Rationalism and Romanticism

A Study of

Kant's "Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone" and

Schleiermacher's "Speeches on Religion."

By John Wood Oman.
What Collins called Free-thinking the Germans called Aufklärung. So great was its power that the latter half of the eighteenth century is known as the period of the Aufklärung. The word is sometimes translated Illuminism, Enlightenment would be simpler and more suggestive. A still nearer equivalent, not for the word but for what was intended by it, is Emancipation. Its ideal was an intellect emancipated from all traditional authority, able and willing to test all conclusions, but, like our own word Free thought, it came in practice to indicate a spirit of negation and shallow confidence rather than the spirit of true liberty which all should esteem.

Hart, whose active life exactly covered the period, has a short paper entitled, An Answer to the Question: What is Aufklärung? He defines it as the advance of man from self caused pupilage. Pupilage, he says, is the inability to use our own understandings without another person's guidance, and it is self caused when it is due, not to want of understanding, but to want of resolution and courage to make use of the understanding. The comfort of having our thinking done for us is so great that few care to face the falls by which we must learn to walk alone. But
the motto of Aufklärung is: Have courage to use your own understandings.

In the emancipation of a people, he says, the difficulty is to shun revolution which usually works only a change of outward yoke without reforming men's ways of thinking. The advance, therefore, should be slow, and, to accomplish that, nothing is needed except freedom to use the reason in every direction. The military officer, however, says, "Reason not but die!" the revenue officer, "Reason not but pay!" the parson, "Reason not but believe!" Only one master says, "Reason as much as you will and on what you will, only obey." By this master he means the great Frederick. No more characteristic product of the age of emancipated intellect could have been found, had he not on one point departed from the type. He refused to accept the prevailing enthusiasm for the natural goodness of the German heart, knowing, as he declared, "the cursed breed too well." As it was Frederick's firm determination to allow everyone to save his soul after his own fashion, and, with a gay if not a godly gladness, to suffer fools, every type of thinking enjoyed under his rule the utmost liberty of expression. And Frederick's rule with its motto, "Reason but obey," gave shape as well as scope to the thinking of the time. Its impress is deep on Kant's own thought. The public use of the reason, he argues, must be left entirely free, while the private use of it may have to be subjected to restrictions. That is to say a man should be allowed to publish any opinion which yet, in the discharge of his
civic duty, must speak and act according to his undertaking. An officer writing on military affairs ought to discuss errors, yet, when he is commanded he must not criticise, but hold his tongue and obey. So also with the cleric. As a good citizen he catechises and preaches according to the standard as he undertook to do; as a scholar he is free, nay is bound to discuss defects and errors in the creed and to suggest improvements. A creed is to Kant merely a sort of government protection to the public. As with all other public legislation, the person appointed to carry it out should act in agreement with it so long as it is in force. Yet, just because he is most familiar with it, he is best aware of its deficiencies and is most called upon to suggest improvements.

This is a curiously theoretical temper, and it was characteristic of the whole age. The middle class who provided nearly all the thinkers, had no place in the public life. The crown lands provided the public revenues; the crown officials ruled all the departments of state; the army drew its officers from the aristocracy and its privates from the peasantry. Public duty was a mere commission from the prince, and public spirit could scarcely exist. The upper classes would rather have been citizens of France than of Germany, and the educated middle class were content with nothing short of being citizens of the world. The result was an amazing intellectual activity which was ready to embark...
with theory on any voyage of discovery, unhindered by questions of the practical consequences. The amazing separation between the theoretical and the practical reason which is such a characteristic of the Kantian philosophy, was, therefore, a matter of daily public experience.

In a soil thus prepared by cosmopolitan abstraction, the seed of English Deism which had fallen so lifeless into the active practical and political interests of our own country, was sown and brought forth abundantly. English books, orthodox and heterodox, were translated. In its liveliest French form, Deism was even more mighty. The root idea was Tindal's conception of a religion always and everywhere directly revealed in human nature. This was a man's charter as a citizen of the world and his commission as judge of all things. Man was indeed emancipated, but whether it was only for freedom to follow what he liked or for the very different freedom to follow what he ought to like, remained to be shown. Not having yet discovered how their freedom imposed a responsibility which demanded all the powers of wisdom and of goodness, too many thought the task ended before it was well begun. Nature was the new Gospel, Rousseau the new Evangelist. All the conventions of the past were to be pulled down, the ground cleared, and a new building erected from the foundation. Education was to make a new race. Human nature, uncorrupted by bad education, was unspeakably good, and, built up
by right education, was infinitely perfectible. The new school which was to fashion the new humanity was called the Philanthropinum. In it the children were above all else to have a good time, that human nature might blossom in the sunshine, only with knowledge profitable for this life were they to be troubled, and even this mild pill was to be well gilded. After such fair aspirations, it was a hard blow when Herder declared that he would not send a calf to be educated on this sublime system.

To follow nature with us would mean to follow all that is living and varied and concrete. But in days when history was thought to be only a long record of the possession of simple truth, it was necessary to evolve the true human nature out of the inner consciousness. Nature was exactly what Butler had called "a futile, imaginary model of a world," and the practical result was to glorify the commonplace and to find the high coast of appeal in what was adoringly called the sound understanding. By a very roundabout road we come back to the temper of Paley — calm, unimaginative, argumentative, utilitarian. Paley's definition of morals as, "doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness," summed up the whole ethic of the popular philosophy, as much in Germany as in England. The sum of private duty was kindly good sense. The justice which regulates our duties to others is defined as "wisdom united to goodness." Church and State
are erected as useful institutions, as sensible arrangements in the circumstances. Mendelssohn, the most popular of the popular philosophers, argues that when man realises that he can as little perform his duty towards himself and towards his creator as towards his neighbour in solitude, he can no longer remain in it without a sense of misery. "He must, therefore, leave it and unite with his fellows in society, in order, by mutual help, to satisfy their needs and, through common intercourse, to further their common good. This common good includes the present as well as the future, the spiritual as well as the earthly— the one inseparable from the other. Without fulfilling all obligations, neither here nor there, neither on earth nor in heaven, is felicity to be expected."

In this sensible reflective way society erects institutions to govern the actions and educate the thinking. And as man's duties refer to his creator as well as to his neighbour, he wants a church as well as a state.

In this easy, abstract, unhistorical way the popular philosophy explained life, morals, government, religion. The sole objects of faith are God, Providence, Immortality. God's existence is proved argumentatively. In his "Morgenstunden" Mendelssohn sets up the usual arguments about a necessary Being which, from the very nature of the case, exists, and the All-perfect Being which must include reality among other perfections—all the arguments which Kant sums up as ontological, cosmological and teleological and
which he endeavoured to show were sophisms of the reason.

Upon similarly comprehensive grounds the popular philosophy based the hope of immortality. The goal of the universe is perfection and for perfection immortality is necessary. A still more direct path is taken by Basadov the founder of the Philanthropinum. Everything essential to human felicity, man is bound to receive as true. Now, without God, providence and immortality, felicity there could be none. Cleanness is the measure of truth. What could be clearer? Of the virtue to which heaven is due, Socrates is the great example, with some deduction for his folly about the daimon, the guiding spirit so different from the sound understanding. As for Jesus, what did he preach but this moral religion? Did He or His Apostles seem to favour for a moment a more positive form of religion, they were accommodating their teaching to their time, on this principle of accommodation everything inconvenient was easily explained away, and it was extensively used even in the most serious exposition of scripture.

Citizenship of the world, the universal religion, the education and perfectibility of the race were the watchwords of the time, themes at once for the loftiest sentimentalities and the lowliest utilities. It was an age in which Bahrdt, a man of the lowest life, could be a theological professor and an ecclesiastical superintendent, and when men could listen to this
eclesiastical rake uttering the finest sentiments about morality the true religion. The church being a department of state, a kind of court appendage of the Frenchified, emancipated princes, outward decency was the prime, sometimes the only consideration. So much was this the case that a charge of fatalism and blank atheism could be regarded as gravely intensified, in that the preaching of them was done without a wig.

Yet it is easy to be unjust to the movement. Its glaring idiosyncrasies are too easily presented as its characteristics. As Gustav Frank puts it, it was the enthronement of subjectivity. That could not fail to be one-sided, but it is always a necessary stage on the way to universal freedom. Its goal, perhaps its natural goal, was the Revolution. But there lay its justification also, for man fell back upon himself just because he found so much authority that denied him his birthright. With all the error and the danger of this exaltation of the individual mind and conscience, the great truth was accentuated as never before, that religion, and especially the religion of Jesus Christ, rejects compulsion and requires a faith and a life. "Religion knows no doing without intention; no conformity of action without conformity of mind. Religious doing without religious thinking is empty puppet show not Divine service. That must come by
itself from the spirit and not be bought by reward or compelled by penalty."

This discernment that religion must find its evidence and its mission in human nature was a great step in progress, even though for a time it threatened to be a step towards the abyss. Nothing can be more certain than that Christ's first aim is with man, not with an organized worship; and all the age wanted was just a deeper view of man and of religion.

In two directions this need was met by the later form of the movement which is known as Rationalism. Through it duty became a sublime conception and scripture a subject of serious study.

In the broad sense of testing every belief, in the last issue, upon persuasion, we all aim at being rationalists, but the term Rationalism is applied to a phase of religious thought dominant all over Germany at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. The distinguishing feature in Rationalism is its relation to the faith and doctrines of the Church. The creed is still essentially the old Deist Trinity—God, virtue, immortality. But, instead of opposing the Church and assailing the creeds, Rationalism discovered its own faith in them. This it confidently regarded as the kernel, and the rest it threw away as husk. With the spread of Rationalism, undoubtedly, a kind of spiritual blight passed over Germany. It was found in pulpits all over the land.
in any people a vigorous spiritual life. It indulged in
eregetical feats which first aroused wonder and then
ridicule. To prophesy (prophesier) was to say something wise; to
walk on the sea was a colloquial way of saying, Christ
was walking on the shore; the five thousand were fed by the
contagion of a good example inducing people to pass
round their luncheon baskets. And the homily was worthy
of the exegesis, as when the morning walk of the women to
the tomb was used to point out the moral of early rising.
Common Rationalism, rationalismus vulgaris, thus grew to be
a term of reproach and ridicule. But we must not on
that account suffer ourselves to forget our obligations to it as
a phase of serious thought.

First of all, its principle was true and only needed to
be better understood. Christianity does come, not with a
command, but with an appeal. It comes to call us into the
liberty of the children of God. If it be the true religion, it
must be the highest embodiment of reason, and the way
to our understanding of it must be by the noblest exercise of our
highest powers. Rationalism only needed what the world
always needs, a deeper conception of reason which would deliver
it from intellectual vanity and shallow formulas, and more
patience and reverence and insight to show the real needs of the
soul. Not by rejecting reason as our guide, but by
finding in it more than shallow abstractions, is our
religious hope.

In the second place, the exclusive insistence of Rationalism
upon morals only needed a profoundly morality to compel it to pass over its own limitations. It began where our Lord began, with doing the deed. It founded religion upon morality, made religion a mere source to morality. But as it rose out of utilitarianism into the austere ethic of reason and set above man's desires the categorical imperative of conscience, the salvation of the soul came to have a loftier significance and the succour of religion a profounder rationality.

Finally, its use and even its misuse of Scripture helped to create the scientific study of the Bible. At first sight, the feature which distinguished it from ordinary Desim, its attachment to the scriptures and the forms of the Church, might seem mere accommodation or even arbitrary misinterpretation. Yet it was less shallow for this respecting the scriptures and the creeds, and just because, in spite of its Rationalism, it could not explain its attachment rationally, it was compelled by this very inconsistency, to seek a deeper understanding. Hence arose a Biblical scholarship of an accuracy, a fulness, and an unbiased regard to fact which may not even yet have rid itself of the arbitrariness of its origin, but which has ended the superficial estimate of the Old Testament, as if there were nothing in it but mere legality and ritual, and has created a vast and deep interest in what it has helped to show, is the living religion of the New.
What it required was a deeper view of the reason upon which so much was built. Instead of the definite unit known as the sound understanding, it was necessary to discern, as Pascal had already indicated, that the knowledge of anything included the knowledge of the infinitely great and the infinitely little. The mechanical conception, the world of self-acting machines, the planetary, the moral conception of life, with its definiteness and its clear boundaries, was the chief cause of the limitation. But, in this the day of its strength, its foundations were already being undermined.

No man represents all the interests of his time so fully as Lessing. The one fire which burned in him with a quenchless flame was the search after truth. Even the secure possession of truth, he thought, would not compensate him for the joy of seeking it. To keep inquiry alive, he published what is known as the Wolfenbüttel Fragments. To the charge that his action was like setting a house on fire to keep the fire-brigade alert, he retorts that doubts are most dangerous in the dark and that it was a praiseworthy endeavour to try to bring every breath of the human spirit into the foundling hospital of the printing-house.

The Fragments, which Lessing professed to have found among the manuscripts of the Wolfenbüttel library of which he was librarian, were really extracts from a work by Remarque, a teacher in Hamburg who had
died a few years before in the odor of sanctity. They taught an ordinary but extremely outspoken form of Deism, with the usual objections to a revelation and the usual bias against Judaism and the whole Old Testament, but attributed more than the usual amount of fraud to Jesus and His disciples. The tremendous sensation caused by the publication was as much due to the person of the editor as to the work itself, yet lessing himself could have had small sympathy with this dogmatic denial of everything but a few generalities of virtue. To him life and history are realities. The Christianity of the Gospels, he feels, has life blood in its veins which never throbs in the cheek of this pale ghost of rational religion. Yet, in his search for truth, he cannot find in a historical religion anything but a fever.

"The restless zeal which makes the appearance of this man so worthy of regard and which at the same time stirs such painful sympathy, springs from unsolved religious problems. He suffers heavily under the historical burden of the positive religions, yet cannot escape the feeling that in this historical growth, in Christianity, the life-force of humanity lies hidden."

"The more convincingly," he writes to a friend, "one party would convince me of Christianity, the more I doubt; the more wantonly and triumphantly the other would trample it to the ground, the more I feel inclined to
uphold it, at least in my heart." In the rational theology of the philosophical theologians of his time he found neither Christianity nor reason. The profundity of the Christian doctrines he is ready to acknowledge. The doctrine of the Trinity is not to him, as to the ordinary Deist, the mere unreason of trying to call three one, but indicates the transcendental unity of God as not inconsistent with a kind of plurality. History, he conceives, as an account of the education of the human race, and the religious development is for him the centre of the progress. Yet, for himself, he knows not what to do with a historical religion, for contingent truths of history can never prove eternal truths of reason. "That is the ugly, wide ditch over which I cannot get, oft and earnestly as I spring."

If this struggle there is no trace in Kant, and yet Kant is even more the herald of the new age than Lessing. Of him Lessing's favourite saying from Leibniz is preeminently true, that the philosophical sects are nearly all right in what they affirm, but not in what they deny. No man is greater within his own limits, but the limits of few great men have been so severely set.

He is a confident Rationalist, and nothing shows better what was meant by that phase of thought than his use of Scripture. Some kind of revelation in history he will not deny, but it only continues necessary
in so far as mankind, not being philosophers, must think largely in figure and symbol. Faith, however, in its absence, is simply the rational assurance that there shall be good to him who does good.

Kant's great book on religion is called Religion within the Limits of Reason alone. The first part of it was published in 1795, but was prohibited because of its dangerous tendency. Next year, however, it was issued complete. Kant's style being thought a sufficient guarantee that it would never corrupt an ignorant public. And surely there was ground for confidence, for Kant's style resembles nothing so much as a river in the fens. At one moment you are in the deep waters of profound thinking, at another you are merely sinking in the mud of confused expression. The only way to make the book clear would be, first of all, to omit half as mere repetition and distracting parenthesis, and then to expand the other half to twice its size, and perhaps it would not be very clear then, for with any expression the thought is difficult and deep.

No one asserts so strongly that the basis of all religion is morality, nay that the sum and substance of it is morality, but the morality we at once feel moves in a higher atmosphere. The heart of the matter lies in his conception of the freedom of the will. The essential point in his account of the matter is that the will acts at all times upon what he calls
a maxim, that is a deliberate principle of action. Natural impulses are not in themselves evil, not do they of themselves override the will. The evil is in accepting the impulse as a maxim. Even his commentator Kirchmann takes this to mean that a man cannot be bad without deliberately resolving to be bad, which he justly considers nonsense. But take the case of an impulse of the flesh urging to adultery. It is not a question of the impulses of the flesh as against the restraining impulses of decency, self-respect and fear of consequences. But the moral law says, 'Reverence your own person and treat other persons as moral beings and not as mere instruments of your pleasure.' Before a man can remain in face of that command, he must accept self-love as a rule of action. He might not admit it, but the transaction is done in some way that comes within the compass of the will. The situation is this. On one side stands the maxim of duty resting exclusively on reverence for the moral law, and to disobey it is an act of reason as much as to obey it. Freedom is the power to make the moral law our law, to follow reverence whatsoever opposition there be of pleasure, and man is free because he can do what he ought. Wherefore the springs of moral and immoral action alike lie in the mysterious sources of the will. The free-will is not an attribute
of the personality merely, but is the personality. These
ultimate reason for any action, the ultimate
acceptance of any motive must be. The immoral
man is not overtaken by impulse, but he has
reversed the moral order and subjected the higher
maxim of the moral law to the lower maxim of
self-love.

Good and evil therefore, are divided not as
heaven and earth, but, as Christianity rightly divests
them, as heaven and hell. To regard man as half good
and half bad destroys the security and definiteness of
all moral principle. In the judgment of reason the
moral law stands by itself, and, to oppose any other
maxim of conduct to it, shows a corruption deep
in the sources of our personality. The cause of it,
though lying in something which is before every action,
cannot operate without our choice. Being in the
last resort a free choice, something for which we
are responsible, it is obligatory to alter it, and
what is obligatory must be possible. And the
real hindrance to the formation of a genuine
moral disposition in us is neither force of impulse
nor defect of conscience, but the deceitfulness of the
heart which is satisfied with the action and
heedless of the disposition which alone gives it
worth, and which ascribes to itself the merit
which is only due to fortune. This self-deceit is
the foul blot on our race, disturbing our moral
judgment and confusing our sense of merit and
demerit, so that the scriptures rightly ascribe the
origin of evil to sin, to transgression of the moral
law as a commandment of God, and rightly
describe the process by calling the originator of
it a liar from the beginning.

Nothing could be in greater contrast to the shallow
optimistic views of human nature and the shallow utilitarian
views of human duty prevailing in Kant's day than this
austere and profound scheme of morals. To find anything
akin to it, we must go back to Butler. If all profounder
views of human need rest on profounder views of human
duty, Kant, even if he had contributed nothing else,
would have to be reckoned a great religious force. By a
very different road he brings us back to the same sense of
the evil of human nature as is found in Pascal, the question
which is still at the heart of all moral and religious questions
today and which is only accentuated by the conception of
 evolution.

Man is not created good, but to be good, and we
now proceed to consider how this end is sought. In this
doctrine of the free though corrupt will Kant rests his
whole conception of spiritual discipline, or in the Kantian
phrase the moral ascetic. Man's whole worth rests on his
power to obey the moral law. The highest means of grace
is to contemplate with admiration this moral endowment.
which makes us who are so dependent upon nature, disregard nature and life itself and allows reason mightily to command without promise and without threat. To awake enthusiasm by this contemplation is a truly moral means of confirming man in good.

The supernatural, in the ordinary sense, has no place in his scheme. Every wise man, he thinks, admits the possibility of miracle, but proceeds in action as if all depended on himself. His objection to the idea of miracle is that it depresses us with the sense of injury to the knowledge we already have and can in no way add to our store. Nothing could show more clearly how much Kant still lived under the mechanical conception of knowledge which he had inherited from his age, for it is quite clear that, under any wider conception of knowledge, a miracle might be a very important source of information. Prayer, moreover, he holds should never do more than ask conformity to God's will and even that a good man might not practise. The whole religion of ritual and outward worship is an attempt to gain God's favour as if he were a mere human superior susceptible of being influenced by praise or persuasion, whereas God is alone pleased when men are morally good. God's source, no doubt, is a reality, but it is outside of our experience, and to be always expecting a work of grace to do what we must do ourselves, if it is to have any merit, is a hurtful moral attitude. Our sole business is to make
ourselves worthy of the Divine succour by following after goodness.

Yet Kant boldly faces the difficulties which grace has been wanted to meet. No one has a deeper sense of man's failure to rise at any time to the just demand, to be holy as our Father in Heaven is holy, of the need of a blessed assurance of perseverance in good, and above all of the difficulty of being delivered from a guilt already incurred, seeing that no future obedience can ever be more than the satisfaction of its own obligation. How a bad man can make himself good is beyond our knowing, but, as the command to make ourselves better men continues, the task must be possible, even though it only be by way of making ourselves receptive for higher succour. This renewal cannot be wrought by gradual reformation, but involves a revolution in a man's views, a complete change of mind, a transition to the maxims of holiness, a kind of new birth, a new creation. Then, so far as his principle is concerned, a man is a subject susceptible of good, and, though attainment needs long progress in a narrow way, the sense of vast and awful contrast between good and evil gives assurance of perseverance and in the eyes of God who sees the endless progress as a unity, he may even now be pleasing as in a sense actually a good man.

One feels that Kant is like an Egyptian fellah with a vast ditch before him, objecting to the rising
of the Nile, because it would hinder him of the credit of filling it with his shadow. Kant will have no gospel and no scheme of morals ever had more need of one. His yoke is not easy, his burden is not light. Though he shared with his age a dislike to Judaism as a religion of mere precepts, he stood nearer to the Judaism of the great prophets than he knew. In spite of the emphasis he puts on freedom, he cannot make man free, but only makes more evident the need of a higher power than mere resolute purpose to raise him to the glorious liberty of the children of God.

In his treatment of historical religion he is a Rationalist out and out; and no work gives a better idea of what was meant by that phase of thought than the Religion within the limits of Reason alone, but it is a Rationalism which has dug its ditches deep and wide and only needs the flood to fill them. Religion is held to be wholly and exclusively moral. But, in addition to the lofty and austere morality which morality alone could never satisfy, there is a remarkable insight at times into the deep meanings of Christian doctrines in which a shallow age had found nothing but absurdities.

All other religions are merely ritual; Christianity is the only moral religion. As the founder of the first true church, Jesus is to be honoured as a teacher who taught publicly a pure, penetrating, simple
religion in face of a burdensome ecclesiastical faith. In point of actual fact, that is all the Divinity that Kant ascribes to Him. The Gospels, he regards, as the very highest embodiment of religion pure and simple, but they and all other positive religions he holds to be necessary only because of the limitations and sensuous nature of man's thoughts. Their use in their own place he will not deny. Even revelation he will not hold impossible: but it could only be of things men are capable of knowing by their own reasons, though not so easily and not so well, and which once known must rest on their moral evidence not their historical.

This religion of reason the scriptures should be used to teach. What he means by this we can see from his treatment of the idea of the Son of God and his Deduction of Justification. At bottom the idea of the Son of God means humanity in its moral perfection, which is the only worthy Divine goal of creation, proceeds from God's nature, is in God from all eternity, is the image of God's glory, not a created thing but a begotten Son. In such an ideal God has loved the world and, only through acceptance of it, can we be children of God. Not having ourselves created it and not knowing how human nature could be capable of it, we say this pattern descended from heaven, and if we represent such a divinely disposed man as holy and not deserving of the suffering which, nevertheless, he accepts for the world's good, we can speak of it as a state of humiliation of the Son of God. Though the ultimate quality of any good act is what is unseen its cannot be exemplified, so far as outward
experience can go, a truly godly minded man, descended as it were from Heaven to earth, who, through teaching, conduct and endurance, gave the example of a man well-pleasing to God, would accomplish an uncalculably great good in the world, effecting a revolution in the human race.

In this Deduction of the idea of Justification, this idea of the Son of God and His work appears as the new man and the sufferings the new man bears in putting off the old. In its purity it is personified as the Son of God who, as a substitute, bears guilt for himself and for all who believe practically on Him, and, as a Redeemer, satisfies, through suffering and death, the highest righteousness, and, as an Advocate, gives the hope of appearing justified before our Judge.

This indeed is rationalistic interpretation, but it is earnest and profound, and has in it all the ideas which once more have placed the belief in the Son of God in our humanity at the centre of all religious knowledge and faith and love.

Finally Kant's deduction of the idea of the Church is full of fruitful suggestions and was in marked contrast to the current released idea of the Church as a court appendage. Every race of rational beings is designed, in the very idea of reason, for the common aim of forwarding the highest as a common good. But an ethical commonwealth cannot be based on outward ties, or it would cease to be ethical. The real basis in Kant's view is the moral order. That is what he means by making religion obedience to the moral law as a command of God. As a command of God it has a unity.
of purpose. This goal we can call a Kingdom of God. Visible churches are apparently only necessary through man's shortcoming, but Kant acknowledges their value and even the duty of working continually for their improvement. The claim of any visible organization to be Divinely constituted is baseless and oppressive, yet a church agreeing with moral religion and in advance of public progress, may well be a Divine institution. Solemnities and observances are no substitute of God, but in their place, they may be a temporary education for the true religion. Yet, the Kingdom of God only comes when the faith of the churches is changed into the pure religious faith which rests neither on fear nor on favour but simply on the assurance of good to all who do good. The leading strings of tradition with its statutes and observances gradually become unnecessary. The history of the church is simply the history of this conflict between the ritual and the moral idea of religion. The triumph of the ritual idea, of the belief that God is pleased with pious trifling, is the moral death of the reason. The cleric is thereby exalted to an authority which needs not to convince but only to command. He becomes so strong that the State is tempted to accept his assistance, and then, from his dominion over men's minds, the church comes to rule the state. The result is a habituation to hypocrisy which undermines the uprightness and fidelity of the subject. As with all wrong principles, the opposite is effected of what was intended. All depends on what we put first. Unless duty is first and religion is built upon it, unless we trust in God's grace because we obey God's
command, we worship not God but an idol.

In all this there is a sufficient amount of truth to be worthy of our consideration. It might be so conceived as to deny their place to the publican and harlot, and it certainly does not impress us as a religion that came to seek and to save the lost; but, if we will only rightly conceive goodness and better understand what makes man good, we need have no quarrel with the contention that the single aim of religion is to make us better men. Only that work will need more than what I have called the labour of the shadow of the working of good resolutions. Meantime it is enough to acknowledge that we shall never make any beginning until our resolution is good, for as Kant says in another place, "There is nothing absolutely good in the world, a good will alone excepted."

By all that was conscious and explicit in his thinking, Kant was related to the eighteenth century. But the influence of what was suggested and implied has been quite as great and by it he is the herald of the nineteenth. To see how this could be, let us glance at his views on those three great subjects of religion, ethics and the nature of knowledge.

We begin with his view of religion. True faith, as we have seen, meant for Kant, simply trust in the assurance of the moral law that these shall be good to him who does good. Belief in God he rests exclusively on this faith.
Faith in goodness involves that the world must be directed by a good holy will, so that all things may serve the ends of goodness. The essence of goodness is to act from regard to the moral law without considering anything beyond, and the essence of belief in God is that all obedience to the law is nevertheless directed to the one worthy end of all effort—the kingdom of God. This faith every man should sooner or later produce from his own reason so that a historical faith is simply preliminary and necessarily imperfect. To mix up matters of ancient fact which the most fervent can know, with the moral faith which only the good can cherish, is for Kant mere vain superstition. Therefore, in spite of his profounder insight, religion is still merely a way of apprehending God and the substance of his creed is still God, virtue, immortality, even as with Deism and the Aufklärung.

In his Ethics we find the same attitude. The moral law is the law of reason and reason is the abstract and uniform element in life. The very test of a moral law rule is its fitness to be universally applied. It is the same categorical imperative for every man and differences in character can only mean imperfections in obedience. Therefore in spite of its great moral depth, we end practically in the Reut idea of a moral law of gravitation equally
known to all and incumbent upon all.

Regarding Kant's Theory of Knowledge, my view may seem unusual. It appears to me that he also approached this matter entirely in the spirit of the Eighteenth Century. His theory is an endeavor to extend the mechanical idea into the realm of mind, no doubt with the purpose of securing in the midst of the universal domain of physical law, a realm of its own for the spirit. Yet the law of gravitation is at the heart of the theory. Kant was a great astronomer as well as a great philosopher, and the two objects which awake his supreme reverence are the starry heavens above and the moral law within. He wrote a book explaining the origin of the planets by the laws of motion, that is by what is now known as the nebular theory and probably was the author of that theory. The Copernican Revolution in astronomy, he himself says, suggested his theory and the influence of the whole astronomical conception is not difficult to trace. To Kant as to Leibnitz, the mind is a monad, a planet moving in its own orbit. The material of knowledge is the multitudinous sense impressions, what he calls the manifold of sense. Thus he conceives as a mere haggle of nebulous atoms as they float into the circle of attraction, they are Related, as it were, into an ordered knowledge by the
laws of reason. The whole is thus a sort of nebular theory of knowledge.

Kant may thus be regarded as the crowning product of the eighteenth century, as its most ripe and perfect fruit. But it is always in the ripe fruit that the new seed grows, and the study of Kant is a great lesson in the faith which believes that the way to counterbalance defects and complete truth is to continue to press forward.

Let us begin with the Theory of Knowledge. The defect in the theory was slaving. A rational knowledge could by no process be created out of an irrational chaos of sense impressions. The world we know is an ordered world and the order we know and do not create. Fichte cut the knot of the difficulty by making the reason produce the manifold of sense as well as the rest. But when it came fully home to Wagle that the moment of contact between man and the universe must be an intercourse of reason, a thinking of God's thought because man was made in God's image, it came with the thrill of a new spiritual discovery. In all its wealth of suggestion the conception was wrought out by Hegel, but in a slightly different, less idealistic form it is also the root of Schleiermacher's thinking. The old hard lines between man and God and between man and man
began at once to fade. God ceased to be thought of as a great planet moving in its great orbit and man as a little planet moving in his little orbit. So overpowering became the sense of the intimate connection by which each is linked to all that the danger of the XIXth century lay towards Pantheism and the confusion of vital distinctions.

Again, the Kantian ethics, working solely with abstractions, was apt to arrive in practice at no more than the moral platitudes of the popular philosophy, which was little more than the glorification of respectability. Rationalism which attacked its apostolical succession in the Kantian morals, was apt to end in a Pharisaism which measured only by act and saw no sinners and harlots going into the Kingdom of Heaven before the visibly moral and self-controlled. Religion was held to be mere craving in hope of getting off easy, and belief in divine grace to be only a round about way of shirking a task that could be no one's but one's own. For the feelings there was no place in the scheme. As Schleiermacher says, "such a system could only logically say of them all, what has been said of friendship, that man must have no time to begin it or to cherish it."

But an ethic which goes deeper into the foundations always shows them to be broader as well as deeper.
A morality earnest soon to austerity, lofty in requirement and rigid in regard to the fulfilment, could not fail to develop individuality and lead necessarily lead to that larger fulfilment of the law which love and not resolution alone can afford.

The moral reason it was soon seen, must be more than a faculty of abstractions, and must embody God's infinite variety as well as the absence of variability or shadow of turning. Then the danger of the XIXth century came no more from the absolute dominance of an inflexible uniformity of rule, but from such generous recognition of every manifestation of life as made it easy to regard evil as little more than a defect.

Last of all, Kant's view of religion crowned the labours of the XVIIIth century. The exterminated historical religion a useful kind of nursery governance, and set up an abstract faith equally valid for all men, that is if cosmopolitan only mean colourless.

Yet the germ of the vast interest in historical Christianity which marked the XIXth century lay not altogether hidden in it. Doctrines which admitted of such profound moral interpretation as Kant gave the Christian doctrines could not be obsolete, and a religion which ended in a kingdom of God could not be heedless of the traces of its realization in the past.
If a kingdom of God within needs to be completed by a kingdom of God without, the history of such a kingdom must deal with facts of supreme value for life. A belief in a historical religion is not any longer to be described as an attempt to build absolute truths of reason upon contingent events of history, for the kingdom of God must be a fact which in the last issue can only be built upon facts. The history of religion is the history of something by the conquests of which we are enriched and the advance of which is the only enduring result of our own diligence. Since the danger of the XIXth century lay no longer in regarding man as if he dropped from the clouds, but lay rather in the direction of ascribing such dependence of the individual faith upon the visible historical forms of Christianity, that the result has been a vague tolerance of everything that ever had historical justification on the one hand, and, on the other, a constant use of antiquity not alone to prove God's wisdom and progressive purpose, but to be the last and the absolute criterion of truth.

As the mechanical idea dominated the thinking of the XVIIIth century, the organic idea governed the thinking of the XIXth. The idea of Serdian hovered continually just on the verge of Kant's horizon. A
generation later it shone clear on every thinker: Hegelianism is a theory of development, of the self-unfolding of the Universal Reason, and Schleemacher even comes within sight of the Darwinian idea, saying all that is in man is a strife which awaits for progress because he has his place in an ordered whole.

Evolution, particularly the Darwinian form of it, has meant to many what it meant to Strauss, that all things are as they are by reason of sufficiently small changes spread over a sufficiently long time. But this way of begging the cause of so vast and wonderful a thing as the world less and less satisfies the mind. The groping of Nature for a goal may be in the dark, but it has all the persistence that rational purpose could attain; and, if there is anything that the illumination of spiritual experience, it is very much easier to discover in the idea of an organic evolution a divine purpose of wisdom and of progress than it was to see it in a mechanical law of changeless operation. In so far therefore the last century wrought with a more spiritual conception of the world than its predecessor.

As soon as this conception of the world as a great growing organism related in every part, or as it appeared to others, a great work of art in process of creation, arrived at power, the past became of overwhelming interest. Every form of research tended to become historical. History took all the past of mankind for its province. Dead languages were interpreted, buried libraries dug up and remote
centuries were illumined with at least a dim torch of knowledge. Science began where history ended and sought to carry back our knowledge of society and man and living creatures and even the inorganic world to the beginnings of things. And philosophy has been as historical as science, having given its whole energy to the task of understanding all that is implied in the process of evolution. Above all the study of religion, and many of the practical interests of religion besides, have been historical. Never before was such energy spent in investigating the past of any institution as was spent last century on the sacred writings and the history of the Christian Church.

The temper of the new age came to self-consciousness in Romanticism. The name has a recognized wider and narrower application. In its wider meaning it stands for the whole poetic revolt against the mechanical rules and intellectual stiffness which the 18th century honoured as classical. It reaffirmed the claims of insight, feeling, poetic imagination. The French classical drama was its outer court and Shakespeare sat enshrined within. It stands for that great movement of which Coleridge and Wordsworth were the priests as well as Goethe and Schiller. That is its wider meaning. In its narrower meaning Romanticism stands for a particular school of literature which,
at the end of the xviii th century and the beginning of the xix th, had its centre in Berlin, and which was simply the extreme wing of the wider movement.

The man at the heart of this Romantic School was Goethe. Carlyle's reverence for that vaguely moral personality has puzzled many readers of the great moral dogmatist. But Carlyle had a sure eye for a great force and he was not mistaken about the preponderating influence of Goethe in the main for good. Goethe's resolve to build as high as he could the pyramid of his nature, sounds pagan, and, understood in one way, is at best for any mortal man, the erection of a molehill. As it wrought on his admirers, however, it was an assertion of the right to walk against foot-binding, an assertion of nature against rule, an assertion of the beauty, variety and splendour of what God had made against the platitude, the sameness the bassetness of what man had determined.

Under Goethe's influence, the world came to be looked upon as a great work of art, of which artistic insight was the only divine interpreter. And of this artistic appreciation of all things the Romantic School regarded themselves as the select exponents. The movement bore all the marks of an extreme reaction, driving individuality to whim and self-pleasing, and allowing gush too often to outstrip enthusiasm. But
a revolt often needs to be extreme, and the effect was immediately apparent.

Already Herder, Jacobi and De Wette had written under the broader impulse, but the philosopher of the distinctly Romantic movement is Hegel and the theologian is Schleiermacher. Though of antagonistic temperaments and singularly independent thinkers, the fundamental conception in both is the same, even though their expression of it is worlds apart. They think no more of a great machine of which they wish to find the driving wheel, but of a great work of art, the more glorious that it is still in process of creation. Of this work, our own mind is a motto, the Universal Reason being copied in us in finite form. Reason is no longer regarded merely as a faculty of abstractions, as nothing but the identical element in knowledge. Hegel takes the laws of thought and seeks to unfold out of them life and history; his great conception being that we do not merely affirm and deny, and remain where we are, but that thought is ever enriching itself through its affirmations and denials, and reconciliations. Quite independently but no doubt under the same influences, it came upon Schleiermacher like a revelation that reason might be the source of individuality, that, like the Absolute Reason, it might reveal identity in variety, unity in multiplicity, that the individual
might be one, distinct, necessary, glorious presentation of the infinite variety, each a sort of quintessence of the Universe, yet with a character all his own.

Whether the basis of this conception is to be called Pantheism or not, is hotly affirmed and hotly denied. If Pantheism means a strong sense of the immanence of God and the feeling that there may be something even higher to pay about God than that He is a Person, probably Schleiermacher and certainly Hegel are to be called Pantheists. But if the error in Pantheism consists less in what it affirms than in what it omits, if it consists mainly in swallowing up the individual, in confusing all distinction in making what Hegel calls all cats grey in the night, it is not a just use of language to sum up the whole position as Pantheism.

As the most characteristic product of this movement, I take Schleiermacher's *Speeches on Religion*. No doubt his *Glaubenslehre* or *Doctrine of Faith*, a book which, it has been said, taught theologians what was meant by systematic thinking, is both more complete and more mature. But the *Speeches* had the deep and lasting influence which a book can only have when it is borne on the crest of a great movement. As Ritschl puts it, the work represents a movement which would have had a large influence without it, yet the soil would not have been so fruitful either of good or of evil, had not
Schleiermacher titled it. Moreover, the author continued to alter and add to the work during a good part of his life, a process which added little to its lucidity but a great deal to its interest.

When it first appeared in 1799, Schleiermacher was living in intimate friendship with the writers of the Romantic School, which placed him face to face with an easy, worldly culture which had decided that religion was only for the vulgar. Just as little, he knows, do his friends worship the Deity in sacred retirement as they visit the forsaken temples. The book is entitled On Religion: Speeches to the Cultured among its Despisers, and so resolutely did he bend his energies to show those literary friends of his that in despising religion, they despised a fundamental and formative element in man, merely because they confused it with a compendium of doctrines about God of a kind to influence mortals, that he scarcely stopped to enquire whether religion had any relation either to right thinking or right acting.

A second edition was not wanted till 1806. By that time culture had become enthusiastic for religion regarded merely as an aesthetic feeling. Dogma however it would have none, and to buffet its body it had no intention. It became therefore an urgent duty to show how an element so fundamental as religion related to thinking and to acting. This was accomplished by extensive and not always profitable alterations of the text.
The third edition appeared in 1821. By that time, he says, in the preface, it would have been fitter to write speeches for the petuistic slaves of the letter. Few changes were made in the text but extensive explanations were added to each speech. They embody his later thinking and indicate a deeper sense of the practical value of the church and the practical bearings of religion.

To give a short account of such a book is difficult, and the difficulty begins with the fundamental conception. Religion is no longer a distinct part of our knowledge which we can give account of in a formula, but is a fundamental relation of life, being the key to its changes and opulent variety. The capacity for religion is born with man even as his capacity for morality or for government, and, like everything else that should be ever present and ever active in the human soul, it lies far beyond the domain of teaching and impressing. Man can only help to quicken this innate power, and he best succeeds when he arouses a living force which shows its own freedom by going its own way. For the cultivation of man for religion we believe know of only one way - the free expression and communication of religion.

The amount of religion, he thinks, is probably as large as ever it was, but it is broken up and driven apart by an oppressive force, through the still prevailing Rationalism. The Universe would train its own observers and admirers did not the rage for calculating and explaining suppress the religious sense. Nothing is done in the true spirit of discovery, nothing in
childlike intuition. No attempt is made to receive the impress of something whole. Everything must be analysed, everything explained.
Discret and practical men, in the idea that their own activity exhausts the task of humanity, crush out aspiration. Even such openings into Infinity as birth and death are only used to win young people for caution and economy.

From this party he turns to his Romantic friends, knowing that they are at least open to impressions and that they have not dissipated their energies in gathering mere encyclopaedic information. If only he could overcome the difficulty which art presents, that, with every completed work, it offers rest and satisfaction to the mind, he believes he might be able to lead them to see that the greatest work of art has for its material humanity itself and that the supreme artist is the Deity who fashions it.

To understand why he calls his work Speeches is to understand his main contention. The religious man, being in touch with the Infinite, deeply feels the need of confirming and completing himself by fellowship with others. To utter his deepest feelings is an inward and may be an overwhelming necessity. But, in doing so, he cannot fall into the light tone of common conversation. On this the highest subject with which language has to deal, all fulness and splendour of human speech should be expended. When poetic skill is wanting, “religion can only be expressed and communicated rhetorically, in all power and skill of speech.” In accordance
with this idea, the style of the book is throughout the style
of the platform—enthusiastic, flowing, intense, rhetorical—in
deliberate and glaring contrast to the dull level of expository
prose, the cherished medium of Rationalism. As a man he is
to speak of the sacred secrets of mankind, and no prepossession
of orthodoxy or pulpit conventionality is to come between him
and his audience. And at the close, he says, of all ways
of communicating religion he has not shunned the loudest.
Surely the whole meaning of this attitude is lost by translating

Discourses

The Rationalists had plentifully discussed on a religion
the hinges of which were Providence and Immortality. The
only result was "the ill-put-together fragments of
metaphysics and ethics now called purified Christianity..."
that perfect plaything with which our century has
presented history." The whole affair is the handiwork of the
calculating understanding, and the discussion which ever
runs into cold argumentation, treats the highest themes in the
tone of a common school controversy. Religion is not this
cold argumentative thing but is seen in pious evagitations of
the mind, from which all activities are excluded until the
whole soul is dissolved in the immediate feeling of the
Infinite and Eternal. With this original and personal
experience, it may be possible to discover again in the outer
world, but a man must first fall back on himself and
find within himself the plan and key to the whole.
What we may call the policeman argument for religion, he detests. To argue for religion as a hedge to keep the people within the limits of law and decency, involves curious hypocrisy. Religion has its own sphere and fulfils its own purpose. "I maintain that in all better souls piety springs necessarily by itself; that a province of its own in the mind belongs to it, in which it has unlimited sway; that it is worthy to animate most profoundly the noblest and the best, and to be fully accepted and known by them." That was the claim by which the book marked an era in religious thought.

Religion in essence, he maintains, is feeling not idea. In the Speeches, he calls religion feeling or intuition for the Infinite, and in the Doctrine of Faith, it is called the feeling of Absolute dependence, and the difference is mainly in expression.

All life, in Schleiermacher's view, consists in a union of opposite activities. The Deity, by an immutable decree, has divided this great work to infinity. The human soul is the example best known to us. On the one hand, it endeavours by absorbing what is around it for its own sustenance and increase, to establish itself as an individual. On the other hand, it is filled with a dread fear of standing over against the Universe, and with a longing to surrender oneself, to be absorbed in a Greater, to be taken hold of and determined. Sometimes one tendency is extreme, sometimes the other, but the most common and the lowest is
colourlessness and feebleness of both. What we need is a power at once to invigorate both activities and to reconcile them. The prophetic souls are those who have found God without losing themselves, and their task is to reconcile man to his place on earth, by interpreting to him the misunderstood voice of God and by opposing to his restless self-love another self-love whereby, in this earthly life and along with it, he can love the Highest and the Best.

To understand this reconciliation we must go back to the moment before the division in our consciousness began. Before the object went from sense became a thing perceived and your sent from the object became a conscious subject, there must have been a moment when sense and feeling mingled and united. Here you have his reading of the Kantian manifold of sense. The feeling which is at the root of all knowledge and all action, is no more conceived as chaotic and nebulous. It is an intercommunication of a reality which is rational with a soul formed for the communication. It is fleeting and transparent as the dew on a blossom, banchful and tender as a maiden's kiss, holy and fruitful as a bridal embrace. It fills no time and fashions nothing palpable, yet it is the holy wedlock of the Universe with the reason incarnated in man. Being immediate, it is above error; and, by laying you directly on the bosom of the Infinite World, it communicates every living original movement in your life. In this original primal experience...
lies the root of every religious emotion, which makes it a feeling or intuition of the Infinite, or a sense of absolute dependence. This dependence of course is emancipation, because the essence of the intuition of the Universe is that we behold all things and do, in their place, they are very good.

In this connection, Schleiermacher does not willingly speak of God, but of the Whole, the All, the Universe, the Infinite. This he does to distinguish what he conceives to be our immediate intuition of God from the abstract, intellectual idea of God of the Deist creed. God, even when rightly used, stands for something more complex, involving intellectual elements not immediately given in this first experience but gathered through our whole wide experience of life and history. This leads us to an important part of his teaching, the relation of religion to doctrine and morality. But nature is one and all our activities are interdependent. Religion, springing as it does from the roots of our nature, being implicit in the very first intuitions which are the beginnings of our knowledge and our activity, must have a very intimate relation to both. Doctrine is not religion, but a system of doctrine is an attempt to review the province of religion. Not is morality religion, but while nothing should be done for religion, everything should be done with religion.

As we do not find the Divine most readily in the
world, but in the smaller image of God within, to complete what is necessarily eversubscribed, we must love humanity, so that, even in seeking the improvement of the worst individual, we must still be able to regard him as in his way a revelation of endless, undivided humanity.

Above all, to the religious man, history is the greatest and most general revelation of the deepest and holiest. For religion, history is prophecy, predicting that the rude, the barbarian, the formless will be re-cast. Nothing shall remain dead mass, but all shall be made individual, connected, exalted life. Blind instinct, unthinking custom, dull obedience, everything inert and passive, all the sad symptoms of the death-slumber of freedom and humanity are being obliterated. That is the goal of the minutes and the centuries, the great, ever-advancing work of redemptive love. In all this anticipation the Divine and the Immortal are involved, for in them alone is there room enough to speak of religion. Yet God and Immortality are not immediate religious impressions, being ideas which may contain religious elements, as anthropomorphism in the conception of God and other worldliness in the hope of Immortality.

In the same way the religions are very far
from being all religious. Yet, unso much as they all rest on actual, living experiences, an individual, vigorous religion is to be found in them, arthing nowhere discoverable in the tags of metaphysics known as Natural Religion. The degeneracy of the Positive Religions is partly inevitable as soon as the Infinite descends into the sphere of time, and is partly caused by dragging forth religion from the depths of the heart into the civil world. But this degeneracy should not hinder us from perceiving that every positive religion has a marked physiognomy and that what is now dead dress, was once molten out-pourings of the inner fire.

Religions are not distinguished by the quantity of religious matter they contain or want, as if, to use a figure which is mine not Schleiermacher's, faces were distinguished by the features they had or wanted. On the contrary they are distinguished by the characteristic way in which they take some one relation of man to God and make it the centre and group all the rest round it.

The idea that a man loses his individuality by belonging to a positive religion is as if we argued that he could lose his individuality by belonging to an actual society or an actual state,
only under such great common influences is his individuality created and displayed. A man's religious character is often quite peculiar and distinctive. The most quiet and sober mind may be capable of the most passionate emotions; a sense most dull to common and earthly things may feel deeply even to sadness and see clearly even to rapture and prophecy; a heart most timid in worldly matters may testify even by martyrdom to the world and to the age." As for the boasted freedom of Natural Religion, it is freedom to be nothing in particular. It has a providence in general, a righteousness in general, a divine education in general. Why it exists the gods may know, unless it is to show that the indefinite can also have a kind of existence.

It consists mainly in denying everything positive in religion and in violent polemics. And its polemic is against life, like objecting to be born because one would have to be a particular person and not man in general.

Religious men are throughout historical. The original fact upon which their religion is founded the moment when they were filled with the conviction which has become the centre of their religious life, is always sacred to them. And still more sacred to them is the moment when this intuition of the
Infinite was first set up in the world as foundation and centre of a peculiar religion.

The original intuition of Judaism was the feeling of universal retribution, the opposition of God to all caprice. That marked feature of its literature—its parallelism—is of its essence, expressing the continual colloquy in word and deed that goes on between man and God. Prophecy also is equally essential, for it presents the part of the transaction not yet before our eyes.

The original intuition of Christianity is the opposition of all finite things to God, and God's way of treating this resistance. Corruption and redemption, hostility and mediation determine the whole form of Christianity. The spiritual world is alienated and all God's dealings are calculated to work reconciliation. His work is not directed to the immediate result for feeling or even for present action, but He uses every new device for countering the innate irreligious principle. In this way Christianity uses religion itself as matter for religion, being thus religion raised to a higher power. Unlike other religions, it recognises its transitoriness; but it is to pass only when all things are reconciled to God, which cannot be looked for on this side of time. Of Christ himself, His unchanging value for
humanity is the clearness with which the original intuition of alienation and reconciliation was realised in him, and the new impulse he implanted in humanity. And probably our author had travelled much farther when he added twenty years later: "I acknowledge a purely inward and mysterious relation of Christ to human nature generally which is absolutely unlimited."

Romanticism found a more systematic expression for itself in Hegel's Philosophy of History in which we may include his Philosophy of Religion. To all the historians of the century Hegel was an inspiration and the more advanced school of Biblical criticism only lived to apply his principles. Yet there is this reason for preferring Schleiermacher's Speeches as the type of Romanticism, that it represents more broadly the varied interests of this essentially historical movement, and the conception of religion as rooted in the primary intuitions has proved itself truer than the criticism which reduces all religion to intellectual and abstract conceptions. The attempt to comprehend history in a formula which began by stimulating the study of history threatened to pervert it, and the idea of religion which first aroused a great religious interest, ended with such an offer of a stone for bread, that the dominant theology at the present time in Germany spends its strength in seeking a basis for religion in what it calls a judgment of value which
shall make it independent of philosophy. On the other hand Schleiermacher's conception of religion as rooted in the primary undivided intuitions has proved a truer psychology and a far more fruitful practical conception. With many the cry has been, "Back to Kant," but they always mean by way of Schleiermacher. Nor is it doubtful that any philosophical attempt at finding a rational universe that might today be entered upon, would be far less likely to begin with Hegel's bold synthesis than with Schleiermacher's conception of the primary rationality in man's elementary impressions.