Dialogism Translatability and Translation

by

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PhD
University of Edinburgh
1994
اهدي هذه الرسالة الي والدي: الشيخ عبد الله بن عبد العزيز آل عبد اللطيف

والدتي الفاضله: حصة بنت محمد الصحيم حفظهما اللهم جميعاً

ربي ارحمهما كما ربياني صغيراً

وكذلك الي زوجتي هديه بنت عبد العزيز المهناء وأولادي عبد العزيز وعروبه.
Acknowledgments

My special gratitude and deep appreciation goes to my first supervisor Prof. James Raymond Hurford for his inexhaustible patience, his incessant encouragement, and his intellectual inspiration, without which the difficult birth of this thesis would not have been possible. The stimulating chats at his office will be most dearly missed. My gratitude is also extended to my second supervisor Dr. Jim Miller and other troika committee members for their help and support. I also thank the Linguistic Department in the university of Edinburgh, for accepting me as a postgraduate student and for making things easier for me.

I am particularly indebted to my soul companion, the unknown soldier behind this work, my ever beloved wife Hadiah Abdulaziz Al-Muhana. I want her to know that my appreciation for her affection and support is beyond expression.

I am also indebted to my father and the rest of my family for their extensive support and concern without which my life would have been much more difficult.

I am profoundly grateful to Dr. Abdulllah Al-Humaidan, Dr. Jasser Al-Jasser, Mr. Abdulaziz Al-Shihah, and Dr. R. Budair for their friendship, unlimited support and encouragement that were crucial in directing me towards pursuing my studies.

Many thanks are due to Dr. Hisham Joma’ah for his friendship, genuine assistance with word processing; to Dr. Sayyed Al-shyab for his help and support at the initial stages of my studies; to Brenda Walker and Rev. A. Sinclair Horne for their assistance.

I thank Mr. Saleh Al-Abdullatif, Mr. Ahmed Al-Ajaji, Dr. Ibrahim Daban, Mr. Abou-Klashap, Dr. Majid Al-Moneef, Mr. and Mrs. Martin, Dr. Adnan Rasheed, for their moral support.

I am also indebted the Institute for European Languages and Translation, and the University of King Saud for providing me with the scholarship.
Abstract

This thesis is about dialogism and translation. It is generally based on Bakhtin's 'Dialogic Principle' as presented by Todorov (1984). The thesis tries to explore the potentiality of this principle for explaining translatability and translation. It also makes use of other literature on Bakhtin.

This thesis tries to explain translation by establishing a dialogue with other existing views. Arguments are presented to show that translation cannot be fully explained by existing reductionist approaches, formal or interpretive. A case for synthesizing these views within the 'Dialogic Principle' is proposed. It is also claimed that translation cannot satisfactorily be explained by linguistic means, and that translation is an inter-cultural communicative act.

This thesis holds the view that Bakhtin's 'Dialogic Principle' bears within it a coherent general explanation of different issues related to translation studies such as history, context, process and product.

In the last two chapters, two dialogical approaches to translatability and translation are proposed. Some examples from actual translated texts are also looked at and discussed. Finally some implications and suggestions for future research are proposed in these chapters.
Introduction

Translation is perhaps as old as civilization itself. Known records about translation go back to the 15th century B.C.: these are the Tell-El Amarna letters in Egyptian and Akkadian (Dimić 1975: 16). Since then translators and other scholars have been engaged in an incessant attempt to come to grips with nature of this practice. All along this history of translation studies, scholars and gifted translators have been accustomed to preface their translations with comments expressing their views of what they think translation to be; however, until very recently, the great bulk of these views were more normative than explanatory.

A possible reason why many scholars shy away from explaining the nature of translation is the great complexity of this practice. This complexity stems mainly from two factors. The first is the complex nature of natural language itself: its relation to thought, culture, and context. The second is the inherently dual nature of translation itself. Doing translation is often like keeping one’s balance while simultaneously riding two horses that constantly alternate speed; enormous efforts are also needed to keep one’s balance when translating between two distinct languages. Questions of taste, fidelity, subjectivity, temporality etc. only add to this complexity.

Only scholars who appreciate this complexity would find I. A. Richards’ description of translation as the most complex type of event yet produced in the evolution of cosmos (Nida 1964: 10) a fitting one. Others, who lack profound acquaintance with the subject, would deem it an overstatement.

It is only with the advent of cognitive studies, philosophical, psychological, linguistic, that the enigmatic issue of translation attracted direct theoretical interest. This came about only as part of the more general study of meaning in natural language, since translation is often seen as a testing ground for the worthiness of a theory of meaning. Ultimately there was no definite solution to the issue of meaning, therefore, there is no final theory of translation. Broad controversy over a myriad of unresolved questions of meaning and culture is the current state of the art of
translation studies. Theoretical trends in translation studies, normally swayed by the general attitude towards language and meaning, can be said to fall in with one of two attitudes.

One attitude starts from the belief in the possibility of separating content from form, and then the re-expression of that content with an equivalent form in the target language (formal approaches). The other attitude is incited by the idea of the particularity of meaning to a language and culture, denying their separability, therefore, projecting translation as only a subjective undertaking (relativist approaches). Translation scholars today are more aware than in any other previous time that both of these views are one-sided. So they started to look for new thoughts and new directions of research to approach the issue of translation. The prevailing attitude is towards synthesizing different eclectic approaches to try to establish a unified translation theory.

This dissertation is to be seen as a contribution to the new attempt of translation studies to reorient itself. It is mainly motivated by the desire to synthesize the two above-mentioned attitudes to translation, since we assume that these two attitudes maybe seen to complement rather than conflict with each other. Therefore, we will concentrate on existing approaches to translation that are conducive to such synthesis.

We anticipate a potential synthesis to be possible within the general views of the Russian semiotician and philosopher Mikhael Bakhtin. These views consist in an overall approach to language as communication that tries to reconcile language structure with language use. Although Bakhtin's main interest is in literature and literature criticism, his linguistic insights are equally appealing. They combine depth with generality, and structure with dynamism.

It was only very recently that Bakhtin's views on language gained currency in linguistic circles in the West. The domination of formalism, as a concept and methodology of research, was perhaps one of the main reasons why the Western academic milieu took little heed of the work of scholars like Bakhtin. The subsiding of formalism as the unrivalled paradigm of research, in addition to the increase of interest in pragmatic approaches to language, has led to the recent surge of interest in
Bakhtin's views of language. However, interest in Bakhtin's views is more noticeable in fields that exist on the fringes of linguistics proper; that is to say in fields like literary studies and communication theory, than in main core linguistic studies.

Bakhtin's outlook on language consists of different levels of imagined dialogues he tries to establish between individuals in context, genres in language, and different languages in a semio-sphere. By means of these dialogues he tries to overcome the previously assumed dualities that pervade language and communication. Bakhtin's use of terms is general and sometimes polysemous, and therefore, resists rigorous formulation. However, his insistence that a language can appreciate another language perspective, dialogizing itself with rather than denying that perspective, his emphasis on contexts of situation and culture make his approach of particular interest to the study of translation.

Bakhtin's writings, extended and broad as they are, are written in Russian, and accessible to us only through translations and other non-direct resources. The great bulk of Bakhtin's ideas incorporated in this thesis are adopted mainly from Tzvestan Todorov's (1984) outline of this principle under the title of *Mikhael Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*. In this book Todorov introduces Bakhtin's main philosophical thoughts to the non-Russian speaking world. Todorov formulated these thoughts from a great number of publications mainly written in Russian during Bakhtin's long life in Russia as well as in exile.

We have also made use of other sources such as some translations of Bakhtin's original works, some comments and explanations of Bakhtin's views made by other scholars (cf. Holquist (1990), Hirschkop & Shepherd (ed.) 1989, Morson (1986), to mention a few names). Some parts of the discussion in this work reflect our understanding of the above scholars' work on Bakhtin and not their original opinion; therefore, we are to blame for non clarity or other shortcomings.

Using insights from the *dialogical principle* we will attempt to survey and evaluate some different approaches to translation and the other related complex issue of translatability. Other works that exhibit a similar synthesis would also be of great interest. Towards the end, we will try to elaborate on the dialogic nature of language
and the reflection of this nature on translation. An alternative dialogic view of translatability will be suggested together with a discussion of certain theoretical implications.

In Chapter 1, we outline Bakhtin’s chief philosophical views of language as communication that can be applicable to translation. His idea of language as an utterance in context, his account of relationships that bind utterances within one language, his concept of language as a heteroglossic phenomenon. We also take interest in his proposal of what constitutes the study of language. The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the central views of the thesis.

Chapter 2 includes the philosophical and socio-anthropological views that underpin Bakhtin’s Dialogism. It tries to put in perspective dialogism as a universal principle that characterises the way our cognition functions. It also incorporates an appraisal of Bakhtin’s position in relation to some modern scholars with which his views can be compared. This appraisal would place Bakhtin within the framework of modern language studies.

In Chapter 3, we try to give an account of the history of meaning and translation studies by shedding light on their philosophical and cultural points of departure. They will be presented as if they are part of one continuous dialogue where they react appropriately to or even re-work one another’s views. One aim of this presentation is to show the continuation of old dialogues into more recent ones, especially those that are related to translation.

Chapter 4 is primarily about different philosophical arguments about translation and translatability. A rough account of these arguments (an account that divides these views into two main reductionist camps) is attempted with the aim of highlighting the need of synthesizing them according to the Dialogic Principle.

In Chapter 5, we use Bakhtin’s perception of language to survey the different ‘endostructural’ approaches to translation, that is, linguistic and anthropological views of translation that embrace structuralist views of language. Our discussion includes also an appraisal of Chomsky’s influence in reviving linguistic formalism and its reflection on translation studies, as well as other formal linguistic approaches to translation. The
aim of this survey is two-fold: to elaborate the continuation of philosophical arguments about language into new linguistic views, and to demonstrate that, as claimed also by Bakhtin, linguistic views of language in general and of translation, though revealing, are slanted.

Chapter 6 considers some semiotic, and pragmatic (exo-structural) approaches to meaning, and their application to translation. These approaches were conveniently chosen according to their relationship to either Bakhtin's translinguistic approach to meaning, or to translation issues. We will aim to make manifest that with the absence of dialogism most of these approaches slide into reductionism. In this chapter we hope to have paved the way for our dialogical approaches to translatability and translation presented in the ensuing two chapters.

Chapter 7 addresses the thorny issue of translatability that was earlier discussed in Chapter 4. The aim of this discussion is to demonstrate that translatability is viable only if looked at from a dialogical point of view. It also includes detailed discussion of the dialogical relationships among utterances (inter-textuality), and the potentiality of these relationships in explaining translation.

Chapter 8 is about a suggested approach to translation from a dialogical point of view. It includes different translated texts to illustrate some of the points mentioned in the previous chapters.
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Chapter 1
The principle of Dialogism

1.1. Introduction

The dialogical principle takes its root from a view of all meaning creation acts as part of one permanent dialogue that permeates the event of existence. The essence of existence is therefore seen not as constituted by an entity nor by its surrounding, but rather by the dialogic exchange between them. It is thus created rather than given. Taking this into consideration, it becomes obvious that dialogism takes existence to be a shared event where every thing is mutually constituted. We perceive things according to their similarity or contrast with other things. According to Holquist (1990), dialogism is based on a two sided relationship of simultaneity and otherness. For example, even the subject’s understanding of himself is dependent on his simultaneous recognition of himself and the other. Bakhtin considers language to be the modelling system that reflects this dialogic relation. Dialogism takes as a starting point the view that meaning in communication is never fully determined outside a pragmatic moment of language exchange in a context of situation. During this exchange meaning is not automatically transferred by one interlocutor nor passively absorbed by the other. In a pragmatic moment meaning comes about as a dialogic negotiation between the two communicating bodies. In other words meaning is a sought-after rather than a given phenomenon. Many of the features that enter into a meaningful exchange of language hinge on the particular relations between the communicators. These relations are said to be dialogic in the sense that they are characterized by a delicate interchange of similarities and differentiations. It
is similarity that makes communication possible, and difference that makes it required. The dialogical principle is also an approach to language that originates from its function in society and in relation to the wider context of culture.

It is precisely these features that make Bakhtin’s views of particular interest to translation, especially when one takes into account that translation has proven to be problematic for formal approaches to language. Furthermore, dialogism allows an explanation of translation that avoids privileging one language over the other.

In what follows we will try to outline the main points in what can be said to be Bakhtin’s linguistic philosophy. This includes his views on the main function of language as communication, the centrality of language to human sciences and what distinguishes language study from other scientific disciplines. We will reserve the appraisal of these views as well as the general philosophy behind them for the following chapter.

1.2. Language As Communication

The main function of language in society, as seen by Bakhtin, is to promote social interaction in which it plays a decisive role. Language does not only mediate social interaction, but also takes its shape from this basic function. Consequently, in order for language to be fully understood, it is best studied within this context, by means and methods that can reveal this function and the ways in which it is achieved. Thus language is best approached from its functional communicative perspective. In its simplistic sense, ‘verbal communication’ takes place, most of the time, in the form of a dialogue between two subjects. However, Bakhtin claims that this direct and simple meaning of dialogue, as two persons in a conversing situation, obscures a deeper and more general sense of this word. If, however, the concept of dialogue is broadened, then a great deal of human verbal communication can be explained. In one sense, all forms of communication as an exchange of information are taken by Bakhtin to be dialogic. In the other, even in a simple exchange of a conversation there are other deep dialogic relations that go beyond the *prima facie* act of information exchange. From all other aspects of communication, Bakhtin highlights verbal communication through language utterances as a paradigm of dialogic communication in general.
All forms of verbal communication, Bakhtin says, always occur on the level of the utterance. The utterance is considered by Bakhtin not simply as a token of linguistic type sentence, but rather as a unit of a new study of communication which he called *translinguistics*.

The act of communication in which utterances are exchanged takes place through the medium of language; nonetheless, it transcends the static system of language to a creative dialogic exchange of meaning, meaning that is unique and new according to every novel communicative situation. In other words, language, even if being a more or less static system, cannot afford but to be innovative in order to fulfil different communicative functions. According to Bakhtin, language utterances, as opposed to sentences, are uniquely structured to mediate this function. ‘Translinguistics’ is the study of how this function is achieved. The difference between linguistics as the study of language and ‘translinguistics’ as the study of actual utterances will be outlined within the discussion of the structure of the utterance. However, T. Todorov considers ‘translinguistics’ as equal to the study of linguistic ‘pragmatics’ and considered Bakhtin to be the *modern founder of this discipline* (1984:24).

Thus, the utterance has a double function in verbal communication: an immediate function as a means of interaction between two subjects in a communication situation, and an indirect one that it plays in relation to all other utterances about the same theme in a wider context. The second function of the utterance is not directly accessible, but it is what gives verbal communication its continuity, and what enters in the making up of social culture. At this point, we will only deal with this second function, the former being dealt with at a later stage.

### 1.2.1 The Utterance Function in Verbal Communication

As mentioned above, in Bakhtin’s dialogic conception of language, utterances are more than replicas of linguistic sentences, but they are said to have peculiar characteristics of their own that distinguish them from the former. These unique characteristics are due to the dialogic relations that link them to other utterances which cannot be ascribed to sentences. Some of these relations are highlighted below.
In Bakhtin’s phenomenological outlook on the social constitution of the individual, language plays a central rôle. Language symbols are the main vehicle of constituting as well as expressing the subject consciousness. Furthermore, in Bakhtin’s view language is taken to constitute the first and foremost social and cultural cohesive force. The unit of organization of language symbols that allows language to perform this function is the utterance.

According to Bakhtin’s views of communication, no matter how we choose to speak or write about a topic, a thing, etc., we will inevitably come across material by others who have previously written or spoken about the same topic, and this will have a bearing on what we say or write. Our discourse, whether spoken or written, is no exception, and is all the time oriented towards previous discourses. Any text always enters into an indirect intense and lively interaction with other texts. Only the mythical and totally alone Adam, approaching a virgin and still unspoken world with the very first discourse, could avoid altogether this mutual reorientation, says Bakhtin (ibid:62). Thus, our communication is submerged in this inescapable dialogue in which, Bakhtin emphasizes, no one will have the final word.

Bakhtin sees dialogical relations between all utterances that are thematically connected. These dialogical relations draw from the subject’s previous experiences and his exposure to the other’s utterances, for whom (the other) the same relations can be said to have taken place. Sometimes these relations take more explicit form when they find their way to the subject’s utterances through different ways of stylization, parody, metaphor, etc.; other times their influence is less explicit even though they play a central rôle in shaping his views or sharpening his prejudices about the theme of the utterance. Thus to Bakhtin:

No utterance can be attributed to the speaker exclusively; it is the product of the interaction of the interlocutors, and, broadly speaking, the product of the whole complex social situation in which it occurs [sic].

(Todorov 1984: 30).

Similarly, there exists a continuous dialogue that animates language and gives it its lively and fertile disposition. Every discourse enters into a direct or indirect dialogue with not only present discourses, but also with other discourses from the past. Culture
is, to Bakhtin, the totality of discourses of a given society presented in a sequential and continuous chain (Todorov's introduction to Bakhtin). Discourse cannot be adequately understood outside its relations with other discourses. Language on its communicative level is where these relations become crucial.

Bakhtin, however, sees an extension of the above mentioned dialogic relations, relations that exist between utterances on the social and cultural level, into more direct communicative encounters. That is, in dialogues that take place between subjects in a communicative situation. The utterance, for example, is oriented towards other utterances that we share the knowledge of with our interlocutors in our common culture. The subject, when in the process of writing, passes through an internal dialogue that goes between him and previous experiences about the same topic. This becomes apparent in his hesitation to choose between various forms, and between different structures during the process of writing, or when he writes a word or a line and then chooses to strike it out in favour of another word or line. This internal dialogue is a reflection of the author's relationship to his cultural horizon on the one hand, and to the utterance context of situation on the other.

The context of situation includes also the other (the possible receiver) to which the utterance is addressed. This other is not only a physical entity, but another subject with the capacity of having social and psychological orientation. (Bakhtin uses the word 'horizon' to identify this dimension). This orientation includes the other's possible attitude to and evaluation of the subject matter of the utterance. The estimation of the other's horizon by the speaker or writer is never fully accurate, since one of the main functions of communication is to fuse inter-subjective horizons, i.e., to improve our estimation of the other with whom we are communicating. In this respect, the other in the mind of the speaker is more ideal than real.

The dialogue also appears between the different utterances when put together in a single discourse. Every utterance in a discourse enters into a dialogic relationship with the previous, and at the same time paves the way for the coming ones. It always alludes to or fortifies a previous utterance; or prepares for and anticipates a forthcoming one. It also maintains a dialogue with the entire discourse by the position it occupies in the structure of the discourse.
These dialogic relations are different from the linguistic, logical, and semantic ones such as deduction, negation, emphasis, repetition, etc., because they (dialogic relations) belong to the level of communication. Meanwhile linguistic relations belong to purely cognitive formal relations. Nevertheless, linguistic and logical relations can become 'communicative', but only if they achieve material existence; that is, if they have an author who creates them in a discourse and makes them perceptible to other subjects. This is so, because behind every dialogic relation in an utterance there is a speaking subject we hear in that utterance. If dialogic relations are abstracted from their author and context, they lose their dialogic and communicative value and become depersonalized- as is the case with sentences in grammar, for instance. Hence the distinction between 'linguistics' as the study of abstract sentences and 'translinguistics' as the study of utterances becomes more manifest.

On the above assumptions of the different dialogues that enter into the making up of an utterance, Bakhtin claims that the utterance is not totally that of its author as parts of it belong to the external world, to other authors from whom he acquired language and to whom his communication is oriented.

To carry this theme further, Bakhtin considers the author only within that external world by linking his internal psychological dialogue with that of the social. In this respect, he claims that we acquire our language only through various interactions with others in our social groups, neighbourhood, and society. This acquisition always comes about by mediation of utterances. These utterances are not objective and unprejudiced, but are already pregnant with others' meanings and aspirations. There is never a word that is exempt from the others' voice, every word remains charged with the other's previous voices (ibid:31).

Furthermore, Bakhtin claims that through language we form our consciousness and our inner psychology, i.e., our consciousness of ourselves comes through our interaction with others. I can see myself only through the other's eyes. Our language, which we learn from others, shapes our experience as it provides the form in which we acquire the experience. Language is the cradle of experience, Bakhtin claims. Thus, meaning, to him, is not subjective but inter-subjective. Therefore, the study of meaning, cannot be scientific but is profoundly cognitive. The 'I' only exists as part of the 'we'. Human personality becomes historically real and culturally productive
only in so far as it is part of a social whole, Bakhtin declares (ibid:23). (We will take up this issue in a more detailed fashion in 2.1.3 as part of the discussion of Bakhtin’s synthesis of the individual with the social.)

1.2.2. The Structure of the Utterance

According to Bakhtin, every utterance as a unit of translinguistics has two parts: a realized, and an implied part. The realized part is the verbal one. It is the reiterative or constant part (the linguistic aspect). This part, Bakhtin affirms, is only one constituent that belongs to everyone in the linguistic community. It consists of the words and their significations as well as the conventional rules of their combinations. This type of signification is similar to the meaning of the words as found in dictionaries; and the meaning of abstract sentences as divorced from context. Significations are always identical to themselves in different contexts; thus, they are said by Bakhtin to signify, but only to have the potential of meaning. In order for them to be meaningful, they have to be unified with a concrete context of enunciation- resulting in verbal communication.

Therefore, when transformed into actual utterances, and having achieved the status of being units of verbal communication, sentences have to say something that has never been said before, as part of their function in a unique communicative situation. This new element of meaning that is added to signification constitutes the ‘unique’ and non-iterative part of the utterance, because of which it has been created in the first place. This, Bakhtin claims to be the implied part of the utterance. What is normally called meaning in language is the mutual combination of the two aspects of meaning. Stated differently, it is the transformation of the shared semantic content of language to convey the unique, individual communicative need. Bakhtin has taken the unique component of meaning as the actual meaning in communication and called it the theme of the utterance.

By signification, in distinction to theme, we mean all the moments of the utterance that are reiterative and identical unto themselves in their repetitions... In fact, signification signifies nothing, but only has the potentiality, the possibility of signifying in a concrete theme.
In this way the implied part of the utterance expresses also its author’s evaluation of the situation or context in which it is produced. This context, in Bakhtin’s communicative view of language, includes more conspicuously the following factors:

1. Space and time of the enunciation, i.e. the spatio-temporal dimension that is common to the interlocutors.
2. The object or theme of which is spoken; and the interlocutors’ evaluation and knowledge of this object.
3. The relations of the interlocutors to each other, and their evaluation of the spatio-temporal context.

Generally speaking, the utterance is unlikely to be understood or explained outside this link to a concrete context of situation. Yet, it is usually the case that an utterance has solely one occurrence in a special context of situation: if, however, an utterance occurs more than once in a single context, all other occurrences or reproductions of the same utterance are considered to be like citations or quotations of it rather than a mechanical repetitions of it. It is in the unique occurrence that we find the true meaning of the utterance. In other words, an interpretation of the utterance is bound to the single pragmatic moment of encounter with the utterance.

In the light of this formulation, the understanding of the utterance can be said to comprise different hypothetical steps that, nonetheless, form a unified and continuous process. This process starts with the psychophysiological perception of the physical sign, the recognition of its reiterative signification. Then it continues with the unification of this signification with its context of enunciation to start the dialogical processing of it. What follows is the final dialogical understanding of the utterance that necessarily includes an evaluative judgment of it which benefits by the hindsight of the communicative action.

Thus, it becomes clear that the understanding of the reiterative part of the utterance is more accessible to scrutiny than that of the unique part. Whereas the first exists as
a part of our general knowledge of our shared language, the second is only detected through the context of enunciation (ibid:51).

Thus Bakhtin distinguishes between the word as a vehicle of expression, as part of language, that is the word with its general designation and its potentiality to mean, and the word as used in a context when it becomes as interpretive word, a word that interprets something else related to the outside reality. The interpretive word is always part of an utterance, and belongs to a user that conveys some meaning as part of an interpretive purpose.

As has been mentioned before, the utterance must express the subject’s evaluation of the context of enunciation. In doing so, that utterance assigns to itself a value; this value is what allows the judgement of the utterance to be beautiful, sincere, courageous, polite, etc. It is also what brings the context as a constitutive and integral part of the utterance -not as an external factor to it. In spoken language, the context becomes visible in the utterance’s phonic structure, as represented by the utterance’s intonation. Intonation represents the speaker’s immediate evaluation of the context. Bakhtin saw intonation as being the boundary between the verbal and non-verbal parts of the utterance in spoken language. It is the immediate relation between verbal structure and verbal communication.

Intonation is the finest representation of the orientation of the utterance towards the listener on the one hand and the object of the utterance on the other. Because of this, intonation can flatter, belittle, or elevate that object. In writing, however, the expression of the evaluation is not phonic but structural, and mostly determined by paradigmatic choices. It is what causes the author, so to speak, to hesitate between different lexical items and between different stylistic options. It follows from this, that in Bakhtin’s concept of communication, the meaning forms during a particular context only, and not outside this context.

On the above grounds, Bakhtin sees the utterance as a unit; no longer of verbal structure but of verbal communication. It enters into relations of dialogical nature that are no more compatible with linguistic relations. But, even so, the utterance is not realizable except through the given and fixed verbal structure. Bakhtin relies a great deal on the above distinctions in order to distinguish between language as an instrument of communication and language as a mode of actual communication, a
distinction that is crucial for delimiting the subject-matter of translinguistics. In other words, he wants to differentiate between the sentences as a unit of language and the utterance as a unit of communication: the first is the unit of the study of linguistics and grammar and semantics, and the second is the unit of the study of 'translinguistics'.

However, the utterance is distinct from the sentence not only because of its structure but also in relation to the way it functions. As said before, the utterance is always linked to a context of situation, and belongs to a different realm, that of the a concrete communicative situation. Thus, the main features of the utterance as a unit of translinguistics can be summarised as follows:

1. The boundaries of the utterance are determined by changes in the participants of the discourse rather than by any structural criterion.
2. Therefore the sign of the completion of the utterance is the likelihood of a response to it by another person.
3. It always expresses its subject, and is addressed to someone.
4. The utterance enters into past and future relations. The past relations serves as its background. The future ones are the responses it incites and foresees.

(The discussion of the structure of the utterance will revisited in chapter (6) when discussing some pragmatic approaches to translation)

1.3. Heteroglossia and Discursive Genres

After presenting Bakhtin's views on the structure of the utterance and what constitutes the major differences between the utterance and the sentence, it seems in order now to present another important theoretical concept attributed to Bakhtin which relates to the way utterances function in their relations with other utterances to form typical utterances of typical contexts of situation. These theoretical concepts are those of heteroglossia, and discursive genres. The two terms stand in complementary positions to each other: 'heteroglossia' is used by Bakhtin to describe what he sees as the heterogeneous co-existence of sub-systems of verbal language, on the level of
communication, in society; meanwhile, the term ‘discursive genres’ is used to characterize the typology of utterances in verbal communication.

Notwithstanding Bakhtin’s belief that language has a more or less fixed structure that exists on the social inter-subjective level, and his consent that without such a structure verbal communication is impossible he does not, however, conceive of language as composed of one unified homogeneous whole; rather he claims that language is a composite of many diverse co-existing sub-systems. As he himself explains it:

Language is not an abstract system of normative forms but a concrete heterological opinion on the world. Every word gives off a scent of a profession, a genre, a current, a party... etc.

(Todorov 1984: 56).

If we accept Bakhtin’s claim elsewhere that the subject producer of the utterance is also an individual that can be described historically as living in a certain age, being of certain nationality, sex, profession etc., then we can understand his claim about language’s relationship to social reality.

This, Bakhtin claims, should not be seen as disputing the subjectivity of the utterance, since every utterance is perforce subjective. However, the subject, with intention of communicating something, is free to choose one of the many types of utterances available to express his intention. These types, however, cannot be totally individual since they exist for others to understand.

Every particular utterance is assuredly individual, but each sphere of language use develops its own relatively stable types of utterances, and that is what we call discursive genre.

(Ibid., 82)

Thus viewed, the utterance also tells us something about its producer, his world views, social status, religion, and among other things his ideological bias. For that reason, it is perhaps safe to say that for its recipients that utterance also creates its producer ideologically. This is so because the subject’s choice of the type of utterance for self-expression reflects the ideological inclination of that subject. There is always another way in which a subject could have spoken.
In the minds of its speakers, language is more than an abstract system of rules; it consists of concrete heterological sub-systems that reflect different points of view of the world. These points of view are somewhat stable and shared by different individuals in the linguistic community. This is so because people acquire language in different heterological environments in various forms of genre. Natural language is acquired in life contexts through concrete utterances that reflect social and ideological values. It is also more likely that people learn the utterances while attached to their ideological meanings and social evaluation. They also learn the ways in which these utterances are used. In other words, their knowledge of language remains associated with these situations.

In our real lives, we speak to our families in one form of language, we pray in another, and we speak to a judge in court in a third, and so forth. We always have better command of language spheres to which we are more exposed; conversely, we often feel helpless and unable to communicate sufficiently in other spheres with which we do not have enough acquaintance. Societies are equally composed of different groups and communities that do not necessarily share the same views of the world. Language is generated by the same diversity it perpetuates. This is what persuaded Bakhtin to say:

Thus, at any given moment in its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom, it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past... between socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form (cited in Cazden 1989:118).

'Heteroglossia' and 'discursive genres' are the two aspects of 'verbal communication' that hold the key to language comprehension. Our ability to use or understand language is, to a large extent, dependent on our mastering of genre and our awareness of heteroglossia.

For that reason, Bakhtin takes an opposing stand to Saussure's view of language on the level of parole as infinitely variable. This is due to the fact that, in Bakhtin's view of parole, no 'single utterance with all its novelty can be regarded as an entirely free 'combination' (ibid). Therefore, Saussure ignores the fact that outside the forms...
of language there exists also forms of combinations of these forms; in other words he ignores the discursive genres (Bakhtin in Todorov 1984:57).

The concept of Discursive genres is complementary to the concept of 'heteroglossia', which Bakhtin uses to describe the types that utterances fall into in language use. The genres as a typology of utterances are arrived at by way of the typology of speech situations or by means of typologies of themes and objects. Genre can be simple as in the case of daily types of speech situations primary genre, or a more culturally developed and organized form of communication secondary genres: this is typical of the written genres: artistic, scientific, journalistic etc. (ibid:82). Every genre, no matter how complicated secondary genre, has its roots in simpler speech situation, primary genre. Genre is the reality that connects words to their actual meanings (connotations) in concrete utterances.

Social genre is a perspective through which reality is perceived. For example, a single problem could be described differently in Arts, religion or science etc.. Thus the genre is more than just a form of utterance organization; it is also necessary for the understanding of the meaning of the utterance. This is so because genres form a necessary background for their mutual understanding in as much as they together constitute the dialogical environment in which they can be better perceived. However, by the same token, genre can be socio-historical, characterizing language in successive points of its development e.g., Victorian English, Modern English and so on.

The theoretical concept of common language is thought by Bakhtin to be an expression of linguistic centralization. It is not given but is desired and intended. It is manifested by certain forces of society seeking greater linguistic unity and homogeneity, trying to make a single genre the privileged and standard genre, that is, to monologize the generic structure of language by putting limits on the heterological ways in which language represents social structure, or the way we view the world. This is so because Bakhtin takes the view that any mention of a standard language, for example, falls within this conception of linguistic centralization. A similar process exists also within a single genre. Language most times represents a metaphysical struggle (dialogue) for domination among genres, in which every genre strives to establish itself as the only genre.
Yet, this struggle for unification within language and genre safeguards language against total heterology and total subjectivity by imposing cohesive organization necessary for communication. In other words, it imposes limits to language change and, at the same time, guarantees the continuity of mutual understanding.

Language, Bakhtin maintains, has two opposing tendencies: one towards unification and centralization which is the centripetal force, the other is the centrifugal force, the force that causes heteroglossia - the driving force behind language change. Language development is the oscillation of these two forces.

The way he sees the function of language in society motivates Bakhtin to say that language as a unified system posited by linguists for scientific study is not given but is extricated by linguists for methodological purposes. Accordingly, he sees the abstract sentences that form the subject matter of linguistics as a genre by themselves. Moreover, he considers normative linguistics as always contributing to the centripetal forces of language. However, the study of utterances and their forms of combinations on the level of communication, because these forms are more flexible, plastic, and free than the normative, stable forms of linguistics, Bakhtin says should be studied by different methods. The methods of studying utterances go beyond their linguistic forms. Despite the fact that they take account of utterances’ linguistic forms, they, however, start from where linguistics leaves off. This point takes us to another important element in Bakhtin’s outlook on language which relates to his views of the epistemological differences that separate the study of discourse from the scientific study of language structure.

1.4. The Study of Language

Due to his view of language as constitutive of human consciousness and human reality, Bakhtin consistently prefers to see language as contingent to this reality. Human knowledge, he claims, falls within one of two domains: the first is the domain of natural and mathematical sciences (N/MS); the second is that of human sciences (HS). These two domains, he points out, should be well demarcated and ought not to be confused. Consequently, he sees them as different in two main respects: they have
distinct subject-matters, and they follow different methodologies. He categorically rejects privileging one of them over the other.

He continues to say that the subject-matter of the N/M sciences are reified objects. These objects do not reveal themselves in discourse, and communicate nothing about themselves. (Bakhtin uses the word ‘discourse’, and the word ‘text’ interchangeably throughout his discussion of the ‘dialogical principle’ as outlined by Todorov 1984). Objects of natural and mathematical sciences always coincide with themselves in different occurrences, and therefore can be de-contextualized.

In natural sciences, he claims, there is only one subject that observes and knows in front of a voiceless object or thing. (The word subject refers to the researcher as opposed to the object or subject-matter). In natural science there is nothing that corresponds to the function of context, says Bakhtin (Bakhtin 1986: 168). This is one of the reasons why Bakhtin takes knowledge in N/S as one sided, and hence can be said to be monological. On the account of the invariability of its object, and under the presupposition that this object will coincide with itself in all occurrences, this knowledge always strives for accuracy as a primary objective.

Meanwhile, the subject-matter of human sciences is not a reified object but a text. For Bakhtin, a text always reveals and expresses its producer and his responses to another previous text, a text as an immediate reality of another subject’s thought and experience. Bakhtin claims that behind every text there is a producer without which this text cannot be fully understood. Man is always a producer or potential producer of text. Therefore, the subject-matter of HS is not the material text per se, but rather the producer of the text in his specificity and capacity of producing that text. HS accesses man only through a text. Text to HS occupies a similar position to that of the ‘reified object’ in N/M sciences. The subject-matter of HS is the text as discourse and not the text as a linguistic unit.

The study of text cannot be one-sided, and the subject behind the text cannot be treated as a voiceless thing, and therefore cannot be de-contextualized. In this case we do not know a text, but we enter into a dialogue with it. Knowledge in HS is said to be ‘dialogical’. Dialogue, Bakhtin says, is not to be perceived in the narrow sense of the word, but in a wider conception of this word.
Knowledge in HS is said by Bakhtin to take the form of textual encounter (dialogue) between a *given* and previously produced text and the 'reacting' or the new text of the producer. Bakhtin sees this encounter not as an encounter of the text per se, but as an encounter of the two subjects (authors) of the texts. It is an indirect dialogue between them.

Owing to the fact that the subject never coincides with himself in different contexts, the text also has a spatio-temporal context that cannot be separated from it. Knowledge of the text is equal to 'understanding' of its subject, and cannot have accuracy as its objective. H/S should always strive for a deeper understanding of its subject. Depth of understanding in HS is the equivalent of accuracy in N/MS.

Textual meaning is never final because contextual meaning cannot be dissolved in fixed concepts, depersonalized, or fully explained in purely causal terms. There can be only a relative rationalization of the text meaning dependent on the help of other texts' meanings. There is usually a continuous widening of the text context in H/S. If we try to study H/S by methods of N/S we risk the reification of their meanings by imposing a finitude to these meanings, drifting by doing so in dogmatism (Bakhtin 1986: 160-2).

In accordance with the above distinction, Bakhtin makes another distinction between language as structure and language as communication. He sees these two aspects of language as falling within the spheres of two different sciences. The science that studies the structure of language system or rules is linguistics. Linguistics, Bakhtin claims, studies language for the purpose of penetrating its objective cognitive nature. It is mainly concerned with the study of language when language is reduced to its materiality (phonetics, syntax, semantics). The material part of language is the constant and reiterative side of it. It is language as a tool only.

Bakhtin does not say clearly whether he sees linguistics as a NS, but it can possibly be deduced that he sees linguistics in that respect, as Bakhtin did not object to linguists *bracketing away* linguistic forms for the study of the system of language. He also speaks of the *verbal structure* as constant, and coinciding with itself in different contexts. Elsewhere, he says that: *one cannot forbid a physician to work on cadavers on the grounds that his duty is to treat not dead but living people* (1986: 139). This perhaps implies that Bakhtin considers linguistics as a possible field of NS research.
The second aspect of language, the communicative aspect, Bakhtin claims, cannot be studied by exclusively linguistic means and should not be accounted for on the linguistic level of language. It is not concerned with language as a tool but rather with the relation of language to the real world. It can only be studied within this world and by another science, 'Translinguistics'. Translinguistics has as its subject-matter discourse as a living and historical occurrence that can be understood only in relation to its producer and in its unique context. It is discourse on its communicative level that constitutes the real meaningful side of language. It is this unique part only that qualifies the discourse to enter the world of communication. The linguistic aspect or the reiterative signification of natural language is only one part of that meaning. It is when this linguistic signification is put in relation with the real world that it becomes meaningful. Therefore, the study of meaning starts with translinguistics and not vice versa.

Translinguistics and linguistics are distinct, but at the same time interdependent and inseparable; one is always needed for the study of the other, but knowing one is not sufficient for knowing the other. Thus, Bakhtin equally criticizes both ‘objective empiricism’ for trying to reduce the communicative aspect of the text to its materiality, and ‘subjective empiricism’ for dissolving it into the psychic state that either precedes or follows it. He claims that they both share the same defect that they seek the whole in the part (Todorov 1984: 19).

By way of analogy, he introduces a related comment on translation in what he describes as the paradox of translation, which he states as follows:

Every system of signs (that is, every "language"), no matter how limited the collectivity that adopts it by convention, can always be, in principle, deciphered, that is translated into other sign systems (other languages); therefore, there exists a general logic of sign systems, a language of languages, potential and unified (obviously it can never become a particular concrete language, a language among others). But a text (as distinct from language as a system of means) can never be fully translated, because there is no text of texts, potential and unified [sic].

(Todorov 1984:26).

In this quotation, we believe that Bakhtin explains an important and often puzzling aspect of inter-lingual translation which is the twofoldness of the possible concept of translation itself. On one level there is the possibility of translation on the level of
structure, that is on the level of pure designation, for example. On this level Bakhtin equates translation with the decipherment of linguistic code. Full translation on this level is possible because Bakhtin foresees an ultimate logic of sign systems, or perhaps, a similar logic of symbolism that is common to all languages. However, on the level of communication, that is on the level of historical utterance, total translation is impossible because there will never be a one and unified discourse for all languages.

This distinction as well as the outline of Bakhtin's Dialogical Principle presented above, are, we believe, of crucial importance to the illuminating of translation. However, some of Bakhtin's other views on language are going to be presented elsewhere in this thesis wherever we find it will be beneficial to our discussion to do so. In the following chapter, we will take up the discussion of the philosophical views that underly Bakhtin's Dialogic Principle, as well as appraising his social anthropological views.
Chapter 2

The Grounds for Communicative Dialogism

2.1. Introduction

The dialogic principle of Bakhtin, as can be seen from the previous chapter, offers a broad explanatory outlook on language and speech. It takes as its focus the communicative function of language. It is inspired by the conviction that language is inseparable from the historical and social realities of its users, and guided by the belief that language exists only as a dialogic exchange of communication between two independent minds. It sees in this dialogic encounter a revealing metaphor for the study of communication as a whole; and devotes constant attention to the utterance as the basic unit of the dialogue.

Influenced by the post-Kantian philosophy that dominated the German intellectual scene in the 19th century, Bakhtin, (cf. Kant) held the constant assumption that everything in this world is divided into two modes of existence; either material being or what he called noumena, or thought created by the mind, phenomena. He also shared Kant's repudiation of pure reason i.e., reason outside the world of experience. However, while he accepted these Kantian basic assumptions, he rejected the Kantian idea of a priori constituted rational concepts of the mind; instead, he advocated that almost all that constitutes the individual's knowledge comes to him from his social and physical environment mostly through the mediation of language. The subject's consciousness, to Bakhtin, bears resemblance to language in that it is formed by a complex socially mediated experience. Thus, he regarded language as the most
important instrument for mediating reality and for constructing the human mind. As a result, he tried to reconstruct the Kantian dialectic of mind/world by mediating it through a dialogic relation by means of language.

By claiming that language is what shapes our intuition, and organizes the way we perceive the world around us, Bakhtin also accepted the non-coincidence of the world of experience to the world of thought. The divergence between the world of matter and the world of mind gives rise to a universal dualism that pervades our conceptual life and forms the cornerstone of dialogism.

Because of the important function of bridging the gap between these two worlds, Bakhtin assigned to language a unique status between the material world and human consciousness. Language, he alleged, is neither a concrete materiality nor an abstract concept, but an inseparable combination of the two. Any approach to language has to include these two aspects, and not to reduce it to any one of them, because language, as he saw it, functions as a unified unique whole (Holquist 1986: 61)

Another important and undeviating feature of Bakhtin’s thinking is related to his views of the universe, as in Bakhtin’s cosmology, the biosphere is in constant movement and change. Bakhtin welcomed Goethe’s conception of the attractive forces of earth’s mass, and the latter’s idea that everything in the universe is in continuing activity and change even if it appears to the eye as stable and immobile. Bakhtin explains that what is important in Goethe’s views is not the scientific ground of the hypotheses as much as its importance as a way of seeing things. Even the mountains, have congealed, but they are not inactive, says Bakhtin (1986:29).

Movement and change, he thinks, reveal themselves in language, which he regards as exhibiting a continuing struggle between forces of change and forces of stability, between different dialects, between different forms etc..

In dialogism, nothing can be understood by itself outside of its relationship with other things. A phenomenon is accessible to understanding only when situated in a relational context with certain other phenomena. Dialogism puts more emphasis on the relational rather than unitary aspects of knowledge. Accordingly, Bakhtin looked at language as also part of this cosmology in exhibiting this relational dynamism. Thus, language is not a totally given system nor totally created expression, it is a combination of the two.
Therefore, Bakhtin was partially in disagreement with the two main reductionist trends of thought about language in his time: namely, behaviourism of J. Watson reflexology (Bakhtin 1986:100 n2 by translator), and abstract mentalism (cf. Saussurean linguistics and classical hermeneutics). His views of language and his philosophical bias were mostly inspired by his critique of these influential trends of the time, although a great bulk of these views can still have some bearing on some of the controversies surrounding language today.

However, we believe that the key to understanding Bakhtin’s position resides in his metaphysical philosophical view on the relation between the subject and his social environment. Overlooking this important relation, as Bakhtin claimed, will result in positing the subject as a unitary whole and will result in reducing him to his physical nature (cf. behaviourism) or to a priori concept of the consciousness (cf. Cartesian mentalism). As we are going to demonstrate elsewhere in this thesis, this issue also asks questions pertaining to translatability and translation, of whether translation is a matter for only objective consideration, or a purely subjective undertaking - or both. Therefore, we believe that Bakhtin’s views in relation to this issue merit a detailed presentation.

2.2. The Individual and the Social

Using the distinction made by Marková (1982: 6), one can say that in relation to the general attitude vis-a-vis the relation between the individual and his environment, scholars can be divided into two camps: the first camp belongs to the Cartesian philosophical tradition that takes off from the idea of the a priori pre-constituted subject that is engaged in ascertaining his knowledge of the world. (This camp includes the Kantian views mentioned above). The laws of thinking are taken to be pre-defined, and the function of language is said to furnish the mind with an accurate representation of the outside world which is totally separate from our consciousness. The second camp is the one that follows the Hegelian evolutionist concept of man as culturally constituted, and man as a product of his world. The consciousness according to Hegel is a result of reflexive interaction with the outside world, and mostly the social part of that world.
Bakhtin, as perhaps was made clear earlier, has more in common with the second camp than with the first one. In his linguistic phenomenology, Bakhtin tried to reconstitute the Kantian relation of mind/world into a dialogic relation between the individual and others in his speech community. It is through continuous dialogue that Bakhtin thought about how individuals contribute to the forming of collective intersubjective beliefs while at the same time being constituted by these same intersubjective beliefs.

Not only did Bakhtin consider that language is what mediates concepts. Also following Humboldt, he accepted that language is the main instrument of thinking in which these concepts are employed which indicates that Bakhtin believed the individual consciousness to be basically verbal. He even went as far as saying that:

A thing, ... in order to affect a personality it must reveal its semantic potential, become a word, that is, assimilate to a potential verbal-semantic context (1986: 164).

Since language is mostly organized outside the individual, and since it also exists for him to communicate with others, individual/other relations become particularly important in forming his personality. This, we think, places Bakhtin among the originators of what Sinha (1988) terms social constructivist psychology (cf. Buber, Mead, Dewey).

For Bakhtin the relationship self/other is a determining factor in understanding other issues such as the relationship of langue/parole, code/message, language/culture etc.. Holquist (1990) noticed that, in Bakhtin’s assumption, ‘the self’ (individual) stands in relation to others in a similar relationship to that of a word to a system of language. They both share their importance and value by being in a single collectivity what the others are not (31). Elsewhere, Holquist observed that:

Dialogue is to Bakhtin’s system what aphasia is to Jakobson’s: a datum from experience that can serve an economical paradigm for... a theory encompassing more global dimensions (Holquist 1986: 64).

Moreover, by considering the self as the unit of existence, and existence within a society as a dialogic phenomenon, the individual is to the understanding of society
what the sign is to the understanding of language. Moreover, the sign/language, self/other distinctions serve a common and higher function of organizing otherwise chaotic experience (ibid).

However, Bakhtin was keen to emphasize that the relationship that binds the individual to a social system is not restricted to that of differentiation, as it (this relation) always presupposes another relation which is that of sameness. In other words, this relationship is not an exclusive or binary one. To him, these two relationships - differentiation and similarity - imply each other, and, therefore, ought to be seen as informing each other. As we will try to demonstrate, these two relationships would perhaps reveal the relationship that binds two expressions, or texts in translation.

Because the relationships cementing the different individuals in a coherent social whole are not exclusive, Bakhtin considered the relationship of the individual to society as one that stretches between, but never reaches, the two extreme poles of total social homogeneity and absolute individual specificity. He rejected reducing one of them to the other. Instead, he tried to reveal the intricate relationships that tie them together in order to prove that the individual’s uniqueness is not in contradiction with his social constitution. Daelmans and Maranhao introduced the three terms, the principle of answerability, the law of placement and exotopy according to which they think Bakhtin tries to explain the two-foldness of this relationship (Daelemans and Maranhão 1990: 224). Because of their potential pertinence to translation, it seems worthwhile to survey them below.

2.2.1. The Principle of Answerability

The principle of answerability was Bakhtin’s explanation of what he thought to be the obligatory addressivity of the individual to his social environment. He alleged that this addressivity that individuals have to each other is, in a Darwinian sense, part of the more general interaction with the environment that is necessary for survival. Like all other organisms, humans are biologically equipped for that survival. Different from the lower forms of life, the addressivity of mankind is marked by a greater amount of voluntariness and choice making. However, this addressivity is an exigence for
survival because, as Bakhtin noticed, there is no *alibi for being* (Daelemans and Maranhao 1990: 220).

Todorov linked Bakhtin’s perception of the constitutive rôle of the other in shaping the conscious of the individual to the existential ‘philosophical anthropology’ of Martin Buber with whom Bakhtin was acquainted, and with whose writing Bakhtin’s views have certain affinities (1984:117 n1).

According to Holquist (1986), Bakhtin is partly persuaded into formulating this thought by physiological studies performed by V. Uktomsky on the human central nervous system. (Uktomsky 1872-1942 was a very close associate of Bakhtin). Bakhtin wrote his first book on *The Architectonics of Answerability* a short time after Uktomsky’s findings (Holquist 1986:68 n2). Uktomsky’s findings pointed the fact that the central nervous system is equipped with a higher form of coordinating procedure that is able to monitor and respond simultaneously to all irregularities that occur on the outside of the body.

These responses, to Uktomsky’s surprise, are directed not to areas affected, but to centres of the brain that are responsible for accelerating certain functions to rectify the stimuli’s consequent effects. For example, if the laryngeal nerve is stimulated the response comes from areas of the brain responsible for increasing breathing rather than areas connected directly with the larynx. This procedure is a lower function of a system that Uktomsky called the *dominanta*. The *dominanta* reorganizes responses of the central nervous system to stimuli according to their vitality for survival rather than their chronological order. It is as if the dominanta re-authors (re-organizes) responses according to their relevance.

It also indicates that the dominanta is highly sensitive to space and time because of its success in performing this task. Uktomsky concluded that the human central nervous system is engaged in incessant re-authoring (addressivity) of its environment i.e., the individual’s responses will gradually be mechanically directed towards stimuli that are more regularly affecting him and more important to his well being, resulting in the ‘dominanta’ gradually modelling itself through this interaction with the environment in a way that takes its shape from the same function it performs (Holquist 1986: 68).
Bakhtin surmised that an analogous answerability exists between the individual and his social environment where the mind performs a similar function to that of the dominanta (in the brain). He suggested that the human mind is engaged in a non-stop addressivity with the outside world (physical, social and psychological). Homeostasis is the central nervous system’s mechanism for responding to external stimuli; likewise, language is the medium through which the mind interacts with the surrounding world.

In other words there are two levels of interaction between the individual and the world, two levels that are analogous and perhaps interrelated, as they might be two sides of the same natural endowment. One level is the system of unconscious responding to the environment on the level of the nervous system. The second is the necessarily conscious responding to the environment on the level of the mind. The utterance is the unit of the mind responding to the environment through language.

It is likely, also, that unlike the central nervous system, the mind’s function is more complex and exhibits a higher form of behaviour that may involve other cognitive functions, such as perception, sensation, memory etc. (ibid: 69). (The sharing of the same central nervous system and the vitality of answerability to survival are two points that will be re-discussed in Chapter 7 in relation to the question of translatability).

Some remarks, we feel, are due here: the first is that Bakhtin, by this analogy, thought that mind does more than simply reflect its material environment. It is capable of dialogically processing and re-organizing this environment. This is apparent from Bakhtin’s criticism of behavioral reflexology in general and American schools of behaviourism (c.f. J. Watson 1913) in particular for failing to see the difference between animal mechanistic reflexes and human conditioned behaviour.

Bakhtin also assumed that behaviourist linguists (e.g. Bloomfield) committed a similar inaccuracy by coming short of distinguishing between daily primary genres and the more complex and highly organized secondary genres such as complex forms of writing. Behaviourists, Bakhtin claimed, oriented their studies towards primitive utterances: therefore their attitude towards language, had been limited to mechanistic responses (1986:61-2).

Bakhtin, as it seems, regarded communication as a very highly developed social and cultural process that involves a sophisticated and creative cognitive system. The
utterance is a behavioral unit of communication that is also partly formed by social and linguistic presuppositions.

The second remark is on the fact that Bakhtin presumed the individual to cognize and process objects of experiences in the way that they are related to their survival, and not the way they are — a hint that suggests that Bakhtin’s view was more akin to interpretive phenomenology than to vulgar materialism. This view is further reinforced if we keep in mind that Bakhtin constantly believed that, in most cases, experience that usually belongs to the community, pre-dates the subject’s and comes to him in the form of expressions that are acquired through live utterances.

A third point is that, Bakhtin as observed by Holquist (1986), when hypothesizing two distinct mechanisms of interacting with the environment (mind and brain), never spoke about the relationship between the two. However, it can be deduced that he saw them as interacting even if he does not mention that specifically.

If, on the other hand we take answerability of the individual to his community as a pattern that falls within the general answerability of the community with other communities in a given culture, and consequently of a culture to other cultures in the world, then would appreciate how answerability can be related to translation. More so more obvious in our time than at any other time, as most boundaries between communities and nations have all but nearly disappeared, except for linguistic boundaries where more is needed to overcome them.

The utterance of language and the social context of ‘answerability’ are inextricably linked. The individual, when he answers to the social environment, re-authors it internally (i.e. cognitively): thus, his responses to it are more directed towards aspects of the utterance that are more relevant and important to him (also to other utterances of the past), and vice versa.

Bakhtin’s ideas here can be compared to the more elaborate views of Sperber and Wilson (1986) on the rôle of ‘relevance’ in shaping human communication. Sperber and Wilson’s ‘principle of relevance’ was based on one of the maxims (quality, quantity, relevance, manner) which had been proposed earlier by Grice (1957) as a guideline implied and followed by interlocutors in a conversation. (The rôle of relevance in communication and translation will be addressed in Chapter 6, 8)
However, it is important in this connection to mention that, according to Bakhtin, while we re-author our environment we are also re-shaped by it. We are the creation of an environment that we constantly help to shape. Relevance, as we are going to try to demonstrate later, can be of significance in explaining translation.

However, and this is one of Bakhtin's major claims, integration is never complete, as within mutuality there is also divergence of needs and particular interests. An individual is singled out from the group by his idiolect, the group by its dialect, a language by its structure. The dynamics of language are entangled in the web of conflict between specific needs and the exigence of uniformity. The main forces that contribute to diversity are those of space and time: space and time not as natural factors but as two dimensions that relate to what takes place in a particular space and during a given time. These two factors are also two dimensions of a single metaphysical law Bakhtin calls the law of placement, and which he employs to account for the systematic forces of diversity within a community.

2.2.2. The Law of Placement

For Bakhtin space and time, as in Einsteinian relativity, were seen as a confluence in one interlocked factor he called chronotop. The law of placement is the law of spatio-temporal (chronotopic) being of man. Since dialogism takes the individual to be the centre around which life evolves; and recognizes that the individual can only observe the world from a single perspective of which he is the centre, the law of placement starts with the commonsensical observation that no two individuals can occupy the same place at the same time. Therefore, every individual observes the world from a unique chronotopical perspective (Holquist 1990: 18). Conversely, every point of view is chronotopic; that is, it is encompassed within chronotopical dimensions. If we generalize this concept to experience in general, no two experiences can be said to be exactly the same. If the law of placement is applied to language utterances, no utterance can ever be a repetition of another. Chronotopically, the utterance, as well as the individual's experience of it, joins the historical unrepeatability of logosphere... where even pauses and silence constitute a part (Bakhtin, 1986: 134).
Bakhtin, inspired by relativistic outlook, employed these insights to de-construct the assumed homogeneity of language in order to account for the heteroglossic forces that he saw pervading all discourse. To him, even the same person that tells of his experience cannot be said to re-live that same experience; i.e., the discoursal ‘I’ is never totally identical with the self or the ‘I’ of the author. If I tell (orally or in writing) of an event that I have just lived... I find myself already outside of the time-space where the event occurred... To identify one’s ‘I’ with the ‘I’ that I tell is as impossible as to lift oneself by one’s hair. (Todorov, 1984: 52).

Still, to Bakhtin, time and space are not to be regarded only in relation to their physical objective sense, but should also be considered from a cognitive point of view. A distinction, therefore, ought to be made between real (objective) space and time and the cognitive space and time that exists in the mind of the individual, or in an artistic work. For the individual the self is above all a cognitive concept with a unique chronotopical history of formation. That is, it has another conception of time and space which it relates to the space and time of its existence as well as other chronotopical events of its past. The self accounts for itself chronologically according to a calendar of its past events that does not necessarily coincide with other pre-existing calendars.

To the self, space and time are everlastingly open and unfinished. Bakhtin (cf. Heidegger, as we are going to demonstrate in more detailed way in 4.6.1) considered the self in relation to its space and time, as a project that is always in the process of completion - in the open event of being. The self, as a cognitive necessity, in Bakhtin’s view, is not given but is always in the process of being created, something always in the future. Therefore, the self will never be able to conceive itself as a complete or a spatio-temporally closed whole.

On the other hand, the time-space in which the self sees the other is always closed and finished, i.e., a closed event. The other is usually perceived as a whole, another self that is complete. Similarly, while my space is the point around which the world evolves, the place of the other to me is a neutral environment, something that exists as an extension of the outside world (Holquist, 1986: 21-2).
My space and time are what enter into the making of my cognitive environment and form my individuality, my cognitive environment. My cognitive environment is the background or the canvas against which my new experience is usually evaluated, i.e., enters into a dialogue with previous ones. Since we can understand a phenomenon only if we place it in (dialogic context) relation to other phenomena (otherwise experience will be a chain of disconnected unrelated events), the cognitive space and time (environment) of the individual, according to Bakhtin, turns into an ethical and aesthetical perspective of seeing the world around (ibid).

Meaning is also to be seen as a relationship between two entities that, while simultaneously occupying the same physical environment, possess two different cognitive spaces. However, understanding is not to be seen as a passive assimilation of the meanings of the other, but as an active cognitive processing of those meanings that involves, among other things, retrieval of other past stored experiences.

2.2.3. Dialogue and Inter-subjectivity

Bakhtin uses the principle of answerability and the law of placement to formulate his translinguistic reconciliation of the individual and the social in language. The individual, he said, is inclined to an incessant addressivity to the environment, not only because of the need to communicate but also because of a psychological necessity for his self identification. Becoming conscious of my self, I attempt to see my self through the eyes of another person, of another representative of my social group or of my class (Bakhtin in Todorov 1984: 30).

In Bakhtin’s project, inter-subjectivity precedes subjectivity and plays an essential part in constituting it. Language as communication, including extra-and-para-linguistic features, is constitutive of the individual’s cognitive life, inasmuch as it is in language that we stock up this experience, and it is by means of language that we recall and dialogically process this experience.

According to many scholars who took interest in Bakhtin’s work (cf. Todorov 1984; Holquist 1990; Booth (1986)) Bakhtin’s working of this relationship exhibits similarities with well-known Western opponents of positivism (cf. K. Burke, M. Buber, J. Dewey, H. Mead). However, Bakhtin shows closer affinities with social
psychologists, such as Martin Buber and Herbert Mead. Their influence on his phenomenology are more conspicuous. Both share the same concern as Bakhtin about the vitality of the self’s appraisal from its relationship with the other. In this concern Mead writes:

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoint of the social, of the other individual members of the same social group or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which it belongs

(Crapanzano 1980: 9).

While Mead saw the individual as equal to what he stands for symbolically in society (ibid), Bakhtin equated him to what he stands for linguistically. However, Mead also emphasized the importance of language and cognition in this regard. Both scholars were against mechanistic behaviourism.

Bakhtin, in comparison to Mead, claimed that the self, in so far as it is invisible to itself, cannot see itself except through the other. It enriches itself from the vantage point of the other, and from being able to see from the outside what it cannot see from its own viewpoint. For the ‘I’ as a self, the other is indispensable, as the other can see things that the ‘self’ is unable to see about itself. For instance, even physically speaking, only the other can see my forehead, the back of my neck or what is behind me. But that does not mean that these parts of me do not objectively exist; they do even if I cannot see them. This is perhaps what impels Bakhtin to re-emphasize this fact elsewhere when by saying that:

I become my self only by revealing my self to another,...It turns out that every internal experience occurs on the border, it comes across another, and this essence resides in this encounter....The very being of man (both internal and external) is profound communication. To be is to communicate. [sic] To be means to be for the other...Man has no internal sovereign territory ..., looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the other or through the other.

(Todorov 1984: 96).

The same also applies to the other, considering that I am always the other self for the other individual. I do not only see the other’s forehead...etc., but I also see him as a spatio-temporal whole against a background that he himself has no means of seeing.
Not only that, but I always see myself in relation (dialogue) to other selves; in the same way that I see him only by comparing and differentiating him from the others.

It is as if the self co-experiences its life as well as the world around it with others. (As mentioned before, this co-experience, of which the individual has no alibi, is essential to the subject’s being). Psychologically speaking, I am what I see myself to be in the eyes of, or in comparing myself with others. The other is my parent, my teacher, my idol, my lover, etc.

The self, on the other hand, always tries to objectify itself, to communicate, and, among other things, convey to others how it perceives itself. It does so by appropriating, as much as possible, the expressions of language (which exist objectively outside, and which the ‘self’ shares with others) for the task of communicating its impressions or meanings. In doing so, it re-experiences them with the others. Expressions of language used to convey love, hate, apology, thanking, admiration etc., almost all human verbal acts, are experienced by others, and he addresses towards others. Moreover, the most important events in the self’s life, its birth as well as its death, Bakhtin points out, are observed only by others.

However, it often happens that the appropriation of language to express our own particular experience becomes a transaction of a less than forthright nature. Our momental experience is by itself a product of our own dialogic processing of that experience with previous ones. That, indeed, is what makes them unique to us and distinguished from other speakers’ experiences. Although our experience is unique to us, it is at the same time similar to that of the others with whom we share the larger space and time as well as language. That is to say we are similar but at the same time different from others. My relationship to others, thus characterized, becomes a relativistic rather than a binary relationship, it comes closer to that two-sided relationship of similarity and differentiation.

Because of the uniqueness of the experience to the subject, the more personalized or emotive an experience is, the harder, perhaps, it is to be verbalized in language, since language is something inter-subjective and goes beyond the subject himself. Language in this sense becomes a concrete communicative reality rather than an abstract system of signs. Because experience and language can never totally coincide, communication will rarely be fully achieved. Yet when the subject uses an expression,
he adds to its meaning a new emotional and evaluative value. Our communication is likely to be more successful with others who have shared the same or similar experiences in the past. Bakhtin's views, so to speak, resemble also those of recent theories of social psychology, as represented in modern theory of symbolic interactionism (cf. Smiths, Clair, Scherer 1980) in emphasizing the contextual influences on speech patterns. Scherer writes on parallel lines to Bakhtin:

nonverbal signs function pragmatically by indicating characteristics or states of the sign users—that is, we postulate a fourth type—the dialogic function (relationship between sign and interacting sign users as a system). Nonverbal signs function dialogically by indicating the nature of the relationship between interacting partners' 

(ibe: 229).
What Scherer refers to here as nonverbal sign is what Bakhtin calls the context of enunciation.

2.3. ‘Exotopy’: The Excursion Into Alterity

Every communicative encounter, to Bakhtin, starts with an implied assumption of otherness. In a communicative encounter, and in order to understand the other, it is important to try to see things from the vantage point of the other - the other not as another individual in a numerical sense, but in his self/other relational whole. As it multiplies, this relation becomes more complex, since one has always to keep in mind that the dialogic relationship self/other exists not only for me but also for the other. This is usually overlooked because we prefer to see the other as spatio-temporally complete, outside this relationship. Language, because it offers us relatively fixed and rigid categories, is a factor in overlooking the complex structure of others. Language offers only one closed grammatical time and grammatical space.

Grammatical time and space (time and space inside a text) are language means of organizing and categorizing the otherwise chaotic space and time outside. We take grammatical time to include not only tense and aspect but also the calendar time which we think is created for the same purpose. In reality, time and space exist in an infinite continuum, and stand as the two aspects of language study least susceptible to rigid categorization, as is in fact demonstrated by the problem of deixes and other
contextual elements in linguistics or pragmatics. Moreover, Bakhtin saw another dimension of time, which is the value of time in relation to that dialogic relationship an event has with other events at a certain point of time.

In order to appreciate the non-coincidence of the self image to itself and how it is viable to be seen by others, we have to magnify the relation self/other into a wider context of communication between two cultures: where one culture tries to understand and consume another (i.e., to have a real and deep understanding) as in translation, for example. Where the differences in the two culture’s ‘semiospheres’ are greater, the categories of a language for depicting the other culture are more rigid.\(^1\)

Now it is important to mention that, for Bakhtin, understanding is not in identifying ourselves with the other (empathy, or what he otherwise called *excursion into otherness*), we only empathize with the other in order to imagine how he conceives the world, sees the world from the extra-locality, and in order to recognize his intention-intention in the Gricean concept of this word. However, it is in a movement in the other direction, i.e., when we place that in a dialogic relation to our own way of seeing things that real understanding takes place. This is, he claimed, necessary so that we do not see the other as a duplication of ourselves.

Real understanding always includes the return to our own identity, and the inclusion of an evaluative context of our own, i.e., in inserting it in a dialogic relation with our own previous experiences. It is another reason why understanding is never complete or absolute, and why meaning (in a communicative sense) is never fully determined.

The outsidedness, finding one’s self in otherness, or the excursion into alterity, Bakhtin called ‘*exotopy*’. ‘*Exotopy*’ is Todorov’s translation of what was literally meant by Bakhtin as *finding oneself outside*. Todorov thought that *exotopy*, which is a word of a Greek origin, is a good approximation of that meaning (Todorov 1984:95).

Exotopy and re-identification, the two terms that explain Bakhtin’s answerability, are in many ways similar to the modern philosopher of hermeneutics H. Gadamer’s notions of *alienation* and *homecoming* (of the self), two movements Gadamer used to explain *Bildung* or the *linguistic and cultural conformation* (Daelemans and Maranhão

\(^1\)We owe the term semiosphere to the semiotician J. Lotman (1991) who used it to depict the semiotic environment of a culture. We will advance some of his interesting and relevant views in the introduction to the next chapter.
Bakhtin gave an example of *exotopy* from the relations between a writer and his characters in the novel. The writer, by creating a character, puts himself in the place of that character in order to see things through his eyes and in his character's space and time. The writer then has to go back to his place to create another character. The writer in this case has a dual relationship with his characters. He is, at the same time, inside and outside his characters. He is disengaged (but never totally) from these characters that he has previously created. However, he enjoys the advantage of expressing views of the world from their position (exotopic position) (Todorov, 1984:99-103).

H. Clark (1987) in a commentary on Sperber and Wilson's principle of Relevance claimed novels and plays to contain multi-layers of communication which he said also as containing multi-layers of communication intention. He gives Melville's novel *Moby Dick* as an example.

In this novel, he pointed out, Ishmael the narrator in the novel tells of his adventures to friends in a local public house; naturally, he does so in a fictitious context of the discourse universe of the novel. Clark claimed that it can be said that Ishmael conveys to his audience his own communication intentions; however, if it becomes clear that Ishmael as well as his friends are both inventions of Melville then it is assumed that there is also a second level of communication intentions, those that Melville tries to convey to us through the invention of the characters as well as their conversation in the novel. The distance between the reader and the characters' intentions is different from that between him and those of Melville (715).

The type of communication that is involved in the manner that Ishmael speaks for Melville to the latter's audience was described by Bakhtin as *polyphonic*. *Polyphony* is a communication situation where a text speaks for more than one author at the same time. (We will re-address this type of communication later in chapter (6) where we will try to link it to the question of translation)

Exotopy reveals itself in the relationship of the critic to the work of the writer. The critic normally has a choice between identifying himself totally with the writer (speaking for him), or keeping full distance from him (denying him his own dialogic
links with his characters), and seeing him from his own (the critic's) point of view. In our judgment Exotopy is a concept that provides useful means for understanding the relationship between the translator and the other's work in so far as the attitude of the translator to the original work is concerned: a translator has the same choice as the critic.

It is noteworthy that Bakhtin saw the novel, where the polyphonic style is usually most present, not only as an important literary genre, but also one with linguistic and pragmatic value, since the novel is the genre where language gives a mirror image of itself. A genre in which language gives a good bird's eye-view of itself as speech. In the novel, and perhaps also in drama, language is usually employed in communicative contexts that reveal through different characters the concrete sociolinguistic aspects of language as discourse. It reveals how different discourses exhibit their ideological orientation, how they confront each other in a form of dialogue in a single communicative situation, and how genres, dialect, acrolects, come into action in real life. Contexts that also often reflect possible difficulties, misunderstandings, or even instances of communication through language failing.

Exotopy, to Bakhtin, can be spatial or temporal, national or cultural, generic or linguistic. Bakhtin's concept of exotopy comes close to Lotman's concept of the differential distance between two interlocutors in a single semiosphere. Regarding the relationship of exotopy to cultural understanding Bakhtin assumed that:

In the realm of culture, exotopy is the most powerful lever of understanding, it is only to the eyes of other culture that the alien culture reveals itself more completely and deeply

(Todorov 1984: 109-10).

Understanding of another culture is not only a simple translation of that culture; it must include the second phase of inserting that culture in the context of the new culture. An assumption shared by Tambiah (1990, P. 111) who explained translation by suggesting a parallel concept to that of exotopy. According to Tambiah:

The translation of culture involves what may be called double subjectivity that is characteristic of the social sciences as presently practised...The double subjectivity involves sympathy and empathy as well as distance and neutrality on the part of the observer.
Tambiah recognized the double-facet nature of translation as an operation that necessitates the identification with the other before re-expressing what he says in the target language, a move of re-distancing one’s self from the other. Tambiah, however, claimed an ethical aspect for translation in what concerns the neutrality towards the writer’s view of the world.

In addition, there seems to be a relationship between the exotopic distance and the type of language involved in a communication; the shorter the distance between two individuals or two groups, for example, the more their inferred speech increases at the expense of their linguistically represented one. Speech also becomes amorphous and elliptical with more familiar acquaintances. A translation from two languages or two genres that are equally developed, or have previously inter-communicated, is bound to be easier and more informing.

Vygotsky noticed that among people with close psychological contact, reduced speech becomes a rule rather than exception (Thought and Language: 238). *Inner speech* (the speech of the individual) has peculiar syntax that is disconnected and incomplete (ibid). Werner and Kaplan (1980) observed that the greater the distance between individuals who take part in a conversation situation, the more autonomous the symbolic vehicles must be; conversely, the more communal and less egocentric the more idiosyncratic and contextualized the vehicle becomes (49).

### 2.4. The Evaluative Tone of Speech

Bakhtin conceived his opinion of language acquisition through speech along the lines of his concept of answerability, because he believed that:

> We know our language-its lexical composition and grammatical structure-not from dictionaries and grammar but from concrete utterances which we hear and which we ourselves reproduce in live speech communication with people around us. We assimilate forms of language only in forms of utterances ...[They] enter our experience and consciousness together

(Bakhtin in Cazden 1989: 120).
Thus, Bakhtin, insisted on dialogue as the early means of acquiring the child’s first words. He claimed that the individual turns these words (utterances) into his own words so that they become the seeds for his later answerability to others’ new words. Karmiloff-Smith (1987) reported that many modern scholars of language acquisition (cf. Halliday (1975), Lieven (1978), Burner(1975)), emphasised the rôle of early language exchanges between the child and his parents in promoting the child’s early conversational abilities and linguistic formation (369). The few new words the child acquires, through a slow process of obliteration of the others’ authorship (removing of quotation marks), and reworking of these words through dialogues with previous ones become anonymous, and take new forms to be the individual’s new words. The more profane and customary the word the easier is the obliteration: meanwhile, the more authoritative the word the harder it is for the word to lose its author.

Authoritative words, such as: proverbs, collocations, dead-metaphors, quotations...etc., always keep their authors even incognito because the individual is always aware of the fact that they belong to the other. Thus viewed, Bakhtin assumed that in every creative utterance of an individual, there are always elements of anonymous authors (other). Individuals in a shared community draw from the same reservoir of linguistic expressions but each with his own stockpile of it.

As pointed out by Emerson (1986) Bakhtin’s concept of the relationship between the individual’s utterances and those of the others is similar to Vygotsky’s division of speech into inner and external speech. Vygotsky claimed that the child’s first speech is social. It is only at a later stage that his language becomes a second signal system for interacting with others. Emerson thought that Vygotsky’s synthesis between idealist and behavioral psychology, employing an approach which takes at its centre language as speech, bears unmistakable resemblance to that of Bakhtin’s between the individual and the social (28-32). For Vygotsky, also, inner speech or speech for oneself originates through differentiation of speech for the others. A child’s language, to Vygotsky, grows simultaneously with his other mental abilities (Thought and Language: 228). Whereas Bakhtin supposed that the individual’s words are others’ words with obliterated authorship reworked through inner dialogues, Vygotsky considered that inner speech is speech with preserved predication and omitted subjects including all other words connected with these subjects.
Both Bakhtin and Vygotsky stressed the view that a learnt word always preserves the connotational and psychological aspects of the context in which it was previously learnt or used. Therefore, the two of them believed that every word recalls to its speaker an experience or context. Each individual is a unique complex of the voices that inhabit him; therefore, the individual cannot be reduced to the social and at the same time cannot be divorced from it.

It also becomes obvious that the individual’s consciousness cannot be said to be totally a unified preexisting whole as assumed by the Cartesian cogito. In this manner Bakhtin de-constructed the subject in the same way he de-constructed language.

It seems appropriate here to mention that these thoughts of Bakhtin are concerned with the acquisition of language as speech with particular attention paid to the functional and connotational aspects of language. Bakhtin, unlike Chomsky, was not concerned with the acquisition of language as a cognitive system of grammar, or the relation of that grammar to the human internal organism. At the same time Chomsky did not concern himself with language as such, but rather with what enables human beings to acquire language.

As already mentioned, Bakhtin thought that the passage from inner speech (internal emotion) to external speech (expressions) is not a mechanical one. It involves a dialogic negotiation in order to find expressions that can convey our experience as faithfully as possible while at the same time being fully understood by our partners and suiting the context of our speech. Our experience, he said, is usually claimed by many competing words in the language. Our choice of them is determined by our evaluation of the context of enunciation. The presence of a word, style or genre always points to the absence of others. Every word or style carries within its meaning a conventional emotional force that reflects its evaluative accent. This objective evaluative accent of the word Bakhtin called its axiological value. Every word he says: smells of the context in which it has lived in its intense social life (Todorov 1984: 57).

Intonation is the main distinguishing feature of speech as utterance from the linguistic sentence. Intonation, Bakhtin insisted, cannot be part of any language system because it can be so easily and fluidly passed from one structure to another. It can
change a request into a question or an order. Because of its flexibility, it is always able to play the semi-signifying rôle of uniting the utterance with its emergent context.

Late Wittgenstein, similarly, spoke of our language embodying residues from our cultural heritage where in *old rites* and behaviours language use was more gestural and intonated:

> In the old rites we have the use of an extremely developed language of gestures, all these processes, these changes of meaning, we still have before us in our language of words.

(Tambiah 1990: 63).

Intonation to Bakhtin was also a stylistic element that is conventionally recognized by the speech community. It has, cultural and ideological structure that underlies our speech. He even went as far as saying that: *even within silent reading of written speech intonation prevails as a stylistic factor* (1986: 85).

Bakhtin referred to intonation as well as the other para-linguistic features as the subconscious of language. A word or a phrase is retained in the mind of an individual with all the para-linguistic features that have affected it in the context of its acquisition as well as other contexts of its usages.

These features inhabit our language in association with their semantic (formal) and connotational meanings. Every word, to an individual, has an aura of para-linguistic features that sometimes remind him of the context of his encounter with them. Bakhtin, therefore, concluded that from the vestiges of all our previous utterances we form the *tonality of our consciousness* which is part of the tonality of our culture. In every de-contextualized utterance we read, we always inject an intonation from an assumed one. When we read a text we are in a sense authored by that text.

### 2.5. Dialogue and the Dialectic

Before we go any further in this discussion, we would like to introduce some important distinctions that are related to the distinction Bakhtin often emphasized between dialogue and (Hegelian) dialectic. Because the two are often confused, Bakhtin regarded these distinctions as crucial and related to the nature of the
distinction he made between the abstract unitary (monologic) study of language as a linguistic system and the inter-subjective dialogic study of language as communication.

Dialectic, in Bakhtin’s opinion, can be applied to the study of language only as an isolated system divorced from its users (reiterative system) but not to language as speech (creative aspect). Swearingen (1990) recapitulated these distinctions as follows:

Firstly, the dialectic as the logic of question and answer and reformulation is always structured by contradictions or opposing views (as in the Hegelian sense, where the dialectic always aims at a higher and unified state of mind); dialogue on the other hand, is not strictly structured by contradictions or opposing views and always implies infinitude and non-closure. In other words, dialogue does not strive for a unified interpretation, and can always be reformulated into new dialogues. This is so because dialogism does not see the relationship between things as one of binary opposition and does not restrict itself to methods of purely logical nature. In dialogue there is no absolute truth or transcendental essence. Therefore, it can be said that every dialectical relationship is a dialogic one but not vice versa.

Secondly, dialogue presupposes language, i.e., it does not take place solely in language, or among language elements by themselves outside the spatio-temporal context or the speech situation’s participants. Dialogue is perforce inter-locutionary. Therefore, dialogic relationships cannot be reduced to linguistic ones, i.e., to strict relationships among units of language by themselves.

Thirdly, dialogue allows for the study of language in aspects that cannot be accounted for by dialectics or other methods that employ classical logic, aspects such as rhetoric, figure of speech, etc. (ibid.). Dialogue is useful in approaching issues where methods of persuasion and preference enter into play; where truth or knowledge is not accessible through empirical means.

Lastly, dialogic relationships are not mechanistic or deterministic; and two consciousnesses are needed for dialogue to take place.

take dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning voices) ..., carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words ..., and that is how you get dialectic

(Bakhtin 1986: 47).
Daelemans and Maranhão (1990) suggest that there are at least three distinguishable levels of dialogism in Bakhtin's metaphoric employment of the term: the dialectic between self and other; the relationship between two interlocutors in an exchange of a dialogue; and the relationship among utterances (232). These distinctions seem to us revealing and useful for the discussion of the dialogic principle, and for the purpose of explaining translation.

We presume that these three levels of dialogism can be approximated to match the different levels of explanation that are usually required for translation. The first level, for example, can explain how the inter-subjective, social and ideological environment is synthesized with the individual's ideological outlook; how in certain moments of history of a single culture the predominant ideological bias of that culture is reflected in its members (researchers', scholars', philosophers') views of the world, including views of language and translation. (An issue that will be discussed in Chapter 2).

The second level of explanation is the dialogic aspect of communication that is related to pragmatic aspects of particular language encounters between two interlocutors through the medium of utterances. This second level of dialogism will also include aspects of active understanding that we think enters into the translation process as a single communicative encounter between the translator and the original author.

The third level of dialogism, which relates to inter-textual relationships among utterances, according to the views presented in this thesis, is of crucial importance for revealing the relationships that bind the translated text to its original. It would be assumed that relationships among utterances can also be manifested cross-culturally, thus allowing translation to be seen as an intercultural dialogue. It will also be assumed that these cultural dialogues play a central role in deciding the direction as well as the main characteristics of a given translation between two cultures at a given time.

It is our assumption that the three above mentioned dialogic encounters; that is the dialogic encounter between two interlocutors, the dialogic interaction between the individual and his social surrounding, and the dialogue that takes place between cultures through translation, can be (as indeed mentioned by Bakhtin) related to each other. Notwithstanding, the distinction assumed between them is only methodological,
as in reality they form an integrated whole which can be included in Bakhtin’s general principle of dialogism. There are also other levels of dialogism such as the dialogue between, styles, dialects or genres within one language. However, if these three levels can be methodologically differentiated, their potential for explaining translation will be enhanced, as I will attempt to demonstrate.

2.6. Bakhtin and Saussure

It is of interest to note that most of the writers who have tried to explain Bakhtin (cf. Todorov (1984), Holquist (1990), *inter alia*) have opted for dialogizing his views with those of the great semiotician F. Saussure, since otherwise it is difficult to adequately grasp Bakhtin’s unbounded style. Indeed, Todorov (1984) and Holquist (1990) agreed in considering Saussurian linguistics to be a precursor to Bakhtin’s dialogism; in the same way that it, i.e., Saussurian linguistics, precipitated other schools of language study. It would perhaps be conducive to the understanding of Bakhtin to put his account of language in some form of a dialogue with those of Saussure.

With Saussure, Bakhtin agreed that the social takes precedence over the individual in the study of language; as he (Bakhtin) also admitted to the ontological status of language as a social phenomenon, and saw that as a condition on its function as a means of communication. Given the fact that language is a social phenomenon, both scholars, however, believed that language only materialises as a reality in the mind of the individual. Holquist (1990) pointed out that both scholars shared the view that language - even if it existed objectively - is better approached from the point view of the individual speaker.

Furthermore, Bakhtin while recognizing the fact that language is a phenomenon that is in a perpetual state of movement and evolution, and is only accessible to studies that reveal its inner structure when approached from a single historical point of view, this can only be done synchronically, thus preferring the synchronic aspect of language over the diachronic one. Holquist cites Saussure as saying:

> It would be absurd to attempt to sketch a panorama of the Alps by viewing them simultaneously from several peaks of the Jura; a panorama must be made from a single vantage point. The same applies to language...
According to Holquist both scholars agreed that the inter-subjective (for Bakhtin, objective for Saussure) history of language and the history of language for the individual do not coincide.

By observing that any scientific approach to language would perforce choose a single main perspective in relation to which other perspectives could possibly be formed; Saussure also noticed that, while being a social phenomenon, language’s mode of existence, is in individual psychology. Similarly, Bakhtin, while claiming that language exists outside the individual, recognized the individual’s distinctiveness in his relation to language. Equally important to note that for both Bakhtin and Saussure, language moves from the realm of naming to the realm of relationships. That the value of any given language unit is greatly determined by its intra-linguistic relationship with other language units. As seen in the previous Chapter, Bakhtin, following Saussure, assumed two types of relations among language units: the relationship within a system (Saussurian paradigmatic relationships), the relationship with other syntactic elements when occurring in a context (Saussure’s syntagmatic relationships). One can perhaps safely say that both scholars start out from the same basic assumptions about language.

However, notwithstanding the above similarities, there are major differences in the two scholars’ approaches as well as some of the philosophy that sustains these approaches, especially in regard to the dual nature of language. Saussure, for instance, declared langue or language as an enclosed system of differential and unsubstantiated signs to be the object of language study, casting out thus, as idiosyncratic and not amenable to scientific study, language events (parole). Saussure also opted for studying language as a social phenomenon only taking the subjective aspect as unsafe for that study. Bakhtin, on the other hand, observed in this a drawback and detected a relationship of continuity between language as an abstract system and language as speech reality. The relationship between them is not one of mutual exclusivity, but rather complementary: we can find a langue only in its disclosure in speech, and speech parole is impossible without a language system.
Another reason for why Bakhtin rejected the absolute objective concept of language, as put forth by Saussure, is that language to Bakhtin is shaped by the external social and ideological reality, by the discursive communicative needs of its speakers. Therefore, he considered language to be an inter-subjective rather than an objective phenomenon.

Consequently, differing philosophies of Bakhtin and Saussure also extended to what the two scholars considered to be the appropriate unit of language study. Whereas, by taking language to be an autonomous system, Saussure considered the sign as represented by words to be most suitable for this study; Bakhtin, considered the whole utterance - where the linguistic and the extra-linguistic meet - to be the basic unit. Since, signs to Bakhtin can be best analyzed by observing their function in actual utterances.

Other differences are also detectable in their position regarding the language sign. While Saussure seemed unclear about the relationship between the sign as a mental construct that can arise in the individual’s mind, and the sign as a social reality, Bakhtin, by contrast, saw these two aspects of sign as related by a dialogic transaction. The two aspects of sign intersect but do not coincide. Thus, although they both agreed on the arbitrary nature of the relationship of the linguistic expression to its referent, Bakhtin, rejected the total uniformity of the relationship between the expression and its meaning as it stands for different individuals, an assumption assumed by the Saussurian system. A sign, to Bakhtin, even if it has the same reference, does not signify exactly the same thing to all individuals in a speech community. The relationship between a linguistic expression and its meaning vis-a-vis a certain individual is always affected by the dialogic context(s) in which it is acquired or was previously used.

Here, an important issue comes to the fore, namely that for Saussure, the words subject and speech community each have one uniform referent, while for Bakhtin this is not so. As mentioned before, Bakhtin, regarded the speech community as a heterogeneous composite of idiolects, styles, dialects etc.. He considered the repercussions of this state of affairs in determining the relationship between a linguistic expression and its signification. Therefore, he judged that, if Saussure considers this relationship from the point of view of an individual then he will perhaps...
be justified in postulating a synchronic close link between the sign and the concept it evokes. If, on the other hand, this relationship is seen from a speech community’s point of view then the relationship becomes less evident, since the meaning of the expression will also vary according to it functions in these sub-language organization.

Of course this is not to deny a minimal amount of agreement between members of a speech community as to what a sign means, but, to ascertain the non total uniformity of that relationship either in the minds of different individuals, or in the function in different speech organization such as genre or dialect.

Therefore, to Bakhtin the unified signification of the sign is perhaps something transcendental, a totality that can be distinguished only theoretically, but not in reality. In reality the signification of the sign is dependent on, in addition to its pragmatic and cultural meaning, the contextual aspects of its use.

One last point of distinction between Bakhtin and Saussure is related to their attitude to the historicity of language. Bakhtin rejected Saussure’s concept of the pure synchronic nature of the system of language, because it is incompatible with the evolutionary and historical reality of language. Language as a closed system of signs is an idealization arrived at by linguists through great deliberate efforts; it exists only in abstraction but not in reality - in vitro but not in vivo. Moreover, language, he says, cannot be approached except through its extraneous reflection in speech. Other linguists’ criticisms of the pure synchronism of language, at Bakhtin’s time, also included Jakobson and Tynjanov who considered:

> The opposition between synchrony and diachrony was an opposition between the concept of system and the concept of evolution; it loses its importance in principles as soon as we recognize that every system exists as evolution.

(Tynjanov and Jakobson in Matejka 1973: 166).

2.7. Bakhtin and Some Recent Linguistic Philosophical Views

Some of Bakhtin’s tenets of language such as his critique of Saussure can be relevant not only to issues of language important at his time, but also to some of today’s controversies surrounding the study of language. More so if we notice that Bakhtin,
for example, did not rule out the need for language abstraction for methodological purposes (phonology, syntax, and semantics). He acknowledged the need for such abstraction as essential to the understanding of language. However, he warned that language as an abstract system of grammar represents only one aspect of language reality - its material side, while leaving unexplained the normative forms of utterances that are related to language use.

However, linguists (e.g. Chomsky) sometimes make it obvious that grammar, but not the whole of language per se, is their main concern. Indeed, many in the field of linguistics, because of the possible intervention of non grammatical factors that can distort the surface manifestation of this system, still regard language as speech as an unreliable representation of the underlying system of grammar. This can be illustrated by Neil Smith who, following Chomsky, alleged that linguistics is not about language, or languages, at least that is not its main focus, it is about grammar (in Widdowson 1989: 129).

Such views are shared mainly by linguists who embraced a Cartesian dualist approach to language or subscribe to the nativist thesis of language acquisition. Chomsky, for example, was interested in finding out what is common to all structures of different languages, the underlying structure of all structures.

This factor, Chomsky (1975) assumed to be an innate biological knowledge, competence. Human language, to him, is not acquired but grows in the individual’s mind. The task of language study in linguistics, to him, was to abstract and describe the human innate knowledge of language (Taylor 1988).

This knowledge (grammatical) consists of a system of formal rules, of idiolectic nature, which if applied recursively, are capable of producing an infinite number of grammatical sentences. Chomsky (1980) clearly stated that language itself is a: derivative and perhaps not a very interesting concept (ibid: 153). Chomsky (1986) worked out a more detailed distinction between what he termed I-language (internalized language) and E-language (externalized language), corresponding to language and grammar contrast.

In such a dualist outlook the manifestation of the underlying system of language (competence) into speech (performance) is seen as a sort of mystery that does not constitute part of scholarly interest. Language as utterance is only important in so far
as it accesses the innate biological competence. In other words, the system of underlying language is not a systematization of the individual's intuition of language, but vice versa, the latter is a product of the former. It is the biological organism that chooses from the environment what fits its structure. By reversing the priorities of language studies, Chomsky reinforced the idea of the priority of form, which is determined by the organism, over content that is selected accordingly from the environment.2

Another philosopher of linguistics, T. Pateman, defined the grammar of a language as representing *that language out of time and hence outside the world in which causality and free will or creativity intervene* (Pateman 1987: 8). For this reason linguists prefer working with ideal language that is produced under ideal circumstances, with hypostatized sentences.

Despite being subjected to severe criticism for its disregard for language use, and lack of definitive empirical support from actual language universal, the nativist thesis as we are going to demonstrate (Chapter 7) is of great relevance to the thorny issue of translatability. It has also gained support from recent biological findings that some linguistic abilities are localized. However, it is dualistic attitude to language remains it weakest point. A linguistic theory that does not explain language use always gives the feeling of being partial.

Bakhtin, as discussed in 2.2.1. above, did not totally exclude the possibility of an internal system comparable to the human central nervous system that might be responsible for organizing the interaction between the mind and its surrounding by means of utterances. Although, he stopped short of explicitly discussing this issue, the analogy he drew between the way the central nervous system and the mind in re-authoring their environment indicates that he takes the two functions to be similar.

Again, Bakhtin disagreed with the concept of speech as an inconsistent representation of the language system. Speech, as he observed, has its own regularities
that ought to be studied on their own merits, i.e., it has its own structures and its own units of study. It is more so, if related not only to an abstract system, but to social reality. In other words, a need exists for relating the grammatical side of language to the social reality of speech. Instead, Bakhtin claimed that language is the inseparable joining of ideal grammar with the real speaking situation.

Although, Bakhtin and Chomsky both regarded larger syntactic units - formal idealized sentences for Chomsky, dialogic utterance for Bakhtin - to be the basic unit of language study and agree to the psychological nature of language, Bakhtin opted for the complete reversal of the linguistic paradigm for language study. Instead of looking for ways of projecting from an underlying system to the study of language use, he thought it is possible to start with the study of language use in its own dynamics and regularities, and then synthesize it with the underlying system of grammar, in which case linguistic abstractions including grammar play an auxiliary rôle.

Bakhtin, therefore, took an opposing approach to that of Chomsky privileging language as speech over grammar and considering the latter to be derivative of the former. Grammar to Bakhtin cannot be totally isolated from language. He in fact stated clearly that:

There is not a single new phenomenon (phonetic, lexical, or grammatical) that can enter the system of language without having traversed the long and complicated path of generic-stylistic testing and modification


It seems likely from Bakhtin's writings as well as from the writings of his editors that even if he considered grammar to be abstract and cognitive and despite the fact that Bakhtin related his concept of the utterance to the findings of Uktomsky, Bakhtin held firm the belief that language grows in the individual's mind through his interaction with his environment particular social environment. Grammar, even if possibly constrained biologically, is the result of a long historical evolution. It is a priori to the individual only in being inter-subjective, and in predating him in a chronological and conventional sense.
Some philosophers of linguistics (cf. Itkonen (1978, 1983)) take a position closer to Bakhtin's by arguing for the grammatical structure of language to be a *systematization* of the individuals intuition of language. Likewise Searle (1976) considers grammar to be reflective of the speakers’ knowledge of it (Pateman, 1987: 261).

In fact, Chomsky was criticized by linguists (cf. Hurford (1987)) for a similar reason of taking language to be only psychological. Language to Hurford is not only psychological but also social. Language, to him, grows in the individual’s mind through his contact with the speech community. In Hurford’s conception, different linguistic forms compete in the *arena of use* for the same grammatical slot. Thus, he recommended an integrated approach to language that brings together the psychological and social aspects of language, and links individual psychology to communication within the speech-community (ibid: preface).

Hurford, by taking the study of numerals as a paradigm case of language study, demonstrated that there is something in the nature of language that is invented rather than discovered, and that these aspects of languages ought to be the object of linguistic investigation i.e., they are - even if being abstract - real objects, not derivative of a priori grammar as Chomsky claimed (ibid: 12).

Similarly, Hurford dismissed the view that takes language to be purely social (cf. as he named them, Lass (1984) and Ladefoged (1980)). Some similarities between Hurford’s realist outlook on language and those of Bakhtin relates to their emphasis on the need for synthesizing the psychological aspect of the individual’s language with the social reality of speech. Also these similarities extend to their beliefs in recognizing potential regularity of speech. Hurford sees speech norms and regularities as characterizable if related to regularities in the *arena of use* (ibid: 27). However, Hurford’s interest in the evolution of language grammar distinguishes him from Bakhtin. The latter is more inclined towards the study of language as communication.

Meantime, it is interesting to note that Bakhtin accepted that there can be universal features that are common to all languages as is obvious when he wrote:

It is possible to proceed towards the first pole, the language of the author, the language of the genre, the trend, the epoch; towards the national language (linguistics) and finally towards the potential language of languages (structuralism, glossematics).

It is, however, our belief that any discussion of translation is impossible without the acceptance of at least a minimal degree of universal unity among human languages. It is also very likely that this unity is a result of the sharing or possession of similar or same linguistic capacities. We take this also to be at the centre of the unifying forces of language.

However, even when Bakhtin wrote of concepts like unified and universal text of texts or language of languages (Todorov 1984: 26), he echoed Tarski in saying that for such language to be also a private language (a material speech) is paradoxical (Tarski in Lefevere 1978: 13).

Yet, Bakhtin's dialogical principle can be seen as a universal one, since he considered dialogism to be inherent in the nature of any language. Universality in Bakhtin's view of language is also detectable in his description of language drift as being attracted by two opposing relations; one to the underlying and unifying force of grammar and the centripetal forces of cognition, the other to the centrifugal forces of evolution and change related to environmental factors including those related to new social and individual communicative needs.

As a result, language to him is a quasi-paradoxical phenomenon that embodies these two opposing interlocked gravitating forces. This reflects itself in other functions of language such as: representation vs expression, stability vs change, sense vs reference etc.

Such characterization of language is comparable to Jakobson's (1971) who also spoke of every linguistic occurrence as related to other occurrences via one form of two opposition relationships; one towards unity, the second towards uniqueness. The two unifying forces are those of contiguity among constituents in a context, and similarity among forms in a paradigm (ibid:244). The relationship of similarity fluctuates from total synonymy to common core antinomy.

According to the contesting forces of language, Jakobson distinguished two types of tropes: metaphor and metonymy which he claimed to be capable of explaining aphasia as well as rhetorical use of language (ibid: 245-59). As it seems, the
universality of language as assumed by both scholars, Bakhtin and Jakobson, relates not to the formal structure of language but to its communicative functions.

Bakhtin’s concept of language as being a conglomerate of communicative genres, strikes an interesting note of accord with Chomsky’s thought of language e.g., English or French as being concept-dependent rather than having an actual unified reference. Chomsky, moreover, considered language as such to be a subject of exploration of socio-political research rather than a linguistic one (Pateman 1987). Bakhtin proposed ‘translinguistic studies’ for such purpose.

Some other linguists with different persuasion from that of Chomsky (cf. Firth) held similar conviction. Firth robustly rejected any concept of language unity:

Unity is the last concept that should be applied to language. The unity of language is the most fugitive of all unities, whether historical, geographical, national or personal. There is no such thing as ‘une langue une’ and there never has been.

(1957: 29).

Bakhtin, nonetheless, had probably accepted the unity of language on the grammatical level, because he would agree with Jakobson that speech can be anti-grammatical but never agrammatical (Jakobson 1971: 259).

2.8. Bakhtin and the Ethnography of Communication

That speech is regular is a fact that has been observed by ethnomethodologists, more notably, Hymes who, in his theory of communicative competence, recognized that language as grammar is insufficient to guarantee its correct communicative use. In a similar view to that of Bakhtin, Hymes (1971) thought that any study of language should include a systematic account of its appropriate use. He, therefore, argued strongly against the exclusion of the communicative ability of language use from Chomsky’s notion of language competence.

Hymes (1971) thought that the linguistic theory of language should be integrated with communicative and cultural factors. The communicative competence of the native speaker, he suggested, should include, in addition to grammatical rules, four elements
that determine whether and to what degree a sentence is: possible, feasible, appropriate and finally what a performed sentence entails.

Chomsky, on the other hand, claimed that it is not in contradiction with his assumptions about language competence to admit the possibility of an independent pragmatic competence, as he clearly puts it:

For the purpose of enquiry and exposition, we may proceed to distinguish ‘grammatical competence’ from ‘pragmatic competence’, restricting the first to the knowledge of forms and meanings and the second to the knowledge of conditions and manners of appropriate use.


Cazden (1989) noticed a fundamental similarity between Bakhtin’s critique of Saussure’s dichotomy of langue/parole and Hymes’ opposition of Chomsky’s distinction of competence and performance. Both scholars, he explained, emphasized the generic (language as reflected in different genres) structure of speech (118). Cazden rightly demonstrated that Bakhtin and Hymes share a lot in common in regards to the importance of incorporating speech into language study. But there are, we think, fundamental differences between the type of resolution proposed by each as to how to overcome the language/speech dichotomy.

As mentioned above, Hymes argued the concept of ‘competence’ to include rules of language use, but basically remains within the limits of linguistics, i.e., his study of communicative competence uses the same linguistic methodology and units as in Chomskyan linguistics.

Perhaps this is owing to what Taylor (1988) saw as a confusion arising from the fact that Hymes and Chomsky used the term competence differently. Taylor perceived this as a result of misinterpretation by Hymes of what Chomsky meant by competence. For Chomsky, competence is seen as something absolute and completely detached from a single language let alone language use. Chomsky’s main interest was language as specific natural endowment of human species, while Hymes argued for competence to include some socio-cultural aspect of language. His notion of communicative competence was relative and involved other speakers of language as well (ibid). Thus, for Chomsky, competence is a priori knowledge, for Hymes, competence is knowledge and skill.
Bakhtin, on the other hand, proposed a totally independent study of speech that employs a different methodology and uses somewhat different units. In his view, the study of speech involves contextual and other emergent aspects; thus, he insisted on making the distinction clearer between the two. The sentence as a language unit is grammatical in nature. It has grammatical boundaries and grammatical completedness and unity (1986: 74). Whereas, the boundaries of each concrete utterance as a unit of speech is determined by a change of speaking subject (ibid: 71).

To Bakhtin, also, the relationships that link utterances are different from those that link sentences. Sentences and utterances relate to two different worlds, the first to the ideal and the second to the real. Bakhtin, unlike Hymes, thought that the linguistic study of language and the communicative study of speech can inform each other, but, nonetheless, avoided lumping them together. His object of study was not the communicative competence of the speaker, but the utterance as an occurrence in context.

As it seems, despite the prima facie similarities, we have at hand two concepts of speech that belong to two different domains of research: Hymes' idea of speech which he relates to the existing research of the underlying system of grammar, and assumes linguistic methodology and units; and Bakhtin's concept of speech that relates to the social and ideological realities, and which takes the utterance, as determined by generic (related to a specific genre) occurrence, as its basic unit.

Bakhtin went even further to claim that while stylistics is essentially distinct from grammar, there are sometimes cases where some scholars might include in stylistics a phenomenon that others will include in grammar. He gave the syntagma as an example where, he thought, grammar and stylistics converge and diverge in any utterance. If the utterance is considered within a language system it is a grammatical phenomenon, if, on the other hand, it is considered in a speech genre, it is a stylistic phenomenon (1986: 66). Accordingly, Bakhtin observed a continuity between language as grammar and language as speech.

Bakhtin views also bear resemblance with some other functionalist approaches of scholars in the fields of ethnography of speech, text linguistics, discourse analyst. A dialogue with these approaches will be the main undertaking of Chapter 6. But in what
follows we will try to show that Bakhtin’s rejection of objective views of language does not imply that he embraces a subjectivist one.

2.9. Bakhtin’s Critique of Subjectivist Views of Language

Bakhtin’s criticism of Saussure’s autonomous perspective of sign systems, as he himself often warned, should not be taken as implying that language is a pure individual or ideological medium. Therefore he was highly critical of the Romantic views that link language to individual or national genius or creativity. Language he insisted is also a historical and social phenomenon.

Yet, he found points of agreement, though not a total one, between his views and those of Humboldt, whom he erected as a proxy figure for the trend of thought that emphasized language as a subjective creation. He was, for example, in accord with Humboldt’s idea of language as an instrument of thought, and an articulation of the world; as Bakhtin also considered the utterance to be individual and reflects its subject’s particular intention for communication.

Bakhtin, however took issue with Humboldt for giving priority to language as a product of the individuals’ creativity over its communicative and social function. This, according to him, undermines the stability of language system and categories. Language is not a mere reflection of the individual mind, nor a product only of the individual psychology, but rather it has its undeniable social and cultural aspects. The essence of language, to Bakhtin, is not the psychological creativity of the individual as much as it is the need of the individual to express and objectify himself. Language thus is an energeia but above all it is a social energeia (Bakhtin 1986: 67). Bakhtin, (cf. Schleiermacher), stressed the need for a conventional linguistic system in order for speech to be communicative (Muller-Vollmer 1985: 11).

The individual is free in terms of the choices he makes in the way he wishes to express himself, nonetheless his choice must be a sign that is social and also accessible to the other. Not only that but a great part of the individual’s inner psychology originates from its social surroundings by the mediation of the sign; the sign not as a mirror reflection of natural and social reality, but as a perspectival refraction of that reality. The sign is the currency by which the ideological enterprise
is transacted. It is also the primary material of which the individual consciousness is moulded (Todorov 1984: 17-8). The rôle of the semiotic system in forming and sustaining ideology is usually seen as one of Bakhtin’s contributions to semiotics.

Bakhtin, as it appears, did not totally reject either the linguistic perception of language as a system, or the thought of language as creativity. Rather, he judged each view to be slanted. The concrete utterance cannot be handled without assuming a system of language; on the other hand, a study of language has to take into account the concrete reality of the utterance as creativity. It is worth mentioning that, by and large, these two polarized attitudes towards language, and the controversies they generate, are akin to the two predominant outlooks on translation studies - a reason for which we think that translation studies would also benefit from Bakhtin’s synthesis between the two trends. This constitutes a central theme that will be frequently revisited as we go along in this thesis.

Bakhtin’s pragmatic outlook on language establishes a link between what is social and stable and what is individual and creative in language. It takes place on the boundaries between language as fixity of structure and language as flexibility of creation. Owing, to this fact, his view of language is characterized by its non-confrontative and sometimes eclectic nature. This is so, possibly because he recognized that language can be seen from different perspectives and consequently described differently. However, where linguists started with similarities in language, he started from differences in communication. He himself described his views as neither linguistics nor philological or literary, but, philosophical views that move across all boundaries of these aforementioned fields (ibid: 103).

This is possibly one of the reasons why Bakhtin’s ideas figure in the writings of many scholars across different fields of study. To give a few examples: Bakhtin, because of his eccentric views on the arts, was considered as a postmodern critic by Hutcheon (1988); and as a postmodern philosopher of aesthetics by Burns (1990). He was also read as one of the originators of phenomenological hermeneutics along with Heidegger and H. Gadamer, by Tullio Maranhão (1990). Ladislav Matejka, on the other hand, edited a book on Bakhtin (1973) as a semiotician. Whereas, Bakhtin was also appraised as a founder of Pragmatics by Todorov (1984), Holquist (1986), a translator of most of Bakhtin’s works into English, regarded him first and foremost
as a linguist of speech (parole) as opposed to a linguist of langue. This, in reality, confirms Bakhtin’s own description of his writing as not belonging to any particular field of human science.

His dialectical and informal style, his emphasis on the social nature of the individual’s language as well as his insistence on the historicity of language seems to have led to this non-restrictive non-formal pragmatism, a pragmatism that places language in the more general and comprehensive dialogue of existence where the relationship of co-existence and differentiation are placed at the heart of that dialogue, where language is not cut off from other signifying systems.

In Bakhtin’s dialogism there is no final utterance: an utterance will always bid another one. An utterance’s meaning is never finalized; it always has the potential of altering its meaning in a new context. Dialogism is also against all sorts of dogmatism regardless of whether this dogmatism is a relativist or formalist one.

While this can be taken as a weakening factor by many who seek parsimony and formalization, by linguists for example; it can, on the other hand, be considered as an enhancing element for other studies where explanatory potential is sought after, as in translation studies. In translation, as I shall argue, differentiation is as important as similarity, and qualitative explanation becomes as important as quantitative methodology. That is how the nature of Bakhtin’s views can be seen as enhancing, for their suitability, the discussion of translation which is, in itself, an inter-disciplinary domain.

After this broad assessment of Bakhtin’s views of Dialogism, we will aim at proving the utility of these views to the explanation of inter-lingual translation and translatability. In the following chapter we will undertake a revision of some of the more often written about turning points in the history of translation; applying some of Bakhtin’s views to our account of them rather than being satisfied, as often practised, by simply chronologically enumerating them.
Chapter 3

Dialogism Meaning and the History of Translation

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter was a presentation of some central issues of dialogism. A broad synthesis of the individual and his social environment was shown to be at the heart of the dialogic outlook on language. A two-way relationship between these two aspects of ontological assumptions about language was suggested, presuming that through a delicate form of dialogic interaction, the individual, while being shaped by his environment also takes part in shaping this environment. Natural language was postulated as being simultaneously a product and the means for this relationship.

Viewed in this manner, the individual consciousness was taken as being a product of the individual's active interaction with his environment at a given point of history, considering the individual, therefore, as a cultural and ideological representative of the cultural age in which he was born. However, language, as heteroglossic totality of different sub-languages, reflects among other things, the conflicting ideological orientation of different groups that can influence the individual within a given culture.

This was also shown to be in harmony with the concept of one general unifying culture or language. Different aspects of the intellectual life of a society, whether scientific, philosophical, religious or even linguistic, were seen as interrelated and forming a wider cultural and ideological umbrella that characterises a given society, and distinguishes it from other societies.
The history of any given intellectual discipline such as translation studies, if seen from a dialogic perspective, cannot be seen as a chronological enumeration of the views that describe this discipline without accounting for the cultural world views from which they have originated, and world opinions that underpin these views.

Translation, as a practice, would equally be seen in this wider cultural context as being triggered by the need to establish a dialogue, whether this dialogue is between two authors or two cultures. In communicating by means of translation the correspondence involved must overcome the boundaries of language and culture. However, as any with other form of communication, translation reflects different aspects of the relationship that exists between two societies at a certain point of their history when the translation takes place.

The semiotician Y. Lotman (1990), described the (literary) history of cultures as dialogic. As he explained, the evolution of cultures fluctuating between periods of intensity (otherwise called the rise of culture) and periods of calm (sometimes called the decline of culture or civilization) resembles a dialogic exchange where periods of activity are compared with the active rôle in a dialogue (when the subject speaks), while the periods of respite equal the inactive part of the dialogue (the listener part).

He further claimed that a culture, when active, is most likely to be on the transmitting side of the dialogue; that is, it affects other cultures. Other times of quiescence are when information flows into this culture from other active cultures. During the period of calm the culture gradually becomes suffused with texts of other cultures, that will be (i.e., the texts) absorbed and adapted until a moment of activity occurs (144).

The flow of communication between two cultures forms, according to Lotman, a semiosphere between the two cultures which is the site in which a dialogue takes place. This semiosphere is inherently paradoxical in the sense that it is at the same time unified and asymmetrical. A semiosphere includes a jointing of two dissimilar views in one unified realm since any semiotic transaction (dialogue) that takes place assumes a certain degree of 'asymmetry' that necessitates the dialogue. Asymmetry is also responsible for creating boundaries between the two partners in the dialogue.
Any dialogue, in Lotman’s view, can, in a similar vein to that of the semiosphere, be said to be paradoxical, since the dialogue always aims at eliminating or overcoming the asymmetrical boundaries that it bears within itself and that has created the need for it in the first place. Almost all dialogues strive for strengthening symmetry in the semiosphere.

Of greater relevance to our topic is Lotman’s claim that there are five stages (which are actually four stages) in the process of acculturation that characterizes the reception of a text into a culture. The first is when the text keeps its alien flavour and remains highly valued for its exoticness. Some times these texts even keep their original language if bilingualism or the speaking of the foreign language is regarded as a sign of the intellectual cultivation of the individual, and the foreign language is seen as prestigious.

The second is when these texts are integrated in and appropriated by the host culture with the result that the imported and locally produced texts reconstitute each other leading to the re-invigoration of the local culture. This process increases because of the need of the receptive culture to break the monotony of cultural order.

A third stage takes place when the host culture starts seeing the appropriated text as superior to its original precursors; thus leading the host culture to be critical of the original rather than the imported which would eventually lead to rediscovering what are seen to be flaws in the original text formulation.

A fourth and final stage is completed when the original text is totally consumed and thus integrated into the culture. In this last stage the culture moves into an active stage, and thus occupies the centre stage of the semiosphere, i.e., is a source of emitting texts to other cultures (146-7).

Lotman’s insights are of interest to our discussion of translation with regard to its formulation of acculturation as a form of a dialogue between two cultures in a semiosphere. Translation, as one can perhaps safely assume, plays a major rôle in the cultural importation of texts as well as in the process of their appropriation. We also

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1Lotman also thought the asymmetry of the human body - left, right; top, bottom; male, female, as contributing greatly to this ‘semiotization’ (Ibid., 133). Therefore he presumed that there is an asymmetry that is inherent in our making.
assume that inter-lingual translation, despite being a bilingual operation, is not triggered solely by a bilingual cohabitation of two languages. In other words it is not enough to have a bilingual environment for the translation to take place, but rather it is the requirement for establishing a dialogue that is crucial for translation to take place. This need for a dialogue may be the trigger for establishing communication with the other. (As we are going argue in a later chapter, this process is important to translation for other reasons related to the creation of an essential intersectional cultural ground between two cultures. This ground is important for the realization of further translations.)

Similarly, it is the type of relationship that is established between the two sides of the dialogue that perhaps decides how we translate or even what we translate. For example, it will be made obvious in this chapter that it is possible for relations between two cultures to exhibit a similar pattern to that which sometimes exists between two individuals. In a situation where these relations are unbalanced for example, one culture establishes itself as the dominant one, and in most cases, this culture is likely to see itself as more authoritative or more central with respect to other cultures.

If such a situation arises, it is more likely that this culture would play the active part in the dialogue and that translation would take place from the language that bestows authority rather than from the language that lacks this prestige and subsequently, the language lacking prestige is more likely to play a rôle similar to the passive partner in the dialogue. Important works in minor languages such as Strindberg’s and Ibsen’s dramas, which were written in Swedish and Norwegian respectively, were recognised only after they were translated and introduced into major languages such as French and German (Lefevere 1990: 22).

As will be seen dialogue does not only take place between different languages, dialects, or genres at a certain point in time, but it also extends to other dialogues between successive historical periods within one culture as an intra-cultural dialogue. Most cultures experience cultural change, from relatively inactive stages to energetic ones. When imported texts from other cultures are completely absorbed, some of the old cultural forms gradually become unfavourable or even rejected.
This rejection is not always placid, and when old cultural norms come to be seen as hindering desirable changes, the peaceful dialogue is thwarted giving way to dogmatism and possibly leading to intra-or-intercultural conflicts of different kinds. As Isaiah Berlin characterised it:

The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straitjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving conceptions. (Bernstein 1988: 214).

What Berlin called a straitjacket is akin to what Bakhtin called monological (monoglossic) views of the world, while the liberating forces are those dialogic exchanges that concede more receptive views of the other.

Following this same Hegelian concept, translation, whether intra-lingual or inter-lingual, can be spoken of as an activity that is created by the need for maintaining a dialogue between different ways of seeing the world, the need for one culture to appropriate another. A current view of the world also reflects itself on the way translation itself is evaluated. For the most part, translation is always viewed within the outlook on the world dominant in a given culture.

Some scholars (cf. Lefevere (1992) believed that translation, especially when concerned with central cultural texts, such as major religious or intellectual works, can influence the evolution of a culture. Lefevere quoted Victor Hugo even as saying that: when you offer a translation to a nation, that nation will almost always look on the translation as an act of violence against itself (Ibid., 18).

It is also of significance to remind ourselves that dialogism, as previously mentioned, while insisting on the uniqueness of the subject, considers the subject only in relation to his social environment. In this account, it becomes obvious that translation does not only reflect the translator's inclination, nor does it exhibit uniquely a cultural uniformity, but it also reveals some aspects of the translator's relation to his own culture, culture as certain epoch and certain location. The subject and culture, instead of excluding each other, each help in illuminating the other.

According to Bakhtin's conception, what we call Medieval, Renaissance, or even Greek, or Roman, are but chronotopical (socio-historical) genres in the trajectory of
human civilization. Each epoch has its own general characteristic that distinguishes it from other epochs that precede or succeed it. These epochs are not simple historical epochs in the physical sense of the word, but rather are important periods in the intellectual and spiritual memories of that culture.

Important epochs in the past life of a culture never die away completely but rather they resuscitate, even in different forms, whenever circumstances are appropriate. Moreover, these circumstances are important for explaining translation if one wants to avoid considering the history of views and attitudes to translation as a plainly chronological listing of events or quotations.

On the other hand, inter-cultural dialogue has always been necessary for the continuance of human civilization. It is not unreasonable to say that there is no major civilization that, even if relatively isolated for a considerable time, has totally escaped dialogical penetration of other cultures. There is no civilization that can be said to be totally virgin or immune from this dialogue.

Emerson (1983) pointed out that Bakhtin considered the boundaries between national languages as an extreme case of boundaries between dialects or idiolect, observing aspects of analogy between different social groups and between separate civilizations. Bakhtin was as much interested in how different dialects, national languages, and distinct civilizations affect each other, as he was interested in how they diverge from each other (Emerson 1983a: 23).

In a similar way, George Steiner succinctly described any model of communication, or any transfer of signification of no matter what kind, vertical or horizontal, as being perforce a form of translation because no two historical epochs, no two social classes, no two localities use words and syntax to signify exactly the same thing (1973: 45).

But the convenience or even sometimes the facility of the practice of translation conceals within it the perplexity of knowing exactly what goes on during the process of the transfer, or even more seriously the nature of the signification of what is being transferred. Without getting a satisfactory answer to these questions, it would be difficult to delimit definite methods for guiding, or objective criteria for evaluating translation. However, Steiner’s equation of translation with communication, reveals an awareness that what is being transferred is some cultural or social rather than isolated signification.
Thus, it seems imperative for any discussion of translation to include a discussion of related aspects of culture, communication, and meaning. Needless to state, the question of meaning is one of the central if not the central issue of translation. Communication, meaning, and translation are very closely interwoven. The discussion of one will most likely affect the discussion of the other. Hence, any intelligible discussion of translation should perforce entail a congruent discussion of meaning and communication.

However, with the acknowledgment of the centrality of meaning to translation, it would be naive to assume that translation is a mere transference of meaning, because in reality, translation is usually used to denote an extensive and multifarious range of activities. In fact, in most times, translation is performed without much questioning in its rules, procedures, or nature. However, it is a truism that any single theoretical approach to translation is always underpinned by one or another philosophical or linguistic view of meaning, without which the understanding of that approach will be impossible.

The issue of meaning is one of the major areas where different disciplines intersect with translation studies. It is the subject where translation studies meet with philosophy, linguistics, anthropology, and poetics, among others. It is one of the main reasons for which translation is seen as an inter-disciplinary field. Meaning’s close link to translation is the reason for which some scholars of different persuasions, rightly or wrongly, have treated translational equivalence as a litmus test for their views of meaning and synonymy. (A detailed discussion of this issue is in Olshewsky, Problems in the Philosophy of Language, chapter 6).

Oceans of ink have been spilt over the issue of meaning in Western philosophy; therefore any historical account of meaning would perforce be sketchy and far from conclusive. We also would like to qualify this account as one of Western tradition only, mainly for two reasons: The first is that this thesis, as is the case with the literature on translation in general, is confined to views of translation in the West. The second is our awareness that other cultures such as Persian, Arabic, Hebrew, to mention a few, have used translation extensively, and almost certain to have developed certain views of translation. (See for example, Hakeem (1989) for the history of translation in the Arabic tradition).
Records of serious debates over meaning date from the time of the Greeks. Since then philosophers have related the subject of meaning to almost every issue in philosophy such as knowledge, ethics and aesthetics. Earlier views of language whether from linguistics or otherwise have emerged from that philosophical tradition and have continued in an intermittent trajectory up to recent times. In what follows we will attempt a chronotopical reading of this tradition in which periodization is determined by major changes in the intellectual climates, and then we will assess the relationship of these changes to the concurrent view of translation.

3.2. The Seminal Debates

It all started with the search for perpetual truth or the nature of knowledge by the Greek philosophers. Genuine debates have been formulated over these issues. For example, Plato (420-384 B.C.) continuing a previous tradition of seeking the essence of things, tried to differentiate between what is essential and perpetual from what is transient and changing. Plato thought that there is a definite criterion or absolute knowledge of truth which is unchanging and which he opposes to the changing world of appearance.

To Plato, the unchanging reality of things are their abstract forms. These forms are independent of individuals’ changing beliefs and prejudices. Knowledge of these forms is represented as abstract a priori concepts. More important than being in a state of belief that something is beautiful is to understand what all beautiful things have in common, i.e, the essence of beauty. This essence, he said, exists a priori to experience in our minds in the form of abstract concepts. We can only know these abstract concepts through pure reason or dialectic.

Experience, on the other hand, was thought by Plato to be only the instantiation of these concepts. Considering that a teacher can elicit the truth of a geometrical theorem from his pupils’ minds without their knowing it before, Plato surmised, this knowledge must be innate to them (Harrison-Barret 1990: 16-8).

Accordingly, Plato made a clear distinction between the ‘literal’ the conceptual meaning of words, and the added rhetorical colouring when words are used, the figural. So, he warned against taking the figural meaning of words for their literal one.
For example, when poetic colouring is stripped from poetry, what is left then is the prosaic literal meaning (Benjamin 1989: 10-11).

Thus a Platonic view of translation would be one that concentrates on the conceptual (literal) meaning of words, with poetry seen as untranslatable. Different languages can be seen as expressing the same a prioristic essence, although they may do that differently. If we eliminate the rhetorical appearance of words we will end up with deep essential similarities among languages.

This dogmatic view of Plato was to be challenged by the Sophists especially Protagoras (480-411 B.C.) who thought that truth is personal and that everything is not related to *episteme* (abstract knowledge) but to *doxa* (belief). *A man is the measure of all things* he said. This was later to be the general slogan of the Sophists (Dixon 1966: 25).

Georgias of Leonti, a Greek teacher of rhetoric, claimed that speech has very little to do with what exists; words communicate only themselves; that is, they have no fixed meaning or any essence. Thus, no two instances of speech, even if the same stretch of language is being used, can be analogous. If one assumes that such analogy exists, it would not be possible to illustrate or verify.

This can be taken as one of the earliest known relativistic views of language. Meaning in language is not related to any essence, but rather is seen as contingent to the particular language and even to the particular instance of use. Hence, any concept of translation that is based on any universal concepts, any cross-language similarity, is ruled out within this radical nominalistic view (Steiner 1973: 250). Corollary to this slogan is the rejection of Plato’s universals, and the belief that every thing comes from experience through perception.

The essentialist views of Plato and the nominalist views of Georgias are two contrary views of language that can be said to form the two poles between which any possible view of meaning in language is formulated. Plato’s views are those that can admit the possibility of total homology between utterances of different subjects, while Georgias rules out the possibility of any such similarity.

If applied to translation, Plato’s position would envision exact or accurate translation, Georgias’ would be sceptical of the idea of translation altogether. Since
the time of the Greeks, views of translation, all through their evolution, have more or less fluctuated between those two extremes.

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who had the greatest sway on modern views of meaning, also held the same views as Plato's of knowledge being absolute and not totally sensual. However, unlike Plato, he gave credence to individual things and to justification through experience to absolute abstract concepts. Thus, to him, what is universal is arrived at through correct method of reasoning. Knowledge, is one of essence which should start with particular things and should be extracted through efforts to make it transparent. Moreover, different forms can exist as a composite of an individual thing. If we say of someone that he is a man and rational then we are said to be answering questions of the sort, of what kind?, or what quality? Answers to such questions constitute what Aristotle called the categories of knowledge. Since the answers to these questions can be either affirmed or denied, the same can be said of predicates which can either be truly affirmed or truly denied of a subject.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle related definitions partly to experience of things by considering them to be statements of the nature of things rather than pure essence. Knowledge, thus, is partly conventional. Instead of looking for essence, Aristotle focused on words in which this knowledge is expressed, and in turn, on how these words are related to things they name. Words that are finite in number can be used to name things or senses which are infinite; therefore, he noticed that a single word may name many more than one thing.

Aristotle also discussed sentences and he compared the sentence, which is composed of words as parts with a single meaning, and composite nouns with parts of no independent meaning. He concluded that the word as a unit with an independent signification is the unit of language (ibid. 33-4).

Marková (1982) claimed that the attempts at discovering the laws of thinking started with Aristotle. Aristotle, according to Marková thought that the laws of logic, laws of thought, and the laws of nature are closely related. The laws of thought are all derived from the law of non-contradiction (a thing cannot be at the same time a negation of itself), and includes the law of identity (a thing is what it is), and the law of excluded middle (a thing either has a property or lacks that property, there is no middle way possibility) (24-5).
These three laws, according to Marková, continue to influence formal logic even today. Also, the discovery of the 'syllogism' by Aristotle, to account for the relationship between different statements and the necessary truth that follows, is seen by many as the corner-stone of the development of modern logic.

Aristotle also contributed significant notes to poetics as an early attempt to write a general theory of the two popular genres of literature there: the tragedy, and the epic. Rhetoric was not seen as masking the essential meaning of concepts, a clear systematic line between the poetic and other functions of language was drawn by recognizing the poetic use of language as an independent mode of usage. Literature was assigned an autonomous status from other uses of language - a case which is still argued for by many theorists of translation (cf. Catford (1965), Jakobson (1959)).

Aristotle’s views on poetics were very much overlooked in the preceding centuries because of the dominance of his ideas on logic. They were to become recognized in Italy at the time of the Renaissance and in Germany in the Romantic era (Ducrot and Todorov 1979: 80-1).

Generally speaking, Plato and Aristotle exemplify the main features that dominated the Greek essentialist philosophy; that is the search for timeless and absolute truths or the rules for absolute reasoning. Since then a line of demarcation between the belief in such a timeless truth and the denial of such essence have been the two main broad trends of thought. In translation studies a similar division endures between believers in total translation in which such essence safeguards the translation operation, and the other camp who have little faith in discovering such essence and took translation to be relative and interpretive.

The Stoics used the logic of Aristotle to establish the relationship between words and things. They distinguished three aspects of words: the sign or sound, the thing the sign’s reference, and the lepton or the immaterial entity or concept that is signified by the sign. The Stoics focused their attention on the lecta or the objective meanings of signs (ibid: 38).

The Stoics’ postulation of a third level (lepton) between words and things proved useful to the distinction between what is signified (signification) and what is referred to by the sign (designation). This distinction allowed translation to be seen as an operation that takes place between distinct conceptual systems without a necessary
reference to any material reality, more or less, in some functional approaches of translation in Saussurian semiotics. (As will be shown in Chapter 6 (4)).

It is perhaps safe to say that a traceable continuation of Greek philosophy can be detected in every aspect of modern Western knowledge. For example, the ‘absolute knowledge’ or ‘absolute ideas’ of Plato as well as his concept of ‘innate ideas’ has found continuity in Descartes views of ‘neutral ideas’ (idears that are neither affirmative nor negative and that are in us from birth). Such rationalist views were recently revived and reformulated by Chomsky’s concept of innate grammar.

The influence of Greek philosophy was recognized by many scholars to extend to today’s philosophy of language and linguistics, in particular those views that concern meaning. Ullman (1973) pointed out that the modern linguists’ debates between ‘naturalists’ (cf. Fodor) and ‘conventionalists’ (cf. Saussure) regarding the nature of concepts, as finding roots in Plato, Aristotle and the Sophists divide over the relation between words and things. Meanwhile, Halliday (1978) attributed the origin of semiotics to the Stoics’ understanding of the sign as objective meaning. They were, he alleged, the first to evolve an advanced theory of the sign. Their theory was resuscitated and developed two thousand years later by Saussure into modern semiotics.

The non-dogmatic stance of the Sophists and their reliance on persuasion only as a criterion for explaining meaning is seen as marking the birth of scepticism and rhetoric. Their echo is more apparent in the field of hermeneutics.

The period of the Greeks can generally be said to be dominated by authoritarian dogmatism, dogmatism that is underlined by the search for the essence of things and virtues and the desire to differentiate between what is Greek from what they considered barbaric (with respect to languages). If we accept Bakhtin’s claim that languages, dialects, or even genres reflect among other things an outlook on the world, i.e., mirror ideological and social conceptions of the world, then this era can be seen as mostly ‘monoglossic’ i.e., dominated by one centralized view and lacking interest in communicating with other cultures or other languages.

However, absolutist ideological and social tendencies of a culture are not only reflected in language and linguistic attitudes, but also makes use of language as an instrument for establishing national hegemony, since language is the most essential
means of ideological and conceptual homogeneity. The relationship of cultural and linguistic aspects is not uni-directional, but rather as a dialectic between the two. Therefore, on an intra-lingual level, and in a monoglossic situation, as the search for unifying concepts or absolute truths becomes necessary, language will be looked at from its centripetal side resulting in the increase of normative attitudes towards language studies and the tendency towards reducing all that is accidental to that which is essential.

Such attitude led to other important contributions of the Greeks to language study, namely, the advancement of grammatical studies, and the development of the Greek grammar by Thrax, with the aim of preserving the Greek language from solecism and vulgarity. In other words, to reinforce linguistic conformity (Ducrot and Todorov 1973: 406).

In this connection, two other points are also worth mentioning: the first is the emergence of parts of speech as an extension of Aristotle’s categories into grammar: the second is the close link of Thrax’s grammar with logic (ibid).

Yet the need for enforcing linguistic homogeneity can also be taken as indicating the co-existence of rival views of language at that time as well as co-habitation of different dialects in Greek society. The prescriptive attitude of Thrax was resented by the other purely descriptive stance of Sextus who, following the Stoics, advocated that: *he who talks as is customary with Greeks is talking good Greek, if we are to follow customary usage and not artificial systems* (Dixon 1965: 41).

Other dissenting voices, such as those of the Sophists, who emphasized the individuality of language, denied the stability of language categories as seen by Aristotelian essentialist methods. Approaching language from its other pole, the centrifugal aspect, they reduced what is essential to what is accidental. Instead of emphasising similarities they strove to highlight differences. Corroborating Bakhtin’s assertion that it is only in a heterological environment that debates over language intensify and the study of language expands. Very little is known about translation at the time of the early Greeks. This might be due to the contempt of the Greeks for other cultures (considered barbaric) a contempt that resulted in a situation in which the Greeks recognized only their own culture and lacked interest in translation from
other cultures, which may be the reason for the lack of records of translation into Greek.

However, Dimić (1975) pointed out that there is evidence of the existence of a class of interpreters in the ancient Egyptian civilization, of whom some were Greeks. Those interpreters were seen as important and highly respectable in the Egyptian society then. The Rosetta stone of the second century B.C. was written in Hieroglyphics as well as Greek.²

Tambiah (1990), on the other hand, believed the early Greeks, who did not distinguish between magic and science, to be heirs to the neighbouring civilization's achievements in metallurgy, geometry and astronomy. However, he appraised the late Greeks as the originators of systematic and scientific thinking (9-10).

Towards the end of this era, the centralized views were challenged, and the Sophists way of thinking reverberated in the Pergamene anamolists and the Alexandrian analogists debate. Analogist Grammar was challenged by Sextus on the grounds that it sacrifices the infinity of forms of speech in common use for limited and finite rules (Dixon 1964: 41), and with this challenge a new dialogical environment within Greek culture can be said to have emerged.

Ullman (1957) cited W. M. Urban in asserting that interest in language grows whenever human culture goes through critical times and that this trend is consistent all through history; in the time of the Greek Sophists, the late Middle Ages; the eighteenth century; the idealistic surge in the nineteenth century, and in recent times (7).

As we are going to see, whenever linguistic debates are not settled for any single philosophical view or for a single language, heteroglossic periods reigned the so-called 'West'. These are periods of uncertainty during which the centripetal forces of language (forces of stability) are faced with an equal or more powerful centrifugal force of change. Opinions of meaning and translation oppose each other resulting in the creation of a permissive environment suitable for a more creative view of translation.

²Dimić also estimated the Tell-El Amarna letters of the 15th century B.C. to be the oldest record about translation. They were written in Egyptian and Accadian, indicating an early awareness of the importance of intercultural communication through translation.
3.3. The Greco-Roman Era

At the time of the Romans the centre of power in Europe shifted from Athens to Rome, the capital of the victorious Romans. This was followed by a massive movement of translation from Greek to Latin. The early Romans, who had acquired from the Greeks the belief that meaning is an integral property of language that is not translatable to another, were pre-occupied with doubts over their language’s ability to capture the Greek language’s refinement and beauty. The idea of the superiority of the Greek language and Greek literature influenced translation at the time of the early Romans. Dimić (1975) reported that at that time only a few important translators were Romans by birth - another reason why perhaps, translators had spread doubts about the ability of Latin to engross Greek eloquence and vividity (18).

By believing in the universality of Greek culture, the early Romans contented themselves with translating synoptic views of the original Greek text’s content. Although Latin, appraising itself from the stand point of Greek, saw itself as being inferior, the act of contact between the two cultures itself, however, can be taken as the mark for starting a dialogue. For triggering a polyglossic climate in Europe which would eventually culminate in a massive movement of translation between the two cultures.

As a result of the massive translation from Greek the Romans adopted, without questioning, the Greek dogmatic philosophy as well as Greek grammar (Dixon 1964:45-7). It was assumed then that Greek grammar was universal and thus suitable for describing Latin.

This adoption was expedited by the urgent need for the consolidation of the power of Rome over neighbouring regions. To do so, it was imperative to teach them Latin. Hence, there was a need for developing a unitary version of Latin for Italy as well as other parts of the Roman Empire.

It was not until the time of Varro (116-27 A.D.) that differences between Greek and Latin were first noticed. Varro observed that Latin has one extra case of inflection (Robins 1979: 465). Concerning translation, Varro’s time was considered by many (c.f. Kelly (1979), Bassnet-McGuire (1980), Steiner (1973)) as the period of the first serious discussions on translation.
Bassnet-McGuire (1980) cited Eric Jacobsen in going as far as to consider translation to be a Roman invention of this period (43). Like Steiner (1973), Kelly (1979) thought the beginning of literature on translation started with Cicero’s (46 B.C.) strong rejection of word for word translation from Greek.

George Steiner divided literature on the theory of translation into four periods. The first extends from the period of Cicero to the beginning of the Romantic era with the appearance of the first book on translation Essays on the Principles of Translation by Alexander Tytler in 1792. The second started with the appearance of Paul Valery’s book Sous L’invocation de Saint Jerome in 1946, a period of hermeneutic influence on theory of translation. The third was inaugurated with the publication of the first papers on machine translation in the early sixties - the era of intense structural investigation of translation. W. Benjamin’s paper Die Aufgabe des Ubersetzer, also in the early sixties, marked the return of the hermeneutic influence on translation studies, and the beginning of the fourth period, which coexisted with the third (ibid 235-238).

Cicero (according to Kelly (1979)) was aware of the syntactic and stylistic variation between the two languages, therefore, he echoed his contemporary Varro in rejecting the universality of Greek categories and Greek structures. He adopted a more interpretive attitude towards the original philosophical and literary texts that he translated. His aim was to create in Latin texts that would be acceptable to the Latin reader, and which would at the same time be as elegant and expressive as the original Greek ones. He was aware that literal translation - even if it was considered as the only honest possible translation at that time - always renders texts aesthetically unacceptable in Latin. The principles of translation should, to Cicero, be non verbum de verbo, sed sensum exprimere de sensu (not word for word but sense for sense) (Bassnet-McGuire 1980: 44).

The other attitude to translation and the one that held views counter to Cicero’s, were those of the contemporary Jewish translators of the Bible and the Talmud who saw literal translation as the only way to faithful and accurate translation. Their views were strictly adhered to by the early Christians as well as medieval Bible translators (Kelly 1979: 36).
Despite the difficulty of establishing what was really meant by the word sense in these old Roman texts or what concept of meaning it relates to in today's notion of the word, it can be noticed, however, that Cicero was contesting the earlier idea of the universality of Greek word order that was taken for granted by his predecessors. Cicero perhaps believed that translating sense-to-sense means the translator, if he feels the need for that, has the right to alter the original word order, and to be the judge of what he translates. This belief presents itself in his concept of good translation expressed in one of his letters as:

What men like you... call fidelity in translation, the learned term pestilent... it is hard to preserve in translation the charm of expressions which in another language are most felicitous... If I render word for word, the result will sound uncouth, and if compelled by necessity I alter any thing in the order or wording, I shall seem to have departed from the function of a translation.

(Nida 1964:13).

Kelly (1979) claimed that within essentialist and objective theories of language, translation tends to focus on the informative content of the original text aiming at preserving as much as possible of the structure and the tenor of the original text, and thus becomes more object centred. Object centred translation is typical of the attitude of translating the central texts of a culture, a translation in which emphases are usually placed on the total preservation of the meaning of the original; such as in the translation of sacred texts. Meanwhile, within a more tolerant view of language, as in artistic attitude towards language, for example, translation is more likely to be subject centred. In which case the translator enjoys more liberty in interpreting the original author's meanings and intentions, being, more or less, free from any unnecessary constraints of pre-supposed judgments or prejudices. Elsewhere, Kelly repeated the claim that the subject oriented translation implies near-equality at least between translator and author (220).

We think that Kelly had a good reason to ascribe the above important distinction partially to the teleological function of text under translation e.g., whether a text is scientific or literary, however, it is our presumption that this distinction implies (as Kelly himself is inclined to admit) near-equality not only between the two authors but also the two cultures they both represent. Since, within a dialogical understanding of
translation, the dialogue between author and translator reflects also a dialogue between their cultures, a dialogue that is always presented in the translator’s attitude towards the text concerned.

If this distinction is accepted, then the early Roman translation from Greek should be seen as ‘object centred’, while views such as Cicero’s should be seen as ‘subject centred’. Although, one has to agree with Kelly that it was unfortunate for the development of translation theory that these two views were considered to be contradictory, and that their devotees presume that they had the whole truth (ibid. 221).

3.4. The Early Bible Translations

Greek theories of language were dominant in the early Greco-Roman era. Nonetheless it seemed likely that a diglossic situation was emerging in Europe with Latin gradually replacing Greek as the language of knowledge and wisdom. This culminated in the writing of Priscian’s and Donatus’ grammars in the fourth century, employing strict and didactic methods that aimed at preserving Latin, which consolidated its hegemony over Europe in the following century.

The introduction of Christianity following the translation of the first Bible, the Vulgate, by St. Jerome into Latin, meant that Latin became the official language of the church, and this helped the spread of Christianity all through Europe. Learning Latin became a central discipline for which the Donatus and Priscian grammars served as essential texts. Linguistic and Evangelistic activities went hand in hand all during the Medieval era (Robins 1979: 469).

Gradually, a monoglossic environment was created in Europe marked by the start of a period in which Latin was seen as the only language of education and culture in face of many other European vernaculars. This development resulted in the impairment of the intellectual and cultural maturity of these vernaculars, and the repression of their natural evolution by Latin’s domination of all aspects of intellectual life. The world was again divided accordingly into Romans (Christians) and the others, with the Bible becoming the sacred text of Roman culture. The word pagan played the
same rôle for the church as the word ‘barbarian’ for the Greeks as a pejorative term for describing the others.

Translation was confined to the domain of religion, in which texts were rendered in *ecclesiastical* Latin (Nida 1964: 14). Pagan texts were not to be read or translated. Harris (1980: 4) ascribed the belief in the concept of untranslatability for a similar reason, that of intellectual isolation of a language community; as he put it:

> An isolated monoglot community having only the most tenuous contact with its neighbours has no reason for supposing that languages were in principle translatable.

Tambiah (1990) claimed that intellectual life at that time was greatly influenced by the idea of the existence of a power outside man, to whom man is obliged and must have faith towards. Allegiance to this power was of great importance. This was coupled with the non-tolerance towards other opinions within the Catholic faith as well as other religions. Catholic faith, according to Tambiah, was reified as a great objective phenomenon that constituted the nature of existence. Tambiah also thought that this idea of ‘natural religion’ was the source of medieval rationalism.

Bakhtin, in his turn, judged the Middle Ages as the time when ‘rationalist dogmatism’ replaced the Greek ‘authoritarian dogmatism’ in Europe (Todorov 1984: 74). Universal truth and a priori knowledge (in the Platonic sense) of the unified natural power was thought to be there only to be discovered. The necessity of congruence between the structure of the mind and the structure of the universe, similar to Aristotle’s previous assumption, was widely upheld.

According to Harris (1980), *the ultimate aim was to explain how every thing - including language - fitted into a perfect schema of this universe* (64). This was an aim reflected in the strong endorsement of harmony between grammar, logic and reality, and constituted the main aim of the Modistae’s grammar.

Discrepancies among languages or even within one language were generally ignored, and only similarities were sought and emphasized. The Modistae, because of their naturalist views, were forced to adhere to the idea that all languages mirror reality as much as Latin does. Logic was seen as underlying both grammar as well as human rationality. Thus the Modistae set for themselves the task of explaining how
the intellect creates grammatical systems through which sounds acquire the power of signification (ibid: 66).

This grammar, sometimes referred to as speculative grammar, was based on consolidated metaphysical, logical and Roman Catholic views. Its contribution to the study of language was in formulation of the first abstract theory of syntax and the postulation of rules that tried to explain embedding and recursion (Robins 1979: 471). The Modistae, perhaps, constituted the link between the Priscian grammar and that of the later Port-Royale, or the continuation of universal views of language and meaning.

Steiner (1975) suggested that the concept of untranslatability found its roots at this time, when religious institutions ruled that the translation of celestial, sublime, and immortal words of religious texts into earthly vulgar and mortal words of European vernaculars to be an act of blasphemy. As Steiner pointed out, this concept of untranslatability was to find secular support from some later schools in semantics and pragmatics under the pretence of the impossibility of total correspondence between different language systems (239).

According to Lefevere (1990), Europe at that time, despite being widely bilingual or even trilingual with many people speaking Latin in addition to their national language, produced very few translations (16). It was suggested that Latin was obviously distanced from other languages through the protectionism of the church. A monoglossic environment was reigning impermeably over Europe as a result of the enclosure of Latin in a dogmatic climate in which other languages were reduced to mere vernaculars. The dialogue between Latin and other dialects was subdued curtailing all translational activities.

It is of interest to note that at the time when translation in Europe was confined to the domain of religion, in Baghdad and Toledo translation from Greek was more at work (Nida, 1964: 14), another indication that the existence of bilingualism by itself is not sufficient for the emergence of translation without other motivations coming into creating a dialogic atmosphere. The atmosphere in which the target language has to be less dogmatic and more receptive, and the source language more appealing and worthy of being a source of translation.

Translation, according to this idea, is being guided by a purposeful answerability between cultures. Cultural answerability can also be necessary to its survival in the
same way the answerability of the individual to his surroundings is vital to his living. Isolated and scattered incidents of translation by certain individuals, are exceptions, but, however, do not alter this view.

Approaching the end of the Middle Ages, a debate was in course between the old guards of the Aristotelian logic and the new trend of Platonic naturalism. Universality of categories and whether they are related to the nature of things or to something common in human reasoning was a central issue at that time to both sides. As a result, another trend of thought emerged and started questioning not only the ontic nature of universal categories but also whether these universals really existed. A new dispute also emerged between the realists who believed that universals have some form or another of existence and the nominalists who denied this claim and saw in universals nothing more than a name.

Again, a period of uncertainty prevailed due to the rising challenge to the old dogmas. A polyglossic situation was forming in this period, coupled with challenges by vernacular dialects to the supremacy and monoglossic control of Latin. The grip of the Catholic faith over the Roman Empire was slowly but steadily being lost. An overall revision of old intellectual and spiritual values reached its peak at the time of the Renaissance.

The start of the age of the Reformation marked a new era of translation in which the Bible (as a central text of the fading Roman Empire) was translated into other European languages with more attention paid to the potential recipients of the translated version. John Wycliff (1320-84) proposed, for the first time, the translation of the Bible into their mother tongue for people who could not read Latin (Savory, 1957: 105). Wycliff, who with his followers were denounced as Lollards, advocated the translation of sentences rather than words, consulting, whenever needed, grammarians or clergymen about the meaning of parts of text under translation.

The era of Wycliff witnessed a change in the attitude towards translation, a change that can be said to present itself in the return to subject centred translation. A translation that contemplated the possible rendering of the meanings of the Bible into other languages, to become the central text for each language in its own right. There was a trust in the translator’s ability to understand and interpret the word of God. This
was in contradistinction to the old attitude that was object centred, and dogmatically emphasized the untranslatability and the literality of the immortal words of the Bible.

In 1530, Luther followed Wycliff by translating the Bible into German. His translation was seen as another important translation of the Bible into a colloquial language and was an indication of the beginning of the shift from the centripetal power of Latin towards the centrifugal power of vernaculars, and the defiance of the conservative power of the church.

According to Luther, the importance of translation was not to latinize German, but to translate into the native speaker's idioms (Morgan, 1959: 274). At the same time this also marked the beginning of the emergence of a multilingual situation in Europe.

However, this shift was not a smooth one. Despite the antecedence of Wycliff and Luther's translations, other well known translators were severely punished. Etien Dolet (1509-1546), an acclaimed French poet, was strangled and burnt with his books following an accusation of heresy for translating Plato in a way that implied doubts about immortality (Nida, 1964: 13).

Dolet, who was also a translator, and humanist by conviction, was the first to seek the formulation of a theory of translation according to which a translator ought to heed five fundamental principles:

a) the translator should fully grasp the content and the intention of the original's author.
b) he (translator) should possess a complete knowledge of the SL as well as TL.
c) he should avoid destroying the meanings and beauty of the original by avoiding word for word rendering.
d) he should seek words in common usage.
e) finally, he should strive to re-generate the original's general effect by employing an appropriate style (ibid. 15-16).

3.5. The Renaissance

It is generally agreed that the first half of seventeenth century was a turning point in the trajectory of Western thought. Three important factors simultaneously transformed
the intellectual scene in Europe: first, the appearance of the Reformation movement and the challenge from within the church itself to the old dogma of the congruence of nature and the structure of the mind (various Protestant movements); second, the advancement of scientific discoveries and the appearance of modern scientific instruments; and third, the emergence of the *literae humaniores* (humanist movement) as a viable rival to the established schools of logic. The humanists challenged the previous assumptions of the co-extension between signs and real things (Wasow, 1987: 81).

An alliance between the reformists and natural scientists led to the abandoning of the theocentric understanding of the universe to be replaced by the universe's portrayal as strictly governed by natural laws. The old notion of external power gave way to the assumption of God as a *generative* and self diffused energy or *idea* (Tambiah, 1990: 17). Experiments with scientific instruments consolidated this mechanical perception of the universe (originally advocated by Copernicus, and endorsed by Cartesian philosophy) giving a pivotal stimulus for the appearance of a new model of research, rational empiricism.

The assuredness of the existence of the subject necessitated that knowledge starts from him and moves outward to the outside world. The old search for the essence of things in the outside world was replaced by the inquiry into the essence of mind as represented in ideas. Thus, according to Descartes, knowledge is subjective and related to the subject's intuition and inferential ability. Searching for laws of thought, Descartes replaced syllogism for mathematics. A discontinuity was established between the world of mind *res cogitans* and external world *res existans*. Similarly, Descartes differentiated between the *idea* which is intuitive and the *judgment* an idea related to the outside world (Sinha, 1988: 5-6).

Ernan McMullin (1988) saw this period as the time that the 'hypothesis', as explanatory of underlying causal structure, came to be the endorsed acceptable form of conjecturing and testing whether by the Baconist empiricists or Cartesian rationalists (33).

In contrast to the rigid idea of a universe governed by precise laws (laws that reflect the perfection of the creator) the Reformation era brought with it a conception of man that is totally free and morally responsible, a man that was seen as more like

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the creator in his free will than like the created mechanical universe (Marková, 1982: 14). Man accordingly came to be acclaimed as the centre of the universe, and the locus of knowledge and certainty (Ibid.).

According to Marková (1982) the domination of the Cartesian paradigm of thinking was a turning point in establishing a tradition of philosophical and scientific research that has extended to our time. The starting point of any investigation, in this paradigm, is the subject, as passive contemplator. Whereas Cartesians rationalists took the subject to be endowed with universal ideas, Cartesian empiricists (cf. Locke) considered ideas as internal experience that, through operations of the mind, originated from external one.

In the field of literary production and literary criticism, Descartes' inductive reasoning featured in different attempts to devise rules for aesthetic creation. The search for models and archetypes led to a renewed interest in translating the works of old Greek masters (Bassnet-McGuire, 1980: 58). By posing as a stylistic pattern to be imitated, translated models served also as pedagogical tool. It was the custom then that every translator wrote a preface to his translation, outlining his views and method of translation.

However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, the idea that meaning is generally accessible through reason only, the belief in Port-Royal's type of underlying syntax, were strongly challenged. For example Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), who believed history and evolution of specific languages can transform all imaginative universals in primitive men's earliest expressions, argued against the universality of Cartesian rationalism in favour of autonomy and historical specificity of individual languages (Steiner, 1975: 75).

All sciences and social institutions are the creation of man himself in accordance with man's historical specificity, and that the same institutions created by man will ultimately re-create that same man. The world is not an objective reality or a creation of a uniformed intuition, but it is the way we see the world according to our own self-created perceptions (Hawkes, 1989: 11-15).

Vico considered that different people, even if endowed with similar internal capacity and can see things in equally intelligible ways, by seeing things from different perspectives or seeing different aspects of things, may form different pictures
of the world. By restructuring their own perception of it, people can also continually re-create the world in which they live. Thus, we do not have a single one nation of man, but rather different and autonomous nations of men (ibid.).

The wide acceptance of Vico’s philosophy promoted the idea that all languages are syntactically and lexically unique. It also brought with it strong resentment to the method of imitation as a way of translation. Not coincidentally, Abraham Cowely (1618-67) thought it totally inconceivable to try to translate literally between Greek and English. In his preface to the *Pindorique* he wrote:

I have taken, left out and added what I pleased; nor make it so much my aim to let the reader know precisely what he spoke as what was his way and manner of speaking

(Morgan, 1959: 279).

These radically contrasting views apparently increased the awareness of translation not only as practice but also as a function. Typological differentiation was clearly outlined for the first time by Dryden in his preface to Ovid’s Epistles. Dryden (1631-1700) saw translation as one the following three:

1. Metaphrase: translating word for word, line for line.
2. Paraphrase: translating with some freedom where sense is more important than words.
3. Imitation: which he admits, may not be considered as translation.

(Bassnet-McGuire 1980:60).

Dryden himself disliked imitation as a way of translation, and advocated striking the right balance between strict adherence to the meanings of the original and the creation of the same stylistic effect in the translation, i.e., between literal and paraphrasal translation. In the preface to his translation of Virgil, he spoke of his desire to *make Virgil speak such English as he would himself have spoken, if he had been born in England* (Steiner, 1975: 256).

The seventeenth century was not only one of great importance for translation theorization, but also the period of the popular spreading of knowledge in Europe as
a result of the invention and establishment of printing, the renewed interest in the old Greek tradition, and the massive movement of translation from Greek, Arabic and Hebrew. Translation played an important rôle in the Renaissance in Europe and was regarded with great respect as an essential activity to the progress of any nation. In this tolerant and polyglottic environment translation was seen not only as possible but also desirable.

The challenge to the linguistic superiority of Latin over the vernaculars of Europe, according to Bakhtin, triggered a linguistic democratization of Europe. By the end of the seventeenth century a heteroglossic linguistic situation, where the centre of linguistic power dispersed from Rome into different European centres, was evident. New attitudes towards language and meaning that were diversified and tolerant, were more customary. Polemics permeated not only discussions about language but also all aspects of knowledge at that time.

The challenge to the European orthodoxies came from the geographical or cultural peripheries that are distanced from the centres where power was more consolidated. For example, Robins (1979) reported that in the Medieval centuries the earlier works on vernacular languages were works by Irish and Icelandic schools (469). This perhaps explains why the Reformation was at its peak in Calvinist Germany and Empiricist Britain rather than in Italy.

The seventeenth century was of great importance to the growth of linguistic studies. The need for writing grammars for the ascending vernaculars has lead to a great advancement in morphological studies. In addition, the discovery of the new worlds, as well as the start of colonial era, exposed Europe to other languages and cultures and made the study of conquered people’s languages a matter of urgency.

One can say that the real interest in the meaning of linguistic expressions started with the advent of empiricism - whether realist or idealist. Empiricism took language representation in the mind as coming through a process of abstraction from outer experience. Locke (1632-1704) concluded a long investigation of the origin of knowledge by claiming that all knowledge must come from experience through perception (causal theory). Words that describe knowledge must have come from the same source. To Locke, words are marks of invisible ideas, ideas which are the object of thought. Whereas Descartes tried to discover the laws of the mind as independent
from reality, Locke, tried to establish the mechanism by which the mind meshed with the external world.

Unlike ideas, thoughts are said to contain propositions about things represented by the ideas. Since we only perceive particular things, general terms such as ‘man’ was explained as a designate of a class of things that refer to the general property of men, ‘complex ideas’. Complex ideas are mental entities that are formed from a ‘collection’ of simple sensory ones through a mechanism of psychological abstraction. Locke apparently continued the tradition of Descartes in rejecting formal syllogistic logic, for him a ‘syllogism discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and arranging the ones we have already’ (Baker and Hacker 1984: 26).

Sinha (1988) observed that Descartes and Locke shared the important idea that the relation between expression and what it represents is that of similarity. By taking expressions to be either a symptoms of thoughts, or a marks of things, they failed to recognize their relationships to the specific communicative needs for which they were created. (This issue, we believe, comes at heart of dialogism. It also is of great importance to the issue of language and translation as will be shown in more detail in the following chapters, especially Chapter 7)

However, Locke’s views lacked a criterion for distinguishing simple ideas such as ‘blue’ from the abstract complex idea of ‘blueness’, or the inclusion of different colours under the general complex idea of ‘colour’. What, for example, is the difference between saying that two particulars agree in respect to some feature and saying that a feature has more than one instance (Harrison 1988: 30).

Locke’s position was diametrically opposed by Berkeley who argued against the existence of a physical world independent of an ‘idea’. Since concepts about weight and shape cannot be images of things so are other concepts. All that we can perceive or know about the physical world are Ideas. Locke’s theory, as Berkeley pointed out, can only account for one function of language, that of making factual statements. Therefore, it is inadequate for explaining other functions such as: asking questions, giving orders, expressing feelings etc.

Leibnitz, on the other hand, argued that one can have a partial or even inaccurate knowledge of something without knowing its ‘nominal essence’. He then suggested that two types of definition for things: ‘logical definition’ based on scientific
knowledge of the thing defined; and ‘physical definition’ based on physical resemblance among things, are both possible (Dixon 1965: 51). Correspondingly, Leibniz postulated two types of truths. The first type is ‘truths of reason’ or a ‘priori’ truths which are the logical truths that are self contained in analytic propositions (true in all ‘possible world’s). These truths are innate truths because it is omniscience of God that makes them true. The second type is the ‘a posteriori’ or the ‘truths of facts’, the truths which are dependent on contingent facts and cannot be determined by pure logical analysis; propositions containing these truths are true only in some ‘possible worlds’ (Lyons, 1977: 39, 147).

Leibniz saw a connection between thought and language and reality by assuming the order of language as mirroring the order of things. This correspondence, even if arbitrary in nature, exists in all languages. The relation between words and things is the foundation of truth; thus, he foresaw a universal language in which simple signs represent simple things, and that can help in logical calculation of the universal properties of things.

The meaning of words to Leibnitz is based on the scientific knowledge of things they represent. Two terms were said to be synonymous if they are interchangeable salva veritate in all possible worlds. Leibnitz accepted the views of the empiricists only in connection to the ‘truths of facts’; but he, following Berkeley, was keen to isolate the transcendental ‘truths of reasons’ as a matter of theological and ‘rational’ inquiry.

Leibnitz, in a sense, represented an early synthesis between rationalist and empiricist views of language. However his logical and essentialist inclinations were to the, then current, Cartesian tradition which saw in formal logic something secondary to the discovery of the underlying causal relations among things.

It is worth mentioning that this century witnessed the beginning of separation of grammar from philosophy (Dixon 1964: 54). Rhetoric was taken to be only a surplus, a decorative art that constituted a mere cloth of the meaning that existed independently in the mind. Therefore, a separation was established all through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance between meaning and the way of expressing it. The polemics over language and meaning, as it appears, were limited to disputes between the dominant views of neo-platonism and the rising empiricism (Wasow 1987: 35).
3.6. The Eighteenth Century

The seventeenth century’s intellectual arena in Europe remained, generally speaking, under the influence of the essentialist philosophy of Catholic rationalism. However, towards the end of the century, experimentation added momentum to the already growing empirical movement, a development that lead to the revision of the old philosophical tradition. Eventually this ended in attempts to regulate what constituted a legitimate and proper scientific knowledge.

It also brought with it awareness of the necessity of explaining discrepancies between objects and their representation in the mind, and reconciling the necessary and universal with the contingent and spatio-temporal. Attempts at resolving the rationalist-empiricist controversy was one of the aims of the writings of scholars such as Leibnitz, Hume, and Kant.

Kant (1724-1804), who tried to defend the possibility of objective scientific knowledge in the face of Hume’s extreme scepticism, and Leibnitz’ monadic metaphysics, represented a turning point in Western philosophy trajectory. Most of the philosophers that succeeded Kant formulated their thoughts either within his views, or as a reaction to them. With no claim to represent Kant’s obscure philosophy, one can sketchily say that Kant’s main interest was to arrive at the necessary condition for knowledge, and whether knowledge can ever be a priori, or objective which was a subject of heated controversy among some of his predecessors, especially between Leibnitz (rationalism) and Hume (empiricism) (Scruton 1982: 13).

Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason gave a powerful argument against the possibility of objective knowledge (knowledge totally detached from experience) as well as against the possibility of knowledge detached from pre-organised intuition. Whereas experience furnishes knowledge only with its content (content without form), reason provides knowledge with form without content (a priori concepts). It is only by uniting the two does knowledge become possible.

In his justification for the a priori, Kant claimed that experience has certain conditions that make it possible, and that these conditions cannot be part of experience itself, because they are the necessary conditions for that same experience to take place. These conditions, therefore, transcend experience and are accordingly named by Kant
transcendental intuition. The ‘transcendental intuition’ determines the mode of our knowledge of things (understanding), and in virtue of which we can approach objects of experience (Ibid., 24).

In what seemed to be directed against Leibnitz’ rationalism, Kant contended that attempts to know objects of experience through intuition and outside worldly experience (by pure reason), will result only in an illusion of knowledge. Against Hume and other empiricists, Kant employed the synthetic a priori argument to refute their case against objective knowledge, and their denial of other aspects of knowledge such as necessity of laws or causality. In this argument, Kant tried to prove the validity of certain propositions that are necessarily true, but different from a priori analytic statements, since they are about objects of worldly experience. Such statements include propositions such as: ‘All discoverable objects are in space and time’; ‘Every event has a cause’. The validity of these propositions was also taken by Kant a proof of the existence of an objective world (Scruton, 1990:17-21). Kant summarised his critique by saying that thought without content is empty; intuitions without concepts are blind’ (Ibid., 25).

On the other hand, Kant assumed that objects, even if objectively out there, are unknowable in themselves, and to the knower they are perforce transcendental objects. We know objects only as they seem to us, and to us they are what they seem; therefore, any representation of them is partial and conditioned by our mode of knowledge of them. Hence, we can only speak of things within the limit of how they appear to us. However, we know objects by means of certain concepts (innate categories, such as substance, causation, relation etc.), of which other concepts are derived through application to objects.

Kant argued that concepts cannot be related to images of things since no general or universal representation can account for the diversity of instances of this representation. Images are not suitable conceptual representation of objects; therefore, the assumption of similitude that underlies it ought to be abandoned (Sinha 1988: 8-10).

As Sinha (1982) explained, since to Kant no representation of an object in itself is possible (that is a representation that includes all aspects from all perspectives), no concept (a priori concept) is related directly to objects, but rather to some form of
possible perspectival representation of it. The possible mental representation of objects of experience is then a representation that is the intersection of the objects and our experience of them. Therefore, our knowledge of things in this sense is partially judgmental and in a sense functional.

By dismissing the concept of image, Kant posited the concept of psychological *schemata* as an alternative description of how concepts represent objects in the mind. Schemata are rules according to which a general representation of an object is represented to the mind without any particular reference to any particular instance of that object (Ibid., 11). According to Sinha (1988), Kant separated language from the representation of concepts by the mind. As to how the mind constructs the schemata of objects, Kant saw that as a mystery (11-12).

Kant's powerful philosophy, as expressed in his different critiques, was influential not only in its substance, but also in its methods of transcendental arguments. As we are going to see in the next chapter, transcendental arguments were used by many scholars such as Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Bakhtin.

Bakhtin used a transcendental method of argument to prove the necessity of the inter-subjective nature of the sign in order for the sign to be communicative (argument against subjectivity). In addition, Bakhtin's synthesis of the given and the created in language is also similar to that of Kant's between the rational and the empirical in knowledge. Davidson, as we are going to illustrate in the next chapter, used a similar argument against extreme relativism to prove the possibility of translation between languages.

The intellectual attempts of the Enlightenment to regulate and schematize impersonal (objective) knowledge reverberated also in translation approaches. Attempts were seriously made for the first time to study and regulate translation. For example, Tytler's (1791) *Essay on the Principles of Translation* was widely considered as the first comprehensive and autonomous attempt to prescribe and outline a clear theory of translation.

In this book, Tytler outlined his views of translation, which were clearly normative, and contained instructions to be followed by the translator in order to achieve acceptable literary translation. Tytler stressed the importance of preserving the original's style and manners so that it would be as strongly felt by readers in the
receptive language, as it is by the speakers of the original language. On the other hand, Tytler emphasised the full knowledge by the translator of the language he is translating from. The translator also ought to follow the original writer in his flow of thought and seek faithfulness to his general meaning rather than to specific expressions. Whenever the translator thinks that the original work suffers certain weaknesses, and the translator thinks that he can render the translated work better than the original writer, he should do so on condition that he does not violate the general meaning of the original. However, the translator should not preserve the manner of the original by affecting its sense. Whenever in doubt the translator should adjust the manner to preserve the original sense.

Tytler thought the translation of poetry by prose is an unacceptable undertaking because the most important element of the work, its beauty, would be lost. He also outlined the main poetic styles with which translators are most likely to encounter difficulties. The chief difficulty for a translator is when he meets idiomatic, expressions which do not belong to universal grammar, and with which the original writer has had greater freedom (Lefevere, 1992: 128-35).

Implicit in Tytler's statement about translation is a belief in the ability of the translator to distance himself from his translation by his ability to isolate the sense of the original and his insistence on the strict adherence to the flow of thought of the original writer. One can also trace a rationalist influence in his views of translation in his mentioning of universal grammar, or even his belief in the untranslatability of certain poetic works if they do not adhere to the universal spirit of things.

In general, it can be said that during the Enlightenment the debate about translation and translatability intensified. A general ambivalence towards translation at the time was characteristic of scholars such as those of Tytler and Schlegel (1767-1845). Influenced by the general tendency towards synthesis and reconciliation, (similar to that of Kant and Mill (1906-1873)), they thought that translation was possible even though poetic translation was regarded with great caution and suspicion.

At the same time an active movement for the re-interpretation of the Bible according to the Protestant faith was taking place in northern Europe. The interest of the northern European Protestants in re-interpreting the Bible gave birth to the new and nascent discipline of hermeneutics (Wasow 1987: 81).
However, Kant’s *constructivist* concept of Knowledge was also instrumental in inciting opposition to the rationalism of the church in the eighteenth century, and the appearance of the nineteenth century evolutionist philosophy, through his influence on expressionist philosophers in Germany (cf. Fichte, Schelling, Herder, and Hegel) (Beiser 1993). According to Beiser, the dynamic views of the evolutionist philosophers were a product of an attempt to make philosophy cohere with the then new scientific discoveries in electricity, magnetism, and biology (7).

The most influential among the expressionist philosophers was Hegel (1770-1830). Hegel’s insights, more notably his *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, developed into what Marková (1982) considered to be the second paradigm of beliefs about science and philosophy, and language. In this paradigm (Hegelian paradigm in Marková’s words) the knowing subject is not a coolly detached individual who tries to discover the laws that govern a meticulously pre-organised world, but rather an individual that is part of the an ever changing world he is trying to discover. One should not fail also to notice that the philosophy that underlies Bakhtin’s outlook on language is in most part Hegelian, and falls within this paradigm.

Kant’s dualism of a priori/a posteriori has proven to be problematic in the same way the mind/body dualism was for Descartes. A great deal of criticism was directed against the way Kant tried to characterise how the two aspects of knowledge he postulated interact.

Preserving certain original assumptions of Kant, such as that experience cannot be about the realm of things-in- themselves and is only possible within a priori limits, and that experience should be accounted for in empirical terms, Hegel, among others, tried to bridge the gulf between the two by assuming a metaphysics where both aspects belong to one identity. In Hegel’s conception consciousness and inert matter (subject/object) belong to one unified universe in which the first is the highest form of organization and the second is the lowest.

If things are but what they appear to consciousness, then, according to Hegel, consciousness is all that is needed to understand the limits of knowledge. Knowledge was said by Hegel to resolve the opposition between what things really are and what we have previously thought them to be. The outcome of knowledge is always something that is different from previous assumptions about it, therefore, the standards
of knowledge are established through the internal comparison of different stages of consciousness, i.e., comparing the consciousness after knowledge with itself prior to knowledge.

Knowledge which is part of the individual’s effort to arrive at total self-consciousness, is perpetuated by refining the opposition between what is assumed and what is actual about things. It is a perpetual phenomenological struggle between things in themselves (as potentialities) and things for themselves (actualities) (Marková, 1982 chapter 7).

Hegel, unlike Kant, emphasised the genesis and the context of philosophy. Philosophy, to Hegel, does not originate from detached contemplation an external world; a world that is passively reflected to our consciousness, nor is it a search for given truths, but a strenuous piecemeal historical search to increase self consciousness. Since no person or entity can be self sufficient or an entity that is enclosed from past or future experience, Hegel claimed that experience includes elements of all past human experience, and can by no means be instantaneous. Hegel also discredited any concept of absolute truth or universal standards of knowledge. A-historicity and the divorce from context are the main source of the transcendental illusion in philosophy that purports such truths or standards. This illusion, he claimed, manifests itself in assuming certain beliefs and values, which are in their reality historical products of one culture, to be universal, in believing that certain principles of thinking are innate while they are actually learnt from experience, and in postulating the possibility of suppositionless knowledge (Beiser, 1993: 270-3).

Marková (1982) pointed out that while the law of non-contradiction is not acceptable in Cartesian philosophy, it constitutes the cornerstone of Hegel’s epistemology. In Hegel’s understanding, every thing is constituted by its opposition. An organism has inherent within itself the potential of developing into something else. It is from the beginning itself as well as something else, another potential organism. The same contradiction is also true, according to Hegel, of the way we recognize things: a universal is to be directly recognized only in its manifestation in a particular. The unity in which we recognize a particular conceals within it the diversity of the universal properties that characterize it; the identity of a thing is conditioned by its differentiation from other things (162-9).
According to Beiser, these ideas of Hegel conceal within them the seeds of extreme relativism and the hidden assumptions about the impossibility of commensurability between languages and hence of untranslatability. However, we think this same idea can be also indicative of the fact that every expression of a language conceals within itself the possibility of being expressed in another language, in other words being translatable.

Thus, to Hegel, experience can only be explained in historical terms. The consciousness of the individual starts with sensory awareness and gradually unfolds into a more developed experienced consciousness. Nationhood, which was seen by Hegel (as also by other Romanticists) as an organic whole, was conceived likewise. Language the sole spirit of a nation reflects its nationhood (Beiser, 1993: 271).

Bakhtin acclaimed the Romanticists for their recognition of the *necessity and fullness of time*. He saw in their recognition of spatio-temporal factors a breakout from the limitations of the Enlightenment’s *abstract morality, rationality, and utopianism*. Romanticists, in Bakhtin’s opinion, restored the historicity and the human creativity of the speaking individual. However, he did not share with them their emphasis on seeing historicity only from the point of view of the individual, forgetting, by doing so, that time for an individual is a time within collectivity (Bakhtin 1990: 42).

Romanticism identified language with the transcendental power that creates a text in the individual’s mind. Von Humboldt (1767-1803), as best representative of such views at the time, conceived of language as:

> ...identified with living capability by which speakers produce and understand utterances, not with observed products of the acts of speaking and writing; It is a creative ability ‘energia’, not a mere product ergon [emphasis added]

(qtd. in (Kelly 1979: 27).

A necessary corollary to these views, was a new concept of untranslatability, a concept that did not take from rational dogmatism, but this time from the Romanticist’s extreme relativism. According to Humboldt:

> All translation seems to me to be simply an attempt to solve an impossible task, every translator is doomed to be done in by one of two stumbling blocks: he will either stand too close to the original, at the cost of taste and the language of his nation, or he will adhere too closely to characteristics peculiar to his nation at the cost of the original. The medium between the two is not only difficult but *downright impossible*.
Herder (1744-1803) held the idea that words are creations of the mind through which analogical processes assign sounds to things in a non-arbitrary way. This analogy was thought to be veiled by the shade of passing time, but, is nonetheless, recoverable through the diachronic study of etymology (Herbst et. al.1979: 6). (As will be shown in the next chapter, Romanticism, including its concept of untranslatability, continued in some of today’s approaches to translation in hermeneutics, especially Heidegger’s.)

Romanticists (cf. Humboldt, Herder, Schleiermacher) believed that language and the history of a people are closely linked and, as they claimed, language is a product of Volksgeist or the spirit of the people (Kelly 1979: 28). A new concept of reality that relates it to language was upheld. This new attitude also contributed to a better understanding of symbolism, as Romanticism saw in symbols a good example of language’s capability to create a reality that transcends every day existence.

Language communities were said to discover different realities about the world. These realities, Humboldt claimed, were unique for every particular language, and he spoke of them as the innere Sprachform. The inner form of language reflects a particular perception of the world that is created through language in the mind of its speakers. The real differences among languages are in their inner Sprachform (Herbst et. al. 1980: 5-7).

Emphasizing the particularity of every language’s inner form was of crucial importance to the future development of the relativists’ views of language as well as the Saussurian concept of language as being determined by an inner structure of differential relations. Their ideas were taken to their ultimate extent by Heidegger’s phenomenology in which language is seen as always creating new existence (Kelly 1979: 29). Heidegger tried to substitute the philosophical process of contemplation by making the word speak for existence (Dasein) (Bakhtin 1990: 158n).

Within hermeneutics, especially with Schleiermacher, translation was grounded in ‘understanding’ - understanding as a process that was thought to be the reverse of the act of speaking, as it was assumed that the same thought underlies the two acts. Schleiermacher thought that understanding of an utterance must involve two aspects: a) understanding of the utterance in relationship to the language of which it is part;
and b) understanding of the utterance in its connection with the inner mental structure of the utterer. However, to Schleiermacher the inner structure of language modifies what is in its speaker’s mind (Mueller-Vollmer 1985:19).

Schleiermacher considered the goal of a translation to be the bringing closer of two distinct characters; that of the author of the original text and that of the reader of the translated version, i.e., Schleiermacher saw the task of the translator as maximizing the understanding between the original writer and the reader of the translated text. Two distinct methods make this possible; either the translator takes the reader closer to the translator by increasing the reader’s comprehension of the author’s text and the author’s original language by means of compensatory information that help the reader to understand that language, or to take the original author closer to the reader by sharing with the reader in his own language the text’s images and impressions that the translator himself gained from reading the original. Translation can fulfil one of these tasks but not the two together.

Schleiermacher’s treatise on translation Über die Verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens (On the various Methods of Translation) contained a developed translation theory. He distinguished, for the first time, between translation and interpretation, and offered deep insight into the relationship between the translation and the original. With Schleiermacher, Steiner (1975) claimed, translation studies moved from the ‘immediate empirical focus’ to enter a new phase, that of the psychological and hermeneutic questioning of the nature of translation (236-7). (A detailed discussion of Schleiermacher views on translation is in Wills (1982 31-33). It contains also a lengthy quotation from this treatise.)

One thing we hope to have made clear so far is that within extreme and reductionist views such as those of Descartes or Humboldt, and with the absence of such synthesis as that of Kant (or indeed of Bakhtin), it is very likely that the issue of untranslatability will arise. The major appeal of dialogism to translation is its rejection of both reductionist attitudes. According to Bakhtin, relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism) (Hirschkop 1989:27).

Bakhtin thought that both trends were hostile to dialogue by taking meaning to be closed and finalized. Dogmatism emphasized homogeneity and completely rules out
change or differentiation, while relativism emphasised heterogeneity and change, and unduly dismissed any concept of similarity. By doing so, they both ruled out translatability. Dialogism on the other hand, avoids such totalization by starting with the initial assumption that some but not all can be understood.

Whenever a given attitude came closer to recognizing the necessity of dialogism, as within a more synthesized views (cf. Dryden, Schleiermacher) a viable discussion of translation was always possible. The other alternative is to formulate purely normative guidelines for translation as is the case with Tytler.

In what follows we will shed some light at the turning point in the study of language, where language becomes a main focus of studying culture. It is a time where, despite the increase in cultural contacts, dialogue between cultures is replaced with a new form of dogmatism during the nineteenth century.

3.7. The Century of Uncertainty

The nineteenth century was mentioned by many (cf. Bakhtin (1990), Dixon (1965), Bassnet-McGuire (1980), among many others), as the century of intense discussion in and around language. One European literary historian saw this era as: une crise de la conscience Européenne (van Tieghem in Bassnet-McGuire, 1980: 64). It was also the century of the beginning of interest in language for its own sake and not for other philosophical or theological interests.

The intellectual atmosphere was democratized again, but this time by the advancement in certain fields of humanities, fields with a potentially shared interest in mind and language, such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology. However, the general and chief interest was in historical aspects, mainly in order to trace the genesis and evolutionary aspects of language.

This general tendency marked the philology of the first half of the nineteenth century in Europe, especially in Germany, under the influence of progress made in biology, especially the Darwinian theory. Coupled with the discovery of Sanskrit, the postulation of genetic resemblance among various languages and the rise of subjectivism led to the convergence of interest on tracing the etymological and phonetic change in language (Ducrot and Todorov 1972).
The desire to study language as an exact science originated from the historical investigation of sound change in language evolution. A group called the New Grammarians advocated (cf. Osthof, Brugman) a positivistic approach to language which maintained that the scientific approach to language should be limited to the investigation of observable facts only (Herbst et. al.1980: 10).

This was perhaps the start of the science of linguistics as a scientific study of language: but, on the other hand, this was also the beginning of the relegation of meaning to a secondary place in the study of language as being not susceptible to objective investigation. Even today many linguists, especially in syntax and phonetics, share the same views for the same reasons.

The nineteenth century was also marked by the rise of nationalism and the erection of intercultural barriers. Interest grew in forming and consolidating unitary national languages from dialects of the reigning political elites, acrolects. Linguistic purism asserted the dominance of some languages over others.

Thus, interest increased in writing different dictionaries to preserve languages and their authenticity. According to Crowley (1989), a major project was under way in Britain in the mid nineteenth century to create a standard language. The term 'standard language', reported Crowely, was recorded as being created in the proposal for the New Oxford Dictionary in 1858. The creation of such a standard language was thought important for national and social unity (76-8).

Crowley reported heated debates over what was to be included within this dictionary, over what was to be considered as standard. This task was achieved by relying on and privileging some traditional well known written works, thus limiting linguistic authorities to the literate elite in Britain at that time (78-9). There is little doubt that this trend was widespread in Europe at the time.

Similarly, Harris (1980) claimed the dictionary to be one of the most influential and significant institutions in Europe. About the advent of the dictionaries in Europe he wrote:

More important, the vernacular dictionary, when it eventually appeared in Europe, was a product of the rise of nationalism, which gave birth also to the serious study of the grammar (128).
Among many reasons for the importance of dictionaries, Harris’s thought that, they give fixity to the meaning of words by posing as repository of authoritative and exemplary usage (ibid). The dictionary also helped to precipitate the rise of structuralism by consolidating the belief that language is composed of a finite number of elements. (for details, see Harris 1980: 130-44).

It is hardly surprising that languages during this period were classified according to their degree of cultivation, with some cultures being considered as more mature and thus more authoritative. Translation from the colonized cultures was widespread to satisfy European society’s appetite for exotic products of alien cultures, with translators in most cases projecting such exoticness on the translated text or exaggerating the foreignness of these texts to satisfy the increasing demand for this sort of literature.

In a sense, the translators, during the Romantic and Victorian era, mostly invented for the reader these exotic cultures rather than translating them, thus imposing the views and images of the TL on the SL texts. Fitzgerald, for example, wrote to a friend about his translation of Persian poetry:

It is an amusement for me to take what Liberties I like with these Persians who (as I think) are not Poets enough to frighten one from such excursions, and really do want a little Art to shape them.

(Lefevere 1990 :19).

This type of attitude towards translation marked the resurgence of an extreme case of subject centred translation, where the balance between the SL and TL is heavily inclined towards the subject receiver of the target text. In other words, a balanced dialogue between the two cultures taking part in translation can be said to be severely inhibited, resulting in a one-way translation.

The nineteenth century, Kelly (1979) claimed, diverted the attention from the translator’s duty of mastering his rôle as intermediary between two cultures, and his accountability to preserving as much as he can from the original (c.f. with Dryden, Huete, Tytler), to his taste for satisfying, by no matter what means, the taste of his readers. He also added that for translation, 'to the technical aspect of theory, nineteenth century historical linguistics contributed nothing (221).
3.8. The Resurgence of Rationalism

In order to pave the way to the discussion of the historical developments that have lead to shaping of the modern controversy about translation and translatability, it is important to mention the resurgence of interest in logic and mathematics that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. This development which took place partly as a reaction to the Romantic subjectivism, and partly as a continuation of the critique by analytical philosophers (cf. Frege) of Kant’s concept of the limitation of knowledge, led to the return to Platonic realism. Analytic philosophy has its strong impact on the views of language that extend to our time, more particularly those of formal linguistics.

With philosophical realism, a paradigm shift from what is subjective, creative, and stylistic (contingent), to what is objective, and designative (necessary), took place, with, however, more awareness for the necessity of bridging the gap between the two. This gap Pêcheux (1982) thought of as the perennial conundrum of philosophy and linguistics. A new page in the study of meaning, formal and essentialist, can be said to have started in the middle of the nineteenth century with the application of new mathematical formulae and functions (symbolic logic) to some of the outstanding logical problems expanding syllogistic reasoning. This development led the practical application of logic and the logical calculi to many new domains of study including that of language.

Concerning language, this problem posed itself as a question of reconciliation between the explication of how a subject can instantly and intentionally use language expressions and the fact that expressions of language must have determinate representational relations with what they stand for in the real world. In modern terms this divide is represented by terms such, meaning vs use, representation vs expression, semantic vs pragmatic, etc..

A pioneering and influential contributions to solving this issue was that of the philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege (1884-1925). Frege tried to solve two of the major problems facing philosophical realism then. One was establishing the co-referential relationship between linguistic expressions and their designata, such as the identity statements that are uninformative (logically tautological) as in the statement
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’. The other was opaque contexts, where two expressions such as morning star or evening star could designate the same planet but express two different senses.

To resolve these problems, Frege separated objective thought from subjective judgment, using the first as a means of calculating the second. Objective thought contains propositions with neutral meaning and is said to be real in the platonic sense. Propositions take their actual meanings from their articulation in judgments (sentences) in which they can be either asserted (be true of a state of affairs), or negated (be false of that state of affairs).

One of Frege’s important innovations was to consider any judgment as a mathematical formula that could be logically decomposed into a predicational function and a number of arguments (Baker and Hacker 1984: 30-4). Unlike Kant, Frege contended direct existence of objective thoughts independent from the subject’s psychological conception of them; the subject relates to them only in so far as being a bearer of them; thus, he distinguished them from ideas that are saturated by the subjects’ emotions and are subjective (Dixon 1965: 62).

Frege posited that thoughts engage concepts, concepts that relate to a third realm of a ‘non-physical, non-psychological nature. To this realm, he also assigns numbers and propositions. Propositions are calculated by laws of thought that are equally independent of subjective judgment, and therefore not psychological truths (Ryle 1969:149).

Frege conceived of concepts (real objects that are not spatio-temporal) as first level predicate-functions taking their truth-values from their employment as a value for an argument in a well-formed formula. Predicates are unsatisfied expressions that need a proper name (referring expression) in order to satisfy the condition for predication (to have a truth value). An expression has no truth value outside its employment in a well-formed statement that expresses a judgeable assertion to which (the sentence) a truth value can be assigned. If paraphrased, a word has a meaning only in its contribution to the meaning of a sentence that is either true or false. Conversely, the truth value of a complex expression is derived from the truth value of its constituents. A sentence as represented by the truth-value (including its sense and reference) expresses a thought.
According to Frege, a distinction had to be made between the reference of an expression (Bedeutung) or what the expression stands for in an utterance, and its sense (Sinn) or meaning. Expressions with the same sense always have the same reference, but it is not necessary for the expressions with the same reference to have the same sense. The reference of proper names are objects, entities referred to by expressions such as 'man', 'beauty', designated objects.

Lyons (1987), noticed that Frege's distinction between sense and reference is reminiscent of an earlier distinction made by Mill between the connotation and the denotation of names, according to which the word 'white' denotes all white things, .... [but] connotes, the attribute whiteness (175). However, Lyon believed that there is a terminological difference between Frege's sense and reference and Mill's connotation and denotation. Connotation to Mill implied an effective or emotional meaning unlike sense to Frege which referred to objective content of an expression. On the other hand, reference to Frege differs from denotation in being an utterance-dependent concept. It is apparent that Frege takes more notice of the contextual aspect of linguistic expressions (ibid.76).³

Frege made another important and widely accepted distinction by isolating what is asserted (the constant content in all assertion) the sense from what is particular to one occurrence that is the force of the assertion. Frege's views paved the way for many formalist approaches to meaning, more notably in later years on positivistic and linguistic semantic approaches to meaning in so far as it postulated the possibility of isolating the objective information in communication.

Frege's influence on translation is an indirect one, stemming from the force of his argument for the objectivity of meaning. The impact of these view on translation is mostly through consequent analytical philosopher's controversial assumption of the possibility of perfect translation by means of objective concepts, and propositions. (The analytical attitude towards translation will be considered in more detail in the following chapter.)

³ Wunderlich (1974) believes that in referential semantics, where an attempt to relate linguistic expressions to facts, there arises the problem of relating meaning to one aspect or another. Thus, the bifurcation of meaning into two aspects, one relating concepts to cognition and the other relating them to objects in the real world seem inevitable (200).
We believe that Frege's insistence on language meaning as being objectively independent from the subject knowledge of them is important for translation. However, dialogism, as has been explained above, does not take meaning in language to be objective in the platonic sense, but takes meaning in language to be objective only in so far as its inter-subjectively constituted outside the subject and independent from him. Yet dialogism does not deny that language expresses its subject ideologically, that is, dialogism does not deny the subjective aspects of meaning. By doing so, it is able to accommodate the ethical, ideological aspect of meaning, not as purely subjective aspects of meaning as Frege takes them to be, but as objective in the sense of being inter-subjective meanings that exist also socially. This view is consistent with the idea that language is not only a representational system, but also an expressive inter-subjective one.

Frege's ideas of meaning represent a return to Cartesian (monological) views of meaning according to which a symmetrical one-to-one relationship is postulated between signs and the objective concepts they represent. The different divisions of meaning such as those between sense and reference, sense and force were mainly motivated by the awareness that in dialogical use of sign in context signs alter their meanings to suit variable immediate communicative need. Apparently, the postulation of a priori facts or concepts is usually inevitable to any views, rational or empirical, that assume the consciousness of the individual to be logically extant prior to its social development.

Another influential idealistic view of meaning as that also marks a revitalisation of interest in Kantian philosophy was that of E. Husserl. To Husserl, as with Frege, concepts are ideal constructs; verbal signs by themselves contain meanings of eidetic essence (essence of the entity described by the sign presented vividly to the mind). Unlike Frege, Husserl, in order to defend his philosophy against possible ravages of scepticism, assigned concepts to pure consciousness (universal structure of the mind). The consciousness by means of which the subject can perceive things belongs to a universal consciousness. Concepts are part of this unprejudiced universal consciousness.

Thus the logic of meaning that forms this consciousness can be recovered by attending through pure dialectic to the immediate constitution of the consciousness -
a process he called *phenomenological reduction* - thus revealing its inherent indubitable thoughts, that are separate from the subject’s individual psychological judgments (Norris, 1982: 41-4).

In Husserl’s phenomenology (cf. Kant) objects in the world are unknowable in themselves. They only partly reveal themselves to the subject when unified with his intention to know them. We can only perceive things in the way they appear to us. Equally, our act of consciousness and structured perception are entwined with the objects we perceive. Equally eidetic essences (universal concepts) must arbitrarily relate to a particular language by an intentional act of meaning, otherwise they would be devoid of meanings. This arbitrary act of appropriation confers on concepts also a sense of indeterminacy in their meanings.

Husserl saw that signs are related to human intention through two acts: the first is a non verbal act of intuition (comprehending the essence of signs); the second (verbal) is that of expression (the use of the signs in expressions). Husserl divided the linguistic sign into two categories: (Anzeige) indication, indicates an object but does not express any meaning about them; and (Ausdruck) or expression. An expressive sign indicates as well as expresses the meaning of its object. Meanings that are unchanging are abstract universal entities whereas the relationship of meaning to signs is always contingent. The relationship between verbal expressions and their meaning is purely subjective.

According to Husserl, what is usually communicated are indications rather than expressions, because they indicate the thought of the speaker at the time. Since there is no way of intuiting the relation forged between the other subject’s verbal signs and eidetic essence, the meaning of all expressions that enter in communication are only what appears to be indications of the speakers thoughts and intentions. These expressions vary from one subject to the other causing partial indeterminacy (Seung, 1982: 18-9).

Thus, meaning in inter-subjective communication, to Husserl, is always indeterminate because of the contingency of the sign to the speaking subject. Therefore, the subject, to the others, is always a transcendental consciousness (Ibid., 22-5). Hence, Husserl’s phenomenology has relegated all linguistic acts and meaning to a sort of indeterminacy with which the concept of determined translation disappears.
all together. In other words, by conceiving the relationship between subjectiveness and otherness as an indeterminate one, he introduced a new concept of untranslatability that is related to the monologic solipsistic consciousness of the individual. Untranslatability that relate to subjective idealism.

On the other hand, Husserl initiated a new trend of thought that will be continued through different phenomenological views of language, meaning, and translation, especially in the field of hermeneutics (cf. Merleau-Ponti, Heidegger, Gadamer, to name a few), a tradition in which translation is seen as merely interpretation. Steiner (1975) claimed an overlap in modern phenomenology between the views of translation and meaning in general and the claim by Husserl and other devotees that every act of communication is a translation of a conventional sign into subjective expression (intention) (278).

We take the opportunity here to point out that Bakhtin, who in a sense can be seen sharing similar phenomenological inclinations, would contest the idea of a given consciousness. The subject’s consciousness, as mentioned before, originates from interacting with other consciousnesses through its answerability to its surroundings. The subject’s phenomenological experience with real objects is rarely direct, but mostly through his ideological interaction with his social vicinity. Therefore the subject’s consciousness is never pure and unified. The social milieu provides the subjects with the important categories of language (signs) that, according to Bakhtin, mediate his experience with external objects.

The sign is the boundary in which the individual psyche (inner sign) meets the social ideology (outer sign). The inner sign is the subject’s own experience, feeling, of the outer sign; therefore, it is unique to him. The inner sign is what gives expression to the introspection of the individual and gives shape to his psyche. In order for this sign to communicate anything to other subjects it ought to be as much as possible equal to the outer sign. The outer ideological sign was also once an inner sign that ceased to be subjective and entered the social ideological domain. The two signs are related through a perpetual dialectic. For that reason the consciousnesses of subjects that belong to the same ideological sign systems is at the same time similar but never identical, they are similar but at the same time different. Bakhtin, here,
reverses Husserl’s view by making expression confer and give shape to essence not the other way round (Vološinov, 1973: 32-40).

With this, simplified and far from comprehensive historical account, we approach the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century. This period witnessed a strong reaction to the previous period of diachronic linguistics and the appearance of the synchronic investigation of language as a semiotic system of signs either in the logical tradition as exemplified by logical investigation of linguistic sign as part of a general theory of sign by the American pragmatist C. S. Pierce (1839-1914), or by Saussurean (1857-1913) semiology. The latter transformed the linguistic and semiotic studies and gave it a new dimension that was soon to be reflected indirectly in translation studies. However we would like to postpone the discussion of the contributions of those two great figures to another chapter.

It has been our primary aim in this chapter to look at certain aspects of the evolution of views on translation in the West not in isolation, but in relation to the historical and ideological factors in which they (views on translation) take their roots and which they at the same time reflect. This evolution, we tried to show, takes a form of incessant dialogue between the different successive epochs of this evolution’s trajectory.

With the absence of a unified theory of translation, and because of the heated debates surrounding the issue of translation, debates that are most of the time philosophical, a survey of the various and conflicting modern views of translation seems inevitable to any discussion of it, not the least for making one’s position clear and identifiable in correspondence to other views, i.e., for placing one’s views in dialogue with those of other scholars who have touched upon the issue of translation.

In the following chapter we will discuss some of the contemporary philosophical debates surrounding the issues of translation and translatability. We will concentrate on those philosophical views that we see important to making clear the issue of dialogic aspects of translation, postponing by doing so the discussion of linguistic and pragmatic views of translation to the two chapters to follow, since, it is our belief that modern views of translation can be rendered more transparent if the philosophical views that sanction them are unveiled. Such a discussion seems also important for
explaining the dialogical approaches to translatability and translation we plan to propose in the final two chapters.

However, the discussion of structuralism - despite being a philosophical doctrine - will be attached to that of linguistics, mainly because of the close association between them, so will be those philosophical insights of Saussure.
Chapter 4

Philosophical Approaches to Meaning and Translatability

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter was an attempt to appraise the historical evolution of views of translation in the West in the light of dialogism. Attention was specially given to the relationship between any particular view and the dominant philosophical and epistemological beliefs that sustained that view in a given chronotopical epoch (historical genre). It was, for example, assumed that whenever a school of thought dominates, the other never completely disappears, but remains slightly obscure as a dissenting voice. In a dialogical fashion, the dissenting views resurface, whenever the old dogmas weaken. A state of dialogism is always there. They might change guise, but in their substance they have kept a great deal of the same essence. For reasons of lucidity of dialogical discussion, we dichotomised those views of language and translation in our discussion into two main poles, viz, essentialists versus non-essentialists. A similar dichotomy has many times proven useful, and is often adopted by other scholars. For example, Harris (1980) Pêcheux (1982) classified outlooks on meaning as either essentialist or rhetorical. Marková (1982) saw a similar dichotomy between the Cartesian essentialist paradigm and the expressionist Hegelian one; likewise, Andrew Benjamin (1989) adopted a general distinction within his discussion of meaning and translation between literal and figural meanings.

In the essentialists' camp (Cartesian according to Marková), we include those concepts of meaning (whether transcendentalist or conventionalist) that start with the
assumption of the prior constitution of the subject’s consciousness, and advocate the possibility of reducing meaning to non spatio-temporal entities, (cf. views that derive from the tradition of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, passing through Frege, Husserl). These concepts we assumed come to the fore whenever a period of time is dominated by rationalist or genetic assumptions about the unity of mankind.

In the other camp (Markova’s Hegelian paradigm) we included those philosophies that consider the subject’s consciousness not as given but as unfolding through his social and cultural interaction (cf. Sophists, Romanticists). In contradistinction to the first camp, these consider essence and conventions as merely normative or metaphorical reductions of contingent, and discursive realities. A corollary to their views is the denial of language as a fixed system.

In recent times, the link between translational issues and philosophical ones has continued. Certain central issues of translation such as meaning are undoubtedly deeply philosophical; more so after a link was forged between meaning and truth. However, and interestingly enough, there also philosophers, like Jacques Derrida, who believe not only that translation problems are philosophical, but that the whole historical project of philosophy is translational. They alleged that the perpetual aim of philosophy is to define meaning, to fix its univocality or...to master its plurivocality’ (Derrida 1985: 120). The translation, or as he alternatively calls it ‘the transport of semantic content’ into a new signifying form, is the only way to make it possible (ibid.). According to Derrida, no philosophy can survive without translation, or one concept or another of translatability. Every new philosophy starts from a central concept of meaning that is translated from an older one (Ibid.). Philosophy thus is the permanent translation of the centre of meaning and truth.

However, through its two main divisions, speculative and analytical, philosophy is also directly linked to translation, first through deliberation about the nature and the possibility of translation, and the second by its attempts at the devising categories and criteria of synonymy. Different standards and concepts from other branches of philosophy, such as philosophy of science, are also integrated in general outlooks in relation to translation studies (questions of the scientific status of translation).

This has never been more apparent than from today’s ingenious polemics over the nature of language. In the fields of language philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, or
poetics, one cannot fail to notice traces of old philosophical debates. These debates, though sometimes appearing extreme and unrelated to translation as common practice, surface in translation studies as a final trench of argument in support of one view or another, especially by invoking the thorny issue of translatability.

Therefore, to forestall any accusation of taking this issue for granted, any discussion of translation, we believe, ought at one point or another to attend to certain questions pertaining to the issue of translatability. Without a discussion of translatability many studies of translation are usually accused of starting with presupposed and unsupported assumptions. Despite being a risky undertaking, the presentation of major attitudes towards this issue merits attention not only to avoid such criticism, but also for other reasons such as those related to clarity and lucidity of the ensuing discussion of translation proper.

This chapter will introduce, even if sketchily, some of the current debates surrounding translation and translatability, especially those between the adherents of logical views of meaning (cf. Carnap, Davidson) and relativists (cf. Quine). We will also present some idealist expressionist views of translation as a distinct attitude towards translatability from those of the empiricists. They will be presented as if they were part of one dialogue surrounding this issue.

Our main aim is to demonstrate that these disputes around translatability are insoluble as long as they disregard the social and ideological aspects of language. Many of the discussions of meaning that deny those aspects are likely to end up denying the possibility of translation either by assuming untenable total translatability, or sceptically denying translatability altogether. An implied aim is to pave the way to our discussion of translatability in chapter (7). In that discussion we will assume that translatability poses no serious difficulties for views of meaning if formulated within the dialogic views of language. Only a midway position between these two extreme views can admit translatability.

We are fully aware that any partition of meaning is only methodological and contrived. However, similar classifications are commonplace in the study of meaning and are generally accepted. Alston (1970) divided meaning into three types: referential, meaningful expressions refer to things, ideational, words stand for ideas or concepts, behavioral, meaning is used to invoke responses. Others (cf. Lyons
(1987), Hurford and Heasley (1983)) preferred a dual grouping of meaning into: what language means, and what a speaker means by using language. Similarly Ullman grouped meaning into analytical and operational. It is usually the case that the division of meaning into two components is linguistically oriented while the trichotomous views are philosophically inclined.

We are aware also of the important contributions to the study of language by the ordinary language philosophers, as well as modern structuralism. Their contribution to the study of translation will be included in the functional and communicative aspect of dialogism and translation. The discussion that follows mainly engages some empiricist and metaphysical views of meaning and translation.

4.2. Translation Meaning and Modern analytic Philosophy

A return to logic permeated language studies at the end of 19th century and the beginning of this century. A trend motivated by the realist philosophers’ desire to rid philosophy of idealism, metaphysical obscurantism and vagueness. Vagueness had disrupted the establishment of objective standards for scientific knowledge. The revival of the logical tradition (Aristotelian, Kantian), and Frege’s hostility towards Hegelian psychologistic empiricism, was continued by modern empirical and positivist philosophers. Those philosophers were aided in their quest by major advances in mathematics. Their philosophy embraced a concept of truth that is mainly derived either from, or aided by logic (cf. Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap) (Steiner 1974: 206).

What started as an attempt to develop a rigorous language for natural science eventually developed in the twentieth century into a formal analysis of meaning in natural language. More particularly in Britain (Moore, Russell) philosophy evolved into rejecting Kant’s idea of judgment as being a psychological synthesis (categories of perception with the object of the world) in favour of Frege’s objectivist thought of judgment as being a judgment of objective propositions. As pointed out by Hylton (1993), Moore and Russell, empiricists who assumed direct acquaintance to objects of knowledge, considered propositions to be among real objects with which we have such acquaintance. However, propositions were considered to be accessible to direct
acquaintance only through inferences (non-sensory perceptions), since they are non-spatio-temporal. Since propositions are non-spatio-temporal, the only methods of their approach are intuitional (Cartesian doctrine) (Hylton, 1993: 463).

It was common belief among advocates of logical realism, that if properly analyzed, and if the relationships that hold among them get to be properly defined, propositions could be used to reveal the real content of natural language sentences. Thus attempts were made to define atomic propositions according to which molecular ones can be calculated. For this reason, the philosophical approach initiated by Moore and Russell was named logical atomism. The atomistic approach to knowledge, by assuming the direct acquaintance with individual objects of knowledge, begot the assumption of composability of simpler proposition into larger ones. Gradually this developed into a therapeutic attitude towards composability of meaning of natural language sentences (Ibid. 445-6).

Philosophy then turned its attention to natural language, and language became almost the main interest of philosophical investigations. In language philosophers sought answers to some of the enduring questions of philosophy, by assuming inconsistency in natural language as a principal source of philosophical problems. Problems of philosophy are said to be linguistic in nature (Katz 1985: 1-2). Ryle put this more specifically as a problem of the linguistic meaning of expressions: *The story of twentieth century philosophy is very largely the story of [linguistic] notion of sense or meaning [sic]' (ibid. 2). The judgment by philosophers of natural language as a source of inconsistency in philosophy started a genuine interest in analyzing meaning in natural language, thus affecting, directly or indirectly, the study of translation (Indirectly, through other offspring fields of philosophy such as linguistics or semiotics) Logical semantics, for example, exerts a great influence on modern atomistic views of meaning and translation within modern mainstream linguistics.

The other aspect of the logical study of language is its naturalist inclination to make translation a natural scientific field, an inclination that reverberated in many recent formalist and machine approaches to translation. It is perhaps safe to say that the modern study of meaning in philosophy has been dominated by logical investigation of language (the Cartesian Paradigm). Now we would like to delve more elaborately into the main issues of this approach.
4.2.1 The drift towards logicism, Logical Atomism

As mentioned above, Moore and Russell continued the logical tradition of Frege in considering the objects of knowledge to be independent from the knower's presuppositions of them. Thus, knowledge, to them is direct and unmediated relation between mind and object through *acquaintance*. For example, Moore and Russell thought that we learn the universal terms such as 'red', 'solid', 'sweet', only by acquaintance with particular objects that are red, solid, or sweet, thus deriving from the sense data associated with particular objects their universal qualities. One main rôle of philosophy, to Moore and Russell, is to make real objects such as propositions clearly present to the mind. Then philosophy must reveal their true identity, and inter¬relationships. As to the origin of propositions, they claimed that they need not be postulated as a priori since they are self evident. Ordinary knowledge, meanings in natural language are to be measured according to their fit with experience derived from acts of acquaintance (Hylton, 1993: 455-65).

Russell, in order to account for the knowledge of general and universal terms, tried to link their meaning to acquaintance in an indirect way by distinguishing (cf. Locke) between *knowledge by acquaintance* and *knowledge by description*. The first type of knowledge is a necessary pre-condition to the second as we use knowledge acquired through sense data for the acquisition of the other type of knowledge via description. (Harrison 1988:45). (Acquiring language on the basis of language.)

Following in the steps of Frege, Russell made a distinction between the 'definite description' of an expression (its sense), and the piece of reality denoted by that expression, or its reference (classical description theory). The denotation (extension) of the expression is then linked to its 'ostensive definition' through definite description. Whereas Frege's 'sense' determines its referent, Russell's 'sense' is equivalent to providing an adequate and sufficient description for the identification of the referent to the hearer (Devitt and Sternely 1987: 39).

A name that can successfully identify a referent was to Russell a 'denotative' name. The main task of language according to Russell is the accurate mapping of objects in the real world. Russell tried to revive Leibnitz' dream of identifying a fixed number of universal concepts, by his attempts at specifying 'basic concepts'. Basic concepts
can serve as building blocks for determining descriptions, and in turn form the foundation of knowledge. One of Russell's ultimate aims was also to arrive at a workable method of delimiting atomic concepts according to which logical definitions of expressions can be calculated (Lyons 1977: 61).

Devitt and Sternely (1987) alleged that by linking the sense of a name to its description rather than to the object itself, Russell was able to circumvent some of the difficulties that confronted the classical referential theory. For example, those related to empty terms (terms with no real reference) which Russell presumed as having sense but failing to denote. Russell was also able to claim that identity statements like 'Everest is Gaurisanker' can be explained according to his formulation as an informative statement since the two names in this statement provide different descriptions of the same denoted referent (ibid: 40).

Seen from one side, allowing the same object to be considered from different points of views constituted a point of strength in Russell's views of the relationship between meaning and denotation. Yet, if seen from a different perspective, this move can call into question the reliability of the definite description theory if description for the same phenomenon comes to be unpredictably diverse. If one takes in consideration the claim of the direct mapping between language expressions and objects in the real world, one can query what causes such variation.

To extend the theory of description to account for terms of general kinds of objects, Russell later introduced his theory of natural kinds according to which some features of the world should be generalizable to kinds of objects. The general terms that identify natural kinds, Russell claimed, associate these terms with their natural kinds. The term tiger, for example, associates different descriptions that are required for identifying the species referred to by the general term 'tiger'. The knowledge of these descriptions were assumed to be vital for the speaker in order to be able to identify tigers (Devitt and Sternely: 67). In other words, it may be that Russell considered the mind of the subject to contain knowledge of general terms in the form of general descriptions. Akin to this formulation is the idea that underlies approaches to meaning in linguistics that link the literal meaning of a word to its dictionary definition.

However, as pointed out by Harrison (1982), it was later to be found out that Russell's description theory, despite its initial widespread appeal, suffers also from
other complications. For example, it failed to explain why the tautological statement ‘Everest is Everest’, if we assume that the two token inscriptions of the name ‘Everest’ are associated with different descriptions, can be informative. A similar problem arises in connection with proper names which Russell said to be disguised descriptions. This problem relates more precisely to the nature of the descriptions needed to be attached to those names in order to be applied to their bearers correctly. If we are to translate these names into another language for the first time, will people be able to grasp the referents of these names by means of descriptions attached to them? Would the mere mentioning of necessary descriptions attached to these names be sufficient for the speakers of the new language to identify these names? (48).

Russell’s treatment, as with all attempts to link language directly with reality by assuming that the main function of language is naming, runs into difficulty with opacity. More related to our issue of dialogism is the mechanism by which different people make use of the same set of descriptions to identify and communicate names. Russell needs to explain how different speakers agree on the same descriptions for identifying objects, and how they come to share this knowledge, or bequeath it to their descendants. This issue leaves Russell’s realist views exposed to the criticism of transcendentalists who would like to have a convincing explanation of how it is possible for different isolated consciousnesses in a given community to possess the same knowledge about the set of descriptions sufficient for identifying a name.

However, Russell according to Marková (1982) revived the old Cartesian hope of accounting for knowledge on the base of fewer primary concepts and limited number of axioms. An approach that eventually inspired many atomistic and computational accounts of meaning in psychology and linguistics, especially those to which the hierarchical structure of data is essential (82). Although, some linguistic philosophers like Jerrold Katz claimed atomic concepts involved in forming thoughts and intentions to be not psychological but platonic. Meaning components in conventional language, he insisted, are brought in from non-linguistic thoughts thus separating meaning totally from language. By doing so, he allowed different forms of language to relate to one meaning or vice versa (LePore 1986: 7).

Katz and Fodor tried ‘componential analysis’ of meaning in natural language by following atomistic and hierarchical methods. At the beginning, as is going to be seen
in the next chapter, many translation scholars believed in the utility of ‘componential analysis’ to translation studies. It is interesting also to note that Katz firmly believed in the Effability Hypothesis which advocates that Each proposition can be expressed by some sentence in any natural language (Katz 1978: 209,). By postulating the Effability Hypothesis claimed that whatever can be said can equally be translated. ‘Synonymy relations can be defined generally for sentences of distinct (and the same) natural languages’ [sic] (Ibid.,193).

Russell’s atomistic approach to knowledge as direct and unmediated is antithetical to Hegelian holism. If applied to the study of meaning in language, meaning of single words can be established independently from their relation to other words in language, via the direct description they re-call of extra-linguistic objects. Being of this nature, atomic discrete units of knowledge can be composed (by applying neutral syntactic rules) to form other larger meaning units, and vice versa. Russell also spared no efforts to reduce mathematics to logic and to devise a perfect logical language: a language based on syntax only with no vocabulary (Baker and Hacker 1984: 38). The aim was to develop a universal formal language for science, as it was thought that some basic logical concepts and logical truths are universal.

The atomistic nature of meaning, plus the assumed universality of concepts are two essential assumptions that support the concept of the cross-language equivalence of language expressions. Bearing in mind that logical atomism assumes the possibility of separating the act of knowledge from the object of knowledge, and of reducing the meanings of expressions to timeless descriptions, it also legitimizes a de-contextualized approach to meaning and translation. Logical atomism can be said to be a clear example of a monological approach to knowledge and meaning in that it assumes a purely objective and perspectiveless universal approach to meaning. Such knowledge can be said to be necessary for certain kinds of knowledge where maximal detachment and objectivity is required.

The success with which Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica were able to reduce mathematics to set-theoretic logic gave a lot of credibility to the theory of description in particular, and rejuvenated confidence in the capabilities of logic, a development which later proved to be instrumental to the ensuing development of analytical approaches to language and meaning.
The major developments occasioned by Russell’s development of logic changed not only the course but also the character of that tradition. This was a result of the later revelation by Russell of certain fundamental paradoxes in Frege’s theory of sets. According to this paradox, a set of sets, or a class of classes, cannot be said to be a member of itself; we cannot, for example, say of the class of men that it is a man. These antinomies can result in paradoxes in the logical analysis of statements. It was soon recognized that some of these antinomies are related not to mathematical or logical terms but to terms and their use in natural language (Schaff, 1962: 32-8). The attempt by philosophers and logicians, more notably by Wittgenstein and Tarski, to rid logic of these antinomies led to the important step of separating the language of analysis, ‘meta-language’ from the language under investigation, the ‘object language’. Gradually, natural language has become the main focus of logic as a subject of analysis ‘object language’, mainly in order to isolate what can be true and meaningful from other meaningless metaphysical statements (ibid. 42).

4.2.2. Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory

Early Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), who also believed in the direct relationship between language and the outside world, supposed that language’s main essence and major function is to describe faithfully states of affairs in this world. In what came to be known as the ‘picture theory’, Wittgenstein supposed that language should mirror reality as fully as a picture of that reality does. Thus, logic if necessary should try to rid philosophical language of distorted pictures that can stand in the way of accurate representation of reality.

Wittgenstein claimed that for language to be expressive at all, it must have a logical representation of some kind which can be followed. Laws of language, which arbitrarily and only conventionally correspond to reality, must be strictly correspondent to the reality that language represents. The logical laws and logical syntax, following this fact must also be conventional. Each language has its own symbolic logic that corresponds in a particular way to reality outside. Thus, logic is to investigate rather than ameliorate the structure of natural language. Natural language is to be investigated as any other symbolic system.

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Logic, to early Wittgenstein, ought to seek not the relation between abstract entities, as thought by Frege, nor to investigate the psychological laws of thinking, as assumed by Neo-Kantians; instead, logic to Wittgenstein should investigate the conditions under which any symbolic representation becomes possible, what logic underlies the symbolic representation, and how is it possible for different structures, despite their being distinct, to stand in a similar representational relation to a given fact, their common logicality (Baker and Hacker, 1984: 39).

To arrive at describing this logicality we need to isolate and define its basic categories. Since our aim is exact depiction of the world, then we should start by isolating the atomic facts necessary for such a task by isolating elementary propositions corresponding to them. Wittgenstein tried to define elementary propositions, an idea procured from Russell’s logical atomism, as facts that can stand on their own, the existence of one never requires, or excludes the existence of another. Wittgenstein then judged that the totality of atomic facts in the real world, and those of propositions expressible in a language must be co-extensive. By relying on ‘elementary propositions’ to form larger representations of the world by the medium of logic, Wittgenstein tried to show how language can succeed in its representation of the world. However, early Wittgenstein did not take in account what perspective a description can adopt. How it is possible for different languages to depict the same reality not only by means of different linguistic conventions, but also different cognitive perspectives?

Wittgenstein who thought that logic is intrinsic to thought so that it is impossible to formulate an illogical thought, claimed logic to be ‘a priori’ in the sense that logical language was considered by him to be true by the virtue of its own structure (ibid. 68). A complete logical investigation of language should also reveal the limits of thought as well as the limits of the world represented by this language. He drew the conclusion that the limit of the world is the limit of the language through which this world is understood (Ibid). In other words, our world can not go beyond what we can describe in our language.

Logic and philosophy according to scholars (cf. Apel (1993), took a ‘linguistic turn’ with the appearance of Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’. According to Apel, Wittgenstein turned Kant’s a priori condition of knowledge into a linguistic one, by
declaring that it is not possible to describe a fact or a phenomenologically given experience, corresponding to a sentence in language, without repeating that same sentence (35). As Apel succinctly put it, Wittgenstein when speaking about language being a priori to experience, did not speak of subjective consciousness of that experience, but about the possibility of inter-subjectively interpreting or speaking about this experience. This view of a transcendental nature also continued with Wittgenstein in his later writing and formed one of his arguments against the possibility of private language. Bakhtin articulated a similar idea about the priority of social linguistic expression over the individual experience.

However, natural language, despite being in logical order, is to Wittgenstein, inconsistent in the way it depicts the world because it uses different modes of signification than that of logical language. In other words, Wittgenstein separated the internal consistency of natural language from its relationship with the extra-linguistic world. The logic of language is therefore, even if conventionally being good logic in the way it represents reality, may sometimes inadequately describe states of affairs in the world in so far as it can give inaccurate pictures of them (Dixon 1965: 66).

The important fact about logical language’s representation of the world is the fit, or one-to-one correspondence between that language expressions and atomic facts, something lacking for natural language. Therefore, Wittgenstein advocated the use of specially devised sign language that has its own grammar and its own symbols for analysis of natural language (ibid 68). He proposed for this purpose a logical language with a logical syntax. Definitions and correspondence rules are to serve the purpose of translation from this language to an object language, and vice versa. Thus it can be said that Wittgenstein in his early work brought the investigation of the logic and syntax of natural language to the forefront initiating, by doing so, the therapeutic approach to natural language. (This concept of translatability, as will be shown, proved to be problematic, and criticism directed against it was generalised to ordinary practice of translation).

To Wittgenstein the truth of a sentence is established on the basis of its being true according to the systematic laws of the language itself i.e., conventionally (The logical necessity of language is not platonc nor psychological but conventional). However, this system has a definite relation to reality. If a speaker knows the elementary
propositions of a language and their mode of combination, then he can grasp, or even predict, the possible state of affairs depicted by these propositions. Therefore, it can be said that to Wittgenstein, the knowledge of a language is equal to knowledge of its logic.

Because the knowledge of a language is equal to that of its logic and the sum of propositions included in that language, Wittgenstein claimed that this is how we come to understand sentences when we hear them for the first time. Moreover, he deduced as a corollary conclusion to this claim the priority of philosophy over science. The philosopher’s task is to formulate sound statements about possible state of affairs in the world which can later be verified through science.

Wittgenstein’s powerful re-orientation of logic towards the investigation of language, and the resulting separation of logic from direct analysis of the real world, is of great importance to the ensuing development of analytical philosophy. Many scholars (cf. Harrison (1988), Baker and Hacker(1984), Dixon (1965)) thought that following Wittgenstein, philosophy turned to language and it became accepted that the task of philosophy is the analysis of statements.

One of early Wittgenstein’s main contributions to the development of logic is related to the new definition he gave to logical constants (connectives, quantifiers etc.). Wittgenstein pointed out that Frege was incorrect about taking them to be representative, as denoting concepts or relations. He (i.e., Wittgenstein), thought of them as logical operators for constructing and defining logical truths of complex statements from atomic propositions. He then introduced the first tables for calculating truth conditions according to logical constants. For example ‘p & q’ is true if p is true and q is true; ‘p ∨ q’ is true if p is true or q is true. In addition to those two he suggested the operators ‘→’ for implication, and ‘∼’ for negation (Baker and Hacker 1984:41-2).

Despite the attempt of Wittgenstein in the ‘Tractatus’ to prove the autonomy of language as a perfect logical system with internal consistency, this autonomy, to him, was not absolute, as is clear from his claim that the total combinations in language are also mirror image of all possible combinations in the empirical world. The problem though remains about how to relate them. Harrison (1988) summarised some of the difficulties concerning establishing the relationship between Wittgenstein’s two realms.
According to Harrison, apart from simple signs (names) standing for simple objects in the world, Wittgenstein's dualistic views risk sliding into representing the world as a purely symbolic construct dependent accordingly, not on the real world, but on the possible combinations of the symbols that represent the world.

Another difficulty with this formulation is that, i) if names relate to objects characterizable by their potential combination with other objects to form state of affairs, and ii) because in every new formation (a states of affairs) there stands a new sense for the name in a new or possible proposition, iii) then defining these objects (names) or their contribution to propositions will prove to be difficult, since we always need one to account for the other. For example we need conventional propositions in order to communicate or speak of states of affairs that we claim those propositions correspond to, and are procreated from. However, Wittgenstein chose to define real objects, not in themselves as expected, but, conceptually by postulating logical a priori simple (atomic) propositions corresponding to them (propositions that cannot possibly be found in relation to, or in contradiction with each other). He later abandoned these because many claimed atomic propositions were found to be interrelated. Nonetheless, even though Wittgenstein emphasised the link between linguistic expressions and reality, it is always the characterization of this relation that seems problematic (Harrison 1988: 223-6), a problem that seems to be inherent in most of the autonomous views of language.

Wittgenstein's claim also implies that the actual or material world outside exists only in the state depicted by language, that there is a possible match between the categories of a statement in language and corresponding objects existing in the world. This presumption is obviously hard to maintain if we assume that things existing in the outside world, at least material things, exist in a continuity that does not correspond with language categories (Schaff 1962: 324). We may take this point further by saying that there is nothing in the structure of reality that corresponds to the structure of language (conventions or grammar etc.). However, later Wittgenstein abandoned these views in favour of other views that considered concepts of natural language to be fuzzy in nature, and claimed language to be related to reality by means of language games.
Some philosophers of science (cf. Nancy Cartwright) are more in favour of late Wittgenstein's views. Cartwright pointed out that the outside world is to a certain extent fuzzy and variable. 'We construct both the theories and the objects (experiments in Cartwright's sense) to which they apply, then match them piecemeal onto real situations' she said (O'Hear 1989: 129). The theoretical precision of the laws and theories in science are results of a complicated practice of 'idealizations, approximations and simplifications', that do not correspond in an unproblematic way to the interconnected and messy state of affairs in the actual world (O'Hear 1989: 127-8). It may be the case that Wittgenstein's 'basic propositions' do not correspond to atomic realities but rather to the idealization and simplifications of these realities as mentioned by Cartwright.

Conceivably, some of the more interesting points in the Tractatus can be related to language studies, such as its emphasis on the concept of creativity stressing thus the capability of the speaker to produce and interpret statements unheard of before. This concept of creativity testifies to the representation of meaning in language as an inter-subjective medium, circumventing the other concept of creativity, held by the 19th century Romanticists, which saw creativity as a unique product of the subject's mind. It allows for meaning to be perceived as partially determinate: some thing which can be read off rather than read in the statements of language (Harrison, 1988: 220). Without such perception, translation is impossible, as there would nothing in language for translation to recover or transfer. For our purpose in this thesis, Wittgenstein's stance, if some what extreme, testifies to the existence of meaning outside the subject, i.e., on the social (objective or inter-subjective) plane, thus making inter-subjective communication a possibility that renders viable the question of translation.

M. Pêcheux (1982) pointed out that there is an implicit acknowledgment of the existence of a system or another type of organization (norms, conventions) in the very heart of any concept of creativity; creativity needs a system to transgress or surpass by the mere virtue of its being a creativity. Moreover, creativity, in order to be abducted must come about as according to some rules or conventions that can mark off this creativity from other meaningless co-occurrence of elements in a sentence or proposition.
Many scholars, among them Bakhtin, preferred to understand the outside world in a broad enough manner as one that encompasses social, cultural as well as psychological realities, i.e., to include sentences and propositions that might be considered nonsensical in Wittgenstein’s restricted definition of reality. If we broaden Wittgenstein’s concept of extra-linguistic world, to include cultural and ideological realities, and allow for perspectival vision of the real world, then we would be forced to see the relation of language to the world not as pictorial but dialogical. The dualism of language and reality is the natural consequence of views that claim direct relationship between the two realms. Dialogism constitutes, in our opinion, a credible forging power that can avoid such dualism. An approach that tried to avoid the historic dialogical relationship between language and reality, and that was influenced by early Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the logical positivist’s. Their views, as we are going to show, represent an exemplary case of reductionist (monological) approach.

4.2.3. Verificationalism

Logical positivists (alternatively called neo-positivists, logical empiricists, Vienna Circle) are a group of philosophers, scientists and mathematicians formed in Vienna in 1930 and included M. Schlick, R. Carnap, A. J. Ayer, among others. They constructed their views around certain assumptions of early Wittgenstein. By taking the latter views to their extreme, they believed that the real world is approachable only through conceptual schemes as represented by different languages. Therefore, they declared that the object of philosophical analysis is language and nothing else. For example, Ayer, declared that they were not ‘concerned about things in themselves but rather about how we speak about them’ (Dixon 1965: 68).

Logical positivists took it upon themselves to rid language of metaphysical defects resulting from the use of general, and contentless expressions. Carnap, one of the most influential positivists, gave the following quotation from a Heideggerian discourse as an example of metaphysical meaningless language:

What is to be investigated is being only and-nothing else; being alone and further-nothing; solely being and beyond being, -nothing. What about this nothing? ...Does the nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the negation exists?.... Where do we seek
the nothing? how do we find the nothing...We know the nothing... anxiety reveals the nothing... (Devitt and Sternely 1989:189).

Positivists made a clear distinction between meaning and truth: the first is the subject-matter of philosophy; the second is the concern of physical science. Logic is the tool for addressing meaning, scientific empirical verification is the means of finding out physical truths. In what concerned language, they assumed that meanings themselves are ineffable and that they are only verifiable either by direct experience or by logical reasoning, (the principle of verification). According to Ayer, a sentence is factually significant to a given person if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to describe (Lyons: 1981: 105). In another version it was assumed that ‘the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification’ Harrison 1988: 67). Only one type of truth was considered self-verifying, because, according to logical positivists, they do not depend for their truth on empirical criteria, those are the tautological truths of logical and mathematical statements. Their truth can only be verified analytically (ibid.72).

Logical positivists thought possible the purification of natural language from all traces of metaphysics by subjecting it to formal analysis. What cannot be logically proven or scientifically verified was considered a metaphysical nonsense (Baker and Hacker 1984: 145). All other sciences such as sociology, history, sociology are subject to the same standards of exactitude as those of logic and physics. For example, instead of studying logic by looking into psychological processes, the logical positivist took the issue the other way round by subjecting psychological statements to logic.

In a series of writings attempted to practically put to work the main thesis of positivism, Carnap, In Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) tried to generate all the highly theoretical statement from simpler ones, ones that correspond to the atomic facts of the immediate ostensive experience. In the Logical Syntax of Language (1948) he outlined a theory of logical syntax, a syntax devised to thwart the generation of what he called Pseudo-statements, statements with acceptable grammatical form but devoid of cognitive meaning. Because the grammatical syntax is inadequate, the study of language, according to Carnap, should be performed by a higher structured language he named pure syntax. Pure syntax provides logical rules of language
formation, as opposed to descriptive syntax pertaining to ‘objective’ problem under discussion. A host of purely formal syntactic and semantic formulations such as deducibility, entailment etc. were supposed to account for the correct syntactic relations among sentences by ruling out any pseudo-syntactical structure. His proposal was a clear attempt to formalise natural language structure by reducing it to logical structures and logical axioms (Katz 1966 Ch. 3.).

It was also assumed that by concentrating on syntax and logical concepts, after doing away with emotive or connotational meanings, natural language statements would eventually be reducible to logical axioms in order to account for their constructive relations (Baker and Hacker 1984:126-7). This is implied that the speakers knowledge of language consists of invariant formal categories plus consistent formal syntactic rules. These rules recursively apply every time these categories are used in larger constructions. Emotive aspects of meaning are contingent to variable contexts and thus unimportant. (The idea of a logical deep structure of sentences with a fixed semantic representation assumed by Chomsky’s transformational grammar was supported by similar assumptions).

Broadly speaking, verificationism, especially in its strong form (which equates meaning with the method of its verification), was found by many philosophers to be unacceptable and hard to apply. Many scholars (cf.Harrison (1988); Lyons (1981) explained that the principle itself, if applied to itself, is unverifiable. This principle cast out most of natural language sentences as meaningless. We can, accordingly, include as meaningless all natural language sentences that do not describe empirical material states of affair, or those that do not comply with laws of logic.

However, the strong form of verificationism conceals a paradox in the very idea of verification, as it seems necessary in order to determine the methods of verification, to know what that sentence or proposition means. Moreover, the problem of defining the methods or proofs is controversial, and was a matter for dispute among positivists themselves. While Schlick (cf. Tarski) thought that statements relate to reality by direct correspondence (external verification), others (cf. Neurath) assumed that verification ought to be by a statement’s coherence with other statements (internal verification) (Davidson 1986: 321).
The relationship involved as shown by many scholars (cf. Bakhtin, late Wittgenstein) is not the absurd one of direct relationships between linguistic expressions (qua linguistic expressions) and the outside world, but rather one between the users of those expressions and outside realities. Such plain facts can be sidestepped only by totally disregarding the relationship between language and speech. In addition, another logical consequence of assuming extreme conventionality of language is to portray them as inpenetrable monads that are unable to inter-communicate.

Tarski and some other scholars have rejected the radical version of positivism that seeks to reduce reality to logically consistent statements. Russell, for example, castigated the logical positivist concept of language and the idea of ‘protocol propositions’ by saying:

*When I say ‘the sun is shining’, I do not mean that this is one of a number of sentences between which there is no contradiction;...., the purpose of words, though philosophers seem to forget this simple fact is to deal with matter other than words. If I go into a restaurant and order my dinner, I do not want my words to fit in a system of other words, but to bring about the presence of food.*

(Schaff 1962: 75).

However, and as seen above, the attempts at defining truth in language either by direct correspondence to the outside world (Frege, Russell), or by appealing to coherence with internal logical truths (Positivism), were not without drawbacks.

Before we go on to the semantic approach to synonymy and translation, we want to mention an important contribution to the formal approach to language made by Tarski (1956). Tarski’s aim was to resolve some of antimonies (Russell’s antimonies as mentioned above) resulting from logical categories inclusion in the same language as the objects to which they apply. As we are going to see below Tarski’s phenomenalist criterion for establishing the truth of a statement will be crucial for Carnap’s *protokolosatz*, and Davidson’s theory of *Radical Interpretation*.

Tarski introduced a new and important concept of truth that relates truth to states of affairs that actually exist in the world that the statement purports to describe. The truths of atomic propositions are said to be dependent on the existence of realities according to which they can be said to be true. The conditions for these truths should
be stated in appropriate meta-language statements and separately from the object language.

Truths are no longer derived solely from the logical content of well formed formulae but from the statement's 'correspondence' to reality. This correspondence was made more clear by Tarski's famous doctrine of 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. The quoted proposition is a proposition of the object language, while the other is of the meta-language. The predicate in 'p', the object language is a function of the predicate in 'q' i.e., the meta-language. The truth of the first is checked by the truth of the second, as it is the predicate but not its function that is verified by correspondence with a state of affairs denoted by the predicate. Thus if we have the sentence 'A is a true statement' we can judge the truth value of this statement by saying that 'A is a true statement' is false, without them being contradictory. The whole statement that contains the two parts is called a T-sentence (Lyon 1987: 168).

T-sentences help to abstract from empirical truths in the object language to the epistemological truths in the logical language. In a sense a translational process is hypothesized between the two. This idea helped to secure the desired separation between 'what is said in language' and 'what is said about language' (Lyons 1987: 168-69). Truth-tables of statements were analyzed first in the rigorous structure of formal language, and then assigned recursively to statements of natural language by the means of T-sentences.

4.2.4. The Advent of Modern Formal Semantics

Our aim so far in this chapter is to present the evolution of the formalist approach to meaning in part to disclose the philosophical assumptions that underpin this approach, and in other part in order to pave the way to the discussion of translatability that ensued from controversies surrounding this approach. The formalist approach has also found a fertile soil in the formal linguistic approaches to translation as well as in projects of machine translation.

In Carnap's 'Logical Syntax of Language', logic was solely concerned with syntax, relations between formulae and the methods of deriving new from old ones
(transformations) using logical truth tables as devised by Wittgenstein. However, by adopting Tarski's definition of truth, Carnap embarked on a more ambitious aim of devising a complete semantic system that is capable of accounting objectively for cognitive meaning in natural language.

In 'Meaning and Necessity' and 'Introduction to Semantics' Carnap tried to put together a comprehensive semantic theory of natural language by postulating three types of rules: (i) 'rules of formation' corresponding to old syntactic rules; (ii) 'rules of designation', linking expressions to their reference; (iii) 'rules of truth', to account for the truth of statements on the basis of the truth of their constituents. By means of these rules, he saw the possibility of developing a logical language that has the capacity of representing the world by employing a sufficient number of well formed atomic or basic sentences which correspond, by either confirming or negating, possible state-descriptions. These basic sentences formed what Lyons (1987) calls 'basic pairs', 162).

By assuming that the universe ultimately consists of a set of individuals, as well as an infinite set of predicates a possible state-description is obtainable by a combination of atomic sentences that assigns these predicates to individuals. Any new state description contains a single value of every basic proposition, i.e., corresponds to a possible state of the universe. 'The semantic content of a proposition can be defined as the class of state descriptions it eliminates' (ibid.162).

A state description is the logical equivalent of the notion of possible world; it is the internal representation of a possible external one. The meaning of a sentence is determined internally by the meaning of its constituents and according to its structure in relation to language L, and its truth value to the truth established by the sense relations it bears in every state description.

The truth a sentence bears in form of sense relations alone is its necessary truth, a truth that is defined logically by the third type of rules (rules of truth) with respect to this language. Sense relations among sentences are calculated by formulated rules among their propositions; these rules are called 'Meaning-Postulates'. Meaning postulates serve two related purposes, one is the restriction of the number of possible state descriptions; second, they help interpret these state descriptions by revealing their inter-relationships.
Carnap’s concept of state description is language relative: the number of possible worlds is conditioned by the ‘richness’ of this language rather than states in the actual world. Meaning-Postulates help to calculate, by using logical deductive methods, such meaning relations as synonymy, hyponymy or antonymy and other paradigmatic relations among predicates of a language. Thus they play a crucial rôle in defining concepts for the semantics of language. Indirectly, they also place syntagmatic restrictions on the choice of subjects for predicates as well as the co-occurrences of predicates in a possible state description.

In order to help calculate the modality of sentences, Carnap introduces, analogous to Frege’s concepts of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, two corresponding concepts of meaning for a given expression. Its ‘extension’ is the set of objects of which it can be predicated, and its ‘intension’ is the concept or the property it denotes. The word blue has the extension of the class of all the blue objects. Its intension is the property of being blue or in other words ‘blueness’ (Carnap 1969: 504-5). Whereas the intension of an expression is its meaning, its extension is the application of this meaning to objects in the world. The intension of a sentence, which equals this sentence’s propositional content, is what determines the conditions under which it can be said to be true. The extension of a sentence is said to be its truth-value in a given time.

The intension of a proposition is the distribution of its truth values in all possible worlds. Unlike Frege’s sense, Carnap’s concept of intension is determined objectively and is constant in all contexts or possible worlds. In a sense Carnap reverses Frege’s priorities by taking ‘intension’ or sense to be stable and necessary and considering ‘extension’ (applicability of ‘intension’ to an individual or class of subject (referent)) to be contingent. Thus the expressions ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’ are extensionally equivalent because they can replace one another without changing the truth value of the sentence, however, they cannot be said to be intensionally equivalent because they do not denote, with respect to their internal relations in \( L \), the same state descriptions. Thus, instead of trying to link language to reality, Carnap, unlike Frege, sought reality in language (Wunderlich 1979: 206-9).

The concept of intension was vital for Carnap’s semantic explication of meaning. Intensions as purely semantic concepts can pose as explicata for meaning of expressions in \( L \). Semantic rules would recursively assign intension as functions to
given expressions every time they are used, providing an explanation for the
intuitional meaning for the speaker of \( L \) (Ibid).

Carnap resuscitated the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic
statements by taking intensional relations to be analytic ones, i.e., ‘a sentence is
analytic if it is true by the virtue of the intensions of its expressions’ (Carnap, ibid).
A statement is synthetic if its truth is dependent on its extension in the actual world.
The construction of the analytical language system is the domain of semantics, Pure
semantics. Pure semantics is independent of any given language and is decided only
by formal logical means. The analysis of any historically given natural language is not
solely dependent on analytical truths, therefore, is considered as part of descriptive
semantics, a branch of pragmatics.

Despite showing more interest in semantics, Carnap acknowledged the importance
of pragmatics. In his view, intensions or the designative meaning of expressions is
their form that may serve as explicata for their pragmatic meaning. He excluded from
semantics two aspects of meaning; the first is the contextual meaning related to the
process of ascribing intensions to objects in a given situational; the second is the
psychological effect of meaning, the ‘emotive meaning’.

The strict separation of cognitive or factual meaning from emotive or connotative
meanings was one of the main contributions of the logical positivists to the study of
meaning. This distinction proved important for the future investigation of meaning
within linguistic schools that assumed the semantic competence of the speaker to be
truth conditionally determined, as well as in certain schools of language use such as
speech act theories as a way for determining locutionary meaning. The separation of
semantics from pragmatics in linguistics, or the distinction between locutionary and
illocutionary meanings in Austin’s speech act theory, adopted strategies similar to
Carnap’s, in separating language from speech, and meaning from use.

In relation to translation the logical positivists placed translation at the heart of the
modern philosophical enterprise, but with different aims and interpretations. At the
centre of their ‘monistic’ philosophy, a form of exact translation plays the rôle of
reducing observable statements to analytical synonymous counterparts. For example,
translation, for Carnap and other logicians as well, serves a methodological purpose;
that of securing passage from one language (object language), which is usually a
natural

language, to

reduction of
Two

a

better defined

one

(meta-language). In other words, the

empirically given sentences to semantic

expressions

are

said to be semantically

or

conceptual

equivalent if they apply extensionally to the
concerned
one

if and only if they

synonymous,

replace each other salva veritate in all possible worlds. They
same

ones.

be pragmatically

can

object. Thus analysis will be

only with the formal (forms) aspect of language and less

with the factual

so

(content).

Formal semantics has embraced synonymy
in its

and translation

as two

central concepts

methodology of calculating meaning and the construction of logical axioms,

emphasising the inter-relation between them. If

one accepts synonymy as a

fact of

logic, and the reducibility of meaning of natural language's expressions to logical
counterparts, the elucidation of cognitive meaning of concepts and their structural
relation becomes
circumscribed
synonymy

un-problematic, and

so

becomes intra-lingual translation. It will be

by finding and matching equivalent

synonyms.

The -acceptance of

entails the acceptance of the possibility of identifying meanings, and

accordingly implies the possibility of consummate translatability. This also should
enforce the prospect
definable in different
seen as

languages and cross-language transference of meaning

can

be

feasible.

It is this concept

concept

of rigorous inter-lingual translation, since concepts will be

of translation that, despite being different from the

of translation,

came

to

influence

particularly those emphasizing the notion of

some

common

later translation views,

synonymy.

more

Analytical approaches to

translation, whether those who base meaning on platonic essence, or logical tautology,
were

the main

inspirations for concepts of cross-language

modified concept

synonymy, or

the

more

of equivalence.

However, the positivist contribution to the study of meaning, whether directly or

indirectly, is of great relevance to modern studies of meaning and translation. It has
raised the
idea of
gave an

hopes of revealing language systems, whether syntactic

studying meaning by semantic

means,

or

semantic. The

and of separating linguistic meaning

initial euphoric feeling that most of the problems of translation finally have

viable solutions. In

a

memorandum written in 1949, Warren Weaver had his

machine translation stated

as

follows:

128

case

for


one naturally wonders whether translation could conceivably be treated as a problem of cryptography. When I look at an article in Russian, I say: ‘This is really written in English, but it has been coded in some strange symbols. I will now proceed to decode.

(Kelly 1981: 35).

However, there were many scholars who expressed reservations towards the positivist’s concepts of synonymy and translation. Werner (1969), for example, challenged this assumption mainly on two grounds. One is a practical objection, according to which Winter claimed that it is not sufficient to postulate synonymy as a means of inter-lingual translation without practically demonstrating how it is obtainable. Synonymy, he pointed out, is not a sufficient translational criterion; since translation should concern itself not only with equivalence but also ‘equipollence’ of terms, that is, their ‘equal power’ of expression. He then claimed that ‘Translations transform as well as transfer, with some factors [of meaning] must be sacrificed for others’ (461). The second ground is his belief that a search for exactly the same meanings in another language is ‘from the outset doomed to fail’. A translator, he explained is like an artist who wants to duplicate a marble statue but does not have marble; his end product in any other material, aided by whatever skill, even if it outclasses the original, will never preserve it totally (477).

Winter gave an example of how even simple words can be mistaken as having exactly the same meaning. One of the sort generally called faux amis, ‘father’, ‘Vater’, ‘pere’, is our best chance of finding cross-language synonymy. No living person is without a father. Fathership is a straightforward biological relationship; however, he claimed, in the American Indian language Mohave, the word ‘father’ has two mutually exclusive meanings, one is the father of a male referent, the other is ‘the father of a female referent. Winter offered many other examples of this sort, as well as syntactic and phonological examples to challenge the assumption of the possibility of translating by means of synonymy (481-9). (The issue of synonymy and the related problem of equivalence will be revisited in the last chapter where some actual data will be discussed.)

Logical empiricists have gone to the extreme of attempting to reduce natural language to logical language and the meaning of natural language expressions to
logical notations. However, the two are different in origin, nature and function. Backer and Haker (1984) demonstrated the dissimilarity of natural and logical language by showing how the two different connectives of natural language, 'and' and 'but' are treated as one in logic. They also pointed out that the logical connective 'and' in natural language can have as many as eight meanings, of which the sentences: 'She washed and dried up'; 'He was eager and skilful'; 'Give me some money and I will help you to escape', are examples. They claimed that in logic we cannot distinguish between these and other meanings of 'and' (173).

Putnam (1978) on the other hand, considered intentions to be of a stereo-typical nature, determined by social agreement. He believed that our language is partly psychological and partly social, that a great deal of our language comes from our interacting with others. Our intensional knowledge of the things is not the same for every one. A specialized botanist will know about trees more than a lay person. Putnam went even to the extent of denying that intentions can always and alone determine extensions. The word water can name the liquid on earth known as H2O, but also it is possible to hypothesize another planet that has the another liquid, that is called water, but has a different chemical composition, say XYZ. When the inhabitants of the two planets exchange visits they will apply their word water to name the other's liquid regardless of the extensional differences between the two, as the two liquids are not the same (61-63). Extension of the term is not fixed by what the individual speaker has in the head...extension is in general, determined socially [emphasis added] (Ibid 72).

Some other scholars criticised the concept of truth on which the notion of intension is based for being intentionally unclear. William James, for example, claimed that the relation 'true of' and the way it is used by the positivists' philosophy does not mediate between ontologically uniform entities, thus, it cannot be claimed to clarify any scientific relation. The relationship between mind and world cannot be summarized by this simplified relation. Dewey, following James, postulated a third constitutive relational realm, that is not an idea nor the thing itself, but an entity that can mediate the two, and by which the knowledge of the world can represented. Something that relates 'organism' with the 'environment' in stable and intelligible way, something like mind or language (Rorty 1986: 338).
Meanwhile M. Dummett claimed that the concept of truth is itself unclear, since it has not been settled as yet whether truth is an objective concept i.e., a property of propositions (realist) or whether it is related to cognition and methods of verification (positivist anti-realist stand) (Baker & Hacker 1984: 155).

Davidson (1984) cited Alfred Tarski dismissing the possibility of obtaining a concept of truth that is at once ‘in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language’. Tarski, thought that ‘the concept of truth (as well as other semantic concepts) when applied to natural colloquial language....leads inevitably to confusions and contradictions’ (Tarski in Davidson 1984: 28).

It is from such awareness of the impossibility of defining objective truth that Bakhtin insists on its dialogic nature. Truth to Bakhtin exists only in relationship to the one who believes in that truth, and the perspective from which this truth is perceived. Even truths of physical sciences can be seen as absolute only as truths that exist among things in themselves (in the Kantian sense), totally independent from our cognition of them, or the language in which we describe them. The moment we put this truth in words (language statements for example) it becomes adulterated and can no more be spoken of as objective. There is always a given position in space and time in which an observer observes or a logician meditates vis-a-vis his data.

Therefore, to Bakhtin, some truths can be taken as more constant and less disputable than others; instead of speaking of them as objective, he chose to speak of them as monological. Logic and mathematical truths are another example of monological truths. They are hypothesized as relations among abstract reified entities; these entities are identical with themselves in every occurrence in all contexts, therefore may be de-contextualized. Thus, any system of signs that includes these truths might be fully translatable (reduced) to another system that can possibly preserve the same relations. However, the moment any sign or a statement is used to represent a statement about realities external to that system, they become a point of view and acquire the perspective of the one using them, in other words they become dialogical. The total reduction of dialogical truths, such as truths expressed in natural language, to another sign system would not be possible (see 1.5 above). The truth of these statements would be said to represent one perspective of many perspectives of looking at things (Bakhtin 1986: 138-43).
Similar qualms about the logical empiricist formulation of meaning and translation were strongly put forth by Quine and his well-known concept of the indeterminacy of translation. Bakhtin and Quine can be said to have a great deal in common in their pragmatic approach to knowledge and the antagonistic attitude towards the reductionist program of positivism. They also strike a similar note of accord in what concerns the rejection of any concept of absolute or final truth. Yet, Bakhtin, as we are going to show, does not share the extreme scepticism of Quine by taking meaning to be objectively shared by members of the speech community. Quine’s views are significant because they are widely entertained as an antithesis of most of the views that uphold translatability between languages.

Quine, in casting doubt on the possibility of fixed and determined translation, saw a passageway to attacking the edifice of analytic philosophy. Meanwhile the logical positivists were placed, in face of this criticism, in a position where they had to defend not only the possibility of translation, but also other issues such as issues relating to delineation of meaning, synonymy, analyticity etc.

4.3. Indeterminacy of Meaning and Translation

In the Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine, aware of the centrality of ‘analyticity’ and ‘semantic rules’ to the positivist’s philosophy, tried to attack their linguistic programme, by repudiating what he claimed to be the two doctrines (dogmas) of empiricism: the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, analyticity; and the possibility of reducing each meaningful statement to an equivalent logical one via semantic rules, reductionism. Without them, he assumed, the empirical approach to meaning is unsupportable.

Quine raised little objection to the logical truths as in ‘No married man is unmarried’ (the first type of analytical statements), simply because they are trivially true. Instead, he directed most of his criticism at the second type of analytical truths that depends on a concept of synonymy, such as in Carnap’s example of ‘No bachelor is unmarried’. Quine rejected the latter statement’s analyticity because it depends on a concept of reducing it to the former via an assumed synonymy of the two terms: ‘unmarried’ and ‘bachelor’ (398-99)).
Quine, queried the way synonymy is achieved, by demonstrating the impossibility of ever devising a definite criterion for defining synonymous terms, thus putting the analytic/synthetic distinction under suspicion. Thus he undertook refuting the positivist's criteria of synonymy one after the other.

Quine started by pointing out that we cannot assume the synonymity of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' by relying on 'definition' (as in the case of reducing one formal notation to another equivalent one) because in this case definition are obtainable only through reports on usage. In this case definitions report rather than explain synonymy. Therefore, another explanation of synonymy must be provided. Quine alleged that we can not define synonymy (as bachelor and unmarried man) by relying on statements of meaning either, because such statements are devised by assuming prior synonymous terms. Quine maintained that what is needed is the explication of synonymy as a phenomenon. Explication, as a form of ascertaining the definition, is only possible by means of improving or adding to the meaning of expressions under discussion.

Quine seized on the distinction made by positivists between meaning and truth to show that synonymy and analyticity can not be properly defined by appealing to either one. Appealing to reference of single terms risks taking Scott and the author of Waverley to be synonymous, whereas using extension of general terms as the criterion will result in the two terms creatures with kidneys and creatures with hearts to be synonymous, which is obviously not the case since they are cognitively different.

If in another account, interchangeability salva veritate in all contexts, poetic and emotional context aside, as a criterion of synonymity should include a stronger 'bi-condition' on this interchangeability, this stricter bi-condition makes it necessary for the two expressions in question to be interchangeable salva veritate in all possible contexts (possible worlds), resulting in statements such as necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors. Placing similar 'bi-condition' on a statement of the form 'necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men', will render it as analytic. This is obviously not possible since not all unmarried people are bachelors, for example.

Besides, the interchangeability salva veritate is relative to the richness of the language concerned, and takes for granted that all languages analyzed have an adverb that is synonymous to the English adverb 'necessarily'. But, how is it possible to
define analyticity for a language that lacks such an adverb? Still, we need also to specify the extension of the adverb ‘necessarily’. This, according to Quine, is inconceivable without appeal to a prior concept of analyticity. Quine by posing such questions had in mind the demonstration of the circularity of the analytic/synthetic argument. Moreover, and to make matters even more difficult, Quine claimed that there are no satisfactory guarantees, that the extensional agreement or interchangeability of the two terms, is not a result of experiential coincidence, and nothing more (404-6).

Quine continued his evaluation of the logical empiricist’s programme by questioning the issue of ‘semantic rules’. Semantic rules or the correlations that serve to reduce natural language meanings to logical ones are to Quine nothing more than translational rules proper. To him any discussion of one language must be by means of another, and would require a translational process linking the two. However, he noticed that we can ultimately reduce one language to another, or even to a third but this would not be sufficient to explain what analyticity is. We cannot say that a statement is analytic according to a semantic rule if we do not know what is meant by the word ‘analytic’. It is possible to use rules to define meaning and analyticity only if we know what they are. Thus it becomes evident that the concept of ‘semantic rule’ is, like that of ‘meaning’, assumed rather than defined (409).

We cannot state the truth of a statement by appealing to conventional rules only because the truth of statements is dependent on what the situation in the real world is like. Brutus killed Caesar would be false had the world been otherwise. Truth is also dependent on linguistic conventions, because the same statement would be false if the words Brutus, and killed did not mean what they meant. In other words the truth of statements is dependent on linguistic convention and the situation in the outside world and cannot be reduced to either one (409).

After repudiating the concept of analyticity that ensues from the reduction of empirical statements to equivalent logical ones, Quine turned to the concepts of analyticity that result from empirical verification, or radical reduction to immediate experience. This requires that every term in a statement be reduced to some sense datum. This doctrine, according to Quine, remains unclear, since we are unable to tell that the sense datum refer to sensory event or sensory quality. If applied to statements
(Carnap’s project in the *Aufbau*) Quine said that this type of reduction needs to be applied for every single statement of the form ‘quality q is at the time x; y; z;’ which, aside from being difficult to verify for every single statement, takes for granted the superfluous and undefined connective ‘is at’. (Quine, here, uses Wittgenstein’s argument of the priority of language over experience as an argument against verification). Quine then claimed that it is impossible to verify single statements individually apart from other statements and other assumptions (412).

Quine rejected the possibility of extricating or separating linguistic or cognitive knowledge from experiential knowledge, claiming that knowledge forms a complete whole, and that the revision or adjustment of some part of this knowledge requires an adjustment of the whole. The difference between analytic and synthetic statements (both of which belong to one form of knowledge) is one of degree and not of kind. Analytic statements are simply less accessible to revision than synthetic ones (ibid 406-10).

Quine derided logical empiricism’s attempt to define analyticity and synonymy without resorting to inscrutable entities such as meanings, and without appealing to previously assumed other synonymous expressions by asserting that there is only one way for doing so, that is by introducing various conventional (logical) notations formulated especially for the purpose of being synonymous. According to Quine, the logical empiricist’s programme is a translation of the Aristotelian metaphysical search for the essence of things, into a search for the same essence in meaning of words divorced from experience. *Meaning is what metaphysical essence becomes when expressed in words*, said Quine. The search for defining meaning by means of analytic statements, statements devoid of any factual content, is an appeal to a metaphysical dogma (410).

Quine considered the difference between analytic and synthetic as one of degree rather than kind. By rejecting the dogmas of empiricism, he rejected also any possibility of objective perspectiveless meaning. He also relativised the concept of knowledge and truth to language and to the holistic beliefs of a given culture in which the language is spoken. (Quine here is at one with Bakhtin’s insistence that our knowledge is mediated not by a priori categories but by pragmatic experience as mediated by a dialogue)
Quine’s attack on analyticity constituted a constant theme in his other writings. For example, in *Meaning and Translation*, he brought this theme close to translation by waging a similar attack on what he called the *analytical hypothesis of translation*. Quine based his analytical hypothesis of translation on the imaginary context of a *radical translation* between two totally disparate languages, say English and a new and totally unfamiliar language. He suggested the case of a *jungle linguist* who lacks any prior concept on which to determine whether he understands what the native means by a word or a sentence, therefore, must try to translate from the unknown language by relying only on sensory observational criteria. The episode gradually unfolds Quine’s arguments against analyticity in the form of this straw man’s difficulties in getting on with his translation.

The jungle linguist has only accessible to him what Quine called *stimulus meanings*, viz. the native’s assent or dissent (*occasion sentences*) to circumstantial events. Stimulus meaning represents to Quine the only unprejudiced, and undiluted meaning to bank on for the jungle linguist’s translation. If a rabbit rushed by and the native said *Gavagai*, the jungle linguist swiftly marks down *rabbit* as a potential translation. The linguist then must verify that every instance of the rabbit appears to confirm that his concept of *rabbit* is the same as that of the native’s *Gavagai* (152-4).

Quine distinguished *observational* occasion sentences incited by immediate stimulus from *standing sentences*, sentences that invoke previous experience of a stimulus. Quine restricted his discussion mostly to the first type.

Quine’s linguist may ultimately repeat ‘*Gavagai*’ to his informant, or may point to a rabbit, to find out that the word ‘*gavagai*’ is the accurate match term in the heathen language for the word ‘*rabbit*’. Ought we to say then that the jungle linguist has succeeded in identifying the term for rabbit, or the meaning of ‘*gavagai*’ in the native’s language? ‘Yes’ if we equate the meaning of a term with its reference ‘extension’, Quine answered. But he continued by saying that this is not possible, not only there are many terms without actual reference in language, or that *creature with hearts* and *creatures with kidneys* are to be equal in meaning, but also for the following reasons. Quine thought that in the jungle linguist’s search for empirical referential meaning, the linguist must identify his informant’s way of assent, the stimulus the informant is heeding, and the exact correlation between the stimulation
and the assent. The linguist when pointing to the rabbit must make sure that the native is assenting to the right stimulus and not to, for example, a movement in the grass. That the native meant only rabbit by 'gavagai' and not animal or white. Worse still, the native's response may be also directed towards a nonexistent collateral stimulus (153).

Quine claimed that by taking languages as conceptual schemes by means of which we break down the otherwise continuous reality, the task of grouping 'rabbit' with 'gavagai' as a translation becomes more enigmatic because we have no way of identifying the object-positing system of the jungle language. For example, granted that the native meant rabbit and nothing else, there is no way by means of which the linguist can explain how that rabbit is construed by the native's language. Thus, Quine contended that we do not even have a way of knowing that the native, when assenting to Gavagai, was not assenting to stages, a particular part of a rabbit, or a different type of rabbit-hood. Translation even of such observable phenomena requires the impossible task of getting out of our conceptual scheme and adopting that of the natives. Provided that we succeed in doing so, we are then required to make the two schemes commensurable. So much for ostensively verifiable terms such 'rabbit', however, Quine wanted us to think of empirically unverifiable meanings such as the assumed synonymy between something like 'bachelor' and 'unmarried', in the native's vocabulary (153).

Quine emphasized the object-positing nature of languages and their capacity for world conceptual recreation by saying that, even if we share the same reality we do not share the ways in which we conceptualise it. The native's language, itself an object in the world, is approachable only by reference to another conceptual scheme, in this case our language, or ultimately any other logical language. As in the case of the 'gavagai' referring to stages of a rabbit as opposed to 'rabbit' as a whole, Quine envisaged a similar situation for phrases such for for the sake of; we require that native's language to have corresponding terms viz, for, the, sake, in the same manner. These categories as well as others such as identity predicates are all tools for individuating the world. Any translation between two concepts is not possible because such a translation requires not only the matching of these tools, but also that they be
co-extensive in meaning (154). So in our jungle linguist’s case the synonymy may turn out to be that of mere assents, and not that of the terms rabbit, and gavagai.

Quine claimed that complete radical translation requires a new matching of the structures that bind smaller units in the two languages in order to generate correct translations for complex of outstanding sentences. That is devising an analytical hypothesis of translation. We may also find ourselves devising a truth functional system of meaning generation in the primitive’s language for this purpose. Truths of larger statements obtained by means of logical connectives such as ‘and’; ‘not’; and ‘or’ must match in the two languages. It would also be better if we can prove unambiguously that the native thinks in a logical way, and demonstrate unequivocally that he uses the same logic as our own. If so then we ought to succeed in translating the logical connectives and and not into the native’s ku and pa respectively; when the native says ‘p ku pa p’ and means ‘p and not p’ in showing that he is he making a usual use of these words.

Quine envisaged a situation where we might revise our conceptual scheme so as to accept contradiction as truthful (162). Such a revision would also a require revision of most of our laws of logic. If this is done how can we know what is meant by the new logic? It is also likely that we perform our revision of logic using the same connectives ‘and’ ‘or’; and ‘not’. In other words meaning is different from truth conditions. Our task becomes even harder if we consider using logical categories such as ‘all’, and ‘some’ in the new logic, since their usage is directly dependent on the grammatical categories of language (plurality, identity- expressions), and the object-positing criteria of a given conceptual scheme(162). Should we also think of revising our conceptual scheme, we must provide the same provisions for the heathen’s scheme (Ibid.).

Quine concluded that we would find the radical translation of the native’s language impossible to accomplish not because of endless difficulties we face in uncovering his meanings, but because those objective meanings, apart from very few cases, are not there at all. The meanings of non-observation sentences are not determined even within one conceptual scheme. Speakers of one language rarely have the same intra-subjective response to the stimulation of words like bachelor or unmarried. A speaker tacitly performs intra-subjective translation to match different occurrences of
'bachelor' to each other. Intra-subjective synonymy is similar to inter-subjective one, provable only through an empirical criterion of assent or dissent but not through meaning. They also can be obscured by collateral information. Quine went further to say that some widespread collateral information can be itself, even if wrong, sustained for a long period of time as the real reference of a term. It all depends on our belief rather than on any other objective criteria. We often adjust our conceptual schemes to fit newly discovered realities. Logic as an alternative conceptual scheme is not immune from this revision. Synonymy and meanings are what we think them to be in a given moment of our history.

Going back to our perplexed jungle translator, Quine envisaged a scenario where he would decide to learn the language of the native to the same degree of proficiency as that of the native as a final solution to the quandary of translatability. Becoming a bilingual translator, he translates by means of intra-subjective communing unaware of what meanings are. There is no objective definition of meaning on which we can definitely base translation (168).

Quine successfully put forth a strong case against complete translatability between languages by radically relativising ontology to the conceptual scheme of the speaker, and by conditioning translatability to literal translation between two languages. He demonstrated the difficulties facing any attempt to translate by means of assumed objective meaning, referential or logical. However, Quine in both articles delivered a great deal of criticism and very little positive substance of what he takes meanings to be. In a few lines where he did, Quine stated that Meaning, on the other hand, is social. Even the man who is oddest about a word is likely to have a few companions in deviation (157). Bakhtin's criticism of reductionism is similar to Quine's, as he also believed that there is no final word, or final meaning in communication. Bakhtin always considered meaning as linked to context and to the communicative functions language serves in that context. Meaning outside context is not objective but objectivized abstract entities that allow linguists to make statements about language. It is the communicative needs of a community that makes them more or less stable and communicative and not any inborn or a priori status.

Quine's views can be detrimental to almost all approaches to translation that rely on mediating translation by means of an objective assumption of meaning, including
those that take equivalence between languages as a primary criterion. We also find Quine justified in emphasising the unknowability of how in the translator’s mind translation is mediated. The nature of this mediation remains up to now a sort of mystery, a mystery that stands between us and forming any definite description of translation processes. However, Quine’s devastating criticism becomes less potent for approaches of translation that start with different assumptions about translation from those of equivalence. We will revisit this issue later in chapter (7). But first let us try to evaluate, even if briefly, our above understanding of Quine’s views.

4.4. Indeterminacy of the Indeterminacy of Translation

Radical translation as well as Quine’s warning of the projective nature of translation was directed precisely against any assumption of the unproblematic coupling of the two languages, in his case: language of observation and language of deduction. The logical empiricists’ admittance of only one type of empirical truth, that is observational or sensory truth, was in a sense an open invitation to classical scepticism, of which Quine has made good use. What Quine did was to use this scepticism for casting doubt upon the reliability of epistemological observation as the only source of scientific data. If observation is exposed to circumstantial indeterminacies then it is unreliable as a source of data.

But, Quine, a naturalist of a different breed, did not deny language’s direct link with reality, but simply substituted epistemic empiricism for a behaviourist version. If we cannot find the totality of meaning in cognitive meaning as Quine claims, it is also unlikely that we are going to find it in a behavioral stimulus or behavioral response. There is no way to confirm that meanings are what get stimulated in the native’s mind, or that these stimulations exist at all. We cannot even ensure that sensory observations are direct and not mediated by mental activity. In other words, Quine’s radical scepticism can work equally strongly against him. If one is so uncertain about the translatability of the native terms, then how could one be in a position to confirm or disconfirm its un-translatability. It requires the knowledge of at least two languages to be able to pass a judgment about the translatability or untranslatability between languages.
Inconsistency is also detectable between Quine’s claim of the holistic nature of knowledge and his concept of stimulus meaning; while the first implies a relational structure of some kind, the stimulus meaning, in Quine’s conception of it, is nothing more than momentarily automatic reflexes. Could we possibly build holistic conceptual schemes from such atomistic stimulus meanings? If not, then how do subjects acquire them?

Quine constructed his informant story around fictitious rather than real empirical events, which allowed him a great deal of manipulation. The episode contained one sole informant, an unrealistic and a petrified speaking object (native), who when he gets switched on by the linguist, automatically responds to the linguist in accordance with a very delimited schema drawn up by Quine, as if the native is conspiring to support Quine’s claim. If Quine’s hypothetical experiment should look for meaning on the social plane, as to be consistent with Quine’s claim of meaning being social, Quine then would find himself in many occasions in between natives who exchange language, rather than in front of one single native who is observing a ‘rabbit’. A spontaneous dialogical situation will be created and will eventually make the native’s meanings less doubtful at least. It might even come to be true that the native being led by similar curiosity would learn some of the linguist’s words and meanings making the task of the linguist more attainable.

Similarly Quine provided a slanted picture of the linguistic quest for defining meaning as being circular. He alternates the linguist’s hypothetical position between two mutually exclusive possibilities: either having meaning as a priori and seeking to define analyticity, or starting with the former and aiming at defining the latter. By emphasizing this prima facie paradox in linguistic methodology, Quine rules out a third possibility of them mutually (dialogically) defining each other. The linguist need not privilege either form or content over the other at the beginning of his empirical research, but simply can start with both using, simultaneously, each to define the other. It is not strictly a question of ‘either or’, but of ‘both and’. It is not a question of what to aim at first, extensions or intensions, but rather it is sensible to use both, each to define and refine the other, as in fact, they are two sides of one coin. In reality this process is the one followed by scholars in eliciting definitional meaning and making dictionary entries. After being inter-subjectively tested by the public,
dictionaries get refined and revised by the public use of them, while simultaneously sharpening the public’s usage of the same meanings.

If we remove the condition of structural commensurability that Quine places on translation, we will have at hand a concept of translation that is widely practised and generally accepted. Quine, (cf. other relativists) justifiably emphasises the relativity of our thinking to our language (conceptual schemes), but they excessively exaggerate their position by denying viable intra-language understanding, or by claiming that languages, as we know them, are impenetrable by each others’ speakers. It is a fact of life that we learn, translate and even borrow terms from other languages. Experts often succeed in deciphering intentionally obscured military codes.

C. Norris (1986) mentioned J. Habermas’ description of the sceptic’s position vis a vis meaning and truth as _transcendental tu quoque_ [emphasis in the original], that is, they insist that their texts be read attentively, and understood properly, while denying the potential of language to convey the meanings they contain (127). He also cited late Wittgenstein as saying _if you tried to doubt every thing you get as far as not doubting anything_ (Ibid.,132).

But this is not to give in to the other side of empiricism, the logical positivists. Both views, that of Quine, as well as that of the positivists are hostile to translation as we know it; one by taking language and meaning out of time and context, and therefore reducing it to finding dubious equivalences; and the other by denying it even that possibility through reducing language only to that context, and nothing else.

Davidson on the other hand, looked at translatability as ensuing from our common rationality, rationality as a condition on communication not only between men of alien cultures, but also on them as members of one culture. In what follows we would like to discuss some of Davidson’s ideas of translatability because they dispute some of those of Quine we presented above.

4.5. Davidson, Rationality and Radical Interpretation

Donald Davidson (1984) conceded Quine’s proposals for the necessity of basing knowledge on observational criteria, with the following result of eliminating the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. However, Davidson believed that
this proposal would solve one problem only by creating another, viz, an irredeemable dualism between ‘conceptual schemes’ and ‘empirical content’, or between intelligible and observational facts. This, Davidson claimed, is the ‘third dogma of empiricism’ (189). Therefore, Davidson assumed that the dualism in its extreme case, as it is presented in some schools of relativism, is untenable. Davidson maintained that there must be a relationship of some kind between the two realms to avoid the third dogma. If one accepts that there is, then of what kind? Davidson thought that two main types of relationships had been proposed, namely that conceptual schemes either organize (divide up according to relativism), or fit experience (predict as in empiricism). Experience to Davidson is that of either the recalcitrant world, or our knowledge of this world (Ibid., 191-2).

Davidson reiterated that if conceptual schemes organize some thing, then the word ‘organize’ implies that what is being organized consists of distinguishable things. Should we say that it is experience that is being organized, then we equally ought to ascribe plurality to this experience. Speaking about experience, as separated from the world, we can only do that in sentences because experience occurs un-individuated. However, organisation of experience by sentences must go beyond experience itself to cover objects in the world where that experience takes place. That is, it must also include objects that are named by words like cars, mountains etc..

Furthermore, Davidson claimed that all languages divide up the world, even if differently, in similar ways. Hence, he took this to imply that ‘A language that organizes such entities must be a language very like our own’ (192). According to Davidson, there is no other possible way for us to think of the other except to assume that he is like us; it is not within our capacity to think of him being otherwise. Therefore, it is more plausible to assume that the other’s mind as well as ours are both rational. If there is a reason for understanding the other, it is because he is rational like us.

Davidson then contended that if two schemes or two predicates are not intertranslatable we have to understand how they are not so. Neither of the views he criticized above offer any criterion for testing what can or cannot be considered true. Moreover, there must be some ontological reality of some kind that is common to the two languages against which our claim may be tested. Without a background of
previously fully or partially translatable languages, we remain unable to assess the degree of their translatability (184-6).

Davidson invited the Tarskian truth condition of a sentence to the heart of his translational views as a tertium comparationis mediating between translatable conceptual schemes and experience. Translation, he claimed, may equally proceed either between two languages and outside events, or between each language and those events. Two languages, even if conceptually distinct, must share something if they are to be true about the same outside phenomena. The interpretation of sentences as translatable or not may proceed in accordance to their adherence to truth. Davidson advocated an extensionalist Tarski-like theory of meaning to assess the relationship of sentences to their immediate context. He replaced the S means that P paradigm with S is true iff P at the time T. Meaning as known by intensionalists was replaced with extensional truth at ‘T’. According to him:

‘Socrates is flying’ is true (in Smith’s language) iff Socrates is flying at T’ (222). Thus, there is no internal or logical restriction on the number of true utterances that a speaker can produce according to this formulation (Ibid).

Davidson claimed his extensionalist interpretation of Tarski’s T-sentences to be respectably empirical (Davidson 1984: 75). One possible aim of this interpretation was to account for cases in which meaning is obscured by contexts such as quotational, propositional attitude, and opaque contexts of natural language. Davidson proposed the treatment of the quoted or embedded assertions on their own merit as statements independent of the quotation or introductory verbs (ibid).

Davidson compared all forms of understanding with of those of interpretation. Both arise on the domestic as well as the foreign plane. We interpret each other in one language in a similar manner to the way we interpret a speaker of another language. In order to construct a theory of meaning based on interpretation, Davidson suggested that it has to start from a new empirical ground similar to that proposed by Quine.

Davidson was aware that the appeal to meaning directly will result in a circular judgment similar to the one claimed by Quine in his criticism of positivism. Therefore Davidson pointed out that all theories that had tried to elicit meaning in relation to reality, whether by causal means (cf. Ogden and Richard’s), or behavioral (cf. Morris’ theory of meaning), had failed to give a good account of the meaning of more
complex or abstract sentences. The reason, he argued was the appeal to the extralinguistic activities that language serves without taking account of the foundational structure of language.

Two elements were essential in Davidson’s theory of interpretation: one is that meaning is inseparable from the speaker’s use of it; the second is that the speaker in his use of language uses a finite number of words and structures according to which he can produce and interpret an infinite number of sentences. So he invoked Brentano’s thesis of the inseparability of an agent’s behaviour from the beliefs that underlie this behaviour. On Davidson’s views it is not possible in interpretive circumstances to separate language meanings from the speaker’s (informants’s) expression of them. Interpreted speech, he presumed, includes actions of assertions that are part of the intentional will of the informer.

Davidson adopted Tarski’s theory of truth because he also believed that speakers can assign truths recursively for an unlimited number of cases of interpretation, in the same way meaning is assigned in semantic theory (Ibid., 134-6). Yet he distinguished between two kinds of interpretation: interpretation in theory, and interpretation of theory. In the first we state the conditions of truths, but in the second it is the concept of truth, as related to human activities, that is being expounded (Ibid., 222).

Thus far it can be said that Davidson’s attitude towards translatability differs from that of Quine in some important respects. Davidson, for example, takes the acknowledgment of the divergence of conceptual schemes as congruous with their interpretability. A beholder of a given conceptual scheme can still empathize with a beholder of another and picture reality by means of the other’s conceptual scheme. He also separated what is uttered in language from the structure of language itself, acknowledging by doing so that two conceptual schemes can depict the same experience by means of different structures.

An interpretation, Davidson claimed, starts according to the norms of the interpreter’s language, and therefore would naturally be normative. When one interprets a language, one interprets the utterances of that language according to the norms of one’s language. These norms, according to Davidson, are rational, i.e., common to interpreter’s language as well as to the other speaker’s. Davidson embraced a holistic concept of interpretation, according to which a behaviour or a
belief of the native is discernable in relation to other beliefs, beliefs that we can ascribe to him by virtue of his being rational. There are rational norms for the speech of the other, that are accessible to us, but our interpretation is also guided by our own norms; therefore the normative interpretation of the other is also critical. It is important thus to bear in mind the distinction between a given interpretation and the norms that guides this interpretation (Ibid.).

Interpretation, to Davidson, was therefore a result of the coalescence of our rationality with that of the interpreted, an optimization of what we think guides the native’s behaviour. It is a dialogue in which a projection of our own belief into that interpretation becomes necessary, since it is an interpretation for ourselves. Any interpretation between human beings cannot be one-sided i.e., cannot be purely objective and free from the normative background of the interpreter.

Davidson presumed that unlike transient direct ones, some observations about the native’s behavior remain constant to form the base for the speaker’s beliefs. By tracing the consistency of the native’s beliefs we can arrive at interpreting some of the basic utterances that can serve as building blocks for the initiation of interpretation. Davidson suggested that at the beginning of our interpretation we ought to be charitable to the native by generally assuming that his beliefs are genuine - *The principle of charity*. This principle aims at maximizing the true beliefs of the native in cases where a decision about their truth is difficult by taking these beliefs to be true by default (Davidson 1984: 27).

Davidson approached interpretation not through sensory stimulus (cf. Quine), but indirectly through verifying what the speaker holds to be true. Though more difficult to justify, Davidson relied in his approach on an a priori assumption of the native being rational. Davidson was charitable to the linguist in his episodes by assuming a scenario in which meaning is accessible to him. Quine, by contrast offered a scenario in which meaning in all possible ways escapes the linguist. In other words, Davidson saved interpretation from the total indeterminacy of radical behaviour by placing it in the subject’s belief. Although Davidson started with his own concept of indeterminate interpretation, his assumption of indeterminacy was a tangible one.

Meaning to Davidson is inseparable from the speaker’s psychological beliefs and intentions; therefore, the logic that studies these beliefs is not expected to be in *perfect*
consistency (Davidson 1986: 316). Davidson thus rejected Quine’s naturalism when it comes to the study of interpretation without necessarily accepting the positivistic reduction of meaning to semantic interpretation only.

Truth to Davidson is neither definitional, nor scientific, but is related to what we hold to be true in our conceptual and coherent schemes. These schemes though different are inter-intelligible. The truth-value of a statement is also contextual and can even be individual. Differences among speakers of the same language or dialects are similar to those that exist between speakers of different languages. Davidson’s concept of interpretation is based on the intelligibility among speakers more than anything else. His interpretation is tightly linked to this concept of intelligibility. At the same time his views of common rationality, and his assumption of ontological reality, are reconciled with differences among experiences and beliefs that form our autonomous conceptual schemes. Davidson apparently tried to come to a half-way compromise between the two Cartesian extremes, that of Quine and the logical empiricists. His views also seem to allow some room for accommodating structuralists’ insistence on the dependency of utterances’ interpretation on systems. (Some of the views we represent in chapter (7) are inspired by Davidson’s insights.)

The philosophical approaches we have presented so far, whether logical or behavioral, (if we use Marková’s terminology), are Cartesian. Their views have in common two general aspects: their search for objective timeless criteria for meaning, and their assumption of sense data as passively internalized by the individual. We tried to present these approaches, diverse as they are, as one broad dialogue. In what follows we suggest broadening the dialogue to include some other approaches that are non-Cartesian, more precisely those of Heidegger, and Walter Benjamin, not only because they represent a different perspective, use different categories and concepts, but also due to their wide influence on some current views of translation.

4.6. Idealist Views of Translation

Among the non-empirical views of translation, what interest us more are some views that arise from a phenomenological outlook on metaphysics. What we call phenomenological views of translation are those that seek meaning not as given in
concepts, but as emergent from interpretative events. Accordingly, meaning is not only determined by a given context of speaking and interpretation but is rather a product of it. A good example of such a trend is M. Heidegger’s, and Walter Benjamin’s notion of translation not as taking place after the act of interpretation, i.e., as transferring of formerly interpreted meanings into another language, as opposed to considering every act of interpretation or understanding as an act of translation. Thus, rendering of one’s understanding of meanings in one language into another is, a re-expression of a single and subjective understanding of it.

Despite their keen interest in language, these two scholars’ views, though different from each other, are radically distinct from those of the formal semanticians. What interested them most was neither the relationship of one language’s expressions to these of another, nor the relationship of language to the real world, but the relation of language to literature and metaphysics.

In many such views, meaning and interpretation are mostly subjective, and indeterminate. However they differ from subjective empiricism in rejecting empirical observation as a criterion for either the study of meaning or translation.

Despite rejection of linking translation to logical equivalence or direct observation, they, however, reduce it to other central metaphysical concepts, such as Heidegger’s concept of existence, or Benjamin’s pure language. In other words they are reductionists of a different persuasion. They ignore the function of language as a neutral instrument of representation, and only focus on its function as an instrument of creative expression. Hence, their attitude towards translation starts from the side of language that is contingent and figural. It is in this respect that they become important to dialogism, since dialogism demands that these two aspects of language should be reconciled.

4.6.1. Translation Time and Existence

Central to Heidegger’s thinking is the idea of Being, Dasein. To him language originates from, and speaks of being. According to Heidegger, all other forms of understanding are related to a basic understanding that pertains to existence, and common to man’s being in the world. Therefore, Heidegger considered Understanding
to be not only of Dasein, but also understanding is itself a form of Being or part the Dasein (Mueller-Voßmer 1986: 32).

This basic concept occupied in Heidegger’s philosophy a central position similar to that of the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant’s, or the idea of fitness for survival in Darwin. Heidegger arrived at this concept by claiming that all the basic assumptions that surround the search for truth assumed in the Western philosophy, such as subject-object distinction, Aristotle’s forms, Huserl’s essence and categories, were only possible by masking, and continually reifying the real essence which is to be found in Being. Western philosophy’s continuous projection of essence outside Being masks the philosopher’s ‘will-to-power’ (presenting Nietzsche’s influence on Heidegger), and conceals a wish to reify and manipulate being. Heidegger claimed that we can disarm Western philosophy of its main assumptions, by the unmasking of Being (Valdes 1987: 44). (We would like to point out to the similarity between these ideas and those of Derrida mentioned at the beginning of this chapter)

By claiming the centrality of Being-in-the world to understanding, Heidegger summoned to the heart of his phenomenology the important question of temporality of Being (ibid). However, even if granted with past and present, the subject’s understanding, his main inclination, is to the future. Communication always directs itself to a future hypothesized understanding to which the Dasein itself is always oriented, that is, towards self-realization, or coming Being (ibid.,34), even though Heidegger saw the understanding of Being that unfolds in front of us as dependent on our past Being, or our pre-understanding of that Being.

We would like to stop here to mention that Bakhtin (cf. Buber, Mead among others) also considered communication a means towards an endless attempt at self consummation. Self realization is a project, and Bakhtin considered language as its main mediator. Like Heidegger, Bakhtin also considered understanding as a dialogue between the new contextual experience and the subject’s old ones. A theme essential to both scholars’ philosophies is that of emphasizing temporality.

Heidegger’s concept of pre-understanding and the logical empiricist’s idea of presuppositionless objective truth, diametrically oppose each other. Heidegger’s submerging of meaning in the temporal context also opposes the logical positivist’s position. Heidegger’s hermeneutics considers all form of understanding as contextual,
and any concept of it as related to a particular understanding of 'Being'. Our understanding is therefore conditioned by the historical horizon of our Being's epoch. This horizon encompasses all the pre-suppositions and prejudices of that epoch. Be it possible to strip ourselves of these presuppositions, our consciousness will be unable to grasp anything new (Seung 1982: 173-5).

Heidegger claimed that as separate from a particular instantiation in speech, language speaks of previous Being, pre-dates the subject, and contains the epoch's horizon. Therefore, it transcends the subject's manipulation of it in speech, and, in this respect, is different from the subject's articulation of it. It follows that language shapes the subject's understanding, and thus, all that understanding amounts to is a linguistic perception of Being (ibid., 35). Language not only describes what exists, but also creates new existence (Ibid., 29). Language is the imprisonment of Being (Kelly 1979: 3).

In Heidegger's phenomenology, every word has an original context which gives it its original meaning. In the original context, the word picks its referent, and relates to something in the world. In other words, this is the moment it takes on a meaning, and enters language as a word. Meanwhile, the thing with which the word associates reveals itself and, at this point, becomes a thing to the subject (Carnap's thing language), in other words, expressible.

In this pragmatic moment, we do not only refer, or name things but also relate to them. This relation, in Heidegger's opinion, constitutes in relation to the meaning of the sign an essential aspect, because it explains how language acquires its authenticity. The authenticity of language, if the sign is misused (language), and if the authentic relation of the sign to its referent is altered, can be destroyed, or distorted. The Greek word physis was distorted by its translation into Latin 'natura' (A. Benjamin 1989: 20-3). The Romans translated the Greek word, like many other words, without experiencing its original Being, and without taking into account this word's authentic relationship to its signified. This is how translation distorts language. This also reveals how language relates to its speakers' identity, contributes to the meaning becoming a property of language, to the Englishness of the meaning in English or to the Frenchness of French. This is what will never be translated.
Language to Heidegger allows for the division and representation of *Being* into categories. These categories are products of our experience of *Being*, and are our repository of past beings. However, their full understanding requires the task of revealing their origin and the history of their coming into *Being*. By inquiring into how these categories' were initiated, we ought also to ask about their cause of being, why they came to exist in the first place (Norris 1986: 68).

Furthermore, the understanding of these original meanings by the subject, Heidegger supposed, means altering their authenticity by introducing them into a new *Being*. However, by understanding words the subject adds to their content what he already knows about the world, thus attaching new additions to their original meaning. Conversely, it is also by means of words that the subject can enrich his knowledge of the world. However, among the different subjects there has to be a remnant of this original meaning that allows for the possibility of communication among them. It is in this remnant, the unconsummated original content that the different uses of the word, and its different meanings have in common, that allows for the possibility of communication (A Benjamin 1989: 22). Therefore, intra-linguistic meaning to Heidegger, as also to Quine, cannot be fully determined not because of uncertainties about the word's reference, but for Heidegger due to its belonging to different *Being*.

To locate the essence of the meaning of a word, Heidegger then distinguished between two aspects of the word: its form that enters in its expression of itself as a reality, the site that binds its different interpretations; and the diverse realities that are expressed in the sign, or its content. We find the essence of the word, not in the word's unchanged form as assumed by logicians or semioticians, but in the realities embedded in its content, even though Heidegger considered it important to have a plane on which the sign acquires its unified self, its form (Ibid).

Different meanings (realities) within a word form can sometimes be conflicting. However, their conflict or disagreement are characterized by their common orientation towards each other, their belonging together, their sharing the same form and origin. Translation accordingly, by preserving only part of the word's relation to its original meaning, can only preserve some essence of its content. This portion of content, usually articulated in a given context, is what the word can share with another word.
It is also the translatable element that the translated word have in common with the meaning of the original word.

Thus we have at hand two essences: one is the original or semantic essence, the other is what is common to the different uses and meanings of the word at the time, or in an epoch, the pragmatic essence (Ibid.,30). The pragmatic truth of the word is what its different uses have in common. The semantic truth of a word is its original meaning (Ibid). Speaking of the general meaning of a word, it is not one or unified, but what confines all these possibilities. It is the polysemous composite of the sign. The unity of the meaning of the sign is to be found only in its original or archaic meaning (Ibid).

Translation is engaging in communication with the text. As in the process of communication, the priority is to establish one single understanding, and the banishment of all other meanings. A similar thing takes place in translation, where at the expense of all possible readings the translator selects only one. Translation then appears as an appropriation of the original, and simultaneously as a denial of other meanings of that original. Translation can also transgress the original in the sense that, as a new text, it will also be open to other possibilities of reading. It is the supplanting of one Being by the creation of another Being, the rendering of one plurality of meaning by creating another. By tying a text to a new chain of being, a translation transforms its original.

Despite the depth of Heidegger’s views, it remains obscure what is in actuality meant by Being. This word Being, all-encompassing as it is, could reveal most of the philosophical problems that related to ontology and metaphysics. However, if the denotation of this word is not satisfactorily explained it can (cf. in Carnap’s case above) be open to accusation of vagueness. Nevertheless, what Heidegger said about time and language, even if related to this metaphysical concept, remains of great revelatory value. Bakhtin, on the other hand, instead of speaking about language as related to being, spoke about it in similar terms as related to social and historical factors. Historical and social realities, to Bakhtin, are what shape the individual’s cognitive consciousness, and hence his being. Putnam also considered language as a product of a division of labour between individual psychology and the social milieu (Putnam 1978: 81).
4.6.2. The Task of The translator

W. Benjamin’s concept of the sign is central to his explanation of the task of the translator as paradoxical and impossible. To Benjamin, what the sign invokes in the mind (consciousness) is not an inscription of the object, but a schema, a Kantian monogram, that is partially produced by our imagination (A. Benjamin 1989: 90). Therefore, language he alleged, is what accesses the image in the mind. The image’s inscription in the mind is dependent on our imaginative reproduction of that image. Thus the essence, if there is one, is not of that of the sign or the object, but of its image in the mind. A translation involves, on Benjamin’s view, rather than the meaning of the original, our image of that original. Translation, therefore is a reproduction of one image into another.

Corollary to that, what makes translation possible has more to do with the linguistic representation of the object ‘linguistic-objects’, than with the object itself. Benjamin emphasised the distinction between the material being of an object and its linguistic being. He accepted unequivocally that the world of language is a world in its own that has little to do with the real world. However, every real object embodies an intrinsic potential to be an expression, to be translated not in one language, but in any language, in his words in man’s language. There are as many translations of the object as there are languages in the world (Ibid., 95).

In its two-dimensional relationship, to object, and image, the sign conceals a dialectic between mind and things. Benjamin ascribed this dialectic to what all languages have in common, kinship of languages (Ibid., 91). This kinship is a result of all languages, sharing the universal property of intending something outside themselves. This intention that underlies every language, he called reine Sprache, the pure language that lies in the heart of all languages.

Pure Sprache is conceived as a higher and purer language, an abstract language that is common to all languages, the psychological force that belies the transformation of any object into a sign in language, something akin to what Bakhtin called language of languages, and not exactly the same as Chomsky’s Universal Grammar.

However, even if languages share the same intention, and the same objects of intention, they can differ in the mode of their intentions, in their structure, words etc..
They can differ in their historical experience. The pure language is responsible for the similarities among languages, while the mode of intention or meaning is responsible for their differences.

The translator's task is to release in his own language that pure language which is under the spell of another (Ibid., 101), to reveal the linguistical creative force that have entered in the formation of one language's text and re-express that force in another. This re-expression (translation), Benjamin metaphorically explained, should incorporate the original's mode of intention (signification) so faithfully that the original and the translation can be seen as two fragments of the same pure language (Kelly 1979: 98). The question of translatability, to Benjamin, even if seeming impossible at a given time, remains open to future possibilities. Even if the translation cannot be done by men, that does not mean that it is not there, it is in the common and the original source of the two languages.

Benjamin rejected the concept of literal translation, as for example advocated by Quine, because a translation can exemplify the exact meanings of the original but, at the same time, be a poor translation. Instead, a translator would benefit his translation more by trying to construct the creative power that generates the coherence of meanings in the original. The power that radiates the impact of that original, its universal linguisticality (Pure Sprache).

Benjamin continued his metaphoric description of translation by comparing the original and its translation with a fragment of broken vessel. Fragments of the Pure Sprache are the origin which all languages have sprung. A translation ought to be different but should equally re-institute the linguisticality of the original to generate the same impact. The task of the translator is to restore the two langues as:

Fragments of a vessel which in order to be articulated together must follow one another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same way a translation, instead of making itself similar to the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail, in its own language, form itself according to the meaning of the original, to make both recognizable as the broken parts of the greater language, just as fragments are the broken parts of a vessel.

(Cited in A. Benjamin 1989: 100).

Although mystical, this quotation, nonetheless, speaks of a different dimension not only of translation, but also of the relationship among languages. It speaks of
Benjamin’s deep awareness that different languages ought to possess something in common, something that allows them to intercommunicate, and though, differently, to be able to express the same thing, a human linguistic fecundity.

For Benjamin every text has life that reflects, beside the creative energy that is behind its making, the temporal gist of its coming to being. This gist conceals within it something sacred to the text, therefore untranslatable. However, the text also has an afterlife, or the ability of the text to survive after losing this temporality, after losing its original context and author, by being appropriated and translated by another person. In a text there exists a potential of different translations. But the translation is not a simple transposition of the text, but a transformation of it into another text. A text when translated is also changed and transformed. (These ideas resemble Heidegger’s that translation transforms the text into another being. Heidegger also claimed that a single translation represents also a disposition of other possible translations.)

Burnett (1985) explained the source the a myth in terms analogous to Benjamin’s after life of a text. The psychological content of the myth remains constant while the myth itself might go through a lot of changes through different times (170). Even if the corporeal embodiment of the myth changed, its central psychic core even if transformed remains unchanged. The myth survives only as a psychic reality. Equally in translation, the physical structure of the language, its expressions, the phonic and intonational aspects are all among what changes, yet a good translation tries best to preserve the cognitive content of the original, its psychic reality.

To Benjamin, a translated text, though it must show some strangeness, ought to be comprehensible. Strangeness in his opinion is common to all translations. When a translator translates, he brings into his language a new fragment of the universal language exhibited in the original language, thus enriching it by expanding its horizon. If there is only one language of absolute linguistic truth, it is the pure language.

In other words translation conceals within itself the impossibility of full translation. However, languages to W. Benjamin and also for Bakhtin, in order to be languages ought to be translatable. As Lyotard, in Au Just nicely put it It so happens that languages are translatable otherwise they are not languages (Rose 1990: 127).
Davidson alleged that there is no other way for the language of the other except to be like ours.

Having discussed some important philosophical debates about translation and translatability, we will in the two coming chapters concern ourselves with their direct reflection on translation theories. However, we will resume the philosophical discussion of translatability in chapter (7). In this chapter we will demonstrate the importance of dialogism to translatability.
Chapter 5

Some Anthropological and Linguistic Approaches to Translation

5.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented some important philosophical views of translation and translatability. The following two chapters are about modern translation theories that take roots from views presented in the previous chapter. For reasons of expediency, we will continue with the dichotomy we established earlier between two camps: the objectivist, and the relativists. The first considered meaning and truth (Cartesian dualist paradigm) as ensuing from either the laws of thinking (cf. logical empiricism), or from observable behaviour (cf. behavioursim). The second, the relativists, denied objective meaning or impartial truth, and, thus, that language has fixed objective meanings. Meaning, to relativists follows the particular expressive need of an individual, or culture.

Objective views of meaning were promoted more notably by linguists, and semioticians. Those of relativists were more popular with hermeneuticians and discourse analysts. We will later argue that these two views have one thing in common, which is the one-sidedness of their accounts of language and meaning. Our aim will be to demonstrate how they complement rather than contrast with each other, and to explain the importance of dialogism to translation.

However, the above dichotomy is far from clear cut and only approximates the distinction. Distinctions in areas related to language studies, because of the complex nature of language, are difficult to establish. For example, distinctions such as that
between semiotics and linguistics, or linguistics and hermeneutics are fuzzy, and these fields are closely interrelated. This was emphasised by Sebeok (1987), for example, who considered linguistics to be a structurally but not functionally autonomous system of semiotics. He claimed that the new-born, prior to acquisition of a verbal system, gets exposed first to numerous non-verbal systems that continue to grow in parallel to the newborn’s verbal system. Furthermore, on the level of communication, the verbal and non-verbal semiotic systems are closely intertwined (12). Similarly, Halliday (1978) treated language as a multi-systemic abstracted structure, and considered the study of natural language as part of a social semiotic.

Still, there are those who expressed misgivings even about intra-disciplinary distinctions such as those between semantics and pragmatics. Uhlenbeck (1978), for example, questioned the validity of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, by advocating a wider scope of language study that can include both aspects. Leech (1983) alleged that the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is objectively difficult to justify. He pointed out that, though it is one of convenience rather than necessity, this distinction ought to be accepted since there is no alternative way of going about meaning (6). However the general attitude of most scholars is to assume that these distinctions are self-evident and there.

Davis (1990) pointed out that there has never been total consensus about what constitutes the subject-matter of linguistics. He claimed that linguistics is one of the few fields that are defined not according to subject-matter, but according to methodology. Take, for example, a definition of linguistics by Crystal (1985), as the scientific study of language (181). It follows from this definition, according to Davis, that linguistics is not interested in language as such, but in the aspects of language that are susceptible to scientific investigation. Hence, linguistics must isolate from language in general the subject-matter of its own investigation.

Davis (1990) claimed that linguistics was engaged in a process of defining its subject matter, and thus, indirectly itself as a field of scientific research. Accordingly, the subject-matter of linguistics has always been an abstract conception of language. A conception that gets occasionally adjusted through different conditions and constraints to suit specific methodologies. In other words, linguistics as a subject-matter is not given but is always in the process of being created. This also may
explain why there is no unified field of linguistics, but different strands, e.g., mainstream linguistics, systemic linguistics, text linguistics etc.

However, one may say that different linguistic approaches were also unified by the philosophical doctrine that underlies them, Saussurean structuralism. Different linguists, as we are going to see, opted for similar methods of isolating language structure, but, remained ambivalent about how to link language structure to language use.

Lyons (1987), for example, described two types of linguistics: micro-linguistics and macro-linguistics, reserving the definition of the system of language micro-linguistics to autonomous linguistics, dependent on the particular definition of it. Others assumed that a distinction exists between semantics and pragmatics, taking pragmatics, as opposed to syntax and semantics, to include all aspects of language related to linguistic behaviour, (see, for example Levinson (1983) for more details). For example, scholars (cf. Grice (1957), Hurford and Heasley (1983)) considered the distinction to be one between meaning in language and meaning in the utterer’s use of the language. Speech act theorists (cf. Austin (1962)) judged language use as a form of regulated behaviour, and made the distinction between locutionary (sense) and illocutionary (force) aspects of the speech act.

Other scholars tried to establish dividing lines between these disciplines using altogether different criteria. For example Itkonen (1983) made an analogy between the study of language and physics. He preferred to see the rôle of autonomous linguistics as analogical to that of (Lorenzen’s) proto-physics. Proto-physics is concerned with the analysis of ideal rules pertaining to internal structure, such as measuring phenomena of mass, length, and time. These rules, Itkonen claimed, are essential for making empirical physics possible. But, like linguistics, proto-physics cannot be treated on the same level as the study of physical behaviour which is the study of physics proper. Itkonen believed that the study of linguistic behaviour is beyond the domain of autonomous linguistics and must be the concern of psycho or/and socio-linguistics (11). However, we think that the latter are deeply intertwined with other disciplines and therefore cannot be strictly defined.

A similar analogy was made by Sinha (1988), this time from biology, between endo-structural studies of an organism that are concerned only with the description
of the inner structure of the organism; and *exo-structural* studies that are concerned with external relations of the organism and its function in the environment. Sinha thought that while reductionist theories of language (cf. linguistics) emphasised endo-structural aspects, interactionist studies emphasised exo-structural elements (169-203).

For our purpose here, since our primary interest is not the study of language as such but the particular issues of translation and dialogism, we will treat all endo-structural approaches of translation as linguistic. We will distinguish them from semiotic approaches that ignore the differences between verbal and non-verbal signs in their approach to translation. Meanwhile, all exo-structural views of language, those that take language use as their main preoccupation, including communication theory, Grice’s theory of communication, speech act theory, and hermeneutics, are communicative.

We are aware that language has other uses than the communicative one, such as uses related to mnemonic or meditational factors, but since in dialogism we think of thinking and remembering as some sort of inner speech, our use of the term ‘communication’ is perhaps less confined than the usual use of it.

In this chapter we will also include some ethno-linguists’ approaches to language and translation. No study of translation can do without them. This may also may take us to comment on some views of translation in anthropology since anthropologists are among the first scholars to apply structural linguistic views in translation studies. Both semiotic and communicative approaches will be taken up in the coming chapter.

However, we think also that it would be beneficial to start our discussion by casting some light on structuralism as a philosophical doctrine that underlies many anthropological, linguistic and semiotic approaches. This is what will be undertaken in the next section.

### 5.2. Structuralism, Meaning and Translation

Structuralism as a general doctrine grew out of the rejection of the naive realist doctrine that takes sense data as a main source of scientific knowledge. Structuralism took little interest in sense data, and concentrated on the underling systems that it claimed were necessary for explaining and interpreting data. Linguistic structuralism
came about partly as a disapproval of the empirical dogmas of the direct relationship of language to the outside world, and partly as a reaction to nineteenth century historicism. However, the seeds of structuralism go back to Vico’s criticism of Cartesian views (as mentioned in Chapter (3)), as well as Humboldt’s notion of inner language. The latter’s influence is apparent in Saussure’s autonomous views of language (Herbst et. al.1980: 6). It was also apparent in Chomsky’s dynamic theory of transformations. The new outlook to language known as structuralism, whether European (cf. Saussure, Jakobson, Prague school) or American (cf. Pierce, Bloomfield, Sapir, Chomsky) has greatly and ubiquitously informed most views of language, particularly in semiotics, linguistics and anthropology (Devitt & Sterelny, 1987: 210-22).

Saussure, for example, criticized the realists’ concept of sign mainly on two grounds: firstly, that it placed meaning outside language by making the sign refer to a priori concepts as if the sign has a meaning in and by virtue of itself; secondly, by doing so, it ignored the way the sign operates within language i.e., the sign’s relation with other elements in language. Therefore, Saussure aimed to shift the meaning in language from outside to inside language (Ducrot & Todorov, 1979: 104).

Saussure thus freed the sign of its direct relation with reality (the thing referred to by the sign) by relating it to conceptual representation of that reality. This bi-planar and transitive nature of the sign is reminiscent of St. Augustine’s (354-430) remodification of the Aristotelian notion of sign. St. Augustine took the words to be conventional sounds affecting the ear. Every word is composed of the signification or the mental representation, the sonus or the sound image associated with it. The sign as a whole is related in a conventional way to the thing signified (Kelly 1979 :8).

According to structuralism, relations within language are independent of the relation between language and the outside world. Terence Hawkes, one of the main advocates of structuralism summed up this position by saying that Language...allows no single, unitary appeals to "a reality" beyond itself. In the end, it constitutes its own reality [sic] (Devitt & Sterelny 1987: 219). To structuralism, language takes precedence over, and therefore is necessary for developing, thought. Saussure held the view that thought without semiotic form is an amorphous indistinct intuition (Ibid., 215). By giving our thoughts their form, language signs shape our experience.
Such a concept of the relationship between language and reality influenced the way translation studies evolved afterwards. One of the major contributions of structuralism to the study of translation is to highlight the previously overlooked link between meaning and culture. As a result the social and cultural aspects of language, as well as the relationship of language and thought became more evident. Jakobson (1971), for example, suggested that language is situated between nature and culture, and that it serves as a foundation for culture (107). Others (eg. Hawkes) maintained that:

language acts as a great conservative force in human apprehension of the world....It allows no single, unitary appeals to a ‘reality’ beyond itself.

(Hawkes 1989: 26).

The structuralist approach to language in general, and the Saussurian one in particular, was characteristically a synergetic one that considered the whole as more than the sum of its independent units, and that independent units represent only a value within this totality. Therefore, the value of the unit in a system is not the same as its value taken independently. This is a position diametrically opposed to atomistic approach of realists, (cf. Russell). In other words, structuralism takes the holistic systems as necessary a priori to the understanding of the meaning of language units. Saussure has made it a main objective of linguistics to elicit and even abstract the totality of language as autonomous systems, and laid emphasis on invariant aspects of meaning that can explain these systems (Tobin 1990: Ch. 3).

Structuralism, thus, especially the Saussurean version, considering meaning to be the value that a sign has within the network of structural relations, adopted a reductionist view of meaning hostile to any idea of cross-language similarities among signs, and denied the existence of conceptual universals. This excludes some scholars (cf. Chomsky in linguistics, Piaget in psychology, for example), who have tried to base their structural views on a concept of a deep innate universal organism responsible for acquiring or producing sign systems.

American structuralism, more notably (cf. E. Sapir and B. Whorf) related some central issues of structuralism, such as the arbitrary relationship between language and outside reality, and the dependence of thought on language system, more directly to translation. They inferred from Saussure's view on the relational aspect of language,
and the Gestalt theory of understanding, the extreme view that subjects remain enclosed within their languages' interpretation of the world. Hence, world views and meaning in general were relativised to a particular language, ruling out any possibility of translation.

Scott 1990 ascribed the revival of the structuralist concept of language after the Second World War to two main factors: the massive transformation of the communication field as a result of advancement of information theory by scholars such as C. Shannon in 1948, combined with advances made in the field of cybernetics (complex systems designs). Scott claimed that the development of system theory was instrumental in spreading the notions of the human brain as an intelligent machine, and of machines as potentially rendered intelligent. Human behaviour ceased to be seen as mere simple reflexes or operant conditioning, and a rapidly growing idea that behaviour involves more complex processes such as planning and feedback, gained momentum (39). Scott pointed out that Saussure's *Cours de Linguistique Générale* came to be widely recognized only posthumously, and was introduced in English for the first time only in 1949, while Pierce's work, which was received with a great deal of religious prejudice at the beginning, soon found a lot of support (72).

As a consequence, language function was separated from language structure, and language came to be viewed on two levels: on the level of the system as a sign; and on the level of function as a message (communication). The structuralist approach to communication was also developed into an abstraction from the message into a stable code and the code theory of communication was advanced in the field of semiotics by Jakobson and the Prague school.

In psychology Piaget put forth a constructivist structural theory of child cognition. In anthropology, Levi Strauss strongly endorsed Saussurean structuralism for the study of kinship systems within a culture where he declared linguistic structuralism as the archetypal model for the human sciences by maintaining that:

> because they are symbolic systems, kinship systems offer the anthropologist a rich field, where his efforts can almost (and we emphasize 'almost') converge with those of the most highly developed of the social sciences, namely linguistics.

(Hawkes 1989: 38).
Even in literature, a structuralist view was advocated by the Russian Formalist School which strongly believed that ‘Since linguistics is the global science of verbal structure, poetics may be regarded as an integral part of linguistics’ (Jakobson 1986: 148).

The revival of structuralism was given a new dimension by the advent of Chomsky (1957), in that Chomsky emphasised explanatory adequacy and the discovery of linguistic universals as the main aims of linguistic theory (Ibid.). Chomsky’s theory merged a structural conception of language with new dynamic mathematical formalism that aimed at obtaining explanatory adequacy, and tried to constitute grammar as a generative structure. Chomsky perhaps did not have in mind the idea of developing a theory of language suitable for automatic system use, yet it is also difficult to assume that he was completely unconscious of these developments around him in language studies at the time. Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures transformed the scene of language studies for decades to come.

George Steiner (1975) dated the beginning of the third period for the development of translation with the publication of the first paper on machine translation. This development, he claimed, has had great repercussions on approaches to translation afterwards. But different attempts made at designing translation machines lead to a growing tendency in translation studies for favouring autonomous views of language (3.2.3 n.5).

The project of a translating machine gradually turned from scientific curiosity to commercial and military viability. The consequences for translation studies were twofold. First, these new circumstances led to a massive flow of funds for the research development of machine translation (MT). Hym and Fought (1975), for example, claimed that these institutionalized funds were essential for forming linguistics as a discipline, and that major governmental funding for MT formed an essential part of this fund. When the fund for MT stopped, this ‘has not entailed the disappearance of the theoretical papers made possible by it’ (13).

Attempts to formalize the process of translation by regulating inter-lingual transfer resulted in designing different formal accounts of possible go-between languages. According to W. Wills (1982), the first demonstration of Russian-English in Georgetown in 1954 brought with it a great deal of undue optimism. Wills ascribed this enthusiasm to the early ingenious assumptions that translation is an automatic
replacement of words in one language with words in another (30). The availability of funds for these projects has increased the interest of information theory in linguistics and linguistics’ interest in translation. This also coincided with the publication of the first book on the science of translation by Nida in (1964), and a collection of papers on translation edited by Brower in (1959) which includes Jakobson’s (1959) short and influential paper On Linguistic Aspects of Translation. The development of an autonomous theory of language suitable for MT was one of the ambitions of many translation studies. For example, Nida’s (1964) last chapter was dedicated to machine translation, while Catford who is a phonetician by profession wrote a book entitled A Linguistic Theory of Translation, which was committed mainly to formalising translational equivalences between systems of languages. Other early attempts to devise a viable process of machine translation include works such as Shannon and Weaver (1949), and (Bar-Hillel (1966), among many others.

On the other hand, the search for a viable theory of MT greatly contributed to the liberation of translation studies from literary and theological monopoly. Translation studies started to be considered as important on their own merits.

However, Saussurean structuralism shared with old formalism certain basic assumptions about translation. Firstly, structuralism kept the old formalist assumption that the two texts in the two languages, the SL text and TL text, perform or ought to perform the same function. This belief was held despite the widely held view that cultures are autonomous systems. Secondly, instead of translation being seen as preserving designation (as was the case with logical formalism) by appealing to the real world, structuralism emphasised the preservation of significations, appealing to the system concerned. Thus, structuralist and formalist approaches to translation share the concept of translation as a meaning-preserving operation. It follows that, thirdly, they both assumed a single possible reading of a text that should render a similar outcome of translations. Lastly, they restricted the unit of translation to words and sentences ignoring by doing so the text as a whole, the text as a unit of translation that reflects its producer’s intention.

Few would doubt that the structural approach to language and meaning has deepened our understanding of language and meaning by going beyond the appearance of the individual linguistic practices to unearth their deeper social essence. It is also
noticeable that most major translation approaches including those of Nida (1964), De Beaugrande (1978), Jakobson (1959), Vinay & Darbelnet (1958), were influenced by Saussure’s and Chomsky's structuralist views. But all these approaches, machine translation included, came to similar conclusions of the impossibility of either matching autonomous language systems, or devising a formal mechanism or universal language that can go between. Another stumbling-block is a host of problems related to putting these approaches into practical use. It became obvious that language is not as autonomous, or systematic as it was thought to be. On the one hand, language relates a to real outside world (Wittgenstein, Russell, above). On the other, language cannot be totally separated from speech, or social and historical realities (Vološinov (1973); Dubois (1984); Pêcheux (1982); Uhlenbeck (1978).

Bakhtin (1986) thought that language system is not an objective but an abstracted objectivized concept that can only approximate what language really is. In Bakhtin’s view language is a dynamic cluster of heteroglossic genres that together form an overarching network-like organisation. This organization can be approximated, only when reified, by linguistic-like approaches. However, in reality this reification cannot be maintained because language in reality is a dynamic ever-changing social reality. Pêcheux (1982) shares similar views by saying that systematicity and creativity constitute each other, and by taking speech acts as creative transgressions of the system of language, he declared that the autonomy of language from speech is not absolute.

For Bakhtin and Pêcheux as well as others (cf. Pierre Bourdieu) the question is not to deny the stability of language forms or language systems, but to question their rigidity and closure. This criticism is best represented by Bourdieu who tried to modify the concept of structure so as to accommodate the spatio-temporality of the discursive practice (Jenkins 1992: passim). Bourdieu accepted the existence of objective social systems that influence the consciousness and desires of the agents living within society; however, he rejected the idea that the influence of these systems on the individual is deterministic, but equally refused to consider them as totally autonomous, or independent of the subject’s intentions and needs. According to Bourdieu, the objective structure familiarizes the individual that lives in a community with an immediate sense of understanding of things, as well as a propensity to act in
certain ways which, Bourdieu called *habitus*. *Habitus* also includes the individual’s awareness of the best strategies for achieving his needs and satisfying his desires within the community.

Habitus, however, stands to practice in a non-deterministic causal relation; that is, it more or less precipitates the individual to behave according to his social and ideological awareness of how things are. Yet, in practice, in a spatio-temporal act, the *habitus* is negotiated according to the specific goals, interest and the context of that particular act. The subject is always capable of behaving otherwise (Ibid.).

Bourdieu objected to the Saussurean concept of *langue* and Chomsky’s concept of *competence*; instead, he postulated, similar to the social *habitus*, a linguistic one. Linguistic *habitus* accounts for the linguistic knowledge that underlies speech acts. A linguistic act is determined by the individual’s linguistic *habitus* and the social linguistic market. (Jenkins, 1992, passim).

We find that the concept of *habitus* is useful in explaining the social linguistic norms and individual tendencies of language use, and we assume also that the social upbringing of the individual can sway the way he linguistically behaves. However, we wish to limit ‘habitus’ to the level of language use, *parole*. By doing so, we presume that *habitus* comes very close to explaining what Bakhtin meant by his concept of linguistic genre. We agree also with Bourdieu that linguistic and social influences on the formation of the individual may not encapsulate the individual consciousness to a point of not understanding or translating other cultures. However, we presume that language structures go beyond the notion of individual strategies or *habitus*, in as much as communication, as many linguists assume, is one but not the only function of language.

Bourdieu’s interest in language was not purely linguistic, but anthropological. This testifies to a new interdisciplinary nature of language study. Bourdieu looked at language from an anthropological perspective as a system of social organization on a par with other social conventional systems of norms or beliefs. His view may sound irrelevant to scholars not interested in language use, to those who are only interested in language structure.

Finally, it can be said that the interest of mainstream linguistics in translation, if we put aside certain philosophical debates, and if we go beyond the euphoric short
period of *MT*, has been minimal. By contrast, translation attracted the interest of literary critics, theologian, anthropologists, because of the nature of their inter-cultural practice. Although, other discipline’s use of linguistic methods has always been eclectic, and sometimes hasty. A field where linguistics and translation issues often intersect is ethno-linguistics. What follows is a discussion of examples of their encounter.

5.3. Anthropo-linguistics and Translation

Language has always been important to the understanding of man. All fields of human sciences including anthropology, ethnology, and archaeology have recognized the importance of language. For many anthropologists the relationship between the study of natural language and the study of human culture has always existed. Linguistics, on the other hand, has grown out of a philological interest in comparing languages. Asad (1979) ascribed the use of the concept of a unified *total culture* in anthropology to emulating the linguistic concept of language system (Grillo *et al*, 1987: 239). Ethnologists (cf. Malinowsky, Burke), have greatly contributed to linguists’ awareness of the functional aspects of language.

The views of man and his language in anthropology and in other fields mentioned above such as linguistics or philosophy reflect an interesting parallelism. Evolutionist anthropology at the beginning of this century (cf. E. Tylor), which considered culture to be an achievement of man, man in the generic sense of the word, approached other cultures as different stages in one unified culture. Since anthropology in most cases is practised by scholars from more industrialized communities engaging in the study of so-called primitive societies, anthropologists had no qualms about matching pieces of cultural achievements of primitive cultures with those of modern ones to detect such evolution. Such comparison made it appear to Tylor, for example, that today’s primitive cultures represent early stages of their European counterpart. Therefore Tylor inferred not only that the mentality of adult primitives equals that of a European infant, but that the behaviour of latter can shed light on that of the former (Tambiah, 1990: 44), whereas, J. Frazer, contended, that principle of similarity, and the principle
of contiguity, the two rational laws of thought, are confused in the primitive frame of mind, making his mystical mind incapable of rational thought (Ibid., 52).

Others, for example Lévi-Bruhl, tried to prove that the primitive’s mind cannot be considered as equal to an early extension of the modern one, but that it is a mentality altogether different. He then concluded his positivistic speculation by saying that the primitive’s thinking derives more from casual participation in his surroundings, than from causal logical reasoning. Therefore, the primitive’s thought is not pre-mature but is pre-logical 85-6).

According to Tambiah (1990) and Leach (1982), the common feature of earlier European practices of anthropology, similar to the ones mentioned above, is its disregard for cultural diversity and the assumption that the units of the discourse of the native and that of the ethnologist are easily interchangeable. The focus was more on thought, of which language was a symptom. The translation from the languages of primitive societies into the languages and meta-languages of the researchers, despite being an integral part of anthropological practice, was not addressed, and often taken for granted.

However, a new generation of anthropologists, in Europe and America, according to Leach (1982), took more interest in first hand experience of other cultures than in missionary reports on these cultures. Field work of scholars (cf. River, Boas), despite depending on paid informants and ready made texts, increased awareness of the importance of empirical work. This awareness opened the door for revolutionizing anthropology by other anthropologists, who in order to increase the empirical worthiness of their work, tried living among the natives and learning the native’s languages. Living among the natives, the difficulty in learning the natives’ language, made crystal clear to anthropologists (cf. Malinowski, Whorf, Evans-Pritchard) the complexity of the natives’ language and culture, and the inaccuracy of previous anthropologists’ generalizations about them (23). Reporting in the researchers’ languages about the native cultures proved very laborious and sometimes impossible. According to Leach (1982), discussions using the native’s language in its social context raised questions the answer to which proved inadequate if the Aristotelian logic of excluded middle is to be applied to them (23). The dilemma then, as described by Barnett and Chen (1989), is posed as what is legitimate and what is
possible in representing the other’s culture (122). However, it became evident that anthropology is about cultures not culture, and the unitary evolutionist view was eclipsed.

Since for anthropologists translation has always played a rôle in interpreting the native languages, the issue of translatability became a pivotal area of the new revisionist attitude. For example, Evans-Pritchard, another anthropologist of the empiricist creed, described the overlap between translation and anthropological studies as follows:

I am not denying that the semantic difficulties in translation are very great. They are considerable enough between, shall we say, French and English; but when some primitive language has to be rendered into our own tongue they are, for obvious reasons, much more formidable. They are in fact the major problem we are confronted with in the subject we are discussing....

(qtd. in Leach 1982: 53).

Relativists, e.g., Sapir and Whorf, as mentioned earlier, objected to the use of translation as an acceptable method of discussing alien cultures, whereas, social anthropologists, mostly in Europe, emphasised functional and structural aspects of such translation.

To describe cultures, anthropologists turned to other fields such as linguistics or social psychology for means of cultural explanation. Saussurian structuralism, Durkheimian sociology and Wundt's version of psychology were among the views social anthropologists resorted to solve cultural puzzles. For example, Saussure’s structural theory was made use of in Germany to explain Völkerpsychologie, as it was viewed in the tradition of Humboldt and Wundt. Weisgerber assigned language the status of a Zwischenwelt (Intermediate linguistic form) between man and culture (Herbst et. al. 1979). Since then most anthropologists sanctioned the idea that knowledge of language deepens understanding of the hidden norms and the ways of thinking of a community.

Yet one can say that a similar schism (rationalists vs realists) pervaded the field of structural anthropology. Empirical practice of anthropology, for example, was characteristic of the British school of anthropology associated with scholars such as Malinowski, Firth, and Evans-Pritchard. This trend adopted a functional view of
language akin to that of ordinary language philosophers, whereas rationalist anthropology was a characteristic of continental anthropology as with Levi Strauss and Bühler, inter alia. Rational anthropologists continued practising old-fashioned cultural anthropology emphasizing the unity of the psyche of man. Therefore they legitimized resorting to universal conceptual postulates such as Strauss’s interest in the universal incest taboo, or Kroeber’s universal patterning of cultures. Both scholars also relied on componential analysis to study conceptual schemes. Scholars of universal anthropology (cf. Strauss, Geertz, as well as Marxist anthropologists) continued to look at other cultures for explaining certain central issues in Western cultures, such as sexuality, laws, and labour (Barnett and Chen 1989: 120).

Early linguistic translation theories, apart from ones influenced by Chomsky’s views, can be said to belong to one of the two versions of structuralism, functionalist or rationalist. Firth, for example, followed the steps of Malinowski; meanwhile Nida continued the tradition of Völkerpsychologists. Some recent views of translation derive mainly from criticism of these two schools, such as de Beaugrande’s (1978) which is a combination of functional linguistics with Chomsky concept of competence.

The issue of translation was first raised against traditional anthropology by B. Malinowski, who accused earlier anthropologists of ignoring the functional aspects of the native’s language. Invoking W. James’ idea that the main function of thought is the interest of its beholder, Malinowski supposed that the main function of the native’s behaviour, including his linguistic behavior, is the native’s well being. If the magic of the native is functioning as symbolic activity, it would cease to be mystical (Tambiah 1990: 67).

Meaning in language, Malinowski claimed, cannot be divorced from its function in a context of situation. Language in general is seen through its instrumental function in society. According to Malinowski (1929), translation is not a matter of mere readjustment of verbal symbols. Translation must always be seen as based on the unification of cultural context [emphasis added] (qtd. in Wellwarth, 1981: 144).

According to Tambiah (1990) Malinowski, among other anthropologists of a functionalist persuasion (cf. K. Burke), emphasised the pragmatic function of language, and claimed that language in some cultures and in certain circumstances is used not only to speak about actions or to describe scientific facts, but also to induce
actions in other individuals, as in ritual practices, or in advertising in modern societies for example.

By highlighting the pragmatic function of language, Malinowski, saw truth in most circumstances of language use as a **pragmatic truth** that stems, not from any objective criteria outside the situations of language use as assumed by truth-conditional semantics, for example, but from language’s functions in different situations. For similar reasons, Malinowski was also keen to distinguish the functional aspect of language from its descriptive one (74-85).

The context of situation as postulated by Malinowski was motivated by purely anthropological considerations, that is to provide realistic evidence about what the meaning of the native’s expressions can be without reverting to what Firth calls the *collective soul* (Firth 1952: 139), or in other words to *Völkerpsychologie*. Therefore, according to Leach, Malinowski views were purely individualistic and saw meaning in language as measured by its utility to the practical need of the individual. Though he did not deny the social dimension of meaning, Malinowski considered social meaning to serve the immediate need of the individual, and went to great lengths to emphasise the utilitarian function of language and culture (26-31). He abandoned any concept of social consensus or social convention for the sake of individual utilitarianism, an issue for which he was much criticized. Leach criticized Malinowski for being, while *self-evidently* correct, argumentatively banal and trivial (30), a criticism that is typically repeated of structuralists of observational empiricist inclination (cf. Malinowski).

Emphasis on observation of individual occurrences of utterances had to be equalled with the precision in the translation of these observations in the languages accessible to the audience of these anthropological writings. In other words linguistic equivalences had to be proposed and justified to validate such translation. Malinowski and others were extremely wary of translation equivalence as a medium of cultural investigation; therefore, Malinowski did not rule out translatability; instead he opted for restricting the conditions under which the native’s and the researcher’s terms can be considered as translational equivalents.

It is interesting to note that, according to Firth (1952), Malinowski proposed two types of equivalences for the purpose of achieving translation. The first, according to
which every expression and formative affix is rendered into an English equivalent, *interlinear* word-for-word translation. The other, was translation into *running* English, a *free or running* equivalence. Translation to Malinowski is achieved by the collation of the two equivalences. Moreover, Malinowski believed that the meaning of a word that is derived from its meaning in different texts, is its *primary meaning* according to which an English equivalent can be postulated (Ibid., 147).

This concept of linguistic equivalence was carried over to translation studies first by Bible translators (cf. Nida (1964), Nida and Taber (1969)) who employed linguistic and anthropological information for spreading the knowledge of the Bible, and then into linguistics by scholars like Catford (1964). Malinowski's work was continued by J. R. Firth, who was a student of Malinowski, and shared the same empirical orientation. Firth was instrumental both in the understanding and development of Malinowski's ideas about translation, as will be shown below.

Some other anthropologists (cf. Evans-Pritchard, Radcliff-Brown, Geertz), championed a functional approach that tried to go beyond individual behaviour to the social background that forms the canvas for that behaviour. They were more interested in the underlying structure of cultures so that if one can say that Malinowski practised anthropology of *parole*, one can describe them as the anthropologists of *langue*. The three scholars considered the translation from the native language to be interpretive. Evans-Pritchards pointed out that the translation of the Zandi Mbori as God entails ascribing all the Christian characteristics of God to Mbori (Grillo *et al.*, 1987: 285). Radcliff-Brown avoided the question of translation altogether by engaging in purely sociological description of the Andaman society (Leach 1982: 30).

Geertz, on the other hand, was reported by Barnett and Chen (1989) as criticising Malinowski for being indiscriminate in his interpretation of the native and as emphasizing the selective nature of interpretation in describing other cultures. Geertz holds that the anthropologist should *interpret* the symbolic activities of the natives by empathizing with them, using hermeneutic dialectical method of explaining the most local by means of the most global, before translating them in his language (121). Geertz questioned the symmetric equivalences between the anthropologist and the informer in the communication situation, by indicating that the presence of the
anthropologist among the natives is specially felt, and that the native may behave in a special way to please him (Ibid.,)

What is interesting in Barnett and Chen is presentation of the rhetoric of anthropology, is Clifford’s criticism of Geertz, a criticism that can be directed against other reductionist practices as well. Clifford accused Geertz of not acknowledging the contribution of the native in shaping the anthropologist’s report, by not giving enough room for the voice of the native, and for depending solely on the fact that (the anthropologists) was there (123). According to Barnett and Chen, Clifford invoked Bakhtin’s concept of polyphony, to claim that Geertz’ work should be taken as engaging in conversation with the native rather than a narration of what the native says. Clifford insisted on regarding the natives not as informants but as participants in a dialogue with the researcher. The native then is part author of the anthropological report, a report which is polyphonic and speaks for the two. The rôle of the native is not that of an informer but collaborator (Ibid.).

5.4. Firth’s Approach to Translation

After introducing Malinowski’s pragmatic views, we feel it is appropriate to join them with those of Firth, not only because Firth’s linguistic approach to meaning is similar to that of Malinowski, but also because of the former’s critique of the latter, a critique which is (even if limited) a significant one. Firth, as a linguist, disagreed with some of Malinowski’s basic philosophical and linguistic assumptions. For example, Firth thought that Malinowski’s views concealed a contradiction between emphasizing the need for a theory and advocating a contextual analysis with a strong realist bias. Therefore, he accused Malinowski of looking for brute facts independent of the statements in which they are described. If a sound film is taken of the natives gardening activity, said Firth, then the visual part of it would be self-explaining, but the native’s meanings that accompany sounds need thorough linguistic analysis (155).

Firth also gave primacy to linguistic form, but, even so, argued against learning meaning from definition and spoke of two types of meanings: general (abstract) and specific (contextual) meanings. Meaning to him can only be established through function of utterance in context (ibid). Thus, building on similar functionalist
assumptions to those of Malinowski that consider meaning to be a property of context of situation, Firth (1952) saw meaning as an integral part of linguistic analysis. Linguistic meaning is a product of language meaning and the intricate interplay of the social relationship of the participants in the communicative situation (14).

As pointed out by Dixon (1965: 90), Firth, by introducing different ranks of grammar, and by treating phonology on a separate level from grammar, was able to assign meaning to larger linguistic units such as collocations, and was able to include aspects of prosodic meaning, not accounted for in abstract autonomous analysis, such as intonation. Firth (1952) also attributed the meaning of a word to its functional use as it collocates with other words, and considered this as evidence of the validity of his systemic views. Firth gave as an example the word ass, a word with a wide collocational-meaning varieties such as: do not be such an ass, he is a silly ass etc. (108).

Firth disapproved of the ‘minimalists’ functional views of language as represented by the Prague school, who consider the phoneme as the smallest unit of meaning and built on that a global hierarchical notion of meaning. Equally, he opposed the dualists’ views for attempting to separate meaning from structure, and for upholding the duality of the sign, as is the case with Saussurean semiotics.

Firth distinguishes between structure which enters in the syntagmatic construction of language and the linear relation among its elements, and system, which comprises paradigmatic relations among language units (1952: 91-2). So he was able to propose a psychosomatic approach that should look for meaning as a relation of the structure of language to its system, the system as it appears in a context of situation (117-8). This could be done by two steps: the breaking down of system into phonology, morphology, and syntax- a multi-systemic approach; then the replacement of the concept of general grammar with different grammars of restricted languages. Since Firth thought it was not appropriate to speak of a unified language but rather of different restricted languages (languages that are used for specific purposes (ibid).

However, unlike Malinowski, Firth claimed that even if the analysis of meaning is dependent on the context of situation, it cannot be found directly in that situation, but has to be abstracted from it. Thus, he prescribed a different concept of function that approached meaning from a linguistic point of view, based on the abstract totality of
the interrelationships of elements of language in a context, and not on the material function of language in situation. The abstract totality of language interrelationships in a context, was equivalent, for him, to the function of that language in the context of situation.

Firth’s concept of restricted language was his empirical functional counterpart of the rational functionalist’s breaking down of language into sub-languages that was a characteristic of the methodology of most of the functional approaches to language (cf. Bühler’s (1934) Sprachtheorie, Jakobson’s (1960) Linguistic and Poetic). The latter’s classifications, however, were related to the system of language prior to language’s use in a context. Some of the more recent works in text linguistics (cf. Halliday (1978), De beaugrande and Dressler (1981)) have tried to make use of both classificatory systems in a broader concept of functional perspective.

Hence, Firth proceeded with a larger unit of analysis, which can account for the occurrence of language in a single context, the text. Text, so to speak, is how a context of situation is mirrored in language. This also coheres with Firth’s partition of language into different functional languages (restricted languages), languages that are not delimited by language systems, but by speech. Therefore the text, for Firth, was a convenient primary unit of systemic linguistic analysis.

Firth was fully aware of the difficulties faced by the holistic approach to language when it comes to accounting for the diverse commonplace functions of language. Therefore he insisted that what gets articulated in a single situation is not the whole language (language structure), but part of that language, or text in context. The text he then treated on a separate level as ‘language system’. In other words, he made a convenient distinction between structural analysis according to co-occurrence in a text, and structuralist analysis with holistic implication.

Bakhtin, who shared similar views about the meaning as an outcome of the function of an utterance (text) in context, would perhaps consider these purely empirical views as insufficient, since to him, there are aspects of meaning that go beyond the context of situation of a text to include relations between the text and other texts about the same subject, ideological and generic relations. He claimed there are aspects of other previous utterances to which an utterance orients itself. To Bakhtin there is a dialogue between the empirical real text and the ideal social, and ideological orientation of the
text, between what is present and what is implied in meaning. To Bakhtin also the relationship between the language of a text and the context of situation is not one of mirroring, but rather one of inclusion. In other words context is not reflected in but rather forms an integral part of the meaning of the text as an utterance. The relationship between speakers in a context is also seen by Bakhtin as asymmetrical, but he considered this asymmetry as caused by, and not a reflection, of the speaker’s previous linguistic encounters. In other words, the transformation of a system of language in a contextual utterance is a realisation that follows generic organization. Though, Bakhtin’s ‘genre’ has a similar meaning to Firth’s concept of ‘restricted language’, genres belong to social realities rather than to linguistic organization.

Firth’s views of translation were mainly inspired by his criticism of the anthropologists’ and linguists’ unrestricted use of it as a method of unquestioned descriptive reliability. Although he advocated approaching translation within the concept of restricted language, he claimed that translation is not concerned with form, but only with content. Consequently, he ruled out any possibility of either finding unified designative forms of expressions between languages, or equivalences of these forms cross-culturally. This may be due to Firth’s denial of a unified meaning of a word, including for that matter Malinowski’s concept of the primary meaning of a word. Dictionary meaning, Firth claimed, is obtained by the lexicographer’s arbitrary collation of authoritative citations (Ibid., 138).

Elsewhere, he quoted favourably late Wittgenstein for saying that the meaning of words lies in their use (138). Translation equivalences are never really equivalent, and the translation-meaning applies to no more than the referential meaning of names (112). Translation to Firth, however, is possible because the difficulties of translation between two disparate languages are not so great if the situations are to some extent common (109). Translation, thus, is possible because two languages may converge on the same context of situation (110).

This citation, as it seems, does not accord with his above mentioned criticism of Malinowski on the account of being so biased to realism so as to neglect the meaning relations that exist within language. It may be obvious that Firth was also resorting to excessive realism by relying only on context of situation to account for what was to him unexplainable, that is translation.
However, what remains unexplained is whether this convergence is systemic or structural, and either way, how this convergence is achieved. Then again, Firth, knowing perhaps that his explanation of translation is not as satisfactory and plausible as his criticism of it, declared that translation is enigmatic because we are not able to detect exactly what happens, or what goes on in our minds, when we translate, a reason for which he alleged that devising a machine that is able to translate is dependent on the availability of sufficient knowledge of what goes on inside the *human machine* when it translates. He went on to say that it was possibly easier to devise a machine that speaks than one that translates (93).

Two things can be said about Firth’s approach to translation; the first is that, by restricting his discussion of translation to the concept of translation equivalence, he ruled out any possibility of translation other than simply finding inter-lingual equivalences of linguistic units. The second relates to his focus on similarity of contexts of situation as a condition of translatability, a condition that can hardly be met. This condition is incongruous with the main function of translation as an operation that aspires to surmount contextual differences.

However, Firth’s functional approach to meaning influenced many widespread modern approaches to meaning, notably Halliday’s systemic approach as well as other text linguistic methods. A serious effort to develop a comprehensive explanation of translation from a systemic point of view is that of Catford (1964). Catford’s views of translation will be presented later in this chapter, not because they are unimportant, but because we want to present in what follows some of Chomsky’s universal concept of language. Chomsky we believe was indirectly influential on comprehensive translation theories, such as those attempted by Catford. Chomsky’s position also contrasts very well with Firth’s.

5.5. Chomsky’s Universalism

Contrary to what is generally believed, Chomsky’s influence on translation studies, even if indirect, was a significant one. This was so for many obvious reasons; the most prominent among these reasons is his concept of universalism as well as the enormous volume of studies of cognition that his theory instigated.
Following Chomsky’s criticism of behaviourism, the attention of linguistics switched from linguistic behaviour (verbal-behaviour) and the taxonomic listing of language constituents (cf. Bloomfieldian structuralism) to more dynamic description of the underlying psychological processes that recur every time we speak a language, and to the underlying knowledge of the speaker. Efforts were made to decide the nature of the organism responsible for those processes. Therefore, one can say that a paradigm shift (in the Kuhnian manner) took place within the field of linguistics and to a certain extent in psychology. In Kempson’s words, attention shifted to answering the question what does the knowledge of language consist of? (Kempson 1988: 3).

Chomsky saw this knowledge as being purely grammatical, and something to do with the structure of the human organ responsible (mind). This organ exists in an initial state S°; which when exposed to outside linguistic environment get transformed to S¹ or the particular grammar of a language. This takes the form of passive unconscious internalisation. Thus, Chomsky distinguished the universal innate grammatical knowledge from a particular language’s grammar, and called it universal grammar, UG, [hereafter]. UG constrains any possible internalised grammar or in other words the set of possible languages (Ibid., 4). Everything else outside this abstract grammar (specific language grammars) is the concern of the unpredictable domain of externalised linguistics (see 2.1.2 above).

This linguistic faculty which is independent of other mental faculties such as memory or knowledge of the world, for example, is represented in a purely syntactic form, and is essential for organizing the way we acquire our first language. This separation is a centrepiece of Chomsky’s views of the modularity of the mind and the autonomy of knowledge of language from knowledge of the world. The mind is assumed to be composed of different faculties or ‘modules’ each with a particular function.

Although Chomsky’s theory was basically reductionist and said very little about meaning and translation, still its contribution to translation was apparent in putting forth a widespread hypothesis of the possible reduction of all languages to the same basic structure. Although, languages are different and diversified, our original linguistic faculty as represented in UG is the same. According to Chomsky (in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, PP. 27-8):
The main task of linguistic theory must be to develop an account of linguistic universals that will not be falsified by the actual diversity of languages and explicit enough to account for the rapidity and uniformity of language learning.

(Chomsky in Steiner 1975: 95).

Steiner reported that in one of the rare moments where Chomsky spoke of translation, he scantly and ambivalently warned of taking his thesis of possible linguistic universals as professing a complete and nonproblematic notion of translatability. Therefore, Chomsky continues:

The existence of deep-seated formal universals ...implies that all languages are cut to the same pattern, but does not imply that there is any point by point correspondence between particular languages. It does not, for example, imply that there must be some reasonable procedure for translating between languages.

(Ibid., 105-6).

Chomsky went on to say that translation between actual languages depends on the sufficiency of substantive universals, and not on deep seated formal ones; thus, there is little reason to suppose that reasonable procedures of translation are in general possible (Ibid.).

According to Steiner an unbridged gap was created by Chomsky between the ‘deep universal structure’ and a possible model of translation based on this structure. The universal appeal of Chomsky’s attitude to language is incoherently matched by a relativistic view, similar to that hypothesised by Whorf, on the issue of translation. But this becomes less of a surprise, if one takes in account that Chomsky maintained a Cartesian outlook to language that took the duality of language as mind (grammar) and language as speech for granted. He was universalist when it came to grammar, relativist when the matter concern speech.

But for Chomsky, as also for other Cartesian approaches that start from assumptions about the timeless essence of thinking or grammar, translation is problematic, since it would be looked at as matching substantive categories (translation equivalences) between languages. Therefore, with the absence of such categories it is easier to rule out translatability than to give up the Cartesian doctrine. At the time of
Chomsky’s writing the above comments, translation was commonly considered to be a matter of finding categorial equivalences between languages.

Some linguists were soon to become dissatisfied with Chomsky’s dualism, and his earlier declaration that the relation between competence (language faculty) and performance (language use) is a mystery. Chomsky’s original theory was further weakened when it became apparent that it was difficult to give an account of language on purely syntactic basis. The adherents of transformational grammar were soon to disagree on the nature of these transformations, and contrary to what had been supposed before, some transformations were found to be non-meaning preserving. To give just one example, passive movement transformations does not preserve the semantic quantification as in:

(1) a- Many arrows did not hit the target.
   b- The target was not hit by many arrows.

(Devitt and Sternely 1987: 104)

There was never an agreement since then on whether semantics is part of the deep structure as supposed by the generative semanticists (cf. Lakoff, McCawley), or whether it is possible to delineate neatly the boundaries between syntax and semantics. Chomsky himself has revised his views more than once to accommodate the problems created by them, for example, in the Extended Standard Theory (1969), Trace theory (1980). In Chomsky (1986) it seems that he prefers to see UG in terms of constraints and parameters that can affect any possible grammar. Chomsky has recently reduced the amount of transformations as means of generating structures to what seems to be only one constraint alpha movement.

However, because of its universal appeal, Chomsky’s theory was a driving force behind a renewed interest in contrastive studies of languages, and, indirectly, to the study of translation. The mood of that period was reflected by Katz’s effability hypothesis of translation mentioned above (4.1.2.3), and in Nida’s (1964) concept of a science of translation. Chomsky’s views gave also an impetus to the appearance of cognitive views of discourse and the views of translation developed in them. For example de Beaugrande and Dressler’s views of translation studies from a cognitive
text analysis perspective, and their concept of underlying text schema, along with recent advances in cognitive linguistics, derived mostly from Chomsky's influence. It became known that every time one translates, one's translation involves the knowledge of how to translate rather than squabbling with a text in a given translation.

Chomsky's Cartesian theory also brought the analogy between the machine and the generating human mind a step closer. His insights on the underlying structure of language increased the feasibility of MT projects. In almost all MT programs one finds a procedure of analysis, transfer, and regeneration according to unified generative structure. However, apart from machine aids to translation, such as automated dictionary and word processing, there has been little success in designing a machine that can translate, even with scientific or technical texts.

However, it remains to be said that Chomsky's basic assumption of UG, his defence of the discontinuity of evolution between species, and his emphasis on the uniqueness of the language of mankind, as well as his strong inclination to universality, are of central importance to the explanation of translatability. As is going to be shown in chapter 7, it would very difficult to uphold the issue of translatability without acknowledging a shared linguistic faculty. Even so, one cannot defend the claim of untranslatability against the empirical proof of the practice of translation.

According to Uhlenbeck the transformational grammar undertaking was faced by a major stumbling block which is the establishment of a unified and incontrovertible criterion of grammaticality. As time went on, two difficulties arose: the first is the intricacy of abandoning meaning totally from the judgment of grammaticality, the second is the dependency of this judgment on contextual factors. The following sentence from McCawley (1976):

2) Kissinger conjectures poached.
Makes good sense and is grammatical only if inserted in an appropriate context which allows for such an antecedent as President Ford likes his eggs (Uhlenbeck 1977: 192).
According to Uhlenbeck language is so organized that the presence of supplementary information is taken for granted (Ibid., 195).

Therefore attempts to account for meaning in a way that is suitable for transformational formalism, lead to two different linguistic theories of meaning:
componential analysis, and truth conditional semantics. A closer look at them would explain why translation cannot be accounted for by purely linguistic means. In addition, it would also place us in a better position to evaluate other approaches to translation that employ linguistic methodology.

5.5.1. Componential Analysis

Katz and Fodor, as early as (1963) proposed a kind of componential analysis (CA), as a theory of meaning that would account for the meanings of language units and their combination within a generative framework. Assumptions about meaning comparable to Carnap’s meaning postulates were merged with some anthropological taxonomic studies of culture to account for the speaker’s innate semantic knowledge. Semantic knowledge according to this theory consists of platonic conceptual primitives that relate to each other through an intricate system of binary distinctive features, similar to that found in phonology. CA was introduced into linguistics to account for paradigmatic selectional restrictions on the semantic co-occurrence of terms, that is, to predict the possible semantic anomaly of sentences.

Componential analysis operates by translating the meaning of words into an artificial language of higher conceptual features, and word’s interrelationships are calculated according to their sharing or lacking common features. For example, the word ‘bachelor’ will be given some semantic representation like: (+human), (+male), (+unmarried) (+adult). Katz distinguished universal semantic markers such as (± human) or (± adult), from particular semantic distinguishers, say for example (± fruits) (± mature). Semantic markers give rise to alytical sentences (their truth is part of their meaning), and are independent from the particular experience of one culture. This is how Katz explains his concept of a semantic marker:

A semantic marker is a theoretical construct which is intended to represent a concept that is part of the sense of the morphemes and other constituents of natural languages. By concepts in this connection we do not mean images or mental ideas or particular thoughts. Concepts ...are abstract entities. They do not belong to the conscious experience of any one, though they may be thought about....

Some linguists and translation theorists, who originally thought translation to be matching of word meanings across-languages, welcomed the idea of semantic markers. For example Leech (1981), summing up the optimistic mood of linguists at the time, wrote the following:

In fact some recent semanticists have assumed that some basic conceptual framework is common to all languages and is a universal property of the human mind

Therefore, he added:
Translation can be defined as finding synonymous expressions in another language


This overstated optimism was short-lived, because CA was later discovered in linguistics to be empirically unsound, because natural language is riddled with different types of conceptual ambiguities and metaphorical usages of meanings that only a creative mind can solve. Translation theorists (cf. Newmark (1981), Nida (1964)), however continued unquestioningly the employment of CA. In translation studies CA continued to form an integral part of an eclectic methodology. Wills (1982) attributed this to two factors: firstly, all translation theories at the time considered translation to be a transference of lexical designation; secondly, CA provided a prima facie rigorous means for contrastive and comparative methods between languages (cf. Newmark (1981), de Beaugrande (1978), Nida (1964), as a few examples) (Wills, 1982: 74-5).

Wills (1982) himself thought that the development of CA was an essential step towards the development of the science of translation (39). Coserieu (1981) suggested CA as a tertium comparationis for designation transference (Ibid.70). Newmark suggested that as translation procedure, componential analysis is both more accurate and profitable than the use of synonymy. (28).

Other linguists (cf. Lyons (1987)) pointed out that CA in its original version is not only empirically unsatisfactory, but also theoretically unsound because it was found out by many linguists that most concepts are inherently fuzzy in nature. Lyons mentioned how the meaning of bush contrasts with tree, or scream contrasts to shout as examples (168). Cultures also differ in what they consider to be adult, fruit, marriage etc.. Some psycholinguists (cf. Rosch (1977)), confirmed Lyons’ scepticism when they empirically discovered that different cultures conceive of colours and other
perceptual phenomena differently, and that semantic categories are prototypical and cultural rather than innate.

Late Wittgenstein who, as shown above, was an ex-believer in a similar atomistic theory of meaning, turned into one of the most the ardent critics of such conceptual views. Wittgenstein, of the *Philosophical Investigations*, argued that concepts have *blurred edges* (boundaries) and that they vary from one individual language game to the other. Concepts, he claimed, are like two pictures that can have the same shape but different *contours* at their boundaries (76.,36n). The word *'game'*, can relate to many concepts that we call *'game'*. For example, we talk about a *'dice game'*, *'political games'*, *'computer game'*, etc.. According to Wittgenstein, the concept of game refers to some family resemblance among different meanings of the word *'game'*. Thus, to late Wittgenstein, language relates to the outside reality through different language games (Ibid., 43.20n).

Other philosophers of language saw the whole enterprise of componential analysis as vacuous since all it does, according to D. Lewis (1970), is to substitute words in natural language for symbols in an artificial *semantic markerese* (Kempson 1989: 8). Since as Lewis noticed, semantic markers of CA do not say anything about what the words stand for and instead they explain them by other words which in themselves need explanation. CA theory was also criticised for the circularity of its logic and failing to delimit a clear distinction between semantic markers and distinguishers by Bolinger (1965).

Bakhtin (1986), on the other hand, thought that meaning in language can be seen from different perspectives, that may be suitable for different purposes. Therefore, he divided meaning relations into three possible types:

1-Relations among objects, among physical abstract phenomena. These are relations exemplified in causal, mathematical, logical, linguistic, relations.

2-Relations between subjects and objects, where a subject acts as an observer in front of immutable object.
3-Relations among subjects- individual personal relations. Unlike the other two, these are dialogical relations among utterances that include personal and ethical relations such as love, hate, sympathy etc.

Bakhtin says that the movement from one to three is a process of *personification*, while the movement in the other direction, that is from three to one is that of *reification* (138).

Even though Bakhtin considered meaning to be mostly social, he thought that linguistics could deliberately abstract from different usages of a word the general signification of that word. However he believed this only to be possible by changing the inter-personal dialogic relationships into monological relationships among language elements, that is *reifying* meaning. They do so by cutting off the subjects use of words from its telos and context and change it into one abstract instance of many other actions, as is the case of most componential theories that adopt autonomous views of meaning, *CA* included. Therefore, Bakhtin warned against the temptation of taking what is abstracted as the real meanings of language units. McMullin (1988) explains Bakhtin’s position clearly when warning that *the seductive thing about formalisms is that they can quite legitimately be studied as ends in themselves and this can be very satisfying exercise* (24).

Therefore, we believe it is fair to say that linguistic meaning can generally be indicative of true communicative meaning, yet it cannot replace that meaning. It is also reasonable to accept the facility and worthiness of employing *CA*, or indeed any other similar compartmental view of meaning such as meaning postulates, for pedagogical purposes in translation teaching, though their effective use for real translation operations is doubtful, more so, because of their non-practicality if applied to longer texts.

5.5.2. Truth-Conditional Semantics and Linguistics

As an alternative to componential analyses, some linguists have suggested another method to account for the interpretation of whole sentences instead of separate lexical items. This alternative was motivated by the observation that the interest of Generative
linguistics (the representation of the autonomous system of language in the mind isolated from pragmatic factors), is similar to that of formal semantic's search for the representation of possible truth of statements outside experience. In addition, the logical structure of syntax, and the compositionality thesis, are shared by the two schools (Ladusaw 1988: 90). These factors and others persuaded some linguists to assume a similarity between the semantic representation of a sentence and its logical form.

Ladusaw (1988) described the linguist’s view of an appropriate semantic theory as one that should account for the speaker’s (ideal speaker) semantic competence. A suitable semantic theory for linguistics is one that should account for linguistic phenomena such as paraphrasing (logical equivalence in meaning), linguistic aberration in meaning, logical relation such as entailment and contradiction among sentences. It was suggested within transformational grammar, that since the semantic representation of language is separated from its syntactic one, semantics plays only an interpretive rôle (89-91). This fact was endorsed more strongly by linguists like Lakoff (1968) who suggested the inclusion of other aspects of formal logic in linguistics by reducing the linguistic meaning of a sentence to its propositional content, and then to the truth-conditions for that sentence.

The advent of the model theory truth-conditional semantics of Montague (1974), reinforced the attempts at interpreting natural language by purely logical methods. Montague grammar is highly technical and beyond the scope of this dissertation. However its basic assumption is that natural language, as any other conventional symbolic system, can be interpreted by logical means. According to Lyons (1981) Montague grammar differs from other truth conditional semantics in that it does not assume an absolute concept of truth but takes truth as related to a particular point of interpretation, that is he treats the intension of a term as a function in a moment of interpretation (possible world) to its extension (164-5).

Even though Montague theory dealt more proficiently with some enduring problems of formal semantics such as compositionality, logical quantification, and some opaque statements, it remained a reductionist theory of meaning that deals only with part of meaning which is the descriptive and truth-conditional meaning. Other important
aspects of meaning such as paradigmatic and evaluative aspects, in addition to propositional attitudes, were overlooked (Ibid.).

Moreover, to speak of meaning as knowledge of truth-conditions, one needs to explain not only the nature of the knowledge involved, but also to define the sufficient conditions for that knowledge. The disregard for explaining the epistemic nature of knowledge in general, and knowledge of language in particular, constitutes a blind spot for the realist tradition. For example, what does it mean to say that we know what we know? or how do we get to know something? This is a tradition that relies heavily on this concept of knowledge, since, as noticed by Quine and others, there are questions pertaining to the meaning of the predicate ‘know’ itself.

As we have shown above, the questions of knowledge, the condition and proofs of knowledge, are thorny ones. The direct knowledge of things in themselves was strongly denied by Kant, as seen above according to whom we only can get to know things partly, and from certain standpoints. Quine and Hegel, on the other hand, claimed that human knowledge of things is ever changing; thus, we may think we know something to be of a certain truth-value, but as time passes we modify or even totally change that knowledge.

If we cannot know things in themselves or outside the particular way we get to know them, then there is no objective way of asserting that they are ‘true’, independent of our belief that they are true. Indeed, as Quine has demonstrated, it is difficult to verify the truth-conditions of statements about truth conditions. Umberto Eco (1988) pointed out that there are different concepts of truth: truth by definition in statement such as elephants are animals; truth by stereotype elephants are grey; historical truth such as elephants helped Hannibal to defeat the Romans (45).

Putnam (1981) subjected truth conditional semantics to a similar critique to Lewis’ with his semantic markerese. According to Putnam truth-conditional semantics consists mainly of matching abstract entities believed to stand for sets of objects in the world with another set of abstract objects of formal language symbols. In other word the models they construct of the world are themselves void of meaning. Putnam explained that if we say that the world is represented in models which are referred to by symbols in language, we are entitled to assume also that the function 'refer' is also represented in that world in a similar way. Hence, we are obliged to assign the word
‘refer’ a reference. However, because reference does not exist objectively, that is, outside the subject who is performing the act of referring, this will be inconsistent with the objectivist assumption of the theory. Moreover, it must be also circular to say that what is referred to by ‘refer’ is refer (127-8).

Many of the ex-believers in objectivist semantics have followed the steps of Wittgenstein in criticising what they had once stood for as objective views of the world. Putnam (1981) is a work to be seen in this light. Lakoff (1987) exemplifies this practice by clearly stating that prominent among the objectivist semanticists I [Lakoff] have been criticising is me-or me as I was in the late 1960s and early 1970s (217).

Cartesian linguistics has remained under the influence of the positivist conception of meaning and science. Linguists in order to mark off linguistic knowledge from other fields of language studies proposed an independent ‘language faculty’. Therefore, linguists limited their interest to propositional content, translation was understood as an exact transposition of such content from one designating system to another. Social, connotational, poetic aspects of meaning were cast aside. Itkonen (1983) claimed that Cartesian linguistics ignores social and dialectical aspects of language by taking the knowledge of language to be individual. He accused the linguistic approach to language of being a disguised normative one that confuses ‘ought’ with ‘is’. In linguistics, he claimed, ‘ought’ is being reduced to ‘is’ (225).

One must always bear in mind that what we learn about the world in science or physics is obtained first through dialogic interaction with the environment, then later abstracted and symbolically mediated through language. Thus Bakhtin (cf. Kuhn) believed that all meta-languages are paradigmatically related to their subject matter dialogically. Thus, instead of explaining language by logic, he thought possible the inverse, that it is natural language, which is even if naturally and conventionally developed, is necessary for explaining symbolic logic. The development of natural language was a necessary condition for the development of logic.

Within the linguistically oriented views of translation, three predominant works are usually seen as forming the main contributions of linguistics to translation, Firth (1959) Nida (1964), and Catford (1965). Jakobson (1957) On Linguistic Aspects of Translation is one of the influential papers on translation, however, this paper took language and translation from a wider semiotic perspective, adopting mostly a
Peircean definition of translation. Thus, instead of considering it within linguistics, we thought it more appropriate to consider it within the semiotic approaches of translation.

To a large extent, these works, that date to what might be called the heyday of linguistics, despite the amount of criticism they were subjected to, were very beneficial in forwarding the study of translation. Some of their insights still influence translation studies today. In addition, there are numerous comments or sweeping statements that were made by linguists and could directly or otherwise reflect views of certain linguists who were not wholeheartedly interested in translation.

5.6. Nida’s Science of Translation

An approach of translation that was influenced by linguistics was that of early Nida (1964). But, the linguistics that persuaded Nida was different from that of Firth’s. Nida resorted to a composite of methodologies that included, in addition to Bloomfield’s structuralist discovery procedures, other mentalist views as developed by Chomsky. According to Nida:

This generative view [Chomsky’s] of language seems to be particularly important for the translator, for in translating from one language into another he must go beyond mere comparisons of corresponding structures and attempt to describe the mechanisms by which the total message is decoded, transferred, and transformed into the structure of another language.

(1964:9).

Nida maintained that translation study should seek to go beyond the observational adequacy of the old descriptive school and aspire to obtain ‘explanatory adequacy’ by uncovering the generative potential of language (ibid.).

It is worth mentioning that Nida’s interest in developing a complete theoretical framework for translation is more profound than those of other scholars (cf. Firth, or Malinowski) because of his commitment to the tradition of Biblical translation. He did not ponder much about translatability, and was guided by firm beliefs in the translatability and the spreading of the word of God. Bible translators like Nida, who had acquired a long established experience in translation, were less apprehensive about
testing any new methods of translating they came across. Nida's adoption of different views from Saussure, Bloomfield, and Chomsky were good examples.

Nida unequivocally declared that the linguistic meaning takes precedence over the referential and emotive meaning, and maintained that the linguistic meaning of a form is inherent to a language and can mean very little outside the system of language (1964:57). Nida's aim was to explain translation as a science and thus comes his reliance on linguistic methods as the scientific approach to language.

Nida also made use of Chomsky's (at the time innovative and fashionable) views of a universal language faculty. This was perhaps no accident, since Chomsky's views had more than one meeting point with the views of the Bible translators. For example Chomsky's belief in a universal grammar is akin to the Bible translator's views of one unified Biblical rationality. His claim of language being species-specific is harmonious with the Christian (and in fact all monotheistic religious) belief of man being the vicegerent of God on earth. Therefore, Nida declared that the generative type of grammar was the best possible means of accounting for the diversity of meaning expression, and declared transformational techniques as suitable for 'decoding' the message of the source texts (60).

Early Nida, in order to formulate a viable process for translation, tried to combine Chomsky's views with those of communication theory. Although Chomsky's use of transformations was only grammatical, Nida tried to employ transformations for generating meaning from a postulated underlying kernel meaning, an approach which was also reminiscent of Zellig Harris's use of linguistic transformations for content analysis. Phrases such as 'his car', 'his arrest', 'his failure' were said to be generated from the kernel structures, 'he has a car', 'he was arrested', 'he failed', respectively. Nida claimed that this treatment helped solve ambiguities of phrases like 'fat major's wife' (61-4).

Nida clearly overlooked some difficulties that may impede the workability of such a procedure, cases where the kernel level is under-determined by the surface meaning. Take for example the phrase 'his arrest', there is no methodological proof that it is derived from the kernel 'he was arrested' or 'they arrested him', because it can also be derived from any other kernel representation such as 'he arrested the culprit' if one is referring to a policeman, or 'to arrest him' in 'his arrest will be a difficult task', or
even ‘his arrest’ meaning ‘his warrant for arrest’. The other option is to rely on meaning for arriving at the kernel representation, a case which renders the whole operation superfluous.

Nida also postulated four basic Kantian-like kernel concepts: object, event, relation and abstract to derive different surface meanings of sentences. For example, in ‘He saw the dog’ the word dog is used as denoting an object, whereas in ‘They will dog his steps’ it is used to denote an event. Nida went back to the same categorization in Nida and Taber (1969) where he postulated four a priori semantic universal categories: Object, referring to thing designator, such as ‘dogs’, ‘house’; event, which designate: ‘eat’, ‘run’; abstract, semantic classes of qualities, quantities, such as ‘red’, ‘good’; and finally relations, the meaningful connection between other terms, e.g., ‘propositions’, ‘conjunction’.

Nida’s general strategy was to resort to kernel structures for the analysis (decoding) and then transfer these kernels to similar structures in the target language (kernel) using these four categories to safeguard the transference. After performing necessary stylistic adjustment, the messages are generated into the target language. Unfortunately, Nida provided good schematization, but no workable examples of this could be produced (66-9).

Elsewhere, Nida tried also to make use of Katz and Fodor’s semantic componential analyses (1964) to safeguard the transference of meaning from one language to another. He designed a hierarchical tree schema according to which the general meaning is deciphered downward to the most specific meaning; for example the word ‘bachelor’ will be analyzed in the following manner:

```
  (animal)  (male)
   bachelor    
       |   (bearer of ac. degree)
    (human)  (male)  (young knight)
          |       (unmarried man)
```

Nida’s theory of scientific translation obviously exhibits influence from the field of cybernetics which makes his approach similar to those employed in machine translation. Even though in the last chapter of this book, he warned of the limitation
of such an endeavour, he however, clearly made reference to them when saying that 'some important insights for translation have come from the science of cybernetics. These insights in their most specific application to translation are known as information theory (125).

Nida (1964), which also showed keen interest in anthropology, developed two types of translation equivalence: formal and dynamic. The 'formal' is achieved between units of grammars, consistency of word usage, and the preservation of the original context. The dynamic is achieved by reproducing the closest equivalent to the meaning of the original, in the most natural and idiomatic expression in the target language. Nida thought that even if some might suppose that such an equivalence is categorically ruled out; it is, however, a perfectly valid translation of certain types of messages (166). Yet Nida's explanation lacked any examples of the first type, neither included an explanation of how it was possible, for example, to achieve grammatical equivalences among languages.

Elsewhere, Nida alleged that since no two languages are identical, either in the meaning given to corresponding system symbols or in the way which such symbols are arranged there could be no absolute correspondence between languages, opposing thus his earlier formulation of equivalence - especially the formal one. More surprisingly, towards the end of the work, Nida also reformulated this equivalence from meaning reproducing the closest message to mean reproducing the impact of the message. He clearly claimed that the total impact of the translation may be reasonably close to the original, but there can be no identity in detail (156). He also stated elsewhere that at certain points the conflict between content and form of (or meaning and manner) will be acute and that one or the other must give way(164).

However, Nida’s deep unease towards the issue of equivalence gets reinforced as one notices that further along he introduced a third type of equivalence, functional equivalence. When assuming the possibility of translating according to two methods, literal with footnotes, borrowing, explaining etc., and functional method (174), Nida scantly explains, or contrasts functional equivalence with his earlier concept of dynamic equivalence, with which it is most likely to be confused; instead, he contrasted it with the literal equivalence, leaving the distinction between the dynamic and functional unclear. All this makes Nida’s study seems more programmatic than
an actual project of translation. As it seems, Nida had an eye on machine translation when he produced it.

It might also be of interest here to note, that translation in Malinowski and Firth’s tradition was aiming at translating the so-called primitive languages and cultures into modern ones, in other words translating something that is obscure and opaque into something discernable and intelligible. For Nida and other Bible translators, the translation operation was the converse, they started from texts (from the Bible) which they assumed fully intelligible and sought to convey them into other opaque cultures. This perhaps explains Malinowski and Firth’s scepticism about full translatability, and their emphasis on the context of situation, whereas, for Bible translators stability of meaning was an essential part of their message, since religious concepts ought to be reproduced in their closest form in the natives language. It is also noticeable that, while informants to Firth and Malinowski were the source of information and translation, for Nida and others they were target of it. Informants, for the Bible translators were usually helped into translating the Bible into their indigenous languages. This, perhaps, explains why Nida defined translation as the production in the receptor language of the closest natural equivalence to the source language (Nida 1964:210). The preservation, as much as possible, of the original’s meaning was the corner stone of Nida’s views of translation- a fact that explains the normative tone of his views of translation.

Nida (1964) is abundant with translation examples, and is a good testimony to the depth and wealth of the Bible translators’ experience. Although encompassing most of the linguistic views at the time, Nida’s use of these views seemed sometimes eclectic, and at other times sounded as if he were taking these views for granted. Generally speaking, Nida’s early approach to translation is considered today absolute, as is also the case with some of the linguistic views he adopted, such as some of Chomsky’s earlier grammatical transformations.

In his later writings, Nida’s original concept of equivalence seems to have changed. Nida (1977) suggested that translation is part of communication and that Communication, whether inter-lingual or intra-lingual, has as its essential purpose the transmission of a message to an audience (Nida, 1977: 99). He abandoned thus any concept of semantic equivalence, and translation for him ceased to be looked at as the
reproduction of the closest natural equivalence. He also stated that translation engages the transmission of the style of the message as well: Inter-lingual as well as intra-lingual translation should be viewed as objects of aesthetic evaluation (100). Nida's recent writing seems to have moved closer to Bakhtin's in considering that any act of communication involves also an act of evaluation, and that no act of communication is ever absolute.

5.7. Catford's Systemic Theory of Translation

It is worth mentioning that modern linguistics, even when providing methodology for machine translation studies, has never taken translation to be a central issue of linguistics; therefore, no major comprehensive work on theory of translation was attempted by well known linguists, except for Catford's (1964) attempt.

Catford's (1964) tried to analyze translation from a systemic linguistic approach as developed by M. A. K. Halliday, who in turn was a devoted student of Firth, and inherited Firth's major linguistic insights. Halliday and Catford continued to emphasize contextual and functional aspect of language over its internal structure, and took meaning to be present on any level of analysis. Catford, therefore, spoke of phonological, graphological, grammatical, collocational etc. levels of meaning.

Halliday (1973) saw meaning potential not in the mentalist conception of it as relation between what one knows and what one does, but rather as a relationship between what one does and what he objectively can do (Halliday in de Beaugrande 1991: 225), which meant that Halliday tried to avoid any reference to the individual mental representation of language, by focusing on its social semiotic aspects. According to Halliday, the context of culture decides the potential, and the context of situation decides the actual (Ibid., 225).

Despite the similarity between Catford's approach to translation and that of Firth, there is, nonetheless, one fundamental difference regarding the concept of equivalence, which, though denied by Firth, is highlighted by Catford as a central concept of translation. Catford stated decisively that the central task of translation theory is that of defining the nature and conditions of translation equivalence (21).
Equivalence in Catford's paradigm was analogous to early Nida's with the provision that it was worked out within a different linguistic framework, that of systemic grammar. While Nida trichotomized equivalence in relation to form, content and function, Catford tried to relate them to the grammatical ranks of systemic grammar. Adopting a comparative method, he proceeded with comparing the two languages concerned in translation according to their ranking structure. Thus he thought that free translation is one that is unbound by ranks i.e., it can shunt up and down ranks; word-for-word translation means what it says; and, literal translation was word-for-word with grammatical adjustment, to characterize this adjustment he surprisingly claimed that it is inserting additional words, changing structure at any rank (25)!, letting the quotation speak for itself.

As an example of three types of translation Catford gives three French translations to the following English sentence:

Eng. It is raining cats and dogs.
Fr.
  a) Il est pleuvant chats et des chiens. (word-for-word)
  b) Il pleut des chats et chiens. (literal)
  c) Il pleut à verse. (free)

A few comments, we feel are due here: first, it is not certain whether (a) is the word for word translation of the English sentence, since the French word 'pleuvant', which is more of an adjective than a present participle, is not a word-for-word translation for 'raining'. Secondly, it is perhaps more likely that (b) is the word-for-word translation, provided that such a translation exists. Thirdly, this is not an ordinary but an idiomatic sentence of English which signifies a dead metaphor, therefore it would be unwise to take as a translation of one idiomatic meaning by another literal meaning. Third, the French say in addition to (c) things like: Il pleut à flots, à seaux, à torrents (Micro Robert Dic. 811).

Firth avoided any comparison between languages, by assuming that languages, according to the functions they perform, structurally vary not only cross-culturally, but also within one culture. Catford, unwittingly accepted such a comparison unaware that
a degree of structural isomorphism is implied in any attempt at comparison. Catford, therefore, when categorising translation according to rank matching between languages ended up with two strange concepts of total and restricted translations. While ‘total’ translation is equal to the ordinary concept of translation, restricted translation meant that one translates on one language level (rank) e.g., graphological, phonological, was less intelligible (22-3). Therefore it was not surprising that Catford would reach the curious conclusion of linguistic untranslatability whenever there is a linguistic mismatch between ranks.

Equally confusing was Catford’s postulation of contextual translation as a separate rank where, because of what he had claimed to be the inseparability of contextual units from formal levels, this translation was unattainable. Catford, however, avoided explaining how context, qua context, could possibly be translated, or what could possibly be translated in a context other than language.

Catford’s approach of translation implies a priori the impossibility of translation; since it presumes the presence of the same or similar context of situation as a condition on translatability, whereas in reality one of the main functions of translation is to overcome the disparity of the context of situation.

Catford, trying to be as faithful as possible to the Malinowski and Firth empirical tradition, suggested an empirical method of calculating (statistically studying) interlingual formal equivalences according to the frequency of their recurrence in contexts (contextual equivalences). A method commonly used in certain structural approaches to isolate the invariant in the unit of study. However it is not clear how he was going to do that if he had ruled out the possibility of total translation, or if, as he did in the following chapter, he defined meaning as the totality of network relations entered into by a form. Worse still is how to determine textual equivalence. Do we need, for example, formal equivalence in order to arrive at textual equivalence or vice versa? or what kind of equivalence comes first? Catford’s theory of translation seems to be another programmatic study of translation that was inspired by the likelihood of the need for a global theory of translation suited for machine use.

The above surveyed works are the major translation projects within linguistics. Even though they can all be considered, by today’s linguistic state of affairs, outdated, they continue, however, to influence translation studies today. De Beaugrande (1981)
is perhaps vindicated in claiming that Catford's theme testifies to the limitation of linguistics at that time (11).

5.7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have represented some of the major linguistic views and approaches to translation. To do justice to linguistics, one may say that they were not developed from the main trends of linguistics, but rather by scholars who felt optimistic about the potentiality of applying linguistic theory to translation. It was also assumed that actual rapprochement between linguistics and translation came through the influence of cybernetics, and materialized in certain approaches to machine translation.

We tried to show that the two linguistic trends mentioned above offer slanted views of language, one by offering only an account of function that deals with restricted aspects of language, the other by offering an autonomous, non-historical concept of language and ignoring the diversity of its use.

The homogeneity that allowed for axiomization of language by linguists was afforded either by assuming that language corresponds in a logical way to representation of the world, or the coherent laws of logic. But as Pécheux (1982) claimed, this systematicity, which casts aside all contextual elements, such as indices, indexical designation, evaluation, emotion etc., was inherent in all essentialist views of language. He thought it was the same objective behind other essentialist views such as Frege's distinction between imagination and thought, Carnap's cognitive and emotive meanings etc. (59).

According to Uhlenbeck (1978), two dimensions of language needed to be eschewed in order to achieve systematicity within formal linguistics. One is semantics which is seen as a parallel study to that of linguistics; the second is intonation which is considered as a residual aspect that relates only to language use. The concept of language consequently becomes amenable to algorithmic computation (186). But Wunderlich (1979), who accepted that in face of a complex phenomenon such as language idealisations seem necessary, warned that excessive abstraction can lead to some solution of the problem, but there may be no way back from the solution to the original concrete problem, leaving the researcher only with a pseudo-solution (106).
Linguistic solutions to translation problems, we believe, clearly justify Wunderlich's misgiving.

In the following chapter we will present some alternative views of translation that tried to go beyond language structure to its communicative functions. Some of these views aimed at complementing linguistic ones presented above. Others opted for completely different strategies. Our aim will always be to try to demonstrate the importance of dialogical aspects of language to translation and translatability.
Chapter 6

Non Linguistic Approaches to Translation

6.1. Introduction

This chapter aims at complementing the previous in accounting for meaning and translation. It starts with communicative aspects of meaning that are scantily touched upon by linguistic approaches, that is, *exo-structural* aspects. There are basically two approaches to the issue of the relation between language and communication. The first is that which starts with language as represented in the form of syntactic and/or semantic rules and subordinates language use as derivative. As mentioned above in Chapter (4), this view took its roots from the linguistic turn in philosophy championed by scholars such as early Wittgenstein, and which reduced the knowledge of the world to the linguistic representation of this world. This trend continued in formal approaches to meaning (cf. semantic, linguistic, and certain semiotic theories and speech act theories).

The second approach, is phenomenological (Brentano, Husserl), which emphasizes the priority of the subject's consciousness, and the subject's presence in the world over the linguistic presentation of that world. That is, the direct experience of the world takes precedence over linguistic mediation. The second view is generally popular with relativists and hermeneutic approaches of language, including those that give primacy to speaker's intention in communication (cf. Grice). However, because of the latter's formalist orientation, he is usually included in linguistic pragmatics.
This can be related to Leech’s (1983) division of the study of meaning into two camps: one that privileges semantics and takes pragmatics to be subservient to semantics (as seen above in the case of linguistics); the other is the one that privileges pragmatics and lays less emphasis on semantics (cf. language use philosophers: Austine, Searle, Late Wittgenstein, Grice). Despite the different philosophical justifications for such a division, it disappears at any moment of language use, and the two camps must give similar accounts of the two aspects of meaning. In other words, the distinction remains methodological rather than real.

One perhaps is justified in saying that since Ogden and Richards’ classic The Meaning of Meaning (1923), the word meaning has been understandably treated with such caution that it hardly figured in the title of any article or book. Instead, more specific surrogate terms such as semantics, pragmatics, referential meaning, textual meaning have appeared in its place.

Similarly, after an intense and thorough investigation, Lyons (1981) concluded that all attempts at finding a unified definition of meaning in language stemmed from two unfounded presuppositions: (a) the presupposition that some kind of reality referred to by the term meaning existed, and (b) the presupposition that what is referred to by the word meaning is something ‘homogeneous’ (136).

A similarity between the notions referred to by the terms ‘meaning’, and what is referred to by ‘translation’ is indeed noticeable, since ‘translation’ is also a term used to designate a wide variety of practices. Furthermore, the analogy can be carried over to the meaning of what is referred to by the term ‘language’ itself; a monolithic conceptual entity that we feel exist but are unable to pin down under one definition or one single framework.

Therefore, once the approaches to translation mentioned in the previous chapter were subjected to closer scrutiny, the notion of translation has also been treated with the same caution and has been subjected to similar divisions. Thus, though translation is one general phenomenon, sometimes one comes across divisions within views of translation as those of Catford’s systemic approach mentioned above, House’s (1977: 26) division of aspects of meaning in translation into semantic, pragmatic, and textual, or Hartmann’s (1980) argument for the eclectic nature of translation studies.
Steiner (1975) justifiably linked the lack of agreement on unified theory of translation to - not only to the lack of a unified theory of meaning- but rather to the absence of a unified theory of language. As he put it:

The bare notion of a mature theory of how translation is possible and how it takes place, of the mental attributes and functions which are involved, *presumes a systematic theory of language* with which it overlaps completely. ... I can see no evasion from this truism. But the fact remains that we have no such a theory of language.

[emphasis added](1975: 279-80).

However, we assume that if one can avoid misleading terms, such as ‘theory’, ‘science’, ‘model’, translation can be approached by general unified principles that are, though very general in nature, still explanatory. Communicative approaches to translation can possibly be seen within this dimension, and this includes the approach to translation within the dialogic principle.

Such a principle, for example, does not strive for a formal axiomatic explanation of the process of translation, but for an approximate explanation, something of the type ‘this is more or less the case’. This is so because dialogism acknowledges, from the beginning, the open ended nature of any act of meaning apprehension, and the impossibility of limiting what a linguistic term might ultimately be used to mean including for that matter the word ‘meaning’ itself. The meaning of a term is more or less dependent on its single use and prior agreement on the limits of the single act of meaning.

Since ‘pragmatics’ is an umbrella term for all issues of meaning related to the function of language in communication including perhaps, all interdisciplinary properties of language, we feel that it would be inevitable to restrict the current discussion, as much as possible, to issues that we judge conducive to explaining dialogism and translation. Our main objectives will be to show that Bakhtin’s perspective on language offers a synthesis between the views of translation presented above.
6.2. Monologism vs Dialogism in Language Function

It would be useful to remind the reader that Bakhtin’s approach to meaning was a translinguistic (pragmatic) one (Chapter 2); that he considered coherent linguistic systems as abstractions brought about only by idealization; that, according to him, though the subject perceives the world from a single dimension of which he is the centre point, and that every subject is spatio-temporally unique, his consciousness becomes intertwined with linguistic experience through the subject’s answerability to his surrounding.

The subject’s consciousness is unique not only in relation to objective temporality, but also to the events that he experiences in this temporality. Unique experience represents the subject’s irreducible (chronotopical) perspective according to which he evaluates and judges things, and also makes the point of departure for the subject’s expression of meaning in communication.

We will try to relate our understanding of dialogism to the dilemmatic question of meaning in order to distinguish Bakhtin’s pragmatics from some views we will later represent. Bakhtin’s pragmatism, for example, is not distinct but is a continuation of the semantic aspects of language. He considered language as a system of representation of things in the world, things not in themselves, but in our relation to them. Yet language is also representative, on a higher order, of our socio-cultural relationships, past and present. That means that language represents things and relationships not for themselves but for us to speak about them.

Bakhtin would agree with Korzybsky’s (1948) assumption that the intensional (representational) meaning of a term is at the same time over-and-under defined by the instance of its one occurrence (extension). That is, it risks saying more about its intension in this single occurrence. A non-striped tiger, for example, is still a tiger. At the same time, the representation under-defines its extension by being unable to account for all properties that may be specific to the particular thing designated by it. Items designated by a representation are not only similar but also different (Introduction, sec. 3).

In a discussion of the difficulty of reading, but this time in relation to the whole utterance meaning, Ortega (1959) shares similar views. He claimed that a utopian
prejudgment is always involved in language transaction because every act of interpreting an utterance is simultaneously *exuberant* and *deficient*. It is deficient because an utterance always conveys to the receiver less than it was originally planned to by its author; It is exuberant because in actuality it communicates, or has the potential to communicate, to the hearer more than the original meanings of the producer (Becker 1982: 124). This quasi-paradoxical state of affairs is, to Bakhtin, due to the dialogical nature of understanding according to which the understanding of an utterance is never entire.

If one admits a relatively loose relationship between intension and extension in the meaning of words representing objects in the world, then one can imagine a looser case for aspects of language meaning related to representations that refer to relationships among individuals. It is this discrepancy between meaning and use that formalism tries to overlook, and relativism focuses upon. Yet it is also what allows languages the greater flexibility to communicate.

It is important to bear in mind, here, that Bakhtin did not deny the existence of the first level of meaning, which he called the reiterative meaning of language, though he seemed to insist that even this meaning can only be learnt dialogically. The life of linguistic representation of meaning is dependent on its transfer dialogically among subjects and social groups. If, for example, we take the first level representational meaning as truth-conditional, then, according to Bakhtin, every subject forms his truth-conditional knowledge for expressions as he encounters them inter-subjectively in recurrent utterances.

Representations by language, thus, seem to be more or less consistent among subjects, but they are unlikely to be identical. As explained by Putnam (1978), a botanist may know about trees more than a layman. One of the communicative aims of language is to make such representations more uniform.

When language is used in communication, a representation functions as only the background to communication that has to be promoted to a second order, which is perforce a perspectival one. That is to say, Bakhtin, unlike functional theories of language (cf. Bühler’s (1934) and Jakobson’s (1960)), considered the function of language as one, *interpersonal communication*. He saw the representational aspect of language as also dialogical. Bakhtin made his distinction between representative
(monologic) and expressive (dialogic) functions of language within rather than without interpersonal communication, according to the relationships involved in this basically dialogic communication. He made the distinction on the second level of language representation between the relationships to things in our speech (monologic relationship), and relationship to people (dialogic relationship).

This is made more evident when we notice that language is capable of representing (expressing) the same phenomenon differently, and forming different perspectives. A single perspective is determined by the particular assertion about the object of the communication. As pointed out by Rommetveit (1990), the designation (truth-functional knowledge) of an object is usually under-determined by the given perspective (proposition) from which we wish to talk about that object (100-101). The perspective in representation in speech, according to Graumman (1990) is similar to that of the perspective in painting where an object or landscape can only be presented from a given angle (109). (These two observations form a part of a collection of studies recently edited by Marková (1990), about the dynamic and perspectival aspects of communication.)

For example the acronym ‘Aids’ and the expression ‘acquired immune deficiency syndrome’ have the same truth-conditional meaning, yet many may perhaps know the first but not the second. However, on a dialogic level they represent two different perspectives on the same phenomenon, one popular, the other medical. Journalists may also sometimes refer to ‘Aids’ as the ‘plague of the twentieth century’ to indicate a third moral perspective.

When translated, say to Arabic, the two first expressions both maintain the same truth-conditional, preserve the same perspective meaning (medical, and popular), even though they loose their acronymic relationship. Suppose also that one says:

1- Aids is Aids.

On truth-conditional reading this sentence is tautological. One can argue, as Quine did, that (1) is vacuous. The fact that we are usually unconscious about the first level of representation makes such a sentence unlikely. On the other hand, on dialogic reading
this utterance can be not only tautological but also emphatic. Now we assume that we say:

2- Hiv virus is the cause of Aids.

In (2) the relationship involved is monologic. That is (2) can be understood as a pure relationship between two objects, reified objects. But for this relationship (as is also the case for (1)) to mean anything must be part of a dialogic transaction between two interlocutors. It also represents a scientific or medical perspective. This monologic function can be compared with Sperber and Wilson’s (1987) descriptive dimension of language.

A different perspective can be produced from the same utterance with slight modification, as in (3) below:

3- Sin is the cause of Aids.

(3) implies a religious or moral perspective on the same issue. Even if the utterer is not known, the utterance itself gives an image of an utterer to be someone religious. Despite the appearance of (3) as descriptive, there is a noticeable difference between the description involved in (2) and that involved in (3). Since the word ‘sin’ does not refer to an object, but to a behaviour that depends on prior definition of sinning, one can claim that this sentence is used to describe an attitude, and should be as seen as standing for an implied perspectival meaning (as interpretive representation, in Sperber and Wilson’s dichotomy). Now we consider the following utterance:

4- My grandmother believes sin is the cause of Aids.

We can imagine in this case that one meaning of (3), one that involves a causal relation similar to the one expressed in (2) is what is believed in (4) by my grandmother, who happens to believe that sins exist but viruses do not, and that sins and not viruses are the cause of Aids, making (4) seem interpretive and descriptive at the same time. In this case, Bakhtin says that dogmatic meaning in (4), is not
monologic, but monologized, or reified. A dialogic relationship to a certain behaviour (sinning), has uncompromisingly been treated as an object that causes.

Of course other dialogical readings of (4) are possible, my grandmother, for example, may believe that promiscuous sexual relationships by sinners helps spreading the virus of Aids. In other words two readings are possible for (4) a monologic de re reading according to its propositional content, and a dialogic de dicto reading where the propositional meaning is subordinated to someone's belief or attitude. (The opposite process of reification is personification, where we relate to objects as if we were relating to people.)

The hearer of (4) may eventually guess that my grandmother is religious and gullible. But he would also assume that this is her perspective and one that I am unlikely to share. With proper tense adjustment, I could utter (4) even if my grandmother was long dead, and it would be meaningful even if my addressee knows this fact. They would eventually know that my utterance of (4) represents only a perspective fixing act. But if I say (5):

5- Many people understandably think that sin is the cause of Aids.

I have indicated that I also may share the same perspective on that issue. (5) speaks directly for the immediate subject's (many people) perspective, but indirectly may reflect my own. However, in all the above examples, a reiterative meaning (general designation) of the word 'Aids' remains constant. Even if one wants to lie about 'Aids', or say Aids does not exist, he must use that reiterative meaning of the word 'Aids'.

In this respect early Wittgenstein's 'linguistic a priorism' is justifiable. However, many of us would remember very little about Aids before being phenomenologically presented with some image of that disease, for example being shown pictures of people with Aids. The phenomenological image of the disease is as important for the meaning of the word 'Aids' as its linguistic representation.

Linguistic representation without an image is not possible, if a proper image is not represented with the sign, the presence of the sign would recall a surrogate representational image, an imagined one based on another previous image. To depict
a new image, we can also depend on expanding old signs, composing new ones, to indicate the new image. It is perhaps the case that every time we see an image we unconsciously approximate a linguistic sign for it, and that every sound, even outside language would perhaps recall, even if faintly, an image. What differentiates language sound and images, from other sound and image is their reiterability, and intersubjectivity.

Some scholars (cf. Jakobson (1971), claimed that our cognition expands rhetorically by building new representations on the base of previous ones, that the two relationships, metaphor (similarity), and metonymy (contiguity), represent two universal logical ways in which our cognition operates and our knowledge expands.

Thus, we may also build a new image not from an old image, but from a single perspective of that image. That is, we build a perspective on a previous perspective, as for example in metaphor and other types of stylization. Poetic language in general may be seen as a perspective on the deep unconscious representational, and often taken for granted, perspective of language in general. It may also exploit the potential of language to adopt new, previously unknown perspective on reality.

Essential to Bakhtin’s pragmatics is this concept of perspectivity. The distinction between monological relations among objects and dialogical relations among people (mentioned above in 5.5.1.), is dependent on the degree of the perspective’s stability across different contexts. Monologic relationships are more constant, more entrenched in cognition, and more prone to reiterability. Dialogic relationships are more prone to contextual factors and more liable to revision and adjustment. However, the difference between the two is not absolute.

Our perspective of things may be dynamic and changing, as has been pointed out by Quine in linguistic philosophy, and by Kuhn in the philosophy of science. However, it is possible that it changes in language gradually and in a piecemeal and unnoticeable process. This process can be imagined as being the mirror image of the process that meaning takes to arrive at a given communicative context; it may start by given context, get generalised to a given genre, then reach a position of higher level adjustment on language as a whole, on some aspects of how our language relates to the world.
Our perspective varies according to the given relationship to certain aspects of reality. For example, perspectives related to our physical experience that we acquire empirically, and those related to our spiritual faiths that are sustained by non-empirical beliefs, are usually the most enduring ones. They are also likely to be more consistent across different genres, contexts, etc. Therefore, they can be said to be more monologic, and their translation is more proximate to the translation of their reiterative semantic representation.

Sometimes, in dialogic communication, establishing a unified perspective can be the aim of the communication. Marková et al. (1991), *Asymmetry in Dialogue*, put forth a view of communication where dialogue is supposed to be invoked by asymmetry of perspectives and the desire of the two parties to overcome such asymmetry. Sperber and Wilson (1987) claimed communication to be an attempt at modifying each other's cognitive environment so as to make manifest in them similar assumptions.

However, an issue that has baffled ordinary language philosophers is the way in which language is transformed into speech, and how the reiterative aspects of language are used to communicate or interpret novel meanings, in a given context, how the general perspective of language becomes an individual subjective one. In the following section, which is in a sense a continuation of this one, we will look into this issue.

### 6.3. Meaning, Pragmatics, and Context

In the study of pragmatics one may distinguish two distinct but overlapping notions; one refers to contextual adjustments that are affected on language in relation to the specific moment of articulation and understanding (Heidegger’s sense of the *pragma* (Benjamin 1989:148)). This includes the study of spatio-temporal deixis, anaphora, and presupposition. The second notion relates to the Malinowskian pragmatic tradition that looked at meaning principally as a function. The latter includes most studies that enter under the title ‘ethnography of speech’.

However, more recently, it became evident that the importance of context goes far beyond spatio-temporal adjustment of sentences, or reference assignment, that certain aspects of grammaticality and acceptability are inseparable from contextual factors.
Context, in other words, is essential for negotiating the perspective according to which an utterance is interpreted. Let us for example consider the following example from Levinson (1983:86):

6- The man who gave his pay cheque to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress.

Linguists concentrated, as Levinson did, on the fact that the pronoun ‘it’ is not anaphoric with the phrase ‘pay cheque’ in the first sentence, but with the other ‘pay cheque’ that of the man in the second sentence. Yet, despite the conflict in referentiality, to most speakers, except perhaps for linguists, the sentence is straightforwardly comprehensible, since what is spoken about in (6) is not a cheque in the material sense of the word, but a cheque in respect of its being a symbolic indication of something else, moral and proper use of payment. The general meaning would not change more if we substitute the pronoun ‘it’ in the second phrase with ‘his cheque’, than if we permute ‘wife’ in the first with ‘mistress’ in the second, in which case we end up with not only a converse meaning, but more importantly, a converse perspective.

However, other scenarios, and other interpretations of co-referentiality are always possible dependent on the actual or imagined context of situation. This context of situation increases the ‘relevance’ of some assumptions and reduces others, making the implications of the former more likely and easier to process (Sperber and Wilson 1987). In other words, people are far more likely to take ‘it’ in the second part of (6) as referring to the second man’s cheque than to the first’s. For example, the same problem of conflict in co-referentiality can be said about the phrase ‘the man’ if we assume that it refers to the same man at different points of time. It may even be said about ‘wife’ and ‘mistress’ if we imagine that the same wife was the man’s ex-mistress. Other sentences like Donnellan’s (1966) example of the non-attributive reference, can be considered according to similar assumptions:

7- The murderer of Smith is insane.
In (7) what is being expressed is a dialogical (interpretive) perspective on the crime rather than a monological act of actual attribution, especially if the murderer of Smith is unknown to the speaker. In such communicative situations, accurate attribution assignment is not a condition for communication to be successful.

Our previous perspective (assumptions) on things can also be important to the understanding of new ones to a degree that it would be sometimes difficult to supply adequate interpretation for sentences, without invoking our previous world knowledge, as in (8) a, b. below:

8-(a) Israel seized large quantities of new weapons from the U.S.S.R.
   (b) Israel seized territory from Syria.


Our previous world knowledge helps to narrow our perspective when reading this sentence and allow us to assign correct reading. Many non-linguist interpreters with appropriate world knowledge would find (8,a) quite understandable.

Context is also essential to determining the specific meaning of a word that otherwise can be polysemous, and under-determined by its original meaning. The following example from Kirsner and Thompson (1976), may help to make this case clear:

9- (a) The farmer fed the sheep.
    (b) The sheep fed the farmer.
    (c) The recipe fed eight.

According to Kirsner and Thompson the specific meaning conveyed by the verb 'Feed' in each of the above examples can only be elicited on the level of the message, and only if cultural and extra-linguistic information are brought to bear (cited in Ullenbeck 1977: 193).

Modal terms such as 'may', 'must', 'perhaps' etc.. all can be seen as dialogically negotiating the perspective in which what follows them should understood. Sometimes
whole utterances fulfil a modal function. Compare for example the interpretation of the (a) in contrast with (b) in the following:

10- (a) Acting in self-defense against future terrorism, Reagan ordered the attack on Kaddaffi.

(b) In violation of all international laws, Reagan ordered the attack on Kaddaffi.

Our evaluation of the second part of the utterance in (10, a, b) is modified by the perspective suggested to us by the first part. The first part of the sentence aims at tuning our ‘cognitive environment’ for the reception of the second part. This is usually more apparent on level of larger text as well, and represents a reason for taking the whole meaning of a text as representing a unified perspective on its theme.

Bakhtin, and more recently Sperber and Wilson, both considered the context of enunciation as an unfolding general event brought about by the intention of two interlocutors to inter-communicate, to try as much as possible to see things from a unified perspective. During this context, single utterances (sentences) are minor events gradually leading towards the unification of the two interlocutors’ horizons; they all form one communicative unity.

Stewart (1986) compared Bakhtin with the ‘speech act’ theorists (cf. Austin and Searle) in taking the production of an utterance as a form of ‘speech act’. However, Stewart thought that Bakhtin would oppose the hypostatization of the speech acts in language by assuming rules that these acts follows when they are realized, or the attempt to delineate a grammar of situation. To Bakhtin, the speech act is an integral part of the context of live situation. According to Stewart’s words, speech acts are not ‘behind’ the historical process, but are emergent in them (45). Thus, speech act theory seems, as Morson suggested, to be a theory of context in rigor mortis (Morson 1986).

Finally there is what Bakhtin called the loophole of the linguistic meaning of a word. This loophole is caused by the ability of the utterer to alter the meaning of his word or his speech act in the very final moment, by, for example, saying something and meaning by it something else, may be even its opposite. The other possible meanings of an utterance accompany the interpretation of the utterance as its shadow, making the context of situation essential for deciding the outcome of the speech act.
Thus, to Bakhtin (cf. Grice, Sperber and Wilson) the outcome of the speech act is dependent on the actual meaning inferred from them in the context.

Bakhtin’s context of situation, which is at the centre of his disagreement with most of the analytical views of communication, can be approximated as in the following figure:

![Diagram of Utterance]

Figure (1) shows the utterance as a unified spatio-temporal occurrence that is divided into two parts the reiterative linguistic signification, and the unique emergent contextual meaning. The two meanings are dialogically interlinked. In this context, the speaker transforms what is reiterative into something new. The interpreter uses the reiterative part to understand the emergent meaning.

In the context and via the act of enunciation, language (as an utterance) wears its utterer’s intention, and carries his evaluation of the topic of the conversation. The words of language become words in use that can be responded to and evaluated. The text becomes a perspective, and dialogizes itself with other texts.

Therefore, Bakhtin invited us to regard the text not as a linguistic entity, but as a voice, that of the author who stands behind the text. In the case of famous texts, as mentioned before in Chapter 2, texts remain linked to their authors. Therefore, except in idealized imagined contexts that are taken as examples of speech, as for example, in linguistic analysis, the text to Bakhtin must belong to someone.
The text, the outcome of the communicative context, can be seen as the experience of unimmediate reality, the reality of that context as modelled by language. This experience also (as also pointed out by Malinowski) is necessary for understanding what the text means. In this regard the text becomes an image of the social interaction.

The relationships among the reiterative forms of utterances are relationships within linguistic genres (register), dialects, and languages. However, the relationships (inter-textual) among content of the whole utterances (voices) are also conventionalized in discursal, ideological generic relationships (Wertsch 1991). They are genres that form images of social interaction. There are, within one language, Wertsch noticed, social languages. The speaker's voice is only heard within a particular social language. They are ideological not in the narrow political denotation of the word, but ideological as involving systems of ideas, shared perspectives.

Thus we may say that Bakhtin's pragmatics is not a meditation on representational language in context, but rather on the function of utterances in context. Though not directly obvious, utterances, as Bakhtin noticed, have also something reiterative about them. There is no utterance that is absolutely new. If we wish to see Bakhtin's pragmatics through the eye of linguistic pragmatics, we can say that it is a pragmatics of pragmatics.

Understanding also includes dialogical relations of evaluating, agreement or disagreement with what has been said on other occasions. In spoken texts they appear as infinitely varied in degree and shading as expressed through intonation. In written text, they depend on how the writer chooses to inter-textualize his perspective, in what social language he speaks.

The text, by belonging to a larger system of ideas, by being one element in a chain of texts, has also (to use Benjamin's word) an after life. It can be used once and again and can be appropriated, quoted, emulated etc. But its context will never be compensated in another occurrence. Nor can its meaning be possibly finalized.

This is not to be interpreted as a denial of the possibility of translation, but only to say that translation is not an operation of transference or transposing of signification or function. Translation is a new communication in a new environment. It is possible but never definite.
6.4. Translation and Semiotic theory

There are, generally speaking, two main streams of semiotics: a structuralist, following Saussure, which starts by a dual concept of sign as a two-sided psychological relationship between the signifier (sound, graph) and the signified (concept); a positivistic, involving a triadic relationship between sign, concept and an outside reality, following C.S Pierce’s formulation.

Whereas some scholars use the word ‘semiotics’ in a restricted sense that is related only to meaning of natural language to mean social interpretation of language meaning (Halliday 1978), others prefer a more general meaning of the word as the study of the communication of any message whatever by Jakobson (1974) (Sebeok 1986: 3). Similarly, semiotics is seen as the study of sign systems in general, verbal and non-verbal, by some scholars (cf. Sebeok (1986) and Lotman (1990)).

As mentioned also in 5.1., Sebeok (1986) considered linguistics to be a structurally but not functionally autonomous system of semiotics. Similar continuity was observed by Lotman (1990) between different sign systems in the mind of the speaker. The contribution of semiotic theory to translation studies was very significant.

Recognizing the non restrictive nature of the field of semiotic, in this section we will attempt to establish a dialogue only with views that can serve our purpose of clarifying Bakhtin’s views of communication, which are themselves considered by many to be semiotic rather than purely linguistic. However, we will present what seem to us to be other important contributions as we go along.

A major contribution by semiotic theory to translation was Jakobson’s (1959) influential paper. Jakobson (1959) suggested three types of translation. They are:

1-Intra-lingual translation, the interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs in the same language.

2-Inter-lingual translation, (translation proper) is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.

3-Inter-semiotic translation, or transmutation, is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of non verbal sign system.

(Jakobson, 1959: 233)
Regarding the above distinctions, we think the following comments are in order. Firstly, by giving this broad definition of translation, Jakobson may have recognized the non-uniformity of the translation process. Secondly, in the third type of translation, the translation can take reverse direction, that is, it can equally take place from non-verbal sign system into a verbal one. Thirdly, the title of Jakobson’s work, being *Linguistic Aspects of Translation*, while the discussion it offers is apparently a semiotic one. This point again gives an indication of how indistinct the border between semiotics and functional linguistics can be.

Jakobson’s definition of the first type of translation is similar to Pierce’s definition of the meaning of a sign as the translation of the sign by a more elaborate sign of the same code, i.e., translation is not concerned with the code (sign vehicle) nor with the object of the sign (referent), but with the interpretant, or how the sign stands to the subject in a given context.

In other words, Jakobson, and in this case Pierce, saw translation not as of a linguistic code, but of the interpretation of the code in the context. Therefore, in the third type, Jakobson emphasized the change of form in the semiotic transmutation, or a move between total sign systems, however within one cultural boundary.

Peirce took the meaning of the sign as its interpretation by another more developed sign. This interpretation is to Pierce a mental reflection of the relations among signs that are established objectively on the social and not on the psychological level. Innis (1986) in his introduction to Peirce’s work, pointed out a similarity between Peirce’s views and Vygotsky’s in that respect; as for Peirce every thought is a sign, and every sign is an external one (2). Holquist (1990) noticed a similarity between Pierce and Bakhtin in not denying the existence of the inner psychology of the individual but rather in refusing to see the difference between what is social and what is individual in qualitative terms. They both see a qualitative extension of what is social into what is individual (ibid).

Inter-translatability between semiotic systems was also emphasized by Lotman (1990) who called attention to a similarity between the rhetorical use of visual images and verbal tropes. Lotman indicated a continuity between pictorial and verbal semiotic systems in the consciousness of the individual, for example, a language text can take a painting as its causal background; also visual experience can possibly affect what
way verbal messages are interpreted (55-62). In other words visual or verbal experience can form a similar perspective on a single experience. In moving pictures, the closest to natural setting of communication, there is a clear overlap of the two messages.

However, Jakobson’s views are less clear about inter-lingual translation, or *translation proper* as he preferred to call it, where the code is different, and elements of experience and culture make translation by other signs less evident. Interestingly, the main confusion arises when the choice is to be made between translating a *signatum* (meaning) only by the help of the *signum* (object in the world) or by the help of the sign only. For example, the issue arises whether words like ‘cheese’ are translatable for cultures that do not have cheese.

Jakobson disapproved of B. Russell’s empirical claim that no one can understand the word ‘cheese’ unless he has a non-linguistic acquaintance with cheese (232). As a structuralist, Jakobson thought that the meaning of a word is in the sign and not the signum. It is not the case that one has to taste cheese, for example, in order to be able to translate ‘cheese’, but it suffice only to have a sign in one’s language for cheese. This confirms the fact that Jakobson takes translation to be that of the signatum (conceptual meaning) and not of the signum. Jakobson justified his position by saying that the word ‘cheese’ can refer to more than one kind of cheese even within one culture; and can also have a connotational rather than referential meaning (Ibid). We will come back to this point shortly.

Jakobson looked at translation from the same point of view of equivalence between language units (cf. Nida (1964) and Catford (1965)) except that to Jakobson, the equivalence was one of message and not code. According to Jakobson, it is the human cognitive experience and its classification that is translatable. If a code is lacking, it can always be created by *terminology qualification, such as loan words..., neologism circumlocution, etc.*, (234. For example, in Chukchee, a Northern Siberian language, the word ‘screw’ was rendered as a ‘*rotating nail*, ‘*chalk*’ as ‘*writing soap*’, ‘*Watch*’ as ‘*Hammering heart*’ (Ibid).

The theory of translation that was developed by Jakobson for interlingual translation is functionalist and starts from something surpassing the system of language to take as its starting point the communicative function of language. Yet the
question remains as to what make the functions compatible or even cross-culturally intelligible. Indeed, it is not clear, from Jakobson's examples above, whether what is translated is an experience and not a code, or whether one can dispense of showing a Chukchian a screw in order for him to understand the meaning of 'screw'. Is the introduction of the sign 'hammering heart' by itself sufficient for the native to know, or to imaginge, what a watch actually is?

Contrary to Jakobson's criticism of Russell above, it seems necessary in this case for the native to have acquaintance with watches to grasp the meaning of that word. If on the other hand, the native has seen a watch before, it would not make that much difference what name he gives it. Therefore, on the level of experience, Jakobson cannot claim that Russell's claim is not factual.

Still, one can say that the dependence on factual experience by itself is not sufficient, as we must also have a signified representation, a perspective on that reality. We usually build on a similar experience of other objects to introduce new terms. Be it that the native does not have a word (sign) for heart, it would be equally impossible for him to formulate an expression for the watch as a heart that hammers.

To solve this dilemma, it may be important to disambiguate what is being translated. If what it is being translated is the signum, and the aim of translation is to create in the native's mind a mental representation of a watch (as an object qua object), it would be essential to provide him with an image of it by showing him a watch or a picture of a watch, and this is perhaps equivalent to producing the truth-conditions for the 'watch' in his mind.

In another concept of translation, and this is closer to Jakobson's conception of it, if what is being translated is not the thing as an object but its dialogical function, whether a direct function in a text or its function as a sign for something else say the watch a symbolic sign for the importance of time, then the translation of a sign by description or terminology qualification or substitution is possible. The two types of translation can be distinguished and can be seen as serving two different purposes, the first monological or representational; and the latter dialogical or functional.

Semiotics, on its dialogical level, emphasises, among other things, the symbolic value of certain cultural artifacts and what they stand for in that culture. An owl, for example, which symbolises good luck in some Western cultures, symbolises death and
bad luck in Arabic culture. Not only can objects and signs symbolize something else, but sometimes individuals also come to symbolise certain trends, thought etc. For example, Metternich symbolising reactionary views, Voltaire’s Candide as representing naivety and bad luck. It is this aspect of meaning, and not the representational meaning, that Pierce saw as always translatable into another sign, and which Bakhtin spoke of as never finalized.

Forster (1958) noticed this phenomenon as characteristic of all meanings in language, and, therefore, took translation to be a symbolic conversion rather than transference of meaning—a testimony that strengthens the views of conventionality of language. It is also the recognition of such symbolic value that inspired Nida (1964) to translate the Biblical expression ‘the lamb of God’ into Eskimo languages ‘the seal of God’, owing the symbolic meaning of lamb as representing innocence. This move has rendered the expression more comprehensible, beside increasing its emotive appeal.

A second look at Nida’s example also illustrates the dilemma facing translation if seen from Morris’s semiotic point of view, i.e., as some translation theorists (cf. House 1977) like to do so by declaring that a translation should be equal to the original in syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects. It becomes obvious that if we pay more attention to one aspect of meaning it is always at the expense of other aspects. In Nida’s example above the semantic aspect of the meaning was sacrificed for the pragmatic meaning appeal. However, the semantic translation was an available option for Nida, but it would have been an obscure one, one that could have rendered the whole translation fruitless.

6.5. Dialogism, Code Theory and Translation

It is important in order to understand the functional views of translation, to consider Jakobson’s influential communicating model. This model is an elaboration of the classical trichotomous functional model of Bühler’s (1934) Sprachtheorie, in which Bühler classifies speech acts into three categories, Darstellung, or representation; Ausdrück, expression; and, Appell, or vocative (Lyons 1987: 51-2). Jakobson developed this into a six-function classificatory model as introduced by his code theory in his (1960) model as shown below:
Figure 2 (Terms in italics stand for functions)

Jakobson, for example, claimed the emotive function as that which is oriented towards the speaker, while the denotative aspect of language is directed towards what is being spoken about in a context. The function that focuses on the message is a poetic one. If we use language to speak about the code, that is a meta-linguistic function.

In Bakhtin’s views, the message depends, as mentioned in 6.3 above, on its reception by the addressee; therefore, what determines the function is its eventful existence at certain times between two consciousnesses, its position on the boundary between two consciousness (Bakhtin, 1990: 106), and not its code orientation.

Therefore, as explained by Todorov (1984), Bakhtin differs from the traditional ‘code theory’ by his interpretation of the concept of the message. In traditional code theory the relationship between the sender and the receiver is mediated unidirectionally by the concept of the message as demonstrated below:

Sender ———— message ———— receiver

Bakhtin saw the message not as the mediating component in the communicative action, but rather as the communicative transaction’s outcome. He, thus replaced the middle factor in the communicative situation (message) by the utterance.

Bakhtin preferred to see the message as unfolding in the immediate context of enunciation by the mediation of the utterance. The message is not a property of code, but of the utterance and the context. The latter gives it its final perspective.

Similar criticism of code-theory was recently voiced by R. Harris (1990) who offered five objections to the fixed code theory. Firstly, what he called the ‘paradox
of inquiring', that is the paradox of one of the participants' in communication asking for feedback. Secondly, how could that fixed code come about in the first place? Thirdly, if we assumed that code is already fixed then any innovation in that code would not be possible. Fourthly, one can not verify that two individuals are using the same code. Fifthly, the fixed code theory requires an ideal homogenous *état de langue* that leaves out idiolectic, or dialectic variation.

Sperber and Wilson (1987) also argued that the code-theory model of communication is inadequate for explaining communication because of *a gap between the semantic representation of the sentence and the thought actually communicated by the utterance* (697).

Bakhtin, as mentioned above, acknowledged the stability of representational aspects of language meaning or signification because he thought that to be necessary for communication, nonetheless, considered this aspect only as one part of the message, the primary material for meaning that must be assigned a final pragmatic perspective when used in context.

Thus he substituted the above code theory's two-dimensional schema with a three-dimensional one that includes the subject-matter, and in which the two interlocutors relates to the same utterance, a schema that looks like the following:

```
SENDER ------- UTTERANCE ------- RECEIVER
       (dialogue)                           (dialogue)
```

The choices of the addressor for his discourse utterances (language genre) are dependent on his evaluation of the subject-matter as well as the expectation of his addressee. Therefore, any act of communication is preceded by an inner dialogue for estimating and evaluating the subject-matter as well as the anticipating receiver. This evaluation includes estimating the receiver's background knowledge, and the receiver's anticipated evaluation of the subject-matter.

This evaluation, however, is not always factual, and it takes place between the speaker and an imaginary figure of his interlocutor; between him and what he thinks the real interlocutor to be. Put differently, he appeals to the perspective from which he thinks his interlocutor will likely evaluate the subject-matter of the conversation.
Accordingly the speaker, his choice of utterance type, his social language, together with the receiver, form what Late Wittgenstein called a \textit{form of life}.

During inner dialogue the speaker starts negotiating his language by exploiting its potentiality, affects his stylistic choices, and gives these choices their final profile by choosing how to intone them. This transition from inner speech to \textit{external speech} is not always automatic because outer expressions are not always co-incident with inner experience, and, hence communication cannot be taken to be a transference of ready pre-fabricated thoughts, or to use Harris (1990) term, a \textit{'telementation'}. It is also never complete.

As Ricoeur (1976) remarked speech is \textit{the process by which private experience is made public}. Language, he continued

\begin{quote}
\textit{is the exteriorization thanks to which an impression is transcended and becomes expression, in other words the transformation of the psychic into the neotic.}
\end{quote}

(Ricoeur 1976: 19).

This takes place in what he calls the dialectic of event and meaning (19).

At the other end, the reception also takes form of a dialogue. The receiver judges the utterances of the speaker not only on their linguistic or semantic merits, but partly also by the image of the speaker, what is expected from him, what he could have meant by an utterance, how possibly he (the speaker) evaluates the subject matter etc..

In certain instances, the reception and understanding of the message take a form of protestation or rebuttal if the utterance violates our previous assumptions of what the world is like.

The reception of the utterance also includes what R. Ingarten called a process of \textit{concretization} (Holub, 1984: 25-6). \textit{Concretization} provides all background necessary information for making sense of an utterance. Following Holub’s example, if one utters the utterance \textit{the child bounced the ball} then there a lot of indeterminacies about this utterance. The hearer has by default to provide a lot of information in order to overcome these indeterminacies and fill in the gaps in meaning, such as; whether the child is male or female, the age of the child, what religion, colour of the child, etc.. Ingarten also made the interesting remark that it is often the case in literary works that
the writer sets the reader in a *schematized structure* making him thus infer the end of
the plot or the work (Holub, 1984: 25).

In the field of artificial intelligence where the process of reception is simulated for
counter use. R. Schank and kass (1988) maintained that language, when used, is
often ambiguous and elliptical. In order to disambiguate sentences, people make use
of, among other things: inferences; understanding causal relationships; identifying of
stereotypical situation; the hypothesising people’s plans goals.

For all the above reasons, we believe that the Bakhtin/Todorov model of
communication is more general and more flexible than that of code theory. It also
recognizes the socio-cultural aspects of language. Hence, its potential for explaining
translation is greater.

Todorov (1984) envisaged a general model of communication from a Bakhtinian
point of view. In this model Jakobson’s concepts of ‘contact’ and ‘code’ are replaced
by ‘intertext’ and ‘language’ on the assumption that the contact among speakers in a
community takes place mostly by the medium of language as an utterance. The
relationships that bind subjects in a community are relationships among the utterances
with which they communicate. The general relationships among utterances are called
‘intertextual’ relationships. As will be shown later, these relationships pervades all
discourses and shape ‘contact’ by means of language. Language is considered to be
the totality of discourses that also exhibit similar dialogical relationships. (In chapter
(8) we will try to explore the potentiality of such a model for explaining translation)

Todorov’s model of communication is illustrated in the following figure:

Another important determining factor for the formation of the message is the speaker’s
intention to communicate. It lies at the heart of transforming linguistic meaning in a
particular point of view. The speaker’s intention was given a special attention in
phenomenological approaches to language, and often considered as an alternative
perspective for defining meaning. Theorists of meaning like Grice constitute an
important continuation of that tradition.
6.6. Communication and Intentionality

6.6.1 Grice’s Theory

Grice’s (1957, 1968) theory of meaning aimed at avoiding normative linguistic attitude to meaning, and the limited mechanical model of communication of code-theory by linking meaning to the speaker’s intention in a given context. Communication was assumed to be interpreter’s active inferring of the speaker’s intention.

Grice distinguished three types of meaning. First, natural meaning a meaning that is determined by nature itself, as in ‘red spots means measles’. Natural meaning enters mostly in some forms of ostensive communication. Apart from natural meaning, two non-natural meanings were separated and alternately called by Grice meaningNN. One ‘meaningNN’ corresponds to the conventional meaning of expressions, the other, which is more important to Grice is what a speaker means by an utterance.

Grice’s main undertaking was to address the problematic cases in which the two meaningNNs do not coincide. That is to account for situations where more information is needed to understand an utterance than actually given, and what Bakhtin called a final loophole in meaning. To Grice our communication is mostly inferential. For example, in the following exchange:

(11) A: There are a lot of fine restaurants in Edinburgh.
    B: I too like to go out tonight.
In (11) B interpreted A’s utterance not as a statement about Edinburgh but as a suggestion for going out to some restaurant. The real meaning of the utterance can only be inferred, depending on contextual factors and relationships between conversants.

Every felicitous conversation, to Grice (1975), has two levels, what is said and what is implicated (conversational implicature), and ought to be logically inferred from the utterance, since a speaker may say $P$ while implicating $q$.

Grice suggested that recognition of what is implicated (intention) is facilitated by conversants conventional agreement on the principles of conversing; namely a co-operative principle. This principle, includes ‘four maxims’: Quantity, giving the right quantity of information; Quality, truthfulness; Relation, relevance; Manner, perspicacity.

To illustrate what is meant by ‘maxims’ as opposed to rules, or principles, Baker and Hacker (1984) pointed out five grouping of rules related to different domains: laws, that are obligatory to follow; informal rules, that are to be followed by convention or practice code; evaluative rules, rules that constitute standards and models; prescriptive rules, as in directives and instructions; maxims, rules that serve as guiding principles, they exist for any one who wishes to follow them (252-66). It could be that Grice’s maxim’s were meant to be some sort of optional rules in Baker and Hacker’s framework.

Ducrot (1969) contrasted Grice’s concept of implicature with the concept of presupposition in the analytical philosophy of language. He concluded that the concept of implicature is supposed to operate in parole in a similar function to that of presupposition in langue. Implicature is situational, rhetorical and a posteriori, while presupposition is linguistic and a priori (Pêcheux 1982: 30f).

Grice’s main thesis is of central importance to translation because it attaches meaning to the speaker’s purpose in communication, which highlights the importance of the individual’s perspective in a single context as the locus of the linguistic practice. In addition, it explains understanding as an active inferential process and not as a passive assimilation of the speaker’s meaning.

Translation can be considered to be a translation of an individual speaker’s specific intended meaning, of his given perspective on meaning, and then the holistic concept
of translation as involving entire conceptual schemes can be avoided. Translation will be reduced to translating how linguistic meanings are invested by a given speaker in a single communicative intention, that is how language is used dialogically and not how it exists as a conventionality.

Grice’s theory also pointed to the fact that communication goes far beyond linguistically communicated meaning. In a sense it accounts for the simultaneous under-determination and over-determination of meaning caused by the gap between language meaning and contextual meaning.

6.6.2. Intention and Relevance

Grice’s thesis was more recently developed into a more unified principle of communication by Sperber and Wilson (1986). They reduced all the maxims of Grice’s cooperative principle into one general principle of relevance. Relevance is what determines the otherwise unlimited contextual meaning possibilities.

The principle of relevance was perhaps developed out of recognizing differences among individuals in terms of their background knowledge, and in terms of their understanding of new information on the basis of older information in general and because of direct contextual factors in particular. Therefore, the principle is formulated in relation to utterances rather than code or linguistic sentences.

The principle operates by assuming that a speaker tries to modify the cognitive environment of the hearer by making manifest (mentally present, and inferrable) to him an intended assumption. The cognitive environment equals the set of facts manifested in it. Therefore, the widely criticised concept of total mutual knowledge was dropped for the weaker concept of mutual manifestness of creating facts and assumptions.

The other modification is that of reducing presuppositional knowledge to a set of assumptions that vary in strength of manifestness, since it was admitted that we have more faith in some facts and assumptions than others. Assumptions get strengthened or weakened according to what happens to them when re-communicated (1987: 669-71).
A strong assumption was claimed to be more relevant and more cost-effective in cognitive processing. Contextual implication is a synthesis of old and new information by means of a deductive device. Contextual effect modifies, strengthens and eliminates previous assumptions (702). It is important to notice here that the context is defined in strictly cognitive terms, making the whole account a subjective one.

An assumption is relevant in context if and only if it has some contextual effect (modifying, eliminating, strengthening) on parts of the hearer's context (120). The more relevant an assumption the more implications it becomes. An individual tries to extract from contextual information as much effect as he can at very little cost, by including it in previous context.

This is about communication in general. In verbal communication, the linguistic code represents only a stimulus (reiterative part in Bakhtin’s terminology) which is automatically and unconsciously decoded. The propositional content acts only as a conscious schema for interpretation that takes place after decoding. The code represents the explicit content of the utterance, on which interpretation can be based for description (monologic meaning), or inferential interpretation (dialogic).

According to Sperber and Wilson, the interpretive level does not proceed according to rules, but by nonspecialized inferences that mediate between the linguistic meaning and the contextual one. Some of what were considered to be a pragmatic tasks (disambiguation, reference assignment etc.) are taken to be part of the first process (Ibid.).

Sperber and Wilson noted that the hearer deduces some implicated conclusions by the help of some implicated premises, the latter either derived from memory or constructed ad hoc (702). Following their own example (12b) would be only an implicit answer to (12a):

(12) a-Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?
       b-Mary: I would not drive any expensive car.

Peter has to add the contextual assumptions *A Mercedes is an expensive car; ‘Mary would not drive a Mercedes’, in order to derive the appropriate conclusion. He can
further assume that Mary would not drive other expensive cars, on the basis of the new information (706).

According to Sperber and Wilson, the three main differences between Grice’s maxims and relevance are: relevance is much more explicit, relevance can be followed more tacitly, and finally relevance can give an account of explicit meaning (162). However, the importance of the principle lies in its ability to explain many figurative uses of language, and its capacity for being a unified outlook on ostensive and verbal communication.

A closer look at the ‘relevance’ principle would reveal a great deal of similarity with the ‘dialogic principle’ of Bakhtin. Indeed, the two principles can be taken as a further evidence of the perspectivity of cognition and knowledge; since they can be taken as explaining the same phenomenon (communication), but from different perspectives, one from a cognitive psychology point of view, the other from a social semiotic one.

Perspective is not only epistemological, but also generic (linguistic genre), since the language used in both fields characterizes the same objects but by means of different discourses. For example, what Bakhtin called dialogue was looked at as deductive processing in Relevance; consciousness as cognitive environment; horizon as cognitive context, evaluation as contextual effect, to mention a few. Indeed the principle of relevance itself has a similarity with Bakhtin’s concept of ‘answerability’ (2.2.1 above). The fact that a similar explanation was arrived at independently and from a different perspective lends mutual support and credibility to both of them. Regarding certain aspects they can even further enrich each other.

However, the two approaches are not identical. For example, the concept of context in Bakhtin’s views is not strictly cognitive but situational and extends beyond the individual’s organism to include social aspects. For example, for a Mercedes to be an expensive car is not only a cognitive fact, but also a social and economic one that can be relativised to Peter and Mary’s income and social status. It would actually make a difference whether (12) was spoken at a company meeting about company cars, or in a car show, or forming a part of a duet song. The processing of an utterance is also dependent on allocating it to a social language.
Indeed, Sperber and Wilson acknowledged that long-term memory is organized into chunks (frames, schema, scenario, proto-type). Avoiding speculation on how information is retrieved from memory, they guessed that a concept, for example, is accessible only as part of an assumption, but stop short of explaining if the assumption itself needs to accessed through a larger chunk (1986: 138). It would be of interest to investigate the relationship between these chunk structures as forms of social reality, and the organization of assumptions in the cognitive environment.

It was also apparent from their work that Sperber and Wilson were having difficulties in leaving the context of situation out. To say that an assumption has more contextual effect because it is more relevant, or that it is more relevant because it had more effect are two sides of the same coin, and can only be differentiated ex post facto. It is more likely that contextual effect is calculated according to the dialogical relevance of one factor to the other, and that relevance itself can be made relevant to ideological and teleological factors that organize the cognitive environment.

Bakhtin also made clear that the processing of assumptions can only be done by means of language by intra-cognitive processing of the different perspectives that language utterances and genres can offer the object. Unlike inter-cognitive dialogue, it allows more flexibility that permits the fusion of different perspectives. Processing of utterances in this respect takes the same characteristics of thinking in Pierce’s idea of it as: *Yourself of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent* (Farr 1990: 31).

These comments should not be understood as undermining the great value of Relevance as a relational concept that went beyond some of the earlier static and stringent views of pragmatics. It is important not only for communication in general but also for translation. Relevance and dialogism can complement each other in that respect, the first focuses on psychological aspects of communication, the second on its socio-cultural ones, an important fact we will make use of in our subsequent discussion.
6.6.3. Intentionality and translation

Scholars (cf. S. Ross (1981)) who maintained that translation, as well as understanding in general, is a 'judgmental re-articulation' of an utterance by another, denied that the aim of translation is simply to grasp the original's writer's intention because:

If recapturing the author's intention were the goal of translation, one definitive translation of the Iliad would seem sufficient. Instead, we find a new and different translation for every generation.

(Ross, 1981: 13).

However, to Bakhtin, the meaning of intention goes far beyond immediate psychological meaning of the word to include the ideological orientation of the speaker's intention, what belies his choice of language, his identifying with a given perspective, or social language. In other words, the speaker, in Bakhtin's view, is approachable only as an ideological perspective. Thus, Bakhtin, distinguishes himself from the de-constructionist approaches to language by highlighting language's perspectival organisation of the level of speech. Also it can be said that different translators interpret intentions in the way they seem relevant to them.

Bakhtin looked at speakers as incessantly engaged in producing intentionally hybrid discourse (Morson and Emerson, 1990: 342-343). The expressions (utterances) we usually choose to use to convey our intentions are already impregnated with other speakers' meanings and intentions, speakers who have previously made these expressions manifest to us through active inter-subjective interaction, as described by Sperber and Wilson above.

Therefore, the utterance which a speaker uses to expresses his intentions also reflects the subject's ideological character, and reflects on his personality. Only if we accept that part of the subject's consciousness is shared by others, that meaning belongs to the social and ideological sphere, can we speak of eliciting each other's meanings, and hence speak of translatability.

Recognition of the speaker's meaning is undoubtedly essential to translation, however, what is often overlooked is that Grice's thesis is also important for another level of intentionality, that of the translator's intention to translate the author's work. The translator's intention makes up his reasons for undertaking the translation;
reasons that are normally brought about by circumstances related to target language environment, and not by those that have evoked the original work. This intention also determines what goes in the translator’s mind at the time of translation.

In translation studies that leans towards comparative methods of texts, functions, or even language systems there is hardly any mention of the rôle of the translator’s intention. The intention involved in the translation is always assumed to be that of the original writer. However, in Bakhtin’s formulation the intention would become a single perspective through which the two can speak with one voice, rendering the translation to be also inter-intentional.

The centrality of the rôle of the translator is obvious from the lack of success in machine translation. The human translator alone can elicit the original author’s intention, his non conventional use of language, his sense of humour, or prejudices. The human translator, unlike the machine, can stop in the middle of a translation, re-evaluate the translation and perhaps start all over again.

Thus, Bakhtin pointed out that dialogic utterances can be hybridized polyphonically, to be capable of expressing more than one subject’s intention in a single occurrence, by one speaker uttering something that has been formulated by someone else. In many of these cases the enunciator is not the original producer of the utterance but only carries out another speaker’s intention of information. For example, a character is a mouthpiece for the intentions of its creator, the author of the play. A speaker also sometimes chooses to hide behind a third person pronoun to express their evaluation of things as, for example, in their use of sayings, quotations, or phrases like ‘many people think’, ‘as is commonly acknowledged’ etc.. Grice also did not say much about conventional meaning in language but rather concerned himself almost totally with the intentional meaning of the speaker, despite the fact that he sometimes alluded to the possibility that the correlations between signals and intentions can be conventionalized and thus become models for speakers to follow (Harrison 1988: 189)

Grice assumed goodwill on the part of the participants in a conversation by assuming their adherence to the cooperative principle. However, a conversation might be designed to misinform or deceive rather than to truthfully inform. The producer can also be equivocal about revealing what he really intended to mean by an utterance, a
practice very common in political speeches and journalistic writing. Take, for example, the newspaper headline below:

13- Muslim activists ready to be jailed.
(The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1992.)

A careful reader will be in two minds about what the journalist is trying to convey because in one reading the journalist seems to be quoting the Muslim leader in showing readiness to go to jail to make his point. In the other reading a reader can deduce an illicit call for jailing of the muslim activists. The pressphotos accompanying the headlines do suggest, and make more relevant, the second rather than the first reading. (The Daily Telegraph’s headline was circumscribed by four big size pressphotos of four Muslim activists, all in sombre and rebellious mood (see Appendix 1. (a)). The photo and the headline form together a message exemplary of the interplay between verbal and non-verbal messages to indicate the second reading.)

This double reading is reinforced by the understanding of the social context of the headline, and by the tacitly conservative perspective associated usually with this and similar right-of-centre newspapers. The writer was aware of his audience’s previous non-totally committed assumptions, and wanted to reinforce them.

The Sun, a more conservative popular tabloid newspaper, one with assumingly more conservative audience, treated the same incident more explicitly to match their expectation. Its headline, which occupies the top of two facing Pages (see Appendix 1. (b)), reads thus:

15- War heros’ message to the Muslim motormouth ‘IF YOU DON’T LIKE US GET OUT’

A liberal and less hostile newspaper The Glasgow Herald, showed an attitude that favoured more or less the first reading, by presenting the incident as follows:

16- Muslims dismiss threats to defy law.
(The Glasgow Herald, January 6, 1992.)
The Glasgow Herald presented the news from a more moderate Islamists’ perspective as an ordinary ‘threat to defy the law’, highlighting also the fact that those Islamic activists do not represent the point of views of all Muslims in Britain, and that they threaten Britain’s security. (Appendix 1. (c)).

The importance of recognizing the original author’s intention was stressed by many scholars (cf. Hatim and Mason (1991)) who insisted that the translator should give priority to the intended meaning. Likewise, they also highlighted the importance of observing the conversational maxims in relation to the target language. In this connection, they pointed to the necessity of revising these maxim’s to suit the target language, which requires certain textual adjustments, such as ellipsis, or redundancies (94-5).

Disregard for the cooperative principle, or lack of good will can also affect translation. A case in point is Fitzgerald’s quotation in (3.2.5) above in which he states that he had done whatever pleased him with the translation of the Persian poetry, because he thought that those people were not poetic enough. He did so perhaps to make his translation more poetically relevant to his audience.

One may say that Grice’s work even if philosophically sound in its focus on the importance of the intention of the utterer or author, is, and this is mainly because of its analytical orientation, too stringent for the purpose of understanding in translation. Translation therefore cannot be said to have recovered the exact meanings of the author. Even in the cases where the author himself revises the translation of his own work in another language, there are always moments where he pauses to decide whether what he wanted to say in his original coincides with the translator’s rendering of it.

Translation, as we are going to demonstrate, must be seen as a complex intentional act, involving more than one intention. That is the intention of the original author as represented polyphonically by a secondary act of intention of the translator. Translation involves, among other things, the intentional choice of the original, the moment and the audience of its translation. That is a reason for which translation can never be an objective practice.

We would like to reiterate what we have already said above (2.2.1.3) that the relation that enters into translation cannot be formulated within binary relation of
either or, but because of its polyphonic nature it involves a relation of complementarity, in other word a relation of both and. The question should not be posed about who speaks in a translation, the translator or the original author, because in reality they both figure in the translation. Translation contains two overlapped voices, the original author’s as well as the translator’s.

6.7. Hermeneutics and Translation

One may say that hermeneutics is a branch of study that takes interest in the interpretation of texts and their functions rather than in the form, or the systemic aspects of languages in which texts are written. Some scholars (cf. Bateman (1987), Kelly (1979)) describe as hermeneutic approaches to language those that focus on the speaker’s goals, beliefs and intentions, thus overlooking what language expressions designate in favour of concentrating on what expressions are used for.

Common to the extreme views of hermeneutics is the view that language rules are individualistic and totally creative. Therefore they subscribe to a concept of untranslatability, though their concept was linked to differences not in language structure (cf. Sapir and Whorf), but to differences related to the intellectual powers of the speakers. (See, for example, Humboldt’s views on language as energia as well as his views about the impossibility of balancing translation as mentioned above in (3.2.4), as well as the Romanticists’ views and prejudices about translation.)

Hermeneutics also emphasises the life nature of the context of language, as is obvious of Dilthy’s (1833-1911) linking the meaning of text to lebensform, Heidegger’s to creation of existence Dasein, or Husserl’s binding it to the speaker’s intention. General emphasis on recognizing the whole intention of the speaker, has developed into what Diltthey has called the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle is a principle of interpretation that conditions the understanding of the parts to the understanding of the whole and vice versa (Seung, 1982: 49).

Some recent views of translation continued the hermeneutic tradition of translation studies established by scholars such as Heidegger and Benjamin (discussed in chapter 4 above). Hermeneutic views have been specifically introduced in the modern debates about translation under the rubric of the general term ‘the interpretive theory of
translation’ in the work of scholars (cf. G. Steiner (1975), D. Ross (1981), Lefevere (1971)).

Compared to definitions of translation in other fields, translation in hermeneutics is considered to be reinterpretation rather than transference. For example, linguistics defined translation as: *...the reproduction in the receptor language of the closest natural equivalent of the source language message.* (Nida, 1969: 10). Semiotics did the same but in term of content as *the transfer of the content of a text from one language into another... a conversion of symbols rather than a transference of meaning’* (Forster 1958: 1); whereas hermeneutics described translation as the *interpretation of verbal signs in one language by means of verbal signs in another* (Steiner, 1975: 414).

Hermeneutics’ attitude towards translation takes little interest in any concept of equivalence, concentrating more on the process of the phenomenological act of translation. Some modern hermeneutic scholars (cf. Gadamer) considered every act of understanding as also an appropriative act of translation into a new contextual horizon. Interpretive understanding is perforce engrossed in previous presupposition on the part of the interpreter (fore-meaning). Gadamer made a distinction between understanding of the semantic content of the text and the contextual interpretation of the text that requires the reconstruction of its original extra-linguistic context (Seung, 1982 chapter 10, passim). Translation, inspired by these views would be a cross-cultural transposition of a text into a new cultural horizon.

Steiner (1975), following the steps of Heidegger and Benjamin, adopted a similar attitude to translation, by taking it to be a violent act of appropriation. Using the term ‘hermeneia’ (Aristotle’s word for interpreting other discourses) Steiner describes translation as a *four-steps hermeneia:* 1) *trust* the initial belief that there are meanings there to translated; 2) *penetration* or what he called metaphorically ‘aggression and appropriation of the other’s meanings, since these meanings are a property of the other’s being in Heidegger’s sense of the word, and because appropriation is always partial. This act of appropriation leaves an ‘enigmatic residue of meaning of the original behind; 3) *incorporation* which is the embodiment of what has been appropriated into the translator’s language. This embodiment contains different shadings of assimilation ranging from total domestication to preserving the complete...
strangeness of the text; 4) restitution where the translator tries to authenticate his translation or restores the disequilibrium caused by the previous operations, and his personal reading of the original. According to Steiner, it is only in this step that the translator tries to restore faithfulness to the original. In a sense it includes putting the two texts, original and translation, together to square the relationship between them (296-300).

One cannot fail to remark certain similarities between Steiner’s concept of ‘incorporation’ and Bakhtin’s concept of inter-textuality. A text that is not properly inter-textualized will always look strange and the translation will be, as Popović (1970) described it, a translation that identifies itself with, or through which one can see, the original, that is a transparent translation (80).

Steiner alleged that the translator, fearing the failure to understand the whole meaning of the original may give it an inflationary meaning by being oversensitive towards its author’s meanings. The result is the over-determination of the act of appropriation which leads to ‘over-translation’ of the original (Ibid).

Steiner claimed that the relationship of the text to the original is not one and uniform, but can be of different types, such as that of imitation, thematic, variation, even it can be one of parody etc.. This diversity of relationships stands in the face of any attempt at theorising or delimiting a single relation as the relation between the text and the original, such as equivalence, for example.

To give a taste of Steiner’s concept of translation, and to highlight the similarity between his view and that of his predecessor Heidegger, it is perhaps practical to consider his example of the French sentence J’aime la natation. If this phrase is translated literally, Steiner suggested, it will render the awkward English phrase ‘I love natation’ (which he claimed was actually used by Sir. T. Browne). Meanwhile, the English counterpart ‘I like to go swimming’, even if less faithful, seems more appropriate. However, this in turn gives rise to another discrepancy if one wants to trace the original meaning of ‘natation’ which has the Old French connection to the word ‘navigare’, which is related to the direction of movement of ships in sea; the word ‘swim’ to the Indo-European origin ‘swem’ meaning motion in general. A translation that aims at preserving the etymological origin of these words will miss this point. Like Heidegger, Steiner, thought that any unified meaning of a word is to
be found only in its original meaning, and that a difficulty of lexical matching between languages resides in the fact that each word has a different being.

Steiner (1975) ruled out the possibility of translating by the intermediary of a formal language mainly because a formal language cannot attend to implicit 'sense', the denotative, connotative, illative, intentional, associative range of significations which are implicit in the original. Thus, he judged translation as never being co-extensive with the original because to fulfil the task of translation a process of translation also requires illustrative re-contextualization. Translation, he added, always exceeds the original and is by nature an inflationary process (276-7).

Meanwhile, Ross (1981) insisted that in translation there exists a triad rather than pairs; original, translation, audience. Translation, he alleged, is the interpretation of the work of the author for the new audience (1981: 26). Since no translation can be assumed to be a repetition of the original, or equal to the original in all respects, Ross claimed translation to be an ipso facto interpretive operation, which must, by its nature, re-articulate only certain aspects of the meaning of the original. In translation, Ross pointed out, we re-articulate what we think to be the Judgment of the original; a judgment that is a choice from different validated perspectives (14-5).

A closer look at this concept of translation that can go to an extreme extent throws some light on Bakhtin's claim that understanding in general has no limit. In other words, we can continue the analysis of a text, its different origins, different previous comments about it, the historical evolution of its constituents, to almost no limits, a reason for which Bakhtin thinks interpretation has to be bound for certain functions in a particular context, and therefore would not continue indefinitely.

Bakhtin's dialogical principle seems to us to occupy a middle ground by being a dialectical synthesis between the essentialist views of meaning and translation that were articulated within linguistics and semiotics and the purely subjectivist views of meaning that are upheld within romantic and hermeneutic views of language, as pure creation.

Some recent approaches to translation have come to grips with the complexity and non-formal character of translation practice. Linguistics and semiotics also became more aware of the multi-dimensional aspects of meaning and translation. New approaches to meaning from experimental cognitive psychology revealed the intricacy
of speaking and interpretive processes. Today, most approaches to translation (cf. De Beaugrande (1978), Hartmann (1980), Snell-Hornby (1988), Hatim and Mason (1990), adopted a more general inter-disciplinary stance that is mostly eclectic in its methods of analysis. They are mostly textual approaches that try also to make use of new findings in text linguistics and discourse analysis.

Some of Bakhtin’s views, such as those of the text as an utterance in context, and ideological relationships among texts (inter-textuality), were widely used, unfortunately sometimes without reference to his contribution, since they were unconsciously passed over as second-hand materials by text linguists from poetics, or cognitive scientists from Vygotskyian psychology to translation studies. Some of these approaches are very penetrating and cannot be overlooked. However, our survey will itself be eclectic in most parts, and far from comprehensive.

6.8. Translation, Text and Discourse

Recognising the limitation of the treatment of meaning in earlier formal theories of language, and being aware of the socio-cultural aspects of meaning, text linguistics tried to establish itself as a linguistics of parole. Text linguists have put forth many arguments in favor of treating the text as the unit for meaning analysis.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the interest of the text as a meaning unit was characteristic of Firth’s functional approach to meaning. Firth’s aim was to use the text to define a general function of a single text in context; however, he did not consider, as seen above, the text to be a unit of translation. Instead, he tried to account for translation formally among systemic but not textual units. Modern text linguistics revived Firth’s tradition but with more emphasis on the global cognitive meaning of the text, and more attention paid to relationships among texts.

As Garnham (1989) also explained, this was aided by psycholinguistic discoveries that in the processing of longer stretches of discourse such as texts, intra-textual elements are interdependent, and the interpretation involves extra-textual knowledge. Interpreters form mental representations of text mostly in terms of their content information and not their forms; the representation they form is influenced by
contextual elements. All this points to the fact that the text may have a global structure within which the meaning of its sentences are deeply integrated (138-40).

Awareness of the unity of the text as a Gestalt meaning unit, which corresponds to contextual communicative purpose, re-oriented translation studies towards the text as a unit. Hence approaches to translation parted company with traditional linguistic and semiotic theories that considered words as the main unit of translation, and oriented itself towards more flexible interpretive theories that considered the text as a whole to be the main linguistic unit.

The shift was also motivated by the recognition that any communication by means of natural language takes the form of a text (Wills (1982: 112). Text linguistics shares with hermeneutics the emphasis on the Gestalt nature of textual interpretation, with semiotics the attention to the social aspects of meaning, and with functional linguistics the teleological division of language into restricted languages.

Text-linguistics, however, is widely practised today and has branched out into many sub-fields. However, what interests us here are some of text-linguistic’s views as applied to approaches to translation such as those, De Beaugrande (1978) and Hartmann (1980).

The textual approach to meaning which makes use of different psycholinguistic and hermeneutic concepts, allowed a wider scope for looking at translation. Within textual material itself, trans-sentential aspects of meaning such as cohesion, coherence, ellipses, became more accountable to meaning analysis (De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981). The text as a whole became more appropriately ascribable to its producer’s intention. Scholars were able to incorporate in their studies of text analysis strategies and devices the producer employs to achieve his intention.

A textual approach to translation made it feasible to speak of language in the restricted terms of text typologies. A classification that was popular among translation theorists (cf. Dressler (1972), Reiss (1971)), was K. Bühler’s (1934) Sprachtheorie and Jakobson’s (1960) Linguistic and Poetic, mentioned earlier. Reiss, for example, postulated three types of texts, informative, expressive and operative (H. Bühler 1978: 452). Dressler (1972) suggested that translated texts themselves represent an independent hybrid type of text, he called translationese (Hartmann 1980: 27).
Text linguistic approaches to translation can be seen as one of two general tendencies. The first are the contrastive approaches (cf. Hartmann (1980, House (1977)). The second are procedural approaches (cf. De Beaugrande (1978). The two approaches share the fact of being eclectic in their analysis, and emphasising the teleological aspect of the text.

Hartmann looked at translation from a comparative textology point of view in terms of textual translation equivalence. He suggested that the translated and the original texts, in respect to their communicative function, should look as two parallel texts. He thought that the text as a product is all that is available for analysis, since there is no way of directly observing the process of bilingual conversion in the mind of the translator (48). Thus, to him a theory of translation process is at least for the time being not possible.

Hartmann, thus, relied mostly on contrastive linguistic methods (cf. those of Di Pietro, Lado, Fisiak), and Halliday’s sentence-based textual analysis to compare texts. He considered that all this approach could account for, each time it applies, is an individual isolated experience that does not allow any form of generalization; a reason for which translation studies should abandon the dogmatic aim of being a science.

House (1977) was devoted entirely to developing criteria for assessing functional equivalence. House defined the function of the text as the use of the text in a given context of situation. She relied on Crystal and Davy’s (1969) multi-dimensional stylistic approach, as well as many other views from a functional perspective, to develop a system for translation assessment. However, despite the thorough and deep analysis, she concluded by alleging that appropriateness of the target text must in the end be subjected to individual judgment (62).

Whereas Hartmann spoke about comparing the two texts in relation to their performing a similar function, House tried to show the means through which they preserve the same function. However, implied in the two approaches is the view that the translated text always performs the same function in the target language. They overlooked the fact that, with the exception perhaps of a few monological encounters where what is related to is an unchanging thing such as in operative, or scientific texts, the context of situation in which the translated text would be received, the
relationships involved between the text and its translator, and the new audience, are not necessarily similar. Therefore, the function of the two texts cannot be said to be always the same, and that the meanings in the new text may have to be negotiated anew dialogically.

A cognitive approach to translation was also put forth by De Beaugrande (1978). De Beaugrande’s reader-based model was obviously an eclectic approach that derives from different fields of language studies. In an account similar to those used in procedural cognitive linguistics, using some concepts of the reception theory of Iser and Jauss, De Beaugrande tried to describe the process of translation aiming at revealing the different strategies that underlie the production, and reception of translated texts. The linguistic structures of the texts were interpreted as signals of these strategies (170).

De Beaugrande (1978), though limited to poetic texts, which he characterised as texts with unexpected meanings, was obviously a proposal for a general theory of translation. According to this theory, translation is first and foremost dependent on the reading of the text. During the reading, the text is subjected to a process of structuration according to the habitual signals used in the text, and the interpreter’s previous experience with similar texts, structuration competence.

Structuration competence, De Beaugrande claimed, is similar but slightly different from the concept of competence in Chomsky’s theory. It is schematically represented in an underlying knowledge which includes the ability to invoke language structure to produce or interpret whole texts, e.g., poetic competence, journalistic competence. Therefore one may say that, to De Beaugrande, competence is textual. It consists of linguistic knowledge to assemble smaller elements of the text to form macrostructures representation of that text in the mind, a representation which is (as also envisaged by Fodor, Bever, Garrett 1974) internalised from the environment (22).

Although De Beaugrande compared his concept of competence with that of Chomsky’s, De Beaugrande’s competence is procedural and is more akin to Hymes’ communicative competence. It has very little to do with Chomsky’s concept of grammatical ‘competence’, which is not only cognitive but biological and has very little to do with language use (21-4). As mentioned in chapter 2, Chomsky did not rule
out a competence of language use which he distinguished as pragmatic competence. Chomsky's first kind of competence is inborn, the second is acquired.

De Beaugrande also remarked that the reader looks forward to the text with some expectation; therefore, he initially approaches the text with unconscious anticipation for his expectation's fulfilment. Only when that fails, the reader resorts to more thorough conscious analysis. Reading, according to De Beaugrande, can add to or permute the original because of structuration and anticipation, so much so that the process of reading can be considered as a type of translation (28).

The mental representation of the text created in the mind of the speaker is a text that is never the exact equivalent to that of the original. This perspective representation is what gets translated. This is a reason why De Beaugrande considered his model to be reader based (Ibid.).

De Beaugrande also considered silent reading (in parallel to the concept of inner dialogue of Bakhtin) to be necessary for any act of writing, including translation (260). He was perhaps aware, though did not explicitly mention, the dialogic nature of understanding. He did not state, for example, that the units of structuration are dialogic utterances (utterances as defined above in 6.3. above) and not sentences as linguistic units. He also fell short of saying that the text also speaks of, besides its linguistic meaning, an outside reality. De Beaugrande also spoke very little about the other dialogue that enters in producing the translated text, or re-structuration of the text to fit the new audience.

Thus, though De Beaugrande alleged that all standards of equivalence are meaningless, because of different possible readings of the original, he, nonetheless, contemplated another concept of equivalence related to the way a text functions between the original author and his source language readers, and that between him and the target language readers, implying by doing so that the translated text performs the same function as the original. This overlooks what he stated earlier, that the text, the translated text as a text on its own right, would be structurated differently by different recipients (the new readers).

De Beaugrande, discussing the concept of equivalence, divided translation into text-based and reader-based. The first is form oriented, the second is content-oriented. This distinction is in many ways similar to the one made earlier by Kelly (3.3).
between *object-centred* and *subject-centred* translation. Because of the structural differences among languages, discrepancies related to language particular use, and the lack of any standardised theoretical criteria, De Beaugrande understandably rejected the unrestricted concept of formal representational equivalence.

He, instead, saw the form-oriented translation in the light of *asymmetrical equivalence* of corresponding forms. The reader-based translation was seen in terms of functional equivalence (95-102). However, as mentioned above, the use of the concept of equivalence would eventually need similar standardised criteria if it were to be used as a translational concept. This is something House (1977) concluded can only be at the final analysis individual.

De Beaugrande's theory was admittedly a broad synthesis of different views of many scholars of different persuasions (cf. Jakobson, Steiner, Pierce, Chomsky, Iser). It was also an early testimony to the inter-disciplinary nature of translation, pioneering in uncovering the complexity of the translation process as a textual undertaking.

De Beaugrande's explanation of translation implies a similar synthesis to that proposed by Bakhtin between empiricists and rationalists, except that De Beaugrande considered the production and evaluation of texts to be a purely subjective undertaking, ignoring the inter-subjective and generic limits on the producer of the original as well as on the translator. This impression is reinforced when one considers that de Beaugrande restricts his views only to poetic translation, an area where subjectivity reigns most.

De Beaugrande's work exhibited a strong hermeneutic influence. Here we want to take the opportunity De Beaugrande makes available to us to bring the dialogic conception of translation closer to the reader’s mind. For dialogism does not take understanding to be a translation, but an active evaluative act of the original. That is, we do not understand someone by simply empathizing with his perspective, translating it into our own, but also by knowing that it is some one else's perspective. It is true that when we understand the original, we do so by unconsciously comparing it to other perspectives as well as with our own perspective. We might keep the same mental representation of the original, but with different attitudes and feelings towards it. Therefore, this evaluation may be reflected, when re-expressing the mental
representation during translation, in different unconscious linguistic and stylistic choices. The translation thus partly speaks of its translator.

However, translators are usually unable to form mental representations of whole texts, since on the average, texts are composed of longer material than can be stored in the mind of the translator. We believe that the processing of the text during reading takes place piecemeal by dialogically interpreting every new utterance according to the gist of the reading of previous ones. What remains registered in the mind of the reader about the text is the gist of that text as a whole, as a one unified utterance. That gist of the text is the general perspective of that text, the general evaluation by the text of the issue concerned, which also form its ideological meaning. (We owe the word 'gist' to Garnham (1989: 139))

It is interesting to note that in his more recent writings, De Beaugrande became more aware of the dialogic nature of language, and reformulated his views in terms akin to those of Bakhtin. De Beaugrande (1991), for example, called for the dichotomization of language into langue and parole, competence and performance, or system and function, to be re-examined, and replaced by a dynamic dialectical one. One that can accommodate language theory and language practice. This dichotomy can be reinterpreted in terms of a dialectic between the potential and the virtual. De Beaugrande thought that Saussure and Chomsky, who had wrongly insisted that linguistic theory concern itself only with potential, and Bloomfield who postulated infinite variation of meaning, were all inappropriate (357-9).

Many approaches to translation followed the trails of De Beaugrande’s work. They all form a general revision of old assumptions about translation, and point to a re-orientation of translation studies towards a more flexible, inter-cultural approach. Hornby (1987) was an attempt to develop an integrated approach, where translation is looked at as a subject-bound activity. Hatim and Mason (1990) is a discourse analysis approach that depends on thorough eclectic analysis of translated texts. It also contains a good discussion of inter-textuality as a semiotic concept that operates between texts. However, despite their detailed revision of the old paradigm of translation studies, it would perhaps be imprudent to see them as an already matured new paradigm. It is maybe safe to say, that translation studies are struggling nowadays
to find a new viable direction. However, we regret our being prevented from surveying them all in detail.

Another important work that came to our attention late in writing this thesis is Neubert (1985). Neubert attempts to highlight the connection between the translation as a product and translation as a process (18). Neubert relied mostly on interactionist approaches in social and cognitive psychology (Schank and Aelson (1977)) to account for the relationship between language and social reality, on text analysis (De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981) to study intra-textual structure, and on conversation analysis of (Gumperz (1982) and Grice (1975)) to study the dynamics of interaction, as well as many other studies. We take much comfort from the fact that Neubert towards the end pointed to a similar conclusion to that of this thesis, making clear that intertextuality is the overriding phenomenon in which all the above factors converged (114).

However, despite the fact that intertextuality is currently discussed by many scholars as mentioned above, in most cases they fail to account for the philosophy that underpins it. Therefore, we think that intertextuality as a relation of abstract and pervasive type, cannot be made clear and obvious without reference to the philosophical principle that underlies it, the dialogic principle. We also hope that our discussion of intertextuality will bring to light Bakhtin as its real originator.

6.9. Conclusion

In this chapter a survey of some communicative views of translation was attempted. As before, the aim has always been to point out the necessity of dialogism to translation. We have tried, as much as was possible, to show that natural language is a dialogical phenomenon that extends from a limited dialogic exchange to dialogue among languages. That dialogism does not only offer a viable explanation of the history of translation as made clear in Chapter 3, or illuminate some philosophical debates about translation (chapter 4), but also can offer a good perspective for criticising actual approaches to translation (chapter 5,6). In what follows we will try to explore the potentiality of the dialogic principle for offering a tentative approach to translatability, as in the following chapter, and to translation in the final chapter.
Chapter 7
A Tentative Dialogical Approach to Translatability

7.1. Introduction

Our aim so far has been to offer a Bakhtin-inspired presentation of different attitudes towards the issue of translation. We also tried to show that some modern theories of translation represent a continuation of old philosophical views of meaning and translation some of which were surveyed in chapters (3), (4). All along we tried to show the relevance of Bakhtin’s ‘dialogical principle’ as potential site of synthesis for diverse views on translation.

In chapter (4) it was concluded that translation cannot be convincingly accounted for by reductionist approaches. For example, views that have opted for reducing meaning to semantic representation only have been devastated by Quine’s demonstration that translation cannot be accounted for by a prioristic analytic means, and cannot be identity-preserving. However, the logical conclusion of Quine’s attack was to deny the possibility of translation altogether. We have argued that Quine’s radical translation was also radically different from the ordinary concept of translation, and that his account of the relationship between language outside reality, while perhaps philosophically sound, was practically unrealistic.

A major alternative reductionist approach was the hermeneutic view of translation as represented by Heidegger, Benjamin, and Steiner, for whom language and meaning are linked to the expressive needs of the individual or the culture concerned. Language and meaning were seen as being in constant flux, and, thus, translation was reduced to ephemeral particular interpretation.
Adopting a broad and comprehensive approach to language, Bakhtin's dialogism, we believe, embraces within it a general possible explanation of translatability and translation. By refusing to reduce language to a priori concepts, and by admitting the uniqueness of every utterance, dialogism rejects the first camp's equating translation with the cross-cultural preserving of the identity of texts. On the other hand, by hypothesizing the subject's consciousness as dialogically mediated by an objective symbolic system, dialogism sees a proximal similarity between different subjects' cognitive constitution that contributes to their intelligibility, and thus to translatability.

Dialogism, as an inevitable universal aspect of being of which no individual has an 'alibi', and as an archetypical model of all communication, is a shared factor of humanity that makes intelligibility across the barriers of language and culture possible. In other words, we do not translate from other languages because we share the same conceptual or linguistic categories with them, but we do so because we share more or less the same answerability with them. We can empathize with them, overcome the conceptual differences between us and them, and try to see the world from their point of view. However, we do so with the full awareness that their perspective is different from ours. Thus viewed, in our translation we do not try to understand how their language reflects objective reality, but how their language reflects their attitude to that reality.

In this chapter, we will try to elaborate more on the question of translatability, and try to formulate a tentative explanation for this issue from a dialogic point of view. A tentative approach to translation will be suggested in the next chapter, and according to this approach we will revisit some of the central issues of translation in the following chapter.

In the following section we will try to demonstrate that dialogism is a basic and inherent characteristic of natural language. By doing so, we will try to show that this state of affairs is necessary for the understanding of the issue of translatability.

7.2. The Possibility of Translation

It is a truism that we can communicate efficiently, even if non-verbally, say kinesically, or by any other sign language, only with other human beings; so much
so that if we are said to be able to translate, it is only from or into an other human language. It is also indisputable that it is not enough to share some physical world in order to be able to communicate, as we share the world with other species with whom we are not even able to communicate efficiently. Consequently, it is likely that we share something in common in order to be able to communicate, or recognize each other’s intentions.

Moreover, as proclaimed by F. Saussure, communication is made possible mostly by the medium of the semiotic arbitrary sign system of natural language. One can even go as far as to assume that even if natural language is a unique phenomenon to mankind, (since there are still those who might argue that other non-human species might equally have a form of language, and that this language might also be arbitrary), we are unable to decipher the language of other species because our mind and those of the other species are not compatible. One can, for example, point to a rabbit with Quine’s native, and the native will point to the same rabbit and say ‘gavagai’, but it is unlikely, with the exception of some humanly trained chimps, that he can have any other non-human primate point to any object and say any thing with him.

There are, however, none who would argue against the fact that every human community that we know of, even if this community lacks one or another semiotic system, has access to at least one natural language. A child, of any race, colour, or nationality, if not suffering a mental impairment, if put in a different society, can naturally acquire the language of that society as a first language and not that of his ancestors. This is not possible with any other species at least with similar speed and efficiency. Besides, we can also learn and communicate in more languages than our own language. Some have tried, even with some success to teach a chimpanzee some simple words or phrases, but no one, at least we have heard of, has claimed to have known the language of a chimp as a chimp.

Our common nature as people ought not to be measured by how our traits are similar or different, but rather by the mere fact that we have such traits. Our similarity is not, for example, determined by how our symbolic or conceptual systems coincide, but mostly by the fact that we are all able to develop symbolic systems of great diversity. We share for example certain biological traits of love, fear, sexual
desire etc., although the way we go about expressing them is different. We are different because we have different identities, but we are one in always striving to establish our identity. We are different because we have different answerabilities, but we are the same in the conditions that guide our answerability, such as our quests for survival.

Identity and differentiation, according to dialogism, constitute rather than exclude each other. The problem arises when we try to emphasise similarity to the point that we try to rule out differences as in the case of postulating a certain 'essence of man' in terms of certain categories of one culture or one rationality. Conversely, a similar problem arises when we try to concentrate on differences so as to deny any similarities. Possible total translation is the logical consequence of the first view. Untranslatability is the corollary of the second. Starting with the latter view, we will eventually end discussing the second.

Hatim and Mason (1991) have mooted the possibility of translation in the face of its denial of by extreme language-deterministic scholars (cf. Sapir (1921)). Sapir’s thesis, as is known to many, denied the possibility of any translation because a language’s categories shape the conceptual structure of the mind of its speakers to a degree that it would be difficult to make a distinction between the two. Apparent differences among languages structures and languages’ categories are at the same time conceptual ones; therefore, if language’s structures are incommensurable, so are their conceptual contents. Merging this view with conventional scepticism about any possible objective recognition of realities in the world, translation to relativists (cf. Sapir), is no more than the delusion of translating. This is a thesis which is usually taken as representative of the views that deny translatability.

Hatim and Mason’s (1991) answer to Sapir’s hypothesis was one of rejection, on the grounds that since we are able to learn other languages then we ought to be able to translate the same languages we are capable of learning. They also thought that the isolation of meaning from one natural language to be expressed in another is possible (29-31).

Hatim and Mason’s rejection of Sapir’s thesis seems to us justified, but we would like to take it further in order to explain how their presumption is possible in the first place. This is so for two reasons. The first reason is that their assertion of the
possible acquisition of another language does not go far enough and explain how it is possible to acquire that language. The second reason, is that the knowledge of another language is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for translation to be possible. We can possibly learn more than one language without necessarily being able to translate them into one another. Even the acknowledgement that we can separate meaning from language does not constitute a guarantee for the possibility of the expression of that meaning in another language.

Therefore, there must be other justifications for translatability that can equally explain language acquisition and bilingualism; these three issues seem to be deeply related and can be attributed to similar underlying factors. In what follows we would like to present what we think to be certain justifications for believing in the translatability of natural languages.

7.2.1 Biological Consideration of Human communication

Lyons (1977) specified sixteen characteristics of human language that distinguish it from other simple systems of communication used by other animals. Most prominent among these characteristics are the following: arbitrariness, interchangeability (reciprocity), feedback, learnability (naturally learnt), reflexivity (can talk about itself), displacement, and prevarication (Lyons, 1977: 71-84).

Hockett (1960) contrasted human communication systems with those of other animals, and concluded that other species’ systems of communication are more related to momentary motivational and biological needs, and lack the referential, propositional, and symbolic features that characterize the human speech (Steklis, 1988: 39). So the question then remains, as was asked by Lieberman (1983), whether human language is different from other species in the same way that a communication system of a dog differs from that of a frog (92).

Recent comparative cross-species studies (Lieberman, Laitman (1983), Gibson (1983, 1988), Saban (1983), suggested that, despite the gross morphological similarity between the human speech organs and brain and those of non-human primates, more particularly those of apes, there are significant differences in the size and shape of the
neocortical, and laryngeal systems of man and those of apes that can explain the speech and language differences between them.

It has also been suggested by the above researchers that the main area of the human brain involved with communication is the neocortical, while it is the subcortical limbic structure in other primates. Subcortical areas are also involved in the emotional and instinctive cries of the human being (Steklis, 1988: 39). Higher cortical areas are also said to be involved in other higher cognitive processes as well (Lieberman, 1983:95). Other differences were suggested relating to the degree of asymmetry between the two hemispheres of the brain, and the density of the vascular link between the two sides (Saban, 1983).

Lieberman (1982) pointed out that our language specific ability that distinguishes us from other primates is related not only to an innate language organism as claimed by Chomsky, but it also involves other peripheral neural mechanisms, those that mediate between sensory input and motoric output. These mechanisms regulate the parsing ability of speaker in speech reception, and 'automatize' his motoric output when speaking.

Interesting also is Lieberman's claim that recent studies have pointed out the fact that in the chimpanzees (the closest primate to a human being, and of which it was proven to have certain cognitive behaviour), certain 'peripheral' mechanisms are lacking (94-5).

These comparative studies confirm recent glossogenetic and paleontological speculations that the development of certain traits by human beings that enabled him to develop language are relatively recent, traits such as: modification to the cortical structure, or even the development of a deeper throat as a result of lowering the larynx and the loss of contact between the epiglottis and the soft palate (to allow the ease of production of some vowels) took place in an evolutionary leap, that some estimate as taking place about 400,000 years ago, with the emergence of *homo erectus*. This also coincided with the emergence of other cognitive, structural, and cultural changes, such as: bipedality (upright posture); advanced compound-tool making; proximal association etc. Some others modified the estimate to a more mature stage of development, that is 100,000 years ago (K. Gibson, 1988).
K. Gibson (1983, 1988) pointed out that the human brain has, through evolution, gradually became heavier, and has developed a thicker neocortical region and more convolutions than any other animal brain. She related this fact to observations of ontogenic development of the human child. She pointed out that the human brain is more convoluted in maturity than in early age, that the maturation of the child's behavioral, intellectual, and speech ability coincides with the growth of brain size as well as changes occurring to the child's cortical structure, such as a gradual convolution of the higher cortex.

If these parallels are sound (a great deal of evidence is emerging to support them), then it becomes obvious that human beings are endowed biologically with the capacity to develop natural language. Whether the human particular capacity has evolved as an extension of the capacity of other primates, or whether it was an evolution of traits inherent to man himself as a different species do not concern us here; what is important to our discussion is that this capacity is species specific and unifies all humans. However, evolutionary studies are important indicators that this capacity has developed hand in hand with other cognitive capacities that were acquired through interaction with nature.

It seems fundamental for anyone who wishes to uphold translatability between languages to acknowledge that there is something about the linguistic endowment of man that is common across all languages. However, it ought to be stressed that this endowment is necessary not only for translatability but also for communication within, and the acquisition of the first language as well. As mentioned before, a child born in a new culture no matter how distant from his original culture will automatically assimilate to that culture and acquire its language, an indication that the biological differences that exist between the ape and the human are non-existent cross-culturally within the human species.

According to Wind (1988), while to non-biologist scholars the assertion that language has a biological basis is an intriguing one, for biologists to say that language has genetic bases is trivial, since to them genes lie at the basis of all phenomena of living organisms (140).

Biological researchers have long ago discovered that the human embryo grows in a very systematic and consistent developmental pattern that is pre-determined
biologically. This an evidence that indicates that the human brain, as part of this development is structured in a particular way. That this structure passes its limits and organization to the function of the brain, which is the mind, is likely. Since limits, for example, for our perceptual or mnemonic abilities can be attributed to biological factors, it is also plausible to assume similar limits on our linguistic ability.

Accumulating evidence also points to a relation between certain language and semiotic impairment and damage inflicted on part of the brain. Damage occurring to Broca's area (an area involved with the motor skills of speech production) has often been linked to aphasia related to speech articulation. And people with damage inflicted on a Wernicke's area has been found to produce well articulated but meaningless speech. We refer the reader to Caplan (1988), and Jackson (1988) for more detailed discussion of the biological foundations of language pathology.

Of course this does not entail that the products of all minds in all times have to be the same. Neither does it have to be that we have identical minds. It is only to assume that we have similar organs (brains), that work according to similar principles. Human brains are, perhaps, not as distinct from each other as we think them to be. That is to say they function in analogical fashion. These findings could possibly answer, even if partially, some questions that relate to the issue of the mind and cognitive processes. As, for example, some of the issues surrounding the notorious thesis of the tabula-rasa nature of the mind. If it is assumed that the mind has no prior organization whatsoever, then it would be impossible to learn anything in an ordained fashion for the first time, more particularly, to learn autonomous holistic structures such as language as defined by Sapir, Quine and others who subscribe to their thesis. Indeed, one of the main tasks that structuralism finds difficult to explain, if we assume that every part of the system is related to every other remaining part, is how an entire system is acquired in a piecemeal fashion. An undesirable logical consequence of the holistic thesis is that we learn the whole system at one go or never.

Translatability ought to be seen as the ability of one brain to intelligibly process the products of a similarly organized brain, whether those products are thoughts or language categories, and not as matching the various products of that capacity. This rids translatability of the old misguided conception that equates translatability with
isomorphic similarities among languages; instead, translation will be seen as starting from presupposed structural and categorial differences among languages, differences that can be ascribed to the way they have evolved. In this regard, we add our voice to that of the integrationists; those who do not see man and language as a product of either nature (cf. rationalists) or nurture (cf. materialists), but rather of both.

Nature and nurture can be seen as complementing each other in shaping man and his language. We are all similar in our biological making, but we are also somewhat different in our dialogic experience with nature. Therefore, it may be reasonable to say that translation takes from both relations: similarity of our biological capacity, and differences in the dialogic evolution of our lives and cultures.

The question, for example, is not whether man was at first a homo-Sapiens (as assumed by rationalists) or a homo-prometheus (according to empiricists), but that he is both. Man produced tools because of his endowment with the intellectual ability to do so; on the other hand, the instruments he produced contributed to the sharpening of his intellectual ability. The two traits seem to us inherently linked in a dialogical fashion. Thus, it seems to be futile to try to dichotomize this issue, or to try to separate these two aspects of man.

Some scholars, (cf. Hurford(1990)) accepted Chomsky’s main thesis that our aptitude for language is linked to a LAD (language acquisition device as explained by Chomsky), which is part of our genetic making; yet, Hurford claimed that the LAD is also open to mutations over the years (88). Of great significance in this connection is that Hurford saw a relationship between form and use, and recognised the difficulty of separating the functional explanations of language from psychological ones (96). Therefore, unlike Chomsky and other extreme nativists, Hurford regarded the LAD as an adaptive system that is partly defined by the arena of use (Ibid).

Hurford (1991) also pointed out that translation, even if riddled with impurities, is possible for a majority of meaningful expressions across most languages, because the range of meanings that humans can conceive and express is relatively uniform across the species (285). Our language, he claimed, is a joint product of two factors: our genetic mental apparatus; and earthly environment. Language is related to our survival in a similar manner to that of other natural endowments, such as breathing,
eating etc.; However, through adaptation to environment, this endowment has developed beyond the basic needs of life-preservation (296).

To say that language has evolved in line with other development in human life according to need, and not the other way around, also lends support to Bakhtin’s claim that pragmatic aspects of language take precedence over semantic or syntactic ones. This claim was also supported by Dubois (1987) who cast doubts about the structuralist thesis of the total autonomy of the language system (cf. Saussure’s and Chomsky’s formulations of it). Dubois proposed instead an ecological theory of grammar according to which internal linguistic structures were seen as partially motivated by competing external linguistic factors through functional competition among different candidate structures in a process he called grammaticization. Grammaticization takes place as a result of negotiation between external social and internal systematic motivations.

Similar views were expressed in Sinha (1988) in which he stated that language function is normally reflected in its structure as an adaptive system. Considering that language is a symbolic representational system, it must extend beyond the organ that represents it to what is being represented by that organ, the surrounding environment (104). Therefore, language, as a tool, was important to the expanding of the mind’s function and was also necessary for developing higher mental functions. Like many other tools, language, he claimed, simultaneously supports and constrains, through adaptive mutation, the representational structure of the organism.

This perhaps explains Hurford’s (1991) suggestion that by learning a first language we may lose our flexibility to learn another language, and his suggestion that the difficulty of learning a second language may be acquired rather than being innate (284). Thus one can say that, as a result of the close link of language and thought, translation is a laborious practice because of the control of our first language over our old mental habits.

The adaptive interaction of an organ to the environment is perhaps the primeval reason for the dialogic aspects of language, as characterized by Bakhtin’s concept of answerability as re-authoring of the environment by the organism (2.2.1 above). The functional explanation of evolution in the views of some scholars (cf. Bakhtin, Hurford, Sinha) ascribes a greater rôle to the social environment, and offers an
explanation as to why that evolution continued even if previously a stage of adaptation has already been achieved. It also explains how a symbolic, non-physical system can evolve as a result of biological mutation.

Schaff (1978) tried to formulate an alternative explanation for Chomsky’s theory of innate grammar by citing the two biologists François Jacob and Jacques Monod in their attempt to explain the relation between what belongs to nature and what is modified by nurture in the human’s knowledge faculty. In their views lies perhaps a supportive and plausible explanation that can add to the strength of the integrationist thesis. Likewise, it may also offer a feasible explanation of translatability.

Using Schaff’s insight, we will try to formulate what seem to us, even if not absolutely certain, a plausible explanation of how translation is possible. Doing so, we are aware that a definite answer to translatability has not yet been formulated, and anticipate that it might be quite sometime before a final solution to this conundrum is to be made available. Our discussion below is to be seen as a best guess at an argument for the possibility of translatability.

Jacob’s thesis starts with the claim that the structure of the brain is determined to the last detail by a genetic program, and that experiments performed on mice by altering certain inherited structure, produced anomaly in their behaviour (Jacob, 1982: 317). As to how this genetic program is related to language Jacob wrote:

Le programme génétique de l’homme lui confère l’aptitude au langage. Il lui donne le pouvoir d’apprendre, de comprendre, de parler n’importe quelle langue. Encore l’homme doit-il, à une certain étape de sa croissance, se trouver dans un milieu favorable pour que se réalise cette potentialité. Passé un certain âge, trop longtemps privé de discours, de soin, d’affection maternelle, l’enfant ne parlera pas. Même restriction pour le mémo... Mais cette frontière entre la rigidité et la souplesse du programme, on ne l’a encore guère explorée.

The genetic programme of man confers on him the aptitude for having a language. It offers him the ability to acquire, understand, and speak any language. But only, if at a certain stage of his development, he happens to be in an environment that is appropriate for the materialization of this ability. If a certain age is passed, and given prolonged seclusion from contact with speech, extended deprivation of motherly care and attachment, the child will never speak. The same conditions apply to the memory.... However, this borderline between rigidity and flexibility of the organ has hardly been investigated

According to Jacob, the genetic structuring of a human organism has two parts: a *closed part* that is unchanging and rigorously delineated, and an *open part*, that allows the individual some degree of liberty of action (Jacob, 1982: 316). Our genetic system, strictly dictates *structures and attributes* of our brain; however, on the level of the function it only determines potentiality (Ibid). Jacob, therefore, seems to take the shape of the particular behaviour of the brain as largely affected by factors related to evolutionary processes.

In the two parts of our genetic endowment, the first guards the structure of the organism, whilst the second is open to different possibilities of adaptation. The first part enters into determining the possible alternatives of how the second part adapts to certain changes. All birds, he claimed, are genetically programmed to identify similar birds of the same breed, however there are different ways for different birds in doing that. *In man, the number of possible responses becomes so high that one can speak of 'free will', so dear to philosophers, but flexibility has its limit* (Ibid, 317).

Furthermore, Jacob claimed that the open genetic program is a trait of mankind only. He also guessed that the development of symbolic systems helped man in his struggle to liberate himself from the constraints of biological limitation, and in his efforts to cope with his environment. Jacob, therefore, suggested that the interaction between the first and the second part is not biological but symbolic.

Despite acknowledging a continuity between different species (animal and mankind), Jacob ascribed to mankind the extensive and innovative use of symbols. Mankind among other animals has the aptitude to build new symbols on the basis of old ones, and to use these symbols in higher mental activity. The evolution of species seems to have made a qualitative leap the moment human beings started manipulating arbitrary symbols, as a consequence mankind came to look as if it was distinct from other species. Along with this view, it emerges that the old conception of man by E. Cassirer as *homo-symbolicus*, if properly understood, can synthesise the above mentioned description of man as being both *homo-sapiens, homo-prometheus* (Cassirer, in Lorenzer 1976: 136).

Lorenzer (1976) claimed that man formed retrievable mental images from raw images only by representing them in discursive language expressions. This in turn accounts for man's ability, as distinct from other animals, to recall these images even
without external motivation (Ibid., 137-40). Being able to do so enabled man to develop higher cognitive functions such as abstract thinking. This explains how language is usually seen as the most important instrument developed by mankind, which has enabled him to develop culturally beyond other primates. It also explains how language is seen not only as a system of communication, but also as a system of representation.

All things considered, it may be in the contribution of our natural aptitude for having a language and our exposure to learning whatever language comes our way, that a reasonable explanation for translatability lies. The restriction exercised by our genetic system on the course of the development of the open genetic system guarantees that we do not become so disparate that the open part of our system cannot be mentally compatible, and that they can, even if with effort, intercommunicate. However, our open system will expose us to the change and exoticness that makes translation needed.

Our belief is perhaps justified despite the fact that no one so far has established beyond any shred of doubt what this aptitude consists of. In other words, what is essential to translatability is a unifying trait of the human psyche, but what this trait is really like is for the future to tell. However, most of what can be offered as a proof of its existence is that we have more reasons to believe that it exists than otherwise. In dispensing with such a thesis, we not only abandon an inference to the best explanation, but, we then have no alternative explanation for phenomena like translation, bilingualism, and language acquisition. It is also the case that there are other things in life the existence of which is rarely disputed despite the fact that we do not know what they really are, such as magnetic fields, and psychological states.

7.2.2. The Prototypical Function of Language

On the other hand, Jacques Monod (1972) in Chance and Necessity pointed out another factor that can help reveal underlying intelligibility among natural languages; this time in relation to the general function they perform. Monod divided the world into objective and projective, i.e., between what exists before or untouched by man, and what man has affected (artifacts) in this world. Most importantly, he thought,
mankind, as distinct from other animals, is endowed, without exception, with a fundamental characteristic which is his having a purpose or a project. This project, he said, is reflected in human's biological structure and characterises their actions. It is a project that necessitates their interaction with the environment, and their projection on this environment by producing artifacts. This project, he claimed, forms the link between what they are and what they produce by their activity (20).

This main project, Monod pointed out, serves the general telenomic purpose of the preservation of the species, that thereby contributes to their invariance and their deterministic side. For the most part all other smaller projects of the human being look like many aspects or fragments of one primary project (24).

For example, the integration of the young in society is essential to the psychic and social being of the young, has the telenomic function of increasing the social solidarity necessary for the well being of the individual, and at the same time serves the continual reproduction of the group (25).

However, preserving the species by reproduction conceals paradoxically a process of multiplying the species thereby increasing the chance of its diversity. This he called the paradox of being (Ibid). All existence, to him, material or not, functions according to a similar principle; even physical objects, unless at absolute zero, (which is an unobtainable degree) go through quantum perturbations (108). Evolution of telenomic systems, he pointed out, is coherent but irreversible. This has guaranteed the survival of certain species over millions of years (117).

Monod considered the development of language to be decisive for the preservation of the human species. Language, to him, was not only possible because of the biological evolution of the human central nervous system, but also language was instrumental in causing that evolution. Language was not only the product but one of the initial conditions of this evolution - evolution of the CNS (124). In other words, Monod regarded language as being dialectically a condition for the epigenetic development of the apparatus that facilitates its acquisition.

Yet Leontyev (1981) pointed out that the advances made by mankind 40,000 years ago (era of the final biological formation of man) have contributed also to the social and psychological advancement of mankind. Whereas, for other animals the environment is something given- something simply there, by developing language,
man was able to project himself on his environment by creating artifacts. Through this projection man also succeeded in partly redefining that environment. Therefore, language ought to be seen not only in relationship to objective reality, but also in realtionship to the created cultural one.

Human cultural achievements, said Leontyev, were inconceivable without the development of communication through language. Language, he claimed, was essential for any form of joint activity that is conducive of man’s achievements. Before the individual entering upon life there is not Heidegger’s ‘nothing’, but the objective world transformed by the activity of generations, Leontyev explained (132-4).

Man’s advancements, in Leontyev’s opinion, were cumulative in character, and include ideal entities such as language, concepts, ideas etc.. These achievements, as claimed by Leontyev, cannot be inherited biologically; they are acquired by successive generations only through language, and social relationships (132-5).

However, if these achievements, language included, can be learnt and mastered by successive generations of the same culture in the form of objective entities, then could it be unreasonable that they can be learnt and mastered by others from other cultures? If we assume that these achievements in the whole constitute an achievement of mankind in general, then would it be reasonable to assume that they can be translated into other languages that serve the same general purpose? If the answer is ‘no’, then we will be denying any form of historical continuity, or mutual correspondence among existing cultures, which we assume to be hard to sustain.

These statements by Monod and Leontyev are consonant with Bakhtin’s claim that human beings are entangled in an inventible answerability or dialogue with their environment (2.3.1 above). Bakhtin also placed similar emphasis on language as essential to the dialogue with both other individuals as well as the material environment. It also concurs with Hurford’s assumption that communication is a species preserving activity. Interestingly enough, it is also reminiscent of W. Benjamin’s speculation that different languages can be imagined to be fragments of the same vessel, so that even if they are broken into different parts, when put together they exhibit the same original harmony. (see Benjamin’s quotation above).
This tension in the mode of existence of man between preservation and change, nature and nurture, also has its reflection in language and characterizes its existence as oscillating between restrictive or centripetal forces, and perturbation or centrifugal counter-forces. Language’s rôle as an ideological instrument that serves the interest and survival of different groups, nationalities etc. can also be seen along these lines. It also illustrates the livelihood and resilience of language as reflected in the dual characteristic of the actual language utterances as distinct from abstract sentences, since utterances reflect both aspects of language at the same time, i.e., stability and novelty.

There are good reasons to believe in the influence of language on our thinking. Constructivist psychologists (cf. Vygotsky in Thought and Language) thought that our thought at an early age is independent of language, but that it gets intertwined with the speech of our community the moment we acquire our first language. Bakhtin also claimed that individual thought is contingent on the expression he acquires through his interaction with the social environment.

However, we presume that the influence of language on thought is not so encapsulating as to be inseparable from it. This is so for many reasons. Firstly, if our thinking is totally controlled by our language, then any change or innovation in our thought will be ruled out. Secondly, children who have not learnt to speak properly would not be able to reason. Thirdly, we do not depend on natural language only to elaborate certain complex thoughts, but we make use also of other forms of communication such as concrete, or pictorial figures, to do so. Fourthly, we may sometimes think of some thought that we are unable to express verbally; or, in other times, we may be able to express the same idea differently. There might be other reasons for the assumption of separability of thought from language; however, we think that the separability of language from thought, even if possible is also difficult.

It may be that our original symbolizing capacity (aptitude) for any system, when realized in a particular system, gets so much intertwined with that particular system that, as Hurford (1991) suggested, we get so habituated with our first symbolic system with the result that we lose our original adaptability to learn other languages. If this is the case, it might be that if we learn a second language, that we may make use of our first second-language to loosen our old habits, and increase our flexibility.
to expedite our learning of a third one. Similarly, as our habits get fixed by age and maturation, we find it more difficult to acquire fluency in other languages.

Interestingly enough, Lakoff (1987), who criticized extreme relativism for taking understanding between languages as impossible by upholding the impossibility of translation, has come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of separating what he called, capacity from system. According to Lakoff, understanding involves the capacity to conceptualize, while translation involves the commensurability of languages’ systems. Therefore, to Lakoff, who apparently considered translation to be linguistic matching of systems, translation is impossible, yet understanding is possible (311-17).

Lakoff may be justified in the distinction he makes between a capacity and the product of that capacity or system. We may also agree with him in his criticism of extreme relativism. However, we think that Lakoff has misjudged translation to be an operation of matching of two language systems, and not the capacity for re-conceptualization of experience in one language by another. We also think that his concept of understanding as only conceptualization is likely to be an accurate one, since translation and understanding are perhaps two stages in one operation, they complement rather than oppose each other.

Thus, language and conceptual capacity are so closely intertwined that if we are said to be able to understand something, then it is most likely that we will be able to re-express it in another language regardless of the linguistic modification that this re-expression requires, provided that we master the two systems. This is so because according to the dialogic view of translation, it is taken as a prima facie fact that translation involves lack of linguistic commensurability between two language systems. Dialogism also rules out any concept of total understanding or total translatability.

Thus seen, translation is made possible not by what languages actually share in terms of similar categories, rules etc., but by our sharing of the same deeper capacity of which these languages are only by-products. Even if our original capacity has been grossly modified by adaptive environmental change, we still retain in a latent form some of that original capacity, which enables us to understand and translate other
languages. It is most likely the case that our original aptitude has itself been translated in one rather than another form, that makes translation difficult.

Translation thus may involve our latent and extant capacity to stretch our language ability and our imagination so as to conceive what the other language has achieved through its long process of answerability and evolution. We do so by also exploiting the centrifugal potentiality of our system to innovate and expand.

As distinct from other species, we are also capable of wilful action that can be transformed into a strong desire for understanding others even if they spoke different languages. With enough will we are able to appropriate and emulate the other symbolic system. Common to all translations is the recognition that what is being dealt with is something of another culture and another world view, that is, something different. This presumption gets reinforced by the fact that all languages (as conceivably explained by Monod, Leontyev), perform a similar prototypical function, that of species preservation.

Summing up, we say that the separability of language from thought, even if difficult and to some extent relative, is a crucial factor for inter-translatability among languages. It would be ultimately impossible to speak of creativity in thought, or thought development if we know that thought is tightly netted in existing stable language systems. Nevertheless, we firmly think that learning another language is difficult because by doing so we learn another way of looking at the world, new habits of thinking. Translating from another language is even more difficult, because we do not only need to free ourselves from our well-entrenched habits of thinking, but, furthermore, we also need to reformulate what is in one language into another.

That different languages have something in common that makes them inter-intelligible, and sometimes appear homologous has been recognized by many scholars. It is part of what W. Benjamin and Humboldt saw as pure language, what Kant, and the Kantians sought to explain by postulating the transcendental subject, what Fodor hypothesized as language of thought, and part of what Chomsky called the Language Acquisition Device. Bakhtin also spoke of language of language, or the common logic of symbolism. Despite differences in explanations, they all testify to a similar deep feeling that there is something common to all languages. One is perhaps tempted to reject one explanation or another, however, it is difficult to reject the existence of that
human aptitude for acquiring or learning a human language, that ability to interpret and translate another language, no matter how hard or poorly it is done.

7.2.3. Rationality and Translatability

Our sharing similar aptitudes for language, as well as similar cognitive apparatus, may mean also that we share other cognitive capacities such as reasoning, or the ability to make certain logical inferences. This fact, as discussed above in (4.5.), constituted Davidson’s main argument for translatability between languages. Not only that, but in addition, Davidson assumed that we also share, more or less, the same world on which we project these capacities.

Others (cf. Tambiah (1991)) suggested that human rationality is similar to our aptitude for language; even if recognized as a trait of all mankind, it does not have to be manifested in any particular or institutional rationality. Rather, it is adapted through dialogic interaction (or as Bakhtin said, by the chronotopical experience) into a particular rationality, a particular perspective of life. Experience shapes our thinking habits, conditions the tonality of our consciousness (psychological overtones and tendencies), so as to make it possible to say that there are different rationalities, just as there are different languages.

Accordingly, we believe that relativists are partly justified in claiming that our language affects our perception of life, and that cultures are remarkably different. In all instances where relativism has focused only on differences (cf. Sapir’s thesis), untranslatability was assumed. Yet, what remained unexplained, is how relativists themselves gained access to the same cultures they assume impenetrable, or how they explain their views in terms that are sometimes borrowed from other cultures, such as Greek, Latin, German.

Follesdall (1987) struck a similar cautionary note by distinguishing between two types of rationalities. One is descriptive rationality, which assumes that the behaviour of the other is nearly always rational and can be explained rationally without imposing any universal conception of rationality. The other type is normative rationality which assumes that it is necessary for the other in order to be rational to think in a similar way to our own. This type of rationality can slide into dogmatism and the
universalisation of one way of thinking without taking any consideration of cultural
specificity or even contextual and practical aspects of reasoning.

Normative rationality, by insisting on seeing the other only from its (normative
rationality) own perspective and according to its own norms, instead of establishing
a dialogue with him to try to understand the world from his point of view, can
change what is basically dialogical into the monological. It refuses to see the others
particular perspective that is acquired through the dialogic interaction between the
other and his world, and ingenuously transforms it into its own.

This type of rationality was prevalent, for example, among the so called ‘arm
chair anthropologists’ of the Victorian era, who spoke of other culture’s customs and
practices in terms of one rationality, that of the science of Victorian time. By
projecting the genetic similarity among people, these anthropologists assumed
similarities of their cultures. Hence, they classified cultures according to hierarchical
scala natura in relation to their conformity to scientific laws of the time, and cultures
were said to develop from savagery to barbarism and then to civilization (Tambiah
(1990). (see 5.3 above).

A normative attitude towards translation could also ensue from recent attempts
at a postulation of a universal semantic system according to which meaning in all
languages can be reduced, such as in the case of the aforementioned hypothesis of
Katz and Fodor of platonic components of meaning (componential analysis) according
to which the effability hypothesis, and the complete inter-translatability of languages
were assumed.

However, we think that effability can be upheld not by assuming a universal
semantic structure, nor by claiming universal linguistic categories, but by assuming
inter-intelligibility among languages as a result of the similarities of the organs that
have produced them. If we can acquire and explain new experience in our language
or come to change our views of the world in our language, then it is also reasonable
to assume that we are also capable of adapting to the views and meanings expressed
in other cultures.

Therefore, it is sensible to assume that translation is a dialogic relation between
two cultures that are necessarily spatio-temporally different, but at the same time
similar in origin and purpose. Translation cannot be about preserving identity,
otherwise it will not be a translation. Similarly, translation is bound to the original so as not to be totally distinct. It is the original and at the same time not the original, a translated text is a new text and at the same time not any new text. It is only through this Hegelian law of contradiction that translation could be understood. Any law of logical identity or excluded middle will miss the point of translatability itself.

7.3. Translation as Similarity in Differentiation

Translation, we presume, is not only about similarity but also about differences. It is not only about what has been preserved between two languages, but also about what has been transformed. It is not only about finding some equivalences but about creatively producing them. Going back to what we have said earlier (in 2.2.2.) about the law of placement (which states that every individual has his own unique private experience, shares many features with his surrounding social environment) we can, perhaps, say that translation is best seen as a relation of similarity in differentiation. It is the attempt to produce a similar mental or conceptual representation by employing, as much as possible, similar productive processes but in an already existing different symbolic system.

For example, Rabin (1958) was intrigued by the fact that the same state of affairs of money possession is expressed differently in different languages: English ‘I have money’; In Japanese and Latin ‘to me, there is money’; Arabic ‘with me there is money’; and in Turkish ‘my money exists’ (Rabin, 1958: 156). In addition to this diversity of expression, it is also interesting to notice the limit of divergence among them, i.e., that they all correspond to a single cross-cultural phenomenon, that in all of them the money is subordinated to the subject pronoun, for example, none of them expressed the state of affairs as ‘I am with the money’, or ‘with the money I am’. It seems that there is similarity in the way all these languages are representing this reality even if it is done in diverse ways.

Indeed the same alternatives for expression exist and are usually exploited within one single system. When we want to convey an experience, we are faced with a multitude of semiotic systems, different genres in one natural language, different styles, and different expressions within one paradigmatic structure.
We are also different in our ability to verbalize our intentions and emotions. Sometimes, we find ourselves powerless and unable to convey certain experience in terms that they can fully understand.

It would appear that the presence of both similarity and differentiation is not a trait of translation only, but also of communication within one language as well. To make our point clearer we like to present figure (4) below based on some of the views mentioned above, especially those of Jacob's. All languages are assumed to be related to a biological unity that constrains the limits of their variation. This can be seen as follows:

![Diagram showing similar and different forces between languages](image)

**Figure 4**(O.G.S stands for open genetic system)

The figure above shows two forces at work in opposing directions: one is that caused by our biological and genetic nature, the force that unites all the human race and contributes to their sharing the same capacity of symbolization. The second is toward diversification because of the way this productive capacity has been put to use. As has been mentioned before, the shape of a symbolizing system derives in part from what is being symbolised.

This may also explain why the unity of language cannot be exhibited in one utterance, as similarly, our original aptitude for language is not totally fully realizable in one single language. Both remain a potentiality but never a reality.

Accordingly, if we can express one experience with different expressions, different genres, and dialects, then we can perhaps express that experience in another language,
language, making translation more difficult as we go along. Expression, communication and also translation cannot be accounted for as kinds but only as degrees. Whenever the 'exotopic' distance between interlocutors is increased by space or time, genre or language, or even family of language, the more difficult translation becomes, because the demand on our symbolic capacity to expand will be greater.

Among other things, the above formulation implies an answer to those who would argue that when we translate, we translate a whole system of meaning and beliefs, thus making translation, because of possible indeterminacy, a sort of impossibility. To such a view we would respond with the remarkable fact that the holistic aspect of language only exists on the level of language as a whole, as a composite abstract symbolic system that cannot be, even if we wilfully try, realised in one unitary whole. Therefore, as we have argued, it is never possible for this system to get articulated or realised within one instance of communication, for example in one translated text.

If we accept that a language and its cultural background can only be partially invoked in a single context, then we must also say that it can only be partially translated. As Fodor and Lepore (1991) pointed out, mental representations are never directly acted upon in an interpretation. What gets interpreted are these mental representations after being transformed into propositional attitudes; meanwhile, the content of mental representation remains in the subject’s mind in the form of a causal link between things-in-the-world and neurological structure (182-9). However, one can equally say that the individual’s intentions or attitudes will not be accessible except through their embodiment in symbolic signs that exist outside that individual, and are by being so also available to others.

Similarly, Searle (1983) claimed that intentionality not only testifies that the mind can initiate action from within, but also create the possibility of meaning by placing limitation on the scope of meaning (Searle in Apel 1991:330).

7.4. Dialogism and Conceptual Representation

Having accepted these assumptions of Fodor and Le Pore above, we are also aware of the problem implied by their taking mental representations to be representations in an innate language, as Fodor (1983) considered them to be representations in the
Language of Thought. For an assumption of any universal shared deep innate language of propositional knowledge would also imply a possibility of complete and straightforward translation, an assumption that does not concur with the actual experience of translation, of which several examples were presented in previous chapters.

Dialogism, on the other hand, assumes that these representations take the form of signs that originate in the cultural and social environment outside the subject. These representations are acquired through discursive and cumulative dialogues by means of actual utterances. Therefore, these representations are not limited to formal aspects but include other extra-linguistic information as well.

According to Sinha (1988) new findings in developmental psychology and in neuro-biology (cf. Changeux (1985)) a process of neural development takes the shape of a ‘selective stabilization process, which is, though under genetic control, not so deterministic as not to allow for variable individual synaptic development. This process, Changeux claimed, is similar to those that Fodor had claimed to take place in his theory of the Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM) (Ibid., 145). It also confirms Bakhtin/ Ukhomsky’s claims that our mental representations are developed dialogically.

Changeux also suggested that at a certain stage of development this neural system of an individual is formed partly by the immediate occurrence of new connections, and partly by the past events (history of the organ) of selective stabilization (147). A mental object (image) lasts only for a very short time; what is more stable and remains as a representation is the neuron configuration that it forms (148).

Further researches on the brain, as explained by Freeman and Skarda (1991), also point out that brain’s function does not resemble the binary processes that take place in a digital computer. Overwhelming evidence from studies on pre-sensory brain activity point to a collective arrangement or neural networks of simple elements whose behavior cannot be strictly predicted by rules. Learning, for example takes place not by the mediation of a single neuron, but by the help of patterned constellations of hundreds of millions of neurons that follow chaotic dynamics in inducing inner behaviour. The neural networks function in a non-linear fashion, they
can be reproduced every time the initial conditions for triggering them are repeated. They also work according to *strengthening and weakening* principles (116-9).

These finding are of great importance to revealing the function of the mind. They also concur with Bakhtin's speculation about the reflexive function of the CNS in selectively representing the surrounding environment (Discussed above in (2.2.)). However, it becomes more relevant to our work, if we combine these findings with Bakhtin's claim that most of individual consciousness is mediated by means of language. It remains an interesting supposition, whether or not language plays a rôle in shaping the neural structure of the brain. If it does, and this a very strong possibility, mainly because a great deal of our discursive practices are prompted by knowledge and beliefs that we acquired not from first hand experience, but rather by what we learnt through our language, then the relation between language and world views become clearer.

Furthermore, an idea of how translation forms bridges between two languages can be inferred; translation of new meanings into a language does not necessarily mean creating new conditions in the brain of the translator, but, it is likely to interact with similar already existing ones in a way to produce new constellations of neurons, strengthening some connections, and weakening others. These new patterns of neuron activation that were originally products of other network systems become integrated in the new environment, and they will be characteristic of a new network. The more we translate between two languages the more we increase the similarity between the habitual patterns of activation in the translator's brain, and the easier also it becomes to reinforce the ones already existing.

Whether the findings of Freeman & Skarda above to be corroborated by future evidence or not remains to be seen. Despite that, we believe that their explanation helps a great deal in approximating what enters into the process of translation if seen dialogically.

Therefore we agree with Sinha (1988) in claiming that mental representations, if they cannot to be related to prior conceptual representation do not have to be image representations of *things-in-the-world* (*representenda*) either. To accept the latter would be to subscribe to the view that equates representation with resemblance, or similitude. For, if it were, translation would be complete and non problematic, as all
we would have to do would be to map via *things-in-the world* different mental representations of them. Instead, it was suggested by Sinha that mental representations are *representamina*; that is, they are things that have been produced socially (70-4). That is, the mental representation of the sign is not an objective but a psychological schema of that perspectival representation of the image (Sinha, 1988, 6-13).

Starting with a similar phenomenological outlook, Bakhtin emphasised the rôle of inter-subjective symbolic interaction in mediating mental representations (see above chapter I). To Bakhtin, they also reflect not only things in the world but also social, ideological, personal attitudes to that world. In this symbolic interaction, utterances (as text) play a central rôle. Inter-subjective relations if seen from the angle of the language utterances that mediate them can be characterized as being also inter-textual relations. Despite lodging in the individual’s consciousness, mental representations cannot be purely subjective; if they were, then they would be untranslatable.

Sinha also discussed other views of perception that consolidate the views of the dialogic nature of mental representation. These views form the core of Gibson’s (1979) ecological theory of perception. The first of these views is Gibson’s claim that our sensory organs do not only passively assimilate to outside stimuli from the environment, but they interact with the outside environment in an active and attentive manner via receiving directions from the organism itself by means of which the attunement of the outer sense organs is obtained. In other words, the organism by deciding what it internalises, is part of what is being actively perceived, forming thus a unity with the surrounding *niche*. The organism also, through a process named by Gibson as *affordance*, selects from the object those features most important to the preservation of the organism. Objects exist outside the organ, not as (qua) objects, but as objects that can afford actions to sustain the organ, i.e., they are edible, touchable, climbable etc.. (131-2).

These findings were confirmed by other psychologists (cf. Bartlett (1932)) who claimed that perception involves active searching by the organism that is directed by *interest and feeling*, and that perception involves also other mental processes such as *imaging, valuing and judging*. The organism selectively abstracts certain features of perception and matches them with other ones already represented in the brain (Young, 1986: 80-1).
What follows from these findings is that our comprehension of texts is most likely to be guided by our previous experience, as well as by the context in which the text is read or heard. In translation we approach a text not as an objective bundle of meanings, but with anticipation about what we are going to find in that text. We sometimes even strenuously search for certain meanings within a text. Translation, therefore, is likely to be partly guided by a selective reading of the original, a reading that gives higher priorities to certain meanings that are more related to the context of the communication and gradually excluding others.

A similar process of interaction to that of the organism and its environment; takes place between the translator and the text, forming, if one is allowed to use the term, a textual niche. Thus, when we translate, we do not translate the whole original range of meanings of an expression, but we select one single meaning that the general meaning of the utterance directs us to. Because we do translate only one potential meaning and leave out others, we may do so with even more precision than was intended in the original. It is, therefore, possible for us even to use very different kind of expression to convey the same meaning. This question will be revisited in another section.

We would like to recapitulate by saying that natural translation is complex, but, nonetheless, is possible. It is possible not because we share universal a priori concepts as argued by Platonists. Conversely, it is not impossible because we lack those concepts as assumed by relativists. It is possible because we are genetically and culturally more compatible than assumed by relativists. Translation is made possible by our sharing of the same semiotic aptitude, and our sharing of the same world, and also more importantly by our commitment and desire to understand each other. Translation owes its existence as a phenomenon to differences among language, to a lack of the universal categories of communication that could make it redundant.

However, this does not commit us to an extreme rationalist position of assuming that we are born with actual universal linguistic traits, nor to an empiricist one of relating language to images of things in the world. Language is partly genetic, partly historical and environmental. It is the result of an inseparable dialogic union of nature and nurture. Translation is possible, because we believe with Tambiah (1990), that
the psychic unity of mankind.... and the doctrine of diversity of culture/societies are not contradictory (112).

Kade (1964) pointed to a possible ethical consequence of the denial of translatability. In his words:

The denial of translatability presupposes a subjective ranking of the various languages... since languages can't be thought of as existing outside, independently of those who sustain it... this implies attaching ratings to those who speak it and we will find ourselves on the surest road to a reactionary racist ideology

(Quoted with modification in Wills 1982: 48)

Having discussed the dialogic character of what is likely to be the mental representation of meaning in the individual's consciousness, and having said that it is mediated mainly by language through discursive dialogic exchanges, we think it is appropriate now to introduce the process through which the dialogic exchange takes place and how the relations among utterances (inter-textual relations) are explained by Bakhtin and others. These relations are also important for explaining cultural and ideological formation through language. They also constitute an important factor in our forthcoming tentative dialogic explanation of translation in the following chapter.

7.5. Inter-textuality in Language and Culture

As mentioned in (6.4), and as can also be seen from figure (3), Bakhtin replaced Jakobson's concept of contact with that of intertext. It characterizes the way utterances relate to each other within a text, and how a text relates to other previous texts. It also constrains the way a new text is produced on the basis of other past texts.

Inter-textuality, which enters in language production as well as language comprehension, functions at the heart of the inter-subjective exchange of utterances. It also accounts for certain inexplicit organizational relations at work in language such as: genre, culture, and ideology.

Therefore, inter-textuality is also important for explaining translation, not only because translation touches on the above mentioned phenomena of genre, ideology
and culture, but also, because these relations are at work within the process of translation itself.

Inter-textuality as a neologism was coined by Kristeva (1969), as an all-encompassing term for Bakhtin’s account of relations among utterances. Bakhtin, as mentioned elsewhere, thought that people appropriate other people’s texts every time they produce a new text, i.e., they dialogize previous discourses on the same subject. Kristeva, similarly, thought that every new text is just a new fusion of citations of earlier texts. As she puts it:

\[\text{tout texte se construit comme mosaïque de citations, tout texte est absorption et transformation d'une autre texte. A la place de la notion d'intersubjectivité s'installe celle d'inter-textualité.}\]

(Kristeva in Sebeok 1984: 175).

Inter-textuality as hypothesised by Bakhtin and Kristeva is also for explaining the transmission of ideological and linguistic forms of utterances among subjects of successive communities. Culture, as mentioned before by Bakhtin, is tantamount to a text of all past and present texts of this culture.

It is mostly by means of intertextual language that ideology is created and culture is stratified. Every utterance has an ideological aura attached to it when heard or acquired. By listening to, or reading an individual’s words, whether this individual is real or a character in fiction, we are usually able to judge his ideological character. This is also how the utterance can be said to constitute its author ideologically.

In other words, every way of communication exhibits an ideological perspective on the world. Language has the potentiality of shaping our thinking habits and the way we judge things in the world, creating certain realities in our minds, or what Weber called our Zweckrationalität (Bernstein, 1988: 209). Following a similar line of reasoning as that of Bakhtin, Habermas ascribes the forming of shared consensus in a society mostly to dialogical communicative actions that pervade the community (Ibid).

It is because of this aspect of discourse that scholars (cf. Foucault (1979)) preferred to see an author more or less through the dimension of the social discourse to which that individual was exposed. The author, according to Foucault, is not one
with a total individual consciousness, nor is he the complete originator of his work even if that work reflects an individual point of view. While subscribing to the same discourse, writers help in the trans-discursive creation of each other by opening to each other the possibility of analogy, comments etc. However, in Foucault’s view, a writer can establish a new ‘discursivity’, that is, establish a new way of looking at things, as is the case of great scholars. However, even in this case, the author is not able to do so without the help of others. Every author is an ideological figure, says Foucault (141-60). R. Barthes (1968) reiterated these views with his renowned declaration of the death of the author. Barthes claimed that a text is but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash (54).

We believe that it is this social and ideological aspect of texts, i.e., the point that the text is not totally individual, that makes it translatable. Without such a dimension communication itself would be inconceivable. However this formulation merits a word of caution, which is also mentioned by Sebeok (1984), (contrary to Barthes’ assumption) against considering inter-textuality as denying the subject his rôle in creating that text. On the contrary, and as mentioned before in (2.13), every subject is unique in his previous experience; therefore, any creation of a new text by the subject is a creative act in so far as it is unique to the subject’s experience and includes his own previous texts that are particular to that experience.

On a different level, the text is also representative of its author’s intention as well as the context in which that intention is expressed. In other words it representative of the given perspective adopted by the author towards the subject-matter of communication in that given text (see 6.(2) (3) above).

The issue of the unique rôle of the subject in communication was fundamental to Bakhtin’s disagreement with structuralism in its extreme stance of giving total primacy of the system over the subject. Bakhtin thought that structuralism by doing so depersonalises the subject (Todorov 1984: 21).

In general, intertextuality serves two purposes: providing a background information; and ideological orientation of the potential reader, that is to set out the perspective in which he should read the article, as for example from the Guardian (Nov. 14, 1992), in (text1) below:
TEXT 1:

Bitterness of the Iraqgate ‘spy’ who feels left out in the cold.

In this example the writer inter-textualized different previous texts; The Watergate scandal’s name; the intelligence agent’s expression of bitterness the day before in the press, some of the tabloids’ reference to him as a ‘spy’; the usage of English cliché ‘to be left out in the cold’, and lastly, perhaps, the title of John Le Carre’s novel *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold*, etc..

However, more importantly, he also inter-textualized what Kristeva (1980) calls the productivity of the text (36), that is, the way this whole text is produced in its form as a headline in a newspaper. Therefore, one can say that inter-textuality operates on two levels: the content which involves the text as as an ideological product or perspective (intentions, situations, and ideological affinities of previous texts); the form that involves the text as as productivity, or linguistic genre.

Inter-textuality as a productivity is not only characteristic of language but also enters into the creation of cultural artifacts of all kinds. It is also productive in other semiotic fields such as painting and cinema. (For more detailed studies of inter-textuality, see Worton and Still (1990)).

It is in texts that social realities are expressed and are responded to. Therefore, texts are usually written not as a direct reaction to concrete reality but as a reaction to earlier responses to that reality in a text. Inter-textuality, therefore, is a relationship of a very general type, that although it cannot be formalised or precisely defined, can be understood. It can be of very general type, or can be a direct relationship where the speaker or writer is reacting to another’s discourse.

An example of inter-textuality that is direct and more obvious, can be said to exist between the following two articles appearing in two issues of *The Economist* with two weeks interval between the two. The two articles are about the Middle East and concern a tension in Israeli-American relations. The first article states the problem as ‘fall out’ and reads thus:

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TEXT 2A:

In principle they are still the best of friends. But even its fans have to admit that the alliance between Israel and America has seen better times....Mr X Shamir plans to visit America.... Bush advisers have hinted that he may be too busy just then to invite Mr. Shamir to pop into Washington for a chat (Appendix 2. (a)).

(Economist, Nov. 4, 1989).

This text can be said to be inter-textualized by another Text that appears two weeks later in the same magazine:

TEXT 2B:

At least the meeting happened, which was a consolation. But facing the White House photographers alongside the American president is not the joy it used to be for visiting Israeli prime ministers.

(Economist, 18 Nov., 1989).

The two articles, despite the time lapse between them, seem so much related that one could easily consider them as two parts of the same article (see Appendix 2.(b)).

People come into being and acquire a language and ideology (world views) that have been shaped for them by their ancestors. Our environment, cognitive or otherwise (that is to say our material environment also) has been transformed into what we call culture (Leontiev in Sinha, 1988: 105). What our language represents is not a pristine world, but a converted and reconstituted reality. Therefore, every utterance, as an intentional act, cannot be understood in and for itself, outside it's ideological context, that is without reference to other similar utterances. This relationship between the utterance and other utterances is not only one of similarity, but the utterance has also to be differentiated from other utterances within the same genre. This semi-paradoxical relationship of similarity and differentiation derives from the dialectical state of affairs of language being both an ideological instrument as well as an ideological construct. It is also a result of the discrepancy between the life span of language and the life span of its speakers.

It is also important to note that the generation succession is never forthright, and cannot be stated in pure temporal terms. It is rather fuzzy and can only be stated in
terms of change - in way of living, beliefs, change in social or linguistic terms and so on. In other words it can only be stated in ideological terms.

Language is the most important means of creating as well as perpetuating this change through either vertical or horizontal communication. That is to say inter-textuality can be either historical and vertical or social and horizontal. This is why it is essential to understand the history of a culture to understand that culture, and why the understanding of a social group necessitates the global understanding of society as a whole. Horizontal inter-textuality is important in explaining a text in comparison with other existing texts, style with other existing styles, a work of art in relation to other works of art etc.

In order to illustrate how utterances dialogize each other ideologically, and how important horizontal inter-textuality between different discourses can be to the deep understanding of texts, we would like to present the following three texts (originally mentioned by T. Trew (1979) cited in D. Lee (1992) about the connection of language and ideology. However most of the comment will be our own:

Text3A:

Riot police shot and killed 11 African demonstrators and wounded 15 others here today in the Highfield African township on the outskirts of Salisbury. The number of casualties was confirmed by the police. Disturbances had broken out soon after the executive committee of the African National Council (ANC) met in the township to discuss an ultimatum by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ian Smith, to the ANC to attend a constitutional conference with the government in the near future.

(98).(The Guardian)

TEXT 3B:

Eleven Africans were shot dead and 15 wounded when Rhodesian Police opened fire on the rioting crowd of about 2,000 in the African Highfield township of Salisbury this afternoon. The shooting was the climax of a day of some violence and tension during which rival black political factions taunted one another while the African National Council Executive committee met in the township to plan its next move in the settlement issue with the government.

(98).(The Times)
Rhodesia’s white supremacist police had a field day on Sunday when they opened fire and killed thirteen unarmed Africans, in two different locations of Salisbury and wounded many others. Their pretext was that the men had been rioting ... Nobody will buy the statement from the Salisbury propaganda machine, that in fact all the [non-fatal] ways [of crowd control] were used. Rather, knowing the blood-thirsty nature of the illegal regime, it is much more conceivable that if any of the non-murderous methods were employed, they were merely a quick formality abandoned without valid reason, in order to rush to the ‘real thing’. For the ANC and Africa it would be wrong to imagine that this is only an isolated act... It follows up other relatively less violent acts of provocation, ...the arrest of and detention of the ANC Leaders... We appeal to our brothers in Zimbabwe to be extra vigilant....

Daly News, Tanzania)

The above three articles refer to the same incident, however, they do so differently by using different ways of describing it. The first (text 3A) is from a British liberal newspaper describing the act as shooting and killing, pointing out while doing so the background of the incident which is the pressure of the Rhodesian government on leaders of ANC to attend a meeting of the government. The second is an article from a more conservative British newspaper. In this text the incident was characterised as a self-generated inter-black clash in which the Rhodesian police had to intervene. The third is from a Tanzanian newspaper which reflects the way some Africans perceived this incident. We think it is self explanatory.

Inter-textuality is present in these articles on different levels. The most general one is the cognitive pre-requisites that we need in order to understand the substance that these three articles share. We are usually unaware of these prerequisites, and mostly because we acquired them in a semi-unconscious manner through different cultural media we take them for granted as something given.

On the level of form, we would not fail, even if we were not told so, to notice that any of the three texts above, are news items from a journalistic genre. Their transactive narrative form, simplified grammar, and choice of evaluative vocabulary all are marks of journalistic style. We recognize this style not only by linking them
to similar texts, but also by differentiating them from other genres such as literary or poetic for example.

On the level of content, and in order to properly understand these articles we need, for example, to know that there is a continent that is called Africa which has a predominantly black population; in this continent there is a country created and controlled by a white minority which is called Rhodesia; that there is a racial conflict taking place there, and so on. If we think of the information that we need in order to understand these articles we will find that it is enormous.

We might also notice that the language used in the above texts is not a neutral or objective medium, but carries within it a political perspectival views on the issue concerned. To call some people 'riot police', 'Rhodesian police', or 'Rhodesian white supremacist police', reflects the position a writer takes in relation to them. Similar positions are also reflected when one chooses to describe the incident as 'disturbances', 'rioting crowd', or 'the police opening fire on unarmed Africans'.

Yet, we cannot understand the reason behind the choice of one term without understanding the other terms that could have occupied its place. To describe the marching or gathering a group of people as 'riot' is in a sense a replacement of other competing terms such as 'march', 'protest', demonstration etc. Linguistically speaking the meaning of riot can be straightforward; however, transalinguistically speaking, this word carries an axiological (evaluative) value that can be understood only by comparing it to the other contenders for its place. By differentiating it from similar words that could have fulfilled its linguistic function.

Knowing the particular choice of the word 'riot', constitute the implied part of meaning, and indicates the ideological orientation of the writer or the newspaper concerned. Here we want to emphasise that while on the level of form inter-textuality engages perhaps total forms of utterances, on the level of content inter-textuality involves not the general meaning of the term, but only the perspectival meaning of the word as used in in a particular utterance in the given context. In other words, what is more likely to be inter-textualized is not the meaning of the word 'riot' as such, but its meaning as forming an ideological perspective when applied to the black Rhodesian demonstrators.
The word 'riot' also calls to the reader’s attention all his previous experiences of what a riot is to which he is likely to compare the new use of the term. Our images of ‘riots’, ‘police’, ‘African’ etc., are not unified or universal. An African would understand different things from these words than say an Englishman, or an American. Even within one culture, they would mean something different to a conservative, liberal, or anarchist. We always draw on our past cultural and ideological orientation to understand new things. In communication the intertextualizing of experience represents a dimension to which our production or understanding is normally relativised. This is how meaning in communication is differentiated from signification in language, and communication is never total or absolute.

7.6. Inter-textuality and Schematic Patterning

Within discourse analysis and text linguistics, there is emphasis on the text as an utterance premeditated by its author, as well as an awareness of the semantic importance of the global sense of the text. These aspects have been approached from a different angle in cognitive discourse analysis, psycho-and text linguistics (by scholars like Van Dijk (1985), Schank and Abelson (1977), de Beaugrande and Dressler(1981), inter alia).

They also emphasized the importance of schematic organization of the text to its receiver. However, how these subjective plans and organisations relate to other texts’ organization or to generic factors is not emphasized or made clear as is the case of the inner structures of texts.

Van Dijk’s (1985) account of the cognitive aspects of the text was comprehensive, and paid due attention to content of discourse. He postulated a semantic macrostructure that exhibits the global organization of thematic content, expressed in conventional text schemata, or the macro-syntactic structure of the texts. Van Dijk also assumed a macro-semantic reference of the text as a whole (gist, topic, theme etc..). However he did not concern himself with how this schema is generated from the macrosociological surrounding.
In his analysis of *routines*, van Dijk (1985) rightly stressed the ideological and perspectival aspects of news. However, he did not distinguish the ideological content of the routine from its form, in other words, from its linguistic schemata. We think that the cognitive *schemata* as put forth by discourse analysts are perhaps another dimension of discourse structuring through a process of inter-textuality. Intertextuality of form is what enters into the formation of the conventional discourse routines of which news *schemata* represent a more organised example. The schemata are acquired by the subject through inter-subjective practice and patterning. One should not forget to mention that mastering such schemata, or what Bakhtin called *secondary genres*, comes only through strenuous efforts, and provides those who master it with an ideological powerful tool.

Bakhtin characterised the ‘secondary genres’ as *highly declamatory genres*. Unlike ‘primary genres’ which are characteristic of daily casual communication, secondary genres are intrinsically linked to social, political, or theological authorities. Therefore, Bakhtin claimed that *preachers, judges, leaders, patriarch-fathers etc. have left life to be replaced by writers... who have inherited their style* (Todorov, 1984: 102).

An explanation of news schemata can be linked to the change that has occurred in the means of mass communication. Unlike before the invention of modern means of mass communication, when leaders and preachers used to speak to their audience face to face, the new methods of communication, newspapers, television etc., communicate massively to individuals, but to each individual separately, in his home, or work etc. Therefore, it is important to create certain similar psychological and ideological realities in the minds of all the subjects. The gradual creation of generic *schemata* helped to render the media style more productive on the level of content, and guaranteed maximum conformity of understanding among different individuals.

Processes of new meaning creation, reifying of signification, enforcement of messages through repetition etc., create what might be called verbal and psychological realities that might not have actual references in social or physical worlds. In other words, the creation of schemata is important also for guiding different writers to a more uniform way of writing, and readers to a more guaranteed uniform
comprehension. Very few people nowadays dispute the ideological influence of mass-media in shaping our minds.

De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) emphasized precisely the use of inter-textuality as the seventh standard of textuality, according to which a text typology is created, and owed a great deal of the creation or interpretation of texts to inter-textual factors (IX. passim).1

However, de Beaugrande and Dressler included ‘polyphony’ where a writer or author creates the speaking character as a type of inter-textuality (In.9). By so doing, and this applies to van Dijk’s views also, they failed to see inter-textuality in relation to producing text schemata (type), and did not emphasize the cultural, or rationalizing effect of inter-textuality on the subject’s mind.

Accepting the concept of general schemata as a productive psychological representation underlying certain genres, we think, however, that inter-textuality cannot by any means be limited to this function alone. This is so simply because inter-textuality is also productive on an inter-generic level, that serves the dialogical relationship among different schemata, or even between different cultures, as in translation, for example. Analogous to the way communication can take place between individuals, groups, societies, and cultures, so does inter-textuality. Intertextuality and communication inform and guide each other.

A similar concept of the schematic patterning of language was Fillmore’s (1976) notion of conceptual frames. Speakers form frames of typical speech situations such as restaurant frame, classroom frame, which Fillmore claimed to be the missing link between language and communication. Speakers were supposed to be making use of frames in interpreting and interacting in language. Fillmore’s concept of frames is akin to Bakhtin’s concept of primary ‘speech genres’.

However, while Fillmore thought that these frames exist as pre-formulated types of discourses, Bakhtin saw them as something similar to modelling skills that are acquired and mastered through interaction, and are, in a sense, something comparable to sentences in grammar, yet they function on the level of discourse. Had they pre-existed in the mind, the writing of scenarios and novels, in which the description of

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1The other standards of textuality mentioned by de Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) include: cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, and situationality (passim).
these frames is an essential part would have been a straightforward task, and not a complex talent developed only by very few.

Furthermore, Bakhtin considered the primary genres that characterise the daily use of language to be essential to the understanding of more complex genres, such as literature or poetry. Understanding of any developed genre necessitates the knowledge of primary ones. Hence, Bakhtin rejected the views that take literature to be another type of language, as sometimes claimed by linguistics or semiotics.

Corollary to this view is an anticipated acknowledgement of Bakhtin that if we take ordinary language to be translatable then literature is also translatable, even if this is difficult. The difference is one of degree, not of kind.

So far we have spoken about the rôle of dialogic communication in the cultural formation of the subject. We also said before that the subject when communicating does so dialogically through responsive understanding (understanding as a dialogue between the utterance and other utterances retained in the subject's mind). However, there are some scholars (cf. Lotman (1990) who claim that there is an intra-subjective type of communication, that exists alongside the 'I to other communication' outlined above. Lotman called this type of communication 'I to I communication'.

In 'I to I' communication, information can be transferred only along the time axis, where the 'I' becomes the receiver of the communication, as in mnemonic function, or when many people make use of a diary or notes in order to re-communicate to themselves information important to them. However, according to Lotman, it can take place in other instances, such as when a message changes its form, in cases were one reads his work after it has acquired an extra value by the fact that it has been printed (Ibid., 21).

Lotman emphasized the rôle this type of communication plays in the cultural formation of a subject, where the same speaker transfers to himself, sometimes using different codes, the same information in different contexts. In this instance, the information gets modified whether qualitatively or quantatively in a given context resulting in the revision of the subject's experience as a whole.

This type of communication is similar to Vygotsky/Bakhtin's concept of 'inner dialogue'. Its importance is not only in explaining what takes place in the speaker's
mind during communication, but also it has the potential to reveal the link between language and thinking. ‘I to I’ communication is perhaps a good explanation of what happens when a subject re-expresses a previous experience in a new medium, such as describing a pictorial scene in verbal language, drawing a picture by the help or guidance of verbal description, etc.

‘I to I’ communication can also provide a clue to what happens in the mind of the translator during the process of inter-lingual translation where a similar experience has to be conveyed in a new code. Moreover, it has also the potentiality of explaining other types of translation, which Jakobson mentioned but said very little about, such as intra-lingual and inter-semiotic translation. It would perhaps be impossible to try to explain intra-lingual, and inter-semiotic translation without a concept similar to ‘I to I’ communication. ‘I to I’ communication can also be seen as the constant common factor between the three types of translation mentioned above.

7.7. Inter-textuality and Translation

André Lefevere (1973) sketched an approach for literary translation that take account of how inter-textuality works within the translation of literary works. He considered the literary work as having two aspects: form, and substance. Literary substance originates from certain conflicts of relationships either between human beings, or between them and established norms, or myths and beliefs etc.. Literature re-expresses these conflicts, but at the same time transforms them in a way that gives them another shape. This transformation takes place when a literary work models a substance (conflict according to Lefevere) according to a given artistic genre. This, he claimed, gives the substance a form that transcends its original manifestation. However, certain relationships that enter into making this substance, love, hate, fear, antagonism etc.. go beyond the boundaries of language and culture and are in a sense universal.

Although literary substance takes a different form of expression in each culture, and different languages have their own special way of going about how to express the literary substance, generally speaking, literary works depart from accepted linguistic norms to form what Lefevere calls secondary organization of language (75-6).
Lefevere alleged that literary forms which are particular to each culture consists of three elements: textuality, contextuality, and inter-textuality.

A particular text acquires its textuality by transforming a common language, for a single purpose of communication into a particular texts. The contextuality is the inclusion in the text of certain features of the socio-cultural background to render it more comprehensible. In Kristeva's words, this is the insertion of a text in history and the incorporation of history into the text (Kristeva, 1980: 68). Inter-text enters into the making of the text through an archetypical literary form in which the text has to be written in order to be considered as a work of art.

Lefevere (1973) thought that text and context, belong to particular civilizations, while substance and inter-textuality can transcend the boundary of a single civilization, and form the tradition of the whole humanity. That is they belong to human civilization in general.

What Lefevere perhaps meant was that an experience although particular to a culture, and linked to its expression in that culture, is however separable and can be expressed in another language. Moreover, different languages can borrow from each other some literary forms or modelling system, i.e., languages can inter-textualize each other. For example, modernism, impressionism, surrealism, are all ways of looking at substances that are developed in Europe and spread throughout the world, crossing boundaries of culture. This is also apparent in other fields such as journalism which, as a genre, has developed to be almost universal. However, when one writes a work of art or a journalistic article, one follows the same modelling system, but uses different means and structures that are available in, and characteristic of one's culture.

Text, in Kristeva's and Lefevere's opinion, is divided into: a geno-text the text of the culture as a whole, of the archetypal 'productivity', and a pheno-text which belongs to a particular substance, a particular author, and a given context. The act of writing, according to Lefevere (Bakhtin, Kristeva) consists of transforming the subject's 'geno-textual' knowledge into a pheno-text. As soon as the writing finishes, the pheno-text becomes part of the geno-text of which it, i.e., the pheno-text, was an appropriation and transgression. The potential reader is the carrier of the act of
promoting a pheno-text into a geno-text. This explains how, as we mentioned before, the subject constitutes an important dimension in Bakhtin’s views.

Translation thus was perceptively characterized by Lefevere as the liberation of substance in one socio-cultural disguise and the re-articulation of that substance into another socio-cultural milieu (77). It is the supplanting of a pheno-text (a text specific to one culture) and the implanting of it in another geno-textual (socio-cultural) environment. We must emphasize here that this is possible only through the mediation of the subject, a reason for which translation cannot be an objective undertaking. The subject, as a translator, by bringing into his translation his unique geno-textual background also brings in part of the geno-textual background of his culture as a whole. The translator as inter-cultural communicator undertakes the narrowing of the language of a text down into a language of a definite genre, then to a language of a single text within that genre, and finally to a single understanding of that text.

It is noteworthy here that different cultures and hence languages make use of different batteries of literary texts, literary styles, rhetorical figures etc., that enter in the concept of geno-text. This perhaps explains how a work of literature is best translated by a literarily talented translator.

Lefevere was noticeably among the very few who went beyond the surface in their analysis of the significance of inter-textuality to cross-cultural translation. However, as we are going to demonstrate, inter-textuality is essential not only to literary texts, but to all types of dialogical texts, that is to all texts of a persuasive nature such as social, ideological, and journalistic texts. Inter-textuality constitutes an essential type of relationship that binds the translation to its original, whether on the general level of accommodating the translated text into the new environment, or on the level of the spontaneous tendency of most translators to emulate the forms and structures of the original. This is the reason for which some scholars (cf. Dryden, 3.3.3; Steiner 6.6, above) have taken some types of translation as an imitation of the original. However, there are other examples to mention.

Rabin (1959) pointed out an interesting method of translation usually used by the Bible translators when translating the Bible to other cultures. According to this method, the Bible translators found it more efficient, if not sometimes necessary, when translating the word ‘God’ to non mono-theistic culture to choose from that
culture any word that denotes a spiritual being in that culture. This was done regardless of the differences between the spiritual connotation of the two terms. They found out that this would facilitate the ease of understanding and acceptance of the word ‘God’ which would otherwise be alien to that culture and thus impossible to grasp. A second thought on this phenomenon will reveal an underlying process of inter-textuality, because of the indispensable need to build on similar or analogical existent inter-textual background, such as an indigenous spiritual being, to produce a satisfactory translation in the new culture of the word ‘God’. Otherwise, to fulfil this need the translators would need to work on creating this background, by education, introductory work, teaching about the culture of the imported text. We think that the Bible translators in this case opted for the second and often easier alternative.

Inter-textuality in translation also is revealed by the fact that translation often takes place from one genre in the source language into a similar genre in the target language. As said before, the concept of language is an abstract concept that only exists on the underlying phonological or grammatical level, but not on the communicative level. To give an example, an interpretation of the Holy Koran into English is set out in ‘text 4B’. This paragraph is supposed to be an interpretation of the following Koran verse ‘ayah’:

**TEXT 4A:**

قال الله جل وعلي " قال لقد علمت مآذن هؤلاء الأرب السماوات والأرض بصائر وإنني لأضحك يا فرعون مشبرا صدق الله العظيم."

*The Holy Koran, Surah 17, verse 102).*

**TEXT 4B:**

He said: in truth you know that none sent down these (portents) save the Lord of the heavens and earth as proofs, and lo! (for my part) I deemed thee lost, O Pharaoh’ (*Al-Qur'ân* 1401H: N2, 33).

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2 According to Islamic teachings, the words of God are not to be translated, but only interpreted in other tongues, since any translation of the words God will result in deforming them.
One would not fail to notice the similarity in the generic style of the two religious texts in the example above. The language in the translation is, more or less, an archaic, vocative style that characterizes religious texts. The choice of words such as 'Lord' 'heavens', 'thee', 'deemed', points to a great resemblance with the style of the Bible. Moslems, as believers in the Bible also, see no harm in adopting such a way of writing when translating religious matters to English speaking countries. One can also imagine how the text would be rendered if the translated into another writing genre, such as scientific, literary language, for example. This might also explain resistance to more modern 'everyday' version of the Bible.

Derrida (1985) cited Borges’ attempt to write a story about a French madman who tried to write, as if for the first time, Cervantes’ story of Don Quixote. Borges’ original was written in Spanish; however, the events of the story takes place in Nimes in France, and in such a way that the text has a French ambience added to it. According to Derrida, a Spanish student of his found the French translation of the Spanish original more faithful and thus better than the original (99).

Derrida owed this phenomenon to the added Frenchness that had been forced on the text, and he went on to say that translation can do almost everything except mark totally the boundaries between the two languages in the single text, or carry over the whole flavour of one language into another, (Frenchness of French or Spanishness of Spanish) (100). This important insight of Derrida, we presume demonstrates the extent to which the inter-textualization can go. At the same time, it also explains that a text is more at home with its original inter-textual environment, a fact that can possibly explain why the translated text that was written originally in Spanish, but set in a French environment can perhaps look better if translated into French.

Similar other examples can be found in the translation of Lapidus. I. (1984) Muslim Cities in The Later Middle Ages which was originally written in English, and was later translated into Arabic. Of this translation we chose one example where the translation would, in certain parts, be more lucid than the original. The original reads as the following:
The zu'ar were self-consciously organized gangs of young men, probably bachelors, who wore a hair style called Qur'ani and robes worn over their shoulders as a kind of uniform. In common usage they were called the zu'ar (scoundrels), ahl-az'ara (evil people), ghawaghah al-zu'ar (rabble of the zu'ar), ghawghah al-harāt (rabble of the quarter), awbash ruin al-zu'ar (riff-raff of the zu'ar), all pejorative terms, for as we shall see, they are turbulent parts of the population.

[underline = original italic]. (154). The Arabic translation is as follows:

TEXT 5A:

كانت عصائب الفتاني منظمه علي نحو من وعي الذات. ولعلهم كانوا عارين. يتكونون لهم زيا مميزا لشعر الرأس يدعى الفرعاني. يرتدون أعواما مرقعة علي اكتاذهم كنوع من البزه التضامنية. وكانوا يعتمدون في الاستعمال الشائع لكلمة بالزمار (الأواعد) والزماري (الناس الأشرار) وقفوة الزمران (زمران الأعزاء) وقفوة الحوارات (زمران الأحياء). أواباش، وجميعها تعابير ازدرائية. لأنهم كما سنرى كانوا منته مشاغبين.


It is of interest here that despite what seems to us an extensive literality and lack of rigour in the translation of this paragraph, the Arabic translation in a certain respect is clearer than the original English. Words like 'zu'ar', Qur'ani; phrases like 'ghawghah al-zu'ar' 'ghawghah al-harāt' have a clearer content in their translations in Arabic than their English counterparts.

However, the inter-textualization by the translator of the English original on the level of form has rendered certain parts of the translation awkward. For example, the sentence: 'who were self-consciously organized', was literally rendered as: 'منظمه علي نحو من وعي الذات'. Which literally means when back translated: 'organized in a way that reflects self wakefulness'; instead of, 'عصبات منظمه علي نحو منعمد' which means 'self-aware organized gangs'. Similarly, the word 'Qur'ani' which is a inaccurate approximation by the original author (Lapidus) of the Arabic word 'Qur'ān' (shaved heads) with the genitive case ending (kassrah) 'i'. The translator has included the case ending in the original stem of the word in the translation, rendering it as 'Qur'āni' (Qur'āni), an anomalous form for the adjective in Arabic. The more appropriate word is (Qur'ān) (قرعاني) meaning (pl. shaved heads, skinheads).
In addition, further inter-textuality on the level of form can detected in the copying of all the parenthetical explanation of the meaning of the Arabic words that were originally intended for English recipients of the text, and the inclusion of which in the Arabic translation would confound rather than help the reader. One might also mention what seems to be an excessive use of commas and periods in the Arabic text following their direct copying from the original English.

It is of interest also to note that the word ‘zu’ar’ which is a colloquial Syrian Arabic plural form for the Arabic original word ‘aza’ar’, is a polysemous word with two possible meanings: ‘a man with little, or shaven hair’; and ‘a vicious or ill-tempered man’. In this instance it is used to convey both meanings at the same time to designate people who have little hair as well as being vicious. This is why the English author has to go to a great length to explain what it meant in English.

Curiously enough, the Arabic press has always had difficulty in translating the word ‘skinheads’ from English for similar reasons. Since it does not suffice to render the word by an Arabic counterpart that means ‘thinely shaved heads’ because this will leave out the other meaning of ‘skinheads’ as people with extreme racialist views. There is no Arabic word that conveys the two meanings; therefore, it usually translated by long descriptive phrases such ‘الجماعات العنصرية من الشباب حليقي’ ‘روؤس’ ‘racist groups of shaven-headed young people’.

Another example of inter-textuality can be noticed even within one text when a writer builds on what he has said or identified already to convey new meanings or continues his discussion of the subject matter. This is obvious in the way the ‘text5’ is continued in ‘text 5C’ on the assumption on the part of the writer that his reader has already sufficient acquaintance with the word ‘zu’ar’, as well as other newly introduced terms to be able to comprehend the remainder of the text. He then continues writing in the following manner:

**TEXT 5C:**

At least some of the zu’ar were shopkeepers. One is identified as a carpenter, another as a baker, and .... One of the zu’ar chiefs was called Ibn al-Tabakh, the son of the cook (Ibid).

This pattern of inter-textualization is productive throughout the whole book.

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Other examples will to be shown below when we try to illustrate our proposed model of translation, these examples are mostly taken from English articles translated in the Arabic press. These articles were collected from different Kuwaiti and Saudi newspapers, where translating articles from English press is a customary practice.

7.8. Conclusion

In this chapter, it was argued that translatability between languages is possible because of certain universal traits of mankind that make different languages and cultures inter-intelligible. The diversity of languages was argued to be the *sine qua non* of, rather than an obstacle to translatability. It was also argued that translation is a dialogic exchange between cultures that is similar in many respects to a dialogic exchange between two individuals within one culture, even though translation is different from the latter in its attempt to establish communication across linguistic boundaries. Translation was seen to involve a relationship of similarity in differentiation between different languages; a relation that also characterises communication within the boundaries of one language. Finally, we tried to shed some light on the rôle of inter-textuality in communication as well as in translation. In the following chapter, we will attempt a model of translation based on what we have already mentioned on the previous chapters. By this model, we will try to explain what goes on in the translation process, and also try to explain some central issues of translation.
Chapter 8
A Dialogic Approach to Translation

8.1. Introduction

To recapitulate, Dialogism as a general and universal doctrine of cognition assumes that awareness of identity comes mainly from relationships with others with whom the identity simultaneously compares and differentiates itself. Individuals reflexively and dialogically constitute one another (see 2.1.3. above). An individual is always selective in his relationship with others, as there are other individuals and events that are more relevant to him.

Analogically, cultures, in which some members are translators, can also appraise itself only from the external point of view of another, that culture being more relevant to its own being than other cultures. Therefore, a translation, even if mediated by individual translators, takes as its general context an intercultural dialogue between two languages at a given point of history.

Translation, a bipartite operation by nature, and diverse in practice, cannot fully be accounted for by reductionist approaches that privilege one aspect of language over another. Linguistics cannot account for translation because different languages have been found to be on the level of system incommensurable, calling for unpredictable lexico-grammatical changes to be affected in a text in order for that text to make good sense in the target language.

On the other hand, various communicative models of translation that have opted for formal, unmediated linguistic or semiotic descriptions of the process of translation in terms of transfer of meaning were not successful for three reasons: lack of sufficient
scientific knowledge of what goes on in the mind of the translator during the process of translation; lack of agreement on the concept of what is being transferred (tertium comparationis); and overlooking the fact that language is a heteroglossic communicative system. The lack of substantial progress in the field of Machine translation makes evident the impossibility of dispensing with the human translator as a responsive rational mediator from the process of translation.

We also tried to show that translation is hardly a pure subjective operation because the subject is tightly netted to his social and ideological environment, mostly through the acquisition of the language in which he is translating.

For the above reasons we would like to propose a model of natural translation that takes into consideration all the complexities involved in translation, a model that links translation to intra-cultural as well as inter-cultural communication. Translation, as we will demonstrate, involves dialogic relations mediated by utterances; relations which are at work within a text, among texts in a single culture, and texts standing between two cultures such as translated texts proper. The model of translation we propose is a communicative one that takes account of Bakhtin’s criticism of Jakobson’s code theory of communication (as explained in 6.3 above), and more particularly Jakobson’s concept of a predefined message mediating communication.

8.2. A Dialogic Model of Translation

The model we propose takes as its general context the concept of a general dialogue between cultures that will figuratively branch out into smaller dialogues, following a similar principle of similarity and differentiation. In this model translation is seen as an intercultural dialogue. As assumed before, even though cultures are not monolithic unified entities with distinct boundaries, they can be defined along broad lines of which language is an important element. Also, cultures, in most cases, directly or indirectly, through trade, war, or common interest have infiltrated one another (see Lotman (1991) 3.1 above). It was also explained that the substance of human experience can also be shared among different cultures (Lefevere (1973) above). The model we propose for explaining translation can be illustrated by the following figure (5):
To understand a text it is not enough to understand the linguistic designations or significations of the linguistic constituents of the text, nor it is possible to properly translate a text by the mediation of a dictionary only, without a sufficient knowledge of the culture in which the text is written. Therefore, the understanding of a given text, being itself a dialogic process, is engrossed in other levels of dialogue that go far beyond the given text as can be seen from figure (5).

To explain translation, we propose looking at the different inter-connected levels of dialogism that enter into the translation process. Therefore, our discussion will include the following points: the rôle of the translator in mediating the dialogue; intra-cultural intertextuality; inter-cultural intertextuality; and translation and dialogic understanding.

8.3.1. The Translator as an Invisible Co-author

Translation, in our approach, involves the re-communication of the original into the new culture by the mediation of the translator. This act of re-communication is, grosso modo, a complex two-sided act. In one instant the translator is the ‘addressee’; in the second he is the ‘addressor’. This act of communication takes place by the mediation not of a text per se, but by the mediation of the utterance as explained in 6.5 above.
We assume this with the awareness that any non-normative explanation of translation will find it difficult if not impossible to predict in what way a translator might behave in relation to the way he treats the original text. Also, it is particularly difficult to try to delimit a definite and objective line between what constitutes a translation and non-translation of a given text, a line beyond which we can say that a given work cannot be considered to be a translation. Such an awareness seems a good reason for avoiding definite evaluative terms about translation outcome, such as saying that a perfect translation can have this or that quality.

Thus, we propose that the translator in his capacity as an addressee in one language and an addressee in another, speaks in a polyphonic manner for that original author in the new culture as if he himself (the translator) were the original author. This may even include instances where the translator tries to mark off the character of the original author by using an indirect speech mode available to him, using for example expressions such as, ‘(x) says’ ‘x believes’ etc.. It is important here to emphasise that even in this type of translation it is still the translator that directly speaks in the text rather than the original author. The translator’s task is somehow similar to that of a ventriloquist.

Accordingly, translation ought to be seen as a double voiced utterance in which two mixed voices are heard; the original author as well as the translator. We must not forget to mention that the translator is also responsible for the choice of the material for translation which reflects his choice of a given perspective on certain matters for his readers. His translation usually reflects among other things his perspective on the original, his evaluative (axiological) choices of style and vocabulary (6.6 above).

The following examples are excerpts from an interview with an Israeli journalist (David Grossman), originally in Newsweek of 6\1\1989, which was translated by two Arabic Dailies:

TEXT 6 (Original)

Stanger:

One often hears some Israelis talk of emigrating. Why?

Grossman:

That is because we feel our future is so tenuous, so vulnerable.

TEXT 6A:
One often hears that some Israelis talk about emigration—why is that so?

This owes to the fact that we feel that our future is precarious.

We hear between time and another that some Israelis speak of emigration—why?

That is so because we feel that our future is unknown and exposed to all kinds of dangers.

In the above translation we notice the absence of the name of the journalist who conducted the interview. Both Arabic newspapers only mention that the interview was done by Newsweek. The position of the interviewer is marked by the characters (*), (■). We also notice that in both cases it is the translator that polyphonically speaks for the interviewer as well as for the person interviewed using the pronoun ‘We’, making the pronoun polyphonically speak for both of them.

This is also often noticed by the fact that when we read a translated work, we do so as if these translations are originally written in our language. It is often the case that the translator remains anonymous to the reader even though his name is mentioned in the title page. The position of the translator in the translation is similar to that of the writer of a scenario in a work of literature, where different characters serve as mouthpieces for the original writer.
However, in real terms, the translator speaks for the original writer through his
dialogic understanding of him, an understanding that is partly influenced by the
translator’s own background, and his capacity as someone who is bilingual to
understand the two cultures (geno-textual background): that of the original, and that
of the translation. Therefore, the translation cannot be said to belong totally to the
original author; it is, in a sense, like any other cultural artifact, the result of the
coordinated collaboration of more than one subject.

Translation, as a process, can also be said to include other polyphonic aspects that
are indirectly involved in forming the translation - 'indirect polyphony'. Whereas
direct polyphony is what enters into the production of direct translation between two
pheno-text of two cultures, indirect polyphony is a more general phenomenon through
which a translator uses his knowledge of one culture to produce texts in another. That
is to say, that he uses his previous encounters with other writers in one culture (geno-
typical background) to accomplish texts in another. In this case the translator is said
to have inter-textualized not only one author in the original culture but many. Of
indirect inter-textuality we perhaps can say that 'text 5’ above (p.291) is an example.
Lapidus has inter-textualized many texts in Arabic and transformed them in a pheno-
text of the English culture.

However, we rarely speak of indirect-polyphonic relationships involved in
translation, because, translation is usually taken to be a direct relationship between the
original and the translated text. This is so partly because of the immediacy of the
relationship of the two texts involved, and partly because the translator can go back
to the translated text during the process of the translation. We, however, think that a
given translation involves the whole cognitive environment of the translated text.

This is also the case with the language of the translated text. This is what
corresponds to ‘Intertext1’ and ‘intertext2’ in figure (5) above. These two inter-textual
relationships are characterized as intra-cultural inter-textuality. The relationship
between the two cultures is taken here to be that of inter-cultural inter-textuality. Now
we would like to have a closer look at these aspects of translation using some
examples from texts, also taken from translated texts in the Arabic press.
8.3.2. Intra-cultural Inter-textuality and Translation

Seen from within, a culture also resembles the self in being an open-ended project of self consummation; it is a continuity that takes from the past and is open towards the future. The history of a culture is registered by its past lived experience and important events rather than by an objective time calendar. Historical landmarks of a culture, even if objectively dated by a neutral time calendar, remain particular to that culture.

The history of a culture reflects the ideological struggles of its different competing sub-cultures, different rival social groups, different perspectives on life. Often, traces of these struggles are to be found in the history of the language of the culture. These struggles are synchronically mirrored in the competing different social languages that exist as different contending discourses. Linguistically speaking they are also reflected in different styles, genres, dialects etc..

However, a culture when looked at from an external vantage point, as in translation for example, presents itself as something total, complete or consummated. This is obvious to a certain extent, by how cultures are sometimes stereo-typed at a point of history by other cultures, e. g., the ancient Greeks as being wise, French poetic, Italians romantic etc..

In Lapidus (1984), of which ‘text 5’ above was taken, all dates were written in two calendars: a Muslim ‘hujriah’ calendar which starts from the date of the migration of prophet Muhammed from Mecca to Medinah (hijrah); and the Christian calendar, that dates from the birth of Jesus Christ. Since the book was about a Muslim city, most of the dates in books written in Arabic about the city were in Hijrah calendar, and related to events that took place within Arabic culture. However, to increase the book’s relevance to the western reader this calendar had to be converted into a Christian one, and deliberately related sometimes to events in Western history. Being aware of this fact, Lapidus wrote his book not only according to events that took place in the culture he was writing about, but he reminded the reader of their contemporaneous Western ones.

Even the title of the two books in the two languages make this fact apparent. In English ‘Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages’, whereas, the Arabic translation’s title is ‘مدن إسلامية في العصر المملوكي’ (Some Islamic Cities in the Mamluki Era).
Moreover, the Mamluki era is a part of Syrian history, the continuation of which can still be felt, and, therefore, has a more relevant meaning to the Arabic reader than to the Western one. The latter is likely to read about this era as a more or less isolated historical epoch, despite Lapidus' unconscious efforts to tune his reader to understanding the historical perspective of Islamic culture.

That is to say a member of a culture, in contradistinction to an outsider, is always conscious of the heterogeneity, and different conflicts that take place within that huge composite called culture. That is, he is always informed about the different perspectives of looking at things within his culture. The translator, on the other hand, even if aware of these aspects would be in no position to reflect them in his translation because they constitute the implied meaning of the original. What the translator at best can do is to approximate these intra-cultural conflicts by homologous social languages or styles that can reflect them.

Sometimes a language can inter-textualize another only through translating a particular genre that seems more relevant to similar genre of its own, but not on the level of language as a whole. English and French may inter-textualize each other on the level of literary more than the political genre. As explained by Lefevere, some genres can even cross cultural boundaries to form a type of universal genre.

Therefore, the process of translation involves inter-textual relationships of a more particular type; that of intra-generic type (religious, poetic, journalistic). These relationships relate to the knowledge of a particular genre in which the text was originally written and in which it is to be rendered as a translation. Lehmann (1986) described understanding in translation as mainly one of content, as he put it:

For textual comprehension the type of knowledge available and how it is structured is more important than what language the subject speaks. Therefore, a professor of literature reading a translation of "A la recherche du Temps Perdu" may understand Proust better than a French wine merchant reading the original text(140).

Intra-cultural relations, therefore, can be said to consist of two acts of inter-textuality, and apply twice: firstly in the understanding of the original as part of 'intertext 1' as shown in figure (5) above, and apply secondly in the rendering of the text in the translated text's genre and culture as part of 'intertext 2'.

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The following text illustrates the importance of the intra-cultural dimension of translation. In The Economist of 7-13\1\1989, in an article about a possible meeting between the Palestinian leader Arafat and the Israeli leadership to discuss peace, the original writer uses the following headline:

**TEXT 7 (Original)**

Guess who isn't coming to dinner.

In this headline the writer inter-textualized through parody the name of a film that has been produced in the U.S. in 1967 under the direction of Stanley Kramer. This film had the title ‘Guess who is coming to dinner’, and spoke of a wealthy white couple in San Francisco whose daughter had made up her mind to get married to a black man. The couple, who usually held very liberal views towards inter-racial relations, found themselves less so when the matter was related to their own daughter. This film is well known in English speaking culture and its title has become almost cliché in English.

The Arabic translator, however, who was in no position to copy the same inter-textual relations, since the film itself is less known by the Arabic audience, and because of the absence of a similar cliché in Arabic, had no means of fully translating this title. Word by word translation will result in a meaningless awkward translation. However, recognizing the cultural perspective of the title in so far as its alluding to an undesirable guest, the translator opted for a similar cliché in Arabic which expresses a similar perspective, and speaks of an incident in which the host left upon finding out who his real guest was. The translation is like the following:

**TEXT 7A:**

حضر الضيوف و غاب الضيف

(BT. The guests showed up but the host had already left)

The way this article is translated explains also the second Inter-textual act (intertext 2), which consists of estimating the best methods of accounting for the original text’s
inter-textual relationships with a comparable one that can preserve in the target culture the same stylistic, and evaluative relationship.

In another example, where the translator insisted on translating verbatim, the translation came out as awkward and sometimes unintelligible as in the translation of text 8 below:

**TEXT 8:**

Ever since Joshua Dispatched two spies on a reconnaissance mission into Biblical Jericho, espionage has been a way of life in the Middle East. Only the methods have changed. In recent years cloak-and-dagger operations, known as human intelligence or HUMINT, began to give way to electronic surveillance, or ELINT.

**TEXT 8A:**

منذ بعث "يوشع" جاسوسين في مهمته استطلاعي إلى أريحا، كما جاء في التوراة، كان التجسس طريق حياة في الشرق الأوسط، ولم يعترض إلا الا ستخدامه. ففي السنوات الأخيرة بدأ تأثيرات "القناع والخنجر" المعروف باسم الاستخبارات البشرية، تختلي مكانها للمراقابات الإلكترونية

(BT. Since "Yosha9" sent two spies on a reconnaissance mission to Jericho as mentioned in the 'Torah', spying was a life method in the Middle East, nothing changed except style only, as in recent years the operation "mask and dagger" known as human surveillance, leave its place for electronic surveillance)

In the translation of (text 8) we notice that the translator, probably relying on dictionary information only, has translated the word 'Joshua' as (يوشع), a name of plant in Arabic for 'joshua tree', while in the original the word Joshua was meant to refer to Jesus as mentioned in the text by Biblical Jericho (Old Testament) to distinguish it from the Joshua in the Torah. Also the translator has literally rendered the idiomatic phrases as a ‘cloak-and dagger’, ‘a way of life’, assuming that it would give the same meaning in Arabic. Moreover, the whole text was meant to serve the function of topically introducing the article and not as an informative one. It was meant to initiate a possible perspective on the following, being itself a perspective on the direct information that it represents. Unlike in the previous translation (text 7A),
the background of the new readers was obviously overlooked in this one, rendering what could have been a dialogic translation into a monologized one.

The above text also illustrates that on the level of linguistic genre, a language may develop a given stylistic organization that is lacking in another, such as in the two words formed by lexical fusion in HUMINT, ELINT. Although a similar process is also common and widely used in Arabic, the translator had difficulties with these two words, obviously because, unlike others, they have not been fully intertextualized in Arabic.

It is important here to note that translator cannot fully re-express these aspects in his translation because they are related to relationships that are unique to the original culture. There are aspects in respect of which the translation and the original will never be the same because they pertain to the unique relationships; each text has to its own culture. These relationships also change every time we inter-textualize a new text.

8.3.3 Inter-cultural Inter-textuality

The conception of translation presented here is akin to that of the structuralist’s explanation of translation in so far as we think that translation involves not only two texts, but also the two cultures concerned. However, in our approach, the two cultures involved are not holistically, but partly invoked in the process of a single translation. Cultures are partly involved in translation through their influence on the subjects involved in the production of the two texts: the original author, and the translator.

It is worth reiterating at this point, that in dialogism no individual internalizes the whole culture, or even a whole language (language as discourse). The individual’s knowledge of language is limited to the number of genres to which he was previously exposed and the degree to which he masters them. The same thing can be said about his knowledge of culture which is limited by his previous experience and what was more relevant to him in that culture (answerability).

Furthermore, according to dialogism, what gets translated in a single utterance is also limited by two factors: the relationship of the utterance to its producer (his intention in creating it); and the context of situation in which it was produced, or
received. In other words, translation involves a single utterance as an instance of communicative experience, as an integrated point of view (perspective) on some extra-linguistic substance (chapter 6. 2. and 3. above).

Communication involves only an instance of communication limited by and restricted to the sufficient communicative function of a text in a given context (Fodor and LePore (1992) (7.2. Above). This highlights the importance of context to language use, and , at the same time, avoids the structuralist holistic dilemma in translation. It also reveals the importance of the speaker’s intention in relation to this communicative act.

The speaker’s intention is not only important for identifying the text with a certain speaker, but also for restricting the general meaning of language to a more limited perspective. To ignore this particular function of context, meaning of language will be boundless, and infinitely deferred. This is so because all that will be left is language elements endlessly differentiated from each other. Language will bear all the characteristics of sceptical approaches that see language and nothing else other than traces of differentiated elements, as for instance, in Derrida’s difference (Norris 1986: 32).

Having said this, we think that the particular task of a translator, in most cases, is not simply to match pieces of the two languages together, but rather to re-interpret the original for new readers by implanting it into a new inter-textual environment. In believing this we also agree with the other structuralist thesis, that languages are not commensurable on the level of the system as a whole, nor are they commensurable on the level of smaller units divorced from their whole systems. (As we have seen before (Chapter 4), even among the closest related languages, this could result in some cases of faux amis.)

Inter-cultural inter-textualization, thus explained, is only possible by the mediation of the translator, who, through his cognizance of the original attempts to funnel his cultural and linguistic knowledge of what has entered into the making of the single text in the original culture into that of the single text of the translation. The translated text will also be seen to be limited by the context of the situation of its production as well as the translator’s intention for translating it. Thus viewed, the two cultures or language systems will be partly, but not wholly inter-textualized.
Therefore, despite the fact that translation is, more or less, a **linear inter-textualization** between the two pheno-texts (the original text and the translation), this linear inter-textualization is balanced, and dialogically negotiated between the genres and cultures of the two language, i.e., involves also the two geno-texts.

The inter-cultural inter-textuality relates also to an important issue of translation, that of the degree of acculturation. This is so because the translator sometimes makes a deliberate decision about leaning towards one language or another, or does that unconsciously, depending on the circumstances of the given translation. He can either fully acculturate a text by leaning more towards the host culture, make the text more relevant and implicable to its intertext; or, alternatively, he can chose not to acculturate a text by keeping his translation as much as he can transparent to the original and confine its implications to the original culture. However, acculturation is always a matter of degree.

For example, a case of extreme acculturation, was mentioned in Newmark (1977: 102) where Clarence Jordan (1969) in his ‘Cotton Patch Version of Luke and Acts’ rearranged the life of Jesus into a more relevant setting of the southern United States environment. In that translation he reinvented ‘Roman Emperor Augustus’ as ‘President Augustus’; ‘Rome’ as ‘Washington’; ‘Bethlehem’ as ‘Val dosta Georgia’. Another example is from a translation of the Bible in an Eskimo language where the expression of ‘Lamb of God’ was rendered as ‘Seal of God’ (Nida 1964).

An example of an attempt to fully acculturate a journalistic text is cited from the Versteeg J. article in the Sunday Times of January 29th, 1989, about Iran after ten years of revolution in which the following examples are cited:

**TEXT 9A**

... while the radicals are likely to back Moussavi Khoeniha, the attorney-general, known as "the Stalinist Mullah".

And

**TEXT 9B**
Those who have money... leave on Friday in their Mercedes, BMWs, Pontiacs or Cherokees, for the ski resort of Dизzen, Iran’s St Moritz, where Islamic skiing keeps the sexes apart on different pistes.

In both texts one can notice how the reporting in these texts has been rendered more relevant by the use of cross cultural images. The impact on the Western reader of the use of a description like ‘Stalinist mullah’ can, with minimum effort, attribute to the mullah all the undesirable characteristics associated with the name of Stalin in the West. The comparison between Dизzen and the Swiss ski resort of St Moritz; the use of the form ‘attorney general’ to convey the meaning of ‘master’ or ‘general spiritual guide’, also indicate a possible desire on the part of the writer to achieve a culturally more relevant and contextually more plausible (in Sperber and Wilson’s sense) understanding of the text, an understanding unhindered by cross-cultural differences.

Yet when translated into Arabic (an Islamic culture by far closer to Iranian culture than its English counterpart) these acculturized phrases posed great difficulties for the Arabic translator. For example (Text 9A) was rendered in Arabic, in the Kuwaity Daily Al-Qabas 1\2\1989, like the following:

TEXT 9C (Ar.)

في حين يتوقع أن يدعم المتطرفون موسوي خوشنی، النائب العام، المعروف ب "العلاستالیئی".

(BT. At the same time the extremists support Mossaway Khow'ni, the general deputy, known as the Stalinist mulla.)

TEXT 9D (Ar.)

ولهذا فإن الذين يملكون أموالا... كل يوم جمعهم يغادرون في سيارتهم "ال버سید".

وال "بي. إم. دبلو" الي منتجع ديزني للتزلج (منتجع "سانت موریتز" ایران).

(BT. therefore, those who have money... every friday leave in their "Mercedes", and "Bi. Im. Double you" to Disney resort for skiing (the resort "St. Moritz" of Iran)

In the first text, the phrase ‘الملا الاستالیئی’ does not have the same connotational meaning in Arabic, and therefore it unlikely to have the same impact on the Arabic
reader as that of its impact in Western societies, where most people take Stalin to be an apostle of ultimate oppression. In the original the word Stalinist was used to refer to that particular perspective of the dictator; in the translation, this perspective was less clear and the phrase was replaced between quotation marks reflecting ambivalence about its perspective.

This also explains translation of metaphor and other forms of stylization in which the expression of meaning is not straightforward. It would be possible to assume, following Dagut (1976), Newmark (1981), that metaphor involves similarity of meaning between two terms in respect to a given property; however, it would be also assumed that the property involved in metaphor is not a property qua property, but the property as a perspective in a given context.

This way we can say the translation of metaphor, to be more inter-textualized, should it be oriented towards the metaphor’s tenor of the target language also and not only to its original’s vehicle or tenor property. A monological translation would be oriented towards the metaphor’s vehicle, or the general property of the original regardless or whether this process is productive in the target language.

This also would explain Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980), argument for metaphors as parts of the conceptual system of a culture and the way that culture experiences life. Metaphor to them is one of the ways in which the conceptual systems are extended by means of stylization between texts. How perspectives of meanings can build on each other. It would also be possible to assume that the intelligibility of metaphor is dependent on the amount of inter-textuality between them within a given conceptual scheme.

In the second text, because of lack of cultural familiarity, the translator has noticeably confused the name ‘St Morits’ in the second instance, and treated it as a second name for ‘Dizzin’ (which he translated as ‘Disney’, as the ‘Iran’s St Morits resort’. The simile was not as productive in Arabic as it was in English.

One would like perhaps to compare the above texts with other instances where meanings in another culture are kept at bay, by the lack of the desire for total acculturation, for example, when the press sometimes borrows the original text of the source language instead of translating it, aiming by doing so at marking off the two
concepts in the two languages as is commonly done by using words like, 'Intifada' (uprising) in the following examples from an article by J. McGeary:

TEXT 10A:

In the West Bank, however, the jubilant Palestinians toasted one another with Mabrouk, the Arabic word for "congratulations." To the foot soldiers in the intifadeh, the year long rebellion in the occupied territories that has won worldwide sympathy for Palestinian national aspirations.

(Time, December 26, 1988)

TEXT 10B:

When their uprising, the intifada, gave these Palestinians the upper hand inside the PLO, they demanded a practical policy instead of a dream.

(The Economist December 24, 1988)

In (texts 10 A&B) above the word 'intifada' could mean very little to an English speaking person without the interpretations that follow it by the writers in English. Thus even if interpreted for the reader in English it carries an unfamiliar and thus less relevant semantic weight because very few readers have come across previous usages of this word which would have no definite perspective for them.

This becomes apparent when we notice that same word intifada was given two different interpretations in the two texts. Whereas, in one instance ‘text 10A’ it was interpreted as a rebellion, in ‘text 10B’ it was interpreted as an uprising, their uprising which could also mean an uprising of a sort particular to the Palestinians. The word can even be rendered less relevant if we use it without any qualifying interpretations, such as in same issue of the The Economist but in a different article in the following example:

TEXT 10C

A year after the eruption of the intifada in the occupied territories, Israel is in one of the tightest fixes it has known.
One possible reason for this is that by using the Arabic word the writer distances himself from any evaluative interpretation of the term; avoiding by doing so the sensitivity of the possible interpretation by either pro-Israel or pro-PLO readers.

On other occasions, acculturation is important for many other reasons such as, ruling out any possible ambiguity in the reading of the original, as we see in the translation of article of the (Guardian of Thursday 5, 1, 1989) about the incident between the U.S and Libya, in which the American fleet shot down two Libyan planes, the original title goes as follows:

TEXT 11

Reagan goes out fighting

This can have many possible meanings when translated in Arabic such as: ‘Reagan goes out of the government fighting’; ‘Reagan goes out of the U.S.A to fight abroad’; or even ‘declare war’ if interpreted according to the Arabic idiom ‘بِخُرْجِ اللِّقَال’ which means a declaration of war. Perhaps aware of all these possibilities, the translator in the Saudi Daily Asharq Al-Awsat of Friday 1,1989, translated the headline as follows:

TEXT 11B

الرئيس ريجان يخرج من الحكم "مقاتلا"

(BT. President Regan goes out of the government "fighting")

In other instances acculturation introduces modifications to the original that are related to increasing the suitability of the text for new readers. In the case of some newspapers with more nationalistic inclination (cf. the Kuwaiyti daily Al-Wattan) for example, articles which were not favourable to their readers were introduced by the warning by the warning phrase ‘بِنظرِ العدو’ (BT. The enemy point of view) on top of an interview with the Israeli official in charge of operations in Lebanon ‘Yuri Lubrani’ (Al-Wattan 17\11\1988) (Appendix 3. (a).

In another instance, (Al-Wattan of 30\10\1989) a translated article from the Christian Science Monitor originally written by Joel Binman in which he argued
against the establishment of a Palistinian state was also introduced by the phrase ‘وجه معاديه للعرب’ (BT. Point of view hostile to the Arabs) (Appendix 3. (b).

Other instances of translations of headlines are interpreted so as to give them more relevance to the host culture, to capture the attention of the reader, for example the Sunday Times article of the 29/11/1989 titled:

TEXT 12

Rival Beirut leaders keep their distance.
The translation in Al-Qabas 12/1/1989 was more specific about the name of the leaders and transformed the headline as:

TEXT 12B

مبرر الصراع بين حكومته وحكومه عون (BT. Justifying the conflict between his government and Aoun’s Al-Hoss: the co-existence of the two governments means the end of the Lebanon)

Changes can be also introduced to avoid offense against publicly upheld moral or ethical customs, as for example, is obvious from the following two examples taken from a translation of an article in the Observer 7/6/1989. The article was entitled:

TEXT 13

Bush is thinking with his bottom.
Which was translated in the Saudi daily Asharq Al Awsat of 8/6/1989 as:

TEXT 13A

ادارة بوش لا يزال حائرا في سياستها الخارجية وواشنطن ترفض تنفيذ الموقف الألماني من الصواريخ.
(BT. Bush's administration is still perplexed about its foreign policy, and Washington refuses to appreciate the German stance towards the missiles)

In Arabic customs the use of such an expression as 'thinking with his bottom' in a public correspondence such as in the press is considered morally unacceptable. It is perhaps arguable whether such a change in the title was only for moral reasons. However, elsewhere in the article in a paragraph opening the following expression 'Horseshit, as they say back in his [Bush] home state of Texas', was completely deleted from the translation, which reinforces the impression that an ethical reason was at least one of the reasons behind the change in the original title.

8.3.4. Dialogic Utterance as a Unit of Translation

According to dialogism, understanding of the original is not a mechanical process, but, rather (as shown in 6.3 above) a complex cognitive process that requires inferential and active cognitive interaction. It is not merely the reading of a text, but also partly reading in that text.

The translator does not understand the text as a bundle of words each with an objective meaning, but rather he tries to interpret the text as a whole global meaning corresponding to a perspective on a given situation. This global situational meaning of the text helps in determining the relationships among its parts, and naturally affects the way they are being translated. Indeed, this understanding takes the form of a hermeneutic alternation between the whole and part till the translator arrives at a specific conclusion about the global intention of the original writer.

Therefore understanding in this respect is a process that includes a restructuring of the original that amounts to its re-cognizance. Recognizance of the text (in Frawley's sense of the word), includes the attempt to reproduce the text cognitively by forming a 'textual niche' (to borrow the term from Gibson) of the original's general perspective according to which the parts are to be understood.1

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1 Frawley (1984) distinguishes translation as one of three semiotic transfers: copying, the word speaks for itself; transcribing or a semiosis that does not involve recognizance; and translation or the recognizance of the information in one code and the recodification of that information in another (160).
Linking translation to the subject’s cognizance of the original permits also linking it to its intelligibility to the translator rather than to interchangeability of language systems. It is, in principle, only in this way that one can say that anything that can be understood can be translated. In other words what gets translated is the ‘psychic reality’ of the text as seen by the translator and not its form (4.6. above).

Following C. S. Pierce, translation ought to be seen as the interpretation of a sign by another sign in another culture. If we assume that every understanding (interpretant) of a sign implies adopting a given perspective on its general meaning, then we can say that translation is re-articulation of one perspective on a sign by another sign that has the capacity to include that perspective, so much so that the translating act is said to be concerned with the contextual implications of the sign rather than the sign vehicle, or sign object.

Therefore the unit of translation is the whole utterance as a teleological unit in which the original intention was expressed and on which the translator makes a judgment or perspective. Sometimes the translator may form different possible judgments of the original; however when translating he might have to articulate one judgment over others. The perspective of the utterance is usually formed according to aspects the translator considers to be more relevant. If a single text is translated by different translators, they are likely to articulate different perspectives of that text according their dialogical understanding of it.

A case in point is the various translations of the following journalistic text which was accidentally translated by three different independent translators. These texts appear in various newspapers, sometimes on different dates, almost certainly without any prior consultation among them. They were gathered by close monitoring of all texts translated in the Kuwaiti and Saudi press over period of three months. Over this period we were able to obtain only two texts that are translated in three newspapers. The number of texts translated in two newspapers was greater. Yet, the translated articles show constant similarities in their subject matter. They usually evolve around three major issues: the Middle East Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian), and the conflict in Afghanistan.

In the following page is the original article from (The Economist Nov. 4\1989) followed by a rough schema of the main points of the article as have been articulated
by three Kuwaiti Dailies. Some parts in this conceptual schema are roughly back translated with the aim of giving a taste of how the original appears in the different translations in Arabic; therefore, some of the structures in the English back translations would seem little odd, or even ungrammatical. Our schematic analysis is inspired by van Dijk (1985) and Bell (1991).

**TEXT 14:**

**Israel and America**

**A case of friendly fallout**

It is PRINCIPLE: They are still the best of friends. But even as facts have to admit that the alliance between Israel and America has seen better times. In mid-November Israeli prime minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, plans to visit America to give a speech to a Jewish audience in Cincinnati. President Bush has already agreed.

Shamir and Bush frowning, not waving

Bush’s advisers have hinted that he may be too busy just then to invite Mr Shamir to pop into Washington for a chat.

Every hinging clerk in the State Department knows exactly what this unfriendliness is all about: Mr Shamir has not clearly accepted Mr James Baker’s five-point plan on how to get Israeli-Palestinian peace talks under way, and Mr Baker is understandably cross. But it is the merest coincidence, the Americans keep saying, that they are suddenly cross with Israel for a whole lot of other reasons as well.

One such reason has to do with arms supplies. Until very recently the American side was sounding defensive over a planned sale of 315 Abrams tanks to Saudi Arabia. During the past week it has been Israel’s turn to be put on the spot. The television claim to have discovered that Israel has been helping South Africa to build a ballistic missile, in return for supplies of enriched uranium. Mr Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli defence minister, denies the story, which is said to be based on a document from the Central Intelligence Agency, “totally baseless”. Mr Bush was more circumspect. He said only that the story would “complicate” relations with Israel if it turned out to be true.

Where Israeli nuclear matters are concerned, the United States has for many years been an accomplished turner of the blind eye. Israel’s possession of a large atomic arsenal has not stopped successive administrations from strengthening military collaboration with the Jewish state. Many Israeli politicians therefore take a sceptical view of the current flap. The Americans, they say, have dragged the nuclear (and South African) skeleton out of the closet mainly in the hope of rattling Israel into talking to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

This time, the Israeli sceptics appear to be wrong. The missiles-to-South Africa story is thought to have been leaked by the Defence Department, in order to block a controversial sale of two supercomputers to Israel. The State Department, while angry about Israel’s stance on the Palestinians, happened to be in favour of selling the computers, so probably had nothing to do with the leak. Even so, the quarrel shows how easily an administration that loses patience with Israel can influence the climate of opinion in Washington.

In recent weeks, many of the 95 senators who declared last May that they supported Mr Shamir’s offer of elections in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza have begun to ask how honestly the offer was made. Mr Shamir could dispose their doubts at a stroke by accepting America’s five-point plan, but not without sacrificing a principle dear to his heart: Israel’s right not to talk to any Palestinians connected with the PLO. It may take more than a lonely November in Cincinnati to turn him round.

The above article is a political editorial type composed of three parts, a title, a lead, and main body. It has six paragraphs and one of them, the first, serves as a lead to the article. The lead sets the scene by answering the who, when, where, and the what of the article (Bell 1993: 150).
The title is considered as an abstract of the abstract, that is it contains the main theme of the text as an utterance. It is usually written in telegraphic style, and sums up the general intention behind the creation of the article, or what van Dijk (1985) called the macro-proposition of the article.

The title is followed by the main body paragraphs including the evaluation, argumentation, and the conclusion of the article. Each paragraph contains a main ‘micro-proposition’ in the form of an event as well as other minor propositions that aim at evaluating that events or propositions of the paragraph (ibid).

These different parts of the article work in a concerted manner to carry over the main proposition of the article, to shape up the possible ‘mental image’ of the article. In others words they are different utterances that, if taken together, form one general unified utterance with a general ideological meaning. Therefore looking at the The Economist article above we can approximate the following general conceptual schema of (text 14):

**TEXT 14**

I Title: (column heading)

**A case of friendly fall out**

(emphasis on the friendly nature of the fall out)

II Lead (paragraph 1):

(MP 1)

American-Israeli alliance is not at its best these days.

(statement of what)(MP 2)

Bush will not be inviting Shamir for a White House visit.

(evidence of why).

III Evaluation (paragraph 2):

(MP 3)

The reason is that Shamir has rejected Baker’s plan. Baker is cross.

(evaluation of the cause)
Justification:

A) Every filing clerk in the state department knows this is the reason. B) Other reasons are mere coincidence.

IV Background Events (paragraph 3):

Other possible background reasons are:

(Episode 1)

Earlier dispute caused by Israel over an arm deal to Saudi Arabia.

(Episode 2)

America’s desire to repay Israel by leaking a story about a similar Israeli deal with the boycotted South Africa in return for nuclear material.

(Episode 3)

Shamir is dismissal of the story. Bush warning of further complications.

V Justification (paragraph 4):

(MP 4) The above reasons are not so because:

A- The Israeli nuclear matters are not new to America who have always turned a blind eye in the past.
B- Even some Israeli politicians think there is something more than that.
C- They think this was a form of increasing pressure on Israel to enter talks with the Palestinians.

VI Argumentation and Consequence (Paragraph 5):

(MP 5) The Israeli Politicians are mistaken for the reasons:

A- The leak was done by the Defence Department. It was for a different reason to block sales of computers.
B- The State Department (the side involved in this (case) is in favour of this sale, therefore, have nothing to do with the leak.

(MP 6)

A- Therefore, the leak has nothing to do with the current fall out.
B- This is a case of an administration which is losing patience, and is likely to grow more impatient in the future.

VII Conclusion (paragraph 6):

Further evidence for (MP):

If we take into consideration the misgivings of the 95 senators about earlier unfulfilled promises of Shamir.
A- Then it becomes obvious that what is said in (MP1) that the fall out is about Baker’s plan becomes more evident.

B- Shamir could mend things by simply accepting the plan.

(America is trying to persuade Israel to accept Baker’s plan)

After presenting this conceptual schema for the original, we would like to present the three Arabic translations followed by a comparable conceptual schema in English aiming at highlighting the similarities and differences between these translations and the original on the one hand, and among the different translations themselves, on the other (for the original texts see Appendix 4. (a)). The first of these translations (text 14A) from the (Al-Anba’ 6\11\1989):

TEXT 14A:

I Title: (Headline)

Crisis disturbs the calm atmosphere of the American-Israeli friendship

II Lead:

(MP 1)(Paragraph 1):

Israel and America are best friends, in principle. But it ought to be noticed, even for the staunchest supporters of their alliance, that this alliance has seen better times than nowadays. (What)

(Episode 1) (paragraph 2):

It is known that Shamir the head of the Israeli government will visit America in mid November, but President Bush’s advisers hinted he will be too busy, and thus he will not be able to invite him for a chat.

III Orientation: (paragraph 3)

1- We have to notice here that the smallest clerk in the State department knows why Washington adopted this unfriendly position.
2-It is known that Shamir did not accept explicitly until now Baker’s plan to move forward Israeli-Palestinians peace talks, a matter that can possibly explain Baker’s annoyance.

IV Evaluation and Background: (paragraph 4)

However, the Americans say suddenly that they are in disagreement with Israel over other issues as well.

V Further Evaluation:

(Episode 2) (paragraph 5):

It seems that one other reason is related to arms supplies. Until recent times, America seemed in a defensive stance over an intended deal with Saudi Arabia...

VI Further Development:

(Episode 3)(paragraph 6):

But Israel had to adopt similar stance last week, when the NBC television announced it had discovered that Israel was helping South Africa in building a ballistic missile in exchange for enriched uranium.

(Episode 4)(paragraph 7):

But the Israeli minister of defence Yitzhak Rabin described this story, which relies on a report from the CIA, as baseless. However, Mr. Bush showed more caution about this feud, and said that if true, this story will further complicate the relations with Israel.

VII Annotational Backdrop:

(Episode 5) (paragraph 8):

It is worthy of mentioning that the United States used to close its eyes in all past years, when the matter relates to Israeli nuclear matter, just as the possession of nuclear arms by Israel never stopped successive American administrations from strengthening its military cooperation with the Jewish state. Therefore, many Israeli politicians look at the present disagreement between the two sides with an eye of suspicion, and they say that the Americans have taken the nuclear "bogey" out of the box with the main aim of pushing the Israelis into talks with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

VIII Argumentation:

(MP 2) (Paragraph 9):
But it seems that these Israeli suspicions are mistaken this time. Because it is believed that the defence department leaked the story of the cooperation between Israel and South Africa to block the controversial selling of two advanced computers.

Further evidence:

(for why Israeli politicians were mistaken) (paragraph 10):

At the same time the State department was angry with Israel’s stance in relation to the Palestinians, but it had preferred the selling and that it most probably was not the side that had leaked the information.

(MP 3) (paragraph 11):

Whatever the issue was, there is no doubt that this feud shows how it is possible for any administration, that loses patience with Israel, to influence public opinion in Washington.

IX Consequence:

(Episode 6) (Paragraph 12):

Therefore, in the last few weeks, many of 95 senators, who have supported Shamir’s offer of election for the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip have about the seriousness and the credibility of Shamir’s offer.

(MP 4) (paragraph 13):

It is clear that Shamir can at once dispel their doubts by accepting Baker’s plan of five points, but this will not happen without sacrificing with a principle dear to his heart which is Israel’s “right” not to talk to any Palestinian with connection to the liberation organization.

(MP 5) (paragraph 14):

Therefore, Shamir might be asked to stay for more than one month in Cincinnati to change his position

(America is having many crises with Israel at the moment)

As seen from the above schema, the text of ‘Al-Anba’ is a leading editorial article of a narrative nature. It occupies the right bottom corner of a page that contains other articles related to different issues of world politics, which indicates that it is not of uppermost importance in the editorial page (see Appendix).

It consists of smaller paragraphs, shorter sentences, and is not supported by any press photos. It contains short sentences containing action verbs together with a simplified grammar at the expense of the logical links between them, increasing, thus, the tempo of the narrative reading of the text. The text also lacks detailed information,
and includes adjectives and phrasal descriptions that aim at making the story more interesting and exciting.

It consists of listing different recent episodes of disagreement between Israel and America. Emphasis was put more on listing the points of disagreement between America and Israel than on analysis of the nature of these disagreements. The disagreement includes all levels of government including the senate and indicates that the Americans are losing patience with Israel. The idea of further possible rifts is being constantly consolidated.

These disagreements (‘crises’ in the words of the translator) form the main theme of the article. The title was designed to make this theme more relevant and to narrow down the perspective for further reading of the article. In a sense the title induces the reader to read into, and not only from what follows. Every episode will be considered in terms of its implication for the theme. ‘Moving forward talks’, the core news item of the article, is just one episode of the fall out.

Our second translation of the same original text (Text 14B) is from another Kuwaiti Daily (Arra’iu Al-9aam 6\1\1\1989). For this translation, we propose the following approximate conceptual schema based on rough back translation:

**TEXT 14B**

I Title: (Headline)

**Israeli-American relations pass through a stage of tension and Bush will not invite Shamir to meet with him.**

II Orientation:

(MP 1)(Paragraph 1):

In principle they are still faithful friends, inspite of that even the most steadfast backers of this distinctive relationship between the Israelis and the Americans admit that this alliance between Washington and "occupied" Jerusalem that it was better in the past..

(MP 2) Evidence 1:

Considering that, the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir will head towards Washington on pre-planned visit with the aim of delivering a speech to the American Jews gathering in the city of Cincinnati and then meet with president Bush in Washington but president
Bush's advisers hint now that Bush will be too busy to invite Shamir to Washington for chit-chatting with him.

II Evaluation:

(MP 3)

In reality every employee in the State Department, no matter how low his position is, knows very well the meaning of this strain that characterizes the formal relations between Israel and the United States.

Cause 1:

What happened is that Shamir did not accept and with no equivocation (frankness) the foreign minister James Baker's plan of five points which relates to the manner in which to organize the Israeli-Palestinian talks, the matter that angered Baker and he is right in being so.

Cause 2:

But in fact it was only a matter of pure coincidence that the Americans insist in repeating that they are angry with Israel regarding many other issues too.

III Further Evaluation:

(Paragraph 2) Cause 3:

Perhaps the most prominent among these reasons that relates to issues of armament... For it is only before very recent times the American side was taking a defensive stance concerning the sale of 315 tanks of the very sophisticated Abrams type. And during the last few days, it was Israel's turn to receive criticism and attack. Due to the fact that the well known American television network NBC has claimed that it has uncovered very dangerous facts about Israel's involvement in helping the South African racist regime in making a medium range missile. In return for Israel's obtaining a sufficient supply of enriched uranium.

III Argumentation:

Although Yitzhak Rabin was quick to deny the allegations in the television report under the pretext that it is not based on sufficient evidence, however the NBC, emphasized the fact that it has irrefutable evidence to authenticate its report.

IV Further Evaluation:

(paragraph 3) Evidence 2:

And from his side, president Bush was deliberately cautious in his reaction when saying that this issue in particular would expose the American-Israeli relations to enormous complications if enough evidence were to appear about the Israeli involvement.
V Argumentation:
Comment on evidence 2:

In reality of what in what relates to Israeli nuclear capabilities, the American administration was used to intentionally close its eyes about what was going on and the fact that Israel had obtained a strong nuclear arsenal did not stop the previous American administrations from dealing with this issue in a manner satisfactory to the Israelis just as it did not stop strengthening military ties with her.

VI Counter argumentation:
Possible Cause:

Considering this, it is the case that many of the Israeli politicians estimate the new American position as unusual and as a source of concern and anxiety. Meanwhile, some others say that the digging out of this issue on the part of the Americans was aiming in the first place at exerting American pressures on Israel.

VII Refutation and Conclusion:
(paragraph 4) Refutation:

But the Israeli misgivings seem misguided.

Conclusion 1:

It is believed that the leak of the information to the newspapers about the Israeli-racist cooperation occurred to block a deal according to which Israel would get highly developed computer systems.

VIII Conclusion 2:

In addition this confrontation with the Israelis shows the effect of America’s impatience with Israel and its influence on the political climate in Washington.

IX Evidence of conclusion 2:

and in the last few weeks, many of the members of the senate who wrote to Baker in the past supporting Shamir’s plan started questioning the reliability of the head of the Israeli government as well as the credibility of his offer.

X Final conclusion:

It could be that Shamir can dispel these doubts in one stroke by accepting Baker’s five points. But this will not happen without sacrificing a principle dear to him that of
refusing to talk to the Palestine Liberation organization. Making Shamir budge from his refusing stance perhaps needs more effort and indirect pressure similar to not inviting him to Washington.

(America is moving in the right direction but needs to do more to change Israel’s attitude)

Unlike the Al-Anba’ article, this one does not include a lead, has a relatively longer title, and consists only of four long paragraphs, a possible indication that it is more of an analytic editorial than news report editorial. It also has a press photograph on the top showing president Bush in an irritated mood (see Appendix 4. (b)).

Similar to the Al-Anba’ text, it is also a leading editorial type. However, as can be seen from its position in the upper right corner of the page, from the accompanying press-photo, and the double-lined title, it was given more importance. The editorial page that includes the article was reserved only to other articles related to the same topic (Israeli-Palestinian conflict), which perhaps, even indirectly, lends support to its content by making it more relevant to local issues and thus also more relevant to the Arabic reader.

The translator seemingly took the original article as analytical and has accentuated part of the original by analyzing the possible causes of the ‘tension’ between America and Israel and rendering them by detailed translations supported by qualifying terms, something missing in the first article. The text is also more elaborate in presenting logical relations among utterances using long analytical and argumentative statements of cause-consequence type. It assumes the reader to be aware of a great deal of background knowledge, and sometimes it provides that background knowledge to ensure maximum understanding.

It contained more detailed information (‘NBC the well known American T. V. Network’; ‘the very sophisticated Abrams type’ etc.) and used more evaluative terms (Racist South Africa; Israeli-Racist cooperation. The title as well as the use of these terms helps in preparing the reader for the article’s conclusion of an American administration that is determined to make Israel bow to its pressures.

The third article (Text 14C) is from the Kuwaiti daily (Al-Qabas 6\11\1989). This article was placed in a page called ‘issues of this world’ (Appendix 4. (c). The
possible conceptual schema, according to our understanding, looks approximately something like the following:

TEXT 14C

I Title: (one column heading)

Why did the C.I.A throw open the militaristic cooperation between Israel and South Africa?

II Orientation:

(MP 1) (new paragraph: 1):

In principle, the United States and Israel are best of friends. However Israel’s supporters ought to admit that the alliance between Israel and the United States witnesses difficult times.

(Evidence 1):

because the prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir plans to visit Washington in the middle of the current month of November, to deliver a speech in front of a gathering of some American Jews in the state of "Cincinnati". And some of The American president’s advisers hinted that Bush would perhaps be too busy so that he will not be able to invite Shamir to the White House to conduct talks with him.

III Evaluation:

Evaluation of MP 1 (cause) (new paragraph: 2):

Any small employee in the State Department would realize exactly the reason behind this unfriendly attitude: that Shamir did not accept clearly the five-points plan that was suggested by James Baker and relates to holding Palestinian-Israeli talks.

Consequence of Evaluation:

Baker feels anger that is justified. But it is only a mere coincidence.

Evidence for Consequence:

For the Americans have never stopped expressing their discontent with Israel for many other reasons as well.
IV Orientation:

Orientation on evidence 2 (new paragraph: 3):

One of those many reasons relates to arms supplies. For it until it recently seemed defensive because of Washington's determination to sell the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia three hundred and fifteen tanks of the "Abrams" type.

(MP 2):

But it is now the turn of the Israelis to be placed in the corner.

(Cause MP 2):

Because the television station "NBC" has claimed to have discovered that Israel was helping South Africa in constructing a ballistic missile, in return for certain quantity of enriched uranium.

Complications:

The Israeli minister of defense Yitzhak Rabin, described this news which is based on documents from the American Central Agency as "not having any basis in truth at all".

But president Bush was more cautious, in saying that this news only, would "complicate" the relations with Israel if it will be found to be true.

VI Evaluation:

(Evaluation Of MP 2) (new paragraph: 4):

In what relates to the Israeli nuclear issues, the United States had always kept her eyes closed for many years. And the possession by Israel of a huge nuclear arsenal did not stop the successive American administrations from strengthening the military cooperation with the Jewish state.

(Possible Consequence in the form of counter argument):

And consequently, many of the Israeli politicians look at the current crises with more suspicion. And say that the Americans leaked the news of nuclear arms and the scandal of (South Africa) in a major manner, in the hope of pushing Israel to conduct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

VII Argumentation:

(Refutation of counter argument) (new paragraph: 5):

But it seems that the Israeli suspicion, this time mistaken. That is because it is believed that the leak of the news of the military cooperation between Israel and South Africa was done by the Defence Department, in order to block the sale of two of the advanced computer systems, and highly controversial to Israel.

VII Evaluation of Argumentation:
While the State Department feels angry because of the Israeli stance from the Palestinians, it has already supported the sale of these systems to Israel, perhaps it could not do much about the leak of that information.

Consequence of MP 3):

Despite that, this dispute illustrates how easy it is for any American administration to influence the public opinion in Washington if it loses patience with Israel.

VIII Orientation:

(Orientation of MP 3) (New paragraph: 6):

And in the last few weeks, many of the ninety-five members of congress, who declared their support last May, for Shamir's proposal to hold elections in occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, started questioning the credibility of this offer. Shamir could dispel their misgivings with one brilliant move, by accepting James Baker's plan of five points.

(Evaluation):

But he could not do that without sacrificing a principle dear to his heart: the right of Israel not to talk to any Palestinian who has connection with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. And perhaps the matter requires more than one month only in "Cincinnati" to change his stance.

(Defence Department leaked the story to block sales of computers to Israel. At the same time the State Department is angry with Israel over talks with the Palestinians).

The article was presented as a one column article in an unfavourable far left corner of the page where it vertically extends from the top to the end of the page. It is placed next to a half-page editorial article by French prime minister Jacques Chirac. By contrast, Chirac's editorial has a the huge headline that constitutes the centre of gravity of attention in the page. The page also contains two other articles, one by Daniel Ortega about the Contras in Nicaragua; the other is about changes in the leadership of the East German Communist party, a further indication that the article was treated as concerning an international issue, that is less related to the main issue in the Arabic press, the Middle East conflict.

A medium sized, solid font column head in the form of a question was placed on top of the column implying that the answer to the question is its central theme. A larger size press photograph, usually placed on top of the article when placed in a
less favourable position in the page, shows Shamir in a very wary mood, as if accused of some grave misconduct (see Appendix).

The column consists of six vertical paragraphs, uses longer analytical sentences and provides more detailed background information than the first. The parts relating to the involvement of the C.I.A. are treated with special emphasis. For example, the translation of the modifier ‘only’ at the end of the third paragraph of the original, in the sentence ‘He [Bush] said only that the story would “complicate” relations with Israel....’ was translated as modifying not what Bush has said, but as if modifying the word ‘story’; rendering, thus, the curious translation ‘But president Bush was more cautious, in saying that this (story) news only, would “complicate” the relations with Israel if it will be found to be true’. Such an example illustrates how the global meaning of the text can affect the way its parts are understood and how such understanding appears in translation. The global meaning is usually obvious from the way the title guides the reader to the relevant meaning.

From the above three examples of possible different translations of the same text, we can draw some interesting and important conclusions for explaining what constitutes the understanding of texts, and how that understanding affects their translations.

First, that the understanding of text involves understanding of linguistic forms only perhaps on a prima facie level; real understanding concerns forming a mental representation of the global content of the whole text as an utterance. This mental representation is to a certain extent unique to the translator. This is perhaps due to the way the translator intones the text when reading it for the purpose of translation. In this case we can say that different translators have had the same linguistic access to the text, but different para-linguistic and evaluative readings of the text.2

It is also evident from the different translations that the translators have read differently not only from the text, but also in the text. It is perhaps the case that reading into the meaning of the text takes place not on the level of what is linguistically and explicitly mentioned, but on the level of what the translator thinks to be the implied meaning i.e., not the reiterative but the creative part.

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2In many other articles that we have come across, and that have been translated more than once, we could not find two translations that are totally similar. Similar translations were a common factor to all of them.
Changes of the titles are also indicative of the attitude of the different translators towards the original text; since they also cohere with the content of the article as reflected by the choices of the way the original content is treated and the evaluative choices in the rendering of the different terms. One can notice, for example, the extra emphasis placed by the translator of text 14A on the question of the difficulties of relations between America and Israel as represented by the words: (Or. skeleton) 'bogey', (Or. take sceptical views) 'eye of suspicion', (Or. current flap) 'disagreement', and how in turn that coheres with its title, whereas, in the second article, where the issue is understood as a case of unexpected tension (text 14B), there is no mention of a 'bogey' but of (Or. skeleton) 'digging out of an [old] issue', (Or. take sceptical views) 'concern and anxiety', (Or. current flap) 'the on-going dispute', and the title was 'The Israeli-American relations pass through a stage of tension and Bush will not invite Shamir to meet with him'. In the third text these terms were translated respectively as (Or. dragged the skeleton) 'leaked the news', (Or. take sceptical views) 'with more suspicion', (Or. current flap) 'current crisis'; and the title was 'Why did the CIA reveal the case of military co-operation between Israel and South Africa?'.

The coherence between the selected title and the way each of these expressions is translated could perhaps throw more light on what we mean by the tonality of consciousness. The tonality does not add to the semantic content of the original, but intervenes with the semi-intonational articulation of that original. The choice of vocabulary and style of presentation reflects directly the attitude of the writer towards the topic; it also reflects indirectly the ideological attitude of the culture towards the topic.

Second, in translation, what gets modified or changed is the utterance as a whole; utterances as representative of larger units of meanings rather than single words. The absence of a single word from an utterance does not preclude the total translatability of the utterance. Therefore, it is highly conceivable that whole utterances out-weigh single words as candidates for being units of translation.

Third, different ways exist for saying the same thing in a given language by different linguistic means. For example, while all the texts, more or less, conveyed the same content, they have done so in surprisingly dissimilar ways and from different
perspectives. It also shows that the distinctions people make in meaning are dialogically related to the purpose of communication and according to a particular perspective in the particular text, and not according to any objective criteria. The following is an English expression and the way they have been rendered in Arabic by three different expressions, one example of many:

(BT. blinked her eyes)

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Text A) (تفمض عينيها)

---

Text B) (غلق عينيها)

---

Text C) (ابقت عينيهامغلقتان)

(BT. kept her eyes to remain closed)

In this example, it is obvious that the three translators were trying to adhere as much as possible to the form of the original, yet they rendered the expression in three different ways in Arabic. This so because if the original form was totally over-looked, then a possible and perhaps more stylistic equivalent form can be found in the Arabic idiomatic expression (يغض الطرف) which means approximately ‘to pretend not to notice’. However, there are also many ways of saying ‘turn a blind eye’ in English such as: ‘to condone’; ‘to be indifferent; unconcerned; unheeding’, to mention just a few.

Therefore we can say that equivalence between the original and the translation can only be a matter of degree and ought to be related to the particular dialogic understanding of the original. A translation can be equal to the original only in certain respects that the translator judges to be more relevant to the purpose of translation.

Lotman (1990) noticed that logical corollary of the equivalence hypothesis (as presented by linguistics and semiotics), and if understood in a narrow sense as standing between units of language or given text, is the acceptance of the possibility of back-translation. This concept of equivalence ought also to be transitive, that is if equivalence exists between A and B then the replacement of A by B and B by C
ought also to result in C given A. This is even more true if it is accepted that equivalence is a two-way relationship between elements of the two languages.

Fourthly, equivalence cannot always be that of function, since the original and the translation may perform different communicative functions in the two cultures. In the case of the articles above, the translated texts, even if chosen because of their ideological suitability to the Arabic readers, nonetheless perform a communicative and ideological function that is different from the original’s. They, as translations from Western prestigious dailies, are used for enforcing the ideological views of that area, that the American policy might at the end turn in favour of the Arabic side of the conflict.

There is perhaps an analogy between the way a text used (original text) and a single word in language in that both can be used by different speakers to communicate different perspectives.

Fifthly, another look at these translated articles would confirm Popović’s (1976) claim that in all of any different translations of the same text there is always a constant invariant core that is common to all of them. One can say that despite the differences among these translations there is a minimal common similarity among them.

The fact that there are non-planned agreements in translating certain articles by many newspapers, and that translation takes place from certain languages more than others leaves open the question whether the answerability of the individual is also linked to the answerability of the community; whether the principle of ‘Relevance’ can apply not only to individuals in communicative situations but also to communities on the level of society and culture.

Finally, we would also like to reiterate a distinction we made earlier between ‘dialogical translation’ which is by necessity partly projective, (that is a translation in which the subject (translator) inevitably projects some of his own understanding, or his culture’s conceptions into the translation), and ‘monological translation’, in which dialogism is reduced by the nature of the substance of translation, the fixed perceptivity of the meaning of the original which makes them viable to reproduction and de-contextualization as, for example, in scientific texts. This type of translation is exposed to the possible normative standardisation of terms as well as permissible
structures. In this type of translation, translation manuals (dictionaries) play an important rôle in guiding the translation. It also happens that translation is rendered monological if the meanings of the original are reduced to ‘reified significations’ through normative intervention.

However, dictionaries do not play an equally important rôle in dialogic translation. The rôle the dictionary plays in dialogic translation also places constraint on the creative side of translation. The dictionary is a tool that extends our ability but limits our choices. However, the difference between the two types of translation is never absolute.

8.4. Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis has been to explore the potentiality of Bakhń’s ‘dialogic principle’ in explaining translatability and translation. It was shown that the different levels of dialogism can offer an over-arching explanation that reveals a great deal about translation as a history, a process, as well as a product. By establishing dialogue with the different approaches of meaning and translation we tried to show that translation can be dilemmatic if looked at from any reductionist point of view, or by methods of binary logic of excluded opposition either/or, which forces a solution to translation of making choices between an original and a translation. Dialogism makes it possible to avoid choosing between such options by adopting a non-restrictive logic of both/and. Translation, as a communicative act of indeterministic nature, and as an operation of divided loyalty may not be tilted towards one position or another, but may be dialogically and contextually negotiated between the two. Translation is not equal to the original in all respects but must resemble its original in some respects.

We also tried to make clear that translation can not be seen as a matter of equivalence, either of meaning or function. The first is as illusory as translation itself, the second involves inter-textual relationships beyond the single translated text. Nor can translation be a purely subjective undertaking.

It was argued that translation is best seen as a dialogic communication that transgresses linguistic boundaries. This act of communication involves certain inter-
textual relationships that operate on social and ideological levels that go beyond the subject translator. Translation is not purely subjective nor purely objective, but can only be inter-subjective.

Corollary to this conclusion is the assumption that translation can perhaps be a science, but not of a mathematical or natural kind. Translation can best be approached by methods of human sciences that take the text as a voice as its unit, and aim at deepening understanding of translation rather than formalising it. The knowledge involved in translation is profoundly dialogical.

Lastly, we would like to emphasise the fact that in this thesis we are not aiming at saying the final word on translation. Translation is likely to remain a subject of controversy for a very long time to come. However, we would assume that translation studies may greatly benefit from investigation of inter-subjective processes through which a social language becomes individual. In order to understand translation, we need to understand more about how different subjects appropriate and inter-textualize each other, what methods they use to polyphonically speak through the same utterances. Further studies are also needed for the contextual interpretation of texts, texts as utterances and not as linguistic units. In doing this we may arrive at characterising the processes through which meaning is negotiated, and then rendered as translation. Cross-cultural investigation of these processes might also be beneficial.
References


---Hegel’s Historicism. ibid. pp. 270-300.


---The Outer Word and Inner Speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language. In


Appendix

1) (a). The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1992:
1. (b) *The Sun*, January 6, 1992:
Muslims dismiss threats to defy law

Leaders of the Muslim community in Scotland were last night dismissing the threats issued by the head of the so-called Muslim parliament, which was set up in the wake of the murder of Muroid Siddiqui.

Dr. Kamin Siddiqui had warned that the two million-strong Islamic community in Britain would break the law if the Government goes on discriminating against it.

A number of moderate Muslims throughout the UK have dismissed themselves from his comments and, in a BBC radio interview yesterday, Home Office Minister Angela Rumbold said of the new organisation: "They may have very good motives in terms of wishing to be a forum but they cannot set themselves up as being totally representative of the Muslims in this country.

"The most legitimate way for people who wish to be representative in this country in the legislature is for them to be elected to the Westminster Parliament."

Dr. Siddiqui's remarks were made with derision by Muslim spokesman in Scotland, who said they were unaware of any Scottish representatives on the self-appointed parliament.

Dr. Kamin Siddiqui, chairman of Strathclyde Community Relations, which described Dr. Siddiqui as a sensationalist, adding: "This man has no real support among Muslims.

Dr. Siddiqui was one of the few fierce and outspoken supporters of the death sentence against Yousaf Roshdie.

There were calls for him to be prosecuted for incitement to murder in a speech at Manchester University.

Mr. Naan, who also attended the conference, estimated that qualified teachers could give the necessary instruction in three hours each week, compared with five and 12 hours at a mosque.

However, both men accepted that changes could not happen overnight, and emphasized that Muslims wanted to remain firmly within mainstream education.

Councillor Walter MacEwan, chairman of Strathclyde region's race relations advisory group and a speaker at Saturday's event, said the council was fully prepared to look at any changes recommended by the Muslim community.

He pointed out, however, that financial restrictions and limitations on the school curriculum meant that new developments could not be easily achieved.

Leader's comment. Page 8

Dr. Kamin Siddiqui

The event, organised jointly by the Muslim Action Council for Scotland and the World Islamic Mission, attracted around 300 pupils, aged eight to 18, from many parts of the country, including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Stirling, and Dundee.

Conference convener Mr. Yousaf Naan said a clear priority was for local authorities to provide Islamic religious instruction within both primary and secondary schools - either as part of the main curriculum, or in classes after school.

Mr. Naan said that, under the present system, Muslim children had to learn the teachings of their faith, and read the Koran, in "bilingual" conditions at a local mosque, which meant much less time enjoyed by their peers.

New teachers employed by the state could provide a higher quality of religious instruction in far less time.

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Leader's comment. Page 8

Measuring up: Thomas Gunn, left, and Pamela Wishart demonstrate their skills.

Woman finds bearings in compass world

A young woman is helping to keep an ancient navigation skill alive by breaking with tradition.

Despite huge technological advances, the magnetic compass is still a vital navigational aid for shipping and an 18-year-old Pamela Wishart is now in the second year of an apprenticeship which could enable her to become a qualified compass adjuster.

"Women at sea are traditionally regarded as bad luck, particularly in the mining community," said her employer, Mr. Thomas Gunn, "but we are trying to change that."

Miss Wishart came to Mr. Gunn's Aberdeen company for a school holiday job when a sea cadet. She enjoyed it so much and made such an impression that she was offered the apprenticeship.

After serving her time, she will have to go to marine college to pass her master mariner's ticket so she can travel the world adjusting compasses as Mr. Gunn has done.

He served his time with a company on the Tore and has adjusted compasses on nuclear submarines, aircrafts, tanks, power boats and the back of a superyacht.

Surprisingly, magnetic compasses are still at the heart of most sophisticated automatic pilot systems and are essential on even the most modern vessels, not least to provide back-up in case the electronic equipment fails.

Thomas Gunn Navigation

Battle for support of

Tory and Labour were at odds yesterday over the housing market, each claiming the other's policies were disastrous for home owners.

Environment Secretary Michael Heseltine said a Labour government would have a calamitous effect, pointing to a new top rate of mortgage tax, announced by the Opposition for people earning well over £40,000 a year.

"The new top rate of tax would send the housing market into a nosedive," Mr. Heseltine said in an interview in the Sunday Times. "Around one in 10 mortgagees are held by those with top-tax incomes. They would lose something like one third of their disposable income.

"No ideas could forecast how many would be forced to sell their homes, but the potential effect on the housing market would be calamitous."

This was just one example of the Labour's disastrous consequences of a Labour Government."

Shadow Home Secretary Bryn Michael faced the Government on the housing front. The party's leader, Mr. Heseltine, said: "The idea that interest rates would affect people's lives is a load of old nonsense, an L.B. council tax bill瞻有。
A case of friendly fallout

IN PRINCIPLE they are still the best of friends. But even as late have to admit that the alliance between Israel and America has seen better times. In mid-November, in a prime minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, plans to visit America to give a speech to a Jewish audience in Cincinnati. President

Shamir and Bush frowning, not waving

Bush's advisers have hinted that he may be too busy just then to invite Mr Shamir to pop into Washington for a chat.

Every filing clerk in the State Department knows exactly what this unfriendliness is all about. Mr Shamir has not clearly accepted Mr James Baker's five-point plan on how to get Israeli-Palestinian peace talks under way, and Mr Baker is understandably cross. But it is the merest coincidence, the Americans keep saying, that they are suddenly cross with Israel for a whole lot of other reasons as well.

One such reason has to do with arms supplies. Until very recently the American side was sounding defensive over a planned sale of 315 Abrams tanks to Saudi Arabia. During the past week it has been Israel's turn to be put on the spot. NBC television claims to have discovered that Israel has been helping South Africa to build a ballistic missile, in return for supplies of enriched uranium. Mr Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli defence minister, calls the story, which is said to be based on a document from the Central Intelligence Agency, "totally baseless." Mr Bush was more circumspect. He said only that the story would "complicate" relations with Israel if it turned out to be true.

Where Israeli nuclear matters are concerned, the United States has for many years been an accomplished turner of the blind eye. Israel's possession of a large atomic arsenal has not stopped successive administrations from strengthening military collaboration with the Jewish state. Many Israeli politicians therefore take a sceptical view of the current flap. The Americans, they say, have dragged the nuclear (and South African) skeleton out of the closet mainly in the hope of rattle Israel into talking to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation.

This time, the Israeli sceptics appear to be wrong. The missiles-to-South Africa story is thought to have been leaked by the Defence Department, in order to block a controversial sale of two supercomputers to Israel. The State Department, while angry about Israel's stance on the Palestinians, happened to be in favour of selling the computers, so probably had nothing to do with the leak. Even so, the quarrel shows how easily an administration that loses patience with Israel can influence the climate of opinion in Washington.

In recent weeks, many of the 95 senators who declared last May that they supported Mr Shamir's offer of elections in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza have begun to ask how honestly the offer was made. Mr Shamir could dispel their doubts at a stroke by accepting America's five-point plan, but not without sacrificing a principle dear to his heart: Israel's right not to talk to any Palestinians connected with the PLO. It may take more than a lonely November in Cincinnati to turn him round.
Israel and America

Yitzhak Houdini

AT LEAST the meeting happened, which was a consolation. But facing the White House photographers alongside the American president is not the joy it used to be for visiting Israeli prime ministers. Right now, Mr Shamir is displeased with Mr Yitzhak Houdini. Behind the usual civilities, he used their meeting on November 15th to make his displeasure known.

On November 15th was the anniversary of the somewhat whimsical declaration of independence the Palestine Liberation Organisation issued from Algiers a year ago. The birthday was marked by sweeping curfews in the still-Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza. Mr Bush would like to show the world that he is doing something for the Palestinians; Mr Shamir is standing in his way.

To push him aside, America's secretary of state, Mr James Baker, has invented a five-point peace plan, the only significant point of which is to get some Israelis and Palestinians talking to each other in Cairo. Israel's cabinet has accepted it (for least to get Mr Shamir his invitation to the White House) but seeks "assurances" from the Americans. In particular, Mr Shamir will not allow even a whiff of Israeli presence in the proposed talks and wants to keep Israeli withdrawal or Palestinian independence off the agenda.

The American hope in all this is to simplify matters by asking both Israel and Egypt to forget about assurances and counter-assurances and say merely that they accept Mr Baker's plan. Then Mr Baker could organise a three-way chat in which America and Egypt cajole Israel into turning the necessary blind eye to the PLO's inevitable if shadowy influence on any Israeli-Palestinian meeting.

Such a meeting might lead on to the Palestinian election Israel has suggested holding in the occupied territories.

Will this American stratagem work? Mr Shamir seldom wifs when the United States turns on the heat. On the eve of his visit he deplored American policy by approving a new Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip. He has to weigh Mr Bush's views against the fury of Greater Israel if he opens the door to a negotiation—no matter how indirect—between Israel and the PLO. But if he makes no concessions at all, he will face the usual threat from his Likud party's Labour partners (fortified this week by a defiant showing in elections for the Haifa trade-union federation) to leave the coalition government and fight an election.

It looks as if he is trapped. But Mr Shamir is a curious mixture of Hamlet and Houdini. When he is overseas he resists the international clamour for territorial compromise by pointing to the Likud party hardliners who now sit his right arm in cabinet. Back in Israel he justifies dabbling with assorted peace plans by pointing to the pressure he is under from the United States. So far he has given each side just enough to prevent a catastrophe (sanctions from the United States or the collapse of his government), and just too little to allow serious peace moves (negotiations with Palestinians or West Bank elections). In the meantime, the occupation continues.

Jordan

A better way

FROM OUR ISLAM CORRESPONDENT

STRIVING to solve one problem, King Hussein has created another. Just possibly, he may also have stumbled upon a democratic way of dealing with the challenge of militant Islam.

By holding his country's first general election in 22 years on November 8th, King Hussein hoped to release some of the pressure for change stoked up by corruption and a failing economy. He did not expect to establish the Islamic fundamentalists as the largest single opposition group in parliament, which is what happened. The well-organised Muslim Brotherhood won 20 out of 80 parliamentary seats, independent Islamic candidates 14 more.

More Jordanian fundamentalists advocate the imposition of sharia law; some want to eliminate Israel by force. They may embarrass the king, who is a noted moderate on the Arab-Israeli issue, but they are unlikely to change his foreign policies. Islamic militants and left-wingers (who also did well in the election) outnumber pro-government members two to one, but parliament itself has little real power. The king is the centre of authority and can dismiss a government that causes trouble.

That does not mean the presence of the militants is unimportant; holding a free and honest election has drawn the fundamentalists into democratic political parties, and now more dangerously on the outside. Or regimes facing an Islamic challenge mean most of the dictators, states and tribal bosses who rule Muslim world) are watching carefully. These regimes have tended to deal with militant Islam in two ways. The first is to suppress the militants—with great loss in Syria and Iraq, more subtly in Algeria. The second, often combined with the first, is to "outbid" them by promoting Islam, introducing sharia law, building mosques, encouraging Islamic programming on television (an example is the Islamic programme introduced in Pakistan by late President Zia ul Haq). Neither approach has worked. Better, perhaps, than dealings with democracy.

Democracy also ties down the kind of free elections, which has allowed Islamic militants to acquire legitimacy. Mr Bush, for example, would probably first try to "outbid" them by promoting Islam, introducing sharia law, building mosques, encouraging Islamic programming on television (an example is the Islamic programme introduced in Pakistan by late President Zia ul Haq). Neither approach has worked. Better, perhaps, than dealings with democracy.

Political parties have been banned in Jordan since 1957. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, had been allowed to function for many years as a "sociopolitical movement", which gave it a built-in enourage over candidates standing without the help of any party organisation. This is why King Hussein may be obliged to legalise political parties—even if some of them will be no friends of the monarchy.

Hashemite kingdom of contrasts

INTERNATIONAL

2. (b) The Economist, November, 18, 1989:

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 18 1989
لا نسمح بأن تختار سوريا رئيساً للجمهورية

الآن،召开会议在巴勒斯坦的主导下

الامة في بيانه الاتهام، أن تأم من النشاطات الاستعمارية في لبنان، وتضع قوة الحاجة إلى الเพิ่มเติม

]]>
واجهة نظر معادية للعرب
لأعيان دولية عربية

مجلة: جويل جمتن، رئيس مكتب إسرائيل للصحافة
المجلة: الوفد
العنوان: وجهة نظر معادية للعرب

هذه المقالة تظهر مدى التطرف والعدوانية للصحف العربيين. في مقالة نشرته مجلة الوفد، يظهر الرأي المعادي للعرب من قبل المذيع الشهير جويل جمتن. يشتمل المقال على تهميش وانسياد عن العرب، ويشدد على الحاجة إلى إفراز جيش جديد من العرب. يشير المقال إلى أن العرب لا يمكنهم التغيير أو التطور، وأنهم يمثلون خطراً على الأمن القومي الإسرائيلي. ينصح المقال بإنشاء جيش جديد من العرب لتعزيز الأمن والدفاع الإسرائيلي.

يرتبط هذا المقال بمشكلة 큰 من الهويات، حيث تواجه العرب، كمجتمع، تحديات وتحديات كبيرة. يعبر المقال عن رغبة في إقامة جيش جديد من العرب، ويرتبط ذلك بشكل مباشر بال الإنسانية والعدالة. يشير المقال إلى أن العرب لا يمكنهم التغيير أو التطور، وأنهم يمثلون خطراً على الأمن القومي الإسرائيلي. ينصح المقال بإنشاء جيش جديد من العرب لتعزيز الأمن والدفاع الإسرائيلي.
مصائب تعتصرض أجواء الصداقة الأمريكية الإسرائيلية

لا تزال الإسرائيلي والولايات المتحدة من أفضل الصداقة ناحية المدا، لكن يتنين
حتى بالنسبة لأحد موسيدي التحالف بينها الاعتراف بأن ذلك التحالف شهد نظارات
أفضل بها هو عليها الآن.

في المعروف أن رئيس الحكومة الإسرائيلية استحباشام يتمز القلم بزيادة
لهمكا في واسط توفر للإلكترونيات، فإن براميد، وإن استشاري
الرئيس يشير المعا إلى أن الرئيس قد يكون في ذلك الكون، بحال بالي حيث أن يتمكن
من دواء شمل واسع الأنباء، إلى جانب الطريق مع السياينة، بعكس

ويتمنى أن يتولى هذا المحسن
ايمار سابا، للائقة وواضح، شمل
هذا القلم في واسط توفر للإلكترونيات، وإن استشاري
الرئيس يشير المعا إلى أن الرئيس قد يكون في ذلك الكون، بحال بالي حيث أن يتمكن
من دواء شمل واسع الأنباء، إلى جانب الطريق مع السياينة، بعكس

لا يزال العلاقات المتزاما لسنوات، في حالة حادثة العاطفة، ولكن
الناطقين بالعربية، وأمر بأي تجربة، ألم بشكل مناسب.

وقد كان الأمر، لا شك أن هذا
النبرة يظهر كيف تستطيع آلية الإدارة
تتعدد صورها مع إسرائيل، أكثر
على مناخ الأراء وبشكل

في الأساليب القلبية الفنية، بعد
العديد من أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ
50 رجل، كتب إكراء-اًورا
لأي منشأ، من خلال المشاكل
في اللغة العربية، وطاع لزة الفئات
يُشهر بإضافات حزينة وبسيطة.
ذلك العرض الذي فيه شعب.

ونسبيت أن شعب يضطغ
تذيد شكوك عزروا بالإصراد من
بينة للغة الإلخاء الرائحة من
فسفاطين، لكن ذلك لا يوجد
الềuية، وذلك لهذا العجز إلى اللحية
التي يتطلب الإمساك بكم من
مجرد شبر واحد، وسحاء في سبيسيتيا تغيير

موفق.
حوارات عربية حول أحداث العالم وتلاقيها ومستقبلها

الخبر:

فج مفجع يلقي بضعة تطورات جديدة لثورة الهجرة في ليبيا.

نتمنى لكم ليلة سعيدة.

المصادر:

1. الأخبار
2. الرصد
3. الإنترنت

عنوان الأخبار:

صحيفة العالم

اليوم:

2011/11/20

ال зрاعة الأصلية

ال})(

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ال зрاعة الأصلية
العلاقات الأمريكية الإسرائيلية تمر في مرحلة من التوتر ويدعي أن ينصح شامير إلى الالتزام بـ...
لا ما كشفت السي، أيها
عن التحول العسكري بين
إسرائيل وجنوب أفريقيا؟

من حيث المبدأ، مائات الوظائف،
الإسكافي في مختبر إسرائيل.
قد يشير إلى مساحات إسرائيل
التي تشكل بناءً على مقاييس إسرائيل.
وقد يانت على مدى النجاح في إسرائيل.
في الوقت الذي يشترك فيه OpenSSL.
بالنظر إلى أعقاب قرار إسرائيل.
هي سببًا لما يقوم به. 
بدلاً من ذلك، يمكن أن يتكون
في الواقع الخبراء، وتشمل هذه
العملاء مع إسرائيل ما
تهيمن على ما.

فما إذا يشكل ذات النواحي
الإسرائيلية، فقد بدت في ذات
المؤثرات الملموسة، بما في ذلك
الموارد، على مدى النجاح في إسرائيل.
هذا يعني أن السي، أيها
وكذلك يمكن أن يتكون
من التحول العسكري بين
إسرائيل وجنوب أفريقيا؟

وهي أن تكتسب السي، أيها
ملاحظة هذه المرة، إذ يُعتقد أن
تم تطوير أداة التحليل الفني بين
إسرائيل وجورجيا، مما يجعل
هذا النتائج، على مدى النجاح في إسرائيل.
وقد يكون أن السي، أيها
هي أن يتكون، بما في ذلك
المتغيرات، وتشمل هذه
العملاء مع إسرائيل ما
تهيمن على ما.