simply stated that they would feature in the curriculum, not what form this focus would take (ibid: 23).

These themes were engineering; business; arts; agriculture; utility industries; and social services (ibid: 20). At senior secondary level they were to be the structure for a vocationally-oriented strand, to be provided in schools, which would be offered along with an academic education strand. A vocational education strand would be offered in technical colleges. The first two strands showed a New Vocationalist emphasis on orientation rather than technical preparation. The third strand was in keeping with this in so far as it moved technical preparation back out of the school system. This tripartite approach had clear parallels with the system of General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) emerging in England at the same time.18

The balance was to be shifted further towards the vocational even at this upper secondary level. Whilst those in academic education would be encouraged to take courses from the six vocationally-oriented fields, which would also be used to shape their academic subjects, students in the vocational strand at technical college would do no academic subjects (ibid: 42).

The effect of these proposals was to reiterate the state’s commitment to a position in which education would be held in a close, instrumental bond with industry. Both education and training had been slated for a reorganization which would facilitate better interaction between them in their joint striving to serve the economy. However, this was by no

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18 Indeed, it is worth noting that this triple-track approach returned to centre stage in England in early 1996 (Guardian 02/03/96: 1).
means integration of the two, and notions such as competency had yet to pass over to education from training.

The education provided for the masses, however, would be focused closely on attitudinal, and to a lesser extent, technical preparation, which carried connotations of training. Notions of the three strands of education commanding equal status were hard to sustain in the face of frequent clarifications that academic education was for the most able and that sifting out to non-formal education or into more vocational streams would primarily be on the criteria of aptitude and ability for academic study (ibid: 22-4).

This “meritocratic” system must of course be read in the light of the parallel privatization strategy. That strategy’s operation “as a means of protecting patterns of privilege” in white education (Christie 1994: 50), meant that the ERS/CMESA proposals amounted to little more than a rerunning of the 1984 Education Act’s division between broad liberal education for the white elite and narrow instrumentalism for the African masses. Where it differed, however, was in its stronger commitment to induction of a limited number of wealthy Africans into the elite system.

After this initial post-1990 phase of research-based agenda setting, the stage was set for policy formulation. Attempts to develop meaningful negotiations between the state and the state-in-waiting had begun with the 1991 establishment of the Joint Working Group, but remained largely unsuccessful. In the mean time the ANC and COSATU began to develop a coordinated policy for education and training, which was to form part of the ANC’s election manifesto package, and the position from which the alliance did finally enter onto the national negotiating stage.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANC POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING

In January 1994 the ANC published its education blueprint for the post-election period. This document, *A Policy Framework for Education and Training* (ANC 1994a) arose out of post-NEPI policy deliberations which saw a further elaboration of both the COSATU and ANC notions about a progressive Post-Fordist education and training system. Something of the nature of this evolution of policy thinking can be seen through an exploration of the draft documents which fed into the core section of the framework, regarding integration of education and training.

Stage One: An Integrated Approach to Post Compulsory Education

In March 1993 a paper on “An Integrated Approach to Post Compulsory Education” was produced (ANC-COSATU 1993a).19 As the title indicates, this document had a narrow focus on the further education level. Following on from the debate about equity and development which the New Times model allegedly overcame, the paper was structured around the equity, economic efficiency and democracy dimensions of various policy themes. The intention behind this was clear: National Party policy would be shown to be neither efficient, equitable nor democratic, in direct contrast to proposed ANC-COSATU policies.

Central to these proposed policies was the integrated qualification structure first considered in the earlier COSATU/NUMSA papers (ANC-COSATU 1993a: 4). This would have three major levels. First, there

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19 This and subsequent drafts were authored by Adrienne Bird (NUMSA) and Gail Elliott (ANC).
would be a basic education level, comprising primary, secondary and adult basic education, and leading to a General Education Certificate. Second, there would be a further education level, leading to a National Higher Certificate. Third, there would be a higher education level, leading to (unspecified) degrees and diplomas (ibid: 5).

In this particular document the focus was squarely on the second level. This would have five certification levels within it, with the existing matriculation level being equivalent to level 3 (ibid: 6). At each level learners would be expected to take a prescribed core group of courses plus a further set of options. This would be based on a competency-based modular approach. However, this form of competency would not be the traditional concept of the ability to perform narrowly defined tasks. Rather, it must be construed as consisting of three basic elements- the traditionally vocational element of the application of skill; the traditionally academic element of knowledge of theory underpinning various applications and the traditionally missing element which deals with the interface of the two. (ibid: 6-7)

All modules would carry the same number of credit points and this would facilitate credit transfer (ibid: 10). The oversight of standards setting would be done by a National Education and Training Board. This would have two sub-committees, one for training and one for education. Significantly, the latter would be the only place that teachers would be included as standard setters, whilst universities would have no apparent involvement.

This model appeared to draw very heavily on that of the British Baccalauréat (Finegold et al. 1990), itself primarily a vision of further education reform. However, whereas the British research arose out of the education sector and retained the feel of an educational view of
integration, here the feel was very much that of a unification which was training-driven. All learning was to be competency-based and all students would have to do at least one vocational subject (ANC-COSATU 1993a: 9). The reference to vocational subjects is itself a reflection of the unfinished nature of the new thinking, as in a fully unified system there would be neither academic nor vocational subjects.

In spite of this training focus, however, the document lacked a really coherent view of how this model would interlock with the nexus. This resulted in a sketch of career paths for a variety of sectors that had 8 levels which were totally un-articulated with the levels previously suggested for education and training (ibid: 14).

Stage 2: A Framework for Lifelong Learning. Draft One

In June 1993 a second paper appeared which broadened the focus to the whole of education and training: A Framework for Lifelong Learning. Draft One (ANC-COSATU 1993b). It used the same tripartite strategy of focusing on equity, efficiency and democracy, but added a longer preamble which further emphasized the equity dimension of the proposals through a restatement of the principles agreed upon by the 1992 National Education Conference (Essop 1992), an attempt to reinforce popular support for ANC education policy. Among these, it was stated that education and training should be:

provided to all on a democratic and unitary basis, opposing any discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, class and age;

[and]
extended to all disadvantaged groups including women, adults, students, youth and rural communities, in order to redress historical imbalances. (ANC-COSATU 1993b: 1)

This document largely replicated its predecessor in its early discussions of the problems of the current system and the principles of the proposed alternative. However, this discussion developed into a new exploration of two possible approaches to integration: a crucial debate in the context of what has happened subsequently.

The first model the paper considered was that of “Two ladders with bridges”. This was represented as a version of the German dual system (ibid. 12). There would be an education track and a training track with provision for transference between them at certain specified points. This model was rejected in this draft for four reasons.

First, it was argued that South Africa was poorer than Germany and therefore could not afford to make the training track as high prestige as the education one. This was a striking argument in the light both of the borrowings of the ANC-COSATU model from elsewhere in the OECD countries and of the NEPI critique of what was now the preferred ANC-COSATU approach as unrealistic at South Africa’s level of development (NEPI 1993). It seemed that borrowings from England and Australia were more feasible than those from Germany.20

Second, “it does not solve the problem of those adults who have no general education” (ANC-COSATU 1993b: 12). This is another important

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20 In so far as the English system is widely held to be inferior in the quality and quantity of skilled labour produced, it may indeed be more feasible to reach English rather than German levels of training. Such an argument was put to me in an interview by Tony Ansara of the Hospitality Industry Training Board (Ansara OI 1995). However, given that the English notions being borrowed were to do with Post-Fordist transition, the argument that a German model was less feasible is unconvincing.
point to keep in mind when we consider subsequent formulations of the actual breadth of learning to be offered as part of adult basic education.

Third, occupational mobility between different sectors was limited as "there is no underpinning for portability of skills in the form of generic knowledge" (ibid.). This issue of portability is another that will re-emerge later in this thesis.

Fourth, it was argued that the "ladders and bridges" model disallowed combinations of academic and vocational learning. This appeared to accord the two tracks a level of rigidity and purity that was not reflected in practice.

The document proposed the alternative of a "unified, multi-path model" (ibid.). This would have a single qualification structure with a core and options (as proposed in the previous document). This approach, it was claimed, "ensures that there is integration in the provision of education and training, hence no polarity of status can result" (ibid: 13). Maximum portability, flexibility and access would be guaranteed through such a structure.

This new document introduced some new ideas and adapted others from the earlier paper. A single Department of Lifelong Learning was envisaged to oversee the integrated system, assisted by a National Certification Council (ibid: 15). Industry Training Boards would be replaced by Sector Education and Training Boards with representation broadened beyond corporate interests. These boards would be expected to oversee training for both the formal and the informal sectors (ibid: 9).
The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of competency noted in the NEPI Framework Report (NEPI 1993) was heightened by an inconsistency in terminology. Whereas page 25 of the document still talked of "competency", page 19 had already seen a shift to "competency outcome": potentially a less behaviourist notion. The shifting sands of terminology in this area will be revisited subsequently, both in this and the following chapter.

In other areas, little development from the previous paper was evident. This was particularly the case for integration between the nexus and the qualifications framework, which was still heavily under-theorized.

Two further themes of this draft are also worth reflecting upon briefly. First, in spite of the shift to a tight integration of academic and vocational education, the paper argued that "the rest of the world recognises basic general education as a democratic human right" (ibid: 2). Whilst it is possible to argue that a truly general education is one which integrates education and training, that clearly was not the conventional usage in "the rest of the world" at the time. Again, what seemed to be happening here, though no explicit references were made, was a further attempt to coopt World Bank arguments, this time in order to move beyond, rather than overthrow, state policy.

Second, the paper was explicit regarding ANC views about where power should reside. As we saw above, the National Party strategy in the 1990-4 period was to remove as much power as possible from the state, whether through decentralization, deregulation or privatization. The ANC was determined to resist this strategy. As regards learning systems, this document made it clear that
Education and training policies have to be decided upon and governed from central government level (i.e. national). Regional and local government tiers will be responsible for implementation and delivery. (ibid: 4)

The battle between this position and that of the National Party, as we shall see subsequently, was also a battle which affected the nature of the unified system being proposed.

Stage 3: A Framework for Lifelong Learning. Draft Two

A further version of this paper appeared in August. This amounted in the main to a tidying up of the previous version. Nonetheless, some interesting shifts did emerge. For instance, there was a stronger attempt to marry career path levels with educational levels. Instead of an eight-level career path and a twelve-level qualification system, a combined twelve-level structure was proposed, although this remained rather under-developed on the side of the career path, with four levels still "to be defined" (ANC-COSATU 1993c: 9). The National Certification Council has been replaced by a South African Qualifications Authority (ibid: 15), more closely reflecting New Zealand usage.

The shift in competency-based language became even more apparent in this version:

Whereas an outcomes approach is a way of defining a curriculum in terms of learning aims, a competency model refers to a particular form of outcome- usually the performance of a narrowly defined task in a workplace (or by simulation). What is being suggested here is a notion of educational outcomes that is broad enough to include any learning experience that might traditionally have been included in an academic course, a college based vocational course or a work based programme. (ibid: 27-8)
This change in language was very significant. Such a version of competencies-outcomes was potentially far more acceptable to mainstream educators than the previous versions. However, it was also quite a move away from what was the accepted industry view, which in practice included large sections of adult basic education provision. Moreover, there was still little likelihood that many educators would see the shift as anything more than a smoke-screen.

Stage 4: A Policy Framework for Education and Training

The ANC policy document published in January 1994 as part of its manifesto development process was far broader in scope than the documents discussed in this section so far.21 In its first chapter on “Goals, Commitments and Tasks” it developed a powerful critique of Apartheid education and stressed the need to overcome the legacy of segregation, poor and inequitable access and undemocratic governance (ANC 1994a: 2). These, of course, were major strands of the equity theme of the People’s Education meta-narrative which continued to be placed at the front, if not the centre, of ANC policy.

At the core of the new system was the proposal for an integrated system (ibid: 15). As previously, this would not only provide equity but would make South Africa more competitive in the face of globalization pressures (ibid.). However, the detail on this was very thin. Whereas the previous documents had covered thirty closely packed pages each, here

21 This was officially designated as an ANC document in contrast to those previously examined. However, as COSATU (along with the South African Communist Party) was committed to supporting the ANC platform for the forthcoming elections, this document should be taken as having COSATU backing.
the consideration of this major new innovation covered only five well-spaced sides.

There was reference only to three "major certificated levels or exit points", with a further three ABE levels beneath these (ibid: 18). RPL and career paths were mentioned but not elaborated upon. Outcomes were now clearly preferred to competencies. However, given the confusion present in the previous formulations regarding their relative meanings, the failure to define outcomes, in this their first public airing, can be read as a major omission.

Two major new points for discussion emerge from a close reading of this document. First, there was a lack of clarity regarding the nature of national qualifications at the higher education level. In the key chapter on "Evolving a National Learning System" there was stress on better coordination between university courses. However, the only reference to a "national core curriculum based on the integration of academic and vocational skills", applied this model simply to pre-Higher Education levels (ibid: 19). Equally, the chapter on "Higher Education", later in the document, made no mention of outcomes in the tertiary level context. The proposals could be read, therefore, as allowing some degree of movement for the universities in avoiding what, for some of them at least, was an unpalatable new approach, shifting, as it did, the balance of power in education away from the universities (Lugg 1994).

Second, the constitutional negotiations prior to the publication of the education and training policy framework had undermined previous comments regarding the centrality of the state in education policy and provision:
Under the Interim Constitution, which defines the powers and responsibilities of the national and provincial levels of government, and in terms of the national policies for education and training, as much decision-making and executive responsibility as possible will be devolved to local and institutional governance bodies as they can sustain. (ibid: 22)

Such a position was far more in keeping with National Party policy of the past decade.

Provincial Education and Training Authorities (PETAs) would be set up to co-ordinate policy at the provincial level (ibid: 24). However, what this meant in practice amounted to very little if the following passage is to be believed:

they [the PETAs] will observe national policy in respect of: the national qualifications system, the national curriculum framework, policy frameworks and guidelines, norms and standards, planning and financing processes, including fiscal equalisation, conditions of service of education personnel, industrial relations in education and training (public employees only), management information systems, and a national quality assurance system, including the monitoring of redress. (ibid: 24-5)

This second passage suggested little in the way of autonomy for provinces, and none with regards to the national qualifications system.22 However, the previous passage, and its close relationship to constitutional negotiations, left open the possibility for greater regional powers. The delineation of those powers, and their implications for specific policy areas such as national qualifications, would have to wait until a later stage of the policy process after the elections. However, an

22 It also seemed to mark a clear move away from the local curricular autonomy suggested by National Party documents since the de Lange Report.
Implementation Plan for Education and Training was drawn up by the CEPD (1994).

The Reconstruction and Development Programme

Education and training policy was but one facet of an overall ANC policy strategy, and also should be considered within that broader framework. Therefore, I will now turn to a brief consideration of what the central ANC document, The Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP] (ANC 1994b), had to say about education and training.

The RDP, as its name suggests, was built upon assumptions of the feasibility of providing development and equity simultaneously, “reconstruction” frequently being used as a synonym for redistribution. However, whilst “building the economy” was one of its five central principles (ibid: para.1.4.1.1), and globalization was referred to several times (e.g. para.1.4.1.7), the principle of “developing our human resources” displayed a bias towards equity.

There was a major focus in the RDP document on the need to develop ABE and compulsory formal education as a response to education as a basic human right, and for empowerment. Although both SAQA and an NQF were mentioned, there was no reference to either competencies or outcomes. Indeed, the stress of the chapter on human resources was on a concern with human development rather than the linkages between learning and work.
Summarizing ANC Education Policy

Through this internal policy process the ANC seemed, therefore, to have developed a position on education and training which saw integration as central to the post-election system. A National Qualifications Framework and a South African Qualifications Authority were also on the agenda, although their likely nature remained unstated in published documents and inconsistent in internal ones. Other positions also remained unclear and contested, notably over the crucial issues of centre-province responsibilities and equity-development tensions. In the case of the latter, the RDP position seemed to reflect a stress on equity which was fundamentally different from the more development-oriented concerns of the education and training policy framework.

A further shaping of all these issues would be provided by the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) which was also to report in early 1994. Before turning to an examination of that crucial document, however, it is necessary to briefly examine how the corporate sector was responding both to the new era and to the negotiating positions being developed by the National Party and the ANC-COSATU alliance.

THE CORPORATE RESPONSE

In many respects the corporate view regarding education remained unchanged from that sketched out in the previous chapter. There was a continued attempt to both supplement and shape state provision through heavy educational expenditure. Investment in technical education continued, but increasingly there was a huge emphasis on making the
school system more effective. Teacher upgrading schemes, improved mathematics and science education and new infrastructure were all elements of the 1990s investment programme (Moyo 1995).

What was more significant, however, was the ever-increasing importance of the business community in the policy process. With the rise of privatization, this new funding from the private sector was increasingly central as a source of leverage for innovation in education as well as training. Moreover, the demise in the state’s ability and willingness to dominate the policy agenda gave big business the space in which to attempt to develop a view of education and training that could be placed against the ANC-COSATU vision.

Much of the new wave of corporate expenditure came from the sources identified in the previous chapter. However, two huge new players emerged. The Independent Development Trust, a state-capital alliance, was responsible for disbursements of R470 million to education in the period covered by this chapter (Samoff et al. 1994: 30). The Joint Education Trust, corporate-funded but with trustees from a wide range of major political and economic organizations, was established in 1992 with a R500 million budget for five years (ibid: 29).

In addition to investment in formal schooling came ever-increasing bursary programmes for African university students, as companies sought to accelerate African corporate advancement. A much larger impact, however, came from a stress on adult literacy and basic education.

A large drive towards employee literacy had started in the mines during the 1980s (NEPI 1992c). In the 1990s that began to broaden out into manufacturing and shift focus towards wider notions of adult basic
education. Major companies, such as Mercedes-Benz and the Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM), pledged themselves to adult basic education for all employees (Dovey 1995; ESKOM 1993).

Development of provision also was apparent in the field of training. The establishment of industry training boards in some industries led to a growth of competency-based modular training (Building Industry Training Board [BITB] 1991; Plastics Industry Training Board 1993; Riches [Director of the Clothing Industry Training Board] OI 1995).

Notions of career paths began to emerge in certain industries such as building and electricity generation and distribution (Burroughs 1993; ESKOM 1993). Multi-skilling also began to enter corporate strategies (ESKOM 1993). Recognition of Prior Learning came into sharper focus. This had been legislated for as part of the 1981 Manpower Training Act, but it was the 1990s before industries such as building again led the way in developing mechanisms to formalize it (BITB 1991; Burroughs 1993).

These practical developments in education and training were accompanied by interventions at the policy level. Here the 1989 establishment of the Private Sector Education Council (PRISEC), representing the major business federations, was an important step. PRISEC's agenda was largely in tune with that of the government with marketization and relevance the two central themes of policy documents (e.g. PRISEC 1992). The entrenchment of technocratic rationality was furthered by the establishment by the Urban Foundation of its own education policy unit (EDUPOL). The EDUPOL vision was very strongly one of market forces and value-free statistical research (Hofmeyr and Buckland 1992).
There was the emergence, however, in the early 1990s of a new strand of thinking amongst employer representatives which was an elaboration on some of the practices outlined above. A 1992 paper by Bobby Godsell, chief corporate negotiator in talks with COSATU and senior Anglo-American training manager, was particularly significant in this context. Godsell showed a strong familiarity with the kind of language being employed by the ANC and COSATU. His vision was one of collaboration with trade unions in organizations which bore a strong resemblance to the type of firm predicted by the New Times model. In this vision, employers would have the responsibility for providing workers with literacy and numeracy training, a major COSATU demand. On education, the call was for a move beyond the academic-vocational division, again reminiscent of the New Times meta-narrative (Godsell 1992).

Such a stance from the corporate world became even more apparent as negotiations between both sides of the political and industrial struggle began. It was largely a response to the successful development of a coherent and persuasive agenda by COSATU. However, two other influences also helped the more visionary corporate leaders to see opportunities as well as threats in the ANC-COSATU propositions.

First, the one existing model of integrative practice in education and training was that of New Zealand, where it was an element of the most thorough-going marketization of education in an OECD country. Taken together with semi-integrative trends in Australia, England and Scotland,

23 Such a firm would be based on high skill labour; flexible production technologies; reduced hierarchies and harmonious industrial relations.
the New Zealand evidence suggested that integration could be organized in the interests of elements of capital.

The significance of integrative practice emerging in the countries with which white South Africa's had its strongest cultural ties should not be under-estimated. However, this seems less important than a second influence, which I shall explore at greater length.

The possibilities of Post-Fordism were also increasingly coming to the attention of South African corporate leaders as a result both of the growing international response to perceived globalization pressures, seen through the actions of many of the transnationals represented in South Africa and in the emerging international literature on the need for organizational transformation (e.g. Peters 1987).

Although this literature was little different from New Times in its concerns and claims, its manifestations as corporate practice made it rather less utopian. Therefore, it is important to distinguish it from its more pro-labour rival. To this end I have called it "Lean Production" after the epithet used in one of the key texts of this meta-narrative internationally (Womack et al. 1990).

There is a growing and wide-ranging literature about Lean Production but here the focus will be on five of the meta-narrative's principal facets before a brief consideration of its implications for education and training policy. Internationally, there is a large critical literature regarding this discourse, as well as a rather less rigorous advocacy literature, and both of these will be used here. In the case of South Africa, the newness of the

24 Hence my use of Post-Fordist as a generic term in this chapter.
discourse means both these literatures are rather sparse.\textsuperscript{25} As a result there will be a greater than ideal reliance here on external sources and extrapolation therefrom.

**Knowledge Workers and the Learning Organization**

One of the central themes of New Times thinking, as we saw earlier, is its claim that the new economic and technological climate leads human resources to become the most important element of a firm’s competitive advantage. This stress was reflected in South African employer formulations (e.g. South African Business Network 1994b). These were in turn rooted in international texts such as *Made in America* which spoke of a “continuously learning workforce” (Dertouzos et al. 1989: 149) and “firms as learning institutions” (ibid: 82).

**Employee Participation**

This meta-narrative stresses employee participation in the decision-making process of the firm. Again, this is analogous to the New Times meta-narrative. However, some authors have stripped away a little of the gloss from this vision. Beale, for example, noted the need to distinguish between employee participation and employee involvement schemes (Beale 1994). Whereas the former sees workers as equal collaborators with management; the latter sees greater involvement in problem-solving for the company by workers. This amounts, in their

\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, probably the best South African source was written by an Australian trade unionist imported by NUMSA, Chris Lloyd.
view, to little more than “the discovery of ways of allowing the company or organization to benefit from ‘shopfloor expertise’ traditionally neglected by management” (ibid: 91).

Such an analysis was concurred with by the NUMSA shop stewards at Toyota SA in Durban in a piece (NUMSA Shop Stewards (Toyota SA) 1992) which was written in further elaboration of a Nattrass article about the factory. In that article she had pointed to the limited nature of participation in the factory, despite Toyota’s rhetoric (Nattrass 1991). For instance, the company ran a scheme called Siyacabanga (we think) in which three innovatory suggestions from a worker would earn that individual the reward of a mug and a key ring. The disparity between the benefits to the firm from worker-led innovation and those accruing to the workers themselves are laid bare by this example.

**Flexibility**

One of the central terms used by Lean Production advocates is “flexibility”. This notion has been used to break down job classifications and demarcations; and to increase the number of non-permanent or part-time staff (Atkinson and Meager 1986). For Wickens, a former director of Nissan UK, flexibility denotes the maximum expansion of all jobs (Wickens 1987). Flexibility inevitably has become a contested practice and its principal British researcher has concluded that it “has been virtually synonymous with the idea of labour being flexible in the interests of capital” (Atkinson 1987: 98).
Such a view can also be sustained for South Africa where many companies seem more concerned with the flexibility elements of Post-Fordism rather than the high skill ones. This has been particularly evident in the case of the contestation between multi-skilling and multi-tasking, as we shall now see.

Multi-Tasking

Lean Production shares New Times's use of the term "multi-skilling". However, as with flexibility and participation this has been strongly contested. In its rubbish ing of the German craft tradition (Womack et al. 1990) and in the Japanese-style stress on limited technical training (Lloyd 1994) the approach is seen by its critics as being far removed from true multi-skilling. Rather, it is argued to be about task accretion (Garrahan and Stewart 1992, and as Wickens implies above) or rotation through a range of unskilled tasks (Lloyd 1994). Lloyd argued that both of these forms of multi-tasking were far more common in pre-election South Africa than multi-skilling (ibid.).

Work Intensification

Linked to multi-tasking in the critique of Lean Production is the notion of work intensification. The accretion of tasks noted above, and applauded by some Lean Productionists (e.g. Peters 1987), is one element of such an intensification. To this is linked the tradition of enforced overtime in Japanese companies such as Toyota (Dohse et al. 1985). The
increased international usage of Just-in-Time approaches\textsuperscript{26} means that workers are less able to control the speed of work and hence create their own unofficial rest breaks (Lloyd 1994). Through the use of work teams with bonuses decided collectively, it is further possible to intensify work as group surveillance of individual workers is more effective than overseer or electronic means.

Some authors go as far as to suggest that what emerges from this discourse in practice is not just Neo-Fordist but is also Neo-Taylorist (Beale 1994; Berggren 1989). Although a stress on learning does emerge, it is far from a radical empowering vision. The inculcation of attitudes and values appears more important than the development of technical skills. As such, integration means little more than a retreat from costly vocationalism into a narrow competency-based attempt at socialization in both school and workplace, where relevance becomes the guiding principle. Such a shift appears very pertinent in South Africa as subsequent discussions will make evident.

THE FOUR META-NARRATIVES

I have now outlined four meta-narratives, two of which were continuations of pre-1990 positions. First, from progressive civil society and education, there was an on-going stress on equity and access to education which, however, lacked a well-defined view of the learning-work relationship. Second, from the ANC, COSATU and many of their

\textsuperscript{26} Just-in-Time refers to a system of maintaining zero buffer stocks at both ends of the production process with small levels of supplies being delivered as necessary. This means work is expected to go on at a constant pace as any stoppage has effects throughout the system. See Lloyd (1994) for more details.
intellectual supporters, there was a position which claimed to reflect both equity and development considerations through a largely Post-Fordist strategy of transforming both learning and work, but which often privileged both development and the workplace. Third, from the National Party and its allies at the head of the education bureaucracy, there was a continued stress on privatization and a need to tighten the links between learning and work. Fourth, from within the business community, but still in its infancy, there was a reading of the same forces as in the ANC-COSATU version of Post-Fordism but which stressed reorganization of both work and learning for capital's benefit.

THE NATIONAL TRAINING STRATEGY INITIATIVE

Whilst the education sector saw few signs of meaningful communication between state and opposition, there was more progress in the arena of training. COSATU was first represented on the National Training Board in August 1991 (Bird 1992b: 47). The movement's representation on the Board was instrumental in the subsequent rejection of the NTS Report and in 1993 it was agreed that a new National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) should be launched, with a new task team including COSATU members. This was to be the first official commission in which the democratic movement actively participated.

Central to the deliberations of the NTSI task team was the ANC-COSATU proposal to integrate education and training. Although the team was to look at training, this focus led it into the educational arena. In this light it was significant that membership of the task team was extended to Gustav Niebuhr of the Department of National Education and F. A.
Booyse of the (white) Department of Education and Culture: House of Assembly, but to no progressive educator.

As with several of the other reports that have been considered in this and the previous chapter, the deliberations of working committees were also important. The limited number of progressive educationalists in the eight working committees was also striking. Whilst one EPU director (Enver Motala) was a working committee member, none of the NEPI Editorial Committee and neither the ANC Director of Education nor the CEPD Director were included in any of the committees (NTB 1994: Appendix A).

Before turning to a consideration of the main Report, I will examine two papers that emerged from the most important of the working committees, that on "Integration of education and training; competencies and career paths and certification" (NTB 1994: 12): committee 2.

**Document 1: Towards a Concept for a South African National Qualifications Framework**

Given the central importance of this committee it is significant that it was chaired by someone from one of the most conservative industries, Bryan Phillips of the Gencor mining house.\(^27\) The early document, "Towards a Concept for a South African National Qualifications Framework" (Phillips 1993- September), was a clear indicator that an employer-friendly version of integration could be developed.

\(^{27}\) Through the "Education for Adults" programme, Phillips had come to prominence in the adult literacy field in the 1980s.
This discussion document was littered with approving comments about, and examples from, the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA), the Scottish Vocational Education Council (SCOTVEC) and the English National Council for Vocational Qualifications (NCVQ). The document appears to have been primarily concerned with building up a corporate lobby in favour of integration and the largest element of its focus was on the desirability and feasibility of such an approach for companies.

The narrowness of the approach was striking when contrasted with the earlier ANC-COSATU formulations. Organs of civil society were to be excluded from membership of the proposed Sector Education and Training Organizations (SETOs) and the informal sector, rural populations, women, youth and the unemployed all disappeared from view.

The approach was also narrow in that it seemed only to apply definitely to the further education and training level, although it was argued that “it may be desirable to broaden these definitions to incorporate general and higher education” (Phillips 1993: 1).

Indeed, this model’s focus was even more limited than that of the post-compulsory-focused first ANC-COSATU draft document analysed earlier in this chapter. In that vision, the matriculation examination would have been replaced by an integrated National High Certificate award at level 3 (ANC-COSATU 1993a). Here, however, it was suggested that matriculation should continue as a separate award equivalent to a National Certificate (Phillips 1993: 13).
Document 2: A Proposal for an Integrated National Approach to Education and Training

The committee’s eventual submission to the NTSI task team (NTB working committee 2 1993- December) reflected much of the Phillips’ view on the future shape of the NQF. This was not surprising given that during the deliberations of the committee, Phillips, representing the PRISEC alliance, and Bird, representing COSATU, dominated proceedings, according to other committee members (Bellis OI 1995; French OI 1995).

Reflecting the COSATU influence, the focus of this final paper was still narrowly on the further education and training levels of a model that finally seemed to have settled on eight full levels plus three sub-levels for ABE (NTB WC2 1993: 6). The exclusion of the broader community from the SETOs was confirmed (ibid: 35). Narrowness of vision was clear in a further comment in passing about universities not necessarily being part of the system (ibid: app. 3. 54). Indeed, the limits to integration were illustrated clearly when it was argued that there should be a separate Education Authority (ibid: app. 3. 47).

This notion of a separate authority for education was tied to a potentially significant linguistic shift. Whereas ANC-COSATU formulations since mid-1993 had talked of an integrated system, and continued to do so in the ANC policy framework of January 1994, committee 2’s document was entitled “A Proposal for an Integrated National Approach to Education and Training”. Whilst, the distinction between “system” and “approach” remained as opaque as many of the other linguistic turns of the period, it
appeared that this represented a looser corporate view, in contrast to the more strongly statist view of the trade union movement.

This sense of looseness was reinforced by an explicit description of the NQF as voluntarist, in the case of private education and training providers (NTB WC2 1993: app 3.51). Whilst it still appeared to be assumed that the NQF would be largely uncontested, this represented the first attempt to address the issue of voluntarism. The strong market influence on this document was also reflected in the assumption that SAQA would be a private company rather than an organ of state (ibid: app 3.47).

The proposal did show signs of a continued equity stress, however, although it was further muted. It was perhaps most noticeable (as too often was also the case in ANC documents) in the initial outlining of principles on which the new education and training system should be based. These were as follows:

- integration
- participation
- relevance
- transparency
- coherence and flexibility
- credibility
- standards
- access
- recognition of prior learning
- articulation
- portability
- non-racism and non-sexism (ibid: 4-6).
Of these, three stand out as strong symbols of the People’s Education meta-narrative. First, transparency, in order to “ensure that access routes, prerequisites and opportunities are clear, simple and understandable to all” (ibid: 5). Second, the commitment “to provide access to appropriate levels of education and training for all prospective learners in a manner that facilitates progression” (ibid.). Third, the requirement to “actively promote non-racist and non-sexist practices” (ibid. 6). The underlying principles of the NQF will be a theme returned to as attention now shifts to the final NTSI Report.

The National Training Strategy Initiative: Discussion Document

The NTSI also based itself in a list of twelve principles (NTB 1994: 8-11). In this list, transparency and non-racism/non-sexism were replaced by legitimacy and guidance of learners. It appears from this that policy and practice no longer had to answer to calls to be transparent but simply had to appear legitimate. This seems to reflect a shift from NECC-style usage in the draft towards greater sympathy with National Party concerns in the final Report. Hence, it is also indicative of a weakening of adherence to the People’s Education meta-narrative and the strengthening of the market-oriented alternative. The abandonment of non-racism/non-sexism, a core NECC principle, can also be seen in this light.

It is worth focusing briefly on some of the other principles as they introduced certain key notions of the Report as a whole. The first principle was that of integration. In keeping with the work committee’s document, the preferred terminology was that of an integrated approach
The significance of this usage had already been indicated earlier in the Report:

The term “integrated approach” indicates a super-ordinate strategy dealing with education and training as a whole which does not, however, impinge on the potential of dealing with each sub-system in a unique tactical manner. (ibid: 6)

This room for manoeuvre given to the sub-systems (however they were to be defined) reinforced the potential for asymmetry between different parts of education and training in what appeared to be a strong contrast to the tighter vision of an NQF, which had been implicit from the earliest NEPI-ANC-COSATU formulations.

The potential for conflict and contradiction inherent in this account of integration was also present in the fourth principle: coherence and flexibility. This stated that

Education and training should adhere to a coherent framework of principles and certification which may be established at national level, but should permit the flexibility of interpretation required to meet the needs of industry and service sectors, providers and learners. (ibid: 9)

In this formulation it was not entirely evident that coherence and flexibility could be successfully balanced nor which would take precedence if balance was impossible. The phrase: “may be established at national level”, could be taken as suggesting that national coherence was certainly not an over-riding principle.

The next principle, standards, led the document into the continuing morass of competency-outcomes distinctions. In this formulation it was stated that
In the training system it has been the practice (and the legal requirement) for some time to express the results of training in terms of competency. That term has however become subject to different interpretations by different organisations and needs clarification, hence the use of the term outcomes in this context. (ibid.)

However, nowhere in the Report was such clarification of the meanings of either competency or outcomes made explicit.

Articulation, progression and portability were important and related elements of the proposed approach. The need to facilitate movement within parts of the system (portability); among those parts (articulation); and between different levels (progression) all had formed a core of the proposal from its earliest development. However, for these to operate to their full extent, coherence rather than flexibility would have to be emphasized.

In reality there was little discussion or elaboration of many of the principles subsequent to their presentation in the introduction. Instead, the Report moved into a lengthy but highly tendentious examination of international experience and its relevance for South Africa, based on research commissioned specially by the NTB and coordinated from Berlin (Frey et al. 1994). This research largely seems to have been conducted

28 In common usage portability tends to be used to cover all horizontal movement and so corresponds to the meanings of portability and articulation in this report.
29 This three volume study looked at “Vocational and Technical Education in Australia, Brazil, Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, Tanzania and Zimbabwe” and was supplemented by NTS research on the NCVQ in England. At least in the case of Zimbabwe, for which I have the most personal knowledge, based on three years of service in the education system, the evidence presented was riddled with inaccuracies about education, training and the economic and political system. Many of these appeared rooted in a rather conservative ideological position.
30 The selection of these countries might seem rather bizarre. However, they can be seen as representative of the NICs (Malaysia, Singapore); the rest of Africa (Tanzania, Zimbabwe); the Old Commonwealth (Australia, England); and the continental European tradition (Germany). As a relatively industrialised and hugely inequalities society, Brazil is often identified as sharing many characteristics with South Africa.
to legitimate rather than inform the NTSI, as can be seen from the claim that international experience (and not from New Zealand!) pointed to the need for an NQF (NTB 1994: 30).

This discussion was followed by an exploration of such issues as defining units of learning and what constituted a module. This represented a retreat to the micro-level of technical detail before the broader philosophical and political questions had been addressed in any meaningful way. Again, this is indicative of the market-oriented meta-narrative.

The Four Meta-Narratives and the NTSI

How did the four meta-narratives shape the NTSI discourse? It was still the case that pro-equity dimensions were claimed for the NQF process, although this was far less explicit than in ANC-COSATU documents. Access was a principle underlying the Report and a concern in this area was a recurrent theme. This was seen as first manifesting itself in the formal schooling system:

Although theoretically all children of a school-going age are able to attend school, the standards and facilities at DET schools are significantly inferior to those found within DEC schools. Furthermore, the number of schools in rural communities is such that children are required to travel substantial distances every day to get to school. These factors restrict the numbers of scholars able to attend school and contribute to the very high drop-out rate experienced in the first few years of schooling. (ibid: 64)

This had implications in turn for access to training and further and higher education, and on ABE provision through higher levels of
demand. The commitment to access and equity also can be seen as operating through the stress on RPL (ibid: 11).

However, the Report can also be read as a further defeat for a radical view of education and training as a result of a series of exclusions. This first became obvious in the principles, which, as was already noted, no longer included “transparency” or “non-racism and non-sexism”. It was also apparent in the Report’s one comment regarding the issue of paid education and training leave, which acknowledged that, “labour believes that workers should have the right to paid education and training leave (PETL)” (ibid: 149).

This sentence is the epitome of the paradigm of negotiated compromise that characterizes the Report. This issue was clearly too important to the unions to be left unrecorded but its contentious nature meant that no discussion or conclusion was attempted.

Exclusion from the discourse and from the NQF was also very strikingly demonstrated by the admission that the data collected on South Africa largely rendered invisible: women, rural communities and the informal sector (ibid: 35). The effect of this was to give the Report a serious male, urban, formal sector bias. As a result there was a danger that those who were already relatively or absolutely privileged would continue to benefit disproportionately from the new system. COSATU members could largely be characterized as relatively privileged in such a context.

Elements of the state’s reliance on the market-oriented meta-narrative could also be discerned from the text. This was most evident when the

31 Whilst some of this data would not have been easy to acquire, the omission of the informal sector is striking in the light of the NTB’s previous interest in this sector (see Chapter Three).
Report did concern itself with education. Mismatch was one such theme which emerged:

A mismatch currently exists between the outputs of the education system and the economic requirements of the country. This is demonstrated by the number of matriculants and degreeed people who are incapable of finding jobs while at the same time a shortage of technical skills exists. (ibid: 58-9)

It was argued that “in terms of integrating the school-leaver into work, the education system plays no meaningful role” (ibid: 72). Academic bias was also seen as a major problem (ibid: 71). All of these strands of discourse were indicative of a continued instrumentalist view regarding education.

That many employers were still locked into conservative training practices was also an element of the Report’s narrative, which indicated limitations to Post-Fordist, or even Neo-Fordist, thinking amongst key stakeholder groups. The limited coverage and impact of industry training boards (ibid: 103-4) and the continued presence of “free-rider” problems (ibid: 171-2) forced the Report to dwell on rather Fordist problems.

Nonetheless, the Report was underpinned by notions of a paradigm shift in education and training being required in order to respond to a similar shift in the economy and the pattern of world trade. Such concerns were evident from the first page of the document:

Economic growth, predicated on meeting the needs of South Africa’s own citizens as well as on finding international market niches at the more value-added end of the world trade spectrum, is a prerequisite for and is based on the availability of more skilled people. (ibid: 1)
Only through an NQF, it was argued, could such markets be accessed. A reading of a new learning-work paradigm was also evident in a use of themes such as flexibility, multi-skilling and career paths.

However, the Report was born out of the coming together of certain strands of union and employer thinking, as represented by the Bird-Phillips axis. Produced by a committee and shaped by the need to negotiate and reach compromise, the NTSI was a master-piece of impressionism in which the overall notion of a NQF responding to globalization was easily recognisable, but in which the actual detail was very hazy.

The implication of this for education was that a large body of stakeholder support now existed for a greater integration of education and training. The mixture of competing meta-narratives and the negotiated and vague character of the NTSI made it unclear as to the nature this integration would assume. The battle for the future path of integration would be left till after the elections.

**SUMMARY**

In the period between the unbanning of the ANC and the 1994 elections, the two principal meta-narratives of the 1980s, the Market-Oriented and People’s Education accounts, were joined by two further important visions. The Market-Oriented meta-narrative of the state was continued through the ERS and CMESA reports. New Vocationalism was at the centre of proposals for a triple-track at senior high school level and the introduction of vocationally-oriented subjects from the primary level.
Equally, the policy of privatization was reinforced by the new Model C schools with their greater autonomy from the state.

People’s Education continued to be reflected in the work of the NECC. most notably in the NEPI reports. However, increasingly the ANC position became more closely associated with that of COSATU and an alternative meta-narrative of New Times emerged. This promised the simultaneous achievement of both equity and economic development goals and postulated a unified education and training system built around national qualifications.

As the elections neared, a segment of the business community began to respond to this position through a meta-narrative of Lean Production. Whilst this used much of the same language of and made similar proposals to the New Times meta-narrative, it tended to downplay the equity and access elements in favour of efficiency.

The NTSI apparently managed to reconcile the four strands. In the next chapter, the problems of maintaining this compromise in the post-election period, and the nature and effects of its unravelling, will be explored.
Jockeying for Position: Meta-Narratives 1990-4

Notes: New Times, Lean Production, Market-Oriented, People's Education=meta-narratives

Internal

Economic crisis

External

Collapsing of communism

People's Education

External

Time

New

Times

Lean Production

Economic crisis

Coming of Elections

International

Japanese Production Practices

US Management Literature

NO systems (NZ, 'Eng', '94, '90)

Lean

Management

Work Cycle 2

NTB

NUMSA

ANC/COSATU

METP

Framework

Initiative

National

Strategy

Training

Jockeying for Position: Meta-Narratives 1990-4
CHAPTER FIVE

POLICY DEVELOPMENT POST-ELECTION

MAY 1994-MAY 1996

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter charted the emergence of an apparent consensus on the future outline of education and training policy in the deliberations of the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI). Nonetheless, it must be understood that the policy parameters agreed upon were both relatively broad and open to a variety of interpretations. As the policy environment shifted from the interregnum before the elections of April 1994, with its pressures to develop consensus policies, to the contested reality of the post-election period, with both a coalition government and civil society engaged in a war of position, so the process of building a dominant discourse of education and training underwent a fundamental transformation.

In the run-up to the elections, the principal challenge had been to develop a single discourse within which the majority of stakeholders could operate. After the election, however, whilst this remained a very visible, and not insignificant, element of the discourse building strategy, another challenge achieved dominance. The new overriding imperative for the active stakeholders became that of shaping the new system by imposing their particular reading onto the broad consensus positions of the immediate pre-election period. It is the development of this struggle
to define and hence control the new system that is the focus of the final section of the thesis.

The Research Questions

In this chapter I am concerned with the two most crucial research questions that emerge from this struggle. First, what model of South African education and training (if any) was emerging between the 1994 elections and the National Party withdrawal from the Government of National Unity two years later? Second, what factors help to explain the shape of South African education and training policy in mid-1996 and the debates that surround it?

The Types of Data

With a shift in the nature of the policy debate comes a shift in the type of data that can best be used for its exploration. In the post-election period there has yet to be an official document of the seminal nature of Wiehahn or the NTSI. Nevertheless there are official, and public, documents which are crucial to an understanding of the current policy phase. Here, of most importance are the draft and final versions of the Education and Training White Paper (DNE 1994; DE 1995a), and the South African Qualification Authority Act (RSA 1995), the latter being enabling legislation for the establishment of this Authority which will be responsible for the operationalization of the National Qualifications Framework. None of these documents, however, contains anything like
the level of data necessary to provide a clear picture of an emergent system.

Inevitably, there are also documents which have an official origin but which have not been published. I will make significant use of two such sources, both from the first three months of the Government of National Unity. Each reflect the operation of working groups which were set up within different structures to move forward thinking about the new education and training system. The first comes from the Inter-Ministerial Working Group, (hereafter referred to as IMWG) established between the departments of National Education\(^1\) and Labour Affairs, primarily to develop the SAQA Bill. The second is a discussion document of the NTB’s working group \(^9\), a post-NTSI group aimed at the operationalization of that report.

With the absence of dominant official texts and, as yet, no output from the recently appointed SAQA Board, it is necessary to place far greater emphasis here than in other chapters on literature emerging from stakeholder sources. Here are included a range of documents: intended either for internal use, for dissemination to members or clients, or for public dissemination. One such document receives far greater attention than others: a report published by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) late in 1995. Unlike the HSRC reports encountered in previous chapters, this is not a government-commissioned document. Nor, as was the case with those previous reports, is it representative largely of views of the Afrikaner intellectual elite. Rather, it represents “an informal

\(^1\) The Department of National Education became the Department of Education on 1st January 1995.
initiative of a group of concerned specialists and practitioners in education and training” (Coombe 1995b).

These “specialists and practitioners” were mostly elements of four principal stakeholder communities: trainers in manufacturing, trainers in the parastatals, COSATU officials and adult educators (HSRC 1995: iv-v). Whilst this does not make them legitimate or official, it does make their findings highly significant, as witnessed by a “notice” at the start of the Report from Trevor Coombe, IMWG Chairperson.2

Use will also be made of the relevant academic literature. This is rather sparse but nonetheless significant given the involvement of many of the key writers in policy advice at national and provincial levels.

Even combined, these literatures cannot provide a rich enough picture of the policy process. This chapter will, of necessity, break from the methods of earlier ones through its far greater reliance on the discourses of stakeholders as expressed through interviews and conversations with the author.

As stated in Chapter One, I met with 40 stakeholders, drawn from national and provincial education departments, the RDP Office and the Department of Labour Affairs; the NTB and the industrial training boards; large employers and employers’ associations; and trade unions from the white craft tradition to independent African unions. Topics discussed included their vision for future policy and practice; their

2 The degree of legitimacy given to this report by such a foreword (calling as it does for comments on the report to be sent to the IMWG) is a tangential, though interesting, question. Subsequently, further official sanction was given to this report by its citation in the national submission to the mid-term review of Education for All (DE 1996c).
understanding of the dynamics operating on education and training policy in South Africa; and their perceptions of the likely actions of other stakeholders. Meetings with another 20 commentators (academics, journalists, former stakeholders, donor officials) also helped to shape my reading of the current period. Further useful insights into the current policy process were gained through a brief direct involvement in the process as a member of a Gauteng provincial task team on technical education and training.

The Structure of the Chapter

The structure of this chapter will follow the delineation of the two principal research questions. First it will address the question of what model of South African education and training appears to be emerging post-election. In doing so it will seek to interrogate the NTSI model in the light of stakeholder comments. This will provide some view of the conflict that lurks behind the consensus. Arising out of the exploration of consensus and conflict, this section will then proceed to outline the possible forms that a South African National Qualifications Framework could take and some key criteria by which different outcomes for the NQF can be theorized.

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3The distinction between commentator on and active participant in the development of emergent policy and practice in South Africa inevitably is an artificial one. I have already noted the work of some commentators as consultants. Moreover, some of those categorised as commentators were members of the group which produced the HSRC report. In so far as such individuals are not staff of major stakeholder organisations and conversations were focused on their readings of national trends, such categorisation appears valid.

4A full list of all informants is included as an appendix.
In the second substantive section of this chapter the focus will shift to the second research question and seek to outline the factors that explain the development of South African education and training policy in the two years since the 1994 elections. Here an analysis will be built upon the rationales of stakeholders and a reading of global discourses and meta-narratives pertaining to education and training which appear to have relevance to the policy process in South Africa.

THE POST-ELECTION MODEL OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The Election-Time Consensus

As was noted in the preceding chapter, an apparent consensus on the future shape of the South African education and training system had emerged by the time of the 1994 elections. The agreed upon model was grounded in an integration of education and training. This integration was to be operationalized through a National Qualifications Framework, under the supervision of a South African Qualifications Authority. This, at least in the view of the ANC, would report to an integrated department of education and labour (IDEAL).5 The new, integrated model would make use of competency-based modularized learning (CBML). Outside the ambit of IDEAL, but nonetheless vital to the functioning of the new integrated education and training model, would be a nexus of policies and structures to develop the links between skills, training, grade and wages.

5 In some formulations this would be called the Department of Lifelong Learning (DEPOLL).
Such was the broad outline of the consensus of early 1994. However, as was argued in the introduction to this chapter, the elements of this consensus have necessarily taken on new forms and expressions as attempts towards operationalization proceed. It becomes necessary, therefore, to explore each of the four key elements of the consensus: integration, an NQF, CBML, and the skills-training-grade-wage nexus; in greater and more critical detail.

Integration of Education and Training

There continues to be very strong support for the integration of education and training. This is seen by many stakeholders as vital to the future success of the South African economy. Rationales for integration have both a local and a global flavour. In the case of the former, ANC and COSATU sources tend to stress the utility of integration as a means for eradicating past divisions; the mental-manual division being reinforced by the black-white division of Apartheid. For the IMWG, however, the presence of a global trend towards integration (itself a reflection of broader forces of globalization) was a strong argument:

There is a worldwide shift towards an integrated approach to education and training which has been compelled by the need for labour market mobility, the learning requirements of advanced technology and new forms of work organisation. A unique opportunity exists in this country to leapfrog stages of development and to implement integration which other countries may be less able to implement comprehensively because of the weight of tradition and the lack of an appropriate political climate. (IMWG 1994: 3)

Although there clearly is broad acceptance of the notion of integration, it is equally evident that there are widely varying understandings of what it
means. Most obvious here is the tension between the use of the terms "integrated system" and "integrated approach". As noted in the previous chapter, this is not mere semantics as the two have very different organizational implications. In South African parlance an integrated system would require an integration of responsibility at ministerial level. An integrated approach, however, could be pursued without such a merger, with an over-arching but decentralized NQF ensuring commonalty of purpose.

There are stakeholder differences in terminology. This is reflected, for instance, in Democratic Party support for an integrated approach (Democratic Party 1994) versus COSATU-affiliates' support for an integrated system (SADTU 1994; Settler 1995). It seems most likely, however, that such differences are born from confusion rather than contention.

This is not surprising given the very real contradictions that were present in ANC/GNU formulations during these two years. In June 1994 the IMWG argued that the RDP had called for an integrated system:

The RDP requires "the development of an integrated system of education and training. ... The education and training bureaucracy must be reorganised at national, sectoral and provincial levels through the establishment of a single national ministry". (RDP base document cited in IMWG 1994: 1)

On the basis of this they proposed an action plan to transfer the NTB to a renamed Ministry of National Education and Training. This, however, did not take place. Indeed, by the time of the White Paper on Education and Training in March 1995, it was argued that whilst the Minister of Education has primary responsibility for the development of an
integrated approach, training “falls within the competence of other Ministries” (DE 1995a: 15). This was reflected further in the SAQA Act which talked of the Minister of Education working in consultation with the Minister of Labour Affairs.

It seems that the original ANC plan to set up an integrated department, although abandoned at the time of developing the GNU, remained a strand of negotiation for some time longer at the IMWG and inter-ministerial levels. However, as the training lobby continued to drive the NQF debate and as the new ministries continued to take shape, support for an integrated system began to slip from the agenda. Certainly, at the time of interview a year after the elections, Trevor Coombe, now a senior education bureaucrat, placed great emphasis on the fact that a radically decentralized NQF, as by then envisaged, meant that there was no need for an integrated system; an integrated approach instead being required (Coombe OI 1995a).

Whilst an integrated system was not a certain guarantor of actual integration on the ground, it is the case that the shift towards an integrated approach raises many questions regarding the envisioned new model. Although Coombe argued that a lack of symmetry between different structures of learning provision (e.g. schools, technical colleges, ABET⁶, company training) is desirable (Coombe OI 1995a), there are many others who are worried and confused about the absence of an integrated strategy between these different structures. The NTSI, and subsequent theorizing by working group 9 and the HSRC group, had very little to say

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⁶ In keeping with the integrationist debate, Adult Basic Education now became Adult Basic Education and Training in South African usage.
about formal education, particularly at compulsory education levels. On the other hand, the Department of Education’s White Paper (DE 1995a) was almost entirely focused on compulsory schooling.

Whilst the IMWG was officially designed as a means of keeping channels of communication open at the highest levels, it was apparent even from within the senior levels of the education bureaucracy that the process of integration was not seen as emanating from educational concerns. Senior non-ANC education bureaucrats, whilst affirming their support for integration, expressed the feeling that the extent of an educational vision and, in particular, the role of the curriculum remains unclear in the emergent model (Botha OI 1995; Niebuhr OI 1995- both Department of Education [and formerly DNE] bureaucrats). Among educators generally, there remains a suspicion of integration as industry-led (although this rarely results in rejection of integration as a notion). The most vocal complaints have come from the universities. Whilst not publicly opposing the NQF and integration, they have argued strongly for the right to interpret the NQF in their own way (Fehnel OI 1995 - Ford Foundation; Niebuhr OI 1995). The work of the National Commission on Higher Education (DE 1996d) has done little to suggest a coming together of the universities and the state around the NQF.

The universities and sceptical educators seem unwilling and/or unable to reject the integrative notion. Indeed, the decision to shift from an integrated system to an integrated approach was intended to secure their compliance (Coombe OI 1995a; Niebuhr OI 1995). It is ironic, therefore, that the shift towards an integrated approach gives them greater scope to claim the right to develop their own, sub-system specific, models of integration.
The degree to which this is tantamount to reinstating the model of ladders (separate sub-systems) with bridges (limited opportunities for transference) between them, a model rejected by the ANC before the election, is open to debate (DE 1996a). Certainly, this was the fear of several commentators who saw no common vision across the different learning sub-systems (Bellis OI 1995; Fehnel OI 1995).

This question will be a central one for SAQA in its deliberations. It is also one which will be returned to when my attention shifts to the range of possible systems that could develop. However, for the moment attention must be directed towards the development of thinking about the key element of those systems: the National Qualifications Framework.

A National Qualifications Framework

Since the 1994 elections there have been many complaints that both stakeholders and the public have been given insufficient detail about the likely form of the NQF (e.g. Democratic Party 1994). Even the SAQA Act did little to answer such criticisms. Whilst only intended as enabling legislation, its lack of even a preamble to enunciate its spirit made it of little use as a guide towards the future NQF (French OI 1995). Equally, the two versions of the education White Paper are very short on detail. As noted above, this seems to have been largely the matter of deliberate strategy to limit dissent.

Whilst two years after the new government was instituted there is still no detailed official version of what the NQF will look like, there are very strong pointers from a number of other sources. The deliberations of
working group 9, the HSRC group and the Ministerial Committee for Development Work on the NQF (DE 1996a) are important here. I will make use too of the annual *Education, Training and Development in Business* survey for 1995 by the management consultancy group, BMI. A final important source of insights into the likely shape of the NQF is the articles and presentations of Adrienne Bird, for many the guiding spirit behind the NQF.

It is clear that the notion of an NQF has developed greatly in sophistication and detail in the two years since the ANC “Yellow Book”.

It now boasts a long list of aims:

- introduce a fair assessment system measuring achievement against clearly stated standards;
- establish a dynamic and flexible system which can adapt quickly to changes in the labour market, workplace and education and training;
- encourage more participation in further education and training;
- develop learning relevant and responsive to the needs of the individual, economy and society;
- promote access to learning;
- provide a variety of routes to qualifications;
- simplify the structures of qualifications;
- provide national quality assurance. (BMI 1995: 4)

As the vision of the NQF has developed, so has the role of SAQA in ensuring its implementation. In its guise as operationalizing agency for the NQF, SAQA is envisaged as setting national standards via National Standards Bodies (NSBs- see below). It will advise the Minister of Education on relevant issues (BMI 1995: 38; RSA 1995 [SAQA Act] Section
5). It will establish the "form, procedures and criteria for regulation of standards and qualifications, certification and moderation" (BMI 1995: 38).

It will be responsible for the development of accreditation policies and procedures for Education and Training Qualifications Authorities (ETQAs- see below) and, through the ETQAs, will develop policy and procedures for secondary accreditation. This in turn will require it to establish quality assurance systems; to develop national principles and guidelines for assessment and certification; and to ensure accredited bodies have fair, valid and reliable assessment procedures (BMI 1995: 38-9).

The NSBs will cover a single "learning pathway or learning progression route" (Bird 1995b: 37) and will bring together education and training providers, employers, unions and professions. Their primary tasks will be to

- set standards which ensure portability and progression within the National Qualification Framework
- submit standards to SAQA for registration and publication
- present standards in a format to be agreed by SAQA which fit within the NQF 'grid' of levels and fields. (Bird 1995b: 37)

ETQA status will be determined by criteria of representativeness and capacity. Two types of ETQA seem to have been agreed upon:

1. Provincial authorities (e.g. provincial departments of education) for schools and, perhaps, the fundamental category for adult basic education and training;

2. Sectoral bodies (e.g. industry training boards). To ensure progression, these sectoral bodies may work with the relevant professional bodies. (HSRC 1995: 144)
They will be primarily responsible for the monitoring and review of the standards set by the NSBs; accreditation and disaccreditation of providers; administration of testing; and issuing of certificates (Bird 1995b: 38; HSRC 1995: 145).

In the February 1996 formulation of the Ministerial Committee, a further level was suggested. Below the NSBs would come a group of Standards Generating Bodies (SGBs) responsible for setting standards for sub-fields.7

The broad parameters of this model appear to have widespread support. Many employers welcome it, stressing its economic benefits. These benefits were reinforced by the HSRC group in their promotional exercise for the NQF. In their view, the NQF will promote competitiveness, efficiency, development and growth (HSRC 1995).

The response of adult educators to the proposals is less straightforwardly positive. Leading adult educators, from the Independent Examinations Board (IEB), the DEAL Trust, Using Spoken and Written English (USWE) and the HSRC, were members of the HSRC group. They and others have also been involved in NTB structures. Adult educators voices can be seen in the emphasis on the NQF’s pro-equity and redress credentials (HSRC 1995).

However, whilst the NQF is seen as a useful mechanism, it is also seen as presenting potential problems. Indeed, some have identified it as posing a threat to the popular adult education tradition. Insensitivity to issues

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7 In the Social Sciences, for example, in the HSRC model there would be a field entitled "Individuals and Societies". Within this it would be possible in theory for anthropologists, sociologists, etc. to develop sub-fields relating to their disciplinary concerns, according to the Ministerial Committee.
of race and gender is one major criticism here (Chisholm and Motala 1994). Many adult educators are also unhappy about the labelling of ABET levels as "sub-levels", which they see as indicative of the lack of seriousness with which they are treated (Burroughs 1995 OI- HSRC). Overall, whilst adult educators do not wish for educational content which is meaningless, there is also some concern that the high standards envisaged will create a "qualifications fortress" (Burroughs OI 1995). The claim that the metals industry scheme to upgrade workers to artisan status will take 50 years for the average worker at current training levels (O'Connor OI 1995) is indicative of such concerns. There is also a concern among adult educators about the unresolved issue of an NQF language policy. Overall, whilst a balance between access and credibility is seen as necessary, it is far from clear as to where this should lie.

The potential lack of common purpose across the sub-systems is another worry. The training version developed by the NTB ignores the informal sector, being too geared to the needs and concerns of formal industry. The education version found in the draft and published versions of the first White Paper, however, seems to be too school-focused (Chisholm and Motala 1994; Christie 1995b).

As was noted above, the universities, on the whole, are far from enthusiastic about the NQF. In many quarters this is reflected, not in opposition, but in avoidance. At a colloquium I attended at the University of Witwatersrand on the future of the university, which was held during the consultation period for the SAQA Bill (June 1995), not one Wits academic made any reference to the NQF and its implications for higher education.
The proposed structure for the NQF does little to dispel the view that its proponents are equally ignorant of the position and realities of the universities. The levels proposed for the NQF reflect neither current practice in the universities, nor potential future best practice as envisaged, for example, in Kraak (1994a). This has not been adequately addressed by the National Commission on Higher Education in its draft report (DE 1996d).

The HSRC Report further indicated the gulf in understanding. That degrees should be validated, and their equivalence decided on, by SAQA (HSRC 1995: 17) may be logical but it was not likely to be popular with the universities. Furthermore, the proposed list of fields and NSBs in appendix B (but arising from earlier working group 9 deliberations) showed apparent contempt for academic conceptions of subject boundaries and the right of subject specialists to determine, or even have a say in determining, such boundaries. It also betrayed a heavy bias towards an instrumentalist view of knowledge, which seriously undermines the validity of academic pursuits. To illustrate these points one need only compare the one proposed NSB for “Individuals and Societies” (i.e. the bulk of the social sciences) with the six for “Utility Services”, including “Archiving and Information Storage” (HSRC 1995: 182-5).

Teachers and other school-oriented educators too have largely not rejected the NQF but remain far from enthusiastic. One of the major teaching associations argued that the proposal was unworkable due to capacity problems (NAPTOSA 1994). Senior educationalists, including
the Gauteng Education MEC\textsuperscript{8} and the director of the RDP Culture of Learning Project, pointed to the other problems facing education (Metcalfe OI 1995; McGurk OI 1995). Certainly, the prospect of having to reorient teachers to a radical new methodology in the light of the massive challenges facing education in other areas is a daunting one (Chisholm and Motala 1994). An acceptance of a lack of symmetry between sub-systems means the training will not have to wait for schooling. However, it may also mean that pressures on schooling to address the NQF will be seriously reduced. Indeed, one leading educationalist argued that a working NQF in education may take as long as two generations (Badcock-Walters OI 1995-Education Foundation)!

It seems clear that the NQF has been broadly accepted, or at least not rejected, by the majority of stakeholders. However, this acceptance often seems to be rather superficial. It is apparent that the real terrain of contestation is the operationalization of the NQF. Lack of symmetry has already been identified as providing a key space for dissent. A second such space would be provided by a decision to make the system voluntaristic.

There appear to be real tensions in the formulation of the NQF regarding voluntarism. Neither the SAQA Act, working group 9, nor the HSRC group has successfully settled the question of the degree of voluntarism to be allowed in the NQF. Working group 9 argued that

\begin{quote}
Such a framework envisages that all qualifications would be made up of modular-based credit-bearing learning programmes (with the possible exception of the first 10
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{8} Member of Executive Council, i.e. provincial minister.
years of compulsory education for the young at school). (WG9 1994: 3)

This appears to imply a universal system, except (possibly) for compulsory schooling. A rather different reading can be made of the more recent HSRC document:

The National Qualifications Framework is envisaged as being developed and implemented on an interdepartmental basis, with fully consultative processes of decision-making, including all concerned government departments, education and training providers, and major stakeholders in education and training. An attempt is being made to fully involve all these national stakeholders around clearly articulated nationally-agreed objectives, while at the same time recognising the right of individuals to learn and the right of institutions to provide learning opportunities, as each think most appropriate. (HSRC 1995: 9)

This quotation appears also to demonstrate a continued belief in the efficacy of a universal adoption of the NQF. However, the final sentence hints at an awareness that some providers would not wish to adopt the national model.

There is a very real problem of interpretation still present. Whilst voluntarism and lack of symmetry appear to have been accepted as inevitable on the one hand, there is still a very strong belief in the efficacy of a strong and universal NQF model. Given continued suspicions about the ANC’s statist proclivities, there remains a fear that making the NQF work may run rough-shod over voluntaristic principles. The National Party withdrawal from the GNU may serve to heighten such fears in certain quarters.

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9 As the lower secondary level would end at the first NQF testing point, it would seem more likely that seven years of schooling at most would be non-modularised.
If voluntarism is to win the day then questions immediately arise as to who will then opt-out. The universities are prime candidates, of course, in spite of Fehnel’s (Ford Foundation) argument that indirect pressure from the pro-integrationist technikons may temper the universities’ enthusiasm to go it alone (Fehnel OI 1995). If schools are to be included as an integral part of the NQF, this too could signal large-scale opting out, with independent and Afrikaans-medium schools resisting on a variety of grounds: standards, anti-vocationalism and culture (McGurk OI 1995).

Even among ITBs, enthusiasm for a strong NQF is not universal. Whilst some boards have explicitly aligned themselves with the forthcoming NQF system (HITB 1994; BITB 1995; PITB 1995a), the 1995 BMI survey found that only one board was actually in favour of taking on the role of an ETQA (BMI 1995: 154). This split between the ITBs also relates to the issue of voluntarism. Whilst the least active supporters of the NQF stress voluntarism very strongly, a tension was evident in the opinions of the more active boards between the needs for voluntarism and a successful NQF, as well as frustration at the slow progress of their colleagues: “of course we want them to come on board voluntarily but the system has to work and hard decisions will have to be taken” (Tyers OI 1995- Transnet Training Board).

Competency-Based Modular Learning

Central to the debate about integration and the NQF has been the notion of Competency-Based Modular Learning (CBML): the use of a competency approach across the whole learning system. For many employers competencies are very familiar, Competency-Based Modular Training
(CBMT) being well established in several industries (e.g. building and clothing). Employers largely seem to welcome the further use of competencies. Indeed, for the Private Sector Education Council, the use of the language of competency was one of the more positive elements of the draft White Paper (PRISEC 1994). COSATU also has been very much in favour of the use of competency (Machin 1995; NUM 1995; Settler 1995).

There is also a large degree of support for CBML from the adult education constituency, although, as we shall see, here too adult educators are at the more critical end of supporters of the new system. For many of them, outcomes (I shall address terminology presently) are a good way of dealing with the many problems caused by Apartheid education (Burroughs OI 1995). It is also argued that they can serve to mobilize a large number of stakeholders. However, as I shall outline, they are also a source of contention for others.

Competency is a highly contested term as the last chapter indicated. Given the controversy surrounding it, there has been an attempt to use a variety of other terms to describe the approach. Certainly such an attempt is not merely cosmetic. Rather, it represents a very significant increase in the sophistication of the approach, which in some ways far surpasses efforts elsewhere. Nonetheless, this is still very much the debate of a very small group of experts (largely those involved in the HSRC group and the Ministerial Committee) and bears as yet little resemblance to the understandings either of the critics or of many of the most staunch supporters of competency.
Whilst educationalists immediately prior to the elections seemed more comfortable with the notion of outcomes rather than competencies (e.g. Gauteng 1994), trainers during 1995 developed a model which shifted the language once more. Bird argued that learning abilities are preferable to generic competencies (Bird 1995b); whilst the Plastics Industry Training Board argued that capabilities should be used in preference to outcomes (PITB 1995b).

The state of the art in terms of definition appears to lie with the HSRC group who defined the four terms: competency, outcome, ability and capability as follows:

Ability: is a generic term for the mental and physical processes that people use, such as communication, decision-making, problem-solving and using tools. These abilities are at the core of all training and education and provide the means of performing tasks in a learning, work or everyday situation. Abilities are developed through engaging with knowledge and activities in a context. Abilities cannot be directly assessed: rather, assessment is carried out indirectly via the performance of tasks which rely on abilities for their completion.

Capability: the expression of generic abilities as they relate to specific content areas, context and value frameworks. A capability is the basic enabling component of performance which involves generic abilities acting in relation to defined content areas, contexts and value frameworks.

Competence: the capacity for continuous performance within specified ranges and contexts resulting from the integration of a number of capabilities.

Outcome: is that segment of a unit standard which is a statement of the required learner capabilities that must be demonstrated. Outcomes are specified by stated performance and assessment and range criteria. (HSRC 1995: 1-2)
These are expert definitions rather than commonsense understandings. Whilst they further the clarity of the expert debate, there is a danger that they also serve to limit non-expert critique as they shift language away from the commonly understood. This notion of competence can be defended as different from that which people think they are attacking: that of narrow Taylorism and behaviourism.

It must be stressed that the HSRC group’s view is not that of all training stakeholders. Here the stress is on a balance between knowledge and skills: an emphasis which many trainers are coming to adopt, as Erwin Sonnendecker of the Building Industry Training Board acknowledged:

> For instance, just by way of physics you do run into problems when you feed water from a copper pipe into a galvanised pipe. However if you do it the other way around you don’t have a problem. Now the trainees just would be taught, "This is the sequence", but on the road ahead they will also be taught exactly why. (Sonnendecker OI 1995)

However, there are others, particularly in the mining industry, who seem to retain a behaviourist view of CBMT, as illustrated by the sample modules prepared for the proposed Mining Industry Qualifications Framework (Phillips 1995). Such an approach is strongly criticized by those who were involved in the HSRC research process. This is exemplified by the comments of John Tyers:

> if you are training in that [Neo-Taylorist] paradigm you subvert the very positive things that have come out of competencies and outcome based learning. You subvert them into this narrow training of a bloke to be competent to do a job. (Tyers OI 1995)

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10 Phillips was initially a member of the HSRC group but later withdrew from participation.
Whilst adult educators see the positive potential of the new approach, they argue for the need to retain a critical stance. This is seen most clearly and coherently through the work of the Independent Examinations Board (IEB) as they seek to establish national examinations across all the ABET sub-levels.

The IEB cautions for the need to keep competencies broad and to stress content and meta-learning. They point to the danger of measurable behaviours being privileged over non-measurable learning; of adequacy rather than excellence being tested; of modularization not fitting with the developmental and non-sequential nature of some types of learning; and of competencies ignoring individual and cultural realities. Above all, they stress that competency is only an assessment tool and should not be fetishized (French OI 1995; IEB 1995; IEB 1996).

Those from the world of formal education find it harder to see the merits in competency. Even Pam Christie, who is broadly in favour of a competency approach, has noted that it is unclear as to whether competency is relevant to the development of children (Christie 1995a). Within the Afrikaner element of the education bureaucracy, similar sentiments have been used to argue that competencies should not be used in the compulsory phase of schooling. A more subtle position is that of Gustav Niebuhr, the most senior of the retained bureaucrats, who argued for the need to run a series of pilots of a competency-based approach in the formal school system prior to an broader operationalization (Niebuhr OI 1995). Whether such a strategy would effectively prevent wider competencization of formal schooling cannot be discounted.
Many educators fear that competencies would make knowledge peripheral, as Ahmed Essop, the Director of the ANC think tank, the Centre for Education Policy Development, noted:

I would certainly be concerned if we ended up in the school system with a notion of competencies and outcomes that threw away with it any notion of what a student should be learning. (Essop OI 1995)

No-one in South Africa has yet advanced a critique of the competency approach of the strength of that of Alan Smithers (1993) in England or Simon Marginson (1994) in Australia. However, Andre Kraak has begun to develop such a line, although it has as yet been more focused on Neo-Taylorism in training rather than the implications for formal education (Kraak 1994b).

Perhaps inevitably, it is the university sector which seems the least prepared to accept competencies. Along with SAQA validation of degrees and trainers' proposing subject divisions for NSBs, the use of competency appears to be seen in some university quarters as part of an industry attempt to capture the definition of really useful knowledge from the universities, as was claimed in academic critiques of the New Vocationalism in England and Wales a decade earlier.

Competency perhaps remains the most controversial element of the proposed new system. This may be due to its representation of not just an arena for contestations of power over learning but also the central theoretical divide. Other elements of the approach are simply not so controversial. For many educators, especially those of Deweyian or Marxian backgrounds, the idea of breaking down the mental-manual
barrier is attractive. The regional interest in Education with Production\textsuperscript{11}, and the central role of South African exiles such as Patrick van Rensburg in developing that approach, helped to attract many educators to such notions (Setai 1990). Given the legacy of Apartheid in both unequal education and unequal development, there are strong pragmatic attractions in integration.

For an even broader group of educators, issues around the NQF, symmetry and voluntarism are not crucial. Rather, it is this issue of competency, with its connotation of narrow training and behaviourism, which unites large sections of radical and liberal educators in concerns regarding the new system. The support of leading ANC educational bureaucrats for the CBML approach allows members of the old bureaucracy to assume the mantle of liberal education as defenders of broad educational values against the alleged threat from narrow training. In the context of the spaces provided by asymmetry and voluntarism, there is the real possibility that an NQF based on CBML will lead to widespread opting out of the new system, to the extent that its pretensions to be a national framework could be rendered ridiculous.

\textbf{A Skills-Training-Grade-Wage Nexus}

Thus far this chapter has been focusing on the contention behind the consensus around the National Qualifications Framework and its implications for education and training. However, the struggle to

\textsuperscript{11} The Education with Production movement began in Botswana as an attempt to make education more economically and ideologically relevant to the needs of Southern Africa. Its theoretical base is in the Marxist tradition of polytechnic education.
construct a new education and training system is but one part of a broader attempt to shape the political economy of post-election South Africa. In particular, given the crucial role that both trade unions and employers have played in the education and training debate, it is not possible to separate education and training policy from debates on policy and practice in the workplace.

The nexus model argues that the four areas of skills, training, grading and wages must be understood as interlinked. International competitiveness depends on upskilling of workers and this must be the central focus of the training system. Grading and wages should be based on the training record and, thus, skills acquisition of workers, and not on other criteria such as seniority. Equally, grading hierarchies should be based unequivocally on real differences between the level and type of skills used for different jobs and not on traditional notions of the "rate for the job" which reflect past not present realities.

Whilst the NTSI did not confirm the nexus as national policy, it did mark the first official recognition of COSATU thinking about the nexus, which had developed from the work of the NUMSA Vocational Project. Nonetheless, the notion remains as one of the more controversial element of attempts to develop a human resource development strategy as part of a broader economic strategy.

Explicitly, COSATU tend to focus on the first three elements of the nexus (e.g. Settler 1995). However, it is clear from even the most cursory reading of many internal documents that the fourth element, wage, is an important part of COSATU thinking (Machin 1995). Whilst COSATU focuses on the nexus as a means of increasing productivity, Business
South Africa (the post-election alliance of business organizations) sees it primarily as a collective bargaining strategy (Dippenaar OI 1995). This view is also shared by other trade unionists (Allen OI 1995- Amalgamated Engineering Union; van der Walt OI 1995- Federation of South African Labour Unions).

This is not to say that support for a greater coordination of the four elements of the nexus does not extend beyond COSATU. What is the ground for contention is the exact nature of such coordination, particularly as it relates to the issue of wage levels and structures. In this section I will seek to explore this contention in greater detail.

Skills

The definition of skill and the subsequent control of access to skilled status is a globally experienced arena of contestation.\(^{12}\) In South Africa, as elsewhere, race and gender have been two powerful weapons used to define and control skill. What makes South Africa unusual in the ranks of industrialized and semi-industrialized countries is the way in which a racial defence of skilled status was given the sanction of law until very recent times.

The legacy of that past is that current debates about skill cannot be separated from the historical impact of huge misclassifications of skilled status on racial grounds, and the massive distortions to incentives to

\(^{12}\) See the earlier discussion on page 54 (footnote) in particular for a more detailed consideration of this point.
acquire skills that the system of the colour bar brought about for all racial groupings.

However, the South African debate around skills also has many elements that would be immediately recognisable to students of OECD skill debates. One aspect of this is an employer emphasis on social skills (e.g. Godsell OI 1995- Anglo-American’s Group Director for Human Resources) as opposed to a trade union stress on technical skills (e.g. Lloyd 1994- NUMSA official). This is linked to broader debates over the range of skills workers need. Whilst trainers in manufacturing see the need for a broad conception of relevant skills of workers, representatives of the mining industry tend to take a narrower view.

This links to the internationally contentious issue of multi-skilling, one of the key areas in which distinctions between the New Times and Lean Production meta-narratives are most apparent, as Chapter Four made clear. Whilst trade unionists largely support the notion of multi-skilling, they maintain a degree of scepticism regarding the proposals or programmes of many employers (Lloyd 1994). Even within employer circles, it seems that understandings and models of multi-skilling are varied.

This is not purely the result of sectoral differences. Automobile manufacturers are certainly more vocally in favour of multi-skilling than mine management (and are explicitly committed to multi-skilling through a national agreement with NUMSA). However, even within the automobile industry differences have been noted between what is seen as the multi-tasking of Toyota, focusing on workers being expected to carry out a wider range of low level tasks- such as sweeping around
their work stations, and what is viewed as the multi-skilling of Volkswagen—focusing on the developing the ability of workers to move between (semi) skilled tasks (von Holdt Ol 1995). Here, a crucial factor appears to be the different countries of origin of these two companies, with their radically different cultures of skilled labour and employer-employee relations.

Multi-skilling is seen as a major force impacting upon the education and training system and the NQF by both Adrienne Bird and Chief Director for Adult Education (DE), Khetsi Lehoko (Mail and Guardian 11-17/8/1995). However, this points to another probable area of contention and contestation. Voluntarism and asymmetry would imply that different visions of both education and training and multi-skilling may emerge in different parts of the system. This will have major implications, however, for other elements of the official view. The avoidance of behaviourism and Neo-Taylorism might well be compromised and with them the notion of the NQF as a high skill path. Equally, the stress of the NTSI on portability might also be undermined. Where, as in the automobile industry, radically divergent views appear to be held by the key organizations, the potential problems are immense.

**Training**

Around the issue of the encouragement of training there are also a range of diverse opinions. Some employers, particularly the parastatals, are
working towards a vision of the "learning organization" as envisaged in the Post-Fordist literature (Verster OI 1995- ESKOM). However, in other sectors of industry the picture is still one of reliance on poaching for skill needs, particularly in the case of smaller firms, as acknowledged by both Business SA and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Dippenaar OI 1995; Dames OI 1995). Many of the more active training board staff spoke in interviews of their frustration with conservative employers: “it’s hard to imagine them taking these paradigm shifts with anything other than an ‘over my dead body’ kind of thing. It might well come to that, we might have to wait for a whole generation of industrialists to die out” (Tyers OI 1995).

The central area of contention is around who pays for additional training. This feeds into the question of whether continued employer responsibility for the bulk of training finance means that employers should have the right to set the training agenda without consideration of other stakeholders or of long term interests of themselves and their industry.

Tensions are perhaps most evident in the mining industry which, as we have already seen, is towards the more conservative end of the sectoral spectrum on the employer side. Here there is a major disagreement between the NUM and the Chamber of Mines over the broadness of training that should be provided. Whilst the NUM are pushing strongly for greater emphasis on health and safety education and improved literacy and numeracy (Plasket OI 1995); the Chamber seems to have a far

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13 As continuous process innovation and intellectual skills become central to company’s competitive advantage, so, it is argued, these companies come to stress and reward the learning inherent in production.
narrower view of what constitutes “relevant training” (Burrows OI 1995; Dippenaar OI 1995).

It is over the issue of paid education and training leave (PETL) that this divergence of views has been most evident, with the NUM formally declaring a dispute with the Chamber over this issue in early 1995. The NUM position was that ILO Resolution 140, recognizing workers’ rights to PETL, should be binding on all industries, and that the notion of learning during leisure time was not realistic for the mining industry in particular:

mine workers work some of the longest hours of all workers in South Africa, probably aside from farm workers, and they are then expected voluntarily (and often being quite old and unused to learning situations) to undertake learning in their own time. We’ve seen that where those opportunities have been made available to workers, very few workers have come forward and even fewer have made a success of it. It’s simply not good enough to say that we’re offering it part-time, after-hours, come-along-if-you-like, without any back-up support, encouragement or incentives. (Plasket 1995)

Employers, however, have focused on the cost of such provision for a struggling industry and appear to perceive this call for PETL as a union attempt to dictate to them in an area which has always been one of managerial prerogative. Nonetheless, after a year long dispute the Chamber of Mines largely accepted the NUM position in a February 1996 agreement.\textsuperscript{14} How this is implemented in practice remains to be seen.

\textsuperscript{14} My thanks to Martin Nicol of the NUM for information on the agreement.
Grading

The reorganization of grading, with its implications for wages, appears to generate major controversy. In several industries, e.g. automobiles, metals and plastics, there has been an attempt to reorganize grading structures to better reflect the types and complexity of skills actually being used by the workforce. Career pathing, recognition of prior learning and payment for skills acquired versus skills required have been three key areas of contention in this regard, and these will now be explored.

Career Pathing

This arises out of the notion of careers rather than jobs and the need to develop a system of career paths for workers. Again, some firms and training boards have responded favourably to COSATU arguments in this regard (e.g. PITB 1994). However, there still seems to be considerable opposition to career pathing. The 1995 BMI survey reported that only 10% of ITBs thought that career pathing would increase in the future (BMI 1995: 154). Even more strikingly, it found that less than 2% of training managers, and only one training board, named the development of career paths for employees as a priority (BMI 1995: 164).

Non-industry participation in the debate about the nexus has been very limited. However, the issue of career paths has engendered some comment from adult educators, particularly in an ABET-focused issue of the HSRC’s In Focus magazine. In a short article by Johan Wydeman, Manager of the HSRC’s Adult Basic Education and Lifelong Learning section, there was a reiteration of his former colleague Elizabeth
Burroughs' fears of a "qualifications fortress". In this case, it is the empowering notion of career pathing that is seen in reality as acting as a further obstacle for those with the least initial education and training:

The very serious danger exists that, if career-pathing is applied as it has been in the past, it may become yet another rigid "gatekeeping" mechanism through which employees' mobility on career path ladders may be controlled from the top. (Wydeman 1995: 9)

For those at the bottom of the system, Wydeman warned, the experience may not be of moving up the ladder but of the ladder itself moving up and out of their reach.

Recognition of Prior Learning

Concerns that career pathing may not be as empowering as proposed are echoed in the case of recognition of prior learning (RPL). This concept has received widespread support in South Africa since the NTSI. However, as with many other of the NTSI principles, it is in reality a highly contested term. Indeed, it is possible to discern three principal meanings from South African and international usage.

In international usage RPL is largely about increasing access to further and higher education of non-traditional clienteles. This appears to be the meaning which is understood by the drafters of the education and training White Paper, and was the meaning that I found employed whilst acting as a member of a provincial task team looking at post-compulsory education.15

15 The Gauteng Technical Education and Training Task Team (during June to August 1995).
In Britain this debate appears to have been responded to more positively by the further education sector than by higher education. In South Africa, however, both sectors face very major challenges ahead over this issue. The further education sector has tended to be very conservative and very closely tied to its industrial roots. The universities, particularly the English-speaking ones, have long had bridging programmes and other schemes to increase access for other than traditional clienteles. However, the post-election challenge is different and greater: how to make such populations and their prior learning integral to the system.

This, however, seems to be distinct from two views in the world of industry. From the COSATU side, it appears that RPL is about recognizing the skills already possessed by workers and potential workers. In the former case, this would allow them to receive the benefits of correct grading and better promotional prospects. As such, it is a strategy aimed at increasing wages across the “unskilled” and “semi-skilled” segments of the workforce. In the latter case, it is about overcoming biases in the hiring process towards certain racial groups, particularly as this has operated through proxy criteria such as minimum educational qualifications.

However, it was alleged by some trade unionists and adult educators that employers were using RPL as part of their affirmative action strategies (Plasket OI 1995; Burroughs OI 1995). For reasons of legitimacy, companies want to have visible black faces further up the occupational ladder. RPL is seen as an appropriate way of identifying and fast tracking suitable candidates. As such, it is very far from the broad empowerment

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16 The use of RPL implies that such categories are meaningless.
strategy of COSATU. There is also evidence that minimum educational qualifications are being used in some industries as a means of avoiding the high costs employers perceive to be part and parcel of RPL. In the clothing industry, for instance, a minimum entry requirement of matriculation can be seen in this light (Riches OI 1995- Clothing Industry Training Board).

It seems that education and training have developed very different debates around the notion of RPL. These arise from readings of different aspects of the legacy of Apartheid. In the education system it is argued that Apartheid structures and syllabi disadvantaged black students and limited their access to further and higher education. In the case of training it is the legacy of the colour bar and the related misclassification of skills that drives reform.

Although different, these two debates do point to similar problems and solutions and, here at least, there appears to be nothing that is inherently incompatible between the progressive views in education and in training. Nonetheless, in both arenas there remains considerable opposition to such views. As elsewhere, this does not manifest itself so much in outright rejection, but in an attempt to take control of the debate and then shape it in less progressive ways. In both sectors this is reflected in an attempt to reshape RPL into an updated form of post-1976 affirmative action.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} As noted in Chapter Two, the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising saw a concern amongst leading companies to bring black, and especially African, workers into managerial positions.
As yet there seems to be little in the way of a South African debate about the possibility of a radical model of competency plus RPL, as is emerging in some cases in England and Wales. This radical model argues that the conventional approach of providing a unitary course to a potentially diverse group of learners is no longer appropriate as RPL and competencies bring about a sharper focus on individual needs. Given adult educators’ experience of working with learners with more diverse learning histories than tends to prevail in formal education, and their professional grounding in group-based methodologies, such arguments have immense potential implications for their work in particular. Moreover, there is a question to be answered regarding the cultural appropriateness of more individualistic conceptions of learning and development in a South African context (McGrath 1995a).

Payment for Skills Acquired v Payment for Skills Required

A further area of major contention surrounds whether workers should be rewarded for the skills they use, and are expected to use, in the workplace or the skills they have acquired. Rooted in the movement’s vision of economic transformation, COSATU’s call for the development of the nexus and increased emphasis on training sees a simple path between further training, more and better skills, higher grading and improved wages. Most employers, however, argue that such a path cannot be paved with concrete and that payment should only be for skills that are relevant to the job. It is this question of relevance, encountered above, that is at the heart of the dispute. Here the COSATU official interviewed felt that different standards were being applied to artisans
and professionals than to un- and semi-skilled workers (Morotoba OI 1995).

There are those among the training fraternity who argued that a shift towards thinking about broadly relevant skills within the framework of the NQF might not only satisfy COSATU, but could actually be in the long-term interests of employers:

paying for skills is not the horror story that most employers believe simply because employers generally are bloody lazy when it comes to using their people. Now if you force them to pay for skills then in a way you force them to optimise their use of those people. That depends once again on how broadly you define skills, but ultimately and ideally, naively, if you force employers to pay for this broad notion of skills then that would be an engine, I would argue, to start shifting this Taylorist mentality, to start saying: if am paying this person for problem solving skills at level one why am I not structuring his job in such a way that he can use those skills? (Tyers OI 1995)

Nonetheless, this cry of reason has yet to influence the majority in the two camps.

This, as we have seen, is but one element of the continuing disagreement around the notion of the nexus. The nexus is a COSATU collective bargaining strategy. However, it is also far more than that, being based moreover in a reading of low skill equilibrium analysis. It is built upon an understanding of the inherited system of education and training, which sees its links to work organization, economic policy and social structures as reinforcing an emphasis on low skill, low wage labour (Kraak 1993b). For the good of the economy, as well as that of the workforce, it is believed that it is necessary that South Africa stops trying to compete on the terrain of lower wage, more productive competitors
Instead, it should seek to upskill its workforce so as to compete in higher value-added sectors.

To move to a new high skill path, a wide range of structural and institutional changes are required. However, it is in education, training and work organization that the most direct challenges lie. In such an analysis, the key task becomes that of developing an NQF which can then reshape what goes on in the workplace. In the previous section I explored the problems faced in developing such a model of the NQF. In this section I have pointed to the many contentious issues still to be resolved around the changes in the workplace. Contestations around the nature of team work and of employee co-determination have not been addressed here, but are also elements of the battle between different visions of the future of the workplace (McGrath 1995c). As there is conflict over the two elements of this struggle, education and training on the one hand and work organization on the other, there is also disagreement over the relationship between them (von Holdt OI 1995). Whilst many employers see it as inevitable that the NQF will reshape work organization; others still see this as interference in the job of management.

What lurks behind such a split appears to be a gap between those who take this hard line conservative stance, and those who see the opportunity to shape the NQF in ways that suit them. So far in this chapter the primary focus has been on those who have sought to use the dominant discourse surrounding reform. However, voices of opposition have been noted in passing. Without reference to such voices an analysis of the likely shape of the emergent South African education and training system would be highly skewed. Therefore, it is time to foreground those
other voices briefly before attempting to reach some conclusions about
the nature of post-election education and training.

Other Voices

Those who participated in the NTSI and HSRC Reports and on the
IMWG and working group 9 essentially were the stakeholders that
"mattered" as the SAQA was being shaped. After the recent appointment
of the SAQA board, other voices may be given new prominence but it is
clear that certain groupings did predominate in the fora of policy
formulation during this time, although even COSATU did not always
come to negotiations and planning as a monolithic force.\(^{18}\) The adult
education lobby involved has already been outlined above. COSATU, the
training boards, the Chamber of Mines and the two national departments
are perhaps the other key groupings represented.

However, there are a number of other groups of stakeholders whose
opinions do shape education and training that must also be considered.
Here too, the use of group labels is more a form of short hand than a
suggestion that there were and are monolithic positions being adopted.

Divisions between employers have already been noted. There have been
references to differences between mining and manufacturing but fissures
run through both constituencies, focused around a complex range of

\(^{18}\)For example, there remains a significant difference in membership profile and union
priorities between the two largest affiliates: NUM and NUMSA. This is part of the
broader historical difference between the manufacturing and mining sectors which
frequently has been at the heart of debates about the South African political economy
(Beinart and Dubow 1995b).
issues, including company size and ethnic and national origins of both
the company and its management. Many employers want to carry on
with business as usual, albeit with a little affirmative action window
dressing as necessary. They are content to persist on low skill paths,
poach skilled labour and promote adversarial industrial relations as in
the past. For them there is no paradigm shift, either in terms of global
technological and economic climate or in local political realities, that
would justify rethinking policy and practice in any more than tactical
ways. As regards education, this tends to lead to a repetition of well-
rehearsed arguments about the need for greater vocationalization.19

COSATU, in spite of its high profile and central role in driving the
current debate, represents a minority of South African workers. Whilst
two other federations, FEDSAL and NACTU20, are now caucusing with
COSATU, they do not seem to have developed an equally sophisticated
view of the need for a high skill path.

There are a large number of other unions unaffiliated to any of the three
federations. It is the white unions to the right of FEDSAL that have the
largest profile of these.21 Here, there is considerable concern about the
implications of the new dispensation on members. Such concern takes
two principal forms. In the case of the Mineworkers Union (now a broad
industrial union in spite of its name and origins), the response is one of
ideological opposition, allied to close ties with the neo-Nazi Afrikaner

19 This, of course, is also the case in Britain.
20 The Federation of South African Labour Unions (predominantly white-collar and with
large numbers of white and coloured members) and the National Council of Trade Unions
(Africanist) respectively.
21 To exclude potential members on the grounds of race would be illegal. However, given
their racist background and their marginalized position in the contemporary industrial
relations scene, these unions remain de facto white-only.
Weerstandbeweging (AWB). On the side of the craft unions, such as the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the stress is on showing the benefits to the country that could accrue from a continuation of the craft tradition and the apprenticeship system, albeit with an acceptance that demarcation disputes are a thing of the past:

let's start looking at utilising aspects of artisan training so that an operator doesn't just operate a machine and when it breaks down he sits down and goes to sleep and waits for the artisan to come and fix it. He must be able to analyse the problem, he must be able to say "I can rectify that, put a new belt on" pending the artisan coming to do a final repair later on. (Allen 1995)

However, concern for "standards" and members' jobs remain central to the craft union position, which thus is unable to break out of a defensive mode.

The role of the universities in the struggle to shape the NQF has already been noted on several occasions. However, as the universities have been largely excluded from positive policy shaping it is relevant to return to them here. Given the Apartheid divided structure of higher education, the degree of commonality between the institutions linked under the Committee of University Principals should not be expected necessarily to allow them to work in harmony. However, in spite of their differing circumstances, and practices, there is little sense that the universities are very different from one another in their philosophical defence of academic standards and the traditional role of the university. Such a defence treads a very fine line between a more positive commitment to quality and academic freedom and a more negative maintenance of elitism and non-engagement with the broad development needs of a new nation. In practice, both strands lead to understandable suspicions
regarding an NQF which could be seen to be both devaluing knowledge and transferring influence over the definition of the parameters of learning from the universities to industry.

In terms of positive proposals or practice, there is some sign of rethinking of course structures leading to modularization, whilst the presence of a representative of the Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA) in the HSRC group and ECSA's development of a pilot project (HSRC 1995: 114-6) suggests that there are likely to be major changes in Engineering faculties at least.

Elsewhere in the Old Commonwealth the forces of conservatism have been split between the training lobby, neo-liberals and neo-conservatives (Moore 1990). We are already familiar with the training lobby in South Africa: those from industry who believe in a Post-Fordist paradigm shift and who see the need for the state to promote responses to it. Whilst many of the stakeholders often show a strong belief in voluntarism this is far from a full-blown neo-liberal position, largely because such a position is not tenable in the current climate. Industry is involved in the quasi-corporatist structure of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In any case, the agenda of the progressive training lobby, stressing as it does the importance of productivity and global competitiveness, is far from anathema to the pro-marketeers.

The importance of neo-conservative standpoints is more relevant in any discussion of education policy. There is a lot of support in certain communities for the kind of multi-culturalism preached under reformed Apartheid through the de Lange Report and the ERS (Kallaway 1995).
That “separate but equal” formulation also has the support of the major Afrikaner parties and cultural organizations (e.g. Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge 1996), as well as the sympathy of Inkatha.

The decision to make compulsory schooling a provincial responsibility, opens up the potential for constitutional problems if a strong NQF is developed which includes formal schooling. However, it is more probable that provincial responsibility for schooling will lead to significant differences between provincial school systems. Whether in the case of the two non-ANC provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape, the forces of cultural conservatism will take those education systems on non-competency or even non-NQF routes remains to be seen. Much will depend on national policy and the contestation of policy by the insiders, as well as local factors and the reactions of outsiders.

Even in ANC-controlled provinces, contestation by conservatives will continue, as witnessed by the attempts to derail the Gauteng Education Bill in mid-1995 and by the disputes over access to traditionally Afrikaans-medium schools in Mpumalanga and Northern Province in early 1996. As was seen previously, a voluntarist NQF would give the opportunity for conservative dominated schools to opt out, even if they lose other battles on admissions, religious instruction, etc.

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22 Cooperation between the national level and KwaZulu-Natal has been affected by Inkatha’s separatist tendencies which meant that the provincial MEC for Education (Dr. Zulu) did not attend meetings of the Council of Education Ministers for a large part of 1995 (Bengu 1995). It is as yet unclear how the National Party’s withdrawal from participation in national government and the running of the other eight provinces will affect the Western Cape.
There are of course also radical educators who are unhappy with the perceived technicist, pro-capital shift of the ANC. For this constituency too, there is little sense of positive alternatives. Whilst non-formal education provides a rich source of alternative practice, the People's Education drive to transform schooling was trampled underfoot in the headlong rush to policy of the early 1990s. Equally, van Rensburg’s attempt to introduce Education with Production into South Africa during the same period was short-lived.23

The typical route, therefore, for radical critics is to support the NQF approach, which after all has the potential to be so much better than the Apartheid system of education, whilst maintaining a critical stance towards it. Such a strategy was encountered frequently in interviews, even with members of national and provincial bureaucracies. After an initial praise singing for the NQF, informants would settle into a long critique of probable and potential dangers in that approach, before concluding with a reaffirmation of the need for the new model to succeed. Such a stance seems indicative of the continued preference of these critics for the pro-equity elements of the approach over the more explicitly Post-Fordist elements.

Throughout this long discussion of education and training policy there has been no mention of the three most important categories of stakeholders at the grassroots level: teachers, parents and pupils. In contrast to the years of People’s Education, these voices seem to be very distant from the heart of debates. Again, this appears to be, in large part,

23 However, North West Province has shown an interest in EWP since the elections. My thanks are to James Drummond, University of the North West, for this information.
an unintended result of the highly complex and technical debate around the NQF. Moreover, these constituencies understandably are more concerned with a range of issues such as the culture of learning, school security, access to good schools, infrastructure and salaries.

There has been no apparent attempt to bring such constituencies into the NQF debate. The Department of Education can boast none of the high profile attempts to explain and listen of other departments, such as Health, with its ministerial tour of South Africa to talk to health professionals, or Population and Welfare, with its highly structured and user-friendly green paper (Ministry of Population and Welfare Development 1995). Rather, the consultation and formulation processes have largely been conducted within a constituency representing a combination of technical experts and narrow corporate interests.

The voices above are those of South Africans with direct involvement in education and training. However, there are also other influential voices which are either not South African or are external to the education and training communities. Attention will now turn to two discourses of this kind: first, that of international donors to education; and second, that of South African macro-economic policy.

The International Donors

In the early 1990s external donors were contributing some $140-160 million per annum to South African education (Duvieusart and Samoff 1994: 11). Whilst this was only 1,5% of total educational expenditure, the leverage it provided was, of course, far greater. This is especially true as
the vast majority of state expenditure was tied up in recurrent expenditure on salaries, etc. Therefore, of the money available for curriculum changes and other innovations, donor support would be a far more significant percentage. Traditionally, of course, this donor support was not directed to co-financing with the government as a result of donor opposition to Apartheid. This is changing as support to NGOs is reduced. Indeed, the March 1996 announcement of the abolition of the RDP office may well accelerate the shift of funds to the state.

Donors, thus, have a potentially large degree of leverage over South African education policy. Whilst South Africa currently is able to effectively preside over its own donor coordination committee and has shown a willingness to turn down offers of tied aid, the conventional wisdom is that in the long run, South African education policy will be strongly influenced by the donors.

The extent to which this is inevitable perhaps should not be overstressed. South Africa’s unique status in sub-Saharan Africa as a semi-peripheral economy should lead to caution about a simplistic reading off from other, neighbouring, experiences. South Africa is a price taker and has a heavy dependence upon primary, extractive industries. However, it is also a regional metropole, exporting manufactured goods to its

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24 The slowness of the state’s response to donor offers, however, has led some donors to keep their existing funding routes open (King 1996).
25 Control of RDP finance has gone to the Department of Finance; project control to the office of Deputy-President Mbeki. The latter seems indicative of internal ANC politics around the succession to Mandela, with Mbeki seeking to reinforce his position as heir-apparent.
26 That is to say, most of what it produces is not of sufficient importance in the global economy that South Africa is able to set prices. Rather, it is largely forced to respond to exogenously determined world prices. This may be contrasted, for example, with the much more powerful oil producing countries.
hinterland within the SADC region. Moreover, it also has pockets of global core production\(^{27}\), which will be the central focus of trade and industry policy if the findings of Industrial Strategy Project are endorsed (Joffe et al. 1993).

This economic reality makes South Africa very different from its neighbours. More crucially, as far as this study is concerned, South Africa’s distinct economic and industrial structure (for sub-Saharan Africa) has contributed to plans for an education and training strategy that are radically different from those which the donors are used to funding. Indeed, with its stress on competencies, integration and a national qualifications framework, the South African model is far more in tune with the Old Commonwealth countries than its African neighbours.

Donors of course will have a huge influence on the overall funding, and hence functioning, of the system and are likely to be strongly interventionist in their now customary areas of quality, efficiency, access, etc. However, it seems likely that for the moment there will not be major interference in the policies of integration with which this thesis is primarily concerned. Crucially, such policies are not those with which the donor community has any great experience in dealing.\(^ {28}\)

\(^{27}\) That is, high skill, high price, high quality.

\(^{28}\) The Old Commonwealth countries are involved in developing such policies domestically but have little experience of marketing them to African countries. One exception here would be the role played by the Scottish Vocational Education Council (SCOTVEC) in the development of the Namibian education system.
The Macro-Economic Debate

Education and training cannot be seen in isolation from broader economic policy. As Peter Kallaway reminds us,

it is extremely important to place educational policy in the context of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the concrete economic and budgetary context of South Africa. (Kallaway 1995: 4)

Kallaway detects a major shift in emphasis towards a more market-oriented stance between the RDP document at the start of 1994 and the second RDP White Paper (RSA 1994) in December of the same year. This was perhaps inevitable given the international climate, with pressure from the IMF/World Bank, broader New Right ideology and globalization forces (ibid.). The result was a first budget in 1995 which stressed financial and monetary discipline. Indeed, it has been described as effectively a self-imposed structural adjustment programme (Lloyd 0I 1995) rather than an attempt to implement the RDP (Adedeji 1996).

Such a policy has two major implications for the proposed education and training policy. First, the climate of overall budgetary restraint led to reductions in the Department of Education's budget in real terms in 1994-5 and a less than satisfactory increase in the 1996 budget (DE 1996b). Given the vast percentage of the budget already committed and the huge legacy of Apartheid,29 this appears to leave very little money available for educational expenditure on the NQF. Thus, the dominance of industrial views in the operationalization of the NQF is likely to persist. The

29 The salary increases that would be involved in a programme to bring all teachers up to the qualifications and salary levels found in white education would more than consume the additional educational budget.
broader effect of such an imbalance will, as elsewhere, be largely determined by decisions about the degrees of asymmetry and voluntarism that the NQF will permit.

Second, the NQF vision as formulated is itself closely connected to a broader Post-Fordist standpoint. For its implementation to be successful, economic growth is probably essential. The budgets of 1995 and 1996 combined, however, do not appear to have been radical enough either to stimulate the economy through external investment, as a result of their conservative credentials, or through internal growth, as a result of their populist pretensions (Kallaway 1995; Lloyd OI 1995). Instead of the 8% growth needed to stabilize unemployment, or the 5% required to stabilize employment, growth in 1995 was thought to be nearer to 2% (Lloyd OI 1995).

In such a climate it is hard to believe that enough employers and trade unionists will be able to negotiate the paradigm shift to a social democratic Post-Fordism, as envisaged in the COSATU-driven vision of the NQF. Rather, it is likely that many employers will see new technologies as a means of intensifying production, improving surveillance and increasing automation, all elements of a Lean Production paradigm. Equally, it is probable that trade unions will be forced into defensive strategies, not least because of the loss of important theorists such as Adrienne Bird. The possible areas of contestation explored in the previous section can be expected to be more serious in such a climate. Yet again, how such contestations are resolved will depend largely on whether the NQF is to be a unified model or will allow different tracks and/or opting out.
This chapter so far has focused upon the apparent consensus around the notion of the NQF and its extent and limitations. The People's Education and market-oriented meta-narratives have been present in the background of such discussions. Nonetheless, a brief focusing on the shifting balance between these two meta-narratives is necessary before turning to an exploration of the current and future nature of the emergent education and training system. This focusing will be on the two versions of the education and training White Paper (DNE 1994; DE 1995a).

**Reading the White Papers**

These two versions of the White Paper, emanating as they did from the education bureaucracy, give a far more educational slant to the discussion than either the interviews or the NTSI. As a result of their origins they were concerned more with issues such as equity and the role of the market in education than were the more training-oriented texts explored earlier.

The draft White Paper of September 1994 began with a detailed and damning analysis of the legacy of the Apartheid education system and had an emphasis on the major People's Education themes of access, governance and curriculum transformation:

access to education and training was severely rationed on a racial and ethnic basis. Compulsory education for White children has been enforced for decades, with the result that the White adult population has been completely literate for generations. By contrast, millions of Black adults and out-of-school youth still have little or no access to education and training. Most Black adults, especially rural women, are illiterate.
.... the historic pattern of governance has been top-down authoritarian or bureaucratic in all departments, but especially in the systems of the majority of the people.

.... the curriculum, textbooks and teacher education were manipulated for ideological purposes and used as instruments of propaganda and indoctrination. (DNE 1994: 9)

This, however, could be contrasted with concerns later in the White Paper which reflected reformist National Party positions harking back to the ERS/CMESA proposals. The right of freedom of association based upon culture, language and religion was one such theme reaffirmed here. This was couched in terms of a need to reflect prior constitutional agreements:

Every person (including a ‘legal person’ 30) has the right to establish, where practicable, an educational institution based on common culture, language or religion, provided that racial discrimination is prohibited. (ibid: 24)

More conservative sentiments also appeared in the financial considerations of the Report. Wide-ranging limitations to free and compulsory education in practice were laid out. This was coupled with a statement of the need for increased cost recovery and cost sharing, even at the primary level (ibid: 53-7). 31 The overall budgetary constraints within which educational change would take place were also highly conservative (ibid: 37). Echoes of the National Party’s technocratic discourse from the 1980s and early 1990s were present also in a stress on the need for managed change.

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30 An organisation or institution having the same legal rights and responsibilities as an individual.

31 The extension of cost-recovery to the primary level goes beyond the position of even the World Bank which lobbied Zimbabwe against such a policy as the start of the decade.
The balance of power between these two meta-narratives, and with their Post-Fordist rivals, was brought into question by the draft White Paper’s statement that the Department of Education would have responsibility for NQF development (ibid: 32). This appeared to mark a significant shift in the balance of power away from the training lobby.

However, this proved to be short-lived, as the final White Paper in March 1995 stated the IMWG’s responsibility for that developmental process. Although this reinforced the dominance of the other two meta-narratives, the rhetoric of equity and choice was still present in the analysis. In this light it was significant that the initial equity focus of the draft White Paper was replaced by an opening section which was both more instrumental and more Post-Fordist:

Successful modern economies and societies require the elimination of artificial hierarchies, in social organisation, in the organisation and management of work, and the way in which learning is organised and certified. They require citizens with a strong foundation of general education, the desire and ability to continue to learn, to adapt to and develop new knowledge, skills and technologies, to move flexibly between occupations, to take responsibility for personal performance, to set and achieve high standards, and to work co-operatively. (DE 1995a: 15)

The shift away from equity concerns was also seen in the placing of “parental choice” before “access” when discussing “values and principles of education and training policy” (ibid: 21). Moreover, the section on the historical legacy of Apartheid, now relegated to later in the text, was seriously watered-down from its September version. Reference to racial-based inequality, so clear in the initial text, was blurred by the abandonment of the use of white and black as descriptors. The achievements of the white (or “elite”, as it was now termed) system were
highlighted and South African education was seen as comparable or even superior to other countries at the same level of development. This resulted in a text which at times verged on an apologetic for Apartheid education, as the following extract indicates:

As with other basic services, the distribution of education and training provision in our country follows a pattern of contrasts and paradoxes. South Africa has achieved, by a large measure, the most developed and well-resourced system of education and training on the African continent, with the highest participation rates at all levels of the system. (ibid: 18)

Such a claim was highly questionable, particularly with regard to the accuracy of the second sentence. Furthermore, conscious racially-based inequalities had become “contrasts and paradoxes”: a remarkable shift from the earlier version. Equally, the decision to begin the section on the historical legacy with this praise-singing of white education (which continued past these initial two sentences) clashed with the page-and-a-half focus of the first draft on “the denial of equal educational rights” (DNE 1994: 9).

Whilst I have argued that the major element of the emergent discourse is built upon broadly Post-Fordist views, the relative strength of these other two meta-narratives is important. Opposition to the NQF approach and tensions between New Times and Lean Production conceptions points to the uncertainty of the balance between equity and instrumentalism in the emergent system. The apparent shift in power in the education bureaucracy back to its ERS/CMESA position of instrumentalism rather than equity thus has potential implications for the overall balance of the system. This will need to be kept in mind as attention now turns briefly
to practice and then to the exploration of the key elements of that emergent system.

The Policy-Practice Interface

At several points already this chapter has crossed the boundary between policy and practice. Before proceeding to a summarization of what the emergent model might look like, it is necessary to spend a brief moment focusing explicitly on the issue of practice.

In the development of new approaches to South African education and training, as elsewhere, there is a complex, bi-directional relationship between the shaping of policy and practice. What is very readily evident in this particular case is the involvement of large numbers of the key policy negotiators in the development of innovative practice.

This rush to create best practice appears to be based on the assumption that those who come to the negotiating table with worked out practical proposals will have the best chance of winning the day: "my bet is that they will probably come to the table and say 'who's got the training schedules and modules for that? OK, that becomes the national standard'" (Costa Pierides OI 1995- Automobile Manufacturers Industry Training Board [AMITB]).

The importance of the development of workable modules which articulate policy and practice can perhaps be symbolized by the progress of Adrienne Bird from policy proposer (NUMSA/COSATU); to practice developer (Metal and Engineering Industry Education and Training Board) to policy formulator and implementor (Chief Director: Human
Resource Development, Department of Labour Affairs). It is also evidenced by the structure of the HSRC Report which devotes a section to practice and, more crucially, a chapter to eight case studies showing how developments in practice amongst the HSRC group not only has allowed them to refine theory, but also gives them the authority to speak to communities of both policy and practice.

These are not the only models of practice that are seeking to help shape policy. AMITB, the employers and NUMSA have developed a programme for training across the automobile industry (von Holdt OI 1995; Pierides OI 1995). In building, BITB are currently involved in a pilot project with the support of the National Training Board and the Irish Government (on behalf of the European Union) to develop RPL mechanisms within training (Eberlein OI 1995- National Training Board; Sonnendecker OI 1995). In the mining industry too, there are attempts to develop new modules (Phillips 1995), although these have been hampered by the exclusively artisanal focus of the training board.

The examples in the above paragraph are all of initiatives in training. Five of the eight case studies in the HSRC Report are also about training. The other three are concerned with the professional development of engineers and Education, Training and Development Practitioners (ETDPs), and the development of adult education examinations (HSRC 1994: Chapter 9).

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32 The 1996 Mine Health and Safety Bill proposed a single Mining Industry Qualifications Authority to cover all occupational levels in the industry (DE 1996c: 13). Thus, it was the industry’s dreadful safety record that brought about the implementation of a long-cherished NUM policy proposal.
There are no comparable pilot projects aimed at the school system. Gustav Niebuhr’s call for such pilots (Niebuhr OI 1995) can be read as a recognition of the need for the school system to start operationalizing the NQF prior to full implementation. Equally, however, it can be understood as a recognition that those who have the most power to shape the NQF during its formative stages are those who can talk in concrete as well as abstract terms. At the moment, it is clear that formal education, here too, is in danger of losing out to the far more organized training lobby.

Even more ironically in the view of the NEPI depiction of adult basic education at the beginning of the 1990s as "chaotic and uncoordinated" (NEPI 1992c: 15), it appears that those in ABET are far better equipped at present to shape policy than their formal schooling counterparts.33

Pierides’ picture of policy being decided upon by those who have the most credible modules, with others acquiescing in them, of course is likely to only hold in part. Here again, asymmetry and voluntarism must be remembered. These issues need to be foregrounded, for they are amongst the key defining issues that will shape the future of South African education and training. It will be necessary to examine what form such a model appears to be taking at this point in its development, and which factors join asymmetry and voluntarism as the key variables that seem likely to shape both the present and future trajectory of the reforms.

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33 This is probably due to the ABET community’s experience of having to think innovatively about curriculum as compared to large sections of formal education’s preoccupation with the collapse of the culture of learning and with the political role of the formal system.
As yet no hegemonic model has been established. This is largely because it is still very early days in the post-election era. The administrative and political legacy of Apartheid was such that reorganizing and capturing the structures of government, bureaucracy and civil society took much of the energy of the stakeholders in the first two years of the Mandela presidency. Whilst policy formulation and the development of practice were carried on, there was the challenge of getting influence in new fora such as NEDLAC, the IMWG (and now SAQA) as well as older organs such as the NTB and the two departments.

Nonetheless, as we have already seen, broader planning has been continuing. Currently, there would seem to be four possible paths the new education and training system, centred around the NQF, could take. This section will briefly outline these before pointing to some of the indicators which will be useful in the future charting of the progress or decline of these alternatives. Of course, it is probable that none of the four paths will be adopted in its entirety. However, they are useful in so far as they point out the possibilities and tensions that exist within the system in rather stark ways.

The Four Paths

Path One: National, Pro-Equity

This path would see the fulfilment of the ANC/COSATU vision for the NQF, grounded in the New Times meta-narrative. It is based on a vision
of an economy peopled by workers who through their broad learning are the chief innovative resource of their firms (Kraak 1993b). This model embraces a paradigm shift in both education and training and the organization of work. Workers would be truly multi-skilled, where multi-skilling means the acquisition of a broad range of craft level skills. Training would be in the relevant skills, defined at their broadest, and employers would provide paid education and training leave. This training itself would be carried out in a way that is not Taylorist but which uses the notion of competencies in a broad sense.

The concept of the training-skill-grade-wage nexus becomes integral to the workplace and careers rather than jobs are now the norm. Training is both the vehicle for improving skills and, through the NQF, a rational means of sorting staff. RPL would be used to decide on training, grading and promotion and would be offered to all workers. The new system means that cooperation and joint decision-making between workers and bosses become the heart of the industrial relations system (Mathews 1989).

In education, the stress shifts to using competencies as a means of redressing the imbalance between skills and knowledge that has allegedly plagued the conventional education system. By focusing on doing rather than knowing, a competency-based approach is believed to move learning away from a sterile information gathering and towards a concern with the application of knowledge. RPL also forms an integral element of education progression, allowing those from educationally disadvantaged communities to access further and higher education in far larger numbers than previously.
It is argued that a distinction between education and training will in fact become irrelevant as there will now be a seamless system. Formal education, adult education and training will be more relevant as categorizations of sites of delivery than different systems or sub-systems, with qualifications and access to assessment being indifferent to the site of learning (McGrath with King 1994).

Such a system promises the end of the academic-vocational divide; the end of industrial conflict; and even the end of class conflict (Bird OI 1995a). The argument in its favour has moral force, stressing the model’s ability to be pro-equity and to redress the legacy of Apartheid. It also mobilizes economic force as it promises increased productivity and competitiveness in response to the pressures of globalization and rapid technological change.

As a result, there is almost a religious faith in the model as one in which all stakeholders will want to participate. This is a mode of reasoning that both the ANC and COSATU tend to operate within but it is not able to deal adequately with power relations. The discussions above make it clear that there are powerful interests in South Africa which are likely to obstruct such a radical restructuring of learning and work. As a result, it is possible to theorize an alternative vision of a truly national, qualifications framework.

Path Two: National, Exclusivist

There is a danger that a more negative version of a strong NQF might emerge under certain circumstances. Economic stagnation or even
decline has already been identified in Chapter Four as problematic in this regard. A radical Post-Fordist system can best be achieved under conditions of economic growth. There are two major reasons for this. First, a shift to a higher skill base would lead to more unemployment unless economic growth was rapid enough to offset the labour saving effect of new technologies and processes. Second, the initial costs of transformation could not be borne in a recession. If the radical supporters of the NQF were defeated in the final decision making, or were forced to make significant compromises, perhaps as part of an overall settlement between narrow corporate interests, then a very different system might emerge as a lowest common denominator.

Such a model, if it had an overall guiding philosophy, might owe most to the meta-narrative of Lean Production with its notions of work intensification and flexibilization, as responses to the challenge of globalization. In such a system, multi-skilling would give way to a form of multi-tasking, which would stress both the flexibility of workers to move from one unskilled task to another and the intensification of work through the addition of maintenance and cleaning tasks to production workers’ responsibilities. Employers would only provide, encourage or pay for training that was deemed relevant in a more narrow job specific sense. Such training would tend to use a less radical, more behaviourist and Taylorist conception of competency. RPL would primarily be a tool for affirmative action, serving as a gatekeeping device to identify those

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34 The World Employment Report, 1995 argues that in the long-term new jobs have tended to outstrip the loss of old ones. However, it notes that this is not automatic nor is there any certainty that the new jobs will be at the same or higher skill levels than the old jobs (ILO 1995: 56). Furthermore, it does not seem reasonable to argue both that globalization is taking the world into a fundamentally new economic and industrial paradigm, and that in this new paradigm we can assume that past trends on re/deskilling are still relevant.
who would be most suitable for further training and promotion. Many of the elements of such an approach appear to be emerging in the mining industry as reflected both in interviews (Burrows, Dippenaar, Godsell: all OI 1995) and sample modules for a Mining Industry Qualifications Framework (Phillips 1995).

Looser linkages than envisaged in the first path would exist between training, skills, grade and wage, with final decision-making lying in the hands of management. Instead of German-style co-determination between employers and unions, there would more probably be something closer to Japanese-style employer-employee “cooperation”.

In education, there would be something which can best be described as New Improved Vocationalism. The New Vocationalist trends of the 1980s and early 1990s in South African education would continue in so far as there would probably be a strong emphasis on the well-known elements of that analysis (as explored in previous chapters) such as academic bias, socialization failure and the need to develop better school-industry links. There would be an overall tendency towards instrumental rationales for education, as witnessed by the following Department of Education formulation:

Human resource development (the integration of education and training) will directly influence the policies pursued by the Department of Education - in particular the need to vocationalise education to meet the needs of the economy. (DE 1995b: 9)

35 German industry has a tradition of strong trade unions which are involved in a wide range of decisions as partners of employers. Japanese industry, after the crushing of trade unionism in the early 1950s, has developed a system in which unions with managerially appointed officials cooperate with the schemes of employers.
This tendency towards vocationalization would be made more powerful by not being directed to the traditional stress on vocational/technical schools or streams. Given the general international view on the past performance of conventional Vocationalism, as expressed by the World Bank (e.g. World Bank 1988); the South African context since the de Lange Commission; and the limited possibilities for funding, it is unlikely that South Africa will embark on a major programme of traditional Vocationalism (McGrath 1995b).

What is more likely to emerge as part of a non-radical model of the NQF is a gradual "colonization" of education by training philosophies and methodologies. In particular, there could well be a shifting of the balance between knowledge and skills that would replace a bias in favour of the former with one in favour of the latter. In such a model, emphasis on skills, typically "soft" ones such as problem-solving, communication and social skills, and the use of competencies would be elements of a narrow behaviourist view of learning that would seek to make all subjects more "relevant".

Such a model would appear less explicitly vocationalist than the technical high school approach of Vocationalism. However, through its application of instrumentalism to all areas of the curriculum in a way which is fundamentally more radical than under the New Vocationalism of the ERS/CMESA model, such a strategy could in fact achieve more of the vocationalizing objective of making education better fit the needs of industry, now reshaped to take account of globalization slogans such as flexibility. Hence the term, New Improved Vocationalism, indicating
this model's development beyond the narrower concerns of New Vocationalism.36

Rather than the broad consensus and participatory spirit of the first path, consistent as it is with the overall RDP philosophy, this version would be more narrowly bureaucratic and technicist, with decision-making residing in the hands of experts. Such narrowness would be made more apparent by the limited access to education and training that this model would offer. Training would be predominantly for those in core, unionized employment, as feared by NEPI (1993), whilst RPL would fail to radically transform access to either education or training. Such trends can already be discerned in the work of the IMWG (1994) and the role of the HSRC expert group (HSRC 1995).

There is a tendency towards narrow credentialism in this path. This would lead to education and training not being sought for the learning opportunities it could provide but for its job-linked certification. This would have a particularly serious effect on adult education, which has a predominantly voluntaristic and communitarian ideology (McGrath 1995a). For those on the outside, this would result in the system becoming a "qualifications fortress" (Burroughs OI 1995). As qualifications become more closely tied to jobs and promotion, so access to these qualifications is likely to become more closely controlled.

36 The relationship between New Improved Vocationalism and globalization will be returned to in Chapter Six.
Factors Against a National Model

Many of the interviews conducted brought out two themes which suggest that a strong and totalizing model of the NQF may not emerge. The first of these is asymmetry: the permitting of education and training (or possibly elements of the two) to pursue their own paths within a rather broad overall framework. In choosing a “unified system” over “bridges and ladders” (see below) in 1993 the ANC was stating a preference for a system in which there would be symmetry at all levels (ANC-COSATU 1993b). However, by mid-1995 a senior ANC civil servant in the Department of Education was claiming asymmetry as a major advantage of the emerging system (Coombe OI 1995a).

Voluntarism must also be considered. Initial ANC-COSATU formulations of the NQF also were clearly predicated on an assumption that the system would eventually achieve universal coverage. This assumption arose in part out of statist thinking, but also out of a faith both in the moral and logical force of the NQF and in the openness of other stakeholders to such forces. However, it is clear that neither compulsion nor universal voluntary acceptance of the NQF can be assumed. The introduction of the two concepts of voluntarism and asymmetry suggests that there may well be far greater fragmentation under the NQF than was initially conceived. This is explored in the next two paths.
Path Three: Fragmented, "Bridges and Ladders"

This path would take South African education and training back to the debates in ANC/COSATU circles during the drafting phase of the "Yellow Book", explored in the previous chapter. However, here the model previously rejected would be the one now adopted. It would be a model in which the different sub-systems (ABET, FE, HE, schooling) would retain a large degree of autonomy within an overall integrated approach. Each sub-system would have its own pathway or "ladder". At specified points on these ladders portability across sub-systems would be possible across "bridges".

This approach would enshrine asymmetry between these different sub-systems, which would be given considerable lee-way to interpret the levels of the NQF according to their own needs. Thus, equivalence of awards across sub-systems would become a potential problem. Training would probably develop along broad NTSI-oriented lines, although the tensions seen between Paths One and Two would probably persist. Adult education would probably be unified around the IEB adult examinations but might well reflect a major industry-oriented bias.37

Formal education would have to respond to these trends, although education stakeholders would be given far greater room for manoeuvre than in a strong version of the NQF. Their response would probably involve an attempt to redress the imbalance between knowledge and skills, but in a way that would still see a fundamental role for the former.

37 Although a non-governmental organisation, the IEB’s experience in setting national examinations at matriculation level and leadership in the field of adult examinations means that it will probably come to set the norms in this field.
Modularization would almost certainly be developed significantly, particularly at the upper levels, but competencies might be abandoned or radically reworked. Progression within systems would be rationalized and RPL and credit transfer mechanisms would probably develop at the further and higher education levels.

This path introduces asymmetry but still sees a basic cohesion within subsystems. However, if we now introduce the notion of voluntarism an even more fragmented system appears.

Path Four: Fragmented, Islands of Integration

In this path, there is effectively no sign of an integrated approach, let alone an integrated system. Rather than the coherent sub-systems of path three, we now have “small islands of integrative best practice in an ocean of non-integration” (Fehnel OI 1995; McGurk OI 1995). Here the experiences of Australia might be particularly relevant. Universities, as in that country, would almost certainly show little interest in competencies or in coordination with the broader system except on their own terms. Professions would be divided about involvement in the system with many remaining outside it (Marginson 1993; O’Connor OI 1995; Lankshear 1996).

In industry, whole sectors might continue on a narrow CBMT route that might not prove acceptable to a SAQA which maintained elements of the original NQF vision. The participation of some ITBs but not others in the HSRC group might be significant as a line of cleavage in this context. The opting out of certain sectors would reflect the more negative possible
outcome of the rush to best practice of progressive trainers: that it repels rather than captures conservative elements. Even within sectors which chose to be part of the system, voluntarism would allow many employers to opt out of all or part of the modular programme offered. In such a system, both inter- and intra-sectoral portability would become highly problematic.

Mass opting out would be inevitable in the adult education field. Some organizations would probably seek and achieve IEB accreditation but many others would either find such a model too costly and demanding or would fail in the accreditation process.

Formal education would see a similar mass opting out. The school system might show little sign of the integrative practice envisaged by the progressives. Instead, a more narrowly vocationalist form of integration would probably emerge in the public school system. For both liberal and conservative reasons such a system would not be acceptable to the private school system, nor to many parents who would seek to remove their children from public education. What would result is a reworked class-divided system with broad education for the children of the elite, and narrow training for the children of the masses, in an echo of National Party policy since the de Lange Report. Of course, it is possible that such a scenario might be complicated by inter-provincial differences in policy and, hence, school response.
FOUR POSSIBLE FUTURE PATHS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM

PATH ONE
- National
- New Improved Vocationalism
- Broad components
- Broad cooperation
- Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL)
- Limited Industrial Training Board involvement
- Limited industrial
- Very limited portability
- Asymmetry
- Multi-skilling
- Pathways + Limited
- Symbiotic systems
- Autonomous
- Limited equivalence
- Fragmented NQF
- Mainly in training
- Narrow relevance
- Limited PETL
- Asymmetry
- Multi-tasking
- Labour Market

PATH TWO
- National
- New Improved Vocationalism
- Broad components
- Broad cooperation
- Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL)
- Limited Industrial Training Board involvement
- Limited industrial
- Very limited portability
- Asymmetry
- Multi-skilling
- Pathways + Limited
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- Asymmetry
- Multi-tasking
- Labour Market

PATH FOUR
- Fragmented National
- New Improved Vocationalism
- Broad components
- Broad cooperation
- Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL)
- Limited Industrial Training Board involvement
- Limited industrial
- Very limited portability
- Asymmetry
- Multi-skilling
- Pathways + Limited
- Symbiotic systems
- Autonomous
- Limited equivalence
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TRAINING SYSTEM

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The Key Defining Factors of the New Model

From the four paths outlined above, and arising in turn out of earlier discussions in this chapter, it is possible to identify a set of key factors that will be fundamental to the shape of South African education and training in the future.

Coverage

The new model could have varying levels of coverage, defined in four ways. Systems coverage refers to the different parts of education and training (e.g. FE, ABET, etc.) that would adopt integrative policies and practice. Geographic coverage refers to the areas of the country that adopt integration. This is most relevant in the case of compulsory education which is a provincial responsibility. Sectoral coverage reflects the question of whether all sectors of industry, and both public and private school sectors, will buy into the NQF model. Finally, level coverage refers to the extent of coverage of a new model across educational and/or occupational levels. This is reflective of the possibility of university or professional refusal to join a broader model of education and training.

Articulation

Two central principles of the NTSI Report were portability and progression. These become major indicators of the future shape of education and training. How easy will it be to move up through the NQF levels, regardless of sites or paths of learning? How easy will it be to
move among such sites or paths, and between different occupations? These are fundamental indicators of how far the NTSI philosophy is being put into practice.

**Broadness of Learning**

The broadness of the learning opportunities provided within the system, both in terms of the range of available fields of learning and what they each contain, is another key factor. Tensions between knowledge and skills, and over Taylorism, behaviourism and competencies, will determine whether those within the system get learning opportunities which enable them to act upon the world or simply to be better reconciled and socialized to a world that they lack the power to change.

**Equity v Efficiency**

At the heart of South African education and training debates in the 1990s has been this tension between equity and efficiency. The balance of power between these two elements in any system that emerges will be another key defining factor. Will the system be one in which the key emphasis is on increasing the access of all potential learners to meaningful learning opportunities, or will the level and type of learning opportunities be conditioned by the narrow needs of industry and the economy? Will it be possible to create the kind of New Times future in which the two concerns are successfully married? One particular touchstone here will be developments in RPL.
Asymmetry

This has been a recurrent theme throughout this chapter. How far will different institutions and structures within the NQF model be allowed to develop their own approaches? How far will a synoptic vision be compromised in the process? Will it result in a lowest common denominator NQF? Will the promise of asymmetry successfully keep potential opponents in the NQF system, and, if so, will this harm the approach? Such questions strike to the heart of whether the model that emerges will owe more to the stronger integrative impulse of the first two paths or the weaker version of the third and fourth paths.

Voluntarism

This too was a recurrent theme of the interviews explored above. How voluntarist will the NQF be? What sanctions and incentives will be used to encourage educational authorities and business leaderships to buy into the system? Voluntarism, of course, brings with it the danger that there will be mass opting-out, thus bringing the alleged benefits of the NQF to a smaller constituency. Equally, it is possible that the fear of opting-out may lead to a watered down NQF, as noted above. The success of attempts to secure voluntary support for the progressive vision of the NQF will be a major determining factor of the nature of the new model.
As noted earlier, it is too early to say what form the new South African education and training system and the NQF will take. There are far too many unresolved contestations that make prediction very hazardous. The withdrawal of the National Party from the government is one such imponderable at the time of writing, as is the appointment of Mkhatshwa (see page 117) as Deputy-Minister. Nonetheless, policy and practice have been evolving for two years since the elections. By taking these as broadly indicative of future trajectories, some tentative predictions can be made. In making these I will utilise the factors outlined above as heuristic tools.

Coverage

It seems likely that coverage will be national in geographic terms, to the extent that examples of NQF practice will be found in all provinces. However, there remain major problems in developing coverage across all systems. Training and adult education are broadly involved in integrative thinking and practice but formal education is far behind, regardless of province. This of course reflects the fact that large numbers of trade unionists, industrial trainers and adult educators became involved in this debate long before significant numbers of educationalists.

It seems unlikely from the perspective of mid-1996 that formal education as a whole will be an integral part of the new approach. Working group 9’s willingness to exclude compulsory schooling from the full force of the
NQF and the reality that only Level One of the NQF directly impacts upon the compulsory phase of schooling suggests that formal schooling might well be left largely to its own devices, particularly at the primary level, although it would undoubtedly be under considerable indirect pressure to respond to integration.

If a more centralized integrative model, as envisaged by the recent Ministerial Committee (DE 1996a), does emerge then this would almost certainly lead to massive opting out of private schools (whose relationship to the NQF is unclear - particularly in the light of national curriculum experience in England and Wales where private schools were exempt). Indeed, it is possible, that this could even jeopardize geographic coverage if provincial ministries find such a system unpalatable. The degree to which the provinces have a constitutional right in this regard remains uncertain and hence the degree of potential opt-out.

Universities have already been vocal in their disquiet about the implications of the NQF (Greenstein 1995b). It is likely that the HSRC Report will also have produced a further legacy of mistrust. Indeed, perhaps the best hope for the NQF here is that the universities might be totally out-manoeuvred through their refusal to try to pro-actively shape the new model. However, this has not happened in Australia, for example (Donn 1996). In this context, it is significant that the National Commission on Higher Education appears to have been paying little attention to a detailed analysis of the universities’ role in the NQF.

An attempt to develop a radical model of the NQF would of course also bring with it the likelihood of sectors or firms choosing to remain outside the system. This seems inevitable given the Australian experience
(O'Connor OI 1995). Indeed, almost any form of integration and the development of an NQF might be radical enough to be opposed by some employers.

**Articulation**

It was always likely that portability between jobs would be more limited than the publicists of the NQF claimed. Indeed, given the specific nature of organizational practice and technology, it is probable that portability will not be absolute even within sectors. Certainly, inter-sectoral portability will be very limited, particularly in the current labour surplus climate.

Progression within occupations may be expected to develop more successfully. However, two outstanding issues remain to be settled here. First, how will the equivalence problems inherent in asymmetry be dealt with? Second, how seriously will the credibility of the model be affected by the inevitable gap between the promise, encapsulated in the slogan "from sweeper to engineer"\(^{38}\), and the reality, which will see no progression at all for many workers?

**Broadness of Learning**

This chapter has argued that there is a willingness in many quarters to seek to develop an integrated form of learning which is based on a non-

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\(^{38}\) This slogan originated in the Australian trade union movement before being introduced to South Africa by NUMSA.
Taylorist conception of competencies. However, there remain major questions about the feasibility and desirability of such a strategy for various participants in the debate. It is not clear that such a model of competencies can be developed, especially in the light of experiences elsewhere (Marginson 1993; Smithers 1993). In particular, it is difficult to get stakeholder support of sufficient breadth. It seems likely that many employers, in particular, would shape the model towards a narrower vision in practice.

A danger also lies in employer-union cooperation. If employers want a narrow model, but will tie it quite systematically to pay and promotions, then trade union acquiescence may be easily achieved. This would be at the expense of educational principles stressing broadness of learning. Even if there was the desire to make learning non-Taylorist, a major problem would remain as the result of the massive shortfall in both quality and quantity of trainers able to teach in a broad system.

There does seem to be a real danger of a more subtle and pernicious form of vocationalism emerging, in which education comes to be seen in ever more instrumental terms. The strength of arguments against traditional vocational education in South African intellectual circles seems enough to foreclose any substantial move towards a major expansion of the technical high schools sector. However, the discourse of competencies and skills, taken together with the Department of Education’s quote in favour of vocationalism cited earlier (page 249), suggests an increasing threat to educational values and to the role of education professionals in setting the educational agenda.
Equity v Efficiency

It is almost certainly the case that the New Times vision underpinning the model of Path One above is unrealistic. The kind of economic, political and social transformations assumed are simply not happening in Britain and Australia (from whence such ideas came) let alone in South Africa. There is some evidence of the adoption of the new thinking in practice but it does not amount to a paradigm shift, nor is it certain to do so in the future.

Given the ideological and economic climate within which South Africa is operating, a less empowering and inclusive response to the very real elements of globalization and technological change is likely to emerge. In such a scenario, equity and efficiency will not be balanced. Instead the latter will receive primary attention. In this case, the vision of an NQF stressing access and progression for all can be expected to give way to the narrower model of Path Two.

Asymmetry

This appears to be official policy. As was noted above, this arises out of a concern to keep as many stakeholders as possible talking prior to the development of a formalized model through SAQA. However, there is a real danger in such an approach that this will ensure, rather than prevent, a disunited system.

The presence of asymmetry in the debate is crucial. It suggests that Path One is untenable, assuming that broad agreement on such a vision would not be possible. As a result, it offers two lowest common
denominator, alternative paths: an integrated system exhibiting narrow Taylorism or an approach which leaves different stakeholders largely to pursue their own visions. In the latter case, it is almost certain that some sub-systems, from the educational side, would resist a radical NQF. Perhaps even more significantly, it is far less certain that the radical view would prevail even in the more congenial settings of ABET and the training sector.

**Voluntarism**

Voluntarism in the new system appears inevitable. In this case, the ability to persuade becomes crucial. However, it does not seem plausible that the majority of stakeholders will buy in to a radical vision, as assumed in Path One. Rather, voluntarism seems likely to lead to a large-scale opting out in all sub-systems, even where an industry or a province as a whole has decided upon participation.

**The Overall Picture**

The above analysis suggests that, in the current climate of debate, there is little prospect of the radical vision of Path One being realized. Indeed, the central importance of the notions of asymmetry and voluntarism point to the implausibility of a strong national system. This relates to

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39 Here again it is important to note that such a reading is based on the trajectory of the first 2 years of the post-election period. The effects of the abandonment of the GNU by the National Party may well shift the trajectory in ways which it would be foolish to attempt to predict in June 1996.
one of the weakest elements of ANC-COSATU thinking. The notion of a strong and integrated ministry to drive education and training reform was a central element of early pre-election formulations. This was abandoned in practice in 1994 but it has yet to be adequately replaced by a new strategy. This indicates that the real question is about the nature of a decentralized system.

Those already developing practices which promote good quality integrated learning probably will continue to do so. However, the debates explored in this chapter suggest that such practice will not achieve hegemony, either as formulated or implemented policy. Rather, there is a real likelihood of a fragmented system in which small pockets of progressive integrative practice will exist alongside wider expanses of narrow Taylorist training, instrumentalized public schooling and largely unreformed and elitist private and higher education.

Whether such an outcome is desirable and, if not, whether there are plausible alternatives are questions which have been addressed elliptically in the discussions of this chapter. Their more direct consideration will have to wait till the next chapter. Before then it is necessary to have a better understanding of the factors behind the development of the current situation. Therefore, the next section of this chapter seeks to answer the second of the research questions posed at the outset: what factors help to explain the current shape of South African education and training policy and the debates that surround it?
REASONS FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION

In order to understand why the system appears to be developing in the ways described above, I will make use of both stakeholders' own rationales for changes and a broader understanding of global discursive pressures on the South African education and training system prior to making any conclusions.

Stakeholder Rationales

Stakeholders appear to have developed rationales for changes to education and training in two distinct areas. First, they have seen such changes in the light of the changed socio-political realities of the post-election period. Second, they have identified a series of economic and education and training realities which have also shaped the transformation.

Socio-Political Realities

There was a strong sense from interviews with stakeholders that the new South Africa would require very different ways of operating in a number of fields. Ray Eberlein, then chair of the National Training Board, saw the changed climate as the root cause of transformed attitudes towards training amongst many employers:

the big companies have realised that their future lies with this [changed approach to training]. Obviously, there are a number of factors impacting on this. There's the entire change from an autocratic approach to a more multi-party approach, there is the influence of the RDP, and obviously
the whole series of changes that have happened in South Africa. (Eberlein OI 1995)

Eberlein's reference to the RDP was repeated by many employers and trainers. The 1995 BMI survey found that 64% of companies and 79% of ITBs had set goals in terms of the RDP (BMI 1995: 158).40 In many cases this may amount to little more than lip service. However, in the case of parastatals, such as ESKOM (Verster OI 1995), and some training boards, such as those in hospitality and building (Ansara OI 1995; Sonnendecker OI 1995), it appears that a real commitment to the RDP is central to overall strategies. How this has been, and in future will be, affected by the change in RDP status at the end of March 1996 remains a question for future examination.

At the heart of the original vision of the RDP was the redress of the legacy of Apartheid. Here too, there was public acknowledgement of the new climate from the largely white stakeholder group. Many respondents were strongly critical of the Apartheid system and stressed their long-term opposition to it. Such a position, for example, was taken by Arthur Allen, head of the craft union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union: “even before the Wiehahn Commission, in fact in 1974, we as the AEU made a policy announcement that we supported change” (Allen OI 1995).

Condemnation of Apartheid and its legacy was particularly apparent in comments about the education system:

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40 The five RDP themes were Meeting Basic Needs; Developing our Human Resources; Building the Economy; Democratising the State and Society; and Implementing the RDP (ANC 1994b).
The racial division and distortion of educational resources and institutions of course has cost the economy and society immensely. The failure to develop effective educational opportunities for black South Africans is one that we are going to pay for for a long time: a generation or two. (Godsell OI 1995)

In the light of political change, the rejection of the NTS, and criticisms of the ITB system,\(^{41}\) legitimacy was a major concern of both the NTB and many of the ITBs. Central to strategies here have been changes in membership of boards to incorporate more union delegates. In the case of building, such an argument was taken further by Sonnendecker who stressed the need for broad community involvement in the deliberations of the training board (Sonnendecker OI 1995).

Both directly through changes in its ability to influence education and training policy and indirectly through the impact of its decision on the climate in the business world, the NP's withdrawal from the GNU is likely to have significant effects on the emergent learning system. At this stage, however, it is difficult to predict precisely what shape these effects will take.

Economic and Education and Training Realities

Although the new political climate since the elections has clearly influenced stakeholder policy and practice, this was not as well articulated in interviews as economic and education and training rationales for change. Amongst such rationales, the following appeared

\(^{41}\) See BMI (1995) for a discussion of problems with the ITB system.
the most important: international competitiveness, technological change, skills shortage, training failure and education failure. These will be dealt with in turn.

International Competitiveness

The newsletter **Competitiveness Update** of the South African Business Network shows a major concern with this issue (SABN 1994a and b). It argues that it is now impossible to use tariffs:

> The interdependence of nations, particularly in respect of trade flows, means that protective tariffs are as likely to harm the country imposing such measures as the country or countries targeted. (SABN 1994a: 2)

Such a position was reflected in the drive towards liberalization by Trevor Manuel when he was Minister of Trade and Industry, a drive that was at a faster pace than required by international agreements. In the light of this new competitive environment, South Africa’s placing at 41st out of 41 countries for human resource development in the 1994 World Competitiveness Report (cited in SABN 1994a) was seen as very serious by those interviewed in early 1995. This situation is held to be most crucial in the NUMSA-organized metals and automobile sectors. Concerns in the latter industry are reflected in the comments of AMITB’s Costa Pierides:

> In our industry it’s a fundamental necessity, if we’re going to survive: we need people who can do the jobs, we’ve got to become productive, we’ve got to utilise our human resources in the best manner we can and to do that you have to train people up so it’s a dynamic process. We see it as a fundamental requirement of survival largely
because GATT's\textsuperscript{42} coming in and we've got the duty rates coming in, internal and external competition now becoming a lot more fierce and if companies are going to survive they're going to have to do things a lot smarter in the future. (Pierides OI 1995)

Technological Change

In many ways concerns expressed by those interviewed about increased international competitiveness were linked to issues of technological change. The issue of \textit{Competitiveness Update} cited above also was concerned with the need to respond to technological change which makes cutting edge industry increasingly globally mobile:

Consider what are commonly believed to be the 7 key industries of the next few decades- microelectronics, biotechnology, new materials industries, civil aviation, telecommunications, robots plus machine tools, computers plus software. All are brain power industries. Each could be located anywhere on the face of the globe. Where they will be located depends upon who can organise the brain power to capture them. (Lester Thurow (MIT\textsuperscript{43}) cited in SABN 1994a: 4)

These industries, of course, are not the same ones as those represented by the respondents. Indeed, many stakeholders reported minimal technological change in their industries. However, a belief in rapid technological change and the need to respond to it does seem to be common in many of the core industries of the HSRC expert group.\textsuperscript{44} It is also strongly reflected in the findings of the Industrial Strategy Project.

\textsuperscript{42} The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
\textsuperscript{43} Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
\textsuperscript{44} The industries represented by this group were hospitality, transport, electricity, plastics and engineering/metals.
Thus, in the minds of many of those shaping policy there appears to be a belief that the future health of the South African economy is dependent on following the imperatives of the newer high technology industries and processes.

Such a belief in a broadly Post-Fordist vision leads on to a strong stress on the necessity to reform education and training to respond to the new learning needs that emerge. Here, South Africa’s NQF debate appears to follow the broad outline of global discourses as witnessed in OECD countries, with their emphasis on making education more skills than knowledge bound, the promotion of lifelong learning and training for flexibility.

Skills Shortage

The notion that education and training must be reformed in the light of technological change can be seen as part of a broader, and long-standing, concern that industry is experiencing a skills shortage, as charted in previous chapters. Whilst the history of skills misclassification and the lack of a skills audit were seen by some as making any definitive statement regarding a skills shortage impossible (e.g. Eberlein OI 1995; Tyers OI 1995), a range of concerns about a skills shortage were raised.

From a variety of industries came a concern about the insufficient numbers of skilled workers. The skills of supervisors were also seen as inadequate by some. This group of workers has conventionally been white and has had little experience of participatory management of African workers at lower levels. Instead, there has been a tradition of
giving orders and following them up with racial abuse and even violence when deemed necessary. One senior manager argued that such an approach would no longer work and supervisory staff must learn how “you get people to do what you want them to do without kicking them, smacking them or threatening to fire them” (Godsell OI 1995).

Training Failure

Managerial skills are also seen as problematic by those at senior levels, such as Andre Dippenaar of Business South Africa, who argue that inappropriate training of managers is at the root of many of the problems of inadequate skills further down the system:

Because managers lack the skills of how to solve problems, because they don’t really understand the relationship between labour practice and education and training, the methodologies are simply not good enough. There is too much stress on content, on doing the “right thing”, on following orders. In adult basic education there’s no understanding of the distinction between andrology and pedagogy: pedagogy simply isn’t good enough for ABE. There’s no understanding of the methodologies required. There was some movement in the late ’70s and ’80s in some industries towards competency-based training, but the majority simply haven’t changed. To be blunt, in South African industry we don’t know how to train. We ask how many courses has someone gone on, how many hours of training have they had, which certificates have they picked up. We don’t ask about what they learnt or what skills and competencies they acquired, what are the outcomes of their training. We give them written tests and say: “you’re qualified to do this” without ever seeing if they can do the job in practice. Our concern is too much with inputs, how many hours of training, how many courses rather than on the output: what has been learnt, what can this person do now. (Dippenaar OI 1995)
Several trainers reinforced Dippenaar’s arguments and reported that many managers and owners resist training, particularly, but not exclusively, in small firms. Problems with the ITB system in its early years (which are still continuing in some industries); poor worker motivation towards training; levy schemes which cover too few firms and have too low contributions; and the historic lack of incentives to acquire skills, all contribute to the problems faced in the sphere of training. As a result, structured training was only available to a few by the time of elections (Tyers and Bird 1994). Moreover, what training there was available was still too narrowly focused on certain occupational levels, as witnessed by the coverage of artisans only by the training board in the mining industry. As with the NTS (Chapter Four), there is still an apparent dichotomy between the vision and the practice of employers regarding the skilling of workers.

Educational Failure

As we saw in earlier chapters (and as is the case in Britain) industrialists have generally been more concerned with criticisms of educational failure than those of their own unwillingness to develop and promote training. However, the similarity between Britain and South Africa is only part of the story here. Arguments about educational failure in South Africa cannot be understood outside the context of an Apartheid education system which provided expensive but highly propagandized education (Christian National Education) for whites and poorly
resourced and less academic education (Bantu Education) for Africans.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, the need for education reform is argued with a complex mixture of motifs drawn from both industrial and welfarist critiques of the past system.

The failures of the past are largely summed up by figures cited by informants: 12 million total functional illiterates (Burrows OI 1995) and rates of 60-80\% functional illiteracy in mining and autos (Denton OI 1995-Toyota SA Manufacturing; Pierides OI 1995; Plasket OI 1995). These are indicative of the well-known crisis of African education. However, the problem is wider, as the Hunter Commission reported:

The racism, inequitable funding arrangements and the lack of democratic structures in the entire education system have all militated against the development of quality schools. (DE 1995c: Paragraph 3.52)

Indeed, whilst conservative elements might wish to defend the standards of white education, a strong industrial critique has developed. A trenchant denunciation of white education came from former teacher, John Tyers, which, though lengthy, is worth reproducing in full:

people look at school buildings and neat uniforms and well disciplined little robots and textbooks that are neatly covered and they think that those are educational standards. Then they look at the black schools where there are 40 odd per classroom and no textbooks and they think that integration is going to cause a drop in standards. Meanwhile all of those things that we see in white schools are not educational standards, they are the trappings of a system, and the outputs of the system are terrible in that they entrench this Taylorist paradigm that we have. It doesn’t teach kids to think, it teaches them to be rote learners. The second point is worse and it is that it teaches them to be rote learners of content that is

\textsuperscript{45} And something in between for other “population groups”.

illegitimate. Thirdly, it assesses them in such a way that it entrenches in them this sense of powerlessness when it comes to learning. Not only is the content of the stuff bad but the learning design and the philosophies underpinning curriculum development are terrible, they are out of touch with the world. The competence of our teachers is abysmal. Our teacher training colleges are horrendous. I don’t have very much good to say about the schooling system at all. (Tyers OI 1995)

The lack of thinking and other skills, the stress on inappropriate knowledge and the failings of the teaching profession are familiar elements of the industrial critique of education found in the Old Commonwealth countries from which much of South African educational policy borrowing emanates. Other elements of the same critique were also very apparent in the account of Bobby Godsell, one of the most prominent of South African industrialists.46

He stressed the long-standing academic bias of the (white) South African education system:

from the end of the Anglo-Boer War, and from the time of Lord Milner, we have suffered from an educational philosophy which has made a forced distinction between academic and technical, and has put the emphasis inappropriately on academic education. (Godsell OI 1995)

The further argument of a mismatch between the output of education and the needs of industry was also rehearsed by Godsell when he argued that “the education system .... fails to prepare young people to take up their place in the kinds of modern societies that exist around the world and exist here also” (Godsell OI 1995).

46 As noted earlier, he has operated on several occasions as the chief negotiator for big business in disputes with labour and the state.
Such stakeholder rationales show a great deal of continuity with the discourses of the 1980s, notwithstanding the changed political realities. As such, they also fit well with Moyo's argument that education reforms since Soweto have been as a result of three crises (of accumulation, legitimation and education), which were perceived by capital and the state (Moyo 1995). Fears about skills shortage, technological change and international competitiveness all point to continuing concerns about the ability of South Africa to maintain past accumulation rates in the light of new economic realities. Fears of poor education and training performance point to a perceived crisis of education, which was seen as so serious as to require the development of a working compromise at the NTSI and beyond. Similarly, the range of concerns around the socio-political realities of the new South Africa speak directly to the continuing need to address the crisis of legitimation. All three crises of course are interwoven and education and training reforms simultaneously engage with all three, although in complex ways.

These stakeholder rationales also point to global discourses and economic pressures which equally have had a major shaping influence on the development of education and training policy in post-election South Africa, as I shall now briefly explore.

Global Discourses

The influence of arguments that globalization is increasing and that South Africa must respond are obvious in some of the responses above, particularly in industries such as autos. It is also evident in documents seeking to formulate economic and industrial policy, notably the RDP
and the Industrial Strategy Project. Such readings can also be seen in education and training documents (e.g. DE 1995b and 1996a) and debates. However, it is necessary to look at globalization pressure as containing at least two key elements.

First, there is the market-oriented formulation with its stress on liberalization and privatization. Such a meta-narrative clearly influenced South African education policy in the reform Apartheid period, as shown in earlier chapters. However, it can also be seen in elements of post-election education policy:

> education policies for a ‘new’ South Africa show remarkable congruence with international trends. South African education policy today neither advances fundamentally new concepts or approaches nor is it informed by educational ideas and experiments associated with either African socialism (‘education for self-reliance’) or Marxism (‘education with production’). Instead, the language of poverty alleviation, meeting basic needs, human resource development, education for lifelong learning, the integration of formal and non-formal education, cost-recovery and cost-sharing are central to educational change. (Chisholm 1994: 1)

This influence is reinforced by the pressure which the international version of the meta-narrative can exert upon overall economic policy (Kallaway 1995). In particular, it leads to a serious questioning of the feasibility of a social welfarist strategy, the historical underpinning of ANC policy on education and elsewhere.

However, there is also a second element of globalization which impacts on South African education and training policy. It is argued in many circles that the increased pressures for international competitiveness arising out of globalization necessitate a major restructuring of economy, industry and learning (Christie 1995b). This vision sees multi-skilling as
the central element of work organization and training. This in turn implies the use of generic skills, which feeds directly into the education and training system. There it combines with two other international responses to globalization pressures: competencies and integration of education and training.

When we look at these two central elements of the current South African debate on education and training, international influences become very apparent. In the case of competencies, the most obvious influence has been that of the work of the Finn and Mayer commissions in Australia, which have influenced the industrial constituency in particular, as evidenced by the NTB’s adaptation of the Mayer generic competencies for South African use (NTB 1994). Such borrowing has been reinforced due to the presence of Australians in key positions in COSATU.

The NCVQ experience from England and Wales is also well-known, although several stakeholders were aware of criticisms of the model, particularly those of Smithers (1993). Indeed, it may prove significant that Khetsi Lehoko, as the person responsible for adult education nationwide, was a graduate student of the education faculty at Manchester University where Smithers teaches.

As far as integration is concerned, lessons are also being learned from the Australian, English and Scottish systems. However, the New Zealand model with its NZQA and its “seamless system” of education and training has been the preferred model of the trainers. As was noted previously, ANC policy, arising out of both NEPI and IPET deliberations also appears to have been very heavily influenced by the debate around the more social democratic British Baccalauréat model (Finegold et al.
Such an influence has come directly through the involvement of Michael Young, co-author of the *British Baccalauréat*, in the NEPI and IPET processes, as well as through the writings of Andre Kraak, whose work owes much to both Young and Finegold.

**Explaining Recent Policy Developments**

As we saw in the last chapter, much of the current South African education and training policy debate arises out of the particular convergence of international and local trends in economics, politics and discourse of the early 1990s. NUMSA and then COSATU used New Times ideas from Australia and Britain as a way of benefiting members through multi-skilling and other elements of that model which could be used to improve pay and conditions. Although such a strategy would have the greatest immediate benefit for COSATU members, their poor economic status in relation to white workers and the discriminatory nature of the Apartheid systems of learning and work allowed this approach to be portrayed as a pro-equity one.

Would-be policy makers from ANC-aligned constituencies were undoubtedly influenced by the practical example of the Australian trade unions but also by the supposedly theoretical example of the new British left with its often incoherent mix of post-modernism, post-fordism and post-socialism.

The new model also offered potential benefits to the adult education community as the new vision of training included a large educational element through the new notion of ABET- adult basic education and
training. Progressive formal educators, faced with the collapse of People's Education, could also take heart in the fact that this model sought to breach the mental-manual divide and was likely to result in a system far better than that which had existed under Apartheid.

The loss of power by the NECC to the CEPD and self-censorship by SADTU, the new progressive teachers' union (Carrim OI 1995), further contributed to the demise of radical educational alternatives. This "collapse of oppositionist trends" (Unterhalter and Young 1994: 12) also benefited the new meta-narrative as it gave COSATU a greater chance of shaping ANC policy.

Employers, on the other hand, focused on the triple crisis seen above. As the negotiation period moved closer to elections and majority rule with an apparently pro-Socialist alliance in power, employers, at least superficially, abandoned their differences in favour of establishing a compromise both among themselves and with the ANC. This process was aided by the instrumental elements of the proposed model, with its potential to be made to stress competitiveness, flexibility and productivity. Its similarity in form to emergent models in avowedly pro-market countries such as England and New Zealand was also important here.

Unterhalter and Young (1994) argue that just prior to the elections the DNE was isolated by the coming together of the proto-state with important elements of capital and labour. As a result, it found itself forced to come on board in the later stages, as witnessed by Gustav Niebuhr being appointed to the NTSI task team. There is undoubtedly an element of truth in this. However, the vocational elements of the
new strategy were not that antithetical to views represented in either the
de Lange or the ERS/CMESA proposals. Moreover, through the
privatization strategy, white education would probably be left untouched
by the vocationalization.

Thus a drawing on international discourses and domestic resources in
order to react to the internal political and economic tensions of the South
African transition led to the emergence of a broad consensus around the
NTSI principles in early 1994. Those forces have continued to transmute
and develop since the elections. Moreover, the policy formulation
period of 1993-4, with its imperative towards developing broad consensus
has given way to a period in which implementation must be addressed.
Broad principles must now be operationalized and priorities, structures
and funding must all be decided. These new dynamics give a very
different imperative towards detail, thus potentially eroding the
consensus.

A major element of post-election contestation has been the shift in the
relative balance of power between stakeholder groups. COSATU have
clearly been weakened by the loss of key officials to the ANC, the GNU,
the bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, the private sector. The small core
of remaining talented officials has been increasingly forced to cover extra
portfolios and help in the mentoring and staff development of new
colleagues. This has contributed to the strong impression that COSATU
is increasingly unable to set the policy agenda, as prior to the election,
especially as others have increased both their legitimacy and their
expertise.
Although many COSATU leaders have gone to swell the ranks of ANC experts, there is an equal sense that the ANC, particularly in the education field, is not able to develop a strong policy direction. The failure to integrate the two ministries and the appointment of outsiders Bengu and Manganyi to be Minister and Director-General respectively did much to lose the impetus towards reform early on at the very top of the system. Bengu’s ill-health after his appointment, the sunset clause protecting the old bureaucracy, and Public Service Commission tardiness in approving new appointments, all conspired with the huge challenge of restructuring the Apartheid division of departments to delay the establishment of a new corps of progressive educational bureaucrats below Bengu and Manganyi. Indeed, appointments to new posts were still taking place 18 months after the elections.47 The constitutional settlement and the need to coordinate with the Department of Labour Affairs similarly made strong policy pronouncements difficult. As it developed through the two versions of the White Paper, educational policy appeared to lose the feel of a radical ANC vision and take on elements which spoke of compromise with the old bureaucracy and with the training lobby.

As the institutionalized forces for a progressive NQF began to look far weaker than before the elections, the marginalization of other popular and radical voices became a more serious constraint on progressive new policy. The ever-greater complexity of the debate around the NQF and integration meant it increasingly resembled a technicist exercise in which there was no scope for involvement of parents, pupils and teachers. At

47 Some of these later appointments (particularly in higher education) are already leaving and capacity remains a serious problem (Electronic Mail and Guardian 13/06/96).
the same time, progressive educational research voices were further silenced by the decline of the NECC and the uncertain future of the EPUs in the face of post-election realities.

The progressive vision of the NQF and integration also seems to have suffered due to shifting trends in usage of international discourses. The New Times arguments of the early 1990s were of course arguments about policy. However, now that the ANC is in government, such arguments have to be backed up by money.

In such a climate, and particularly as part of a Government of National Unity, the ANC seems to be increasingly influenced by the orthodoxy of neo-liberal economics. The smaller state such ideas promote is not one to carry out the interventionist growth and social welfarist strategies that the models of the RDP and the NQF were built upon before the elections. In such a climate, neither direct state expenditure nor market-driven economic expansion is likely to fuel a broad NQF as an element of an expansionist New Times strategy.

Money is at the heart of the shifting balance of power. In a climate of marketization, and a phase of prioritization and implementation of policy, the contest to shape policy gives massive influence to business as a major potential source of funding and provision for education and training reform. Whilst the bright ideas of COSATU could carry the day at the negotiating table prior to the elections, it is the bright coins of business that now can be expected to achieve pre-eminence.

48 Minister Manuel’s financial proposals of June 1996 were indeed so market-oriented (no national minimum wage, accelerated tariff reduction) that a National Party spokesman declared he could find no fault with them (South African Press Association 14/6/96).
There still remains a group, centred on the HSRC cluster, who have a vision for a broadly progressive version of integrated education and training. However, this new grouping of progressive practitioners is largely beholden to its individual organizational affiliations, many of which are in the ITBs and the parastatals. It seems unlikely that this will allow them to be much more than pragmatic lobbyists for a moderately broad NQF.

Given the shift of power away from the unions to the employers, and the inability/unwillingness of the ANC to redress this, these practitioners may find themselves swamped by pressures towards a narrow Taylorist form of training. In such a situation, a defensive compromise may well be struck by COSATU which limits the coverage and broadness of learning of the new model in return for benefits to members. Even then, it is possible that such a deal would still fail to bring large sections of industry and the professions on board, leading to fragmentation.

The real debate around the NQF and integration has continued to be located in training rather than education circles. As we have seen, radical education voices have been silenced through the dual power of progressive rhetoric and technical complexity that have been mobilized around the model. More conservative forces, with less pressure to be positive and less loss of capacity, have not been so marginalized.

The vocationalist elements of the new approach, taken together with the apparent inevitability of voluntarism, allow considerable room for manoeuvre for more conservative forces in education. For white schools, the universities and the retained elements within the Department of Education, vocationalism can be criticized in such a way as
to transform narrow sectional interests into a principled defence of liberal educational values. At the same time, the likely ability of these universities and schools to opt out means that a system of vocationalism for poor (largely African) pupils and liberal education for wealthy (largely white) pupils is a probable outcome.

Such an outcome is in keeping with the old DNE policy, as we saw above. Moreover, the probable presence of New Improved Vocationalism (NIV) in the state school system can also engage the support of business leaders who retain a strong fear of academic bias. Through its reworking of vocationalization via competencies and generic skills rather than vocational subjects and tracks, NIV also can draw on the support of forces more conventionally thought of as progressive. For COSATU, it appears in keeping with their programme for industry, centred around increased access to skills training for the working class. For many progressive educators, the transformation of a vocationalization strategy into a potentially positive force, legitimated as it is by international discourse, is also a strong attraction. Given the shift of power such groups may have been seduced into supporting a broader vision of CBML than will in fact emerge, yet may now be incapable of stopping the narrowing of focus.

The multiple factors shifting power away from progressive forces since the elections and the pervasiveness of international discourses that can be marshalled in favour of a more restrictive model of the NQF, help to explain the apparent demise of the national progressive version of the new system (Path One). These same forces also combine to push COSATU towards a narrower consensus, as in Path Two. However, it is far from certain that a centralized NQF will emerge. Instead, it appears
likely that there will continue to be considerable disagreement both between and within sub-systems regarding the future model.

The emergent best practice may well be narrower than envisioned by the more progressive thinkers. However, it will still be too radical for many employers. On the other hand, its vocationalizing tendencies, as regards education, will be sufficient to allow conservative educational forces to mobilize against it on positive (i.e. liberal, enlightenment) grounds. This explains why even a picture of bridges and ladders may be too optimistic.

The above analysis has sought to explain why a rather limited and fragmented form of integration appears likely. It has not attempted in any great detail to critique such a model, although elements of such a critique are clearly present. This task of commenting on the strengths and weaknesses of the emergent model will be accorded greater weight in the next chapter.

There has been some stress on the ability of conservative education and training forces to oppose and, hence, reshape the agenda. Nothing, however, has been said as to whether the post-election climate offers scope for progressive forces to mount a counter-attack. Whether such scope exists and the form it might take are further topics for the next chapter, to which our attention must now turn.
CHAPTER SIX
LEARNING TO WORK,
TOWARDS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters of this thesis have shown the complex nature of the interaction between learning and work in twentieth century South Africa, mediated as it has been by the intertwining of local and global forces; the playing out of stratifications based on race and class; and the operation of often conflicting political and economic imperatives. This survey culminated in an exploration of the emergent policy discourse of the post-election era, with its often profound dissonances between manifesto pledges and policy trends.

The first task of this chapter will be to provide a summary of the arguments regarding the development of such a post-election process. Then I will move towards a consideration of the policy discourse that appeared to be the most favoured at the point at which the National Party left the Government of National Unity. The concern here will be to move towards some commentary on the current policy debate. In order to do this, it will be necessary to get a sense of the positive and negative elements of the emergent discourse in order to explore its probable implications.

There will also be an attempt to provide a similar analysis of the main alternative to this rather narrow model: a strong NQF as offered in pre-
election formulations by the ANC and COSATU. Subsequently, the possibility of a third way from outside the mainstream of the current policy debate will be explored.

In the light of these discussions, a series of further concerns moving beyond the scope of the thesis will be raised as matters for further investigation. Issues will be raised regarding research strategies for the future charting of education and training reform in South Africa. Questions will be formulated surrounding theoretical issues such as the generation of models of integrated education and training. Concerns will also be expressed with regard to the implications of this research for the development of similar policies in other countries, most notably within the Old Commonwealth.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION AND TRAINING POLICY DISCOURSE

As we saw in Chapter Two, at the start of the twentieth century South Africa had an essentially pre-Fordist economy dominated by agriculture and mining. African involvement in the white core economy was mainly as unskilled migrant labour. This was contrasted with the peripheral economy of the areas reserved for Africans after the 1913 Native Land Act. In the pre-Apartheid segregationist discourse these areas were seen as the appropriate cultural as well as economic locales for Africans, which would help to preserve both African and European culture. In practice, of course, some Africans would enter (white) urban areas to "minister to the needs of the white man", as the Stallard Commission put it (cited in Lipton 1985: 18). However, these Africans
were to be unskilled, temporary sojourners in that environment and not an integral part of the consumer market of the white economy. This policy was reinforced by a reliance on the large number of migrant workers who came from outside the borders of the then Union of South Africa.

In a situation in the 1920s in which the proper milieu of Africans was believed to be the tribal reserves, and in which African incursions into white South Africa were on unskilled terms, the model of industrial education, influenced by practices in the Southern states of the USA, appeared to make sense as a model for African education in the Union. This model emphasized the need to adapt African education to meet the rural needs of the masses rather than the needs and aspirations of the elite few who straddled the boundary between the two South Africas as clerics, court interpreters and teachers.

The inherent tensions in this model between separate development and ministering to white needs came to a head in the aftermath of the Second World War. On the one hand was the position of the United Party which was broadly sympathetic to the large English\(^1\) corporations engaged increasingly in diversifying out of mining into manufacturing. Encapsulated in policy documents such as the Fagan Report (Union of South Africa 1948), this position saw the future industrialization of South Africa as both inevitable and desirable. For it to be successful, there would also have to be a massive transfer of African production and consumption from the peripheral to the core economy. Such a view was based on economic incorporation of Africans not political or cultural

\(^1\) As noted earlier in this thesis, this is largely a linguistic category related to medium of business.
equality, the latter being notions which remained on the radical fringes of the white political community.

On the other hand was the view of the National Party. It was, to a large extent, the representative of the Afrikaner blue collar workers and minor civil servants who had been the beneficiaries of the response to the poor white problem of the 1920s, but also of the teachers, clerics and smaller farmers who formed the backbone of respectable Afrikaner society. For the National Party, the economic threat posed to the former constituency by increased black economic involvement\(^2\) dovetailed neatly with the cultural and ideological concerns which exercised many of the latter constituency in particular. Thus it was argued that separate development should be continued. Indeed, through the policy of Apartheid this would be better codified.

Nonetheless, after its gaining of power in 1948 the National Party still had to deal with the tension between the political and ideological rhetoric of truly separate development and the awareness in the economic domain of how far white South Africa, at both the individual and societal levels, was dependent, and found it congenial so to be, on African labour. This was reflected in a new learning system which encapsulated this dualism. Bantu Education stressed the continued relevance of a curriculum adapted to meet African needs, in particular through an emphasis on “Bantu culture” across a range of subjects. However, it also reflected the changing demand of the white economy with respect to African labour. The increased importance of manufacturing, and changes in technologies across both primary and secondary production sectors, meant an

\(^2\) A removal or watering down of the colour bar would in the first instance have led to competition for many jobs from Indians and coloureds.
increasing demand for labour which was basically literate and numerate and which could be trained to semi-skilled levels. However, racial separation was reinforced even in the nature of this basic education for the workplace. Whereas technical colleges, technikons and apprenticeship programmes continued to expand for white youth, African industrial preparation consisted of literacy, numeracy and, for some, sub-artisanal training, although much of the latter was geared to the needs of the homelands. The plan appeared to be to set South Africa on a path of Racial Fordism (Gelb 1991) which saw the white economy achieving the industrial maturity of mass production alongside the preservation of a pre-Fordist African economy.

The rival meta-narrative of the United Party had not been totally eliminated however, and began to be reworked in the 1960s through the efforts of the Education Panel (1963 and 1966). The argument was that now, in the face of skill shortages, the continued growth of the economy could not be guaranteed by the increased use of either domestic or imported white labour at skilled levels. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to bring ever larger numbers of black, including African, workers into the Fordist economy.

This vision informed industrial practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a series of exemptions to and evasions of the colour bar emerged. However, it remained outside the official policy regime under which African apprenticeships, for instance, were still not permitted. Nonetheless, as Chapter Three argues, the global crisis of Fordism, which first emerged between 1968 and 1973; the internal shocks of the 1973

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3 Of course in reality many African workers operated at skilled levels, though few of them were recognised as skilled workers.
Durban strikes and the 1976 Soweto Uprising; and the resultant wave of sanctions, disinvestments and company-level industrial relations concessions, combined to produce an existential crisis for the Apartheid system.

Large sections of the Afrikaner elite saw the way forward in an acceptance of the discourse of English big business which sought to move towards an Economic Fordist position with increasing incorporation of Africans into the core economy as both producers and consumers. However, control over African political power was seen as essential to the continuation of capital accumulation; the maintenance of white privilege (though now to be exercised, at least in part, through class as a proxy for race); and the need of the Afrikaner political elite to bring as much of their constituency as possible with them so as to remain in office.

Reforms in legislation pertaining to the workplace were the first indicator of the emergence into official discourse of a market-oriented meta-narrative which privileged the market whilst maintaining cultural and political asymmetries. Recognition of non-racial (i.e. predominantly African) trade unions and the legalization of African access to apprenticeships were two central elements of the new approach as reflected in the Wiehahn Report (Wiehahn 1982).

The Riekert Report’s recommendation for liberalization of influx control regulations (Republic of South Africa 1979) was another pointer towards new thinking, although it did illustrate also the contested and limited nature of the shift towards the dominance of the market-oriented meta-narrative, mediated as it was by tensions within Afrikaner ranks.
As far as the learning system was concerned, tensions were, if anything, more acute and the state was unprepared to accept several of the recommendations of the de Lange Report, for example for a single education department for all races (HSRC 1981a). Nonetheless, the primacy of a belief in African involvement in the industrial economy over a desire for separate development was evident in both official thinking and the increasingly substantial educational investment programmes of the large corporations. Mirroring trends in other countries, the former restressed the existing emphasis on the orientation, preparation and socialization functions of education as the central element of a vision which saw learning primarily in terms of the needs of the workplace. Meanwhile, the corporate investment of the large firms was often more sharply focused on technical and commercial learning for African urban youth.

As Chapter Three argued, this shift in the dominant meta-narrative should be seen as part of a strategy to respond to a triple crisis which threatened to overwhelm South Africa. The shocks outlined above had produced an accumulation crisis. The failure of education to respond to this and the emergence from 1976 of open revolt in sizeable sections of the education system indicated an educational crisis. Together these two crises both pointed to and sharpened a third crisis, of legitimation. All three crises were to inform the second strand of official educational discourse of the 1980s: privatization.

A greater market role and a reduced state role in education potentially served simultaneously to reduce the tax burden; to stimulate the economy; and to distance the state from education policy, thus addressing the other two crises. The attempt to downplay state responsibility for
educational policy was also seen in the related rise of technocratic rationality as policy increasingly became portrayed as a process in which the real decision-making lay in the hands of technical experts who provided value-free scientific recommendations upon which the state then acted.

That this strategy was of only limited effectiveness was illustrated by the persistence of the triple crisis throughout the 1980s. In the educational sphere this was marked by continued contestation in classrooms and communities which coalesced around the People’s Education movement in the middle of the decade. Based in notions of transformed access, governance and curriculum, this movement, explored in Chapter Three, provided a wide-ranging, if only partially systematized, critique of the existing education system.

By the end of the 1980s it was clear that the tensions inherent in the reform programme of state and capital were themselves unresolvable. At the heart of the problem was the attempt to move towards a deracialized Fordist position in the economic sphere, through the incorporation of ever-larger numbers of Africans, Indians and coloureds into the realms of mass production and consumption, whilst denying the Fordist logic of a universal franchise and an integrated nation-state in the political sphere.

The impossibility of this position was accepted in February 1990 with the unbanning of the ANC and other organizations. The four years which followed, before the elections of 1994, have been characterized in this thesis (Chapter Four) and elsewhere as an interregnum. As far as this thesis is concerned, this can be seen most clearly in the struggle for dominance between four different views of the learning-work nexus.
Chapter Four demonstrated that the newly dominant market-oriented meta-narrative remained largely unchanged as the circumstances of the early 1990s, most particularly the need to shape the post-election settlement, reinforced the state’s emphasis on privatization and instrumentalism as a means of maximizing future white economic and political power.

The People’s Education vision also remained on the agenda as majority rule came ever closer. However, Chapter Four also illustrates the way in which ANC documents, often now co-produced with its alliance partner, COSATU, began to reflect arguments which had slowly emerged out of the crisis of Fordism in the advanced industrial economies over the past two decades. In the South African version of such arguments, the best hope for the future lay in a shift beyond Fordism to a Post-Fordist situation in which South Africa could hope to compete in the global marketplace with those advanced economies and the newly industrializing countries. Through greater economic competitiveness, a paradigm shift towards New Times would come into effect which would boost economic development. At the same time, equity would be enhanced through a number of transformations. A reorganization of learning and work would occur which would lead to up- and multi-skilling. There would be an end to Taylorism and an associated increase in worker participation in corporate decision-making. Finally, the education and training system would be transformed around the re-integration of knowledge and skills.

In response to this vision and to international trends, a further meta-narrative, for which I have employed the term “Lean Production”, emerged from elements of big business and the industrial training
community. Here, it is suggested in Chapter Four, the emphasis was primarily on the efficiency elements of the Post-Fordist vision rather than the equity strands. Reduction of organizational hierarchies and the replacement of conflict with collaboration in the industrial relations system were the principal workplace elements of this vision. For learning, the central theme was the development of a synoptic approach across education and training through the universal use of a competency-based approach.

All four of these meta-narratives would continue to be deployed in the period after the 1994 elections.

The evolution of the relationship between learning and work in South Africa since industrialization began in the late nineteenth century has seen certain recurrent themes as the above outline has illustrated. Prior to the 1994 elections there was an on-going process of redefinition of black, and especially African, involvement in the white core economy characterised by increased co-optation, rather than a deracialization of that core. There was also an evolving theme of instrumentalism in the way that African education was shaped by white South Africa so as to serve the needs of the white political economy.4

Chapter Five argues that these themes have continued to operate in the post-election era, although the outward manifestation of a non-racial South Africa has had the effect of further blurring the intertwined impacts of race and class. Writing in 1993, King predicted that the dominance of market ideology globally and the weak nature of the South African economy would make increased vocationalization almost

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4 This is not to deny African agency and resistance in the development of educational provision in South Africa.
inevitable after the elections (King 1993) and this has been proved true, particularly at the level of discourse, although, as has been noted, it is important to distinguish between different strands of vocationalization.

The power of white vested interests to continue to shape the South African political economy has of course been strengthened by the global influence of the market ideology. Nonetheless, internal factors have also been of great importance. The “commanding heights of the economy” were not nationalized as per pre-1990 ANC formulations but remain largely in the hands of local, and increasingly international, capital and are managed by a predominantly white managerial elite. The influence of big business in the media, the existence of the Government of National Unity and the sunset clause protecting the jobs of white civil servants all served to reinforce the continued influence of the old elite in the first two years of the Mandela presidency.

Internal tensions within the ANC played a role in excluding ANC Education chief, John Samuel, from the posts of either Minister or Director-General of Education. They were also probably an element in the transfer of control of the Reconstruction and Development Programme from Jay Naidoo to the more business-friendly Trevor Manuel and Thabo Mbeki. At the same time, the relatively low priority with which the ANC appeared to view education and training at the time of the elections resulted not only in the failure to integrate the two portfolios, but also in the appointment of a Minister (Sibusiso Bengu) and

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5 Naidoo, formerly Secretary-General of COSATU was Minister without Portfolio but charged with responsibility for the RDP. New Minister of Finance, Manuel, had as Minister of Trade and Industry shown himself to be willing to liberalize faster than international agreements required and continues to do so (see Chapter Five). Deputy-President, Mbeki, is frequently criticized for being more in-touch with business opinion than grassroots sentiments.
a Director-General (Chabani Manganyi) of Education who conservative elements of political and civil society would not judge as radicals.

The ANC's ability to transform the learning system has also been compromised by the institutional culture of the national Department of Education which is still heavily influenced by the large numbers of bureaucrats remaining from the old dispensation. Whilst it might be too strong to talk of cooption, the view that the March 1995 White Paper largely represents a victory for the old guard seems reasonable (Kallaway 1995). Equally, the pervasive feeling gained from many activists and academics that technocratic rationality appears to be affecting ANC bureaucrats also seems plausible.\(^6\) As policy continues to be a largely technical process, so the loss of capacity by both the ANC and COSATU, as a result of the loss of personnel to parliament and the civil service, has weakened their ability to intervene pro-actively in the policy debate.

Several of these processes have also weakened progressive elements of civil society and thus further reduced the chances of the triumph of a Post-Fordist model. In particular, loss of human and financial resources by NGOs and civics,\(^7\) taken together with the ANC's failure to ensure a genuinely transparent and participatory policy process, have weakened the ability of progressive civil society to bolster alliance policy against the conflicting forces noted above.

\(^6\) So pervasive was this feeling in casual conversations with academics and activists that it is difficult to reference it. The weight given to the opinions of external consultants in shaping the policies on school governance and finance, and on higher education serves to reinforce this perception.

\(^7\) Community organizations.
THE EMERGING MODEL

Thus, as Chapter Five argued, it appears that a far less radical vision of education and training reform than that proposed by the ANC in 1993-4 is beginning to emerge in South Africa. This narrower model is grounded in notions of asymmetry and voluntarism and would allow a great degree of flexibility for providers of education and training to develop their own niches. This undoubtedly does have some advantages over the potentially centralised and bureaucratized NQF approach of pre-election ANC-COSATU formulations. In particular it could conceivably lead to more scope for the emergence of innovative practice than in a more regulated version. The lack of enforced symmetry could also be seen as advantageous given the present situation in which large sections of training and adult education are far better prepared to take advantage of an NQF approach than is the formal schooling system.

Elements of progressiveness might be found across multiple sites in such a system. Curriculum reform, for example, would undoubtedly come to the school system. In so far as this could be expected to amount to a move away from content littered with pro-Apartheid propaganda and from an over-emphasis on knowledge to the detriment of skills and meta-learning, such reform could be judged as progressive.

It should be noted that there would also probably be a limited pro-equity dimension to the emergent model. The likely spread of competency-based modular learning could be expected to make access to learning easier, particularly for non-traditional clienteles, especially if a credit accumulation and transfer system was at the heart of the work of SAQA. Some form of Recognition of Prior Learning also seems inevitable in
such a scenario. A growing number of employers are attracted to this on the grounds of efficiency, seeing it as a more rational way of selecting candidates for training and as a means of speeding up that training. This of course has an equity pay off as well, given that this means of selection and training is to the advantage of those lacking high levels of formal education.

As this model appears to be the likely outcome, we might also view it as having the benefits of being a feasible approach, in contrast to the utopian nature of some other proposals. Certainly it would be far cheaper and simpler than the more ambitious ANC-COSATU model seen in Chapters Four and Five. Crucially, given the huge shortage of trainers and educators in South Africa, a less ambitious model would be far easier to deliver.

Nonetheless, many of the other advantages only apply in a comparison with the present system, not with the ANC-COSATU model which takes many of the elements of the narrow approach and deals with them in more thorough ways. There are also very strong grounds for criticizing the narrow model.

At the heart of such criticisms is the way that a marketized, competency-based model would be likely to entrench privilege. At the pedagogic level, the competency focus, which would be exported to the public system of education and which would also tend to cover lower levels of training (as envisioned by Phillips' proposals for the mining industry, see Chapter Five), would lead to an impoverished, instrumentalized and Neo-Taylorist form of provision for the masses, which I have termed New Improved Vocationalism. At the same time, however, the greater
use of market forces and the continued existence of a huge private education system would permit the elite to continue to enjoy a broader education, followed in most cases by a broad professional training.

Moreover, the possible equity gains noted above which might arise from improved access would also tend to be opposed by the furtherance of marketization. In the previous chapter it was noted that there are already cases where RPL is being used only for those already inside firms, with ever higher educational qualifications being required from new recruits. Moreover, a largely market-driven system of provision would be likely to privilege access to education and training of those with the characteristics which the market prefers: male, able-bodied, urban and formal sector employed.

Such a system would also tend to run contrary to many of the central and laudable positions on which opposition to the Apartheid regime was based. If the market and the consumer are granted sovereignty, it is difficult to see how transparency, participation and thorough-going democratization are to be promoted. The transparency of school league tables and participation through nursery vouchers (as in Britain) are no substitute for democratic decision-making from the community up to the national level. There seem to be strong grounds for fearing the implementation of such a model. What then are the alternatives available to South Africa?

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8 Democratization in this formulation is not the granting of the right to vote every five or so years for a party to be chosen from a list in which all subscribe to the belief that they are controlled by the market in any case. Rather, it is about the maximization of societal involvement in decision-making at all levels.
A STRONG NQF

The most obvious alternative to the model critiqued above is of course the vision that appears to emerge from ANC-COSATU policy statements prior to the 1994 elections. Many of its claims have already been referred to in the course of Chapters Four and Five. However, it is worth making a more explicit and concentrated critique here.

The claims made for this model are very impressive. It is asserted that the model can deliver on both equity and economic development. By valuing workers as the key productive resource, the workplace allegedly becomes more humanized and less conflictual. This is reflected in greater worker involvement in corporate decision-making, and in education and training which puts greater emphasis on problem-solving and team work. In so far as this is true, it is an attractive vision. Even for core workers the Fordist world was often nasty and brutish.

Equity is at the centre of a vision of learning which seeks to do away with old divisions and inequalities. Through the integration of education and training, represented by a single qualification structure, the model proposes an end to class-divided learning. Instead it suggests a system built upon the principles of high participation and late selection.

Economic benefits are also held to accrue. In the ever more intensely competitive and globalized market environment, analysts have identified South Africa’s only hope as residing in its ability to develop areas of high value-added production (e.g. Joffe et al. 1993). It is widely accepted that high value-added can only come from the best quality human capital. It is argued that the multi-skilled workers in this vision can provide South Africa with the improved levels of productivity,
innovation and competitiveness necessary for the economic growth that will in turn allow higher employment and greater social expenditure.

This vision of a model which "pursues the goals of individual development and social equality as well as economic efficiency" (Raffe 1994) is clearly very attractive. Not only does it counter-act the excessive and atomized individualism of the market model. It also offers a radical response to the failings of capitalist education which in South Africa was made even more pernicious through the mechanisms of the Apartheid system and Bantu and Christian National Education. This alternative vision harks back to some extent to Dewey in its stress on collaborative learning and the marriage of the mental and the manual.

Though this model is part of a broader international movement there are several elements of particular significance and attractiveness in the South African context. As Michael Young (1992) has argued, an integrated system of education and training is built on the premise that there is unity and equality underpinning diversity. This is an important principle which has too often been ignored in South Africa in the past.

In the 1920s the vision of Loram paid lip-service to equality but stressed diversity in practice, leading to the disunity of adaptation. In the 1950s the approach of the Eiselen Report was to downplay even further the notion of unity in favour of racially-based and legally enforced diversity. In the 1980s the de Lange Report made some claim for unity around the issue of a single department (rejected by the state) but vocationalization and privatization reinforced the primacy of diversity. In the light of this historical background, a system building diversity upon a strong foundation of unity is to be applauded.
Given the collapse of a culture of learning in South African schools in the two decades since Soweto, the model’s proclaimed ability to remotivate learners and to reward success rather than penalize failure would be important. This collapse of the culture of learning is related to the lack of formal learning experiences of large sections of the South African population. Here too, the ANC-COSATU model offers important answers. Mechanisms like a credit accumulation and transfer system (CATS), recognition of prior learning (RPL) and paid education and training leave (PETL) are all ways to increase access to learning opportunities for those previously disadvantaged. Moreover, the ability of an integrated system to shift the vision from a narrow concentration on formal schooling to incorporate other modes of learning, whether formal, non-formal or informal, is equally important in the South African context.

Nonetheless, there remain several major questions regarding the efficacy and viability of this approach. In general, models of Post-Fordism, and Post-Fordist education in particular, remain somewhat under-theorized. Crucially, power is largely absent from such accounts, which as a result remain rather weak on the processes through which the vision may be expected to be adopted, implemented, resisted and subverted.

On the question of education-economy links too there is a need for better theorising. The current education system appears implicitly to be blamed on the economic structure but this causality can apparently be reversed with regards to the future. The more rigorous British vision of Finegold et al. (1990) explicitly argues that changes in the learning system can kick start changes in the workplace, in the economy and in society:
The promotion of increased participation and higher achievement will of itself feed back into economic development. The opportunities for firms to move into higher value-added product markets are transformed when education reaches a large majority of the population. Education therefore becomes a tool for the control of economic and social change, rather than a social instrument driven by economic change. (ibid: 49)

However, this is not entirely persuasive, given the little attempt made to explain how a society can achieve such a kick-start. In the South African context such claims remain almost entirely tacit.

The South African model is also weaker than the vision of Finegold et al. in other important respects. Whereas their model is rooted in educational concerns and thus maintains a primary concern with learning as a non-instrumental activity, the South African model is very much one which has emerged from the trade union movement and the training arena. Whilst laudably it seeks to address concrete needs of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, its vision is seriously narrowed as a result.

It has consistently failed to keep the philosophical high ground claimed by Young above. The weak theoretical underpinning of the South African version has allowed compromises in key areas. The shift from an integrated system to an integrated approach is at the centre of these compromises. Such a shift allows each sub-sector of the education and training system to pursue its own interests and visions without having to work cross-sectorally to develop thorough common visions and practices. The asymmetrical approach accepted by senior ANC bureaucrats such as Coombe (see Chapter Five) fails to address the key insight of the British unified systems theorists that a divided, class-based
system must be replaced by a truly integrated system, not simply reformed. The asymmetrical approach fails to effect such a transformation and instead returns South Africa to a position in which diversity is likely to be privileged over unity.

More concretely, the narrowness of the ANC-COSATU formulation is seen in its failure to make clear what integration means to the system of formal schooling. It is also apparent in the tendency to view the world through formal sector industrial eyes. The formal sector only accounts for about a half of South African employment, even if we exclude unpaid household labour. Nonetheless, agriculture and the informal sector are hardly visible in the NQF vision. Without the fuller consideration of the needs and aspirations of those within these locations, the NQF model can never be truly radical and inclusive, regardless of rhetoric to the contrary.

Narrowness is also apparent in the choice of an integrated approach which is made synoptic through the use of competencies. The first criticism of this is the vagueness of the definition, which has been subject to frequent alteration without genuine clarification. The training origins of the ANC-COSATU approach lead to a tendency to leave this vision open to a mode of implementation which could be Taylorist and behaviourist in practice. Moreover, this competency-based version of integration is potentially highly individualistic (McGrath 1995a) and throws into question Raffe’s balance between the individual and the social.

The last group of criticisms of the ANC-COSATU model relate to its feasibility. Questions regarding this issue clearly stem from the apparent strength of the alternative model. They are also related to the weakness,
identified above, in theorizing the impact of power relations on the Post-Fordist underpinnings of the model.

The most usual questions asked of this model relate to its economic underpinnings. It seems probable that, at least in the foreseeable future, only pockets of Post-Fordist production can be expected to develop in South Africa. The country is not likely to become a major foreign investment draw (Unterhalter and Young 1995), given the still terrible level of violence and the instability of domestic investor confidence.9

The feasibility of the proposals as regards the capacity of the learning system is also questionable. Resources, whether human, physical, administrative or infrastructural, simply do not appear to be available in anything like the quality and quantity required. In the face of more pressing problems and strong opposition, state commitment to such a strategy inevitably is uncertain.

These concerns help to sharpen a focus on two issues which go to the heart of debates about the future of South African education and training. I have suggested above that the NQF model is more developed with respect to the needs of the advanced sectors of the economy and the workers within those sectors than it is upon those outside formal sector industry. In this case, should a national learning strategy be based upon the alleged needs of the future which are as yet manifested in only a tiny part of the economy, or should it be based on the more immediate needs of those disadvantaged hitherto? Even if the former approach is deemed desirable or necessary, what are the practical implications of attempting to graft a Post-Fordist learning system onto a fundamentally differently

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9 This was illustrated by the sharp, if temporary, fall in the value of the rand in response to the Mandela health scare of March 1996.
structured political economy? Neither of these questions has as yet been answered satisfactorily by supporters of the Post-Fordist strategy.

AN ALTERNATIVE VISION?

It is of course easier to criticize than to provide viable alternatives. However, some attempt to suggest an alternative vision for South African learning should be attempted here.

What seems to be the most crucial thing to be said is that education needs to be seen as an important priority in its own right. In spite of much rhetoric and a handful of Presidential Lead Projects\(^{10}\), it appears that educational interests have been less important than political and economic considerations in setting a learning agenda. Both the decision not to integrate education and training at the departmental level and the Bengu/Manganyi appointments can be seen as examples of this tendency. This lack of prioritization of education needs to be tackled.\(^{11}\)

In many ways what is most important is a process not a policy. It can of course be argued that the needs of South Africa are so great that immediate action is what is required. However, the reality is that there has often been far more technicist process in evidence since the 1994 elections than clear policy pronouncement or implementation. The ANC has been committed to principles such as transparency and participation: these need to be actively addressed as far as education policy making is concerned.

\(^{10}\) A series of special projects of the RDP have been established which are high-profile but often low-impact and -sustainability. ABET, school feeding and the culture of learning have featured here (DE 1996c).

\(^{11}\) The appointment of Mkhatshwa may be an important step in this regard.
A sign of the possibilities in this regard was the Population Green Paper (Ministry of Welfare and Population Development 1995) which sought to outline the possible policy options in a relatively accessible manner and which offered questions and text around which to structure responses. Though not perfect, this approach does point to the possibility of being more transparent and participatory. This can be contrasted with the argument used by the ANC that debate on the National Education Policy Bill should take place after it had been passed by parliament (Bot 1996).

There have been moves towards addressing the governance issue and success in this regard could also further the possibility of a more democratic learning policy. Not just parents, but also learners must be not simply permitted, but encouraged and facilitated, to become involved in setting the learning agenda at all levels.

Teachers and other educators also have an integral role to play. Teacher training reform has too often been seen as a question of upgrading skills. Whilst that is individually, professionally and societally desirable, other considerations are also vital. Reorientation to a new curriculum and, more particularly, a transformed pedagogy is related to the need to democratize South African education. However, teacher training (pre- or in-service) can also help to empower teachers, and through them communities, to take better control of their own education provision.

Regardless of the finer details of the curriculum or the qualifications system, it is widely appreciated in South Africa that access to learning opportunities and the establishment of a culture of learning must underpin the future system. However, neither of these is as straightforward as some accounts imagine. Access can be significantly
increased by such devices as modularization and the plethora of acronyms such as RPL, PETL and CATS already referred to above. However, the physical and epistemological\textsuperscript{12} access to learning opportunities of hitherto disadvantaged South Africans cannot be fully addressed by such mechanisms as long as they are controlled and operated from within the elite. Equally, a culture of learning cannot be fully established until the learning available is valued by the communities and individuals to which it is offered. Democratization of control over learning content is central to such a process.

Much of the above appears consistent with a unified system of education and training. Many of the arguments which that model has advanced for the need to break down the barriers between education and training, mental and manual, academic and vocational, have a long pedigree which I have no difficulty in endorsing. However, other elements are based in what appear to be often rather implausible claims for and about Post-Fordism. The challenge would seem to lie, therefore, in developing a model of a unified system that was less beholden to Post-Fordist rhetoric.

However, as stated above, education policy must be democratized and developed from the grassroots not imposed from above. If it is accepted both that the NQF model is here to stay for the moment and that there are positive elements to be found in it, then the challenge becomes one of opening windows of opportunity through which the model can be made to empower and facilitate individual and community involvement in the setting of learning agenda. In such a vision, innovation and

\textsuperscript{12} This term is used by Morrow (1993) to note that even where physical access to learning is acquired there are often problems due to the alien nature of the intellectual frame of reference within which the student is expected to operate.
networking rather than bureaucratization and regulation would be the defining principles of NQF operation.

I have already criticised the ANC-COSATU model for not dealing adequately with issues of realism and the difficulty of overcoming vested interests. Such charges also can be levelled against the vision above and, indeed, are hard to deny. There is no strong evidence that even a moderately progressive vision can succeed in the current climate. However, in that case it does not seem unreasonable to argue that a model which seeks to mobilise a broad constituency behind a progressive vision is no less plausible than one which is primarily based on the good offices of the ANC-aligned elements of a technocratic elite. Whether the collapse of cooperation with the National Party and the appointment of People's Education veteran, Mkhatshwa, as Deputy-Minister will shift the balance in favour of a more progressive vision remains to be seen.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES

The above discussion has pointed to some of the policy and research questions that remain unresolved at the end of this study. Most fundamentally, it is evident that the future shape of the NQF and the South African learning system as a whole is far from certain. As a consequence there is a continued need for research to chart the developments of the national system, initially for the next three years until the 1999 elections. Adaptation of policy sociology of education approaches, such as that of Ball (see Chapter One), to South Africa and the further development of the critical hermeneutic reading begun here would seem to be particularly fruitful methodologies for such research.
Such a hermeneutical approach also could be profitably directed at the type of data which, though crucial, this thesis has not sought to collect. The history of education and training policy presented here is in need of complementing with a parallel study which prioritizes the voices (for example, of teachers, community-based activists, union organisers) that are left silent by this methodology.13

The constitutional settlement, as it continues to be interpreted, will also impinge on future policy by moving the provinces to centre stage in the exploration of educational policy and practice. The early stages of a research strategy is emerging here (e.g. Donn 1995; Kruss 1996), which is focused particularly on the Western Cape and which seeks to address the complex power relationship between centre and province at the various stages of the policy cycle. In the next three years an extension of such a focus to other provinces is both probable and desirable.

Equally, it is important to move beyond the overview of education and training developments presented here and to focus more directly on the concerns of particular sub-systems. Whilst much of the current attention is on the high profile school and higher education sectors; other areas such as further education and adult basic education would benefit from a new wave of critical research.

Policy is not simply about pronouncement but has to be inscribed in practices. A further element of a future research strategy regarding the NQF therefore will have to be based on the exploration and analysis of

13 Moyo’s thesis (1995), with its exploration of teacher upgrading programmes through interviews with the teachers themselves, is an example of the kind of important research already done in this field.
emergent practice. The small number of pilot projects centred around the National Training Board will be one obvious source of valuable data.

Nonetheless, a number of broader issues must be addressed. How can the NQF reach peripheral individuals and communities? How can they, and others from outside the elite, take an increasing degree of control over their learning within an overall, unified framework? The role of the informal sector as a location of the poor and as a potential engine for economic growth make the study of its interactions with the NQF of particular significance. Such a study forms an important part of a proposed Pan-African research project (King and McGrath 1996).

Some of the issues raised are more theoretical. The present and future characteristics of the South African economy must be considered in conjunction with ideas about the linkages between the workplace and the learning system. The theoretical underpinnings of the unified model are in need of further elaboration and, crucially, the model needs to be linked to a theory of implementation. The possibility of developing a truly progressive model of competencies/outcomes is another important issue here. So is the feasibility of a unified model which is agnostic regarding the claims of Post-Fordism.

Indeed, is it possible that the pressures of globalization are in fact not leading to Post-Fordist solutions reflected in unified education and training systems of the progressive model? Instead, could it be the case that a more Neo-Fordist system is emerging which will be reflected in the far less progressive model of New Improved Vocationalism?

The model of NIV itself is in need of greater development than has been possible in this thesis. It is necessary to develop a clearer typology that
would allow a sharp comparison of Vocationalism, New Vocationalism and New Improved Vocationalism, and which would point to the environments in which each of them flourishes.

Many of the issues above equally have relevance to the situations of other countries, particularly those of the Old Commonwealth, also embarked to varying degrees on integration. The need to interrogate the theory of implementation implicit in the unified system; to question the feasibility of a radical model of competency; and to explore the degree to which integration is tied by necessity to Post-Fordism, can all be learned from the South African example presented in this thesis. These themes, and other issues arising from studies in the Old Commonwealth, point to the need for further research into the broader international trend and possibly to comparative studies (Donn and McGrath 1996). Here too, it is to be hoped that the methodological approach adopted in this thesis might be a useful starting point for this research.

Given that South Africa is far less part of the core global economy than the other Old Commonwealth countries, such comparisons are of course particularly problematic. However, South Africa's different status, on the semi-periphery of the global economy, raises further questions for comparative research. Can a Post-Fordist learning strategy succeed in semiPeripheral economies? Instead, is New Improved Vocationalism probable? Which economies, indeed, are the most similar to South Africa in terms of their insertion into the global economy? Can any lessons be drawn from their experiences as well as South Africa's that would justify the identification of the one best learning system for semi-peripheral economies, or even the main challenges that would need to be overcome in improving them?
This thesis has sought to show the tensions that remain at the heart of education and training policy formulation in South Africa two years after the first democratic elections. By exploring the historical and international ideological contexts of South African thinking about education and training policy, it has been possible to highlight these tensions as well as suggest some trends that appear to be present in the attempt to resolve them.

The thesis argues that there is a very great danger that much of the radical vision of education and training transformation that developed in South Africa prior to 1990 will increasingly be sidelined in policy formulation and practice. Both at an ideological and an economic level, there appears to be a growing belief amongst stakeholders that the pressures of globalization constrain education and training policy to be largely economistic.

Even the vision of the ANC-COSATU alliance, with its many positive elements, is largely constructed within a paradigm which sees education in instrumental terms. This vision, grounded in what I have termed the New Times variant of Post-Fordism, sees learning as directed to the concerns of the workplace, both to the need to increase employment and incomes on the one hand, and to enhance international competitiveness on the other. However, the progressive elements of this workers’ vision of Post-Fordism are severely threatened by the facility with which employers and other less progressive forces have been able to construct an alternatively nuanced Post-Fordist meta-narrative of Lean Production.
Such a vision brings with it the danger of an expansion of Taylorism in the learning system and managerial power in the workplace.

Whilst certain key elements of the radical formulation of the 1980s, such as access, remain embedded in the core agenda, the first half of 1996 has seen a further increase in the usage of managerialist notions such as labour flexibility. In the aftermath of the National Party’s withdrawal from the GNU and the appointment of Mkhatshwa as Deputy-Minister, there is perhaps a possibility for some reflection on the desired future path of learning reform in South Africa. The economic pressures are immense and must be addressed, and the political realities of the mid-1990s are very different from those during the first flowering of People’s Education a decade earlier. Nonetheless, there is still a role for critique and challenge of policy and an opportunity to construct a less instrumentalized vision of learning and a broader vision of work which includes the informal sector and household work.

Two years after the first democratic elections many questions remain regarding South Africa’s future, in the spheres of learning, of work and beyond. The need to produce answers has generated much that should be applauded in the work of the new government and nation. However, in the quest for quick solutions to immense challenges it should not be forgotten that much of the strength of the anti-Apartheid tradition lay in the asking of hard questions of the past, of the present and of the future. It is on the nurturing of that questioning spirit that a large part of the realisation of a better model of learning, of work and of society will depend.
APPENDIX

SOURCES OF ORAL DATA\textsuperscript{1,2}

Glenn Adler, Sociology Department, University of the Witwatersrand, 13/06/95

Arthur Allen, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 30/03/95

Tony Ansara, Hospitality Industry Training Board, 03/03/95

Saliem Badat, Education Faculty, University of the Western Cape, 24/03/95

Peter Badcock-Walters, Education Foundation, 11/04/95

Jeremy Baskin, National Labour and Economic Development Institute, 17/02/95

Ian Bellis, Department of Human Resource Development, Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit, 13/06/95

Adrienne Bird, (1995a in text) Metal and Engineering Industries Education and Training Board\textsuperscript{3}, 31/03/95

Eddie Botha, Department of Education, 07/07/95

Ray Bredenkamp, Motor Industry Training Board, 07/03/95

Mike Bullock, Plastics Industry Training Board, 02/03/95

Elizabeth Burroughs, Human Sciences Research Council, various

\textsuperscript{1} As noted in Chapter One, oral data was collected from a variety of interactions. Many of those listed below provided information through formal interviews. Others, however, provided information through less formal conversations, often spread over a number of occasions. The multiplicity of conversations with certain individuals will be reflected in the absence of dating for when the data was collected from them.

\textsuperscript{2} Interviews and conversations took place between January and July 1995 in South Africa. However, some conversations with staff from the University of Western Cape took place in Britain subsequently as a result of a British Council link between the University of Edinburgh and UWC. Discussions were also carried on via e-mail with some of those researchers listed above.

\textsuperscript{3} Affiliations given are those at the time of interview/conversation. Several informants have since moved to other organizations.
John Burrows, Mining Industry Artisan Trades Training Board, 15/02/95

Nazir Carrim, Education Faculty, University of the Witwatersrand, 23/05/95

Linda Chisholm, Education Policy Unit, University of the Witwatersrand, various

Monica Cilliers, Toyota SA Marketing, 13/03/95

Trevor Coombe, (1995a in text) Department of Education, 22/05/95

Mieke Dames, Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, 28/03/95

Michael Denton, Toyota SA Manufacturing, 24/03/95

Andre Dippenaar, Chamber of Mines/Business SA, 01/03/95

Ray Eberlein, National Training Board, 06/03/95

Schalk Engelbrecht, Human Sciences Research Council, 22/02/95

Ahmed Essop, Centre for Education Policy Development, 07/04/95

Richard Fehnel, Ford Foundation, 13/06/95

Ed French, Independent Examinations Board, 05/06/95

Steve Friedman, Centre for Policy Studies, 11/04/95

Jeanne Gamble, Department of Adult Education and Extra-Mural Studies, University of Cape Town, 18/07/95

Bobby Godsell, Anglo-American Corporation, 14/03/95

Deon Haasbroek, Department of Labour Affairs, 13/03/95

Ken Hartshorne, Centre for Continuing Education, University of the Witwatersrand, 24/02/95

Peter Kallaway, Education Faculty, University of the Western Cape, various4

Andre Kraak, Academic Planning Unit, University of the Western Cape, 22/03/95

4 The Kallaway 1995 cited in the text is, however, a conference paper (see bibliography).
Glenda Kruss, Education Faculty, University of the Western Cape, various

Khetsi Lehoko, Department of Education, 22/05/95

Chris Lloyd, National Union of Metalworkers South Africa, 03/05/95

Rosemary Lugg, Human Sciences Research Council, various

Neil McGurk, RDP Culture of Learning Project, 19/06/95

Mary Metcalfe, Member of the Executive Council for Education, Gauteng, 23/05/95

Sam Morotoba, Congress of South African Trade Unions, 14/03/95

Enver Motala, Gauteng Department of Education, various

Gustav Niebuhr, Department of National Education, 07/07/95

Peter O'Connor, Australian Adult Educator, various

Costa Pierides, Automobile Industry Training Board, 28/03/95

Merle Plasket, National Union of Mineworkers, 10/04/95

Anton Prinsloo, Motor Industry Training Board, 07/03/95

Peter Riches, Clothing Industry Training Board, 29/05/95

Denzil Russell, Department of Adult Education, University of the Witwatersrand, various

Rheta Smalle, Toyota SA Marketing, 13/03/95

Erwin Sonnendecker, Building Industry Training Board, 29/03/95

Alan Tonkin, South African Business Network, 31/05/95

John Tyers, Transnet Training Board, 29/03/95

Ben van der Walt, Federation of South African Labour Unions, 10/03/95

Ryno Verster, ESKOM, 29/03/95

Karl von Holdt, South African Labour Bulletin, 10/07/95

Nic Wiehahn, Nic Wiehahn and Associates, 07/07/95

David Williams, Financial Mail, 30/03/95
Francis Wilson, South African Labour Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town, 24/03/95

Harold Wolpe, Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape, 24/03/95

Loveway Zwelithini, Food, Farming and Beverage Workers Union, 16/02/95
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