TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:

The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

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1994
This study investigates and proves the continuity between Tsarist, Soviet, and current Russian military thought which is predicated on the twin conceptual pillars of voennyi nauk (military science) and budushchaia voina (future war); identifies the integral military-civilian commission consensus/decision process; defines the context for Aleksandr Svechin’s 1920s works; and contributes original General Staff source materials. The continuity of process for developing Russian military doctrine is documented in three parts:

1) The Imperial Russian Army Reforms 1856 to 1914 are linked with the issues of forming and training a standing "professional" conscript army that first became significant in the mid-19th century. The Ridiger and Miliutin Reforms advanced the process of creating a modern Russian military establishment in the wake of humiliating Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). The decade of the 1890s and the years immediately prior to World War I are of singular importance to understanding the conceptual continuity retained by the present Russian military because these decades marked a renaissance of theoretical thinking and debate which resulted in the development of the voennyi nauk methodology for forecasting budushchaia voina; while the Russian Army began attempting to integrate emerging technologies. Today this same technological modernization issue is at the forefront of Russian military thought and hence of efforts to create a new military art.

2) Lessons from the The 1921-1923 Interregnum, and the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms are pertinent due to the striking economic and geo-political similarities between this time period and the present Russian situation. For a decade up to 1930 within the Red Army there transpired an open debate -- the first and only such open debate for nearly 60 years -- about the nature of budushchaia voina. That 1920s debate, which climaxed around differences between the strategies of "destruction" and "attrition" illuminated in General A. A. Svechin’s 1927 Edition of Strategia, reemerged in the late 1980s as the dialectic foundation for the development Russian military doctrine for the 21st century.

3) Findings: Past, Present, Future investigates the nature of the current Russian budushchaia voina concept which must reflect the vastly altered political-military, geo-strategic, social, economic, and technological situation in which Russia finds itself in the aftermath of the December 1991 disbanding of the Soviet Union; and then project into the 21st Century the type of threats, the most likely nature of warfare, and hence the deployed military force structure required to defend Russia. By documenting 150 years of Russian military transformation from an ineffectual mid-19th century feudal peasant conscript army into a highly capable "professional" modern army at the end of the 20th century, this study proves the continuity of the Russian future war forecasting process, and of the military-civilian commission consensus-building and decision-making process, that are the foundations upon which the Russian military establishment is built -- and periodically dialectically renewed.
DECLARATION

I, FRED CLARK BOLI, do hereby declare that I am solely responsible for the research, writing, and composition of this PhD dissertation:

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I remember well my grandfather Ford Clark saying, "No one alone ever accomplishes anything." The sagacity of that timeless adage is particularly true concerning this PhD dissertation. My Mother, Isabelle Clark Boli, was the teacher who instilled in me the desire to question, explore, study, learn and write. Without the enduring friendship and guidance of University of Edinburgh Professor Emeritus John Erickson, FBA, FRSE, whose knowledge of Soviet and Russian military affairs is consummate, I could never have begun this work, let alone finish it. Mr. John Gooding of the University of Edinburgh Faculty of Arts, Department of History, always provided me with invaluable advice. The continuing wise counsel, support and assistance of retired University of Edinburgh Assistant Secretary Mr. Michael J. H. Westcott was of inestimable value. By obtaining from Moscow many of the unique Russian archival materials used to document this dissertation, Mrs. Karen Bronshteyn of East View Publications, Minneapolis, MN provided crucial assistance. Although I remain solely responsible for any errors of commission or omission within this dissertation, I am forever indebted to Mrs. Dorothy C. Elliott for meticulously proofreading and editing the final text. Last, and most certainly not least, I can never thank my dear friend and wife, Diane Hawthorne Boli, enough for her persistent encouragement and patience which made completion of this work possible.

FRED CLARK BOLI
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Preamble</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PART I

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY REFORMS 1856 to 1914

17    The Crimean War Experience: Lessons and Legacy
21    The Ridiger Commission on Military Reform
29    The Miliutin Reforms (1861-1881)
33    - The Reserve Cadre Army Concept
37    - Military Education: A Reform Priority
45    - War Ministry and Force Structure Reorganization
53    - Army Mobilization: An Unsatisfactory Capability
56    - The Military District System
68    - Rearmament and Weapons Modernization
77    - The Obruchev Plan for Future War
85    - Re-Evaluation of Defense Requirements (1870-1872)
101   - The 1873 'Secret Society': 'Dimitum' and Decisions
118   - The 1874 Military Conscription Law
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART I (continued)

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY REFORMS 1856 to 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 132  | The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878):
The Outcome and Lasting Significance |
| 150  | The 1890s Russian Military Renaissance:
    Technological Modernization and Military Science |
| 160  | Stagnation of Applied Russian Military Art |
| 171  | Aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War:
    Lessons and The Ridiger Reforms (1905-1909) |
| 188  | Prelude to World War I: Is There Enough Time
to Transform the Russian Army? |
| 195  | Technology and Aviation "Revolutionize" Warfare |
| 203  | The Sukhomlinov Reforms (1909-1914) |
| 211  | The Initial Period of War (Autumn 1914):
    Time Runs Out |
| 218  | Contemporary Lessons from the Imperial Army |
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:

The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART II

The 1921-1923 Interregnum and the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>The 1921-1923 Interregnum: The Red Army Demobilization Disaster and Ideological Conflict over the Role of the Red Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decision to Demobilize: Political, Military, and Economic Reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>Demobilization Reprieve: The Spring 1920 Polish Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>Red Army Demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243</td>
<td>The Territorial Militia Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>Gusev-Frunze &quot;Theses&quot; on the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army (RKKA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248</td>
<td>- Factors in the Russian Civil War Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>- &quot;Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine&quot; and Future War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257</td>
<td>Impact of Red Army Demobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>- Morale: Order and Discipline Destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>- Personnel Reductions and Command Restructuring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>Dawn of the Red Army Reform Era: Reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International, Domestic, and Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>- Military Impetus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART II (continued)

The 1921-1923 Interregnum
and
the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>273</td>
<td>The 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Developments and Russian Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274</td>
<td>German Revolt: 'World Revolution' Fails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>Party Democracy: The 'Forty-six' Challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278</td>
<td>Gusev Commission Report Findings:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;The Red Army is not a reliable fighting force.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>282</td>
<td>Mixed Military System:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Militia and Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>291</td>
<td>Frunze's 'Militarization' Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>- One-man Command ('edinonachalie')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>- Purge of Military Specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>- Expansion of the Junior Officer Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>- Restoration of Officer Career Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>- Order and Discipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve Red Army Morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>305</td>
<td>- Nationwide Industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Required to Modernize the Red Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>Changes Institutionalized Through Education:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Red Army Becomes the &quot;School of the Nation&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART II (continued)
The 1921-1923 Interregnum and the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>316</td>
<td>Aleksandr A. Svechin, <em>Strategiia</em>: Toward &quot;Permanent Operating Factors in Protracted War&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>319</td>
<td>The Red Army Military-Historical Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>325</td>
<td>&quot;War of Destruction&quot; versus &quot;War of Attrition&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>340</td>
<td>The Strategic Line of Conduct</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART III

FINDINGS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

The Russian Budushchaia Voina Concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>345</td>
<td>Findings: Past, Present, Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347</td>
<td>Origins of the 'Future War' Concept: The Russian Military Strategic Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>- Dragomirov's &quot;Russian School&quot;: Morale and Moral Superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352</td>
<td>- Leer's &quot;Academic School&quot;: Fundamental Laws of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>353</td>
<td>The Integrators: Geisman, Neznamov and Mikhnevich Develop the Social-Economic Foundation for Protracted Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360</td>
<td>Mikhail V. Frunze: &quot;Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategia: Attrition (izmor) versus Destruction (sokrushenie)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>Tukhachevskii's Budushchaia Voina Study: The First RKKA Shtab Systematic Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>396</td>
<td>The Sokolovskii Nuclear War Anomaly: Quantitative Analysis Displaces Military Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>414</td>
<td>Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov: &quot;The Revolution in Military-Technical Affairs&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>437</td>
<td>Makhmut A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze, Voennyi Teoretik: Destroys the Sokolovskii Voennaia Strategia Anomaly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

INDEX: PART III (continued)

FINDINGS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

The Russian Budushchaia Voina Concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov - &quot;Foresight!: General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>457</td>
<td>Gaivoronskii's General Staff Academy Textbook: Military Science -- A Stalwart of State Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469</td>
<td>Igor N. Rodionov: The Military Academy of the General Staff View of Budushchaia Voina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>493</td>
<td>Military Science Fuels the post-Soviet Russian Military Doctrine Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>- Russian Military Academy of the General Staff Military-Science Conference, May 27-30, 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contemporary Military Doctrine and Military-Technical Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>553</td>
<td>- Defense Industry: Procurement, Conversion, and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>555</td>
<td>- Deterrence, Stability and Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>558</td>
<td>The First Russian Military Doctrine: Presidential Decree No. 1833, November 2, 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>562</td>
<td>Continuity of the Russian Military Transformation Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

BIBLIOGRAPHY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>596</td>
<td>Part I  Selected Bibliography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>608</td>
<td>Part II Selected Bibliography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>620</td>
<td>Part III Selected Bibliography</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Dates of Key Military-Historical Events and List of Russian Military Commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1873 'Sekretnoe soveshchanie' Meetings Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>List of Literature, Maintained in the Military Academy of the General Staff Library 'Spetskhran' (Special Holdings) Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Index of doctoral and candidate dissertations, defended at the Institute from 1968-1990. Institut voennoi istorii Ministerstva oborony SSSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Fundamental Conditions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine, President of the Russian Federation Decree No. 1833, November 2, 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:

The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

We are watching an unprecedented spectacle: revolution coming from above and not from below.

- Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich, 1917

PREAMBLE

Today the struggle to save the army is the last struggle
for the state system, for nationality, for Russia.

- A. Prokhanov, 1990

In the aftermath of the November 1989 destruction of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent unification of Germany, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of Communism in Europe, the continuing withdrawal of the former Soviet Western Group of Forces from Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the declaration of independence by the former Soviet republics, so-called Western conventional wisdom and popular public sentiment assert that 'the Soviet Union is dead,' 'we won the Cold War,' and the former Soviet Union no longer constitutes a 'threat.' It is beyond any doubt that the events since late 1989 constitute a seminal change in the international security environment -- what the enduring Russian military theorist General Aleksandr A. Svechin definitively analyzed in the 1920s as a "completely new strategic landscape."

Regardless of the immensity of these strategic changes, such absolute and unquestioning assertions about the total demise of the 'Russian threat' are a long leap of faith from reality, given the great uncertainty that remains about the eventual outcome of reform
programs in Russia and in the surrounding newly independent states. The eventual success of the democratic political and market economic reforms, which were initiated in January 1992 by President Boris Yeltsin, is by no means guaranteed. This uncertainty is due to the enormous magnitude of the problems faced by his fledgling government, let alone those of the highly nationalistic and traditionally oriented newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Even if these democratic political and market economic reforms eventually succeed, Russia and three of the 'Newly Independent States' (NIS), Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine -- in the absence of parliamentary ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) and of actual physical nuclear weapons and delivery system destruction -- will continue to be the only nations on Earth with the military capability of utterly destroying the United States of America. Russia also continues to maintain a formidable conventional military force, which it is incrementally in the process of attempting to modernize and upgrade with emerging technologies. Research and development for some of these advanced technologies has been prioritized by the Russian military to eliminate the least promising. For the remainder, funding continues unabated -- even with the dire civilian economic straits through which Russia is currently attempting to navigate.¹

Ideally, the range of political-military alternative futures for the former Soviet republics might be considered as unlimited.

But, in fact, their future is restricted by the socio-political culture of the Russians and of their neighbors, by their domestic historical precedents for problem resolution and, not least, by the virtual collapse of their 'war communism' command economies and by their seeming inability to reach a political consensus about the type of economy which should replace the failed socialist model economy. Aleksandr S. Kapto, Head of the Ideological Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (KPSS/TsK), highlighted the first requirement for the success of reconstruction (perestroika) and renewal (obnovleniia) of socialist society:

The sociopolitical and economic transformations presuppose a creative and thorough comprehension of the country's historical past, the experience of world development, and the achievements of non-Soviet social thought, science, and technology, and the inclusion of these achievements in the strategy of renewal, taking into account the specific features of our traditions and social psychology.²

Beyond question, the Great Russians now face a geo-strategic, political, economic, and military situation that is unique in their history. The collapse of the Communist dictatorship has returned the Russian Empire to inside state borders unseen since the mid-18th century during the rule of Catherine the Great, and has created the possibility of further disintegration of the Russian state, as distinct ethnic groups from the autonomous districts that were created during the 74 years of Communist rule seek rights of national self-determination. The huge Communist bureaucracy that controlled and operated the Soviet command economy, top-down, through the

principle of 'democratic-centralism' has been eviscerated by six years of Mikhail Sergeivich Gorbachev's perestroika reforms, and especially by the 'shock therapy' economic changes, implemented after the failed August 1991 coup d'état attempt that brought to power the 'radical democratic reformers', led by Boris Yeltsin. The result is near economic chaos, with the old command economic system inoperable, but without a viable market system to replace it. In particular, the former Soviet military establishment -- now firmly controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense -- is faced with the absolute requirement for renewal (obnovleniia) in order to fulfill its historic and patriotic duty of defending Russian national security interests.

The renewal of the Russian military is not, however, without precedent. Repeatedly, throughout the last 140 years, the Russian military has been afflicted with 'times of trouble.' Each time the Russian military managed to reform itself, and to prevail, by learning from mistakes, by retaining 'fundamental laws of war' from past international experience, by adopting applicable aspects of the latest military art and technology from abroad, by integrating these factors into a synergistic new military doctrine, and then by developing and deploying a force structure that the General Staff forecasted would be adequate to achieve victory over projected national security threats in a 'future war.'

Historically, this General Staff analytical and forecasting process has proven to be quite successful and highly accurate in

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identifying Russian and Soviet defense requirements and in establishing the required doctrinal concepts, military art, and strategy. The conceptual basis for Russian defense policy always must be created first. However, implementing and applying these concepts has consistently been the major difficulty faced by both the Russian and Soviet General Staff, largely due to the bureaucratic impediments inherent within their respective autocratic and socialist political and economic systems.

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the December 1991 formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) -- and particularly the establishment of the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 16, 1992 -- the dialectic and iterative process of debating the creation of a new Russian military doctrine and national security posture began again. General-Colonel Viktor Samsonov, Chief of the General Staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, summarized the severity of the current Russian military situation most succinctly:

It's going to be difficult to defend ourselves in the event of a military conflict. The first strategic echelon is completely destroyed and this is not a secret. The reason is that to create the forces of the first echelon we put everything into the border areas -- Kiev, Carpathian, Baltic military districts, etc. That's why we wanted to include the air defenses in the Strategic Forces and count them as collective security means. But it unfortunately didn't happen, so everything collapsed. And, in the Trans-Caucasian district, we dismantled all radar posts because they were attacked more often than combat units. ... Our defenses, especially in the South, are tremendously weakened. And, if we have to fight, this can be done only by forces deployed in the Center. The centralized defense system doesn't exist any more.4

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One should not assume from General Samsonov's very pessimistic statement of the serious problems facing the Russian military -- as it is now politically popular in the West to do -- that the territory of the former Soviet Union is 'defenseless' because, in fact, the CIS retains an immensely powerful and potentially dangerous, though temporarily disorganized, military capability. Nor should one assume from the severity of the problems facing Russia that the General Staff must perform a 'zero-based' analysis of their new military requirements. More practically, the Russian Ministry of Defense, through the General Staff and General Staff Academy, will conduct a 'scientific' analysis of historical lessons, and debate those lessons, in the process of creating a military doctrine upon which to develop and deploy the required force structure for 'future war.'

A. D. Borshchov strongly implied in 1990 that historic lessons remain pertinent to contemporary conditions:

Fulfillment of all defense programs under present-day conditions, and especially measures for preparing to repulse a possible external attack, must be based on a scientifically grounded theoretical concept and be conducted on a purposeful, planned basis without any conditionalities or manifestations of subjectivism and dogmatism.

Borshchov continued:

... Everything previously accumulated must not be taken unequivocally and transferred to modern conditions in its initial form. ... Any past experience requires continuous creative study and practical application only with consideration of the entire set of changes which have occurred since the war, and which are occurring now, will not be superfluous even today.6

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6 Borshchov, p. 22.
The extent of these changes and the current turmoil within Russian society were underscored in a February 23, 1993 broadcast statement by Russian Defense Minister General Pavel S. Grachev. Following a weekend meeting of pro-Communist and nationalist officers that called for Grachev's resignation and a mass demonstration that day in Moscow by an estimated 20,000 pro-Communist military veterans, General Grachev denounced the military participation in "political experiments and battles": "The high command will not permit any split in military ranks.... The [Russian] military want, above all, stability." He asserted:

They want to shake up, split the army, blow it up from inside to achieve their well-known ambitions. These people, striving for power, should understand once and for all [that] any attempts to draw the armed forces into the political struggle are criminal and fraught with danger.8

That same day, in Tbilisi, Georgia, the leader of the Georgian Republic and former USSR Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, called for the removal of all Russian troops from the Black Sea Coast, Abkhazia and Adzharia; threatened mobilization of Georgian military forces; and told his parliament that if the Russians did not leave Georgia, Georgians would have to "rise up with weapons in our hands to defend the country." Once again, so serious had become the potential for domestic strife throughout the former Soviet empire -- and not at all unlike the historical precedents of the late-19th and early-20th centuries -- that Grachev felt compelled to warn that the

forced removal of the Russian President (Boris Yeltsin) could lead to a "reign of terror."

The fulcrum of the present Russian senior officer corps, about 90 percent, are former Communist Party or Komso mol members who have been reared and educated for the last two generations on the 'historical and dialectic materialism' of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, as elaborated by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, et al. This ingrained Russian 'military culture' virtually demands that an investigation of historical lessons be accomplished to establish a 'thesis' against which can be opposed an 'antithesis' to be 'negated' in order to create the new Russian military doctrine -- which eventually will consist of an evolutionary 'synthesis' of the old lessons from history, new technologies, military science, military art, strategy, and tactics based upon the Russian General Staff forecast of 'future war' probabilities. This new military doctrine -- the conceptual basis for future Russian force development and deployment -- will likely be very different from the World War II 'stereotyped' offensive Soviet force structure, with its highly centralized command, forward deployment, and masses of heavy tank formations to which Western analysts have become accustomed over the last forty years. But, the new military doctrine will retain a distinct continuity from past Russian historical experience.

It is that continuity of process for developing a new Russian military doctrine and force structure that this three-part study seeks to investigate.

* Grachev, op. cit., p. 2.
In Part I -- The Imperial Russian Army Reforms 1856 to 1914 --

the reform precedents are of interest since the issues of forming and training a standing 'professional' conscript army first became significant after Tsar Aleksandr II 'freed the serfs' in 1861. The Miliutin Reforms that spanned the decades of the 1860s and 1870s sought to create a modern Russian military establishment in the wake of humiliating Russian defeats in the Crimean War (1853-56) and Russo-Turkish War (1877-78). The decade of the 1890s is of particular importance to understanding the conceptual continuity retained by the present Russian military. During this decade severe political and economic constraints precluded the deployment of the force structure that the Imperial General Staff forecast as required for 'future war,' while Russian military thought began attempting to integrate modern technology -- at that time, railroads, machineguns, rapid-fire artillery, electro-magnetic communications, and airplanes -- into the existing force structure. Today this same issue of technological modernization is at the forefront of Russian military thought and hence of efforts to create a new doctrine, strategy, and operational art. The repeated defeats suffered by large and relatively modern Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 also taught the Russian military new, fundamental lessons about the importance of morale and military education.

After the 1905 Revolution, which followed hard on the heels of Russia's military defeat by Japan, and right up to the 1917 'October Revolution,' the Imperial Army was faced with domestic terrorism and nearly continual nationalist insurrections around the periphery of
the Russian Empire. Three issues remain important contemporary problems that the new Russian Ministry of Defense must take into consideration as it reorganizes: (1) the judicious application of the military science process for the development of a new military doctrine; (2) the existence of warring factions within and around Russia; and (3) the necessity for technological modernization.

In Part II -- The 1921-1923 Interregnum, and the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms -- the lessons are particularly pertinent to this study due to the striking geo-political similarities between this time period and the present Russian situation. Then, as now, the Russian state had suffered a cruel and crushing military defeat; a political revolution had brought a new socialist form of government to power in 1917; the borders of the Russian Empire had collapsed onto the shoulders of the Russian heartland; and Russia remained surrounded by active national independence movements. By the end of the Russian Civil War in 1920, the Russian economy was devastated, necessitating Lenin's experiment with the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP) market reforms. The new Red Army, faced with the political and economic imperatives of drastically reducing its force structure, also desperately required technological modernization, trained officer cadres, and a new military doctrine with which to defend the nascent Soviet state. Therefore, during the decade up to 1930, within the Red Army there transpired an open debate -- the first and only such open debate for nearly 60 years -- about the nature of budushchaia voina (future war). That 1920s debate, which climaxed around differences between the strategies of 'destruction' and 'attrition,' illuminated in General A. A. Svechin's 1927 Edition of
Strategiia (Strategy), reemerged in the late 1980s as the dialectic foundation for the development of Russian military doctrine.

Part III -- Findings: Past, Present, Future -- investigates the nature of the Russian budushchaia voina (future war) concept, which must reflect the vastly altered political-military, geo-strategic, economic, and technological situation in which Russia finds itself in the aftermath of the August 1991 Revolution and the December 1991 disbanding of the Soviet Union, and then project into the 21st century the types of threats, the most likely nature of warfare and, hence, the deployed Russian military force structure required to defend Russia. Even under the most stable of domestic and international conditions, the required holistic and comprehensive forecasting is a daunting task. But with the uncertainties and turmoil of the present Russian economic and political situation, the emergence of the international 'new world order,' and the explosion of emerging technologies, predictions of the nature of budushchaia voina become all the more problematic. Because the Russian General Staff forecasting process is now -- as in the past -- dialectic, iterative, and evolutionary, ample evidence now exists, based on the November 1993 announced new Russian Military Doctrine, to initially determine the theoretical precepts upon which the future Russian military will be based.10

The foundation upon which the 'military-technical aspect' of the new Russian military doctrine has been based, for the 1990s, and

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beyond, is the vision of former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov's 'revolution of military-technical affairs.' Shortly after becoming Chief of the General Staff in 1977, Marshal Ogarkov, with the approval of the KPSS Central Committee, initiated a comprehensive study of future Soviet international security requirements. In 1982 Marshal Ogarkov published some of the initial results of this study in Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva (Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland) and expanded upon the implications of emerging technologies on modern warfare in his 1985 book, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti (History Teaches Vigilance). Since these visionary works were first published, their implications and significance for international security have been debated inconclusively, but vigorously, both within the Soviet Union and abroad. Regardless, since 1985 the Soviet Army, and now its successor the Russian Army, has continued to make halting incremental

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11 Existence of this "global forecast" was confirmed to the author during a 1989 personal discussion in Washington, DC, with Academician Yuri Ossipian, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. According to Dr. Ossipian, Marshal Ogarkov and the General Staff were key proponents of initiating this "twenty-five volume study for the CPSU Central Committee International Department that incorporated inputs from throughout the Soviet government -- political, social, economic, military, scientific, foreign affairs, and psychological -- that revealed the domestic and international trends into the 21st century." Ossipian said, "The initial drafts were completed during the Brezhnev government in the early 1980s and revised during Andropov's brief tenure to create the analytical basis and conceptual foundation for President Gorbachev's perestroika (transformation) program."

12 For a comprehensive and most useful analysis and discussion of these two Ogarkov works, see Mary C. FitzGerald, Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977-1985, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, November 1986.
progress toward realization of Marshal Ogarkov's conception of a "new quality" of defense capability. The startling success of precision-guided weapons employed by the United States and the Allied coalition in the 1991 Gulf War with Iraq, reportedly the fourth largest military force in the world, served to reinforce strongly on the Russian military the veracity of Marshal Ogarkov's predictions. The lightening speed of combat operations also reinforced the necessity for the Russian Army to act on their plans for renewal (obnovleniia), or be left hopelessly behind in the arena of military technology, possessed and being deployed by the rest of the world powers. The fundamental question remains, just as it did in the 1920s and earlier, of whether or not the Russian economy can create and sustain the capability to produce the sophisticated, technologically modernized type of military force structure that the budushchaia voina methodology forecasts -- and perhaps even necessitates.

What the Russian military now envisions is a complete military reform, an obnovleniia, that must go way beyond any tinkering with the old socialist political, economic, and military system as originally planned under Gorbachev's perestroika. Prior to this, during a round table discussion between senior Soviet commanders in February 1990, Colonel Danilov of the Defense Ministry Information Directorate pointed out the requirement for a "comprehensive transformation of the most important aspects of the entire system of

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state defense organizational development." General-Colonel Bayev, Chief of the Defense Ministry Central Finance Directorate, concurred that most significant was the question of what military reform was designed to achieve, namely, "a modern, trained, well armed, strong army dedicated to the Soviet people." General Manilov attempted to summarize the "principles of military reform" as political, organizational, and social. The political principle must relate the state's military organization to the "degree of actual military threat." The second principle of military reform should be understood as being based upon a cadre organization with universal military service, but with an increasing number of "professional" military personnel. And the third principle entails "guaranteed provision of social protection" for all servicemen plus the assurance of openness in "defense organizational development."

During the September 27-29, 1993 United States-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference, General-Major Viktor Mironov of the Office of the Russian Minister of Defense, put forward three basic premises of the 'military-technical aspect' of the "emerging Russian military doctrine" as the following: "1) optimize research and development of advanced military technologies; 2) modernization of the Russian armed forces; and 3) restructure the armed forces to

14 Trushin, V., *Voennaia mysl',* No. 4, 1990, pp. 3-11.
15 Trushin, pp. 3-11.
16 Trushin, pp. 3-11.
achieve a 'new quality' of combat capability." At that same conference, Dr. Sergei Kortunov of the Russian Foreign Ministry observed that "without clearly defined borders and a unifying ideology, the development of a coherent military doctrine is impossible." He opined: "We must now work together in order to make Russia technologically competitive against her emerging regional security threats." General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition and Procurement Office, Russian Ministry of Defense, described Russian military procurement as focused on "obtaining the latest technologies, especially in the area of command and control communications." He explained that "based on the trends revealed by future war models in the 1990s, [the Russian Army] could not allow enemies to attain military-technical superiority." In closing, General-Colonel Mironov sagaciously asserted: "Technology alone is not a total answer to effective military capability. Rather, the desired capability is the result of a synergism between technology and military art."


The statements of General-Major Viktor Mironov, General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov, and Dr. Sergei Kortunov provide conclusive evidence of the continuity between Tsarist, Soviet, and current Russian military thought, which is predicated on the twin concepts of voennyi nauk (military science) and budushchaia voina (future war). It is precisely that continuity of the Russian military science future war forecasting process, and of the commission/conference consensus-building and decisionmaking process, which leads to the implementation of those forecasts, that this study seeks to document.

The army's ailment lies in the fact that society at large cannot define its concept of an army, why it is needed, what functions it must perform and, finally, just what is it to be like?

- Igor Kononov, 1989
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

PART I

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN ARMY REFORMS 1856 to 1914

The [soldiers'] oath is a vow, given before God, to serve God and Sovereign with faith and truth, to obey commanders uncomplainingly, to bear patiently cold, hunger, and all the needs of a soldier; to spare not even [one's] last drop of blood for Sovereign and Fatherland, to go to battle boldly and cheerfully for the Tsar, [for] Holy Rus, and [for] the Orthodox faith.

- Chtenie dlja soldat, 1857

"Pulia dura, a shtyk molodets" -- (The bullet is a fool, but the bayonet is a fine lad.)

The Crimean War Experience: Lessons and Legacy

The long-held European myth of the 'invincible' Russian Army was dispelled through repeated, costly military defeats, but the Russian Army -- for all its multitudinous problems -- had not been broken, despite the loss of Sevastopol and the destruction of the Black Sea Fleet. Paradoxically, after the Crimean War ended, the Russian Army was greatly admired by European military leaders for its stalwart defense of Sevastopol and for the tenacity of its soldiers. Overall, Russian international prestige was diminished greatly with the revelations that her army was awkwardly organized, technically backward, and poorly led; and dependent on an inefficient and

underdeveloped state infrastructure with primitive industries, almost no railways, and weak finances. Yet, by the sheer magnitude of her territory and population, Imperial Russia remained imposing. Russia, however, was no longer a leading power in Europe -- nor would she become one again for nearly another century.

The Crimean War provided the Russian military with abundant evidence that the sheer weight of frontline manpower, coupled with drilling perfection on the parade ground, was no substitute for modern equipment, efficient organization, sound training, and competent leadership on the battlefield. Russian commanders had tended to concentrate so intensely on preparation for parades and reviews, emphasizing the spotless appearance of their troops and parade-ground precision movements, that their soldiers had received negligible preparation for the rigors of actual combat. With the

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23 Wirtschafter, pp. 71-72.
prudent judgment indicative of a future Chief of the Main Staff, General-Adjutant Nikolai N. Obruchev contributed these thoughtful words:

The Crimean War revealed that army organization at that time did not satisfy the state defense goals. For defense purposes there were too few tactical units; these units did not have sufficient [command and] control, material support, [and] allotments of people.26

As a result of these deficiencies, victory eluded the Russian Army, while Russian manpower losses were enormous.

For Russia, the Crimean War of 1853-1856 was an all out effort. Before the war Russia fielded an army with 980,000 officers and soldiers, plus a significant, though indeterminable, number of Cossack irregulars. At the conclusion of the war in January 1856, in spite of an estimated 450,000 casualties owing to combat and disease,25 the Russian army numbered 1,802,500 regulars, 370,000 militia, and 170,000 irregulars -- an immense army of 2,343,500 men.

With the inclusion of navy personnel the total Russian wartime force

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25 Russian and British accounts of war casualties differ markedly; however, John Shelton Curtiss' estimate of 450,000 casualties, based upon official documents from the Russian War Ministry Medical Department, would appear to be the more reliable -- as is Curtiss' assessment that "the Crimean War was more costly for Russia in terms of manpower than any war between 1815 and 1914." For specific additional details, see Curtiss, pp. 470-471.
structure rose to between 2,400,000 and 2,500,000 troops.\textsuperscript{26} Although, for this time, such a gigantic fighting force was assembled because of the contingency of a Europe-wide war in 1856, typically, most Russian soldiers were not engaged in the rigors of actual combat.\textsuperscript{27}

General Obruchev concluded:

But, in spite of these 2.5 million troops we were weak. Many were old soldiers. By increasing the levy masses of recruits poured into the army, the formation of [recruits] into hastily formed units was unstable.\textsuperscript{28}

The critical lessons of the Crimean War were that the social disruption and enormous expense of maintaining all these troops in the field ruined the Russian economy and that the disastrous military performance in combat dictated the need for fundamental army reform.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Officers} & \textbf{Soldiers} \\
\hline
Regular Troops & 31,954 & 1,742,343 \\
Irregular Troops & 5,083 & 406,981 \\
National Militia & 6,035 & 369,098 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & 43,072 & 2,518,422 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{26} Curtiss, pp. 470-471; Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1870), pp. 1-2, presents this table with a somewhat higher total number of troops.

\textsuperscript{27} Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 3, in TsGVIA, VUA. Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia..., p. 75 gives the Imperial Army's revised force structure table.

\textsuperscript{28} Obruchev, op. cit., p. 3.
The Ridiger Commission on Military Reform

The most telling and didactic critique of Russian military system failings during the Crimean War came from a distinguished and trusted Russian nobleman and commander. While the war was still in progress, in a June 4, 1855 note, addressed to Tsar Aleksandr II and delivered to the Emperor through the War Ministry, General-Adjutant Count A. F. Ridiger, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and the Grenadier Corps, dispatched the first official document criticizing the Russian military system. He pointedly accused that the main reason for the failures of Russian arms was the military command. Convinced that "excessive command centralization led to the oblivion of the foundation of military art," Count Ridiger wrote:

First, the abuse of power by the central administration damaged the independence of lower command channels, throwing the latter into the role of transmitting reports and orders.... These duties, essentially, occupied mediocre personnel; nothing is easier than being gadflies executing standing orders..., and it is impossible to demand from these marionettes integrity, responsibility, or knowledge about people and circumstances...."

Ridiger's biting words revealed his frustration with the incompetent leadership and retinue of the existing Russian military system:

The second reason, which turns out to be influenced in no small measure by the absence of capable people in the military service, is degenerated people, whose military spirit, knowledge of tactics and warfare, and about people, allows them to occupy themselves with only one military practice, the scope of which is limited to regulations and parades.30

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Through a subsequent series of personal notes, after he successfully 'had gotten the Tsar's attention,' Ridiger urged Tsar Aleksandr that "worthless commanders," who had displayed "almost criminal faults and negligences," be removed and advised that "talented commanders" be given wider authority. Count Ridiger particularly cited the mismanagement of the 1853 and 1854 Danube campaigns (an undisguised condemnation of the gross failings of Field Marshal Paskevich) and the command negligence before Sevastopol, Eupatoria, Balaklava and Kerch, when the enemy's Crimean expedition had been predicted three months in advance. Count Ridiger's notes also repeatedly criticized the "excessive centralization of authority in the military administration, which deprived the lower officials of all initiative and turned them into mere agencies for forwarding instructions."

On June 23, 1855 General Ridiger summarized his analysis for the Tsar with a series of five proposals for improving the Russian military system:

1) He urged the elimination of excessive centralization;

2) insisted on changing the nature of training of the troops so as to emphasize preparation for battle, including careful individual instruction of the soldiers, with parades and reviews to play a secondary role;

Curtiss, p. 469; see Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oboroneRossii," pp. 27-28, in TsGVIA, f. VUA. Materialy sekretynogo soveshchaniia..., p. 87, which severely, and openly, criticizes Field Marshal Paskevich and the Emperor Nikolas I for "holding forces to defend the Baltic and Poland" to the extent that "nothing was left for strengthening infantry defenses or fortifications elsewhere in the Empire."

Curtiss, p. 469.
3) stressed raising the intellectual level of the officers;
4) proposed the creation of special commissions to resolve these problems; and
5) urged improvement of the quality of the commanders by requiring strict periodical attestation of their suitability, by the drawing up of lists of candidates for positions, careful selection of the appointees, and the weeding out of the unfit."

By his marginal notations Tsar Aleksandr II approved Ridiger's recommendations and, on July 20, 1855, with Ridiger as chairman, and with General P. A. Dannenberg, the 'Hero' of the infamous Battle of Inkerman, serving as his deputy, the "Commission for Improvement of Military Units" was inaugurated for the specific purpose of changing the Russian military system by implementing Ridiger's recommendations to the Tsar. Other members of this select commission included General-Adjutant Prince Bariatinskii; General-Lieutenants Maksimovich and Merkhelevich; Count Baranov; General-Majors Barantsev, Glinka, Gechevich, Kurdiumov; and Colonels Kartsov and Loshkarev. The Ridiger Commission was assigned six broad, and very important, tasks:

1) to change and to simplify regulations; 2) to improve armaments; 3) to introduce within the military knowledge concerning the physical development of soldiers and officers; 4) to create a new peacetime troop training program; 5) to change the system for selecting officers for command positions; and 6) to establish new principles for officers joining the candidate register in order to obtain an advancement in rank through military service."

33 Curtiss, p. 469; see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., *Voennye reformy*..., p. 45.
To assist with the immense task that this military perestroika envisioned, in February 1856 General-Adjutant D. A. Miliutin was summoned to join the Ridiger Commission, where he contributed significantly to both its deliberations and the solutions adopted.\textsuperscript{36} The Commission members directed implementation of what would be labeled, not always with admiration and approval from within the Russian military, the 'Ridiger Reforms' that incrementally paved the way for the total reorganization of the Russian military system. This transformation would be conducted in the succeeding decades by future War Minister General-Adjutant Dmitrii A. Miliutin.\textsuperscript{37}

Count Ridiger and his commission members certainly were not alone in their condemnation of the existing Russian military system. At the end of 1856, General-Adjutant Glinka criticized the entire system of Russian military education, even more sharply than had Ridiger, by enumerating flagrant scandals and extremes in his note to the Tsar titled "About elevating the level within the military of meritorious command and officer personnel." General Glinka almost stridently urged that officer education be improved and command functions be separated from logistic and supply duties:

The main concern of many unit commanders is not about correct and formal troop education in order to reach the desired perfection, but about finding means to succeed and besides to profit from the delivery of the supplies which are given to them.... Regimental commanders have become largely some kind of unit suppliers, cleverly and sharply ceding nothing to civilian traders....\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{36} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy}..., p. 46.

\textsuperscript{37} Curtiss, p. 469.

Noted Russian military historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii summarizes the unique significance of the Ridiger and Glinka notes, writing that these letters were "the first in 25-30 years that criticized the existing military order, [and] informed [the Tsar] about the impossibility of maintaining the current military system."35

Still, the proposed 'Ridiger Reforms' were not universally accepted within the Russian military. Quite the contrary, both for personal selfish as well as genuine professional reasons, the Russian officer corps became divided, with some individuals supporting change; with others vehemently opposed to any alterations; and with some adding further to the confusion by advocating the adoption of elements of both military systems. The initial result, therefore, was great turmoil, as 62 of the total 282 War Ministry directives for 1855 pertained to reorganization of the Russian Army. Then, in April 1856, General N. O. Sukhozanet succeeded Prince Dolgorukov as Russian War Minister, with the specific tasking from Tsar Aleksandr II to lead an army reform program, which Sukhozanet neither personally understood nor actively supported. To further complicate the situation, Tsar Aleksandr II assigned Sukhozanet two contradictory main tasks:

1) reduce the army in accordance with peacetime conditions, namely by this seeing to all measures for curtailing expenditures; and, 2) transform the military forces, their armament, construction and command toward the new principles, shown by the course and experience of war.40

40 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 47.
General Sukhozanet chose to maximize implementation of the Tsar’s first task, and proceeded to do so without either a definite plan or without any consideration of state defense requirements. Sukhozanet virtually ignored Aleksandr’s second task. General Dmitrii A. Miliutin later would confirm Sukhozanet’s actions in a March 4, 1859 letter in which Miliutin wrote:

All measures taken by General Sukhozanet have the exclusive objective of reducing military expenditures: one after another are curtailed, abolished, reduced.... Everything done in this period of time has a negative character. Continuing along this path can lead the state to complete impotence, at a time when all other European powers are strengthening their armaments.  

Regardless of General Sukhozanet’s incompetence and his best efforts to ignore the task of reforming the Russian military, as a result of the Ridiger Commission efforts, immediately following the Crimean War some of the very worst conditions of imperial military service were gradually altered, with the reduction of compulsory service to fifteen years; with the elimination of the most harsh forms of corporal punishment, such as flogging, except in the penal battalions; and with the provision to soldiers of better quarters and sustenance.  

Only after the emancipation of the serfs on February 19, 1861 by Tsar Aleksandr II, however, did it become ever more apparent that a military system of recruitment drawing solely upon the lower classes, and accompanied by conditions of service that could only be

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41 D. A. Miliutin, Pis’mo ot 4 mar’ta 1859 g.; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 47.

described as penal servitude, could not be continued.\textsuperscript{43} Prior to this, between 1825 and 1854, under the rule of Tsar Nikolas I, the Russian Empire was besieged by 674 peasant revolts. This astonishing total grew both in intensity and frequency throughout this thirty year period -- from 16 each year during the initial decade to over 38 each year in the last decade, and particularly during the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{44}

Almost immediately following the emancipation of the serfs, fresh, sporadic insurrections flared throughout the Empire, attaining particular violence in Penza and Kazan, where thousands of former serfs refused to work and attacked the manor houses of the major landowners. Ironically, it was the Imperial Army, itself composed largely of these same conscripted peasants, that was called upon to quell the riots -- a duty which they quite ruthlessly discharged with courts-martials, summary executions, floggings, and deportations to the frozen wastelands of Siberia. In 1861 there were 1176 reported cases of serf insubordination to former masters. The following year the number dropped dramatically to 400 cases. In 1863 there were 386 reported cases. And by 1864, as tensions abated, acts of violence on estates had dropped to 75.\textsuperscript{45} Following the Crimean War and the emancipation of the serfs, the Imperial Army largely succeeded in its internal repressive mission. However, this 'victory' was greatly diminished by the temporarily hidden cost of alienating the army from the Russian peasantry, upon which it was almost totally dependent.

\textsuperscript{43} Florinsky, p. 907.


\textsuperscript{45} Florinsky, p. 922.
In retrospect, the Russian government and its aristocratic leaders understood full well that the humiliating defeats suffered by the Russian Army during the Crimean War were the result of their poor leadership, severe logistical problems, obsolete and even antiquated weapons technology, and a weak economic infrastructure. But the Autocrat and his courtiers took great pride in the fact that their poorly armed and inadequately supplied conscripts -- the peasants -- displayed an unbreakable courage. They knew that the individual Russian peasant soldier, ever faithful to his service oath to the Tsar, demonstrated a "capacity for suffering and his courage and steadfastness in battle were legendary in Europe." N. F. Dubrobin's analysis summarizes that "the reasons for the failures of the Russian armed forces were unskilled battlefield commanders, in the absence of a reciprocal force level, and the backwardness of unit material-technical equipment in relation to the enemy weaponry." Thus, "the Crimean War represented the psychological break after which it became clear that fundamental reform was imminent" in order to transform not only the Russian military, but Russian social institutions.

Only the national qualities of the Russian soldiers -- bravery, steadfastness, and endurance -- prevented further success of the Anglo-French aggressors.

- Pavel A. Zaionchkovskii

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46 Wirtschafter, pp. 72-73.
47 Wirtschafter, p. 72.
49 Wirtschafter, p. xvi.
The Miliutin Reforms (1861-1881)

Occupied with its own internal regeneration
-- above all Russia searched for peace.\textsuperscript{51}
- General N. N. Obruchev

Professionalism begins with education.\textsuperscript{52}
- War Minister Dmitrii A. Miliutin

General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, who held the full confidence of Tsar Aleksandr II, 'The Great Reformer,' was appointed the Russian Assistant Minister of War in August 1860, following the summer 1859 recommendation by Field Marshal Prince Bariatinskii that Miliutin, his Caucasian Army Chief of Staff, become the next Minister of War. Beginning in May 1861 Dmitrii A. Miliutin \textit{de facto} was put in charge of the Russian War Ministry, was officially named Minister of War on November 9, 1861,\textsuperscript{53} and served in this distinguished capacity until shortly after the March 1881 assassination of Tsar Aleksandr II. General Miliutin was an ardent Russian nationalist who sincerely acknowledged the profound influence of the Russian military past -- particularly the contributions to the concepts of modern warfare made by the great Russian commanders Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Kutuzov.\textsuperscript{54}

In General Miliutin's logical and experienced judgment:

\textsuperscript{51} Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlja otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1870), p. 54.


Suvorov stood supreme in relation to military affairs for his century, and no one could then grasp that he had created an entirely new type of war, even before Napoleon gave Europe lessons on new strategies and tactics.\textsuperscript{55}

But General Dmitrii Miliutin was also the man of vision and 'new thinking' who implemented the much overdue basic reform of the Russian military system -- at times literally dragging this most conservative, tradition-bound, awkward, ignorant, and backward institution out of medieval times and into the late-19th century.

The Miliutin reforms constituted the first attempt during the 19th century to 'professionalize' the Russian military, with the goal being "the infusion of efficiency and competence into every aspect of Russian military life."\textsuperscript{56} Miliutin's fundamental philosophy toward Russian military reform is contained in his 1839 article entitled, simply, "Suvorov," in which he discussed in considerable detail his belief in "the genuine genius of the military art of this colossal eighteenth century commander."\textsuperscript{57} Miliutin then wrote:

In military art there are two sides: material and moral. Troops are not only the physical strength [and] mass, which are combined with weapons for military operations, but together with these [are] the unity of the people which endow wisdom and heart. Moral force plays an important role in all considerations and calculations of the commander and, consequently, the worst deficiency is to see the army only as a machine. He must know how to lead men, to attach the troops to himself, and by his moral power over them to intensify that relative power.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{56} Fuller, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{57} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{58} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, pp. 49-50.
Given Miliutin’s identification with Suvorov’s leadership style, it is quite understandable that the military training system which Miliutin implemented was not entirely dissimilar to that employed by Generalissimo Suvorov a century before. Both training systems were predicated on the principles of tactical depth, individual initiative, and a complete understanding by the troops of their military tasks.59 The first of the Miliutin reforms was introduced on January 15, 1862 when, after a rather protracted internal military debate, the War Ministry plan for military transformation (preobrazovanii) was approved by the Tsar.60 The last Miliutin reform was adopted on January 1, 1874 when Aleksandr II signed the ‘special declaration’ on military conscription.61

Throughout the dozen vital years of the Miliutin reforms, it is important to understand at the outset, as William C. Fuller, Jr. so meticulously describes, that ‘professionalism’ per se could not then, and cannot now, be equated with excellence, or even with military

60 Obruchev, "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," pp. 11-15, describes the reasons for the new Russian Army organization ordered by the Tsar in 1862 and analyzes the army force structure.
61 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennyie reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii, pp. 6, 51, and 331. For force structure details of the 1862 army reorganization which incorporated the recommendations of the Ridiger Commission into “five improvements”, see Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazhenija ob oborone Rossii," pp. 3-4, in TsGVIA, VUA, Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia..., p. 75.
competence and proficiency." The majority of Miliutin's new 'professionals' spent their military careers preoccupied with training, stockpiling war materials, and planning for 'short war' scenarios -- just as they had been taught by General M. Dragomirov, Commander of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg, through his Lectures on Tactics that emphasized morale as the decisive factor in warfare. This 1864 work was used as the principal handbook on tactics until 1905. Many of these new 'professional' Russian military officers consciously chose to ignore the rapid changes in combat potential, which were being introduced at the turn of the century by other European armies through their incorporation of emerging military technologies.63 Major factors behind this Imperial Army reluctance to adopt new combat methods and equipment were the entrenched military education and officer seniority systems.

At the end of the 1840s, the Imperial General Staff Academy annually matriculated only 25-27 very select officers into a strict formal curriculum that was steeped in the heroic battlefield traditions of Suvorov and Kutuzov. This tiny, elite officer cadre served as junior staff officers in the Crimean War, bridling under the leadership incompetence displayed by their superiors and the sting of repeated military defeats. They would emerge in leadership positions during the decades up to the turn of the century. Thus in

63 For a comprehensive and most revealing discussion of the subtle Russian meanings of "military professionalism", see William C. Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 1-46.

65 Fuller, pp. 5-6.
Zaionchkovskii’s opinion: “The command art of Suvorov and Kutuzov, therefore, still was disseminated in the Russian Army at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries as new tactics, so called ‘depth,’ were added to the linear attack formation.”

- The Reserve Cadre Army Concept

The prevailing mid-19th century Russian Army organizational principle called for the maintenance of a huge standing peacetime army. Basic to Miliutin’s military reform concept was the idea that there was no requirement for such a large peacetime force because a trained reserve cadre could be used to expand a small regular army in wartime. Following the Crimean War, as a member of General-Adjutant Count Ridiger’s military reform commission beginning in 1856, Miliutin first expounded his reserve cadre ideas. The reserve cadre concept did not originate entirely with Miliutin, but was founded on the writings of Astaf’ev, Goremykin, and Teliakovskii a decade earlier, from which Miliutin appropriated ideas for a paper titled “Thoughts on the Disadvantages of the Military System Existing in Russia and on Means to Eliminate Them.” It would be, however, another five years before the reserve cadre army concept was incorporated in the 1861 draft plan of the general military reform commission by a special commission on army organization chaired by the Nikolas General Staff Academy Commander, General Baumgarten.

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The initial Imperial Army reform plan, after a considerable delay, was finally presented to Tsar Aleksandr II on January 15, 1862. This plan listed "eight difficult tasks associated with the possibility of fulfilling [the Tsar's] two requirements" which were: 1) that internal security be maintained, and 2) that army expenditures be reduced, dramatically.

Most taxing of all the difficulties in attempting to implement this Russian military reform plan was the antithesis existing between the Tsar's two requirements. The Russian revolutionary movement -- particularly the Zemlia i Volia (Land and Will) group -- grew so rapidly following the Crimean War that General Miliutin noted in June 1861: "Reliable information has been received that in all forces located in the western and southwestern provinces a very serious decay of discipline has been observed, both among officers and also among the lower ranks." As discipline within Russian Army units continued to deteriorate during the ensuing year, in July 1862 Miliutin addressed the issue in a secret circular to all commanders by stating categorically: "I consider it Your duty to pay special attention ... to the dangerous revolutionary propaganda beginning among the lower ranks." Of particular concern to War Minister Miliutin was the vitality of the "Committee of Russian Officers in Poland," which was closely associated with the Zemlia i Volia faction, that rallied supporters with the provocative


call, "Kto zhe spaset Rossiiu?" -- "Who will save Russia?" -- to which the boisterous reply was: "Voisko!" This seditious idea that 'the troops' would free the Russian people was the harbinger of revolutionary events that would transpire a half century later. Also of concern to Miliutin was the fact that in St. Petersburg revolutionary propaganda was gaining credence and support among the military academy cadets and students, which indicated that the movement to overthrow the Tsarist government would neither be quickly nor easily extinguished. 69 Because of the increasing intensity of the internal revolutionary movement, the Tsarist government was now reluctant to allow Miliutin to decrease the size of the army at all, yet still demanded sharp reductions of army expenditures. By the end of the Crimean War, the Russian government had run up an enormous debt, totaling nearly a billion rubles, which crippled its capability to develop economically and necessitated the extreme military expenditure retrenchment ordered by Tsar Aleksandr II. The extent of that deficit, nearly 80 percent of which was created to finance the Crimean War, is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crimean War (1853-1856) Russian Debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 43.
Therefore, Miliutin was restricted, in fact, to reducing army spending within only two elements of the whole military budget: 1) by eliminating the acquisition of new weapons and equipment -- clearly the top military priority, or 2) by curtailing the creation of the army reserve cadre. Miliutin reluctantly chose the latter alternative and sought to devise another way to form the reserve cadre army, which he considered to be of "huge significance."\textsuperscript{71}

The January 1862 military reform plan, as approved by the Tsar, called for a peacetime Russian Army with 765,532 active-duty soldiers that could expand by nearly 80% during wartime to 1,377,365 men. Officially, however, financial constraints dictated that only 242,000 men in the reserve cadre could be equipped and trained, and General Miliutin suggests in his memoirs that the real size of the reserve army was only 210,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{72} Miliutin's path out of this dilemma was to raise the number of recruits inducted annually from the 80,000 pre-Crimean War level to a post-war level of 125,000 men, while simultaneously shortening the length of their required service to between seven and eight years. Over the course of seven years, this scheme potentially would generate a total trained reserve cadre of 750,000 men -- a reserve force some 20% larger than the one approved by the Tsar on January 15, 1862.\textsuperscript{73} Still, Miliutin was faced with the considerable problem of providing well-trained and educated officer

\textsuperscript{71} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy}..., p. 53.

\textsuperscript{72} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy}..., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{73} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy}..., p. 54.
cadres for both the active-duty and reserve forces which he judged to be the "decisive condition" for transforming the Russian Army.74

- Military Education: A Reform Priority

In the 'junkers' schools are the future of our army.75

- General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, January 1, 1865

At the heart of what General Miliutin sought to accomplish throughout the 1860s and 1870s was "to create a broadly educated, socially responsible officer corps." This priority objective would be accomplished mainly through a course of instruction for the intellectually most capable officers at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff in order that the Imperial General Staff would be transformed eventually into a true intellectual and 'professional' elite. At the same time, educational opportunities would be expanded for the rank and file military throughout the Empire by the introduction of the military 'Gymnasium,' staffed with civilian instructors to teach liberal arts, as well as the more traditional specialized military subjects of strategy and tactics.76

Although immediately after the Crimean War the Ridiger Commission studied the considerable failures of the military education system and had proposed the reorganization of the entire education establishment, General Ia. I. Rostovtsev, who had been appointed personally by Tsar Nikolas I to head the military education

76 Fuller, p. 9.
system as Chief of the Main Staff, stubbornly refused even to think about any major changes in the existing system. To his credit, Rostovtsev did initiate in 1858 a series of specialized courses for topographers, engineers, and artillery officers. Due to the consistent support that Rostovtsev received from the Imperial Court, along with War Minister Sukhozanet's indifference to fundamental military reform, for Assistant War Minister Miliutin the possibility of affecting major changes was held in abeyance. It was not until after Rostovtsev died in 1860 and was replaced by Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, who was much more amenable toward education reforms, that Miliutin realistically could begin to change the manner in which Russian Army officers and soldiers were educated. 77

Fundamental to General Miliutin's military education concept was his conviction: "Discipline is the foundation of military service: it inevitably also must be the basis for military education." 78 The disruptive and rebellious attitude that plagued the cadet corps throughout 1860 stood in heinous contradiction to Miliutin's deeply held beliefs about military service, and hence also played a large role in focusing his efforts to reform the entire military educational system. 79 Miliutin was absolutely convinced that "The military's own schools can have only one goal -- to provide scientific specialized education to those young people who personally feel a calling to military service." 80

Based on the force structure projections for the January 1862 reform plan, Miliutin quickly discerned that both the quantity and quality of available officers was grossly insufficient to create his desired reserve cadre\(^1\) -- even in peacetime -- since the existing Russian military educational system produced principally junior officers, and not particularly well-educated junior officers at that. On February 10, 1862 War Minister Miliutin issued his "Opinion about Military Education," which he began by stating:

> In recent years the opinion has been expressed most strongly that at the present time the military education establishment, in their own view, has no contemporary requirements to properly control state education of society and of the military and that they even are not satisfied with their own special assignments.\(^2\)

Miliutin seriously criticized the deficiencies of the existing cadet corps officer educational system that took between seven and eight years to graduate a junior officer, since the future army officers entered the program as children. Miliutin especially emphasized the necessity to radically reform the cadet corps because the education of one officer through the program cost nearly 10,000 rubles -- an exorbitant sum, especially for a brand new, inexperienced junior officer with limited specialized training. The fact that each year the cadet corps expended 4,712,000 silver rubles to educate 494 young men, or 9538 rubles per cadet, was a waste of army financial resources that the War Ministry could not tolerate, particularly at a

\(^{1}\) Obruchev, "Dannye dlja otsenki...," pp. 8-10.

time when Tsar Aleksandr demanded a severe curtailment of all army spending. Yet, Miliutin recognized that between 1825 and 1855 less than thirty percent of all Russian commissioned officers had any specialized military education. He therefore made education a mandatory requirement for all officers.

Military schools were brought under the central control of the Ministry of War on January 21, 1863 when General-Major Isakov was put in charge of all Russian military education with two explicit tasks: 1) correct the educational failures that had led to the Crimean War disasters and; 2) eliminate the intensifying revolutionary activity among the youth who formed the cadet corps. Then, on May 14, 1863, Aleksandr II disbanded the entire cadet corps -- with the exception of the Pazhesk, Finland, Sibir, and Orenburg cadet schools -- and, using the old cadet corps as a foundation, directed the creation, of three principal military schools -- Pavlovsk and Konstantine in St. Petersburg, and Aleksandrovsk in Moscow. The academic faculties and two-year curricula of these three military schools subsequently were reorganized to conform with prevailing civilian educational standards.

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84 Fuller, p. 8.
87 Florinsky, p. 907.
In 1864 the first 402 junior officers were graduated, but this small quantity rose only gradually to 486 new officers by 1876, which was far short of the number required to begin changing the manner in which the Russian Army operated. Besides, of these new military school graduates, only fifty percent were assigned to operational infantry or cavalry field units which fulfilled less than fifteen percent of the total army new officer requirement. The remainder of the new graduates manipulated their first assignments in order to remain in more lucrative administrative billets located in the cities or major provincial capitals.88 To correct this junior officer deficiency, Miliutin wisely chose not to fight the ingrained manipulative Russian social system directly. Instead, in 1865, he opened twelve new 'junker' military schools, located in cities primarily to attract members of the nobility into the officer corps. Miliutin's plan was to establish a two-year-long 'junker' school in each military district with a total enrollment of 3000 students so that each year 1500 new officers would be added to the Russian Army.89 Between 1865 and 1872 there were a total of 11,536 'junker' military school graduates, who made up the shortfall of junior officers in the Russian Army. Eighty-six percent were nobility.90

In 1862, when Miliutin began to change the Russian military education establishment, there already existed three military academies for senior officers -- Nikolaev General Staff, Artillery,

90 Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., pp. 243 and 246.
and Engineering. Here, too, Miliutin sought to improve the education system, but not as radically as he had done with the cadet corps. In January 1863 the Nikolaev General Staff Academy was removed from control of the military education establishment and assigned to the general-administrator of the General Staff. Following the reorganization of the General Staff the academy would be assigned directly to the General Staff. Miliutin, however, was not satisfied with purely cosmetic organizational changes. Rather, he had long been convinced, as evidenced in his September 5, 1851 note titled "Eshche mysli o Voennoi akademii," that the curriculum was "too academic, theoretical, and pedantic" and that it "had to be made more practical" so that the course materials would relate more directly to the requirements of military service.

Therefore, beginning in 1865, course changes were implemented: 1) to expand the officers' understanding of operational command and control beyond the battalion level; 2) to broaden their knowledge of all aspects of the Russian military, for example, administration, logistics, engineering, whereas previously studies had been confined to the individual officer's branch of arms; 3) to learn more about physical sciences, especially cartography and topography; and, 4) in 1869 the first war games were conducted at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy employing the tactics of Dragomirov and Leer. At the Artillery and Engineering academies as well, 1863 marked the start of

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course changes designed to increase the officers' practical knowledge of sciences that would be of battlefield use -- ballistics, metallurgy, and explosives as well as construction materials and techniques. All were new subjects added to the curriculum in an effort to modernize the Russian Army.\textsuperscript{94}

General Miliutin was absolutely determined to create a 'professional' officer corps with the specialized knowledge and skills, acquired both from military schools and from command experience. He was equally determined to instill a commitment to upgrading performance standards; a group identity characterized by high self-esteem and confidence; the ability to recognize and articulate military special interests; and, autonomy to control both entry to and advancement within the officer corps.\textsuperscript{95} To the extent that Miliutin succeeded in this quest -- which was to a very considerable degree -- he not only modernized and reformed the Russian Army, but also, transformed Russian society as well.\textsuperscript{96}

One of the principal ways that General Miliutin sought to transform Russian military education, and thereby Russian society itself, was by the initiation of a broad program of public journals and periodicals through which military knowledge could be expanded, current issues discussed, and mass public support for the military generated. Perhaps the best known, and most authoritative, of these periodicals was \textit{Voennyi sbornik} (Military Herald), which was founded

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{95} Fuller, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{96} Fuller, p. 11.
\end{flushright}
in 1858 at Miliutin’s initiative and in 1861 became the official publication of the Russian War Ministry. *Voennyi sbornik* quite successfully acquainted its readers with the military thought and discussions of the most distinguished Russian educators of the time -- Dragomirov, Puzyrevskii, Leer, Martynov, Mikhnevich, and many others -- while informing a broad public readership of the latest military-scientific problems and providing a rich source of military historical materials. By the turn of the century, the content of *Voennyi sbornik* increasingly would become more openly critical of the leadership of the Russian Army and the organization of the Russian military system and, at times, stridently advocated the necessity of reform.®

*Voennyi sbornik* was not alone in this quest to educate both the Russian military and public. Between 1878 and 1905 over 100 military journals and 25 military newspapers were in publication. Some of the most influential of these military publications included: *Artilleriiskii zhurnal: Morskoi sbornik* (1848-1917); *Inzhenernyi zhurnal* (1857-1917); *Oruzheinom sbornik* (1861-1909); *Pedagogicheskii sbornik* (1863-1917); *Voennye besedy. ispolnenyye v Shtabe voisk gvardii i Peterburgskogo voennogo okrug* (1885-1901); and *Razvedchik* (1889-1917). The first Russian military newspaper to be published was *Russkii invalid* (Russian Veteran), founded by P. P. Pezarovius in 1813. During its first years the paper was used to circulate decrees concerning the army and navy. Then, as readership grew, its articles

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® Zhilin, p. 76.

® Zhilin, pp. 76-78.
began covering Russian Army history, and by the end of the 19th century a significant amount of the paper was dedicated to current issues concerning army and military education reform. As Russia's largest military newspaper Russkii invalid published: 1) official decrees, domestic news, and foreign news; 2) articles covering internal events, military maneuvers, and General Staff meetings and conferences; and 3) discussion of the latest issues concerning Russian Army education, armaments, and equipment. All this newly available information served to elevate the educational level of both the Russian military and Russian society at large.

- War Ministry and Force Structure Reorganization

During Miliutin's long tenure in office, important technical improvements were introduced in the Ministry of War organization. Between 1862 and 1867 Miliutin conducted his principal reorganization of the War Ministry. In 1862 two new directorates -- artillery and engineering -- were created with the objective of unifying the engineering departments and the headquarters of Field Marshals and Inspector-Generals. At the beginning of 1863, military education was assigned to the War Ministry as a main directorate, and later in that same year the Main Staff was reorganized with the addition of a military topography department and oversight of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. In 1864 the provisions and commissary departments were merged into one new commissary department. Then, at the beginning of 1866, the General Staff Main Directorate and the

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99 Zhilin, p. 79.
Inspectorate department were merged under the Main Staff, thus concentrating under Main Staff supervision all matters concerning troop control.\textsuperscript{100} With these structural changes in place, in 1867 Miliutin turned to making the staff function more efficiently by reducing the number of assigned officers by 327 men and the number of soldiers by 607 men, which cut by one-half the tide of paperwork flowing in unending waves in and out of the War Ministry.\textsuperscript{101}

According to the new War Ministry Regulations, which had been in draft since early 1868 and were published January 1, 1869, with the objective to broaden greatly the War Ministry functions and powers, the Ministry consisted of the following sections: "the Imperial Main office; the Military Council; the Main Military Court; the War Ministry Secretariat; the Main Staff; and seven main directorates."\textsuperscript{102} The seven main War Ministry directorates were: the Commissariat (Intendant); Engineering; Military-Medicine; Military-Education; Irregular Troops; Artillery; and Naval.\textsuperscript{103} As of January 1, 1869 the Main Staff responsibilities included: "1) complete information about troops...; 2) all personnel and force structure matters...; and 3) all matters concerning construction, service, housing, training, and troop finances."\textsuperscript{104} Together with these duties

\textsuperscript{101} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{103} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, pp. 103-105.
the Main Staff was given responsibility for overall army strategic, fiscal, and service policy. The Main Staff was now composed of six departments plus naval and Asiatic sections, while the Imperial Main Office, although it continued to exist, was isolated from any operational control of forces. Miliutin's initial reorganization of the War Ministry was a most commendable advance over the Byzantine labyrinth that had preceded it. However, the continuing ability of the nobility to interfere with military administration by going directly to the Tsar wreaked havoc on the Miliutin's intended improved staff efficiency.105

When the January 15, 1862 War Ministry paper on "The Basis for Troop Organization" was approved by Tsar Aleksandr II, the goal was to transform the Russian Army. The plan directed the formation of a regional military system, fielding a smaller peacetime army of just 748,194 soldiers, by creating a reserve force in which all lower ranks were put on leave in peacetime and received military training while in the reserve. All active Russian Army units were placed in "cadre status" ready for wartime augmentation by the reserves. The active regiments were "always required to be in readiness to transition to wartime conditions," while the reserve regiments, formed with only two battalions each, were maintained at considerably lower readiness levels. Additionally, the 1862 plan called for the deployment of local troop formations, called "rezervnyi" or "mestnyi voiska", composed of 96 battalions, each with 880 soldiers and junior officers -- a total of 84,480 trained soldiers -- who would be

responsible for maintaining internal security, performing guard duty, and training recruits, during both war and peace.\footnote{Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlja otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," pp. 11-15; Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 3-4, in TsGVIA. f. VUA. Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia..., p. 75; also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., pp. 68-71.}

Miliutin's new organization plan was unsettling, to say the least, to many Russian Army officers and enlisted men alike who passionately wrote to the Tsar that Russia would be unable to defend herself in the event of another war and, in the process, ignited a firestorm of differing opinions that inundated military headquarters. Nineteen general officers, who were mainly corps and division commanders, openly protested the reorganization. An interesting exception to the overall opposition to the proposed four-battalion regiment structure was presented by General-Adjutant N. N. Murav'ev who wrote: "The four battalion composition is large enough for administration and logistics, [but] for purposes of maneuver a three battalion [regiment] would be better..."\footnote{Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 71.} As a result of all the bitter dissension, in September 1862 Tsar Aleksandr II convened a special 31-member commission, with General Dannenberg as Chairman, "for the purpose of looking into the suggestion of changing the existing troop organization." As the Dannenberg Commission set to work at the end of December 1862, the commission members were divided into four sub-committees -- infantry, cavalry, artillery, and "investigation of general issues" -- each with the task to look into Murav'ev's suggestion about the 'correct' size of infantry regiments.
After over a year of deliberation, in mid-March 1863 General Dannenberg presented a new troop organization plan. The Dannenberg Commission concluded that a reserve cadre army was inappropriate and that the creation of locally-based, 'Prussian-style,' territorial army corps was indispensable for Russian defense requirements. General Miliutin was diametrically opposed to this finding. In his March 13, 1863 reply to General Dannenberg, a very angry Miliutin openly threatened to take the issue to the Tsar for resolution, if Dannenberg did not withdraw his "abnormal proposal." Although Dannenberg's rejoinder was both terse and intentionally ambiguous, a closed commission session quietly made major changes in the plan that was presented to the Tsar as the "majority membership opinion," with the following rather contradictory recommendations: 1) it would be "inexpedient" to change from five infantry battalions to three per regiment even though three-battalion regiments on the battlefield would be "most expedient;" 2) assuming that peacetime regiments all would have three battalions, the formation of new wartime battalions should be avoided; 3) the previously planned strength of reserve battalions should be decreased to 340 men while active battalions should be increased to 800 soldiers and junior officers; and 4) the creation of four-battalion regiments should require those want this structure to prove how it will benefit the Russian Army.

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War Minister Miliutin shrewdly, and perhaps a little smugly, agreed with the Commission recommendations. The international situation had changed during the fifteen months that Dannenberg's commission members had dallied, pondering laboriously over how to reorganize the Russian Army. Miliutin now recognized that it was essential to increase the size of the active standing army -- which was exactly what the Dannenberg Commission proposed.

Throughout 1863, the insurrections in Poland, coupled with the increasing threat of entanglement in another European war, prompted Miliutin to reevaluate the active army force level required to preserve Russian security. By the time Dannenberg finally presented his findings, Miliutin had already decided that the active force should be increased by 350,000 troops, or 19 infantry divisions plus several fortress regiments, and had begun to take measures to expand the active army by recalling troops that had been released on leave. The main force augmentation was accomplished, however, by conducting a new recruit levy, since Miliutin concluded in a January 1, 1864 War Ministry note that calling up the reserve cadres would denude the country of internal security troops and instructors for the recruits. Besides, the immediate combat readiness of the reserve cadres was not much greater than that of the new inductees, and both groups would require extensive training before becoming truly combat ready. These realizations caused Miliutin to begin army reorganization anew in 1864, with the dual objectives of simultaneously restructuring the army while reducing the number of active-duty troops required.111

Owing to Miliutin's resolute actions to increase the active army, by the spring of 1864, the regular army stood at 1,132,000 troops, organized into 47 infantry divisions. With the outbreak of peace, however, by the end of July 1864, 28 of the 47 divisions were reduced to the ambiguously defined "substantial peace" manning level and 12 to the "ordinary peace" level -- a total reduction of 264,000 men -- swiftly accomplished by releasing mainly all soldiers who had entered army service before 1856 and by retaining only the younger soldiers. The price paid for this rapid reduction in force was the loss of dearly gained and virtually irreplaceable combat experience -- at least without fighting another war.112

Then, on August 2, 1864, the War Minister Miliutin began the implementation of his new organization plan by ordering the further reduction of active infantry battalion combat manpower. Cadre infantry units also were ordered to reduce their manpower to 380 soldiers per battalion, but still maintain 15 senior officers and one or two staff officers in each regiment, regardless of war or peace. Miliutin's new organizational structure called for maintaining the existing 47 infantry divisions -- 40 army, 4 grenadier, and 3 guards -- each fielding four regiments composed of three battalions, each with four companies. Of the latter, three were 'line' companies and one was a 'firing' company.113 Finally, Miliutin's plan called for

112 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 78.

113 For an entire detailed breakdown of the 1864 Russian Army structure, including infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering, and fortress troops, see Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii, (Moscow: Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1952), pp. 75-79.
the formation of 30 separate 'firing' (musket/rifle) battalions and
40 'line' (bayonet) battalions, along with an increase in fortress
troop strength.\footnote{114}

During the course of 1865 and 1866, even further major force
reductions were accomplished, so that on January 1, 1867 the Russian
Army stood at 742,000 troops -- "the lowest numerical level in the
last 25 years,"\footnote{115} according to official War Ministry records.
Following some additional minor tinkering to eliminate extraneous and
redundant "non-combat elements" by some 25 percent, or 50,000 men,
the War Ministry very proudly proclaimed on January 1, 1869 that the
reorganization of the Russian Army was complete.\footnote{116} Here, the
official War Ministry comparison between the 1860 and 1868 force
structures from the Russian Central State Military-Historical
Archives (TsGVIA), is a most instructive means to understand the
extent of the prodigious changes that Miliutin wrought.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY CONTENT:</th>
<th>1868</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1860</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacetime &amp; Wartime</td>
<td>Peacetime</td>
<td>Wartime</td>
<td>Called to form new units</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
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<td>Batteries</td>
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<td>Field Cannon</td>
<td>1400</td>
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\footnote{114} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 75.

\footnote{115} TsGVIA, \textit{Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva}, No. 1 (L), No. 7, p. 10; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 79.

\footnote{116} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 79.
**Strength of These Units:**

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>1860</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officially in wartime</td>
<td>1,154,000</td>
<td>1,395,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officially in peacetime</td>
<td>726,000</td>
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**Difference:**

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<th>496,000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve troops on leave included in above numbers</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>242,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime reserves to be called up in wartime</td>
<td>Reserve shortfall to be filled by new recruits:</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Army Mobilization: An Unsatisfactory Capability**

At the very height of Miliutin's army reorganization, 1867, the War Ministry suddenly began to take the first steps to develop a genuine mobilization plan for the new Russian Army. The avowed objective of the Main Staff was a complete wartime mobilization of a half-million men that would require only 30-40 days to bring all units up to full combat strength. In reality, six months were required to fully mobilize an army corps -- the same length of time as had been required in 1859.¹¹⁸ The principal reasons for this disconnect between Russian military theory and practice were: first, shortfalls in war reserves of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies with which to equip the reservists; second, an insufficient number of infantry officers to command and to manage new or expanded

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¹¹⁷ *TsGVIA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva*, No. 1 (L), No. 11, p. 25; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., *Voennye reformy...,* p. 79.

units; third, an absence of enough horses to move supplies, let alone to expand the cavalry or artillery units; and finally, inadequately developed railroads throughout Russia to enable rapid regrouping (peregruppirovka) of army forces.

The primary motivation behind this new emphasis on Russian force mobilization was the fact that four Prussian army corps clearly had demonstrated an ability, between May 7 and May 19, 1866, to fully mobilize in twelve days -- three times more quickly than the Russian Main Staff had planned for, let alone could execute, a wartime mobilization.119 The Main Staff analysis revealed that:

The new system of troop organization was, doubtless, a step forward in comparison with its predecessor. Its fundamental advantages resulted in a capability to deploy the army, without having to resort to the formation of new tactical units. ... However, this new troop organization system had extremely limited capabilities. In the case of war, increasing the size of the army by 60% from the peacetime level could hardly be achieved within the same timeframe that Prussia and Austria were increasing the size of their deployed armies by more than three times.120

It is important to note that in peacetime the Prussian and Austrian armies each maintained standing armies numbering somewhat less than 500,000 troops, and each had the capability to expand its wartime army to around 1,500,000 soldiers.121 Consequently, the Russian military's concern about mobilization was genuine, since Prussia and

119 Obruchev, "Dannye dla otsenki vooruzhennykh...," p. 79; and Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., pp. 79-80.
120 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 80.
121 Obruchev, "Dannye dla otsenki vooruzhennykh...," p. 72; see also Voenno-statisticheskii sbornik na 1868 god, (St. Petersburg, 1867); cited by Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., footnote 2, p. 80.
Austria were likely to mobilize simultaneously which would result in nearly a three to one force superiority against Russia -- even if Russia could mobilize her army as quickly as her likely opponents, which she could not. The additional concern of the Main Staff was this: Should Russia have to mobilize to its full 1,154,000 wartime end-strength, no reserves whatsoever would be left, either for internal security or for any other contingencies.

In P. A. Zaionchkovskii's considered judgment, the following major deficiencies existed in Miliutin's new military structure: first, the 'line' attack concept was retained and new tactical principles of conducting warfare were not applied; second, the artillery brigades were not incorporated within infantry divisions and therefore the artillery and infantry continued to function independently rather than as combined arms; third, within each three-brigade cavalry division, only the dragoon brigade was armed with other than sabres and lances, at a time when the entire cavalry of all other European powers were equipped with pistols; and finally, the logistic system for supplying active forces was not worked out satisfactorily.

But, in 1868, these deficiencies were not apparent to War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin and the Main Staff. They were transfixed by the significant progress they had made, despite internal army resistance and financial restraints, in modernizing the Russian Army. Only some ten years later, in the aftermath of the bloody 1877-1878

Russo-Turkish War, would the breadth of these serious omissions begin to come to light. Although General Miliutin clearly foresaw major problems in the case of war, and characteristically would attempt to find solutions, he would be unable to rectify the causes in time to avoid another Russian disaster.

- The Military District System

The most long lasting of Miliutin's reforms was the initiation of the territorial military district system, which is still in use to this day -- albeit in repeatedly and extensively modified form. The genesis for General Miliutin's concept of a military district system can be found within his 1856 notes, written at the end of the Crimean War, titled "Mysl' o territorial'noi sisteme voennogo upravleniiia" and "Mysli o nevygodakh syshchestvuishchei v Rossii voennoi sistemy i o sredstvakh k ustraneniiu onykh". In the latter, Miliutin succinctly defined his basic thought underlying the creation of a military district system: "The Empire should be divided into military districts, of which one [portion] would be frontier, and the other internal.... Troops also should be divided into two categories: active and reserve."124

Although these diary notes go on to describe in some detail the rationale for and advantages of a new command and control system, Miliutin’s initial conviction about the necessity to decentralize military decisionmaking and to alter totally the manner in which the Russian Army was organized and directed was reinforced by his service

124 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 84.
experiences, between 1857 and 1860 in the Caucasus, as Chief of Staff for Field Marshal Prince Bariatinskii. These ideas gradually were refined by the end of 1861, after he became Assistant War Minister. As a result, the creation of a military district system was one of the main military reform proposals -- if not the key proposal -- presented to Tsar Aleksandr II on January 15, 1862.\(^{125}\)

General Miliutin followed up this official January proposal with an early May 1862 note to Tsar Aleksandr II that was entitled "Glavnye osnovaniia predpolagaemogo ustroistva voennogo upravleniia po okrugam" and in which Miliutin strongly urged the creation of a military district system, both in peacetime and in wartime. He contended that the army corps, on which the existing Russian military system was based, was too large a tactical entity for theater operations and therefore had to be divided, formed into detachments from various corps, and new detachment headquarters created before the army corps system would be capable of conducting wartime operations. Miliutin went on to enumerate three reasons, learned through the painful experience of war, why the existing Russian military system had to be changed. First, the division, not the corps, had proven to be the superior tactical battlefield formation. Second, military districts would improve military readiness and eliminate having to reorganize forces before entering into combat. And third, the consolidation of command of all active and reserve units within a military district, including artillery and engineering troops, under one military district commander would greatly simplify

control and unity of action. In his conclusion Miliutin averred: "The most important advantage of the suggested arrangement will be the elimination of the existing unsatisfactory military command and control [which is characterized by] the utmost centralization in one ministry." Miliutin declared that he had come to the conclusion that decentralization was essential from the fact that independent command already existed in the Caucasus, Orenburg, Western and Eastern Siberia regions (krai), which functioned quite effectively without the "small change tutelage of the ministry."

Miliutin's military district concept envisioned the creation of a total of fifteen military districts. Each district would be formed with a military district commander's headquarters, composed of a command center and four administrative directorates -- supply, artillery, engineering, and medical -- under the overall supervision of a Council of the Main District Directorate that would be chaired by the military district commander, but also have assigned a War Ministry representative. The military districts that General Miliutin envisioned in 1862 were: 1) Finland; 2) St. Petersburg; 3) Baltic (Riga); 4) North-West (Vil'no); 5) Poland (Warsaw); 6) South-West (Kiev); 7) Southern (Odessa); 8) Moscow; 9) Khar'kov; 10) Upper Volga (Kazan'); 11) Lower Volga (Saratov); 12) Caucasus (Tiflis); 13) Orenburg; 14) Western Siberia (Omsk); and 15) Eastern

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Siberia (Irkutsk). As part of his rationale for initiating the military district system, Miliutin had in mind making the Russian military system "economically profitable" and a means of accomplishing two important goals:

First, to eliminate the excessive centralism of the military directorates, freeing the War Ministry from a series of secondary functions. The military districts, concentrating in their hands the command and fiscal functions, will ensure troop combat preparation, and also direct all organizations of local military directorates. Second, the military districts, by substituting their own designs to disband the internal guards corps, will facilitate the consolidation of state 'internal peace.'

The brilliance of the Miliutin concept was this: The military district would function essentially the same, whether Russia was at war or at peace. However, the important questions concerning how an army would continue to function should its military district fall into enemy hands, or how the military district would continue to support its army should that army advance against an enemy outside its assigned district, were left unresolved. Nevertheless, so convinced was Miliutin that the Tsar favored his military district proposal that he specifically asked for the Tsar's decision by August 1, 1862 so that the War Ministry could begin to implement military district organizations that fall.

War Minister Miliutin noted in his memoirs, however, that without waiting for the Tsar's formal response, development of his

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129 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennyе reformy..., p. 86.
130 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennyе reformy..., p. 60.
military district concept proceeded between May and August 1862, with the consolidation of active and reserve administrative functions under the as-yet-not-officially-named military district (MD) commanders. As a result, during the summer of 1862, the first Russian military districts -- Warsaw, Kiev, and Vil'no -- were created, with the Odessa MD established by the end of 1862. On the territory of these MDs, all Russian troops were placed under the command of the MD commander. Not surprisingly, this watershed change in the manner in which the Russian Army operated was not universally welcomed, either within the army or by the provincial governors. Of 211 senior general officers who commented to the War Ministry about the new arrangements, a clear majority, 117, favored the military district concept and only 10 officers were adamantly opposed. The remainder supported the concept with reservations or with the alteration of minor details.132

The St. Petersburg Governor-General, Prince Suvorov, openly praised Miliutin's military reform proposals, exuberantly commenting:

> Of the numerous War Ministry arrangements in its fifty year existence, the proposed and already partially executed construction of military command and control by districts is one of the most remarkable attempts to improve military administration and strength.133

But Prince Suvorov took exception to the decentralization aspects of the plan, asserting that, in his opinion, the War Ministry had to be the sole center for military command and administration and that he

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133 TsGVIA, Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva, No. 1 (L), No. 25449, p. 168; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., *Voenny reformy...*, p. 89.
therefore did not support the changes. General-Lieutenant Baumgarten of the Main Staff also took exception to decentralization of power and opposed the military district concept, in its entirety, because of the loss of authority by the army corps commanders. Several of the corps commanders concurred with this objection and affirmed that the army corps had to be maintained because the division was "too weak" to be considered the principal wartime tactical unit. The 'army corps versus the division' issue thus became the focus of an intense senior-level military and government debate, while the many advantages that both the military and the state might accrue through the formation of military districts was virtually ignored. Gradually, however, the army corps commanders came around to the majority general officer opinion, based on the experiences of the Crimean War, that the army corps "did not have any independent significance." 

In an effort to resolve the conflicting general officer opinions and to expedite moving the military district formation process forward, in February 1863 Miliutin convened a commission to create "Regulations about Military Districts," initially staffed with two sub-committees: the first, on unit command, chaired by General Count Geiden; and the second, concerning administrative-fiscal matters, chaired by Ustrialov. As the commission deliberations continued through 1863, three additional sub-committees on artillery, engineers, and military medicine were added. At the beginning of

1864 the final commission findings were transferred to a military codification committee which in August 1864 published the first War Ministry directive defining the structure, command relations, and responsibilities within military districts.

By this directive unity of command was ensured by placing the MD commander in charge of all forces within his district, with the exception of the active troops inspectorate. The military district command and control functions were vested in a council and six departments: 1) district headquarters; 2) commissariat; 3) artillery; 4) engineering; 5) military medicine; and 6) military hospital inspectorate. The major omission in the directive, however, was that no single department or commander had responsibility for financial management. Rather, the MD Council was assigned fiscal responsibility, which would result in ferocious, interdepartmental budget battles, fought out at the Council, where the War Ministry representative quickly became the arbitrator, with his rulings elevated to the War Ministry itself for final decision. Since each military district headquarters structurally mirrored the War Ministry organization in St. Petersburg, individual MD departments tended to refer their 'unfavorable' MD Council decisions to their counterparts at the War Ministry, where the bureaucratic battle for funds and resources was renewed, seemingly 'ad nauseam.'

Miliutin thus succeeded in 1864 in abolishing the antiquated Corps of Internal Defense, created in 1811, and replaced it with a military district system based upon two troop classifications:

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1) active field forces, whose primary purpose was combat during war and during peacetime training for the wartime defense of Russia; and
2) local reserve forces, composed of 70 infantry, 19 rifle, and three sapper (engineering) battalions, subordinate to the commander of local forces in each military district for quelling disturbances, but also mainly responsible for inducting, training, and equipping active field force recruits. Through this organizational reform Miliutin intentionally shielded his prized combat troops from local civilian use for internal defense against "pernicious enemies of the state" by effectively inserting the local forces between the active field troops and the local civilian authorities.137

Through the implementation of the military district system, Miliutin succeeded in reversing centuries-old Russian common practice -- that had become a routine of army life by the mid-19th century, at the discretion, or lack thereof, of local civilian authorities -- namely, the use of army troops for thankless guard duty, bandit chasing, dispersing unruly crowds, and repressing any rebellious peasant villages.138 During the course of 1864, six additional military districts -- Petersburg, Moscow, Finland, Riga, Khar'kov, and Kazan' -- were formed; and subsequently the Caucasus, Turkestan, Orenburg, West Siberia, and East Siberia military districts were organized. This completed the formation of a total of fifteen military districts, much as Miliutin first had envisioned.139

137 Fuller, pp. 78-79.
138 Fuller, pp. 76-77.
139 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy... pp. 95-96.
Irrespective of such an important, visible success, Miliutin was not a leader who was willing to rest on his laurels. On the contrary, he knew that the military district system, if it were to survive and become institutionally established, would have to be continually nurtured and refined to satisfy ever changing military and political requirements and trends. Therefore, in 1865 the War Minister created the "Special Commission for Investigating Questions concerning Use of the Regulations about Military District Command and Control," headed by General Nepokoichtsik, the chairman of the Military Codification Committee.140 The singular success in reforming the long-established Russian military system, that was achieved through the implementation of the territorial military district, is perhaps best revealed in Miliutin's own words contained in his January 1, 1867 report to the Tsar:

Now directly and boldly I can say that the new local administrations are acquitting themselves fully as was expected, when the ministry entrusted them with their formation. All central government orders are executed now with such an energy as is possible only through the existence of a durable organization in all parts of the local administrations. The power of the district troop commanders and the founding of the military district councils established unexpected communication and unity in the activity of the various military administration departments, and the strengthening of local control and the new organization for fiscal management have acted, on one side, to significantly reduce expenditures for huge military department stockpiles, and on the other, to improve the quality of articles satisfying the troops....141

Neither was Miliutin blind to the imperfections in the new system, nor self-satisfied with his accomplishments. Certainly the decentralization of command and control that accompanied formation of the military district system improved unity of action, created greater efficiency within the military administration, and enabled the Russian Army to mobilize more effectively and to deploy more quickly in the case of war. However, certain deficiencies were beyond Miliutin's power to correct immediately. First, the army corps, which was retained as the basic tactical unit, was too large to be maneuvered in a timely manner on the battlefield. Second, each military district commander, by regulation, was responsible to the Tsar alone and, therefore, the commanders' decisionmaking powers were constrained by dependence on the whims of the Imperial Court, ministers, and government bureaucrats, which prevented decisive action. Third, in the European military districts, the coexistence of both civilian and military local administrations set the stage for unending, acrimonious, personal and institutional disagreements over priorities, authority, and power, which would severely erode the intended simplified, efficient functioning of the new military district system.\(^{142}\)

During the course of 1868, opposition to the new military district system coalesced around a group led by Miliutin's former commander in the Caucasus, Field Marshal Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, and his henchman, General R. A. Fadeev. Bariatinskii originally had

recommended to the Tsar in 1859 that Miliutin be appointed War
Minister, while concealing an ulterior motive of diminishing the
Tsar's, and hence the Imperial Court's, authority over the army.
Bariatinskii believed that Miliutin would put in place a 'Prussian-
style' territorial military system, in which the Chief of the General
Staff had full command authority over the army. Naturally, Prince
Bariatinskii expected to receive that appointment as Chief of the
General Staff. When Miliutin's 1862 reform plan did not correspond
to Bariatinskii's private scheme, the Prince turned into Miliutin's
most determined and persistent anti-reform foe, both personally and
substantively.143

Throughout the 1860s Bariatinskii continued to see that
particularly vicious anti-reform articles were published in the
"reactionary aristocratic" newspaper Vest'. Then, in 1868, General
P. A. Fadeev took up the cudgel in his book Vooruzhennye sily Rossii,
criticizing the entire post-reform Russian military system as
"unsatisfactory" and advocating the adoption of the Prussian general
staff arrangement, under which the General Staff operational command
authority was separate from the War Ministry administrative
functions. Inspired, prodded by, or perhaps even with the complicity
of Prince Bariatinskii, with whom he had spent the winter, in the
spring of 1869 General Fadeev wrote a note to the Tsar complaining
about the April 17, 1868 War Ministry Regulation which, in his
opinion, "diminished the role of the Emperor as supreme commander of
the Russian Army that had first been established in 1716" by Peter

the Great.\textsuperscript{144} The invidious Fadeev note achieved its desired effect of restricting the further implementation of Miliutin's military reforms because it struck at the heart of a most sensitive royal subject -- the power of the Autocrat -- and called into question Miliutin's personal motives. Tsar Aleksandr's attitude toward military reforms always had been contradictory: on the one hand, as a result of the Crimean War army fiascos, the Tsar supported army modernization -- within his prescribed strict financial constraints; on the other hand, Tsar Aleksandr II was suspicious of Miliutin's reforms because their fundamental character ran against his autocratic ideal of a feudal military order, with himself as the supreme commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{145}

As a result of such pernicious imperial suspicions, a rising general condemnation of the reforms by the nobility, and demonstrated systemic failures during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, by the end of Miliutin's tenure of office the number of military districts contracted. In 1881 there remained in being only thirteen military districts -- Petersburg, Finland, Vil'no, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, Khar'kov, Moscow, Kazan, Turkestan, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberia, the Caucasus -- and the Don Cossack Army territory (oblast) which was treated as a fourteenth military district following the elimination of the Riga and Orenberg MDs. By law, the authority of each military district commander was constrained and he was held personally responsible only to the Emperor. De facto the military district


\textsuperscript{145} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, p. 133.
commander still was directly subordinate to the War Minister. The administrative organization of each military district purposely continued to be an exact duplicate of the War Ministry Military Council and Main Staff organization in Saint Petersburg which, despite the bureaucratic 'turf battles' this arrangement engendered, greatly facilitated military communications and resulted in improved overall military command and control.\textsuperscript{146}

- **Rearmament and Weapons Modernization**

All organization and combat methods of the army, together with its victory or defeat is dependent on material, i.e., economic conditions: on human material and on weaponry.\textsuperscript{147}

- Frederick Engels, *Anti-During*

The most important problem of 1860s and 1870s Russian military reform -- the solution of which determined troop organization and the entire system of combat preparation -- was re-equipping the army with modern weaponry.\textsuperscript{148} An official War Ministry report called attention to this top priority military concern:

Under existing military art conditions artillery technology has achieved extraordinary importance. Weaponry improvements give today's decisive preponderance to that army which in this aspect outweighs the other. To this truth we are convinced by the bitter experience of the last [Crimean] war. Our troops, at last equipped with rifled weaponry, quickly recovered from their poor morale caused by heavy casualties and regained their normal steadfastness to redeem the imperfection of their weaponry.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{146} Fuller, p. 8.


\textsuperscript{148} Zaionchkovskii, *Voennye reformy...*, pp. 56 and 136.

\textsuperscript{149} TsGVIAt. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva, No. 1 (I), opis' 2, d. No. 1, p. 76; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., *Voennye reformy...*, pp. 56-57.
During this period, under Miliutin's leadership the obsolete Imperial Army weaponry from the Crimean War gradually was replaced with more modern arms and equipment -- not only once, but twice -- as the grossly inaccurate, and ineffective, flintlock musket first was replaced with the muzzleloading rifled musket and then with the breechloading rifle, to improve the rate and accuracy of fire.150

Between 1856 and 1862 the Russian Army purchased 286,331 smoothbore assault muskets for 'line' infantry, while designated 'firing companies' were reequipped with rifles having an improved range and accuracy out to 1200 steps. By 1862 a total of 260,106 Russian soldiers were armed with '6-line' rifled muskets, that had been imported principally from German and Belgian factories. By the direction of Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich, however, the Russians' own famous Tula Armory did produce 25,000 of these rifles. During these years neither field nor fortress smoothbore artillery changed appreciably.151 General Miliutin noted on January 15, 1862:

War has led us to realize the unsatisfactory nature of our most active measures to supply our troops with modern weapons. We must now openly acknowledge that in material composition of artillery and troop weapons we lag behind other European states.152

Despite Miliutin's identification of the problem, during the first half of the 1860s, fully half of the active regular Russian infantry -- let alone any of the new reserve cadres -- still did not have rifles. The light field artillery batteries still were equipped

150 Fuller, p. 7.
with smoothbore cannon. The fortress and siege guns were obsolete as well. Miliutin gave priority to Russian domestic production of both military weapons and equipment, even though he considered the quality of indigenous workmanship to be inferior to the prevailing European standards: "Other European powers by far have left us behind in matters of military construction."\textsuperscript{153}

In 1862 -- at the beginning of the Miliutin reforms -- the combined annual Russian firearm production of the Tula, Izhevsk, and Sestroretsk arsenals was only 90,000 muskets and pistols, which was not even adequate to arm each new recruit, let alone to build up any war reserves. It was Miliutin's novel idea to commercially lease these government-managed arsenals in order to increase the level of domestic production while lowering firearm costs.\textsuperscript{154} And it was Miliutin's decision to increase domestic firearm production while simultaneously importing foreign weaponry to offset the domestic production shortfall. He succeeded. By January 1, 1865 all infantry units were equipped with muzzleloading '6-line' rifled muskets. But European states at this time already were introducing metal cartridges and breechloading rifles with significantly improved range, accuracy, and rates of fire -- which once again left the Russian Army equipped with 'new' obsolescent weapons. The Russian War Ministry continued to produce the '6-line' rifled musket until 1867.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{153} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{154} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, pp. 141-142.
\textsuperscript{155} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 139.
Perhaps most frustrating of all to General Miliutin was the fact that even after his investment of thousands of rubles on arsenal modernization, and the successful introduction of new production equipment and techniques, at the end of the 1860s, the quality of indigenously produced Russian weaponry remained inferior to contemporary European standards. General Miliutin was still struggling with the problem of Russian firearm quality as late as November 5, 1868, when he wrote: "We must build our own factories in order to produce our own rifles in the future...."

Daunted, but undeterred, by his failed efforts between 1862 and 1865 to rearm the Russian Army with modern weaponry, Miliutin set out again to rectify what he clearly considered to be the unsatisfactory combat capability of the Russian military. To a significant extent, the impetus for Miliutin's renewed effort to modernize Russian military equipment and weaponry came, not only from the recognition of weapons developments in Europe, but from Imperial General Staff analysis of technological developments and their impact on battlefield tactics and war strategy during the United States' Civil War between 1861 and 1865. True to Russian form of establishing military commissions to study, discuss, and provide solutions to recognized problems, in 1864 the Imperial Armaments Commission found that the firearms employed by foreign infantry had created "completely new conditions" on the battlefield.

137 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 139.
Thus, after the conclusion of the American Civil War in April 1865, in early 1866 two Russian Army officers, Colonel Gorlov and Captain Gunius, were sent to the United States with the mission of evaluating the weaponry employed and determining "a superior firearm for the Russian Army" with which to replace the obsolete '6-line' rifled musket. As a result of their preliminary investigation, the Russian War Ministry concluded in 1867 that the most cost-effective solution would be to reconstruct the existing '6-line' rifled muskets into breechloading Terri-Norman rifles, and later into Karl rifles, which utilized paper cartridges.

Unfortunately for the Imperial General Staff, time and technological progress wait for no man, and certainly not for the laborious Russian bureaucratic commission decisionmaking process. At the very time that the Russian War Ministry decided on the transition to Terri-Norman and Karl rifles, the much more durable, reliable, and powerful metal rifle cartridges were being introduced into Western armies. Then, in 1868, a special commission on weapons conversion revealed that progress at the Russian arsenals was not at all proceeding smoothly. The November 20, 1868 report on the Izhevsk arsenal, written by the Commander of the Caucasus Military District, General-Adjutant Glinka-Mavrin, concluded that the conversion was neither "profitable" nor produced the desired "superior firearm."

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War Minister Miliutin responded quickly with a series of decisions favoring the acquisition of rifles which utilized metal cartridges, and noted in his diary:

It is unfortunate that it (the rifle business) began to go through because of an unnatural situation, and I thought about a means to give it a new direction. Fortunately, a satisfactory occasion presented itself: one Guards Colonel.... Gan, who was returning from leave abroad, proposed to me that he bring with them from Vienna Krnk model rifles, that had been offered to him there.... It was preferable that the Krnk models returned with Gan himself arriving before any others turned their attention to our easily acquired property; we came to the thought that using this system might perhaps be more satisfactory than conversion of our 'six-line' muskets.162

Ballistics data on the Krnk rifle proved to be significantly better than that of the Russian Karl models -- which was exactly what Miliutin told the Tsar at the beginning of February 1869 -- and, as a result of the Tsar's decision, a 'special commission of experts,' chaired by General-Lieutenant Rezvogo, was formed to evaluate the suitability of the Krnk and Varanov rifles, that utilized metal cartridges, for Russian Army use. The Rezvogo Commission, after extensive tests and comparisons, selected the Krnk rifle as being "25 percent superior" to the Varanov model rifle. The final decision to reequip the Russian infantry, however, was referred to a second commission, chaired by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. On March 15, 1869 this second commission, formed to evaluate the results of the Rezvogo Commission, recommended to War Minister Miliutin that the Russian army be equipped with the Krnk rifle. Then two further commissions were set up. The first of these commissions was assigned

the responsibility to organize the production of 500,000 Krnk rifles; the second, to produce 150 million rifle cartridges for delivery by March 1, 1870.¹⁶³ But the 'Great Russian Rifle Debate' did not end with the 1869 selection of the Krnk rifle.

In early 1868, Colonel Gorlov and Captain Gunius returned with their final evaluation of the firearms used during the American Civil War. They recommended the small-caliber rifle, officially designated the Berdan No. 1, as a "superior infantry weapon." By the end of 1868 the War Ministry managed to purchase 30,000 of these rifles. However, in 1870, it was decided to modify these Berdan rifles into cavalry carbines which were designated the Berdan model No. 2. Then, following an 1874 decision to produce only small-caliber rifles, the Berdan model No. 2 was produced in quantity.¹⁶⁴

Thus, on the eve of the Russo-Turkish War, on January 1, 1877 the Russian Army was equipped with a total of 375,754 small-caliber infantry rifles; 14,365 cavalry carbines; 15,000 Dragoon rifles; and 72,272 Cossack rifles. However, the St. Petersburg state cartridge factory, managed by the Main Artillery Directorate, failed to supply the army with adequate quantities of rifle cartridges: producing in 1872 only five million of the 31 million cartridges ordered; in 1873 only 18 million of 37 million; in 1874 only 18 million of 60 million; in 1875 only 38.5 million of 60 million; and, at last, in 1876 the 80 million as planned -- for an enormous five-year total production shortfall of 108.5 million cartridges from the requisition.¹⁶⁵

By 1877 only a third of the Russian infantry was equipped with small-caliber Berdan rifles, while the remainder carried obsolescent Krnk rifles or obsolete Karl rifled-musks into combat. The following archival data document the quantity of Russian firearms produced between 1872 and 1876 as well as the total firearms with which the Russian Army was equipped, or held in the war reserves, as of January 1, 1877:

### QUANTITY OF FIREARMS BY TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>KARL</th>
<th>KRNK</th>
<th>BERDAN No. 2</th>
<th>SMALL CALIBER</th>
<th>DRAGOON SM-CAL.</th>
<th>COSSACK SM-CAL.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4819</td>
<td>4430</td>
<td>5210</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>10564</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>91851</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>1876</td>
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<td>145191</td>
<td>5155</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>30000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TYPE FIREARM

- **Karl infantry rifle**: 150868 units, 51096 in reserve
- **Krnk infantry rifle**: 372700 units, 192866 in reserve
- **Dragoon rifle (Krnk mod.)**: 40597 units, 2658 in reserve
- **Berdan No. 1 Model 1868**: 17810 units, 10104 in reserve
- **Berdan No. 2 (Small-caliber infantry rifle)**: 253152 units, 103616 in reserve
- **Small-caliber Carbine**: 12102 units, 6388 in reserve
- **Dragoon rifle (Small-caliber)**: 2352 units, 7648 in reserve
- **Cossack rifle (Small-caliber)**: 60000 units, 10000 in reserve
- **Smith & Wesson revolvers**: 70275 units, 6490 in reserve

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166 *Istoricheskii ocherk deiatel'nosti Voennogo Upravleniia...,* Vol. 6, (St. Petersburg, 1881), p. 105.

167 "Vsepoddanneishego doklada po Voennomu ministerstvu 19 fevralia 1877 g.," TsGIVA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva, No. 1 (L), No. 23, p. 167.
Of a total 48 Russian infantry divisions at the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War, 27 were armed with the Krnk rifle; 16 had new small-caliber rifles; and the 5 remaining divisions, which were deployed in the Caucasus, carried the reconstructed Karl rifled muskets. Strelkovyi ('shooting' or 'fire') battalions all had the rapid-firing small-caliber Berdan No. 1 Model 1868 rifle, but in the Turkestan and the two Siberian military districts troops remained equipped with the Karl musket. Dragoon regiments generally were armed with the Krnk rifled musket, although a few regiments had received their small-caliber rifles. Hussar and Ulan regiments were armed with small-caliber carbines in 1875, while the Cossack regiments had been reequipped with the small-caliber 'Cossack carbine.' Thus armed, the Russian Army would enter into war and stand the test of battle against the Turkish Army.

The main soldiers' weapons are the bayonet and rifle butt. The bullet helps him only to reach the enemy better, more surely.


For an exceptionally clear description of Russian infantry battlefield tactics as well as artillery and cavalry concepts at the outset of the Russo-Turkish War, see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 39-48; see also Menning's quite comprehensive chapter explaining the military campaigns of the Russo-Turkish War, pp. 51-86. His inclusion of theater maps is particularly helpful for understanding the flow of combat action.

The prevailing Russian Army training philosophy and officer attitude, with which the Russo-Turkish War was entered, is perhaps best reflected by this 1874 Order No. 245 issued by the 27th Infantry Division Commander, General-Lieutenant Kridner; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voenny reformy, p. 197.
- The Obruchev Plan for Future War

Significantly, in relation to the 1860 requirements, have they begun to be fulfilled, or do there remain requirements which bear on our new offensive capability? European society and political life is developing with such speed that such a question cannot be answered without sound discussion.171

- General Nikolai N. Obruchev

Throughout the 1860s, and even onward toward the turn of the century, the most vexing problem General Dmitrii Miliutin faced as Imperial War Minister was how to establish effective and secure lines of communication. As custodian of this enigma, he needed to maintain precise command and control while moving huge numbers of troops and enormous quantities of war supplies in a timely manner, southwestward from St. Petersburg and Moscow, to defend Russia's borders against the anticipated aggression by Austria and Prussia. Supply problems and command arrangements had not been resolved by the creation and implementation of Miliutin's military district system. Indeed, they may even have been exacerbated by the new system -- and he knew it.

The initial idea about army logistics followed a perspicuous plan. In peacetime, each military district (MD) commander was responsible for supplying the one army located on the territory of his own district. In case of war, should a theater of war (TV) be created on the territory of a given military district, that MD commander was responsible for supplying the one army operating within the TV that

corresponded, basically, with the territory of his military district. This seemingly straightforward and fairly simple command arrangement was complicated, however, by serious omissions.

Each army had a separate commander who was not subordinate to the MD commander, but reported to the supreme field commander of the TV, as supposedly did the MD commander. However, because the MD commander was responsible only to the Tsar, just like the supreme field commander, in practice, a dual chain-of-command (dvoenachalie) existed. And neither of these twin command channels communicated with the other, and the authority of the War Minister was not specified, even as late as 1868. No provisions were made for more than one army operating in a given military district. Nor were supply arrangements clarified for the situation of an army operating simultaneously in two military districts, since control of logistics and supply was vested in the MD commanders and not the supreme field commander. Further, the MD administrations had neither any peacetime functional arrangements to supply the field army in wartime; nor any requirement to establish such arrangements. Finally, should a field army, during the course of conducting wartime operations, either move out of its originally assigned MD to another MD or beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, no provisions were made for that army to continue to receive supplies. Miliutin's MD system called for the MD commander to supply the army only within his own military district. This was the complex command and control issue that Miliutin attempted to redress through the 1868 and 1869 Field Regulation revisions that would generate a conflagration of opposition.

The problem that General Miliutin saw as "the most urgent military requirement" in 1868 was to rectify the inadequacy of strategic railroads in the western and southwestern provinces of Russia. The issue of insufficient railroad infrastructure had been first addressed in 1864 through a series of articles published in Ezhenedel'noe pribavlenie and Russkii invalid, entitled "Set' russkikh zheleznykh dorog. Uchastie v nei zemstva i voiska," which were inspired by Miliutin, and written by Colonel N. N. Obruchev.

Obruchev discussed the fact that between central Russia and the western provinces of the Empire there existed only "three strategic railroads: 1) from Warsaw to St. Petersburg; 2) from St. Petersburg to Moscow; and 3) from Moscow to Sevastopol. But a quarter of the country within the space between the Black Sea and Warsaw remains closed."

Colonel Obruchev predicted that a future war was likely to occur in these poorly developed southwestern and Black Sea border regions of Russia and, consequently, attention had to be paid to strengthening their infrastructure. He recommended that the first priority should be given to constructing a railroad between Kiev and Odessa, as well as to the construction of parallel north-south railroads inside the western Empire borders. In subsequent articles, Obruchev proposed the construction of 5000 kilometers of railroads in European Russia at a cost of 200 million rubles and that the work could be performed by military railroad units. But in 1864 the

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164 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 120.

165 Russkii invalid, No. 22, 1864, p. 3; cited by Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 120.
timing of Obruchev’s proposal was not propitious, given the huge budget deficit hanging over the Russian government. As a result, nothing was done.166

After a four-year delay, at the end of 1868 Miliutin became so absolutely convinced that Russia’s ability to conduct a future war successfully was critically dependent on the development of lines of communication and military infrastructure in western Russia that he instructed now General Obruchev to write an official War Ministry report to document the strategic condition of Russia. Obruchev’s report, dated November 12, 1868 and entitled “O zheleznykh dorogakh, neobkhodimykh v voennom otnoshenii,” laid out in detail the weakness of Russia’s defenses, the areas which were vital to actively defend, and the nature of Russia’s strategic requirements:

Our western provinces are geographically less defensible and politically most weak. Here are the flat fields of a land, still far from being amalgamated with Central Russia.... Clearly, it follows, that by attacking us in the west and not even dreaming about reaching the heart of Russia, an enemy can injure us greatly along our borders.... The Polish kingdom is the key to our western defenses. But also in the case of war against us, in all likelihood, an entire coalition will take part.... Therefore, of some importance to us, among other things, is to secure ourselves in the [Polish] kingdom, of great importance is to connect its defenses with the northern and southwestern defenses, which would prepare us for all eventualities and give us the capability to regroup troops freely through all the western provinces.167

Obruchev went on to note that the railroads of Austria and Prussia ran directly to the Russian western border, which gave these potential enemies a great advantage -- the capability to rapidly

166 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 120.
concentrate their armies along the border against Russia. He then characterized the Russian railroad lines of communication and defenses:

There is only one line for rapid communication between Dvina and Warsaw. But reserve units of our defenses remain at his time without solid communications with the central government, and [without] means to concentrate their troops in the border regions -- [in capability] to transfer them [troops] between regions, we are greatly inferior to the enemy.168

General Obruchev next spelled out the four Russian strategic requirements as "essential decisive tasks":

1. Unite the central Russian regions with the Crimea.
2. Secure solid communications between Poland and the Russian center in order that Pri-Baltic region troops could be transferred not only from the north-east on the Petersburg-Warsaw railroad, but also from the east and south-east.
3. Construct railroad lines of communication connecting the operational bases on a line along Dneistr-Western Dvina [rivers].
4. Ensure the rapid transfer of troops from one region to another by constructing parallel railroads along the western borders.169

Continuing this line of logic, Obruchev stipulated, in detail, exactly which critical defensive points should be connected by railroads and which western and southern Russian cities needed to be added to the railroad network. He enumerated a secondary category of railroads to be built solely for the purpose of strengthening defenses. For economic and defensive purposes, he concluded Russia's development of its railroad system was "unsatisfactory." Obruchev's report was presented to the Council of Ministers and discussed by them on February 11, 1869, but in General Miliutin's own words:

"Arguments and quarrels were prolonged. Only a few of the members concurred with the War Ministry statement."\(^{170}\)

Despite all the dissension, and after much deliberation, the Council of Ministers decided to build two critical railroad lines, recommended in the Obruchev report -- Brest-Smolensk and Brest-Kiev -- but all the remaining 'required' railroad lines were rejected. Only later, at the prodding of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, did the Ministers decide to give top priority to constructing the Transcaucasus railroad connecting the Caspian and Black Seas.

Although this railroad was not specifically part of the Obruchev plan for Western Russian infrastructure development and defense, upon its completion the Transcaucasus railroad was of "extraordinarily important significance to the improvement of army [mobilization capabilities] and also for the rapid concentration of the army in that, or any other point, in the theater of military operations."\(^{171}\)

So critical were railroads to effective mid- and late-19th century military operations as the principal means of rapid transportation and communication that in late 1868 the Main Staff set up a special committee "On the transfer of troops by railroad and water means," directed by General-Major Annenkov. The War Ministry, and hence the Main Staff, considered this committee to be of such great importance to the functioning of both the military districts and field armies that Count Geiden, the Chief of the Main Staff, chaired the committee meetings. As a direct outgrowth of this


committee's work, in 1870 the railroad troops were created as a separate command to exploit the use of railroads; especially enemy railroads, should a war lead to military operations outside Russia. This command was based on the 'military-worker' companies that originally had been formed during 1851 for the purpose of regulating the use of railroads to expedite the transfer of military cargoes.\textsuperscript{172}

The initial Obruchev report on Russian strategic conditions and plans for future war resulted in an exceedingly significant, if only incremental, and grudgingly accomplished, movement forward of Russian Army logistic, mobilization, concentration and maneuver capabilities. For War Minister Miliutin the partial implementation of the Obruchev strategic plan was unsatisfactory, despite the rather remarkable progress that he had made, personally and quite literally, in forcing through the expansion of the Russian railroad network during the 1860s. According to War Ministry statistics, in \textit{Istoricheskii ocherk razvitiia zheleznykh dorog v Rossii s ikh osnovaniia po 1897 god vkluchitel'no}, 2nd ed., (St. Petersburg, 1898), Tables 1 & 3:

\begin{quote}
In 1861 the general extent of Russian railroads was 1492 'versti,' [one verst equals approximately 2/3 of a mile or one kilometer] and by 1871 it grew to 10,900 verst. During the period of the 1860s important rail lines were constructed: Moscow-Kursk-Khar'kov-Rostov; Moscow-Kozlov-Voronezh; Orel-Riga; Moscow-Nizhni. Construction of the Petersburg-Warsaw railroad was completed.\textsuperscript{173}
\end{quote}

As a result of this rapid expansion of the Russian railroad network,

\textsuperscript{172} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 123.

there was a significant increase in transportation of cargoes by rail: "If for the five year period from 1865 to 1869 total cargo transported was 377 million pud, then for the following five years (1869-1874) the transportation of cargo rose to 978,601,00 pud."\(^{174}\)

Still, Miliutin saw around him only an ever-accelerating deterioration of the Russian domestic and international situation. By the late 1860s peasant disorders were increasing in intensity and frequency, and factory workers were beginning to organize. Both were changes which resulted in a palpable increase in revolutionary activity within Russia that was accompanied by the marked expansion of violent crime. Concerning the international situation, Miliutin reported to the Tsar on January 1, 1869 that it was "essential to increase the wartime strength of the army in view of the colossal armament [stockpiles] of the other European states."\(^{175}\) Miliutin's initial warning went unheeded. Russian military expenditures continued to be constrained by Finance Ministry niggardliness. On January 1, 1870 Miliutin again made his case about growing armament disparities to the Tsar even more stridently:

This question is so important and relates to so many state interests, that it requires broad investigation, and therefore, if it pleases your imperial highness to command, that a commission be formed of several people, with whom you entrust the most important affairs of state, who could verify through discussions all sides of this note's subject proposal.\(^{176}\)

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\(^{176}\) TsGVia, Kantseleiia Voenogo ministerstva, No. 1 (L), No. 13, p. 10; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., *Voennye reformy...,* pp. 257-258.
Next to this sentence Tsar Aleksandr II just penned, "Soglasen" -- "Agree" -- thereby setting in motion a wholesale Tsarist government re-evaluation of Russia's defense requirements, and subsequently a most heated debate over military reform progress and purposes.

- Re-evaluation of Defense Requirements (1870-1872)

During the first half of 1870, a huge, singular handwritten memorandum, authored primarily by General Nikolai N. Obruchev, titled "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," was put together within the War Ministry. Intended as background data with which the senior leadership could appraise the condition of the Russian Army, this unique document contained an invaluable compilation of information on the composition of the Russian Army" and the armies of the major European states.177 "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii" also described in trenchant depth the changes in the state of European military-political relations for the twenty-year period between 1850 and 1870, and reported the current status of

177 Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1870), in TsGVIA, f. Voenno-Uchenogo Arkhiv (VUA). Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia, 3, 8, 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g., pp. 195-197.

178 Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," Part III, "Transformation of the European Military System," pp. 61-164. Current (1870) force structure tables for the following 'Russian enemies' are detailed on the pages indicated: German and Prussian armies, p. 84; North German Union forces, pp. 88-89; French Army, p. 103; Italian Army, p. 118; Austrian Army, pp. 137-138; Turkish Army, p. 156; Swedish Army, p. 163.
those relations. Obruchev's perspicacious analysis observed that these changed political relationships posed "an extremely serious" threat to the Russian Empire due to the numerical superiority of a potential alliance of "Russia's avowed enemies Austria, Prussia, Turkey, and Sweden," combined with the "large standing armies maintained in peacetime by Austria, Prussia and the Northern German Union." In seeming contradiction, he judged: "The significant advancement of the Russian people summons for us new friends and allies in Europe, but even more greatly increases the masses of our enemies...."  

Because of this incipient, but expanding, political threat posed by nationalism, combined with the continuing growth of the massive armament stockpiles of the western European states, Obruchev concluded that Russia had no logical choice but to increase the strength of her standing active army and reserves, to increase the deployment of reserve forces, and to lengthen military service obligations. But Obruchev envisioned, and emphasized, that these force structure increases should be restricted to the extent "that

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179 Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," Part II, "Changes in European Political Aspects," pp. 24-60. Part II emphasizes throughout that the "national element" is the "new European political foundation," charges that the French under Napoleon III are at the "forefront of this movement" (p. 25) and warns of the "growing post-1866 influence of the German Union" (p. 38).


our army only should be recognized as fully sufficient for defense and perhaps less for offensive purposes." As a direct result of Obruchev’s definitive recommendations -- with which War Minister Miliutin agreed completely -- in August 1870 the War Ministry’s "highest imperative" was given to initiating the work of the ‘commission on conscription regulations’ to prepare new directives concerning personal military obligations. These new regulations were considered to be essential to expanding the state recruit base, from which the army could mobilize in order to expand to its wartime strength, and constituted the initial staff work that would lead to the landmark 1874 Law on Military Conscription.

Impetus toward further reform of the Russian military system was also propelled by international developments. France and Prussia mobilized for war in the fall of 1870, causing Miliutin to reflect: "Then we understood how tardy it was to worry ourselves excessively about our economy, the development of which had been neglected and by which our military forces were to be improved." Adding fuel to the momentum toward army reform was the report of State Council member P. A. Valuev, who returned to St. Petersburg after observing the Prussian mobilization and the opening military engagements between France and Prussia. At General Miliutin’s suggestion Valuev wrote to Tsar Aleksandr II explaining that the Prussian mobilization success was the result of the existence of trained reserves from "a

\[182\] Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki...," p. 204; also cited by Zaionchkovskii, *Voenny reformy...*, p. 258.

significant portion of the population having completed military service," which in the Prussian governmental system constituted "one form of elementary public education." Valuev concluded his letter by asserting: "Russian security demanded that her construction of military forces not lag behind the level of military forces of her neighbors."^{184}

On October 5, 1870 War Minister Miliutin delivered Valuev's letter to Tsar Aleksandr II, who evidently understood most clearly the vital importance of Valuev's report, because on October 7, 1870 Tsar Aleksandr directed Miliutin to study ways to improve the Russian armed forces and to submit a formal reform proposal. Personally, as well as professionally, Dmitrii Miliutin must have been most pleased to have successfully engineered the bureaucratic outcome he desired; especially since General Obruchev and his staff had already prepared the necessary background information and the War Ministry commission on new recruit regulations had been underway since August. Thus, during the remainder of the month of October 1870, the Chief of the Main Staff, Count Geiden, with the assistance of Generals Obruchev and Meshcherinov, polished up the final details of their military reform proposals for formal presentation to the Gosudar Imperator.^{185}

During the first days of November 1870, this 'all-inclusive' War Ministry report was presented and on November 4 the Tsar issued a

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"supreme command," that was published the following day in the newspaper Pravitel'nyi vestnik. In this historic order the Tsar explained the unsatisfactory preparation of reserve and replacement troops for call-up by the army during wartime, and suggested the necessity of implementing universal military service, albeit with a shortened period of service for each recruit. To this end the Tsar directed the War Ministry to create: "... a proposal about the formation of replacement army units and the broadening of direct participation by the entire population of the state in military duty through the observance of several conditions."186 Obviously expecting just such an Imperial order, on November 7, 1870 Miliutin delivered to Tsar Aleksandr II two additional War Ministry reports, titled "O razvitii nashikh vozruzhennykh sil" and "O glavnykh osnovannakh lichnoi voennoi povinnosti," in which were defined the Russian Army requirements and the means by which universal military service could be implemented.187

In the "O razvitii nashikh vozruzhennykh sil" memorandum, Miliutin characterized the authorized wartime army as consisting of 738,000 soldiers, including irregular troops.188 The troops stationed in the Caucasus, Orenburg, Turkestan, and two Siberian military districts were excluded from this figure. He considered that it was

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188 Obruchev uses the figure of 730,000 soldiers as the basis for the 1862 plan for a wartime Russian Army composed of 553,000 active duty soldiers and 177,000 reservists. See Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dla otsenki...," p. 15.
essential to keep these forces in place in order to maintain internal security within the Empire and, besides, the inadequately developed transportation system allowed them to be redeployed only with the greatest difficulty. Further, Miliutin demonstrated that because of the existing structure of local and reserve forces, coupled with the transportation system deficiencies, only between 500,000 and 600,000 troops could be concentrated within the main theater of war along the western borders -- a quantity which he deemed to be grossly insufficient to defend against a fully mobilized million-man German Army, let alone contain Germany's likely allies.

Miliutin then continued to explain in explicit detail how, over a period of 15 years, a Russian reserve army of 1,900,000 men and an active army of 1,263,000 soldiers could be created by increasing the annual recruit induction from four to six men per thousand population while reducing the period of recruit active service. Miliutin's key element for rapidly expanding the Russian Army was to be the creation of 120 identical local cadre reserve battalions, each of which would be manned with 500 soldiers in peacetime, that in wartime could become 120 three-battalion regiments fielding 3500 soldiers each for a total of 30 new infantry divisions. Miliutin's proposal also called for the local artillery batteries to expand in wartime to 96 batteries, or 24 reserve artillery brigades, fielding 768 cannon and 27,576 men. No changes, however, were purposed for either the cavalry or engineer branches.

Miliutin estimated that 15 years following implementation of this reform proposal, in wartime, the Russian Army would be able to
field: 1,234,460 combat troops (active and reserve); 136,920 border fortress troops; 100,720 local troops; a 240,000-man state militia; and 49,330 men in "general assistance units" for an army total of 1,761,430 troops that could be augmented further by a 1,910,000-man trained reserve. Since only 1,708,000 of the trained reservists could be equipped by the army, a 202,000-man general state manpower reserve would be created simultaneously. Miliutin concluded by stating that execution of this "program requires significant resources" -- to say the least, an understatement of the enormous financial and material commitment necessary to train and equip so large an army -- but that without its implementation "the danger remains that the state is unprepared to defend itself." The military reform proposals found in Miliutin's "O razvitii nashikh vooruzhennykh sil" memorandum, as well as Obruchev's "Dannye dla otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," eventually, if belatedly, would become the foundation for the 1870s Russian Army reorganization.

In January 1871 the War Ministry created the powerful Organizatsionnaia Commission to oversee the work of restructuring the Russian Army. In order to carry out its enormous task effectively,

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189 These same Russian Army force structure figures appear in Obruchev's "Dannye dla otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," pp. 195-197; along with a breakout by branch of arms and their deployment strength in each military district.

190 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., pp. 261-266; see also Obruchev, "Dannye dla otsenki...," p. 198, with a slightly different emphasis, echoes that in wartime 700,000 troops deployed in European Russia "are only enough for defense."
the Commission was subdivided into nine sections: 1) organization of infantry units; 2) artillery and engineering units; 3) cadre guards units; 4) cavalry cadre; 5) the priority in which to calculate troop requirements and to call-up reserve members; 6) commissary and artillery reserves and trains; 7) Cossack troops; 8) irregular police (militsia); and 9) state militia. Progress in building the army’s strength, however, was slow, but significant, as noted by Miliutin in his August 1871 diary entries, and then again in the 1872 Main Staff memorandum concerning troop formations. The latter documents that the level of peacetime active troops increased by 112,816 in 1872 to create a total force of 650,989 men; while in wartime the increase would be 119,132 for a total of 1,095,045.191

As a result of what Miliutin could only consider to be unsatisfactory reform progress, on November 28, 1872 the authority of the Organizatsionnaiia Commission was reinforced by the inclusion within its membership of six military district commanders -- Gil’denshtubbe, Kartsov, Drentel’n, Potapov, Khrushchov and Chertkov -- along with a group of frontline operational commanders. All were tasked to expedite the Russian Army reorganization.192 At their first meeting in November, the new Commission members concluded that it was impossible to meet the required wartime active force levels by the mobilization of reserves alone because the gigantic amount of men and

191 TsGVIA, f. VUA 79013, "Zapiski Glavnogo shtaba ob ustroistve voisk 1872 g.", pp. 71-72, Table Nos. 4 and 6; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 271.

materials that had to be moved to the European theater of war was
totally beyond the capability of the Russian transportation system.
By a vote of 35 to 1, the Commission members agreed that the only
viable solution was to increase the size of the peacetime active
standing army and, thereby, to reduce the number of reservists who
would have to be mobilized. The reservists would be placed in two
categories: 1) voisk reservnykh, "for the purpose of rear services,
fulfilling secondary military activities and occupying fortresses;"
and, 2) voisk zapasnykh, "for the purpose of preparing the wartime
supplies of other troops and for use in internal and local
service." Through these Organizatsionnaia Commission consensus
decisions, at the end of 1872 a major long-term goal of the Imperial
Main Staff -- to establish and to maintain a standing, territorial
Russian Army -- was advanced significantly; but was not yet ready for
implementation.

Perhaps the most influential member of the Organizatsionnaia
Commission, overall, was General N. N. Obruchev who, at the beginning
of 1873, eloquently described the strategic condition of the Russian
state and the critical necessity to reconstruct the Russian Army in
his "Soobrazhenia ob oborone Rossii" ("Considerations concerning the
defense of Russia"). Obruchev's enlightened opening statement could
just as well have been written now, at the end of the 20th century,
as been penned over a hundred years ago, when Russia was entering the
last quarter of the 19th century. The memorandum began:

All European powers alike profess their desire for peace, but, at the same time, all continue to develop their own armed forces: strengthening army cadres and reserves, preparing for their rapid mobilization, constructing new fortresses and strategic railroad lines. To preserve peace, all prepare themselves for war. Therefore, we also must take urgent measures to guarantee the security of the Empire, all the more so, because at present the transition from peace to war takes place, as is said, instantaneously.  

Obruchev posed for the first time and suggested quantifiable answers to what have become, over the last century of conflicting state ideological precepts, enduring, vitally complex security questions: How much is enough military force in order to defend the state? How quickly can the army be mobilized? How rapidly, and where, do we need to concentrate forces against the enemy? Have we adequately prepared the defense infrastructure in the projected theaters of military operations?

General Obruchev logically explained the high probability of coalition warfare against the Russian Empire. Not only could Germany and Austria -- the most likely antagonists -- join forces, but they could obtain the assistance of Turkey and Sweden as well. Russia absolutely had to increase the size of her active standing army. Not counting the officer corps, the 1873 wartime Russian Army could field 1,006,000 troops, while Germany had an army totalling 1,270,000 men;


Austria, 1,020,000; Turkey, 230,000 (without militia); and Sweden, 168,000. Russian Army manpower was outnumbered nearly three to one against likely European coalitions, and by some 2.3 to 1 against her avowed enemies -- Germany and Austria -- even before the other critical military questions of mobilization time, concentration, and state infrastructure adequacy were considered.196

The success or failure of mobilization virtually predetermined the ability of the Russian Army to concentrate defensive forces along her European borders. Obruchev held forth: "Mobilization of troops in the number that is required is completely new for us."197 Reflecting this concern, a 'special commission' on the readiness of the Russian Army in 1866 concluded that the army's ability to transition to a war footing was "unsatisfactory."198 The Russian Army thereafter made progress in reducing the amount of time required to mobilize troops: down from the five-and-a-half months that it took to field four army corps in connection with the Franco-Austrian War in 1859; to two-and-a-half months in 1863 for the Polish Rebellion; to an estimated range of 25-111 days in 1867; and between 8 and 39 days in 1872.199 Still, the Russian Army mobilization capability

196 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 5-6, in TsGVIA, f. VUA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchanii..., p. 76; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., p. 280.
remained unsatisfactory; the principal reason: Germany was able to mobilize her entire army in only nine days. The following table documents by military district the progress the Russian Army made between 1867 and 1872 in improving mobilization capability:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Military District Name</th>
<th>1867</th>
<th>1872 (in days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petersburg</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>from 10 to 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>from 9 to 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vil'no</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>from 10 to 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>from 10 to 20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Khar'kov</td>
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<td>Moscow</td>
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<td>Caucasus</td>
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General Obruchev's concluding analysis of the Russian Army's mobilization capability demonstrated his foresight and understanding of the holistic social, political, economic, and military nature of future war:

From this it follows that Russia still with great energy must conduct a shortening of the time required for its own troop mobilization. However, the measures required for this depend not only on the War Ministry alone, but primarily on taking charge of the entire state, since the main way to solve [the problem] is by the introduction of an obligation [to provide] horses (or to requisition them) and the development of railroads.

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The mobilization of logistics, especially supplies of weapons and ammunition, had not kept pace with the ability to mobilize manpower,\textsuperscript{201} hence the Russian Army could not concentrate forces rapidly enough in the anticipated European theater of war. Although the time to move supplies forward had been significantly reduced, from an average of 45 to 90 days in 1867 to 16-18 days in 1872, the main limiting factor was an inadequate reserve of horses for field transportation during the first 30-60 days following the mobilization order. According to General Obruchev: "The wartime supply of horses is our most difficult mobilization problem."\textsuperscript{204} This serious deficiency was complicated further: first, by the army's wide dispersal to provinces outside the expected primary theater of war along Russia's European borders, and second, by the absence of sufficient strategic road and railroad infrastructure throughout the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{205} Obruchev resolutely defined the requirement for progress: "The speed of army concentration mainly depends on its general distribution and the routes leading to the theater of war."\textsuperscript{206}

Russia had five railroad lines running from the interior to her western borders: Petersburg-Warsaw; Moscow-Warsaw; Kursk-Vil'no; Odessa-Belostok; and Riga-Rovno. In sharp contrast, Germany had

\textsuperscript{201} Obruchev, "Soobrazheniiia ob oborone Rossii," p. 10, in TsG Via. VUA: Materialy sekretnyh soveshchaniy..., p. 78.

\textsuperscript{204} Obruchev, "Soobrazheniiia ob oborone Rossii," p. 12, in TsG Via. VUA: Materialy sekretnyh soveshchaniy..., p. 79.

\textsuperscript{205} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 282.

\textsuperscript{206} Obruchev, "Soobrazheniiia ob oborone Rossii," p. 16, in TsG Via. VUA: Materialy sekretnyh soveshchaniy..., p. 81.
completed construction of 10 strategic railroad lines, oriented mainly in a west-east direction; Austria had six such strategic railroad lines; and Turkey had one rail line extending through Romania toward the Russian border. Analyzing these facts, General Obruchev came to the generous conclusion that the Russian Empire had "twice less means to concentrate troops than her enemies" because the Russian Army would require some 63-70 days to mobilize and concentrate, while the Austrian Army would require only 30-33 days. In a war against Germany, the Russian situation was deemed to be much worse. The Russian Army could mobilize and concentrate forces in 54-58 days, while Germany would require only 20-23 days. This would mean that Germany could seize all of Poland and most of Latvia before the Russian Army could even take the field to give battle, most likely in the region of Minsk. This was a completely unacceptable prospect for the Russian Empire. Therewithal, Obruchev made an exceedingly gloomy, but entirely accurate prediction: "Now when the entire strategic assessment, and state defense itself, must be based on railroads, the strength and linkage of our main bases has been

207 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 17, in TsGVIA, VUA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchanii..., p. 82.
208 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 18, in TsGVIA, VUA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchanii..., p. 82.
209 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 19-20, in TsGVIA, f. VUA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchanii..., p. 83, details the full Russian mobilization tables against Austria and Germany; see Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., p. 283, for a summary of these tables.
lost.” Obruchev forewarned about the inadequacy of the Russian Empire's defenses:

Based on the presented survey of the means to defend the Empire in relation to those of its opponents, it is impossible not to arrive at the conclusions that at the present the condition of the Russian armed forces is unsatisfactory for ensuring its [the Empire's] security; that the mobilization and concentration of our army, owing to the long distances, to the uneven distribution of horses, and to the limited lines of communication, especially railroads, takes place more slowly than that of our opponents; finally, that engineering preparations in relation to the Empire's border expanse do not meet contemporary requirements....

Obruchev's remedy for this dangerous state security condition was to recommend a plan for increasing the number of active duty infantry battalions from the existing 516 to between 820 and 840 battalions, stationed in the anticipated theater of war -- European Russia -- because: "Here is our primary danger, and in order to escape it, we must be ready to establish equal forces against these neighbors."

In General Obruchev's view: "Everything depends on securing the flanks of Poland." It was particularly essential that an expanded Russian Army be concentrated to defend the western and southwestern

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flanks of Poland and Galicia from attacks launched from Eastern Prussia. Russia had to defend along the Polish borders, rather than continue to distribute troops piecemeal throughout the Empire’s far-flung military districts, where the lack of transportation infrastructure did not permit their timely forward concentration. Further, Obruchev argued that these new Russian troop concentrations in the Southern and Southwestern theaters had to be supported by the construction of a network of fortresses and railroads sufficient to allow for stubborn and persistent point defense against any attack, the regrouping (peregruppirovka) of forces laterally to the decisive point of battle, and the uninterrupted shipment of supplies and reinforcements to the front.

Obruchev’s unique strategic "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii" ("Considerations concerning the defense of Russia"), which today we would describe properly as a strategic assessment and future war

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216 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," pp. 42-45, in TsGVIA. VVA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchani..., pp. 94-96, details Obruchev’s plan for the defense of the Polish Kingdom, along with a prioritized listing of required new strategic railroad construction.

217 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 38, in TsGVIA. VVA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchani..., p. 92 presents Obruchev’s proposed increased troop dispositions in European Russia by military district and army corps.

218 Obruchev, "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 47, in TsGVIA. VVA: Materialy sekretnykh soveshchani..., p. 97 gives a prioritized listing of 6780 km of new railroad construction, with Poland topping the list with four new lines totaling 1000 km.

(budushchaia voina) forecast, formed the foundation for the Tsar’s 1873 'secret society' deliberations on the creation of a Russian national military doctrine. The 'secret society' participants would debate Obruchev’s recommendations in counterpoise to the existing Miliutin military system and to the recommendations of other senior military and aristocratic leaders of the Russian Empire.

- The 1873 'Secret Society': 'Dimitum' and Decisions

Between 1870 and 1872 all the proposals and counterproposals for reorganizing the Russian Army generated great, emotionally intense, substantive rifts both within the War Ministry and the Main Staff, between their respective members, and among the military branches of arms, other government ministries, and individual members of the nobility -- each of whom sought to protect their individual fiefdoms and to preserve their inherited, or traditional, rights and privileges. The substantive vital necessity to improve the defensive capabilities of the Russian Empire became increasingly entwined in an impenetrable mangrove swamp of personal animosities, competing opinions, and bureaucratic failures to execute government directives, originally intended to improve military capabilities.

In the vanguard of the opposition to the Miliutin reform plan to create a 1,900,000-man wartime army based on the mobilization of reservists, the insidious General Fadeev surfaced again. This time he emerged with the support of the politically well-connected, hence, powerful, St. Petersburg Police Chief General-Adjutant Shuvalov,
who "thought the Miliutin system pernicious for the army and
dangerous for the dynasty."220 In an 1872 letter to Tsar Aleksandr,
written with the fecund, duplicitous editorial assistance of Field
Marshal Prince Bariatinskii, General Fadeev achieved the penultimate
in demagogy. With unprincipled personal insult to Miliutin, while
trying to maintain the traditional feudal military order, to dispense
with the hated military districts, and to expand significantly the
active standing army, Fadeev charged:

All institutions of Peter the Great, of Catherine,
of 1812, all traditions, the entire way of life of the
Russian Army are fossilized like old wild grass; from
this rubbish heap, which is signified by the graves of
two centuries of Russian military experience, rises
only the professional heads of Mr. Miliutin and his
idealists.221

Once more Fadeev's emotional bandwagon appeals had their desired
effect. Reform opposition intensified and approached a zenith
between February 28 and March 31, 1873 with the activation of the
novel royal 'secret society,' personally chaired by the Tsar, to
investigate the implications of social and military reform for the
purpose of creating a Russian national military doctrine.222

General-Adjutant Dmitrii Miliutin had foreseen that the
accelerating intensity of opposition to his military reforms could
not be resolved through the compromises of competing positions.

222 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 293; see Appendix II for the TsGVI A, f. VUA: 1873 Sekretnoe Soveschchanie Meetings Index of background materials and the names of the key discussion participants.
He knew, truly, that to the Russian psyche compromise was then, and is now, a barely tolerable indication of weakness. Miliutin also knew that the only way to resolve the military reform impasse was, in the typical Russian fashion, through the formation of a special, select group of senior policymakers who could persuade the Tsar to issue an Imperial decree. Therefore, according to Miliutin's memoirs, in the War Minister's summer 1872 report to Tsar Aleksandr, the following intentionally provocative, obsequiously veiled suggestion was posed:

I consider it my duty to turn your Highness' earliest attention to these new proposals which are required by the State ... based on the general conviction about the unsatisfactory increases of Russia's military forces considering the threatening armaments of all Europe. Inevitably it must be said ... in connection with the supreme strategic and political considerations that ... the decision of so many important matters should not be laid on the responsibility of one war minister; it requires joint discussion with the other ministers and their cooperation. Therefore, I suggest an idea to your Highness -- call together a conference of several of the most select people who are authorities about state and military affairs. This idea was submitted to your Highness in complete loyalty.223

As a result of Miliutin's plea His Majesty, Tsar Aleksandr decided to form the 'secret society' at the end of 1872. However, because the War Ministry was unable to prepare immediately all the background materials that were necessary for the members to consider in order to make informed decisions, the actual 'secret society' meetings were delayed until the beginning of 1873.224

Prince Bariatinskii, meanwhile, with his usual persistence made sure that the forthcoming commencement of the Tsar's 'secret society' deliberations concerning military reform were well publicized. Now with the backing of the prospective future Tsar, Grand Duke Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, he promoted a series of strongly-worded opposition articles in the newspaper *Russkii mir*. One such article stated:

The Russian defense establishment requires neither more resources nor a major overhaul. The present task of the military directorates is to understand how to use the immense resources of Russia for the creation of a powerful vital force ... for which the present military budget is more than sufficient..."225

Obviously, the vituperation of the opposition's continuing tirade did not endear its membership to the Miliutin reformers, especially since the expansive public debate ('glasnost') impugned the military reformers' loyalty to the state and their professional competence.

With Tsar Aleksandr II personally chairing the meetings, the 'sekretnoe soveshchanie' sessions began on February 28, 1873 and concluded one month later on March 31. The rather large official society membership included the ministers of foreign affairs, war, finance, the Imperial Office, internal affairs, and members of the State Council: Chevkin, Count Stroganov, and Count Ignat'ev. Imperial family representation included the Tsarevich Aleksandr, the heir apparent, and Grand Dukes Vladimir Aleksandrovich, Konstantin Nikolaevich, Mikhail Nikolaevich, and Nikolai Nikolaevich. Army representatives included the Field Marshals, Count Berg and Prince Bariatinskii, the commanders of the military districts, and the

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Military Council. The Tsar commanded that all discussions be held in "complete secrecy" and that no working materials or official reports be maintained.

According to the military historian P. A. Zaionchkovskii, there are none but "extraordinarily insignificant" records of the 'secret society' proceedings in the Moscow Central State Military-Historical Archives (TsGVIA); only two documents, "Voprosakh, podlezhashchikh obsuzhdeniu" (Questions, presented for discussion) and "Zakliucheniiakh Sekretnogo soveshchaniia" (Conclusions of the 'Secret Society'). Fortunately, Miliutin's Vospominaniia, and the diaries of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich and Tsar Aleksandr II provide some details concerning this important series of meetings. The Index to Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia... in Appendix II is of particular importance because it reveals the existence of somewhat more numerous archival documents than Zaionchkovskii first described.

The initial 'secret society' session opened on February 28, 1873 with the first of two questions to be discussed concerning the appropriate size of the Russian Army: "Are the armed forces which Russia presently has at its disposal in the event of a European war

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226 TsGVIA, f. Voennno-Uchenogo Arkhiv (VUA): Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'stvom Gosudaria Imperatora, 28 fevralia, 3, 8, 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g., "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym...," (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript], 1873), p. 1; see Appendix II, p. 23, for the complete list of "Sekretnoe soveshchanie" participants.

sufficient?" The society members were instructed that if they
determined that the existing Russian army forces were not sufficient,
they were to recommend ways to strengthen the army as well as the
measures required to increase the military budget.

According to General Miliutin, as the discussions began, and
as might have been expected, Prince Bariatinskii at once took the
offensive, charging that increases in the military budget were not
required in order to strengthen the army and that all that was needed
was to "curtail superfluous expenditures." Aleksandr perceptively,
if rather curtly, noted in his February 28 diary entry only:
"Bariat[inskii] protiv voen[nogo] min[istra]" -- "Bariatinskii is
against the war minister."219

Finance Minister Reitern, naturally, supported Bariatinskii,
calling attention to the "uninterrupted growth of the War Ministry
budget; the impossibility of further increases in military
expenditures; and the strain on the financial condition of the state"
if army expenditures were increased by 15 million rubles a year, as
requested by Miliutin. As the 'secret society' consensus coalesced
around the need for a larger army, Reitern conceded, eventually and
seemingly quite reluctantly, that an additional 10 million rubles

219 TsGVIA, f. VILI, "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia
pod minym...", (St. Petersburg: [Unpublished Manuscript],
1873), p. 1; see also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., p. 294.

219 TsG IAM, f. Aleksandra II, No. 678, opis' 1, d. 61, Zapis'
28 fevralia 1873 g.; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A.,
Voennye reformy..., p. 295.
annually could be available for army expansion beginning in 1875.230

At the conclusion of the discussion of the first question, the
Tsar issued his recommendation to the War Minister, which was
accepted without any objections. Tsar Aleksandr’s decision stated:

In view of the danger presented by the uninterrupted
expansion of European armed forces, it is considered
necessary, following even to this day a peaceful policy,
to increase those peacetime forces that Russia has at its
disposal. ... Measures to expand the armed forces are
not to be taken any earlier than are determined to be
normal, and are to conform directly with those financial
means, which can be allotted to this purpose without harm
to the other economic and moral state needs. ... The most
profitable distribution of expenditures in relation to
troop organization is that which achieves the possibility
for the greatest development of the armed forces without
special excessive expenses for maintaining them against
present death.231

Overall, this clear Imperial decision to expand the Russian Army
essentially was that which Miliutin had desired and requested. But,
the implementation of the Tsar’s instructions, with their numerous
limitations, in practice, would prove to be most difficult indeed.

The second ‘secret society’ question, discussed during the
initial session on February 28, 1873, dealt with the rearment of
fortresses and the construction of additional separate border
fortifications, particularly in the Warsaw military district and on
its flanks.232 Concerning this most important question about

230 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voenny reformy..., pp. 294-295;
"Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym...,”
p. 6, confirms this 10 million ruble increase in the 1874
total military budget to 174,290,000 rubles; and projects
for 1875-1879 a staggering 179,290,000 rubles annually.

231 "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...,” pp. 6-7;
also Zaionchkovskii, Voenny reformy..., pp. 295-296.

232 "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...,” pp. 7-8.
strengthening Russia's western defenses, the society members reached an impasse, with general agreement only on the need to improve the major Polish fortresses, but without consensus on the requirement for additional fortifications on the flanks of the most probable avenues of attack. Thus, the strengthening of Russia's border defenses was "extended for an extraordinarily lengthy period."

At this point, into the fray hurled Prince Bariatinskii. This time he resoundingly proposed to Tsar Aleksandr the creation of a "special financial ways and means commission" to look into methods for generating savings within the existing military budget that could be applied to army expansion and the strengthening of defenses. Tsar Aleksandr approved. The membership of the Bariatinskii Commission, which the duplicitous Prince himself chaired, prominently included State Comptroller Greig; State Council members Chevkin and Ignat'ev; "several other persons"; and a few representatives from the military departments. Almost to a man the financial ways and means commission members were strident opponents of Miliutin's military reforms.

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233 Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine utverzhdennym zaklucheniiam, sostolavshimsia v sekretnom soveshchanii pod minym predsedatel'ствовать Gosudaria Imperatora, na Glavni Shtab vozлагаetsia," (St. Petersburg: pis'mo, 28 Maia 1873 goda.), in TsGVIA, f. VIU. Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'ствовать Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia, 3. 8. 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g., pp. 27-30, asserted that: "The security of the Empire requires the following construction" before explaining the rationale for the first priority fortresses Novogeorgievsk, Ivangorod, Zerchev, and Brest; followed by the Grodno, Ossoyets, Rovno, and Dubno fortresses in the Southwest Theater.


The second 'secret society' session took place on March 3, 1873 to discuss and decide questions about strategic railroad construction requirements.236 According to Miliutin's Vospominaniia the members had no fundamental objections to the requirement for expanding the strategic railroad network in Western Russia and "affirmed the objectives proposed by the War Ministry."237 On the subject of strategic railroads, the 'secret society' concluded:

The final determination of the direction of these [rail]roads, equalizing the consistency of their construction in connection with the general improvement of a consolidated network, is assigned to the Railroad Committee, first, in order to look urgently into this question concerning the possibility, welcomed by the War Ministry, of eliminating troop dispersal, stockpile distribution, and elevated investment difficulties and, second, in order to designate roads for construction, keeping in mind the special importance of accelerated completion for the line, planned through Poland.238

Unfortunately for the War Ministry, and especially for the Russian soldiers, the Tsar's assignment of determining which railroads to build to a committee -- especially one subject to the influence of the powerfully connected 'anti-reform' Bariatinskii Commission -- virtually guaranteed that no immediate action would be taken to construct the strategic railroad network that Miliutin and Obruchev had so meticulously determined, and proven, to be essential for

236 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," p. 1.
238 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 9-10; see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., pp. 296-297.
Russia's defense in a future war. Still, the railroad committee bureaucrats deliberated; but no new railroad construction orders were issued.

The third session of the 'secret society' was convened on March 8, 1873 to consider and discuss two most important questions: "measures to accelerate army mobilization and concentration in the theater of war." Included within the subsets of these questions were: 1) the difficulties of troop dispersal (dislocation) throughout the expanse of the Empire; 2) the status of troops assigned to the border regions; 3) the measures necessary to supply the army with horses; 4) the requirement for building new troop barracks; and 5) the quality of unit military training. Surprisingly, none of these major issues became the basis of dispute. Here, the 'secret society' was generally in agreement concerning the actions required. The members concluded that it was necessary to strengthen peacetime army and cavalry concentrations in the western military districts in order to ease the mobilization difficulties caused by existing army dispersal. This determination to 'forward base' the Russian Army logically led to the requirement to build new barracks in the western military districts and to improve training.

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239 Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine utverzhdnym zakliucheniiam, sostoiavshimsia..." p. 34, explains the rationale for and lists the top priority railroad construction requirements for defending Poland.

240 "Zakliucheniiia sekretnogo soveshchaniia..." p. 2; see also Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 297.

The fourth ‘secret society’ session met on March 10, 1873. The principal questions scheduled for discussion were the size of the annual conscript draft and the appropriate length of active army service obligation.²⁶² Tsar Aleksandr, however, began the session by telling Miliutin to skip the conscription question and to proceed with the sixth discussion topic concerning structure of the army, which subsumed all eight remaining issues about troop organization and weapon requirements.²⁶³ The Tsar proffered that it was impossible for him to understand the conscription issue without first determining how the army was to be organized.

Prince Bariatinskii, with Byzantine guile and supported by Count Berg, seized on the opportunity this change in the scheduled agenda presented. He proposed eliminating the existing military districts in European Russia and replacing them with four armies: Petersburg, Warsaw, Kiev, and Moscow.²⁶⁴ According to General Miliutin’s diary entry, for the following three hours Miliutin suffered in egregious silence through venomous attacks on the military district system that he had labored so diligently for twelve years to establish. When at last Miliutin spoke, he bitterly proclaimed with deepest conviction:

The destruction of the military districts will lead to the return of the former disorder, to the former commissariat and its wasteful consumption of provisions. All this was said emotionally and sharply and in

²⁶² "Zakliucheniiia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 2-3.
²⁶³ "Zakliucheniiia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 4-5.
conclusion this phrase appeared: 'All would be as it was, but I intensely feel [that] the present requires a radical transformation, which must be developed and completely achieved.'


That very night the Tsar dispatched a note to Dmitrii Miliutin requesting his presence at the palace on Sunday morning, March 11, to explain his behavior. Of this meeting Aleksandr recorded only that he had an "unpleasant" conversation with Miliutin, while the latter stated that they "shook hands, embraced, and with an embarrassed voice [the Tsar] asked: 'Why did you take to heart that which was said yesterday? Seldom do I hear such dissension....'" What actually transpired between the two men at that Sunday morning meeting may never be known, given the sparsity of detail in the only


246 TsGIAM, f. Aleksandra II, opis’ 1, d. No. 61, zapis’ 10 marta 1873 g.; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voenny reformy..., pp. 299-300.

accounts, but the evidence of subsequent events strongly indicates a rare appeasement. The Tsar and his War Minister seemingly managed to strike a compromise that preserved the Emperor's authority over Prince Bariatinskii's dissident 'anti-reform' group of nobles by reducing the number of military districts and by limiting the expansion of the military budget. This confidential franchise also satisfied the Miliutin reformers by authorizing the reorganization of the Russian Army structure into six regiment divisions, sub-divided into two brigades each; by increasing the military budget by 13 million rubles annually; and by expanding the standing army, using the justification that reservists could not be properly equipped upon mobilization to reinforce the active army. The operational command hierarchy for corps and military districts, however, remained ambiguous, with the Tsar continuing to assert his authority, and personally to intervene, down to the division level.248

For the next three weeks, no 'secret society' meetings took place, while the details of the compromise were vetted in private among individual members. After two weeks of factional maneuvering, Miliutin recorded that on March 24 the army organization and command questions were "conclusively decided" in the Tsar's apartments at a meeting attended by Grand Dukes Nikolai and Mikhail Nikolaevich:

The Emperor explained, that they wanted to discuss the proposed army reorganization further. Here for the first time I was commanded to give an explanation for my objection to the system that they considered to be already decided. ... I explained in conclusion that if in peacetime preparation of the corps commander chain of command is recognized as essential, then it is better to

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introduce this hierarchy into the existing army organization rather than under other conditions disrupting the division as the fundamental military administrative and structural entity. These last words of mine would serve to loosen the knot that had been forged. The Emperor, I saw, reversed himself, opening the way out of this intricate situation. 248

At this point the Tsar decided not to change the existing number and structure of divisions and to have four battalions in each regiment, with four companies in each battalion. However, the critical question of corps commander subordination -- to the Tsar, to the War Minister, or to the military district commander -- which would determine the wartime effectiveness of the military districts was left open, with the Grand Dukes suggesting that "only corps commanders who were not members of the royal family should be subordinated to the military district commander." 250 Tsar Aleksandr was inclined to accept the proposal of his fellow nobles as a satisfactory compromise; but did not explicitly do so at this time.

On March 31, 1873 only the thorny issue of military district command authority remained to be resolved at the fifth, and last, 'secret society' session. 251 Tsar Aleksandr opened the discussions by explaining the solution worked out the week before and recommending it to the assembly. Immediately, however, Prince Bariatinskii arose to challenge the proposal to subordinate corps commanders to military district commanders as "an unsatisfactory waste of personnel" that

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251 "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 24-25.
would only cause "the bureaucracy to predominate." The Grand Dukes Mikhail and Nikolai Nikolaevich, quickly falling into line with Prince Bariatinskii, then withdrew their previously agreed compromise proposal.253 No documentation apparently exists detailing the ensuing discussions, but the decisions reveal the fact that Organizatsionnaia Commission recommendations, except about reserve and local troops, were accepted.253 In peacetime, army divisions would be subordinated to the Emperor rather than to the corps commanders. The number of war ready active troops deployed in the border regions would be increased and the War Minister would have "supreme authority on all military matters."254

The 'secret society' resolved that it was necessary to expand the size of the active army "primarily by increasing the number of new military units." New reserve units would be formed to help mainly with rear services in wartime, but in peacetime only the active units would have full cadres of personnel, while the reserve units would have only an officer cadre along with all required equipment. Local troops would be used in peacetime to maintain internal security, and in wartime for logistics and reserve unit training.255 The 'secret society' avoided its avowed aim of creating

254 "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 24-25.
255 "Zakliuchenia sekretnogo soveshchaniia...," pp. 12-14; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., pp. 301-302.
a standing territorial army but, most importantly, established the necessity for organizing the armed forces deployed throughout the Empire in peacetime in the same manner as they would be employed in wartime.

In the aftermath of the 'secret society' intrigues, the number of active infantry divisions remained unchanged, with the exception of the addition of one active division to the Caucasus Army. Each division henceforward would be composed of two brigades, with two regiments, each fielding four battalions of four companies. This left the size of the active Russian army unchanged, because each regiment previously fielded three battalions with five companies each. Save for one active division in the Caucasus Army, all other divisions were maintained in peacetime cadre status, mainly due to persistent severe financial constraints. The number and size of cavalry divisions also remained unchanged, but each cavalry division was separated into two brigades, with the first brigade led by the division commander and the second by a designated brigade commander. Artillery units were reformed into eight-battery brigades, with four batteries assigned to each division. Concerning the key issue of the appropriate length of conscript active military service, the 'secret society' participants concluded that six years was the appropriate length of time for military service.

257 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchanii...," pp. 15-17; also Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., pp. 302-303.
258 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchanii...," p. 12.
While the 'secret society' determined that it was necessary in peacetime to have active army corps in place in the border regions, the members stipulated: "The corps commander in all relationships and in all units is subordinate to the Supreme Commander [the Tsar] and to the commander of the military district." For Miliutin, his pyrrhic victory embodied in this decision must have been a real disappointment, since the unity of command problem was not resolved. However, his new system of army organization was preserved, albeit in a modified form, and the overall role of the military district commanders was strengthened -- for the interim.

Crown Prince Aleksandr Aleksandrovich's prophetic diary entry on the concluding day of the 'secret society' meetings confirms the persistence of the opposition that had coalesced against the Miliutin military reforms. The future Tsar wrote: "I believe that there will be changes still and that this decision has not been resolved entirely." The distinguished Russian military historian General P. A. Zaionchakovskii offers a most succinct, yet very telling, conclusion about the Russian military transformation process:

259 "Zakliucheniiya sekretnogo soveshchaniia..." p. 25; see also Miliutin, D. A., "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine utverzhdennym zakliucheniiam, sostoiavshimsia...," p. 48, which reinforces this important conclusion for the Main Staff; see also Zaionchakovskii, P. A., Voennoe reformy..., p. 303.

260 "Zakliucheniiya sekretnogo soveshchaniia..." pp. 24-25; see also Miliutin, "Glavnomu Shtabu. Soglasno Vysochaine utverzhdennym zakliucheniiam, ...", pp. 48-50.

... As a result of the secret society decisions, the existing military organization system and command of the army were maintained. However, all further measures to strengthen the armed forces and to fortify the border regions were brought to nought by severe financial considerations.262

- The 1874 Military Conscription Law

Miliutin's reform program was consistent and comprehensive due in large measure to his consummate bureaucratic skills and to the continuity of his twenty-plus years in office, but owing as well to his very progressive ideas concerning social equality, the importance of mass education, and individual human dignity -- much of which was codified implicitly within the late-18th century training manual by Generalissimo Aleksandr Vasilevich Suvorov entitled *Nauka pobedy.* Suvorov's enduring canon, *Science of Victory,* may be summarized in seven main points:

1. In war morale is of immense importance. The principal weapon is the man. All the men must strive for victory and understand how to achieve it. ("Every soldier must understand his maneuver.")

2. Victory is achieved by attacking and defeating the main forces of the enemy.

3. One of the most essential conditions of victory is a swift and sudden blow. ("Victory is decided by the legs; and the arms are only instruments of victory.")

4. The bayonet charge plays the decisive role in crushing the enemy.

5. A soldier must be trained only for what will be useful to him on the battlefield. Everything likely to overburden him must be cast aside. On the other hand, the soldier must be trained to perfection. ("Hard on the training ground, easy in battle.")

6. Commanders must pay the utmost attention to the men's needs.

7. Soldiers must be trained to treat civilians and prisoners of war kindly. ("Don't offend civilians. Treat prisoners kindly and humanely."

The preceding Suvorov principles had been misinterpreted and denigrated by Russia's ruling nobility for nearly three-quarters of a century. Historian Michael Florinsky therefore judges that "Miliutin's greatest achievement was the humanization of discipline, the betterment of conditions of service, and the introduction of conscription borne equally by all social groups."

Despite, or perhaps in part because of, the deeply entrenched civilian and military Imperial bureaucracy, Dmitrii Miliutin sought to rectify the contradiction between the social stature of the Russian military and the army's capability to effectively perform its national security responsibilities. The principal mechanism for making the required sharp break with past Russian social policy -- described by William C. Fuller, Jr., as "Miliutin's greatest achievement" -- was the Conscription Law of January 1, 1874. The impetus for initiating Russian universal military conscription derived neither from humanitarian concerns nor from libertarian idealism. Rather, after Prussia decisively crushed Austria in 1866, military pragmatism dictated that a failure to imitate Prussia,

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265 Florinsky, p. 907.
which would emerge as the dominant military force in the German Empire by 1871, would risk future military disaster for Russia.266

The 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War had a most illustrative and edifying impact on Russian thinking about future war. During the course of that war, the decisive influence of improved-accuracy, longer-range artillery on the outcome of battle repeatedly was demonstrated.267 The war also revealed that massive employment of individual rifle fire succeeded in stopping infantry bayonet charges. However, these revelations only belated would began to seriously influence Russian military thought and combat operations.268

On November 7, 1870, War Minister Miliutin first suggested to Tsar Aleksandr II the need to alter the Russian conscription laws in a note entitled "O glavnykh osnovanniakh voennoi povinnosti" (About the Main Basis for Military Duty). In the introduction of this letter, Miliutin described his rationale for initiating universal military service:

266 Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," p. 38 and pp. 61-71; see also Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob oborone Rossii," p. 14, in TsGIA. f. VUA: Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'ствоватьm Gosudaria Imperatora. 28 fevralia, 3, 8, 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g., p. 80; also Fuller, p. 11.

267 For a War Ministry report, dated January 1, 1873, about "the decisive significance, which artillery has shown on battle results in the latest Prussian-French war," see TsGIA. Kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva, No. 1 (L), No. 18, p. 103; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 162.

In recent years the occurrence of changes in almost all European states in the organization of their armed forces presents to them the capability, of not increasing the numerical size of their armies in peacetime, [but] to elevate them in wartime to enormous levels, raises the question of accordingly strengthening our troops also.269

After developing this logic in detail, the conclusion of Miliutin’s letter offered a seven-point proposal, which Miliutin called "Proekt osnovykh nachal polozheniia o lichnoi voennoi povinnosti" ("Draft Basis to Begin Regulations on Personal Military Obligations").270

Upon review of Miliutin’s proposal, on November 17, 1870 an Imperial Order was published announcing the formation of two commissions: 1) for working out Regulations concerning Military Obligations; and 2) for composing Regulations concerning Reserve, Replacement, and Local Troops. Oversight of this new taxis, with its potentially far-reaching implications, was vested in the War Ministry, with Chief of the Main Staff Count Geiden chairing both commissions. Membership included representatives from all main state ministries. The Military Obligations Commission had as members War Ministry representatives General-Majors Klugin, Obruchev, Anichkov, and Annenkov; Navy representatives -- Kontr-Admiral Stetsenko and Kapitan Pervogo Ranga Sveshnekov; Internal Affairs -- Semenov and Makov; Finance Ministry -- Girs and Demontovich; and, somewhat later,

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270 For a detailed enumeration of the seven points proposed in Miliutin’s "Draft Basis" for initiation of new regulations on universal military service, see TsGIAL, f. Soveta ministrov, d. No. 83, 1870 g., pp. 29-30; cited in Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy..., pp. 305-306.
several army unit representatives joined in the discussions -- General-Adjutant Shnitnikov, Prince Masal'skii, General-Lieutenant Sukhodol'skii, and General-Major Zeime.\(^{271}\) As these commissions set about their deliberations, on December 10, 1870 the issues of universal military service and army reorganization initially were discussed by the Council of Ministers. Miliutin noted about this meeting in his *Vospominanija* that the ministers "were not opposed to the basic idea of the plan,"\(^{272}\) however, over the ensuing months and years leading up to the 1873 'secret society' decisions, intense, substantive opposition developed to proposed conscription reforms. The first indications of the depth of this opposition to change within the Council of Ministers came on December 20, 1870 in their "fundamental directive": "... Substitution or excusal from military service is not conceded. On what basis the presently existing substitutions temporarily can be retained as a transition measure is subject to decision."\(^{273}\)

On January 5, 1871 the renamed "Commission for Creating New Regulations Concerning Personal Military Obligations in the Empire and in the Polish Kingdom" set to work with expanded civilian representation, including industrialists Sazikov and Morozov, the chief St. Petersburg politician Pogrebov, provincial representatives,


the director of the St. Petersburg Conservatory Azanchevskii, doctor of philosophy Zeiberling, Professor Khvol’son, and Baron Gintsburg. To facilitate their efforts to draft a recommendation for the Tsar, the Commission was divided into four subcommissions and each were assigned separate topics to investigate: 1) the length of service and the privileges for fulfilling military duty; 2) induction age for service, the call-up system, and conditions for initiating induction; 3) financial expenses of the induction system; and 4) voluntary service and military substitutes. The essential issue the Commission sought to resolve was the possibility of reducing the existing army service obligation from 15 years, down to six years, active duty (seven years for the navy), followed by nine years of reserve duty. For two years this commission deliberated, labored and pondered over its task of reforming the conscription system and on January 19, 1873 finally concluded its efforts by presenting to the State Council a broad recommendation for a plan to implement "Statutes (Ustava) concerning military obligations and Regulations (Polozheniia) concerning the state militia [territorial army]."

The State Council, in turn, distributed the commission report 'for comment' to the ministerial departments and to senior-level administrators. The planned statutes were subjected to extensive individual modification -- depending on the whims and personal proclivities of the individual reviewers -- as each 'fiefdom' sought

275 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 314; For an account of the deliberations leading up to the commission recommendation, see pp. 308-314.
to protect its own interests. At the forefront of opposition to the 1873 draft statutes was Education Minister, Count D. A. Tol’stoi, with whom War Minister Miliutin conducted an extensive dialogue in an effort to ameliorate Tol’stoi’s objections and to incorporate his recommendations concerning the curtailment of military service obligations in exchange for completion of education.\textsuperscript{276} Miliutin at long last was able to deliver the revised statutes concerning military duty to the State Council on March 6, 1873. Along with the statutes Miliutin sent a brief note stating that he concurred in the changes which, in reality, altered only minor details and not the overall substance of his proposed conscription reform.\textsuperscript{277}

On April 2, 1873 the War Ministry’s revised plan for military service statutes evoked a "heated debate" during discussions in a 'special session' of the State Council that was chaired by Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, and which included important members of the royal family, along with State-Secretary Baluev, the ministers of court, war, finance, internal affairs, education, navy, the chief of police, the counselor for Polish Kingdom affairs, and the state internal affairs counselor, Prince Gorchakov.\textsuperscript{278} Prince Gorchakov called the proposed "gradual implementation" of the conscription reforms a "dangerous reversal of the people’s existence" which would "rapidly raise the education level of the population." Gorchakov continued, asserting that the Russian people were neither as well

educated nor as amenable to change as the Prussians and that, in his opinion, it was preferable to "call into the army ranks young people who were not bound by thoughts about the necessity to fulfill military duties, [who] never have any anxiety about their unsatisfactory new situation...."

General Miliutin's rejoinder apparently eliminated concerns about any adverse impact on army discipline that might be caused by broadened educational opportunities, and Gorchakov received no support from the other meeting participants. At the conclusion of the State Council 'Osobogo prisutstviia,' the most important changes to the commission plan for introducing new military service laws and regulations were: 1) the period of service in the navy and separate localities was established at 10 years, following seven years of active service and three years in the reserves; 2) for individuals who completed a higher course of education, the period of active service was shortened from 10 to 6 months; 3) for volunteers who had completed middle school, the service obligation remained at 6 months; 4) the retirement age was reduced from age 40 to age 38; 5) the special restrictions concerning military service by people of the Jewish faith were removed; and finally, the total length of active and reserve duty for those individuals who completed middle or higher education courses was set at 15 years.280

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Tsar Aleksandr still had to approve the Gosudarstvenii Sovet decisions and, unfortunately, Education Minister D. A. Tol'stoi was not particularly well satisfied with the outcome of the 'special session.' Tol'stoi renewed his struggle against the statutes by blatantly contriving an outrageously lengthy list of conditions and requirements that he wanted incorporated before he would support the conscription reform law. Baron Del'vig recalls in his memoirs that Count Tol'stloi started with "52 printed pages of demands."281 The essence of Tol'stoi's objective -- which delayed initiation of the conscription law by over six months, in a running battle of letters and arguments -- was to preserve the existing educational system, which intentionally denied to the broad masses of the Russian population the opportunity for more than basic reading and writing skills, while excluding individuals with higher education from any military service obligation.

As the dispute with Count Tol'stroi protracted and stalemated, War Minister Miliutin's recourse was to write to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, the 'special session' chairman, charging that Tol'stroi's demands "contain so much incorrect data and unfounded arguments that it will be completely impossible to prepare refutations in the short time available."282 Konstantin Nikolaevich apparently had experienced enough of Count Tol'stroi's maneuvering delays, acted swiftly, and the very next day, on the morning of


December 3, 1873, Tsar Aleksandr II approved the planned universal military service statutes -- before the whole State Council could even began discussions on them later that day. 283 Since Miliutin could not have been looking forward to the bitter confrontations and imminent contested defense of his conscription reform proposal before the whole State Council, he obviously was quite relieved to have the deadlocked military service issue decided, and exclaimed in his Dnevnik this day: "Dai bog, chtoby tak bylo!" --("Thank God, that this was so!"). 284

Still, throughout the month of December hearings before the State Council were held -- even though the Tsar's decision made them largely irrelevant, save as a political stage and public rostrum -- and it was not until January 1, 1874 that Tsar Aleksandr II confirmed his approval of the "Ustav o voinskoi povinnosti" (Military Service Law) before the assembled State Council and signed the manifesto putting that law into effect. 285 As a result of the 1874 law on universal military conscription, General Miliutin individually, and the entire Russian people more particularly, won an epic battle for social progress and equality.

The fundamental concept of Miliutin's 1874 military service law was to substitute the large and costly standing Imperial Army with a considerably smaller cadre force, possessing significant trained reserves that could be mobilized for wartime service. Under the new,

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universal conscription law, Russian military service became the personal legal obligation of every able-bodied male, regardless of social status, upon reaching age twenty. Six years of active service were to be followed by nine years of service in the army reserve, followed by five more years of service in the militia -- a total of twenty years of mandatory service to the state. The reserve and militia units, however, only would be called to active duty in the case of national emergencies. 

Unique to these lengthy terms of service, the 1874 law deducted time from the required service period based upon the educational level attained by the recruit:

The higher the level of education, the shorter the term of service with the colors. The conscription law, then, was both an act of military reform and an act of social reform, since Miliutin hoped with its aid to drive the peasantry of Russia into the schools. The act of 1874 was the quintessential illustration of Miliutin's reformism: while using the resources of the Empire to modernize the army, Miliutin also wished to use the resources of the army to modernize the Empire. 

In practice, there were numerous loopholes in the 1874 Law on universal military service. Not all twenty-year-old males were drafted. Instead, each individual was categorized according to his family status (for example: single, married, only son), and selection for active service was made by a lottery drawing that inducted men in the order in which their number was drawn until the annual quota was filled. Special privileges were given to 'educated' individuals who held academic diplomas. Elementary school graduates were required to

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286 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchaniia...", pp. 3-4 and pp. 13-14; see also Florinsky, p. 908.

287 "Zakliuchenii sekretnogo soveshchaniia...", p. 12; see also Fuller, p. 11.
serve only four years; secondary school graduates served from three years down to eighteen months, depending on the stature of the institution at which they had been matriculated; and completion of higher education was rewarded with a brief six-month service obligation. Further, if graduates of secondary and higher schools volunteered for military duty, their terms of service were halved -- a very brief three-month military service 'respite' for the university graduates who, anyway, tended to belong to the nobility and proprietary classes.288

Therefore in reality, and despite Miliutin’s best intentions, which did in fact give to the only-recently-freed serfs an incentive and opportunity for some upward social mobility, the obligation for military service continued to fall most heavily upon the uneducated peasantry. Yet, during the first seven years after its implementation, the 1874 Law on Military Conscription succeeded in raising by over 50 percent the number of individual Russians who received a basic education and in creating an expanded military reserve available for wartime mobilization289 -- just as Generals Miliutin and Obruchev originally had intended and proposed. The following table documents this progress:

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288 Florinsky, p. 908.
289 Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennyje reformy..., p. 334; for the detailed proposals for expanded Russian Army mobilization capability, see Obruchev, N. N., "Dannye dlia otsenki vooruzhennykh sil Rossii," pp. 165-170; also Obruchev, N. N., "Soobrazheniia ob obrone Rossii," pp. 19-20 and 38, in TsGVIAM, f. VU, Materialy sekretnogo soveshchaniia pod minym predsedatel'ostvom Gosudariia Imperatora, 28 fevrnia, 3, 8, 10 i 31 Marta 1873 g., pp. 83 and 93.
DATA on 1874 Universal Military Service Law Implementation

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<th>YEAR</th>
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Moreover, in 1875 General Miliutin initiated a training program for new recruits that schooled them not only in the martial arts and unit tactics, but also began to give them rudimentary reading and writing skills. This new military emphasis on the completion of an education, accompanied by the softening of brutal discipline, the shortening of terms of service, and the improvement of living conditions, made the Imperial Army into an experimental vehicle for the betterment of the Russian masses.

By the end of Dmitrii A. Miliutin's distinguished and lengthy term of office in 1881, the Imperial Russian Army was no longer a hated penal institution. Indeed, men with criminal records were specifically excluded from military service. Although hardly universally welcomed by members of the old Russian military aristocracy, the significance of the Miliutin reforms cannot be exaggerated. Professor Michael T. Florinsky summarized the contradictory significance of these innovative military reforms most clearly when he wrote: "Strange as this may seem, it was in the army, that stronghold of tradition and conservatism, that Russian democracy scored one of its first modest, yet real, successes."  

The best examination of military reform is, naturally, war.  

- General P. A. Zaionchkovskii

... Against us will be all of Europe.  

- General N. N. Obruchev

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291 Florinsky, p. 909.
The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878): The Outcome and Lasting Significance

The 1877 failures perhaps yielded more uses than would have been brought forth by one brilliant success, which would have hidden our deficiencies.294

- Colonel Pavel A. Geisman

As indicated by Colonel Geisman's pensive statement, the greatest long-term significance of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War lay in the influence that a series of crushing defeats had on the thinking of the Russian Army leadership -- even though, ostensibly, Russia 'won' the war, which was concluded by the Treaty of San Stefano on February 19, 1878.295 As a result, Bulgaria was freed from the 'Ottoman Yoke,' while Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro obtained their full independence, but at a truly frightful cost of Russian lives and the virtual destruction of the Russian economy.

During the remainder of the 19th century and well into the beginning of the 20th century, the military failures inflicted major, detrimental political, diplomatic, and economic consequences on the Russian Empire. However, within the War Ministry and Main Staff, the military defeats ignited an unprecedented introspective comprehensive


295 For an excellent, concise, and well-documented analysis and description of Russian combat operations during the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War, complete with maps of the major campaigns, see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The Russian Imperial Army, 1861-1914, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 51-86.
investigation and analysis, not just of the causes of these Russian military failures, but of the very nature of warfare itself. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 thus constituted a virtual turning point in Russian military thinking, after which previous "ad hoc" preparation for warfare was no longer acceptable and systematic, dialectic historical research was adopted as essential for the discovery and rigorous application of 'fundamental laws of warfare' to all military activities.

In 1879, at the instigation of General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, the General Staff Historical Commission was created under the direction of General-Major Zykov (after 1885, under General-Major Domontovich). For 32 years, between 1879 and 1911, the historical commission conducted exhaustive investigations of Russian military preparation for war. *Sbornik materialov po russko-turetskoi voine 1877-1878 gg. no Balkanskom poluostrove*, the largest publication ever printed in Tsarist Russia, was completed in 1911, incorporating 500,000 documents culled from the army division level to the General Staff level and compiled into 97 volumes and 112 books. The underlying assumption concerning future war preparation was then, and continues to be to the present day, that only through the 'correct' interpretation and application of 'laws of warfare' can Russian security be ensured.²⁹⁶

Russian involvement on the Balkan Peninsula stemmed from its long historic, political and religious ties with their fellow Slavs, particularly with the Serbs. In the 1860s and 1870s, especially to

the time of the assassination of Serbian Prince Mikhail Obrenovic in 1868, a rising wave of Pan-Slavism actively promoted the creation of an enlarged Slavic state in the Balkans by incorporating Montenegro and Bulgaria under Serbian auspices and Russian protection. In 1875 the Balkan crisis erupted anew, when Slavic peasants in Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against their Muslim landlords, and Turkish troops forcefully suppressed them. In Russia, this action by their longstanding Turkish enemy caused angry indignation and swelling public pressure for the independence of the Balkan Slavs. Thus, "during the spring of 1876, when Turkish irregulars massacred as many as 30,000 Bulgarians,"297 who had joined the insurrection against the Turks, Russian Pan-Slav "agitation reached a fever pitch" as "retired and furloughed Russian officers entered Serbian military service."298

Although Serbia and Montenegro went to war with Turkey in the summer of 1876, the Serb resistance quickly collapsed, which caused Russia to force an armistice on Turkey in October 1876. In January 1877 Turkey rejected outright the recommendation of the 'Great Power' conference held in Constantinople at the end of 1876, which proposed the creation of autonomous Christian provinces in European Turkey. Despite ensuing, frantic diplomatic activity to preclude war, which resulted in the London Protocol of March 1877, Romania agreed to permit Russian troops to transit across its territory on April 4. On April 12, 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey.299

297 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets..., pp. 51-52.
298 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets..., p. 52.
In 1877 the Russian Army was not numerically inferior to the Turkish Army, but the Russian Army suffered from very grievous shortcomings. Neither the 1873 'secret society' army reorganization decisions nor the 1874 conscription reforms, which sought to improve both the quality and effectiveness of the Russian military system, had been implemented fully by the beginning of the Russo-Turkish War. This resulted in a severe shortage of Russian reserve officers and trained cadres. Russian Army rearmament had not been completed either. This caused the majority of the infantry to continue to be armed with the old-fashioned muzzleloading rifles and the field artillery to be equipped with antiquated smooth-bore cannon. The majority of Turkish units had modern rifled weapons. In Bruce W. Menning's considered judgement, the extended Battle of Plevna was, 

... an epic confrontation ... between Russian and Turk for Balkan hegemony. More than any other set of circumstances, it was Plevna that would reveal the yawning gap between offense and defense opened by changes in technology, including chiefly the widespread adoption of breechloading rifles.

Russian medical and supply services were still as inefficient as ever, even with Miliutin's reform efforts. These organizational failures were compounded by inadequate railroads and highways in the theaters of operations, and by ever-lengthening communication lines, which naturally increased as the Russian Army pushed forward into the Balkan Peninsula. Not least among the multitude of Russian Army failures were compounded by inadequate railroads and highways in the theaters of operations, and by ever-lengthening communication lines, which naturally increased as the Russian Army pushed forward into the Balkan Peninsula. Not least among the multitude of Russian Army

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301 Menning, p. 60.
difficulties was their lack of good military leaders and the absence of unity of command.\textsuperscript{302} Between June and December 1877, with Tsar Aleksandr himself, and the Imperial Court, continuously present at the European Front, field commanders deferred all complicated strategic decisions to Imperial Headquarters, where the "power politics" of court intrigue tended to take precedence over sound military decisions, or to winning the war.\textsuperscript{303}

The most glaring deficiency of the Russian Army -- and certainly the one that caused the most casualties to the maneuver columns and the attack 'lines' -- was in applied tactics. The Russian field commanders pressed the offensive, misapplying their rote erroneous interpretations of Suvorov's attack formations, by using 'decisive' infantry bayonet charges, unsupported by artillery or rifle fire, against fortified enemy positions defended with superior weaponry. The Russian high command ignored the impact that technological innovation had made on warfare during the century which had elapsed since the time when Suvorov's aggressive tactics had succeeded so brilliantly.\textsuperscript{304}

The army reorganization approved by the 'secret society' had not been implemented -- save for the development of a mobilization plan. At the end of 1875, a special army mobilization committee was created, composed of heads of all main directorates of the War Ministry and chaired by Chief of the Main Staff Count Geiden, for


\textsuperscript{303} Florinsky, pp. 1002-1003.

the sole purpose of resolving three specific tasks: first, to clarify systematically all data and information concerning the preparation of active army personal and unit equipment; second, to investigate problem areas and to direct corrective measures that had to be taken in order to remove any deficiencies discovered; and third, to create a "complete mobilization plan.”

During the early months of 1876, the mobilization committee completed its first two tasks, and, not later than May 1876, was to present to the War Ministry its final "complete mobilization plan." However, in the spring of 1876, the exigencies of the growing threat of war caused the committee to redirect its work from mobilization planning toward actual war preparations. In the summer of 1876, Mobilization Directive No. 6 was published as a plan for calling up and equipping reserve units as well as for moving soldiers, horses, and equipment to forward concentration areas by railroad. Included in this directive was a compilation of data on the wartime logistic requirements for ten of the military districts. The most important measure taken to ensure a successful mobilization, however, was the October 16, 1876 publication of the "Law concerning Military-Horse Obligations" which stipulated that in the case of war "all horses fit for military service were subject to mobilization with corresponding compensation to their owners.”

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At the end of 1876 -- in accordance with the 'secret society' decisions -- the Russian Army was organized into six army corps and, with the completion of the mobilization, during the course of 1877 an additional nine army corps were formed. Each of the 15 active army corps fielded between two and three infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and an artillery brigade. The greatest command difficulty was not in forming the army corps themselves -- plenty of raw peasant 'line' (riadovoi) manpower was available -- but in finding qualified reserve officers to lead the troops of the newly formed units into battle.

In anticipation of the increased wartime requirement for officers, at the end of 1875, Miliutin initiated three measures that resulted in expansion of the officer corps by a total of 5805 men. Miliutin ordered: 1) the call-up of 2555 retired officers; 2) the early graduation of 2515 students from the junker schools; and 3) the promotion of 700 sergeants and non-commissioned officers to the officer ranks, without an examination. Still, throughout the war the Russian Army suffered from a severe officer shortage -- all officers, let alone 'qualified' officers -- particularly in the 'line' infantry battalions, which incurred the heaviest combat casualties.307

Miliutin's efforts to establish a functional reserve officer cadre failed because insufficient manpower and financial resources were committed to the objective until it was too late to be accomplished, at any cost. He had first proposed a reserve officer

cadre in his January 15, 1862 report to the Tsar. That the Russian mobilization succeeded in organizing such a large force so quickly was primarily the result of the existence of the military district system and the fact that in 1874 Miliutin formed in each military district a "mobilization institute" and required all unit commanders to attend the course.308

Paradoxically, the most glaring deficiency of the mobilization process also originated from the manner in which the military district system was organized. The Field Regulations directed that all supplies for an army would be provided through the frontier military districts:

With the movement of the army beyond the borders of the Empire, when management of bringing in supplies through the frontier military district directorates will be inconvenient for the field directorates, as a matter of necessity local intendancy, artillery, and engineer directorates will be established in areas occupied by the army, which are to be titled appropriately for that city or point where they are located.309

Unfortunately, the Field Regulations neither stipulated how, nor by whom, these field logistics and supply directorates would be created nor to whom they would be subordinated -- to the military district commander or to the War Ministry? And, as a result, "during the initial period of war no local directorates were created and the field armies had no supply bases."310

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It was not until the end of September 1877 -- nearly ten months after the Russian Army initially began its mobilization -- that General Drentel'n succeeded in organizing the 'rear services' directorate. Only in November 1877 was a local supply directorate established in Bucharest, Romania; and in December 1877 -- when the war was within a month of conclusion -- was a supply directorate organized in northern Bulgaria. In sum, throughout the Russo-Turkish War, the Russian Army logistics system, if indeed it remotely could be called a system, was in chaos. Yet, Professor Bruce Menning's description of the significance of the final campaign of the war is most illuminating regarding the innate ability of the Imperial Army to improvise and to learn from its experiences:

Overall, in the trans-Balkan campaign the Russians had recouped their fortunes by accomplishing one of the most daring feats in modern military history. They had driven the elements of three large columns (Gurko, Kartsov, Radetskii) through the Balkans under conditions which saw trails covered with ice and snow measuring up to four meters in depth. They had utilized surprise and turned to their advantage both superiority in numbers and failure of the Turkish field forces to assure one another mutual support. In most cases the Russians had overcome strong defensive positions either by envelopment or by maneuver. In a word, the Russians had convincingly overcome the paralysis of Plevna.

General Dmitrii A. Miliutin's January 1, 1879 annual report to Tsar Aleksandr II genteelly summarized the gravely deplorable combat condition of the Russian Army. The War Minister wrote:

Any war, essentially, summons forth a striving toward transformation and improvement in the construction and upkeep of the armed forces: it suggests the best means in order to control [that which] already has been done and

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312 Menning, pp. 77-78.
the best indications of those notions that are still to be done. In this regard the experience of the immediately past war must not pass without leaving a trace for our army...\textsuperscript{313}

As early as January 1, 1878, however, General Miliutin had rather candidly expressed his dissatisfaction with what could only be labeled politely as "serious deficiencies in combat capability" when he wrote: "The present campaign also revealed several imperfections of our troops' tactical training."\textsuperscript{314} In another report Miliutin stated his misgivings somewhat more objectively and forcefully:

It is impossible not to confess, that our infantry, although with a glorious concluding campaign, and taught 'by the book' using information published up to the Franco-Prussian War, displayed [its] customary 'first class,' not considering rapid-firing weapons tactics.\textsuperscript{315}

Revised and improved troop training became a main focus of the Russian Army leadership at the end of the war, and therefore between 1879 and 1880 the "Main Committee for Troop Formation and Training" was tasked to prepare new infantry and cavalry combat regulations concerning "instruction of active companies and battalions in battle." In 1879 the committee recommended that the company become the "principal tactical entity" in combat and that all companies in the attack 'line' fire once at the enemy from a distance of 800 paces.

\textsuperscript{313} TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 27, pp. 4-5; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, pp. 350-351.

\textsuperscript{314} TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 25, p. 70; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, p. 356.

\textsuperscript{315} TsGVIA. f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva. No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 27, p. 80; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voenny reformy...}, p. 356.
before initiating the 'decisive' bayonet charge. This was heresy to the traditional Russian infantry attack concept and the pages of 

*Voennyi sbornik* subsequently became the battleground of a debate between the reformers of the committee and General M. I. Dragomirov, the stalwart proponent of the traditional Russian 'line' tactics and frontal bayonet assaults.

Dragomirov was renowned for his emphasis on three key elements of combat tactics, as enshrined in his book *Zapiski taktiki dlia voennykh uchilishch*, (St. Petersburg, 1866), which were close order maneuver, decisive bayonet attack, and soldier self-sacrifice. Characteristically, at a time when technological change had revealed new conditions of warfare that demanded far greater independent action by individual soldiers to achieve battlefield success, Dragomirov evaded the issue of combat casualties and advocated the maintenance of the existing Russian combat tactics -- employing the same stereotyped infantry formations that he had dictated in his book. Dragomirov wrote:

The customary performance by our troops in the last war, which did not fully account for rapid-firing weapons tactics, is unjustly described by the regulations.... It is impossible not to remark about a matter that is not in the regulations, such as the use of troops for peacetime occupations.317

Other authors, published in this same *Voennyi sbornik*, No. 3, 1879, such as 28th Division Commander, General-Lieutenant Brand,

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suggested that the new regulations did not go far enough in changing infantry combat tactics to account for rapid-fire weapons and for their impact on the changing nature of warfare. Without exception, however, the authors disagreed with the committee’s proposal for the infantry to shoot only once at a distance of 800 steps as being "unacceptable." As a result of this blatant, continuing lack of Imperial Russian Army leadership consensus, neither new infantry nor new cavalry regulations were officially adopted before 1881.

Despite changes in the overall manner of infantry training, the combat preparation of the Russian Army continued to have serious deficiencies that were demonstrated during the 1880 field maneuvers of the Warsaw and Vil’no military districts. The War Ministry report stated:

By outward appearance, combat training, material equipment, and general technical preparation the troops in both districts are in excellent condition; concerning the actual maneuvers, the majority of senior commanders up to and including the regimental commanders showed unfamiliarity with command functions, not knowing how to use local objects, the peculiarities of special weapons types, the special characteristics of cavalry, and to maintain constant communication with the combat units.

As demonstrated by these maneuvers, at least, twenty-four years of Miliutin's military reform efforts and the humbling Russo-Turkish war experiences were all for nought -- the Imperial Russian Army remained bound by tradition and seemingly was totally incapable of adapting to

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a new military art. Emerging technologies were dictating that for soldiers to survive, let alone to win, on the battlefields during any future war, a transformation was vital.

The immediate aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War experience revealed clearly that the Russian Army was incapable of conducting successful wartime operations against an alliance of opponents in a 'big European war.' The most important change indicated was in the organization and employment of reserve forces, which the 1873 'secret society' decisions had determined would be formed only in wartime for providing logistic support to the active army. The Russo-Turkish War demonstrated that reserve units were required to reinforce active units during combat operations and that, in peacetime, it was essential to maintain an active reserve cadre upon which to expand the army in wartime.\textsuperscript{320} This determination resulted in the introduction on August 15, 1878 of new "Regulations on Reserve Infantry Troops," which stipulated that the reserve infantry would be employed to "reinforce the active army by maintaining garrisons in fortresses and other fortified points and by employment for local internal service."\textsuperscript{321}

Further, the 1878 "Regulations" provided for the maintenance, in peacetime, of 96 separate infantry battalions with five companies of 80 soldiers each -- a total of 400 men per battalion. In wartime, it was planned that each company would expand into a whole battalion

\textsuperscript{320} Zaionchkovskii, P. A., \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 351.

\textsuperscript{321} \textit{Polnoe sobranie zakonov}, 2-e sobranie, 1878, No. 58805; cited in Zaionchkovskii, \textit{Voennye reformy...}, p. 351.
forming a total of 480 battalions; of which 384 battalions would be organized into 96 infantry regiments, creating a total of 24 reserve infantry divisions. Thus, the new regulations planned for the expansion of the Russian Army from 48 active peacetime divisions to 72 wartime infantry divisions -- a 50 percent increase in strength, or some 500,000 soldiers. Then between 1878 and 1880 all infantry regiments were reorganized into the four-battalion structure, as originally approved by the 'secret society' in 1873. In January 1879 Miliutin proposed that a total of 2,100,000 reservists were required in order to reinforce the active army and to defend Russia in the event of a 'big European war.' Later the State Council revised this figure downward to 1,700,000 reservists because the Council judged that a larger reserve force would have necessitated the "complete reconstruction of the cadre army."\(^{322}\)

At the end of 1880 a new mobilization plan, designated No. 8, was published which specified the order in which 825,000 reservists would be called to active duty, forming a wartime army of 1,425,000 soldiers. This same plan provided for the further expansion of the wartime Russian Army to a grand total of 2,350,000 troops through subsequent mobilizations. The main problem with Plan No. 8 was that by the end of 1880 there were only 1712 officers and generals in the whole Russian Army and the new mobilization plan required 19,000 officers for its execution.\(^{323}\) This terrible plan deficiency was

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\(^{322}\) Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 352.

\(^{323}\) TsGVTs, f. kantseliarii Voennogo ministerstva, No. 1 (L), opis' 2-ia, d. 31, pp. 13-14; cited in Zaionchkovskii, P. A., Voennye reformy..., p. 353.
recognized in advance by the War Ministry, and at the beginning of 1880 new "Regulations concerning Officer Reserves" were introduced that required all officers to serve in the reserves following completion of their active tours of duty. There continued, however, to be a severe shortage of officers, and the new 1880 "Regulation" did not even begin to address the most serious problem, which was the continuing poor quality of reserve officers. Overall, during the immediate post-war period many of the 1873 'secret society' decisions were belatedly implemented -- with one major exception. By the time War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin left office in 1881, not one of the recommended strategic railroad lines, so meticulously designed and justified by General N. N. Obruchev, for connecting the European military districts had been constructed -- not one.\(^\text{32}\)  

For the Russian military the costly, indeed embarrassing, 'victory' over Turkey presaged an extended period of extreme fiscal austerity. After the inauguration of Tsar Aleksandr III in 1881, the priority of army equipment modernization, which the senior military leaders so strongly desired and the Russian Army so badly required, was reduced and became exceedingly difficult. Immediately after the Russo-Turkish War, however, during the three years while Tsar Aleksandr II still ruled the Empire, the Russian Army retained its top priority in the state budget queue.  

Combat action during the Russo-Turkish War had proven that the Russian artillery, in particular, was inferior in range and rate of fire to that of contemporary European states. Thus, only half way

into the war, on July 24, 1877 a special commission, chaired by General Barantsev, was organized to address the problem of weapons modernization. General Barantsev’s commission quickly came up with a three-year plan on October 2, 1877 to modernize the whole Russian field artillery by replacing the existing four-pound cannon with 3550 new nine-pound Maievskii cannons that had a superior range and rate of fire. However, because of production difficulties and inferior workmanship at the Obukhovsk factory, by January 1, 1881 only 276 of the 358 active artillery batteries were rearmed. None of the reserve artillery batteries had received the new cannons. Barantsev’s plan also called for increasing the quantity of heavy fortress artillery to 4567 cannons, but in the January 1, 1881 inventory of fortress artillery there were only 3838. The major success of the Russian Army rearmament program was due to the mechanization of domestic rifle production process in the late 1870s, which greatly increased annual rifle production output. As a result, by 1881 all active and reserve infantry units were reequipped with new small-caliber firearms with greatly improved the accuracy and rate of fire. At the end of 1880 the Russian Army firearm inventory was as follows:

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Because of the imminent military austerity period, it is important to note that by 1881 not all army units were standardized with the small-caliber Berdan rifles and that the rapid-firing magazine-fed infantry weapons, which then were being introduced into the armies of the other European states, still had not been purchased for the Russian Army -- nor would they be for some time. 

In sum, following the assumption of the Russian throne and the historic 'Crown of Monomakh' by Aleksandr III, in 1881 a financially constrained period for the Russian Army was ushered in. During the last two decades of the 19th century, the Russian officer corps was caused to turn inward and introspectively to look at their entire method of conducting military operations. In turn, this intellectual investigation of alternatives led to innovative, even brilliant.

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1880 Russian Army Firearm Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Military Units</th>
<th>In Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small-Caliber rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry (Berdan No. 2)</td>
<td>1,481,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Berdan No. 1)</td>
<td>3,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>51,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>127,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbines</td>
<td>16,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KrnK Rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>258,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Brand New' Rifles</td>
<td>40,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Russian military conceptual thought, especially within the General Staff and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. Military theoreticians investigated the entire spectrum of military strategy, science, art, and tactics that, in essence, continue to be the basic foundation for current Russian military thinking.

At the end of the XIX - beginning of the XX centuries, special branches of military-scientific knowledge developed significantly: military administration, military geography and military statistics, military pedagogics, military-technical disciplines. Russian military theoreticians engaged themselves very broadly concerning the question of military administration.

Through their determination, this branch of military scientific knowledge began to investigate the following questions: army organization, its composition, military command arrangements, individual service requirements, measures for securing internal order and discipline in the troops and, finally, satisfaction of army material requirements.

The dependence of army composition, organization, and continuation of military service on state and social order and economic reserves was perceived.

The question of army mobilization and mobilization work in unit departments received great attention in the study of military administration.

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330 For a comprehensive history of the Russian General Staff and analysis of the military intellectual debates during the last half of the 19th century, see Erickson, John, "'New Thinking', Old Habits," in "Tsars, Generals, Commissars: The Russian General Staff 1716-199?," (Edinburgh, Scotland, [Unpublished Manuscript], 1994).

331 Zhilin, pp. 172-173.


334 Ridiger, A. F., Komplektovanie i ustroistvo vooruzhennoi sily, (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 543-565.
It was the failures of the Russian Army against the Turkish Army in 1877-1878 -- coming as they did some twenty years after all too similar Crimean War disasters, and, during the intervening years, General Dmitrii A. Miliutin's army reform efforts -- that prepared the stage at the close of the 19th century for the determined intellectual effort by the Russian military to find and to alleviate the causes of these gross failures that continually undermined Russian national security.

The 1890s Russian Military Renaissance: Technological Modernization and Military Science

Tekhniicheskii progress revoliutsioniziroval vse voennaia delo.
(Technical progress revolutionized all military matters.)

- Frederick Engels

Hindsight usually sharpens perceptions, and in retrospect the lessons of the Russo-Turkish War seem neither so obscure nor so controversial that they could not have been systematically studied to foster additional productive change within the tsarist army. However, the complexities of modern armies are such that perception of need is only one of a series of preconditions necessary for constructive change and adaptation. To begin, some kind of permanent mechanism must exist to study the past systematically for whatever lessons it might hold for future combat. Then, another mechanism must exist to translate lessons learned into changes of regulation and organization. Next, the political and military leadership has to display sufficient awareness of the need for constructive evolution in order to support change. Further, the leadership must exhibit the will and determination to implement and supervise change. A final important factor would be the existence of a disciplined and educated corps of military professionals, officers and noncommissioned officers, to oversee at all levels the actual implementation of change.33j

The initial investigations of the Russo-Turkish war focused on the tactical battlefield changes required by all branches of arms, the need for combat engineers, and the requirement to improve the soldiers' level of training. By the turn of the century, the focus expanded, under the rubric of military science, to include a broad

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historical investigation of the influence of social, economic, and political factors on the conduct of warfare. Particular initial concerns were the alteration of military art for the conduct of combat operations, the methods of accomplishing attacks, and the proper role for accurate rifle and artillery fire during the course of battle.

Writing in 1893 A. M. Zaionchkovskii discussed the results of his studies of Russian infantry tactics before Lovchei, Plevna, and Sheinovo. He found that the 'firing lines' were too crowded together; that there had been only "weak preparation for the attacks by rifle fire"; and especially, that "the infantry had begun continuous bayonet attacks too early -- at a distance [from the enemy] of nearly two verst." These antiquated tactics exposed the advancing infantry to continual, withering defensive rifle and artillery fire and resulted in enormous, unsustainable casualties.

Zaionchkovskii concluded, along with the other influential Russian military theorists of that time such as Epanchin and Martynov, that the most important tactical lesson of the war was the need to reorganize infantry units so that attacks could be conducted with the help of covering fires against enemy positions. Epanchin espoused the critical requirement for better educated commanders who knew how to concentrate their forces and to control the battle, since

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336 Zaionchkovskii, A. M., Nastupatel'nyi boi po opyt deistvii generala Skobeleva v srazheniakh pod Lovchei, Plevnoi (27-30 avgusta) i Sheinovo, (St. Petersburg, 1893).

337 Zhilin, p. 174.
at Plevna "huge masses of troops did not participate, occupying themselves with work in the rear or -- in even greater error -- did not participate in the main attack direction."\(^{338}\)

E. I. Martynov went even further, charging that the Russian Army High Command was so incompetent and negligent that it wasted forces and "practically had given up active operations on the Balkan Peninsula during the siege of Plevna."\(^{339}\) As a result of these analyses, and others like them, new tactics were introduced into the Russian Army which thinned out the infantry 'firing lines' so that the soldiers did not make such a concentrated target for gunfire. Improved communications were introduced between the commanders and their troops. A growing ground-swell began to build within the military intellectual cohort as "the majority of authors ... rejected the decisive role of the bayonet attack."\(^{340}\) Unfortunately, neither the Tsar nor his aristocratic senior military leaders understood the necessity for change that emerging military technologies dictated. Consequently, it would not be until the beginning of World War I that appreciable changes in Russian Army tactics could and would be made.

At the end of the 19th century the Industrial Revolution was well underway. With it came transmutations, which promoted a rapid increase in scientific knowledge and elevated industrial production, especially in the fields of railroad transportation, chemistry,

\(^{338}\) *Obzor voin Rossi ot Petra Velikogo do nashikh dnei*, (St. Petersburg, 1891), pp. 191-192.

\(^{339}\) Martynov, E. I., *Blokada Plevny: (Po arkhivnym materialam)*, (St. Petersburg, 1900), pp. 24-25.

\(^{340}\) Zhilin, p. 175.
physics, electricity, radio, telegraphy, aeronautics, and metallurgy -- all of which then were 'emerging technologies' to which the Russian military, along with all other armies, had to adapt. Whereas earlier in the 19th century the descending order of importance of the military branches of arms was infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the 1890s witnessed the accelerated ascending role of artillery and other technically trained troops, as more effective, and lethal, forms of combat were investigated, developed, and deployed. In addition, the range, accuracy and firepower of infantry weapons began to increase with the introduction of more powerful, smokeless gunpowder and the improved ballistics of pointed bullets to small caliber (7.62mm), magazine-fed (five rounds), bolt-action, rapid-firing rifles like the 1891 Mosin.

In 1895 the Russian Army began receiving the Belgian 7.62mm Nagan revolver system and the development of an infantry automatic weapon was initiated with machine pistols designed by V. G. Fedorov and F. B. Tokarev. Also in 1895 the Russian Army adopted the French Maxim machinegun system, but due to financial and political constraints the field deployment of this 'emerging technology' proceeded very slowly, almost leisurely, so that it was not until the eve of the First World War that the Russian Army was able to deploy a full total of eight machinegun regiments organized with 32 machineguns in each infantry division, and between six and twelve machineguns per cavalry division.\textsuperscript{341}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{341} Zhilin, pp. 16-17.}
Russian "artillery was perfected" during the 1890s with the development and initial deployment of more modern weapon types such as the 3-inch (76mm) rapid-firing field cannon Model 1902, which had a range of eight kilometers and a rate of fire of ten rounds per minute. Both the Model 1902 field cannon and its predecessor, the first Russian rapid-firing cannon, initially were developed at the Mikhailovskii Artillery Academy, which had been founded in 1855 during the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{342}

Additional Russian artillery systems under development at the turn of the century included the 122mm light field howitzer Model 1909, and heavy field artillery such as the 107mm cannon Model 1910 and the 152mm howitzer Model 1910. Mountain artillery was also under development, but only after the Russo-Japanese War revealed the requirement for this artillery type was it deployed as the 76mm cannon Model 1909. New fortress and siege artillery systems were being investigated but, again, it was not until after the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War fiasco that they were placed into production during the pre-World War I armaments build-up as the 152mm fortress howitzer Model 1909; the 152mm siege cannon Model 1910; the 203mm siege cannon Model 1911; and the 280mm siege mortar Model 1912.\textsuperscript{343}

During the last decades of the 19th century, Russian scientists -- along with a great number of renowned scientists world-wide -- were involved with the investigation, invention, and development of

\textsuperscript{342} Zhilin, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{343} \textit{Istoriia artillerii: Ot drevenikh vremen do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii v Rossii}, (Moscow, 1952), p. 242.
numerous technological breakthroughs that eventually would change dramatically the entire form, nature, and means of future warfare:

V. V. Petrov created the electro-magnetic telegraph; A. N. Lodygin developed the incandescent lamp; P. N. Iablochkov invented the electric light. Russian physicist A. S. Popov invented the radio. In 1895 he demonstrated in St. Petersburg the world's first working radio station and radio receiver. A. F. Mozhaikii patented the world's first aircraft in 1881. N. E. Zhukovskii presented the basis for modern hydro-aerodynamics. K. E. Tsiolkovskii developed the theory of jet engines. N. N. Benardos and N. G. Slavianov discovered the capability to arc-weld metals. D. K. Chernov laid the foundation for modern metallurgy.  

While such boastful Russian claims to the invention of all these technological innovations cannot be factually proven, it would perhaps be more objectively correct to state that noted Russian scientists were participating in the investigation of these new branches of science in last decades of the nineteenth century.

The invention of the gasoline-powered internal combustion engine, however, altered irrevocably the future course of warfare. The application of this new technology to vehicles opened the way, not only for previously unattainable army maneuver capabilities, but for the creation of armored vehicles and airplanes. In Russia the development of armored vehicles did not begin until immediately prior to World War I, but as early as 1902 motorized transport was deployed with the Kursk and Kiev maneuver armies and then employed during the Russo-Japanese War for purposes of communications, troop transfer, and the re-supply of ammunition and war materials. It was,
principally, the integration of internal combustion engines into airborne vehicles that truly revolutionized warfare by creating the possibility for armed combat within a whole new dimension, wherein time and space were compressed. The well-documented "world's first manned, powered, sustained, and controlled flight by a heavier-than-air vehicle" on December 17, 1903 by Dayton, Ohio's Orville Wright at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina aside, the Russians continue to claim that "A. F. Mozhaiskii invented and constructed the world's first airplane. On August 1, 1882 the Mozhaiskii aircraft took off and flew over the field."\[345\]

Mozhaiskii's apparent early Russian aeronautical success was not, somehow, followed-up by any indigenous aircraft development. Rather, Russian aeronautics tended to focus instead on the use of tethered balloons (aerostati) for battlefield reconnaissance and the use of dirigibles for ocean reconnaissance until well after the Russo-Japanese War.

In 1884 a military commission chaired by General M. M. Boreskov was established for the purpose of investigating "aeronautical applications, pigeon-carried mail, and out-of-reach observation for military objectives," and the first Russian aerostat development program was undertaken. In 1890 Boreskov's commission issued its report on "The Condition of Aeronautical Units," and only thereafter was the deployment of aerostati begun within the army, initially for


\[347\] Zhilin, p. 21.
observation purposes, and later to correct artillery fires.\textsuperscript{348}

In the meantime, in 1885 the first military aeronautics command cadre of twenty soldiers and two junior officers was created, and these aerostat units began taking part in large-scale military maneuvers in 1893 at Krasnoe Selo; the Kiev Military District in 1899; and at Kursk in 1902. Between 1894 and 1904 aeronautical units were manned by a grand total of 2085 soldiers, and between 1888 and 1904 training was provided to 163 officers, of whom six were naval officers, seven were from the Bulgarian Army, and one was a Serbian.\textsuperscript{349} It was not until 1910 -- nearly thirty years after Mozhaiskii's reported historic first flight and some seven years after the Wright brothers' 1903 documented first flight -- that the first Russian military aviation unit and officers' aeronautical school was formed at Gatchina near Moscow.\textsuperscript{350}

By the last decades of the 19th century, the fledgling field deployment of new telegraph, telephone, and radio communications technologies began to change the entire conduct of battle by greatly facilitating 'real-time' military command and control. These new communications technologies enabled the field commander to stay in direct contact with his higher headquarters, and expanded the information available both to the field commander and to his higher

\textsuperscript{348} Istoriia vozdukhoplonovaniia i aviatsii v SSSR: Po apkhivnym materialam i svidetel'stvam sobremenikov. Period do 1914 g., (Moscow, 1944), p. 270.

\textsuperscript{349} Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk veennogo vozdukhoplonovaniia v Rossii, (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 144.

\textsuperscript{350} Zhilin, p. 20.
headquarters upon which to make decisions, to issue direct orders to subordinate units, and thereby to control the course of battles in a more timely manner.

The first Russian Army application of these new means of communication was during the Russo-Turkish War -- over twenty years after the British and French succeeded in establishing a telegraph link between London, Paris, and the Crimean Peninsula -- when a 100-verst-long (60 km) telegraph system was activated to link Russian forward fortresses with their higher headquarters. In 1880 the first Russian line to carry both telegraph signals and voice was introduced. In 1884 telephones were first included in the Russian communication units' table of equipment (ToE). And during the ensuing years, telephones were installed inside the border fortresses to direct artillery fire. By 1890 the Warsaw, Brest-Litovsk, Novgorod, and Ivangorod fortresses had a total of 54 permanent and 22 temporary telephones. Although by 1904 each Russian division deployed in the Far East had assigned four field telephones, and some six kilometers of wire, it was only following the Russo-Japanese War that telegraph and telephone communications entered into general field use in the Russian Army.\footnote{Istoriia otechestvennoi artillerii, (Moscow and Leningrad, 1970), Vol. 2, Book 5, pp. 63-66.}

Since radio was the newest of the emerging communications technologies, only during the winter of 1899-1900 was its Russian inventor, A. C. Popov, able to put his radio to its first practical use by establishing contact with the shipwrecked Russian battleship
"General-Admiral Apraksin"; and then, following Popov's success, between 1900 and 1904 a total of 54 radio sets for communication with the Russian Fleet were installed at Kronstadt.332

Combat engineering also received increased emphasis in Russian military-technical thought. In 1893 the Nikolaev Engineering Academy, which had been founded in 1855, was tasked to create a military engineering educational program that would include in the curriculum not only construction and demolition of fortifications, but physics, chemistry, electricity, and mechanics. The Academy was also tasked to study methods for integrating combat engineers (sappers) with the other Russian Army branches -- infantry, cavalry, and artillery.333

During this same time frame, totally new types of explosives such as smokeless gunpowder, dynamite, and plastic were developed by chemists. Both pressure-sensitive and insensitive demolition mines were developed, as were anti-personnel shrapnel mines and electronic detonators, which allowed for mine detonation on command at the desired time without endangering one's own people. As a result of the increased combat effectiveness of these new explosive technologies and the increased educational emphasis that combat engineering received, the number of sapper battalions in the Russian Army slowly began to expand. By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Army had 2500 sappers, and ended the war with some

333 Zhilin, p. 54.
3500 engineering troops. All these aforementioned 19th century technical and weapons systems developments would have an immense impact on the means of combat and on the organization of Russian military forces -- eventually.

Stagnation of Applied Russian Military Art

Immense scientific and military-technical progress of the Industrial Revolution increasingly was unveiled on the world’s battlefields. Yet, prevailing Russian military principles throughout the 1890s, and well beyond the turn of the century, adhered to General M. I. Dragomirov’s badly misapplied interpretations of Suvorov’s 18th century maxims. Paraphrasing Suvorov, Dragomirov’s overarching basic principle was: "In war the main role belongs to man." As commander of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy between 1881 and 1890, Dragomirov successfully corrupted the minds of nearly a whole generation of Russian officers who, later as field commanders, would mechanically attempt to apply Dragomirov’s rules:

All troop education and training must be done to instil a very few ideas: 1) put upbringing above education; 2) proceed from analysis to synthesis, i.e., drill subjects to the sections, but do not stop at this, but permanently unite these sections into one, so that they are united by activity against the enemy; 3) drill expediently; 4) develop people’s attention to military assignments; 5) train them to meet the unexpected quickly, but not fussily; 6) conduct training so that not one step by them is contrary to your orders; 7) be familiar with the mutual peculiarities of various types of weapons;

Zhilin, p. 196.
8) conduct maneuvers so that [paraphrasing Suvorov] "each soldier knows his own maneuver"; 9) eliminate everything which promotes the development of self-preservation, and encourage everything which praises self-sacrifice, and then give them practice in overcoming the sensation of danger; 10) drill using demonstrations, and not by descriptions; 11) principally beware of using measures which would not be allowed in peacetime practice -- that is it, everything. All these ideas can be combined into one single idea: in upbringing and training conform the will and the minds of the men to yours.138

General Dragomirov continually, and most certainly until after the Russo-Japanese War, denied the possibility of the existence of a military science. In 1881, as he was assuming command of the General Staff Academy, he wrote: "At the present time no one in command can give confirmation whether or not military science can exist; it is inconceivable, exactly as are the inconceivable sciences: poetry, painting, music."357 With such a closed, troglodyte mentality rampant in the army leadership ranks, it was small wonder that the visionary military thinkers within the General Staff and General Staff Academy experienced grave personal and intellectual difficulties in attempting to reorient and to transform the Russian Army.

Among those who, in their own inimitable, if somewhat flawed way, attempted to introduce scientific analysis to Russian military thinking was Dragomirov's successor as Nikolaev General Staff Academy Commandant -- General A. G. Leer. Leer was convinced that in all military operations and experience there were 'fundamental laws' which, if discovered through rigorous historical research, and if

357 Dragomirov, M. I., Sbornik original'nykh i perevodnykh statei, (St. Petersburg, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 444.
studied, learned, and applied in the proper battlefield context, led inevitably to victory. Leer's two most influential publications in this regard were *Metod voennykh nauk* (The Method of Military Science) in 1894 and *Korennye voprosy* (Current Questions) in 1897.

As early as 1869, General Leer had written:

> Military science, as the theory of military art, has the task of establishing and clarifying laws, which create the foundation of military art, through the investigation of their elemental qualities, their influence on each other individually and in combination, depending on continually changing conditions.\(^{358}\)

Later, in *Korennye voprosy* he would perceptively observe that "without science there can be neither sound thought, nor inspiration, nor experimentation."\(^{359}\) General Leer emphasized that it was in the arena of military strategy that the "objective laws of warfare" had their greatest significance:

> Strategy in the broadest sense is a synthesis, an integration of all military subjects, its generalization, its philosophy. It presents information about warfare in one general channel from all scientific departments -- it is the science of all military sciences.\(^{360}\)

By searching for, and discovering, the 'eternal principles of war,' he was convinced that it was possible to strengthen the general understanding and fabric of Russian society at large. This he believed to be essential, because he had determined through his

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research that, it was only when the entire Russian people understood their history and supported the state's goals that they would be capable of being dependably trained as soldiers who would defend the state.\textsuperscript{361} Ironically, to the bitter end, Leer obstinately "continued to ignore the command genius of the great Russian commanders,"\textsuperscript{362} believing that all one needed to know about military strategy and warfare was written in the historical classics.

One of Leer's contemporaries, General A. K. Puzyrevskii, who would eventually become the Imperial Army Chief of Staff, pursued Leer's same general scheme of historical analysis by emphasizing the comprehensive nature of military history, but he stressed historical investigations as the means through which war was revealed to be the revolutionary vehicle of civilization. Although Puzyrevskii considered that "past forms and capabilities for conducting war were out-of-date for modern conditions,"\textsuperscript{363} he wrote:

In the history of military art there is not an era which does not have scientific significance; temporary small decays of military art are addressed as such, as are temporary broad developments of all elements; and only by studying these and others is it possible to discover the principles that facilitate the development of military art.\textsuperscript{364}

Puzyrevskii, along with A. K. Baiov and D. F. Maslovskii, was at the forefront of the effort by Russian military historians to reveal the

\textsuperscript{361} Zhilin, pp. 148-149.
\textsuperscript{362} Zhilin, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{363} Zhilin, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{364} Puzyrevskii, A. K., \textit{Istoriia voennogo iskusstva v srednie veka (V-XVI stoletiiia)}, (St. Petersburg, 1884), Vol. 1, p. iii.
singular greatness of Russian military art as demonstrated by the most successful 18th century army commanders -- particularly Peter the Great, Rumiantsev, Suvorov, and Bagration. Puzyrevskii not only demonstrated Tsar Peter the Great’s skillful uses of active defense and passive defense during the Great Northern War (1700-1721), but emphasized that throughout that war Peter required that "the entire army [135,000 soldiers at that time] had to be in constant readiness to go wherever it was needed." Puzyrevskii thereby established that maneuver on interior lines was a key ingredient for strategic success, along with decisive offensive action, such as that which Peter displayed at Poltava in 1709. Maslovskii’s studies of the 1756-1763 Seven Years War depicted Rumiantsev’s successes against Frederick the Great’s Prussians as being the result "not of maneuver, but of decisive action straight at the established goal," using ‘line’ tactics and bayonet attacks to achieve outright victory.

Through historical works such as these the principles of attack and the offensive as the way to ensure victory became enshrined in Russian military art and thought at the end of the 19th century -- regardless of the changing forms of warfare implied by emerging technologies. These military historians, in general, considered "the most important task of military-historical science to be the clarification of national [Russian] peculiarities in the conduct of


366 Zhilin, p. 162.
war and battles; for example, the Russian army is at its very best when the people know they are defending themselves.\textsuperscript{367}

Other Russian military theorists took a different approach to the application of scientific analysis and thought to the problems of warfare. E. I. Martynov envisaged that "the development of military art was dependent on the level of civilized society and showed this using concrete historical examples."\textsuperscript{368} Martynov wrote:

The strategic art of each era is only the child of its own time, and consequently, the product of a certain civilization; it is inspired by its ideas; receives general operational rules from it; and from its main characteristics takes its features. About this dependence usually nothing is said, but meanwhile it shortly strikes the eye that the most correct and broad understanding of military events is greatly facilitated by the generalization of the development of military art with the social progress of mankind.\textsuperscript{369}

Upper most in Martynov's mind was the influence on modern warfare of the new factors connected with the rapidly expanding industrial production capabilities of society; the introduction of these new technologies into the army; and the size and type of military force that would be necessary to employ these new technologies. Preoccupied by a topic that is as pivotal today as, it was 100 years ago, Martynov first identified and began to explore the impact of emerging technologies on military command and control. He was certain that on the battlefields of the future timely information flows between the commanders and their troops would become critical.

\textsuperscript{367} Zhilin, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{368} Zhilin, p. 84.
\textsuperscript{369} Martynov, E. I., Strategiia v epokhu Napoleona I i v nashe vremia, (St. Petersburg, 1894), p. v.
to the execution of the commander's battle plan and orders, and hence to the commander's ability to control the course of battle. Martynov understood that these unheard-of scientific developments pointed to an absolute overall requirement to elevate the educational level of the Russian officer corps, not just from a theoretical and academic standpoint, but through practical 'hands-on' experience using these new technologies.370

To E. I. Martynov as well belongs the distinction of being the most probable author of a series of anonymous 1893 Voennyi sbornik articles entitled "Mysli o tekhniike voin budushchogo."371 The great significance of these "Thoughts about the Technology of Future War" was that the author(s) sought to integrate technological and organizational changes "into a coherent series of projections about the nature of future war within an entire theater."372 In so doing he (they) established budushchaia voina (future war) as a legitimate and generally accepted analytical category for assessing training, supply, reconnaissance, and technical army requirements.

Another approach to the development of Russian military art as a science, which was rather critical of Martynov's standpoint, was taken by A. N. Petrov who emphasized that "science, as a rule, has no principles, but knows only laws."373 Petrov averred:

Zhilin, pp. 84-85.

"Mysli o tekhniike voin budushchogo," Voennyi sbornik, 211, No. 5, May 1893, pp. 38-39; 212 No. 8, August 1893, pp. 222-223.

Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets, p. 129.

Petrov, A. N., K voprosam strategii: (Kriticheskii ocherk), (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 45.
Military science reveals numerous examples, laws, that victory is always on the side of those who know how to combine conditions of force, time (of one's own choosing), and place (locality and space). These elements of victory have the quality of fundamental laws and therefore always remain permanent.374

Earlier, Petrov had charged Martynov with overstressing the influence of social development and state economic prowess on an army's ability to achieve victory by writing that "... the genius of one man who demonstrates his capability by delivering creates military art."375 Nevertheless, Petrov also clearly recognized the importance of the changes that emerging technologies were introducing to army combat capability when he wrote: "Military affairs of necessity demand serious scientific preparations which must be as serious and deep as is the priority role established for the military in wartime."376

It can be justly argued that General N. P. Mikhnevich was the singularly most influential and greatest Russian military theorist at the end of the 19th century. He was the first to conceptually integrate the divergent 'Academic' and 'Russian historical' schools of thought (i.e., Leer, Martynov, Geisman, et al., v. Dragomirov, Puzyrevskii, Miliutin, et al.) into a general theory of military science.377 In the course of publishing more than thirty works discussing military science, spanning the period from the end of the

374 Petrov, op. cit., p. 118.
376 Petrov, A. N., K voprosam strategii: (Kriticheskii ocherk), p. 118.
377 Zhilin, p. 90.
19th century through the beginning of the 20th century, Mikhnevich consistently affirmed that military science "concerned itself with the study of wars -- this is the science about war." 378

Although his later works assumed a more political tone that was none-too-subtly critical of the Tsarist government, already in the 1890s General Mikhnevich recognized the dependence of a nation's military capability on the level of its social and economic development (its material basis) while positing that, over the course of more than three thousand years of human experience, laws and principles of war are "broad empirical generalizations, derived from a multitude of factors." 379 Thus, the task of military science, according to Mikhnevich, was to identify those broad ideas, to study the changes in them over time, and to discover the reasons why certain of those laws and principles remained unchanging.

Mikhnevich's fundamental conclusions were that "natural (man, space, time, forces, and the initial period of combat) and artistic (means of combat) elements of the combat environment have decisive significance on the course and outcome of wars"; that the "correct consideration of these [elements] allows the commander to work out decisive, most completely suitable conditions"; and finally, that "the new technical combat means demanded decisive transformation [perestroika] of all military systems." 380

379 Mikhnevich, op. cit., p. 16.
380 Zhilin, pp. 91-92.
The force of General Pavel A. Zhilin’s valedictory statement concerning Russian military-scientific discussions and technological progress during the transition from the 19th to the 20th century is so succinct and revealing that it is deserving of quotation in its entirety:

The end of the XIX and beginning of the XX centuries was characterized by tempestuous growth of industrial forces, by the development of production, transport, and other sectors of the economy. Technical progress had an enormous influence on the development of military affairs. The army was equipped with new, more modern weapons and military equipment. These increased its combat power and maneuverability. The invention of smokeless gunpowder, the introduction of magazine-fed rifles, machineguns, and rapid-firing artillery provided increased range and density of fires. The developments in military technology evoked an increase in artillery and special types of weaponry in the composition of the armed forces. Aeronautics, aviation, and technical means of communication were rapidly developed. The army’s equipage with new, more modern weapons and military technologies led to a fundamental change in the capabilities and forms of conducting military operations. Before the war [World War I] military thinking was occupied with many complicated questions. It was of critical necessity to estimate the influence of these new factors on operational military forms and capabilities, to work through the views on the most expedient [efficient and effective] use of armed force in warfare.381

Were one to change the text only by adding the types of ‘emerging technologies’ currently under consideration -- information systems, precision-guided weapons, space-based reconnaissance, robotics, and anti-missile defenses -- the essence of Zhilin’s farewell to the 19th century becomes a flawless introduction for the Russian military transition from the 20th to the 21st century.

381 Zhilin, pp. 33-34.
Between 1881 and 1904, then, the Imperial Russian Army would confront the challenge of retaining evolutionary momentum under one war minister of limited vision who would fight only grudgingly to retain the status quo and a second of great vision who would fight for relatively little. Meanwhile, at the hands of Dragomirov and Leer, tactical and strategic thought first blossomed, then ossified. At the same time, the accelerating pace of technological change and the expanding tasks of the army would impose greater competition for fewer resources. Together, these ingredients added up to a recipe for intellectual and organizational stagnation — even in a period of ostensible growth — which could easily lead to military disaster.382

382 Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 94.

From the first major conflict at Tiurenchensk (April 1904) through the battles of Liaoyang, Shakhe River, the siege of Port Arthur, and the final bloodbath at Mukden (February/March 1905) the Russian army did not win a single significant victory in the war.383

Machines more and more will become superior to the muscular power of men.384

- General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, 1912

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was an unmitigated military disaster for the Russians.385 The repeated stinging defeats left analysis of the causes politically very sensitive -- both for the Russian Army high command and for the Tsarist government. Therefore, investigation was controlled directly, and very strictly, by the War Ministry. In September 1906, a full year after the formal conclusion of the war by the Treaty of Portsmouth, the Imperial War Ministry elected to follow the precedent established in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War and created a Military-Historical Commission, attached to the Main Directorate of the General Staff, for the specific purpose of discovering lessons of the Russo-Japanese War.


For a superb discussion and analysis of the campaigns and battles of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, complete with maps and diagrams, see Menning, Bruce W., Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 152-199.
In October 1906 this 'special military-historical commission' began the task of writing the official history of the Russo-Japanese War with General Vasilii Iosifovich Gurko, the son of the famous 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War hero, as its chairman. After sorting through "more than 10,000 volumes" of archival materials, the nine volumes and 16 books of this official history would not begin to be published until 1910, with completion of the full history in 1913. It would be nearly three years after the Russo-Japanese War concluded that the Vil’na Military District published the first serious study. Throughout the winter of 1907, an intense review of Russian Army combat performance was conducted to try to determine the reasons for the disastrous wartime failures in the Far East.

In part this delay in attempting to uncover the causes of defeat was the result of the necessary preoccupation of the Tsarist government and its military leaders with the great turmoil of the 1905 Revolution and its aftermath. Initiation of the Vil’na Military District study also coincided with an overall attempt at Russian Army reform. What the Vil’na Military District study revealed was a biting indictment indeed of the Russian military leadership and command system for strategic and tactical mistakes, lack of decisive military action, poor use of available static communications, dishonest staff work, weak central command direction, and unskilled field commanders. In the spring of 1908, the Vil’na study unloaked

386 Menning, p. 201; for details of the commission findings, see Russko-iaponskaia voina 1904-1905 gg.: Rabota Voennno-istoricheskoi komissii po opisaniiu russko-iaponskoi voiny, 9 vols., (St. Petersburg, 1910).
insufficient leadership concern with troop welfare, education, and training."

A large share of this indictment fell squarely upon the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. As the highest military educational institution of Russia, and since 1832 the "home of the Russian military intellectuals," this august body was supposed to exquisitely prepare the Army elite for command and staff duty. Between 1878 and 1889 the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, under the direction of General M. I. Dragomirov, had become, in effect, the 'central brain' of the Russian Army directing the development of military thought and military science.

It was Dragomirov himself who first introduced into the curriculum mandatory scientific research studies which required senior students to investigate systematically military-historical or military-scientific themes in order to be graduated. However, when General A. G. Leer assumed command of the Academy in 1890, the practical preparation of officers for field command and senior staff duties was de-emphasized, and he discouraged the faculty from seeking 'real world' solutions to actual military science problems. Leer was an authority on the Napoleonic Wars who pushed the Academy toward a much more 'academic' curriculum, focusing on European history, the Middle Ages and the military classics. Consequently, the military historic and 'scientific' lessons, and the even more pertinent

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38/ Sbornik sistematischeksikh soobshchenii po istorii russko-japonskoi voiny, sdelannykh v Vilenskom voennom sobranii v techenie zimnego perioda 1907-1908 gg., (Vil’na, 1907-1908); for a study summary, see Zhilin, pp. 44-45.
practical experiences, of the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War were neither studied nor investigated.388

Not until 1902 did War Minister A. N. Kuropatkin begin to focus his personal attention on these educational deficiencies. Leer had been replaced in 1898 as Commander of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy by General N. N. Sukhotin, who promptly began changing the curriculum to emphasize more practical military subjects, such as statistics and military administration. But the reparative Academy curriculum changes occurred too late to influence the leadership capabilities of that generation of Nikolaev General Staff Academy graduates who ineffectually occupied command positions during the Russo-Japanese War.389

Thus, in 1906 a General Staff special commission again changed the Nikolaev General Staff Academy curriculum to focus on applied strategy, tactics, and military history -- especially the burning lessons of the Russo-Japanese War -- as part of the overall Russian military reform effort between 1906 and 1912.390 To underscore the historical importance of the General Staff Academy within the Russian military system -- both then and now -- it should be noted that at the start of the First World War of a total of 36 corps commanders, 29 were Nikolaev General Staff Academy graduates; and of the 70 division commanders, 46 had finished the academy course; and an even

390 Zhilin, p. 49.
higher percentage of graduates were serving in senior staff positions at the War Ministry and on the General Staff.  

During the war with Japan, inordinate casualties were suffered by the Russian infantry -- the 'Queen of Battle' -- which composed the majority of the Russian Army. Therefore, between 1906 and 1910 the General Staff Military-Historical Commission focused considerable attention on the 1904 Field Service Regulations that officially codified the tactical views of General M. I. Dragomirov. After two amendatory Imperial Army attempts, in 1881 and 1895, to improve the infantry regulations by endeavoring to incorporate the lessons of the Russo-Turkish War, in 1900 Chief of Staff Dragomirov first published his version of the field regulations, which he revised in 1902.  

Dragomirov's tactical concept, sadly for the 'line' soldiers, consisted of infixed rote application of General Suvorov's brilliant 18th century bayonet charges, without consideration of Suvorov's selective genius of knowing when, and most importantly, when not, to use this tactic. The tautological use of these stereotyped tactics against the fortified Japanese field positions, from which defenders could sweep the attacking Russian infantry with magazine-fed rifle, rapid-fire cannon, and especially machinegun fire with impunity, was the main cause of the slaughter of so many brave Russian soldiers.


392 Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets, pp. 137-139.

393 Osipov, K., Suvorov, (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1945), p. 18; see also Zhilin, p. 162.
and, consequently, of the disgraceful defeat of Russian arms. \textsuperscript{394}

One of the clearest war lessons was that "the preponderance of fire is the principle condition for success in modern battle." \textsuperscript{395} During the last quarter of the 19th century, military-technical developments, particularly the deployment of rapid-firing weapons with increased accuracy and range, changed the entire nature of warfare by eliminating the tactical effectiveness of the infantry 'firing line' and of the massed bayonet attack. The necessity for mutual support between infantry and artillery on the battlefield was a most critical lesson, since the combined fires of the two branches could be superior to that of the enemy. \textsuperscript{396}

With the objective of increasing the firepower of the 'firing line,' V. G. Fedorov succeeded in creating his first automatic rifle in 1905. Alas, when Fedorov briefed Tsar Nikolas II on the greatly improved rate of fire, Nikolas rebuffed this remarkable new weapon: "He personally was against the development of automatic rifles since there would not be enough cartridges in the country for them." \textsuperscript{397} Consequently, the first of Fedorov's automatic rifles would not be produced until 1912.

Other lessons of the Russo-Japanese War were far less clearly defined, nonetheless important, but much more difficult to correct.

\textsuperscript{394} Zhilin, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{395} Cheremisov, V. A., \textit{Osnovy sovremennoy voennogo iskusstva}, (Kiev, 1912), pp. 11-12.


\textsuperscript{397} Polivanov, A. A., \textit{Iz dnevnikov i vospominаний po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchnika, 1907-1916 гг.}, (Moscow, 1924), Vol. 1, p. 110.
The quantity of weaponry on the battlefield alone was determined to be insufficient to insure successful army operations, even if it became possible to equip the Russian Army with the most modern weaponry. Special attention was directed to the training of command personnel who had prepared their troops inadequately for battle; to eliminating the often very cruel relationship that officers had with their troops; to elevating extremely low troop morale and inhumane living conditions; to resolving the absence of popular support for war aims; and to dispensing with the failure of military discipline.

The failure of discipline in the Russian Army was considered to be inseparable with overall lack of Russian social discipline, and the result of "the increased number of illiterate soldiers (up to 60 percent) who were incapable of independent thought and declined to analyze events." In 1901 the Russian Army inducted 122,000 illiterate recruits who were incapable of learning new military technologies or of taking independent action on the battlefield. The General Staff Military-Historical Commission conclusion was that the army had failed for "deep social reasons," which necessitated the "improvement of the quality of the entire army." As a direct result, during the few years before World War I began, mainly at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, military education received renewed emphasis and assumed quite strong Russian nationalist overtones.

398 Zhilin, p. 184.
399 Zhilin, p. 199.
400 Zhilin, p. 187.
401 Zhilin, p. 6.
The Russo-Japanese War investigations unveiled, overall, a stunning disconnect between Russian military theory and its actual battlefield practice. Military technology had changed the entire concept of warfare. The Russian Army had changed fundamentally neither its technology nor its tactics. The result had been another disaster.

For a wide range of reasons, but particularly because Tsar Nikolai II and his inner court circle did not wish the publication of critical articles which might identify the Romanov Dynasty with the wartime disasters, one of the most influential analyses of the military failures was not published until 1912. General Miliutin, the famous military reform War Minister under Tsar Aleksandr II, wrote that there was a growing influence of army technical equipment and weaponry on successful military activity. Miliutin firmly believed that recent military-technical developments required an increase in the quantity of what he termed "special weapons" in the armed forces and close attention to troop training. Because of the changed character of battle, he considered it essential to elevate the knowledge and initiative of each soldier so that individual soldiers, as well as divisions, corps, and armies, might operate independently. Miliutin emphasized that the increased role of weaponry and technology in warfare absolutely demanded the modernization of the Russian Army.402

Miliutin's ideas stood in sharp contradiction to the majority opinion among Russia's senior military leadership, who had been so thoroughly indoctrinated during Dragomirov's tenure as General Staff

402 Zhilin, pp. 110-111.
Academy Commandant to believe unquestioningly that "the decisive role in warfare [is that] of man [due to] his moral force." The more visionary Russian military thinkers -- such as Mikhnevich, Neznamov, Geisman, and Martynov -- had by this time come to the firm conclusion that "modern warfare is not only military, but a political and economic composite of the opposing sides."

On the eve of the First World War, most of the Russian military intellectuals were looking into the abyss of 'total warfare,' but the old Russian Army leadership could not, and would not, see it because of their preoccupation with the 'fundamental laws of warfare.' To further compound the difficulties that the Russian military leadership was experiencing, these proud 'professional' officers were subjected to a wave of anti-military literature which, in the aftermath of their Russo-Japanese War fiasco, denigrated and ridiculed the Russian Army as sadists, incompetents, fools, and madmen. In the latter months of 1906 this situation of civilian interference in military affairs, declining prestige, and eroding army discipline became intolerable -- and to this 'identity crisis' the Russian army leadership began to react strenuously with a 'burning desire' to upgrade army quality and prestige.

War Minister General A. F. Ridiger consistently espoused the idea of national military reform -- that upon a solid foundation of popular support a fully 'professional' army must be created and

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403 Zhilin, p. 111.
404 Zhilin, p. 111.
405 Fuller, p. 159.
consecrated to the singular mission of defending the Empire against all external enemies. The concept at the root of Ridiger’s vision was the ability to mobilize the entire nation for military service in order to form "a homogeneous patriotic army drawn fairly from all classes and nationalities in the Empire." General A. F. Ridiger was the son of General-Adjutant Count A. F. Ridiger, Commander-in-Chief of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, who took the precursor actions in 1855 that led to initiation of the Miliutin military reforms following the Crimean War disasters. As early as June 1905, War Minister Ridiger wrote to the Interior Minister asserting that troop dispersal on police duty was "completely incompatible with the interests of the military." Then, in December 1905 -- at the very crest of the revolution -- Ridiger insisted upon, and a rather panicked Council of Ministers approved, additional finances to improve his soldiers’ living conditions, to increase their pay, and to augment their diet. At Ridiger’s insistence, the Council even provided each soldier with a government-issue blanket, overturning the longstanding custom of requiring soldiers to buy their own blankets.

A June 20, 1906 War Ministry circular clearly warned military district commanders that "continuation [of the policy of helping civilians] will doubtless lead to the total disintegration of the

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606 Fuller, p. 203.
607 Fuller, pp. 220-221.
608 Fuller, p. 154.
609 Fuller, p. 147.
army and the loss of it as an organized military force." General Ridiger’s attitude toward civilian authority and toward army internal repressive service was best revealed in his early 1906 letter to General-Major Kryzhanovskii, 2nd Cavalry Division Commander:

I had no desire at all to turn the troops into executioners or punitive commands as I calculated that this was not their job at all, and, moreover, thought that it was very dangerous; under such conditions the troops would easily run amok and would simply turn into bandits, while the population would come to hate the army and would refuse funds for satisfaction of its needs."

Throughout 1906 Ridiger gradually began to reinsert the military district (MD) commanders into the chain of command by concentrating back in the provincial and district capitals the army detachments that had been deployed on repressive service. Once these troops returned to military control, the MD commanders were under strict War Ministry instructions not to part with them. To counteract the strident protests from local civilian authorities when their requests for troops were met with intransigent refusals by MD commanders, Ridiger initiated a glasnost’ campaign demanding that the Interior and Finance Ministries strengthen their own police and guard forces and that army units be released from disruptive police duties."

The Russian military ‘identity crisis’ approached its pinnacle during an August-September 1906 exchange of letters between Ridiger and the Prime Minister, P. A. Stolypin. Following Ridiger’s repeated futile requests for army relief from further repressive service,

\[ \text{Fuller, p. 154.} \]
\[ \text{Fuller, p. 145.} \]
\[ \text{Fuller, pp. 149-150.} \]
Stolypin rebuffed Ridiger’s appeal, averring that the survival of the
government was more important than army training or army survival.

General Ridiger’s September 13 rejoinder bordered on insubordination.

Essentially accurate, but rather curt and angry, it stated:

All organs which enjoy the support of the troops have
completely forgotten that the army is not a machine but a
living organism which can be threatened, and which acts
as a real support only if certain qualities are present,
qualities inculcated by suitable education and the
preservation of internal order and discipline.413

Apparently such blunt language was exactly what senior Russian
government officials needed to focus their attention, for, in early
November 1906, just as Ridiger was preparing to take the issue of
continued army police and guard duty to the Council of State Defense,
Tsar Nikolas II summoned the commanders/governors-general of the key
Warsaw, Vil’no, Kiev, and Moscow military districts to St. Petersburg
for a special conference on the subject of using military detachments
for internal security. To a man -- with the sole exception of
General Skanlon from Warsaw -- the military district commanders
strongly urged the Tsar to eliminate the use of the army for
repressive service. Fully keeping in character, however, Tsar
Nikolas issued but a weak and indecisive declaration at the end of
the conference that “he expected all governors-general to help in
reducing detachments.”414

Consequently, the Tsar’s decision went virtually unheeded and
during 1907 the arbitrary and harmful use of military detachments for

413 Fuller, p. 156.
414 Fuller, p. 152.
guard duty by civilian authorities did not decline appreciably:

Main Staff data revealed that from January to the end of October there were 1058 civilian summons for aid; 997 and 1/2 companies, 4 training commands, 7 local commands, 42 scouting commands, 340 and 1/4 squadrons or sotnias, 16 field guns, 4 machine guns, and 4704 soldiers in separate commands took part. The army used weapons at civilian request 48 times.\textsuperscript{413}

While these numbers were considerably lower than during the previous two years, they were still far too high to satisfy the War Ministry, and besides, the accuracy of civilian reporting on their use of the army was quite suspect. In December 1907 General Palitsyn, Chief of the General Staff, determined that ten infantry regiments, five reserve battalions, four cavalry regiments, and one artillery brigade were outside their assigned military districts on repressive service, which seriously degraded army mobilization capability.\textsuperscript{414}

General A. F. Ridiger was successful in introducing significant military reforms, despite all the impediments caused by the taxing and disruptive internal security requirements. Following the humiliating army defeats of the Russo-Japanese War, he attempted to establish a more modern and effective Russian military capability. Between 1905 and 1908 General Ridiger persistently fought for, and obtained: 1) the creation of the Higher Attestation Commission, which on paper had the power to select only the most highly qualified officers for command positions; 2) increased pay for his soldiers; 3) better housing; 4) a shortened period of mandatory military service; 5) an improved officer pension law; 6) a much more effective

\textsuperscript{413} Fuller, pp. 152-153.

\textsuperscript{414} Fuller, p. 153.
regimental purchasing system; 7) greater emphasis on the technical training of soldiers; and 8) expanded officer educational opportunities.417 Owing to Ridiger's concerted efforts to instill greater 'professionalism' in the army, General Staff officers, who had matriculated at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy and demonstrated operational command competence and expertise, gradually replaced the old privileged Guards and cavalry officer elites in command positions. "In particular, General Staff officers came to occupy the majority of field command posts: by 1912, 62 percent of all corps commanders and 68 percent of all infantry division commanders wore the black insignia of the Staff."418

Had it not been for Tsar Nikolas II's decision in June 1905 to sever the General Staff from the War Ministry, Ridiger might have been able to accomplish even more far-reaching military reforms. In the name of 'managerial efficiency,' the crass, politically-motivated June 1905 decision raised General Palitsyn's organization to equal ministerial status and imposed the Council of State Defense over both the War Ministry and General Staff. Communications between the War Ministry and the General Staff broke down, War Minister Ridiger lost control of the General Staff, and the State Defense Council became an exceedingly unwieldy institution, incapable of its intended purpose of unifying military and naval planning.419

417 Fuller, pp. 159 and 220.
418 Fuller, p. 221.
419 Fuller, p. 159.
One of General Ridiger's most consistent goals was to reorganize the Ministry of War in order to eliminate redundant and nonessential bureaucratic offices and privileges which, to his thinking, were counterproductive to a 'professional' military organization. To this end, in 1906 Ridiger attempted to shed the civil administration of Turkestan by turning this responsibility over to the Interior Ministry. He also proposed abolishing the Main Administration of Cossacks and absorbing the Cossack formations into the regular army. Bureaucratic opposition to these proposals, in particular from the Finance Ministry, was sufficient to block any action on these badly needed reforms.420

To further complicate the task of reforming the Russian army, the Finance Ministry consistently denied to Ridiger the 2.14 billion rubles which the army estimated it needed to replenish the war materials consumed during the Russo-Japanese War. Even worse, due to continuing internal security taskings, Ridiger was powerless between 1904 and 1908 to increase army training levels. Essential basic command skills and marksmanship were not only diminished, but seriously began to deteriorate.421

The Russian Army held no mobile training exercises between 1904 and 1906; and in 1907 only 504 battalions, 331 cavalry squadrons, and 306 and 1/2 artillery batteries received training. Throughout 1907 only 52 percent of the troops in the Caucasus military district participated in field maneuvers, while for the Odessa and Moscow

420 Fuller, pp. 221-222.
421 Fuller, p. 160.
military districts the percentage receiving training was an even lower, and completely unacceptable, 37 percent and 30 percent, respectively. During 1908 Russian Army training levels finally returned to a more "normal" number, with 751 batteries, 487 squadrons, and 439 batteries participating. However, with mass officer resignations throughout this period resulting in a serious 20 percent shortfall of officers by 1907, army leadership and command experience at the unit level was severely impaired. When called upon as reservists to mobilize for World War I on July 18, 1914, these very poorly trained officers and soldiers would be all that Russia had available.\footnote{Fuller, pp. 166-167.}

Professor William C. Fuller, Jr., aptly summarizes the situation:

Ironically, at the very moment that a military consensus on the urgency of reform, increased army spending, and expansion of training had coalesced, the civilian government was denying the army the requisite money, manpower, and opportunity. This frustration, heaped on top of the fundamentally adversarial position of the War Ministry toward the civilian government with regard to internal repressive service, is the backdrop for the obstructionist conduct of the War Ministry during the revolution.\footnote{Fuller, p. 168.}

As a reformer, General Ridiger was faced with one additional, and critical, flaw in the Russian social and military system -- the failure to motivate individual soldiers and officers. Despite the prolonged exposure to the General Staff Academy teachings of General M. I. Dragomirov concerning morale as the decisive factor in warfare, in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War fiasco and the turbulence of
the 1905 Revolution, "if Russia was to be victorious in the future, ... the nation and the Empire had to be morally regenerated in some way."  

The 1906 revision of the Fundamental Law (Constitution), which "reserved to the Emperor the formulation and direction of military policy," blocked Ridiger's path toward any meaningful restoration of army morale.  

To the end of the Romanov Dynasty, Tsar Nikola II would maintain adamantly that the army was his 'personal fief' which entitled the Romanov family to by-pass the military chain of command and to interfere directly with military affairs where and when they chose. Since Tsar Nikola considered army officers to be his 'personal vassals,' he had no compunction about overturning officer appointment recommendations of the Higher Attestation Commission and continuing an Imperial patronage system that promoted his personal favorites, while simultaneously preventing General Ridiger and the War Ministry from discharging these very same officers, who had displayed such mediocrity and ineptitude as field commanders during the Russo-Japanese War.

It was precisely because of the Tsar's continuing interference in military matters -- coupled with the obstruction of military goals and financial parsimony of the civilian bureaucracies -- that the Russian military leadership increasingly became 'politicized.' The military leadership sought to circumvent the Tsar's whims by securing

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424 Fuller, p. 197.
425 Fuller, p. 197.
426 Fuller, p. 232.
support for army positions from the new legislature, the State Duma, which Tsar Nikolas had ‘allowed’ to be inaugurated, but which he abhorred, since the Duma never ceased to seek further restriction of his power as Autocrat. It was General Ridiger’s failure to defend the Imperial family ‘adequately’ against the repeated condemnation by the Duma members of senior military officials, the nobility, that tried the Tsar’s patience and led the Autocrat finally to lose confidence in Ridiger, to remove him from office as War Minister on March 10, 1909, and to replace him the very next day with General V. A. Sukhomlinov. To General Sukhomlinov, a shameless though highly capable Imperial sycophant, fell the unenviable task of taking a poorly prepared and demoralized Russian Army into World War I.

Prelude to World War I: Is There Enough Time to Transform the Russian Army?

...Only a general upsurge of national life — cultural and economic — could appropriately elevate the military potential of the country.

- General Anton I. Denikin

Railroads and electric telegraph already give to the talented general or War Minister the means for entirely new combinations in a European war.

- Frederick Engels

Neither Russia nor the other European powers were prepared for war when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian throne, was assassinated on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo, Bosnia by a Bosnian student with Serbian terrorist connections, one G. Princip.

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427 Fuller, p. 235.
In the early 20th century European alliance system armies had to be mobilized before the states could prepare to defend themselves. Historically, from the beginning of the 19th century, no European state could mobilize more than five-to-seven percent of its total population. But, on the eve of the First World War France could mobilize 58 percent; Germany, 43 percent; and Russia, 46 percent.\(^{28}\)

Russia's mobilization capability was circumscribed by some 19th century territorial and bureaucratic fences, however. The peacetime Russian Imperial Army fielded 1,423,000 troops composed principally of workers and peasants from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The formation of "national military units" -- for example, Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirgiz, and Latvian, -- was strictly forbidden by Imperial policy. Also, the total number of 'non-Russian' soldiers was restricted by Imperial policy to one-fifth of any unit in peacetime and to one-third in wartime. Yet the population base from which the Tsarist government had to conscript in order to mobilize, of necessity, had to include 'non-Russian' nationalities.\(^{29}\)

Moreover, Russia's mobilization problem was compounded by the fact that Russia had no partial mobilization plan. Yet, the Russian government was committed by treaty to come to Serbia's assistance against Austria, which Russia could not do without mobilizing forces. General Ianuskevich, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Sukhomlinov, the War Minister, initially agreed with Foreign Minister

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Sazonov, to partially mobilize Russian forces. Their General Staff subordinates convinced the generals, however, that such an action was impractical -- if not impossible. The staff planners asserted that a territorial system for augmenting peacetime forces was required for partial mobilization, and that Russia had no such territorial system.

When the Russian government officials, after much turbulent soul-searching, revoked their attempted partial mobilization and decreed a general army mobilization on July 18, 1914, they were well aware that their decision effectively ruled out the preservation of peace. In their minds the only alternative to mobilization was unacceptable -- Russia's total vulnerability to Austrian and German aggression. On July 27, 1914, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British Foreign Office permanent under-secretary, insightfully described this unfortunate situation:

I am afraid that the real difficulty to overcome will be found in the question of mobilization. Austria is already mobilizing. This ... is a serious menace to Russia, who cannot be expected to delay her own mobilization, which, as it is, can only become effective in something like double the time required by Austria and Germany. If Russia mobilizes, we have been warned that Germany will do the same, and German mobilization is directed almost entirely against France, the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilization for even a fraction of a day. ... It seems certain that Austria is going to war because that was, from the beginning, her intention. If that view is correct, it would be neither possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilizing.

For Russia mobilization was all or nothing -- and so it turned out to be for the other European powers as well.

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430 Florinsky, p. 1319.
Russian government concern over possible German and Austrian hostile intentions toward Russia had been building since the 1880s. German encroachment into the Near East began by sending diplomatic missions to Turkey and by building the Baghdad Railroad through the Balkans and Asia Minor -- both of which were deemed to be a direct infringement on Russian political, military-strategic, and economic interests. The Tsarist government did not want the Baghdad Railroad approaching its Caucasian frontiers; Great Britain did not want that same railroad to begin interfering with its ship-borne Indian trade; France, which was also heavily involved in Near East affairs, had become all the more anti-German since the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War. As a result, for divergent reasons, Russia, Great Britain and France all shared a common interest to constrain German expansion toward the Near East.

Also in this same time period, the Hapsburg monarchy of Austria-Hungary, with considerable German encouragement, was attempting to acquire the neighboring Southern Slav lands -- Bosnia, Serbia, and Greece -- which it intended to consolidate as a Balkan component of the Hapsburg Empire. Austria-Hungary and Germany had been allied by treaty since October 1879, and Italy joined them in 1882 to create the 'Central Powers,' the so-called 'Axis.' A formal Russian-French union was not created until the years 1891-1893. Diplomatically Great Britain was brought closer to that union in 1904 by the British-French Agreement on colonial questions. And only in 1907 did the British-Russian Agreement to regulate mutual policies

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411 Zhilin, p. 10.
toward Tibet, Afghanistan, and Iran lead to the creation of the 'Entente' uniting Great Britain, France, and Russia.\textsuperscript{122}

During the 1908 Bosnian war scare, when Russia and Austria stood on the brink of open conflict, Russian concerns over the progressive German and Austrian expansion into the Balkans and the Near East -- to say nothing of their hostile intentions toward Russia -- became exceedingly intense. War Minister Ridiger would later credit this 1908 confrontation with changing the opinions of Russian civilian officials about the threat of war in the West, which subsequently resulted in abolishing the Finance Ministry limitations on the military budget. Later that same year the Russian military budget was increased to 299 million rubles. This enabled Ridiger to begin expanding the army machinegun arsenal -- an army objective that General Sukhomlinov, his successor in early 1909, continued to implement.\textsuperscript{133} Also, partly as a result of the Bosnian war scare, the Russian Third and Fourth State Dumas were especially solicitous to the army. The Dumas demanded that Article 96 of the 1906 Fundamental Law, which defined the Tsar's powers over the army and navy, be revised to allow the Duma to consider the military budget. Finally, in April 1909 Tsar Nikolas II conceded to the Duma on supervision of the military budget, but withheld oversight of military organization, planning, or administration. The Imperial Decree of August 24, 1909 confirmed these extended Duma budgetary powers.\textsuperscript{434}

\textsuperscript{122} Zhilin, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{133} Fuller, p. 224.

\textsuperscript{434} Fuller, p. 236.
The events that unequivocally focused the attention of the Russian Army, government, and Duma on Russian national security needs were the 1911-1912 Italian-Turkish War and the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars, which set the stage for direct Axis-Entente conflict. As a result of these growing international tensions and as a direct consequence of the Duma budgetary intervention, Russian military expenditures rose from 643 million rubles in 1909 to 965 million rubles in 1913, an increase in state expenditures from 24.8 percent to 28.5 percent. From 1900 to 1913 Russian military expenditures increased from five percent of national income to seven percent. This meant that by 1913 Russia was out spending all other European states for military preparedness. In 1910 the Duma passed the 'Small Program' to spend 714 billion rubles over ten years, and subsequently authorized the 1913 'Big Program' to spend 433 billion rubles annually between 1914 and 1917. The 'Big Program' projected a 40 percent increase in army manpower to nearly two million troops by adding 480,000 soldiers during those four years. Regrettably for the rank and file soldiers, Russia began its military build-up so late and from such a serious position of obsolescence -- and had such enormous social, structural, and institutional obstacles to overcome -- that even with these aggressive military construction programs, the Russian Army came into World War I at a most significant, comparative disadvantage to the Axis powers.

435 Zhilin, p. 15.
436 Fuller, p. 227.
437 Zhilin, p. 13.
War Minister Sukhomlinov tried to prepare the Russian Army for war -- even though his efforts led his detractors to accuse him of treason and negligence following the debacle that occurred during the opening months of battle; mainly the shortage of artillery shells that developed in 1915. The principal flaw -- that Sukhomlinov was either disinclined to or was incapable of rectifying -- was the almost total fixation with a European 'short war.' The General Staff predicted that war would last no more than six to eight months and could be fought with war materials and munitions initially on hand. In 1910 the Polivanov Commission on Supply Norms "definitively" judged that a "long war" in Europe was impossible -- which was very much in keeping with Tsar Nikolae II's predilection to rule out the possibility of any war at all. The Commission did not rule out the requirement to modernize army weaponry. In 1909 Sukhomlinov had begun introducing new quick-firing artillery into the inventory, "while 214 mountain guns (model 1909) and 122 six-inch Schneider howitzers were on order. In 1910 the Russian Army acquired 864 new heavy machineguns and the Vickers light machinegun was adopted for standard use." After 1911, Russia's ally, France, insisted on Russian military modernization, especially the upgrading of railroads in European Russia, which by 1913, along with the growing perception of a Central Power threat, facilitated War Ministry efforts to obtain increased funding for the Russian Army from the Finance Ministry.

438 Fuller, p. 237.
439 Fuller, p. 222.
440 Fuller, p. 224.
Technology and Aviation "Revolutionize" Warfare

Between 1908 and 1914 the internal combustion engine was a sufficiently advanced emerging technology to allow the Russian Army to begin development, and then production, of armored cars and tanks, armed first with machineguns, and then with cannon. A total of forty-five armored cars were produced by Russian factories during this pre-World War I period and in 1910 the first Russian Army automobile unit was formed; followed in 1911 by the beginning of the first eleven-month-long automotive class for 45 officers and 273 "technical specialists" (mechanics). Also in 1911 V. D. Mendeleev, son of the famous Russian chemist who invented the periodic table of elements, began development of the first Russian "bronekhodom" (tank); to which A. A. Porokhovshchik added machineguns in 1914. These developments led to the production in 1915 of the first true Russian tank, the "Vezdekhod," which weighed-in at four tons, but could travel 25 to 40 kilometers per hour, with a two-man crew consisting of a driver and a machinegunner. Despite these technological improvements, throughout World War I the use of tanks and armored cars by the Russian Army would be limited primarily to reconnaissance missions and flanking attacks into the rear of enemy positions. The lightness of the armor and the small quantity of armored vehicles that were produced precluded employing armored vehicles in mass for a decisive impact on the course of battles.

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441 Zhilin, p. 18.
442 Zhilin, p. 19.
Motorized transport also expanded as part of Sukhomlinov's build-up of the Russian Army. The first Russian motorized units had been introduced into the Kursk and Kiev maneuver armies in 1902 and saw service in the Russo-Japanese War. By 1914 the Russian Army employed 475 trucks and 3562 light cars to execute its peacetime mobilization plan. Also, by the outset of World War I, the Russian Army fielded some 6000 quick-firing field guns to Germany's 5500, but only 791 of these artillery pieces were heavy guns in comparison to Germany's 2000 pieces of heavy artillery.

Aviation units were introduced into the Russian Army, beginning in the summer of 1910 with the formation of the first aviation school at Gatchina outside Moscow. Later, additional military aviation schools were located at Sevastopol and the outskirts of Warsaw. In St. Petersburg the Higher Aeronautics course was initiated in 1911 and graduated 270 pilot officers during its first three years. In the fall of 1911 the first Russian aviation units began participating in army field maneuvers. Six aircraft and their pilots were assigned to the St. Petersburg military district exercises, two aviation detachments (12 aircraft and pilots) reported to the Warsaw military district, and another detachment was assigned to the Kiev MD. These

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444 Fuller, p. 227.
445 Zhilin, p. 225.
446 Istoriia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR: Po arkhiyvnym materialam i svidetel'stvam sovremennikov, Period do 1914 g., (Moscow, 1944), p. 531.
first aviation units were attached directly to the corps headquarters and performed near-by reconnaissance missions that included "locating enemy troop concentrations, correcting artillery fire, dropping bombs and exploding shells, maintaining communications between units, executing airborne drops, and convoying ships."\footnote{447}

The first combat employment of Russian military aviation took place during the 1912-1913 Balkan War, when a single volunteer aviation detachment joined the Bulgarian Army.\footnote{448} A most impressive early Russian aeronautical accomplishment -- while not entirely effective or successful due to underpowered engines -- included the 1913 creation of a heavy, four-engine aircraft, euphorically labeled the "Ruskii vitiaz'" (Russian Hero), which could carry seven passengers aloft for one hour and 54 minutes. The next year the "Il'ia Muromets," which had a flight duration of six hours with a crew of six, was constructed. The "Il'ia Muromets" was accepted by the Russian armed forces and equipped with a mechanical bombsight which, for its time, enabled it to target enemy positions with considerable accuracy.\footnote{449} Of even greater immediate importance, especially to the flight crews of this early, experimental bomber, was G. E. Kotel'nikov's 1911 development of the Russian parachute.\footnote{450}

\footnote{447} Zhilin, p. 21.
\footnote{448} Gol'dberg, Ia., "Balkanskaia voina i balkanskoe voennoe vozdukhoplavanie," \textit{Voennyi mir}, No. 11, 1912, p. 135.
\footnote{449} \textit{Istoriia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR: Po arkhiivnym materialam...} (Moscow, 1944), pp. 511-514.
\footnote{450} Zalutskii, \textit{Izobrestel' aviatsionnogo parashiuta G. E. Kotel'nikov.} (Moscow, 1953); cited in Zhilin, pp. 22-23.
Also, between the fall of 1912 and April 1914 three new Russian aircraft factories produced a total of 315 aircraft.\(^{451}\) As a result, by the beginning of the First World War the Russian Imperial Army deployed 263 aircraft, 39 aviation detachments, and six aviation companies.\(^{452}\)

Although aeronautics was a new science, it was given inordinate attention by Russian military intellectuals because of its potential to radically alter the forms of combat and the means to achieve victory in future war. In the words of Neznamov, reconnaissance was initially seen as the principal mission for aircraft

\[ ... \text{in order to find the true enemy force, in order not to strike deserted positions in vain, in order to give corresponding concentration of our own columns by means of maneuver, since the army command (army group) does not need details, but needs to know the movement of the main mass of enemy forces, the extent of the front on which he is attacking (disposition), and the required location for our most courageous groups (or their absence -- sometimes this is even more important).}^{453}\]

N. Borozdin, however, thought that aircraft, and particularly dirigibles, had a potentially great role to play in warfare through their wide employment as bombers to destroy enemy targets, rather than just to find them and to report on their location. He wrote: "They [aircraft] will need to act, not only against enemy troops that are ready for battle, but against troops that are completely

\(^{451}\) Istoriiia vozdukhoplavaniia i aviatsii v SSSR: Po arkhivnym materialam..., (Moscow, 1944), pp. 492-493.


\(^{453}\) Neznamov, A. A., Strategicheskoe i takticheskoe znachenie upravliaemykh vozdukhoplavatel'nykh apparatov, pp. 6-7.
unexpected and unprepared for it." What Borozdin foresaw was the fateful application of airpower to strike suddenly at enemy reserves, maneuver columns, concentration points, rear headquarters, and bivouacs -- virtually anywhere that enemy force concentrations were located, in order to destroy their operational effectiveness.

B. F. Naidenov was another Russian aviation pioneer who divined the future immense impact of aviation on warfare:

Recently airplanes have reached such a stage in their development that the whole state is now interested in them because they are an entirely new technology which can have an gigantic significance on military affairs.

V. Faibishchevich was at the forefront of early Russian thinking about the creation of special military aircraft for the conduct of air battles. His analysis prompted the General Staff to become involved in the actual development of fighter aircraft.

At the present time when flying apparatus are becoming such a normal, necessary part of the huge army organism, just like all other types of weapons, hardly anyone is amazed by the suggestion about the possibility of air battle. If modern flying apparatus are to undertake such a difficult task, then the appearance of a new type [of aircraft] should not be long awaited.... We can say affirmatively that at the present time Earth does not have a good means for defeating flying apparatus ... the single means would seem to be the creation of military squadrons, which could destroy all enemy forces that appear in the air.

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On the very eve of the First World War, the General Staff leadership finally would come to recognize the import of these Russian military thinkers' writings about the applications of airpower to combat. Official documentation contains this statement:

In order to inflict damage on the enemy, special sections of combat airplanes attached to the army are designated. The main mission of these airplanes is the destruction of enemy air reconnaissance means, i.e., intelligence collection airplanes and dirigibles, for which they are equipped with machineguns and bombs ... the principal purpose of which is to combat the enemy in the air.\(^{437}\)

That same year, on September 9, 1913, pilot officer and General Staff Captain P. N. Nestorov was credited with the first vertical flight of an aircraft. As a consequence of his intellectual and physical preparations for air combat, in the opening days of the war, this daring inventor of the demanding 'Nestorov Loop' (outside loop) aerobatic maneuver, "for the first time in the world on September 8, 1914 rammed an enemy aircraft while airborne, properly beginning air battle."\(^{438}\) The first true Russian fighter aircraft, however, was not developed and introduced into the order of battle until 1915,\(^{439}\) which E. N. Kruten' judged to be "the beginning of true air warfare" -- the creation of the military ability "to break through by force into the depth of the enemy and to defend one's own airspace."\(^{440}\)

\(^{437}\) Kratkie rukovodiaschcie dannye dlja pol'zovaniia aeroplanami, kak sredstvom razvedki i sviazi, a takzhe boevogo ikh primeneniia, (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 8.

\(^{438}\) Zhilin, p. 228.


\(^{440}\) Kruten', E. N., Tip apparata istrebitelia, (Moscow, 1917), p. 4.
Additional technological advances adopted by the Russian Army included the deployment in 1909 of the first sound-measuring station for intelligence collection purposes. In September 1914, with the help of this station, two German artillery batteries successfully were located and destroyed.\textsuperscript{461} Engineering support also was expanded by the inclusion within each army corps of an engineering (sapper) battalion, composed of three to four specialized sapper companies, which included fortifications, mines, demolitions, bridging, and searchlights. Generally one sapper company was assigned to each division, with one or two companies held as corps reserve.\textsuperscript{462}

At the outset of World War I, the Russian Army fielded 18 automobile-mounted searchlights and 43 cavalry-drawn searchlights, along with 39 transportable searchlights and 40 searchlight stands.\textsuperscript{463} The applications of radio technology by the Russian Army also expanded prior to World War I. During the initial mobilization, in July 1914, the Russian Army had seven communications companies with some 100 field radio sets, 30 light-cavalry radio sets, along with 12 base stations and eight fortress radio stations, while the Russian Navy was using 120 radios aboard ships.\textsuperscript{464}

\textsuperscript{461} Zhilin, p. 23.


\textsuperscript{464} \textit{Ocherki istorii tekhniki v Rossii 1861-1917.}, (Moscow, 1975), pp. 186 and 189.
The Russian Navy, moreover, was at the forefront of the investigation of the whole spectrum of emerging technologies for application in future war, and in particular led the way toward the development and military application of radio technologies. In large part this was due to the considerable weight and mass of early radio transmitters and receivers which were not compatible with army field deployments, but were very suitable for ship-to-shore communications. By 1907, at Baltic Sea installations the Russian Navy had in "active service 14 coastal radio stations and 53 observation posts; on the Black Sea, two coastal radio stations and 19 observation posts; and on the Pacific Ocean, one coastal radio station and seven observation posts." The Russian Navy even experimented somewhat with the use of radios aboard naval observation aircraft in order to improve the timeliness of intelligence communications. It was in 1911 that


Ocherki istorii tekhniki v Rossii, p. 186.

S. A. Beknev wrote about the possibility of using wireless telegraph for communications with aircraft, and in 1913, he added that the first successful air-to-ground communications were accomplished.\footnote{Zhilin, p. 226.}

The Sukhomlinov Reforms (1909–1914)

General Sukhomlinov had many detractors who were exceedingly fond of ridiculing his 1910 plan to dismantle the majority of Russia's fortresses on the Western Front as "idiocy." Regardless, Sukhomlinov leaves a legacy of pointed military organizational reforms that were introduced between 1909 and 1914 in order to make better use of the emerging technologies to improve army combat capability. By abolishing in 1910 the reserve and fortress troops, which comprised fifteen percent of the Russian Army and were stagnating in static defensive positions, he made available for front-line duty seven new infantry divisions and one rifle brigade (the 3rd Finlandskaia). He standardized the Russian infantry brigade structure at eight battalions, divided equally between two regiments. Consequently, this uniform system enabled field commanders to know, with some certainty, the number of troops they were committing to battle when they inserted an infantry division or a regiment:

"Instead of 63 field divisions and 18 rifle brigades consisting of 1110 battalions, it became possible to have 70 divisions and 17 rifle brigades, i.e., 1252 battalions."\footnote{Zhilin, p. 26.} Further, infantry divisions were each augmented with an artillery brigade fielding 48 cannon; heavy
field artillery was created; and the number of engineering and railroad troops was increased. Finally, the composition of each infantry regiment was altered to include a machinegun section with eight machineguns as well as communications, intelligence, and educational units.470

Sukhomlinov initiated in the European districts of Russia a simple, less expensive, and more equitable territorial system of recruitment, modeled along the lines of the British, French, and German systems. Each territory had a specific quota of recruits. Upon mobilization, localities would be required to provide manpower to fill out army corps, divisions, and regiments. These reserve forces were divided into two categories: 1) the younger recruits who would reinforce the field troops; and 2) the older soldiers who would perform rear (logistic) services. Simultaneously, a new service law was introduced which decreased the length of required active service for the infantry and field artillery, from 5 to 3 years; for the other service branches, from 5 to 4 years; for the navy, from 7 to 5 years; and for reasons of age or service deficiencies, nearly 7000 officers were dismissed.471

Under Sukhomlinov's direction, mobilization planning was improved so that the six-month supply of artillery ammunition stockpiled in August 1914 was exactly the planned requirement for the 'short war' that all Europe expected. As a first major step toward the total elimination of debilitating civilian guard duty in 1913,

470 Zhilin, pp. 26-27.
471 Zhilin, pp. 26-27.
by War Ministry order 13404, dated March 20, 1912, Sukhomlinov ended "guarding civilian institutions in towns or areas outside the immediate vicinity of general headquarters." Sukhomlinov, doggedly fought to free the army from police duty: in fact, under his leadership the Russian army came close to realizing the old dream of professional officers -- the total commitment of the army to external defense and its emancipation from the burden of internal repression.

Ironically, he achieved a decades-old Russian Army objective that occurred too late to have any positive impact on Russian professional military development, or on the outcome of the World War.

The virtual explosion of new military technologies at the turn of the century, caused Russia's military theoreticians to believe that equipment, administrative, and organizational changes alone -- such as those implemented by General Sukhomlinov -- would not be adequate to cope with the entirely new methods of warfare these changes portended. It was therefore necessary for the General Staff and the Nikolaev General Staff Academy to determine: first, exactly what the likely nature of the imminent European war would be; second, to develop the military art, strategy, and tactics necessary to achieve victory that would incorporate both the new technologies and the changed nature of warfare; and finally, to teach these revelations to the Russian officer corps.

While the senior Russian Army leadership and government inner circles remained preoccupied with a 'short war' scenario, lasting only several months and not more than a year, strategic thinkers like

\[^{572}\] Fuller, p. 250.

\[^{573}\] Fuller, pp. 243-244.
Neznamov, Mikhnevich, Elchaninov, and Martynov thought that "the coming European war would be inevitably intense and would develop a protracted character."\(^{474}\) The reason these learned military officers held their convictions so strongly was because their analyses showed the sharply growing role in warfare of state economic development. Expanded economic capabilities would provide massive, million-man armies with rapid-firing weapons, virtually 'unlimited' quantities of technical equipment, and the means of moving troops more widely and quickly along railroads -- all of which would greatly intensify combat and broaden the theaters of active operations.

A. A. Neznamov, in his 1909 work entitled *Oboronitel'naia voina* (Defensive War), was among the first to discuss the fact that under the new conditions of warfare the entire state population would have to fight the war, and not the army alone. The outcome of warfare was now becoming increasingly dependent on the whole state’s internal economic production and the morale of the country:

Now, in war, not only the army of the state fights, but the entire people; the burdens and excesses of war are carried not only by that portion of the population which directly serves under the flag and is located on the battlefield, [but] the whole population carries them.\(^{475}\)

What concerned Neznamov most,\(^{476}\) however, was not generalizations from

\(^{474}\) Zhilin, p. 95.


\(^{476}\) For an excellent explanation of Neznamov’s future war concepts, particularly his contributions to ideas about speed, concentration, maneuver, combined arms, "fire as the primary factor in contemporary battle," and his "embryonic form of a theory of successive operations," upon which M. N. Tukhachevskii subsequently would build, see Menning, *Bayonets before Bullets*, pp. 212-215.
past experience about the nature of future war, but "analysis of the probable means and methods of waging future war." Concerning the importance of this emphasis in military affairs, Neznamov stressed:

Even the past does not provide a full idea of the present, especially in our fast-moving century. ... Past military thought cannot be ignored, but must constantly make corrections because of present technical advances and, where possible, also peer ahead.478

Nikolai P. Mikhnevich, like Neznamov, used budushchaia voina as a common point of departure for seeking a "unity of theory and practice," but placed his emphasis in a somewhat different direction by investigating the protracted nature of future wars employing "strategies of attrition and exhaustion."479

The main question of war is not about the intensity of exertion by state forces, rather about the duration of that exertion, and this will be found to be completely dependent on the state's economic order.480

Mikhnevich emphasized that because of the growing military-economic might of states, "it is impossible to judge a war concluded by victory over, and even the destruction of, armies," because modern European states have the capability to absorb army losses and to replace them with new troops. Therefore, in his judgment, it was

477 Menning, Bayonets before Bullets, p. 211.


480 Mikhnevich, N. P., Strategiia, (St. Petersburg, 1911), Book 1, p. 97.
necessary to destroy the most important centers of population and state activity, i.e., the economic and political centers, occupy enemy countries, [and] completely annihilate his military forces in order to achieve a conclusive victory.\textsuperscript{481}

Mikhnevich went on to suggest that Russia’s vast geographic expanse made it feasible for the Russian army to conduct protracted warfare successfully on Russian territory. But, he also rejected this concept for conducting combat operations because of the likelihood for extremely heavy Russian economic and population losses, as well as the potential for domestic insurrection.\textsuperscript{482}

Mikhnevich’s analysis of the role of economic and morale factors on the outcome of wars led him to the view that “victory already was not only about the numbers and energy of the army, [but] the speed of economic development and the anticipation of morale.”\textsuperscript{483}

In his view, the main wartime morale factors were the talent of commanders, the combat valor of the army, and the spirit of the people; as well as the “morale quality of the troops, like energy, courage, self-control, steadfastness, and perseverance in battle.”\textsuperscript{484}

Each of these factors were considered to be dependent on the level of state social development, which he directly related to the amount of the state’s planned preparation for war. He urged, therefore, that Russia be prepared well in advance of the onset of hostilities.

\textsuperscript{481} Mikhnevich, N. P., \textit{Osnovy strategii: Kurs Intendantskoi akademii}, (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 43.

\textsuperscript{482} Zhilin, pp. 98-99.

\textsuperscript{483} Mikhnevich, N. P., \textit{Strategiia}, (St. Petersburg, 1911), Book 1, p. 40.

\textsuperscript{484} Mikhnevich, op. cit., pp. 50-57.
Early on Mikhnevich wrote: "It is necessary to prepare a plan for economic measures to supply all the necessities for the population of the country."\(^4\)

General A. G. Elchaninov also stressed the necessity for Russian preparation for war "by the exertions of all, both moral and material, forces of the state."\(^5\) He emphasized that: "Especially, it [advance preparation for war] is relevant to us, Russians, with our technological backwardness, [and our] dependence on foreign states."\(^6\) Elchaninov described four types of preparation for war: social, political, economic, and military. Of these, he considered the social understanding of war aims to be the top priority, after which all other preparations would follow: "If all the people are to participate in war, all the people also must understand their inner-most thoughts."\(^7\) Essentially what Elchaninov advocated was the necessity for creating a unified social opinion concerning war aims, and hence a unified military doctrine.


\(^7\) Elchaninov, A. G., Strategiia, pp. 151-152.
To some members of the Russian military intellectual cohort led by Neznamov, historical experience showed that the formation of a 'correct' doctrine, with its twin political and military-technical pillars, but above all an elevated social-political and economic condition of the state, constituted the guarantee of success in war. Operational-strategic and tactical mistakes during campaigns and battles could be corrected during the course of a war, but in the considered opinion of Neznamov: "Doctrinal errors were unforgiving and, as a rule, lead its followers to perish." Others, led by A. M. Zaionchkovskii, argued that a unified military doctrine was not a necessity and could lead to army passivity. For nearly a year a lively debate transpired on the pages of *Russkii invalid*, until August 1912 when Tsar Nikolas II tired of the turmoil and abruptly ended the debate by forbidding the publication of any more Neznamov articles on unified military doctrine. Tsar Nikolas summoned the Ianushkevich Military Academy Commander to the Summer Palace at Tsarskoe Selo on the outskirts of St. Petersburg and instructed him:

> Military doctrine consists of that which, in order to fulfill all my duties, I decree it to be. I request that you tell Neznamov that he may no longer discuss these questions in the press. I am also telling *Russkii invalid* about this."

The idea of a Russian unified military doctrine did not die by Imperial Decree, but, as we shall see subsequently, continued to live, and lives, long after Tsar Nikolas II tragically perished.

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489 Zhilin, p. 143.

The most immediate impact of the Tsar’s decree was the virtual cessation of all public discussion about the changing role of society and the army during war, and the continuation of the entrenched General Staff policies that favored old forms of combat operations and seemingly took little note of the imminent revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare. The General Staff had, however, in their extensive search for a means to achieve decisive military victory in a ‘short war,’ by 1910 seized on the necessity of conducting at the beginning of any future war a quick, decisive strike fully utilizing all available state forces and means. But, the senior leadership of the Tsarist government deceived themselves into also believing that the key factor determining the success of this offensive would be the moral force of the entire Russian people supporting the war -- regardless of the quantity or quality of new weapons technology with which the Russian Army could be equipped.

The Initial Period of War (Autumn 1914): Time Runs Out

The Russian strategic plan for a European war initially called for a defensive action against Germany and a vigorous dual-purpose offensive against Austria: first, to save Serbia from annihilation; and, second, to prevent an Austrian invasion from the south into Russian-occupied Poland. However, once the French and British forces in the west began to be overrun by the opening German offensive, their desperate appeals for a Russian diversion prompted the high

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command to improvise an offensive into East Prussia. The diversion operation was planned as a pincer movement by two numerically superior Russian armies with the objective of encircling the German army under Von Hindenburg.

On August 17, 1914 General E. K. Rennenkampf began to advance on Konigsberg, while to his south General A. V. Samsonov pushed westward through the very difficult Masurian Lakes region. The initial Russian success in dislodging the Germans was deceptive. Rennenkampf’s advance westward was excruciatingly slow while the Samsonov army, isolated and without communications to either Rennenkampf or Russian headquarters and short on supplies and munitions, continued to press forward until Von Hindenburg trapped Samsonov’s army in the Tannenberg-Soldau forest. Two of Samsonov’s corps surrendered; Samsonov committed suicide on August 30; and by mid-September Von Hindenburg, reinforced with two corps transferred from the Western Front, drove what remained of the Russian armies out of East Prussia, with the Russian loss of 300,000 men and 650 guns.

The failure of the East Prussian offensive was a shocking defeat, both for the Russians and for their allies, because of the gross ineptitude, mismanagement, lack of coordination, and unpreparedness of the Russian leadership. Although the Russian Army eventually was able to stabilize the Eastern Front along the East Prussian border by October 1914, and even attempted unsuccessfully to renew their offensive in November 1914 and February 1915, they never regained the initiative before the 1915 German drive eastward.492

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492 Florinsky, pp. 1322-1323.
The simultaneous, pre-planned Russian offensive on a three hundred mile-wide front into Galicia on August 18, 1914 was initially far more successful in its objective of checking the Austrian advance into Poland than was the ignominious, unsuccessful Russian offensive into East Prussia. By September 3 the Russian Army captured Lemberg (Lvov), the ancient capital of Galicia and a critical rail junction, and pressed forward to invest the fortress at Przemysl; seized Czernovitz, the capital of Bukovina; and reached the Carpathian Mountain passes leading onto the plains of Hungary.

Although the Russian offensive stopped short of one of its main objectives, Cracow, because the troops and supplies needed to take the city were tied down in the siege of Przemysl, in three weeks' time a staggering blow was dealt to the Austrian army, which lost some 350,000 troops that its much smaller manpower reserves would have very great difficulty replacing. Whether this success of Russian arms was the result of superior Imperial Staff long-range planning, the character of the individual Russian leaders who effectively coordinated the operation, or the weaknesses of the Austro-Hungarian Army, which was more comparable to the Russian Army in terms of staff work, logistic system and communications than was the more efficient German military system, will long be debated by historians.493

Following the September 6 to 11, 1914 Battle of the Marne, the Western Front began to settle into the tedious stalemate of trench warfare, thus releasing German troops from France for transfer to the

493 Florinsky, p. 1324.
Eastern Front, where the Germans had made a pre-war promise to Austria that they would launch an offensive into Poland upon the outbreak of hostilities. In anticipation of the arrival of these reinforcements, Von Hindenburg transferred the majority of his army from East Prussia to Silesia, and on September 28 launched a major offensive into the southwestern provinces of Russian Poland.

Russia responded to the German threat by withdrawing twelve army corps from Galicia to concentration areas behind the Vistula River, immediately north of Warsaw. With the removal of a large portion of the Russian Army from Galicia, the Austrians initiated an offensive to relieve Przemysl, but unwisely overextended themselves, which forced the Austrians to beat a hasty retreat back to Cracow. More importantly, from the Russian standpoint, the Austrian defeat exposed the German southern flank, which forced on Von Hindenburg's army a 100-mile strategic retreat from the gates of Warsaw in order to escape encirclement.

The respite for the Russians was illusory, however, because on November 11, 1914 the Germans, under General Mackensen, renewed their attack toward Warsaw in coordination with a new Austrian offensive in Galicia. Despite ferocious fighting and heavy casualties on all sides, neither offensive made significant progress against the Russian troop concentrations, and by mid-December 1914 the Eastern Front drifted into a winter hibernation along a line some thirty-five miles west of Warsaw.494

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494 Florinsky, p. 1324.
The first four months of World War I was not a total disaster for Russia. Certainly the Russian Army suffered a staggering defeat in East Prussia, but it had not collapsed before the vaunted German onslaught. Russia had successfully invaded, and now controlled, Galicia, while Von Hindenburg's offensive against Warsaw had been stopped.

Strategically, the Russian Army in December 1914 was in a far better position than it had been at the beginning of the war. The Russian Army's exposed geographical position in western Poland had been eliminated by the withdrawal, transfer, and concentration of forces in the Warsaw region, thus consolidating the front and shortening the lines of communication. Russian Army mobilization was now well under way, expanding the standing 1.4-million-man peacetime army by 5.2 million conscripts in 1914 alone, and thereby transforming it. The first engagements had revealed, however, what Michael Florinsky quite succinctly describes as the following "glaring imperfections of the Russian military machine":

Poor staff work; lack of coordination; shortage of planes, artillery, rifles, and munitions; helplessness of the commissariat in providing for the needs of the army; inadequacy of the communication and railway system and the deplorable state of the roads. The expenditure of munitions and rifles during the Galician and Polish campaigns was far in excess of domestic production and deliverables from abroad and made dangerous inroads on the modest stores available. Last but not least, there were ominous signs of declining morale and lack of confidence in victory.

The immense mobilization process, or the lack of preparation therefor, was itself a major contributor to declining Russian Army
morale. Initially, there were very few draft evaders because the Russian population patriotically supported a war against Germany. Thus, the first call-up of draftees actually proceeded in an orderly manner.\textsuperscript{97} However, once the inductees reported for duty, the mobilization process began to deteriorate rather rapidly. At the beginning of the war the Russian Army had only one million rifles in its war reserve, and munitions were so scarce that thousands of the new recruits received only one bullet before they went into combat. The paltry 525,000 rifles produced annually by Russian factories was insufficient to maintain the peacetime force levels during a war, let alone arm the avalanche of new inductees. Perhaps even more urgently important, in the long run, no government provisions were made to care for the inductees' families, who suffered inordinately during the long course of the war from the loss of income and support -- in some cases starving to death.\textsuperscript{98}

Most of the draftees languished in the rear for the lack of instructors, training facilities, and replacement equipment, while many frontline Russian combat units were struggling to survive with only 25 percent of their authorized strength. The Imperial Army had an acute shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers, rifles, machineguns, artillery, munitions, uniforms, boots, food, quarters, transportation -- everything was in short supply -- just as the General Staff military theoreticians had forewarned.

\textsuperscript{97} Florinsky, p. 1375.

\textsuperscript{98} Iakushkin, p. 183.
The Russian troops suffered, and died, horribly from this lack of preparation and from the utter stupidity of inducting so many million men, when these huge masses of troops were neither needed against a combined Austro-German army which totaled 1.3 million men, nor could the new Russian recruits be supplied properly. Still, these raw, untrained recruits -- predominately peasant former-serfs pulled directly from their landowners' estates -- were sent unarmed to the front where, formed as the second and subsequent echelons for frontal attacks, they were expected to pick up the weapons of their fallen fellow soldiers, killed in front of them, and continue forward. Therefore, it is not surprising that under such horrific conditions the Russian peasant conscripts were annihilated by the thousands; but also frequently surrendered en masse or deserted.

In 1915 another 5.2 million men would be drafted into the Imperial Army; 2.7 million more in 1916; and another 600,000 in 1917, for a total of over 15 million Russian men mobilized to serve for World War I. As a percentage of the total labor force, this meant that in 1914 fifteen percent of the Russian working-age male population was serving in the army; in 1915, twenty-five per cent;

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500 Florinsky, pp. 1329-1330.
in 1916, thirty-six per cent; and in 1917, thirty-seven per cent. This immense mobilization of manpower, with its attendant severe dislocations of peacetime trade, industry, transportation, and agriculture -- when coupled with the ineptitude of the Russian government in organizing and conducting the war effort which resulted in tremendous losses of life, property, and territory -- in the course of the war completely devastated the Russian economy and contributed significantly to the intense renewal of the great Russian social unrest that spawned the February and October 1917 Revolutions which ended, finally and with finality, the ruling Romanov Dynasty.

**Contemporary Lessons from the Imperial Army**

In 1854, 1877, and in the Japanese War we lost a great many lives through ignorance or the erroneous interpretation of Suvorov. Must there be more casualties? Is it not high time for us to revert to Suvorov's methods of common-sense, his shrewd appreciation of warfare, and his endeavors to train the Army on such lines as to render it as efficient in peacetime as on active service? Is the time not ripe yet to heed his golden rule: "Wars are fought not with numbers but with knowledge"?503

"Wars are fought not with numbers but with knowledge"?

- General Elchaninov, 1912

During the sixty-odd years between the beginning of the Crimean War (1853) and the start of the First World War (1914) the Russian Imperial Army underwent a transformation that took it, admittedly,

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501 Florinsky, p. 1353.
with numerous false starts and through a series of disastrous, costly military defeats, from a feudal conscript army employing, at best, stereotyped 18th century tactics, to a modern mass standing army. Under the leadership of a 'professional' officer corps, this new Russian Army could, if its senior commanders allowed it to do so, effectively apply many of the emerging technologies available at the beginning of the 20th century.

In the process of accomplishing this metamorphosis, the Imperial Army came to the forefront of changing Russian society itself because the principal factor leading to the transformation of both the Imperial Army and of Russian society was the education of the Russian people so that they could understand and adapt to the new forms of warfare that industrialization and new emerging technologies wrought. The leaders in this Russian societal education process included numerous visionary military thinkers -- men like Miliutin, Obruchev, Neznamov, Martynov, and Mikhnevich -- who General Pavel Zhilin describes as:

Russian military writers at the end of the XIX and beginning of the XX centuries left an enormous theoretical legacy. In their creative investigations of the complicated questions of mass army military art are found a visionary understanding of the peculiarities and character of war, which, for their time correctly defined the fundamental factors to achieve victory in war. In their military-scientific works they examined also the most important questions such as the initial period [birth] and essence of warfare, the ways to build military forces, the forms and methods of conducting military operations, and others.\(^{304}\)

\(^{304}\) Zhilin, p. 234.
Throughout the Russian military transformation, as still today, the investigation, development and deployment of advanced emerging technologies is a driving force behind military change. The prevailing Russian military intellectual view, especially as World War I approached, consolidated around the concept still applied within the Russian military: military-scientific investigations of past experience employing a dialectic process, which incorporates the latest emerging technological innovations, can be used effectively to create an operational framework, or paradigm, based upon the proven eternal principles of warfare -- such as surprise, speed, space, time, force, mass, and maneuver -- in order to obtain maximum effect toward achieving victory in war.

A few of the pertinent lessons, that, based on available information from this exceedingly rich Russian historical period, might be accepted as 'laws,' include evidence that the Russian people, while individually peaceloving, make excellent soldiers and fight best when directly defending their 'homeland' from a clearly defined and well-understood external enemy threat, against which the population patriotically can coalesce. That Great Russian 'homeland' does not, in any way, include the peripheral republics of the former Soviet Union. Further, even without such domestic popular support, the staunch fighting qualities of the Russian soldier are such that even in defeat -- even in calamitous defeat with horrendous casualties -- he does not break. Rather, the Russian Army suffers, endures, reorganizes, and perseveres. Patience, persistence, and long-term planning and preparation toward state goals also take on the characteristics of a 'fundamental law.'
From the middle of the 19th century through the First World War, Russian Imperial Army military intellectuals explored in great depth, while the peasant soldiers and commanders simultaneously learned the hard way on the battlefield, the critical requirements for defending the Russian homeland against aggressors. In the process, the Russian military came to the conclusion that rapid maneuver from secure strategic bastions along interior lines of communication was a prerequisite for being able to concentrate superior forces at the decisive points around the periphery of their vast country during the initial period of war in order to engage, and to defeat, the enemy at the time and location of Russian choosing. Russian military thinkers also determined that numerical (quantitative) superiority alone, either in manpower or weaponry, was not of itself decisive. Rather, the synergistic (qualitative) combination of military education, combat training, leadership, readiness, strategy, operational art, and tactics, if integrated with the employment of superior (or at least comparable) weaponry through precise command information flows to and from disciplined leaders in order to control the pace and scope of battles, guaranteed decisive victory in war. In this context, the analysis by Gulevich, from nearly 100 years ago, retains the characteristics of an 'eternal principle' or 'fundamental law':

The decisive role in the course of wars will be played by the state social-economic system. Warfare demands the exertion of the entire country's social and economic organism. Therefore, the state system must be prepared for the political, military, financial, and economic aspects of war.505

505 Gulevich, A. A., Sravnenie ekonomicheskogo stroia Rossii i glavneishikh evropeiskikh gosudarstv s voennoi tochki zrenija, (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 36.
But, as is well known, truth, suitable for all time, does not exist. Truth is always concrete. The character of modern warfare with its grandiose expanse and diversity of military technologies in no way can be compared with that of past wars. It is entirely evident that the achievements of Russian military thought, despite their gigantic value, cannot be applied mechanically to modern conditions. ... Soviet military science absorbs all the best that exists from the past military heritage. It is widely used by applying it to the modern, currently changing forms and methods of conducting warfare.506

The new technical combat means demanded decisive transformation (perestroika) of all military systems.507

- General N. P. Mikhnevich

506 Zhilin, p. 235.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process
and the Concept of Future War

PART II

The 1921-1923 Interregnum
and
the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms

The 1921-1923 Interregnum:
The Red Army Demobilization Disaster and
Ideological Conflict over the Role of the Red Army

The army is a copy of society and suffers from all its
diseases, usually at a higher temperature.
- Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed

Decision to Demobilize:
Political, Military, and Economic Reasons

The final defeat of General Wrangel and the evacuation of the
remnants of his Volunteer Army from Crimea on November 16, 1920
"opened a new era for the Red Army, though hostilities continued well
into 1922," particularly in the Ukraine, the Kuban, Central Asia,
and the Caucasus. As early as September 1920, Caucasian Front
Revvoensovet (RVS) member Ordzhonikidzi had received a telegram from
Lenin directing to "most quickly and completely liquidate all
[bandit] bands and remnants of the White Guards in the Caucasus and

von Hagen, Mark, Soldiers in the Proletarian
Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist
State, 1917-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1990), p. 127; for well-documented accounts of events
that transpired during the Russian Civil War, see
Budennyi, S. M., Preidennyi pot', Book One, (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1959) and Book Three, (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1973); Beskovtnyi, L. G., Russkoe voennoe iskussava XIX
v., (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); Rostunov, I. I., Istoriia
pervoi mirovoi voiny 1914-1918, 2 vols., (Moscow: Nauka,
1975); Stone, Norman, The Eastern Front 1914-1917,
Kuban -- this matter is of absolute importance to the entire state."509 Progress in quelling these marauding "enemies of the Revolution" was slow. The highly maneuverable bands employing guerilla tactics were exceedingly difficult to eliminate. They tended to assemble, raid an area, and disperse before Red Army units could find them, let alone encircle and destroy them in a battle.

Consequently, as late as November 1921 Budennyi's First Cavalry Army reported the continued existence in the Caucasus of "95 organized bandit groups with a strength of approximately 4500 sabers [cavalrymen] and nearly 1000 bayonets [infantrymen] with 60-70 machineguns."510 The 'counterrevolutionary' groups that most threatened Soviet power in 1921 were, first, Nestor Makhno's 2000 man partisan band which plundered the Ukraine virtually at will; and second, the "Army for the Salvation of Russia," organized in the Don and Kuban regions on June 23, 1921 by Princes Ukhtomskii and Dolgorukhov with 212 former Imperial army officers and several thousand soldiers.511 Although the most serious opposition to Soviet power, the White Volunteer Army, commanded by Denikin and Wrangel, was gone forever, in 1921 alone there were an additional 170,000 Red Army battle casualties, followed by 21,000 combat losses in 1922.512

510 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 266.
511 Budennyi, Book Three, pp. 163 and 244.
A more recent source using archival materials states that during the course of the Russian Civil War from 1918 to 1922 "the Red Army lost 939,755 in dead and missing and 6,791,703 wounded."513

But already in the summer of 1919, with the defeat of Admiral Kolchak's forces on the Eastern Front, the Revvoensovet (RVS) had begun to consider the peacetime structure of the Red Army.514 Under the direction of the Main Staff and the Field Staff, a series of commissions were established to prepare proposals for the rapid transition to a military system based on militia, demobilization, and restructuring of the central command apparatus. This latter commission was chaired by P. S. Baluev, a former Tsarist general, who proposed retaining the existing dual staff system, but with the General Staff becoming the "supreme operational institution within a system directed by a State Defense Council."515 However, the Field Staff report, dated January 1920, proposed the creation of a single Great General Staff (Bol'shoi General'nyi Shtab) by merging the Main Staff and the Field Staff under the overall policy direction of the RVS.516 To help resolve the conflicting and contentious institutional positions, a January 1920 conference of Party leaders, members of the RVS, commissars, and military specialists agreed on the formation of a single, unified General Staff, however, it would not be until

514 Kliatskin, Na zashchite..., pp. 430-432.
515 Kliatskin, Na zashchite..., pp. 426 and 451-52.
516 Kliatskin, Na zashchite..., pp. 430-432.
February 1921 that the Main Staff and Field Staff were actually merged to create the much more cohesive, and increasingly powerful, Red Army Staff (Shtab RKKA).³¹⁷

By the winter of 1920, the most senior members of Lenin's government who formed the Council on Labor and Defense (Sovet Truda i Oborony - STO) were hoping to send half of the Red Army's five million men-under-arms home for spring planting in 1921, "if the international situation and the transport system allowed."³¹⁸ The STO was in near panic over the collapse of the Russian economy, that had been caused by nearly seven years of continuous warfare on the territory of the former Russian Empire. By 1920 Russian heavy industrial production had fallen to only one-seventh of pre-war levels. Cast iron annual production was at 116 thousand tons -- only three percent of the pre-war level, while coal was at one-third; oil at forty percent; and Russian agricultural production was at just a meager sixty-five percent of the former Tsarist level. Everywhere there was growing unemployment.³¹⁹ When the Russian economy failed to respond positively to military manpower cuts, in October 1921 a Party Central Committee plenum would order a further Red Army reduction down to 1.5 million troops; by October 1922 army strength would drop even further to 800,000 soldiers; and by February 1923 the Red Army

³¹⁸ von Hagen, p. 127.
would reach its provisional peacetime level of 600,000. Although "encircled by capitalists," besieged, isolated, and thus only temporarily at peace, for the Bolshevik leadership the economy became the number one priority. "No longer were the needs of the army at the center of the regime's attention."^31

Political pressure to demobilize the Red Army had been building well before the Ninth Party Conference, held in the March-April 1920 time frame, since the concept of a standing army was anathema to the Communist Party leaders; but especially to the Left Social Revolutionaries, who stridently advocated the creation of a territorial militia and lived in utter fear of a "Bonapartist" military coup, fueled by the deteriorating Russian economic conditions. They were the progeny of the European social democratic movement who, in Jake Kipp's words, carried with them,

... an undying distrust of any ideas coming from professional soldiers of the old regime. On the one hand, reformers and revolutionaries shared the strong antimilitarist thrust of European social democracy, which viewed the military as the sources of a vile and poisonous militarism. The professional soldiers' desire for glory, like the capitalists' search for profits, only brought suffering to the working class. All socialists shared a commitment to a citizens' militia as the preferred means of national defense.522

531 von Hagen, p. 129.
Into the breach at the Ninth Party Conference strode Leon Trotsky, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) and War Commissar, who proposed "labor militarization." Trotsky's idea was that rather than demobilize the Red Army wholesale and return the quasi-literate, experienced, and indoctrinated conscripts -- nearly 80 percent of whom were peasants -- home into a devastated economy, the soldiers should be converted into conscripted "labor armies" that would introduce organization and planning into the rural areas in order to help build socialism. In his keynote speech Trotsky pointed to the success of the Third Red Army in rebuilding the Urals rail network and praised their discipline and self-sacrifice in applying military organizational methods to what traditionally were considered to be civilian economic tasks.523

Although the 103 army delegates to the Eighth Party Congress, also in March-April 1920, argued strenuously and vehemently against either demobilization, "labor armies," or transition to a territorial militia, the Congress resolved to initiate a gradual redeployment of the regular army into militia units that would be located in Russian interior areas with large concentrations of industrial workers who would be able to provide the loyal, "core-tested elements of the local proletariat." When the Eighth Party Congress authorized the formation of Trotsky's labor armies, it also "accepted the principle of mass mobilizations of conscripted labor, along the lines by which we proceeded in the building of the Red Army."524

523 von Hagen, pp. 117-118.
524 von Hagen, p. 120.
Lenin's government thus instituted a fundamental change in the role of the proletarian dictatorship, namely, to "mobilize the nation's resources for economic and military tasks" using the organizational principles of the Red Army "to provide, for the less conscious and more backward peasant masses, natural leaders and organizers in the persons of the most conscious proletarians...."—many of whom were either former, or currently serving, Red Army soldiers. Finally, the Ninth Party Conference thought it wise to caution that implementation of these ambitious military reforms could be suspended if new international security threats to the Soviet state emerged. To reflect the importance of this planned transition to a territorial militia and the new emphasis on civilian economic matters, in April 1920 the senior-level government Council of Worker and Peasant Defense, first formed in November 1918, was renamed the Council of Labor and Defense (Sovet Truda i Oborony - STO).

**Demobilization Reprieve: The Spring 1920 Polish Attack**

In late April 1920 the Red Army obtained a reprieve from demobilization and reform when the Polish Army launched a major offensive on April 25, 1920 with the immediate objective to "liberate the Ukraine," and with an ultimate goal being "the total defeat of Russian imperialism." Jozef Pilsudski, head of the independent

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525 von Hagen, p. 120.
526 von Hagen, pp. 120-121.
new Polish State and Polish Armed Forces Supreme Commander, basically sought to restore Poland's eastern frontiers to those that existed prior to the 1772 partition by seizing the western provinces of Russia and of the Ukraine.528

After the September 1919 declaration of the 'Curzon Line,' establishing the 'temporary' new Polish border, Pilsudski decided to take advantage of the turmoil in Russia to push Poland's border eastward, before the new border could be defended by the Soviets.529 Pilsudski's preemptive attack on the Russian Southwestern Front with 738,000 men, supported by the Ukrainian guerilla forces of hetman Simon Petliura, initially succeeded in driving back the Russian defenders and in occupying Kiev on May 7, 1920.

For the fledgling Soviet state, the struggle to secure its borders and to preserve the gains of the Revolution suddenly took precedence once again, and the STO issued an immediate Red Army mobilization order that yielded some 300,000 recruits from the 1901 birth-year group. A second call-up for multiple-year groups assembled a total of one million men to augment the existing ranks and swelled the Red Army to its civil war peak of 5,317,159 soldiers, who succeeded in containing the initial Polish advance.530


530 von Hagen, p. 121.
To compound the Bolshevik difficulties, however, in June 1920 -- just as the Western Front Commander, the twenty-six-year-old Mikhail V. Tukhachevskii, whom Lenin at times referred to almost fondly as "the dashing Red lieutenant,"\(^5\) was preparing the Red Army for a massive counteroffensive against the Poles -- Baron General Petr von Wrangel attacked unexpectedly in the south, out of Crimea across the Perekop Isthmus, which was defended only by the weak Thirteenth Red Army, and via landings at Genichesk from the Sea of Azov. Wrangel's attack took the Bolshevik defenders in the flank by surprise in an energetic, but desperate, effort to seize the major grain-producing Northern Tauride region in order to supply and to relieve his Volunteer Army from entrapment in Crimea.\(^5\) The 40,000 veterans of the April 1920 Volunteer Army evacuation from the Kuban port of Novorossisk to the Crimea had been reorganized into three corps, one cavalry division, and one Caucasian brigade armed with 100 cannons and 500 machineguns,\(^5\) that first inflicted heavy casualties on the thinly defended Red troops. \(^5\)


\(^5\) Budennyi provides a somewhat different structure for Wrangel's Crimean Army: 4 army corps (General Kuteptov's 1st; General Slashchev's 2nd; General Abramov's Don; and General Pisarev's "laughable" summary group), plus General Barbovich's two division cavalry corps. Wrangel's army was equipped with 630 machineguns, 108 cannon, 24 armored cars, 12 tanks, 4 armored trains, and 24 aircraft. See Budennyi, Book Three, p. 19.
on I. P. Uborevich's 13,000 man Thirteenth Red Army "guard force" during the Crimean Peninsula breakout, and at the end of June decisively defeated a counterattack by the Red First Cavalry Corps now commanded by Zhloba.\textsuperscript{336} The Revvoensovet rushed some 35,000 fresh Red Army troops to the Crimea during the month of June 1920 -- including many of their last reserves, who were badly needed on the Western Front against the Polish offensive -- in order to try to contain Wrangel's outbreak by reinforcing the Thirteenth Red Army to a strength of 41,000 men.\textsuperscript{335} But by the beginning of July 1920, the entire Northern Tauride was in the hands of the White Army.\textsuperscript{336}

This new two-front war, on the Western and Southwestern Fronts, stretched Soviet military manpower and resources to the limit. To meet the crisis Budennyi's Konarmiia (First Cavalry Army) was redeployed from the Caucasian Front to the Southwestern Front to form a strike group with 18,000 sabers, 52 guns, 350 machineguns, five armored trains, an armored car detachment, and eight aircraft directed against a thinly-spread Polish Third Army that had very limited reserves.\textsuperscript{337} With sporadic logistic support and limited operational cooperation from the Twelfth Red Army, Budennyi's Konarmiia, fielding four cavalry divisions reinforced with two infantry divisions, combined surprise and concentration of mass on June 5, 1920 at the weak juncture of the Third and Fourth Polish

\textsuperscript{336} Denikin, pp. 357 & 363.
\textsuperscript{335} Denikin, p. 363.
\textsuperscript{336} Luckett, pp. 361-361.
\textsuperscript{337} Kipp, in \textit{Soviet Military Doctrine}, p. 105.
Armies to break through the Polish front with one cavalry division into Galicia.\textsuperscript{538}

Budennyi's penetration of Polish lines caused Marshal Pilsudski to evacuate Kiev on June 10 and to begin a general retreat from his overextended positions in order to preclude envelopment as Budennyi's cavalry thrust well into the Polish rear area around Zhitomir and Berdichev.\textsuperscript{539} During the following month the \textit{Konarmiia} pressed on to participate in heavy fighting around Rovno, which the \textit{Konarmiia} captured on July 4 in a flanking attack; lost to a Polish counterattack on July 9; and regained through a direct assault on July 10, 1920.

Budennyi's force engaged in forty-three days of intensive combat without effective logistic support. Cavalry brigades, which at the start of the campaign had numbered 1,500 sabers, were down to 500 or less by the end of the fighting. The fighting at Zhitomir and Rovno exemplifies the combined-arms approach that typified Soviet employment of strategic cavalry. It also showed its limited ability to engage in sustained combat.\textsuperscript{540}

Meanwhile, Tukhachevskii continued preparations for an all-out Red Army offensive to seize the Polish capital.\textsuperscript{541} By the end of July 1920, when Tukhachevskii launched his across-the-front drive for Warsaw, his Western Front forces had been reinforced, primarily with

\textsuperscript{538} Weygand, pp. 49-50.

\textsuperscript{539} Zotov, "Boi i konnoi armii v raione Rovno v iiune 1920 g.," \textit{Voina i revoliutsiia}, No. 2, February 1929, pp. 102-103; also Kipp, in Soviet Military Doctrine..., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{540} Zotov, "Boi i konnoi armii v raione Rovno v iiune 1920 g.", \textit{Voina i revoliutsiia}, February 1929, pp. 104-118; also Kipp, Jacob W., in Soviet Military Doctrine..., p. 105.

\textsuperscript{541} Tukhachevskii, M. V., \textit{Pokhod za Vislu}, (Moscow: Novosti, 1992). See this reprint for Tukhachevskii's justification of his Polish campaign decisions.
poorly trained and unwilling returned deserters, from twenty-three
divisions up to thirty-four divisions. The Western Front was divided
by the Pripet Marshes, where General Shrepin's "Group Mozyr" with two
division equivalents sought to maintain a link between two Red Army
main strategic directions: 1) a Northern Front of twenty infantry
divisions and two cavalry divisions forming the Third Cavalry Corps
under General Gay-Khan; and 2) a Southern Front of eight infantry
divisions and the four cavalry divisions of Budennyi's Cavalry Army
-- a total of nearly 790,000 troops.\(^562\)

Following the success of the initial Western Front attack,
Tukhachevskii's plan called for his stronger Northern Front to pursue
the Polish Army relentlessly back to Warsaw so that the Poles would
have no respite during which to regroup. Then the Northern Front was
to flank the Warsaw defenses on the north occupying positions astride
the Warsaw-Danzig line of communications, thus cutting off Warsaw
from its arms and munitions supply line.

As Tukhachevskii's forces rushed headlong toward Warsaw,
"assuming that the enemy were beaten, even though no real battle had
taken place," in his zeal Tukhachevskii neglected to concentrate his
armies, failed to secure and organize his own lines of communication,
and persisted in trying to out-flank Warsaw, even though the maneuver
badly split his forces. "As a result, the Fourth Army on the
northern flank, and the Twelfth and Cavalry Armies on the southern
flank, made no contribution to the issue of the Battle of Warsaw."\(^563\)

\(^562\) Weygand, pp. 46-47.

\(^563\) Weygand, p. 51.
All the while the rapidly retreating Polish Army shortened its interior lines of communication, regrouped, and concentrated its remaining forces on Warsaw.

Then, between August 14 and 17, 1920 at the Vistula River, the Polish Army, strengthened with French reinforcements under General Weygand, halted the overextended Red advance, pinned the Soviet formations against the Polish-East Prussian border, and went over into a counteroffensive that has come to be known in history as the "Miracle of Warsaw." Tukhachevskii's Western Front quickly lost over 70,000 prisoners, as Pilsudski's forces first encircled the Red troop concentration between Narev and the German frontier, and then swept the panicked newly recruited Russian riadovoi (rank and file line troops) before them, overrunning Brest-Litovsk and eastern Galicia. Almost unprecedented in Russian history, army morale had been broken. Most of the Red Army heavy equipment had been captured, and there were no immediately available trained reserves with which to stop the Polish advance. "Tukhachevskii's general offensive took place without adequate reserves, effective command and control, or logistical support."545

Simple and straightforward as the preceding conclusion may seem, over the years great obfuscating controversy has continued to swirl around the failure of Tukhachevskii's offensive, because of the Communists' bitter ideological disappointment that their Polish brethren "proletariat did not unite" and arise to overthrow their

"imperialist oppressors"; because the Bolsheviks tarred the lowly Russian peasant army conscripts as "psychologically unsuitable" for offensively advancing the cause of "world revolution"; and because Joseph Stalin, the Political Commissar of Budennyi's Cavalry Army, sought to cover up the disaster, and especially his own role therein, by blaming War Commissar Trotsky. Thereby Stalin embroiled the failure in Russian politics, and later in his "cult of personality."

All the excuses about inadequate communications, lack of supplies, and battle weariness aside, the fact is that Budennyi's Konarmiia persisted in attacking independently toward Lvov. Budennyi ignored Red Army Commander-in-Chief Kamenev's specific orders to regroup, to join with the Twelfth Red Army, and to attack toward Lublin in order to relieve pressure on the Northern Front. Had Kamenev's orders been executed, the Southern Front might -- just might -- have prevented Tukhachevskii's defeat on the Vistula from becoming a rout.546

In the process of their retreat and 'miracle' victory on the Vistula, the Poles, it seems, had learned a valuable lesson from their nearly disastrous spring attempt to seize all the Ukraine. This time Pilsudski wisely pursued the more limited objective of securing Poland's own frontiers. Considering the small size of the Polish army, their limited supplies and means of transportation, and the probability that the starving Russians would make an all out effort to regain the Ukrainian 'bread basket' if the Poles seized any significant amount of former Imperial territory, in September 1920

the Polish government made its first tentative peace proposals to the Russians. By October 12, 1920 the Soviet and Polish governments agreed to a temporary cease-fire and initiated peace negotiations. The Red Army was now free to concentrate its forces on Wrangel's Volunteer Army in South Russia -- the only remaining major threat to the Soviet state and the Bolshevik top priority for elimination.547

Red Army Demobilization

Following an intense and bloody two months of near-continual fighting, first, to clear the White Army from the Northern Tauride and then to break through the defenses across the Salkovo and Perekop Isthmuses into the Crimean Peninsula White bastion, on the bitter cold day of November 15, 1920, while the last of General Wrangel's forces were completing their embarkation at Yalta,548 Budennyi's Konarmiia and Bliukher's 51st rifle division occupied Sevastopol. The Southern Front Commander Mikhail V. Frunze rather unctuously, but no doubt sincerely, telegraphed to Lenin:

Today our units arrived in Sevastopol. The Southern Russian counterrevolution finally has been played out by the powerful strikes of Red regiments. Our exhausted country is open to the possibility for healing wounds which have been inflicted by the imperialists and the civil war. The revolutionary zeal, that the Red Army displayed in past battles, remains such that in the field of peaceful labor construction Russia can gain a no less brilliant victory. The Red Army of the Southern Front sends its regards and congratulations to the victorious workers and peasants of Russia and to the whole world and to all active international revolutionaries.549

547 Luckett, pp. 362-365.
548 Luckett, p. 383.
objective analysis than either the highly propagandized White or Bolshevik versions of the reasons why the Communists succeeded in consolidating their hold on the territory of the Russian Empire:

Militarily the reasons usually adduced for the Bolsheviks' victory stress their domination of the center of the country, with relatively short interior lines while their enemies were on the outside, disunited, with vast distances to travel before they could come to grips with the main Red forces. The White offensives were not so much defeated as they were spent in long marches through partisan-infested territory, the long communication lines, lack of supplies, and disease (especially typhus) taking toll of their armies even before they faced the enemy. Their troops were almost always inferior numerically to the Bolsheviks', since there was no practical coordination, and really in the nature of things there could not be any, between the major White centers in Siberia, in the south of Russia, and on the Baltic.

Meanwhile, the White evacuations at Kerch and Theodosia proceeded with some considerable confusion and difficulty, as the White rear guard had trouble separating itself from the Red vanguard. At Theodosia alone some 30 various White military units were taken prisoner. But on November 16 the entire White evacuation fleet of 126 ships, carrying 145,693 men, women, and children, assembled in the roads of Theodosia -- and set sail away from their homeland for the unknowns of Constantinople. Almost immediately within the

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531 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 147.

532 Budennyi disputes the figure of 145,693 White evacuees, claiming that according to Soviet data the correct number is 83,000 Russians who fled. Budennyi, Book 3, p. 147.
European half of Russia effective White resistance to the Bolshevik government collapsed. The Russian Civil War 'officially' was over, even though the killing continued for another two years in the Ukraine, Siberia, the Kuban, Central Asia and the Caucasus.\textsuperscript{535}

Equally quickly, as White armed resistance in European Russia collapsed, in December 1920 the Red Army's temporary reprieve from a massive demobilization ended. Marshal Georgii Zhukov describes the status of the Red Army at that time:

During the civil war the Party and people not only were victorious over the enemy, but in the process created a massive regular army; created a central and local military supply organization; and introduced unified command of units. By the end of 1920, the Red Army consisted of 5.5 million men at arms; despite losses between September 1918 and December 1920 of nearly 2.2 million men, of which 800,000 were killed or wounded in battle and 1,392,000 perished from serious illnesses.\textsuperscript{536}

The Eighth Congress of Soviets decided in December 1920 that, with the heinous counterrevolutionaries vanquished; the end of foreign assistance to the White resistance, as well as the termination of direct foreign intervention; and with the Russian economy lying in total ruins, the proletarian state could no longer afford to maintain the large standing Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The Congress resolved, however, that because of their "capitalist encirclement" and the continuing diplomatic crises that could lead to a new foreign intervention against the Socialist Fatherland, it was essential to preserve the state's capability to defend itself and urged that local

\textsuperscript{535} Luckett, pp. 383-384.

soviet should give "all necessary aid" to the army during its demobilization."

As the actual Red Army demobilization began in December 1920, under the direction of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Revvoensover Respubliki - RVSR), conditions so quickly deteriorated to near chaos that the Soviet government's still exceedingly fragile control over the Russian countryside once again became seriously jeopardized.

The RVSR decreed the release of all soldiers and sailors according to a strict schedule: first all men aged thirty-five and older, then men aged thirty-two to thirty-four, followed by the next three age groups. The center would then study the feasibility of further cuts, but hoped to be able to release even twenty-five-year-olds beginning in late spring 1921.556

The Russian rail system, seriously degraded and in some cases all but destroyed outright over the long years of war, was incapable of moving these two-and-a-half-million demobilized soldiers over the vast distances of the Russian steppe in so short a time frame. Trains soon backed-up in stations, stranding the frequently ill and battle weary troops, who so desperately wanted only to go home, with neither food nor shelter in the bitter winter cold. The stranded soldiers took matters into their own hands, demobilized themselves, and began the long walk back to their peasant villages. By the middle of February 1921, the rail system was so completely constipated that the RVSR specifically authorized Petrograd and Moscow military units to leave their garrisons for home on foot.

555 von Hagen, pp. 128-129.
556 von Hagen, p. 129.
Former soldiers -- "Heroes of the Revolution" -- trekked homeward, only to find upon arrival that their homes had been destroyed or pillaged in the wars; that their property and livestock had been looted or confiscated; and that they had no means to support themselves or their families, if indeed their families were still waiting for them. For survival many thousands of demobilized soldiers chose to join partisan bands, or outright 'bandit' groups, that roamed the devastated countryside, inflicting at will even further suffering on the population. "Armed insurrection swept Tambov and Orel provinces, the Ukraine, Turkestan, the Crimea, the Caucasus, the entire Western Front, the Chinese border, and Mongolia."557

The Red Army of the period 1920 to 1921 was nearly as exhausted as had been its White opponents before their defeat on the Crimean Peninsula. Both had lived off the Russian countryside, ravaging it mercilessly during the course of the civil war, as first one side and then the other occupied a territory and sucked sustenance from it.

The victorious Red Army in no way resembled the professional European standing armies of the time:

[The Red Army] was a vast, straggling, loosely organized force, resembling an overgrown partisan army, with few common factors binding it together.... It contained every conceivable type of unit, from semi-barbarous forest brigands to battalions of fanatical Communist cadets; and every kind of soldier, from sabre-rattling ex-NCOs to precise and doctrinaire professors in the military academies.558

557 von Hagen, p. 129.

The depleted Red Army units found themselves surrounded by starving peasants, rampant disease, crime and brutality of every conceivable kind, and open rebellion against any authority -- all in areas that before the wars had been rich, self-sustaining agricultural regions. In the first twenty days of the demobilization, army priority for food rationing fell from its wartime second priority -- behind only defense industry workers -- to sixth place, causing the already harsh living conditions in army units to become simply intolerable. "Once the army lost its privileged position, it became less immune to the hardships that plagued the rest of the country. The fuel shortage left barracks cold. No repairs could be afforded."539

In the spring of 1921 Budennyi's Konarmiia, located in the Ekaterinoslav district of the Ukraine, was typical of the sad state of the whole Red Army. Budennyi wrote:

Its condition worsened catastrophically. Division reports were successively worse, one to the next. Even in the Ukraine 1921 was a year of hunger as people and cattle perished from famine. We fed the horses with roof thatch. Despite this the horses weakened. We lost thousands of horses, and this negatively impacted on troop morale. Maintaining discipline became all the more difficult. Combat capability of the army fell.560

On April 5, 1921 the RUSR ordered the Konarmiia to reduce itself by one-third of its strength and recommended the redeployment of its divisions and regiments to dispersed, "more secure," separate locations within the Nikolaev, Kremenchug, and Tambov districts -- an action which effectively would have eliminated the First

559 von Hagen, p. 130.
560 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 213.
Cavalry Army. Budennyi protested Trotsky's decision and requested the transfer of his Konarmia to the Don, Kuban, and Stavropol' districts, which, following a 'personal for' letter from Budennyi to Lenin, was accomplished.\textsuperscript{561}

Meanwhile, throughout the Red Army whole units of chronically underfed, or unfed, soldiers living in unheated barracks fell ill, while "civilian organizations simply left the army to fend for itself, perhaps, in some cases, exacting revenge for the army's abusive treatment of them in the recent past."\textsuperscript{562} Not surprisingly, under such atrocious conditions Red Army morale collapsed -- with no viable mission, seemingly unwanted, and certainly uncared for by their country -- the RKKA soldiers who had won the civil war and preserved the Revolution, for some very good reasons, began to ask "Pochemu my zdes?" ("Why are we here?")\textsuperscript{563}

The Territorial Militia Debate

That same uncertainty about the fate of the Red Army also began to permeate discussions at the most senior political levels of the army and eventually reached into the innermost circle of Lenin's government as well. One of the initial focal points for the debate over the army's future was the December 1920 second national assembly of the Political Administration of the Revolutionary Council of the Republic (PUR), whose director, Ivar Smilga, was excoriated by the

\textsuperscript{561} Budennyi, Book Three, pp. 213-215.
\textsuperscript{562} von Hagen, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{563} von Hagen, p. 132.
delegates for his lack of leadership and for his failure to defend army interests. According to the angry army political workers in attendance at the assembly, Smilga not only had not acted with sufficient vigor to prevent the creation of a territorial militia by the Ninth Party Conference and the Eighth Congress of Soviets, but had allowed the encroachment into army political affairs of the Main Political Enlightenment Committee (Glavpolitporsvet), headed by Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskiaia.\(^{564}\) Despite Smilga's strident attacks on Trotsky's militia army as being incapable of "guaranteeing 'proletarian hegemony' in the army" and his assertion, which echoed the assessment of General Obruchev fifty years earlier, that "in time of war, Russia's rail network would hinder the rapid mobilization of an army that was territorially organized," within two weeks after the end of the assembly, Ivar Smilga was replaced by Sergei Gusev -- over Leon Trotsky's strong objection.\(^{565}\)

Sergei Gusev, too, had opposed Trotsky's militia plan during his address to the assembly as "premature abandonment of the regular Red Army," since a peasant militia army could be "the organized armed form for the petit bourgeois and anarchist counterrevolution."\(^{566}\) Gusev also argued that, as the recent Polish campaign demonstrated so convincingly, a peasant "militia army was suitable only for a defensive war" and was backed in this assertion by the popular and

\(^{564}\) von Hagen, pp. 132-133.

\(^{565}\) von Hagen, pp. 134-135.

\(^{566}\) Gusev, S. I., Grazhdanskaia voina i krasnaia armiia: sbornik voenno-teoreticheskii i voenno-politicheskikh statei (1918-1924), (Moscow, 1925), pp. 15 and 34.
very influential Red Army commander, Mikhail Tukhachevskii. It must be remembered that what many Bolshevik revolutionaries, and some military leaders like Gusev, ideologically, but rather illogically, expected imminently to happen was a 'world revolution' in which the 'toiling masses' world-wide would follow the Russian example, arise, and overthrow their 'hated capitalist oppressors.' The exuberant Communists, flushed with their civil war victory, fully anticipated that Karl Marx's dictum -- "Workers of the World Unite" -- must now certainly be carried forward into fruition. Therefore, the first ruling Communist government in the world had to be prepared militarily to take the offensive, to seize the initiative by promoting and assisting revolution abroad, and to defend and to secure their own Russian Republic from the anticipated 'inevitable imperialist assault,' aimed at destroying the Soviet homeland -- "the birthplace of the Socialist Revolution."

With this perceived hostile international political climate as background, the December 1920 PUR assembly overwhelmingly affirmed their adamant opposition to any transition of the Red Army into what they deemed to be an "inferior" territorial militia army.

On the basis of their recent experience in the Civil War, the political workers declared that 'in a peasant Russia the implementation of a militia system for the entire country would meet with insurmountable political and strategic difficulties.' A militia system would deliver the army into the hands of the peasantry, and in the event of war would doom the country to military defeat because of the poorly developed rail network. They advocated instead 'a permanent army, not necessarily large, but well trained in the military sense and politically prepared, made up of young age groups.'

\[567\] von Hagen, p. 135.
The delegates repeated the by now ritual insistence that the barracks become a military and political school for young citizens, and, accordingly, that the miserable condition of the existing barracks be rectified immediately. Finally, if the nation were to experiment with a militia system, the formation of new units should not be entrusted to Vsevobuch, but should be left in the hands of the army itself.568

"Vsevobuch" was the acronym for the Universal Military Training Administration that had been created in April 1918 when the Soviet Republic switched from voluntary military service to obligatory military training. From 1919 to 1923 Vsevobuch was headed by Nikolai Podvoiskii, who, as a dedicated advocate for a people's militia, continually sought to expand the Vsevobuch role in forming units, organizing supply and conducting political work among the military.569

The next round of the continuing debate on the future of the Red Army was launched with the opening of the Tenth Party Congress on March 6, 1921 when Vsevobuch Chairman Nikolai Podvoiskii offered a "Resolution on the question of the reorganization of the armed forces of the Republic" in which he asserted that a militia army was the "only genuine socialist military organization" because of the existence therein of "comradely socialist democracy." Leon Trotsky seconded Podvoiskii's motion with an impassioned address, as only the inimitable Trotsky could make, entitled "The Involvement of the Masses in the Creation of the Army."570 Ivar Smilga, the PUR Chairman until only a few months before, verbally assaulted the territorial

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568 von Hagen, p. 135.
569 See von Hagen, pp. 29-34, for further descriptions of Vsevobuch's role and of Podvoiskii's intrigues.
militia proposal warning that "soldiers were again demanding the right to elect officers" and that "the radical proposals being put forward to reintroduce 'democracy' into the army would destroy what little fighting ability Red Army units had managed to preserve."571

Despite Smilga's plea, the Tenth Congress was not ideologically or psychologically prepared to dispense with their socialist roots and resolved to initiate experimental militia units in six interior military districts, while the regular Red Army would continue to defend the state border districts, but deferred a final decision on army organization and structure until after further discussion on the army's future role.572 As a result of this ongoing debate, it would not be until 1922 that the first militia units actually would be organized in Petrograd.573

**Gusev-Frunze "Theses" on the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army (RKKA)**

The leaders of the Tenth Congress discussion on the future structure and role of the Red Army were Sergei Gusev, PUR Chairman, and Mikhail Frunze, an 'Old Bolshevik' and much decorated Red Army Commander of civil war fame, who drafted and distributed to the delegates their "Theses on the Reorganization of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army." The Gusev-Frunze "Theses" were among the first attempts to coherently present the 'lessons of the civil war' by

571 von Hagen, p. 142.
572 von Hagen, pp. 138 & 143.
incorporating the influential views of senior political staff, Red commanders, and military specialists (voenspets). The "Theses" focused not only on the most important factors in the civil war victory and the character of that war, but injected into the debate the projected nature of future wars, which, the authors judged, were likely to be considerably different from the wars just concluded.

- Factors in the Russian Civil War Victory

Gusev presented as his analysis of the situation that in the future the Red Army would not face a splintered enemy force that was "shaky, hostile, or neutral to the proletarian dictatorship, poorly trained and armed, hastily formed," and hence "unreliable because of the soldiers' hostility toward the officers," as the White armies had been. Rather, the more formidable "imperialist" standing European armies confronting and encircling the Soviet state were all "well armed and well trained," with fully prepared command staffs, internal cohesion, numerical superiority, and "chauvinistically inclined" against socialism. European standing armies were not "improvised peasant armies." The Red Army, Gusev concluded, "in the form that it has currently taken, is altogether powerless against mighty imperialist armies" and therefore, "the Soviet state must undertake to make the Red Army equal to its imperialist counterparts."

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573 von Hagen, p. 143.

576 von Hagen, pp. 143-144.
Gusev proposed to the Congress, first, that Podvoiskii's and Trotsky's militia armies in the provinces would create the material basis for "local particularistic strivings to the detriment of the interests of the Workers'-Peasants' Republic," while he, viewed the currently existing centralized army organization as embodying state interests, as opposed to the regional loyalties that a militia would appeal to. If the party and government insisted on shifting to a militia system, Gusev demanded that it be strictly limited to proletarian and semiproletarian cities and villages, and that the new units maintain close ties with the special assignment detachments and with trade unions. In primarily agricultural areas, ... the 'particularistic strivings' of the peasantry would reinforce the local authorities in their inclinations toward autonomy.577

Second, Gusev warned:

The persistence of an overwhelmingly 'petit bourgeois peasant' majority that remained fully capable of spontaneously reviving capitalism in the Soviet Republic, combined with the delay of revolution in the West and the economic devastation of the country, created a situation particularly ripe for 'Bonapartist attempts to overthrow Soviet power.'578

By preserving, and strengthening, PUR oversight of the Red Army political apparatus, Gusev asserted that the political inclination of the peasantry could be redirected to make a peasant-based counter-revolution impossible. Perhaps the main reason for Gusev's concern was that in 1921 the peasantry made up 71 percent of the Red Army, while supposedly loyal proletarian workers constituted only a meager 18 percent. By 1923 the percentage of peasants in the Red Army would rise even higher, to 73.4 percent -- a level exceeding even the 69.3 percent in the 1913 Imperial Russian Army -- before steadily

577 von Hagen, p. 144.
578 von Hagen, p. 145.
declining thereafter as the Frunze Reforms went into effect. Third, Gusev argued adamantly that "the training of a highly qualified officer corps, beginning with the reeducation of the Red commanders" -- while requiring a long period of time to accomplish -- "was capable of producing a cohort that was not only militarily competent but also politically conscious." The "bourgeois" armies that trained their soldiers only in military arts and tactics would be impotent against this "conscious" cohort. Gusev urged the Congress to create this superior form of Red Army officer cadre by transforming "the barracks into a military and political school" that would also become a "labor school," integrally tying the Red Army to the "working life of the nation." Thus, far from detracting from military training, through their labor soldiers could participate directly in the economic recovery by rebuilding, and expanding, the national military barracks network.

- "Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine" and Future War

Frunze elaborated on Gusev's themes, urging Communist Party unity and agreement on what he labeled as a "unified proletarian military doctrine," or "proletarian scientific theory of warfare," that would define the nature of the Red Army and its role in society. In 1921 Frunze wrote an article for Voennoe delo (Military Affairs) titled "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii" ("A Unified


von Hagen, p. 145.
Military Doctrine and the Red Army") in which he offered a comprehensive, if rather convoluted, explanation:

Unified military doctrine is the adoption by the military of a given state of that learning, which establishes the character of the country's military force construction, the methods of war preparation of troops, their leadership on the basis of the supremacy of state views on the character of military missions and methods for their resolution which are formed for them, derived from the state's class structure and determined by the level of development of the country's industrial strength.  

Frunze averred that Marxist-Leninist military doctrine was not just a set of ideas based on "objective military experience" that was to be codified solely by the General Staff; but primarily a political statement of the will of the dominant social class. Therefore, in Frunze's conceptual construct:

The military apparatus must take the organizational form most fitting to the general state tasks and have armed forces which are unified on the basis of common views on the character of military tasks and the means of accomplishing them.  

As such, Soviet military doctrine, as defined by Mikhail Frunze, would be both a political and military statement, rather than a purely military document, independently derived and separate from official state political ideology.

The conceptual basis for Frunze's "unified military doctrine" assumed that future war would be a mass war against "imperialists" in which the Soviet state would have to mobilize all its civilian and military resources, as had been required during the First World War.

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and the only too recently concluded Russian Civil War. Frunze believed emphatically that capitalist encirclement constituted a continuing real threat to the Soviet state:

Between our proletarian state and the rest of the bourgeois world there can be only one condition -- that of long, persistent, desperate war to the death: a war which demands colossal tenacity, steadfastness, inflexibility, and a unity of will.... The state of open warfare may give way to some sort of contractual relationship which permits, up to a definite level, the peaceful coexistence of the warring sides. These contractual forms do not change the fundamental character of these relations.... The common, parallel existence of our proletarian state with the states of the bourgeois world for a protracted period is impossible.  

Jake Kipp ever so correctly states that this imminent threat, as defined by Mikhail Frunze, "created a need to study future war [budushchaia voina], not as an abstract proposition, but as a foreseeable contingency."  

According to Semen Budennyi, Frunze concluded his unified military doctrine article with the following four basic assumptions:

1) Military affairs of a given state, taken in totality, are not independently supreme and purposes are determined by the social conditions of the state.
2) The character of military doctrine, accepted by the army of a given state, is determined by the character of the general political line of the leading class.
3) The fundamental basis for a vital military doctrine consists of its strict agreement with the social aims of the state, and with those material and spiritual resources, which are found in its instructions.
4) Doctrines, capable of being a living organizational movement for the army, are impossible to invent.

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584 Kipp, in Soviet Military Doctrine..., p. 108.
Other Frunze assumptions included that the proletariat alone could wage offensive warfare -- which was essential for victory -- since the peasant army (militia) had been proven to be suitable only for defense of its homeland and that the Soviet state must attain technological superiority over the "imperialists." To achieve the "technological revolution" that he considered to be essential for future military success, Frunze advocated the education of the political leadership in order to lay the military-political foundation for a massive industrialization program that would concentrate on building the most modern defense industries possible. Frunze’s ambitious and large-scale education program dovetailed nicely with Gusev’s focus on "internationalism" and requirements for expanded industrial production.586

Frunze also proposed that "the General Staff be transformed into a ‘military and political headquarters of the proletarian state,’ mainly by the addition of the army’s most senior political workers," which would ensure the unity of "political and military leadership ... in one central state institution," thereby ensuring the defense needs of the Soviet state. With this argument for the consolidation of military and political power within the General Staff, Frunze brought forward into the 1920s the debates that had transpired a half-century earlier, during the Miliutin Reforms when Prince Bariatinskii and his cohorts vehemently opposed War Minister Miliutin and proposed the creation of a ‘Prussian’ General Staff that

would effectively restrain the existing civilian bureaucracy and Imperial household control over state resources.\textsuperscript{587}

Frunze, as had his co-presenter Gusev before him, also advocated the assignment of high priority to defense industry development through a government plan for major investments in weapons modernization.\textsuperscript{588} Because of the projected increasing technical complexity of future warfare, Frunze stressed the importance of integrating civilian economic and planning organizations with the military during peacetime:

If we examine in general those tendencies that are being created in the realm of military affairs, then we must recognize that the center of gravity is moving away from the operator toward the organizer. Successful battle now depends less on correct operational leadership than on the correct organization of the rear and on everything that prepares for the conduct of military operations.\textsuperscript{589}

For this purpose, Frunze proposed placing military officers within civilian government departments to coordinate defense planning.\textsuperscript{590}

Leon Trotsky, the RVSR Chairman, was absolutely furious at the impertinence of the Gusev and Frunze proposals, and, according to Gusev, "attacked them fiercely at the closed session devoted to military discussion and won Lenin's approval" to keep the provocative 'Theses' out of the public account of Tenth Congress proceedings.


\textsuperscript{588} von Hagen, p. 145.


For the time being, however, the foundation of the Soviet armed forces would continue to be the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Only in Petrograd, Moscow, and the Urals, the areas with the highest concentrations of industrial workers, would the territorial militia system be initiated by assigning "experienced troops" along with dedicated Party members in "special assignment detachments."

The Congress resolved to continue the demobilization of the army's oldest soldiers, to slow the release of workers, and to stop altogether the release of Communists. Because the government had decreed a reduction in the size of the army with no loss of its combat and political effectiveness, the congress resolved that, as far as possible, the army should be freed from labor assignments in the civilian economy. At the same time, it ordered the creation of transitional militia units in industrial regions, combining the principles of workers' participation in industry with their service in militia forces.591

The Tenth Congress declared that the several groups and individual comrades, who were agitating to alter the current organizational principles of the Red Army; to introduce the elective principle; and to subordinate commissars to party cells, as "politically dangerous and likely to provoke and intensify the breakdown of the Red Army," and called on the Central Committee to "take exhaustive measures to eliminate all such disorganizing agitation."592

What Frunze had done was to propose a settlement, initially and only temporarily for the Bolsheviks, of the Imperial Russian Army debate that had erupted within Nikolaev General Staff Academy circles after the military failures of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.

591 von Hagen, p. 147.
592 von Hagen, p. 147.
That successor debate to the 1873 'secret society' investigations of a Russian national military doctrine had reached a crescendo in 1911 with the brilliantly provocative writings of Neznamov; experienced a rapid denouement after Tsar Nikolas II personally intervened in 1912 to forbid further discussion of doctrine; and thereafter had lain dormant until after the 1917 Revolution, when the need for a common (unitary) military doctrine "as the summary of the leading views accepted in a given army in a given era ... to secure the mutual understanding of leaders and executors" became increasingly important. Indeed, ideological unity was deemed to be so critical to the new Soviet state that the Eleventh Party Congress, which opened on March 27, 1922, promptly would formally approve Mikhail Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine."

Regarding Frunze's unitary military doctrine, Bruce Menning's trenchant analysis is most precise:

The enduring significance of Frunze's contribution to a definition of doctrine lay in its comprehensive nature, Marxian orientation, and explicit linkage to the military policy of the Communist Party.

As a result of Frunze's efforts, Soviet military doctrine, through its many future iterations, would continue to define the Communist

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Menning, in Soviet Military Doctrine..., p. 43.
Party as the leading political force for the whole of Russian society, and through it, to establish the organic military linkage and integration with that society which the Communists' Imperial Army predecessors had advocated as essential to achieving victory in modern warfare.

**Impact of Red Army Demobilization**

The resolutions of the Tenth Party Congress, however, not only did little to stem the continuing deterioration of morale in the Red Army throughout the remainder of 1921, but actually aggravated the problem immensely. The decision of the Tenth Congress to implement Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) created in the Soviet Republic a limited market economy, legalized private trade, ended forced grain requisitions from the peasantry, denationalized numerous industries, and sanctified private property -- a policy which many Communists ardently believed "betrayed the Revolution." Largely in protest over this decision, between August 1920 and the end of 1921, the number of Communist Party members serving in the Red Army dropped from 278,400 to a mere 86,000 members, as the Party rank and file 'voted with their feet' and left the Red Army in droves.

So disgruntled were the predominately peasant soldiers remaining in the Red Army over their abysmal living conditions and lack of a mission, and so very dispirited were the remaining Party cadres, that PUR Chairman Gusev reported to the August 1921 Central Committee plenum about the "grave situation in the army." As army
morale continued to plummet during the waning months of 1921, in December the RKP(b) Central Committee, in an effort to salvage and reverse the situation, ordered the first peacetime Communist Party mobilization which required all members in the age group of 20 to 22 to enlist for military service.596

- Morale: Order and Discipline Destroyed

The induction of more 'proletarian' young men into the army -- even though on an ideological basis they were the new Party faithful -- only served to further exacerbate army morale problems. As the older soldiers were demobilized, the composition of the Red Army quickly changed from a preponderance of very dedicated, tough, battle-hardened civil war veterans to mostly 20- and 21-year-old semi-literate peasants, with barely 10 percent of all soldiers having any Russian Civil War combat experience.597 Famine swept through Russia during the fall of 1921 and on into the winter of 1922, while the intensely hated private traders, labeled "NEPmen," became ever richer, supplying the cities and villages alike with what very limited food and goods as were available at exorbitant prices.

For the Russian public, after suffering through long years of war and economic deprivation for the cause of social equality -- or mainly just trying to survive the chaos -- the new disparity of wealth between the 'haves' and 'have nots,' created by Lenin's NEP engendered especially intense jealousies and hatreds that began to

596 von Hagen, p. 150.
597 von Hagen, p. 160.
tear the starving Russian society apart. Conscripted soldiers were
definitely in the 'have not' category, and could not help but view
with envy what few goods they saw in store windows that for them were
beyond any reasonable expectation of ever obtaining. Intuitively Red
Army soldiers began asking, "Is this what we made the Revolution for?
For this our comrades had to die?", while senior PUR officials warned
"the Red Army experiences NEP in its most negative aspects and
expresses dissatisfaction with this NEP."

Mark von Hagen summarized the significant initial impact of NEP
on the Red Army most eloquently when he wrote:

The denationalization of industry and legalization of
private trade put army supply officials at the mercy of a
chaotic market, where they had to compete with civilian
agencies and individual citizens for often scarce goods.
As the army's budget was slashed and inflation spiraled,
life in the army deteriorated markedly. Dire economic
straits forced many soldiers and officers into the
marketplace to make business deals with NEPmen. Military
delegates to the Tenth Congress of Soviets ... feared the
erosion of unit morale and discipline if servicemen's
attention was distracted, especially by so disreputable
an occupation as trade. Petty trading was deemed
entirely inappropriate for a military man, not to mention
a soldier in a socialist army. After all, soldiers did
not live by a code of material interest, but rather
obeyed a higher ethos of self-sacrifice.

- Personnel Reductions and Command Restructuring

Living conditions for soldiers in the Red Army ever worsened
throughout 1922. As an extraordinary level of duty and training
requirements piled up due to chronically under-strength units, in

\[\text{598} \quad \text{von Hagen, pp. 166-167.}\]
\[\text{599} \quad \text{von Hagen, p. 167.}\]
February 1923 the Communist Politburo agreed to reduce the Red Army even further, to 600,000 men -- "the minimum necessary for the security of the RSFSR" -- but within a scant few months pressing state economic difficulties caused the Central Committee to decrease this 'minimal' number even further, to 562,000.600

To complicate the army's problems yet more, in its infinite wisdom the Revvoensovet Respubliki (RVSR) simultaneously began a series of organizational changes and structural reforms that left commanders and soldiers alike wondering where, and to whom or what, they belonged as unit identities and loyalties, forged in the cauldron of civil war battles, were wiped out. Characteristic of the turmoil these organizational changes caused is the case of the Kharkov Military District that was formed in January 1919 by the Ukraine Workers'-Peasants' Government. In February 1920 the Ukrainian Reserve Army was merged with the Kharkov Military District. Less than a year later the Reserve Army was disbanded. Next, the RVSR suddenly dissolved both the Kharkov and Kiev military districts in April 1922 and placed their units under the command of the Ukrainian and Crimean Armed Forces; which themselves were reorganized, yet again, in June 1922 to form a new Ukrainian Military District. For a common peasant soldier, such continuous uncertainty and in his mind, irrational and totally unnecessary, change -- coming on top of all the economic and physical hardship -- led to a virtual

600 von Hagen, p. 175.
collapse of army morale and rising indiscipline in the ranks during the last months of 1922 and into early 1923.\textsuperscript{601}

Still, Army Commissar Leon Trotsky, who by his own admission had been almost totally focused since 1921 on the problem of economic recovery that "had absorbed my time and attention to a far greater extent than military matters,"\textsuperscript{607} took no action to stem the crisis faced by the vanishing Red Army. With what seemed to the serving Red Army officers and soldiers to be gross indifference to the fate of the army, Trotsky neither pressed central government authorities for a regular peacetime army budget nor became involved with the intricacies of army reorganization. Instead, he relinquished responsibility for administering daily army functions to his RVSR Deputy Chairman, E. M. Sklianskii, and to his Chief of the Red Army Staff, Pavel Lebedev, who later would be discredited as "an aristocratic holdover from the Imperial General Staff Academy."\textsuperscript{603}

Trotsky and his comrades on the RKP(b) Central Committee and Politburo were temporarily basking in the euphoria that accompanied the end of civil war hostilities and the diplomatic recognition, recently garnered from the international community. They were possessed, seemingly, by an elevated sense of relative security for their hard-won, new Soviet Republic. Therefore, ideologically, they saw no reason to alter their plan to dispense with the Red Army.\textsuperscript{606}

\textsuperscript{601} von Hagen, pp. 175-176.

\textsuperscript{602} Trotsky, Leon, My Life (New York: Scribner's, 1930), p. 518.

\textsuperscript{603} von Hagen, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{604} von Hagen, pp. 186 and 183.
As part of the general Red Army restructuring that accompanied the post-civil war demobilization, the central military command was also fundamentally reformed. The RVSR made one of the key changes on July 25, 1921 when it decided to broaden the mission of the General Staff Academy to include the preparation of field commanders in addition to staff officers, and to "elaborate theoretical questions concerning organization and the conduct of battle and the influence of these factors on troop control." To convey this cardinal mission change, by order of the RVSR on August 5, 1921 the historic General Staff Academy was neologized to the RKKA Military Academy. Then, to implement the expanded curriculum, which was to emphasize the functional development of both staff and command expertise, several additional, very distinguished professors were assigned to the faculty, such as the former Imperial Army officers A. A. Svechin, A. I. Verkhovskii, and A. E. Snesarev; along with experienced operational commanders and staff officers such as N. V. Sologub, N. N. Shvarts, and E. A. Shilovskii. And, on August 27, 1921, the Western Front commander, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii, took over the critical future war educational duties as Chief of the RKKA Military Academy.

All did not proceed smoothly with the expanded RKKA Academy mission, due principally to the continual tension between the faculty and their 'socialist' students. The academy students, almost without

606 Bulzakov, p. 23.
exception, were civil war combat veterans who believed fervently in 'continuing revolution,' supported Frunze's unified military doctrine, and wanted their heroic wartime experiences enshrined in the academy curriculum. The academy faculty, on the other hand, was composed predominately of former Tsarist officers, who tended to denigrate the validity of the fluid 'pure civil war experience,' with its numerous opportunities to maneuver forces, to achieve frontal breakthroughs, and thereby to bring about a decisive victory. These military intellectuals, instead, tended to focus on teaching an updated, and highly controversial, version of the historical lessons of classic warfare -- much as had their late-nineteenth century predecessor, teacher and mentor, General A. G. Leer.607

Aleksandr Ivanovich Verkhovskii was one such voenspets faculty member. He was an experienced military historian and commander, who served as War Minister of the Provisional Government in 1917. As head of the RKKA Military Academy Tactics Department, Verkhovskii became an outspoken advocate for the "creation of a cadre mechanized force to support an infantry-based militia force and ... a strategy of attrition ... [for] Russia's geo-strategic situation."608 In this same period the Deputy Head of the Strategy Department also was a former Imperial General Staff officer voenspets, N. E. Varfolomeev, who concluded:

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Objective changes in the nature of warfare associated with the appearance of million-man armies and technological innovations had recast the face of battle, increased its spacial and temporal dimensions, broken down the conventional forms of combined arms, forced a rethinking of problems of command and control, and laid the foundation for the emergence of the operation as the bridge between strategy and tactics.609

Seven years later, in 1928, Varfolomeev would describe the modern military operation as "the totality of maneuvers and battles in a given sector of a TVD [theater of military actions] which are directed toward the achievement of a common objective that has been set as final in a given period of the campaign."610

But the Communist Party, flushed with its victories in the 'glorious October' Revolution and the Russian Civil War, was ideologically totally unprepared to accept the historical lessons of classic warfare as promulgated by the voenspets faculty members of the RKKA Military Academy. In April 1922 the Communist Party had adopted as the foundation of Soviet military doctrine Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" concept, in which "the idea of offensive war generally predominated in the military-technical part.... Although in its declarative political part, Soviet military doctrine always retained its defensive cast...."611

At the Eleventh Party Congress, one of the principal advocates for Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" was Mikhail Tukhachevskii. He did not agree with those who argued that the main educational task was to train young, inexperienced junior officers, rather, he wanted to emphasize the preparation of senior commanders for handling the crucial, and increasingly complex, technical matters of strategy and tactics. A conceptual foundation of Tukhachevskii's proposals for Soviet military reform and army reconstruction -- that clearly bore continuity with his Imperial Army heritage and marked him as a student of Jomini, the founder of the Nikolaev General Staff Academy -- was that "maneuverability was the main quality of the Red Army, derived from its revolutionary spirit."612

During the Russian Civil War, cavalry had been the principal branch of arms capable of strategic maneuverability. Tukhachevskii understood, however, that during the course of the First World War emerging technologies had changed the means for achieving battlefield and strategic maneuverability. The new weaponry that allowed defenders to concentrate massive firepower against a cavalry charge had rendered cavalry obsolete. Aircraft, along with tanks and armored vehicles, now opened new possibilities for expansion of the scale of army maneuver within compressed time frames, and therefore the Red Army, according to Tukhachevskii, had to be modernized to incorporate these latest technologies and to develop a new military art, strategies, and tactics for their effective employment.613

612 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 288.
613 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 288.
Tukhachevskii's military reform proposals, discussed during the separate military policy caucuses, were incorporated in Frunze's final report to the entire assembled Eleventh Party Congress on the evening of April 2, 1922. Consequently, the Congress decided that a strengthening of the Red Army was essential, despite the "difficult economic conditions in the country," and ordered an "increase of army combat capability, defined by a concrete program of military construction, which paid special attention to strengthening party influence in the army and the fleet." 614

So extremely vigorous and politicized became the split between the 'revolutionary students' and the unreliable 'Trotskyite' spets faculty at the RKKA General Staff Academy that in late 1922 a purge commission, headed by A. S. Bubnov, expelled 348 of the 648 Academy students from the Party and recommended that more Red Commanders be assigned to the faculty, a measure that could not be carried out immediately since the academic qualifications of the 'proletarian' Red Commanders were virtually nonexistent. P. P. Lebedev did, however, promptly replace Tukhachevskii as RKKA Academy Chief. 615

Yet, as a result of the 1922 split and despite a reshuffling of the RKKA Military Academy faculty, a dark cloud of doubt and distrust about the political reliability of the voenspets faculty members lingered, and intensified, because of their conceptual disagreement with, and increasingly active intellectual opposition to, the content

614 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 290.
of Frunze’s ‘unified proletarian military doctrine.’ One consequence of these suspicions was that the teaching of the "new" concept of "operational art" at the RKKA Military Academy was short-lived and did not emerge within a military curriculum until 1931, when a department by that name was formed at the Frunze Military Academy.616

Between 1921 and 1923 the central military command underwent several other changes and modifications, both as a means of inducing fiscal economy, as the overall Red Army force structure was being reduced, and in an effort to create a more effective and efficient military bureaucracy. The Administration of Armored Forces was upgraded to the status of independent Administration of the Chief of Armored Forces, in recognition of the forecast, more important role to be played by armored forces in future war. Command of artillery units was consolidated under the Chief of Artillery, while the Chief of Supply position was created to unify the two independent supply organizations that had existed during the civil war. Also, unified military leadership was vested in the new People’s Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs, and the policy formulation duties of the Revvoensovet accordingly were expanded.617

By far the most significant, and long lasting, immediate post-civil war change to the central military apparatus was the creation of the Red Army Staff (Shtab RKKA). By decree of the Revvoensovet on January 29, 1921, the unified Red Army Staff was established by

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merging the Main Staff and the Field Staff, thereby making all military executive departments subordinate to the new, integrated staff. This same RVSR decree tasked the Red Army Staff to upgrade training and supply procedures; to develop a system for unit assignments; to eliminate the destructive high turnover rates of army personnel, particularly officers; and to formulate new service regulations.

The new Red Army Staff, which was headed by the former Chief of the Field Staff P. P. Lebedev, was organized into eleven directorates (upravleniia): Operations, Organization, Mobilization, Command Staff, Combat Training, Internal Service, Military-Topographic, Military-Communications, Military Schools, the Military-Historical Commission, and Military Intelligence. Also assigned to the Chief of the Red Army Staff were the separate Administration of the Chief of Armored Forces, the General Staff Academy, and the military section of the State Archives. Attached to the Red Army Staff was a "special administrative department," headed by S. I. Ventsov between 1921 and 1925, for the specific purpose, first advocated by Frunze in his 1921 Voennoe delo article "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii", of coordinating military defense plans with civilian government departments and economic enterprises. The dual function of this secret "special department" was: first, to coordinate with the Main Administration regarding industrial orders for arms and other

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military supplies being processed through the civilian central state planning (Gosplan) agency; and second, to participate in planning expanded road and railway construction to ensure that military requirements were anticipated, and fulfilled, to the extent possible under prevailing financial constraints.620

Although the merger of the Main Staff and Field Staff into an integrated single staff greatly enhanced the power, authority, and control of the senior military leadership over purely military matters, Red Army Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev retained command of the field armies during the waning months of the civil war and assumed control of the old Field Staff inspectorates and of the military district administrations. The Red Army Staff also took over responsibility for the organization and recruitment of territorial militia units from Podvoiskii’s Universal Military Training organization (Vsevobuch).631 Party political control over the Red Army Staff was guaranteed, however, by the continued practice of staff dual subordination (dvoinachalie) to the Revvoensovet and to the Red Army Commander-in-Chief.622

Through the evolutionary changes implemented during this major staff reorganization the Red Army was at long last bringing into practice the administrative reforms that had been so hotly and acrimoniously debated by their Imperial Army predecessors; but

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632 Danilov, V., "Stroitel’stvo...," p. 15.
effectively blocked from implementation by the vested interests of
the ruling nobility, and successive Tsars, over the course of nearly
a half-century. The Red Army, while theoretically (and in glasnost' de
claratory Soviet statements) constituting an army of a new
"socialist-proletarian" type, clearly was, in fact, marked by the
"scars of the past," which integrally tied it to the heritage of the
Imperial Army.623

Dawn of the Red Army Reform Era: Reasons

- International, Domestic, and Political

Beginning in early 1923 challenging international events
dramatically altered the overall priorities of Lenin's government.624 First, the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, and Romania, bluntly
deprecated Foreign Commissar Georgii Chicherin's disarmament schemes,
which left the Soviet state with well-armed and hostile neighbors on
its immediate borders. Second, France occupied the German Ruhr
valley in January, which threatened Soviet Russia with possible
involvement in a new European war because Russia was now allied to
Germany through treaties for secret military cooperation as well as
for public trade and commerce. Third, Great Britain declared the
'Curzon ultimatum' in May, which threatened to break off relations
if the Soviet government did not comply within ten days with the

623 Lee, Kent D., "Implementing Defensive Doctrine: The Role
of Soviet Military Science," in Soviet Military Doctrine
from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991, p. 269.

624 A comprehensive discussion of 1922-1923 European
diplomatic history is presented in E. H. Carr, The
March 1921 trade agreement, and heightened tension by raising the specter of a new British "anti-Bolshevik" crusade. And finally, high-level French and British military delegations visited Poland -- following hard on the heels of a Soviet diplomat's mysterious assassination in Switzerland -- which created, for the paranoid Russians, a genuine war scare. So intense was this emotion that the Communist International (Komintern) decided to postpone its planned June 10, 1923 scheduled session because of "the danger of war."

- Military Impetus

To the Red commanders, who knew how poorly trained their young and inexperienced recruits were and how the lack of discipline in the ranks forewarned that the soldiers could not be relied upon to obey orders, the international events of early 1923 constituted a true military emergency. How could the raw, undisciplined, and poorly armed peasant conscripts of the Red Army possibly defend the Soviet state from modern European armies -- let alone seize the initiative for a decisive offensive that would lead to victory?

By March 1923 this vibrant image of an imminent military catastrophe percolated into the Communist Central Committee inner sanctum, where Trotsky's enemies seized on the military emergency, accompanied by Lenin's absence due to illness, as the opportune issue and moment to attempt to remove Trotsky as Army Commissar. The RKP(b) Central Committee appointed a special commission, including as members some of Leon Trotsky's most vehement and implacable enemies

625 von Hagen, pp. 183-184.
-- Frunze, Dzerzhinskii, Voroshilov, and the former director of defense industry, Petr Bogdanov -- to review defense preparedness and to report back on prudent corrective measures.  

Not surprisingly, the commission determined that the army command had no adequate mobilization plan for war and had failed ... to make an inventory of the nation's resources in preparation for such a plan. The Central Committee ordered the army command immediately to formulate operational, organizational, and mobilization plans.

The Communist Party Central Control Commission had been formed in 1922 as a means to exercise control and to enforce discipline by monitoring the conduct of Party members. It quickly was co-opted by the ruling Party elite as their personal tool for preserving power and for ensuring compliance with their 'diktati.' In June 1923 this mysterious and widely-feared body appointed its special commission to investigate the condition of the Red Army. Valerian Kuibyshev, a close political colleague of Iosip Stalin, was designated chairman and instructed to study four military districts: the Western, Ukrainian, Moscow, and North Caucasus. Kuibyshev began the six-month-long investigation, using a team of investigators composed of Control Commission members, the Red Army and Navy inspectorates, and various former Tsarist officer voenspets. Very shortly thereafter, "Kuibyshev was replaced by one of Trotsky's most determined foes, Sergei Gusev. ... When the results were compiled, Trotsky's ouster seemed inevitable. A new era was beginning in the Red Army."  

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626 von Hagen, pp. 184-185.


628 von Hagen, p. 185.
The 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms

As it is only by means of a well-regulated standing army that a civilized country can be defended; so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized.  
- Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*

**Background:**  
**International Developments and Russian Politics**

Not unlike the mythological Phoenix, the Frunze Reforms would attempt to raise the Red Army 'from the ashes' of demobilization and conscious neglect by the Bolshevik rulers of Russia. In the fall of 1923, while the *RKP(b)* Central Control Commission was completing its investigation of the condition of the Red Army, developments in Germany elevated Russian 'war fever' to yet greater heights and created the critical mass of Russian political and military support necessary to begin changing the Red Army’s social status, priority for resources, domestic and international mission, and wartime fighting capability.

German Communists, in cooperation with left socialists, prepared a general strike and staged an armed coup in Hamburg which, to many Soviet leaders at least, indicated that the long-awaited 'world revolution' they predicted was about to commence. The Red Army was put on unofficial alert, but not mobilized, in anticipation of having to move forward into Central Europe to defend Russia from the expected 'inevitable imperialist counterrevolution,' while Red Army military advisors and a small delegation headed by Karl Radek was dispatched to Germany with offers of assistance to their brother socialist revolutionaries. By the middle of November, however, the
German revolution collapsed, internal order was restored, and the Bolsheviks were left in the very awkward position of needing to explain ideologically not only why the European proletariat had failed to follow the Russian example, but why the Russian socialist revolution had not spread throughout the world. For Lenin's followers this was a most embarrassing turn of events, but one that Trotsky's opponents skillfully would employ to discredit him further and to diminish his influence in a fierce struggle for power inside the Communist Party.629

- German Revolt: 'World Revolution' Fails

Within the Red Army leadership, the failure of the German revolution brought a mood of despair and defeatism, reinforced by a growing dissatisfaction and resentment over developments since the end of the civil war; but also an even deeper concern about the reliability of the Red Army soldiers. The overwhelming majority of army peasant conscripts, despite the aggressive agitation of Bolshevik political activists within the army units, had been totally indifferent to the fall 1923 German crisis and unsupportive of any Russian involvement, whatsoever. The army leadership concluded that "agitation failed because the peasant soldiers saw little or no connection between the German events and their own lives and households. Peasants simply did not support offensive revolutionary

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For the senior Red commanders, even the enthusiastic support for 'continuing revolution' by their naive junior officers was of little consolation, so few were their numbers in comparison to the preponderance of peasant conscripts, who formed the bulk of the Red Army.

- Party Democracy: The 'Forty-six' Challenge

Concurrently with the stillborn German revolution, the Red Army leadership found itself embroiled in the domestic economic policy debate, following a summer of intense labor unrest and strikes which seriously alarmed the Bolsheviks and forced them to consider ways to alleviate the workers' grievances. On October 8, 1923 Leon Trotsky sent a letter to the Communist Party Central Committee criticizing their domestic policy decisions, and only a week later forty-six prominent party members from across a wide socialist ideological spectrum signed a statement "demanding that the Central Committee convene an emergency conference to review the political and economic condition of the country."631 In addition to Trotsky, among the 'Forty-six' who "demanded that the RKP(b) Politburo devise a comprehensive economic policy that would allow the state to take a more direct role through economic planning,"632 were Trotsky's close personal friends Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, the FUR Director, and Nikolai Muralov, the Moscow Military District commander.

630 Kasatkin, Vasilii, "Germanskaia revoliutsiia i russkii krest'ianin," Krasnaia prisiaga, No. 19, 1923, pp. 3-4.
631 von Hagen, p. 198.
632 von Hagen, p. 197.
Not content just to challenge the Central Committee over domestic economic policy, the 'Forty-six' also protested the existing constraints on discussions at party meetings and the now common practice of directly appointing secretaries, which caused the RKP(b) Central Committee majority to threaten these 'oppositionists' with disciplinary sanctions. The last week of October, while acknowledging the criticisms made by the 'Forty-six' and approving the expansion of "inner party democracy," an enlarged Communist Party Central Committee session "censured Trotsky and reprimanded the Forty-six."633 By further alienating his 'Old Bolshevik' comrades, Trotsky took one giant step closer to his eventual removal as Army Commissar, and inadvertently toward the initiation of the essential army reforms that he so strenuously opposed.

The chain of key events that finally cleared the way for the initiation of the Frunze Reforms began in late December 1923 when Trotsky's crony, PUR Director Antonov-Ovseenko, dispatched an army circular sanctioning "the complete restoration of party democracy in the army" and set February 1, 1924 as the date for a major conference of military political workers in an effort to build support for Trotsky's position -- all without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of the Central Committee. Antonov-Ovseenko followed these bold and politically foolhardy actions with his own December 27, 1923 letter to the Central Committee virtually threatening them with an army mutiny. He wrote quite harshly that,

633 von Hagen, p. 199.
the army was not a group of 'courtiers to the throne of party hierarchies,' and that the party feuds had been harmful to morale in the army. 'This cannot go on for long,' he warned. 'Only one thing remains -- to appeal to the peasant masses who wear the uniforms of Red Army soldiers and call to order the leaders who have gone too far.'

Almost immediately after the distribution of Antonov-Ovseenko's circular sanctioning "democracy in the army," party members within the army began advocating "permanent military assemblies to decide all questions of army life," and committees of disgruntled soldiers began to form -- not at all unlike those formed in 1917 and 1918 to bring down the Tsar and to launch the October Revolution.

To the beleaguered Central Committee -- already challenged by domestic economic chaos, worker grievances, failure of their beloved 'world revolution' to materialize, and a growing internal party opposition -- this threat of a 'Bonapartist' military revolt was all too real, especially since it was beginning, however incidentally, to follow their own very recent path toward revolution, government overthrow, and seizure of power. Consequently, Central Committee action was both swift and decisive. On January 12, 1924, "the Central Control Commission reprimanded the defiant army cells and the Orgburo demanded the removal of Antonov-Ovseenko from the PUR directorship."

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635 von Hagen, p. 200.

636 von Hagen, p. 200-201.
On January 17, 1924, Antonov-Ovseenko was replaced by Andrei Bubnov. Immediately, Bubnov revoked the pernicious circular that had proclaimed party democracy throughout the army and clarified that, the elective principle applied exclusively to the lowest level of party organization (company and regimental cells) and to party commissions. All the rest of the political apparatus, because it served functions of administrative and political control, was to be appointed from above. The special imperatives of the military mission did not permit the army's Communists the luxury of the type of political life that civilians enjoyed; rather, 'side by side with party discipline there exists an especially strict and consistently applied military discipline.'

Although nearly a year would pass before Bubnov's new strictures could be fully enforced and Party discipline in the army restored, in January 1924 the Communist leadership directed unequivocally that any "civilianizing deviations" which disrupted army morale, undermined discipline, threatened the army's combat capability, and especially, sought to undermine, or overthrow, Communist Party political supremacy, would no longer be tolerated.

Gusev Commission Report Findings:
"The Red Army is not a reliable fighting force."

Vladimir Ilich Ulianov, the revolutionary leader of the Soviet Republic whose 'nom de guerre' was Lenin, died at 6:50 p.m. on the evening of January 21, 1924. Lenin's departure from the Russian political scene dramatically altered the prospects for army reform. Leon Trotsky no longer had the protection of the 'Father of the October Revolution' to shield him from his personal enemies or from

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637 von Hagen, pp. 201-202.

638 Budennyi, Proidennyi put', Book Three, p. 325.
his political opponents. These factions immediately set in motion a most aggressive campaign of 'palace intrigues' and vendettas, first to increase, and then to consolidate, their own Party powers.

Within a week of Lenin's death, the Communist Party plenum appointed a new commission, headed by Sergei Gusev, to look into the condition of the Red Army. This authoritative commission, which included Mikhail Frunze, Kliment Voroshilov, Mikhail Lashevich, Aleksandr Orekhov, Aleksandr Egorov, Grigorii Ordzhonikidze, Iosif Unshlikt, Nikolai Shvernik, I. M. Voronin, Andrei Andreev, and the new PUR Director Andrei Bubnov, virtually to a man were strong political opponents of Trotsky's programs -- as well as his bitter personal enemies. The commission's first act was to resuscitate the previous June 1923 report, that conveniently had been buried by Trotsky's allies, not only because it was so politically damning of Trotsky's army stewardship, but because of its alarming conclusion -- "The Red Army is not a reliable fighting force."

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639 Berkhin, Il'ia, *Voennaja reforma v SSR (1924-1925 gg.).* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), pp. 59-60; also in von Hagen, p. 202, with the caveat that sources conflict over the exact timing of the appointment of this commission.

Berkhin's end of January 1924 timing from army archives is confirmed by a Frunze report published in *Voennoo-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 6, 1966, pp. 66n.

However, Nikolai Kuz'min in *Na strazhe mirnogo truda (1921-1940 gg.).* (Moscow, 1959), pp. 21-22, cites Central Party Archives in placing the commission formation before Lenin's death when the RKP(b) plenum first convened on January 14-15, 1924.

640 von Hagen, p. 203.
The Gusev Commission presented the glaring army deficiencies contained in the June 1923 report findings to the February 1924 Party Central Committee plenum. This voluminous commission report indicted Trotsky, by name, as it identified the following critical Red Army deficiencies:

The absence of any serious strategic thinking at the top of the military chain of command; ... no realistic plan for mobilization in the event of war; ... current organizational structure and personnel at army headquarters rendered it unsuitable for the tasks of preparing the country's defense and directing the army; ... army headquarters had no single view about the purpose and structure of the army and had not approved a single standardized manual for any of the service branches; ... the RVSR had yet to introduce a regular system of units and formations, though the Civil War had ended three years earlier; ... rear organizations were still cumbersome and swollen; ... the weapons supply system was inadequate for any future war; food and clothing supply also continued to present a deplorable picture; ... problems of staff morale and low professional standards; ... the shortage of officers, in some units reaching 50 percent, and their low qualifications; ... unsatisfactory political work in the army; and that organizational chaos at the top made itself felt in the extreme instability of command personnel at the bottom."

Individual commission members took turns excoriating Trotsky's leadership of the Red Army. Mikhail Frunze accused the Red Army Staff of mechanically cutting army personnel strength to correspond to Revvoensovet Respubliki orders without first actually planning a structure and organization for the peacetime army or deciding the specific types of combat capabilities and military specialties that should be retained. Frunze concluded that the Red Army Staff had failed to provide adequate leadership and said quite bluntly that the

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"641 von Hagen, pp. 203-204."
senior leadership should be changed.\textsuperscript{642} Another senior commission member, M. M. Lashevich, castigated the Red Army Staff for being completely out of touch with the real, everyday problems that the field army was experiencing and suggested that the reason for this failure was the continuing dominance of the Staff by former Tsarist generals. Lashevich, and the Commission, therefore concluded that the Red Army Staff personnel had to be "renewed" and the central command apparatus purged of all "unfit and useless" elements.\textsuperscript{643}

Commission Chairman Gusev complained that there were too many aged former Tsarist military specialists in the command hierarchy and that Trotsky's Revvoensovet had not acted vigorously to replace them with younger Red commanders who had civil war experience. Worse, Gusev charged that the majority of the 'Red Genshtabisti' (General Staff) veterans from the first graduating class of the General Staff Academy had been demobilized.\textsuperscript{644}

Perhaps as alarming as anything that the commission found was the fact that of the 87,000 officers who were graduated from the Soviet military schools during the civil war, some 30,000 had been killed and another 30,000 had been demobilized, leaving "not more than 25,000" Soviet-trained officers on active duty. Of those army officers remaining on active duty, approximately 45 percent "came from unsuitable social backgrounds and over five percent were former

\textsuperscript{642} Berkhin, I. B., \textit{Voennaja reforma v SSSR (1924-1925 gg.)}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), pp. 63-64.

\textsuperscript{643} Berkhin, pp. 61-62.

\textsuperscript{644} Berkhin, p. 61.
White officers." With less than 50 percent of the Red Army officer corps composed of politically loyal Red commanders, to the Communist Party hierarchy it was then small wonder that the peasant conscript soldiers lacked discipline, suffered from poor morale, and had negligible combat capability -- the Red Army had no loyal leadership.

**Mixed Military System:Territorial Militia and Regular Army**

Again the Central Committee acted swiftly and decisively by ordering the Politburo to correct the most serious army leadership deficiencies while recommending that a further investigation of the other Gusev Report findings be conducted. Six years after the October Revolution the Communist Party thus reversed its civil war military policy that declared the regular army to be a "temporary stage in the transition to a genuine people's militia" and adopted a mixed system of territorial militia and regular army units, "as a necessary compromise until the nation could afford to maintain a large standing army." By 1924 the influence of anti-militarists, like Podvoiskii and his Vsevobuch colleagues, had waned to an extent that made the compromise "mixed military system" politically acceptable and resulted in "an important, albeit qualified, victory for the proponents of the regular army."647

On March 3, 1924 Mikhail Frunze replaced Efraim M. Sklianski as Deputy Army Commissar and Deputy Chairman of the Revvoensovet (RVSR),

645 von Hagen, pp. 204-205.
646 von Hagen, p. 208.
647 von Hagen, p. 208.
thereby assuming de facto control of the Red Army from the politically weakened and discredited Trotsky. Within days of assuming the deputy positions, Frunze formed a new Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (Revvoensovet USSR - RVS), composed of some of the most prominent Communist Party opponents to Trotsky’s territorial militia, labor army, and economic programs -- including as members Voroshilov, Bubnov, Ordzhonikidze, Semen Budennyi, Sergei Kamenev, Shalva Eliava, and Aleksandr Miasnikov -- who would implement the Communist Party mandated army reform without Trotsky’s participation. Then, in April 1924, Frunze replaced the much maligned Pavel P. Lebedev as Chief of the Red Army Staff as well. Mark von Hagen notes that "by the time that the Central Committee formally relieved Trotsky of his duties in January 1925, Frunze already had been administering the army for nearly a year." Thus, by April 1924, the way was already cleared to restore, to revitalize, and to transform the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA). The

On August 28, 1923 the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Revvoensovet Respubliki, (Russian initials RVSR) officially was renamed the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR (RVS-SSSR), or RVS for the sake of clarity, in recognition of the new Soviet constitution, adopted on October 6, 1922, that created the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The actual "rebirth" (obnovlenie) of the RVSR/RVS as the supreme Red Army policymaking body under Mikhail Frunze’s leadership occurred nearly six months earlier shortly after Frunze was appointed as RVSR Deputy Chairman on March 3, 1924. See von Hagen, p. 205.

von Hagen, p. 205.


von Hagen, p. 205.
exact date that Mikhail Frunze was named Chairman of the RVS was January 26, 1925. The Red Army reform would be led by a military theorist who was politically reliable, combat tested, and a proven effective organizer -- Mikhail V. Frunze.

Frunze and his associates wasted no time as they set out to restructure the Red Army with a 'troika' of primary goals: first, to make the peacetime military organization more efficient; second, to purge the Red Army of most former Tsarist officers and the allies of Trotsky; and third, and perhaps most important, to restore army morale, discipline, and wartime fighting capability. Many of the decisions about how to streamline the central military command were enacted in March and April 1924.

With the Russian Civil War officially over, in peacetime there was no longer a need for a position of Army Commander-in-Chief to direct field forces so Kamenev's job was abolished. The Red Army Staff itself was reorganized into three separate functional entities: 1) a Main Administration of the Red Army (Glavnoe upravlenie RKKA), with N. N. Petin as its chief to oversee daily army administration; 2) the Red Army Staff, headed by M. V. Frunze as Army Chief of Staff, with primary responsibility for long-range military planning; and 3) a Red Army Inspectorate (Inspektsiia RKKA), headed by former Red Army Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev, with responsibility for the combat training and inspection of the armed forces.

653 Zakharov, p. 174.
Inspectorate, however, was only a transitionary vehicle for implementing military reforms that lasted until the end of 1924 when the Inspectorate functions were divided between the Red Army Staff and the Main Administration. By the beginning of 1925 the Red Army Main Administration had taken over responsibility for inspections, as well as for combat training, mobilization, recruitment, the network of military schools, and the daily administration of the army.

Under this new arrangement the Red Army Staff gave up operational control of the Red Army, but gained responsibility for overall defense policy, to include mobilization and operations plans and the restructuring of military units. The rationale for this structural alteration was contained in Frunze’s dictum:

[The Red Army Staff] must become not only the brain of the Red Army -- it must become the military brain for the entire Soviet state and prepare that material which forms the basis of the work of the Defense Council.

In order to increase the number of younger Red commanders serving within the central military command apparatus while eliminating the "Trotskyites" and most of the "conservative" ex-Tsarist officers, Frunze ruthlessly reduced the total number of central apparatus

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657 Berkhin, p. 152.
659 Berkhin, p. 148.
personnel by some 23 percent while simultaneously increasing the percentage of avowedly-loyal Communist Party members assigned to key staff and administrative positions from 12 percent in 1923 to 25 percent in 1924.\textsuperscript{660}

In close cooperation with the Party Central Committee, Frunze and his new RVS team initiated the transition to a mixed military system that would preserve and reorganize an expanded territorial militia alongside the regular standing army. According to RKP(b) records, the Central Committee had actually decided in favor of a territorial militia during the course of discussions in 1923 and issued instructions to Trotsky's Revvoensovet to carry out the required peregruppirovka of forces.

On August 8, 1923 the RKP(b) Central Committee, using the auspices of its Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and Council of People's Commissars (SNK), had issued a directive titled "About organizing territorial militia units and the conduct of military training for laborers,"\textsuperscript{661} which Leon Trotsky and his RVSR colleagues evidently intentionally chose to ignore. The Central Committee rationale for a territorial militia was that the struggling Soviet economy could not afford a large standing regular military force, and politically for the Soviet leadership, at this time, there seemed to be no other viable choice than the compromise solution of a mixed military system.

\textsuperscript{660} Zakharov, p. 176,

\textsuperscript{661} KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 7th ed., (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953, p. 858.
Therefore, following assumption of responsibility for military policy as de facto RVS Chairman in April 1924, Frunze began to implement the RKP(b) Central Committee’s approved concept for a territorial militia. He sought, with great determination, however, to preserve the hard-won maneuver capability of the regular army. Frunze was convinced that army maneuver capability was critical to the previous Red Army success in the Russian Civil War, and would be equally critical in any future war.

Frunze insured continuing Red Army maneuver capability by retaining twelve regular cavalry divisions and only four territorial militia cavalry divisions; and for the infantry the force mix was reversed with twenty-nine regular divisions and forty-two territorial militia divisions.662 By October 1, 1925 the RVS would further reduce the army size to 562,000 troops, organized into twenty-six regular cadre divisions, plus thirty-six territorial militia divisions; one territorial militia cavalry division; and one regiment of armored trains.663 Of these remaining units, 90 percent of the regular cadre divisions were stationed along the Soviet borders, while all of the territorial militia divisions were garrisoned in the interior.664 Consequently, the disposition of the reformed Red Army military districts and divisions at the end of the Frunze Reforms in 1925 through 1929 was as follows:

663 Kuz’min, N. F., Na strazhe mirnogo truda (1921-1940 gg), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 31.
DISPOSITION OF THE RED ARMY 1925-1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Districts</th>
<th>Rifle</th>
<th>Cavalry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Moscow MD</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Leningrad MD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) White Russian MD</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Ukrainian MD</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) North Caucasus MD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) South Caucasus Army</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Volga MD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Central Asian MD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Siberian MD</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>71</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After having the Red Army Staff formulate the 1924 plan for the reorganization of military units, and following the creation of several experimental units, Frunze proposed to the EVS that no further troop organization changes be made for at least a year in order to provide some stability and to test the effectiveness of the new system. The Revvoensovet concurred and Red Army structure began to stabilize.666

Frunze also revised and implemented the 1922 conscription law. The law mandated two years of service for regular army recruits, while all remaining twenty-two-year-olds were required to enlist in the territorial militia for a period of four years; during which time they were to report for active duty two months a year, usually during the summer. The initial transition effort did not go smoothly at all. At the recruitment centers peasant protest meetings blossomed...

666 Mackintosh, in The Red Army, p. 56.

during the scheduled spring 1924 call-up. Within the regular army there arose considerable resistance to the mixed system, since many regular army soldiers and officers considered a transfer into the militia to be a "personal disgrace" because the militia units were considered to be "inferior." Many soldiers and officers complained bitterly about their transfers to the territorial militia, and Frunze sympathized with them saying, "we were not given the choice" between having a large "regular army of 1.5 to 2 million men and the current system of the militia."667

As a result of these complaints, but also with an eye to the future when militia unit combat capabilities would have to be integrated effectively with the regular army units in any war, Frunze and the RVS made every effort to ensure that service in the territorial militia resembled service in the regular army in all aspects, save the shorter terms of active duty and territorial recruitment.669 Yet, with the release of large numbers of junior and middle-ranking officers during 1924, many militia and regular army units were left so severely undermanned, with minimal training capabilities and at times with no drill instructors, that Frunze could only report to the RVS plenum, held between November 24 and December 1, 1924:

667 von Hagen, pp. 206-209.
668 von Hagen, p. 207.
669 von Hagen, p. 208.
"I can say with absolute certainty that during the course of this year we did not have a Red Army, if we mean by this an organized and trained force."⁶¹⁰

Still, through the mixed system compromise, the Red Army leadership gained significant party concessions that were essential to the future formation of an effective and revitalized military force. First, all territorial militia units were assigned directly to the Army Commissariat instead of being indoctrinated by Nikolai Podvoiskii's Vsevobuch 'civilianized' training organization, which was disbanded. Second, all special assignment detachments, called 'chony,' that previously had belonged to the 'Cheka' secret police, and its successor the GPU, were absorbed into regular army units. Third, each territorial militia unit was reformed around a cadre of regular army officers and soldiers, constituting ideally a core of 10-15 percent of the unit strength, who were responsible for all militia training and preparedness. Fourth, since the predominantly peasant militia units were considered to have questionable loyalty to the Soviet regime and inadequate combat capability, all were garrisoned in military districts that did not border with any foreign country. Fifth, the Party promised that pre-induction training would be expanded so that the army would receive better educated recruits, who would be perhaps even literate and thus a little more politically reliable, for military training. And finally, a uniform system of military districts was organized to replace the hodgepodge of fronts

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and autonomous armies that had wreaked such havoc during the
demobilization on the army chain of command and on unit morale.\textsuperscript{671}

\textbf{Frunze's 'Militarization' Program}

Incessant military manpower turnover was one of the critical
problems on which the 1923 military commission had focused special
attention. In order for the reformers' army revitalization plans to
succeed in creating a "homogeneous peacetime force," along with "a
competent method of political control,"\textsuperscript{672} from the putrid remains of
the post-demobilization Red Army, the first crucial step was to
develop some semblance of organizational stability. To accomplish
this vital objective, the team of Frunze, Gusev and Bubnov, backed by
Voroshilov and Tukhachevskii, instituted a series of measures -- for
glasnost' purposes, called generically, 'militarization' -- that were
calculated to create an army environment in which the authority of
officers would be unquestioningly respected and soldiers could count
on a strict, but fair, disciplinary policy. This program of
'militarization' marked another significant departure from Bolshevik
Party policy during, and immediately after, the Russian Civil War,
at which time a revolutionary "commune model," based on "conscious
discipline" and "comradely relations" between officers and soldiers,
was in vogue -- very much to the detriment of effective Red Army
discipline and unit morale, and to the great disgust of any and all

\textsuperscript{671} von Hagen, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{672} Mackintosh, in \textit{The Red Army}, p. 54.
- One-man Command ('edinonachalie')

The linchpin of the militarization program was the gradual elimination of the practice of 'dual command' ('dvoinachalie') by which political commissars exercised direct oversight of the Red commanders; but mainly were watchdogs over former Tsarist officers serving as military specialists -- right down to countersigning all orders before soldiers were required to obey them.

From the earliest days of the Russian Civil War and the founding of the Red Army, however, the dual command concept of sharing all authority in a given military unit between a commander and a political commissar had introduced colossal organizational confusion, severe tension, and, not infrequently, outright hostility between the two unit leaders that degraded both men in the eyes of their subordinates. Political commissars could not seem to restrain themselves from dabbling in military operational matters that were supposed to be the exclusive preserve of commanding officers. Commanders took great umbrage at always having the commissar watchdogs looking over their shoulders and always questioning their motives. Neither the commissars nor the rudiments of what would become the Red Army officer corps were satisfied with this dual command arrangement which they both disparagingly referred to as "bureaucratization" -- meaning unnecessary parallelism and tedious

\[\text{von Hagen, pp. 209-211.}\]
"paper shuffling had come to replace all meaningful activities."

One-man command (edinonachalie) increasingly came to be viewed by Soviet military and political leaders alike as the appropriate solution to "bureaucratization." So severe was the morale problem and confusion created by dual command that, as early as 1922, PUR Director Gusev had issued a regulation stipulating that if a Red commander had been a loyal party member for two years, and "was sufficiently prepared for political leadership," the full-fledged political commissar of his unit could be replaced with an "assistant for political matters." However, very little progress was made in implementing Gusev's potentially very significant change owing to the fact that shortly after Gusev issued the regulation, Trotsky shipped Gusev off to the wilds of Turkestan; the PUR staff bureaucratically resisted relinquishing any political control to the military; and very few of the battle-seasoned Red commanders had the subjectively determined requisite political education.

Then, in March 1923, Deputy Army Commissar Sklianski attempted to rectify the situation by ordering the introduction of one-man command in the central military administration, following Gusev's same 1922 guidelines. This doomed the transition attempt to early failure for the almost identically same reasons as before. The way ahead for the introduction of one-man command finally was cleared in April 1924 when Frunze ordered the "purge of unreliable military specialists" in the middle and senior ranks from the army's central administration, thereby opening their duty spaces for assignment to

\[\text{von Hagen, pp. 211-212.}\]
veteran Red commanders, whose loyalty the regime could trust.675

- Purge of Military Specialists

Frunze claimed credit for reducing the quantity of 'spets' in the central army administration by 40 to 50 percent during 1924. By January 1, 1925 the number of serving former Imperial Army officers throughout the Red Army declined from 2598 to 377.676 The net result of this 'spets purge' was a serious decline, both in the quantity and the quality, of officers serving in the Red Army. Soviet military schools and academies could not yet train and graduate adequate quantities of replacements, despite their efforts to accelerate the education process and to simultaneously elevate the professional standards of the graduates. "In 1923 the Army Commissariat listed 74,910 officers and administrative personnel. That number dropped to 53,003 in 1924, but rose in 1925 to 76,273 men, 15 percent of the entire army."677

There remained, especially, the continuing problem of obtaining adequate numbers of militarily 'qualified' officers. The new academy graduates, while certainly more politically reliable and trustworthy, and hence more acceptable to the Communist government than were the military specialists, generally lacked the requisite operational and field command experience that is so crucial for the development of

675 von Hagen, p. 212.


677 Berkhin, Voennaia reforma, p. 262.
effective wartime battlefield leaders. The military specialists (voenspets) and the civil war veterans were the sole repository of that combat experience in the Red Army -- and they were all but gone.

The initiation of military one-man command and the replacement of political commissars proceeded very slowly precisely because there were so few 'fully qualified' Red commanders. The first Red Army commanders were true warriors, who, with conviction, actively fought the civil war military battles at the front; not politicians or academics or 'intelligentsy' who understood the convoluted intricacies of the socialist political debate. Hence, generally, the Red commanders were unprepared to assume the very involved, and at times rather contradictory, education and political control responsibilities of the commissars. Conversely, most of the Red commissars, while fully indoctrinated in the polemics of socialism and the latest changes of Party line, almost completely lacked the requisite operational military knowledge and skills to take over Red Army command responsibilities -- regardless of the Bolshevik propensity to believe that the commissars could expand their military skills more easily and quickly than Red commanders could become politically educated. As for the former Imperial Army military specialists, they clearly had superior professional military knowledge and command abilities, but could not be trusted by the Bolsheviks -- regardless of the extensiveness of political education, due to the incompatibility of their former loyalties and social backgrounds with the new reality of revolutionary socialism.\footnote{von Hagen, p. 213.}
Enough progress in exorcising the differences between Red commanders and Red commissars was made, however, that in June 1924 the Central Committee Orgburo decided to transition the entire army to one-man command. PUR Director Bubnov was appointed to determine the appropriate pace and process for the transition. Andrei Bubnov presented his report at the July 28, 1924 Central Committee meeting. At that same meeting both Stalin and Frunze enthusiastically supported making the transition as quickly as possible. A month later Frunze abolished the titles of Red commander and military specialist decreeing that one title alone was sufficient for all officers -- Commander of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army.69

The decision to transition to one-man command encountered such intense opposition from Red commanders, Red commissars, and former Tsarist military specialists ('spets') -- all of whom feared the uncertainty, loss of power, authority, position, and control that the process entailed, both for personal and professional reasons -- that the one-man command reforms could only be implemented in stages, continuing throughout 1925. Grave reservations about the pace of the transition and the political qualifications of the new commanders were expressed by Western Military District political directors in September 1924. The identical reservations were adopted at the army-wide political directors' meeting in November of that same year.

While recognizing the totally deplorable condition of the army, the political directors demanded firm assurances from their leaders that one-man command would not "in any way diminish the role of political

69 Berkhin, Voennaia reforma..., pp. 263 and 293.
work, or the significance of political organs in the Red Army," and that the practice of "transforming political departments into sections of officer's staffs" be banned.\textsuperscript{660} As a result of such strong resistance, the RVS decided to slow the transition pace once more, and hence, "forbade commanders to merge political departments with their staff organizations, and ordered commanders to preserve the autonomy of all political organs and to respect the important role of political work in the Red Army."\textsuperscript{661}

So critical of the transition to edinonachalie were certain influential military politicians that Frunze elected to delay indefinitely any changes in the very sensitive national units or for the navy. Meanwhile, reform in the army was limited to the lower command echelons, and greater scrutiny of officer "social origins and party service records" was ordered before officers could be promoted. Consequently, by October 1, 1925 -- well over a year after the RKP(b) Orgburo initially decided to transition the entire army to one-man command -- "only 14 percent of the highest ranking officers exercised full command."\textsuperscript{662}

Beneath the highest command levels, transition progress was considerably more rapid. And, since these were the very officers who would actually lead individual soldiers and units in battle, the morale and combat capability of the Red Army began to improve: "By April 1925, one-man command had been implemented among 14 percent of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{660} von Hagen, p. 215. \\
\textsuperscript{661} von Hagen, p. 215. \\
\textsuperscript{662} Berkhin, \textit{Voennaia reforma}..., pp. 306 and 311.
\end{flushright}
divisional commanders and 26 percent of regimental commanders. Six months later those figures rose to 44 and 33 percent respectively.\textsuperscript{683} Another source states that "by 1 October 1925, 73 percent of all corps commanders, 80 percent of all brigade commanders, and 54 percent of all directors of military educational institutions held one-man commands."\textsuperscript{685}

Despite delays, Frunze insisted, with the support of the KPSS Central Committee and the RVS, that "There is to be no turning back."\textsuperscript{683} Regardless, it would not be until 1931 -- some six years after Kliment E. Voroshilov succeeded Mikhail Frunze as RVS Chairman, following the latter's untimely death on October 31, 1925 -- that the transition to Red Army edinonachalie would be pronounced as complete.\textsuperscript{686}

Edinonachalie was conceived by Frunze and the RVS to be only the first step in restoring the authority of the Russian officer corps. To ensure the institutionalization of this most important reform, the RVS altered the 1925 regulation detailing the duties of political commissars to eliminate "any reference to monitoring officers' conduct." Commissars' duties were hereby confined by


\textsuperscript{684} Berkhin, \textit{Voennaia reforma}, p. 306.


\textsuperscript{686} Berkhin, \textit{Voennaia reforma}, pp. 306 and 311.
regulation to "direct and conduct day-to-day party and political work" and "to ensure the education and training of the personnel of the Red Army and Navy in a spirit of class cohesion and Communist enlightenment." In compensation to the disgruntled commissars and political officers for the curtailment of their positions of authority, Frunze, with the backing of both the RVS and PUR, launched a campaign for the "militarization of the political staff," through which Red commissars who improved their military skills demonstrably were offered the opportunity for promotion. The main route by which to acquire this requisite improvement in military skills was through matriculation and graduation from a military academy. Literally hundreds of commissars did so. "Almost without exception, they were promoted to one-man commands after they completed their training."688

- Expansion of the Junior Officer Corps

Expansion of junior officer corps responsibilities and authority -- and through the junior officers, the reestablishment of strict army discipline -- was another key element of Frunze's transformation of the Red Army command structure. With the exponentially increased number of duties and responsibilities that the introduction of one-man command entailed for senior officers, Frunze considered it essential that the chronically under-manned

687 Berkhin, Voennaia reforma...., pp. 395-396.

junior officers corps, that functioned much like non-commissioned officers in Western armies as the principal interface between the commander and the line troops, become the officer group responsible for troop control. Junior officers, much like their Imperial Army predecessors, were the individuals who had daily, close contact with the ordinary soldiers while conducting drill and routine training. And therefore, Frunze reasoned, the junior officers could have the greatest positive impact on changing soldiers’ behavior and performance, both individually and as a group. Frunze clearly saw the newly graduated junior officers as "the foundation upon which rests the entire matter of discipline" and as "the unique transmitter of all educational influences from above."

- Restoration of Officer Career Opportunities

Creation and retention of the desired quantity of Red Army junior officers -- especially ones with the requisite education, military skills, dedication and loyalty -- was no easy matter, given the economic constraints under which the Red Army labored. Yet, by using the growing international tensions as a justification and a political lever, Frunze and his RVS developed, and won approval for, a long-range program to improve substantially the material benefits for junior officers, in particular, and for the entire officer corps and the Red Army. In the 1924 first Red Army budget, expenditures were earmarked for officer pay raises, improved housing, and pensions

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that, over time, could raise significantly the army's standard of living, provide more material incentives and rewards for service, and thereby encourage retention of junior officers.

In June 1924 the RVS raised officers' pay by an average of 21 percent. Another raise in November increased officers' pay by one-third and that of regular troops three and one-half times. Allowances for living quarters were raised, and the pension program was put on a solid footing.690

With the implementation of these pay and benefit reforms, officer retention improved, since a Red Army career now became attractive. And, with the retirement of "many exhausted veterans" from earlier wars and the purges of the "politically 'alien' or 'unreliable' military specialists and Trotskyists," promotion opportunities for new military academy graduates and junior officers expanded, which revitalized the army officer corps with a "loyal and increasingly well-trained" cadre of leaders.691

- Order and Discipline Improve Red Army Morale

Restoration of army discipline and combat readiness proved, however, to be much harder objectives for Frunze to accomplish, both for ideological and for social reasons. During the civil war and the Red Army demobilization immediately thereafter, civilian methods of persuasion and debate -- labeled "trade union methods" by Stalin and Trotsky -- had seriously eroded, indeed destroyed, traditional forms and means of military discipline.

690 Berkhin, Voennaia reforma..., pp. 326-327.
691 von Hagen, p. 220.
In the largely peasant conscript Red Army of 1924, the "comradely rules of conscious discipline" that initially transformed the civil war Red Army into a vast volunteer commune simply no longer sufficed to defend the Soviet state. Consequently, the January 1924 Gusev Military Commission determined that the familiarity between officers and troops had reached a "state of crisis" with the systematic refusal by soldiers to obey the orders of commanders. By the fall of 1924, "Frunze warned that the situation had become threatening."\(^{692}\) A contumacious army increasingly was putting the entire Soviet state at risk.

In a January 1925 address entitled "Lenin and the Red Army," presented to the Military Academy of the Red Army on the solemn occasion of the first anniversary of Lenin's death, Mikhail Frunze assaulted the barricades of army discipline.\(^{693}\) To make his point, Frunze cleverly invoked Lenin's authority, used party discipline as an analogy, and "posed the army as a model of relations in [Russian] society," as he applied the dialectic logic of Lenin's April 1920 "Infantile Disorders of Left Communism" to repudiate the left socialist "commune model" army.\(^{694}\) Frunze enumerated three conditions as essential for the restoration of army discipline:

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\(^{693}\) For complete text of this address see M. V. Frunze, "Lenin i Krasnaia Armiia," *Sputnik politrabotnika* 18, (Moscow, 1925), pp. 1-5.

\(^{694}\) von Hagen, p. 223.
First, the officer corps and political staffs must be as selfless and steadfast as the party itself; second, the army command must maintain 'living and organic contact' with the Red Army masses; and third, the soldier masses must be convinced of the correctness of 'our leadership' on the basis of the actions and behavior of the army's elite.695

Frunze then launched into the most controversial element of his address concerning 'mushtra,' and its diminutive 'mushtrovka' -- the rhetorical terms describing the "extremely harsh drill-sergeant discipline" command style associated with the old Imperial Army and with the military specialists. During the interminable, harsh years of the civil war, the foolish or frustrated army commander or commissar who even dared to utter the word 'mushtra' before his military comrades instantly was in considerable danger of rebuke, or even serious physical harm; but also at risk of being accused of reviving 'reactionary' ideology, with possible fatal consequences. *De facto* Army Commissar Frunze now brazenly proclaimed that "To achieve this order we must, and here it is absolutely inevitable, employ the familiar elements of 'mushtra.'"696

Following Frunze's speech the floodgates of military and political approbation to restore army discipline opened. By April 1925 PUR Director Bubnov organized and chaired a commission to replace the 1922 disciplinary code with a new much more strict version. Also in 1925 a most eloquent and impassioned, if somewhat pedantic, argument for greater army discipline was published in *Voennyi vestnik* by Aleksandr Sediakin, the Volga Military District

695 von Hagen, pp. 223-224.
696 von Hagen, p. 224.
Commander. Sediakin effectively summarized the attitude of many serving military officers:

From the first minute of his army service, a soldier had to be made aware that he was not just serving time, nor was army life designed for his entertainment. The army was 'a severe, often very severe, school of life and combat.' Never in history had anyone attained military success 'with sentimentalizing and sugar-and-honey democratic methods of educating a soldier.' [Instead,] Revolutionary armies 'come to consciousness only via mountains of corpses' [and] the only way to ensure victory in war is to instill the strictest discipline and to make the most severe demands on soldiers.697

Frunze himself remained on the attack for increased discipline by proclaiming in May 1925: "Now we are waging a decisive struggle against all slovenliness, loose discipline, negligence, and unconscious attitudes toward service."698 The following week at the Third Congress of Soviets -- Frunze's first major public appearance after officially replacing Leon Trotsky as Army Commissar on January 26, 1925 -- he dispersed the faltering opposition and critics of restored army discipline with a barrage of statistics. Far from causing a mass exodus from the army, Frunze argued that "the tougher disciplinary measures had produced a sharp drop in desertion, from 8 percent in 1923 to 0.1 percent in 1925," as well as "significant decreases in the incidence of military crimes" and "less severe punishments" generally699 -- all of which Frunze claimed to be the


result of the recent reforms that were intended to restore predictability and certainty to military discipline, and to thereby eliminate the past arbitrary policies that had inculcated feelings of injustice and discontent within the army ranks.

- Nationwide Industrialization Required to Modernize the Red Army

Improved army combat capability still remained an elusive goal for the Frunze reformers. Throughout 1924 they struggled against ingrained socialist ideological preconceptions derived from the 1917 Revolution, and before, along with the social backwardness of the peasantry. In February 1925 Frunze found himself compelled to remind an assembly of territorial militia party secretaries that "an army is above all an instrument of war," rather than a social experiment, and that the secretaries therefore had to focus their attention more directly on military training instead of rural agitation and propaganda.\textsuperscript{706}

Increasingly the Red Army leadership came to disbelieve the Party cant, which, in contradiction to logic, but understandably, bore a oddly striking resemblance to the 19th century teachings of General Dragomirov. Many of the now senior local leaders received their basic military education at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy: "The mere inculcation of military values in the populace would suffice to guarantee that the nation could withstand an assault by a

modern army equipped with the latest technological weaponry.  

Senior Red Army leaders knew full well that all the major European powers and Japan were rearming at a rapid pace; that the disarmament appeals of Soviet diplomats were to no avail; and that as long as the Soviet Republic remained predominantly a peasant society, with a national economy based on agriculture, it risked decisive military defeat by the more advanced industrial powers. Frunze expressed the majority complaint saying that peasant Russia "could not sustain an 'army suitable for fighting a war' because a peasant did not have 'the feeling of strength, faith in himself, or capacity to make independent decisions, precisely the capacity which life instills in a worker.'" For the Red Army the only logical solution was the massive, state-wide industrialization of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Frunze summarized this Red Army consensus:

Military thought has arrived at the conclusion that in any future war the outcome of combat will be decided not by those comparatively small military forces, which in peacetime every state has in readiness and which can be filled out in the very first weeks through mobilization, but the outcome of combat will be decided by the participation in it of the entire population en masse, of all countries, of all states in unison, and demands the decisive exertion of all industrial forces of the country.

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701 von Hagen, p. 243.
Frunze fired the heaviest rounds of the military drive for industrialization after the April 1925 Fourteenth Party Conference. At that Conference, Felix Dzerzhinskii, the infamous 'Chekist,' miraculously now metastasized into the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh), successfully defended his 1924 and 1925 economic priorities. He placed the military share of industrial production in dead last place behind demands of the peasant market, urban populations, the commune system, and the rail industry.\footnote{Valentinov (Vol'skii), N., Novaja ekonomicheskaia politika i krizis partii posle smerti Lenina: Vospominaniia, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971); cited in von Hagen, p. 245.}

At the RKKA Military Academy graduation breakfast in August 1925, attended by Soviet President Kalinin, Frunze opened fire and "challenged civilian party and state institutions to fulfill the promise of the October Revolution by launching an industrialization program."\footnote{von Hagen, p. 243.} Whereas Kalinin exhorted the graduates to create a "proletarian October in the field of military science," Frunze rejoined that "objective conditions" did not exist for such a "revolution" since "at that moment when we can count on not a million-man working class, but rather a ten- or fifteen-million proletariat, both our strategy and tactics will begin to take on an altogether different character."\footnote{Frunze, M. V., "Rech M. V. Frunze na torshestvennom zavtrakе, posviashchenном 5-mu vypusku slushatelei Akademii," 5 August 1925, published for the first time in Izbrannye proizvedeniia, (Moscow, 1977), pp. 432-433.}
In Frunze’s opinion, only with a true ‘revolution’ in the whole Soviet economy, which in Marxian terms ‘transformed increased quantity into an entirely new quality,’ could the Red Army itself begin to be transformed into a modern fighting force. Both Frunze and his Deputy Chief of Staff Mikhail Tukhachevskii stressed that in a future war the key economic sectors would be the tractor industry, communications, and transportation.  

Finally, after nearly two years of intensive lobbying and the creation of a nationwide glasnost’ campaign, using mass organizations to build support for the military position by advocating and agitating for ‘industrialization’ and ‘modernization’ of the Russian economy, in December 1925 the Fourteenth Party Congress -- "the Congress of Industrialization" -- resolved to "take all necessary measures to bolster the strength of the Red Army and Navy." Mikhail V. Frunze himself did not live to see the fruition of his Herculean efforts. Kliment E. Voroshilov took over the position of War Commissar following Frunze’s sudden, untimely, and mysterious death from a "heart attack" on October 31, 1925, after a medical operation was accomplished, at the direction of the KPSS Central Committee, in the Moscow Kremlin hospital on October 30.

The atrocious extent of the enormous military industrialization problem against which Frunze had labored, and which Voroshilov fully inherited, can be documented indirectly by extrapolating from

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707 von Hagen, pp. 244-245.
708 von Hagen, p. 247.
available economic statistics for the period 1926 to 1927 which show that the feeble Russian automobile industry produced only 500 vehicles and that the Soviet rail system had only 22,000 carriages and wagons. Yet, both industries were means of transportation essential to the efficient deployment and maneuvering of the Red Army. Even in 1928, the Siberian Military District (which stretched from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean) had only thirty light tanks and twenty-one armored cars.710

Although great political turmoil among the party leaders would attend the fundamental reorientation of Soviet economic policy before the actual implementation decision was made in 1927 to undertake the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, the Frunze reform initiatives laid the conceptual foundation for a legitimate "strengthening of the military and patriotic elements in the Soviet political culture of the late 1920s and early 1930s."711 The impending 'militarization' of Soviet society, in many ways, could be seen as a culmination of that socialization process that had been set entrain over eighty years earlier with the Miliutin Reforms and had been accomplished incrementally over the subsequent decades, through a halting dialectic process, that, nonetheless, continually strove to create a modern professional Russian officer corps which was integrated with, and was supported fully by, a patriotic, literate, and enthusiastic Russian populace.

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710 Mackintosh, in The Red Army, p. 57.
711 von Hagen, p. 247.
Changes Institutionalized Through Education: The Red Army Becomes the "School of the Nation"

The key to institutionalizing the military gains made through the Frunze 'militarization' reforms, just as during the Miliutin reforms sixty years earlier, was education -- comprehensive, nationwide education that included political, cultural, social, historical, and scientific subjects as well as purely military training. Effectively, the Communist Party political leadership saw the Red Army as becoming the "school of the nation" -- that single educational institution through which all able-bodied male citizens passed, were indoctrinated, and upon discharge from active military service returned to civilian occupations and local communities where, ideally, they too became disciples proselytizing others to the policies of the Communist leadership. For the military and for the Soviet state, the PUR was charged to carry out this goal:

"Our mission is to destroy the old regime in the hearts and minds of Red Army men [because] a soldier had to know why and against which enemies he was fighting, and he had to want to fight and had to be prepared to give up his life."

To this end and regardless of the fact that the last three lines, as well as the entire general concept, of this 'new' goal were taken nearly verbatim from General Dragomirov's Taktiki textbook, used at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy and by the Imperial Russian Army throughout the last half of the 19th century, in July 1925 a revised two-year-long political education program was

\[\text{von Hagen, p. 275.}\]
implemented based on the three bulwarks of "militarization, sovietization, and internationalization"; with "militarization" as the overall unifying concept.

The primary task of all education, both in content and form, was to guarantee combat readiness and soldier morale. The entire first year of a soldier's education was designed to transform 'the peasant who was called to serve in the Red Army into a Soviet soldier who had a clear idea of the Red Army, its aims, organization, and history.'

Throughout the 280 hours of political education scheduled during a recruit's first year of military training ("militarization"), heavy emphasis was continually placed on discipline -- defined as the unswerving obedience to the orders of superiors. During the second year of service, 190 hours of political education were designed "to transform him into a loyal, informed Soviet citizen and potentially a cadre who might enter the Soviet bureaucracy upon release from the military" by stressing "sovietization" -- "the bond of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class and its party."

The third pillar -- "internationalization" -- although discussed throughout the entire two-year program, had no formal course materials or scheduled instruction periods and was left largely to the discretion of the individual political officers. These PUR officials complained endlessly that they had a difficult enough time trying to convince the average peasant conscript of "the indisputable need for the defense of the Soviet state," let alone to

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713 von Hagen, p. 276.
714 von Hagen, p. 278.
sell him on the requirement to perform any "international duty."\textsuperscript{715} To the average peasant the deeply emotional Russian term 'rodina' (Motherland) encompassed only his family's village (mir).\textsuperscript{716} It therefore required great patience and considerable persuasion by political officers to convince these often illiterate, and at best semi-literate, individual peasants that the 'rodina' concept also applied to the multinational Soviet state as well. Broadening the concept to include their personal "unity with the proletariat" of other countries -- let alone with the entire world in accordance with Karl Marx's dictum -- was quite simply beyond their comprehension.\textsuperscript{717}

What did work in the socialization process, however, was to build on the peasant's new-found loyalty to the Red Army as the cornerstone for developing his personal attachment to the new socialist political order.

The army opened up opportunities for radical state intervention in society and from its earliest days it played an important role, as a 'school of socialism' in sociopolitical training and cadre formation.\textsuperscript{718}

During the 1924 annual military draft, only 24,700 -- or 4.8 percent -- of all recruits inducted into the Red Army were Communist Party or Komsomol members; and in 1925 the number of party members was intentionally increased to 39,000 -- or 12.8 percent of the total.

\textsuperscript{715} von Hagen, p. 278.

\textsuperscript{716} The Russian word mir has the triple meaning of "village", "peace", and "world" -- which goes a long way toward explaining how the Russian peasantry narrowly defined their "world" as a "peaceful" communal "village."

\textsuperscript{717} von Hagen, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{718} von Hagen, p. 343.
After serving two years in the Red Army, the 1924-year group discharged 66,000 Communist Party or Komsomol members in 1926, while the 1925-year group discharged 64,500 Party members back into civilian society.719 Additionally, by 1925 the proportion of Red commanders who were Party members had risen to 40 percent.720

In fact, the Red Army -- always under the leadership of the Communist Party as the 'vanguard of the proletariat' -- was purposely portrayed as 'the family of workers and toilers,' and as the liberator, defender, provider, and educator of the peasantry that had given them entirely new personal opportunities and a conscious memory of their glorious Russian history.

Stalin described the army as 'the only nationwide (vserossiiskii) and statewide (vsefederativnyi) place of assembly, where people of various provinces and regions come together, study, and accustom themselves to political life'; furthermore, the army was 'a school' and 'a great apparatus linking the party with the workers and the poor peasantry'.721

Lopsided though such portrayals might have been, in reality: "The army played a fundamental role in state building and nation building as a working environment that brought together representatives of all social groups entitled to Soviet citizenship, as well as many of the diverse national groups that made up the Soviet Union."722

719 Berchin, p. 54.
720 Budennyi, Book Three, p. 334.
Thus, for many individuals, service in the Red Army became the high point of peasants' lives -- they never before had lived, nor afterward would they live, as well as they did in the Red Army; nor would they share with other civilian village comrades the deep bonding of a common sense of purpose and mission. But they never forgot their loyalty to the Red Army, and hence to the Soviet state -- their mutual, unifying 'rodina.'

Mark von Hagen summarizes the main elements and the extensive impact of the Frunze reforms on the Red Army, and on the entire Russian society when he writes:

Active-duty soldiers, veterans, and the militarized political elite were the key actors in the process of the interpenetration of militarist and socialist values; they also articulated the intricately intertwined interests of the Red Army and the Soviet state and its many political institutions and organizations. The central leadership, in pursuit of its program of militarized socialism, placed military needs at the top of its list of economic priorities by the end of the first five-year plan. Patriotic and military virtues came to dominate education and culture.

Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense Georgii Zhukov conclusively describes the Russian Civil War lessons that became institutionalized through the Red Army "School of the Nation" following the Frunze Reforms, and their lasting influence on the future course of the Soviet Armed Forces:

The enormous amount of military experience and theoretical generalizations derived from the Russian Civil War formed the basis for the development of the Soviet Armed Forces for many years. Those lessons are as follows:

\[1\] von Hagen, pp. 288-289.

\[2\] von Hagen, pp. 341-342.
First is the unity of the army and people. The Red Army could not have been victorious without the unity that existed between the troops at the front and the material and political support that was received from the rear. This unity allowed the army to expand throughout the course of the civil war.

Second, the directing role of the Party, both in advising on military questions and influencing the army through the party-political apparatus, had a colossal significance. Because of the Party leadership, it was possible to concentrate forces and military resources on the most important military direction; as well as to transfer enormous numbers of human and material resources between fronts to the critical point.

Third, the victorious and lasting principles upon which our armed forces were constructed are strict centralization, unity of command and control, and iron discipline. The principles upon which a regular army, that had to prevail, was created are centralization and unity of direction in all branches of the army, strict maintenance of the chain of command, and discipline.725

The Red Army was genuinely an army of a new type that reflected the new social and political structures of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia. Once the army had attained a measure of legitimacy in the Soviet political and social orders, the old military elite that survived in a much expanded Soviet officer corps was able to exert greater influence in shaping Red Army traditions. They succeeded in, say, reviving Russian nationalism and Great Power ideology only to the extent that their attitudes and practices found a resonance in the political culture of the army and party elites.726

726 von Hagen, p. 340.
Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia: Toward "Permanent Operating Factors in Protracted War"

In many respects, including command, the 20th century is closer to the 17th than the 19th. We mainly wage the limited operations of a strategy of attrition; the rear and its work are much more important, and the political and economic fronts of the conflict are frightfully intense. The study of new forms of warfare is a necessary part of the activity of the high command; the new course of events in warfare can be understood and evaluated only if the events are measured by a new yardstick.\textsuperscript{727}


Dialectics acknowledges the radically contradictory requirements of the art of war: ... Dialectics cannot be driven out of the realm of strategic thought because it is the essence of strategic thought.\textsuperscript{728}


The focal point for the Red Army future war debates and for opposition to the officially approved 'unified proletarian military doctrine' was the former Nikolaev General Staff Academy, which Trotsky's Revvoensovet Respubliki (RVSR), as part of the general post-war army reorganization, on August 5, 1921 renamed the RKKA Military Academy. Given the long-established General Staff Academy mission to develop a military science for investigating the nature of future war; its RVSR assigned task to "elaborate theoretical questions concerning organization and the conduct of battle and the influence of these factors on troop control";\textsuperscript{729} and the continuity of the faculty between the two academies, it is entirely logical that

the new RKKA Military Academy would become the epicenter of
dissension as the voenspets faculty members -- former Tsarist
officers A. A. Svechin, N. E. Varfolomeev, A. I. Verkhovskii, et al.
-- attempted to apply intellectual rigor to the complex problems of
future war.

The stage for odious argument within the RKKA Military Academy
was set in the summer of 1921. Victorious Red operational commanders
and staff officers, such as N. V. Sologub, N. N. Shvarts, and E. A.
Shilovskii, were assigned to the faculty. Veteran Red commanders
began arriving as the first students. And, on August 27, 1921 the
Western Front commander, Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevskii, took over
as Chief of the RKKA Military Academy.\footnote{Bulzakov, p. 23.}

Former Tsarist Army General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin
was a most outstanding, outspoken, and provocative future thinking
officer, and hence, for the RKP(b) most controversial and politically
'dangerous.' Svechin was a RKKA Military Academy faculty member
during the free exchange of ideas that characterized the exceedingly
First World War, General Svechin had been one of the 'Young Turks' at
the Nikolaev General Staff Academy whose work attempted to translate
and to incorporate systematically the lessons of military history
into then current Russian strategy, operational planning, tactics and force structure. His investigations amounted to a concerted effort to create a 'military science' founded on historical experience.\textsuperscript{32}

Although World War I (1914-1918) combat operations and events of the October 1917 \textit{Krasnaia Revoliutsiia} interrupted these intellectual efforts by Svechin and his Academy colleagues, the Bolsheviks, believing firmly in the validity of 'scientific and historical Marxism,' ideologically were predisposed to continue, and to expand significantly, the work to develop a 'military science' that they considered might be crucial to the survival of their new state. Therefore, using the 1879 precedent first established by the War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin to investigate the Russo-Turkish War,\textsuperscript{733} between 1918 and 1924 the Bolshevik leadership resuscitated the Military-Historical Commission concept; attached it to the All-Russian Main Staff as the Commission for the Study and Use of the Experience of the War, 1914-1918;\textsuperscript{734} and specifically tasked the Commission initially "with distilling the lessons of the First World War and [later] the Soviet Civil War."\textsuperscript{735}

\textsuperscript{32} Lee, Kent D., in \textit{Soviet Military Doctrine...}, p. 274.

\textsuperscript{733} Menning, Bruce, W. \textit{Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Army, 1861-1914}, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 94.


\textsuperscript{735} Lee, Kent D., in \textit{Soviet Military Doctrine...}, p. 275.
The Red Army Military-Historical Commission

For the majority of its existence, the Military-Historical Commission (VIK) was headed by Aleksandr Svechin. After First World War operational assignments as a regimental and division commander, as well as Northern Front Chief of Staff, beginning in September 1917, Svechin joined the RKKA in March 1918 and served temporarily as Chief of the All-Russian Main Staff from August until October 1918, when he assumed full-time faculty duties at the RKKA Military Academy.

Under Svechin’s leadership, the Commission carried forward the rigorous process, begun in the late-19th century and expanded prior to the World War, of legitimizing the concept of future war as a valuable ‘scientific’ analytical method upon which to base Russian force structure development. Of this process Aleksandr Svechin wrote that "problems of military history are especially dear to persons studying strategy, since, by its very method, strategy is merely a systematized reflection over military history."

For a precise account employing archival materials to document the functioning of, and struggles within, the VIK, see Polikarpov, V. D., "Poiski 'Ugla zreniia.' Ataka kraskomov na nauchnom fronte" (The Search for a 'Corner Standpoint.' The Attack of the Red Commissars on the Scientific Front). Nachal’nyi etap grazhdanskoi voiny. Istoriiia izucheniiia, (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 120-154.


What initially got Svechin and his fellow Commission members into serious ideological conflict with the Communist Party was their "absence of a Marxist analytical framework" and their insistence in the 1919 first volume of *Voenno-istoricheskii sbornik. Trudy Komissii po issledovaniiu i ispol'zovaniiu opyta voiny 1914-1918 gg.* that the commission objectively would reveal "the truth, only the truth, the whole truth." To the Communist Party and to the Red commanders, increasingly 'truth' was becoming ideologically based and colored, 'subjectively' determined to serve their personal causes, and beginning to exclude 'objective' interpretation outside the Marxist conceptual framework.

The four explicit volumes of *Trudy Komissii po issledovaniiu i ispol'zovaniiu opyta voiny 1914-1918 gg.*, published between 1919 and 1921, did not at all endear the Military-Historical Commission to the Communist Party. First, the RVSR issued Order No. 914 of 30 April 1921 assigning the Military-Historical Commission (VIK) to the RKKA Shtab in an effort to establish control over its work; then by RVSR Order No. 1148, dated 29 May 1921, the VIK was disbanded; only to be reformed on 15 July 1921. Finally, with the publication of RVSR Order No. 1879, dated 2 September 1921, the VIK was designated the "Commission for Investigation and Use of World and Civil War Experience," with S. I. Gusev as Chairman and M. N. Tukhachevskii

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serving as his Assistant Chairman.¹⁴¹

As the commission's task expanded to include analysis of the Russian Civil War, the "truth" about history became even more contentious -- and ever more "dangerous."¹⁴² Over the course of the 1920s, within Bolshevik Russia, and then within the Soviet Union, the Communist Party leadership increasingly was in the process of settling personal scores based upon interpretations of Marxist ideology, of burying the civil war errors of aspiring leaders, and of replacing objective historical analysis with dogma. All of which Aleksandr Svechin viscerally rejected.

A second issue eventually, and ultimately, placed Svechin, together with the other members of the Military-Historical Commission and of the RKKA Military Academy voenspets faculty, in direct conflict with Communist Party and Red Army leaders, who could be described as adherents to a 'neo-Russian School' due to their strong chauvinistic and xenophobic inclinations. That issue was Svechin's adamant insistence that the only appropriate methodology by which military art could be taught at the RKKA Military Academy was through the application of military science. Not just any, so-called 'military science' would do for Svechin. It had to include the study of the complete international evolution of strategy and tactics as

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¹⁴¹ Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nyi etap..., p. 120.

developed, not just in Russia or during the civil war, but in foreign countries; particularly by applying the military theories contained within important German works, such as those by Clausewitz, Moltke, Delbrueck, and von Schlichting.

A. A. Svechin placed at the foundation of the development of the armed forces a definition of the nature of future war based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the history and prospects of military affairs; ... taking into account the 'nature of the historical moment' and economic potentials of the country at each individual moment.743

Despite Svechin's consistent advocacy of the primacy of politics, to the Communists and Red commanders bathing in the glory of their civil war victories and inflamed by their passion for the imminent socialist 'world revolution,' Svechin's work would become heresy. His emphasis on the evolution of military art, warnings "against any effort to create closed systems on the basis of past combat experience," and urgings that the "proper topic of military history was the study of those tendencies shaping future war"744 were not 'politically correct;' hence both they, and he, became outcasts.

Based on his three part Istoriia voennogo iskusstva, published between 1922 and 1923, during the 1923-1924 academic year at the RKKA Military Academy, Svechin delivered an innovative series of lectures on strategy -- "the highest level of military art" -- in which, for the first time, he sought to define for future Red Army leaders the


spatial and temporal expansion of protracted future warfare using the concept of "operational art," that had been adopted by the German General Staff prior to World War I, as the essential functional linkage between strategy and tactics.\textsuperscript{745} Svechin's description of operativnoe iskusstvo (operational art) -- even through it would eventually be adopted by the Soviet Army in the 1930s -- placed him in direct conflict with portions of Frunze's 'unified proletarian military doctrine' and with official Communist Party policy, both of which were oriented toward an offensive and decisive battle in a short war to promote the socialist 'world revolution' and thereby to secure the Soviet state. In contradiction to such dogmatic Communist Party thinking, Svechin taught:

Tactical creativity, in its turn, is regulated by operational art. Military action is not something decisive in itself, but only the raw material from which an operation is assembled. Only in very rare cases can one count on achieving the decisive aim of military action by one act. Normally this route to the final aim extends over a number of operations: the latter are separated in time by more or less significant pauses, extend over separate parts of the territory of the theater of war, and are especially sharply distinguished on account of differing intermediate aims, to attain that which the efforts of the forces are temporarily directed. We call an act of war, in the course of which forces are directed in a defined region of a theater of war towards attainment of an established intermediate objective without any break, an operation. An operation is a conglomerate of very different activities....\textsuperscript{746}


These comprehensive lectures, based upon his entire experience as a professional officer, military historian, scientist, and theorist, formed the foundation for Svechin's most controversial and enduring work -- *Strategiia* -- which was first published in 1926, and in a revised 1927 edition by *Voennyi vestnik*, and ignited an intensely personal, yet substantive, strategy debate within the Red Army.

Svechin had already fanned the embers of the smoldering Red Army strategy debate in a March 1924 *Voennaia mys' i revoliutsiia* article entitled "*Opasnye illiuzii*" ("Dangerous Illusions"), when, in support of the recently deceased Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) to rebuild the devastated Russian economy using market mechanisms, Svechin wrote:

> One must welcome the rejection by Soviet power of any sort of chauvinism, from the pressure to use the Red Army for promoting revolution by force of arms. But should such manifestations of chauvinism appear, then look at a map, reflect on modern technology and give up any sort of pleasant but even more dangerous illusions.  

Despite War Commissar Mikhail Frunze's support, up to his death in October 1925, for Red Army protracted warfare preparations, which continued to provide Svechin's intellectual endeavors some modicum of political protection, the Communist Party devotees to 'class warfare' and destruction of 'imperialists' were incensed by the implications of Svechin's "Dangerous Illusions." Through this March 1924 article, coupled with his earlier 'objective' analyses of warfare and later writings, particularly *Strategiia*, Svechin began to make implacable foes of Kliment Voroshilov, Frunze's successor as War Commissar, and

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Svechin, A. A., "*Opasnye illiuzii*," *Voennaia mys' i revoliutsiia*, No. 2, March 1924, pp. 49-50.
of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the future Chief of the RKKA Main Staff (1925-1928), who believed in and advocated for the "complete militarization" of the Soviet economy so that a technologically modernized Red Army could be the means for seizing the initiative and for conducting decisive offensive battle leading to the "total destruction" of the enemies of the Soviet state that would accomplish a "revolution from without." 748

- "War of Destruction" versus "War of Attrition"

The basic premise of Svechin's Strategiia, which was adapted from the work by the distinguished German military theorist and historian, Hans Delbrueck, was that the strategy of all warfare could be analyzed within a paradigm as being one of two types: 1) "wars of destruction" (sokrushenie), characterized by the rapid accomplishment of war aims through the decisive defeat of enemy forces in battle during the initial period of war; and 2) "wars of attrition" (izmor), characterized by protracted warfare involving the total political, diplomatic, military, economic, and population resources of the state to achieve the war aims -- "the line of least resistance runs through prolonging the war, which would cause the enemy to collapse politically." 749

Svechin was particularly critical of "decisive military operations" during the initial period of war and warned that such


unprepared action could lead to disaster." He argued that for economically backward Russia the only appropriate strategy was a prolonged "war of attrition," trading time and Russian territorial space while selectively employing as appropriate both defensive and offensive military operations, until the entire resources of the state could be mobilized and united with army actions at the front, i.e., "... the effort a state is capable of making on the front and the rear constitutes a single entity," in order to bring about the ultimate aim of warfare -- the collapse of the enemy government. In essence, Svechin's *Strategiia* elaborated a totally new theoretical construct for future war, which applied historical experience through the dialectic methodology of military science, and incorporated those trends that were altering the nature of warfare, to create a conceptual system with, as key elements,

- the establishment of a political-economic foundation beneath strategy; a division of strategy into two ideal types; attrition (izmor) and destruction (sokrushenie);
- the delineation of operational art and the assertion of a radically new understanding of the concept of operations;
- a reduction of the role of tactical combat in shaping force structure; denial of the importance of the single decisive engagement and the transformation of combat into an ongoing, episodic process; radical reduction of the role of march-maneuver as a major strategic factor and the emerging importance of the meeting engagement;
- emphasizing the role of transportation and communications in strategy and the significance of military-technical superiority; and the emphasis on theater-specific conditions in shaping appropriate strategy and operational art.

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Svechin's logical analysis and conviction that future wars necessarily would be protracted "wars of attrition" was sufficient alone to set him in opposition to Tukhachevskii and the left Communist Party faithful. However, in the process of detailing his strategic paradigm, Svechin also used Strategia as a polemic forum -- a decision that was not politically wise, but one which certainly displayed Svechin's characteristic intellectual integrity -- to attack none too subtly the civil war performance of the revolutionary Red Army leadership. Svechin wrote concerning the wartime leadership:

One example of irrational organization is the way in which the Red infantry was organized in the Civil War. The basic desire to reduce the percentage of noncombatants led the first organizers to reject the corps as an organizational unit, which was undoubtedly correct.... But subsequently the size of a division rose to 50,000. ... Divisions with a strength of 5000 to 6000 would be most appropriate for the conditions of the Civil War. ... A ratio of 12 noncombatants to one combatant was considered good, and the ratio was often much higher. ... In the old Russian army the ratio of noncombatants to combatants was equal to two men in the rear for one combatant.... Victory will be won not by unlimited mobilizations of senior citizens but by a very strict accounting of every man drafted into the Red Army.753

At the forefront of Svechin's condemnation were the strategic failures, particularly during the disastrous 1920 Polish campaign, of Budennyi, Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov, and Stalin. Although Svechin did not specifically name them, his words leave no question about where he considered responsibility, and blame, to lie. Svechin's vivid descriptions of their failures, which these emerging leaders of

the Soviet Union and Red Army were trying their best to bury as deeply as possible during the Party internal political battles that followed Lenin’s demise, virtually guaranteed Svechin’s exile from responsible positions after 1930, as political power increasingly consolidated around Stalin’s ‘cult of personality’ -- and eventual elimination in 1938. Svechin sharply condemned the entire strategy of the Polish operation:

In 1920 Poland was a more formidable enemy than Wrangel. From the perspective of destruction, it would have been correct to direct most of our efforts against Warsaw. ... The decisive point -- Warsaw -- would have decided the fate of the Crimea. ... In final analysis, Wrangel won the Warsaw operation, not Pilsudski; the Poles' Lublin attack was made possible by the divided attention of the Southern Front and the fact that the latter was pursuing local goals in Poland rather than an energetic offensive to the Vistula. As goals of operations, Warsaw and the Crimea were set in an order opposite the ones they should have, which had unpleasant consequences.754

Concerning the performance and merit of S. M. Budennyi’s legendary Russian Civil War Konarmiia (First Cavalry Army), Svechin noted rather sarcastically:

But the enemy's quality is more important than his strength. ... The laurels of the Red Cavalry can be ascribed not only to its bravery but to the disintegration of White and Polish infantry units. ... Certain cavalry commanders left a lot to be desired. ... The economic disintegration of the Civil War years put the cavalry at the forefront, and its leaders proved to have the talents they needed. Thus, cavalry, like any other branch of service, is of value not in and of itself but rather in connection with the room that the nature of a war provides for its activity. ... The organizer of an army can neither be guided by patterns ... nor respond to fashions like an Aeolian harp responds to the blowing of the wind.755

But Aleksandr Svechin reserved his most incisive criticism for Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the Western Front Commander during the military failure to seize Warsaw in August 1920, who, now as Red Army Chief of Staff, sought to 'mechanize' the army in order to implement his 'deep battle' future war operational concept. Concerning Tukhachevskii's expansive force structure proposals for the Red Army, Svechin pedantically pointed out:

We must get a clear conception of the nature of future operations and be able to determine the requirements they will make of tactics, and only then will it be possible to provide a proper solution for problems of organizing branches of service in the proportions that are actually necessary. The correct solution could lead to significant savings, but success will come only to an organizer who is a master in strategy, operational art and tactics.  

Further on Svechin continued his assault against Tukhachevskii:

We must above all ensure the stability of the military high command and the continuity of the work of the agency responsible for the operational plan, the general staff. A great deal of attention and profound consideration of strategic issues are needed in order to avoid drifting aimlessly. We need leadership with proven views on the art of war. ... Revolutionary changes in operational views are hazardous and detrimental.  

It was, however, for Tukhachevskii's conduct of the 1920 Polish campaign itself -- and hence, by implication, for the entire Soviet and Red Army leadership -- that Svechin amassed his greatest scorn. The text of Strategia is spiked throughout with the following enduring military-strategic lessons and typically very harsh analytical assessments of the performance of the Red Army leadership:

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A strategy of destruction characterized most of the Red Army's offensive from the banks of the Dvina to the Vistula in 1920. ... Destruction involves not only speed and linearity, it also involves massiveness. In approaching the Vistula the Red armies had become so numerically weak and so cut off from their sources of supply that they were more phantoms than reality.738

An analysis of communications yields a large number of extremely important guidelines for strategic art: strategic thinking should pay sufficient attention to logistics; the basic directions for an offensive should coincide with the most important available trunk lines of communications, and the pace of an offensive can only temporarily lag behind the pace of restoration of railroads demolished by the enemy; the strategist should keep communications in mind even when he departs from an analysis of his own logistics and looks ahead at the enemy; and only attacks on the enemy that will cause him to lose important junctions and lateral lines should be given serious consideration, and the only way to destroy an enemy army is to cut off all the arteries supplying it.739

Our reaction to the carelessness of preparations and logistics that characterized the Red Army's Warsaw operation should not impel us to the opposite extreme. A plan will be sound when it does not leave too much to chance but also does not get bogged down in details and or delve too deeply into the various scenarios that may be encountered in carrying out the plan. ... Operational art does not allow for rigid decisions.740

Not every movement forward is in essence a strategic offensive. An offensive at any and all costs, as an a priori method of operation, leads to a situation in which our forces are dispersed where the enemy permits, activity degenerates into weakness, into an offensive 'phase,' into a very dubious location of the front somewhere ahead and a return to the starting position.741

Specifically against the 'unified proletarian military doctrine' promulgated by Mikhail Frunze, and thus in contradiction to the policy of the Communist Party, Svechin argued:

Of course, it is impossible to get all the members of a general staff to hold the same views, particularly in our era of the rapid development of the art of war. Complete unity of doctrine and the lack of differences in the interpretation of operational and tactical issues could be achieved only at the cost of stopping efforts for further development.762

Contemporary military history, which tries to proceed from a single, absolute, uniquely correct line of strategic conduct, is incapable of clarifying the meaning and relationships in the jumble of military events that it considers some sort of chaos.763

However, Svechin very strongly supported Frunze's proposals for the creation of a powerful Red Army General Staff, urging:

Only a general staff, a collection of persons who have forged and tested their military views under the same conditions and under the same leadership, who have been carefully selected and are bound to one another by mutual responsibility and concerted efforts to achieve fundamental improvements in building the army, is capable of coordinating and harmonizing preparations which are so extensive, so diverse and run in so many different directions. A variety of specialists are required in the military profession; the specialty of the general staff should be to combine individual efforts into a single entity, eliminate friction and achieve a high level of organization.764

Following the publication of Svechin's Strategija, First Edition, so extremely polarized and politicized became the split within the Red Army, especially between the RKKA Military Academy

faculty and the RKKA Main Staff, which was under Tukhachevskii's leadership, that early in 1926 a Red Army 'special conference' was convened for the specific purpose of debating Svechin's thesis concerning the strategies of 'izmor' and 'sokrushenie.' Through these conference discussions an effort was made to reach some internal consensus about the appropriate Red Army strategy for contemporary conditions.65

As a result of this 'special conference,' the details of which were not published, but which certainly must have included an very spirited, 'no-holds-barred' debate, Svechin revised his Strategiia, as he writes in the Preface to the 1927 Second Edition, having "conscientiously reviewed all the numerous critical comments ... by certain obscure military men and politicians,"66 so that now "wars of destruction" could be undertaken under specific favorable international conditions.67 Although in his second edition of Strategiia Svechin acknowledged that a strategy of "destruction"

67 Svechin's "favorable international conditions" did little to appease his critics, who advocated a strategy of "destruction" because, for the isolated and "encircled" Soviet Union, the following conditions were realistically unattainable: isolating a hostile state from possible allies; providing active allies for oneself; engendering hostile attitudes on the part of neutral countries toward the enemy and sympathetic attitudes toward oneself; depriving the enemy of the possibility of getting loans and acquiring the raw materials and weapons needed to wage war; and opening up foreign sources of economic cooperation for oneself. The odium of declaring war must be directed away from oneself and toward the enemy if possible. See Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., Strategy, p. 131.
could be applied in warfare, he remained convinced that future war necessarily would be a "total war," demanding the "permanent mobilization" of the state in order to field maximum military capabilities during the critical initial period of war. The theory of "permanent," or "three-echelon," military mobilization envisions the following general concepts: 1) minimum mobilization reserves gathered by the beginning of the war -- the first echelon of material support of the army; 2) a second echelon composed of special military industry capable of supporting the army until the final mobilization of all remaining industry; and 3) a third mobilization echelon consisting of civilian industry supporting the army and the country until the end of the war, after exhausting mobilization reserves.

Most importantly, the Second Edition of Strategiia continued to contradict openly and unequivocally the ideological precepts that the Communist Party leaders now wished to transform into dogma. Svechin included such biting and ideologically unacceptable comments as:

Strategy is a discipline in which success depends very little on the memorization of precepts issued by a school or the assimilation of logical constructs contained in textbooks on strategy. A unity of doctrine based on the unity of strategic guidelines is illusory. In strategy the center of gravity lies in developing an independent point of view which primarily requires careful homework.

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Or later on:

In the spring of 1920, Lenin advocated a policy of attrition and in his brochure entitled "The Infantile Disorder of Leftism in Communism" he attacked the doctrinaires who blindly insisted on politic destruction. He characterized this leftist dogmatism as an attempt to ignore limited intermediate goals and achieve the ultimate goal in a single bound.\(^7\)

There is no doubt that in future wars, with the intense class struggles associated with them, there will also be more favorable conditions for exploiting occupied territories.\(^8\) The experience of 1920 indicated the need to prepare carefully to take advantage of the existing situation. A great deal of room is opening up for dreams of making Tamerlane-like thrusts over thousands of kilometers. But in our era dreams are more dangerous than they have ever been before.\(^9\)

\[\ldots\]

Real life does not encourage prophecy or clairvoyancy. In strategy prophecy may only be charlatanism, and even a genius is incapable of seeing how a war will unfold. But he must put together a perspective in which he will evaluate the phenomena of war. A military leader needs a working hypothesis. Of course, not every military leader will take the trouble or have the opportunity to think about the nature of a future war. Strategic mediocrity perhaps prefers to proceed from stereotypes and recipes. Reality will be a cruel disappointment for such a poor excuse for a leader.\(^10\)

Therefore, even with the revision of his original *Strategiia*, Svechin, and his few remaining voenspets colleagues, increasingly would be publicly vilified in the Communist Party and Red Army press as the battle for ideological 'truth' became fully engaged during the last years of the 1920s. Because Lenin's NEP was proving to be


ineffective in dealing with Russia’s immense economic deficiencies, Stalin, with the support of War Commissar Voroshilov and RKKA Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii, was by 1927 advocating industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, totalitarian controls, the ‘militarization’ of Soviet society, and the need to mechanize the Red Army in order to pursue a "war of destruction" strategy. Svechin’s Strategiia, with its support for NEP and heavy emphasis on protracted "war of attrition," was now totally out of step with Stalin’s Communist Party political line -- and would become even more so following the 1927 war scare with Great Britain.774

Typical of the scathing criticism Svechin’s revised Strategiia received was a review by one A. Vol’pe, published in the May 1927 edition of Voina i revoliutsiia, the main journal of the Red Army General Staff. Vol’pe wrote that "Strategy, ... despite its obvious merits, might well be dangerous, imbued as it is with grains of bitter skepticism"; and "... dangerous because it is abstract"; and "... Svechin is unwilling to be bound by any ready-made conclusions or conventional rules."775 Vol’pe judged that "Svechin gives priority to politics over strategy rather reluctantly"; took grave exception to Svechin’s idea to create an "economic general staff" -- "no one needs an extra planning body"; but patronizingly congratulated

Svechin for advocating "in a simple and convincing manner ... that a country should have a strong army." Vol'pe withheld his most damning political indictment for the inadequacy of Svechin's method of argument:

Dialectical materialism seeks not only to cognize the world but also to transform it. But Professor Svechin's dialectic does not pursue any positive goals, and he seems content merely to observe changing phenomena and look for contradictions that make possible the transition from quantity to quality and negation of negation.

Then, with only a mention of the last two chapters of Strategiia -- which contain Svechin's most fundamental arguments on the protracted nature of future warfare and the "line of strategic conduct," along with the most critical judgments about Communist Party and Red Army leadership -- Vol'pe offered: "Taken as a whole, Professor Svechin's book still remains the only fundamental work on strategy." And so it would remain for over a generation, until the first edition of Marshal Sokolovskii's Voennaia strategiia would be published in 1962.

In January 1928 Svechin was attacked in Voina i revoliutsiia again, this time by V. Novitskii, on the grounds that "his exultation of a strategy of attrition is dangerous. ... After all, is such a

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strategy really acceptable to us?" After explaining very briefly why the answer to his question was emphatically "No", Novitskii asserted in a rhetorical question that:

Our strategy undoubtedly is a strategy of destruction. Our strategy is a strategy of rapid and decisive attack.... Should not we all turn our attention to securing the maximum development, accumulating the best means for a swift and rapid strike and securing the best economic resources in everything to the end that they would be set aside for that attack?  

The credibility of Svechin, and his fellow "war of attrition" advocates at the RKKA Military Academy, sagged even further when the Communist Party adopted the First Five-Year-Plan at the "Congress of Collectivization" later in 1928, and became exceedingly tenuous as they potentially were labeled 'class enemies' and 'wreckers' in the aftermath of the 'Shakhty Affair' when Stalin charged before the April 1928 KPSS Central Committee plenum that an "economic counterrevolution" to sabotage the coal industry was being led by the voenspets and funded by Western "capitalists." The brutal tone for the imminent totalitarian 'reign of terror' was set with the ascendency of Stalin to power and his paranoid enunciation: "We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. Comrades, we cannot forget about this for even one minute."  


In 1929 the attacks on Svechin and his *Strategiia* intensified even further when the Communist Academy sought to infuse the old 'bourgeois' military science with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism by organizing a Section for the Study of the Problems of War, which reopened the 1921-1922 Trotsky-Frunze debates on the 'unified proletarian military doctrine' to which Svechin was so vehemently opposed. The Military Section of the Communist Academy wanted to assume the functions of the RKKA Military Academy faculty as the principal center for the study of the military problems of the USSR. Hence, the militarily neophyte Communist Academy politicians presented themselves as dynamic, young 'new thinkers', as opposed to the old 'bourgeois' voenspets of the RKKA Military Academy, who were ridiculed and suspected of being 'wreckers' of the new order.\(^782\)

Tukhachevskii, who was serving as the Leningrad Military District Commander between 1928 and 1930, continued to proselytize for a "mechanized mass army as the means to conduct decisive operations in a total war."\(^783\) Both to promote the credibility of his own 'deep battle' concept for any future war and, as a former Tsarist officer (voenspets) himself, to prove his own 'ideological purity' to the Communist Party leadership, Tukhachevskii openly joined in the fray, charging that Svechin's writings were infested with "idealism," were contaminated with "bourgeois ideology," rejected outright the


possibility of "decisive operations," and advocated "limited warfare." In this manner Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii made a distinct, duplicitous contribution to the ending of open debate within the Soviet military, which so uniquely characterized the 1920s.

At the Sixteenth Communist Party Congress in 1930, Soviet War Commissar Kliment E. Voroshilov arose and defined Tukhachevskii's army "mechanization" concept as constituting "a qualitative change in the nature of future wars" which, in Voroshilov's opinion, if not exactly in Tukhachevskii's, would "bring about the possibility of a short, bloodless war, carried quickly on to the territory of the attacking enemy." In that same year Mikhail Tukhachevskii was elevated to membership in the Revvoensovet, promoted to Deputy Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, and assigned as RKKA Director of Armaments, in which positions he effectively ended the debates over which strategy was appropriate for the Soviet Union -- sokrushenie or izmor -- by ensuring that a strategy of destruction was adopted through the implementation of his concept for a mechanized mass army dedicated to decisive offensive action in the initial period of a future war.
The Strategic Line of Conduct

Aleksandr A. Svechin's most enduring contribution to military thought and to strategic art -- that only was recognized by the Soviet General Staff and Stalin following the Red Army fiascos during the opening months of World War II and would be labeled "permanent operating factors in protracted warfare" -- was the identification of what Svechin called the "strategic line of conduct" leading to the ultimate goal of warfare -- victory. The principal elements of the "strategic line of conduct" are: First, the Sequence of Operations pursues limited goals of attrition, which expose preconditions for the next operation engendered by the first operation, ultimately leading to the "overturning of the enemy's military front." Second, the Curve of Strategic Intensity takes into consideration, not only the forces initially deployed and engaged, but also the prospect for force deployments to grow and for the balance of forces to change over time, which necessitates reinforcement, supply, new manpower mobilizations, and troop movements between fronts in order to maintain frontal stability ('nastoichivost'). Third, the Initial Moment of an Operation "must be coordinated with political requirements, ... the overall military situation, ... the completion of our deployment, ... [and a time] when the balance of forces is favorable" and, to this end, "awaiting a favorable moment for beginning an offensive means maintaining a defensive formation.


Operational deployment for an offensive should be completed only at the last minute.\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, p. 294.} Fourth, the \textit{Breakthrough of an Operation} places on the strategist the obligation to "keep offensive operations from getting drawn out to the last gasp," i.e., "to stop an offensive ... as soon as our forces lose their tactical advantages..." and to conclude the offensive operation by an immediate transition to the defensive.\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, pp. 295-96.} Fifth, \textit{Operations on Interior Lines} "involve successive movement of the center of gravity from one theater to another" by limiting oneself to a minimum of forces for the defense on positional fronts and by organizing "a powerful strategic reserve whose guest appearances in each theater of war lead to a favorable break in the situation" by concentrating superior forces successively on every front.\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, p. 297.} Sixth, \textit{Proportioning Operations} is the "most critical task for the strategist" in order to "always ... take advantage of numerical superiority in the most decisive way possible" and to ensure that "every operation, including a defensive operation, ... [is] provided with assets appropriate to its goal."\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, pp. 301-02.} And finally, A very important task for art is selecting a line of strategic conduct that represents the harmony of required coordination; ... it cannot yield a prediction of the actual course of events on the military front, but at any given moment it should make it possible for us to react to military events in accordance with the logic to which everything should be subordinated for achieving victory in a given war.\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, p. 306.}
Tsarist General-Major Aleksandr A. Svechin’s own words best portray the significance of his underpinning philosophy regarding "the most important issues of strategic logic":

"The most artful strategic offensive will lead to a disaster if we do not have enough resources to reach the ultimate goal, which will secure the peace for us."795

A strategist who knows the evolutionary requirements of the military profession, understands the resources needed at a given moment and has an idea of the strengths and capabilities of both sides and the nature of a future war dwells on a certain way of resolving strategic questions that should lead him to the ultimate goal of military front operations, plans a series of intermediate goals and the sequence in which they are achieved; regulates strategic intensity and always tries, if not to subordinate, to tie the interests of the present to the interests of the future strategic 'tomorrow.' He is not independent in his decisions, but must coordinate the solution of the war problems on the military front with events on the political and economic fronts. ... At the forefront we have to put harmony in the nation's war preparations, but it is no less important in the war's leadership, only the nature of harmony in this case is immeasurably more subtle. ... This achievement of harmony, is the essence of strategy, and it forces us to classify practical work on strategy as an art.795

In a future war, technical initiative will be overwhelmingly important. But the general staff must take a favorable attitude toward technical innovations and conduct the first steps in the deep rear in complete secrecy. New weapons suitable for combat may be developed in secret if the technicians and tacticians involved are highly skilled and military academic committees, which ... are strongholds of technical reaction and a graveyard for new ideas, are kept out of the operation. And the top leadership must be confident enough to begin mass production without first trying out the equipment in battle.796

In his closing thoughts Svechin offers a most prescient observation:

Modern warfare also leaves room for strategic reserves, that is, fully trained and mobilized units that are not tied to an operational goal. ... A strategic reserve is strategic wealth, which is naturally put aside if the front is not fighting at full pitch. ... Of course, the concept of a strategic reserve radically contradicts the ideas of destruction, which require extreme intensity to achieve success at a decisive point. But this concept logically fits within the framework of a war of attrition. A prolonged conflict is generally impossible without a strategic reserve."

The singular expository and disquisitional writings of Aleksandr Svechin, about military history, the evolution of military art, strategy, operational art, and the protracted nature of future warfare -- along with the prodigious quantity of other astute Russian military theoretical works about the nature of future war produced primarily during the 1920s, but also during the decade of the 1930s -- forge a direct, substantive dialectical linkage between past

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79\footnote{Svechin, A. A., in Kent D. Lee, ed., \textit{Strategy}, p. 303.}

798\footnote{See Zakharov, M. V., ed., \textit{Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v Sovetskikh voennych trudakh (1917-1940)}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965) for an annotated bibliography of major Russian military theoretical works. Zakharov's large collection of excerpts from the writings of Frunze, Tukhachevskii, Kamenev, Uborevich, Vatsetis, Shaposhnikov, Svechin, Verkhovskii, Triandafillov, Belitskii, Vol'pe, Egorov, Isserson, Varfolomeev, Krasil'nikov, Shilovskii, Melikov, Galaktionov, Kalinovskii, Kuznetsov, Kryzhanovskii, Ammosov, Favitskii, Sukhov, Lapchinskii, Khripin, Tatarchenko, Algazin, Teplinskii, Zherve, Ludri, Dushenov, Iakimychev, Panteleev, Belli, et al., serves as a teaching mechanism and as examples for the General Staff about how to write about strategy and future war. Also, for a previously classified bibliography of period Russian military theoretical works, see Appendix III, The Spetskhran (Special Holdings) of the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff Library for a listing of 713 titles.
Russian Imperial Army military thought, the founding of the Red Army, the 70 years of Soviet military doctrine, the present new-1993 Russian military doctrine, and the future development of Russian military science. Still, among this crowd of distinguished Russian military thinkers, Svechin’s Strategiia stands out as the seminal work defining the nature of future warfare -- a "completely new strategic landscape."

A particular strategic policy must be devised for every war; each war is a special case, which requires its own particular logic rather than any kind of stereotype or pattern, no matter how splendid it may be. The more our theory encompasses the entire content of modern war, the quicker it will assist us in analyzing a given situation. A narrow doctrine would probably confuse us more than guide us.\textsuperscript{99}

\textbf{Strategy must make a comprehensive effort to predict the future.}\textsuperscript{800}

- A. A. Svechin, \textit{Strategiia}


TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY:
The Relationship between the Transformation Process and the Concept of Future War

PART III
FINDINGS: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

Military Science elucidates the nature (essence and qualities) of military affairs, resulting in the teaching of leading principles for future activity.801

- General G. A. Leer, 1883

Views on the character of future war form a most important part of the Military Doctrine ... of one state or another and exercise a significant influence on its practical preparations for war.802

- Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia, 1933

Military Doctrine is a system of views on the essence, aims and character of a possible future war ....803

- Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar', 1986

Integral to the study of Russian military history is understanding the meticulous detail and momentous depth in which Russian military scientists explore the ever changing character of budushchaia voina (future war). Especially noteworthy in their studies is the driving force of technological change on the nature of future war as well as the impact of the social, political and economic condition of the Russian state, and that of prospective


foreign security threats. Upon this complex forecasting foundation anticipated Russian military capabilities are first determined, and then illuminated within a military doctrine.

Parts I and II of this study document the laborious and highly politically charged commission process by which the Russian military transformed itself and therewith, of necessity, Russian society from an illiterate feudal standing army during the Crimean War (1853-1856) into a 'professional', late-20th century military establishment employing modern weaponry and possessing a systematic methodology -- voennyi nauk (military science) -- to address and to analyze the probable nature of future war. Although not entirely effective, this transformation evolved, admittedly haltingly, through the vicious cauldrons of warfare and the lists of peacetime intellectual challenge and debate.

Over this 140 year period the Russian military science intellectual process and the decision-making commission process derived therefrom were driven, in large measure, by emerging technological developments, foreign and domestic, in the means of conducting warfare and by perceived international security threats. These twin processes were psychologically and intellectually motivated and orchestrated to attempt to secure the Russian heartland: First, from European or Asian land invasion; second, in the mid-20th century, from a global exchange of nuclear weapons; and third, at the dawn of the 21st century, from an amorphous but technologically imminent and potentially equal or even more ubiquitous and devastating, prospect of a global aerospace attack
employing precision-guided 'conventional' weapons. To the Russian political and military leadership, the latter clearly presages yet another 'revolution in military-technical affairs.'

Origins of the Future War Concept: The Russian Military Strategic Tradition

The genesis of the present Russian military preoccupation with the nature of budushchaia voina lay in the humiliating combat failures of the Imperial Army during the Crimean War. At the initiative of General-Adjutant Count A. F. Ridiger, Tsar Aleksandr II inaugurated the first Russian military reform commission -- the Ridiger Commission (1855-1856) -- tasked specifically with investigating and correcting the causes of the defeat and with recommending measures to preclude a recurrence of such a military disaster in the future. The resulting commission process, granted by fits and false starts depending on the personalities of successive individual War Ministers and Chiefs of the General Staff, and certainly neither efficiently nor always effectively, has continued for over 140 years and is institutionalized within the Russian military as the principal means for achieving consensus and for reaching major decisions concerning future war.

Intellectually as well as functionally, the key member of the harbinger Ridiger Commission was General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, the future Russian War Minister, from 1861 to 1881. General Miliutin instituted and, despite intense internal political resistance from the entrenched aristocratic Russian military leadership, institutionalized comprehensive Imperial Army reforms, particularly
in the critical areas of officer education, military district organization, war planning and the forecasting of future war requirements.804

The most significant and lasting reform carried out by Miliutin during the 1860s and 1870s was the creation of "a fundamentally new system of military education." The impact of this reform would alter the social composition of the Russian Army leading to the inculcation of a new ideology based on nationalism and an increased emphasis on the moral influence of words and literature on the military.805

During Miliutin's lengthy tenure as War Minister, his main advisor on war planning and forecasting matters was the future Chief of the Main Staff, General Nikolai N. Obruchev. A pathfinder in Russian efforts to understand the changing nature of warfare, Obruchev authored the first-ever Russian future war studies -- the 1868 'Russian Strategic Assessment' report, the 1870 General War Plan, and the background materials for Tsar Aleksandr II's 1873 'secret society' discussions about crafting a national military doctrine and decisions to alter, albeit belatedly, the army structure.

Because the Imperial decision to transition to a cadre army through universal military conscription was delayed until January 1874, and the financial resources necessary to begin implementing those changes were withheld until 1875, even with the extensive Miliutin reforms the Russian Army was very nearly as unprepared for

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805 D'IAkov, p. 61.
the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) as it had been for the Crimean War over twenty years before.

The nature of warfare in the late nineteenth century was beginning to change with the broadening of the geographic expanse of combat within a theater of military operations, with the increased size of engaged armies, with the introduction of emerging technologies such as railroads, telegraph and, especially, with longer-ranged and more accurate rifled small arms and artillery. But, alas, Russian Army infantry tactics did not change appreciably and continued to rely on Suvorov’s 18th century concept of the massed bayonet charge as the ‘decisive’ method of attack. As a consequence, even though the Imperial Army ’won’ its war with Turkey on the Balkan Peninsula, Russian battle casualties were inordinately and unacceptably high, and the Russian domestic economy was devastated by the disruptive losses of manpower and material. This ignominious ‘victory’ thus caused a renewed, and greatly intensified, effort within the Russian military to divine the nature of modern warfare and, since financial resources were severely constrained during the last two decades of the 19th century, to prepare, intellectually at least, for future war.

The loci of Russian military efforts to debate and attempt to understand budushchaia voina, and certainly the most important means for influencing Tsarist military-historical thought, were centered within the General Staff Military-Historical Commission, first established in 1879 for the specific purpose of investigating the

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806 D'iakov, p. 62.
conduct of the Russo-Turkish War, and within the Nikolaev General Staff Academy where in 1898 the first Russian military art faculty was established.80\footnote{D'iakov, p. 62.}

The General Staff Military-Historical Commission diligently, if rather bureaucratically, pondered over its investigations of the failures of Russian arms and valiantly amassed the largest study ever published in Tsarist Russia -- the immense 97-volume \textit{Sbornik materialov po russko-turetskoj voine 1877-78 gg. na Balkanskom poluoostrove}. The reactionary nature of Tsar Aleksandr III's regime that came to power in 1881, the intensified domestic revolutionary activity, and the study's biting indictments of a Russian military leadership that was composed almost exclusively of members of the royal family, however, created a political climate rift with delay. Thus, the full commission report was not released for publication until 1911 -- 33 years after the Russo-Turkish War concluded and well after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) revealed virtually identical myopic Russian Army leadership deficiencies and command negligences.

\textbf{- Dragomirov's "Russian School": Morale and Moral Superiority}

Meanwhile, at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, antithetical schools of military thought were developing. First, the thesis of General M. I. Dragomirov's strongly nationalistic "Russian School" emphasized the superiority in combat of troop morale and moral authority over military technology and equipment. This school of
thought denied the need for a ‘military science’ and the need to fundamentally alter existing Russian ‘line’ battlefield tactics in order to adapt to the increasing lethality of new weaponry which were rapidly changing not only the nature of future military combat, but also the entire character of warfare itself.

Dragomirov’s "Russian School" philosophically insisted that weaponry "only prepare the battle, but it was decided by man, with his moral force";\(^{808}\) that "wars result from the nature of man himself, that they are inevitable and eternal";\(^{809}\) and that "the permanent qualities of mankind" lead to the "eternal battle of will and intellect" which consequently require that special attention be placed on the study of national character and the "decisive role of the great commanders in the history of military art."\(^{810}\) In this latter context Dragomirov echoed his illustrious ideological forerunner, General Miliutin. He asserted: "The valor of the Russian soldiers, their steadfastness, is the result of racial peculiarities of the common Russian man";\(^{811}\) and that "Suvorov had no predecessors; nor a successor..., truly, one is not soon expected. In the waves of the future great there is no successor."\(^{812}\)

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\(^{808}\) D’iakov, p. 62.

\(^{809}\) D’iakov, p. 64.

\(^{810}\) D’iakov, p. 67.

\(^{811}\) Dragomirov, M. *Odinnadtsat’ let, 1895-1905. Sbornik.,* Book 1, p. 3.

Leer's "Academic School": Fundamental Laws of War

The antithesis to General Dragomirov's "Russian School" began to develop between 1875 and 1880 with the philosophical view that a positive "military science" existed for the study of warfare. By the 1890s, what would become at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy under General G. A. Leer the "Academic School" argued that in warfare there existed specific "eternal laws" that could be revealed through the disciplined and rigorous study of classical military history by applying a "critical-historical research method" to discern the "facts" from applied tactics and actual strategy. The "Academic School" asserted that there existed in battle a qualitative superiority of weaponry over the "moral force" of soldiers. But, in their zeal for historical investigation, especially of great 18th century Russian military victories, they divorced military theory from military practice by denying that either emerging technologies or the changing character of future war altered the "fundamental laws of war." In reality, the basic world-view of both the "Russian" and the "Academic" schools of military thought, intellectually, were the same. Namely, Russian national chauvinist, and therefore, they remained idealists, the advocates of the 'Russian school' did not connect the 'nationalist' element with the social economic structure of given countries and with their attained level of material

813 D'iakov, p. 64.
814 D'iakov, p. 62.
production. Because of this the possibility was denied them to understand correctly the essential process of developing military affairs and to see its general regularities.\textsuperscript{415}

It was with such hidebound traditional Russian tactical military concepts, that contained gross factual misinterpretations of the glorious 18th century Russian military victories of Rumiantsev, Bagration and Suvorov, that a whole generation of Russian officers were trained during the 1880s and the early 1890s and then, as field commanders, went unprepared into a technologically and strategically different type of broad expanse warfare with the Japanese in 1904\textsuperscript{416} -- once again with disastrous consequences for the Imperial Army.

**The Integrators: Geisman, Neznamov and Mikhnevich Develop the Social-Economic Foundation for Protracted Warfare**

At the turn of the century, a dialectic synthesis began to negate the "Russian" and "Academic" schools of military thought concerning the nature of future war. In the forefront of this process was the distinguished General Staff Academy faculty member Colonel Pavel A. Geisman. While agreeing with his Academy Commandant, General G. A. Leer, that there were 'inevitable' and 'eternal laws of war,' Geisman also supported the "Russian School" philosophy that "of greatest significance in war and in battle is the

\textsuperscript{415} D’iakov, p. 72.

But as Colonel Geisman's synthesis progressed, incorporating elements of both schools of military thought, he tended to digress from the "Russian School" emphasis on the importance of national military experience toward a more "Academic" position that "first place is occupied by material requirements; thereafter follows intellectual and, finally, gradually lessening themselves, spiritual requirements." In his later writings, in the last half of the 1890s, Geisman began to integrate the "Academic" investigation of the material aspects of warfare, i.e., the military-administrative and military-economic matters, as handled by the great Russian commanders, while deemphasizing the purely spiritual aspects of warfare.

Other Russian "Academic" military theorists at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy took a different approach to the application of scientific analysis and thought to problems of future warfare. Among the most prominent was E. I. Martynov who was the first to assert that "the development of military art was dependent on the level of civilized society and showed this using concrete historical examples." Martynov focused his detailed analytical investigations on the influence of society's increasing industrial production capabilities on the conduct of future war, the significance of the

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819 D'iakov, p. 66.
820 Zhilin, p. 84.
introduction of new technologies into the army, and the size and type of military force that would be necessary to employ these new technologies. Martynov was concerned especially by the impact of emerging technologies on army command and control. He was convinced that communications would decisively determine the ability of future commanders to control combat operations. Martynov concluded that, in order to achieve success in a future war, technological developments required an overall elevation of the theoretical and practical educational level of the Russian officer corps.821

Following closely in Martynov’s footsteps, Ivan Bliokh’s five-volume seminal study of future war, entitled *Budushchaia voina v tekhnicheskom, ekonomicheskom i politicheskom otnosheniakh* (St. Petersburg, 1898), along with a sixth volume of *General Conclusions (Obshchie vyvodi iz sochineniia Budushchaia voina,...)*, presented a unique analysis of all aspects of warfare. Bliokh ventured to predict some sixteen years before such a world war happened, "a great war of entrenchment ... the duration of battle, which may be prolonged for several days and which ... may yield no decisive results," and concluded that "perfection" of emerging technologies would create "entirely new conditions for the wars of the future."822

A. A. Neznamov, in his 1909 work entitled *Oboronitel’naia voina* (Defensive War), was among the first to discuss the fact that under

821 Zhilin, pp. 84-85.
822 Bellamy, Christopher D., *Budushchaya Voyna: The Russian and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of Future War*, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Center for Strategic Technology, 1989), pp. 11 and 82.
the new conditions of warfare, not just the army in isolation on some remote battlefield, but the entire population of the state would have to fight a future war. The outcome of war was now becoming increasingly dependent on the internal economic production of the whole state and the morale of the entire country. Neznamov used historical experience to show that the formation of a unified national military doctrine, with political and military-technical twin pillars, was an essential component of state security. Above all, Neznamov emphasized that an elevated social-political and economic condition of the state constituted the guarantee of success in war. Strategic and tactical mistakes made during individual campaigns and battles could be corrected during the course of a war, but "doctrinal errors were unforgiving and, as a rule, lead its followers to perish." Neznamov was supported in these conclusions by General A. G. Elchaninov who stressed the necessity for Russian preparation for war "by the exertions of all, both moral and material, forces of the state" and advocated the necessity of creating a unified social opinion concerning war aims, and hence a unified military doctrine.

N. P. Mikhnevich was a contemporary of Geisman, Martynov and Neznamov at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy. His synthesis of thinking on military science began with a strong attachment to the

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823 Zhilin, p. 143.
"Russian School" viewpoint emphasizing the "primacy of the morale element of military affairs over the material," and "the physical and moral elasticity of the Russian soldier which secured for the Russian Army the capability to escape demoralization even while suffering incomparably greater casualties than any other army.”

Mikhnevich initially revealed his priorities by stating that "... in order to appraise the strength of an army, first of all we pay attention to the moral quality of the war, then to the quality of leadership, only afterward to their numbers, then to training and finally to the weaponry of the troops." As an ardent Russian nationalist, Mikhnevich asserted that "our military art almost never was inferior to Western Europe, but very often went forward, giving direction, to new ideas in the areas of tactics and strategy, which in Europe were taken up from us." It was in the area of methodology, however, that in 1899 Mikhnevich successfully began to synthesize the discipline of "critical military-historical investigation," i.e., "military science," from the "Academic School" with his "Russian School" propensities when he wrote Voennaia nauka i stepen' tochnosti eia vyvodov. Mikhnevich affirmed that military science "concerned itself with the study of wars -- this is the

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826 D'iakov, p. 70.
Mikhnevich was the first Russian military theorist to recognize in a holistic manner the strict dependence of a nation's military capability on the level of its social and economic development (material basis), while positing that laws and principles of war are "broad empirical generalizations, derived from a multitude of factors."

Especially in his landmark two-volume work Strategia, published in three editions between 1899 and 1911, Mikhnevich developed Neznamov's line of thought to prove that future wars would tend to become protracted precisely because of the growing military-economic might of states, since, even with the complete destruction of armies in the field, modern European states would have the industrial capability and population reserves to absorb large army equipment and personnel losses and to generate new armies with fresh troops. Therefore, Mikhnevich concluded that during protracted future wars it would be necessary to destroy the enemy's most important economic, political and population centers; to occupy enemy countries; and "completely annihilate his military forces in order to achieve a conclusive victory." Mikhnevich also suggested that Russia's vast geographic expanse made it feasible for the Russian Army to conduct protracted warfare successfully on Russian territory, but rejected any advocacy of this strategy due to the probability for

831 Mikhnevich, op. cit., p. 16.
832 Mikhnevich, N. P., Osnovy strategii: Kurs Intendantskoi akademii, (St. Petersburg, 1913), p. 43.
severe Russian economic and population losses and the potential for domestic insurrection.833

Analysis of the role of economic and morale factors on the outcome of wars led Mikhnevich to the synthesis that "victory already was not only about the numbers and energy of the army, [but] the speed of economic development and the anticipation of morale."834 He defined the principal wartime morale factors as the talent of commanders, the combat valor of the army, and the spirit of the people as well as the "morale quality of the troops, like energy, courage, self-control, steadfastness, and perseverance in battle."835 Each of these factors were considered to be dependent on the level of state social development, which he related directly to the amount of planned preparation by the state for a future war. Mikhnevich urged, therefore, that Russia had to be prepared well in advance for the onset of any future war.

Mikhnevich synthesized a new thesis of military thought predicated on three concepts: 1) Wartime military capability is dependent on the entire social-economic structure of a state; 2) "military matters progress under the influence, in the main, of improvements in technology";836 and 3) "... the sophistication and number of fighting machines, skillfully controlled, will be the main

factor in determining the outcome of the [future war] struggle."\textsuperscript{837}

These concepts supported his prescient conclusion that "the new technical combat means demanded decisive transformation \textit{(perestroika)} of all military systems,"\textsuperscript{838}

General Nikolai P. Mikhnevich, who would serve as the Russian Imperial War Minister during World War I, became the singularly most important, influential and, perhaps, greatest Russian military theorist at the dawn of the 20th century. Tsar Nicholas II's August 1912 mummeriy decree forbidding the further public discussion of a unified military doctrine could not quell the momentum of the intellectual process that was by now becoming institutionalized within the Russian military through the investigations and teachings at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy, although events of "The Great War" (1914-1918), the October Revolution, and the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) certainly would interrupt and then dialectically reshape the process.

\textbf{Mikhail V. Frunze:}
\textit{"Unified Proletarian Military Doctrine"}

With the fall of the Romanov Dynasty in October 1917 and the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (\textit{Rabocheikh i Krest'ianikh Krasnaia Armiia - RKKA}) beginning in December 1917 novel socialist political and military ideological constructs, untried in practice, came into vogue in Russian government and military


\textsuperscript{838} Zhilin, pp. 91-92.
leadership circles. However, the reality of the Russian Civil War -- particularly the threat to the survival of the Soviet Republic posed on the Eastern Front by Admiral Kolchak's Siberian Army during the summer of 1918 -- disabused many, but not all, of the new Soviet political and military leaders of their principled notion that a standing army could be allowed to, or forced to, 'wither away' and be replaced effectively by a volunteer 'peoples' militia' (Red Guards).

As a matter of expediency, and survival, War Commissar Leon Trotsky pragmatically turned to and relied upon the only source of military expertise remaining in the fledgling Soviet Republic, the 'military specialists' ('voenspets'), who had been officers of the defunct Russian Imperial Army. Trotsky's decision, with Lenin's backing, to employ the 'voenspets', set in motion a dialectic process which, through a course of odious political and military doctrinal debates, fought out through a seemingly unending series of Russian Communist Party councils, commissions, conferences and congresses, lasting for the duration of the civil war and beyond, through the decade of the 1920s, sought to synthesize an original 'unitary' Soviet military doctrine. This doctrinal experiment would seek to integrate the 'eternal laws of warfare' and historical experience, derived through the application of Russian military science, with the politically correct socialist language and concepts of the vernal Soviet state. At the leading edge of this process were the former Tsarist 'voenspets', serving on the RKKA Main Staff and on the faculty of the RKKA Military Academy -- and especially on the rejuvenated Military-Historical Commission -- whose operational military planning
and academic expertise ensured that the continuity of Russian military-historical experience would be retained in the formulation of any new Soviet military doctrine.

One of the most important debates concerning the future of the Red Army took place at the Tenth Party Congress, which opened on March 6, 1921. Nikolai Podvoiskii, Chairman of the Universal Military Training Administration (Vsevobuch) from 1919-1923, offered a "resolution on the question of the reorganization of the armed forces of the Republic" in which he asserted that a militia army was the "only genuine socialist military organization" because of the existence therein of "comradely socialist democracy." Leon Trotsky seconded Podvoiskii's motion for the creation of a territorial militia in an address entitled "The Involvement of the Masses in the Creation of the Army." However, the Tenth Congress members, still ideologically bound to their Socialist political roots, resolved to initiate only experimental militia units in six interior military districts, and deferred a final decision on army organization and structure until after further discussion on the army's future role. Meanwhile, regular Red Army units were to continue to defend the border districts.

Discussions on the future structure and role of the Red Army were led by Sergei Gusev, PUR Chairman, and Mikhail Frunze, the famous Southern Front Red Commander who ended the civil war by defeating Wrangel on the Crimean Peninsula. The talking points used

840 von Hagen, pp. 138 & 143.
by Gusev and Frunze, titled "Theses on the Reorganization of the Workers'-Peasants' Red Army," constituted one of the first attempts to coherently present the lessons of the Russian Civil War by integrating the expert views of Party senior political staff, the Red Commanders and the former Imperial Army 'voenspets.' The "Theses" not only described the fluid character of the Russian Civil War and the most important factors in the Soviet victory, but, injected into the debate on the role of the Red Army the projected nature of future wars, which, the authors judged, were likely to be markedly different from either World War I or the Russian Civil War.841 That the concept of future war was included in this first Bolshevik formal debate of military requirements is clearly indicative of the intellectual influence of the 'voenspets' within the Red Army; of their profound ability to utilize Russia's rich historical experience in a military science analytical methodology; and of the resultant continuity between past, present and future Russian military doctrine that was being forged, despite the internal economic and political turmoil. Gusev's portion of the "Theses" presented his analysis that in a future war the socialist Red Army would not face a splintered enemy force that was "poorly trained and armed, hastily formed" and hence "unreliable because of the soldiers' hostility toward the officers," as the White armies had been. Rather, the "imperialist" standing European armies confronting and encircling the Soviet state were all "chauvinistically inclined" against socialism and "well armed and well trained" with fully prepared command staffs, internal cohesion

841 von Hagen, p. 143.
and numerical superiority over the Red Army. European standing armies were not "improvised peasant armies." Gusev concluded that the Red Army "... is altogether powerless against mighty imperialist armies" and "the Soviet state must undertake to make the Red Army equal to its imperialist counterparts."842

Gusev then argued, first, that Podvoiskii's and Trotsky's territorial militia armies would create in the provinces the basis for "local particularistic strivings to the detriment of the interests of the Workers'-Peasants' Republic," and that he "viewed the currently existing centralized army organization as embodying state interests, as opposed to the regional loyalties that a militia would appeal to."843 Second, Gusev warned that,

the persistence of an overwhelmingly 'petit bourgeois peasant' majority that remained fully capable of spontaneously reviving capitalism in the Soviet Republic, combined with the delay of revolution in the West and the economic devastation of the country, created a situation particularly ripe for 'Bonapartist attempts to overthrow Soviet power.'844

By preserving and strengthening PUR oversight of the Red Army political apparatus, Gusev claimed that the political inclinations of the peasantry could be redirected in order to make a peasant-based counterrevolution impossible. Gusev advocated that "the training of a highly qualified officer corps, beginning with the reeducation of the Red commanders, was capable of producing a cohort that was not only militarily competent but also politically conscious." Finally,

842 von Hagen, pp. 143-144.
843 von Hagen, p. 144.
844 von Hagen, p. 145.
Gusev speculated, perhaps more wishfully than logically, that the 'bourgeois' armies that trained their soldiers only in military arts and tactics would be impotent against the "moral and political superiority" of the Red Army "conscious" cohort.845

Mikhail Frunze's singular contribution to the Gusev-Frunze "Theses" was to urge Party unity and agreement on what he labeled as a "unified proletarian military doctrine," or the "proletarian scientific theory of warfare," the purpose of which would be to define the nature of the Red Army and its role in society. Earlier in 1921 Frunze had written an article for Voennoe delo (Military Affairs), "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i krasnaia armii" (A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army), in which he attempted to integrate the socialist ideology of the ruling Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) -- RKP(b) -- with the historic lessons of Russian military science. Frunze posited that Marxist-Leninist military doctrine was not just a set of ideas based on "objective military experience" to be codified solely by the General Staff, but primarily a political statement of the will of the dominant social class. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine, as defined by Mikhail Frunze, had to be a unitary political and military statement rather than a purely military document, independently derived and separate from official state political ideology.846

845 von Hagen, p. 145.

The conceptual basis for Frunze's "unified military doctrine" assumed that future war would be a mass war against "imperialists" in which the Soviet state would have to mobilize all its civilian and military resources, just as had been required during the First World War and the only too recently concluded Russian Civil War. Frunze's construct of total societal mobilization for a protracted future war was a direct derivative from the analyses of Tsarist military theorists Mikhnevich, Neznamov, et al., which built upon their work and reinforced the validity of Imperial Army "military science" by incorporating the strict "scientific and historical materialism" of Marxism-Leninism.

Frunze believed emphatically that capitalist encirclement constituted a continuing, real threat to the Soviet state and that only a Communist offensive led by the "proletariat" could ensure victory in the imminent war. He considered the Russian peasantry, as evidenced by the 1920 Polish disaster before Warsaw, to be reliable only for the defense of their homeland. Finally, Frunze concluded that in order to succeed in a future war the Soviet state absolutely had to attain technological superiority over the "encircling imperialists." To achieve this essential "technological revolution," Frunze advocated accelerated education of the Soviet political leadership cadres in order to lay the military-political foundation for a massive industrialization program concentrating on building the world's most modern defense industries.847

Frunze also proposed to the Tenth Party Congress significant organizational changes that effectively would consolidate and centralize political, economic, and military power. Of particular importance to Frunze was that "the General Staff be transformed into a 'military and political headquarters of the proletarian state,' mainly by the addition of the army's most senior political workers," which would ensure the unity of "political and military leadership ... in one central state institution," and thereby guarantee the fulfillment of the defense needs of the Soviet state. With this argument for the consolidation of military and political power within the General Staff, Frunze echoed the debates that had transpired a half-century earlier during the 1860s and 1870s when Prince Bariatinskii and his cohorts vehemently opposed the reforms of War Minister Miliutin and proposed the creation of a 'Prussian' General Staff that would effectively restrain the existing civilian bureaucracy and Imperial household control over state resources.848 Frunze rationalized, however, that because of the increasing technical complexity of future warfare and because "success in battle now depends ... on the correct organization of the rear and everything that prepares for the conduct of military operations,"849 the integration of civilian economic and planning organizations with the military during peacetime was of critical importance.

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The desperate Russian domestic and international situation following the formation of the Soviet government and the conclusion of the Russian Civil War is paramount to understanding the reasoning behind the Gusev-Frunze "Theses." Frunze's advocacy of a "unified proletarian military doctrine" and the increased centralization of power, in effect for what later would become the "militarization" of Russian society, was not derived from Marxist-Leninist ideology. Indeed, such a proposal was contradictory to established socialist ideology. Nor was it the result of a problem peculiar to the new Russian Soviet Republic. Rather, during the Communist struggle to assume power and their subsequent fight to survive during the civil war, the Party leaders had experienced first-hand the political and military tendencies of Russian society to fragment into independent, uncooperative and disruptive entities that, at best, simply ignored central authority and, at worst, actively opposed it.

The genesis of the Frunze-Gusev proposals should be understood also in the context of a pragmatic effort to resolve a longstanding Russian historic difficulty with the decentralization of power and to provide an effective national defense. Without strong central governmental controls, local Russian provincial governors and military district commanders turned their territories into squabbling satrapies with the result that the national government of such an immense and ethnically diverse empire tended to devolve into an indefensible anarchy.
Therefore, in Frunze's view -- and in the view of the Eleventh Party Congress which opened on March 27, 1922 and adopted Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" -- doctrinal unity between the political decisionmakers and executors of policy, centralized political-military power, and control of economic resources were a logical, indeed, the essential and only, means through which to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Typical of policy debates within Russian intellectual and senior leadership circles, however, during the freewheeling future war discussions that took place within the Red Army throughout the 1920s, there was not unanimous agreement. The debates became intensely politicized following the Communist Party's official adoption in April 1922 of a "unified doctrine" which incorporated both political and military aspects. Intellectual disagreements on the nature of future war became highly personalized as well because in Russia correct ideology -- ideological 'truth' -- was, and is, the basis for attaining and maintaining political power.

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Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia: Attrition (izmor) versus Destruction (sokrushenie)

Dialectics acknowledges the radically contradictory requirements of the art of war. ... Dialectics cannot be driven out of the realm of strategic thought because it is the essence of strategic thought.831

-Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategiia

With striking dialectical continuity, extending back over a generation to the "Russian" and "Academic" school debates, during the 1920s the focal point for the Red Army future war debates and for opposition to the officially approved Communist 'unified proletarian military doctrine' was the former Nikolaev General Staff Academy, which on August 5, 1921 was renamed the RKKA Military Academy. Given the enduring General Staff Academy mission to develop a military science for investigating the nature of future war, its Revvoensovet assigned task to "elaborate theoretical questions concerning organization and the conduct of battle and the influence of these factors on troop control,"852 and the continuity of the faculty between the two academies, it is entirely logical that the new RKKA Military Academy would become the epicenter of dissension and open dialectic debate.

Former Tsarist Army General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin was a most outstanding, outspoken, and provocative future thinking, and hence, for the RKP(b), a most controversial and politically

'dangerous' RKKA Military Academy faculty member during the free exchange of ideas that characterized the exceedingly turbulent post-Russian Civil War military doctrine debates. Although World War I combat operations and events of the Russian Civil War had interrupted the intellectual efforts by Svechin and his Academy colleagues to create a Russian military science founded on historical experience, the Bolsheviks, believing firmly in the validity of "scientific and historical Marxism," ideologically were predisposed to continue, and to expand significantly, the work to develop a military science that they considered might be crucial to the survival of their new state. Therefore, using the 1879 precedent established by the War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin to investigate the Russo-Turkish War, between 1918 and 1924 the Bolsheviks, with a little prodding and considerable controversy, resuscitated the Imperial military-historical commission.

On May 8, 1918 the former Tsarist military specialists of the All-Russian Supreme Staff (Vserosglavstab) took the initiative of setting up a "military-historical unit" attached to the Operations Administration. Then, at the suggestion of VVS voenspets General

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855 Menning, Bruce, W. Bayonets before Bullets: The Imperial Army, 1861-1914, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 94.

M. D. Bronch-Bruevich, whose illustrious brother V. D. Bronch-Bruevich was closely connected with Lenin, on August 13, 1918 by Order No. 688 the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs (Narkom or NKVD) formally approved the creation of a Military-Historical Commission (VIK) attached to the Vserosglaushtab. The first VIK Chairman, General V. N. Klembovskii, and his most capable assistants, Infantry Generals N. P. Mikhnevich and V. A. Apushkin, were tasked to accomplish a comprehensive study of the lessons of the World War. In December 1918 Klembovskii was relieved as the VIK Chairman, General A. A. Svechin took over as Klembovskii's replacement, and the VIK was expanded and redesignated as the "Commission for the Study and Use of the Experience of the War, 1914-1918" and specifically tasked "with distilling the lessons of the First World War...."

Aleksandr Svechin headed this Commission for the majority of its existence. In January 1920 the Commission reverted to its original designation as the VIK, with broadened responsibilities for studying the history of the Red Army and the civil war. On May 29, 1921 the VIK was disbanded. At that time Svechin was assigned to the faculty of the RKKA Military Academy. The VIK, however, officially

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857 Rostunov, I., "U istokov sovetskoj voennoi...," pp. 86-87; also Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nyi etap grazhenskoj voiny (Istoriia izucheniiia), (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), p. 84 concerning August 13, 1918, Order No. 688.

858 Korotkov, I. A., Istoriia sovetskoj voennoj mysli, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980), p. 28; also Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nyi etap..., pp. 84-85.

859 Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nyi etap..., pp. 84-85; also Lee, Kent D., in Soviet Military Doctrine..., p. 275.

860 Polikarpov, V. D., Nachal'nyi etap..., p. 86.
was reformed on September 2, 1921 under PUR Director S. I. Gusev, with Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii as his Deputy Chairman, with the mission to evaluate both the World War and the Russian Civil War.861

Under Svechin's leadership the Military-Historical Commission carried forward the rigorous process, begun in the late-19th century and expanded prior to the World War, of legitimizing the concept of future war as a valuable 'scientific' analytical method upon which to base Russian force structure development. Of this process Aleksandr Svechin wrote: "Problems of military history are especially dear to persons studying strategy, since by its very method strategy is merely a systematized reflection over military history."862 During the six years that the Commission conducted its investigations, Aleksandr Svechin, in particular, along with his distinguished voenspets fellow Commission members, such as A. M. Zaionchkovskii, E. I. Martynov, A. A. Neznamov, et al., built on their and Mikhnevich's earlier Russian protracted war studies, along with military theories contained within German works, such as those by Clausewitz, Delbrueck, von Schlichting and Moltke, to synthesize an entirely new dialectical foundation for the Red Army debates about the nature of future war. However, because studies investigating historical 'laws of warfare' were inexorably and integrally bound to

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Soviet political power, ideological 'truth,' and internal Communist Party politics, Commission members found themselves assigned with a contradictory, ever-changing, hence dangerous and even potentially fatal, "major role in the ideological struggle for the construction of a new Soviet society." 

What initially, and finally, plunged Svechin and his fellow Commission members into a deep ideological conflict with the Communist Party was their "non-Marxist" methodology and their intellectual determination that future wars in the industrial age would be "wars of attrition." In such future wars the full economic potential of the state and a strategic defense most probably would, and could, be more significant than the strategic offensive concept, or "war of destruction" against "imperialism," and more critical than the moral fervor of "world revolution," which the Party faithful increasingly advocated to defend the Soviet state. In a March 1924 Voennaia mysl' i revoliutsiia article entitled "Opasnye illuzii" ("Dangerous Illusions"), Svechin employed passages from Lenin's 1920 "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" to support the Party's adopted New Economic Policy (NEP). But in the process, he sharply contradicted major elements of Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" by developing ideas that a military policy based on a political concept of "ideological superiority" was dangerous and that inadequately prepared strategic offensive operations in a future war could lead to disaster. Svechin wrote:

One must welcome the rejection by Soviet power of any sort of chauvinism, from the pressure to use the Red Army for promoting revolution by force of arms. But should such manifestations of chauvinism appear, then look at a map, reflect on modern technology and give up any sort of pleasant but even more dangerous illusions.

Rather than a quick, decisive offensive "war of destruction" fought on foreign territory, Svechin foresaw that future wars would be a series of protracted, severe, and exceedingly costly contests, fought both on foreign territory and within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, that would require the total mobilization of enormous human and material resources in order to prevail, utilizing variable offensive and defensive strategies, in a "war of attrition." Through his work with the Military-Historical Commission and the publication of "Dangerous Illusions", Svechin made implacable foes of Stalin's crony, Kliment E. Voroshilov, who would succeed Frunze as War Commissar in November 1925, and of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the future Chief of the RKKA Main Staff from 1925-1928. Svechin's article directly contradicted Tukhachevskii, who believed in and proselytized for the "complete militarization" of the Soviet economy so that a technologically modernized Red Army could be the means for seizing the initiative and conducting decisive offensive battle leading to the "total destruction" of the enemies of the Soviet state that would accomplish a "revolution from without."

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The culmination, and most enduring, of Svechin's intellectual efforts was *Strategiia*, first published in 1926, in which he defined and contrasted the differences between strategies of "attrition" (*izmor*) and "destruction" (*sokrushenie*) and specifically advocated the advantages of the former strategy for the defense of Russia. Svechin's basic premise was that all warfare could be analyzed within a strategic paradigm consisting of two types: 1) "wars of attrition" (*izmor*), characterized by protracted warfare involving the total political, diplomatic, military, economic, and population resources of the state to "cause the enemy to collapse politically"; and 2) "wars of destruction" (*sokrushenie*), characterized by the rapid accomplishment of war aims through the decisive defeat of enemy forces in battle during the initial period of war.867

Svechin was especially critical of "decisive military operations" during the initial period of war and warned that such unprepared action could lead to disaster.868 He argued that the only realistic strategy for economically destitute Soviet Russia was a prolonged "war of attrition," trading time and Russian territorial space while selectively employing, as appropriate, both defensive and offensive military operations, until the entire resources of the state could be mobilized and united with army actions at the front to achieve the ultimate aim of warfare -- victory through the collapse of the enemy government.869

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Strategiia elaborated a wholly new theoretical construct -- "attrition" (izmor) -- for future war. This theory applied historical experience through the methodology of military science and incorporated those trends that were altering the nature of warfare to create a conceptual system for future warfare that was the antithesis of Frunze's offensive, i.e., "destruction" (sokrushenie), and his dogmatic "unified proletarian military doctrine." Svechin's consistent emphasis on the evolution of military art, warnings "against any effort to create closed systems on the basis of past combat experience," and urgings that the "proper topic of military history was the study of those tendencies shaping future war" made his work a heresy to the Communist Party leadership which in April 1922 had adopted Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine," was promoting "class warfare" and "continuing revolution," and was advocating a decisive offensive strategy of "destruction" rapidly to advance the socialist cause of "world revolution."

Svechin's negation of the Communist Party 'truth,' embodied in a strategy of "destruction," alone was more than sufficient to earn him the enmity of Lenin's successors. However, Svechin openly used Strategiia as a caustic polemic to attack the civil war performance of the Red Army leaders. The strategic failures of Budennyi, Tukhachevskii, Voroshilov and Stalin during the disastrous 1920 Polish campaign were at the very pinnacle of Svechin's condemnation,

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and he left no doubt about where he judged blame and placed responsibility. Svechin condemned the strategy of the Polish operation in no uncertain terms:

In 1920 Poland was a more formidable enemy than Wrangel. From the perspective of destruction, it would have been correct to direct most of our efforts against Warsaw. ... The decisive point -- Warsaw -- would have decided the fate of the Crimea. ... As goals of operations, Warsaw and the Crimea were set in an order opposite the ones they should have, which had unpleasant consequences.871

At a time when Tukhachevskii had just become RKKA Chief of Staff, Svechin expressed his great scorn for Tukhachevskii's leadership during the 1920 Polish campaign. Svechin wrote:

A strategy of destruction characterized most of the Red Army's offensive from the banks of the Dvina to the Vistula in 1920. In approaching the Vistula the Red armies had become so numerically weak and so cut off from their sources of supply that they were more phantoms than reality.872

He effectively accused Tukhachevskii of incompetence:

Not every movement forward is in essence a strategic offensive. An offensive at any and all costs ... leads to a situation in which our forces are dispersed where the enemy permits, activity degenerates into weakness, into an offensive "phase", into a very dubious location of the front somewhere ahead and a return to the starting position.873

Specifically against Mikhail Frunze, and thus against the Communist Party "unified proletarian military doctrine," Svechin argued:

Complete unity of doctrine and the lack of differences in the interpretation of operational and tactical issues could be achieved only at the cost of stopping efforts for further development.  

He continued:

Contemporary military history, which tries to proceed from a single, absolute, uniquely correct line of strategic conduct, is incapable of clarifying the meaning and relationships in the jumble of military events that it considers some sort of chaos.  

Svechin’s vivid descriptions of the Red Army leadership failures during the Russian Civil War, which these emerging ‘infallible’ leaders of the Soviet Union and Red Army were trying their best to bury, or to ‘historically revise,’ during the power struggles following Lenin’s death, virtually guaranteed the eventual elimination of Svechin in 1938. Political power increasingly consolidated around Stalin’s ‘cult of personality.’

Publication of Svechin’s Strategia, First Edition, triggered an intense split between the RKKA Military Academy faculty and the RKKA Main Staff, which was under Tukhachevskii’s leadership. Early in 1926 a Red Army special conference convened for the specific purpose of debating Svechin’s thesis concerning the strategies of izmor and sokrushenie, and, through these discussions endeavored to reach some consensus concerning the appropriate Red Army strategy for contemporary conditions.  

As a consequence of this special conference, Svechin reluctantly revised Strategia. In the 1927

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Second Edition, he suggested that "wars of destruction" could be undertaken given specific favorable international conditions.  

Although Svechin acknowledged that a strategy of "destruction" could be applied in warfare, he remained convinced that future war necessarily would be "total war," requiring "permanent mobilization" of the state in order to field maximum military capabilities during the critical initial period of war.

Significantly, the Second Edition of Strategiia continued to contradict the policies that the Communist Party leaders now wished to make into dogma. Svechin included such venomous comments as:

A unity of doctrine based on the unity of strategic guidelines is illusory. In strategy the center of gravity lies in developing an independent point of view which primarily requires careful homework.

He persisted:

The experience of 1920 indicated the need to prepare carefully to take advantage of the existing situation. A great deal of room is opening up for dreams of making Tamerlane-like thrusts over thousands of kilometers. But in our era dreams are more dangerous than they have ever been before.

The battle for ideological 'truth' became fully engaged. Following the revision of his original Strategiia, Svechin increasingly would be publicly pilloried in the Communist Party and Red Army press during the last years of the 1920s. Lenin's NEP had proven ineffective in dealing with Russia's immense economic

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878 Svechin, A. A., Strategiia, 2nd ed., p. 43.
deficiencies, and Lenin was no longer alive to defend his policy. By late 1927, Stalin, with the support of War Commissar Voroshilov and RKKA Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii, stridently was advocating industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, totalitarian controls, the "militarization" of Soviet society, and the need to mechanize the Red Army, in order to pursue a "war of destruction" strategy. Svechin’s *Strategiia*, with its support for NEP and heavy emphasis on protracted "war of attrition," was now almost totally in opposition to Stalin’s Communist Party political line.881

In 1929 the attacks on Svechin and his *Strategiia* intensified even further. The Communist Academy now sought to infuse the old 'bourgeois' military science with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism by opening afresh the 1921-1922 Trotsky-Frunze debates on the "unified proletarian military doctrine," based on a "war of destruction," which Svechin so adamantly opposed.882 Tukhachevskii, who continued to advocate a "mechanized mass army as the means to conduct decisive operations in a total war,"883 joined in the fray. He charged that Svechin’s writings were infested with "idealism," were contaminated with "bourgeois ideology," rejected the possibility of "decisive

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operations," and advocated "limited warfare."

Then, at the 16th Communist Party Congress in 1930, Kliment E. Voroshilov, the Soviet War Commissar arose and defined Tukhachevskii's army "mechanization" concept as constituting "a qualitative change in the nature of future wars" which would "bring about the possibility of a short, bloodless war, carried quickly on to the territory of the attacking enemy." The result was that Tukhachevskii, through his political connections and insistence on the nascent concept of "deep battle," directly contributed to the end of open debate within the Soviet military, which had so uniquely characterized the 1920s.

Aleksandr A. Svechin's most enduring contribution to military thought and to strategic art was the identification of the "strategic line of conduct" leading to the ultimate goal of warfare -- victory. The principal elements of the "strategic line of conduct" are:

1) Sequence of Operations; 2) Curve of Strategic Intensity;
3) Initial Moment of an Operation; 4) Breakthrough of an Operation;
5) Operations on Interior Lines; and, 6) Proportioning Operations.

Svechin believed the latter represented the "most critical task for the strategist" in order to "always ... take advantage of numerical superiority in the most decisive way possible" and to ensure that "every operation, including a defensive operation, ... [is] provided

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with assets appropriate to its goal." Svechin's own words best describe what he considered to be "the most important issues of strategic logic":

A strategist who knows the requirements of ... a future war dwells on a certain way of resolving strategic questions that should lead him to the ultimate goal of the operations of a military front, plans a series of intermediate goals and the sequence in which they are achieved; regulates strategic intensity and at every moment tries, if not to subordinate, to tie the interests of the present to the interests of the strategic 'tomorrow' of the future. ... We have to put harmony in the preparations of a nation for war at the forefront, but it is no less important in the leadership of a war, only the characteristics of harmony in this case are immeasurably more subtle. This coordination, this achievement of harmony, is the essence of strategy and it forces us to classify practical work on strategy as an art.

Modern warfare also leaves room for strategic reserves, that is, fully trained and mobilized units that are not tied to an operational goal. ... A strategic reserve is strategic wealth, which is naturally put aside if the front is not fighting at full pitch. ... A prolonged conflict is generally impossible without a strategic reserve.

Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin was clearly the most outstanding and influential, yet controversial, Russian military theorist to participate in the turbulent free exchange of ideas that characterized the post-civil war military doctrine debates. Indeed, so

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controversial, and threatening, to the political and military leaders of the Soviet Union were Svechin’s conclusions that for six decades his works were banned. They were rescued and restored to their place of honor only in the late 1980s by Kokoshin and Larionov as the thesis upon which to base the renewed dialectic process to synthesize a 'new' Russian military doctrine to replace the offensive strategy of "destruction" that prevailed, albeit with several modifications, throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. V. N. Lobov opined:

A. A. Svechin placed at the foundation of the development of the armed forces a definition of the nature of future war based on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the history and prospects of military affairs; ... taking into account the 'nature of the historical moment' and economic potentials of the country at each individual moment.891

Of this renewed search for an appropriate military doctrine, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov duplicated his Russian predecessors Miliutin, Dragomirov, Leer, Neznamov, Mikhnevich, Svechin, et al., in most concisely describing the process:

In its development, Soviet military science has always been based on the richest military-historical experience. In studying the history of our country and that of other states, and in generalizing the experience of past wars, military history reveals the fundamental laws and tendencies of the development of military affairs, and in this way makes it possible for military science to be correctly oriented in its examination of problems of the present and future.892

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As an integral part of this dialectic process, Svechin’s prodigious writings on military history, the evolution of military art, operational art, strategy, and the protracted nature of future warfare forge a direct substantive linkage between past Imperial Army military thought, the founding of the Red Army, the 70 years of Soviet military doctrine, the new 1993 Russian military doctrine, and the future development of Russian military science. As such, Aleksandr Svechin’s *Strategiia* is a seminal work which defines the nature of future war.

In a future war technical initiative will be overwhelmingly important. But the general staff must take a favorable attitude towards technical innovations and conduct the first steps in the deep rear in complete secrecy.893

... Strategy must make a comprehensive effort to predict the future.894

- A. A. Svechin, *Strategiia*

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Tukhachevskii's Budushchaia Voina Study: The First RKKA Shtab Systematic Investigation

... Our work is an attempt to give a systematic statement of the fundamental problems of future war and to establish correctly a precise arena for an entire rank of salient questions about preparations for war and ... future war plans.895

Up to this time neither here nor abroad (as far as we know) has such a work appeared.896

- Berzin, Chief, RKKA Shtab IV Upravlenie, 30 June 1928

At the height of the Red Army debate over the appropriate strategy to be followed in a future war -- izmoro (attrition) or sokrushenie (destruction) -- and following the end of the XIV RKP(b) Congress "which set the general course ... for the industrialization of the country," Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, the Red Army Chief of Staff, issued Directive No. 20030 on January 26, 1926 in which he stated: "One of the essential questions for our preparation for war is the question concerning a determination of the character of our forthcoming war -- of primary consideration, of course, in the European theater."897 Tukhachevskii stipulated in this directive that "the most important basis for determining the character of war is characterized by the industrial forces of the enemy, considering

896 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xi.
897 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. xi.
possible alliances, etc." and emphasized: "It is especially important to pay attention to ... capturing the industrialization course of the USSR, which must transform it into a self-supporting economy...." Through Tukhachevskii's Directive No. 20030, the RKKA Shtab, with the Fourth Directorate under its chief Berzin in the lead, was tasked to "create a special work on the character of future war"; which, over the course of two years and "numerous meetings with Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii," resulted in the rare and very candid classified intelligence assessment titled *Budushchaia voina.*

The RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate's, and hence Tukhachevskii's, explanation of the rationale for the *Budushchaia voina* study was that before World War I "the direction of military thought proved itself only in relation to the broad scale [of future war] in expanse and in the size of armies; but in relation to the material scale and its protracted nature it was a complete fiasco." The study's authors, who included Ia. M. Zhigur, who was Assistant Chief of the Third Department within the RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate, and the Third Department Chief Nikonov, judged that,

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900 "Only 80 copies were made of this extremely candid and forthright study; and all but the one [copy] maintained by the Soviet Army Central State Archives (TsGASA) were destroyed during the 1930s" according to the Introduction to Tukhachevskii, *Budushchaia voina.* Chast' I.


902 Tukhachevskii, *Budushchaia voina.* Chast' I., p. vi. (Underline in original text.)
the fundamental mistake, which was made in preparation for world war, in our opinion, consisted of underestimating the changes which new conditions of warfare brought. The monstrous material scale of war, the unprecedented persistence of combat, the colossal losses in the areas of economic and political life revealed the general essence resulting from conditions of the contemporary era.

As a consequence, the Fourth Directorate collective concluded that "the task of working out the situation and analyzing future war conditions at the present time must be formed as one of the essential elements of work by organs for preparing the army and the country for war" and that "... the problem of determining the character of future war has become entirely real and at the present time the drawing up of a well thought out and substantiated war plan is unthinkable without work on deciding this problem." There can be no doubt, that for the Red Army there is seriously substantiated and mature work concerning the changing conditions of future war and establishing definite views on its character. We have, as in other states, this factual work being conducted in recent years, such as in the lines of our military literature (for example, the work of A. A. Svechin, Strategia) and in the areas of working out official military doctrine (regulations).

Berzin's Fourth Directorate of the RKKA Shtab, with Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii's approval, opined that the results of works such as Svechin's Strategia were,

903 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. vii. (Underline in original text.)
904 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. ix.
905 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. x. (Underline in original text.)
906 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' I., p. x.
... totally unacceptable, since in order to develop a war plan the single general and isolated forms of future war have not been sufficiently determined, except for the necessity to comprehensively investigate the concrete conditions of such a war which threatens the Soviet Union.... From this derives the necessity for a specific, completely secret work, which would contain concrete analysis of future war conditions, including its most accurate variants.  

The 1928 *Budushchaia voina* study is the RKKA Shtab initial effort to fulfill that 1926 military science requirement set by Tukhachevskii. The twelve chapters of the study, comprising 734 pages of data, tables and analysis are remarkable for their detailed assessment alone, and become all the more compelling as proof of the validity of the Russian military science process based on the accuracy of the study's conclusions -- which, nearly seventy years later, still remain pertinent at the end of the 20th century.

For example, the Russian military scientists determined that "in modern operations the most important problems are the material scope and 'long-range battle' (dal'noboinost')" because "the saturation of modern mass armies with technical means, rapid-fire artillery, and automatic weapons demand during all operations the provision of great quantities of supplies, particularly ammunition." Concerning the possibility of employing a "strategy of destruction" (sokrushenie) to "decisively defeat the encircling Imperialist enemies," which for political purposes Tukhachevskii advocated in public, the study surprisingly suggested that both

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Tukhachevskii and the RKKA Shtab had reached just the opposite military-technical conclusion; i.e., "contemporary operations, considering each separately, as shown by the 1914-18 and civil wars, do not have a decisive character. Approximately nine-tenths of all operations during previous wars were satisfied without large quantities of prisoners and military spoils," which were considered indicative of military "destruction" of the enemy. To prove this point about the likely protracted nature of future war, with great candor -- and a political consequences be damned attitude -- the Fourth Directorate authors quoted and footnoted none other than Aleksandr Svechin's *Strategiia*, which Tukhachevskii had determined to be "unacceptable":

For successful destruction (*sokrushenie*) hundreds of thousands of prisoners are required, the total annihilation of entire armies, the seizure of thousands of cannons, warehouses, trains.... Such victories have taken place neither in Galicia, nor in border conflicts, nor during the 1920 Red Army offensive [against Poland led by Tukhachevskii].

Because Tukhachevskii and the RKKA Shtab had reached the conclusion that a single "decisive" wartime operation would not be feasible in a future war, *Budushchaia voina* proposed:

... It is necessary to conduct a series of successive operations correspondingly distributed [controlled] in space and time. The combination of a series of operations necessitates the enemy using up his material and personnel reserves, or causes the enemy to accept battle with his main troop mass under conditions unfavorable to him, and [for us] to liquidate them.


The significance of this conclusion is that it proves that the Red Army leadership, and Tukhachevskii in particular, had not forsaken a decisive strategy which equated victory with destruction of the enemy. Quite the contrary, they had employed the dialectic military science process to alter the operational means by which sokrushenie could be achieved through a protracted series of combined operations.

There was, however, a critical caveat to Tukhachevskii's and the RKKA Shtab's proposal for preparing the Red Army for future war:

Modern armies must obtain corresponding weapons, technical means, and organizational forms in order to conduct operations with decisive goals. ... The most decisive operational results can be attained by acting on the enemy flanks and rear....

Therefore, the Budushchaia voina authors considered it vital to "elevate army offensive means, primarily artillery, tanks, [and] aircraft, in order to facilitate breaking enemy defenses" so that the Red Army could "continuously act toward decisive goals," particularly during the initial period of a future war when "especially active and decisive operations" by the army were both planned and deemed essential for the defense of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the greatest concern of the RKKA Shtab, at least as depicted in this 1928 assessment, was that in future war military operations would stagnate into positional trench warfare, as they had during World War I, and become protracted. Tukhachevskii and his...
staff officers saw the possibility of a protracted "war of attrition" as being highly likely were war to break out in the 1928-1929 time period since "... the Red Army in the initial period of war does not possess superior forces which can ensure the lightning destruction of all its opponents at once."916 The "threat of positional war forms" was further magnified by the assessment that "saturation of the front with troops, artillery, and especially machineguns in a future war will be several times more concentrated than in the Polish-Soviet war [1920]. Completely different conditions for military action will be created by this."917 As a result the RKKA Shtab officers -- with considerable similarity to statements made by their Imperial Russian Main Staff predecessors and with almost verbatim foresight to the post-Soviet requirements of their Russian General Staff successors -- judged that, "... successful combat action must have large fire forces, more powerful means of suppression (tanks, armored cars, rapid-fire artillery, etc.) than it [the army/cavalry] had in 1920, and has at present...."918 Further, Tukhachevskii considered the necessity of "increasing the number of bombers and fighters" to be a matter of "special importance."919

The classified conclusion of the Budushchaia voina assessment enumerated ten pages of specific politico-military requirements for

916 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast’ VI., p. 692.
917 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast’ VI., p. 716.
918 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast’ VI., p. 718.
919 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast’ VI., p. 721.
"construction of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" during the First Five-Year-Plan (1928-1932), which Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii and the RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate saw as being absolutely critical to developing the capability of the Red Army to conduct decisive combat operations. Of the purely military requirements listed, the following six stand out as germane to the continuity of Russian military thought and to the Russian military science process, beginning with the 1860s Miliutin Reforms and extending through the formation of the Russian Armed Forces in 1992 -- and beyond, into the 21st century.

First, Chief of Staff Tukhachevskii assigned "top priority" to the "military training of the reserves," with "special attention" to ensuring that peacetime training corresponded to "the demands of future frontal armaments." 920 Second, "industrialization of the USSR, military preparation of our production [facilities], increasing the technical means of combat and our overall defensive capacity is one of the most effective means of ensuring peace...." 921 Third, "... in wartime our industry must be prepared to produce significantly greater quantities of military supplies...." 922 The fourth necessity for constructing the Red Army, which stood in sharp contradiction to the declared public policy of "continuing revolution" and an offensive strategy of immediate enemy "destruction," was that "... preparation for war requires that the armed forces and the

920 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 724.
921 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 724.
922 Tukhachevskii, Budushchaia voina. Chast' VI., p. 725.
entire economy of the Soviet Union will be prepared to conduct protracted warfare."\(^{923}\) Fifth, Tukhachevskii specified: "... The near-term general direction for building our armed forces must be strengthening the technical means of the Red Army and, especially attack and suppression means ... artillery, tanks, and aviation."\(^{926}\) Sixth, the authors of *Budushchaia voina* concluded: "Our military technologies lag behind foreign [technologies] not only because of our limited production capabilities, but also as a consequence of the weak military work of scientific-research institutes."\(^{925}\) The final overall assessment about the nature of future war was that:

In order to reduce the possibility of positional warfare from arising, it is essential to increase substantially the Red Army attack means and to guarantee in wartime the highest attainable quality of armaments, ammunition supplies, and durable equipment articles for conducting continuous active offensive operations. Without such a guarantee we stand before the threat that future war will take a positional character. To a significant extent the evasion of this depends on the direction of our armed forces construction and on the development of our production capacity and its preparation for war.\(^{926}\)

The above conclusion about the social, political, economic and technical nature of future war originated in late-19th century Russian military thinking, permeates 20th century Russian military thought, and will continue to influence the peacetime preparations and wartime actions of the Russian military leadership well into the 21st century. This fact is a direct result of exclusive senior

\(^{923}\) Tukhachevskii, *Budushchaia voina*. Chast' VI., p. 725.

\(^{924}\) Tukhachevskii, *Budushchaia voina*. Chast' VI., p. 727.


\(^{926}\) Tukhachevskii, *Budushchaia voina*. Chast' VI., p. 734.
leadership education at the Military Academy of the General Staff, and the continuity of the military science process learned therein and subsequently applied by members of the General Staff to the resolution of military theoretical and military planning problems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Russian military science process, which continually undergoes iterative dialectic revision in order to utilize only the most current, and hence accurate, data for determining the likely nature of future war, remains the lynch pin of all Russian military thought.

Every state constructs its own military system and conducts preparations for war based on its determination of views on the character of future war. Truthfully, these views very seldom find themselves included in the expression of an officially codified military doctrine. Usually they slip into view only in departmental remarks expressed by various military authorities or, also, in the form of isolated instructions in regulations, lectures, and courses of instruction. Theoretical conceptions of future war often occur, turning up as the fruit of individual works by separate theoreticians, whose respectability and substantiation of these conceptions and the influence of them on the course of preparation for war, depends on the talent and authority of their authors. However, even this is not systematized, [and] the presentation of an unsatisfactorily formed view about the character of future war shows its influence on practical military construction, and this we can substantiate in every state.9

Construction of the Red Army and preparation of the USSR's economy for war must proceed from the perspective of protracted war.928

- Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, 1928


The Sokolovskii Nuclear War Anomaly: Quantitative Analysis Displaces Military Science

Taken as a whole, Professor Svechin’s book still remains the only fundamental work on strategy.979

Some thirty-five years elapsed between the publication of Aleksandr Svechin’s Strategia, Second Edition; the completion of the comprehensive, classified Budushchaia voina930 study by the RKKA Shtab Fourth Directorate under Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii’s direction; and the next major Russian/Soviet work to attempt to define and clarify the nature of future warfare, Voennaia strategiia, published in three editions (1962, 1963, and 1968) by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskii. Between 1928 and 1962 numerous ‘future war’ treatises were published, especially by gifted authors such as Tukhachevskii, Triandafillov, Isserson, et al., in the main, these military theoretical monographs were oriented toward the changing nature of battles at the tactical and operational level of military art, rather than toward the changing nature of strategy and of the overall nature of future warfare. Throughout the Stalinist ‘cult of


personality' from the 1930s to 1953, there existed an intentionally manipulated determinism about the future that caused the forecasting of the nature of future war to become a neglected science. Therefore, it was not until after Stalin's death in 1953 that military science once again began to investigate seriously the impact of new weapon technologies on future war.931

Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, who served as Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1952 to 1961, set out to explain how the emerging technologies of "weapons of mass destruction" -- mainly nuclear weapons -- and the development of the means to deliver them over a broad geographical expanse using ballistic missiles had "revolutionized" warfare, "necessitated a fundamental review of many tenets of military strategy"932 and, in effect, made the "initial period of war" the only period of war due to the tremendous destructive power of these new, post-World War II weapons systems. Sokolovskii's team of authors wrote:

Thus strategy, which in the past had consisted of the gains of tactics and operational art, today acquires a potential for achieving the objectives of war by its own autonomous means, regardless of the outcome of tactical engagements and operations in various armed combat spheres. Consequently, even general victory in war is no longer the crown, the sum total of partial successes, but the result of a one-time application of the state's entire strength, accumulated before the war.933

931 Kipp, Jacob W., From Foresight to Forecasting: The Russian and Soviet Experience, (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1988), pp. 177-85.


In this fundamental manner, while predicting the elevation of extremely short "wars of destruction" to a new, higher qualitative level of temporal and spatial intensity which portended the "revolution in military affairs," in which the side that struck first would 'win' what essentially was a 'zero-sum' game using quantitative analysis, Sokolovskii departed from the much more complex Russian military science tradition that had investigated warfare in depth and had recognized the predominant role of a state's social-economic base, moral authority, political morale, and the initiative of the individual soldier in achieving victory during protracted future wars. Further, with his rather myopic, but at that time politically essential, bravado which overemphasized the role of nuclear weapons, Sokolovskii's team relegated military strategy to "studying the conditions under which a future war may arise.... In examining the probable enemy's strategic views, Military Strategy turns its attention to the sort of political and military aims the enemy might pursue in a future war."934 The essential task of Soviet military strategy therefore became focused on developing the means for "repelling a surprise nuclear attack of an aggressor."935

Sokolovskii did stress, however, that the character of future war was an integral component of the theory of strategy, as had Svechin before him. In Voennaia strategiia Marshal Sokolovskii

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stated unequivocally:

The next important element forming part of military strategy is the question about the character of future war. Here, strategy examines the conditions and factors which, at a given moment in history, determines the character of future war, the way military and political forces are distributed, the quality and quantity of material resources, military and economic potential, the probable composition and potential of opposing coalitions and their geographical distribution.\textsuperscript{936}

Therefore, Sokolovskii's emphasis on the initial period of war, during which the main military action was a mixed counterforce-countervalue nuclear 'strike' (udar) throughout an enemy's territory,\textsuperscript{937} and reliance on quantitative analysis methodologies to determine beforehand the nature of that initial 'strike,' should be understood as an anomaly in the Russian military science tradition. Sokolovskii did not, however, totally depart from the established Russian process for investigating the nature of future war. Russian military planners, since before the beginning of the 20th century, intentionally had avoided planning operations beyond the initial period of war, because they were considered to be too unpredictable.

Within the Communist Party and the Russian military establishment, Marshal Sokolovskii's vision of a nuclear future war certainly was far from being universally accepted. In 1962 Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, quoting Lenin as the fountainhead of enduring wisdom and truth, underscored that: "V. I. Lenin warned that


the use of imposing achievements of technology for the mass extermination of millions of human beings ... would inevitably lead 'to undermining the very conditions of existence of human society'."938 One year later Khrushchev pledged that "the Soviet Union will never use these weapons first."939 Indeed, it certainly was not by chance that in 1962, the very same year that Sokolovskii's *Voennaia strategiia* First Edition was published, *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* reached back into Russia's history to publish for the first time M. N. Tukhachevskii's 1931-1932 secret materials, entitled "*Novye voprosy voyny,*" which dialectically analyzed the impact of aviation, tanks, radio, chemicals, education, training, command and control, technology, and the national economy on the state's ability to conduct a future "war of destruction," employing Tukhachevskii's "deep battle" operational art concept.940 Nor was it an accident that these same materials on the nature of future war were included in Volume Two of Tukhachevskii's *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* by Voenizdat in 1964. The publication of Tukhachevskii's writings in the Soviet Union was a remarkable event. For nearly two decades after Stalin executed him as a 'traitor to the state,' Tukhachevskii had become a 'non-entity' and his writings had been banned, publicly at least, until the 1954 publication of the first volume of his *Izbrannye proizvedeniia.*


By the 1960s the broad expanse of Tukhachevskii's analysis about the nature of future war, even though it was couched mainly in terms of "battle" and "operational art," was a most useful and convenient foundation for the traditional Russian military branches of arms to build an antithesis to Marshal Sokolovskii's narrow nuclear war vision and the new, dominant role of the Strategic Rocket Forces. In sharp contrast to Sokolovskii, Tukhachevskii had written:

It is essential to know how to follow up, as new means of battle and operations reveal themselves that can alter former operational-battle forms and also the need to develop one's military in order to achieve greater effectiveness in the use of military-technical resources, which the expansion of the country's technology and production can give.\textsuperscript{941}

Tukhachevskii continued, harking back to and sounding much like a rather updated version of the great Russian military theorists -- Martynov, Neznamov, Mikhnevich, and even Svechin -- to emphasize the importance he attached to having the Soviet Union prepared for war, because the country

... will be able to return to the former methods of operational activity and will give a much more decisive character to the course of the war. In future war the strongest will be that country which will have the most powerful civilian aviation and aviation motor production capability.\textsuperscript{942}

In this same article Tukhachevskii explained his original operational art concept of "deep battle" (glubokogo boia) as "the simultaneous engagement of the enemy's military order [of battle] throughout its


entire depth" and that long range tank groups (tankovaia gruppa
dal’nego deistviia) were essential to "create in the enemy rear
obstacles ... where his main forces can be annihilated."943 He then
asserted, citing from Engels' _Anti-Diuring_, that "the most important
task" of the civilian and military leadership was to see that the
"education of soldiers concerning the creation of new forms of battle
constantly was out stripped by the activity of officers and the
organs of military control" so that the "transformation (perestroika)
and modern development" of the army could be accomplished most
expeditiously.944 Of "supreme importance" to Tukhachevskii, however,
was the "organization and training of [command and] control sections,
which must not only 'know how to manage [administration],’ but also
know the technical complexity and diverse activities of modern
armies."945

It was in the concluding section on command and control
(upravlenie) of Tukhachevskii's "Novye voprosy voiny" article that
opponents of Sokolovskii's quantitative analysis approach to the
initial period of future war found, by inference, their most potent
dialectic arguments. Recalling that the Tsarist army "planned a
battle only up to the moment of their bayonet attack against the
enemy," Tukhachevskii charged that they "did not know the process of
offensive in depth, did not know about combined arms, and did not

know communications and [command and] control of the stages of deep battle".946

But it is impossible to imagine battle and an uninterrupted flow of events combined with diverse technical means of combat. Battle is complicated, ever changing, and therefore command and control must be prepared for sharply altered situations, and sometimes also for radical transformation of the plan designed earlier. The plan of battle must, as first priority, coincide with real facts and with those factors which play a decisive role in the various stages of battle.947

Tukhachevskii's arguments surely were no comfort to Sokolovskii's operational researchers who saw the future as being dependent on one branch of the Soviet Army alone -- the Strategic Rocket Forces -- but could not elude the ghosts of past Russian military science. The main thought that formed Tukhachevskii's conclusion was:

Clearly an established goal, an internally coordinated plan mobilizes all forces and means, the entire frame of mind and enthusiasm in one mastered, understood, and organized direction. Good [command and] control, knowing how to concentrate all its forces and means for attainment of the primary task at a given time, must be capable of quickly transforming this concentration toward new directions....948

Thus, after a hiatus of nearly a generation, in 1962 and again in 1964, the Russian intellectual gauntlets were cast as the iterative military science process sought once more to divine between two contradictory positions the 'correct' path for the future development of the Soviet Army.

Meanwhile, as nations stockpiled ever-increasing quantities of nuclear weapons throughout the 1960s and 1970s, some military theorists in the Soviet Union and the United States, along with a few of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, became transfixed with the idea of 'winning' a nuclear war, investigated ad nauseam weapons exchange ratios, and developed intricate, quantitative mathematical war planning models in an effort to 'optimize' the effectiveness of nuclear strikes. Also, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, increasing numbers of works seeking to formalize predictive forecasting techniques began to emerge.949

The purpose of this operational research, which was not constrained solely to nuclear warfare, was to apply science and mathematics to derive models of future military phenomena and to determine their rate of change, primarily in order to establish a means through which to create stability (ustoichivost') by exercising control over possible future war outcomes. As General M. M. Kir'ian would describe somewhat later, these preliminary investigations would make it possible to model,

... the direction and tendencies in the development of armed forces, military technology and military art, both in one's own country and of the probable real enemy; the character, course and outcome of future war.\footnote{Kir'ian, M. M., Problemy voennoi teorii v sovetskih nauchno-spravochnykh izdaniakh, (Moscow, 1985), p. 93.}

It is important to note that, as Christopher Bellamy so insightfully points out, mathematically modeling the military-technical aspect of future war reveals, at best, only half of the Soviet-Russian equation for the concept of future war. The political aspect of doctrine comprises the other half of the model. Even the mathematical half of the equation is subject to gross interpretation since, in the Russian military lexicon,

'technical' not only refers to technology, but also to technique. Changes in technique may be associated directly or indirectly with changes in technology. ... The phrase 'military-technical' as used in Russian extends to cover 'technical' aspects of military operations: the integration of infantry, artillery, armor and air, how operations are planned and controlled. It is arguably not so much the changes in technology itself but associated changes in technique, which have altered and will continue to alter the character of war.\footnote{Bellamy, Christopher D., Budushchaya voyna: The Russian and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of Future War, (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1989), p. 32.}

By the late 1960s, as open Soviet literature on forecasting became more abundant, even such an influential Soviet military officer as Marshal Sokolovskii began calling for a change of emphasis for military strategy to "generalize and analyze the laws and tendencies of the development of technology" and "to foresee possible changes in the methods of conducting armed struggle and to spot new
phenomena in time." James McConnell points out and documents the very important fact, however, that as early as 1964 Marshal Sokolovskii and his most senior writing collaborator, General-Major Cherednichenko, had begun to question in print the nature of future war as depicted in their own book, *Voennaia Strategiia*, and actually were leaders in the opposition to eliminate the distortion to Russian military art caused by overreliance on nuclear weapons. The Soviet government meanwhile continued to insist, officially at least, that the most pressing problem of contemporary military strategy was working out methods of waging nuclear war.

Simultaneously, during the 1960s and early 1970s, more and more often Russian military theorists were returning to their roots seeking to better understand the holistic nature of future war as something other than a gigantic spastic, virtually uncontrollable, exchange of nuclear weapons during the initial period of war that could possibly annihilate the participants, and non-participants alike around the world. The roots to which Russian military theorists dialectically turned to solidify an antithesis to Sokolovskii's digression from the historic orientation of Russian military science, as well as to counter the stinging conventional

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force reductions instituted during the Khrushchev regime, were the debates over military science methodology and the content of unified socialist military doctrine during the 1920s.

The unlikely genesis of a concerted Russian military effort to displace quantitative analysis and to restore military science, and hence restore the Soviet General Staff, the General Staff Academy, and the conventional branches of arms to the 'rightful,' historic places was Colonel Ivan Alekseevich Korotkov's 1971 article in Vestnik voennoi istorii, with the seemingly prosaic Communist academic title, "K istorii stanovleniia sovetskoi voennoi nauki" ("Toward a history based on soviet military sciences"). Behind the facade of this title and a textual discussion that, to the uninitiated at least, might seem to deal only with old arguments that transpired a half-century earlier, Korotkov, in reality, was building a firm dialectic case for the current adoption of a protracted war strategy of "attrition." In so doing Korotkov resurrected from the Tsarist past the legendary Russian military theorists -- Jomini, Leer, Mikhnevich, Petrov, Puzyrevskii, Bliokh, et al.954 -- and even, for the first time in over a generation, went so far as to discuss Aleksandr Svechin's participation in the 1920s doctrinal debates and to describe favorably Svechin's Strategiia and his "three-echelon mobilization" proposition,955 which, of necessity, would require the


955 Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...", p. 64.
complete and total social-political-economic preparation of the Soviet Union for protracted war.

The masterful crafting of Korotkov's article, its sound dialectic logic, and its meticulous historical documentation made it exceedingly difficult for the Communist Party leadership to fault Korotkov's thesis, even though they might not agree. This was especially true since Korotkov copiously employed the writings of Lenin, the 'Father of the Socialist Revolution,' to create the foundation for recommending a change in current military doctrine. According to Korotkov, Lenin used works of the 19th and early-20th century military theorists as the basis for the development of his ideas concerning warfare. For example, "Today our tasks are impossible to decide through the scientific study of new methods, if our experience of yesterday does not open our eyes to the incorrectness of old methods."954 Referring specifically to military affairs Korotkov depicts Lenin as stating:

Speaking about the combat preparation of the country and its defensive capability, Lenin demanded serious preparations to defend the homeland, beginning with the economic problems of the country, putting in order the railroads, without which 'contemporary warfare is an empty phrase.' ... 'The military needs to carry on properly, or it will not carry on at all.'957

In March 1922, in a Krasnaia armiia article entitled "Oznachenni voinstvuiushchego materializma," Lenin underscored the importance of


military science by emphasizing the "enormous role of the dialectic method ... in the development of society" and that "the general scientific method of Marxism is historical materialism."958 Only then did Korotkov make reference to the May 8, 1922 RKKA Military Academy discussions of military science, which were organized by Revvoensovet Chairman Trotsky to "conclusively dethrone" military science as a holdover from the bourgeois past, but failed to reach any consensus of view among the distinguished faculty of the Military Academy who, as we have seen, ideologically were severely divided between former Tsarist officer 'voenspets' and Marxist Red commanders. What is unique here is Korotkov's insertion of a quotation of the shunned Aleksandr Svechin to drive home his main point: "For everyone it must be clear, that the methods of military affairs and of organization depend on the overall economic conditions of a given society."959

Korotkov did not stop here in building his case against Sokolovskii's narrow view of nuclear "wars of destruction." Rather, he went on to assert that "in order to create a theory of future war, to foresee its character, it is necessary to study all the changes in political and economic conditions."960 Then, Korotkov quoted Frederick Engels' statement that, "over the course of many years, studying all the branches of military science was one of my main


960 Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...," p. 54.
occupations.... Korotkov pointedly concluded in the first section of his article that,

in conditions of sharp ideological struggle in our country, in which the beginning Soviet military science originated, the unsatisfactory philosophical preparation of military cadres was discovered. Therefore, the Communist Party took measures to broaden the introduction of Marxist-Leninist methodology in military affairs.

In the last section of his article, Korotkov stressed, still using the seemingly arcane military doctrine debates of the 1920s as examples, that "the most important military-theoretical problem ... was determining the technical characteristics of future war" and quoted the legendary Mikhail V. Frunze's opinion in "Front i tyl' v voine budushchego" that,

... the necessity of preparation for protracted and persistent war obliges us always to maintain forces [and because of this] ... by no means does a strategy of lightning strikes renounce this absolute necessity....

Then, opining that Frunze's thinking about military-technical issues "has not lost its significance even today," Colonel Korotkov noted that Frunze predicted "future war to a considerable degree, if not in its entirety, will be a war of machines," judged that technological developments would lead future war to involve considerable maneuver

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962 Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovlenia...," p. 56.
at all levels of military art, and concluded with Frunze's recommendation that "military doctrine must establish decisive action as the mission of the armed forces, and ... to prepare the army for large-scale maneuver operations." 965 To further dialectically buttress his case for a protracted "war of attrition" strategy employing massive maneuver at the operational art level, Korotkov turned to the writings of Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii, who concluded that destruction of an enemy required a "series of successive operations". 966

Completing one operation, it is necessary at that very moment to foresee and to prepare for the next, so that no battle transition, no respite can separate one operation from another and give even temporarily to the enemy the possibility to re-group (peregruppirovat'sia) and to strengthen himself. 967

Tukhachevskii judged the success of his theory of "successive operations" to be dependent on the "decisive steps carried out by the unseen workers of the rear." 968 Thus, according to Korotkov, was laid the foundation for Tukhachevskii's theory of "deep operations," which would carry the attack throughout the depths of the enemy defenses

and for which Tukhachevskii, in 1932, defined the conditions for success as:

1) Frontal attack. The wider the attack front, the greater will be the other various conditions and success of the operation. 2) Successive destruction of the enemy echelons, dismembering them through the entire depth.\(^\text{96}\)

To Tukhachevskii as well Korotkov assigned the responsibility for development of the tactical theory of "combined arms battle" that appeared first in the 1925 RKKA Field Regulations and was expanded upon in the 1929 Field Regulations "... as a system, which unites the fires and movement of all branches of troops.\(^\text{97}\)

Through his dialectic analysis Korotkov left no doubt about the new direction he was advocating for the Soviet Army -- essentially, 'back to the future.' Aleksandr Svechin and the other 'ghosts' of Stalin's 'cult of personality' were not exonerated, but their theories on the protracted nature and combined arms character of future war were no longer so 'invisible.' The first public inkling of an actual Soviet doctrinal shift from Sokolovskii's quantitative theories of nuclear dominance and a return toward primarily a protracted conventional warfare orientation against NATO would not

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\(^{96}\) Korotkov, I., "K istorii stanovleniia...", p. 68; citing Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennikh trudakh (1917-1940), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), pp. 132-133.

come until January 1977 during President Brezhnev's Tula speech."

Perhaps not so accidentally, Brezhnev's harbinger speech coincided
that same year with the appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union
Nikolai N. Ogarkov as Chief of the Soviet General Staff and with the
initial operational capability of the Soviet intermediate-range SS-20
ballistic missile, which created the possibility for an independent
Soviet theater nuclear option." However, not until later in the
1970s and early 1980s, did emerging weapon technologies and
potentially changing battlefield conditions allow Russian military
theorists to synthesize yet another completely new estimate of the
nature of future warfare. This new hypothesis was predicated on the
forecast capability to accomplish traditional strategic, operational,
and tactical missions, and perhaps even some new missions in space,
utilizing long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons which
could negate the conundrum of nuclear war theory -- mutual assured
destruction (MAD) -- in which both sides, in a nuclear exchange,
would be utterly destroyed.

In the theory and practice of unleashing war and in the content of its initial
period the compulsion by many to decide questions of troop concentration and
strategic dispersal is new."

971 For an excellent and well-documented analysis of this
important shift in Soviet military doctrine, see
McConnell, James M., "Shifts in Soviet Views on the
Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics,

972 McConnell, James M., "The Irrelevance Today of
Sokolovskiy's Book Military Strategy," Defense Analysis,

973 Korotkov, I. A., Istoriia sovetskoj voennoi mysli.
Kratkii ocherk (1917-iiun' 1941)., (Moscow, 1980),
p. 142.
Throughout Russian military history there have been many "revolutions in military-technical affairs." Perhaps none of these 'revolutions' is any more significant, however, than Marshal Ogarkov's vision of future war. Not just because his vision formed the foundation for current and likely future Russian military doctrine which can directly affect the lives of people and the national security of countries worldwide, but because Marshal Ogarkov's new thesis, which was dialectically derived through the General Staff military science process, synthesized a means to make conventional warfare -- perhaps even a form of global conventional warfare -- not only possible once more, but perhaps even a valuable component of Soviet-Russian security policy. Paradoxically, this occurred at a time when a whole generation of post-World War II Western decisionmakers had convinced themselves that the mutual possession of nuclear weapons produced a stability (stabil'nost') in international security relations that precluded outright warfare, especially between nuclear 'superpowers.' Marshal Ogarkov, who served with distinction as the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from 1977 until 1983, articulated his vision of the nature of
future war in his elucidative 1982 book *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva* (Always Ready to Defend the Homeland) and again in his 1985 book *Istorija uchit' bditel'nosti* (History Teaches Vigilance). Counterintuitively, these publications accompanied the ushering in of President Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika, glasnost'* and *uskorenija* programs to reform peacefully the Soviet body politic.

As early as 1979, however, Marshal Ogarkov obviously had disavowed the thesis of Sokolovskii's *Voennaia strategia* by indicating, in almost verbatim contradiction to Sokolovskii's conclusions, that Soviet military strategy was no longer confined to "a single blow of general significance but would rather consist of a 'series' of strategic operations, each of which would realize one of the war's 'partial' objectives." Ogarkov's intellectual construct of future war employing "successive operations" to achieve "partial victories," the sum of which would lead to the defeat of the enemy, was derived directly from the writings of Mikhail Tukhachevskii and the Red Army doctrinal debates of the 1920s. Ogarkov still implied that the principle form of military action in continental theaters would be the nuclear strategic operation. However, in 1981 he apparently altered this formulation so that "strategic operations in continental and ocean theaters ... could be either conventional or nuclear."  

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Prior to the publication of Ogarkov's two major works, with their prescient revelations on the synthesis of a new Russian vision of future war, the antithesis to the nuclear war theory fixation, dictated by Sokolovskii's *Voennaia strategiia*, was conclusively established with the publication of Ivan A. Korotkov's *Istorija sovetskoi voennoi mysli* in 1980. Korotkov's chapter entitled "Osnovnye problemy voennogo iskusstva: Opredelenie sotsial'no-politicheskogo kharaktera budushchei voiny" was of particular merit and of very special importance.

Once more Korotkov turned his reader's attention back to the Red Army military doctrine debates of the 1920s, but this time with greater emphasis on the lasting wisdom and outcome of the debates rather than on the origins of the debates themselves. Army Commissar Mikhail Frunze's May 19, 1925 report to the Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR was employed to stress that "... not only the armed forces conduct modern warfare, but the whole country in its entirety, demanding the exertion of all industrial forces of the state."977

Sokolovskii most particularly was targeted. Korotkov bolstered his argument using Frunze's statement affirming the protracted nature of future war: "During a clash of first-class competitors, a decision cannot be attained by one blow. War will take on the character of a protracted and fierce (zhhestokoogo) contest...."978 This conclusion was supported by former Chief of the General Staff B. M. Shaposhnikov

977 *Tretii s'ezd Sovetov Soiuza SSR. Postanovleniia*, (Moscow, 1925), pp. 39-40.

who harkened back to the thesis of Svechin's *Strategiia*:

Certainly all future wars will take on the characteristics of wars of attrition (*izmorf*), but depending on the measures of the enemy country, on his internal condition, on the evolution in its class struggle, the possibility of a strategy of destruction (*sokrusheniia*) cannot be excluded."99

Ivan Korotkov's primary emphasis, however, was that the most "important strategic problem" -- the problem of "decisive significance" -- facing Russian military science during the 1920s and in the 1980s (using his own italics) was "determining the most likely forms of armed combat, i.e., the probable nature of future war. Would the nature of future war be characterized by the vast offensive maneuvering of forces, as during the Russian Civil War and the 'Great Patriotic War' or, would static positional defenses prevail, as they had during World War I, as the dialectic struggle for dominance between offensive and defensive forms of warfare continued? The use of Lenin's unequivocal statement, "'We would be not only fools, but also criminally delinquent'"94 if we would pledge to conduct only defensive warfare,"982 left no doubt about Korotkov's answer to this question or about his understanding of the historical 'laws of war.'

Korotkov's conclusion about the maneuver character of future war was reinforced by citing the 1922 statements of Mikhail Frunze

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that "maneuverability must take hold like a weed and be the lifeblood of our Red Army,"983 and:

... Maneuverability will be the essential principle which transforms the character of our future operations. However, maneuverability itself demands a broad and complete familiarity with the positional forms of conducting combat.984

The distinguished voenpots military historian A. M. Zaionchkovskii, who had been a member of Svechin’s Military Historical Commission (VIK) and a fellow RKKA Military Academy faculty member during the 1920s, supported Frunze’s position with his analysis. He promulgated that although "defense is one of the fundamental forms of combat, its main objective is for preserving and mobilizing forces as a secret reserve combat source."985 Recalling the directives to the RKKA Shtab by the RKP(b) and SNK SSSR in the first five-year-plan, as publicly documented by M. Zakharov in 1970, Korotkov emphasized that in future war "the decisive types of weaponry will be aircraft, artillery and tanks."986 This assertion sharply contradicted the then prevailing KPSS and General Staff exoteric position concerning the supremacy of the Strategic Rocket Forces and nuclear war.

In the second half of his chapter on "Osnovnye problemy voennogo iskusstva," Korotkov addressed the highly controversial "initial period of war" (nachal'ny period voiny), on which Sokolovskii's treatise and nuclear warfare theorists placed such inordinate emphasis. Korotkov went to considerable lengths to substantiate that the outcome of the initial period of war was dependent upon the peacetime interrelationship of political, economic, military and geographic factors, and not purely dependent upon the conduct of initial combat operations. To prove his dialectic argument, Korotkov returned to the December 1925 RKKA Shtab Conference, held in the Ukraine Military District and chaired by the Mobilization Department Head S. I. Ventsov, for the purpose of discussing the means to mobilize combat troops, reserve forces and supplies. The Conference report concluded that the initial period of war was primarily a mobilization period and that "to attain the objective of successful mobilization (rapidly and of the entire country), the report proposed the timely preparation for it, even in peacetime."987

While opining that this fundamental premise of peacetime preparation remained valid, Korotkov went on to develop the thought that because of the introduction of new military technologies which changed the likely character of future war by enabling an enemy to conduct a "powerful strike during the first days of a war, a covert

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border defense in depth" should be prepared and "air defense forces would have to be maintained in full combat readiness."

Korotkov stressed that "the most decisive measure against an aggressor" was, quoting from A. M. Zaionchkovskii, "to seize the initiative at the beginning of the campaign, when the enemy had not yet prepared for operations during the time which preceded war," i.e., to preempt offensively against an enemy attack based on strategic intelligence indications of his preparation to go to war. In 1933 the RKKA Chief of Staff A. I. Egorov had reported to the Revvoensovet Soiuza SSR that the General Staff had concluded its investigations about the initial period of war, at least for that portion of the iterative military science cycle, and found that:

New means of armed combat (aviation, mechanized and motorized units, airborne, etc.), their quantity and quality of growth creates anew questions about the initial period of war and the character of modern operations.

Consequently, to Korotkov and the General Staff, strategic indicators of enemy war mobilization were, and remain, a critical factor in Russian military strategy and military art. Russian military theorists and the political leaders of the Soviet Union came to the

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conclusion way back in the 1920s that they could not afford to absorb an enemy attack and thereby lose control over the initial period of war. This conclusion subsequently was strongly reinforced by their experience of the German Operation Barbarosa at the outset of World War II. Therefore, the Soviet Army of the 1980s fully intended to "attack on warning" in order to seize the initiative.

Korotkov concluded his discussion of future war by stating that Russian military historians and military theorists had objectively utilized the military science process very successfully to reveal the nature of future war; however, for political, economic and personal reasons, the leadership of the Red Army and of the Soviet Union never put the documented lessons of military science into practice, as evidenced by the disastrous initial period of Fascist aggression during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). Warning that it is impermissible in the future to suffer such terrible consequences for reason of neglect, Korotkov closed by underscoring that at the present the "fundamental threat to the concentration of our troops is enemy aviation and airborne groups which have the capability to actively disrupt lines of communication to a depth up to 600-800 kilometers." In 1982 further evidence appeared that Soviet military doctrine was transitioning away from the 'inevitable' nature of a future nuclear war. Marshal Ogarkov stipulated in Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite Otechestva, as did General M. M. Kir'ian in his book

992 Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoj voennoi mysli..., p. 140.
993 Korotkov, Istoriia sovetskoj voennoi mysli..., p. 135.
Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress i Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR, that conventional warfare was now the basic option of Soviet military doctrine. Ogarkov, in particular, underscored that the principal threat to the Soviet Union was now a "general conventional war" which would involve military operations in all theaters on a geographic scale similar to that of World War II and that such a war would be protracted -- "extending over many years." Confirmation of this Russian rediscovery of protracted conventional warfare lay in Marshal Ogarkov's late 1981 article "Na strazhe mirnogo truda," and again in October 1982 in his "Tvorcheskaia mysli polkovodtsa," in which the Chief of the General Staff emphasized the requirements for improving Red Army mobilization infrastructure and for increasing war industry material stockpiles. Ogarkov considered both these actions to be absolutely critical to forming an independent protracted conventional warfighting capability. General Kir'ian also pointed out that this important doctrinal reversion toward protracted conventional warfare was rooted in the early days of the Soviet regime -- a direct continuation of the Russian military science tradition.


It certainly was not that the leaders of the Soviet Union had forsaken nuclear warfare entirely, because the Strategic Rocket Forces continued to maintain, and to expand, a most formidable nuclear weapon delivery capability. Rather, it was that the Communist Party and General Staff sought to broaden their military options in an effort to escape the conundrum revealed by their military science investigations that in a nuclear war there could be no winners, i.e., nuclear weapons were not a politically useful basis upon which to conduct military operations. That conclusion was reinforced by General Rybkin and his associates who wrote:

A world war with the use of nuclear-missile weapons ... is absolutely unacceptable, not only for pragmatic, but above all for moral and ethical reasons, since a nuclear war would be a crime, not only against those living today, but also against future generations."

At that time many in the West judged such statements, Ogarkov’s articles, and Leonid Brezhnev’s February 1981 report to the XXVI Party Congress, when he stated -- "To expect victory in nuclear war is dangerous insanity" -- to be only propaganda. Or, worse yet, such statements were determined to be disinformation to forestall the planned NATO deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in the European theater which would allow the Soviets to maintain a unilateral force advantage.

In retrospect these Russian statements would appear to have been genuine efforts to escape peacefully, if not to remove entirely,
the strategic roadblock confronting their 'national interests.' Indeed, the primary reason Soviet motives were so very suspect in the West -- aside from the precedent of some six decades of Russian duplicity, which had destroyed all possibility of Western trust -- was because the Brezhnev regime had chosen, quite specifically, to re-couple the European theater to the national territory of the 'superpowers' in late 1981 by declaring the escalation of a theater nuclear conflict to be "inevitable," even though in June 1982 at the United Nations Assembly he caveated this declaration with a unilateral commitment "not to use nuclear weapons first." Also in 1982, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov gave one of the most explicit confirmations of the Soviet doctrine shift -- away from the 'inevitability' of nuclear war and back toward a protracted conventional war capability -- when he wrote:

Only extraordinary circumstances -- direct nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union or its allies -- could compel us to resort to a retaliatory nuclear strike as the ultimate means of self-defense.

The rationale behind the desire of the Russian military leaders to alter Soviet military doctrine at the beginning of the 1980s was very clearly stated in James McConnell's important analysis:


The timing of the shift away from counterforce coincided with new intelligence estimates of Soviet conventional capabilities, which opened the way for an alternative to nuclear weapons. To pay the price of entry into the nuclear club, Moscow had been drawing down on its conventional strength for a decade; what had once been its greatest asset had become a source of vulnerability.

On April 8, 1985 the most important, and most controversial, book of former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov went to press. *Istoriia uchit bditel’nosti* (History Teaches Vigilance) is a concise, information-packed little book that is especially significant both for its timing and for its content. Published at the beginning of a 'new regime' in Moscow -- less than a month after Mikhail S. Gorbachev took over the reins of the Communist Party -- it signaled a major Soviet policy shift away from direct confrontation with the NATO allies back toward greater accommodation, i.e., the initiation of a Soviet "peace" and "defensive military doctrine" diplomatic campaign. This compact text explicitly stated that Marxist-Leninist military science had discovered a "revolution in military-technical affairs" that superceded the one brought about by nuclear weapons in the 1960s, i.e., as described in Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's three editions of *Voennaia strategiia*.

Aside from the few true 'gems of wisdom' about the likely nature of future war buried within a very subjective and accusatory

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Marxist-Leninist short history of the socialist struggle against "imperialism -- the highest form of capitalism" and "enemy number one -- the USA," it would be all too easy to dismiss this opuscule as yet another 'Bolshevik propaganda' weapon. However, Ogarkov's work is unique because he explains in considerable detail about how the Soviet military science process uses Hegelian dialectic logic -- which entails a radically different intellectual process from that of commonly used Western deductive logic -- to arrive at its conclusions about military affairs and the nature of future war. Marshal Ogarkov enlightens the patient reader about how the Russian military collectively thinks about military and international security problems and further documents the continuity within the dynamic dialectic Russian and Soviet military science process.

For purposes of this study, the heart of Ogarkov's thesis on the "revolution in military-technical affairs" is contained within his chapter entitled "Na osnove zakonov nauki" ("On fundamental scientific laws"), which Ogarkov begins by stipulating:

The history of war and military art testify that the decisive influence on military affairs is above all the industrial production level attained at a given moment. Within this the continuing changes in weaponry and military technology have special importance in its development.

Based on this historically established premise, Ogarkov proceeds to specify the contemporary significance of emerging technologies and their immense significance on the organizational structure of the armed forces, on the command and control system, and on the basic

\[1005\] Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 22.

forms of combat:

A profound, in the full sense of the word, revolutionary transformation in military affairs presently is going on in connection with the further development and qualitative improvement of thermonuclear weapons, the boisterous development of electronics, and also in connection with the remarkable qualitative improvement of conventional means and methods of armed combat.100/

While Marshal Ogarkov only vaguely hinted at the general nature of this on-going 'revolution' in future war military capability, he tantalized his readers -- most likely in response to U.S. President Ronald Reagan's March 1983 announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, derisively referred to in the Western press by its alias, "Star Wars" -- by asserting:

... The fundamental threat to peace is the United States' unrestrained development and concentration of nuclear weapons, the aspiration to conduct an arms race even in space, and the intensified research on weapons of mass destruction, based on new physical principles. ... Also, on a broad front work is being conducted in order that, in terms of military qualities and effectiveness, conventional weapons will approach that of nuclear [weapons].1004

In 1985 neophytes about the nature of emerging military technologies could disregard Ogarkov's message as more bombastic Russian propaganda, or label it as 'disinformation,' duplicitously designed to curtail "Star Wars" and Western nuclear weapons development programs; while socialist 'fellow travellers' could willingly accept Ogarkov's seemingly simplistic generalizations at face-value. Reality, as usual, was far more complex -- and perhaps even more 'revolutionary' -- than even a most knowledgeable military

1007 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti, p. 41.
1008 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti, p. 25.
leader like Marshal Ogarkov could divine. Indeed, within the inner sanctums of the Soviet General Staff, the Pentagon and world-wide scientific research centers, work was underway, and had been for nearly two decades, to develop a completely new generation of 'smart' weaponry, utilizing the most recent micro-electronic and computer technologies available, which would possess incredible accuracy and a 'stand-off' capability to destroy targets from great distances.

This precision-guided weaponry was but a small part of the 'Information Age' revolution in military affairs that Marshal Ogarkov was predicting -- and, yes, seeking to delay, since the indigenous Soviet industrial base could not compete in this new micro-electronic cybernetic arena. In the early 1980s only a handful of individuals world-wide really knew the military potential of these emerging technologies. Hence, in Western nations there developed a public debate -- unfortunately, more often than not, with the Strategic Defense Initiative as the 'whipping boy' and predicated more on individual political convictions than on scientific facts -- about what this distant Marshal of the Soviet Union meant by "weapons of mass destruction based on new physical principles" and a "revolution in military-technical affairs," and how he reached such conclusions.

_Istoriiia uchit bditel'nosti_ offered little further direct explanation about 'what' was entailed in a "revolution in military-technical affairs" in terms of specific military weapons systems or mission capability changes -- nor was it intended to do so. At the beginning of the Gorbachev regime, Ogarkov's purpose (and that of the Russian military) was to accuse the Brezhnev regime of failing to adequately provide for the defense of the Soviet Union and to
challenge the Gorbachev regime to provide the expanded economic and
technological wherewithal to allow the Soviet Army to modernize in
order to keep pace with the 'Information Age' revolution that was in
progress in the West. *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti* served this
purpose very nicely.

Marshal Ogarkov did provide, however, most valuable insights
into 'how' the General Staff derived such conclusions about the
probable nature of future war through its military science process.

For example:

Dialectics demand the matching of each phenomenon with
the account of its historical development. Through
verification of this condition, the development of forms
of conducting military activity and their connection with
the changing organizational structure of the armed forces
can be worked.\(^{1009}\)

... It is through this [process that] the highest
military leadership acquires the capability to influence
the course and outcome of warfare in direct and decisive
ways.\(^{1010}\)

Ogarkov continued to explain, and in so doing revealed his
frustrations by very strongly criticizing the policies of former
Communist regimes:

It is especially important at the present stage that the
dialectic process realizes the development of military
affairs under conditions of rapid scientific-technical
progress. Noting the transformation (*perestroika*) of
views, which are deadlocked in deliberations and not
being put into practice, new questions of military art
and military construction are pregnant with serious
consequences.\(^{1011}\)

\(^{1009}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 45.

\(^{1010}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 47.

\(^{1011}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 47.
Further on Ogarkov clarified somewhat more explicitly what he meant by the "revolution in military-technical affairs," but still only in vague generalities, by stating that:

... New forms and means of conducting military activity are being developed and introduced to existing anti-aircraft and anti-parachute operations. In other words, a dynamic antithetical struggle is going on between defensive and offensive means.\(^\text{1012}\)

Ogarkov judged that the "uninterrupted antithetical struggle between offensive and defensive means is revealed by the internal historical development of military affairs"\(^\text{1013}\) and proceeded to describe in some detail the significance of this dialectic:

The appearance of new offensive means always led to the inevitable creation of corresponding means of countering [it], and of course, to the development of new capabilities for conducting combat, battles, operations, and wars in their entirety. Therefore, in present conditions, when active changes from one generation of weaponry to another are taking place, it is especially important that military cadres are not one-sided, but from all sides proceed to investigate all aspects of the development of military affairs on the basis of a deep understanding of the fundamental law, the core of dialectics -- the law of unity and struggle of opposites.\(^\text{1014}\)

The law of transformation of quantity into a new quality was also described by Ogarkov as "leading Soviet military science to understanding the character and forms of development of the armed forces, the readiness capability, and the conduct of military activity."\(^\text{1015}\) As an example of the practical application of this

\(^{1012}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 48.

\(^{1013}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 49.

\(^{1014}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 49.

\(^{1015}\) Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 50.
dialectic law, Ogarkov explained that in the 1950s and 1960s, when there were a small number of nuclear weapons, such weapons were looked upon only as a means for increasing combat firepower in traditional military operations; but, during the 1970s and 1980s, as the quantity and destructive power of nuclear weapons grew, along with the distance and accuracy with which nuclear weapons could be delivered, in warfare and in the conduct of operations their significance changed, taking on an entirely new quality.\(^{1016}\)

On the premise of the dialectic law of "Transformation of Quantity into a New Quality," Ogarkov next introduced the dialectic law of "Negation of the Negation," which in military affairs shows the "growing advanced character of development, its direction, and the process of creating new [weapons]."\(^{1017}\) About this Ogarkov wrote:

New technology and weaponry generation after generation inevitably push out [replace], negate old technology and weaponry. The action of the law of negation of the negation is revealed in this lesson. ... During the years of the Second World War and especially during the period following, for the armed forces and fleet there began to be deployed progressively throughout their structure a new type of weapon -- without a barrel (rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, missiles of all other types). Through their outstanding accuracy and maneuver qualities, they already are beginning to change, and even to some extent replace, conventional weaponry.\(^{1018}\)

Ogarkov went on to show the direct dialectic application of Russian military science in his discussion of military doctrine. To do this he quoted Mikhail V. Frunze's statement that: "The essential condition for a living military doctrine consists of its strict

1017 Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti*, p. 52.
conformity to the general aims of the state and to those material and spiritual resources, which are found in its instructions."\textsuperscript{1019} After referencing the legendary Russian military theorists Miliutin, Dragomirov, and Mikhnevich, the similarity of whose historic views ostensibly provided legitimacy to his own, Ogarkov explained:

In its contemporary meaning military doctrine is understood in a given state at a given (operational) time as a system of views on the aims and character of a possible future war, on the preparations of the country and armed forces for it, and on the capabilities in order to conduct it. Military doctrine customarily defines: what is the probability level of future war and with which enemy it will have to be conducted; what kind of character the war can take, which the country and its armed forces can expect to conduct; what aims and missions can be assigned to the armed forces during the conduct of such a war and what kind of armed forces it is necessary to have, in order to achieve the assigned aims by any means; proceeding from this, follows the general military construction and the preparation of the army and country for it [future war]; and finally, by what kind of capabilities to conduct the war...\textsuperscript{1020}

Ogarkov then underscored the "intimate dialectical connection and interdependence of the social-political and military technical aspects of doctrine"\textsuperscript{1021} before asserting the politically obligatory disclaimer -- widely disabused and disbelieved in the West -- that "the May 15, 1980 Warsaw Pact Declaration ... distinctly records that we 'do not have, have not had, and will not have any strategic doctrine, except defensive."\textsuperscript{1022}


\textsuperscript{1020} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{1021} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{1022} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 72; also p. 77.
The skepticism of Western analysts and policymakers about the veracity of Ogarkov's statement concerning the "defensive" nature of Russian military doctrine -- which could be viewed at best as contradictory, if not outright duplicitous -- can be understood best within context by comparing Ogarkov's "defensive doctrine" political assertions with that of his and other contemporary Russian military authors military-technical analysis about the imminent "revolution in military-technical affairs" and the looming convergence of offensive and defensive military capabilities. For wishful Western analysts and policymakers, who are frustrated by such a confounding and contradictory dialectical dichotomy, it is most unlikely that such ambiguous Russian policy formulations will disappear, given the nature of the continuing process for developing Russian military doctrine. As Marshal Ogarkov has explained, it is inherent within the nature of the Russian military science process to develop contradictory, multifaceted alternatives; while Western science tends to seek optimum, usually quantifiable, single courses of action to resolve problems and issues.

Specifically concerning the nature of future war, Marshal Ogarkov dialectically returned to the origins of Soviet unified military doctrine in the 1920s by citing Army Commissar Mikhail V. Frunze’s conclusion that the prerequisites for constructing a military doctrine were: "First, a clear and exact idea about the character of future war; second, a correct and exact accounting of those forces and means that will be deployed by our possible opponent; third, an equally precise accounting of our Soviet
resources."1023 This initial Soviet military doctrine posited that future war would require the mobilization of the entire material and spiritual resources of the country and would be characterized by the maneuver of forces and offensive forms of combat across broad expanses of territory.1024 Then, in the 1930s, Ogarkov explained, because of the "growing danger of a new world war with the imperialists," it became, necessary to specify the military-technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine and based on the new tendencies in the character of future war and the direction of development of military affairs to work out substantial recommendations for the improvement of military technologies, of capabilities for preparing and conducting operations, for the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of the country....1025

Here, without mentioning the shunned former Red Army Chief of Staff Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii by name, Marshal Ogarkov emphasized that: "Of supreme importance in those years were the Soviet military thought investigations of the theory of deep operations and battle."1026 Continuing his subliminal praise for the brilliant ideas of the man Stalin had executed as a traitor nearly five decades earlier, Ogarkov wrote:

Within it [Russian military theory] existed the basic possibility of simultaneous suppression of enemy defenses in their entire depth by artillery fires and aviation strikes, of decisive penetration of the tactical zone of defenses by massed forces, and means for selecting the direction and for striving to develop tactical success in

1024 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel’nosti, pp. 73-74.
1025 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel’nosti, p. 74.
1026 Ogarkov, Istoriia uchit bditel’nosti, p. 74.
the operation during the course of battle employing powerful mobile units of tanks, motorized infantry, cavalry, and parachute troop landings.\textsuperscript{1027}

Upon this military scientific dialectic foundation, Marshal Ogarkov drew the conclusion that "modern world war," which would be unleashed by the "imperialists," would,

acquire an unprecedented destructive character. Military actions will be conducted simultaneously in broad zones, will be distinguished by singular violence, will bear a highly maneuverable, dynamic character and will continue until complete victory [is achieved] over the enemy. The most important requirement of Soviet military doctrine is the maintenance of the Armed Forces of the USSR in high combat readiness...\textsuperscript{1028}

Ogarkov then explained that the critical factor in achieving the required "high combat readiness" is the "provision of the armed forces and fleet with modern military technology and weaponry"\textsuperscript{1029} because, since 1945, there has been a "tempest (buria) of scientific-technological progress, which has proceeded at a dialectic gallop, toward a genuine revolution in military affairs."\textsuperscript{1030} In this regard Ogarkov considered that the "active and decisive" role of the Soviet state was to ensure the development of a "world-class" economy and of the country's mobilization preparedness. But it was to the Soviet General Staff and to the General Staff Academy, in particular, that Marshal Ogarkov assigned the historically established, crucial responsibility for armed forces organization and education:


\textsuperscript{1028} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{1029} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{1030} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 88.
... Great attention is devoted to the questions of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, of the expedient relationship among their views, branches of arms and service, combat and support troops and forces, but also to the composition of staff personnel, their training, education, and cadre preparation, who direct improvement of the system and organs of command and communications.\textsuperscript{1031}

Ogarkov finally insisted, sounding a bit too much like a distant siren song of Mikhail Frunze during the 1920s unified proletarian military doctrine debates, and almost certainly alienating some of his long-term Communist Party comrades, that the "principal basis for organization of Armed Forces [command and] control (upravleniia) in peace and wartime" had to be one-man command (edinonachalo):

The principle of unity of wartime political and military leadership, of centralized army and fleet control with broad initiative and necessary independent action by all control organs at their own level is in the interest of achieving battle, operational, and war objectives. A great role is allotted to the entire country in providing active combat troops (forces) and reserves of various types.\textsuperscript{1032}

In this manner, by challenging over twenty years of ossified Communist Party 'conventional wisdom' concerning the content of Soviet military doctrine, the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff and Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai V. Ogarkov laid the dialectic foundation for the transformation of Russian military doctrine away from the narrow spectrum of Marshal Sokolovskii's \textit{Voennaia strategiia} and toward a much broader new synthesis.

\textsuperscript{1031} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{1032} Ogarkov, \textit{Istoriia uchit bditel'nosti}, p. 78.
Makhmut A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze - Voennyi Teoretik: Destroys the Sokolovskii Voennaia Strategiia Anomaly

In this military-theoretical work the scientific activity of the outstanding Soviet commander and military theoretician M. V. Frunze is analyzed, his role in the development process of Soviet military doctrine and of the most important conditions of Soviet military science, and the significance of his military-theoretical legacy to contemporary conditions is revealed.\textsuperscript{1033}

- General-Colonel Makhmut A. Gareev

Proof of the continuity in Russian military thought, and of the existence of a dialectic military science process through which that continuity is advanced, can be nowhere more clearly, succinctly and authoritatively documented than with the above cited description and the subtitle used by Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General M. A. Gareev, to introduce his book \textit{M. V. Frunze - Voennyi Teoretik. Vzglady M. V. Frunze i sovremennaia teoriia (.... The Views of M. V. Frunze and Contemporary Theory)}. Most directly stated General Gareev’s thesis was that, although the preoccupation of Sokolovskii’s \textit{Voennaia Strategiia} with nuclear warfare during the 1960s had developed a "profound and, on the whole, correct analysis"\textsuperscript{1034} for that time, during the ensuing decades conditions had changed. These changes necessitated a restoration of most of the previous Russian military art concepts and former historically validated principles of future war which Sokolovskii’s operational researchers purposely had

\textsuperscript{1033} Gareev, M. A., \textit{M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), contents note of the catalogue record on the reverse of the title page.

\textsuperscript{1034} Gareev, M. A., \textit{M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), p. 239.
rejected. In the process of analyzing Frunze’s contributions to the development of Russian military thought in the 1920s and of synthesizing its relevance to the 1980s, General Gareev unequivocally and explicitly confirmed in 1985 that the 'Sokolovskii anomaly' was being replaced by a more expansive and historically justified Russian paradigm concerning the protracted nature of future war.

What was truly unique in Gareev’s work was that rather than burying his critique of Sokolovskii within the text of what might seem to some to be irrelevant historical propaganda, as all too often had been the case in previous efforts to forward the debate of the nature of future war, Gareev left no doubts about the negation of *Voennaia strategiia* by directly citing Sokolovskii's text and proposing a specific antithesis. For example:

In the '60s and '70s the authors of this and many other books primarily proceeded from the fact that, in all cases, wars would be conducted using nuclear weapons, while military action using only conventional means of destruction was viewed as a brief episode at the beginning of war. However, the upgrading and stockpiling of nuclear-missile weapons have reached such a level that the massive use of these weapons in war could entangle both sides in catastrophic consequences. Together with this, a frantic process of upgrading conventional weaponry types is going on in the armies of the NATO countries. The main emphasis is put on developing highly accurate guided weaponry that approaches low-yield nuclear weaponry in effectiveness. In these conditions, it is assumed in the West, there is an increasing possibility of fighting a relatively protracted war with conventional weapons, and primarily with new types of highly accurate weapons.\(^\text{1036}\)


And what is terribly important in Gareev's analysis, building on Ogarkov's precedent of a "revolution in military-technical affairs," is that Russian military science reached the conclusion that in future war precision-guided conventional explosive weapons would approach low-yield nuclear weapons in effectiveness. No longer would nuclear weapons be required to destroy 'hard targets' such as heavily defended installations or reinforced command and control bunkers, airfield runways, dams, dikes, bridges or fortified gun emplacements that had proven to be relatively impervious to attack using conventional explosives during previous wars. Always before, the destruction of hardened targets had required either the use of a massive artillery barrage, a huge number of costly aircraft bombing sorties, or a single nuclear weapon. Now, because of the exceptional accuracy of a wide variety of emerging precision-guided munitions (PGM), it was becoming possible, using only one PGM armed with a conventional high-explosive warhead, to destroy many of these types of targets -- and to destroy them all if a low-yield nuclear weapon was mated with a PGM. Furthermore, the low radar cross-section and maneuverability of PGMs made them virtually impossible to detect in time for air defenses to react; and the range of PGMs allowed for their launch at targets within the Soviet Union from virtually all azimuths. The shock wave that these realizations sent through the Soviet General Staff, which was particularly dependent on secure command and control to conduct military operations, was profound. The vital Soviet command and control system and military infrastructure were vulnerable to PGM attack in a future war.
Gareev also saw the possibility of nuclear war developing without massive nuclear weapons exchanges, and took exception to Sokolovskii's nuclear war targeting philosophy which focused on "the economy, system of state control, and strategic nuclear means, along with groupings of armed forces in the theaters." Instead, Gareev proposed a global counter-force nuclear targeting strategy in which "groupings of an opponent's armed forces," wherever located, became the primary targets:

The virtually unlimited range of the means for delivering nuclear weapons, which makes it possible to cripple any groupings of an opponent's armed forces, has changed our notions of the nature of war. Therefore, in a strategic sense, a war can take the form of a global confrontation between two major coalitions of armed forces that has no historical precedent in spatial scope, ferocity, and destructiveness. Pressing his argument, Gareev contradicted not only Sokolovskii's description of the character of future war, but complained that "from the former theory of military art almost nothing remains" and challenged the professional understanding of the basic principles and process of military science by the Voennaia strategia authors:

... It is stated in this book that a whole series of well-known principles, norms, and rules which formerly were considered authoritative for military strategy are now subject to radical revision or have lost their importance entirely. The authors included among these the principles of concentrating forces and means on the decisive axis, economy of force, and partial victory.

They postulated that strategic deployment, strategic offense, strategic defense, strategic maneuver and other basic strategic theory concepts largely have lost their importance.1040

In keeping with Ogarkov's return to the conventional war option, while sharply disputing the contents of *Voennaia strategiia*, Gareev asserted: "... at the present time the principle of concentration of forces and means on the decisive axes is required in the newly specified conditions" and that "the objective of this principle ... retains its significance."1041 Concerning the importance of strategic reserves and the historic Russian propensity for maneuver forces that Sokolovskii dispensed with through the shifting of nuclear weapon targets, Gareev charged that "the appearance of new means of destruction not only does not nullify, but all the more greatly elevates the importance of strategic reserves and the necessity for them to maneuver in wartime."1042 Nor did Gareev accept Sokolovskii's proposition that economy of force could be discarded because the outcome of future war would be decided by inbeing forces at the time of the initial nuclear strikes. Gareev stated quite unequivocally:

In contemporary conditions the outcome of wars, to a significantly greater extent than before, depends on the quantity and effectiveness of those forces which are applied at the very beginning of the war, however the


strategic principle of economy of force is retained in its entirety, as in a war between gigantic coalitions with their enormous potential capabilities it is difficult to expect it will have a short duration. Therefore, it is essential to be ready for protracted, persistent, and fierce military combat.\textsuperscript{1063}

Rather than Sokolovskii\'s strategic concept through which \textquoteleft victory\textquoteright was attained by a single nuclear \textquoteleft strike\textquoteright that would destroy simultaneously the enemy\textquotesingle s economy, population centers and armed forces, Gareev advocated a return to Tukhachevskii\'s future war concept, wherein partial victory was possible through a series of strategic operations\textsuperscript{1064} and in which both the strategic offensive and strategic defensive retained important functions. In Gareev\'s judgment, \textquoteleft The strategic content of war is discerned as a complicated system of integrated simultaneous and successive operations.\textquoteright\textsuperscript{1065} At this point, as James McConnell correctly concludes, \textquoteleft There is very little left of the Sokolovskii version of military strategy. Indeed, the only Sokolovskii amendment still standing is the concept of an expanded theater of military action....\textquoteright\textsuperscript{1066} Thus, with these judgments about the nature of future war and through his dialectic discussion of M. V. Frunze\'s contributions to the development of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{1063}] Gareev, M. A., \textit{M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 240-241. (Gareev\textsuperscript{'}s bold in original text).
\item[\textsuperscript{1066}] McConnell, James M., \textquoteleft The Irrelevance Today of Sokolovskii\textquotesingle s Book Military Strategy.\textquoteright\textit{ Defense Analysis}, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1985, p. 252.
\end{itemize}
Soviet military science and the Red Army, General Makhmut Gareev indubitably returned Soviet military doctrine to the legacies of its Russian Imperial Army and Red Army predecessors.

Gareev's work went beyond just destroying the 'Sokolovskii anomaly,' however, by clarifying the role of military science in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces:

If we are speaking from the perspective of the further development of the theory of military art, then in the light of examination the problem of maintaining high military readiness to repel an unexpected enemy attack acquires especially great importance. ... Therefore, one of the important tasks of military science is the research of ways to further elevate the military readiness of the Armed Forces, their capability to conduct decisive action by defeating any aggressor under any conditions at the beginning of a war.1047

In this same time period, General Kir'ian also weighed in concerning the great importance that the Russian military establishment attaches to the military science process and described, using ambiguous generalities, the manner in which research was organized to attempt to predict the nature of future war:

A superficial analysis ... in modern war conditions will result in errors ... to solve these problems a system of organs was created, which are concerned with prognosticating the possible character of future war and problems connected with it. It embraces the General Staff and the headquarters of the Armed Services, and also other military organizations: corporations, commissions, institutes, societies, centers. Various technical means for predicting situations which arise in operations have been created which play out the various decisions which may be taken in order to establish the most expedient [optimum] one.1048

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1047 Gareev, M. A., M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), pp. 242-243. (Gareev's bold in original text.)

By far, General Gareev's most important, and perhaps singular and enduring, contribution to the development of the Russian military science process and to military art was his conclusion that in future war there would cease to be a distinction between purely offensive and purely defensive military operations:

Speaking about the problems of offensive and defensive operations, it must be taken into account now that all the more distinctly the tendency of troop activity is being demonstrated for further merger of offensive and defensive capabilities.\(^\text{1049}\)

This statement stands in sharp contradiction to the historic dialectic of warfare as described by Marshal Ogarkov which counterpoised offensive and defensive military operations as a continuing bi-polar struggle, during which, over time, due largely to technological advances, first the offense would prevail over the defense and then vice versa. In contrast, Gareev's synthesis postulated that there would be no clear distinction between offensive and defensive military operations because on the modern battlefield, dominated by the enormous destructive power of nuclear and precision-guided weapons, maneuver of forces and fires would become the sine qua non of both "offensive" and "defensive" military operations:

Enormous significance is acquired from a first strike by the enemy's nuclear missiles, while his precision-guided weapons remain the basis for grouping their forces in initial regions for conducting an offensive and counterattack.

The basis of modern defenses is also fire and maneuver in combination with firmly holding on to occupied positions. It is characterized by the use of powerful fire means, which permit the destruction of splendid enemy forces while still at distant approaches, and high levels of activity by defending troops.

... Modern weaponry permits the attainment of an uninterrupted attack, unexpected and violent strikes, and great activity and stability (ustoičivost') of defenses.109

The implications of this most authoritative Russian military judgment were, and continue to be, of immense significance, both politically and militarily. It is worth noting that Russian military science reached these conclusions about the lack of distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" force structures at least five years before the great international political debate about Russian "defensive doctrine" and "reasonable defensive sufficiency," et al., was launched. To the Russian General Staff, the content of that coming political debate -- but not the outcome of the debate itself -- largely would be irrelevant because Russian military officers already knew that a "pure defensive doctrine" was impossible, given the capabilities of modern weapons technology. It might then be prudent for Western military analysts to ponder: "For whom was the Russian glasnost' debate on 'defensive doctrine' staged?"

In his conclusion of M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik, General Makhmut Gareev once more offered solid, concrete evidence of the continuity of Russian military thought and of the enduring legacy of a military science process derived therefrom when he wrote:

In the works of Mikhail Vasil'evich Frunze, the reader even today finds many profound thoughts and expressions of opinion about general problems of military science, theoretical and practical questions of military art, military construction, training, [and] the political and military education of personnel. However far forward military affairs advance, the dialectic of its development, the methods of creatively arriving at a

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resolution of vital problems, the penetration into the depths of the investigative process revealing and analyzing concrete historical conditions, which M. V. Frunze so skillfully applied, in scientific work they will serve further on as reliable guideposts.

... The contemporary achievements of military science and military art have absorbed into themselves the entire military experience which preceded it, ... revealing its continuation to a new qualitative level.\textsuperscript{1051}

Further evidence concerning how the dialectic military science process for investigation of the nature of future war is used, employing historical examples to discuss current issues, came in an authoritative June 1988 \textit{Voenny-istoricheskii zhurnal} article by General-Lieutenant M. M. Kir'ian entitled "The Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War," which was prefaced by an unsigned article titled "Remember the Lessons of History: Strengthen Combat Readiness in Every Way."\textsuperscript{1052} In the preface article particular emphasis was placed on the fact that:

In comparison with previous wars, the command and staffs now possess significantly less time for organizing an operation and combat. At the same time the scope of the work involved in collecting the information, carrying out various sorts of calculations and issuing tasks to the troops has substantially increased and continues to grow. The extensive introduction of automated systems and facilities makes it possible to free the command bodies from resolving many technical questions, and due to this additional time is released for analytical and creative work.\textsuperscript{1053}


\textsuperscript{1052} See \textit{Voenny-istoricheskii zhurnal}, No. 6, June 1988, pp. 3-10 and Kir'ian, pp. 11-17.

\textsuperscript{1053} "Remember the Lessons of History: Strengthen Combat Readiness in Every War," \textit{Voenny-istoricheskii zhurnal}, No. 6, June 1988; in FBIS, JPRS-UMJ-88-012, 7 NOV 88, p. 4
At a time when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had emphasized before the June 1987 Communist Party Plenum: "... We are moving toward major decisions, particularly important are scientific soundness, theoretical and ideological-political clarity in understanding the essence and main sense of the commenced changes as well as the trend in the restructuring of command and control," the preface article stressed:

The level of technical equipment available has always been and remains a most essential element determining the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and is the material basis of their combat might. This is one of the main conditions for thwarting the enemy's intentions of achieving military-technical superiority and at the same time is a most important prerequisite for maintaining the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces on a high level. At the present stage in the development of military affairs, one of the main factors in strengthening the country's defense capability is military science.\textsuperscript{1034}

This important article concluded with the assertion and guidance:

Qualitative changes have occurred in it [military science] in recent years. ... The unprecedented growth in the strike force, fire power, and mobility of the troops have made it possible to fundamentally revise many traditional ideas as well as work out new recommendations on the organizational development of the army and navy, the forms and methods of conducting armed combat and the readying of the Armed Forces to repel aggression. At present the primary tasks are the strengthening of the links of theory and practice and the extensive involvement of all levels of military personnel in scientific work. ... Here it is essential to see to it that the results of the conducted research are promptly introduced into the life and activities of the troops.\textsuperscript{1036}

\textsuperscript{1034} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{1035} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{1036} Ibid., pp. 4-5.
General Kir'ian dialectically built on this military scientific foundation. He returned the reader to the late 1920s and early 1930s—a time when the concept of 'the initial period of war' first received great attention in Soviet military theory. First, Kir'ian employed the 1933 report of RKKA Chief of Staff A. I. Egorov to the RVS which underscored that "new weapons (aviation, mechanized and motorized formations, modernized cavalry, airborne troops and so forth) and their qualitative and quantitative growth pose in a new light the questions of the initial period of a war and the nature of modern operations"\(^1\) to define the then, and current, military tasks:

The destruction of the enemy cover troops; the thwarting of its mobilization; the capture and destruction of material supplies; the capture and holding of strategically important areas; anticipating the enemy in deploying the main forces and seizing the strategic initiative. Particular attention was paid to air and mechanized troop operations.\(^2\)

General Kir'ian then brought in the former RKKA Chief of Staff Mikhail N. Tukhachevskii's work, "The Nature of Border Operations," to underscore the likely nature of "fierce large-scale border operations"\(^3\) during the initial period of war. He ended by stipulating the contemporary conclusions of Russian military science concerning the nature of budushchaisa voina:

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 6.

In considering the new trends of the imperialist states in preparing and conducting initial period [of war] military operations, Soviet military science worked out recommendations on preparing to repulse the enemy attack and these basically came down to the following. Modern wars start by surprise, by treachery. Here the concentration and deployment of the invasion army as well as the mobilization of the main enemy forces will be carried out gradually under various pretexts (courses, maneuvers, exercises and so forth). ... The initial period, as before, will be the interval of time from the start of military operations to the entry of the main mass of armed forces into them. Its chief content will be a retaliatory strike against the aggressor invasion army with the forces of the border military districts.... The border district troops in the course of the initial period will repulse the enemy attack and carry military actions into enemy territory with simultaneous mobilization, concentration and deployment of the second strategic echelon, the Soviet Army main forces.1060

In conclusion, General Kir’ian sagaciously observed:

There was a clear need for carrying out measures of a preparatory nature prior to the start of hostilities, including mobilization and strategic deployment of the armed forces for conducting the first operations. There were also trends for increasing the scale and decisiveness of combat, achieving significant results in the initial period capable of having a greater impact on the further course of the war and reducing the length of the initial period.1061

Military doctrine gives Military Science the task of working out scientific problems, connected with researching the character of future war.1062

War undergoes a constant evolution. New weapons create new forms of combat. To foresee this technical evolution accurately, to assess the effect of a new weapon of the course of battle and to employ it before the enemy does are essential conditions of success.1063

1060 Kir’ian, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
1061 Kir’ian, op. cit., p. 9.
1062 Kir’ian, M. M., Problemy voennoi teorii..., p. 83.
A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov - "Foresight!: General Svechin on the Evolution of the Art of War"

The 1920s and early 1930s were a time of stormy development of social thought, including military-political and military-strategic thought. ... Nothing interfered with the free exchange of opinions; participants in debates felt relaxed and believed that they did not all have the right to the absolute truth -- later on this no longer was the case.1064

- A. A. Kokoshin and V. N. Lobov, 1990

The continuity of the dialectic Russian military science process was further reinforced with the publication of the article "Predvidenie!" by Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin, the future, first civilian Russian Deputy Minister of Defense, and the former Chief of the Warsaw Pact and Chief of the General Staff, Army General V. N. Lobov. This authoritative article emerged at a time of dramatic change and unrest within Russia -- there was accelerating social turmoil as the Communist Party was losing its control; the Russian military was increasingly coming under domestic criticism, for their failed strategy in Afghanistan and for the heavy-handedness and corruption of its senior leadership; and young civilian 'democratic reformers' were advocating wholesale changes in Russian military doctrine. Dr. Kokoshin and General Lobov adeptly employed the military science process to illuminate the essential role of the Russian military. The antithesis upon which these authors chose to base their arguments was none other than the 1920s "bold conclusions and profound generalizations" of the former Tsarist General Aleksandr A. Svechin.

First the authors quoted Svechin's writings to establish the unquestionable "superiority of politics over strategy" -- a euphemism that also applied to the Russian military: "The assertion about the domination of politics over strategy, in our opinion, is of worldwide historical importance."\textsuperscript{1063} Using Svechin's authority as a historic military theorist, they then proceeded to strongly criticize the civilian leadership and 'democratic reformers' who were seeking to virtually eliminate the force structure of the Soviet Army:

Responsible political figures should be familiar with strategy ... a politician who sees a political goal for military actions must realize what is attainable for strategy given the resources it has and how policy can influence a change in the situation for better or worse.\textsuperscript{1066}

The best known, indeed, the 'classic cases' of a Russian civilian leader not listening to the advice of his military professionals were attributed to Iosip Stalin during the 1939-40 'Winter War' with Finland and the tragically costly opening days of the Second World War. Kokoshin and Lobov cited these as a very thinly veiled warning to the opponents of a strong Russian military establishment. The authors then concluded:

Today, ... it is all the more important that the top state and political leadership know the theory and practice of military strategy and the implementation by the military mechanism of decisions made by policy. After all, such decisions on the boundary of politics and military affairs can lead to the most fatal, irreversible


\textsuperscript{1066} Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", Moskva znamia, No. 2, February 1990, p. 172.
consequences. They should especially know, it seems, the real capabilities of command and control systems and equipment -- theirs and the enemy's -- communications and reconnaissance systems, and missile warning systems. ... Otherwise policy will not be able to exercise real, but only declarative control over military strategy, and there will be no correspondence between the political and military-technical components of state military doctrine.\textsuperscript{1067}

With their political tyl' (rear) thus secured, Kokoshin and Lobov turned their attention to their main thesis, and principal contemporary concern -- the nature of future war -- predicated on the enduring historical truths contained within Svechin's works from the mid-1920s:

A. A. Svechin wrote that the world had entered a transitional period in which not only Europe but the entire world is beginning to appear as a 'completely new strategic landscape' and in which the art of war in many schools is turning to new methods and techniques of waging war and is acquiring new forms in a situation of social upheavals coming to a head.\textsuperscript{1068}

After discussing in some depth Svechin's views on the dangerous nature of an ideologically-based offensive "war of destruction" strategy, i.e., "the experience of history is not too comforting -- it shows that overestimating the capabilities of strategic offensive operations can lead to catastrophic consequences for the attacker,"\textsuperscript{1069} Kokoshin and Lobov emphasized Svechin's convictions about the protracted nature of future wars and the singular importance of a


state's industrial base, economic resources and mobilization capability before reaching their conclusion that "equally decisive military and political goals can be pursued with a 'strategy of attrition' as with a 'strategy of destruction.'" They then used Svechin's emphasis on the "Red Army's infantry and equipping it with reliable and effective close-combat weapons" as justification for asserting:

The industrial-economic and cultural level of the USSR, despite industrialization and development of education, would not make it possible in the foreseeable future to be equal to the West in the level of being equipped with combat equipment and the ability to properly use it on a strategic and operational scale.

With the above horrendous admission of the failure of the Communist political-economic system, Kokoshin and Lobov moved on to rationalize the requirement for Russia to return to a "defensive" strategy by discussing the correlation between the offensive and defensive on a strategic scale. Here Svechin's *Evoliutsiiia iskusstva voina* was employed to emphasize:

Defense in strategy has the opportunity of using the boundaries and depth of the theater, which forces the attacking side to waste forces in order to strengthen the spaces and to waste time crossing it, and any gain in time is another plus for the defense. The defending side reaps where it sows..., since an offensive is often stopped by false reconnaissance data, false fears, and inertness.


The legendary Clausewitz was brought into the argument as well to emphasize that defense was "the strongest form of waging war for the materially weaker side" before explaining that Svechin examined defensive operations as a "dialectical unit with the offensive -- as a means of ensuring conditions for going over to an effective counteroffensive, resulting in the defeat of the enemy." In other words, "... in the majority of cases, the effectiveness of a strategic counterattack far surpasses in scope the initial thrust of the attacker." Kokoshin and Lobov judged from this analysis that: A. A. Svechin's conclusions were confirmed in many operations of World War II and also have not lost their importance today -- of course, with all the corrections for the development of military technology and new tactical and operational forms of conducting combat operations.

Concerning those new forms of conducting combat operations, Kokoshin and Lobov were unusually candid and fiercely critical of the inadequacy of Russian military education. This was particularly true concerning strategic defense, which they judged "was the only sure method of defeating the enemy" because it integrated "a totality of operations which included counterstrikes and counterattacks at various pre-prepared lines." The authors explained that the educational, and operational, consequence of the banning of Svechin's works was that the theory of strategy was abandoned "as a whole, and

the strategy of defense in particular" -- so much so that in 1936 when the General Staff Academy was established, "a strategy course was not included in its curriculum.\textsuperscript{1076} "No attention was given to the dialectics of the correlation of defense and the offense."\textsuperscript{1077} The blame for this gross failure was laid squarely on Stalin, because "everything pertaining to strategy gradually began to be considered the exclusive right of the supreme leadership"\textsuperscript{1078} -- just as had been the case under successive Tsars prior to the Bolshevik Revolution.

Of special concern, however, to Kokoshin and Lobov were what Svechin labeled "the great devourers of space" -- the emerging technologies of radio, aviation, motor vehicles, and all modern equipment. "Foresight ... is especially valid today, when command and control and communications equipment, transportation equipment, and means of delivering ammunition to the target have developed rapidly."\textsuperscript{1079} Dr. Kokoshin and General Lobov concluded their historic military science lesson with a stern warning based on the experience of the Soviet Army during the Great Patriotic War:

Oriented on an immediate counteroffensive, shifting to a general offensive, groupings not covered by a deeply disposed defense were themselves quite vulnerable to powerful surprise strikes. The command and control and communications system proved to be particularly

\textsuperscript{1076} Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", \textit{Moskva znamia}, No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{1077} Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", \textit{Moskva znamia}, No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{1078} Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", \textit{Moskva znamia}, No. 2, February 1990, p. 179.

vulnerable. Its disruption was almost the main factor that sharply changed the balance of real combat capabilities in the aggressor’s favor. It seems that this factor has not been sufficiently taken into account to this day.\footnote{1080}

The rationale for this assertion was that after the Second World War, ...

... increasingly new political, economic, scientific and technical, and operational-strategic factors ... fundamentally changed, using A. A. Svechin’s expression, the ‘strategic landscape.’ These factors included, above all, nuclear weapons, as well as the evolution of conventional weapons....\footnote{1081}

The authors then introduced a third factor, other than nuclear weapons and the evolution of conventional weaponry, into the nature of future warfare:

After World War II, conventional arms passed through at least three stages in their development, which are sort of permeated by the trend toward an increase in the role of electronic command and control, communications, and intelligence equipment and, accordingly, electronic warfare (EW) equipment. The success of combat operations of any scale on land and at sea is determined now by winning superiority not only in the air, but also over the airwaves.\footnote{1082}

Throughout this important article Kokoshin and Lobov revealed the dialectic continuity in Russian military thought and contributed directly to the process of transforming Russian military doctrine.

\textit{Now, when these problems of the theory of strategy, [and] the art of war as a whole, ... are being widely discussed, it is important to consider them in a historical context and turn to the forgotten or half-forgotten works of Soviet political scientists and military theorists of the 1920s and early 1930s, a prominent place among whom belongs to A. A. Svechin.} \footnote{1083}


\footnote{1083} Kokoshin and Lobov, "Predvidenie!", \textit{Moskva znamia}, No. 2, February 1990, p. 182.
Gaivoronskii’s General Staff Academy Textbook: Military Science -- A Stalwart of State Defense

The basis for preparing [for war] lies in the correct idea about the character of future war, state objectives in such a war, and the armed forces’ missions.1084

Military science studies and generalizes the military-historical experience of human society and reveals the path for practically deciding all military affairs questions in concrete historical conditions.1085

- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii, 1990

The importance of General Gaivoronskii’s new Military Academy of the General Staff textbook, titled Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva (The Basis of Strategy and Operational Art), can be evaluated on several levels.

First, this textbook was written specifically for use by Academy students in understanding the ever changing character of future war. The text was compiled under Gaivoronskii’s direction by proven senior professors and former faculty members of the General Staff Academy -- men such as Generals Grebish, Pelekh, Kasenkov, Smirnov, et al. Historically, each Academy student was 'hand-picked' to attend the General Staff’s course of instruction. Graduates, almost always, were assigned to senior leadership and decisionmaking positions within the Soviet Armed Forces, depending, of course, upon their demonstrated level of performance, singular capabilities, and political connections.

1084 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva, (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy, 1990), p. 79.

1085 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 79.
Second, this textbook is indicative of the overall emphases within the General Staff Academy curriculum and points to the general thought patterns of the 1990s generation of Russian military leaders.

Third, Gaivoronskii's textbook builds on the 1980s works about the "revolution in military-technical affairs" and documents the incorporation of the concept of protracted warfare using advanced military technologies into the General Staff Academy curriculum.

Fourth, Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva is a transition work which evidences the considerable movement within the Russian military science process from preoccupation with offensive "wars of destruction" toward a more holistic future war concept of "wars of attrition," utilizing both offensive and defensive military art to accomplish military objectives assigned by the civilian political leadership.

And finally, the text reveals the continuing responsiveness of the Russian military leadership to directions from their civilian political leaders. This is apparent through its reluctant discussion of the supposition that the defense of the Soviet Union is based on "repelling aggression" -- exactly as proselytized in the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine. It is significant to note, however, that this text displayed very significant differences between the Russian civilian and military leaders about what operational concept constituted a "defensive military doctrine." Based on professional military judgment, the General Staff seriously and rightfully questioned the validity, if not the sanity, of the civilian analysts' "purely" defensive military doctrine.
Osnovy strategii... begins by underscoring the critical significance of military science as a fundamental process for discovering the likely nature of budushchaia voina:

Determining the character of future war is one of the important problems of Soviet military strategy and Soviet military science as a whole. Correct representation about the character of warfare has significance for the entire state, since only on this basis can be answered the questions: with what kind of enemy, in which theater of military action, and for what kind of war is it necessary to prepare the country; what kinds of missions are expected to be decided during the war, what kind of armed forces must the state have, and in what direction must its construction be carried out; what kind of exertion will the war demand from the entire population.1086

Predicated on this definitive statement, General Gaivoronskii stressed the vital importance of state economic development by dialectically utilizing Lenin to assert that "without serious economic preparations conducting contemporary warfare against the leading imperialists ... is impossible"1087 since "in present conditions scientific-technical progress exerts an especially great influence on the character of war."1088 That is to say, "The level of development of science and technology exerts a decisive impact on the perfection of armaments, military technology, [and] the creation of new weaponry."1089 Then, just to make sure that Academy students would not forget the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on

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1089 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 28.
the nature of budushchaia voina, the General repeated himself:

The decisive influences on the character of war and, principally, on its strategic content, are military-technical factors. ... The leading place among the military-technical factors is occupied by armaments and military technology.1090

Gaivoronskii then enumerated a few of the new military technologies that were rapidly changing the nature of future war. Concerning nuclear war, he stated that "owing to the achievements of basic science there is the possibility to focus the energy of a nuclear explosion, creating a directed energy nuclear munition of less mass and power." He noted that conventional weapons with "greatly increased accuracy, range, rate of fire, and explosive power" demonstrated a tendency toward a "sharply increased effectiveness of conventional weapon strikes with highly reliable and accurate precision-guided munitions," which will lead to a "broadened zone of possible combat action and a growing role and significance of the initial period of war and of its first operation."1091

Of particular significance within Osnovy strategii... is Chapter 4, "The Preparation of the Armed Forces to Repel Aggression," which describes the "main trends" (glavnye napravlenia) for the development of military capabilities required to conduct future war. Gaivoronskii and his cohorts stressed that "the economy always has a decisive influence on the conduct of wars, but its role has grown especially in contemporary conditions, when already in peacetime huge expenditures ... are required to constantly ensure the required armed

forces' military-technical level. And, to make sure the students did not miss the point about the necessity for civilian and military leaders to modernize the armed forces, the authors emphasized:

The most important factor, which has a direct influence on the preparation for the armed forces for war, is the state's economic condition -- that is the development level of science and technology, production, agriculture, transportation, demographic composition, and the extent of the population's preparation -- but also the physical-geographic conditions of the countries and the TVD. The peacetime development of the armed forces was described as being accomplished "in accordance with the overall state economic development plan, new scientific achievements in weaponry and military technology, and the character of international conditions." The authors next listed the "main trends in the development of military science" as,

all aspect investigation of prospective world military-political conditions -- military, economic, scientific-technical, and morale-political potentials of countries, possible variants of escalating wars by aggressors, their scale, form and capability of conducting [war]; determination of prospective developments of principally new types of weapons and military technology, and the possibility of their production. 

This section about military science concluded with the statement: "The central trend of military science development is the determination of the possible character of war in the modern era and the study of fundamental problems of military art."

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1093 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 79.
Increasing the level of combat readiness of the armed forces was considered by the authors to be a critical task, and the specific "main trends" for accomplishing this were listed as,

- Equipage of the army and navy with modern weaponry and military technologies and their maintenance in constant readiness for combat use;
- Perfection of the [command and] control system;
- Preparation of all armed forces personnel for complicated and various decisive tasks in modern wartime conditions;
- Perfection of the organizational capabilities of commanders, headquarters, political organs, of their knowledge how to practically accomplish sound and continuous troop command and control in all conflict conditions;
- Increase the effectiveness of military-scientific investigations and incorporate their results in practical armed forces preparations.  

Almost hesitantly, as if in lament, the authors cautioned that there are two, mutually interdependent, sides to "armed forces building":

One is the theory of building the armed forces, the other side is the practical actions by the government and the highest military leadership organs to accomplish all measures.... The theory and practice of armed forces building are based on the conditions of state military doctrine and are completely subordinate to it.  

While submitting to the Communist Party "primacy of politics" and suggesting that both internal domestic and foreign factors played a role in the ability of the armed forces to modernize, the collective returned to their primary emphasis, that "in modern conditions, the influence of military-technical factors continuously increases" and "the most important factors" in armed forces building are:

- The general level of military-scientific development in one's own country and abroad; the results of military-scientific investigations and studies; [and] other scientifically substantiated conditions related to military affairs.  

1099 Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 94.
In constructing the armed forces, the authors considered that: "The improvement of technical equipment occupies one of the central places, since, in conditions of a hurricane of military-technical progress, matters of force military-technical equipage are one of the primary indicators of military readiness." Consequently, they stipulated that the equipage of the armed forces was "determined by military-technical policy" and,

the most important trends of military-technical policy are: system integration technologies; improvement of interaction between various internal complexes of each type of armed force [and] service branch; unification and standardization of weaponry, of all military technology, [and] the reduction of all types of [weapon] categories.

Concluding the section about armed forces construction, the textbook authors asserted: "The important trend in improving the capability of weaponry and military technology is the modernization of already existing weapons systems." With none too disguised dissatisfaction, they warned the 'democratic reform' political leadership that: "Military science cries out for decisions on tasks of a deep investigative character concerning the necessities of modern war, for clarifying the [decision] mechanism by revealing their objective laws, the developmental tendencies of armed combat means, [and] the methods of conducting military action."

The nature of *budushchaia voina* was envisioned only in vague general terms: "World war ... will have global dimensions" and, modern operations will be characterized by decisive goals, highly directed and dynamic action; great expanse of scale; sharp struggle to seize and to maintain the initiative; unequal development of military action on the battlefields and in regions of active engagement; abrupt and frequent changes of combat conditions, and a large variety of methods of military action.\textsuperscript{1104}

Further on the authors explained more explicitly that in a future war the "fundamental method of military action" would be by, combined arms forces, both with use of nuclear weapons and also conventional high-accuracy weapons (reconnaissance-strike system and complex), simultaneously to strike important military-economic, military, and other enemy targets, his groups of troops (forces) throughout the entire depth of their deployment with their subsequent complete destruction.\textsuperscript{1105}

In an unusually pointed display of the durability of their Soviet General Staff Academy professional military education, as reinforced by a lifetime of service within the Soviet Army and the Communist Party, General Gaivoronskii and his fellow textbook authors were adamant in their rejection of the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine based on "defensive sufficiency":

... By defense alone it is impossible to destroy an aggressor. Therefore, after repelling the attack, troops and forces must be capable of conducting a decisive offensive. The transition to it will take the form of a counterattack....\textsuperscript{1106}

General Gaivoronskii and his co-authors remained convinced, based upon their interpretation of the 'laws of warfare' revealed

\textsuperscript{1104} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., *Osnovy strategii...*, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{1105} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., *Osnovy strategii...*, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{1106} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., *Osnovy strategii...*, p. 118.
through the military science process, that: "The offensive is the most important type of military action since only by a decisive offensive can the complete destruction of the enemy's offensive forces be achieved." They recognized, first, that initial defensive operations followed by a counterattack (offensive), employing either nuclear weapons or conventional weapons alone, could "destroy the enemy's most important frontal groups of forces in the border regions throughout their depth." Second, that "the anti-air operation has special significance" because the achievement and maintenance of air superiority was the key to the success of combat operations. And third, that "this method of conducting a combined arms operation takes on a decisive character." Aleksandr Svechin's "war of attrition" concept had not as yet cast into oblivion the entrenched Soviet concept of the "decisive offensive," or "war of destruction;" however, the Gaivoronskii textbook documents the trend of Russian military science away from exclusive focus on the offense toward the incorporation of new offensive and defensive concepts in strategic and operational planning.

The conclusions of Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva are particularly important because, based upon the results of the 1991 Gulf War, the text demonstrates the success of the Russian military science process in evaluating the changing nature of warfare and in creating a military theory commensurate to those changes. This is especially true because in 1990 no evidentiary proof existed


\(^{1108}\) Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 133.
of the "revolution in military-technical affairs" in actual applied combat operations -- it had not yet occurred. General Gaivoronskii and his colleagues wrote of the growing tendency for future war combat operations to be characterized by "the increasing role of operational-level units in decisive strategic missions."\textsuperscript{1109}

Inbudushchaia voina, the authors opined:

The deployment [of forces] and a strictly designed system of operational control on the basis of a unitary plan will ensure the desired destruction of nuclear means and [command and] control systems; gaining air superiority and fire superiority in the decisive direction; simultaneously engaging the enemy from the front, rear, and in the air; repelling an invasion through defensive troop activity and destroying his most important groups of forces by means of a high-tempo counterattack (offensive).\textsuperscript{1110}

They explained:

Changes are taking place also in the content of the principles for preparing and conducting operations. The principle of decisive concentration of forces in the most important direction at the decisive moment in order to accomplish the main mission in contemporary conditions is characterized by the trend for the use by the first echelon of qualitatively new powerful fire means and the most capable units in terms of fire and anti-tank defenses in order to repel the enemy invasion using reinforced and highly mobile troop (force) groups for a counterattack (offensive). The changes in quantity and quality are shown by the [reduced] density of forces and means, the [increased] capability and [reduced] time period for creating combat groups. The qualitative side of this trend is influenced by scientific-technical progress [which] is becoming predominant. Already at the present stage the achievement of superiority over the enemy is realized, mainly, by the means of rapid concentration of forces, of fire means, and troop maneuver in the selected direction.\textsuperscript{1111}

\textsuperscript{1109} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., \textit{Osnovy strategii}..., p. 209.

\textsuperscript{1110} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., \textit{Osnovy strategii}..., p. 209.

Gaivoronskii underscored that in modern combat operations further developments were being realized in the principles of troop maneuver and the maneuver of forces and fires with the result being the "growing role of fire destruction." The textbook concluded:

Fire destruction of the enemy is of especially important significance during the transition of troops to the counterattack, but also the conduct of powerful fire strikes, effective use of aviation, parachutists, and mobile units during the development of successful counterattack (offensive) operations.¹¹¹²

The authors also determined that:

Reconnaissance is elevated to an extraordinary significance; as is the constant growth of the tendencies to advance the importance of [command and] control (upravlenie) in deciding the operational missions, the increasing extent and complexity of the control tasks, the demands of constant readiness of the control organs to accomplish unexpected tasks, the growing role of combined arms commanders' staffs in the preparation and the conduct of operations necessitates a secure, enduring [command and] control system.¹¹¹³

This important General Staff Academy textbook, which incorporated the findings from military-science investigations concerning the "revolution in military-technical affairs" into the military theory and military art of the Soviet/Russian Armed Forces, stated:

... Modern operations are marked by the definite tendencies connected with increased striking power, mobility, maneuverability, and ensuring the safety of troops (forces), by seizing and maintaining air superiority, by maintaining constant high military readiness through increased deployment and unexpected troop (force) actions, by routing large enemy groups through means of high-tempo use of new forms and capabilities of action.¹¹¹⁴

¹¹¹² Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 211.
Truly the General Staff had seen the future of advanced technological warfare through the lens of its military science process and, as was its historic responsibility, had made a concerted effort through the publication of Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva to educate both future military leaders and the civilian government leaders about the crucial implications for the security of Russia and the Soviet Union. The full impact of emerging technologies on future war was not fully evident in 1990 but, to the professional military scientists of the General Staff and General Staff Academy, the evidence was conclusive -- Soviet and Russian military-technical policy had to be changed and sophisticated advanced military technologies produced, if their armed forces were to gain and retain "world class standards" in the ever-accelerating era of technological progress that constitutes the 'Information/Computer Age.'

The development of military science is becoming one of the most important directions of building and developing the armed forces. It allows the attainment of an acceleration of military-technical progress and the decision of military-technical policy tasks for military construction.\textsuperscript{1115}

The determining factor in the changing character of operations, of their preparation and conduct, is the means of armed combat.\textsuperscript{1116}

The unity of state interests ... at this time demands agreement about the strengthening of state defenses, in this matter the sphere of military science -- the theory of military art -- is the central stalwart.\textsuperscript{1117}

- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii, 1990

\textsuperscript{1115} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva, (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy, 1990), p. 106.

\textsuperscript{1116} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 114.

\textsuperscript{1117} Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., Osnovy strategii..., p. 4.
Igor N. Rodionov: The Military Academy of the General Staff View of Budushchaia Voina

Military science shows us that there are two forms of military action -- offensive and defensive. In the past, the offensive form of military action was decisive when the concept of victory was equated with annihilating one's enemy, occupying his territory and enforcing total surrender. In the era of nuclear weapons these military goals are no longer possible because they will lead to mutual destruction. We therefore reject offensive action in the opening phase of any war.1118

- General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, 1990

While the Soviet Union was in the throes of political dissolution and economic collapse, some of the most precise evidence of the dialectic nature of the Russian military science process; of the authoritative use of commissions and conferences to advance that military science process; of the continuity within Russian military thought between the past, present, and future; and of the specific vision heralded by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's "revolution in military-technical affairs"1119 began to be openly and candidly discussed. A total of five military-academic exchanges were held between the United States' National Defense University (NDU) and the Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff (MAGS) in Washington, DC and Moscow, USSR between May 1989 and June 1991.

During the first-ever 'get acquainted' exchange visit held in Washington, DC in May 1989, only a glimmering of Soviet military

1118 Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, United States' National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.

thinking about future war came from Colonel Aleksandr S. Skvortsov:

Three trends are evidence of the new Soviet 'defensive doctrine': 1) changes in military art which define how we will employ forces; 2) the reconstruction of our force structure which is now in transition; 3) our preparation and training as shown by our operational and tactical exercises. Military science has revealed a new relationship between the offensive and defensive. This new relationship has created a major problem for us -- reconnaissance. 1120

A few months earlier, however, the Commander of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Army General G. I. Salmanov, had indicated in a 1988 Voennaia mysl' article that the Soviet Union had to be prepared for "all types of wars," but with primary focus on a protracted world war in which "the belligerents will strive to achieve their strategic and political objectives using only conventional means of destruction." 1121

During the second NDU-MAGS exchange, held in Moscow, USSR in September 1989, the new MAGS Commandant, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, set the tone for the visit. He very forcefully stated his conviction that "emerging technology weapons are approaching nuclear weapons in effectiveness." Upon agreement with General Rodionov's assessment, followed by the suggestion that Marshal Ogarkov's 1982 and 1985 books had arrived at the same conclusion, General Rodionov


replied, "Does this mean that in the future it will be possible to accomplish strategic goals without seizing territory?" Following a thoughtful pause and mutual agreement, General Rodionov concluded, "Yes, in the next 20-30 years emerging technology weapons will change the nature of strategic operations." 1122

Rear Admiral Viacheslav N. Shcherbakov, the Commandant of the Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, and deputy head of the Soviet exchange delegation, expressed great concern about the possible character of a future war saying that "Soviet offensive forces will be made obsolete through the deployment of emerging technologies." This concern was echoed by Captain First Rank Anatoli A. Rimskii, the Military Assistant for Strategy to Soviet Minister of Defense Iazov. Captain Rimskii averred that: "SDI, the development of space systems, and operational concepts for space systems are the most important factors we must understand as we initiate our defensive doctrine."

Colonel Vladimir I. Slipchenko, a specialist on ballistic missile defenses and Senior Professor of the MAGS Air Defense Operational Arts Faculty, suggested that "space is the single most important factor for understanding and forecasting modern war." 1123 Clearly, from these preliminary discussions, Russian military science had continued to investigate the nature of budushchaia voina, dialectically building on the work of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.


1123 Author’s conversations with Rear Admiral V. A. Shcherbakov, Captain First Rank A. A. Rimskii, and Colonel V. I. Slipchenko, Moscow, USSR, September 1989.
The extent of that continuity and the predicted nature of the transformation of future warfare would be revealed during subsequent plenary exchange and personal discussions.

General-Colonel Rodionov introduced the plenary discussion topic for September 21, 1989, "The Character of Modern War":

The socio-political and military-technical aspects of modern war and future war are both critical and complicated matters. Formerly our assessments were based on the experience of past wars -- particularly on the experience of the Great Patriotic War -- but now fundamental changes in the global political-military and military-technical situation have created conditions which make it most difficult to frame the character of future war due to the length of time between wars. A mistake in our assessment or in force development could be catastrophic -- much more grave than during World War II. We therefore place special emphasis on the importance of this subject. I would stress, however, that we no longer consider war to be inevitable.¹¹²⁴

General Rodionov then called upon Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov to describe the characteristics of modern war and the factors considered during the Russian military science process in order to reach this assessment. Skvortsov first explained, "In peacetime, the possibility of a global war places restraint on political-military actions; yet, the fundamentally new character of weapons, if put into wide use, will create a completely new form of combat."¹¹²⁵ Skvortsov then enumerated the following six factors as the basis of the Russian military science analytical framework:


1) initial period of conflict;  
2) likely intensity and scale of combat;  
3) employment means;  
4) consequences to our economy and population;  
5) duration of war; and  
6) influence of US and NATO doctrine.

Colonel Skvortsov continued:

We consider war to be a condition forced upon us -- a totally irresponsible action by others. We no longer teach about surprise and preemption at the General Staff Academy; however, Soviet Army defensive operations will not be defensive to the end of a war. The Soviet Army will act decisively to protect the Soviet state if an enemy does not cease operations immediately.  

Next he presented his assessment that "the character of modern war, either nuclear or conventional, will be as follows":

1) extremely high intensity operations that will be dynamic and at a high tempo;  
2) broad global extent, to include operations in space;  
3) extremely destructive combat, more so than ever before;  
4) huge expenditure of resources to seize and maintain the initiative;  
5) disappearance of a 'front line' or first echelon so that an effective FEBA no longer exists; rather 'zones of combat' up to 100 km wide and deep will be created;  
6) no country or area will be safe as no 'deep rear' will exist;  
7) strategic goals will be achieved through combined arms operations such that no one weapons system, such as tanks, can be singled out and the effectiveness of other weapons systems ignored;  
8) the destruction of nuclear and chemical plants will be a disaster during either a nuclear or conventional war. The Soviet Union, however, does not specifically target nuclear or chemical plants -- Chernobyl' is too fresh in our minds; and  
9) nuclear war could liquidate the world's population.
Following Colonel Skvortsov's very specific presentation when asked for an explanation of the difference between 'modern' (sovremennaia) and 'future' (budushchaia) war -- terms which all Russian discussants seemed to be using interchangeably -- Captain Rimskii replied that the two terms have very distinct and specific meanings. He explained that "Eight to ten years ago [around 1980], we ceased using the term budushchaia voina because it implied the inevitability of war. Sovremennaia voina studies assess the near-term period 5-10 years into the future; while military science forecasts 10-20 years and 20-30 years into the future."\(^\text{1128}\) Captain Rimskii's explanations of the terms 'modern' and 'future' may have a considerable long-term significance because, during the following NDU-MAGS exchanges, no further mention of sovremennaia voina was made by Russian military officers -- implying the extension of a period of peace for the next 5-10 years, i.e., from 1995-2000. Ominously, however, in all subsequent discussions the Russian General Staff officers consistently insisted on using the term budushchaia voina, with its implied inevitability of war some 10-30 years in the future, i.e., in the 2000-2020 timeframe.

Colonel Evgenii G. Korotchenko, Deputy Director of the MAGS Operational Arts Faculty, concluded the plenary discussions of the character of future war with a most provocative, and prescient, statement concerning the crucial significance of emerging technologies:

\(^{1128}\) Author's conversation with Captain First Rank A. A. Rimskii, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.
New weapons now under development will lead to the total vulnerability of every state during any war. In modern warfare there is an increased importance of information systems and automated controls. These improved information systems increase operational effectiveness. The side which uses time most effectively will 'win'; and 'winning' could well mean loss of national control, not the seizure of territory. We believe that on the battlefield of the 1990s information systems incorporating artificial intelligence still will be vulnerable. There could also emerge unexpected capabilities and systems in the future; we should consider these possibilities. Even in a so-called conventional war there could be wide vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{1129}

The third NDU-MAGS exchange took place at the U.S. National Defense University, Ft. Leslie J. McNair, Washington, DC and the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI between May 29 and June 5, 1990. During the opening discussions Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov addressed the Soviet military "main task in the 1990s" as "the perfection of new organizational structures." Skvortsov affirmed that:

The focus of our military reorganization has changed emphasis from quantity to quality -- actually this change began well before arms control negotiations began to accelerate toward agreements. Of special importance to our reorganization is the improvement of all aspects of our air defence forces -- territorial, anti-ballistic missile, space, and electronic warfare. While we will emphasize the improvement of our air defenses, we will continue the modernization of our naval and army forces to achieve a 'sufficient' balance.\textsuperscript{1130}

In separate personal discussions throughout the week-long exchange with General Rodionov, Colonel Skvortsov and Captain Anatoli Rimskii, each, individually and separately, confirmed that

\textsuperscript{1129} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 21, 1989.

\textsuperscript{1130} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, United States' National Defense University, Washington, DC, May 31, 1990.
the originator of the Soviet military perestroika (transformation) concept was Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Each referred to passages from Ogarkov’s 1985 book Istoriia uchit bditel’nosti -- almost verbatim -- when stressing the critical importance of the "revolution in military-technical affairs" that was being created by "emerging technology weaponry."

Discussions with Colonel Skvortsov were particularly helpful in reaching an understanding of the dialectic foundation for Marshal Ogarkov’s work, which Skvortsov described as being based on the unpublished 1919-1922 lectures of General A. M. Zaionchkovskii, the distinguished voenspeta faculty member at the RKKA Military Academy. Shared unpublished passages from Zaionchkovskii’s lecture notes, which were discussed in some detail, emphasized that "the superiority of quality over quantity will lead to victory." During these talks, Colonel Skvortsov explained that while the Soviet military was attempting to maintain the full range of its capabilities, despite the domestic political and economic turmoil,

in the General Staff Academy curriculum we no longer are emphasizing as heavily the works of Isserson, Triandafillov and Tukhachevskii [the creators of the offensive ‘deep battle’ and ‘deep operations’ concepts during the late 1920s and 1930s which were applied to Soviet military art as the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) concept during the 1980s]; rather we are now including the more balanced works of their contemporary military theorists Svechin and Frunze.

1131 Author’s conversations with Gen-Col. I. N. Rodionov, Captain First Rank A. A. Rimskii, and Colonel A. A. Skvortsov, Washington, DC and Newport, RI, June 1990.

1132 Author’s conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.

1133 Author’s conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
When asked about how the Russian military concept of "active operations" was to be integrated into the new Soviet "defensive doctrine," Colonel Skvortsov's abbreviated response was: "Preemptive actions were to be excluded from the opening phase of a war, but that 'active operations' would be utilized from a defensive posture in order to seize the initiative from an enemy." Admiral Shcherbakov, who had joined this particular discussion in progress, concluded the conversation by saying: "For the Soviet Navy there is no longer a clear distinction between offensive and defensive actions, since at sea there are no clear lines to defend."

On June 1, 1990 during the plenary discussion session at the National Defense University, the newly promoted General-Major Evgenii Korotchenko gave a most illuminating presentation on Soviet military actions at the outset of a war. General Korotchenko said:

Since time is the decisive factor during the initial period of war, there will be a strong temptation by either side to preempt during the mobilization and deployment phases. We view the following four critical missions as the key to successful defense: (1) forming a breakthrough penetration of the enemy forces through a massive surprise counterattack; (2) destroying the enemy command and control, communications, and information system; (3) eliminating the enemy's military-industrial base; (4) eliminating the enemy's reserve forces.

Author's conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.

Author's conversation with Rear Admiral V. A. Shcherbakov and Colonel A. A. Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.

Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, United States' National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 1, 1990.
And concluded his presentation by asserting:

The attacker always has the initiative. We will seize the initiative first at the operational level and then develop that action to the strategic scale. We would assume an unacceptable risk of failure were we to delay seizing the initiative; thus, on several axes we will seize the initiative almost immediately. Our counterattack will make full use of radio-electronic measures and will begin the first moment that aggression against the Soviet Union is detected.1137

At this point General-Colonel Rodionov framed a most haunting question. His inquiry demonstrated the depth of vision developed through the Russian military science process:

In a future war is it possible that without the use of ground forces or nuclear weapons, the employment of air, naval, and space precision-guided munitions could lead to victory?1138

During a concluding plenary session at the U.S. Naval War College, General Rodionov answered his rhetorical question and explained with great clarity his concept of budushchaia voina:

For hundreds of years victory in war was achieved through the seizure of territory. That stereotype no longer applies, and we are now examining the concept of military victory without territorial occupation. This concept already exists in the General Staff Academy and at the General Staff. We are developing this capability especially in space through the use of command and control systems and precision-guided weapons. We believe that in a properly executed surprise attack employing precision-guided conventional munitions, it will be impossible for an enemy to retaliate. We are entering an entirely new era of weaponry and weapons effects. Our experience with the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster taught us that we cannot send soldiers into, or fight in, areas...
contaminated by radiation. Victory in this new type of warfare will result from destroying the military and the military-industrial base of the enemy so that he cannot continue the conflict. The extent of the damage inflicted depends on the duration of enemy resistance and political objectives.\textsuperscript{1139}

Rodionov ended with this most thought-provoking statement:

No one wants war -- of that I am convinced -- but we General Staff officers must plan for the worst case contingency of a general war. Today we cannot inflict on any enemy unacceptable damage using only conventional weapons. But, in the none too distant future, it will be possible to paralyze military forces, a nation's economy, and its command and control system through precision attacks on nuclear and chemical plants, as well as on command and control nodes. Ideological war cannot be won without the total destruction of the enemy -- of an entire people -- along with destruction of their economic infrastructure. In a future war this will no longer be necessary as the destruction of military capabilities and the military infrastructure will be sufficient.\textsuperscript{1140}

According to Captain Rimskii one of the principal focal points for future war planning is the General Staff Military Science Directorate, which was headed at this time by General-Colonel Makhmut Gareev, who had broached some of these same future war concepts in \textit{M. V. Frunze - Voennyi teoretik}.\textsuperscript{1141} In subsequent discussions with General Rodionov, and with other members of the Soviet delegation, it became absolutely certain that Russian military scientists and the military leadership had concluded that victory will be possible in a

\textsuperscript{1139} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 4, 1990. (The BOLD of "especially in space" is this author's due to the emphasis placed by General-Colonel Rodionov.)

\textsuperscript{1140} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 4, 1990.

\textsuperscript{1141} Author's conversation with Captain First Rank Anatoli A. Rimskii, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
future war without the use of ground forces or nuclear weapons, and that the General Staff was seriously studying and planning methods to accomplish this goal -- certainly not in 1990 or in the immediate future -- but within the projected 10-30-year time horizon of their budushchaia voina concept.1142

General Rodionov’s discourses on the nature of future war were neither propaganda nor disinformation. Rather, they were a concise indication of General Staff conceptual thinking on the changing nature of warfare and of the investigations performed by Russian military science to develop appropriate offenses and defenses for the new environment. General Rodionov was deadly serious when he talked about Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov’s singular role in identifying the "revolution in military-technical affairs" resulting from "the emerging technologies of conventional precision-guided weaponry that takes on the characteristics of weapons of mass destruction."1143

It is particularly significant to note that in June 1990, such visions of future war were most provocative and controversial. But, the content of these proposals was prepared well over a year before the 1991 Gulf War operationally proved the substance of Ogarkov’s thesis, thereby validating the Russian military science process.

The prescient nature of Russian military science became all the more evident during the fourth NDU-MAGS exchange, held at the Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow and the Kuznetsov

1142 Author’s conversation with General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
1143 Author’s conversation with General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.
Naval Academy in Leningrad, between September 7-16, 1990. While the likely nature of future war continued to dominate the discussions, during the intervening four months between exchanges, a notable shift in the ideological emphasis of the General Staff Academy officers had occurred. According to the Soviet officers, this was attributed in large part to the July 5, 1990 signing of the London Declaration in which "our leaders have mutually declined to consider our countries as enemies." Gone were the confrontational remarks extolling the 'superiority' of Communist ideology that had punctuated previous discussions. In their place appeared an almost plaintive repetition of the need for mutual cooperation. During the opening plenary discussion session in Moscow, General Rodionov explained:

Overall, I am very optimistic about the future of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Still, the threat to us posed by Third World countries is unlikely to disappear, and this fact will change military art in four ways: 1) increased attention must be paid to the defense of state borders and of our national territory; 2) with reduced military budgets and force structure, the effective employment of both large and small units becomes critical; 3) force mobility becomes more important than ever before since defensive forces must be concentrated within a theater at the decisive point and time; 4) efficient peregruppirovka sil [regrouping of forces] is critical to successful defensive action with limited forces.1145

The Russian military concept of peregruppirovka sil (regrouping of forces) is an exceedingly important, particularly detailed and complicated construct that applies individually to branches of arms

1144 Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 1990.

and to combined arms operations, that is, to Western armed services and joint operations. It can apply either to the reinforcement of existing forces or to mobilization of entirely new units, in order to create conditions for an attack or for the successful development of a promising operational direction. The _peregruppirovka sil_ concept also applies to the ability to change an operation that is already underway to a new direction. In all cases the essential element is the capability to secretly concentrate the strategic or operational reserve at the decisive point and time. Historical evidence abounds from the Great Patriotic War (World War II) of the successful application of this Russian military art concept at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.\textsuperscript{1146} As such, _peregruppirovka sil_ is a 'fundamental law' of Russian military art that remains as pertinent today as it was fifty years ago -- perhaps even more so according to General-Colonel Rodionov.\textsuperscript{1147}

By prior mutual agreement, an entire day of plenary sessions was devoted to discussion of "The Influence of New Weapons and Technology on the Military Arts of Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces." In his opening remarks General-Major Slipchenko focused on the

\textsuperscript{1146} For excellent descriptions of the _peregruppirovka sil_ concept in action during preparations for such major battles/strategic operations as Stalingrad and Kursk, see Shtemenko, Army General S. M., _Sovetski general'nyi shtab v gody voiny_, 2 vol., (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981); also, for a full military-theoretical discussion of the importance of strategic _peregruppirovka_ and _Osnovy peregruppirovok sil_, see Gaivoronskii, F. F., ed., _Osnovy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva_, (Moscow: Voroshilov General Staff Academy, 1990), pp. 87-88 and 143-149.

\textsuperscript{1147} Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 1990.
importance of the Russian budushchaia voina concept as "the critical planning framework for future force development, deployment, and possible operational employment." At this time General Slipchenko, a recently promoted air defense specialist, was serving as Director of the MAGS Military Science Department. He explained:

Our two countries are currently in a nuclear stalemate which assures mutual annihilation in the event of a war between us. The emergence of new precision-guided conventional weapons and real-time reconnaissance capabilities, however, is creating revolutionary changes in military art and strategy. The analysis by our General Staff reveals:

1) The secret movement of forces will no longer be possible.
2) The traditional 'rear' will be as much a battlefield as the front lines.
3) The destructiveness of these new weapons will negate any significant role for war readiness material stocks.
4) Large-scale strategic attacks will be possible throughout the depth of a nation's economy.
5) Command and control functions will be totally destroyed.
6) The economy of combatants will be paralyzed.

Slipchenko continued:

War outcome will be determined by a single massed strike by precision-guided conventional weapons. Consequently, the traditional role of conventional armed forces equipped with infantry, tanks, and artillery is virtually eliminated. The entire territory of the adversaries becomes the battlefield. There will be no distinction between the 'front' and the 'rear.' We project that in the future there will be neither flanks to turn nor lines of communication [LoCs] to protect. We will retain strategic nuclear weapons, but at significantly reduced levels since they will be needed only to eliminate the most extensively hardened targets. Even these current

1148 Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy (until August 26, 1990 designated the Grechko Naval Academy), Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.

1149 Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.
nuclear weapons will be gradually replaced by a smaller number of modernized 'third generation' [enhanced radiation, microwave, particle-beam, and nuclear-excited x-ray laser] nuclear weapons. Finally, warfighting capabilities can be transferred into space to create entirely new forms for achieving strategic missions.\textsuperscript{1130}

General Slipchenko's concluding thought, which revealed the thoroughness of the Russian military science process, will long remain worthy of consideration and will require concerted mutual action: "The revolutionary change in military art leading to the future war concept that I have described is already beginning. The leaders of both our countries must deal with it."\textsuperscript{1131}

At the end of the day-long discussions on "The Influence of New Weapons and Technology on the Military Arts of Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces," Captain First Rank Iuri P. Gladishev, a Senior Instructor at the MAGS Department of Naval Operational Art, introduced the salient point that "new technologies are creating a whole new science called 'The Theory of Combat Systems,' through which real-time integration of intelligence and strike systems is being developed."\textsuperscript{1132} General Evgenii Korotchenko then concluded the September 1990 exchange by emphatically, indeed almost passionately, reiterating the Russian military science finding that: "Precision-guided munitions [PGMs] are

\textsuperscript{1130} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.

\textsuperscript{1131} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.

\textsuperscript{1132} Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.
approaching the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons in their effectiveness."^1153

In November 1990 Voennaia mvy' published a Special Edition in which the key portions of the Ministry of Defense draft Soviet military doctrine and military reform requirements were discussed. To a considerable degree this draft reflected the content of the presentations made by the General Staff officers during the NDU-MAGS exchanges. The basic premises of the revised military doctrine were: first, a global nuclear war would be a catastrophe for all mankind, because it could not be limited and there could be no victors; and, second, modern conventional warfare could be both global and protracted with advanced conventional munitions, i.e., precision-guided weaponry, was becoming the "basic means of warfare."^1154

The proposed ten-year-long reform plan specifically called for an increase in defense spending between 1996 and 2000, apparently in order to accomplish the plan's stated objective "to reduce the military-technical lag behind NATO forces -- above all in systems such as long-range, conventionally-armed precision missiles and automated weapons control and command and control systems -- and to concentrate efforts on developing new spheres of military equipment and advanced technologies."^1155 Further, the principal direction of

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^1153 Author's notes, NDU-MAGS Exchange Plenary Session, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 13, 1990.


military-technical policy was described as being toward "a qualitative upgrading of arms and military equipment based on the latest scientific-technical achievements and cutting-edge technologies, the timely creation of a scientific-technical reserve, and the exploitation of basic and exploratory research in creating new weapons of war." The substantive and practical content of this new military doctrine and military reform, as proposed by the Defense Ministry in 1990, beyond any doubt bore the engraved imprint of the visionary thinking of Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov about the likely nature of future war.

In March 1991 at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, General-Major Vladimir I. Slipchenko presented an important lecture titled "Impending Changes to Reform Plans for Employing the Soviet Armed Forces." In this lecture, he elaborated on the nature of future war in light of the results of the January-February 1991 Persian Gulf War. Slipchenko stated that the continuing development of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic offensive weaponry was creating "essentially a new type of war -- the aerospace war."

Further, he explained that "third-generation" nuclear weapons -- a category in which he included nuclear-excited x-ray lasers and nuclear microwave as well as kinetic energy weapons -- were creating a means to escape from the "nuclear impasse" of "mutually assured

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"destruction" created by existing nuclear weaponry. This was because, according to Slipchenko, "third-generation" nuclear weapons are "environmentally clean" and can be employed both from sea-based and space-based platforms to destroy an opponent's ground-based civilian and military infrastructure. While stating that the technologies for these new weapons are available already, Slipchenko reflected that it was necessary only to accumulate "sufficient quantities" in order to make "aerospace war" a viable possibility. He predicted that by the year 2000 the deployment of advanced or emerging technologies weapons -- reconnaissance-strike complexes, long-range cruise missiles, precision-guided missiles, "stealth" technologies, space-based and directed-energy weapons, and "third generation" nuclear weapons -- would make "aerospace war" a reality.\textsuperscript{1158}

General Slipchenko judged that in such a technologically advanced war it no longer would be necessary to seize an enemy's territory in order to be victorious. He defined "three criteria for achieving victory": 1) destruction of the opponent's armed forces; 2) destruction of military-economic potential; and 3) collapse of the opponent's political system. Slipchenko continued, perhaps just a little disingenuously since, even in the early 1960s, Marshal Sokolovskii wrote about the offensive and defensive properties of "space-based weapons,"\textsuperscript{1159} that in the past Soviet views about the nature of future war were primarily "two dimensional," however, now air-delivered and space-based weapons systems "are giving war a new,

\textsuperscript{1158} Slipchenko, "Impending Changes...," Lecture, March 1991.

third dimension." In the meantime, until adequate quantities of advanced technology weapons are produced and deployed, Slipchenko concluded that the Persian Gulf War had been a "transitionary war" -- "a clash between two concepts of warfare" -- with the loser, Iraq, employing past concepts and the winning coalition, led by the United States, using "air attack weaponry as the basis for victory."¹¹⁶⁰

As such, Slipchenko viewed the Gulf War as "the prototype of a technological operation." Future war would be conducted through the massive employment of advanced weapon technologies in the form of robotics, electronic warfare systems, long-range guided missiles, remotely piloted vehicles, reconnaissance, and space-based weapons. Each would utilize "artificial intelligence" information systems to accomplish near-real-time targeting and strikes throughout the depth of an enemy's territory. On this battlefield of the future, all borders and flanks, all concepts of 'front' and 'rear' would vanish. Distinctions between tactics, operational art, and strategy disappear as well, because, precision strikes can be conducted at will against the priority targets of the enemy's state -- the military command and control system and military forces, wherever located. Disturbingly, according to Slipchenko's vision, "surprise" is "decisive for the course and outcome" of this new form of war, since non-nuclear precision strikes throughout the opponent's target set can be planned in advance and executed at will. Thus, the initial period of war becomes "essentially the only period in future war."¹¹⁶¹


The fifth, and final, NDU-MAGS exchange discussions took place at the U.S. National Defense University in Washington, DC and at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, between May 28 and June 4, 1991. In the decisive aftermath of the Gulf War between the augmented NATO allies and Iraq, there was a marked attitude change by the Russian participants. The Gulf War outcome had demonstrated conclusively to the Soviet General Staff the ability of NATO powers to implement to an alarmingly great extent, but not fully, the "revolution in military-technical affairs" predicted by Russian military science, and specifically enunciated by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov over a decade before.

At this same time, the professional military officers of the General Staff could only stand by and watch the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact alliance and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, the decreasing quantitative and qualitative strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, the growing independence movements by republics within the Soviet Union

(which, in retrospect, would have but a scant six months of remaining existence), and the accelerating turmoil along the borders of both Russia and the Soviet Union --- all of which the General Staff viewed as very serious threats indeed to the security of the Soviet Union.1165

In early June 1991 Boris Yeltsin had not yet been elected the first President of the Russian Federation and the mysterious August 1991 coup d'etat attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was still nearly three months in the future. But the visiting Soviet General Staff officers obviously were worn down by the political turmoil, economic deprivations, and continual uncertainty about the future, and were very concerned about the future of their families and of their homeland -- be it Russia, Ukraine, or the Soviet Union.

The clearest exposition concerning the nature of future war occurred in a speech by General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov to the NDU faculty and students on June 3, 1991 entitled "The Modern Military and Political Situation and Problems of Soviet Military Art." He most eloquently stressed how far forward United States-Soviet relations had advanced since the depths of the 'Cold War,' and how essential it was that a new security system be established based on "the principles of cooperation, good-neighborliness, and the reduction of armed forces and armaments."1164 But, General Rodionov also singled out "several issues ... that cause our concern":

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The first and most important issue is the military-strategic imbalance in favor of NATO. ... Taking into account the substantial superiority of NATO in PGM, reconnaissance assets and means, [and] automated command and control systems, the total superiority of NATO unified armed forces could be 1.5 to 2 fold. ... Thus in operational and strategic terms a basically new situation has emerged in the distribution of military forces: the military-strategic parity which is the basis of stability in the world has been upset. ... Considering the above mentioned facts, one of the most urgent problems Soviet military art is to solve now is the task of finding ways to repel an aggression and to accomplish the objectives of the first defensive operations, conducted under conditions of considerable general superiority of the opposing side. It is a very acute problem and we are thinking about how to solve it.1165

General Rodionov continued, but this time with particular emphasis on how the altered international situation would influence the military:

... The second factor of the strategic situation which now to a great extent determines the directions of development of Soviet military art ... is the deployment of our Armed Forces groupings within the Soviet national territory. ... We will have either to create new basic combat and support systems or to reconstruct them significantly. The stationing of troops will change too. Development of the infrastructure of the territory of the country will be a rather complicated task. ... We will have to take into special consideration the fact that today a considerable quantity of strategically important groupings and objects will be in the defensive zones of the first operational echelon's large units.1166

Regardless of the political-military turmoil caused by the collapse of the 'world socialist system' and the domestic economic burden of having to recreate a military infrastructure to provide for Soviet security requirements, General Rodionov carefully placed his greatest emphasis, and expressed his gravest concern, over the likely nature of budushchaia voina:

1165 Rodionov, "The Modern Military ....", pp. 4-6.
Further development of the means of warfare is another strong negative factor of the present military-political situation. There is no doubt about the fact that we are witness of a principally new breakthrough in the development of the means of reconnaissance, command and control, destruction, electronic counter-measures, etc. These conditions change the notion of the character and scale of warfare, of how wars and operations should be prepared and conducted.\textsuperscript{1167}

General Rodionov concluded his address, as personal experience shows he is wont to do, by challenging the audience with a most thought-provoking statement which he left unanswered, but which delineated the future direction of Russian military science investigations and the desired, eventually deployed Russian military force structure:

Most of all from outer space the territory of the Soviet Union is vulnerable. We are less preoccupied with a threat from land directions.... We cannot but come to the conclusion on the basis of recent experience that space-based weapons capabilities have increased considerably.

Preparation of the Forward Task Forces for repelling the first and following massive fire and radio-electronic strikes is the task of paramount importance for our Armed Forces. While resolving this problem it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the number of anti-precision-guided weapon measures, and the level of training of officers and men.

Like you, we consider that success of the first days and weeks of the war considerably will determine the progress and the outcome of war in general.

... Ultimately, we will have to decide how to seize and maintain the operational and the strategic initiative....\textsuperscript{1168}

Unequivocally, the dialectic Russian military science process -- as explicitly revealed through the dialogue of the NDU-MAGS exchanges over the course of three years of interaction -- had forecast a "revolution in military-technical affairs." And upon that

\textsuperscript{1167} Rodionov, "The Modern Military ....", p. 9.

\textsuperscript{1168} Rodionov, "The Modern Military ....", p. 10.
foundation, the transformation of the Russian Armed Forces was in progress. The Russian goal was, and continues to be, the integration of emerging technologies with new military missions and new forms of military and operational art which will create an entirely different, and exceedingly lethal, new type of budushchaia voina.

The synthesis of offensive and defensive capabilities is leading toward a new type of warfare that can be waged exclusively from one’s own territory. The goal of this new type of warfare is not the seizure of land; but the attainment of political objectives through the application of control and counterforce.1169

- SA Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, 1990

These new weapons constitute a breakthrough in military art.1170

- General-Major Vladimir I. Slipchenko, 1990

Military Science Fuels the post-Soviet Russian Military Doctrine Debate

There is no pure offense and no pure defense.

- Aleksandr Pranovich, 1991

Official confirmation of General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov’s concerns about the nature of future war and the security threats facing the former Soviet Union and Russia was not long in coming. The 1991 Voennyi vestnik article entitled "On Major Approaches to Developing the Military Doctrine of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)" opened with the following statement which substantively matched, and explicitly expanded upon, the content of General Rodionov’s NDU address:

1169 Author’s conversation with Colonel Aleksandr Skvortsov, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 1990.

1170 Author’s conversation with General-Major Vladimir I. Slipchenko, Kuznetsov Naval Academy, Leningrad, USSR, September 1990.
Military doctrine is a system of official views and theses setting the direction of military building, of the preparation of the country and the armed forces for war and the methods and forms of its conduct. It is directly conditioned by the sociopolitical and economic system, the development of the economy, science, education and culture of a country and its people. Military doctrine alters under the influence of such factors as changes in the military-strategic position of the country, the creation or prevision of the emergence of new means of armed struggle, the new military-economic possibilities and the trends of a certain development of international relations. ... The need to develop a new military doctrine for the CIS is indisputable.1171

Aleksandr Pranovich then proceeded to enumerate, in exquisite detail, the changes in the Soviet global military-strategic position:

The USSR-led world socialist system, which comprised more that 26% of the Earth’s territory, numbered a third of its population and produced over 39% of its manufacturing output, has ceased to exist. Gone with it is the socialist community, which occupied 18% of the planet’s territory, had less than 10% of its population and accounted for 33% of world manufacturing output and about 25% of world national income. At the same time the communist movement, on whose support the country relied more than once, suffered a major defeat.1172

Pranovich continued the litany of his lament:

The former USSR and its successors have lost their influence in the Third World countries, as well as military allies.... Treaties on reciprocal military assistance ... are losing their validity.... The USSR as a single federal state has ceased to exist. Former socialist-community countries in Europe are calling for a revision of prewar and postwar frontiers.... The growth of separatist and extremist movements turning into armed conflicts, not just in border areas of the former USSR, but also in its internal regions.... The emerging world correlation of forces does not favor the successor to the former USSR.1173


1172 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 11.

1173 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 11-12.
And on the domestic condition of the former USSR:

The internal political situation in the former USSR is characterized by a fierce struggle for power at all levels, the orgy of so-called pluralism, the growth of outbursts of inter-nationality, ever intensifying struggle, failure to observe the Basic Law (Constitution), and ever-increasing lack of authority, and growing chaos.1174

Of special military concern, however, was the fact that:

"The single military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union is rapidly falling apart, its enterprises, research institutions and other structures are declared the property of the sovereign republics...."1175 Further on, Pranovich complained:

One does not need to be a prophet not to foresee a sharp decline in the level of technological developments in the military field and their realization in the short and the long term. This will lead to a lag in supplying not only the requirements of defensive sufficiency, but also behind the world level of scientific and technological development.1176

But worse still:

The armed forces of the former USSR are going through an acute crisis. ... Troops are being withdrawn from the territories of Germany, Poland, and Mongolia according to an accelerated schedule, [and] have been pulled out from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The sovereign republics ... have started establishing their own armies, claiming jurisdiction over the units of the armed forces of the former USSR, with a full complement of weapons, military equipment, assets and infrastructure, stationed on their territory.1177

Sounding much like the apparitions of Miliutin, Vannovskii, and Frunze before him, Pranovich wrote:

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It will take enormous financial and material resources to restructure the armed forces and the entire military organization of the country in accordance with the concept of defensive sufficiency, conversion, and the pullout of troops from Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Mongolia, in the face of a many-billion ruble deficit of the national budget and the extremely difficult economic position of the country. The armed forces of the country are being organized, and as a single structure, have ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{1178}

Thus, while visualizing the forces of NATO and of the other nations surrounding the former Soviet Union growing steadily stronger, Pranovich reiterated General Kir’ian’s concern, as well as that of the leaders of the Imperial Army a century before:

The border troops, in times of war constituting an important part of the cover echelon, are now a completely separate force and have been placed under republican control. The interior forces are subordinate to the republics. The country’s mobilization system as a single organism has fallen apart.\textsuperscript{1179}

It was within this context of great uncertainty and an especially disadvantageous 'correlation of forces' that the Russian General Staff sought to apply its historic dialectic military science process to develop a new Russian military doctrine capable of coping with the radically altered political-military-strategic situation of the former Soviet Union. The Russian civilian press and analysts roared on about the political aspects of "defensive doctrine," "reasonable sufficiency," and "sufficient defense." However, the professional military officers of the General Staff and General Staff Academy quietly had set to work, performing their historic responsibility to the Russian people, regardless of who ruled Russia.

\textsuperscript{1178} Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...", p. 15.

\textsuperscript{1179} Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...", p. 15.
Once more, the Russian military diligently began applying their scientific methodology, historical precedents, and 'fundamental laws of war' to synthesize a new military defense capability for Russia and the former Soviet Union. This development process for a new military doctrine greatly concerned Pranovich:

In short, the elaboration of military doctrine when there is a total absence of a perception of our potential adversaries (united under the common notion 'there is no enemy'), of perceptions about the political and economic system of the country without profound studies of possible consequences, of its drastically changed military-strategic position, is a matter extremely problematical, if not hopeless.1180

As the thesis for dialectic synthesis of the new Russian military doctrine, Pranovich reported that the foundation would be the "last military doctrine of the USSR," that is to say, "the existing doctrine adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Countries in 1987."1181 After an obligatory description of the political aspect of the 1987 Warsaw Pact military doctrine, which was predicated on "the need to prevent war in the nuclear age,"1182 Pranovich explicitly listed the contents of the crucial military-technical aspect as:

In terms of military art the doctrine envisaged: the intensification of intelligence with a view to the timely disclosure of the preparation of the potential enemy for attack; response counterblows from the strategic nuclear force in repulsing an aerospace attack of the enemy; a deliberate switchover to strategic defense and the conduct in all the theaters during the initial period of strategic defensive operations; repulsing an enemy intrusion by first-echelon fronts; taking additional

measures to raise defense system stability and prevent the loss of a considerable part of territory (reduction of the security zone, consolidation of the tactical zone); fire destruction of the enemy, the use of the second echelons of armies and fronts to take up defense or for counterblows; consideration of the influence of the defensive nature of operations on the combat use of the air forces, air defense troops, and the operations of fleets; the struggle for strategic initiative from the very beginning of the repulse of aggression and the conduct of vigorous and resolute actions; and the improvement of the armed forces' control over the defensive character of military actions.1183

With regard to armed forces development, the military-technical aspect of the 1987 Soviet doctrine sought to establish a more equitable balance between offensive and defensive operations and strategy -- just as Aleksandr Svechin had advocated over six decades earlier. It would maintain the "military balance and defensive sufficiency with the aim of reliably repulsing aggression and inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy."1184 Since a "crushing defeat" could only be inflicted from the offensive, however, there continued to exist a major contradiction between the peacetime political use and meaning of "defensive sufficiency," which implied a non-hostile "passivity," and the wartime General Staff concept of obornitel'naia dostatochnost', which required decisive offensive action to achieve victory following an initial period on the strategic defensive. Consequently, the Soviet Armed Forces were to be prepared, i.e., trained,

... for actions in any kinds of war (nuclear and conventional, general and local); ... fuller assimilation of the methods of preparation and conduct of defensive battles (operations) and conduct of counteroffensives;

1184 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 22.
... allocating for preparation for defense not less than 50% of the time, detailed elaboration of defense matters and the switch to the offensive from a position of defense; ... and the education of the army and navy personnel in the spirit of vigorous and resolute actions both in the defense and in the offense.  

As the antithesis to the 1987 Soviet military doctrine, Pranovich charged that, during the "acceleration (uskoreniia) ... of the processes of political, economic, and legal reformation of society" following the unsuccessful August 1991 coup d'etat attempt, the civilian press and various military reform committees were rejecting the previous doctrine and advocating a "purely defensive doctrine of coalition defense" using a vague "optimal criteria" of the "reliable defense of the state." Pranovich, and his General Staff colleagues, found such assertions as "we have no enemies" to be naive, at best, if not foolhardy. And efforts to base military doctrine solely on its political aspect were not founded on "scientific principles," e.g., military science: "From a scientific point of view, to substitute a 'doctrine of coalition defense' for the established notion of military doctrine is incorrect." Pranovich, and his General Staff colleagues, found such assertions as "we have no enemies" to be naive, at best, if not foolhardy. And efforts to base military doctrine solely on its political aspect were not founded on "scientific principles," e.g., military science: "From a scientific point of view, to substitute a 'doctrine of coalition defense' for the established notion of military doctrine is incorrect."  

He (i.e., the General Staff leadership) explained:

There occurs in our view a deliberate confusion of the notions of relaxation of military-political tensions in the world with that of potential enemy. So long as there persist the deep, including hidden, temporarily frozen, contradictions causing tension and conflicts, so long as armies and military alliances are preserved, one cannot think that a permanent peace has set in on Earth. That

\[1185\] Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 22.  
\[1186\] Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," p. 23.  
is why the assertions that 'if we steadily move along the road of gradual reduction of the armed forces of the world community' it is possible to lower the possibility of crisis situations is a great delusion. The appearance of crisis situations is caused not by the existence of armed forces, but by the emergence of political, economic, territorial, ethnic and other disputes, and the armed forces, just as wars which they conduct, are only the consequence of these contradictions.

Therefore, in the elaboration of military doctrine there should be no avoiding the definition of potential enemies and possible threats. Avoiding this is a profound mistake, a self-deception.1188

The Russian General Staff professional military officers, through the Pranovich article, then proceeded to explain most eloquently and honestly why, from a soldier’s viewpoint, in future warfare there could not exist a "purely defensive" force structure, operation, strategy, or doctrine in which weapon firepower would be reduced and the means for rapid concentration and maneuver on the battlefield would be excluded.

The question involuntarily arises whether the authors of this idea conceive what it actually means to deprive a large unit of mobility, striking power and firepower, to constantly sit in the trenches, to be without the ability to quickly disperse and concentrate in the right place, to rapidly make a maneuver in the conditions when the opposing side is reconnoitring in real-time, with the resolution power of reconnaissance of equipment of several centimeters, day and night, in any weather, with the readiness of reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-striking complexes within several minutes and even seconds to deal a blow with a sniper’s accuracy over any distances. Are these authors not convinced by the experience of the Gulf War where the multinational force, or, more precisely, the NATO forces, selectively struck at urban point targets with a probability of hitting equal to 0.9, while artillery systems with laser sights ensured the destruction of targets with equal accuracy at distance of 26 kilometers.1189

Warming to his lesson, and thereby challenging the credibility of the civilian leadership of the new Russian government, Pranovich charged:

... We clearly must be aware that in present-day warfare the battleground is much like a ring for a boxer where success belongs to those who are more secretive and carry out a maneuver more quickly and deal a precise and powerful blow to the opponent -- be it in defense or attack.

He continued:

... An indispensable element of defense is a counterblow (counterattack), which is essentially an offensive.... There is no pure offense and no pure defense. Strategic and operational defense is a system of defensive, counterattack, offensive actions, retreats, marches, encounter battles.... One must be a dilettante not to understand these truths.1190

Before reaching his final conclusions, Pranovich sharply enunciated two especially grave Russian military concerns. First:

... When speaking of stability (ustoičivost') and the offensive potential of the sides, one should primarily take into account the availability of new weapons, new technology for their manufacturing and use, the possibilities of reconnaissance and the ability of the troops (forces) to solve tactical and operational tasks in the shortest possible time.1191

And second:

... The hasty, ill-conceived disarmament measures, launched under the pretext of converting the military-industrial complex. Certainly we do need conversion [modernization] badly, but it must be undertaken after the specification of the requirements of the armed forces.... To carry out conversion with these needs not yet defined, even the methodology of such calculations not elaborated and the concept of defensive sufficiency put forward, but not yet worked out in detail, means to do enormous damage to the defense of the commonwealth as a whole and to each of its members in particular.1192

1190 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...", p. 27.
1191 Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...", p. 29.
The authority with which the Pranovich article was written and the detail in which it not only explained the role of Russian military science in the development of military doctrine, but also precisely revealed the essential technological elements for future war, resulted in a trinary conclusion worthy of quotation as the official position of the Russian General Staff:

1. The times are long past when military doctrines were developed by intuition, proceeding from the moment's requirements. Now one needs comprehensive systematic investigations, enlisting the best experts of the commonwealth, computer technology, cybernetics and adequate software for these studies. Otherwise the commonwealth will throw billions to the winds and undermine, not strengthen, its defenses.

2. Conditions are not yet ripe for the elaboration of a new military doctrine. The earlier-produced doctrine, bearing a defensive character, is suitable enough for the new Commonwealth of Independent States, just as it was suitable for the Warsaw Treaty. On the whole it is in line with the tasks and objectives of the commonwealth and each of its members concerning its defense, the character of modern war and the methods of conducting it, and consequently armed forces building and the preparation of the countries for their defense. It needs only an adjustment corresponding to the features of the commonwealth members.

3. One should not destroy the military-economic base, created by incredible efforts of many generations, as a single complex -- the foundation of foundations of the defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States -- without a serious program of conversion including not only the conversion of military-industrial capacities and military products, but also the conversion of personnel, the conversion of research and development, depending on numerous factors, the most important of which is the complexity of the switch to a market economy. Without serious research in this regard damage will be done not only to the commonwealth members' defense, but also to the effectiveness which we expect from conversion.\footnote{Pranovich, "On Major Approaches...," pp. 30-31.}
In effect, what the General Staff leadership expected from "defense conversion" was an accelerated "modernization" of the Russian military-industrial infrastructure. Emerging technology weaponry could then be produced and would be used to increase the "effectiveness" of the armed forces, thereby eventually providing the capability to conduct budushchaia voina at an elevated level, at least comparable with if not superior to, the technological sophistication demonstrated during the Gulf War by the NATO allies and other Western nations.

Given the historic primacy of politics institutionalized within the Russian system of government, the General Staff chose, however, a politically untenable position of 'standing in the door' against the development of a new Russian military doctrine. A new doctrine was an absolute political necessity and would be forthcoming -- laboriously and eventually -- when the time was 'ripe.'

Machine-building plays the dominant, key role in implementing the scientific and technological revolution.... Microelectronics, computer technology, instrument-making, and the entire informatics industry are the catalysts of progress. They require accelerated development.1194

- Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, June 1985

In the dialectical competition between defense and offense, the center of gravity is shifting in favor of defensive technologies ... to jump the gap and create fundamentally new weapons systems that are capable of accomplishing strategic defense missions.1195

- M. Aleksandrov, October 1990


- Russian Military Academy of the General Staff
Military-Science Conference, May 27-30, 1992

We are witnesses and participants of a historic event in the destiny
of a renewed Russia, the creation of its own Armed Forces.1196
- Russian Minister of Defense, General of the Army Pavel S. Grachev

There can be no more conclusive evidence of the Russian
military science process in action, nor more concrete proof of the
continuity of that military science process and its critical role in
predicting the likely nature of budushchaia voina -- from which is
derived the force development and force deployment plans, military
art, strategy, operational art and tactics of the Russian armed
forces -- than the convocation of this most senior-level Military
Science Conference at the Russian General Staff Academy. The timing
was as notable as its stated purpose. The May 1992 Conference
followed quickly the establishment of an independent Russian Ministry
of Defense with Russian President Boris Yeltsin as temporary Defense
Minister on March 16, 1992; immediately after the May 1992 promotion
of Army General Pavel Grachev to the Defense Minister position; and
paralleled the publication of a draft Russian military doctrine.
The stated Conference purpose was: "Discussion of military security
problems and an examination of Russia's military doctrine as well as
basic directions for establishing and reforming the Russian Armed
Forces and employing them in possible military conflicts and wars."1197

1196 Grachev, Army General P. S., "Introductory Remarks,"

1197 Erokhin, V. M., ed., "Forward to Presentations at the
General Staff Military Academy's Military-science
Conference from 27-30 May 92," Voennaia mysli',
For this specific purpose Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army P. S. Grachev, called upon senior-level military experts to participate in a discussion process aimed at building consensus about the future of the Russian Armed Forces. He summoned together the most "prominent scientists of the Ministry of Defense military academies and scientific research establishments, the Russian Academy of Sciences" as well as "representatives of the General Staff, branches of the Armed forces..., Russian Ministry of Defense main and central directorates, ... the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command, and the chiefs of staff of military districts, fleets, and large strategic formations...." Among the 55 presenters at the Conference, most of whom were General Staff Academy faculty members, were such distinguished contemporary military theorists as General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Army General Makhmut A. Gareev, and Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin. Collectively, there was at that time no more authoritative group of Russian military experts. Nor was there a more authoritative venue than the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff, whose Military Science Faculty has the specific mission of advising the General Staff on the likely nature of budushchaia voina.

In his opening remarks General Grachev underscored that "we are entering a period of creation of new Armed Forces with new structures, with new models of weapons, with new strategy, and with

1199 Author's conversation with General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Commander, Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff, Moscow, USSR, September 1990.
new operational art and tactics..., and then defined the most critical tasks as:

We are concerned above all with questions of ensuring Russia's security, including by military means. The development of Russia's military doctrine is especially urgent in this connection. A concept of Russian Federation Armed Forces force generation must be formed and practical measures for upgrading them must be carried out on its basis.

Grachev continued, emphasizing that,

... new missions arise for the Armed Forces under present conditions; adjusting a mechanism for military structures to interoperate with the Security Council; interoperating with entities of state authority and management; reviving the prestige of military service and a system of military-patriotic values and ideals supported by all society; and establishing new interrelationships among servicemen, and chiefly among officers.

Then, with a stout warning that could just as easily have been written over a century before by General Dmitrii A. Miliutin, or by his Red Army successor Mikhail V. Frunze, General Grachev stated:

We are faced with the need to form, reorganize and reduce the Russian Armed Forces in the shortest possible time periods. There is a strengthening desire in certain circles of our society to accomplish these tasks simultaneously, but the economic and sociopolitical situation in Russia does not allow us to do this. We do not yet have the necessary material means. A 'landslide' reduction of the Armed Forces may lead to a sharp rise in sociopolitical tension in society. A rapid break of existing military leadership structures may lead to a loss of command and control.
Before concluding his remarks by enumerating the participants, describing the schedule of discussions, and urging all the participants "to show more activism and boldly and frankly express your opinions and suggestions, which we need today as never before," General Grachev stressed that: "Another very important task is to eliminate the existing gap between the present makeup and structure of the Armed Forces and the real requirements of the Russian Federation."

The first presenter was none other than visionary Commander of the Military Academy of the General Staff, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, who began with a very alarmist, and factually accurate, evaluation of the military-political situation which would pervade the entire conference: "... The Soviet Union has disintegrated, ... the Union's unified Armed Forces have disintegrated, its defensive system has fallen apart, and the world military-strategic balance essentially has been disrupted." After emphasizing that "the country is on the verge of making very crucial decisions on defense matters," General Rodionov carried on in the historic tradition of the Imperial Army and Soviet General Staffs by defining military doctrine as,

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... a system of fundamental views and provisions on questions of the defense of the country officially adopted in a state in a given time period for mandatory fulfillment by all state, including strictly military, entities. It reflects a state's attitudes toward war and defines the nature of possible military missions which may face it, methods of accomplishing them and primary directions of military force generation.1207

He explained that open debate was essential during the development of doctrine. But, once the provisions were incorporated in legislative and government documents, they become "mandatory for everyone, and serve as it were as the aims of supreme political and military authority on national defense questions." Rodionov then asserted:

"Now it is a question of adopting a fundamentally new military doctrine for Russia."1208

On this premise, General Rodionov proceeded, first, to describe the requirement for the "political fundamentals of military doctrine" (the political aspect) to be based upon the principal idea of,

the Russian state's peaceable policy, the fact that Russia does not plan to attack anyone and will not use military force first, and that its Armed Forces will be directed toward protecting the country's national interests and the state's territorial integrity and independence and repelling aggression.1209

Second, he elaborated upon Russia's "global and regional national interests" and the specific threats to those interests:

A military threat to Russia's national interests exists and hardly will disappear in the near term. This is

confirmed by conclusions from the analysis of actions by probable enemies and allies which are very important in forming the state's military doctrine. That [military science] assessment is not at all simple and lately has been distinguished by extremes. Previously it was considered that almost the entire world was the probable enemy, but now we declare that we have no probable enemies nor can there be any, that all former enemies are friends. That approach is profoundly erroneous.1210

As is customary in all Russian discussions of military doctrine, Rodionov next turned to what, for the "soldier in the trenches," is the more important, indeed, crucial consideration, the military-technical aspect of military doctrine. He described "the nature of wars which Russia may be forced to wage," i.e., budushchaya voina, or perhaps more correctly as defined earlier, sovremennaya voina, due to the immediate and limited time frame of Rodionov's projection. This was followed by a four part taxonomy of war: First, a "global nuclear threat" that, he judged, "will be preserved as long as other states have nuclear weapons and the capability of using them." To avert this type of warfare, "all means (political, diplomatic and military) must be directed toward preventing it, but the deciding role here will rest with Russia's capability to inflict damage on the probable enemy in a retaliatory nuclear strike under all conditions."1211 Second, a "major aggression against Russia with conventional weapons," most likely beginning "in air and sea space with the delivery of strikes by aviation and naval forces, and in the future also from space," as


"confirmed by the fact that developed countries have powerful, effective means of precision air attack and have an advantage in their development." Here General Rodionov cautioned:

Such a war, using precision weapons and enhanced-yield munitions, can have serious consequences, and if opposing sides set for themselves the achievement of decisive goals, it is fraught with the constant threat of developing into a nuclear war. Because of the reality of these options, Russia must openly declare that it has the right to use the entire arsenal of weapons at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, to repel aggression.

Third, Rodionov envisioned, "local wars and military conflicts" both near the Russian and CIS borders as well as in other countries as being "waged with limited involvement of armed forces." Such threats posed the danger of "developing into major military clashes," either from escalation or from other countries "using them as a pretext to carry out large-scale aggression." And fourth, the intervention of the armed forces in internal ethnic and religious conflicts or in a civil war, which, from conversations with General Rodionov, he believes to be a necessary, but always abhorrent, use of military force -- just as it was a century before to his Imperial Army predecessors.

For the Russian officers and civilians present at this conference, and for Western military officers and policymakers, wherever domiciled, all of whom have a distinct obligation to

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understand the difference between political-military theory and its applied practice, General Rodionov's most striking and sagacious analysis was his dialectic contrasting of the 1987 Soviet military doctrine with the military-technical requirements of defending the new Russian state:

Previously the state's military doctrine envisaged only defensive operations in the initial period. Later it was presumed that the enemy would be expelled from captured territory with the help of a counteroffensive and military operations would cease without invading the aggressor's territory in case of reaching his state border. 'Hitting the enemy not on foreign, but on friendly territory' was intended. The mission of defeating the enemy was not assigned. ... These provisions, predetermining defeat in a future war in advance, essentially are very dangerous for a state.1215

History attests that an indifferent defense, passiveness and loss of strategic initiative never before brought victory to belligerents. ... The principal argument in favor of such a strictly defensive concept was considered to be the fact that otherwise a contradiction arises between defensive political and offensive military-technical aspects of doctrine. In fact, the fallaciousness of this approach was as follows: political aspects were transferred to military-technical aspects, and the time before the beginning of war was identified with the time after its beginning.

The new Russian military doctrine must precisely, clearly and unequivocally reflect the proposition that if an enemy has begun aggression and armed conflict, its evaluation must proceed from the laws of warfare. In this case the armed forces must choose and carry out those forms and methods of military operations most effective in a given situation: the offensive, the defense, and the delivery of fire strikes against the enemy no matter where he is located. This includes strikes that must be delivered above all against the aggressor country's territory and against his most important military and economic installations.1216

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1216 Rodionov, "Approaches to Russian Military ...," pp. 11-12; in FBIS, 30 SEP 1992, p. 5.
This clear delineation of the political and military-technical aspects formed by the firebreak of the beginning of any hostilities, to General Rodionov was not only an entirely logical approach to the formulation of military doctrine, but also an absolute necessity, given the envisioned character of the first two, most deadly, types of future war. He explained:

Each state has a geopolitical and strategic position inherent only to it and has its own features, capabilities and interests in accordance with which armed forces force generation must be carried out. It is fully understandable that one would consider here the economic and S&T [scientific and technological] capacities for upkeep and outfitting of the Army and Navy, but they must be strictly calculated, coordinated and brought into agreement with missions and national interests for ensuring the security of society and the state. ... In establishing the Russian Armed Forces it is necessary to set a course not toward their quantitative, but toward their qualitative development. The priority should be given to new, most effective means of warfare (aerospace weapons, precision-guided weapons, and modern command and control and reconnaissance equipment). This will permit increasing the armed forces' combat capabilities with their lesser numerical strength.\(^{1217}\)

In conclusion, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov issued an enduring clarion call for the transformation of the Russian Armed Forces. His predecessor military theorists and reform implementors -- Ridiger, Miliutin, Frunze, Svechin, and Tukhachevskii -- immediately would have recognized the strategic similarity:

In the makeup of the Russian Armed Forces it is necessary to have permanent readiness forces of limited numerical strength; mobile air-transportable reserves capable of movements to any region of the country in short time periods; as well as strategic reserves formed in a period of threat and in the course of war to conduct large-scale military operations. During a strategic deployment the Russian Armed Forces must be capable of establishing

three major groupings -- western, southern and eastern -- which would have the capability of independently accomplishing strategic missions, if necessary, on their own axes. They must be built on one-man command, which is called upon to be strengthened and developed in every way. ... On the whole, a course must be set toward creating a professionally prepared, well trained cadre army.

One of the key conference presentations illuminating the continuity of the military science process within Russian military thought was given by General-Major A. N. Bazhenov, the Chief of the Military History Institute. He defined the problem of Russian national security as,

... above all a question of such problems as foreign policy support ... (particularly a search for reliable allies) and domestic political and economic support..., [and] sociopolitical stability and the necessary level of military production, which run through all the homeland's history."

Bazhenov characterized the historical Russian concept of "national security" as "a system of guarantees of sovereignty, territorial integrity and protection of national interests relying on military force" and asserted:

Military guarantees have always dominated the process of development of Russian state history. The desire to seek a solution to national security problems by geopolitical and military means -- by expanding the territory and maintaining an army surpassing those of neighboring states in numerical strength and arms -- was the most typical. It was believed that the farther off forward defense lines were, the more reliable security was."

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After lamenting the military’s "spiritual vacuum ... that needs to be filled," he elegized, "What moral norms and spiritual ideals can inspire a soldier of the Russian Army that is being formed?" He proposed reviving "the idea of serving national interests and serving a national idea purged of any kind of nationalist distortions," and concluded:

... The Army’s strength always has comprised the foundation of the homeland’s national security. Russia accumulated a very rich experience in resolving the entire set of questions of its Armed Forces force generation which merits very thorough research and consideration in solving present problems. The primary lesson which can be learned from history is that military reform is the only tested method of bringing an army which has fallen behind in its development into line with demands of the time.1221

The two "revolutionary" military reforms that Bazhenov chose to equate as being most comparable to the 1990s formation of a new Russian Armed Forces were the late-17th century initial founding of the Imperial Russian Army by Peter the Great and the creation of the Red Army following the 1917 October Revolution. In the latter, "the Red Army essentially became similar to the prerevolutionary Russian Army in basic indicators (principle of manpower acquisition, system of command and control, troop organization and so on)."1223 Bazhenov’s rationale for selecting these two reforms is very telling about the breadth and depth of the presently intended changes to the Russian...
Army during the 1990s -- "We are not talking about the usual type of military reform, but about the creation essentially of a new army, about the revival of what has been lost. It is important here to take into account everything there was in the past, both positive and negative." General Bazhenov's final conclusion approaches the validity of an "eternal law":

Incomplete military reforms which dragged on excessively in time always did considerable harm to the army. Nothing has such a pernicious effect on the Army's status as 'unclaimed' reforms -- those which have objectively matured but are postponed for particular reasons.

Of all the major themes that ran through the May 1992 conference presentations, none rang out more loudly than the deficiency of domestic military-technical policy and the professional military concern about the ability of the Russian economy to provide the technological wherewithal to 'convert,' that is to say 'modernize,' the weapons and equipment of the new Russian Army. In one way or another each of the participants addressed this complex, multifaceted question. However, the specific task of defining the current Russian military-technical policy goal fell to General-Major Iu. A. Nikolaev, the head of an unspecified "scientific research institute," who proposed that "[the goal] in the present stage must be to maintain a defensively sufficient potential at the minimum necessary level ensuring that the military threat is parried no

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mater from whence it comes...” General Nikolaev stipulated:

... Today the principal tasks reflecting the essence of military-technical policy are the following: Creating and maintaining an effective Russian Armed Forces armaments system taking into account the conditions of their force generation in the transitional period and of the state's economic capacities; not allowing a critical technological lag behind the most developed countries and preserving general scientific/technical parity in the area of creating modern, highly effective weapons; ecologically clean and economically profitable recycling of obsolete military equipment and equipment being freed up in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces; sensible conversion of military production which takes into account specifics of the defense complex and its high scientific/production potential.

General Nikolaev further explained that the "unchanged fundamental basis" for meeting these priority tasks was the 1990 State Program for Development of Armaments and Military Equipment which, for the years 1991 to 2005, specified the five basic missions of the Russian Armed Forces: "... preserving a nuclear potential for deterrence under any conditions; repelling an enemy aerospace attack; repelling aggression in continental TVDs; repelling aggression in ocean and sea TVDs; and supporting day-to-day activity of the Armed

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1227 For a thorough and well-documented description concerning specific Russian views about emerging technologies; particularly micro-electronics, automation, and informatika, see Gordon A. Grant, John H. Lobingier, Kevin D. Stubbs, Richard E. Thomas, Steve R. Wassell, Soviet Technological Priorities, STRATECH STUDY SS89-2 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Center for Strategic Technology, 1989); also Robert Lempert, Ike Y. Chang, Jr., Kathleen McCallum, Emerging Technology Systems and Arms Control, R-4029-USDP, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991).

Forces and combat operations."1229 It was, however, through his research about the nature of budushchaia voina that Nikolaev saw: "The use of conventional weapons is more likely; their effectiveness is growing by many times with use of precision weapons...." He therefore determined "the following ... main priorities in developing the Russian Armed Forces for the next few years":1230

- ... fixed superhardened and mobile ground missile systems and a backup battle management system and equipment for active protection as well as for countering a multi-echeloned ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] defense system;

- ... continue the work of upgrading the space component of the missile attack warning system;

- ... protection of force groupings and of the country's most important installations against air strikes becomes a special priority.

- ... above all we should develop precision weapons (ballistic and cruise missiles with precision guidance systems, strike aviation with a large radius of action) and upgrade means of combatting aircraft carrier groupings.

- ... give preference to developing and upgrading minefield equipment (above all air and missile-artillery remote minelaying systems), reconnaissance/attack and reconnaissance/strike complexes, maskirovka [Literally "camouflage;" however, this exceedingly intricate Russian concept includes "concealment," "deception," and "reflexive control."], and electronic countermeasures equipment.

- ... heightened attention must be given to creating operational mobility equipment, especially air equipment, as well as various air-transportable arms.1231

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With remarks which warned of drastically falling military production and the threatened break-up of large military-industrial enterprises and scientific-research centers, General Nikolaev cautioned:

Preserving scientific and technological parity in the military area and not allowing a critical technological lag behind the most developed countries demands preventive scientific research along the most important directions of science and technology having a determining and fundamental importance for creating advanced weapons models."\(^{1232}\)

Nikolaev concluded his comments with the proposal that: "Today ... it is necessary to give this activity a more purposeful character and to elevate the centralizing role of the Ministry of Defense in planning and financing research and development aimed at creating high-level advanced technologies."\(^{1233}\)

General of the Army Makhmut A. Gareev, a most distinguished historian and professor at the Military Academy of the General Staff, presented to the Military-Science Conference a most enlightening paper entitled "Military Doctrine, Force Generation." This pragmatic discourse provided a most eloquent example of the dialectic Russian military science process in action and of its direct linkage -- past, present and future. General Gareev initially cited the 1920s, when Mikhail Frunze began work on creating a "network of military-scientific societies ... and military-scientific conferences ... to discuss approximately the very same questions we are examining today." Had he chosen to do so, Gareev just as easily could have


tied Trotsky's employment of Tsarist military specialists to the late-19th century explosion of military-scientific societies and commissions as the foundation upon which Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" was laid. Instead, General Gareev elected to emphasize: "We still are living with that doctrine and with those military-theoretical provisions developed under Frunze's leadership...."

Like Frunze before him, Gareev was particularly concerned by the "phenomenon of passiveness and indifference" in the Russian officer corps: "A mobilizing idea is extremely necessary. That idea must permeate basic provisions of military doctrine, unite officers, and provide an impetus for elevating the state of morale of all personnel." Looking into the future, rhetorically Gareev asked, "Just what should we serve?" and answered his own question, "We should serve that which Russian soldiers have served for centuries: Rodina [Motherland], the homeland, and to protect the national and state interests of the Russian Federation. ... It is impossible to build anything worthwhile in a blank space." General Gareev then explained an enduring, cardinal point about Russian society:

I must emphasize that it is impossible to create a modern doctrine and bring up soldiers in a spirit of readiness to defend their Motherland without being respectful


toward our country and toward the history of our people and Army and without considering experience obtained in past years. The principal idea uniting all personnel is that Russia can and must be revived and must develop only as a great power. This is determined not only by our wishes, but by a number of fundamental objective factors: historical traditions, the geopolitical position it holds in the world, and its economic, political, and spiritual needs. Any attempt to deprecate Russia's role will encounter opposition in society and the people will not understand this.1237

After raising an arcane question, inconclusively debated within the Russian military since the late-19th century, of whether to introduce a new "corps-brigade-battalion" organizational structure in place of the existing "army-division-regiment" system, General Gareev stated his own preference for the latter, and concluded:

The fact is, in planning the reduction and transformation of the Armed Forces, we are striving to make our defense organizational development less burdensome for the economy. But everything is happening differently in practice -- expenditures not only are not decreasing but, conversely, are increasing.1238

General-Colonel V. Ia. Abolins, a retired Military Academy of the General Staff Strategy Faculty professor, reiterated the long-standing revelations of military science that the new Russian Armed Forces could be capable of defending the state "if qualitative parity above all and a certain quantitative parity of personnel and equipment with the probable enemy are preserved in the principal TVDs and will not be inferior to him in mobilization capabilities and

military-economic potential." General Abolins reasserted that it was "very important to preserve a military-economic potential (under all conditions) capable of supporting the development, upkeep and alert duty of the Strategic Deterrence Troops," i.e., nuclear weapons delivery capability, while "at the same time creating a space defense system and developing a system of warning of an enemy missile attack is necessary, since the danger of a missile strike may arise for Russia not just from the United States." Abolins then raised the highly controversial -- at least among Western civilian analysts -- specter of the possibility of a future war, which by Russian definition lies in the 2020-2030 timeframe, involving space operations which the Russian military science process had revealed to be increasingly likely:

The militarization of outer space also requires answering measures. It is presently impossible to exclude the circumstance that the emphasis of warfare may be shifted, or already is shifting into outer space. ... A need has matured for having Russia's own space defense forces to oppose the enemy, for creating ABM systems, and for space surveillance. In our opinion, they can be within the composition of the Air Forces. It is necessary to prepare for space warfare.

Concerning critical weapons systems development, which the Russian military includes under the category of "force generation,"


General Abolins stressed:

A close relationship between military science as well as natural and technical sciences is assuming more and more importance in solving military force generation problems. Improving the state's defensive might and achieving a qualitative leap in creating weapons and combat equipment necessitates consolidating efforts of the Russian academies of sciences, military academies, and other scientific establishments of the Armed Forces, especially as problems of creating fundamentally new means of warfare and tactical automatic robotized systems with artificial intelligence as well as information support of military operations already are on the agenda.\textsuperscript{1242}

Turning to the problem of training "leadership cadres of ministries and various departments" about national security issues, and particularly about "military security, mobilization preparation, and defense of the country," General Abolins highly approved of General Rodionov's initiative to admit a select group of senior-level civilian functionaries to the Military Academy of the General Staff.

The experience of higher defense courses which previously existed under the Military Academy of the General Staff and command and staff practical games held there showed that joint training of civilian and military specialists not only helps them improve knowledge of fundamentals and of practical measures for transferring the Armed Forces and national economy to a wartime footing and for mobilization training, but also permits fully determining the 'bottlenecks' in these questions and methods of remedying deficiencies.\textsuperscript{1243}

After stating that the goal of mobilization is to "preempt the enemy in establishing force groupings" and therefore advising against rejection of "the military district structure since it is best to prepare and establish operational-strategic groupings on the basis of

\textsuperscript{1242} Abolins, "Some Problems of Preparing the Country....," p. 86; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{1243} Abolins, "Some Problems of Preparing the Country....," p. 86; in FBIS, JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 SEP 1992, p. 47.
troops of border military districts, which form corresponding front large strategic formations," General Abolins reinforced what was fast becoming the 'new' Russian military litany -- mobility, constant readiness, qualitative improvement, and "fundamentally new solutions to space surveillance and warning"1244 -- all of which has a most familiar historical ring to it. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his conviction about the importance of military science with this definitive statement:

Problems of preparing the country and Russian Armed Forces to repel aggression are presently urgent for all state entities and the military leadership. Their resolution will permit increasing the defense capability of the Russian Federation and combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces being established. Military science must play a very important role in this matter. It is on military science that one should rely in performing tasks of preparing the country and Russian Armed Forces to repel possible aggression.1245

General Abolins' candid, and factually accurate, statement about "increasing combat effectiveness" while numerically decreasing the number of troops and weapons should come as a surprise to members of the Western 'arms control mafia', who maintain, philosophically, that the mutual elimination of weapons and reduction of military personnel leads to peace. Unfortunately, Russian military science does not permit such a fallacious, 'subjective' approach.

On the fourth and final day of the May 1992 General Staff Academy Military-Science Conference, the Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense, Dr. Andrei A. Kokoshin, and the Minister


of Defense, Army General Pavel S. Grachev, consecutively summarized conference findings. Dr. Kokoshin, responsible primarily for military-industrial policy in the Russian Ministry of Defense, reinforced the significance of this military-science conference in his opening remarks: "A large number of the ideas and propositions heard here can be included in the text of the Russian State's military doctrine and in the Armed Forces force generation concept." He stressed the fundamental, and continually growing, importance of emerging technologies in budushchaia voina:

Today military doctrine needs a more in-depth study of many questions of military-technical policy [the primary role of the military-science process], since military art largely is determined specifically by the development level of equipment and arms. This demands coordinated, joint work by military cadres and civilian specialists from the defense industry, i.e., by those who create military equipment for the Armed Forces of the future.

In order to accomplish this new integration of civilians within the Russian Ministry of Defense (Ministerstvo oborni - MO), Kokoshin stipulated that there was "no acute need to radically transform" subunits that already existed within the MO and the General Staff. Instead, civilian specialists gradually would be phased into military positions following the completion of training "using our best technical higher educational institutions and the General Staff Academy." Kokoshin concluded, "Major work is at hand, during which problems already are arising which demand immediate solution. At the


same time it is necessary to think about the future in order to build really modern, powerful Russian Armed Forces....

The final conference summary, delivered by General of the Army Pavel S. Grachev, displayed the seminal role of the military-science process in formulating the new Russian military doctrine:

I agree with General Rodionov’s briefing, and with the other speakers, that doctrine must be developed based on conclusions from an objective analysis [the role of military science] of the present world military-political situation and long-range scientific forecasts. Doctrine must become an integral continuation of the concept of Russian security in which state policy goals and tasks are formulated and the Russian Federation’s priority interests are defined. In it our state’s attitude toward war and toward use of military force as a means of achieving political goals should be expressed; missions facing the Russian Armed Forces should be confirmed, and the nature of military danger and possible wars [future war] in which Russia may be involved; and ways to deter and repel aggression by military means should be defined.

Demonstrating the dialectical continuity between the Russian military past, present, and future, General Grachev emphasized that "one of the most difficult tasks is a determination of forms and methods of conducting combat operations and their practical introduction in the process of Armed Forces training" in that "it is impossible to ignore the objective principles and laws of warfare;" yet "the state presently does not have the necessary material means

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for a radical Armed Forces reform. Therefore, Grachev considered it "advisable to leave the branch structure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces unchanged for the period of their formation." However, he also considered it essential to continue with the development of a well-equipped force, capable of executing a "mobile defense concept" of operations, making maximum use of existing military personnel, because a "radical breakup will require significant material inputs" involving "a significant transformation (perestroika) of systems for command and control, orders, procurements, cadre training, etc."

For the long-term force generation of this "mobile defense concept," General Grachev returned to the fundamental issue -- "Could the Russian economy and military industrial base provide the modernized weapons and equipment deemed essential for budushchaia voina by the investigations of military science?" He emphasized the crucial importance of Russian military-technical policy:

Military-technical policy problems should hold a special place in Russian Armed Forces organizational development. ... It is possible to maintain the minimum necessary level of Armed Forces technical outfitting only by determining the priorities for arms and military equipment development and procurement. In my view, priority must be given to the development of highly mobile forces, strategic arms, air defense weapons, military-space weapons, army aviation, and reconnaissance, EW [electronic warfare], and command and control equipment.  


Punctuated in distinct and flagrant contradiction of the commonly accepted Western understanding that 'defense conversion' relates to increasing the production of Russian civilian consumer goods, General Grachev then directly tied the Russian military concept of 'defense conversion' with weapons and force structure 'modernization' by very emphatically stating:

It is also impossible to ignore defense enterprise conversion questions, which represent a very important statewide task. I emphasize this in connection with the fact that an opinion exists that conversion is a matter only for the Ministry of Defense. That approach is incorrect. We all have to think seriously how to preserve the existing scientific-technical potential of the defense industry within reasonable limits. I consider it impermissible to lower the level of research, development, testing and evaluation financing. If we permit this, then we hardly will be able to accomplish the task of making a transition to quality indicators of Army and Navy outfitting with new kinds of arms and military equipment.\textsuperscript{1253}

Not at all unlike his illustrious Imperial Russian and Soviet predecessors, General Grachev judged that the "fundamental transformation of our economic system is the problem of all problems." He proposed the transition of the Russian Armed Forces to a new, higher qualitative level. Beginning in 1992 this alembic process would be accomplished in three stages over a period of 6-8 years. The first stage would initiate the development and approval of the numerical strength and structure of the Russian Armed Forces; the sequence and time periods for military reform; their command and control system; a legal basis for functioning; and "a system of social guarantees for servicemen, their families, and persons

discharged from military service. In the second stage, 1994-1995, the withdrawal of Russian Armed Forces from other states to Russian territory would be completed; force groupings would be established; the Armed Forces would be reduced to 2.1 million by 1995; and a "mixed manpower acquisition system" would be implemented. The third stage, from 1997 and 1999, would usher in the withdrawal of the Northwest Group of Forces; the reduction of personnel strength to a minimum 1.5 million troops; and the completion of the "reform and transition to new organizational structures with consideration of the reorganization of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms." Grachev cautioned, however, that these "time periods are tentative" depending on the "domestic political and economic situation in Russia as well as [the development of] interstate relations."

Citing the "disruption of the previously established systems of communications, command and control, and the military infrastructure" and the fact that "the European part of our state previously was given insufficient attention," General Grachev charged: "Our military theory largely lags behind today's, not to mention tomorrow's demands."


Where are the weakest places in the development of military art?"1258

This very pointed question clearly illustrated the continuity of problems through which the application of Russian military science remains trapped. General Grachev enumerated five areas of concern:

1) "Our immediate task is to deter aggression"; 2) "we have insufficiently thought out and substantiated questions of preparing and conducting combat operations in local and regional wars"; 3) "we say much about the increased role of offensive air weapons and others including precision weapons, and even more about the need to revise existing forms and methods of waging warfare.... But what practical recommendations have we developed for the troops?" 4) "I am troubled very much by questions about strategic deployment" and concerning the strategic reserve, "How can it [equipment stored in Siberia] be moved from there in case of necessity?" and 5) finally, and critically:

It may seem to some that I am excessively emphasizing the significance of the practical direction of scientific research, but it must be remembered that we live in a special time. There are very difficult tasks in the military sphere, many of which previously were not accomplished on the scale of Russia. Today the role of military science has grown considerably. This is connected above all with the fact that on the one hand we have a time shortage and consequently science is required to have a special promptness and a preemptive nature; on the other hand, as you realize, miscalculations in solving problems raised are inadmissible now and avoiding them requires an exceptionally precise assessment of many objective and subjective factors of the political, economic, and strategic situation and of all trends in the development of military affairs. Based on this assessment, military science must provide a substantiated forecast in the shortest possible time....1259


In concluding his conference summary, General Grachev assigned specific taskings which, once again, demonstrated the direct linkage of such conferences to the Russian government consensus-building process and revealed the continuity of the current Russian commission process with that first energized over 120 years earlier when General Dmitrii A. Miliutin set out attempting to create the very first Russian military doctrine. General Grachev commissioned:

The Ministry of Defense, with the involvement of specialists of scientific research establishments and military higher education institutions together with representatives of Russia's legislature and executive entities, must generalize all proposals expressed during the conference, take them in to account in the draft military doctrine, and pass the modified draft to the interdepartmental commission by 1 July of this year [1992] for examination and submission to the President of Russia.\textsuperscript{1260}

Further, the new Ministry of Defense, through "the General Staff, military academies, and scientific research organizations" was ordered to "complete work on ... the Armed Forces development concept" which, by direction of the Russian Federation President, was to be submitted to the Minister of Defense prior to August 15, 1992 and to President Yeltsin for approval by September 1, 1992. The General Staff, staffs of Armed Forces branches, and military academies were tasked to "assess ... the new trends which now have appeared in the development of military affairs" for the purpose of developing new tactics, combined arms regulations, and "fundamental documents for the strategic and operational levels." Also, the General Staff was instructed to establish a "provisional commission"

to inspect the Russian Armed Forces, paying "special attention" to
the state of troop affairs, strength levels, combat readiness, and
the level of training.\textsuperscript{1261}

Never departing from the long-established, ingrained Russian
dialectic military science process, General Grachev repeated, one
last time for the benefit of the conferees, that "preserving the
level of the scientific potential will remain one of the principal
tasks." He resolved that simultaneously "we must take account of
Russia's historical military experience and all that is best and most
valuable which has accumulated not only in the former Union's Armed
Forces, but also in armies of other states\textsuperscript{1262} during the process of
transforming the Russian Armed Forces to cope with \textit{budushchaia voina}.

\begin{quote}
The struggle in the sphere of command and control and delivery of fires comes
to the foreground, and so the priority must be to create systems of command and
control, intelligence, electronic warfare, and conventional and nuclear
engagement. That approach involves changes in forms and methods of waging war
which showed up in the local military conflicts of recent times, especially in
the Persian Gulf...\textsuperscript{1263}\\

I would say many of our studies in the area of military art bear an abstract
count. They often are separated from our country's real life and economic
capabilities. Of course, scientific investigations must be directed toward the
future, but they cannot be allowed to go over into the area of fantasy, and
many here specifically fantasized. It turns out as in the familiar saying: "It
went smoothly on paper, but they forgot about the ravines, and that is what
you walk through.\textsuperscript{1264}
\end{quote}

- General of the Army Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, 1992

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Certainly the views expressed by the Conference participants were not the sole opinions concerning Russian national security requirements -- only the most authoritative military opinions. Indeed, a quite heated debate transpired between 1987 and 1993, ostensibly over military doctrine -- but really about economic and political priorities -- as civilian 'democratic reformers' sought to curtail the economic and political power of the Russian military establishment. The influence of the General Staff view, however, is singular. It is cohesive and predicated on historically documented, and therefore 'objective,' military-scientific analysis. In sharp contrast, the conflicting civilian 'military reform' views were, and are, just that -- conflicting, fragmented, lacking in historical evidence, and hence can be considered highly 'subjective' by the professional Russian military establishment and by a Russian society, both of which prize, perhaps above all, a central unifying idea. For this reason, over the long term, the coherent national security ideas and detailed plans of the professional Russian military, now composed of civilian and military personnel alike, are most likely to prevail -- just as they have in the past. These ideas and plans are centered most specifically on the restoration of historic "Russian national interests" and of international respect for the "powerful" Russian narod (people), as exemplified during the General Staff Academy Military-Science Conference.

This is not to predict that the 'transformed' new Russian Armed Forces in the year 2000 will be identical to, or even resemble, the 1992 General Staff proposals. In point of fact, there are simply too many economic and political variables that could alter the outcome.
Rather, it is to stress that the May 1992 Military-Science Conference presented a living blueprint -- a baseline 'objective' goal -- which, due to the strong consensus among the Russian military leadership, will be used flexibly to guide Russian force development toward those well-defined force generation, technological, and military art capabilities required to defend Russia and to win a future war.

Official confirmation of the progress in implementing the guidelines established at the May 1992 General Staff Military-Science Conference came in a June 1993 interview by Nezavisimaia gazeta reporter Mikhail Karpov with Russian Federation First Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrei Kokoshin. While summarily dismissing his 'faith in the all-inclusive document, which will immediately provide an answer to all the problems that trouble us' and any governmental efforts to work out a "unified military doctrine," Kokoshin emphasized that with the passage of the October 1992 Law on Defense, "the necessity of working out and ratifying a military doctrine was fixed in law." Consequently, Kokoshin explained, in distinct contradiction to his denigration of the concept of a "unified military doctrine," that the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff now were making a concerted effort to fit the "totality" of government and defense ministry documents and plans "into a unified, integrated whole." This comprehensive effort would "reflect the real interests of the state and its capabilities and the degree to which they are based on a correct forecast of the political-military and

military-technical situation.” The latter is exactly the historic role of Russian military science.

In response to the interviewer's question concerning the status of the integration process, Kokoshin replied that "new operational plans have been worked out and approved. The Ministry of Defense presented to the government at the start of this year [1993] new basic data for a review of the entire industrial mobilization plan." Kokoshin seized the opportunity to inject a most important point concerning the likelihood of the Russian military being physically able to achieve its force modernization goals:

A complete military-technical policy for the armed forces has been formulated for the first time, it seems. At the end of December [1992] the MoD approved the foundations of the program of armaments to 2000-2005. This plan is based upon the transition to an army of 1.5 million as provided in the "Law on Defense." The "key issue," according to Kokoshin, was the force generation problem of "recruiting and elevating the armed forces." And, here too, he suggested that progress was being made with the passage of the "Law on Military Obligation and Conscription."

Mikhail Karpov asked about the practical application of the "Foundations of the Military Policy of the Russian Federation" document, developed under Kokoshin's leadership by "a group of defense industry leaders and retired generals" at the end of 1991 and in early 1992. Kokoshin described the process as "quite useful" because "the key advantage was the involvement of weapons makers,

leading systems analysts, experienced General Staff officers -- specialists in strategy and operational art, as well as civilian and military historians. During this applied military-science process, Kokoshin praised the "professional cooperation among this wide range of experts" as crucial "to success in working out not only military-strategic aspects of war prevention, but also a typology of potential wars and armed conflicts, an assessment of the degree of their probability, and the entire specter of military-political challenges to the national security of Russia." From this analysis "certain conclusions could be drawn on armaments programs...." The following "areas were given top priority: reconnaissance/intelligence systems, target acquisition systems, troop control systems as well as rapid response and rapid deployment forces which could react on any axis." Kokoshin described his vision of budushchaia voina, which in every way corresponded to that predicted a decade earlier by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and refined by General-Colonel Igor Rodionov, and which succinctly demonstrated the Hegelian dialectic concept of transformation of "quantity into a new quality":

... War has moved away considerably from annihilating blows of the combat club or the slashing blows of the two-handed sword to the pricks of the rapier with actions of selected characteristics. Today the striving to master high-precision weapons to a large extent is shaped by the demands of a new type of war with relatively limited and strictly regulated goals and a corresponding new understanding of the term 'victory.' The presence of such weaponry in sufficient quantity also determines the potential for containment of aggression.

Victory in this new type of warfare was defined by Kokoshin using the novel terms of the uniquely Russian psychological 'science' of "reflexive control," through which in wartime individual, group, and mass confusion and chaos are to be sown throughout enemy ranks:

For the achievement of real victory it is necessary to know not just the armed forces of the opposing side but also its state-political system, the actual functional mechanisms of decision-making, the particulars of thought and reactions of state and military leaders and much else. If it is a coalition war then it is necessary to understand the correlation of common and private interests of its members. ... Today after an epoch in which the concept of a strategy of complete destruction of the enemy in the physical sense dominated, we must constantly keep in mind that any armed conflict to a much greater degree than before is a very exact composition of purely military measures as well as political and propaganda measures.

It is most pertinent to note that by Russian definition "reflexive control" techniques are just as applicable in peacetime as during wartime, perhaps even more effectively so, given the relaxation of international political tensions and the absence of a stereotyped 'enemy syndrome.' As if to avoid the possibility of readers drawing the above conclusion, Kokoshin abruptly shifted gears by insisting that inadequate attention had been given to the holistic nature of

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the successful NATO strategy in the 1991 Operation Desert Storm because of the media sensationalism caused by the employment of advanced technology weaponry. Kokoshin sought to downplay the singular importance of precision-guided armaments and to return Russian military art to its fundamental roots, grown at the dawn of the 20th century in the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, by emphasizing Aleksandr Svechin’s concept of protracted warfare, in which the mobilization of the entire society in a "war of attrition" was decisive.

Interviewer Mikhail Karpov, however, was not distracted from the immense significance of emerging military technologies -- nor should we in the West be distracted, save at great risk. Karpov pointedly asked Kokoshin about the priorities for armament and military equipment development in Russia’s new military doctrine. Kokoshin enumerated the following top priority technological modernizations:

We are making a significant investment in the development of means of combat [command and] control, means of warning of missile attack, on systems of control of space. ... Development of a wide range of high-accuracy weapons figures prominently ... to be the means of deterring aggression and of inflicting destruction on the enemy in continental and maritime TVDs. ... The problem of communications at the tactical level demands special attention and concentrated efforts. What is needed is a qualitative improvement of the system of processing and managing information...1274

Concerning the ability of Russian defense industries to deliver these military requirements by the 2000-2005 timeframe, Kokoshin explained:

1274 Kokoshin, "Russia’s Military Doctrine," p. 5.
The main problem is that the entire system of state mechanisms for financing defense spending has been disrupted. Even after the passage of the budget this is so. It is already clear that such a full-priced program demands an increase of appropriations for armaments and military equipment, especially for design bureaus.\textsuperscript{1275}

In conclusion, Andrei Kokoshin suggested that, in the process of reducing defense expenditures and defense production "by 65-68 percent in comparison with 1991" and of consolidating defense industries, a solution had been found to one of the most critical problems that has plagued the Imperial and Soviet armed forces throughout their long histories:

In the past we received partial, unfinished systems, which were accepted by the armed forces under pressure of industry, and the state and party structures. This was especially common for the navy, which accepted vessels that were not in combat-ready condition and even 2-3 years after the acceptance hundreds and even thousands of factory workers, engineers, and scholars worked on them although officially they were accepted into the armed forces and already had crews on board.\textsuperscript{1276}

If, indeed, the new Russian Defense Ministry has found, at last, a means of ensuring that defense industry production matches the budushchaia voina battlefield military requirements generated through the military science analytical process -- a problem clearly identified at the Nikolaev General Staff Academy at the turn of the century -- an immense, though incomplete, transformation step forward will have been made toward translating very sophisticated Russian military theory into practical wartime combat applications.

\textsuperscript{1275} Kokoshin, "Russia's Military Doctrine," p. 5.

\textsuperscript{1276} Kokoshin, "Russia's Military Doctrine," p. 5.

... Fundamental significance belongs to continuous perfection of existing weapons systems and military technology, the development and introduction of the very latest weapons systems, investigation of the entire spectrum of capabilities for preparing and conducting operations, the effective use of the singular and unified views of the armed forces and service branches, the presence of a distinct system of their combat and operational readiness, the comprehensive security [and] reliability of troop and weapon [command and] control during operations.1277

- General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii

In a Special Edition of Voennaia mysł', which was released for publication on May 19, 1992, the Russian General Staff unveiled its draft military doctrine for the new Russian Federation.1278 The basic doctrinal conditions were striking, both for the consensus they represented within the Russian government and for the changes in content, which showed considerable movement away from the glasnost' "defensive doctrine" that had marked its 1990 Soviet predecessor.

A most noticeable change was that the number of perceived threats to Russian "vital national interests" actually increased. No longer was supposed Western superiority in nuclear and high technology conventional forces, based "around the territory of the USSR," considered to be "the main military danger" to Russian national security.1279 Presupposed were underlying new threats from

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"territorial ambitions" of the states bordering Russia and the "proliferation of nuclear [and] other types of weapons of mass destruction" to other states.1280 Two "direct" threats to Russia were described: first, the introduction of foreign troops into contiguous states; and second, the build-up of air, naval, and ground forces near Russian borders.1281 Additional sources of conflict were listed as violations of the rights of Russian citizens within the former Soviet republics and "local wars" -- the most probable type of war -- which could further escalate into large-scale conventional wars.1282 Finally, the Russian military adjudged that attacks with conventional weapons on its nuclear forces and facilities as well as "other potentially dangerous objects," would be viewed as an escalation equivalent to employing weapons of mass destruction.1283 From this assertion it could be implied that any such conventional strikes would evoke a nuclear retaliation from Russia.

The 1992 doctrinal priorities called for the near-term creation of Russian "mobile forces and reserves," with the "mobilization and strategic deployment capability" for dealing with border conflicts "in any direction (all-azimuth defense)," and for the protection of the rights of Russian minorities in the former Soviet republics.1284 Longer term, the 1992 draft military doctrine stipulated development

1280 "Osnovy voennoi...," Voennaia mysl', May 1992, p. 3.
of the emerging technologies required to fight the projected high intensity future war and for a "rapid surge production" capability for these same emerging military technologies.\textsuperscript{1285}

The key to accomplishing these specific objectives is Russian military-technical policy, which itself was described as having two top priorities: first, "emerging high-precision, mobile, highly survivable, long-range stand-off weapons"; and second, "quality weapons, equipment, and command, control, communications, and intelligence systems" that would permit the quantitative (numerical) reduction of the Russian Armed Forces without a loss of combat capability.\textsuperscript{1286} The overall goal of the new Russian military-technical policy was stated as ensuring that the weapons and military equipment of the Russian Armed Forces would meet or, most significantly, exceed, "established world standards."\textsuperscript{1287}

The differences between the 1990 draft Soviet military doctrine\textsuperscript{1288} and the May 1992 draft Russian military doctrine included no less than five major components. First, in 1990 Soviet military art was touted as being based on a "defensive strategy," such that the Soviet Union would not strike preemptively and would conduct only

\textsuperscript{1285} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysli'}, May 1992, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{1286} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysli'}, May 1992, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{1287} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysli'}, May 1992, p. 9.

defensive operations during the initial period of war. However, in 1992 both these restrictions were deleted and replaced with a simple statement that the Russian Armed Forces would conduct "all forms of military action, either defensive or offensive" as deemed appropriate and would "seize the strategic initiative to destroy an aggressor" -- just as Aleksandr Svechin had recommended nearly seven decades earlier.

Second, in 1990 the Soviet "wartime objective" was to "repel aggression, defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state." Whereas in 1992 the Russian objective became the more direct requirement to "repel aggression and defeat the opponent."

Third, the 1990 Soviet military doctrine -- at the insistence of Gorbachev's civilian 'military reformers' -- had sought through the concept of "sufficiency" (dostatochnost'), that was oriented more for peacetime international political consumption than for military-technical implementation in wartime, to preclude the possibility of conducting large-scale offensive combat operations. The 1992 draft, while retaining the basic overall concept of "defensive sufficiency," significantly altered the conventional force "sufficiency" concept to mean that "without additional deployments,"

that is to say, without mobilization, the Russian Army could not conduct large-scale conventional offensive operations.\textsuperscript{1296}

Fourth, the Soviet draft posited that nuclear war "can have irreversible catastrophic consequences ... for life on Earth, ... will be characterized by catastrophic consequences ... for all mankind, [and] will transform to a global scale \textit{(masshtab)}" that could not be limited to a single region.\textsuperscript{1295} The new Russian draft eliminated the "global" nature of nuclear war, stressing only that nuclear war "can lead to ... catastrophic consequences for life on Earth -- for all mankind," which opened the ambiguous possibility for the Russian Armed Forces to fight a limited nuclear war. The 1992 draft however, retained a "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons and "other weapons of mass destruction."\textsuperscript{1296}

Fifth, and finally, the 1990 force structure development goal for the Soviet Armed Forces was to be able to "repel aggression."\textsuperscript{1297} However, in 1992 this goal became "concentration on strengthening by optimizing the Russian table of organization and equipment (TO&E) for all possible wars,"\textsuperscript{1296} which placed a premium on force modernization.

Clearly, the 1992 draft Russian military doctrine marked a retreat from the excessive 'defensism' imposed by Gorbachev, et al.,

\textsuperscript{1296} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, May 1992, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{1296} "Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt)," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, May 1992, pp. 3 and 5.
\textsuperscript{1297} "O voennoi doktrine SSSR (Proekt)," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, Special Edition, 1990, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{1298} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, May 1992, p. 8.
on military doctrine, art, and strategy as promulgated in the 1990 Soviet draft. The reason behind the renewed political-military assertiveness, documented in the 1992 draft military doctrine, lay in the revelations of the General Staff military science process that took into account the full spectrum of changed, and changing, Russian domestic and international circumstances that had befallen Russia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union; compared the condition of the remaining Russian Armed Forces to the advanced military capabilities displayed by Western states during the 1991 Gulf War; and projected the material-economic and military art requirements for Russia to fight and 'win' a possible budushchaia voina.

Because Russian military science had uncovered a new type of combat action -- the "electronic-fire operation" -- characterized by surprise and massed, prolonged missile, aerospace, electronic, and naval strikes with the objectives of "suppressing the opponent's political and/or military-economic potential" and "ensuring the victor's supremacy in political or economic arenas," a new priority strategic mission was assigned to the Russian Armed Forces -- to repel a surprise "aviation-missile attack."*1299*

The 1992 draft Russian military doctrine -- as a result of the military science process -- vividly portrayed the decisive importance of the initial period of a future war. Unequivocally, the General Staff had reached a consensus that the employment of precision-guided air and naval weapons against critical command, control, and communications nodes and strategic deployments, accompanied by

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preemptive or simultaneous electronic warfare, could make the initial period of this new type of future war the only period of war.\textsuperscript{1300} For that reason it was determined that the Russian Armed Forces "must act with maximum decisiveness and activeness, effectively using all forces and resources, morale, economic, and military potential" to "repel aggression"\textsuperscript{1301} during the initial period of any future war -- there just might not be another chance to do so.

Both the Soviet and Russian military doctrines were 'draft' documents which indicates that, although they were approved for publication, insufficient leadership consensus existed for them to be officially adopted by the respective governments. As such, both the 1990 and 1992 draft doctrines can be considered as public education tools of the General Staff and Defense Ministry in an effort to develop and build domestic consensus about the appropriate direction for the Soviet/Russian national security posture.

\textsuperscript{1300} "Osnovy voennoi doktriny Rossii (Proekt)," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, May 1992, pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{1301} "Osnovy voennoi...," \textit{Voennaia mysl'}, May 1992, p. 6.


From September 27-29, 1993, the U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference was held with the objective of promoting a better mutual understanding of military-technical policy as a driving force within the future international security environment. Sponsored by the United States Department of State and National Defense University, this three-day international symposium took place at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Crystal City, Virginia, USA. Under the broad generic definition of 'military-technical policy,' three topics were discussed at length by invited American and Russian government, military and private business representatives: 1) Contemporary Military Doctrine and Military-Technical Requirements; 2) Defense Industry: Procurement, Conversion, and Cooperation; and 3) Deterrence, Stability, and Missile Defense.\(^{1303}\)

Contemporary Military Doctrine & Military-Technical Requirements

The first presenter, Dr. Jacob Kipp of the United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, set up the background for the discussions through his "Historical Perspective on the Development of Soviet Military Doctrine." Dr. Kipp explained that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, its successor, the

\(^{1303}\) For the complete texts of the conference presentations, along with discussion summaries by Sergei Kortunov, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Fred Clark Boli, National Institute for Public Policy, see Comparative Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 1, January-March 1994.
Commonwealth of Independent States, had failed to reach any consensus on military doctrine. Therefore, Soviet military doctrine now had been adopted as Russian military doctrine and the Russian National Army was to be the foundation for a proposed collective security alliance on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The new Russian General Staff, as inheritors of the traditions and information base of their Soviet predecessors, had tendered a draft military doctrine in May 1992. This proposed doctrine sought to minimize the changes to be implemented through military reform: 1) by retaining NATO and the West as threats to Russian security interests, 2) by constraining internal military reforms to preserve the Russian military's privileged position within society, and 3) by suggesting that the Russian state continued to be in a "pre-war period of construction." Dr. Kipp concluded that the basis for these Russian General Staff assertions included their perception about the nature of future war that first was articulated by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's "revolution in military-technical affairs" in the mid-1980s and confirmed in 1991 during the Operation Desert Storm aerospace war, in which the advanced computer/information system technologies of "reconnaissance-strike complexes" and precision-guided weapons were employed with devastating effect against Iraq.

Further, the Russian General Staff, as successors of the Soviet General Staff elite, continues to see itself as the repository for responsibility to preserve state security interests. Dr. Kipp suggested in closing that there was an on-going intense internal debate within Russian military circles in an effort to refine the nature of the future war threat, as well as the strategy and the
force structure required to meet 21st century military challenges.\textsuperscript{1304}

General-Major Viktor Mironov, of the Office of the Russian Minister of Defense, then enumerated the political aspects of the "Emerging Russian Military Doctrine" as:

1) Based on Russian interests in a "stable" international order; 2) development of the Commonwealth of Independent States as a voluntary collective security, economic, and political alliance; 3) the decrease of external military threats to Russia; 4) the elimination of war as a means to resolve international conflicts; 5) the protection of Russian security interests; 6) the political and economic integration of Russia into the international community; 7) a significant demilitarization of Russian society; and 8) building a democratic government ruled by law.

Concerning the critical military-technical aspect of Russian military doctrine, General Mironov presented three basic premises: 1) optimize research and development of advanced military technologies; 2) modernization of the Russian armed forces; and 3) restructure the armed forces to achieve a "new quality" of combat capability.\textsuperscript{1305}

Dr. Sergei Kortunov, Head of the Department of Export Control and Conversion of Military Technologies, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, examined the "International and Domestic Environment" in which military-technical policy and Russian doctrine were being formed. Kortunov opined that a "doctrinal vacuum" continued to exist in Russia because the new military doctrine, which was not one single document but a broad collection of pertinent materials, was still in the process of being formed "with great difficulty" due to the


"ambiguity of the present international situation at this turning point of history." The Russian government was attempting to "clarify friends, enemies, and threats," but, "without clearly defined borders and a unifying ideology, the development of a coherent military doctrine is impossible."

Dr. Kortunov enumerated the following factors as critical components of any doctrine that had to be evaluated in order to formulate the new Russian doctrine:

1) The continuing global transition from a bi-polar to a multi-polar balance of power with the emergence of new economic and military power centers in Europe, the Far East, and Central Asia; 2) the new orientation on a north-south axis versus the previous east-west axis of security threats, especially those new ideologically motivated threats from states that potentially possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction; 3) the weakening of the trans-Atlantic link between the United States and NATO as the latter searches for a new 'raison d'être' following the end of the Cold War; 4) the prospect for forming a 'Common European Home' is no longer realistic given the extent of the former Soviet Union's social and economic problems and the differences between the two social systems; 5) how to resolve Russia's continuing 'internal command and control crisis' and the 'failure of Socialism'; 6) how to change our 'senseless social infrastructure' in which the 'military-industrial complex continues to produce unneeded, and unwanted, weapons to the detriment of our national living standard'; and 7) the integration of the nations of the former Soviet Union into the western economic community and especially the granting of access to advanced Western technologies.1306

Concerning this last point Kortunov emphasized that: "Russia requires access to Western technologies. The proffering of friendship and promises of access to technologies is fine; but action is essential.

We must now work together in order to make Russia technologically competitive against her emerging regional security threats.1307

In response to a question about "why no Russian military doctrine had been approved during the 16 months since the draft was presented in May 1992," Dr. Kortunov stated that the original draft doctrine had been forwarded to the Russian National Security Council, where it was reviewed and returned to the General Staff and Ministry of Defense for revision. Defense Minister Grachev had sent the revised draft doctrine back to the National Security Council for approval in May 1993 and, as of late-August 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin "was ready to accept" the new military doctrine.1308

General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov, Chief of the Acquisition and Procurement Office, Russian Ministry of Defense, spoke in considerable detail about the "Implementation of Russian Military-Technical Policy" being oriented "most importantly" toward fielding "quality military equipment that would determine the readiness of our forces to engage in a future war."1309 To that end General Mironov said that Russian military procurement was focused on "obtaining the latest technologies; especially in the area of command and control communications," because, "based on the trends revealed by future war models in the 1990s," the Russian Army absolutely "could not allow

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enemies to attain military-technical superiority.1310

To achieve the required qualitative improvements in the Russian armed forces, including the generation of funds with which to retain quality personnel as well as improve housing, Mironov said that beginning in 1988 Soviet weapons procurement was curtailed gradually. The result was that between 1991 and 1993 the military share of the total Russian state budget declined from 35 percent to 16.5 percent, while the percentage of the military budget spent on weapons procurement declined from 50% to 23% in these same years.

Mironov emphasized that the primary task (glavnaia zadacha) of the Russian military-industry between 1993 and 2000 would be the research and development of new, high quality, advanced technology weaponry and the military art required to employ these technologies. The decision to deploy the actual weapons systems after the year 2000 would be made toward the end of this decade. General-Colonel Mironov emphasized: "Technology alone is not a total answer to effective military capability; rather the desired capability is the result of a synergism between technology and military art."1311

The implications for future war of the near exponential, and irreversible, advance of emerging military technologies were addressed by Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. In his presentation on "Future Military-Technical Requirements," he predicted that by the


year 2000 some 30 countries would possess space reconnaissance capabilities and warned that the same technologies that were required to place reconnaissance satellites in earth orbit could be utilized to deliver weapons of mass destruction worldwide.

Ambassador Cooper cautioned that during the 1991 Gulf War, described as "the first space war" by the Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak, "space was a sanctuary" and "the technologies employed were 20-30 years old." Ambassador Cooper suggested that to defend against an expected global weapons proliferation, "an active defense is our only prudent course."

By the year 2000 and at a reasonable cost, technological advances in materials and microelectronics held forth the promise of being able to deploy a global satellite constellation of "Brilliant Pebbles" anti-ballistic missiles to augment sea-based and land-based regional missile defenses. Citing Russian President Boris Yeltsin's historic January 29, 1992 proposal before the United Nations to create a "Global Protection System" (GPS) to defend the international community against ballistic missile attack, Ambassador Cooper wryly and conclusively welcomed the proposal: "... U.S.-Russian cooperation in creating a Global Protection System can be a cornerstone ... to assure regional and global geopolitical stability in the new world disorder...."  


Defense Industry: Procurement, Conversion, and Cooperation

With an insightful presentation on "Military-Technical Policy and Defense Industry," Dr. Evgeni Fedosov, Director of the Russian State Institute of Avionics, opened the second day of the symposium. Academician Fedosov explained that because of the anticipated nature of future war -- conclusively demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War -- the Russian Ministry of Defense planned to double the size of its air forces by the year 2000. As a percentage of the total Russian military force structure, the air force would increase from the present 12.5 percent to 25 percent. Of the total 1.5 million man Russian armed forces, the Russian Air Force is projected to have some 400,000 personnel, with 5500-5700 aircraft, of which 50-60 percent will be combat aircraft.

A primary mission for the restructured Russian Army and Air Force will be improved air mobility as a means to deploy forces, i.e., 'strategic reserves,' rapidly from central military districts to reinforce local units and contain crises at Russia's borders. Concerning tactical and strategic combat aircraft, Fedosov emphasized that the new focus would be "improved quality across the board with the introduction of all-weather and all-aspect weapons systems, advanced information and communications systems, and precision weapons delivery capabilities."131

The development and deployment of these "required weapons systems" entails the incorporation of advanced technologies utilizing new materials and metals as well as emerging digital, microelectronic and optical technologies. To facilitate the introduction of these advanced technologies, and to hold down costs, "We have decided to reduce the number of different types of aircraft that we produce and to concentrate on producing multi-role aircraft instead of the single function aircraft that we produced in the past; further, we intend to combine civilian and military production facilities between 1993 and 2000 in order to replace older aircraft systems more quickly."  

Dr. Robert Stein, Vice President, Advanced Air Defense Programs, Raytheon Company, presented a startling depiction of "Military-Technical Requirements: The View from Defense Industry." He described in expert detail the "information processing revolution" that now has made -- and continues to make -- "time the essence of victory." Dr. Stein explained that the implementation of this technological revolution would enable computers and communications systems to accomplish of "billions of operations per second." Offensively, the emerging information system micro-technologies would make possible the creation of smaller, even more accurate, stand-off precision-guided missiles with a significantly longer range, as well as improved electronic counter-measures and means to more effectively disrupt command and control systems. Defensively, Dr. Stein foresaw the "information processing revolution" as the foundation upon which extremely reliable theater defenses can be deployed against both

ballistic and cruise missiles, and the creation of defenses against the latter being "absolutely essential." 1316

**Deterrence, Stability, and Missile Defense**

The third day of discussions began with a flawlessly logical presentation by Dr. Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, entitled "Stability and Ballistic Missile Defenses." The focal point for subsequent discussions became Dr. Payne's conclusion, that stability \textit{(stabil'nost')} -- defined as a quantitative balance, or bi-polar "parity," between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces -- was no longer a valid basis upon which to center relations in the increasingly complex multi-polar world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; nor was a policy of mutual deterrence \textit{(sderzhivaniia)} likely to assure future stability. All agreed that the "new world order" required new approaches for measuring "geopolitical stability" in terms of "peaceful change and human progress." The simple quantitative "stability" equations developed, and enshrined, over the last forty-odd years, were incapable of defining the unpredictability of the new multi-polar international security environment and the value systems of individual nations. Participants acknowledged, however, that the "theology of 'stability' \textit{(stabil'nost')} would continue to have its devout adherents as long as nuclear weapons continued to exist."

A consensus developed that "ballistic missile defenses can positively influence 'geopolitical stability' by preserving freedom

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of action, dampening incentives to escalate, enhancing international cooperation, and moderating negative political developments." To this end the Russian participants called attention to President Yeltsin's January 1992 proposal for the international development of a "Global Protection System" (GPS) against ballistic missiles as a means to advance cooperative international relationships and "political and technical measures aimed at preventing possible proliferation and use of ballistic missiles."1317

During the closing question and answer session General-Colonel Viacheslav Mironov offered singular clarifications to the statements previously made during the symposium: first, "The development of advanced technology weaponry is a strategic mission for the Russian military"; second, "The Russian government will maintain strict control over the Russian economy, mainly because our experience with a private economy is that private business hides their profits and pays no taxes to the state"; and third, "Conversion of defense industry is directed toward the development of advanced technologies and a diversification of the Russian defense industrial base."1318 It is critically important to note that General Mironov's third point is a far cry from the generally accepted Western 'conventional wisdom' that Russian defense conversion is a means by which to improve domestic civilian living standards by shifting away from military production to the production of consumer goods.


General-Colonel Mironov also spoke about the most significant, indeed, perhaps even profound, action that the Russian Ministry of Defense has taken to date in its effort to bring 'stability' (ustoichivost') out of the turmoil within its military-industrial system -- namely, management of all military production has been consolidated under the Ministry of Defense. Prior to 1992 nine separate, and highly independent, ministries exercised control over individual segments of military production. For seventy years the Soviet Army, and the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army before it, essentially had to take whatever weaponry those industrial ministries could, or would, produce. Now, according to General Mironov, the Russian military has central control over all military production and will direct subordinate industrial enterprises to fulfill military production requirements.

This decisive action initiates a historic, nearly 140-year long, 'dream come true' for the Russian military leadership. In theory, at least, military requirements now will drive actual military production. In practice, however, the technological limitations of the generally obsolete and decrepit Russian industrial infrastructure very well may prevent the mass production, but not the limited building, of the high-quality, advanced technology weaponry that the Russian military perceives as absolutely essential for any future war in the "Information/Computer Age."1319

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The U.S-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference was very successful in improving mutual understanding about the likely nature of future war and the decisive role that emerging information and weapons technologies will play in this new form of war. In the course of the presentations and discussions, the symposium also provided solid evidence that the dialectic Russian military science process, as institutionalized within the General Staff, continues to be a crucial support mechanism for Russian decisionmakers -- be they Imperial Autocrat, Soviet Communist, or 'Democrat.'

The First Russian Military Doctrine: Presidential Decree No. 1833, November 2, 1993

The text of the 1993 first Russian Military Doctrine (See Appendix VI) is the result of a continuing process that began over 120 years ago, in the mid-19th century, with War Minister Dmitrii Miliutin's first efforts to create a Russian national military doctrine. During the late-19th and early-20th centuries, that initial process never reached fruition, principally, because of the extensive interference of successive Tsars, their courtiers, and the entrenched bureaucracy. After the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War, the search for a "unified military doctrine" for the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was revived, finding substance in Army Commissar Mikhail V. Frunze's "unified proletarian military doctrine" in 1921. Frunze's work became the foundation for all subsequent iterations and political revisions for the military doctrine of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, up to and including the last Soviet military doctrine which was declaratively
"defensive" -- at least in its political aspect. Yet the continuity of Russian military thought remains embedded within the November 1993 Russian military doctrine, with the strong reverberation of Frunze's advocacy in 1921 for a massive industrialization program "to build the world's most modern defense industries."\textsuperscript{1320}

Since 1987 Soviet and Russian military doctrines have gone through metamorphoses having no less than three 'draft' stages -- 1990, 1992 and 1993 -- in order to reach the form which was officially decreed by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on November 2, 1993. It is important to note that, although President Yeltsin announced the adoption of this first-ever Russian military doctrine, the text of the new doctrine was never officially published. Therefore, the November 2, 1993 doctrine also should be considered, in context, to be a 'final draft' Russian military doctrine because, as previously documented in this study, the Russian military collectively considers the present timeframe (1990-2000) to be a "transition period." The warfighting capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces are to be 'transformed' through the introduction and integration of advanced weapon technologies and a refined military art to be able to accomplish what military science has revealed to them to be a "revolution in military-technical affairs" -- an entirely new form of 21st century warfare employing long-range precision-guided weaponry.

The November 2, 1993 doctrine, is presented in Appendix VI in

\textsuperscript{1320} Frunze, M. V., "Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia armiia," \textit{Armiia i revoliutsiia}, (1921), reprinted in \textit{Izbrannye proizvedeniia}, (1957), Vol. 2, pp. 4-22.
five sections: 1) introduction; 2) political basis; 3) military basis; 4) military-technical and economic basis; and 5) a concluding section. At the outset the new doctrine explicitly states that it is for a "transition period" (perekhodnogo perioda) and then proceeds to set goals and priorities for the Russian state to achieve in order to attain their desired "revolution in military-technical affairs" for budushchaia voina.

It is important to note the timing of President Boris Yeltsin's November 2, 1993 announcement of this new Russian military doctrine -- less than a month after Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and the General Staff had abandoned their apolitical stance and had taken Yeltsin's side against the obstreperous and highly disruptive 'conservative' Parliamentarians by sending troops forcefully to disband the Parliament on October 4, 1993. Given the Russian peoples' collective propensity for 'reciprocity' and quid pro quo, it is most likely very much more than just coincidence that this new Russian military doctrine 'suddenly' was approved by the Russian President. There is considerable circumstantial evidence, though no 'smoking gun,' that Presidential approval of the new military doctrine -- which is heavily weighted toward exactly those capability goals that the Russian military had long desired -- was exchanged for the military's support against Yeltsin's political enemies.

This is especially likely because, for public consumption, the new military doctrine apparently had lain dormant since first being promulgated in May 1992.1321 But, in reality, it was being revised

-- repeatedly -- by the Defense Ministry and General Staff over the course of eighteen months, and then twice "examined" by the Russian Federation Security Council on March 3 and October 6, 1993. On November 2, 1993 the Russian Army received a firm commitment of singular importance from the Russian government. This commitment to the technological modernization of the Russian Armed Forces embodied the military realization of budushchaia voina requirements, predicted through the military science process well over a decade earlier, and carried forward an iterative Russian military transformation process that had begun after the Crimean War.

Evidence of the trend toward implementation, and the growing domestic popularity, of the highly nationalistic and assertive Russian national security and foreign policies revealed during presentations at the May 1992 General Staff Academy Military-Science Conference and at the September 1993 U.S.-Russian Military-Technical Policy Conference, and later sanctioned under the aegis of the November 2, 1993 new Russian military doctrine, appeared in Izvestia on March 11, 1994. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote:

Russia is doomed to be a great power. A dangerous and aggressive superpower under communist or nationalist rule, peaceful and flourishing under democratic rule -- but still a great power.

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Continuity of the Russian Military Transformation Process

All cardinal political changes in Russian history -- both progressive and reactionary -- began with unsuccessful wars: the reforms of Alexander II in the 1860s; the First Russian Revolution of 1905; the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; and Mikhail Gorbachev's 'perestroika.' If, following this pattern, another Russian foray into Central Asia's murderous politics ends in defeat, the consequences for Russia and the world are bound to be very sad indeed.1320

The very idea of the future was ... in large measure a function of technological change, and this, as well as the evident and increasing influence of technology on the possible conduct of war, reinforces the position of technological change as a key element and catalyst...1326

Russia today must devise means for dealing more effectively with conflicts designed to restore stability within the country.1327

- Gen-Col. Igor N. Rodionov, Commander, Military Academy of the General Staff

Analogies between long-past and present events should not be drawn too directly or overstated -- including events that happened during the 19th century Miliutin reforms; or following the Russian Civil War during the 1921-1923 Interregnum and the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms; or the turbulent military doctrine debates of the 1920s with the 1990s predicament, in which the Russian military establishment now finds itself embroiled during the current 'Time of Troubles' that has followed the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indubitably, these periods do have great similarities, and there does exist a considerable continuity of military thought,


1326 Bellamy, Christopher D., Budushchaya voyna: The Russian and Soviet View of the Military-Technical Character of Future War, (College Station, TX: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University, 1989), p. 7.

from which Russians and Westerners alike can learn important lessons about how relevant past problems were resolved, or the solution of continuing problems was advanced (or retarded). Yet, there are also very great Russian societal differences that have occurred between the early and present late-20th century. These differences tend to mitigate, or to modify, direct analogies, but do not invalidate the continuity of the Russian military science dialectic intellectual process or its inherent usefulness.

Over the course of seventy-four years of Communist rule, the most significant Russian societal changes -- which have included in the forefront of that process the political and military leaders and members of the armed forces -- have taken place in demographic distribution and the level of education. No longer can Russia be characterized simply as an illiterate or quasi-literate peasant society, with the majority of the population living in isolated rural communal villages (miri), engaged in local agricultural production. Nor do the Russians any longer constitute the majority of the population on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Today the roughly 150 million Great Russians are the minority, albeit still the largest, single nationality among the newly independent states that in 1991 formed the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even more significant, the vast majority of Russians have completed secondary (some 10 years of instruction) or advanced education, most live in urban areas and work either in government offices or industrial production plants, while a scarce few individuals successfully have launched and sustained private retail and manufacturing enterprises since the inception of Gorbachev's perestroika program in 1985.
It is the elevated educational level of Russian society, coupled with the creation of truly global communications, that now permit the Russian population to be much better informed about the issues affecting their lives and far more likely to question government or political party agendas. Hence, they are much less susceptible to the agitation and propaganda of any one emerging group of politicians than were their forefathers to the utopian designs foisted upon them by the Social Democratic and Communist activists at the dawn of the 20th century.

A word of caution is in order, however. The Great Russians, and their fellow Slavs, historically and psychologically, tend both to desire and to require a strong central leadership and a cohesive, central, moral ideological concept in order to affect political and economic advancement. This basic predisposition, which strongly contradicts the 'democratic' (in the Western representative political sense of the word) transformation process that now has been underway since the Gorbachev regime, tends to greatly exacerbate social tensions. Yuri Afanasyev, the Rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities, points out that the Russian people have extremely limited experience with the concepts of democratic institutions and personal freedoms, either under the Tsars or under the Communists. This "double bondage" of totalitarianism has left a legacy of a "sense of lost -- or rather never acquired -- Russian identity and the deformed perception of the surrounding world as a threat."\(^{1328}\)

\(^{1328}\) Afanasyev, Yuri, "Russia Fails, Again, to Escape the Totalitarian Trap," International Herald Tribune, March 1, 1994, p. 7.
Afanasyev thus concludes that:

Russia, instead of moving along the axis of time, will continue spinning in the Western vs. Slavic circle codified in Russian thought by Pyotr Chaadayev in the early 19th century. This tension promises further conflicts like the failed coup of August 1991 and the forced shutdown of parliament last October [1993].

For these very reasons, and others such as the longstanding, unresolved territorial claims and economic differences between the diverse groups composing the social bouillabaisse of the former Soviet Union, the present turmoil in Russia, and in the other newly independent republics, is much more likely to be quite protracted -- perhaps extending for a generation, or more -- rather than to be quickly, if ever, resolved.

The most striking similarities between the post-1917 period and the present are the virtual total economic collapse of Russia; the market and general policy mechanisms by which the Soviet government first sought, and the Russian government now is seeking, to resolve immense and vital economic problems; and the resulting prodigious impact of the economic collapse, and ineffectual efforts to resolve it, on the Russian military. The devastating economic collapse that followed the Russian Civil War was the result of seven years of war on the territory of the Russian Empire coupled with implementation of the Bolshevik’s ‘war communism’ policy of nationalizing all private economic enterprises. In contrast, the horrendous Russian economic collapse of the 1990s is primarily a self-inflicted wound caused by seventy-four years of Communist nepotism, abuse, and mismanagement of

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a now discredited, yet still clung to by some, socialist economic philosophy. Of Lenin’s fledgling Soviet government, Kulikov wrote:

After their heroic victory in the civil war the Soviet people stood face to face with the colossal difficulties of restoring a destroyed national economy. Almost all sectors were on the edge of collapse. The critical condition of industry, agriculture, and transport demanded the immediate use of all forces of the country on the economic front. ... But at that very time it was necessary to preserve and consolidate the defense of the country.\(^\text{1330}\)

Marshal Kulikov’s statement aptly serves to describe the situation both of Boris Yeltsin in 1991, and of Lenin before him in 1921.

There are, however, very big differences in these two leaders’ approach to the development of a broad commitment to change. Lenin and the Bolsheviks were victorious advocates of an entirely new social experiment. They pragmatically sought any means possible to make the socialist political-economic system work, and thereby to preserve Soviet power, when they adopted the New Economic Policy (NEP) that re-introduced limited market mechanisms in 1921.

In marked contrast, from the time of his election in June 1991 as the first Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin has presided over the break-up of the former Soviet Union into its constituent independent republics and was at the Russian helm when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officially was dissolved in December 1991. Actually, the Soviet Union already had failed while Gorbachev’s Communist government was attempting to reform itself from within through a program labeled perestroika, and effectively had ceased to function on August 19, 1991 when Vice President Gennady Ianaev and

\(^{1330}\) Zhukov, p. 101.
his fellow conspirators unsuccessfully attempted a coup d'état.\textsuperscript{1331}

Inescapable facts, considered derogatory by many Russians, remain tied to the Yeltsin regime: the Russian Empire (disguised for over 70 years as the multinational Soviet Union) contracted to a size not seen since the rule of Catherine the Great, over two hundred years ago; a global network of economic, political, and military allies was lost; Russia was eliminated as one of the world's two 'superpowers,' except for the continuing possession of an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons; dangerous centrifugal forces have emerged within the Russian Republic as autonomous regions and districts seek ever increasing, if not outright, independence from Moscow; local military conflicts along the southern borders of the former Soviet Union have grown more intense, as strongly nationalistic factions within the newly independent states seek to reclaim their historic territorial 'rights;' and a resilient Russian nationalism with strong Pan-Slavic overtones has been reborn, as evidenced by the stunning December 12, 1993 Duma election victory of ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's 'Liberal Democratic' Party.\textsuperscript{1332} All the while, President

\textsuperscript{1331} For a well-documented chronology and discussion of important events surrounding the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the creation of the Russian Armed Forces, see Rogov, Sergei, et al., "Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security," Center for Naval Analysis Occasional Paper, June 1992.

Yeltsin and his small cadre of devoted supporters have attempted to institute sweeping 'democratic' political reforms and a market economy in the Russian Republic through an uncooperative, fractured, but entrenched parliament and government bureaucracy, that ideologically are determined hold-overs from the Communist era, without first developing a coherent, mutually agreed plan of action for change.

For the Russian population as a whole, the economic collapse has resulted in a sharply falling standard of living. This has been accompanied by near hyper-inflation and rising unemployment, along with an expanding wave of violent crime, failing public health, rapidly declining life expectancies for men, which dropped from age 62 in 1992 to age 59 in 1993, and a shrinking population due to the death rate exceeding the birth rate by 800,000 in 1993. According to David Coleman, a demographer at Oxford University:

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1334 For an explicit description about how some 150 Russian organized crime gangs extort between 10 and 20 percent of gross revenues from 80 percent of all Russian businesses and why violent crime in Russia shot up 36 percent in 1993, see Duffy, Brian, and Jeff Trimble, "The Wise Guys of Russia," *U.S. News and World Report*, March 7, 1994, pp. 41-47; and its companion article by Julie Corwin and Douglas Stanglin, "The Looting of Russia," pp. 36-41.


A decline in life expectancy this dramatic has never happened in the postwar world. It is really very staggering. It shows the malaise of society, the lack of public health awareness and the fatigue associated with people who have had to fight a pitched battle their whole lives just to survive.1337

Russian society also has suffered an extremely severe blow to its intense national pride and spirit because of the territorial and political losses that have come about as a result of their own decades of misplaced beliefs and actions. It is very difficult indeed for two whole generations of Russians to accept that they believed in, worked for, and lived, a Communist lie. Some individuals will never accept that fact. Despite all their tremendous suffering, and yet some great achievements during the period of Communist rule, within the Russian collective subconscious, not unlike a century before, there stubbornly continues to reside the...

... image of an outside world perpetually leaving Russia behind, ... [which feeds] the widespread conviction among Russians that they are different, that they stand apart, with a destiny of their own. The notion of 'Holy Russia' runs deep of a people lacking the German's industriousness or the American's entrepreneurship, but endowed with unique spirituality and mission.1338

It is precisely this severe contradiction, between the lofty Russian self-image and the harsh reality of their destitute economic condition that engenders and sustains the continuing social turmoil, that precludes the building of consensus on required political and economic actions. That contradiction is reflected most clearly in


1338 Schmemann, Serge, "Russian Reform: They'll Do It Their Way." International Herald Tribune, February 21, 1994, p. 4.
the cynicism of the popular Russian comedian Mikhail Zhvanetsky, who sagaciously ponders: "Much has changed, but nothing has happened; or is it that much has happened, and nothing has changed?"

Perhaps the most important difference between the 1921 and 1991 Russian political and economic situation was the existence of established mechanisms for international cooperation. In the 1920s Lenin and the Bolsheviks were economically and politically isolated -- 'encircled by capitalists', as the Communists phrased it -- and were considered pariahs by the Western governments, and by the international community in general, because the Communists advocated and promoted 'world revolution' and sought to subvert and overthrow the established international order. During the 1920s the League of Nations was ineffectual in dealing with the modern 'Eastern Question' of the fledgling Soviet Union, while the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the 'Group of Seven,' et al., did not exist to help nation states to resolve political grievances or to effect political and economic development.

Today Boris Yeltsin's Russia need not be isolated, unless the Russian government itself chooses to withdraw from international contact -- as the traditionally prideful and xenophobic Russia society may yet demand. The existence of established international institutions is a critical difference between the beginning and the end of the 20th century that has the potential means to preclude the

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turmoil in Russia -- if not on the territory of the entire former Soviet Union -- from further degenerating into anarchy or open warfare. These established international public institutions, along with private business enterprises and personal contacts, can extend to a transitioning Russian government great assistance and advice in implementing reforms; financial assistance (with the caveat of certain restrictions) that can provide a degree of stability to the Russian economy; and, most importantly, a constant open avenue of communications with the outside world. This synergistic network potentially can prevent Russian society from introspectively festering on its immense, putrid problems, from turning xenophobic (as Russian society historically is wont to do), and then lashing out with righteous national indignation around the Russian periphery -- as Russian nationalists historically also have done. Communications with the Russian government and people are open presently. These communication channels must be kept open, and expanded, if Russia is to be groomed for responsible membership in the 21st century global international community. But, in final analysis, democratic Western governments, corporations and private individuals can only provide ideas and suggestions, since only the Russian people themselves can resolve, and take the necessary decisive actions, to fix their internal social, economic, and political chaos.

For the Russian military as a whole, the similarity between the conditions in which the Red Army found itself during the 1920s and the plight of the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces during the 1990s
undoubtedly brings about an eerie and most unsettling feeling that "history is repeating itself; today our situation is like that at the end of the Civil War" -- which is exactly what a senior Soviet General Staff officer very bitterly said during the 1990 NDU-MAGS exchange in Moscow.

Command arrangements, manpower mobilization, and morale were all major problems that had to be solved by the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War; as were difficulties of supply and transport without which the Red Army would have ceased to exist.1340

Once again in the 1990s, Russian military and political leaders unequivocally must resolve these same problems, and many others:

1) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact;
2) the disintegration of the Soviet Union;
3) the rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe;1341
4) the loss of Russian military prestige following their defeat in Afghanistan;
5) poor troop discipline, low morale, and declining combat capability;
6) deliberate draft avoidance;
7) the need to find additional or to build new housing for those front-line troops and their families withdrawn from Europe;
8) the simultaneous requirement to build a new military logistic and communications infrastructure in order to deploy forces in the Russian homeland;
9) the precipitous reduction in military force structure, budget, and

weapons production, the need to educate a new generation of officers about how to fight, and win, a new kind of future war employing the latest advanced technologies. All of these prodigious problems of the 1990s have befallen the Russian high command simultaneously -- just as they befell their predecessors at the conclusion of the Russian Civil War.


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There are, however, very important differences between the two periods that should work to the advantage of the Russian military as its leaders work their way through the transformation process from a stereotyped, armor-heavy post-World War II Soviet Army, with massive quantities of nuclear weapons, to the 'new' numerically smaller, more mobile, and technologically modernized 'professional' Russian Army.

First, over the course of Communist rule the Soviet military became a highly professional, well-educated, established organization -- albeit somewhat skewed at senior levels with too many deadwood, unimaginative, bureaucratic hold-over officers from the 'Great Patriotic War' -- with very precisely defined, dynamic, and evolving military doctrine and military science concepts that constitute a foundation upon which its successor Russian military can, and will, construct a new military system. In the 1920s the RKKA founders had no such immediate, and readily available, legacy from the Bolshevik Revolution, the Social Democrats' partisan militia concepts, or the experience of Red commanders during the civil war upon which to draw in order to initiate an advance of the professional Russian military agenda. Rather, the RKKA leaders had to draw initially on the knowledge and expertise of former senior Imperial Army officers, the 'voenspets', who succeeded -- through a very heated, even personally fatal, intellectual and political debate process, that spanned the course of the Russian Civil War, the Interregnum, and the decade of the 1920s -- in incorporating the rudiments of Imperial Russian military science as the foundation for 'new' Soviet Army military thinking and doctrine. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov explains the critical role of Soviet, now Russian, military science:
Historical experience testifies: the more that military doctrine is based on the conclusions of military science, the more fully it responds to real conditions and posited requirements. And conversely, the less the principles and recommendations of military science are used in military doctrine, the more often are encountered manifestations of subjectivism, departures from the requirements of reality, and the pursuit of fleeting advantages.\textsuperscript{1344}

Second, the 1990s Russian military does not have to engage ideologically in pitched political battles over the likes of a "unified proletarian military doctrine," the "territorial militia" and "labor armies" debates, the 'correct' course for advancing the cause of "world revolution," or the 'proper' social origins and the political reliability of its officer corps as did the RKKA leadership during the 1921-1923 Interregnum leading up to the 1924-1925 initiation of the Frunze Reforms. Nor does the new Russian Army have to defend itself from the convenient socialist political scalpels of 'socialism in one country,' Iosip Stalin's 'cult of the personality,' or an offensive short-war "strategy of destruction" that was bitterly contested up to 1930.

... In the 1920s, soldiers provided crucial aid to the proletarian dictatorship in its 'primitive accumulation of legitimacy.' They helped build the state's institutional structure and shaped the political culture that would usher in the era of Soviet socialism.\textsuperscript{1345}


\textsuperscript{1345} von Hagen, p. 343
Furthermore, the Russian military does not have to 'prove' itself in order to claim membership in Russian civilian society -- even though the proud, steadfast Russian military image was severely tarnished by their 1989 defeat in Afghanistan and by scandals concerning the 'illegal' activities of some of the now retired top leaders.

Rather, the new Russian military leaders, 'Afghantsi' all, perhaps as a result of learning well the lessons of history, have ostensibly very carefully avoided direct involvement in Russian domestic politics -- aside from a few minor General Staff skirmishes with the new civilian military analysts over "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine." In fact, when the new All-Russian Officers' Assembly -- which had formed to promote the resolution of military housing, benefit, and career issues and to defend the military's social and civil rights, just as similar associations had coalesced in 1917, 1905, and during the 1890s -- became too vociferous and openly threatening to the Yeltsin regime, Minister of Defense General Pavel S. Grachev stepped in. On March 26, 1993 Grachev issued an unequivocal warning about Russian military involvement with political issues and emphasized the need to support all efforts to "safeguard civil peace and harmony in society."
This is not at all to say that there has been no military-civilian debate about the substantive content of the new Russian military doctrine -- far from it. In fact, as previously discussed, the 'interim' May 1992 draft military doctrine deliberately and intensely was debated as a means to generate ideological consensus. Likewise, the November 2, 1993 'final draft' doctrine will continue to be debated, as the Russian General Staff iteratively applies its established and proven military science dialectic process.

Third, very much like its Imperial Army predecessor and since the outset of Gorbachev's perestroika in 1985, the Russian military has consistently attempted to distance itself from any role in quelling domestic disturbances. The major exception to this military policy resulted in the highly controversial, and greatly propagated, use of military personnel during the April 9, 1989 "Tbilisi Massacre," during which some thirty Georgian civilian

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During personal conversations during 1989 and 1990 with the Commander of the Military Academy of the Soviet General Staff, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, who in April 1989 commanded the Soviet Army troops deployed to control the Tbilisi, Georgia civilian demonstrations, he repeatedly, adamantly, and quite indignantly denied that Soviet military personnel took part in any killings or that poisonous gas was used for riot control purposes. Rodionov claimed that it was the Georgian internal security forces (MVD), not under his command, who killed the demonstrators; and that, for Georgian political purposes, the Russian Army was blamed. Rodionov was furious with the then Soviet Foreign Minister and native Georgian, Eduard Shevardnadze, for allowing the Soviet military to be pilloried. In September 1990 when I commented to Rodionov that I had seen him on television testifying before the Supreme Soviet concerning the 1989 events, he replied, "Yes, they investigated the Tbilisi incident, and have exonerated me, and the Soviet Army." At dinner that evening Rodionov added that he was still very upset with "his old friend Shevardnadze" for putting him personally, and the Russian military collectively, through such a deluge of negative publicity.
demonstrators were killed with entrenching tools and, allegedly, with poison gas. Since that time the Russian military leadership has been adamant about avoiding army employment against civilian disturbances. Within Russia itself the use of military forces for the control of demonstrations has been minimal -- even during the abortive August 1991 coup d'etat attempt.

For reasons as yet not fully explicable, but almost certainly in return for an unspecified quid pro quo from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the most conspicuous and violent direct Russian Army involvement in domestic politics took place on October 4, 1993. Paratroopers from the Tula Airborne Division, units of the 'Kantemirov' 4th Guards Tank Division, and elite 'special forces' (Spetsnaz) elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (the former

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1350 Regarding the price the Russian military-industrial establishment extracted from Yeltsin's 'democratic reform' government for putting down the October 1993 Moscow rebellion, fomented by Parliamentary leaders, Russian historian and former member of the Russian Parliament Yuri Afanasyev speculates, with no firm documentation, that "the day after the insurrection ended, Mr. Yeltsin convened a Security Council meeting that had only one item on the agenda: a new military doctrine that expanded Russia's security interests throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union and rescinded the 'no first use' nuclear weapons pledge." Afanasyev further notes: "There are no more vows to reduce the armed forces by two-thirds." These concessions would seem, however, to be exceedingly meager indeed, given the longstanding preoccupation of the Russian military with force modernization and with the 'revolutionary' nature of future war, which would require the Russian government to commit enormous economic resources in order to accomplish to the degree envisioned by Russian military science. See Afanasyev, Yuri, "Russia Fails, Again, to Escape the Totalitarian Trap," International Herald Tribune, March 1, 1994, p. 7.
Dzerzinskii Division) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employed tank and armored personnel carrier gunfire to drive rebellious and obstructive members of Vice President Aleksandr V. Rutskoi's and Speaker of Parliament Ruslan I. Khasbulatov's political faction out of the Russian Parliament building. What is abundantly clear, in Professor John Erickson's explicit words, is that:

The military is no longer dependent on the autonomy which it virtually filched while the politicians bickered. Now it can become, if not the arbiter, then at least the regulator of policy, both internal and external. It wishes to show itself to be 'a precisely controlled army' which possesses enormous might, including nuclear might, and which must not be ignored.

The Russian Army leadership, seeking to retain its lofty place above the political fray, "will claim that it fought neither for Yeltsin nor against Rutskoi, but for the 'safeguard of civil peace and

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1351 Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to centre stage," The European, October 7-10, 1993. It is important to note that these same units were the ones declared as "ready forces" by General-Colonel Leontii Kusnetson, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of the General Staff Main Operational Directorate, on May 13, 1992. See Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 13, 1992; also Rogov, Sergei, et al., "Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International Security," Center for Naval Analysis Occasional Paper, June 1992.


1353 Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to centre stage," The European, October 7-10, 1993.
harmony in society' as was one of its traditional roles in Russian society. Whether or not the Russian military will be able to exclude itself further from the hated, repressive 'police duty' of quelling internal demonstrations remains an open and unresolved question. For well over a hundred years, successive Russian military leaders have fought strenuously against this role, maintaining that the primary purpose of the professional Russian military is external defense.

Between 1991 and 1994 Russian military forces were deployed operationally along the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, and of the Russian Republic. They were engaged mainly in border security operations in Tajikistan against Moslem Afghan cross-border incursions; questionably in trying to separate the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in their continuing fight over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory; arguably in support of the Abkhazia rebels, who are attempting to break away from Georgia; and the Fourteenth Army along the Ukraine-Moldova border. However, with the creation of local territorial regiments -- the first army brigade of which will be garrisoned at Omsk, with a regiment at Tiumen in Western Siberia -- and the assumption of border patrol duties by conscripted and contract regional Cossack units as part of

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1354 Erickson, John, "but at what price? The army moves to centre stage," The European, October 7-10, 1993.

the now developing "mobile rapid deployment force," and a mobile
forces command that has been set up by the General Staff "to become
fully operational in 1995," the potential for the Russian Army to
become sucked into the quagmire of local conflicts and disturbances,
within what the Russian government refers to as the "near abroad,"
exponentially increases, unless tight central command and control can
be maintained.

In the aftermath of the December 12, 1993 Duma election victory
of ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky's "Liberal Democratic Party"
and the virtually immediate reshuffling of President Boris Yeltsin's
cabinet to reduce the role of 'democratic reformers,' evidence of a
revitalized Russian international assertiveness appeared in early
1994. Russian Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev visited Tbilisi,
Georgia, for talks with Georgian leaders about extending Russian
military base leases in the Caucasus region beyond the current 1995
expiration date. General Grachev explained that, "Russia would like
to keep three bases in Georgia, one in Armenia, and one in Azerbaijan
[and] station about 23,000 troops outside its borders in the Caucasus
Mountain region." The next day, February 3, 1994, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin arrived in Tbilisi to sign a treaty
of friendship and military cooperation with Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze. Upon ratification, effective July 1, 1994 the treaty
would grant the Russian Army permission to retain the use of three
bases in Georgia for aircraft and marine landing forces of the Black

1357 "Russia Seeking To Keep 5 Bases," International Herald
Sea Fleet in exchange for Russian assistance in training and equipping the new Georgian Army.\textsuperscript{1358}

Further, and perhaps even more alarming, evidence of Russia's potentially revanchist policy was contained in President Yeltsin's February 27, 1994 speech concerning the 25 million Russian nationals residing outside the Russian Federation, within territory of the former Soviet Union, that the Russian government refers to as the "near abroad." Yeltsin said:

> Our duty is to make 1994 a year of close attention to the problems of people of Russian origin living in neighboring states. We have numerous facts that clearly show our fellow countrymen are being discriminated against. Russia's duty, not in words but in deeds, is to bring a halt to such practice.\textsuperscript{1359}

This was followed by a major policy statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, released by the Novosti information service on March 15, 1994. In defining "the main areas in which action will have to be taken in 1994," Kozyrev placed particular emphasis on national security concerns, including:

- elimination of hotbeds of armed conflict at Russian borders;
- ... an all-round development of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and its earliest transformation into a full-fledged regional organization with an ever-increasing level of economic integration and political cooperation; [and], ... protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking population [in former Soviet republics].\textsuperscript{1360}

\textsuperscript{1354} Hiatt, Fred, "Georgia Signs Military Pact To Rejoin Russia Sphere," \textit{International Herald Tribune}, February 4, 1994, p. 1.


These thinly veiled threats to the governments of the independent states of Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan, each of which has within its borders large numbers of ethnic Russian minorities, coupled with Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s assertion of Russia’s duty to take on the "heavy burden of peacekeeping," potentially set the stage for expanded Russian military involvement throughout the "near abroad" in a concerted effort to restore Russian imperialism.

Disquietingly, the historical precedents within the Russian Empire for such ‘internal security operations’ by the Imperial Army during the reign of Tsar Nikolas II were completely unsuccessful, either in maintaining the required strict central troop control or in quelling disturbances. The idea of territorial recruitment itself harkens directly back to the 1924-1930 Frunze Reforms, as does the continuing employment of irregular army units to guard the Russian borders. This newly planned Russian Army structure, however, bears a most striking resemblance to Imperial Army deployment patterns of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, which were none too successful in stopping internal rebellion and, for their efforts, ended up with the old Imperial Army becoming the object of intense social scorn, ridicule and hatred throughout the Russian Empire. Only time will tell if the sordid history of Russian ultranationalism, chauvinism and imperialism actually is ‘repeating itself.’ But, in early 1994, all the factors would seem to be in place for it so to do.

The fourth advantage that the 1990s Russian military possesses, that its 1920s Red Army predecessor did not have, is an established and well-developed institutional and industrial base, both of which throughout the 1920s, as has been discussed previously, were
exceedingly weak, backward and undeveloped, if not nonexistent.

After 1917 the Bolsheviks faced a problem very similar to one that had vexed imperial bureaucrats before them, the 'underinstitutionalization' or 'undergovernment' of the country, especially the countryside. Throughout the 1920s the party remained weak and the soviet administrative network ineffective. \(^{1361}\)

In the 1990s the Russian military not only has a highly developed, if in some areas technologically obsolescent, military-industrial complex, but the leaders of that complex remain firmly entrenched within the Yeltsin government and are exceedingly resistent to any changes in economic policy that might diminish their individual power or the funding for their industries, especially proposals for the conversion of defense industries to the production of civilian goods.

While 25 percent of the Russian labor force in 1994 is employed by a 'private economic sector' that is wracked with pervasive organized crime and bribery, fully 75 percent of all Russians remain employed in large socialist government enterprises, fully nine years after Gorbachev launched his perestroika reform. \(^{1362}\) Great Russian 'lip service' has been given to 'defense conversion' in the context of shifting the proportion of civilian goods produced by the military-industrial complex from 40 percent to 60 percent of total output, thus reversing the ratio that existed at the outset of Gorbachev's perestroika program. However, little real conversion progress has been made toward this goal. Why? Because, first, there have been no real incentives for the Russian defense industries to do

\(^{1361}\) von Hagen, p. 341.

so; and second, 'conversion' in Russian has a dual meaning of 'modernization.' For the huge, but generally technologically backward, Russian defense industries the emphasis has remained on the 'modernization' aspect of conversion. This is an objective that the Russian General Staff fully supports and encourages in the aftermath of the 1991 Desert Storm campaign that, in their minds, totally validated former Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's visionary predictions of an imminent "revolution in military-technical affairs." Perhaps intentionally, Ogarkov's vision of future war echoed the views of former Imperial Army officer and RKKA voenspets N. E. Varfolomeev, who wrote:

... Technical innovations had recast the face of battle, increased its spatial and temporal dimensions, broken down the conventional forms of combined arms, forced a rethinking of the problems of command and control....

Indeed, the Russian military of the 1990s will not have to 'industrialize' before it can begin technological modernization.

because, despite the confusing and often contradictory swirl of changing managerial relations and economic conditions, many of the advanced, and emerging, technologies in the areas of information systems, cybernetics, micro-electronics, robotics, electro-optics, high-energy physics, metallurgy, and artificial intelligence, et al., are currently under development in Russian research centers. These technologies will, however, have to be applied within the existing, or newly created, industrial production facilities before sufficient quantities of high-technology weapons systems and equipment can be produced to actually deploy a Russian military force that is operationally fully capable of accomplishing the type of warfare predicted by Marshal Ogarkov.\footnote{Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., \textit{Istoriiia uchit bditel'nosti}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985) and Ogarkov, Marshal N. V., \textit{Vsegda v gotovnosti k zaschite Otechestva}, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982).}

Perhaps the best available evidence of the quid pro quo, obtained by the Russian General Staff in exchange for their support of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in October 1993, was Yeltsin's following clear confirmation that the defense sector of the Russian economy was going to receive the renewed emphasis long sought after by the Russian military: "In 1994 we must put an end to the flawed practice of unilateral concessions. This particularly concerns the defense budget. Let us not forget that spending for defense is not at all the same as spending on war."\footnote{Trevelyan, Mark, "Concession-making is over, Yeltsin says," \textit{The Washington Times}, February 28, 1994, p. A13.} On May 10, 1994 Yeltsin’s commitment to strengthening the Russian defense industrial sector
also was confirmed by "a member of the lower house of parliament’s defense committee," who stated that President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin "had agreed to increase defense spending from 33 trillion rubles to 55 trillion rubles in the 1994 budget"\textsuperscript{1367} -- a whopping 66 percent spending increase! That same day Prime Minister Chernomyrdin defended the military spending increase by asserting that despite a Russian Federation inflation rate raging at 10 percent a month and a planned 1994 budget deficit pegged at 9 percent of gross domestic product: "We cannot sanction mass closures of our exhausted plants since that would usher in an unsupportable rise in unemployment and sharply worsen both the political and social situation in the country."\textsuperscript{1368}

The fifth advantage the current Russian military possesses is a highly developed and structured military educational system that has its tentacles throughout the armed forces, starting with the Russian Military Academy of the General Staff at the pinnacle and progressing downward through the branches of service academies to the newly reborn local ‘junker’ academies. This latter portion of the military education system is designed to provide a basic literacy, to motivate individuals toward a military service career, and to train badly needed junior officers in basic tactics. The 1990s Russian military educational structure and system has a striking, and intentional, resemblance to that utilized by the Imperial Army following the


implementation of the Miliutin Reforms in the late-19th century. The reason for this resemblance is because 'it worked' back then to help build a cohesive 'professional' officer corps and to unify the entire Russian military in support of its armed forces.

In the 1990s the Russian military, once again, must create a 'modern,' well-trained, and professional officer corps. Once again, it must educate the Russian population and a new generation of officers and soldiers about the most current military technologies and the most likely emerging future technologies; about how to employ those technologies at the tactical, operational, and strategic level; and about the impact of those technologies on the new Russian military doctrine. Soviet doctrinal revisions were under development since well before 1987, but only thereafter became the focus of heated public debate. So contentious were, and still are, some aspects of this new Russian military doctrine that the Yeltsin government delayed its public announcement until November 2, 1993.1369

In 1991, General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov revealed his personal innovation for the Russian military educational system, which entailed the implementation of a practice, that returned the system toward its 19th century origins. Beginning in 1990, the Russian military leadership made a significant conscious effort to explain, and to teach, young civilian defense analysts and the 'democratic' reformers within Boris Yeltsin's government about the rationale and

1369 Schmemann, Serge, "Russians Drop 'First-Use' Vow On Atom Arms," International Herald Tribune, November 4, 1993, pp. 1 and 8; see Appendix VI for the full text of the November 2, 1993 Decree No. 1833 of the President of the Russian Federation titled "Osnovnye polozhenia voennoi doktriny Rossisskoi Federatsii."
requirements for maintaining a sound Russian military combat capability. The educational program was accomplished by initiating a special four-month-long course of instruction at the Military Academy of the General Staff. 1370

This type of Russian military glasnost' (publicity) campaign has a long heritage dating back to the 19th century Miliutin Reforms, the military science debates of the 1890s, and the promotion of the 1920s Frunze Reforms, when the Russian military took the lead in educating both Russian society and members of the armed forces about national security requirements. Here there is an exceedingly strong continuity between past and present that has, over the last three years, appeared to succeed splendidly -- from the Russian military leaders' viewpoint. The most radical, and distasteful, civilian proposals that would have all but eviscerated Russian military combat capability, by the adoption of concepts such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive doctrine," have subsided into oblivion.

General Rodionov's civilian leadership education program should be understood as fulfilling one of the key historic responsibilities of Russian military science. As Julian Lider's insightful analysis points out:

A comprehensive assessment of the character of future war, i.e., of its social and political essence, probable methods of waging war and the appropriate measures which

1370 General-Colonel Igor N. Rodionov, Commander, Military Academy of the General Staff, explained the purposes of this new civilian course of instruction to the author in a personal conversation in June 1991 that occurred during the fifth exchange meetings between the United States' National Defense University and the Soviet Military Academy of the General Staff.
need to be taken to prepare the country and its armed forces for it, are made on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations selected and presented by military science. It is the latter which ought to examine all possible means, methods and forms of conducting future war taking into account the socio-political and technomilitary development and to present to the leadership various ways of solving military tasks in future wars.¹³¹

Sixth, the Russian military leadership generational change that has transpired during the tenure Gorbachev and Yeltsin is potentially an exceedingly important development that seemingly has been all but unnoticed, or at least inadequately analyzed, in the West.¹³² Gone -- completely gone -- from the top Russian leadership positions and throughout the armed forces ranks is the 'Great Patriotic War' generation of Russian military leaders. As young men they commanded victorious, massive armies and fronts in the offensive against Germany during World War II. Others participated in the victory as junior officers. And then, with few exceptions, this generation of leaders became entrenched within the Soviet/Russian Army seniority system in positions where their vision, military intellectual development, and understanding of scientific and technological advancement ossified.

The new Russian military has swept the slate clean by retiring from top to bottom within the Russian Army the 'Great Patriotic War'


generation in an effort to rejuvenate the officer corps, to open up military thought and military science to original ideas, and, especially, to eliminate resistance to incorporation of new, advanced forms and means of decisively conducting battle in a future war.

This current rejuvenation of Russian military personnel is not totally unlike the purge of the military specialists during the Frunze Reforms, which had the long-range effects of opening passage for the development of Tukhachevskii's "deep battle" tactics and for Svechin's "operational art" and "war of attrition" concepts. The 1990s generation of Russian military leaders is twenty years younger than its predecessors, and is new and untried, save for their common command and warfighting experiences in Afghanistan, which did not entail frontal or TVD scale military operations. Beyond that these new leaders are united by their advanced military education at the General Staff Academy, where, throughout the 1980s, the teachings of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov concerning future war and the "revolution in military-technical affairs" predominated. As a result, the new generation of Russian military leadership -- with great correlation to the Russian legacy of political-military transitions -- is strongly motivated to develop a new Russian military doctrine and a new force structure that will incorporate the very latest technical advances.

Author’s conversation with Gen-Col. Igor Rodionov, Soviet General Staff Academy Commandant, June 1991.

This information concerning Russian military leadership attitudes and the General Staff Academy curriculum emphasis is the result of the author’s personal discussions in June 1991 with Gen-Col. Igor Rodionov, Soviet General Staff Academy Commandant.
As a consequence of this generational turnover, within the Russian military establishment institutional and intellectual opposition to change itself, once again, has been overcome. There is a general consensus within the Russian military leadership about force modernization -- if only the concerted political will and economic wherewithal can be found with which to implement the desired, perhaps required, force structure 'revolution.'

Seventh, and finally, the Russian military of the 1990s indeed has inherited a rich historical legacy, both from its Imperial Army and Red Army predecessors, upon which to further investigate, on the basis of the established dialectic principles of military science, a new and living military doctrine that will be the conceptual foundation upon which 21st century Russian military art and force structure will be developed.

Eventually, as the recovery and technological modernization of the Russian economy allows, and, based on historic precedent, most likely well in advance of any marked improvement in the Russian civilian economy, that new force structure will be deployed for the purpose of defending the rodina against the military threats projected through the enduring Russian General Staff budushchaia voina analytical process. Here, at this crosspoint, the continuity between Russian past, present, and future is most clear, precisely because the historical, analytical, and forecasting process is so well integrated into Russian military thought. In the considered opinion of Russian General Staff Academy General-Colonel F. F. Gaivoronskii:
Military art, in the process of its development, has trodden a road of many centuries -- from the most simple, primitive forms and methods of using armed forces to those, which are declared, or are used in practice in contemporary wars. It is important to clarify that this process did not unfold in a chaotic fashion, not in a disordered way. Its study and deep reflection permit one to identify firm laws and trends in military art and constantly recall them while constructing forecasts of its further development. ... Although modern conventional weapons have moved far ahead in effectiveness, range and destructiveness, the parameters for their use remain, all the same, within the confines of rational bounds. ... The process of establishing the trends and laws of military art is unfinished. The analysis which has been conducted only serves as a step in its turn along this road. 1375

While this Russian military science historical analytical process has long been disputed, and argued over, in the West -- mainly because Western military establishments do not approach the questions of military policy and force structure requirements in the same highly integrated and centralized manner as do the Russians -- the fact that the Russian Army does not accomplish its analysis of state military requirements in identically the same manner as do Western military establishments is moot. Some analysts would point out that over the last 140 years the Russian military consistently has failed to translate their prodigious military theoretical works, developed through the military science process, into applied military action on the battlefield. Essentially, this is true -- at least during the initial period of warfare. The Russian military, and consequently Russian soldiers and the Russian people, have suffered repeatedly, egregiously, and ignominiously, from the unconscionable

disconnect between military theory and practice. However, this fact alone does not invalidate the military science process itself, which, quite accurately has predicted, and continues to predict, the likely nature of budushchaia voina.

Rather, primarily because of economic, technological, and political restraints, that were beyond the direct control of military leaders, despite their concerted efforts to remedy the deficiencies, the Russian Armed Forces did not receive the timely financial and material resource allocations required to accomplish the essential structural reforms and force modernizations dictated by their military science. Therefore, what is critically important is that the Russian Army, over time, has developed and continues to utilize a highly systematic and fully integrated analytical, consensus-building and decisionmaking process that can -- given the political will of Russian civilian leaders and adequate allocation of economic resources -- effectively accomplish the translation of future war military theory into deployed force structure.

The guarantee that the Russian Army analytical process for deriving budushchaia voina military requirements, utilizing the voennyi nauk dialectic methodology, will continue regardless of the domestic Russian social turmoil, lies in the fact that, over the last 140 years, these concepts and the process for their implementation have been institutionalized within successively the Imperial, Soviet, and Russian military education systems -- especially within the hallowed grounds of the General Staff Academy -- wherein generation following upon generation of Russian military leaders has been, and continues to be, imbued with the precepts of budushchaia voina.
In Russia ... every major transformation in the political and social structures was inextricably bound up with changes in military affairs, especially in the sphere of service requirements. The process of enserfment, Peter the Great's reforms, and the Great Reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century all bore the imprint of military exigencies, and each of them redefined the obligations of military service and, by extension, of social status in fundamental ways.\textsuperscript{1376}

They [the Russian military] forgot nothing and learned nothing. They dream of washing off with blood what they consider the 'shame' of the 1989 'defeat.'\textsuperscript{1377}

Our closest neighbors have an interest in seeing a stable and strong Russian state. A strong Russia is the most reliable and real guarantor of stability throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. ... The world community needs a strong Russia, for otherwise it will be a constant source of threats to the security of mankind.\textsuperscript{1378}

- Russian President Boris Yeltsin, February 1994

Until recently, even the remote possibility of the restoration of the U.S.S.R. seemed unthinkable. That it remains an option should set off alarms throughout the democratic world.\textsuperscript{1379}

It is a fact, that admissible theoretical activity cannot yet decide the questions concerning practical expediencies.\textsuperscript{1380}

- Vladimir Ilich Ulianov

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1376} von Hagen, p. 340.
\item \textsuperscript{1380} Lenin, V. I., \textit{Poln. sobr. soch.}, Vol. 11, p. 17.
\end{itemize}