THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONNECTION IN WAR-TIME:

1812 - 1815

by

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Introduction

This study was begun as an inquiry into British public opinion of the Treaty of Ghent (1814) concluding the War of 1812 with the United States. Its scope has been widened for two reasons. The first is the apparent lack of any clearly defined British reaction to the end of the war—a fact which, in view of the extremely vocal campaign against the Orders-in-Council in 1812, requires some detailed explanation. The second reason has to do with the general history of the Anglo-American connection.

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain in the period 1783-1815 have received a great deal of attention as has, to a lesser degree, the position of Canada in what J. B. Brebner has called the North Atlantic triangle. It is true also that the Anglo-American connection was of much greater importance to Americans than to Britons during that period. The presence of Britain, shadowy in places but no less real for that, dominated the world at which Americans looked out from inside their borders. This fact and perhaps a lingering sensitivity about America's former colonial status have made it natural that studies in this field have been undertaken primarily in the general context of American, rather than British, history.

The interest taken by historians in the Anglo-American connection before 1815 thus roughly corresponds to contemporary
attitudes. The period of the American Revolution and the Parliamentary debate over the future status of the newly independent United States of course bulks large in any account of the British Empire. And, both for its intrinsic importance and its effects on the British cotton industry, the American Civil War was a subject of concern and interest in Great Britain. But between these events the British public appears to have been concerned with American affairs only in moments of briefly acute diplomatic friction.

Historians have lately been engaged in showing how, after the Napoleonic Wars, a quieter and more steady integration was taking place in the Atlantic community, a connection founded on migration, complementary economies and intellectual interchange. Little is written, with the one exception already mentioned of diplomatic relations, of the nature of the Anglo-American connection before 1815 or, more particularly, of British attitudes towards America and relations with her at that period. This is scarcely to be wondered at, since for twenty of the thirty years between the Treaty of Paris and Madison's call for a declaration of war, Britain found her attention engrossed and energies engaged in the struggles with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. The circumstances were exceptional, despite the length of the period, and it might be argued that - with hardly a break in sequence - the history of the Atlantic community merely continues in 1815 from
the point at which it had been interrupted sometime in the late eighteenth century. Despite, or perhaps because of, a great deal of acrimonious debate and a war lasting for two and a half years, very little substantial progress in the relations between Great Britain and the United States can be discerned during this period. With hindsight one is inclined to look on Lord Sheffield, the successful propagandist for the severance of the Anglo-American tie in 1783, as the head of a diminishing and out of date company, but the views he had made so effective still carried weight. And attitudes of arrogant condescension, if not dominant, were persistent, even if they were gradually giving way to more liberal ones, exemplified in those who had waged the fight against the Orders in Council. Little, apparently, had changed since Shelburne's ministry had fallen in 1784 partly because of the issue of a liberal peace with America. Indeed it might have seemed in 1815 that the only result of the intervening third of a century had been the strengthening of the arguments of each side in the debates of 1784.

It is commonplace that all historians regard their chosen period as transitional. And for few periods in modern history can such convincing claims be made for the occurrence of significant change as for the years between the end of the American Revolution and the downfall of Napoleon. This is the Age of Revolution, par excellence —
economic revolution as well as political. Yet little change was evident in the terms of the Anglo-American connection; and even of that little the major part might well have been obviously temporary - i.e. the extraordinary growth of American commercial competition under the stimulus of war, and the effect of French 'excess' on an initial British tendency to look upon republican experiment with sympathy. These changes were small beside the continuing realities of interdependence. America remained in 1815 an economic 'colony' of a 'metropolitan' Great Britain, much as she had been in 1775, and the same relationship could be seen in numerous other aspects of the Atlantic civilization. But if certain basic conditions obtained and would continue for a long time to do so, the question of the context of this relationship's future development remained unsettled.

Thus the period 1783-1815 may be thought of as the setting of an essentially static confrontation of opposing views of the Anglo-American connection. To a degree, that generalization would hold true of any period in the history of the relations between the two nations. On both sides of the Atlantic there have always been complaints about conditions that neither has been often very willing or able to do much about. Circumstances have always played a more important part than events in this history of this connection. Our particular period then is as significant for the development of these circumstances as it is for the more spectacular
military and diplomatic conflicts. This is not to say that the possibility of radical changes coming out of political hostility was non-existent. Certainly there were those in America as in Britain who wished for 'new departures' in the terms of an Anglo-American connection; but while such views might alter the tenor of public opinion or even the policies of government, the essential factors governing the connection remained the same.

This statement is easily made after a century and a half, but its truth was not so clear in 1815. The question of what was the relationship between the United States and Great Britain appeared more open than it does today. To some the previous thirty years were to be regarded as an epilogue to the American Revolution. Thus there were Americans who christened the War of 1812 'The Second War of Independence' and who regarded it as a victorious war because it finally taught the British that America was determined to follow her own interests even to the point of war. In Britain there were those who equally wished to deny any special relationship between the two countries and who looked upon the war as providing an opportunity for the careful definition of a British policy towards America no less 'realistic' than that governing her relations with any other nation. The passage of time and the events of 1783-1815 (or more precisely 1804-1815) had tended to confirm such Americans and such Englishmen in their respective
antipathies.

The pamphleteers who presented these views in Britain developed their ideas mainly in the context of a closed colonial system excluding the United States. Their position is perhaps most clearly seen in the fact that they were only intermittently answered in argument and even then never in terms of an equally coherent 'doctrine'. For there was no one in the number of those concerned with America who 'believed' in an Anglo-American connection as such. What the pamphleteers fought against was never more clearly indicated by them than as an 'improper partiality' of government for American interests. That such a partiality existed and that it injured certain colonial interests is beyond question. Yet when the opportunity for the correction of its effects was presented by the American declaration of war that opportunity was never fully taken, and for this it is impossible to blame the British government which certainly attempted a revision of its American policy along the suggested lines. For those who wished to disentangle British interest from American were struggling against an increasing entanglement, all the more complex and difficult of resolution for being all the less calculated. The War of 1812 did indeed mark a break in a process of growing interdependence. The opportunity was a real one. But the break was not clear enough in the midst of spectacular European events nor of long enough duration to destroy the special habits that were
developing to dominate the history of the North Atlantic community of the 19th century.

Yet if the opposition to a special relationship with America could not effectively determine the course of that relationship, it could nevertheless play an important part in determining the future tone of public opinion and governmental policy towards the United States. This is one aspect of the significance of the limited period chosen as the subject of this dissertation. In more general terms, the attempt will be made to analyze the baggage of attitudes and ideas with which the British would face post-war relations with America.

Much of the foregoing may appear to minimise the factors working for a closer understanding between the United States and Great Britain. And such an impression may be reinforced in the course of our inquiry when it touches upon the heightened hostility of war-time. Yet we can measure the strength of the Anglo-American connection by the opposition it had to face and can derive a greater understanding of that opposition from the fact that in war-time latent antagonisms are encouraged to develop to a point that enables them to be clearly seen and discussed. It is also true that war tended to focus disparate British interests and attitudes with respect to America on a single issue. And finally in the effect of the war on Britain we may be able to gauge the actual state of the post-colonial Anglo-American connection in its earliest stages.
This plan of this work will be as follows: First, the attitudes and generalized feelings of the British public will be discussed and the war outlined as seen through its eyes. Because of the nature of the material the press forms the principal source for this chapter. The public was naturally most interested in the military and naval events of the war, but, apart from immediate questions of victory and defeat, further considerations of strategy and Imperial policy came into prominence. Britain entered the war with no purpose but defence and perhaps a just retribution. The second chapter will deal with the emergence, not only in the public mind but in that of the government, of more fully developed war aims. An important aspect of this development is to be seen in the way in which the available military resources of Great Britain were employed.

The expression of war aims was encouraged by a body of interested opinion which may be described roughly as 'mercantilist'. To these interests, concerned primarily with shipping and Canadian trade, war was welcomed as making clear what the future course of British commercial policy should be, that is: the maintenance of a closed colonial system from which American ships and American produce should as far as possible be excluded. This recrudescence of mercantilism was opposed by a growing body of British manufacturing opinion favourable to and favoured by intimate commercial relations with the United States. These were the people who had, in
their distress of 1811-1812, campaigned so effectively against the Orders-in-Council. The contrast between these two opposing views and an investigation into the actual effect of the American War on British industry and commerce form the basis of the next chapter.

This concludes the discussion of the most important factors affecting the Anglo-American connection during this period. The final chapter traces the course of the negotiations at Ghent. They are treated first in the context of international relations at the time and then in terms of British policy and public opinion. These negotiations turned on important issues in the Anglo-American connection, although those elements of it which were to develop in the following thirty years received little attention at Ghent.
CHAPTER I

A RELATIONSHIP DEFINED BY CONFLICT

British Public Opinion and the War of 1812

"Half the people of England do not know there is war with America and those who did have forgotten it".1

Such was the view expressed by Francis Jeffery, editor of the Edinburgh Review, when President Madison asked him about British reactions to the War of 1812. If we can take at its face value the frequent assertion of Americans (and among them the President was conspicuous) that the war was undertaken to compel British respect, then the question was an important one, and the answer to it as disappointing to Madison as one feels it was meant to be. America had gone to war ostensibly that the British government and people might learn that war was after all a possible weapon of American policy, that the United States would not, when the need arose, shrink from active hostility to protect its rights. The reactions of Englishmen to such a demonstration could not fail to interest the American government or the American people.

Although its existence created more tangible issues, particularly as concerned Canada, the War of 1812 is marked by this curious desire, not confined to Americans alone, to instruct. What was to be concretely gained from the enemy appears at times to have been considered as less important than what was to be taught him. To some extent the war bore the aspect of an exercise in the influencing of public opinion.
on both sides of the Atlantic, America attempting to impress upon Britain what Americans felt were the unacknowledged implications of their independence, Britain to demonstrate the consequences of such unjustifiable attacks. Considering such aims, it is not surprising that a certain confusion existed at the war’s end and in the minds of historians since as to what exactly the war accomplished.

Yet, if difficult to assess, the effect of the war on British attitudes, both public and official, cannot be denied. Public opinion was largely ephemeral in its effect, except insofar as it became crystallized in governmental policy; the fact that members of the Cabinet appear to have shared certain general attitudes towards America and, within the limits of capability, to have attempted to act on them, added to government’s responsiveness to more particular public pressures (such as those of the Canadian merchants and of the British manufacturers and taxpayers) is the principal justification for a study of public opinion. And any such study must be, in effect, a measurement of America’s ability to make the significance of its independent existence felt in Great Britain.

The Repeal of the Orders-in-Council, and the American Declaration of War.

When on 23 June, 1812 the new British government
announced the provisional revocation of the Orders-in-Council, in so far as they applied to the United States, it appeared that the drift of the two nations towards war had finally been halted. Ever since resumption of the British war with France in 1803 had created circumstances that ended what Bradford Perkins has called "The First Rapprochment" between Great Britain and America, the legal, commercial, and emotional conflicts between the two belligerents, Britain and France, and the most important neutral, the United States, had grown increasingly complex. War had threatened on more than one occasion, most notably in 1807 when the American frigate "Chesapeake" had been stopped and searched by the captain of a British man-of-war Britain and France were of course more concerned with each other than either was with the United States. Thus British conflicts with America were for the most part the result of circumstances arising from the European war rather than from any essential differences between the two nations; although an increasingly

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* The Orders-in-Council of 7 January, 1807 and 26 April, 1809 had placed restrictions on neutral commerce with France in retaliation against Napoleon's decrees aimed at the destruction of British trade. The first of these orders prohibited neutrals from engaging in the coasting trade of France or in trade with any port from which British ships were excluded. The second announced a blockade of all ports in territory controlled by Napoleon; all trade in the goods of such territories was to be considered unlawful and ships engaged in it were to be subject to capture and condemnation. Furthermore any ship found possessed of a certificate of French origin (protecting it from capture under the French decrees) was lawful prize.
uneasy situation obtained along the Canadian-American borders. The most irritating of these circumstances was apparently the interference with neutral trade which Great Britain had felt to be a necessary weapon in her struggle against France.

If the general response in England to revocation of the Orders provides any guidance, public opinion seems to have accepted the idea that all of America's grievances had been bound up in the violence done her profitable neutral commerce. It was this commerce which France and Britain had each attempted to manipulate to its own advantage with little regard to American interests. American reaction to this had been expressed, in the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts, by a refusal to trade at all with the belligerents; Britons, especially those whose interests were affected by the consequent loss of American markets, naturally assumed that America's greatest grievance lay in the restrictions that had been placed on her commerce.

Revocation did not of course mean that American interests weighed any more in the scales of British policy than they ever had but that the distress experienced by British industry in 1811 and 1812 (whether as a result of Napoleon's system or of American retaliatory measures) was great enough, and ably enough presented before Parliament and the public, to force the government to reverse the policy of its predecessor in hopes that the consequent opening of the American market might provide
relief. The motives which led to this reversal, although
deriving primarily from conditions of depression and industrial
unrest, came in part, of course, from the government's desire
to remain at peace with America. Certainly Great Britain
had no aims which could be achieved by war with that country.
But this is not to say that such a war was feared.²

The government was aware of the dangers of war with the
United States, and it was confidently and frequently asserted
in the Parliamentary debates on the Orders that their repeal
meant peace. War was an object neither of government policy
nor of public desire, if for no other reason than it would
mean the reclosing of a market so recently reopened. But
there existed a body of opinion, expressed most forcibly in
that part of the press which supported the government and all
warlike measures with the greatest enthusiasm, which professed
itself little worried by the prospect of American war. Not
surprisingly these papers—the most prominent was the
Courier—had been vociferous in their approval of the policy
embodied in the Orders-in-Council.³

Those who had laboured mightily for repeal were naturally
inclined to view their victory as averting war. In their
concentration on the Orders-in-Council and on the Anglo-
American commercial relationship, the British manufacturer and
merchant had overlooked the other sources of friction. Some
private doubts were expressed as to the conditional terms in
which revocation had been effected or to the fact that it had come very tardily, but no apprehension of the coming war was to be seen. rejoicing, congratulation, self-congratulation, and increased commercial and industrial activity were the order of the day in those areas which felt their fortunes bound up with a reopening of trade across the Atlantic. And despite a certain chagrin, those who had opposed revocation appeared willing to accept the fact of it — more especially no doubt since a Tory government had accomplished it.

The American declaration of war, 16 June, 1812, when news of it arrived in Britain in the middle of July, did little to change the minds of those who were firmly convinced of the efficacy of repeal. It was generally believed that when that repeal became known in America, the American government would move to restore peace. These hopes died slowly and were prolonged by the period of confusion which, as we shall see, lasted almost until the end of 1812. This uncertainty did not extend to the Courier which soon stated its conviction that the war would indeed continue and which was little affected by abortive negotiation or rumoured reconciliation. That paper, in contrast to most of the others, did President Madison the justice of taking his expressed intentions seriously, pointing out that his war message to Congress dealt primarily with grievances having little to do with the Orders-in-Council. Thus with varying degrees of
The Causes of the War

British attitudes towards American war were only in part to be explained in terms of reaction to what Americans did or said. Other factors, political, economic, military, formed a context which might do much to influence the interpretation any individual Englishman would either publicly or privately place on American affairs. The more detailed aspects of the Anglo-American connection as it existed during the war will be dealt with in following chapters. Here we are concerned with the historical background of that connection in so far as it entered into public comment on the war and with those 'international' concerns which had little direct bearing on the course of the American war but which presented a likely and perhaps inevitable context for any British discussion of its causes or events.

About the same time that the American Congress declared war, Napoleon had marched into Russia, and Wellington into Madrid. In any account of British opinion about the war across the Atlantic that across the Channel is of great importance, not only because of connections that might be seen or imagined between the two conflicts, but as well
because twenty years of struggle on the Continent had created a frame of mind in Britain that determined in advance certain reactions to any new adversary. During those twenty years the British had been educated to the ferocity of changeable circumstance, but they had not succumbed. The result was to make Englishmen justly proud of their tenacity and their strength. If the American war had been one in which some substantial, new, challenge faced Great Britain then, perhaps, its problems would have created a body of public opinion differently arranged and differently directed than was the case. But American hostility as a concomitant of French war had been part of the British experience for at least eight years before the War of 1812 and for a longer time even than that to those who remembered the Revolution.

American affairs were regarded by the general public as fitting into an already existing frame of reference, the most notable thing about which was its military bias. Such a situation has never been unusual in the history of war. Public opinion tends to occupy itself with the details of victory and defeat to the exclusion of all else; while the latter may give rise to doubts and questionings, the former not infrequently induces a taste for further victory and a complete humbling of the enemy. This was certainly the case in British public opinion about Napoleon and a factor that British Ministers had always to keep in mind.
The important result of such attitudes, for our purposes, is in the responses which would almost inevitably greet any third party entering into a war against Britain at this time, responses shared even by a majority of those otherwise friendly to America. For a war-time atmosphere encouraged people (who in peace might be more readily governed by considerations of expedience or personal interest) to look on public affairs in the simple and clear-cut terms of what was 'just' or 'unjust', 'honourable' or 'dishonourable'. Whatever the motives of the United States may have been in declaring war, whether an attachment to the French Emperor or a just resentment at the immoderate exercise of a British right, the effective result was the same: America gave aid and comfort to Britain's enemy at a time when Britain had vital need of all her energies to fight that enemy. In fact, many believed that the United States had done so knowingly and deliberately.5

That Americans had in the past found their profit in British discomfiture was evidenced by the degree to which American trade had encroached upon what had previously been a field dominated by the merchant ships of Great Britain. That such motives should lead them into a war at a time when Britain appeared more isolated in her struggle against Napoleon than she had ever been was, given the American character, not unexpected. Such charges were for the most part vague, especially with respect to the forms in which
Americans expected to take their profit. A motive frequently attributed to the United States at the beginning of the war was a desire to displace Britain as the chief trading nation of the world. This had of course been a common argument in the polemics surrounding the policies embodied in the Orders-in-Council, but that the fact of their revocation should produce no change in American intentions appeared to argue some deeper purpose. 6 Canada was mentioned as a goal of American belligerency too, but no one explanation dominated the press comment of the first months of active war.

One important source of information regarding American motives was the Federalist press of America, primarily in the New England States. Comment from it was often printed in British papers and the charges it brought against the Republican Administration were given wide circulation there. 7 In attributing base designs to the American government, indeed, the British press would have far to go to equal Americans themselves. The past history of Republican sympathies seemed to lend credence to the Federalist charges. Among the most prominent of these, and one often repeated during the course of the war, was that of the 'servility' of the American government to the ruler of France. President Madison's complaints of French depredations on American commerce went unnoticed or were ascribed to low cunning, and the mission of Joel Barlow was widely represented as the sure sign of an alliance between the
two nations.

The war declared by the United States against us is a war instigated by Bonaparte, as a French war for French objects, and the American President is the tool and agent of Bonaparte. No moderation of ours...could have been of any avail.8

Evidence of a highly circumstantial kind was brought forth in support of such accusations, however patent their absurdity. A suspicious similarity was discovered between the stated positions of the French and American governments on maritime questions.9 The burden of the charge was the war's inevitability - whatever justification Americans might give for going to war would be a cloak for motives far less honourable. The best that could be said for the American character was that it calculated shrewdly for its own gain. At the worst it showed a mixture of the braggart and the perfidious.10 Here could be found ample reason for directing that intransigent cast of mind developed during the long European wars against the new enemy. It is not surprising that, in some quarters, the American declaration of war met with a particularly militant reception. Here was a question of honour not to be reasoned about but to be acted upon. The British public knew what to think of Napoleon. If Madison was his familiar, they would find no problem in knowing what to think of him or to do about him.

This was one result of the circumstances into which an American hostility was projected. Another was the obvious
fact of the paramount importance of the European conflict, for if European war could be made to furnish the causes of American war, the primacy thus evidenced in the public mind also tended to obscure the events across the Atlantic and to relegate them to a secondary significance. The operation of this factor was almost always fortuitous. Important happenings in America, if news of them reached Britain at the same time as that of more important events on the Continent, were often slighted, while insignificant occurrences were at times given an undue prominence because of a dearth of Continental news.

A concern with the past history of the Anglo-American connection does not appear to have been quite as modifying a factor as the immediate concerns of the French war. In Canada, naturally, such considerations bulked larger; it is probably true that Loyalist hostility towards the United States was second only to the incompetence of American command as a circumstance contributing to the preservation of those provinces. Hostility on the grounds of past antagonism, although present in Britain, was there neither so intense nor so widespread. When it appeared the tone in which it was discussed was more often irritated than injured, and the chief object of attack was more often the deluded policies of the British government than the past actions of the United States. The American Revolution was not remembered for military defeats, nor for the hardship it caused, but rather
for the generous terms granted to America at its termination. For some the history of the subsequent thirty years was a tale of conciliation persisted in to the point of national humiliation.

At the root of such complaints lay an annoyance with that ambivalence seemingly inherent in the peculiar character of the Anglo-American connection. The United States was an independent nation and was obviously determined to stand on what it believed the rights of its independence. And yet there was the feeling on both sides of the Atlantic that a certain special relationship obtained between the two nations. The question of the extent and nature of that relationship, and of the degrees of similarity and difference between the two nations, excited (and continues to excite) misunderstanding and irritation. Despite all disputes there remained in the British mind a prejudice that Englishmen and Americans, having the same blood, the same traditions and language, had every reason for friendship.\[11\]

That such sentiments were, in any known terms of national interest, meaningless, was doubtless true and a source of acute annoyance to those who felt their own or a wider British interest diminished thereby - especially when these American relations had so far forgotten blood as to declare war against it. Yet against reason and often even against inclination the sentiment persisted, and if we can never directly measure its
influence on British policy, we can feel it as surely as those who complained of it. The reality behind a belief in a special Anglo-American connection was of course undeniable, but it was just this reality which provoked anger in those who believed that it had blinded the British government and the British people to the equally important reality that America, as a foreign nation, had interests and purposes at variance with those of Great Britain. In short, the War of 1812 reawakened and provided new arguments in the perennial disagreement over the proper relationship between the United States and Great Britain. It cannot be said that the conflict between opposing views of the relationship ever assumed the proportions of a public debate, as it had immediately after the American Revolution. The problems lay in solution, as it were; no issue appeared around which they could crystallize - so that few Englishmen found themselves compelled to resolve the contradictory attitudes towards America in their own minds. The problem was, in 1812, no longer a new one. It had been lived with for a period of time during which certain partial, if obviously incomplete, solutions had evolved. Practice suggested that if solutions were possible, they lay not in the realm of an official and comprehensive policy, but in the continuing complementary development of two economies and cultures.

For the most part those who opposed what they termed an 'improper partiality' for the United States were interested in the profit to be gained from a policy of proper hostility. Not unnaturally they employed arguments based on the national
interest in order to gain public approval of their cause. Thus their point of view gained a measure of less interested support during the course of a war the very existence of which seemed to bear out their contention that America had attempted 'to unite at the same time the advantages of two inconsistent characters.' Not only did hostilities furnish ample proof of the folly of conciliation and friendship based upon a misleading conception of common interest or culture: they also provided an opportunity for the rectification of past mistakes arising from that assumption.¹²

The subjects discussed by these lobbyists were primarily commercial, and in that aspect will be discussed in Chapter III. We are concerned here with the arguments presented and feelings aroused with respect to other areas of the Anglo-American connection. As has been mentioned, discussion of the evil effects of 'conciliation' derived from the debate on the problems arising at the end of the Revolution, and more particularly from Lord Sheffield's determined resistance to Pitt's bill of 1783 providing for what amounted to a North Atlantic economic union. Lord Sheffield had insisted that all talk of Britons and Americans forming one 'people' was merely rhetorical and that the best basis for relations with a foreign and independent nation was an awareness of its true interest and an undistorted view of its conduct.¹³ Much the same views were expressed in James Stephen's pamphlet of 1805, War in Disguise. The argument there was that
Britain, in countenancing America's immense neutral trade with France, submitted herself to what was actually an act of war against her. The most recent example of such a mistaken policy of conciliation had been the revocation of the Orders-in-Council. Against this revocation a number of pamphleteers argued in terms not very different from those used by Stephen or Lord Sheffield. To these polemicists the War of 1812 was a welcome illustration of the accuracy of their reading of American motives.

In this view Britain, amiable and friendly, had been consistently duped by Americans, who had concealed under protestations of amity a thorough-going antagonism to every British interest. The results could be seen in fields other than commercial competition, and could be felt by others as much as by those whose business interests had suffered. Late in the war, Castlereagh wrote to Lord Bathurst: "I had an opportunity of looking into our system towards America for years past, as well as the growing value of Canada, and I trust we shall never again commit the egregious folly of spoiling America by acts signally unjust to our own subjects and to all foreign powers." If the scope of the Foreign Minister's inquiry was limited by the files of the Foreign Office as they exist today, the Canadian interests could pride themselves on a most important convert to their views, for those files are full of memorials and communications describing the Anglo-American connection in just such terms.
terms as Castlereagh used.

The Canadian boundary was also a subject which served as a reminder that Great Britain had sacrificed a great deal for good relations with the United States. One pamphleteer, after showing the extent of territory in British hands at the end of the Revolution, went on to point out to the Government "that America actually gained nearly as much territory by negotiation at the end of the war, as she did by a bloody contest of seven years" in order that "they may, when they come to negotiation, endeavour to regain what has been so wantonly and foolishly thrown away." ¹⁵

It is obvious that some uncertainty existed about American motives in going to war. In the light of her refusal to accept revocation of the Orders as an adequate answer to her complaints, it is not surprising that to some the United States appeared determined on war whatever efforts might be made to conciliate her. To appeal to an 'inveterate hostility' towards Great Britain was however to beg the issue, and most comment seemed agreed in finding the American motive primarily in her desire "to force a sacrifice of our essential maritime rights." ¹⁶

Although the immediate reaction of many Englishmen was, as William Cobbett mocked, to defend a rather vague concept of 'maritime right' without thinking much of what it meant, one cannot say that the initial response, in the press at least, was entirely unreasoning; although as the war continued
less and less inclination to question those rights could be remarked. At the beginning, even the most militant of the newspapers appeared to believe that diplomacy might discover some suitable arrangement to meet American complaints by employing the characteristically British device of a suspension of the practices without a renunciation of the abstract right. 17

While other maritime rights were mentioned from time to time, few newspapers stressed any American grievance other than the impressment of sailors from their merchant ships. The long-standing British position that she had a right to the services of her seamen found on board neutral vessels on the high seas was not challenged. It is clear however that the exact grounds of dispute were understood by few, for the United States' contention did in fact amount to an assertion that her flag covered all sailors on board American merchant ships, that the British could not impress Britons found there. There was in short substantial accuracy in the statement of one paper that "Great Britain is at war with America for the maintenance of her undoubted right to the services of her subjects." 18

Maritime rights in any respect were a very sensitive point with the British public, and any passing complaint from America on the manner in which these rights were exercised was liable to be regarded as an attack on the basic principle of British supremacy on the seas. America was not of course
the only object of resentment where this subject was involved. No matter who touched upon it, enemy or ally, the point was a sore one. Thus a frequent explanation of Napoleon's war aims was that he desired to destroy the British Empire, and therefore Britain herself, by destroying her Navy. When he had failed to do this by force, he had resorted to other means and had struck at what many considered the foundations of British power in her commerce. 19

Here was yet another piece of evidence for the collaboration of France and the United States, for the latter nation no less than the former, wished to see Britain's naval power brought low. 20 Setting forth the official view of the war echoed in much newspaper comment the Prince Regent declared that any admission of American pretensions was equivalent to a surrender to France. His entire argument was directed against the stand taken by Napoleon on maritime matters as if that position was the one on which the United States based its grievances. 21

The mere mention of the subject of maritime questions even by an ally sufficed to provoke irritated response from British Ministers. With respect to a discussion with Russia, the British Minister in St. Petersburg, Clancarty, wrote to Castlereagh, that if Britain had submitted to the principles of the Armed Neutrality Europe would have had few resources when faced by French power, and that in consequence of her stand at
that time she had saved those nations from the otherwise certain results of their own folly. Much more of the same air of injury was directed towards America. The British Navy had safeguarded the United States and had made Washington's hopes of isolation from European conflict a reality. Not only did the United States make war against a country thus protecting her, but she gave as justification grievances which were they to be satisfied would destroy the very force to which she owed her continued freedom from French domination. Her ingratitude could be matched only by her perversity.

The moral tone is never far distant in public justification for any war, and the War of 1812 was one in which both countries believed their honour to be involved. However indefinite such a concept may be when applied to the relations of nations, there can be no question that in this case at least it defined considerations of importance on both sides of the Atlantic. The committee of Congress, recommending war, declared it impossible for the United States to consider herself independent while Britain continued to impress seamen from her ships. A similar appeal to patriotic pride was not absent in Great Britain. "To seek peace through humiliation is a course neither of honour or advantage," declared George Canning on the occasion of his election for Liverpool, and many newspapers echoed his words. "With all its evils war is better than national dishonour, submission, and degradation... and in this instance... it has been thrust upon us with every
every ungenerous and aggravating circumstance."

Such statements are easily dismissed as merely reflecting the windy rhetoric of the duelling field, calculated to enlist public support of a war, the material issues of which were neither so readily appreciable, nor so emotionally charged, as this of 'honour'. But an appeal to it might find a ready response in those whose interests might be better served by peace than by war, and there is no denying that emotions thus excited might be real and powerful enough to have an appreciable effect on the conduct of the war.

Indeed there was some justification for the views held on both sides of the Atlantic that, in some substantial sense, the honour, or at least prestige, of each nation was involved. In a system of international relations where the strength of a nation's position depended to a great extent on the degree of implied and potential, if not direct, force it could bring to bear, 'honour' was merely a term that might be used to measure the implication. America's position was, that to submit to Impressment - quite apart from the question of actual harm done to her maritime well-being - would be, in effect, to be prepared to see her wishes disregarded with scorn and her citizens abused by all nations. The British, on the other hand, (naturally somewhat less sensitive to a point of American prestige) tended to look upon this grievance as a mere pretext for an attack directed by ingrained ill-will against the naval power of Great Britain or against her Canadian provinces. And, it was felt, to
countenance American pretensions, to cease impressing, would be to give over any serious claim to the allegiance of British subjects, and to see the British navy drained of its manpower in order that a rival nation might profit and be made strong.  

In the arguments of both sides can be seen the implication that the issue was larger and more serious than the number of sailors involved might indicate. One of the principal duties of a nation was the protection of its citizens; one of the overriding duties of a subject was allegiance to the Crown. Neither could admit of diminution or division. Who questioned either questioned a nation's honour.  

British newspaper opinion in general did not bother to argue the concept even to this extent. Honour was honour; and that was that. Cobbett, like John Randolph in America, was almost alone in pointing out that such a principle might embroil a nation in a war for the most paltry and insignificant objects, a war, costly in lives and property, that could produce no possible gains equal to its cost. Sympathy with America was expressed by others, but no one, not even Cobbett, suggested that Britain should surrender her 'undoubted right' to her own seamen. Even that portion of the press persistent in its hostility to the Government and often quite critical of its handling of American affairs believed that 'it was wise, and must always be wise, to maintain our maritime right'. The general currency of this view was in part due to the unthinking acceptance of an old shibboleth, in part to an
understanding of what the continuance of naval supremacy required; but into press discussion of this matter not infrequently crept the implication that one of the best reasons for defending Britain's maritime rights was that America attacked them. For Cobbett was not entirely tilting at windmills when he stated that a peace on terms honourable to America would be, to some in Britain, a dishonourable one.27

In view of such opinions and the prominence given them in America, it is not surprising that Americans felt that the success of their policy of war was to be measured in part by the reactions of the British to it. In entering into hostilities in a state of unreadiness the American government appears to have looked upon war in some such abstract way, as if its purpose was to be accomplished by its mere declaration. If a narrative of British public opinion during the war proves little else, it makes clear that more than a statement of hostility was necessary to command a respectful attention.

Once Great Britain was in a struggle with the United States which many Britons felt they had made great concessions to avoid, it was to be expected that they might in their turn find that a salutary lesson was the best recompense that injured innocence could impose on American hostility. That the American declaration of war followed close upon great concessions by Great Britain was a strong reason for a sense of injury and evident justification for a belief that
conciliation only called forth new demands. The existence of war, without reference to any permanent consequences resulting from it, might become its own excuse for continued hostilities. Irritation and a desire for revenge could be ignored as the mere froth of a war-time emotion, except that they were to colour, and at times determine, the course of the conflict. Other, more concrete issues were certainly at stake, but mixed with these – with the desire of the American frontiersman for Canada or with British territorial demands in the negotiations for peace – was often the scarcely concealed purpose of defining the war, as what one Englishman was to call it, 'a struggle of national resentment'.

Of course to many Britons it seemed that the United States had already defined the war in this manner; for her avowed grievances were widely considered, and even by her friends, as too paltry to justify a war. For some this state of affairs was cause only for an anticipation of a speedy agreement between the two nations; for others the relative insignificance of American demands masked other motives and was thus indication in itself that the war would continue. Of all the press comment at the beginning of the war, only Cobbett's took the American position seriously, and only he seems to have understood the attitudes which underlay American belligerency, perhaps because the quality of their tetchiness approximated that of his own mind.
At the very beginning of the war, even before hostilities could have exacerbated feeling against America, there existed in Britain a body of opinion which looked on the United States with little patience and which anticipated the coming conflict with something less than regret. The factors which have been outlined here all contributed to a state of mind conceiving of an American war as one in which Britain's chief purpose should be a spirited defence of her rights and her honour. What these demanded was "prompt and vigorous war...the only course becoming this great country, affording the best chance of bringing the American government to their senses". Britain had given in to America until further concession could mean only the surrender of all those "principles and rights by which we have acquired and by which we can maintain our present greatness". 32 It was argued that conciliation had been proved ineffective since it had met with no other response than a demand for a further surrender of rights. "They have only risen in their terms; as unreasonable concession will always induce and encourage an unreasonable enemy to do." "Nothing but the pressure of hostilities will bring them to their senses." 33

We cannot know for sure how representative these sentiments were of British opinion as a whole. But even in the expressed opinions of those who wished for good relations with America was the obvious and nagging apprehension that
feelings of hostility towards America were to some extent justified and that they would do much to determine public attitudes as well as governmental policies during the war. From the first there was a demand for a decisive military victory over the United States, not necessarily in order to gain any material advantage, but rather to deal out a punishment justly merited by what was considered by many 'unreasonableness' and by a militant few 'treachery' and 'ingratitude'.

A Period of Uncertainty - Forbearance or Vigour?

As has been seen the fact that revocation of the Orders more or less coincided with the American declaration of war had caused a general conviction in Great Britain that the American government would suspend hostilities when it learned of the British act of conciliation, but there were many who found in President Madison's war message reason to believe that the conflict would not be so soon ended, for in it they saw inveterate opposition to Great Britain and demands not encompassed by revocation. "On some points", wrote Viscount Melville, 1st Lord of the Admiralty, "they seem so unreasonable that perhaps nothing but hostilities upon them will bring them to their senses." Similar opinions, together with a detailed analysis of the American position, appeared in the government press in London. As explained by the Courier, the war was due to the 'resentful temper' of Americans. The causes avowed by the President,
especially Impressment and Blockade, were discussed but dismissed in the end as unreasonable.

Nevertheless, it was obvious enough that whatever irritation there might be with America, few in the beginning looked upon war with her as desirable. The government press had affected indifference to the prospect of hostilities while the revocation of the Orders-in-Council was still being heatedly debated in Parliament, but it might be safe to ascribe these statements more to political tactics, to an obvious desire not to be moved by the arguments of those seeking revocation, than to a belief that war was really to be looked forward to. (However, it should be pointed out that revocation was most certainly due more to the distress of the manufacturing districts than to a fear of war with the United States.) The gratified surprise with which Ministers privately greeted the news of American defeats early in the war is evidence that they had not expected hostilities to bring with them anything so welcome. More significant were the continued efforts of Government to show forbearance, in the hope that revocation would lead finally to peace. In this they reflected and deepened the general uncertainty in Britain about American policy and aims. The abortive negotiations carried on by Admiral Warren on the North Atlantic Station, by Russell, the American charge, and Lord Castlereagh, the new Foreign Minister, in London, the apparent determination of the Government to be liberal in its dealings with American trade and to avoid signs of provocation
at initial acts of American belligerency, all showed that it felt a settlement was possible. Indeed, as late as October (three months after the American declaration had become known in England), Castlereagh was writing that he had expectations of a peaceful arrangement taking place.36

Even the *Courier* believed that peace might finally result, if only because the reaction of American commercial interests to the repeal of the Orders would force the American government into an 'amicable arrangement' with Great Britain.37 This government paper professed to see such forces in effective operation soon after the declaration of war. It also admitted to a hope and an expectation that Impressment, while a right that could never be relinquished, might have its abuses eliminated by mutual agreement.38 Papers friendly to America chose to treat the subject of the war much more briefly and for the most part simply published the rumours of peace and armistice that proliferated during the summer and early autumn of 1812.39 A most obvious reason why war against America was not urged with all the vigour of that prosecuted against France was the lack of means available to strike any very signal blows across the Atlantic. Little could be spared, in the way of men, from the armies operating against the French in the Spanish Peninsula. Problems of transport and supply, even had the manpower been available, would have meant great delays, too, in bringing military pressure to bear against the United States.
There were other considerations which did something to diminish the American conflict in the eyes of both British public and British Government. The very pride in achievement and the feeling of strength which had been built up during the struggle with Napoleon seemed to make many Englishmen, in Cobbett's words "affect to despise America". They had not believed that she would declare war, and when she had done so they did not believe, and with some justice, that she could effectively prosecute it. The United States might be treacherous and ungrateful, but she did not constitute any serious military danger. It has been noted that the British view of America's internal situation was based largely on the Federalist press. To magnify dissident opinion in the United States, relying on it for an interpretation of the policies of American Government, was also to give an inordinately large picture of the power of the opposition and of the unpopularity of the war, fostering the comforting idea in Britain that America would fall and in falling divide, perhaps irrevocably, through its own arrogance and greed and without Britain being required to strike any particularly heavy blow.

This was an idea and a hope which persisted throughout the war. 1812 was an election year in the United States, and it was hoped, and in the press at any rate confidently expected, that DeWitt Clinton would defeat Madison and the Federalists obtain a 'peace majority' in Congress. "Should they fail in
these objects, \( \text{they were determined} \) to petition the government to make peace, accompanying their petition with a declaration, in case of refusal, of their determination to secede from the Union. In part this was wishful thinking and has its parallels in other wars. Such statements overlooked the potentially dangerous preponderance of American force on the North American continent. But they were based on an estimation of the effective use of this potential strength that was essentially correct. Those who had first-hand knowledge of American affairs, men such as A. J. Foster, a former Minister at Washington, and the returning British consul from Norfolk were convinced that "America is very ill-prepared and so torn with party violence that nothing effectual will be done save by privateering." General Hull's surrender at Detroit early in the war, after a bombastic proclamation on the 'liberation' of Canada, provided further proof that the firm stand taken by America reflected merely weakness. As the Prime Minister, the Duke of Liverpool, wrote to the Duke of Wellington, in Spain, this event made "the recent vapouring of the Americans truly ridiculous." 

Even after the American declaration of war was known there remained some uncertainty about the effect of repeal of the Orders-in-Council on American determination. In general, either because the Orders were considered a pretext or because a careful reading of President Madison's War Message made it
clear that they did not make up the whole of American grievances, British opinion slowly inclined to the belief that the war would continue. But for a while there was a tendency to see if a mild policy would not produce an overwhelming desire for peace on the part of the American people. This was at first the policy of Government, and indeed the counsel of necessity. There exists in the Liverpool Papers in the British Museum a memorandum which cannot be ascribed to any member of government but which puts rather fully the case for conciliation. The opinion, which was to grow during the next two years into something like a conviction, that difficulties with America could be settled only by vigorous warfare, was not completely dominant at the beginning of the war at least.

In this memorandum, a lenient system of warfare is advised. Such a system would contrast strongly with what might be expected from France in similar conditions and would do much to show up the false assumptions of anti-British warfare in America. A vigorously conducted war would, on the other hand, induce the Federalist Party to support war and would create lasting ill-feeling between the two countries. It was further argued that the 'French' policy of the American government could be counteracted only by mildness.

Forbearance has rarely been attempted as a principle of conduct in making war. One suspects that the experiment in kindness would in this case have involved the renunciation of
Canada. But that such sentiments and such advice could exist is perhaps some evidence for the factors limiting the wholeheartedness of the British war effort.

Other evidence exists: Cobbett's statements for example that 'Nothing...will ever make an American war popular in England' and that "the British public do not grudge anything yielded to America so much as to other powers". These assertions cannot be said to be borne out by the evidence of the bulk of expressed Press opinion, but there are scattered indications that - for political reasons - sympathy was shown to the Americans and facts ignored in their favour. At a Fox dinner in Bristol one speaker stated:

The country is placed in a state of war against the American people; against that people, whom, for a long series of years, our royalized government has hated, on account of their republican principles, principles which they imbibed from their English forefathers... It seems to be the making war for the sake of making war. The Americans complain of the impressment of their seamen, and we repeal our Orders in Council. They reiterate their complaints, they make war to enforce their just rights, and we tell them that they have no reason to complain; for we have repealed our Orders in Council.50

The press of the early nineteenth century was at best an imperfect barometer of public opinion, but there seems to be no reason to believe in any large body of submerged opinion in America's favour. The most that can be said with certainty is that, in Parliament, in the official pronouncements of the
Government and occasionally in private correspondence, regret was expressed that difficulties between England and America had resulted in war. This regret was, however, almost always tempered by an assertion that Britain could never agree to the only terms on which America had declared she would make peace. Even the French wars may be said to have been a remote concern to the majority of Englishmen, and it is unlikely that any very widely held unexpressed view of American war existed. In general it may be said that the attitude of the British public was at the beginning of the war of a mildly exasperated hostility which tended to deepen as the war progressed and which had a growing effect on the attitude of government, not so much as a matter of conscious response as of shared feeling.

Defeat, Victory, and Public Opinion.

Although the quickening tempo of Napoleon's progress to total defeat during the year 1813 far overshadowed the events of the American war, there remained enough interest in what was happening across the Atlantic, particularly in contrast to unqualified European success, to ensure that British defeat or victory in that quarter would not pass unnoticed. War of course increases the emotional content of particular issues. The process can be observed in British reactions to the American war; it operates fitfully while Great Britain is engaged on the Continent and with greater intensity after the first Peace of Paris in April 1814. Two aspects of the Anglo-American conflict dominated: the first the maritime issue, the second Canada, about which latter little had been mentioned at the war's beginning but which, as it became the theatre of
visible conflict, gradually assumed the place of first importance.

What initially kept interest on naval matters was the unexpected string of American victories at sea. Their result in Britain, besides a certain amount of irritation, was to confirm an opinion that the United States, in complaining about Impressment and other British maritime rights had in mind not her honour but her power and that she was determined to challenge the British on the element that was Britain's own. Such an American threat might seem on the face of it laughable, but here again one must take cognizance of the fact that the war with France and the experience of a very real French threat to British naval supremacy might have the result of magnifying what were really peripheral defeats into the first steps of a deeply hostile purpose. Whatever significance for the future lay in the American naval victories, nothing obscured the present preponderance of British force on the sea, and a correct reading of American motives was merely to be one reason among others for speedily bringing that force to bear.

The American victories reinforced a demand for 'vigorous and decisive measures'. It was complained that Britain was doomed to hear of "the incessant and successful activity of our unnatural foe while our immense naval armament...confines itself to the capture of a few insignificant coasting vessels".
The obvious remedy to the kind of warfare conducted by the American Navy was Blockade, but writing to Sir Thomas Cochrane, commanding the West India station, the First Lord of the Admiralty implied that the public required something more spectacular. As we shall see various opposition groups in Parliament were making use of the American victories to harass Government about the state of the Navy. He should regret, wrote the First Lord, "both on public and private grounds if the summer of 1812 should pass over without something being done to make up our losses... We require success very much; the loss of the Macedonian and Java frigates and the narrow escape of the Amelia on the coast of Africa having excited a considerable degree of dissatisfaction, and although the malcontents know not what to complain of, but bad luck, they have a kind of desire to complain of this Admiralty."

These considerations were of course reflected in the official correspondence of the Admiralty and especially that to Admiral Warren. "It is of the highest importance to the character and interests of the country that the naval force of the enemy should be quickly and completely disposed of."

But, although it was said in Opposition circles that "we are paying the full penalty of our willful folly" the main reaction and the one taken more publicly by the Opposition was a determination to correct whatever deficiency had led to the defeats. It was almost
universally agreed that Britain could not accede to American demands, and generally believed that the United States should feel the full strength of the navy she was attempting to destroy. Even those who were not very enthusiastic about the war itself agreed that

Whatever difference of opinion there may be of the policy of the American war, there can be none of the necessity of preserving a superiority over every other Power upon the ocean - Whenever the character of British seamen shall sink, their country will sink with it.57

The debates in Parliament58 provide some indication of British reaction to American success and of the use those opposed to Government might make of it. The most important point to be noticed is the absence of any criticism of the course of action which led to the war. Nor is there any suggestion that Britain should give up her maritime right for the sake of peace. The Earl of Darley, in moving for an "inquiry into the circumstances of the war with the United States, and more particularly into the state, conduct and management of our naval affairs, as connected with it", implied that the determination of the government not to repeal the Orders-in-Council, a determination persisted in until the last moment, had been a main cause of the war; but the principal burden of his argument was the lack of preparation for a conflict which they must have seen was inevitable. There was no question that Britain had a strength equal to the demands of American war, and the only ground of complaint
was that the government had been 'lukewarm and pusillanimous' in its prosecution. The superior force of the American frigates, the lack of training of a large proportion of British crews, the poor construction of British ships, were the reasons put forth in these debates for the defeats. The remedy was in Great Britain's power, and Lord Darnley hoped that she would avail herself of it and 'renew our wonted triumphs'. It was in this tone that the debate was conducted, and the attitude of those who approved the inquiry was, as the Earl of Galloway pointed out, rather inconsistent, for from having been the supporters of a system of conciliation towards America they had now become insistent on a vigorously conducted war. It is hard not to believe that some measure of opportunism did indeed enter into the stand taken by the Opposition. The most significant conclusion to be drawn from that lies in the contrast between what opportunity had dictated at the time of the campaign against the Orders-in-Council and what it now dictated. It seems reasonable to infer that the change to some degree represents a change in the general attitude of public opinion. Darnley's motion was defeated.

Two months after the debate in the Lords, the subject was brought before the House of Commons. The substance of complaint was much the same, although the causes to which British defeat were ascribed were somewhat changed. It
was "...not any superiority possessed by the enemy either in skill or valour, nor the well-known difference in the weight of metal...but arises chiefly from the decayed and heartless state of the crews of His Majesty's ships of war, compared with their former energy and zeal... and with the freshness and vigour of the crews of the enemy." Lord Cochrane did not draw the moral from this state of affairs that an American of the time might have, but gave as reasons the long-term of service during a long war, abuses in the award of prize-money, as well as insufficient pay. In short, he was grinding the axe of a naval reformer and had little interest in the American war as such. As in the debates in the House of Lords, there was no mention of any present or future danger to the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and no question that Great Britain really could blame anyone but herself for her defeats. Cochrane's motion was defeated, more decisively than that in the House of Lords. And if there had been any wide-spread inclination to censure the Government, the news of the defeat of the American frigate Chesapeake by the Shannon outside Boston harbour announced, a few days after this debate, a victory signal enough to silence criticism. The point was made by several newspapers.59

In general, it can be said, a large majority of those interested in American affairs from a patriotic point of
view desired to see a substantial defeat inflicted on the American Navy, and welcomed the news of the Shannon's victory when it came. But the greater number of these do not appear to have been particularly dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, trusting and hoping that 'Brother Jonathon' would be given a good drubbing but having little inclination to complain if the process seemed slow. As the war continued naval news gave way to that of the war on land, for the simple reason that the measures taken by the Admiralty were effective, and the situation at sea quickly returned to what had, since Trafalgar, represented normality; the enemy's only threat was his privateers and these presented a decreasing danger. Nevertheless, the brief show of force by America did have some effect on public opinion. It brought home the reality of the war. Insignificant as it may have been in comparison with the Napoleonic struggle, American War could no longer be ignored in hopes of conciliation or by wishful, thinking about America's weakness or cowardice - such opinions of course remained but they did not play the part in public attitudes that they had at the beginning of the conflict. It is probable that, had Britain not been elsewhere engaged, the effect of American activity would have been much greater. As it was, there is noticeable an increased hostility towards the United States, an hostility which showed itself in demands that the 'honour' of Great Britain
should be redeemed by signal victories over the Americans and in a more extreme position being taken on the subject of maritime right, so that what was required was not only that America should not be allowed to force her pretensions on Great Britain, but that she should be required to explicitly recognize the rights about which she complained. Thus what British honour and interest demanded was victory impressive enough to bring the United States to reason and concession. Mingled with such feelings and perhaps important in bringing them about were the simpler motive of revenge, a desire for victory for its own sake and that the full force of war should be levelled against an enemy which had trusted to it. "War they would have and war they have got."^60

Both the Admiralty and the public recognized that the correction of the situation lay with Great Britain. The Admiralty issued orders to check the overconfidence of its captains, forbidding them to enter into engagements with superior ships. They also gave instructions for the regular practice of gunnery on board British ships, since the inactivity consequent on a long period of uncontested naval supremacy had been a factor in American successes. The danger to merchant shipping was removed by the convoy system, and the Blockade instituted early in 1813 made it increasingly difficult for American warships or
privateers to get out of port. These actions were not dramatic but they achieved their purpose of neutralizing the naval strength of the United States. The general naval strategy, therefore, although perhaps unnecessarily slow, was unhurried in its application, and provides no grounds for believing that the Admiralty was suddenly awakened to the presence of any great danger. The public clamour subsided and in the end seemed to have taken the absence of American victory as sufficient in practice for its requirements. This after all had been its accustomed experience in the years that followed Trafalgar.

America complained of British arrogance on the sea and may have felt that she had humbled it, but the moral of the story was lost on the British if their attitude on maritime right is any evidence. For the determined tone in which that question continued to be dealt was in no way abated by American victories and seems indeed to have become more firm. The efforts made by the small American Navy only made her presumption on the matters under dispute appear the more dangerous if acceded to. American strength was insufficient to compel a hearing for the American interpretation of maritime law and merely succeeded in irritating British public feeling. The subject of maritime right was not even to be discussed; both Government and public looked on the attempts of Congress to provide some
basis for negotiation on the subject (by passage of a bill forbidding the employment of foreign seamen) with little conviction in the first case and outright scorn in the second. Both considered the subject as a purely internal one not to be dealt with by the legislature of a foreign and hostile power. "The American legislature may pass what Bills it chuses... but if they think that any such measures will induce/to abandon our right of search and of taking our own seamen and subjects wherever we find them, they will find themselves totally mistaken. The right of search is one of such vital interest to our maritime power that to surrender it would be treason."62

In the circumstances a victory like that of the Shannon over the Chesapeake was not likely to be a frequent occurrence. Its recurrence was precluded by the strategy necessarily adopted by the Admiralty. And if that victory may have satisfied any inclination that the public may have had to complain of the Navy, there still remained that spirit of retribution which had been called forth by the American declaration of war and intensified by the American victories at sea. As the war progressed the obvious focus of this spirit became the struggle along the Canadian border. Canada, as a field on which British honour could be retrieved, claimed a greater place in public attention, and emotions called up by naval war transferred to that on land. There
were in addition reasons why British honour was involved specifically in Canada and why victory there might wear the guise of justice. Even before the declaration of war, desire for Canada had been mentioned as either a tacit or overt motive for American actions. It was, one paper wrote, 'the favourite object' of Americans.\textsuperscript{63} The maritime issue, however, dominated the first year of war, and it was not until Summer 1813 that Canada increased in interest.

One must again recognize the important part played by the Federalist press in the formation of British public opinion about the motives of the American government. That a desire for annexation of Canada played a large, if somewhat submerged part in the declaration of war cannot now be denied.\textsuperscript{64} The Federalist press, then, had substantial truth on its side (if not public statements of policy) when it insisted again and again that the United States was engaged in a war essentially aggressive. In the absence of clear public statements the truth was magnified and distorted, but the effect on British opinion was naturally enhanced. In addition certain commercial groups both profited from and themselves added to a new interest in British North America. It was later argued by the American commissioners at Ghent that the United States attacked Canada merely because Great Britain was vulnerable there, but the sometimes obscure statements of President Madison (not so
obscure in private correspondence - he felt Britain should relinquish Canada in the interest of future harmony between the two countries) could be read to provide evidence for American designs; and the proclamation of General Hull, extremely explicit in its offer of liberation to Canadians, was often mentioned as confirmation that conquest was a motive close to the President's heart. It was believed in Britain that the United States had begun hostilities in the confident expectation that Britain, totally engaged on the Continent, would be unable to defend her territory. Clearly, if America was to be allowed to achieve her purposes with impunity, she would be encouraged to act the same treacherous part again, whenever the opportunity should present itself. Self-interest as well as honour demanded that she be made to appreciate the error of her ways.

All this bombast however should not lead to the conclusion that the sole object of the war was conceived of as retribution and glory. The war focussed attention on British North America and its value to Great Britain. As has been indicated this idea was assiduously promoted by those who believed that they thus served their own economic interest: Canadians who had no desire to forego the protection of the Empire for submersion in the greater mass of the United States, British traders looking for a privileged position in Imperial trade. The great bulk of the pamphlet literature of the time directed
toward American affairs had as its main theme the lack of interest shown by the British people and Government in the claims and potentialities of Canada, and as its main hope that the war would open the eyes of the British as to the folly of conciliating the United States at the expense of those provinces. Part of that sense of outraged honour which may be seen in British public opinion may no doubt be traced to this propaganda. Yet beyond questions of economic self-interest lay a growing awareness, crude perhaps, of the strategic demands of British North America. In short, what was seriously being considered here for the first time were certain aspects of the future Anglo-American relationship on the continent of North America.

President Madison's private opinion was that the cession of Canada was the only way in which continuous war might be prevented. And the British commissioners at Ghent felt that this end could be better reached by carving a neutral zone out of American territory and by allowing Great Britain exclusive military possession of the Lakes. The future lay however with a course of mutual arrangement in which first one side then the other could be persuaded that it surrendered little or nothing for the sake of friendship nevertheless thereby achieved. As it turned out the part of forbearance was, in this instance and whatever her motives, to be Great Britain's. The quality of that
forbearance can be gauged in part by the obstacles it was to overcome.

A desire to protect a commercially important area was strengthened by an animosity towards America created by the war. From motives of national interest it was important that American designs should be thwarted and that, if possible some guarantee should be provided for in the treaty of peace against further aggression by the United States, or at least provisions that would make such aggression less easy of accomplishment in the future. From motives of injured pride, it was necessary that Americans be made to pay the full price for their attempt on British territory so that they might be less inclined to repeat it. In either case decisive victory in the field was required; and it was to this that public opinion as well as military strategy looked.

The latter half of 1813 was a period in which American affairs were almost completely obliterated in the public mind by the 'vast changes' taking place on the Continent. The proportion of space given to American news in the press diminished, and comment on that news was almost entirely non-existent. While Napoleon fell back from Moscow to Paris, the American commissioners were engaged in a confused attempt to settle the time and place of negotiation. Very little information of this reached the British public, which was in any case far more interested in
the spectacle of the downfall of the Corsican tyrant. Yet Continental success could not fail to have some effect on the character of British opinion about the American war; and when the approach of negotiations between the United States and Great Britain became imminent, it was to be expected that the British public would in part look upon the war across the Atlantic with attitudes coloured by the recent spectacular victories nearer home.67

This was as we have seen not unprecedented; but under the circumstances, with the prospect of effective action in America, such an attitude became more specific and more intense. The first result was a reiteration of the demand that the United States should be punished for acting as she had. For the first time it appeared possible that Britain would shortly be free to deal with her. "...The hour of retribution is at hand, and notwithstanding the gigantic efforts now being made throughout Europe, there will be found a sufficient force to spare to bring a conviction of their errors home to the American government, and punish them for their adherence to a despicable tyrant, and a vile and unnatural system of the most complete slavery."68 Having become accustomed to victory, the press not unnaturally wished to negotiate from a position of strength. "Whilst we generously offer to sheath the sword, we shew we have the power to wield it with effect:
and negotiation for peace is preceded by a brilliant victory in war (the capture of Niagara) - this is the attitude in which Britain should always negotiate. 69

Public opinion ranged from a simple wish that Britain should not appear to be asking for peace after defeat, and the more aggressive one that the United States be made to pay on the battlefield a very high price for her presumption. 70 As the year 1814 progressed it was the more belligerent of these desires that prevailed, first in the demand for a more active prosecution of the war, secondly in an expectation of terms of peace more than favourable to Great Britain.

To those who conceived of Franco-American relations in terms of concerted ideology, purpose, and opportunism, British victory in Europe could only present itself as offering better prospects of greater exertions and eventual victory across the Atlantic. This was of course only one strain in an anti-Americanism formed by sentiments of economic and naval rivalry and the more generalised feelings included in the term 'honour'. From whichever of these viewpoints it was regarded, Napoleon's defeat meant an opportunity to direct the great strength that had caused it to an equally worthwhile object. 71 News of the attempts of the Americans to get a negotiation under way reached the British press during this time, at the beginning of 1814. These attempts were often ascribed to fear of what America
might expect from British power momentarily elsewhere occupied72... "The desire for peace was never so strong in the American states as at present - Not only the reverses of their great ally must necessarily affect them, but they have also apparently lost all confidence in their own armies (In reference to the Wilkinson affair)... It will be difficult to skrew up [the American people] again to a high war tone.73 And although the universal rejoicing on the occasion of European peace led the First Lord of the Admiralty to write to Sir Thomas Cochrane "... you see we count the war in which you are actively employed as nothing", he added the hope that the Americans were now to receive a 'good chastisement'.74 The press was less mild: "But for the unprincipled conduct of Mr. Madison, England might at last repose upon her laurels." When Mr. Madison were laid as low as his master then there would be peace indeed. Nor was the good humour of certainty lacking.

Epostulary Ode from Jonathan Scribble to James Madison

Good lack, friend James, sad news I hear
From t'other side of th'Atlantic -
My heart is sore, and eke my ear
With listening pain will turn, I fear,
My pericranium frantic.
Did you not hear, at Washington,
That Emp' rer Nap his race had run,
And lost all fame, rank, sceptre?
That now in Elba's little isle,
The hero dwells a dull exile,
Without a wife to soothe or smile -
For they behind have kept her!
JAMES MADISON, if this you know,
And eke if you believe it too,
(Though twas a tale of sadness!)
Why prosecute a hopeless war
With Britain, under such a bar?
- The joke you've carried quite too far -
  JAMES MADISON, 'tis madness!
Your golden dream of glory o'er -
  Gone, gone on viewless wing, JAMES!
Of Canada, alas! no more
  May you be king, JAMES!
'Tis all a wronghead, rainbow race,
A silly senseless, wild goose-chase,
A pop-gun fired in thunder's face -
  A farce of ridicule -
Stop, maniac, stop! - repent - resign -
And shew, tho' late, of wit some sign,
  No longer play the fool!

The dogs of WELLINGTON are out!
  And by the fate of Pharoah!
They'll circumvent you round about,
And search - and scent - and hunt you out,
  From Potomac to Niag'ra!
You'll sorely be oe'rtaken
Unless you save your bacon.
By crying lustily, peccavi!
  Be advised then, I pray,
Without further delay,
Let orders be sent
  To your agents at Ghent
To sue for instant Peace, and from their vengeance save ye.  

Popular demands were, as well, more specific. British victories might indeed disincline Americans to future hostility, but a "clear, full, and definite adjustment" of boundaries was equally necessary to remove causes of any contention after peace. The numerous petitions of Canadian fishing and fur trade interests were commented upon favourably in the newspapers, and frontier revision was put forward as the justified object of increased exertions across the Atlantic. One member of the House of Commons, Mr. Whitshed
Keene, believed that American designs on Canada made it imperative for Great Britain to secure military superiority in North America, especially in possession of the Lakes. Otherwise, he continued, America "would get Canada into her hands, expel the English from that Continent, and subsequently endeavour to possess herself of our West India islands, and all of the European settlements in that quarter of the globe." Exaggerated for purposes of debate as such sentiments might be, the general accuracy of the analysis of American motives that led to them could not be doubted. Thus Britain was presented with an opportunity of determining her defence that might not recur. "For two or three years at least, nearly our whole attention might be directed towards America." Here, however, Mr. Keene erred. As we shall see, Government might agree with him about what should be done; it was not, finally, to admit that it could be.76

But in the meantime it appeared that military success in America might indeed have permanent results. The expressed determination of the Government to prosecute the war with vigour was welcomed, and, as an example of that policy, the British operations against Washington were seen not only as a merited retaliation against American presumption but also as a demonstration that might force agreement to British terms of peace from the American Government.77

The prospects of an end to the war in Europe were regarded
in a somewhat different light by those who wished for peace with America. If the American War had arisen because of the difficulties of the position of the United States as a neutral, the end of the Napoleonic Wars would naturally put the issues in dispute into abeyance. It seemed unnecessary to prolong the contest over what had become abstract principles. "It is believed by many," wrote the Liverpool Mercury at the beginning of negotiations, "that the transatlantic republic will concede much, in order to obtain a peace with this country. The termination of the war with France has itself caused most of the objects of hostility on both sides to cease. A reference to principles, which, in a period of general peace, can have no specific object, can never be a justifiable motive to continue a course of desolation and bloodshed."

But is was recognised that such considerations did not govern much public feeling, and it was in part a fear that a spirit of 'retaliatory hostility' should become dominant that led to an increased expression of anti-war opinion. Such opinion, one may guess, had been dormant rather than non-existent during the first year and a half of the war, when it appeared that American policy had been responsible for hostilities. Under such circumstances, representations to the British government could achieve little. However, the fear began to be felt that the effect of continuing war on British opinion and policy had become harmful.
A war, once begun, is frequently continued for no other reason than because it has begun; while every transaction of it increased animosity on either side. This we fear is the relative situation of the two countries. Every day adds to their mutual animosity, while success on neither side can ever be expected to produce the humiliating spirit of concession in either. In this point of view... we cannot but perceive a gathering irritation on both sides the Atlantic which threatens two people, whose real interests lie in friendly intercourse, with all the horrors of protracted war.81

Objections to a growing spirit of war in Great Britain were widespread, and complaints were made of that portion of the press which was 'exciting' the nation to conquest, and to every species of injustice and extravagence. The government too was accused of attempting to keep alive 'a spirit of rancorous hostility' towards the United States.82

The most obvious exercise of such a spirit was in the methods of warfare undertaken in America and in the reaction of the British public to their initial success. Sir Alexander Cochrane's proclamations were interpreted by Samuel Whitbread in the House of Commons as 'inciting the Negroes in America to rise and revolt against their masters', a complaint, it should be said, more to be applied to the Admiral's strong convictions than to the degree to which the Government was willing to support him in them.83 The
burning of Washington and the general enthusiasm it evoked were also subjects of criticism.\textsuperscript{84}

On the whole then, it was believed that hostility towards America was beginning to dominate the conduct of the war and it was feared, after the Government press had published a suggested list of demands to be made at Ghent, that the same spirit was to dominate the making of the peace. The war was to be put on the footing of a contest for territory and conquest.\textsuperscript{85} The objections to such a course were manifold.

The effect on America was most frequently referred to. "The result is...likely to be, that all parties in America will be united against our inordinate pretensions, than that peace will be the result of ... [the] labours... of the Commissioners at Ghent."\textsuperscript{86}

The advantages on either side were almost balanced; under such circumstances continuance of the war would be unlikely to result in substantial gains for either America or Britain, and the effects on future Anglo-American relations might be far-reaching and detrimental. Antagonism and suspicion might well become the foundation
of their mutual future. Particular reference was made to the encouragement that protracted war and increasingly ingrained hostility might have upon the growth of American industrial and military power.\textsuperscript{87}

The advantages which it was felt the Government wished to gain were critically examined. Wellington's later conviction that the British Army had gained no success to justify a demand for territorial cession is frequently encountered, and the unimportance of British North America adverted to. The widespread assumption that revision of the Canadian boundary and the creation of an Indian buffer state would serve as an adequate protection for British North America was questioned—largely on the grounds that peace and a friendly, or at least unirritated, United States would constitute a greater safeguard to those provinces than any terms of peace that might lead to a future conflict, in which America might not again fail to reap the full benefits of its potentially superior force. Little advantage, in short, was to be gained at all commensurate with what was sure to be a staggering cost to Great Britain.\textsuperscript{88}
This line of argument was best summarized in the *Examiner*:

Though I utterly despair of convincing the many that battering, burning, destroying, imprisoning, wounding, killing, shouting, illuminating, and thanksgiving are not desirable things, I may prevail on a few... to... agree that even those high enjoyments may be purchased at a price beyond their real worth.

Even with complete success, we will have lessened the possibility of their being good customers to us... increased their animosity to us, and their desire to ally themselves with and to benefit our enemies rather than ourselves. ...And inasmuch as we have dragged from them a portion of their territory, enough to vex, though not enough to weaken them, insomuch have we lessened the chance of a durable peace, by giving them a popular cause for war, as soon as their renewed strength will enable them to wage one. ...The expense of this most successful war will certainly amount to many millions of money, the procuring of which will have added greatly to the national burthens. To set off against this, we shall have some leagues of wild territory along the American lakes, which will not bring into the treasury an additional sixpence, but rather add to the general expenditure. ...We have already more than an ample portion of foreign territory. ...As for the assertion, that the Canadian frontier will be greatly protected by this acquisition, it appears to me altogether futile; for we shall still have a frontier, and whether it be Canadian or under any other name (i.e. as part of an Indian Territory), that portion will be open to invasion, and the more so, as it will lie within the natural boundary of the Republic.

As for the national honour, I suppose it will hardly be urged that it would be at all tarnished by making such a peace as this recommended - The country will have relinquished none of its maritime rights, not even those which are manifestly doubtful; the war has not yet lasted long enough to have involved us in any great expense, though it is already beginning to touch us on this tender point; and after the skill and courage and real power we have just exhibited in Europe, the moderation of our conduct cannot possibly be attributed to ignorance or to imbecility. Should we then be no immediate gainers by this moderation, it is apparent that we should suffer neither in reputation or in strength; and it is equally clear,
I think, that by cherishing our resources, we should be better enabled to resist any future attack on either. The nation requires repose; our commerce does not flourish, neither do our manufactures thrive. The necessaries of life are far from being cheap; and the tax-gatherer is as active as ever... Such are the effects of the long war out of which we have emerged that we can not now meet our neighbours in the general market.

As we are now smarting under the effects of the late war in Europe, it is a lamentable thing to see the nation involved in a new contest with America; as we can terminate it with honour, it is every way our interest to do so, for, if we ultimately even obtain all our demands, that all is hardly worth one week's cost of the war - and if procured only by years of hostility, it will inevitably serve to lower us in the scale of Europe, while our neighbours are daily adding to their power. 89

Arguments such as these, coupled with a marked want of success in the last quarter of 1814, turned British opinion rather out of favour with the war. 90 The publication by the American government of the initial phases of the negotiation at Ghent bore out fears of a war conducted for the acquisition of American territory and increased the opposition to it. It is a possibility that among the considerations which led the British government to somewhat abate its demands at Ghent the force of public opinion was not the least, but the available evidence would indicate that if the Government did in any respect bend to that force it was moved more by the outcry against the continuance of war taxation than by any criticism of its war aims or methods.

Complaints of taxation are of course part of the daily diet of all governments, but there was a noticeable increase
in their frequency as the French Wars came to an end. As is usual in such cases the government was forced to continue to pay the expenses of war long after the last shot had been fired and long after public acceptance of such expense had been replaced by impatience. Thus the government sought to justify the continuance of its war taxation by the continuance of war with America. Besides the obvious fact that American war did indeed involve an expenditure that the government would have rather been without, its excuses in this respect put an added pressure on it to terminate the conflict with the least delay possible. 91

Some indeed refused to consider the war as requiring much expenditure. The question was in the minds of the tax-paying public apparently not an entirely straightforward one. It is sometimes difficult to decide from the argumentation whether the tax was disliked because of the war, or the war disliked because of the tax. One is not unnaturally inclined to the latter explanation, although opponents called war and tax equally unjust. However, even at a public meeting in London at which such sentiments were expressed and apparently supported by a majority of those present, the view that there was some justification for the war with America and that British policy in the matter should be guided by considerations other than those of trade and commerce received applause. The speaker's further assertion that "If the country was determined
to support the war it was of course necessary to provide the Government with the means of carrying it on." was obviously less popular with the gathering. 92

It is significant that the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, was engaged in sounding out public opinion on the continuance of the income tax as the finishing touches were being put on the Treaty at Ghent. He wrote to Mr. Hart Davis, M.P., for Bristol, "If the country are against the continuance of the tax as a part of the revenue necessary for defraying the expense of a Peace Establishment it may be expedient to give way to their wishes, but I am sure you will see the propriety and even necessity ..." of continuing the tax "... until the American war shall have been concluded not only by a Treaty of Peace but by that Peace being ratified by the President of the United States and until the Arrears of the War Expenses of the last years shall have been fully discharged." Davis allowed himself to be persuaded but very reluctantly, 93 and Liverpool was probably not far from right when he wrote to George Canning, just beginning his embassy in Lisbon, that even the continuance of war with America would not have prevented a great clamour against the tax. He asked "whether ... it was not better to conclude peace at the present moment before the impatience of the country on the subject had been manifested at public meetings or by motions in Parliament?" 94
The Treaty of Ghent

The announcement of the peace signed at Ghent was generally welcomed in Great Britain. Lord Castlereagh, at Vienna, pictured the government as opposing a general cry for war when it made peace, but although dissatisfaction was expressed with the terms of the settlement or with the fact that America had not been sufficiently humbled, the event itself was by most accepted as necessary. 95

Not surprisingly the greatest displeasure was evidenced in Canada where the Montreal merchant and the fur trader of the far West were bitterly convinced that a great opportunity for permanent gains against the United States had been sacrificed in a desire for peace. The fur traders, in particular, after their great exertions to conquer and hold the American Northwest, felt that "Our negotiators, as usual, have been egregiously duped ... As usual, they have shown themselves profoundly ignorant of the concerns of this part of the Empire." 96

Although comments such as these undoubtedly found their way across the Atlantic, their effect in Britain was negligible. Nor did the subject of the Canadian border or the Indian barrier play much part in immediate British reaction to the Treaty. One newspaper did express fears that the British failure to gain concrete territorial advantages and the subsequent referral of boundary problems to commissions would allow the Americans to place themselves in a much
stronger position, militarily, with regard both the future negotiations and the possible outbreak of another war. This same newspaper was concerned that the signing of the Treaty might signal some relaxation in the determination of the government to provide Canada with an adequate defence. But while a fear of the recurrence of war (especially upon Napoleon's return to France in April 1815) was more frequently to be encountered, the views expressed here on the Canadian boundary had no reflection in other papers, which when they mentioned the subject at all did so either to deny its importance or to consider it as a peg on which to hang a contention that the United States had not been made to suffer any visible sign of a merited punishment.

Much of the press comment against the Treaty was of a similar nature. Peace had taken place, it was complained, accompanied neither by the full fanfares of military victory nor by any tangible evidence of American defeat. Indeed, one paper maintained that Britain had made peace in the midst of reverses. Although the Courier, speaking presumably on behalf of, if not as the government, demonstrated at length on three successive days that the Treaty represented a British victory because America had signally failed to achieve any of the objects for which she had gone to war, a belligerent minority of the press refused to consider the Treaty as anything more than the result of a
degrading weakness. The United States had shown itself, said the Times, pressed to extremities, forced to resort to taxation and conscription, and unable to resist Britain's power to insist on peace on British terms. The failure to force a recognition of the British position on maritime rights, like the failure to gain a boundary rectification, was a confession of a disgraceful lack of will on the part of the British government.

Such views represented the extreme form of opinions commonly expressed with greater moderation. The majority of newspapers had no quarrel with the official view that Britain had justly opposed American pretensions as to maritime right or American designs on Canada. While unwilling to greet a victory in the peace, they were nevertheless pleased with the event. Although Americans would not have been justified in expecting such treatment, the Treaty gave evidence of "... the moderation of the British Ministers, and their earnest desire to put a stop to the calamities of a warfare so abhorrent to humanity." 97

Peace was not without its benefits to Great Britain. Certainly the reduction of governmental expense and the consequent reduction in taxation was to be welcomed. One paper, at least, recognised the good effect that the signing of the Treaty might have on Britain's diplomatic position at the Congress of Vienna. And if the British public would have foregone such benefits had the United States persisted in
her claims, few papers expressed a belief that either the British claims put forward at Ghent or a desire for retribution would have justified the sacrifices involved in the continuation of the conflict.

The implication here that the demands put forward at Ghent represented no vital British interest was seen equally in the frequent assertion that the end of the war in Europe had done away with the immediate issues between the two countries. Only one paper went so far as to profess complete indifference to the fate of Canada, but many expressed a reluctance to continue the war for the definition of what had become abstract maritime rights. With no object, peace was the object.

...there was only the alternative of crushing the enemy, or giving him such terms, as would neither mortify his pride, nor injure his interests materially. To the former extent the country was unwilling to go; and it would be inhuman to shed the blood of a single soldier or seaman, to obtain a paltry object - a few acres of barren territory, which would offer us no compensation for the expense, and leave a corroding feeling in the bosom of the party, from whose fears it was extorted; and who would inevitably seize the first moment we should be engaged in war with any other power, to recover the lost territory, and obliterate the disgrace. War has but two objects: - the destruction of your antagonist, or an equitable and durable peace. Few would pursue the former; and if you wish to have a solid peace - one that would offer a prospect of continuance - you must render the terms acceptable to both parties; otherwise the suffering and humbled party will be on the alert for an opportunity to retrieve the loss or disgrace he may have suffered. So far the present treaty is a wise one, and the terms ... are honourable to this country. 98
Although an American might in 1815 have felt a bit restive under generosity so freely expressed, suspecting that that virtue was but necessity in another form, he might, had he lived long enough, have come to believe that the words had expressed a reality beyond their intent. It is difficult to recapture the feelings with which those who were interested at all greeted American peace. Certainly neither the government nor the public conceived any relation with America that depended upon Britain's consciously avoiding irritation to Americans. It was only in contemplating the mutual self-interest of complementary economies that the idea of some relationship larger than conflict presented itself, and even then generally in the light of profit or doctrine. Yet such a relationship depended ultimately on a sense of mutual acceptance that really appears to be absent in British public opinion during this period. The Treaty of Ghent was nothing, a mere truce, unless the future it might represent was created in the attitudes of the public and in the policies of the government.
CHAPTER II

The Defence of Canada

Little need be mentioned of the reaction of British military men as such to the American war. They noted its excesses, complained of its boredom, admired the courage or deplored the cowardice of their enemies. For some American war provided employment and a chance for advancement in their profession at a time when, with the end of the war in Europe, many professional soldiers were being put on half-pay. In general, the attitudes of the soldier more or less faithfully reflected those in Britain itself, and the military man given to reflection could find in the conduct of the Americans he faced ample illustration for the preconceptions, favourable or unfavourable, with which he came furnished to America. If any attitude predominated in the mind of the British soldier it was probably the same simple desire for "retribution" that no doubt animated the American soldier against whom he fought. The situation was and is not new. ¹

What is perhaps more surprising is that very little of the initiative for a correction of Canadian strategic weakness or for the exploitation of the possibilities of a successful war came from the British military. The civil authorities and Canadian commercial interests were foremost in requesting action to that end, and it is a rather frequent occurrence to find a provincial legislature or Governor suggesting a
particular strategy and Lord Bathurst in London complying and issuing orders to the military commanders to effect the desired end. It was not normal, of course, for the military to determine final goals, but the British experience in India, for example, seems to indicate a greater military influence on such determination than is here the case. Obviously involvement in Canadian events rarely led the military to espouse Canadian causes as such; and further that military opinion in this respect did not differ markedly from British opinion in general may be taken as indicating in part the truth of Canadian complaints that there was in the British public little interest in or real understanding of Canadian needs and aspirations.

The Resources of Canadian Defence

When the United States declared war, Great Britain was certainly not militarily prepared for it. Indeed the assurance, elsewhere noted, that revocation of the Orders-in-Council meant peace led Bathurst to instruct the Governor of Canada, Sir George Prevost, that "His Majesty's Government trust that you will be enabled to suspend with perfect Safety all Extraordinary Preparations for Defence, which you may have been induced to make in consequence of the precarious State of the Relations between this country and the United States." 2

Although for the previous twelve years at least threats and rumours of war had circulated on both sides of the Canadian-American borders, the requirements of the British effort in
Europe in 1812 made it impossible for any large defence force to be permanently stationed in Canada. In addition, in terms of logistics and communications the difficulties of a proper defence were enormous. The burden fell at the outbreak of war on the small number of British regulars and Canadian militia, a circumstance recognised well enough in London. Even after the war had begun, Bathurst saw no reason to expect to be able to send reinforcements to these meagre forces. Added to these difficulties was the fact that large numbers of Americans of uncertain allegiance had for the past ten years been settling in Upper Canada. Canada was to be preserved only by the incompetence of the Americans and the energetic leadership of Major-General Isaac Brock, commanding in Upper Canada.

An awareness of the weakness of their position in Canada had led the British, as early as 1807, to attempt to find some security in the friendship and even alliance of the Indians within the American borders. This attempt had been due primarily to the effect of worsening Anglo-American relations during that year as a result of the Chesapeake affair. The difficulties of British policy were great, and their diplomacy needed to be delicate. They had to maintain the friendship of the Indian, which meant, in practice, both bribing and frightening him - and at the same time restrain him, since Britain did not want to provoke a war, only prepare
for the contingency of one. In the first task the British governor-in-chief, Sir James Craig, had been eminently successful, so much so indeed that by 1811 he found himself working feverishly to restrain the enthusiasm of the Indians for war. However, by the beginning of 1812, when British officials had come to regard war with America as inevitable, little was done to hold the Indians back. The British were concerned only to give them no overt encouragement that might serve as a pretext for a declaration of war by the United States. 4

Except for the employment of Indians in the American Northwest, British war aims were at the outset strictly limited to defence. The reluctance on the part of the British government (in London, as opposed to its remote agents in the western Great Lakes) to undertake any full-scale military or naval action against the United States was reinforced by its hopes for the abortive negotiations for an armistice which Admiral Warren was conducting during the first months of the war. This reluctance was reflected to the restrictions it attempted to put on the use of the Indians.

Had it been possible to have induced the Indians to preserve a strict Neutrality, between the Americans and this Country, in the contest in which we may be engaged, the interests of Humanity might have required that we should resign the benefit of an Alliance with them and of their active co-operation with us in the field. - But, I fear, there can be little doubt that if not restrained as our friends, they will act against us as Enemies... Upon every principle of self-defence therefore we cannot but be justified in conciliating them, and

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if they are determined to engage in the War, in employing them to promote our success. — I cannot too strongly impress upon you the Necessity of keeping that Control over them which may enable you to prevent the Commission of those Excesses which are so much to be apprehended from their Employment, and which cannot fail to bring discredit upon the Power in whose service they are Engaged. It would be desirable if possible to restrain them from acting at any time except under the immediate direction and guidance of some Officers of the Indian Department. 5

It appeared that the course of the war would be determined by the use Americans might make of the opportunity British weakness provided to achieve their purpose, the conquest of Canada. The situation was clear to any Englishman reflecting on the British situation: success, if it were to come would only do so by the failure of the United States to employ its latent superiority. 6

This indeed turned out to be the case, and Canadian defensive efforts were surprisingly effective. Although now perhaps less blame attaches to General Hull's surrender at Detroit than was the case at the time the reputation gained by Isaac Brock in his conduct of the initial campaign in the West remains not less than it was then. 7 There is no question that Brock saved Canada and rallied disaffected elements to the British side by his victory and that, as a further result, the way was opened to the occupation of large areas of the American Northwest by the fur traders and Indians. To this we will return. But it should be pointed out that the surrender of Detroit was a defensive victory only. Brock
did not attempt to follow up Hull's capitulation by an invasion of the United States, and there is no indication that he believed that any permanent territorial advantage was to be gained from the war.

The question of the Indians was something else, for here the necessities of Canadian defence led Brock to advocate, albeit in somewhat vague terms, a war conducted to wrest security for the Indians from the aggressive American frontiersman. Brock was well aware that relations with the Indians were a delicate matter for the British, who could not - if they wished Indian support in the war - give any intimation that either British strategy or war aims or future policy would slight Indian interests. The immediate question which gave rise to his reflections was a proposal that Detroit should be evacuated.

...Such a measure would most probably be followed by the total extinction of the population on that side of the River, or the Indians, aware of our weakness and inability to carry on active warfare would only think of entering into terms with the enemy. - The Indians ... have been extremely suspicious of our conduct, but the violent wrongs committed by the Americans on their Territory have rendered it an act of policy with them to disguise their sentiments - Could they be persuaded that a peace between the belligerents would take place without admitting their claim to an extensive tract of country, fraudulently usurped from them, and opposing a frontier to the present unbounded views of the Americans, I am satisfied in my own mind that they would immediately compromise with the enemy. I cannot conceive a connection so likely to lead to more awful consequences.
If we can maintain ourselves at Niagara and keep the communication to Montreal open, the Americans can only subdue the Indians by craft which we ought to be prepared to see exerted to the utmost. The enmity of the Indians is now at its height, and it will require much management and large bribes, to effect a change in their policy, but the moment they are convinced that we either want the means to prosecute the War with spirit, or are negotiating a separate peace, they will begin to study in what manner they can most effectually deceive us.

Should negotiations for peace be opened I cannot be too earnest with your Excellency to represent to the King's ministers, the expediency of including the Indians as Allies, and not leave them exposed to the unrelenting fury of their enemies.

For Brock, to ignore the Indians was not merely to lose their support; it was to allow a positive accession of strength to American power. This was so not because the Indians necessarily would join in military activities against Canada but because of their lack of confidence in the ability of the British to protect them would lead them to allow such activities to take place without their opposition.

Brock's views were transmitted to London by Sir George Prevost who, in more general terms, argued the great importance to Canadian defence of maintaining the Indians in possession of the lands which they then occupied in the American Northwest. He suggested that Britain press for stipulations in their favour in any negotiations with America - particularly an agreed boundary between the Indian territories and those of the United States. Bathurst replied:
The faithful and orderly conduct of the Indian Tribes gives them a fair claim to protection and Reward, and you will not therefore hesitate to give them every assurance that in any negotiation for Peace - which may be hereafter entered into with the American Government their interests will not be forgotten.

This was the immediate origin of one of the most important British demands at Ghent two years later. Although the idea of a barrier or frontier to protect the Indians was not new, it was not one to which Americans would react any more passively in 1814 than they had in 1763. Brock clearly wished to maintain Indian alliance as an essential part of Canadian defence, and his statements imply that even in peacetime such a system would be based on the presence of allies within what Americans would consider the limits of their own borders. Brock appears to have understood clearly that such a position would be basically dependent on Indian trust of Britain and that this trust could only be gained by effective British action on their behalf. The British government, in the person of Bathurst, concurred in the general aims which Brock put forth; but, without sufficient force to insist on real guarantees for the security of the Indians - and by implication that of Canada - little could be done. If British goals were essentially defensive, their accomplishment required an offensive force that would render defence superfluous.

The resources at Brock's command in 1812 were not equal to a strategy encompassing more than defence. Indeed it might well have appeared at the outbreak of war that they were not even equal to that. After his victory at Detroit, Brock was forced to hasten to the Niagara frontier to repel another
American invasion, and there, at Queenston, he was killed. 11

In his ideas about the Indians Brock had appeared to stress their weakness and their need to be defended. In the ordinary course of events this was certainly the case, but even as he wrote the Indians were giving evidence that with British aid they might successfully advance their own cause. A month before Hull capitulated at Detroit, and under the leadership of one of Brock’s young officers, a Captain Roberts, they had done much to ensure the surprise capture of Michilimackinac from the small American garrison which had not at the time learned of the outbreak of war. The energy shown by the Indians owed much to the influence and encouragement of the fur traders, in particular Robert Dickson, who had spent the previous year trading with and ministering to the needs of the Indians of the Northwest. War with the United States had been in the air for most of 1811 and 1812, and Dickson did what he could to win the Indians over to the side of the British while at the same time restraining the immediate action that long resentment of American pressure on the frontier impelled them to. 12 At the actual outbreak of war, Dickson was able to employ a band of over one hundred warriors almost immediately. 13

"The Surrender of Michillimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction." 14 If the coming of the war found much official military opinion necessarily defensive in attitude, the fur trade and its Indian
allies were much less willing to wait upon events. The Americans were forced to evacuate their most important settlements around the shores of the western Lakes - Chicago and Green Bay - and on the upper Mississippi - Prairie du Chien. By the end of 1812 all of the area covered by the present states of Wisconsin and Michigan was controlled by the British and Indians.

Dickson lost no time in attempting to gain official recognition of his role as Indian agent, and in this he was backed by the influential body of Montreal fur traders, who were convinced that their continued prosperity depended on British control of the Northwest at the end of the war. One of these, James McGill, wrote to Prevost, supporting Dickson's proposals, "The Indians are the only Allies who can aught avail in the defence of the Canadas. They have the same interest as us, and alike are objects of American subjugation, if not extermination." 15

The Canadian government was aware of the possible importance of the western Indians and appointed Dickson agent to them. His main duties were to organize and provision them as an effective fighting force, maintaining their close alliance with the English and as far as possible restraining them from acts of cruelty and inhumanity. 16

Throughout the Spring of 1813 Dickson was carrying out his instructions and successfully countering the propaganda
of American agents. His activities bore fruit in the number of Indian warriors joining the British forces during that year. The Indians, however, were not an unmixed blessing. They were difficult to control and unaccustomed to any type of warfare other than that of the forests. Difficulties of supply were a hindrance as well. When Procter, who had succeeded Brock in command of the British forces of Upper Canada, failed to defeat the Americans at Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson during the summer and, because of this and American naval supremacy on Lake Erie, was forced to retire to Canada, the Indians melted away, many of them (as Brock had predicted) to make their peace with the Americans.

Nevertheless, Dickson continued his efforts. They were crowned with no further success during 1813; but if the Americans now dominated communications to the east, the British influence still controlled the area to the west of Michilimackinac. The fur traders might still have felt justified in believing that their prompt action had given Great Britain a permanent strategic and economic advantage in the western lakes.

In this area both opportunity and will were present from the beginning of the war. That such was the case was due no doubt to the active interest of the fur trade. The motives of the traders were self-interested, but self-interest, they felt, was in this case an accurate guide to an understanding of the greater problems of imperial defence. The
desire of the fur trader to oppose the pressure of the American frontier and thus to protect the Indians in their gathering of furs was, in choice of means, in no way divergent from the desire of the British government to secure a more or less permanent form of protection for Canada. This at any rate appears to have been the view of those Canadians directly interested. Whether or not the British government would take the same view was to be seen at Ghent.

The Northwest was the only area in which an active defence appeared to offer prospects of profit, but events there did not make much impression elsewhere. As we have already seen, Procter was unable to follow up Brock’s early successes and eventually had to give up Detroit and retire across the boundary. Nothing could be gained, it was clear, until large reinforcements should arrive from England. Until then the Canadian armies were once more on the defensive.

A third element of Canadian defence, control of the Lakes, was inherent in the geography of the frontier and in the underdeveloped state of overland transportation and communication, although this does not appear to have become completely obvious to either side until underlined by events. According to Prevost the British had naval superiority on the lakes at the beginning of the war, and good use was made of this in their campaigns in the West — for the initial victories at Detroit and Michilimackinac were materially aided by the speed and surprise thus afforded the British forces. Bathurst recognised the
significance of naval control and specifically instructed Prevost to maintain it. Only by the use made by the British of their superiority were the Americans made aware of the part that naval power might play along the Canadian frontier, but if their realisation was belated their activity once undertaken speedily assured them of superiority on Lake Erie and an uncertain equality on Lake Ontario. 17

The importance of the Lakes could not be overestimated. They formed the sole practicable East-West line of communications for the British, a line exposed moreover along its entire length to American attempts to sever it. Whichever side could dominate this vast inland waterway would have taken the first necessary step to effective invasion of the other. British domination at Michilimackinac and Detroit opened the way to the occupation of much of the Northwest. American victory on Lake Erie reversed the relative position of the two nations and allowed American forces to advance far into Upper Canada.

The importance of the contest for naval supremacy was clear, but it should be reiterated that it was important only with respect to the military situation. 18 The British effort on the lakes was primarily another aspect of her persistent attempt to compensate for Canadian numerical inferiority. Yet the same factors that had created that inferiority had their effect on the employment of naval power on the lakes,
for although reinforcements were sent out from Britain, it was recognised that the lines of supply and communication across the Atlantic were too long to enable such reinforcements to have much effect on the outcome of the struggle. After initial successes, the British, in September 1813, lost control of Lake Erie to Commodore Perry, partly because they had used their temporary superiority too passively and had allowed Perry to escape into the lake from Erie Harbour when he might have been prevented, but primarily because the strategic and logistic advantages possessed by the Americans were so great. 19

The loss of this battle emphasized the vital importance of the lakes to the British government and led Lord Bathurst to increase his exhortations to Prevost to make...

...every effort, during the Winter for the Establishment of some naval force on Lake Erie, or for the destruction of that of the Enemy. And tho' I am aware that the natural consequence of the late disaster is to diminish the hopes of success, yet the reduction of the Enemy's present superiority is of such importance, with a view to the preservation of Upper Canada, and maintenance of a communication with the Indians, that nothing but its absolute impracticability could justify its not being attempted. 20

Fortunately, control of Lake Erie, although it determined the course of the western war until the peace, was not as vital as that on Lake Ontario. Here the domination shifted back and forth, as each side alternately launched bigger ships, but this in itself was sufficient guarantee against
any American action more serious than raiding expeditions. That the Americans did use their supremacy on Ontario when they had it more vigorously than did the Canadians is some indication of the British attitude. 21 But the obvious significance of the lakes for Canadian defence was not lost on the British government, and we shall see them at Ghent putting forward claims to the exclusive military possession of their waters.

The survey thus completed of Canada's defensive capabilities has incidentally illustrated, in the persons of General Brock and Robert Dickson, the importance of leadership and determination in making the greatest use of resources that would, after all, have been inadequate against any determined American effort. There is no question that the great distance separating Canada from London precluded a direction from England of more than the most general strategy and that leadership such as Brock and Dickson exhibited was an unusually important factor in any effective operations in Canada - either offensive or defensive. Without entering into the controversy over the abilities of Governor Sir George Prevost, one must however note the responsibility which the government placed on him. Lord Bathurst's statement of this responsibility was an answer to a complaint by Prevost of a lack of detailed instructions from London.
His Majesty's Government have indeed declined giving you such instructions because it appeared to them impossible in any case to direct with advantage Military Operations in a quarter so distant, and because the peculiar circumstances of the Canadas, their imperfect Cultivation, the immense extent of their frontier, and the consequent uncertainty as to the point which might be selected for attack materially increased the general difficulty of giving such Instructions from here. H.M. Government also felt that to prescribe to you a specific plan of Campaign, formed as it must have been upon intelligence received from the Province, and which could not have been acted upon until many months after the circumstances upon which it might have been founded had occurred as a measure calculated only to add to your Embarrassments, and to fetter your judgment without diminishing your responsibility. It was therefore in every point of view considered more expedient to place at your disposal such means of defence as the Exigencies of the Service required, and to leave their direction and distribution to your own discretion, more especially as the correct view which you had expressed on the two points most essential to the Defence of the Canadas, the maintenance of a Naval Superiority on the Lakes and the uninterrupted communications with our Indian Allies, had at an early period received the Sanction of H.M. Government, and had been repeatedly called to your attention during the course of the preceding Campaign.

Canada's fate did not of course depend entirely on the number of troops stationed there or on the abilities of her governor. Nowhere was this truth more clearly illustrated than in that area in which her resources seemed most inadequate—that is on the short overland route from Lake Champlain to Montreal. There, if anywhere, Canada's best defence was to consist in American weakness, both in strategic planning and in tactics (this latter failure being amply illustrated by the campaign of General Wilkinson on the St. Lawrence.) Such a
defence, while fortunate, could never be accounted as permanent, and it is not surprising that Lake Champlain became the scene of the major Canadian military effort of the war.

Possibly one reason for American strategic ineptitude was the fact that support in the United States for the war tended to be weakest in the East and that Canada was thus protected precisely where American preponderance of manpower might have been expected to have made its greatest effect. This factor was never minimized either by the British government or the British public. The opposition of New England to the measures of the Republicans was well known, and no Englishman could have been more violent against the American government or attributed to it baser motives than some Federalists. It is not surprising that the British government should have measured the influence of the Federalists by the loudness of their complaints and have attempted to make internal American dissen­sion work for the defence of Canada.

Britain was of course precluded from the prosecution of a vigorous war by her lack of available resources in North America; but it would appear that beyond this the official British attitude at the beginning of the war, whatever signs of irritation there may have been, wavered between the passive and the conciliatory. There was much to be said for supposing that the causes of Anglo-American war had receded sufficiently to allow a peace almost as soon as war had been declared, but once America - by her rejection of Admiral Warren's overtures and by the actions of her Navy and privateers - had indicated a determined belief in the continued justification of her
belligerence, it must have appeared rather quixotic of the British to attempt to fight a war with what were for the most part the weapons of diplomacy, by the withholding of force or by its mere threat rather than by its employment.

That this was to be Britain's policy with respect to New England soon became obvious. The concessions given to the trade of New England were in part determined by the necessities of the Maritime Provinces, and indirectly by those of the West Indies. American supplies were required in both places. In addition Halifax represented an important entrepôt through which British manufactures might be smuggled into the United States. This consideration was not unimportant while Napoleon still dominated the continent of Europe. But the main factor governing British policy was the hope, largely fulfilled, that, by forbearing, the virtual neutrality of New England might be gained. On his arrival at Halifax, Warren however apparently no longer put much faith in the separation of New England and considered talk of it as merely part of "an electioneering struggle", although he continued to believe that the war should be conducted more leniently against these states than against the South. 23 Thus the successive extensions of the blockade of the American coasts did not reach New England until April of 1814, when the British government had determined on a more forceful policy.

The Use of Seapower

We have now arrived at one of the most important aspects
of British strategy: the use of her Navy. John Quincy Adams was to suggest at Ghent that Britain's power to annoy the United States along her coasts was the surest defence that Canada might have against her. There is no question that such a conclusion was warranted by the events of the war. Yet this was only part of the story. No other war aim was assumed, in such a judgment, than defence or peace. Should Britain wish for more from hostilities with America, she might use her naval force with greater precision than would mark its employment for purposes of diversion or retribution. These last were certainly foremost in the minds of the Admiralty and the Government during the first two years of the war, but Britain put forward at Ghent proposals that implied a revision, however mild, of the relative positions of the two nations occupying North America. As Britain's strongest arm, the Navy might have been expected to play some part in achieving this aim. Thus it may be possible to document the changes in British attitude and policy during the war by an examination of the extent to which those changes were reflected in naval strategy.

The question of the best use of available naval force arose early in the war. The suggestion was made by Admiral Sir Richard Keats, governor of Newfoundland and commander of that station, and debated in England, that British strength could not be applied in any massive effort of attack or
blockade because of the great demands of the European war and that a coasting warfare, one that is of sudden temporary descents on America's Atlantic shores, might provide comparatively great effects for the use of slender resources. Warren seems to have supported this view, and Lord Melville agreed that if the Admiral was correct "... the business of annoying and crippling the enemy will be more effectively as well as economically performed than by resorting to the only other alternative of maintaining constantly a large naval force on the station". 24

But, although the assistance of the Russian fleet in the Baltic (as a result of Napoleon's attack on that country) had released British forces for use against the United States and although actual British naval strength in North America amounted to almost seven times that of the Americans, that strength was at the beginning of hostilities only adequate for immediate defensive purposes. The American naval forces were outnumbered indeed, but all they required was scope not numerical superiority. And thus the British needed many times the number of ships that would give mere equality. The early victories of the American frigates and the depredations of American privateers, especially in the Bay of Fundy, made this abundantly plain. 25 Therefore, the British Navy was forced into a posture essentially defensive - directing the slow mobilization of its vast but dispersed energies to the purpose of the nullification of American ability to do
harm. Until this was accomplished - it took a surprisingly long time - further objects, such as diversion in favour of Canada, had to wait. 26

It was admitted by all concerned that the effectiveness of Admiral Warren's fleet was to be measured in the first instance by the degree of protection it could afford to the Maritime Provinces and to British trade. The forces at his command were manifestly unable to do this, and reinforcements were sent him in the Autumn of 1812, consisting of 3 Sail of the Line, one '50' and one '40'-gun ship, 8 smaller frigates and 4 sloops. 27 Yet this added preponderance was still, Warren claimed, insufficient to his ends, and he was given the authority to commission local vessels. Admiral Warren and the Admiralty were not quite in agreement about what could be done; he was continually demanding more ships and they continually complaining of his inactivity, suggesting always more vigorous measures such as the creation of a special flotilla to be assigned to the protection of Canada and Nova Scotia, the last named province being most vulnerable to American attack from the sea. But although the Admiralty confidently felt that Warren had "ample means for carrying on the War with that degree of vigour and effect which the honour of H.M. Arms, and the character and interests of the Country require" their principal object was clearly defensive, and their only suggestion for vigour was that the enemy should be 'annoyed'. That the enemy himself retained
the power of annoyance was shown a repeated warning not to allow single ships to be risked to an attack from superior force. 28

If instructions to Admiral Warren reflect a defensive attitude, they as clearly indicate the slowly growing ability of the British navy on the American station to determine the conditions under which the naval war was to be fought. The question of the best use to be made of this increasing force remained, but the alarms and excursions of the early months of the war had already limited the area of choice. And in one aspect at least choice was, by the nature of the conflict, superfluous.

A mere system of warfare could not define the extreme limits of an Anglo-American relationship which extended to areas both physically and figuratively beyond the reach of guns, but it provided nonetheless a deep if negative illustration of one of the most significant factors in that relationship: the degree to which American well-being was involved with the British domination of the seas. For as soon as the United States became an enemy of Great Britain, American commerce ceased except insofar as the British, for reasons of their own, were prepared to allow it to continue. This result of war was automatic and hardly a matter of conscious policy. Nothing could have shown more forcibly the extent to which American trade had implicitly relied on the protection of the British fleet
than the stagnation which reigned in American ports when protection became hostility. Not only were American merchantmen trading with other parts of the world swept from the seas, but even that coasting trade on which, because of the poor state of overland communication, interstate commerce so largely depended was stopped. 29

The American government had properly based its policy on the leverage which dependence on American markets and American products might give in Great Britain to American demands. The repeal of the Orders-in-Council had marked its success. Yet it had preferred to discount the complementary truth, well enough recognised by the merchants of New England, that the United States had, to use Jefferson's famous phrase, married itself to the British fleet and nation. There had been, to be sure, nothing inevitable about this, ... but we need not again explore here the ironies of Jeffersonian policy. Its results have been noted.

While Napoleon had given Great Britain her first lessons in total war, the techniques of such a system were still in their infancy and only reluctantly employed. It was of course universally appreciated that a nation might be attacked through its economy, but the British government did not apparently view such a strategy as necessary or even desirable where America was concerned. That very interdependence which made America vulnerable was felt in Great Britain. British troops in the
Peninsula needed American flour; British manufacturers needed American markets. The commercial policy which, at least at the war's beginning, dictated by these necessities and by a temporary policy of forebearance will be dealt with in the chapter following this. We are concerned now with the effects of that policy on North American naval strategy.

It is quite obvious that the British government was reluctant to employ its naval strength in a close blockade directed against American commerce. A most important reason for this was of course the prior claims of the war in Europe. Lord Melville had, as we had seen, shown that he did not wish to use the large forces necessary for such a strategy, but his evident concern, in the same letter, over the capture of the Macedonian is an indication that the activities of the American navy were to force the Admiralty into greater exertions. Americans could have accounted this as something of a minor success for a policy of gaining the attention and respect of Great Britain.

It should be stressed that the blockade of the American coasts, as it was instituted in the early stages of the war was primarily for the purpose of containing American warships and privateers, was thus a defensive measure and not one directed, except incidentally, against the American economy. A blockade of Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware was ordered from England in November 1812 and instituted in the following
month. It was extended to New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and the Mississippi in March of the following year.  

Although the Admiralty did not feel itself in command of sufficient force in American waters to justify a formal notification to neutrals of blockade along the entire coast of the United States, it nevertheless expected Admiral Warren to use his forces to watch those coasts closely.  

The Admiralty's concern over the activities of the small American navy was evidenced in a number of other ways. It found cause for annoyance in the fact that Warren had felt it necessary to use such a large part of his available force in convoy duty, since such a proceeding indicated the facility and safety with which the American navy had hitherto found it possible to put to sea. Early in 1813 the force under the Admiral's command was once again increased, and at the same time that he received notification of this he was informed of the Admiralty's disappointment that he had not yet gained those advantages which might have been expected from his already overwhelming superiority. Indeed

...Their Lordships are not only not prepared to enter into your opinion that the force on your station was not adequate to the duties to be executed, but they feel that, consistently with what other branches and objects of the public service require, it may not be possible to maintain on the Coast of America for any length of time a force so disproportionate to the Enemy as that which, with a view of enabling you to strike some decisive blow, they have now placed under your orders.
We need not consider in detail the victories gained by American ships in single combat. Not only had they no effect on the final outcome of the war; there was no indication that either the Admiralty or the Government seriously conceived of American activities on the ocean as evidence of a desire to destroy British naval supremacy. The subtlety of American indirection to this end might have been discerned behind their determination to end the British practice of impressment, but when it came to an open challenge on the seas, only the British press gave the appearance of believing in such a deeply calculated purpose. The British Navy knew otherwise; The defeat or neutralisation of American naval power held no promise for the future, and none was needed. And if the Navy had suffered an unwonted blow of its pride, it recognised by its strategy of containment that the American navy merely represented an annoyance.

There existed however no other job for Admiral Warren than the limiting of the effects of this annoyance. The Admiralty was definite in stating that the object of the reinforcements he received was the destruction of the small American Navy or the rendering it harmless in port. Once this object was obtained, Warren was directed to return the major part of his augmented force to England.33 We may see something of the balance of priorities in the minds of the Lords of the Admiralty in their intention to recall this force adequate to more extended offensive purposes.
against the United States for use in the blockade against France.

It is of course evident that if naval force was not lacking for anything in the nature of combined operations on the American coasts, military force was. There was no question of detaching troops from the Peninsula, where Wellington was waging a very difficult campaign. The only force given to Warren at first to "annoy" the Americans consisted of two battalions of Royal Marines to be stationed in Bermuda. Considerations of available force thus ruled out large-scale operations on the American coasts, although Warren had suggested early in the war, and again during its course, an attack upon New Orleans which would not only "cut off the resources of the Southern American states" but which would also have the effect of "inducing the States at present so hostile to peace."

Warren also presented plans which were to bear fruit later in the war for a series of flying attacks on the Atlantic ports. 34

Yet, if such suggestions were premature, the possibility that the use of a relatively small force might effect an important diversion for the benefit of Canada was not ignored, and in March of 1813, approximately 2,000 troops under the command of Colonel Sir Sydney Beckwith were dispatched across the Atlantic for this purpose. Bathurst's instructions to him and the Admiralty's to Warren are interesting in that they
show the considerations which governed this first attempt in
the war to translate naval preponderance into advantage on
land, as well as a slight difference in emphasis between the
military and naval views of the proposed expedition.

It having been judged expedient to effect a
diversion on the Coasts of the United States of
America in favour of Upper and Lower Canada, which
the American government have declared to be their
intention to wrest from his Majesty in the course
of the ensuing campaign, Sir J.B. Warren will
receive instructions to direct a squadron to
proceed with the Troops named in the margin
towards those places on the Coast, where it may
appear to him most advisable that a descent should
be made...

...You are not to look to the permanent
possession of any Place, but to re-embarking the
force as soon as the immediate object of each
particular attack shall have been accomplished...

...As the object of the expedition is to
harass the Enemy by different Attacks, you will
avoid the risk of a general Action, unless it
should become necessary to secure your
retreat...

...If you shall be enabled to take such a
position as to threaten the Inhabitants with the
destruction of their property, you are hereby
authorized to levy upon them contributions in
Plate and Money in return for your forebearance.
But you will not by this understand that the
magazines belonging to the government, or their
Harbours, or their shipping are to be included in
such an arrangement.

You will on no account give encouragement to
any disposition which may be manifested by the
Negroes to side against their masters. - the
Humanity which ever influences His Royal Highness
must make him anxious to protest against a system
of warfare which must be attended by the Atrocities
inseparable from (occurrences) of such a description...
Individual Negroes, if threatened with the vengeance of their masters, should be encouraged to enlist in the Black Corps.

You are in no case to take Slaves away, as Slaves, but as free Persons whom the public becomes bound to maintain. This circumstance as well as the difficulty of transport will make you necessarily cautious how you contract any engagements of this nature.

My Lords cannot at this distance decide on what may be the most advantageous employment of this force; they entrust the choice of the object to your judgment on the actual view you may have of the advantage of the King's Service, and the state of the Enemy's, compared with the means military and naval which may be at your disposal; against a maritime country like America, the chief Towns and Establishments of which are situated upon navigable Rivers, a force of the kind under your orders must necessarily be peculiarly formidable, while its operations may be carried on with comparative ease and security, as it will rarely, if ever, be necessary to advance so far into the country as to risk its power of retreating to its embarkation.

In the choice of objects of attack it will naturally occur to you that on every account any attempt which has the effect of crippling the Enemy's naval force should have a preference; but beyond this general recommendation and the directions stated in Sir S. Beckwith's instructions, My Lords cannot, on the information now before them, venture to proceed... Select... and... execute those particular objects which may offer the greatest advantages with the least comparative risks.

...Circumstances may arise to render it necessary to employ the force under Beckwith's orders in the defence of Canada... In the event of any unforeseen disaster occurring to H.M. Army in Canada of such a nature as to endanger the safety of that province, you should be at liberty to apply the whole military force under your orders to the preservation of H.M. North American dominions without any reference to the specific object for which the force was originally detached...
With respect to these instructions the following should be noted: The intention to strike where the enemy was most vulnerable, the implication of a punitive strategy but one well qualified by a desire for moderation in its conduct, the use of naval force as part of a large-scale strategy of Canadian defence. These points are perhaps obvious, but they will be useful as a reference in the context of a developing war purpose.

The troops under Beckwith, in fact, accomplished little, and Warren complained, probably justly, that he did not have an adequate force to launch any serious attempts on positions along the American coastline. Yet he did believe that his presence there did compel the American government to keep troops in the area of Chesapeake Bay that might otherwise have been employed against Canada. Colonel Beckwith agreed.37

The immediate American threat on the sea had been more spectacular yet more capable of being met than that on land; but in both cases the secondary importance of the American war was evident. British policy was to remain by and large defensive in nature until the possibility of the use of increased force was presented by the end of the war against France. There is no indication that the execution of a definite and agreed policy merely waited upon the availability of adequate means. It would be more true to say that policy and execution waited together and that Britain would be led to a determination of war aims more by "the
lessons of the war" and the demands of interested colonial
groups than by any long-standing line of conduct towards
America.

The diminishing number of American naval successes and
finally the defeat of the Chesapeake by the Shannon early in
1813 made it clear that a remedy had been found for British
overconfidence. From this moment on the story on the seas
was the slow and effective constriction exercised on American
initiative by the convoy system and the blockade. The
Admiralty, in March of 1813, pressed on Admiral Warren the
desirability of putting all the American ports in a "state
of permanent and close blockade". The purpose of this was
primarily to prevent American commerce-destroyers from
gaining the high seas. The blockade was instituted on the
major ports along the Atlantic coast south of New York, and
at the mouth of the Mississippi. Yet Warren still did
not have enough force to maintain a full and complete
blockade, as was indicated by the distinction made by the
Admiralty between a notified blockade and a de facto one.

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having
understood that an opinion has obtained in this
Country that the blockade of the American Ports
and Harbours was to be confined to those places
the blockade of which has been notified in the
Gazette, I am, to prevent any misapprehension,
commanded to refer you to my letter of the 10th of
February last, recommending to your attention a
blockade of all Ports from which the Enemy was
likely to annoy the Trade of H.M.'s Subjects, and
to acquaint you that their Lordships expect and
direct you to maintain a blockade de facto of every
port to which your force may be adequate and which
shall afford any facilities, either to the Privateers or Merchant Ships of the Enemy.

H.M.'s Government has notified a blockade of certain Ports only because it is considered that for this purpose your force will be always adequate, and that it may be concluded that you will be able to maintain throughout the year such a blockade most strictly, but this is by no means intended to interfere with your authority to establish blockades de facto, of any other Ports, whenever you think proper, warning off or back such neutrals as may, before they have heard of the de facto blockade attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port.

My Lords understand that it is apprehended that the Enemy will endeavour to turn the Channel of their Trade from the blockaded Ports to others which are not so, particularly to the Southward... You are to... use every means in your power to interrupt both the Coasting and Foreign commerce of the Enemy and to follow with new measures of hostility any attempts they may make to evade those which you may have already enforced.

...By an attention to this point and to... the still more important of affording to British Trade frequent and adequate Convoys, the resources of the Enemy will be crippled and impaired and the Commerce of H.M.'s Subjects facilitated and protected.

The blockade was closing in and becoming much less defensive in character as the threat of American naval activity receded. Although even up to the end of the war one of the principal tasks of the British squadrons remained the close restriction of the United States' warships to their home ports, the way became increasingly open during 1813 to use of British naval superiority for more vigorous purposes. What remained to be seen was whether or not the use to be made of the Navy would in any way reflect expanded war aims.
But before we attempt to explore any changes in British intention, it may be well at this point to summarize briefly the attitude of the British government to the war during the first year or so of hostilities. Britain's aims remained throughout 1813 what they had been at the beginning of the war: defensive and essentially pacific. This was a policy to a great extent determined by demands placed on British resources by the war against Napoleon. Yet there is little indication that any overall policy or goal had been formulated that merely required force adequate to allow it to be put into execution. That a desire for retribution was present at the beginning of the war and that it grew as the war progressed was certainly true - available British force was often put at its service - but such a desire could not be called a policy and in so far as it reflected any other purpose it was directed to the defence of Canada. On the whole the British, even when their available forces might have been put at the service of an aggressive policy, preferred to protect Canada by means that we might call "diplomatic", that is: by the encouragement of the Indian alliance, by the establishment of naval supremacy on the Lakes, by favouring New England and thus in effect creating a temporary buffer state in the Northeast, by depriving Americans of the ability to do harm on the high seas, by threatening action along the American coasts. By and large these methods were successful in what they set out to do and
that very success led the British into the attempt to make their gains — in their nature temporary and valid only for the duration of the war except insofar as they might be recreated in the case of another war — permanent. This was another matter indeed, involving much more than adroit manoeuvring of forces or a merely defensive military strategy. Americans might find themselves balked of their desire for Canada and for the decisive humiliation of the British fleet, but they would logically resist the conclusion that having failed to win they had thereby lost. If Britain wished to make her defensive gains permanent, she would have to make peace at that price attractive to America. This implied a much greater and more purposive military effort than had hitherto been in evidence.

The British government had of course been aware of the possible value that might accrue from victory in North America. As the Prime Minister wrote to Wellington only a few months after the beginning of the war, Hull's surrender of Detroit and the consequent opening up of the Michigan Territory placed Great Britain "on a footing in that Quarter of the World on which we have never stood from the Period of American Independence." But if unexpected gain was to be welcomed, there were, as we have seen, inadequate available resources to pursue such gains actively. However high British hopes were to become, however explicit her war aims, this weakness remained, and until the end of the war the basic British policy was one of waiting on events rather than
the making of all-out efforts to influence them.

The Ultimate Security of Canada.

British means may have been perpetually inadequate, but there was a growing disposition by the end of 1813 and throughout the last year of the war to use them as effectively as possible, a developing conception of what should be and might be gained by increased vigour. As the war progressed it was only to be expected that the British government should become increasingly sceptical of American motives and increasingly convinced of the consequential necessity for a more active prosecution of the war. Although a disposition to believe in a serious American threat to British seapower was quieted by the obvious success of the Navy in nullifying that threat, American designs on Canada assumed thereby a greater relative and absolute significance. Hull's proclamation at the beginning of the war, strongly reflecting American annexation sentiment, was constantly brought up in the British press during the war and certainly appears to have had its effect on the British government as well. Ministers were no doubt more willing to heed the growing barrage of exhortation, advice and complaint from Canadian interests when American actions seemed ample proof of many of the Canadian claims. Added to this was the propaganda of New England Federalism, which never tired of accusing President Madison of conducting a war of aggression rather than, as he claimed, one of honour and defence.
The existence of such attitudes implied the development of a more active conception of defence. The explanation lies perhaps in nothing more subtle than the natural strengthening of wartime bad temper. However effective British caution might be in preventing the Americans from repeating their early spectacular victories at sea it was not a very satisfying release for injured pride. Thus it is not surprising that the blockade took on an aspect of retribution in the eyes of some naval men. While the blockade did not extend to New England it seemed only just that its greatest effect should fall on the South, the section of Jefferson and Madison, inveterate enemies of Great Britain.

With more substance the point was often made that the activity of the Navy in preventing American commerce from reaching the outside world would have a significant restraining effect on American ability to wage war. One could not read into the instructions of the Admiralty any settled desire to destroy American competition to British commerce - although such a result was not unwelcome. It is more likely that it was becoming clear that the merely restrictive activities of the British navy would take away from the Americans the ability to wage an effective war and would provide in addition a strong motive for their abating those maritime pretensions which were the cause of the war.

And finally one must note the merely punitive aspect of the employment of British force. In failure Americans were merely getting what they deserved, but the way was open to
more specific revenge. America should be made to feel the consequences of the war she had invoked. There were of course individual variations. Admiral Warren apparently only wished for a termination of a conflict which had little real purpose. 42 But his successor, Sir Alexander Cochrane was of a much more bellicose frame of mind and in this he probably reflected the attitudes of his superiors in the Admiralty, for his conduct was clearly more welcome there than Warren's had been. Thus the Navy under Cochrane's command assumed the appearance of a floating police force, dispatched to exact a just retribution and to threaten retaliation where necessary. Such a purpose had been evident from an early date in the war. 43 In May of 1813 Bathurst had threatened that if President Madison should, as he had indicated he would, revenge on British subjects Indian excesses in the West, the British Navy would exact its own retribution on the Atlantic coasts of the United States. He further threatened to encourage a slave rebellion in the South. 44 The instructions to Beckwith already quoted implied a like ability and a like intention to employ naval preponderance for non-naval ends.

At the same time as the British mood was becoming harder, prospects improved for an increased use of force against the United States. As Napoleon was pushed back into France, ships hitherto on blockade duty around the European coasts as well as soldiers victorious in the Peninsula might be liberated for use in North America. Although other considerations strictly
limited the number of troops that Britain was in the end able to send to America, there is certainly every indication she was ready to employ force against the United States.\textsuperscript{45}

The defence of Canada was of course the principal object of the government, and at the beginning all reinforcements had been absorbed by that immediate need. Colonel Beckwith's troops, initially used for operations in the Chesapeake, were soon sent to reinforce the defences on the Lakes.\textsuperscript{46} The weakness of the Americans and the limited successes obtained over them encouraged the British Government to believe in the possibility of more active measures. As early as July of 1813, a suggestion was made by Bathurst that the reinforcements received by Prevost (although these were limited in number) might be used "to convert, if necessary, your defensive into offensive operations". But he also added "that H.M.'s Government would feel great difficulty in recommending any offensive operation which should lead you a great distance from your frontier."\textsuperscript{47}

In view of this continuing weakness, less likely to be quickly remedied on land than on sea, it is not surprising that the chief theatre for a warfare of increased vigour was to be found along the Atlantic. The possibility that force might be employed against the American coast to serve as a diversion in favour of Canada had been contemplated from a time early in the war. A persistent plan was for an attack in the area of Chesapeake Bay. It was expected that such an attack would take place early in 1814, but this had to be
called off, as the troops had been needed in Canada. As a result, Admiral Cochrane's instructions to Admiral Cockburn, commanding in Chesapeake Bay, confined him at first to the acquisition of information about the strength of the American forces. 48

There is little evidence before May of 1814 of instructions directed specifically to the gaining of territory for the purposes of the coming negotiation. It was in that month that the approaching victory over Napoleon allowed over 3,000 men to be sent from the Gironde to America. But the commander of these troops was given orders that had obviously been drawn up with continual reference to those issued a year previously to Colonel Beckwith. The principle object of H.W.'s forces, even as their capability grew, remained diversion, harassment, retaliation. 49

The expedition against Washington, when it came in August 1814, did not represent any change in British strategy. The objects of activity along the coasts remained largely what Admiral Warren and Lord Melville had defined them as early in the conflict. No specific instructions directed the expedition, although the American capital had been mentioned, among other places, as a possible object of attack. But if the strategy of harassment and diversion was the same as it had always been, the spirit which animated it was new.

The flames of Washington expressed wonderfully well the purposes of the British government. A deepening
hostility towards America had chosen the determination of Admiral Cochrane and the ability of General Ross for the execution of its intention, and in giving them the necessary reinforcements, had evidenced its will. Before the attack the Admiral had stated that he had "...it much at heart to give [the Americans] a drubbing before peace is made". The enthusiasm with which the government greeted its success at Washington showed that he had accurately voiced its purpose. 50

Much has been made of the attack as an act of retribution for certain American excesses in Canada and as a result of Sir George Prevost's request to Admiral Cochrane that he punish the Americans for these. 51 But this request was merely the occasion for the exercise of a power for which the growing spirit of retribution would have, in any case, soon found employment. The burden of this spirit was that the consequences of war should be made immediately apparent to those who had so unjustly resorted to war. The War Office, indeed, appeared to feel that the lesson had not been sufficiently clear. In reference to the projected attack on Baltimore, Ross was exhorted "If you could make its inhabitants feel a little more the effects of your visit than what has been experienced at Washington, you would make that portion of the American people experience the consequences of war, who have most contributed to its existence." 52

In this the use of military force merely reflected the general state of British opinion, but there were the further considerations that the attack would detain American troops
which might be otherwise sent against Canada and that, in the future, the lesson of American vulnerability along the Atlantic frontier might serve as a defence for Canada less tangible but more effective than any cession of territory. If the spirit of retribution and retaliation in which the attack on Washington was undertaken had any greater significance this was it.

That the British government was tending to rely less on the withholding of force than on its use is shown by the approval of Cochrane's decision to extend the blockade to the ports north of New York. His avowed reasons were that contraband of war was reaching the United States, that the American government was being materially aided by the revenues accruing to it by reason of the New England trade, and that, finally, Britain herself with the opening of the Continental markets no longer needed to trade with the enemy. What is noteworthy is the determination of the government to override the objections of Canadian merchants as well as its obvious opinion that New England secession was not an event in which to place much hope. It is significant that in explaining the extension of the blockade to the complaining merchants of Halifax, Cochrane stressed its importance for the security of Canada. This was in marked contrast to the policy of the first period of the war, in which it was felt that Canada's security lay rather in an appeased and unblockaded New England. 53
This did not mean that the British government renounced all hope of action on the part of New England, but rather that their belief was now that those states might be more easily goaded than coddled into secession. At any rate, the British government continued to show itself willing to support a move for independence both morally and with supplies. What Britain would not do, however, was engage itself in a promise of alliance or active military assistance. Here was, a gain, the hope of a cheap defence for Canada.

In the nature of things, British force could be brought to bear more readily along America’s Atlantic frontier than along her Canadian one. On the coasts the British navy had only to garner the fruits of an inherent superiority. Although much more had been accomplished by the British in Canada than anyone at the beginning of the war would have had a right to expect, the situation there remained a difficult, if not hopeless, one. The government, as we have seen, defined the aims of Canadian defence as the maintenance of communication with the Indians and of superiority on the lakes. While Britain could not be said to be, at the end of 1813, in secure possession of either of these advantages, the hopes of the government were sanguine and indeed appeared to extend to the possibility of limited offensive operations. Bathurst wrote to Prevost:

I am perfectly aware that the Superiority which the Enemy has acquired on Lake Erie and the Power which they may there derive of interrupting your Communication may impose upon you the Necessity of abandoning for a time the more distant parts of the Upper Province and
may thus obstruct your intercourse with the Indian Nations and although the fidelity of those nations has hitherto been proof against the insidious attempts of the Enemy, yet I see too much reason to fear that unless the Communication is restored they will be compelled to renounce their Alliance with this country. The primary object of your exertions therefore will be to open an intercourse with them - H.M.'s government see but two modes by which this can be effected, either by recovering the command of Lake Erie or by establishing a new channel of Communication through Lake Huron, independent of the other Lake...

But in attending to the Creation of a Naval Force on Lake Huron you will not relax your Exertions for the increase of the existing Flotillas on the other Lakes - You must be aware that on Lake Ontario more particularly the Contest for Naval Supremacy will be renewed at the Commencement of the ensuing Campaign and that its success will depend on the exertions which you may be able to make during the Winter for increasing the number and efficiency of the Fleet under Sir James Yeo...

The preservation of the Fleet under his command is (next to the destruction of the Enemy) the object most essential for the security of Canada. - So long as it remains entire the Enemy are precluded from attempting with any hopes of success the attack for which their means are preparing and their Troops collected. Of the numbers of the Enemy's force tho' considerably increased, I confess that I feel but little apprehension, when I consider the number and composition of the force by which they will be opposed. It is as you observe not sufficient to conceive the idea of moving Armies in concert from different Quarters to act simultaneously on a given point, and I cannot but hope that previous to the execution of the Project an opportunity may yet be afforded you of separately attacking one of those Armies before it can be supported and thus either repairing the failure of this campaign or of opening the next with Vigour and Success. 54

Prevost responded to such promptings neither vigorously nor enthusiastically. Although a limited success was obtained in the reinforcement of Michilimackinac by a small number of
bateaux constructed on Lake Huron, the Governor continued
to conceive of the British position in Canada in strictly
defensive terms and to act accordingly. This was shown
by his readiness, in May of 1814, to enter into talks with
the Americans for an armistice which was to last for the
duration of the negotiations for peace. Of such a
proposal the British government emphatically disapproved:

It is the wish of H.M.'s government to press
the war with all possible vigour up to the moment
when peace shall be concluded. A proposition
to continue the Armistice during the Negotiation
is very contrary to this system...

If...you have been persuaded to conclude an
Armistice...you are hereby instructed...forthwith
to make known to the American government that you
have received peremptory orders to put an end to
the Armistice after due Notification. 56

The government, in sending large numbers of the Duke of
Wellington's Peninsular veterans to Canada as reinforcements,
had already made it clear that they no longer considered
defensive strategy as the limit of their expectations.
Indeed they began to think in terms of the victories which
might be gained by this large additional force and then
translated into permanent advantages in the Treaty of Peace.
The demands to be made at Ghent were thus strongly reflected
in the instructions sent two months earlier to Prevost.
Obviously the British were relying on the effectiveness of
their military power to achieve very greatly expanded war
purposes.
When this force shall be placed under your command His Majesty's Government conceive that the Canadas will not only be protected for the time against any attack which the enemy may have the means of making, but it will enable you to commence offensive operations on the Enemy's frontier before the close of the Campaign. At the same time it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the Interior of the American Territory as might commit the safety of the Force placed under your command. The object of your operations will be; first, to give immediate protection; secondly to obtain if possible ultimate security to His Majesty's possessions in America.

The entire destruction of Sackett's Harbour and the Naval Establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain come under the first description.

The maintenance of Fort Niagara and so much of the adjacent territory as may be deemed necessary and the occupation of Detroit and the Michigan Country come under the second.

If our success shall enable us to terminate the war by the retention of the Fort of Niagara, and the Restoration of Detroit and the whole of the Michigan Country to the Indians, the British frontier will be materially improved. Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champlain the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will if you deem it expedient expel the Enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, always however taking care not to expose His Majesty's Forces to being cut off by too extended a line of advance.

If you should not consider it necessary to call to your assistance the two Regiments which are to proceed in the first instance to Halifax, Sir J. Sherbrooke will receive instructions to occupy as much of the District of Maine as will secure an uninterrupted intercourse between Halifax and Quebec.

Influenced more by the caution which qualified his instructions than by those instructions themselves, Prevost continued
to hang back, stating that it was his intention to confine himself to defence until he had gained complete ascendancy on the lakes. To this Bathurst replied with some asperity that offensive operations against the American bases on Lake Ontario were so well calculated to gain that ascendancy that a failure to undertake such measures would "very seriously disappoint the Expectations of the Prince Regent and of the Country". Prevost finally began, at the end of August 1814 (and before receiving Bathurst's latest admonition referred to above), the movement which ended in his defeat at Plattsburgh. Although Wellington was to suggest later that no one could have achieved what the British government required, Prevost discovered that failure was as disappointing in London as inactivity, and he was recalled to England so that he might explain himself on both counts. 58

The campaigns under Prevost, if the most important attempt to gain "ultimate security for the Canadas", were not the only one. Some months earlier, in April, orders had been sent to Admiral Cochrane for the occupation of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and it was directly stated that the Government wished these islands to be occupied because of the approaching negotiations with the United States. 59 We do not know who initiated this action, but it is likely that the process of decision was much the same as that with respect to the occupation of Machias and Castine in Maine a few months later. Here again the object was the gaining of advantage at the
peace. That object was avowedly military, and as such not unlikely to appeal to the concerns of Government. The New Brunswick House of Assembly in its Spring session had petitioned for the occupation of as much of the territory of Maine as would allow for the constructions of an overland military route from the Maritime Provinces to Quebec. This had, incidentally, probably been one of the purposes of the British negotiators who had settled this particular boundary in rather vague terms at Paris in 1783. Bathurst, therefore, sent instructions that this be done, and despite the fact that Prevost was unwilling to proceed with more than a small and token occupation of territory, Governor Sherbrooke was successful in carrying out this purpose. His letter to Bathurst is important in showing the influence that colonial voices had on the making of policy of this sort.

I am of course, ignorant of the intentions of H.M. Government respecting the boundary line to be drawn between us and the United States, but I hope I shall not be deemed presumptuous in suggesting that if any incursion is to be made into American territory from these provinces, the most desirable plan would be for us to occupy the Penobscot with a respectable force and to take that river (which was the old frontier of the State of Maine) as our boundary, running a line from its source in a more westerly direction than that which at present divides us from the Americans. 60

The most striking use of the newly available force was at Washington and, as we have seen, directed to defensive and punitive purposes. The second large-scale operation was directed against New Orleans. Because of the slowness of communication, this battle was fought after peace was signed and its outcome was in that respect at least meaningless.
Thus attention has never been fully directed at the process by which this expedition came about or the reasons behind it. This is unfortunate, since much more was expected from victory at New Orleans than had been at Washington or Baltimore. Bathurst's instructions to Ross reveal a policy that is sweeping indeed, far beyond anything contemplated previously in the war.

The campaign against New Orleans had its origins in considerations very similar to those obtaining at the other end of the Mississippi. Here, too, the Indian alliance was a governing factor, one which might occupy American strength so that it would find little time for mischief in Canada. The Indians of the present states of Alabama and Mississippi, after sustaining crushing defeats at the hands of Andrew Jackson, turned to the British to help them regain their position. Cochrane responded by sending a Captain Pigot, first to open talks with the Indians, then to supply them with arms, ammunition and training in their use. There was no intention on the part of the British to do more initially than harass the Americans by the use of these Indians within their borders, and certainly no suggestion was made that the southern Indians might be granted a status of guaranteed neutrality similar to that proposed for those of the Northwest.

The reports sent by Pigot encouraged Cochrane into believing that an attack on New Orleans was feasible, and a long list of questions concerning that area was sent to Pigot. The British government showed itself enthusiastic for the project.
They were unable however to send the number of men that Cochrane had said was necessary and to which they had initially agreed. And they gave their approval should Cochrane decide to change the object of the expedition. With his assurance that the reduced number would be adequate approval was again given. 62

Whatever the Admiral's motives for so warmly forwarding this expedition (The historian of the Army attributed his enthusiasm to that love of prize money which characterised sailors, and more particularly Scottish sailors. 63), those of the government were clear enough. The expedition was to secure the mouth of the Mississippi and deprive the back settlements of access to the sea, a purpose obviously directed against the American spirit of expansion which had caused the war. It was hoped that the British forces could gain some valuable possession "by the restoration of which we may improve the conditions of peace." General Ross, to whom these instructions were addressed before his death at Baltimore was known, was given the option of attacking the back country of Georgia, presumably from the Spanish possessions in Florida. He was also instructed to cultivate the good will of the Spanish and of the Indians "upon whose Territory the American government has made the most unjustifiable encroachment."

In general terms then, we have the clearest indication of a British attempt to create military advantages that could either become permanent at the peace or be used to barter for
some such advantage. But there was more than this. Although at the time (1803) Great Britain had welcomed the purchase of Louisiana from the French because it seemed to put an end to Napoleon's American aspirations, there were now indications that Britain was not unwilling to preside over a large-scale territorial readjustment in this area. Although realising that little could be done without the active co-operation of the inhabitants of Louisiana, Bathurst stated that "with their favour... on the other hand we may expect to rescue the whole province of Louisiana from the United States." The prospects then were either that the territory would become independent or that it would revert to Spain, although the latter alternative was preferable. - An ambitious programme, one which it was obvious Britain would not and could not carry out unaided. More than once in these instructions stress was laid on the intention of Britain to give support to the inhabitants only if they wished it and to discourage, in any event, any tendency on their part to "place themselves under the Dominion of Great Britain." The British saw here as they did not see in the Northwest that to oppose American expansion was to become involved in conflicts that might be never-ending. If it was possible for others to assume this burden, whether they be Indians, New Englanders, or Spaniards, Britain would be only too happy, but in the case of Louisiana at least she was not even willing to make the establishment of the situation she thus encouraged a sine qua non of peace. It is possible that the British government expected the question
of Louisiana to enter into the negotiations. The frequent argumentation of the British Commissioners on that subject, although basically irrelevant to topics under discussion at Ghent, has the appearance of having been prepared for use in more auspicious circumstances. But although Britain's conception of a barrier along the Mississippi to American expansion was far-reaching, it was secondary to her desire to wrest some concrete advantage for the defence of Canada from the negotiations for peace. This is borne out by a letter following the main instructions, in which Bathurst strongly urged Ross to keep the War Office immediately informed of his progress. 64

The Peace of Ghent, and Prospects for Canadian Defence.

The British government had initially considered its military aims as purely defensive, but as the war progressed and forces were released from the European war, it began to appear that Great Britain might legitimately make use of the American conflict to gain a more permanent security for Canada. As described at Ghent, this security required the creation of an Indian buffer state in the West, British military occupation of the Great Lakes, and the retention of certain strong points along the Canadian borders, either to block any future American attempts at invasion or to secure an uninterrupted communication behind the frontier. Such expanded goals, it was recognised, could only be won by force of arms. Thus the policy of the government was to engage in offensive operations while the negotiations were
under way - in hopes, first that an increased pressure on them might lead the Americans to accede to British demands, secondly that Britain might make concrete territorial gains which would justify her demands, especially for the revision of boundaries. Although her effort in the latter respect may be said to have partially succeeded, her failure in the former was manifest. Such a failure made such a success without consequence. For to whatever justification continued possession of Niagara and part of Maine presented to the British government, the United States Commissioners at Ghent - by refusing to conclude peace on the basis of it - proved themselves blind. British activity and demands had, indeed, served rather to stiffen then to soften American resolve, and her major exercise of force at Plattsburgh had resulted only in American victory.

It remained for the Duke of Wellington to point the obvious conclusion. Because of circumstances having nothing to do with the American war, he was offered the command in Canada early in November 1814. The government believed that if any military profit was to be made there the Duke was the man most fit for the task, and that should peace require a retreat from stated British demands, it would be more palatable made by him than by any other. Although Wellington had himself felt that his presence might be required in North America, a further consideration led him to resist the offer made by the Earl of Liverpool. It was his opinion, Wellington said, that the British forces neither had gained nor could gain any military advantage which might justify a demand for the
cession of territory from the United States. Without naval superiority on the lakes it was "...impossible to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy, which, with those superior means might with reasonable hopes of success be undertaken..." This was a criticism of the British position not only at the time he wrote but throughout the war as well. 65

The effect of this opinion on the British government was great, but as we shall see, there were other than purely military reasons why the government chose to abandon its attempts to win an "ultimate security" for Canada by force of arms. Sheer indifference was perhaps, as disgruntled Canadians were prone to complain, not the least of these reasons. But one should not be mislead either by this apparent indifference or by any conception of a sudden flowering of Anglo-American friendship at Ghent into a belief that Great Britain, in making peace, had resigned Canada into the keeping of American good-will. For if the British government no longer looked to military victory in war, it had nonetheless been made aware of the importance of military defence in the protection of its Canadian provinces. Indeed the fact that such an awareness became embodied in a policy of strengthening Canada's ability to resist was one of the most important results of the War of 1812. 66

It may be as well, before examining this policy, to stress its limits. In no sense could it be said that Britain sought the renewal of war in North America. Having
learned that war was possible and preparing for its possible renewal, she also desired the reduction of any friction that might lead to such a result. Thus, although initially tempted to claim that the inclusion of the Indians in the Treaty gave Great Britain some right of protection over them, she wisely (at least for Anglo-American relations) left them in the care of the conscience of the American frontiersman and encouraged them to accept the security thus offered them by the peace. 67 And a desire to avoid the antagonisms that an armaments race on the lakes might call forth, coupled with a fear that American logistic advantages there were too great to be overcome in any such contest, led to the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, providing for demilitarisation there.

Except for its expressed intention to double the number of troops to be garrisoned in Canada, the British government made little immediate attempt to reorganise or strengthen Canadian military defences. It should be mentioned, however, as one of the ultimate results of the war, that within four years of its end such a strengthening had been well begun. 68 But the major immediate effort was directed to redressing somewhat the great advantages in numbers possessed by the United States and thus improving Canada's ability to defend herself. For it was generally recognised that whenever the United States might be able, as it was not during the war, to make its preponderance in population felt then Canada was doomed. Even before it became clear that Canadian security was to gain little but peace at Ghent, preparations
had been under way in Britain to encourage settlement in
Canada. 69 Obviously no immigration could in a few years
make up for Canada's deficit in numbers, but it was hoped
that by settling retired soldiers in positions of strategic
importance some degree of defence would be provided in case
of future hostilities. In addition, in time of peace the
movement of Americans across the borders might be prevented.
These offers were in the first instance made to troops
serving in Canada, but after the war encouragement, by the
offer of free passage, was extended to the Scottish High-
landers as well. It was also considered important to turn
the spontaneous emigration which appeared quickly at the end
of the war away from the United States and into channels more
beneficial to imperial defence. 70

The importance placed on an increased population can be
seen in the suggestions made by Sir George Murray early in
1815. Sir George Prevost, owing to his failure to achieve
what had been expected of him, was relieved of his position
as governor-general and recalled to England. News of this
was carried to him by Murray, a veteran of the Peninsular
War, who was appointed provisional lieutenant-governor by
Prevost's successor. Murray was in Canada less than five
months before returning to England, but while he remained
he sent home interesting analyses of what he felt were the
requirements of Canadian defence. His suggestions were
based on the realities of Canadian geography rather than
on the experience of the war.

128
As to the security of the British Power in these Provinces, it appears to me that the roots of that Power are at the sea; and that in strengthening it we should proceed from the base upwards, and not begin at the other extremity.

The area which he felt most needed strengthening was that part of the St. Lawrence between Montreal and Lake Ontario. He suggested that the harbour at Kingston (the principal naval base on Lake Ontario, located where the St. Lawrence flowed out of it) be widened and that the Fort there be resited to cover the dockyard and shipping. But he stressed that the most immediate object was the increase of the population of the area by immigration from England. As well as increasing the inherent strength of the frontier, such settlements would also act as protection for the line of communication between Montreal and Kingston and make possible the construction of a road.

Murray was equally concerned with the way in which these settlements were to be made, emphasising the benefits to be gained if the government could "establish a considerable mass of [emigrants] together, in preference to scattering them about accidentally". Such a grouping would enhance their military value of course, but he was equally concerned with the problem of maintaining the loyalty of the new settlers. The importance of a loyal and enthusiastic population had been recognised at the beginning of the war by General Brock, who did much to rally its support behind his efforts. Lord Bathurst, too, was aware of this problem.
Murray felt that one advantage of concentrating new settlement was that it would have the effect of keeping in the emigrants an attachment to the Crown. This apprehension as to the weakening effect of American influence may be seen equally in his belief that no English-speaking settlers should be planted in areas immediately contiguous to the frontier because of the likelihood that they would "... assimilate themselves ultimately with their Southern neighbours." 71

Murray had not come to Canada to direct the reorganisation of its defences, nor was his advice, apparently, solicited by the government. Yet his suggestions form a relevant appreciation of the military consequences of the Treaty of Ghent.

The War of 1812 had no lasting effect on the real relative military positions of Great Britain and the United States in North America. The campaigns of the war served to illustrate those positions without forcing either side to accept the full consequences of its weakness. The United States found no useful way of translating undoubted advantages of population and proximity into military victory. The American Navy was allowed a number of spectacular victories before its activity was stifled by the quiet preponderance of Britain's convoys and blockades. That preponderance had opened the way to Washington but was able to do nothing to prevent defeat at Baltimore and New Orleans. The British Army, having been given time and opportunity to array its superior strength was unable, at Plattsburgh because of a
failure of leadership, at New Orleans because of an under-
estimation of the enemy, to force the United States to
make sacrifices for the sake of peace.

The Treaty of Ghent, in reverting to the *status quo ante
bellum* was thus an accurate expression of the military results
of the war. The failures on both sides, however, were
salutary. Neither had suffered the concrete losses which
might have appeared to make a revanche a matter of military
necessity or national pride. Each had achieved a degree of
success which might serve as matter for self-congratulation
while, if irrationally, quieting fears for the future. Yet
the element of luck in those victories made it unlikely that
the adventure would be repeated by the United States or
encouraged to recur by Great Britain. Shadowy assumptions
such as these were not, properly speaking, in the realm of
realistic military thinking, but they served an important
purpose in finally precluding the necessity of such thought.
The long peace which was to be the good fortune of North
America was due, in part at least, to the fact that celebrating
its victories in its traditions, each side remembered its
defeats in its policies.
CHAPTER III

The United States and the British Economy

However important questions of prestige or of the military situation in North America might appear to the average Englishman, it would not have been difficult to find many who felt that of the factors governing the relationship between the United States and Great Britain the most significant were economic. Such a belief often involved, as well, a commitment to a particular view of Anglo-American politics in terms of much broader considerations. Relations with the United States had long been a focus for those Britons interested, often vitally interested, in the economic policies of their country. The repeal of the Orders-in-Council was not merely an incident in Anglo-American history; it was as much the first important victory for the British manufacturing interest in its long struggle for free trade and, conversely, a defeat for those who believed that the maintenance of Britain's economic and military strength required a carefully thought out and strictly applied system of commercial regulation.

Bound up with these questions of doctrine, but in many cases operating irrespective of them, were the actual conditions of a North Atlantic economy as it had been evolving since it had begun to operate in a new political context after the United States achieved independence. Although William Pitt had failed, at the end of the
American Revolution, in his attempt to grant the United States a special and privileged position inside the walls of the Imperial economy, the needs and habits of both countries re-established a commercial connection across the Atlantic scarcely less intimate than that which had characterised their relationship before 1776. ¹ And if by 1812 the nature of that connection had undergone great changes under the impacts of war and of British industrialisation, it is well to remember that it preserved its eighteenth century structure, in which Britain was the metropolis and America the colony. ²

The linked consequences of American political independence and Anglo-American economic ties had received no formal recognition in any formal British policy since Pitt's failure. For this the long wars with France were no doubt in large measure responsible. But the problem had not failed to present itself in various forms during those wars. The Orders-in-Council had been seen by Americans, with some justice judging by the effects of the Orders if not by their purpose, as an effort to legislate the conditions under which their commerce might be allowed to exist and were indeed hailed as such by some Britons who believed that the United States had long taken advantage of Britain's distress and the ambiguity of their own position to gain a dominating place in the commerce of the world.

The United States in resenting the restraints thus offered to its independent action had not taken the course
which pride might have counselled, but had resorted first to
the well-tested policy of using British dependence on
American markets as a lever to force a change of policy by
the British government. That Americans calculated
accurately was shown by the willingness (however reluctant)
of the British government to relinquish a major weapon in
its war against Napoleon in order that its manufacturers might
seek prosperity in American markets.

But the American government, driven apparently by a frenzy
of abnegation scarcely appreciated by the New Englanders whose
selves were to be denied, chose to persist in hostilities over
an issue, impressment, her belief in her right to which Great
Britain would not relinquish under any circumstances yet
experienced by her. Nothing could have more nicely defined
the effective limit of commercial considerations in the deter-
mination of national policy.

Thus the War of 1812 began, paradoxically, at a moment when
the major outstanding economic issue between the two countries
had reached a solution. Yet the very existence of war, if
it created no new problems, once again emphasized the possibil-
ities for disorder inherent in a complex relationship subject
to the demands of American independence, the traditions of
British imperialism, mutual necessity, and the incalculable
development of an industrial system. The possibilities were
not fully realised because, as shall be seen, of Napoleon's
decision to invade Russia, a decision which neither President
Madison nor Lord Liverpool could do much to influence. When
news of the President's declaration of war reached Britain, however, the full consequences of Napoleon's action were still in the future, and war with America threatened to throw the British economy back into the abyss of depression and unrest whence a timely repeal of the Government's restrictive policies had so obviously rescued it.

The Orders Revoked and War Declared

In their campaign to get the Orders-in-Council repealed British merchants and manufacturers had given ample public testimony of their conviction that not only their own prosperity but peace with America depended on a reversal of British policy. The equally public rejoicings that met success, the addresses of thanks, the dinners, the congratulations that were lavished on those members of Parliament who had done most for the cause all testified of a belief that the troubles of 1811 and 1812 were no more.  

Actions as well as words evidenced the optimism of the ports and manufacturing towns of England. Although no formal notification could immediately arrive of the disappearance of American counter-measures to the Orders, the government of the United States had frequently asserted its intention of allowing the resumption of normal trade as soon as its complaints were satisfied. It is not surprising that those whose interests and attention had been totally engaged in the struggle against the Orders should have, ignoring the other questions at issue with the United States, assumed that the way to the resumption of peaceful trade had
been made entirely secure. The American Chamber of Commerce in Liverpool stated its belief that shipments could be safely dispatched to America, and Liverpool merchants as well as agents for American firms competed for the available shipping. Liverpool was the center of the American trade, but other ports felt the excitement. London commission agents hurried to fill outstanding American orders, even (in one probably not unique instance) far beyond the advance made by the American correspondent. It is estimated that exports totalling at least £4,000,000 left British ports for America before war once more choked off the trade. 4

The effect of all this trading activity was not slow to make itself felt in a number of those industries immediately interested in the American market. The iron and cotton manufacturers felt this increased demand, as did the more minor boot and shoe industry of Hinckley, which had enthusiastically greeted revocation and proceeded to clear its warehouses in a few weeks. 5 There is some evidence also that businesses not only increased production to meet this demand but hastened to re-establish direct relations with the American customers. One merchant in assorted iron and iron hardware hurried across the Atlantic only to find on his arrival in New York in September that he had made the trip in vain. 6

News of the American declaration of war did little at first to slacken the precipitous flow of goods leaving the English ports. 7 A conviction that revocation would cause
the American government to have second thoughts was as we have seen widespread. Some anxiety was indeed expressed, but the exporter appeared to be more concerned with the reactions of his own government than with the intentions of the United States. It was feared that Britain would rush into hostilities without waiting for the effect of repeal on American resolve. Indeed, rumours of an impending declaration, even before they had been realised, had caused British exporters to attempt to forestall immediate hostile action on the government's part. Their representations led the Privy Council to agree to the issuance of licences of protection for American ships loaded with British goods. 142 such licences had been granted by the end of July when the actual fact of war became known.

The government's obvious desire to pursue a policy of forbearance and to enter into immediate negotiations for peace based on repeal of the Orders calmed the fears of the exporters. When the American declaration of war had caused a worried deputation of Liverpool merchants to call upon Mr. Rose at the Board of Trade they were assured that no obstacles would be put in the way of exports to the United States; indeed instructions were forwarded to the collector of the port of Liverpool that a number of American vessels, to which because of uncertainty over their status he refused permission to sail, were to be allowed to proceed. In addition the date after which no more licences of protection were to be issued (originally 15 August) was twice extended.
Although Henry Brougham took what satisfaction he could from the temporary relief which repeal had afforded the manufacturers, peace was not the result, and a permanent commercial arrangement with America had to wait on the conclusion of a war fought over other issues. Those whose interests lay in trade and manufacturing were not indifferent to the progress of the war or the prospects of peace, but there is a marked contrast between their views on these subjects and their vociferous complaints, only a few months previously, on the subject of the Orders. This requires some explanation.

The prior confidence in an economic reading of American motives was one of the reasons why, when that nation did persist in her belligerency, there was at first so little opposition to the war in Great Britain. The dispute over the Orders had occupied the public mind to such an extent that it was difficult for many people in Britain to realise that any other American complaint could be important enough to be a basis for war; and this seems to have been doubly true of those directly interested in the removal of restrictions on trade. It was apparently proven that America was not really concerned with the doctrines of freer neutral trade to which the manufacturing interests were in general favourable at a time when they were seeking markets, but that her reasons were founded far more in factious intransigence, and even in a spirit of malice towards Great Britain. Those who had agitated so effectively against the Orders and who had rushed
to profit by repeal began to feel that they merely had given hostages to American hostility. If any one deserved to share in Brougham's triumph it had been the Alexander Baring who stated six months later:

...the distress we exhibited and the awkward situation we should be in with the large shipments that have been made may induce the Americans to try to induce from us further concessions. 12

The obvious reluctance of New England commercial interests to support a war supposedly fought for their benefit reinforced the opinion in Britain that the aims of the American government were essentially political.

It is not surprising therefore that there was no agitation for a quick end to the war comparable to that against the Orders-in-Council. In the view of those opposed to the Orders, Britain's policy had been directed against neither enemy nor competitor but against a customer, and in this it had injured British prosperity far outweighed any other considerations. Thus the American producer - of cotton primarily - the American shipper, the British manufacturer and he who exported British products had all shared a common grievance. But however sympathetic British manufacturers may have been towards American complaints of restrictions on her trade, this sympathy does not appear to have extended to suggesting that Great Britain should give up the strategic advantages which were assumed to be derived from her maritime rights in order to secure a peace that might have benefited manufacturing prosperity, but compromised British honour.

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Henry Brougham, who more than any other deserved and had at the time received the support of the manufacturing interest for the leadership he gave against the Orders was later in 1812 made to feel the full force of this change of opinion. He campaigned in the election of that year for one of the two seats in Parliament for Liverpool (with, it should be said, a good deal of public support that could not be reflected in the voting). But to a request for contributions, Thomas Attwood, a prominent Birmingham merchant replied that that city was unable to give much assistance and that

... many of the most wealthy and public-spirited gentlemen of this town, have enrolled themselves in the party opposite to Mr. Brougham, from an apprehension that he would compromise the honour of the country. 13

The evidence of the press suggests that when the British manufacturer regarded the apparent aims of the American government, he saw them in much the same light as his fellow-countrymen did. And we may surmise that, individually, although less committed to strident patriotism than many supporters of the Government, he probably shared with the general public those feelings of pride or honour previously outlined. To some extent, undoubtedly, the commercial classes shared, too, current beliefs in the indispensability of "maritime rights" to British power. Unable to see a commercial policy that harmed them as in any way possibly consonant with ideas of British power, they were willing to set immediately obvious strategic considerations above their self-interest. It is only fair to
note, however, that the economic situation was improving steadily throughout 1812.

The subject of "maritime right" had particular interest for commercial circles because of certain aspects of the struggle in which Britain had been engaged for the past twenty years. A major stake in the war with France was often represented as the commercial ascendancy of Britain in many of the world's markets. The British Navy was the chief support of this supremacy. Against the Navy Napoleon had launched his greatest efforts and, failing, had, contrary to all the customary usages of warfare, attempted to strangle Britain's economy by shutting her off from her chief markets in continental Europe. In this too he had failed, because, it was felt, of the British blockade and the effectiveness of the Navy in protecting merchants who introduced goods into Europe in defiance of Napoleon's system. Thus not only had the Navy's prestige been great because of its victories over the French in battle, its essential importance as the protector of British commerce on the high seas as well had been emphasised, having become indeed almost to be taken in this respect as a matter of course. It guaranteed the passage of goods and helped to guard and even create overseas markets, a notable recent example of which had been the opening - in 1806 - of Buenos Ayres to British trade by ships of the fleet, an action which had sent a flood of manufactured goods heading in that direction from British factories. The painsed surprise, in ports from Poole to
Glasgow, which greeted the activities of a few American privateers in the Irish Sea is some indication of the extent to which the absolute protective power of the British Navy was taken for granted.

No more than the most vehement Tory newspapers or pamphleteers did the organs of manufacturing and commercial opinion examine the actual effect compliance with American demands might have had on the strength and effectiveness of the British Navy. Newspapers like the *Liverpool Mercury* might regret the war, criticising what they felt to be the blunderings of British diplomacy which had led to it, but they reluctantly agreed that it must continue so long as the United States put her price for peace as a British renunciation of her "maritime rights". The emotional content of this concept of maritime rights peculiar to Great Britain had grown, during the Napoleonic Wars, to such an extent that it had become almost beyond criticism even by those who had the most to lose in a war waged for its maintenance. Some idea of the importance of this concept as a factor inhibiting dissent can perhaps be seen by implication in the significant increase in criticism of the Government after it became known that the American Commissioners at Ghent had waived all discussion of maritime matters.

All this should not be taken to mean that war with America was by any means popular in Manchester, Liverpool,
or Glasgow. If manufacturing opinion was not disposed to question the concept of maritime right, neither does it appear to have conducted an impassioned defence of it. Merchants and manufacturers must have realised that the Government would not agree to a peace on American terms and that the economic distress caused by a war would not be general enough or deep enough to force it to do so—it was one thing to avoid war by timely concession, another to purchase peace. Those concerned with America as a source of raw material or as a market regretted the course events had taken, but there is no indication that they felt they could do much in the circumstances to influence the Government. They might be "better pleased to hear of an amicable arrangement with America" than of Wellington's Peninsular victories, but they seemed to agree in "suspecting that it will not take place." 14

The political dispute had overshadowed the economic; commercial opinion was, if reluctantly, compelled to follow Government on the former issue, where it had strongly opposed it on the latter. At a dinner given for Francis James Jackson (former minister to the United States) in Glasgow by the Lord Provost and the Chamber of Commerce soon after the beginning of the war, "The opinion...in general...was, that our government had condescended sufficiently far in their endeavours to come to a good understanding with America; at the same time, no hostile feeling was expressed against that country and, next to a toast to Mr. Jackson, the toast drank with the most
applause was, 'the speedy termination of our differences with America'.

Until the last months of the war in 1814, this remained in general the attitude of those interested in the American trade. In such circumstances British manufacturers did not concern themselves very greatly with what appeared would be the merely political terms of peace. Except for those dealing with Canadian goods or their carriage, there was very little interest manifested in the determination of frontiers or of a permanent Indian territory. Indeed one merchant at least was able to anticipate an American conquest of Canada with equanimity. The primary thing was peace itself, on terms which would not appear to be dishonourable to Great Britain. Cotton manufacturers looked forward to a profitable reversion to the status quo ante, that is to an assured supply of raw cotton and an accessible American market for their products. If they were unwilling to see peace gained at the price of abject submission to American maritime demands, they were still more reluctant to see it put yet further out of reach by the government's intention to wage an increasingly vigorous war for the security of Canada and the Indians. First and foremost they desired the resumption of a profitable commercial relationship with the United States - believing this to be as well a more effective guarantee of good political relations than any addition to the territory of Canada. The absence of any feeling that detailed negotiations were necessary for
this is evidence that such a relationship, despite intermittent interruptions over the past ten years, was taken almost as a matter of established fact in itself, having been disturbed only as a result of ulterior, political considerations on both sides of the Atlantic. This state of affairs for the early 19th century in general has been noted by Professor Redford who remarks that for a trade of such extent there is, in the records of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, remarkably little discussion of Anglo-American commercial relations. 18

Nevertheless, the war had disrupted those relations at the very moment abolition of hindrances to them had held out extremely favourable prospects to the British exporter. One might expect that, even taking into consideration a determined adherence to British maritime rights, there would have been much more complaint of the war than was actually the case. But in fact, for various reasons, deep hardship never materialised. There was never a complete stoppage of Anglo-American trade, and in addition - and more important - the circumstances which had convinced the American government that Embargo and Non-Intercourse would be effective measures of coercion against Great Britain were already changing when those measures finally achieved their aim with repeal of the Orders-in-Council.

Yet had the effectiveness of American measures depended alone on the exclusion of British goods from the American market, the recurrence of distress in Britain for a brief
period during the autumn of 1812 indicated that the American war might have proved as disastrous as Non-Intercourse had. Belief in the efficacy of repeal died hard, but uncertainty and anxiety grew. 19 The notices of ships sailing for the United States, which had swelled the columns of Liverpool newspapers during June and July, dropped steadily in number during August and by October the disappearance of trade to America was said to be causing "damned distress" in that city, although there are indications that a trickle of shipping continued to find its way across the Atlantic during the winter of 1812-1813. And the manufacturing towns which had seen their inventories diminish and their production once more thriving, again found themselves overstocked with articles meant for sale in America. And the new commercial decline, involving as it did the absorption of capital in inventories, threatened renewed business and banking failures. 20

Although the collapse of Napoleon's Continental System after the defeat in Russia removed the possibility of a return to the widespread depression of 1811 and 1812, the loss of American markets still made itself felt, particularly in those industries which had specialised production for American needs or those individual companies or localities which had sent the greatest part of their manufactures there. It should also be remembered that the United States was primarily a market for manufactured goods, while a larger proportion of British exports to Europe was made up of
re-exported colonial produce. The official customs records are too generalised to indicate the effect of the war on particular firms or in particular areas, and the records of individual companies too fragmentary to allow a detailed evaluation of the place of the American market in the British economy. But taken together with the evidence of the press these sources of information can, especially in times of distress, provide some indication of the closeness of the Anglo-American connection in this respect.

The hectic activity of June and July which followed the revocation of the Orders, coupled with the decline in production that occurred during the autumn of 1812, shows that, in the exceptional circumstances of wartime at least, the state of the American market appears to have had an effect somewhat out of proportion to the actual quantity of British goods exported there. One of the reasons for this was that the British manufacturer was beginning to be persuaded that his prosperity depended on the accessibility of foreign markets, which might not take a majority of the goods he produced but which provided the margin of his profit. The lesson had been emphasised time and again during previous ten years, and as the American war became an assured fact in late 1812 it began to appear that it would be given again.

The effect of a renewed loss of overseas markets was generally felt less by those primary producers, such as the iron masters or the cotton yarn spinners, who had a greater flexibility in finding markets in bad times than more
specialised manufacturers.\textsuperscript{21} One such firm W. & G. Strutt, suffered some diminution of yarn sales during 1812, but the loss was slight and more than fully recovered during the following year.\textsuperscript{22} The situation of the cotton manufacturer was as we shall see complicated by the fact that an increasingly large part of British imports of raw cotton were coming from America before the war. Thus the American war in the long run tended to push up the price of raw cotton. Firms that were hardest hit by this were those who used Sea Island Cotton, a particularly fine American type which could not be replaced by the plentiful importations of Brazilian cotton which in part made up for the loss of other types formerly imported from America. This had the effect of pricing goods made from this cotton out of demand, and one firm of cotton-spinners, McConnell & Kennedy of Manchester, felt the necessity of reducing or entirely stopping production in October of 1812.\textsuperscript{23} In one instance, too, local conditions exacerbated the effects of American war. Glasgow, the most important center of the Scottish cotton industry, was hit by a strike of cotton weavers for higher wages which threatened many of the manufacturers, who had in many cases adventured without capital, with failure.\textsuperscript{24}

Another industry obviously affected was that of woollen textiles. Although Lord Sheffield had taken the opportunity of his annual report to the Wool Fair at Lewes in July to extol the benefits of the loss of American markets and to declare "... how little the manufacturers need to regard a
direct trade with the United States", some engaged in that industry clearly did not agree. A movement was begun in Yorkshire a center of the wool manufacturers to petition against the war, and there was in Trowbridge, a secondary center, a marked decline in sales and profits that lasted during 1813, even at a time when other industries were feeling the invigorating promise of peace and free markets on the continent. 25

It is difficult to ascertain why the iron industry should now, during the winter of 1812, have begun to suffer from slump conditions after successfully riding the storms of 1811 and early 1812 which had so battered other industries. 26 There is every likelihood that (although the immediate market was internal) the American war had something to do with this, since a large number of specialised secondary iron industries appear to have directly felt the loss of American sales. The Midland nail industry, for example, was, because of the great demand for nails in a country of wooden housing, closely tied to those markets and suffered greatly in exclusion from them. Two-thirds of Birmingham's nailers were said to work for the American trade. During the period of trade restrictions this industry had undergone a severe depression, and former exporters had turned in consequence to the home market, making for great competition there. This situation continued throughout 1813 and 1814 because, in contrast to
many other industries, this gained little from the opening of continental markets. Throughout 1813 nails were "at a most unprecedented low price and almost unsaleable." Its extreme specialisation paralysed it, and although this industry, consisting of small individual producers, was neither a major one nor typical it serves as an extreme example of dependence on American markets as well as helping to show why even the larger primary industries could be indirectly affected by American war. The iron-industry must have suffered too from the conditions that prevailed in Sheffield, where the loss of the trade to America had caused a revival of the labour unrest of the earlier months of the year, as well as those described by Professor Ashton in the much more minor pin manufactory. The British tin plate industry too experienced a drop in demand and production which lasted for the entire period of the American war.

One industry which should be mentioned in particular since its publicists frequently emphasised their delight in anything which reduced American trade was that of shipping. For the vigorous campaign which was waged during 1813 for a relaxation of the monopoly of carriage to India by the East India Company was due in part to the desire of the ship owners of the outports to find some compensation for the loss of trade to America.

The dissatisfaction felt in the manufacturing towns of England was expressed in a movement to agitate against the war which was however but a pale imitation of the agitation
against the Orders-in-Council. Brougham, at the first news of the American declaration, considered "our labours as only begun" and declared his intention to resume the moving and shaking which had previously been so effective, but (for reasons that have already been noted) this astute politician must have soon been made aware that such a renewal of his campaign would no longer receive popular support. 31

Opposition to the war was feeble. An invitation was sent out to various English towns for a meeting in London "to urge on Ministers the importance of adjusting all matters in dispute with America", but response was poor and the merchants applied to in Sheffield and Liverpool at least were reluctant to associate themselves with such a movement. 32

Thus although there can be no question that American war caused distress in certain industries and in certain areas, the political circumstances surrounding its declaration and the relative improvement in the British economy during 1813 and 1814 meant that the American government could not continue to rely on economic pressure as an effective weapon against British policies or actions.

Much less hampered in its policy than it had been, the British government was nevertheless led by the difficulties of industry during late 1812 to extend to America the efforts it had made to force manufactures into the enemy's markets. Direct exportation of British goods to America was permitted and every encouragement was given to a contraband trade across
the borders of Canada and by sea from the Maritime Provinces. That the blockade was not sooner extended to New England was due in part to this policy. The government also wished to assure, by the granting of licences, the provisioning of its forces in the Spanish Peninsula. But we may note the new flexibility which war had given by the readiness of the government later to block this trade, when it appeared that hostilities might be more effectively prosecuted by denying manufactures to the Americans.\(^{33}\) And if some aspects of Anglo-American commerce were favoured, the importation of American produce into Great Britain was consistently discouraged.

**Imports from America: Cotton**

The cotton industry had not initially appeared to suffer from the loss of American supplies. Certainly the manufacturers had become, over the past few years, accustomed to the intermittencies of trade - and indeed had adjusted themselves somewhat to an economy of speculation and unforeseen contingency. Thus whenever the opportunity presented itself, they had built up stocks of raw cotton against the times when supplies might be cut off.\(^{34}\) To this, to uncertainty about American intentions, and to the slackness of demand for the manufactured product was due the unexpected quiescence of the cotton market during the initial stages of the war.\(^{35}\)

Cotton had long since outdistanced tobacco as Britain's principal import from America. (With respect to the latter
product, although it was the practice of the customs to allow it to be brought into Britain even from nations with which she was at war, the blockade and attendant difficulties of transport caused, towards the end of the war as stocks diminished, a decided slump in the trade. 36) But the British cotton manufacturer was not yet, in 1812, so dependent on America for his supplies as he was later to become. Although approximately half of the cotton used in Britain in 1811 had been of American origin, new sources in Brazil and to a lesser extent old in the West Indies made up in part for the loss of American cotton. 37 Nevertheless the American war could not but eventually have an effect on the price of cotton and, after two years of war accompanied in its later stages with high levels of production for continental markets, we will find the manufacturers complaining of high prices and great scarcity of supplies.

The speculation unleashed by Napoleon's defeat in Russia gave the first indication of such a development. December 1812 saw a marked increase in cotton prices, but it appears by January of the following year that the manufacturers did not feel justified in increasing production when prices of their raw material remained so high without immediate prospects for the sale of their manufactured goods. 38 But the market became increasingly sensitive to American news as stocks gradually declined, and although the manufacturers purchased little more raw cotton than they needed the prices did not decline during the poor state of the demand during
the first half of 1813. 39

While war was thus in effect diminishing actual commercial contact between the United States and Great Britain, it was at the same time emphasising its significance. It is not too surprising that the subject was brought to the notice of government, whose intervention the erstwhile freetrader was not reluctant to solicit in his own interest. In November 1812 petitions were presented to the Board of Trade for prohibition of the export of raw cotton from Great Britain. (This trade was concentrated in the London market.) In these it was declared that prices had risen twenty per cent since the declaration of war and that stocks were rapidly declining, a statement that must be regarded as somewhat exaggerated in light of the records of the company of one of the signers. It was also said that several manufactories had stopped work and that a number were working only part-time. 40

Although it considered the needs of the industry, the government was much more inclined to use its economic policy as a weapon in the war with America, a result one assumes of that increased freedom of action already noted. They showed themselves perfectly ready, in the spirit of the Orders-in-Council, to place difficulties in the way of the manufacturer in order to cause even greater effects in America.

Cotton wool is a raw material essential to our most important Manufacture; an interruption of the importation of Cotton Wool would be injurious to all the Towns (Manchester &c.) engaged in this manufacture. But then Cotton Wool is the produce of the most Anti-Anglian part of the United States. A vigorous blockade of their Rivers and Ports would make them

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feel the pressure of that war, of which they are the authors, while a free Importation of their Cotton Wool would be a relief to them. Added to this we can get Cotton Wool from the East Indies, from the Brazils and in limited quantities from our own plantations. It must however be recollected that from the East Indies the arrival of any additional supply will be tardy and that there is none so good as the American wool. So that the wool from other parts is (for the finer manufactures) an indifferent substitute. But then on the other hand there is I believe a great supply at hand of Cotton Wool; and if American wool be really wanted, as the law allows of Cotton Wool to be imported in any Ships from any Country, it may if necessary be imported from the United States on neutral vessels (if neutral property) without licences.

It is true that this would be represented as only laying a tax on a raw material to be paid by the manufacturer to the neutral or fraudulent carrier; but it would at least limit the importation to what was necessary; and upon the whole I am of opinion that for the present the Americans would suffer much more by the interruption than we should. 41

The discussion of which this letter was a part resulted eventually in a proposal to lay a duty on cotton the produce of the United States in favour of that coming from British colonies. The duty was to be 3d a pound when the cotton was imported in British ships and 9d a pound when imported by neutrals. Although Sir Robert Peel attributed the measure to "the clamours of the cotton merchants around the Board of Trade" 42 and although it certainly was approved by those interested in the shipping and importation of cotton from the West Indies and Brazil, it is more likely that considerations of the war were uppermost in the minds of Ministers, as well perhaps as the thought that the extra revenue raised from the necessities of the cotton manufacturers would not be unwelcome.
is doubtful that the increased cotton duty was part of long-term scheme for limiting the economic connections between the United States and Great Britain. As the Corn Law of 1815 was to show in its passage, the Liverpool Administration was not over-indulgent to the expressed wishes of British manufacturers, unless public agitation - as in the case of the Orders-in-Council - forced it to be. In all probability the cotton duties were an opportunistic measure designed for revenue purposes, taking advantage of the necessities of the manufacturer, while at the same time placating the vocal West-Indian and shipping interests. West Indian cotton, even had there been an adequate quantity, could not have entirely replaced the American product because of its comparatively inferior quality. And there seems to have been no intention on the Government's part to deprive the British manufacturer of American supplies. Nicholas Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressly stated that he had no desire to impose a complete prohibition of American cotton. Admitting that the Blockade would make supply difficult, he nevertheless implied acceptance of a trade such as that coming from Amelia Island. "He had been told that a geographical Blockade would be more effectual, and he acknowledged it; but we had no right by the law of nations to institute such a blockade against America; for America had never become a party to the Continental System which was our only ground for adopting this course towards France." These statements, plus the fact that ships coming from Amelia Island and taken by the Customs were soon released,
indicate that the Government hesitated to go too far in imposing on the support given in general by the manufacturers to the war. 43

Of course there were some, and not only those who felt that the duty favoured their interests, who were quick to approve it as a proper example of economic warfare on the assumption that the effect of the measure would be to make British merchants purchase their raw cotton from other than American sources and that these other sources would prove adequate to British needs. 44 A fear that Britain might again depend on a possible enemy for an assured supply was not absent from these calculations. This was a concern which was to occupy the British importer of cotton for the next 50 years and which was to find harsh justification at the time of the American Civil War.

The cotton duty was also regarded as a proper war measure against the United States. While she refused to admit British manufactures, petitions from Paisley, for example, asked that cotton and all other American produce be excluded from British ports. And A.J. Foster, in the House of Commons, presented this right of retaliation as justification enough for the new duties. This argument was put forward with particular reference to the southern states who, it was said, had been "particularly rancorous" against Great Britain. To allow a trade in cotton from America which could be paid for only in specie was to subsidise indirectly the American war effort. 45
"...Instead of aiding the enemy, it ought to be the policy of this country to accelerate the termination of hostilities by increasing the pressure of war upon America, especially on the Southern States, who have been most hostile towards us."

Further political justification for the duties was seen in their possible use for bargaining purposes in negotiations for peace. 46

Objection to the proposed duties were not slow to arise among cotton manufacturers, who were naturally against any measure tending to raise the price of their necessary raw material, a raise which they claimed could not be compensated for by a recent improvement in the price of their manufactured articles. 47 Contrary to the claims of those supporting the duties, they insisted that such a measure would help other countries in competition with Britain, without injuring America. Cotton could not be obtained in sufficient quantity or quality from other sources and being necessary would have to be purchased at any price. 48 The Americans themselves might find it advantageous to begin manufacturing their own cotton when the cost of the British finished article got so high, and in international markets any nation competing with Great Britain would in effect be receiving a premium equal to the difference of price in the raw material, a circumstance aggravated by the higher wages of the British labourer. 49

The continental countries were generally mentioned in this context. It was stated in the House of Commons that cotton manufacturers would not object to the duties if they were
accompanied by a strict Blockade of the American coasts and did not have the effect of excluding cotton from Britain alone while leaving others access to it. But this opinion was not echoed elsewhere. 50 For, suspecting West India and shipping interests of being the real authors of the measure, those opposed to it feared that it was meant to be permanent, a fear to which the statements of those interests seemed to give some foundation. 51 One speaker, closely connected with the American government and American trade - Alexander Baring, - accepted the duties as a war measure but objected strenuously when it appeared that they were to be continued in time of peace. 52

Cotton manufacturers believed the duty to be particularly inadvisable since it came at a time when the industry was already in a bad situation and had been so for a number of years. Its losses had been "enormous" and the privations suffered by the workers "exceedingly great". Many cotton mills, according to a Yorkshire petition, had been converted to other purposes and a new duty or prohibition would entail "the entire ruin of the trade". 53 We have seen that grounds of complaint existed in the scarcity of cotton imports. This situation was made worse by a corresponding increase in price; and American cotton, although 40% more expensive than other types was very much in demand, a fact supporting the manufacturers' contention that West Indian and Brazilian cotton were not of such high quality as the American product and were consequently unable to provide an adequate substitute, whatever the quantity imported. Some did admit an increased
demand for their goods, but argued that this was based mainly
on speculation in hopes of the opening of the Continent,
which if disappointed would lead to even greater losses and
suffering. Speculation would only be worsened by uncertain
policy, since it was in the power of Government to suspend the
duty whenever it felt proper. Finally, it was claimed any
serious depression in cotton trade would entail economies and
thus give rise again to labour disturbances.

The most vocal supporters of the measure were not
unexpectedly to be found in the ranks of the West India
merchants, concerned with a better market for their own
product, and shipping interests, who had of course a monopoly
of the carriage of colonial produce. They first set about
undermining the arguments of those opposed to the duties.
They insisted that sufficient supplies could be obtained
from countries admitting British goods, that the duty itself
would encourage an increased importation of cotton equal to
the amount formerly taken from America. Thus the duty would
in effect not mean an increase in the price of the manufactur-
er's raw material, since the only taxable cotton would not
be able to compete in British markets. Another supporter of
the measure, tacitly agreeing that American cotton could not
be dispensed with, argued that prosperity did not depend on
the price of the raw material but on the manufacturer's access
to foreign markets. This would actually be forwarded, it was
argued, by the duty since the greater use of British shipping
would bring an expansion of markets for manufactured goods,
presumably by encouraging a more profitable two-way trade with cotton producing areas. Thus wages would rise, and there need be no fear of labour unrest. This indeed was what had begun to occur soon after the American declaration. 56

But the main arguments for the duty were protectionist and directed to the encouragement of British colonial cotton. Indeed it was complained of by some as not being a sufficiently effectual measure to this end. One writer proposed a stringent blockade to exclude American cotton from all markets in order to safeguard British exports from foreign competition. Others advocated complete prohibition or really high protecting duties, an indication that they envisaged a continuation of the system after the peculiar circumstances of the war had ceased. The war itself was regarded as an auspicious opportunity to break the dependence of Great Britain on American supplies. Even admitting that some deprivation would result, it was necessary: "The disease ... is arrived at that height, from ignorance or inattention, that it will be both a painful and dangerous operation to effect a cure; but that must be attempted, and the moment most auspicious for that operation has now arrived, and, if let slip, will never again recur." 57

By summer of 1813 the duties had been put into effect, and except for one instance towards the end of the war there appears to have been little further complaint made against them. American produce remained high and speculators in it did well, but once more American action - excluding all
commerce to and from Britain - made dissent of little possible practical value. The effects of the events on the Continent began shortly to be felt, and at the end of the year there was a general revival in the trade in cotton manufactures (as evidenced by a steep rise in prices), which made the price of raw cotton somewhat less important to the manufacturers (although demand and in consequence prices rose steeply). In addition Amelia Island began to be used as a depot for the export of American cotton, which prevented the full effects of an absolute lack of that produce from being felt. Yet the cotton markets fluctuated markedly in response to news and rumours from America. 58

When it gradually became clear that the ability of Continental markets to absorb British production had been grossly overestimated, British manufacturers again became concerned with the expense and availability of raw cotton. By November 1814, British merchants were selling for what the market would give, and dumping their cotton goods on Dutch, Belgian and German markets. Towards the end of the war, the merchants, manufacturers and spinners of Manchester in a memorial to the Board of Trade, pleading a depressed trade and reduced employment, asked for a renewal of 3 George 43, allowing the import of cotton in friendly vessels from states not in amity with Great Britain. 59 They complained of the insufficiency of American cotton and its high price. It was, they said, actually imported from France, who was carrying out a trade with Amelia Island. This situation
would make the Continent a depot for cotton, subjecting Britain to heavy expense and making her dependent on others for her supply. When a bill to this effect was introduced, there were protests by London shipowners who claimed that the measure had been passed only on account of the war and that the Navigation System should be restored, since Britain was at peace (i.e. with France.) Peace with America shortly put an end to any debate on this subject, but the cotton duties remained, and further representations were made for their removal, again because of alleged foreign competition.

Of all the arguments on either side the most accurate seems to have been, in this instance at least, the one that linked the well-being of the English cotton industry to the accessibility of markets rather than to the price of raw material. Except when Continental markets were closed, as in 1811, or depressed, as in 1815, the United States, in the opinion of British cotton merchants, did not play its principal role as a purchaser of finished goods, but as a producer of necessary raw material. Even in this respect America’s position was not so commanding as it was later to become. Limited supplies were available throughout the war, and only when the British export trade was low was there any complaint made, complaint furthermore generally of the high price of raw cotton rather than any paucity of supply, which paucity when it existed tended itself to be regarded primarily in relation to its effect in driving prices up. It is true that at this period Britain was coming to increasingly depend on American
supplies of raw cotton, but the manufacture of that material did not dominate the British economy to anything like the degree that it was to arrive at in 1860. In 1812 its requirements were less and could be at least partially met by recourse to old sources in the West Indies and new in Brazil. But even with the new duties it was becoming obvious that the future lay with American supply. The inherent weakness of the position of the West Indian cotton merchant was reflected in his declining position in Liverpool since the beginning of the century. As one of the most important of them implicitly admitted, the end of the war with America would mean a lower price for cotton and little prospect of much profit to be gained from the West Indies.

Imports from America: Grain

Cotton was the most important of Britain's imports from America. There were others, in themselves of much less value, which were given some prominence in the public mind because they represented a margin of safety protecting Britain from any scarcity of home or of other foreign supplies, a margin made to appear more crucial by the circumstances of the war with Napoleon. Naval supplies of all kinds belong to this category, but judged by its place in public opinion the greatest of these imports other than cotton was corn. This was brought into Britain mainly as wheat, in the form of flour, easier and more economical to transport than the unmilled grain. In proportion to Britain's total consumption,
estimated at 7,000,000 quarters a year, American imports were very small, averaging over a period of thirteen years 1800–1812, approximately 100,000 quarters a year or a little less than 1½% of Britain's needs. However, as was the case with cotton, a psychological factor should be taken into account. Galpin explains this:

Impressed by the idea of his own self-sufficiency, the Englishman became visibly excited whenever that self-sufficiency was threatened. On every hand he saw visions of impending famine ...
... Forgetful of the possibilities of retrenchment and substitution, not pausing to investigate the extent of the supposed failure, and believing starvation inevitable, the Englishman turned to Europe and America for relief. As long as these sources were open he was somewhat satisfied. Any interference... immediately caused the Englishman to believe that starvation stared him in the face. It was, therefore, just the dependence placed on this supply, though small in itself, just the fear that it might be interfered with, that caused the market to rise so abnormally high.

For three years previous to the war about one-fifth of Britain's foreign supply came from the United States whose importance was the greater because of unsettled conditions and varying Napoleonic policies in Europe where by far the largest proportion of imports originated. Thus America's declaration of war coupled with prospects of a bad harvest sent grain prices, in August 1812, to 155s a quarter, higher than they had been for ten years previous. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Government took the measures customary in times of scarcity, continuing the Starch Act and forbidding all distillation from grain. The
situation, however, did not turn out so badly as had been expected. Although the harvest of 1812 was below average, it could not be described as disastrous. Prices fell steadily for the remainder of that year, and during the next there was a great increase in the amount of corn imported from all European countries except France and Holland. The harvest, too, in 1814 was a good one.  

Of less significance to public opinion but of equal concern to the Government was the American supply of corn for British forces fighting in the Spanish Peninsular campaign. In Cobbett’s opinion this was one of the most powerful weapons America had. "She knows how necessary her food is to Portugal, Spain, and our armies; and she will make sure of accomplishing her object in a short time." Aware of this danger but trusting in the cupidity of American merchants, the Government issued licences freely to all ships sailing to Spain with corn. The year 1813 saw, in fact, a greater number of barrels of flour shipped from America to the Peninsula than had ever previously been exported thence; soon the same events easing the situation in England were operating there as well. In both instances we must again note how unfortunate the timing of the American declaration of war was, if it had been calculated to bring the maximum economic pressure to bear on Great Britain. For the same circumstances that opened Continental markets to British goods also made the possibility of Continental grain imports in times of scarcity much more assured. Britain might desire
peace with the United States because peace would help her economic position but she would not be forced to capitualte due to distress, if indeed even distress would have made her do so.

Although war with America did not mean starvation, it did emphasise the fact that Britain had been receiving a large proportion of her grain imports from a nation on whose friendship she could not always depend. Such a lesson could be read with even more justification from her relations with the Continent over the past twenty years. The whole problem influenced the passage of the highly protectionist Corn Laws of 1814 and 1815. Protection, it was often argued in the debates on these laws, was necessary to encourage agriculture, and if it were not encouraged "... you must obtain supplies from foreign countries, from countries that were lately your enemies, and are now only your provisional friends." 74  
This was a secondary point; the main arguments for and against these bills turned on other issues. But the problem was taken up elsewhere and in another respect, that of finding supplies from outside Great Britain less subject to the possible animosity of a foreign government.

Thus whenever consideration was given to the replacement of the United States as an exporter of grain to the United States, Canada was invariably mentioned. There was, however, little encouragement for these hopes in the events of the years preceding the war. Prior to 1812 Canadian exports of grain had been very small and never dependable, averaging
about one-fourth of those from the United States; and even this meagre amount probably included a large proportion of American wheat smuggled across the border in defiance of the Embargo and Non-Intercourse Acts. As soon as war broke out Canadian exports of wheat stopped entirely. Although this was in part due to the facts that much of the most highly developed agricultural land lay close to the border, and that the presence of British troops created an increased internal demand for flour, there seems little reason to believe that Canadian exports would have been at all substantial had the circumstances been different. Even before military operations had become extensive, one Canadian merchant complained; "there is not the smallest chance of our exporting a Bushel of Wheat or a Barrel of Flour during the year 1813 unless we should make peace with America." Indeed before peace came Canada was forced to import grain from Great Britain and Ireland, as well as from the United States. As G.S. Graham says, "It is a curious commentary on the logic of the old colonial system that in 1813 the British Parliament should have been compelled to raise the heavy restrictions on the export of domestic flour and wheat in the interests of the North American colonies." Those who wished to encourage the growth of Canadian wheat did not dispute these facts; but it was argued that they did not reflect Canada's true potentialities. Britain's dependence on America had been an exceptional case, for the European War created an artificial scarcity which America
alone at the time had been able to remedy. However to suppose that American supplies were essential in time of peace was absurd, and a preference given to Canadian corn would assure that should any scarcity arise in Britain those colonies could make it good. Although American flour was admittedly superior to Canadian, if Canada could be certain of a better market her methods of production would naturally improve. Her soil was very fertile and she was capable of growing much more than she did. Her possibilities in this respect were said to be proven by the large number of Americans who had left the exhausted soil of New England to cross the border and settle. Furthermore an increase in Canadian grain production would start a cumulative process whereby more emigrants from Britain would be encouraged to settle there thus opening more land for cultivation. An additional advantage was forecast in exactly the opposite process taking place south of the border, depriving the United States of the important stimulus given her development by her export trade in wheat. That such a process of growth was feasible was to be shown in America itself during the next few decades, when British investment in and demand for cotton stimulated and was in its turn stimulated by the rapid expansion of
the southern cotton frontier. And with respect to Canadian wheat in particular the next hundred years were to show the promise fulfilled. But in the circumstances of 1815, such hopes were wildly optimistic and took no account of the enormous difficulties that were to be faced in the settlement and development of Canada. Canadian corn had been given preferential treatment in the schedule of British duties since the beginning of the century, and the degree of preference had been increased by the Corn Law of 1815, without making any appreciable difference in the amount of corn exported. The problems of Canadian development were internal and could not be solved merely by measures regulating imperial commerce, nor by the hopeful animosity which saw Canada replacing the United States in the pattern of British trade.

The Imperial System

The increasingly high degree of protection given the English farmer, coupled with a great advance in British productivity, made the question of either the United States or Canada supplying flour to Britain rather a suppositional one for many years after the war. But often reference to Canada was included in the broader context of its development towards an eventual goal of entirely supplanting the United States as a factor in imperial trade. That the war was being fought for the preservation of those provinces and
fought moreover with determined loyalty on the part of the Canadians brought the contrast between their reliability and the 'provisional friendship' of the nation to the south into a greater prominence than had been the case at any time since the American Revolution. Those who wished to encourage the development of the colony emphasized the neglect with which its potentialities had been treated in the past. "Although these possessions have for many years almost escaped notice, yet the magnitude of their vast and neglected resources, incapable of longer concealment, have at length attracted attention, and now exhibit an inexhaustible mine of wealth."

Such glowing, and hazy, rhetoric directed its appeal to enthusiasm rather than to a sober estimate of possibility. And the writer no doubt was more interested in the part merchant shipping was to play in the encouragement of Canadian prosperity than in a distant future. The war gave the shipping interests, as well as other Canadian economic interests, the opportunity of presenting a case for the consideration of the value of Canada negatively enhanced by American hostility. For these interests looked with favour on anything which might lessen America's position as a source of British supply, for the benefit of British colonies—since such a development would, they believed, help to obliterate or limit the gains made by the United States, during the
Napoleonic Wars, in the carriage of world commerce. Yet though the appeal was to mere enthusiasm and national prejudice, we should not reject on that basis alone the claims made on behalf of an important British industry and an important British colony; because extravagant though they may have been they were to some extent based on fact and real potentialities.

Of the five products most frequently mentioned in connection with Canada, that is: wheat, hemp, fur, fish, and lumber, only the last two could be considered as at all approaching present expectations. Wheat has already been discussed. The second item on our list, hemp, had figured for many years in hopes for the development of the colony, and financial support had been given by the British government for experiments in its growth in Canada. However, despite the assurance of publicists and their insistence that Britain should depend on no foreign nation for her supplies of Naval Stores, the Board of Trade decided that the experiments had shown only meagre results and refused to continue their support. The fur trade had at one time been of great importance but which had seriously declined as a result first of the treaty of 1783, giving the greatest part of the area in which the trade was carried on to the United States. Although the retention of frontier posts after 1783 and the apparently favourable terms granted
to the trade by Jay's Treaty had given some assurances to
the fur traders, their real problem was the inexorable
advantage of the American frontier of settlement, and thus
agriculture, into the former hunting lands. As so frequently
in the past the Canadian traders and those in London closely
cooperated in applying the greatest possible pressure on the
British government to demand boundary changes from the
United States. In a memorial to the Foreign Office the
fur traders claimed that for the previous ten years the
United States had harassed them and the Indians with tolls
and restrictions in violation of Jay's Treaty, and that the
surest protection of the Indians, Canada, and their own
trade was a revision of the Canadian-American boundary and
a permanent Indian territory under British protection and
guarantee. We have seen in the previous chapter the
efforts which the fur trade made during the war to provide
some basis for such demands at the peace, and the next
chapter will describe the fate of such proposals at Ghent.
There is little evidence that the British government was
primarily interested in guarding the fur trade when it
advanced these demands, in a modified form, as a basis for
negotiation. But it had clearly been influenced by the
strategic arguments used by the fur traders in presenting
their case. There was a good deal of agreement between the fur
trade and the government in these matters. For example
the question of military control of the Lakes had significance for the fur trade and its lines of supply. Considering the state of Canadian communications, possession of the Lakes, the only adequate means of East-West transport, was as important economically as it was militarily. It is not surprising therefore that in addition to the military security to be gained by frontier changes and a recognized British predominance on the Lakes, the elimination of American competition and quarrelsome hindrance of British trade in that area was considered an important advantage to be achieved. The failure of the Commissioners at Ghent to do so was angrily criticised by those interested in the Canadian routes of trade; but the attitude of the British government and its evaluation of the importance of Canadian interior trade can perhaps be seen in the comparative weight given this question with that of the Fisheries, for it consistently refused to consider the advantages given by a free navigation of the Mississippi as an equivalent to those which would accrue to the United States if they were again allowed to fish under the terms of the 1783 treaty.

The Fisheries, too, presented a strategic as well as an economic side, but they were looked at in the light of certain deeply ingrained assumptions and present intensive propaganda in their behalf. Their importance had been enhanced by the war and the opportunity it gave for their
operation unhindered by American competition for the first
time in thirty years. 87 Nothing could have made clearer the
advantages to be gained from a revocation of the privileges
that had been granted the United States in 1783. The
American Fishery had grown steadily under that dispensation.
Although a distinction should be made between the Fishery
itself and the supply of foreign markets with fish, there is
no question that America's privilege in British waters was
of great importance to her in her international trade,
particularly as regarded West Indian markets. Thus while
the United States had been encouraged to supply the West
Indies with fish - both her own and those caught by
Canadians - the disadvantages suffered by Canada both in
respect of distance and duties in trade with those islands
were increased and operated to diminish the output of an
industry not merely in its initial stages but one which had
existed for many years and was capable of immediate
expansion if given some measure of official support. 89
Commercial policy with respect to West India trade is dealt
with below, but the exclusion of the United States from the
Fisheries was also looked to as a step beneficial in itself
to Canadian prosperity. The American fisheries had been
very extensive before the war, accounting for one-half to
one-third of the remittances of New England. They had been
encouraged by heavy duties laid by the United States on all
fish not caught by Americans, even if they were to be re-exported. Protected by Admiral Warren's fleet the British during the war years had an exclusive share in the Fisheries; this, coupled with a sharp decline in American competition, had encouraged a great increase in the activity of the industry and in its prosperity. The British trade had, it was claimed, grown by 300,000 quintals to 946,152 quintals a year, over two million pounds having been returned to Britain to the advantage of the balance of trade. It was only natural that there should be a demand that these gains be maintained at the peace, that the privileges (or 'rights' in the American view) granted to the United States in 1783 should not be renewed. "It is better to put it completely out of their power again to mistake our favours for their prosperity."90 Should America be allowed once more to participate in the Fishery, all the improvements made by the British industry during the war would be lost, and "A nation possessing natural resources should never permit them to be used against herself."91

The British government which had at first been unwilling to commit itself, appears to have been persuaded by these proposals, and we may assume that their subsequent action was founded to a large degree on them.92 The Board of Trade forwarded one petition to the Foreign Office with the comment that the subject was of 'considerable importance'
requiring 'the favourable consideration of government' on it, and they believed exclusion of Americans from the fisheries a point of easy attainment. From the beginning of the negotiations at Ghent the British ministers were very firm on this question. In the first instructions to the Commissioners the view was strongly emphasized that the American position in the Fishery had been a privilege, granted by the Treaty of 1783 and abrogated by the war. It was stressed that this point should be made perfectly clear to the Americans from the start of the negotiations. It was, and when the latter declared that they had no instructions on the point, this was taken by the British Commissioners and Ministers to mean that the Americans did not question the British view of 'privilege' as opposed to right. The fate of this question in the negotiations will be dealt with at length in Chapter IV. It is sufficient to mention here that the Treaty of Ghent as finally signed contained no mention of the Fisheries and that the British Government thereupon proceeded to act on its assumptions and to exclude American ships from the Fishery. But the degree to which a wartime hostility had receded could be seen in the considerations which led Castlereagh, in the phrasing of W. S. Graham "to a sacrifice of nominal Newfoundland interests" in the Convention of 1818 for the sake of friendly relations with the United States. What
had seemed in time of war to be only just became in circumstances less charged with feeling only inexpedient. 95

The last of the generally mentioned Canadian products was lumber. This was perhaps the most important of them all to Great Britain as well as being of very great significance to the future development of Canada. Britain's supply had normally come from the Baltic. Here again we see the effect of Continental Wars in bringing to light the possibilities of British North America. In this instance expectation was not illusory, and Canada was able to supply Britain with an amount almost equal to that formerly taken from the Baltic. 96 Yet, even in this instance, we cannot discount the part played by American exports to Canada, for it was one of the most constant components of the contraband trade across the border both before and during the war and was consistently included in British lists of produce permitted for import. The significance of this is to be found more in the West Indian markets than in those of Great Britain where the colonial product was not only amply protected against the foreign but was able as well to take full advantage of its protection. Thus, although American competition did exist it was not of first importance to the development or retardation of the industry. 97
It should be made clear that to a significant extent all the products of Canada, and not only lumber, were free from American competition. There were other markets than the West Indies - A large proportion of Canadian fish went to the Mediterranean. That so much criticism was directed specifically against the United States was due to two things: first, the embittered feelings that the conflict had engendered; second, the doctrinaire mercantilism of the shipping interest, which was much less concerned with the particular cargoes carried than in the re-establishment of an Imperial Navigation System that had been relaxed in the exigencies of war and that would assure them, and not foreign shipping, of the freights for those cargoes. It was in this respect that American shipping was feared. The British shipping interest had seen America make the best of the tremendous advantages she had had as a neutral in the Napoleonic Wars. They had supported all measures in the past which held out some hope of seriously hobbling the Americans. They had vociferously supported the Orders-in-Council. They now looked to war with America as an opportunity of regaining an ascendancy they had lost and were determined that insofar as it lay in her power Britain should curtail those privileges which had allowed the United States to challenge the position of the British merchant marine.
One of the sorest points was the American share of the trade to the West Indian possessions of Britain. By the Navigation Laws, American ships should not have been allowed into these ports, but during the French wars the state of supply of those islands was so precarious that the Government often allowed them to import American produce; indeed such importations often took place without permission when necessity demanded. The British government in 1794 had agreed in principle to this trade as they had previously agreed in practice. And despite a campaign, renewed in 1804, of the shipping interest against these relaxations of the Navigation Laws, the only thing which had to any degree deprived the United States of her commerce with the West Indies had been her own restrictions. Even then the Governors of the various islands had opened their ports to all Americans continuing to trade in defiance of their own country’s laws. Nevertheless, restriction and then war had operated to give Canadian trade, carried on in English ships, the protection it had never received from the British government. It may be thought that in view of this prosperity the shipping interests were not being completely candid in arguing against conditions that had obtained ten years previously; but they were aware that their prosperity was due to exceptional circumstances and might easily be ended when the war ended. Indeed the flourishing
state of the trade between the British North American colonies and the West Indies was the best argument possible for not allowing to the United States any future prospect of a share in it. America's 'unmerited envy and hatred' had shown the importance of American trade by making it possible. The United States 'in a moment of delirious animosity' had 'thrown the whole away'. They should not be allowed by a false British sense of conciliation or lack of regard for her own colonies to regain what they had lost.

'Impolitic laws' and 'an improper commercial system' were blamed for the commanding position secured by the United States in West Indian markets between 1783 and 1808. That position had been a direct result of Britain's opening West Indian ports to American goods and even encouraging her trade with duties on her produce less than those levied on that of other foreign nations. Not only had America profited greatly by this legal commerce, but it had given them as well an opportunity to engage in the smuggling of prohibited goods, such as manufactures in and sugar out. Canada, it was asserted, was able to supply the needs of the West Indies — she had done so when Non-Intercourse and Embargo had put an unprecedented demand on her abilities in this respect. Before that time differences in freight charges due to the relative nearness of the United States had given that nation the advantage of being able to undersell
Canadian produce in the island markets, an advantage for which the British government had not compensated her North American colonies by levying adequately protective duties in their favour. The comparative distance of Canada from West Indies markets was moreover a disadvantage only when those markets were being alternatively open to American shipping in times of scarcity and closed to it in times of abundance. Ships from British North America had always arrived to find prices in the reverse state of what they had been informed and were often forced to sell their cargoes at a loss. This state of affairs had naturally discouraged the trade with the effect of making the West Indies appear even more dependent on American supplies.

Much was made too of the uncertainty of adequate American provision to the islands, affected as it had been in the past by the politics and diplomacy of the United States. This propaganda appeared to take little note of the fact that the islands themselves seemed in any case to prefer the cheapness of American produce to what appeared to them the doubtful certainty of an expensive Canadian supply. One has only to make a cursory survey of the correspondence from the West Indies to the British government to see that the planters believed that famine must surely attend any stoppage of trade with the United States. Even after eight years of virtual Canadian monopoly of the trade and
before the United States had embarked on the system of commercial retaliation which was eventually to secure her demands, there were petitions and memorials from the West Indies for the introduction of American produce direct from the United States. The reply of the promoters of Canada to this was that if in the long run Canadian produce was properly protected an abundant and consistent supply would be forthcoming. Furthermore, this trade would be of greater advantage to the islands than that with the United States, because it would take the form of barter, whereas in the past, American ships had taken much less from the West Indies than they had brought, consequently draining them of specie.

That the arguments of the shipping interests were valid, at least as far as their own prosperity was concerned, is amply proven by the flourishing state of Canadian-West Indies trade after the United States had excluded herself from it. However, hopes that Canadian produce would be available in a quantity sufficient for West Indian needs were premature. One of the most important links in the trade to the West Indies was that from the United States to British North America, a fact that America would, in her post war struggle for the trade, take effective advantage of. It has been noted to what extent Canada was able to supply even her own requirements of wheat during
the war. Provisions of all sorts were very scarce for the supply of the Fisheries for example, and had to be imported from the United States. Thus what was required was a modified Navigation System which would allow American produce to be imported into Canadian ports while excluding it from the West Indies.

The British government was responsive to these demands and took advantage of the fact that the war had ended all previous treaties with the United States. The Commercial Treaty of 1815 made no mutual arrangement for the regulation of trade between the United States and the British North American possessions. Britain was left free to order that trade as she saw fit. The government proceeded in the attempt to recreate the favourable wartime conditions. It tacitly allowed American produce to be imported into Nova Scotia and New Brunswick by a very wide interpretation of what was a 'public emergency'. American ships were prohibited from West Indian ports. Writing to the Governor of Tobago in 1815, the Board of Trade reaffirmed "...the intention of His Majesty's Government to adhere rigidly to the principle of confining the general trade of His Majesty's colonies to British ships." and "the propriety of abstaining as much as possible from any departure from that principle... As the produce of His Majesty's colonies is effectually protected in the home market against Foreign competition, it is not unreasonable to expect that a preference should be shown in the Colonies to the use of British ships and
the consumption of British produce." 106

The demand of the British shipping interest that American goods and American ships be excluded from the West Indies was only the most important part of a general attempt to reduce the volume of commerce carried by the United States and to increase that carried by British shipping. The United States, it was asserted, had gradually intruded itself into the channels of Imperial trade. "Whilst their government was almost without form or consistency, they threatened us into concessions by which they have acquired an amount of merchant-shipping equal or even greater than our own." The complaint was not a new one. Similar fears of the growth of American shipping had played a significant part in the proclamation of the Orders-in-Council against which America had so strongly protested. That the Orders had been repealed was an indication of the strength of the position America had captured and an augury of the importance manufacturing interests were to have in the future determination of British commercial policy. This may partially explain the vehemence with which the shipping interest attempted to make use of the strong hostility against America encouraged by the war. It might probably be their last chance to create an Imperial system of trade without American participation.

The first step was the elimination of any preference
given in the past to the United States greater than that given
to other foreign nations. "It is evident that we have been
at once guilty of an improper partiality towards them as
regards other foreign nations, and at the same time of
injustice to our own colonists; and, also of actually
countenancing a system which might ultimately tend to the
ruin of our own shipping."

This partiality had been
evidenced not only by the relaxation of the Navigation Laws
in the West Indies to allow the importation of American
produce, but also in a system of duties on imports from the
United States into Great Britain itself which threw the
carrying trade between the two countries almost entirely
into American hands. Each country laid a flat ten per cent
ad valorem duty on the products of the other entering in
foreign ships. The apparent reciprocity of this measure
obscured the fact that the value of British manufactures
per shipload exported to the United States was much greater
than that of the raw materials imported thence into Britain.
Thus British duties ranged from 6½d. on lumber to 15 shillings
on cotton while American duties ranged from 4 shillings to
30 pounds, or in many cases to a sum almost equal to the
freight charges. No cargo, it was said, was ever shipped
to the United States in a British ship if an American could
be found to take it. This advantage meant moreover that
American ships could afford to ask a lower rate on freight charges and thus underbid their British rivals. The remedy was to lay duties on shipping itself without reference to the goods carried and thus secure the import trade to British ships. This trade was of particular importance since the products carried were generally bulky raw material which employed a great amount of tonnage. With this trade in their hands British shippers would be able to wrest Anglo-American commerce from the United States.

There was a more radical variation on this theme, envisaging an almost total rupture of direct commercial relations between the two countries. This was probably suggested by British experiences since the Embargo, and perhaps looked to similar restriction in the future. It was to make Canada a depot for all trade to and from the United States. Indeed it was claimed that the United States had gone to war primarily to split the economic co-operation of the American border and Canada before it became too advanced. The length of the frontier was however so great that nothing could prevent a profitable commerce from springing up; and the growing settlement on both sides presented ever improving prospects for the introduction of British goods into America. In addition the St. Lawrence was put forward as the natural outlet of American produce. In either case the carrying trade would be exclusively British.
Such a situation did exist during the war, but its continuance in peace-time required a degree of self-denial in the British exporter, who was not to ship his goods directly to American markets, that was hardly to be expected. It is not surprising then that peace saw a rapid drying up of Canadian demand for British goods, a demand that had thrived only on illicit trade and on the requirements of the British armies.

In concluding this survey of the propaganda of the British shipping interest it may be well to quote the opinion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in a private letter to Lord Castlereagh at Vienna, of the advantages which the British shipper had gained by the American war and of the situation in which he was likely to find himself upon the arrival of peace.

...though we suffer a heavy loss of general trade by the almost total interruption of our intercourse from America, we derive from the very same circumstances a considerable increase of European trade. A very considerable transit trade in the Mediterranean & between the North & South of Europe had for several years been carried on by the Americans, as well as a great trade in colonial produce, both of which are now suspended by the war, & have in great part fallen into our hands. Nor do I believe we shall lose so much of this advantage as is supposed, on the return of peace, for I do not believe that in time of peace the Americans navigate much cheaper than we do, whatever our shipowners may pretend. We have likewise in our great Ports, & especially London, an advantage in forming assorted Cargoes much beyond any other places, in the World. Amsterdam & New York come perhaps next to us, but at a great distance.
The Condition of War and the Condition of Peace

These, then, were the specific British interests concerned in one way or another with Anglo-American commerce. We have come at them as they tried to influence British public opinion and national policy. It is only to be expected that such an approach, used in isolation, should give a distorted view both of the state of Anglo-American trade and of the attitudes towards that trade held by the British public. In one respect indeed the determined effort of the shipping interest to make their point of view prevail is a negative implication of the extent to which an opposing attitude was, either through conviction or inertia, prevalent. A close commercial relationship between the two countries went back for many years and had not ceased to exist when it had become, in 1783, no longer a colonial one. There was no need of memorials and petitions from 'those interested in the American trade' because that trade was, in contrast to the one with Canada, large and fairly well intrenched. That such petitions would be forthcoming whenever the stoppage of that trade took serious proportions is amply proven by the controversy provoked by the Orders-in-Council. The war, for the reasons we have seen, did not impose as great a hardship in this
respect as had the restrictions of the previous four years, and it was only towards its end that complaints were to be heard of the distress it was beginning to cause British cotton manufacturers. The rejoicing reported in Manchester and Liverpool is some sign that the self-interest of all the specific areas of the British economy did not require the dissolution of Anglo-American commercial ties. Thus when one comes to examine general and broader British opinion about those ties the greater part of what might be called an 'exclusionist' point of view is seen to exist only in the propaganda of those whose self-interest was involved while in most other instances of expressed opinion it was accepted, although often grudgingly, that some degree of interdependence was an inevitable reality and was likely to continue to be so in the foreseeable future. What remains to be examined are the suppositions about the nature of the Atlantic economy which underlay these opinions.

First, however, we should attempt to bring into some sort of order the general views of the 'exclusionists'. For although we can measure their decline by the difference in the effectiveness of their opinions in 1783 and in 1814, they retained the ability to influence the government in particular instances, and they remained the embodiment, in a violent form, of general prejudices that had not died out. To locate the most significant source of these ideas we must
go back to Lord Sheffield's pronouncements at the end of the American Revolution, for it was the fact of American independence which lay at the very root of all exclusionist thinking. Lord Sheffield had then succeeded in pointing out the necessary consequences of that fact to the British people and to Parliament. He had begun in this way:

As a sudden revolution - an unprecedented case - the independence of America, has encouraged the wildest sallies of the imagination; Systems have been preferred to experience, rash theory to successful practice, and the Navigation Act itself, the guardian of the prosperity of Britain, has been almost abandoned by the levity or ignorance of those, who have never seriously examined the spirit or the happy consequences of it."  

Lord Sheffield repeatedly stressed the fact that the United States had become a foreign and independent nation, that they had renounced their privileges in the Empire while renouncing their duties. Britain should not base her policy on what a later writer called 'mistaken feelings of consanguinity' but on a realization that her best interests were not those of America nor those on which that nation would base its policy. To the exclusionist of 1814 with thirty years of American history in his mind, this must have seemed if anything prevision of the future far too mild. During that period American independence had defined itself as 'inveterate hostility' and the United States had so far acted in her own best
interest as to interdict British commerce from her ports
and to declare, in the end, war. To rely on American
friendship, to allow the United States special advantages
in consideration of that friendship was folly. To
exclude America as much as possible from any participation
in British trade was to exclude an enemy and "a competitor,
formidable in her natural advantages, which at present may
be restrained; but which, if permitted to flourish will
undoubtedly overwhelm Britain."

"It is absurd in any mother country to allow strangers
to supply their colonies, when every market possible should
be opened that can encourage agriculture." The
corollary of the expulsion of the United States from its
position in British commerce was their replacement by
British colonies. The ideal was the old mercantilist
one of a self-sufficient Empire: it was based on two
principles: the first security of supply in time of war,
the second the monopoly of carriage by British ships.
Both were violated by the position of America. The West
Indies was presented as being able to supply all British
requirements as far as cotton was concerned, and Canada
seen as capable of taking America's place as a supplier
of a number of other products. If the certainty of
American hostility and the possibility of American war
were to be continuous, mere prudence indicated that the
British should attempt in advance, by finding sources of supply elsewhere, to limit the effect such hostility and such war might have on her economy and that of her Empire.

"If instead of being considered a burden... the colonies were cherished as the surest prop of our commercial prosperity and national strength, then we should find both them and Britain independent of America, or of any other power." 116

"No American articles are so necessary to us, as our manufactures are to the Americans, and almost every article of the produce of the American states, which is brought into Europe, we may have at least as good and as cheap, elsewhere... Great Britain, from the nature and quality of its manufactures, and from the ascendancy it has aquired in commerce will command three-quarters of the American trade." 117

Lord Sheffield went on to ask why Britain should make concessions when it had nothing to gain and could only lose. The prospect he envisaged was one in which the United States would take great quantities of British goods without being able to export anything but a small part of her produce to Great Britain, who would have all the advantages of her prosperity of a completely favourable balance of trade. The United States was to remain an economic colony of Britain's with the difference, to invert Lord Sheffield's own phrase that they would have none of the privileges and all of the duties of their position. In taking no cognizance of the possibility that the
United States could pursue an exclusionist policy as well as Great Britain, he ignored their most powerful argument against his system. The argument was powerful not because it appealed to so abstract an idea as consanguinity but because it attacked the prosperity of an increasingly powerful and ever more vocal section of the British economy. A fear of the growth of American manufactures coupled with the evidence of 1806 that Britain would only command American markets at American pleasure were strong reasons why Sheffield's successors of 1814 should not repeat his assumptions. But their only answer was to draw his system closer about them. They read the relative prosperity of 1813 and 1814 as a sign that Britain could do without American markets. "...instead of thousands starving, instead of individual ruin - instead of national bankruptcy - we behold general activity, increasing work, and augmented demand, and so far from commercial credit having received the slightest shock, we perceive it advancing rapidly and securely to greater degrees of confidence and prosperity."\textsuperscript{119} It was argued that the United States could not be prevented by Britain from becoming a manufacturing nation. They would eventually produce enough for their own needs and exclude the British. It was in British power and best interest to develop her colonies as markets
for her manufactures as well as sources of her required raw materials. Thus the rupture of all Anglo-American commercial relations would be complete. "Measures like these would bid defiance to America; she might then copy or improve on Chinese policy, and retire as a world within herself, adopting the advice of her wild theorists and visionary statesmen."

Those who believed that Britain gained little of economic importance from the Anglo-American connection found ample justification for such a belief in the state of the economy in conditions of actual warfare. For if the first few months of hostilities had seen a partial recurrence of the distress that had accompanied Non-Importation and Embargo, the great hopes excited by Napoleon's defeats in Russia in the winter of 1812-1813 was the signal for a sudden burst of commercial energy in Great Britain. Although, as we have seen, certain industries responded but sluggishly to this stimulus, in some the response was very swift indeed.

But even before this, the circumstances which had made American measures so effective had begun to become inoperative. France and Britain had gradually come to a degree of tacit agreement on trade restrictions, and a licensed commerce had grown up between them during the early months of 1812. And even before the Russian disaster, Napoleon's invasion
had acted in favour of British trade; by the withdrawal of troops from Germany in preparation for it he had made supervision of his system of restriction much more difficult in the ports of that country; by attacking Russia he had automatically detached her, and Sweden as well, from that continental unity which had helped to make his system possible and so effective. As Lefe writes: "...ce ne sont pas les 'lois naturelles' de l'économie liberale qui ont sauve l'Angleterre; c'était l'hiver Russe."¹²³

The American case had been aided also by the very serious industrial disorder which had swept Britain during 1811 and 1812. While the loss of American markets had certainly contributed to the depression and unemployment which caused these outbreaks, other complex factors had not been insignificant. One of these had been the high price of grain and consequently of bread. The steady decline of these prices throughout the second half of 1812 and during 1813 goes a long way towards an explanation of the surprising lack of effect of American war in Britain. In general terms those combined factors which had led to social discontent were much ameliorated.

The full effect of continental events was not felt until 1813, but during that year and until the Cossacks entered Paris in the Spring of 1814, the receding tide of the Grand Army seemed to open up an ever-increasing prospect of good
times for British commerce. There was a great speculation in many different types of goods and an equally great expansion of production. The effect of this movement of trade was clearly to be marked in the prices of colonial and American produce. The situation was later described by Henry Brougham:

After the cramped state in which the enemy's measures and our own retaliation had kept our trade for some years, when the events of Spring 1814 suddenly opened the continent, a rage for exporting goods of every kind burst forth, only to be explained by reflecting on the previous restrictions we had been labouring under, and only to be equalled by some of the maritime delusions connected with South American speculations. Everything that could be shipped was sent off.

In commerce it is often 'prospects of trade', that is speculation, which governs opinion; an American war appeared much less disastrous when concurrent with the opening of continental markets than Non-Intercourse had when Europe was closed to British exportations. For various reasons British hopes were in the event far from fulfillment, but these hopes existed practically until the end of the American war and, in stimulating the economy, distracted commercial opinion from any bad effects that might have been felt from that war.

Government policy reflected a confidence in the strength of Britain's economic position. At the beginning of the war, the Privy Council had discussed the ways in which British
goods might be smuggled into America and had listened to schemes suggested by Americans themselves for the introduction of such contraband. But the government was much less ready to approve such measures in 1814, and indeed attempted to interdict all trade with America of any kind. It was for this reason that the blockade was extended to New England. The United States, it was claimed, had been allowing this trade for the customs revenue it produced along with supplies for the American war effort. "...however much it may affect the interest of a few, an effective blockade must ultimately tend to the future safety of British America at large. When the order of council was formed bearing the date the 13th of October, 1812, there was not that extension of commerce which now happily prevails with the ports of Europe; every means was resorted to, for the purpose of forcing the introduction of British manufacturing into the foreign markets." This was no longer the case.

The lesson was clear: British dependence on American markets was not so great as either Americans or some Britons had suggested. Was indeed a writer in the Glasgow Herald on firm ground in opposing "the belief...that either this country or the cotton manufacturers are in any degree dependent upon America for anything that concerns their welfare or prosperity."?
Those who wished to minimize Anglo-American interdependence frequently attacked the misguided sentiment of their opponents, but it was on their own ground of British self-interest that they met the greatest resistance. Controversy over the proper nature of the Anglo-American relationship was in essence a controversy between the divergent views of mercantilists and free traders as to where Britain's future lay. In this argument questions of sentiment entered little if at all.

The term 'free traders' has been used, although to some extent those so designated had not yet come to consider themselves as acting on the basis of any doctrine. A freer trade with America merely seemed the counsel of their own best interests. Indeed these men, primarily connected with manufacturing, themselves benefited, as opponents were not slow to point out, from highly protectionist duties laid on foreign manufactures. And as we have noted they still paid lip-service to the principles of maritime right which were, from the commercial point of view, merely wartime extensions of a protectionist system. What is occurring here is a phenomenon which has many parallels. Often in periods of transition the old doctrines appear to have all the advantages of cohesive argument, while the new forces of practice and unformed opinion - that will eventually come to dominate the public mind with the dogmas of their bias -
are articulate in detail only where their own immediate interest is concerned and are as yet unable to mount the higher platform of the 'national' interest.

The manufacturers had felt their prosperity threatened by the Orders-in-Council and had acted strongly against them. The cotton manufacturers had feared the imposition of new duties, but in this case had been overborne. They appeared willing to acquiesce, for the prospects presented by the opening of the Continent seemed to make the industry secure. They were nonetheless eager to see some accommodation take place with America. As one merchant wrote to Henry Brougham from Liverpool:

I am naturally extremely anxious to know whether any thing is likely to be done with America. To us it appears that the ascendancy of France on the continent is gone, and consequently that our manufacturers will have a trade, even much better than the present. Still we have surely the greatest reason to wish to be at peace with America, for peace with her would be nearly tantamount to a general peace. It would relieve all our Merchant Ships from the necessity of sailing with Convoy, and it would amazingly increase our exports, and lower the Exchange which is now so much against us.128

The American market assumed greater importance as it began to become evident that Europe could not, in its exhausted state absorb the production of British factories. Continental markets continued to be disturbed by the vicissitudes of international politics, and so long as Napoleon remained ruler of France the trade was difficult.
After his complete defeat in the Spring of 1814, the reopening of those markets and a more steady trade found continental merchants unable to buy British goods except at extremely low prices.

Ministers...must know...how much the manufactures of England stand in need of the only market that promises them relief. The return of continental peace has brought no solace to trade. The utter disappointment of all mercantile adventure has woefully proved to us that the continent is exhausted; and that it is only to the Western hemisphere that we can prudently look for the consumption of our home manufactures. Europe in time may require colonial produce but it is vain to expect such commercial treaties as shall open a great demand for our home-made articles.

A great deal of the opposition to a war waged for boundary revision in North America came from manufacturing interests, for the war was beginning to take on new economic aspects. One cotton merchant wrote in resignation rather than anger:

We have very little to console us respecting America, if we may judge from the preparations to annoy them, and indeed if we fare no better on shaking hands with them, than we did with our Continental neighbours, we need not much care, in an economical, or commercial point of view; the...duties laid on our principal are felt very oppressive at present, and I would not be surprised if they were obliged in long, to abandon some of them. The cotton trade has of late been a very losing business.

In a more general way the conflict with America was seen as perpetuating the conditions under which the British
economy had suffered during the long war with France:

The nation requires repose; our commerce does not flourish; neither do our manufactures thrive; the necessaries of life are far from being cheap; and the tax-gatherer is as active as ever... Such are the effects of the long war out of which we have emerged that we cannot now meet our neighbors in the general market... As we are now smarting under the effects of the late war in Europe, it is a lamentable thing to see this nation involved in a contest with America. 132

It was only to be expected that manufacturing opinion should begin to discover and explain the specific ways in which the military and diplomatic conduct of the war was hurting or might hurt British commerce. One such complaint was against the British strategy of attacking American ports such as Baltimore. "To obtain success of so uncertain a character we are called upon to make exertions... the object of which is to destroy those maritime towns of the United States, which abound with British capital, British consignments, and of which the mercantile body consists chiefly of the agents of British merchants." 133 And British interests were not only directly affected by this strategy but indirectly as well.

Should we succeed in destroying some of their maritime towns, which would be probably all in our power to effect, we might, in inflicting so useless a wound on their commerce, still more deeply wound ourselves. The property and interest of our own merchants, during so long and beneficial an intercourse with the United States as preceeded the present
war, ought to be hostages for the security of towns, the destruction of which would scarcely produce that submission, which our government seems to exact from the Transatlantic Republic. 134

To demand such a war as complaints like this implied was of course in effect to demand peace; and peace was to find itself important in the doctrines of Free Trade. In such a context the motives and meaning of war could not be plainer. "We are carrying on a species of warfare on the most extensive scale...for no other purpose than that of inflicting if possible an incurable wound on the commercial prosperity of the Americans." 135 Such a result was something less than feared by the protectionists who, there may have been some reason to believe, were behind the determination of the government to bring it about. Perhaps it was to undermine at one time the idea and its practical manifestation in a vigorous system of warfare that Mr. Marsh called in the House of Commons for the accounts of Canadian trade, his purpose being to "shew how far it was consistent with prudence, that His Majesty's Ministers should, in order to augment our Canadian territory, give a pledge to con the country at war..." 136

Here then was the crux of the disagreement on the issue of peace or war. To the exclusionist war symbolized the optimum conditions of relations with America; destruction of American commerce, protection of British shipping and
the encouragement of British colonies. Peace in this view was merely war without the armies. To the manufacturer, on the other hand, anything which prolonged the conditions of war and increased American hostility meant that American markets were shut to their goods. The Orders-in-Council had defined such a 'state of war', and it could be well remembered what American hostility had led to in that instance. At the beginning of the conflict Cobbett had said that it might destroy Anglo-American trade forever. Two years later such a fear seemed even more justified. A writer in the Liverpool Mercury declared that the war "...in whatever manner it may terminate, will make a much wider separation in the interests of Great Britain and The United States than that which was supposed to be occasioned in the Revolutionary war." And he went on to review the history of Anglo-American relations during the previous thirty years in terms of the conflict of these two ideas: peace with friendship and commerce, war with jealousy and restriction.

Indeed in the opinion of many experienced and liberal-minded statesmen, the separation of the colonies from the mother country, might have been rendered beneficial rather than injurious to the latter. A generous and conciliatory policy might have attached those states to us, in friendly intercourse, particularly as their wants, their manners, and their connexions, led them naturally to look to the land of their fathers for their principal supplies. Unfortunately this principle did not influence the British
administration. Commerce might be continued or increased, but the patronage in all the extensive colonial government was extinct. It happened, therefore, that during all the thirty years that followed the acknowledgement of American independence, the trade between individuals of Great Britain and the United States almost daily increased, while in all the diplomatic communications between the ministers of the two governments a soreness and an uneasiness of disposition was discernable. Governments are always more jealous of each other than nations are. The British Cabinet could not forget that the United States owed their independence in great measure to the interference and assistance of France; and the American administration aware that it was ever suspected of a partiality to the enemy of this country, maintained a tone of peevish complaint in all its communications.  

Thus counter-blockade followed blockade, retaliation followed restriction; and the two governments were led into war against the best interests of the two nations. As an explanation of international politics the analysis is crude enough, but its account of injured pride and a careless drift towards war contains some truth. That commerce can exacerbate international ill-will is a principle today admitted to be as true as its reverse, but it was in 1814 not yet a principle that the state of industrial activity throughout the world seemed to encourage. The metaphor for commerce was 'Peace'.

The fear was that by prolonging the war Britain might encourage American hostility to take an ever-increasingly active form. "Nothing could be more erroneous than that policy which would turn America from views of internal
improvement, of commerce, and civilisation, and from that line of pursuits which enabled us, in respect to that country, to give full scope to those great principles of political economy by which the intercourse of the world would be most beneficially regulated." Both countries stood to gain from an intercourse based on friendship and peace. But war had led the United States to think of more harmful things and if continued would induce them "to look to the formation of a great military and even naval power, to be turned against the parent from which that community had issued. Were this to happen America would begin to become involved in the international struggle for power, and as a rival to Great Britain. Peace and commerce would become secondary to aggression and aggrandizement on the part of the United States wherever, in Canada or on the seas, their frontier marched with Britain's. "The great fundamental principle on which [our ministers] should have acted, was to turn America from this fatal policy, as adverse to [her] real interests as to those of this country; and to neglect no opportunity of bringing the fatal contest into which we had unfortunately been driven to an amicable conclusion." 

Another consequence of war was that it led not only to American military competition with Great Britain but to manufacturing competition as well. The encouragement given
by Embargo, Non-Intercourse, and war to a growing American industry did not pass unnoticed in Great Britain. While some insisted that, because America was thinly populated and the price of its labour high, the United States would find it much more to their advantage for many years to come to send their raw materials to Britain taking British manufactures in return, others feared that the advances made in industry across the Atlantic had been overlooked, where "no watchful policy" had "investigated America's public measures." Profits of neutral trade and advantages of internal tranquility had given, it was said, the active spirit of American enterprise the opportunity to make use of the protection offered by the war and the encouragement of the American government. The United States had many natural resources as well - good streams for power and an abundant supply of raw materials. "The state of their country is sufficiently mature, to excite confident hopes of success on the one part, and to warrant uneasiness and jealousy on the other." American hopes were "founded on making the citizens of the states independent of a European supply and supplanting Britain in foreign markets... Great Britain never before had such a dangerous rival... This, then, is the area of systematic contest, which must eventually endanger the safety of the one or the other." This last statement proceeded from and was
given as reason for an exclusionist bias; but those who looked to a profitable commercial relationship with the United States were no less concerned with the possible threat of the competition of American manufactures in American markets. "The war for the taxation of America hastened by a century her separation from this country; and I will venture to say that the war for the Orders-in-Council, the attempt to govern the commerce of America, has hastened the progress of that country towards being a great manufacturing and a great naval power by at least a century." It cannot be said to what extent this particular statement was uttered merely as an attack against Government, since the speaker was in Opposition, but even Mr. Hart-Davis, who moved the address of thanks to the Prince Regent on behalf of the government, echoed it. Nowhere better than in this fear of American manufacturing can one see that the principles of peace and free trade were meant to insure British predominance in American markets. War, military or economic, was restriction. Restriction meant retaliation and the exclusion of British goods. Thus Britain's greatest fear should be that, having achieved political peace, "the two nations, who have hitherto regulated their intercourse on the most prosperous and liberal principles, should now begin a warfare of commercial restriction, hurtful to the prosperity of both."
We may mention in passing one consequence of this fear which was the very great importance attached to the prevention of emigration by skilled artisans. This had no direct connection with the problems of the Anglo-American connection, except for the long range question of the peopling of North America. But the United States was a favoured destination of British Emigrants at this period, and many people believed that she was engaged in a determined and systematic effort to seduce skilled British workers from their allegiance. The dangers were evident if America was to be prevented from developing her manufactures, for it was believed that she must import British skill to do so. Thus very stringent precautions were taken at ports to prevent artisans from leaving.

The attitudes that have been described revolve around a central idea about the economic positions of the United States and Great Britain relative to each other. The idea is not always stated but frequently implied. The various opinions and desires of those interested in strengthening ties with America defined those ties as what a colonial relationship was supposed to be. In this their analysis was substantially correct and would continue to be so for many years to come. America "was essentially a great agricultural country, and could advantageously supply us with her raw produce, while she took our manufactures in return." The deep
self-interest of both parties was involved in the relationship, and Britain could only be favourable to the rising prosperity of America based on her agriculture, because the effect of this development would be to open vast new markets for British manufactures. "Will it be maintained, in the present day, that the prosperity of America is a loss to this country". The idea was "antiquated". If this concept of Anglo-American relations was essentially economic colonialism, there was nevertheless an awareness that the context of such a relationship had changed since 1783. For the cement which held the two nations together was no longer political or military authority exercised through London, but the friendship of each for the other based on the knowledge, and in the hope, of mutual benefit. This was the condition of peace.

It was only natural that with these ideas seen as implied by it, actual peace, should have been greeted with cheers and bonfires in Manchester and Birmingham. The lingering apprehension about American ratification can be attributed to nerves; the uncertainties of the past twenty years had made such a reaction understandable. With respect to the Treaty itself, the political terms were unimportant; the fact of peace was everything. As one of the supporters of the address of congratulation moved in the London Court of Common Council said rather testily, the American war had been a matter of politics and politicians; any peace was
preferable to it, for Britain had been losing one of her best customers. The best comment on that was the great increase of commercial activity taking place in the industrial towns and in the ports in the months immediately following the signing of the Treaty. Britain had at last returned to the condition of peace, a condition in which it was "for the benefit of all parties... that the world... be one great arena, to which the industry of all nations should have free access, in order to fight out the battle of fair and honorable competition".
CHAPTER IV

The Negotiations for Peace

Negotiations to end the war began almost at its beginning. The British government felt hopeful that when news of the revocation of the Orders-in-Council became known in America the way to a settlement would be clear, and it authorised Admiral Warren, commanding the North American station, to propose an armistice. These efforts failed, primarily because of American insistence on impressment as a cause of war. Russell, American charge d'Affaires in London, had also been empowered to arrange an armistice in the event of repeal and the abandonment of the practice of impressment. Castlereagh's answer to these proposals constitutes the first statement of official British aims in this war. At this point the issue was simple: Britain would not relinquish her maritime rights and would defend herself against attack. An important addition to this position was Admiral Warren's refusal, supported by the government, even to discuss the matter of impressment. Thus early attempts at negotiation failed, Russell left for the United States, Admiral Warren began his preparations for blockade off the American coast, the war was more or less under way.

Although the British government assiduously insulated its relations with the United States from involvement in
European affairs, it was impossible to treat the American war as entirely divorced from the effects of events in the larger international arena. War with France was bound to influence British aims in an American war. Certainly while her full exertions were required on the Continent, Britain could hardly hope to pursue an aggressive policy in North America. On the other hand, victory over France presented the opportunity of an increased effort across the Atlantic and the possibility of translating military advantage into permanent political gain there. These hopes proved illusory, again, when it became clear that Britain was too involved in the making of a European peace settlement to allow her to divert to the war with the United States strength adequate to the accomplishment of her expanded purpose. To a certain extent, then, the British government was governed in its attitudes and actions by factors not entirely within its control; but it attempted as far as was possible to retain its freedom in dealing with American affairs as wholly without the sphere of European international relations.

The Formulation of a North American Policy

American hopes had centred in Russian mediation, first purposed to Adams in September of 1812. I do not intend to deal here with the rather complicated story of the failure of the Russian offer, except as it illustrates
Britain's desire, already indicated, not to be subject to the difficulties of Continental power politics in her dealings with the United States. Her experiences of the uses made of American war by the European nations in the period of the American Revolution may have played a part in this desire, but a more dominating consideration was most certainly her fear that the subject of maritime law and her 'rights' might be raised by those nations which, while her allies in the struggle against Napoleon, had shown themselves unwilling in the past to acquiesce in the British view of this matter. Of the members of the Neutral League of 1800 only Russia in 1813 could be considered as a major power and one whose interest in the American war might lead to embarrassment in the Alliance.

The maritime question was one on which Britain felt particularly sensitive, and her determination that it should be excluded from all discussion in the alliance was marked. No opportunity was avoided for pointing out to the other nations that the British felt this matter to be peculiarly their own province. The Emperor Alexander, in offering his mediation to the United States and Great Britain, had excited fears that he intended to bring the maritime problem into the councils of Europe, and the British answer was a threat to withdraw from any general Congress before agreeing to such a discussion. Metternich, too, was forcibly reminded
of the British position that her 'rights' were impossible of revision since they were in fact not British alone but common to all nations and thus a part of international law.  

Alexander protested that he had only meant to help to free Britain from the distractions attendant on the American war so that she might be able to employ her resources more effectively against France. Yet the British government remained sceptical about Russian intentions and insisted on reading Count Lieven, Russian ambassador in London, a lecture on the entire subject – the desirability of excluding maritime questions from the general Congress, the fact that Anglo-Russian disputes on the matter had been settled in a Convention of 1801, and a further statement of Britain's position with respect to the United States.  

British reluctance to mix 'a question purely domestic between Great Britain and America with the settlement of Europe' is evident; but no less marked, although perhaps less vehement, was her refusal to allow questions of New World international politics to become a factor in the war or in the negotiations with the United States. This is shown in the British reply to Spanish proposals, first to enter the war on the side of Great Britain, and then to associate the questions of Florida and American support for South American revolution with the peace negotiations.  

Castlereagh made vague promises to take up the matter with
the United States after the conclusion of peace, but apart from this his answer was a polite and firm refusal. Here again, fear of the difficulties of such an association and possibly of the uses that Americans might make of it may have determined the British attitude. A more likely reason lay in the fact that Spanish policy towards her South American possessions was not one which British ministers felt they could support.

The importance of this aspect of British policy was not lost on Americans, who, however, found they had few arguments to counteract its effectiveness in the courts of Europe. The European powers were of course much more interested in the defeat of Napoleon and a subsequent European settlement than in irritating Britain by fighting America’s battles for her. As much because of its own weakness and relative insignificance as because of its own inveterate reluctance to become involved in the European balance of power, the American government in dealing with the British was forced to rely on its own resources — the effectiveness of its armies, the ability of its commissioners at Ghent — and on the uncertain pressure of European events on British policy.

At the same time that they rejected Russian offers of mediation, the British government offered, itself, to begin direct negotiations with the United States. This
offer had been preceded by an unofficial communication to Albert Gallatin through the agency of Alexander Baring which offered a clarification of the British position on maritime issues. Castlereagh's suggestion that questions of right should not be raised, if it rejected the claims with which the United States had gone to war, at the same time showed no disposition to insist on an explicit American recognition of the British position. He hoped to find in the American government, he said,

...a disposition...as a measure of expediency and Conciliation, to treat upon the basis of Endeavouring to correct by suitable Regulation the abuses incident to Impressment, coupled...with the reciprocal adoption of...such Provisions of a Municipal description as tend to confine the Seamen of each State to their respective Services.\footnote{11}

Although his further reasoning is obscure it appears to imply a willingness to discuss the question of right in a negotiation joined to a belief that neither side would be likely to recede from its position.\footnote{12} This was the position maintained by the British government to the end of the war. It felt itself strong enough to make its wishes effective in any foreseeable future, and was content to waive discussion of a number of points that might have been expected to arise in the negotiations.

Castlereagh's instructions to the British commissioners at Ghent were perhaps more explicit but described no
essential change of purpose. The government, he wrote, refused to relinquish the principles of British maritime right; at the same time he suggested that discussion on checking the abuses occasioned by the exercise of that right might be undertaken. The burden of devising a specific cure for the evils that made impressment necessary was put on to the Americans. Castlereagh also suggested the possibility of lenient treatment for those who had been naturalized in good faith, but there was no question of a recognition of the naturalization. As for Britain's right of search on the high seas, this could not be given up in exchange for legislative enactment by a foreign nation. Again, it was possible that arrangements to check abuse might be made. On the whole, however, the British government were inclined to let these questions rest, since the return of peace in Europe had made them academic.13

In replying to a list of topics suggested to them by the British, the American Plenipotentiaries had added that of neutral and belligerent rights. Castlereagh repeated his belief that there was little need for such discussion. He implied that the measures taken against France had been extraordinary and retaliatory in character. He was unaware, he said of any difference existing 'upon the ordinary law of blockade, or of any other branch of neutral or belligerent rights' and reiterated his
government's reluctance to be drawn into discussions on these subjects, since such discussions must necessarily involve all the maritime issues, including impressment. Castlereagh no doubt wished to avoid the consequences of his own and American intransigence, and obviously, here, the British government felt itself to be negotiating from a position of strength which could in no way be much enhanced by prolonged disputes in the negotiation. The power of her navy was a sufficient guarantee of Britain's interpretation of maritime law. There was no need to continue the war over the definition of now abstract rights. To this the American Commission tacitly agreed.¹¹

(The subject of maritime right was mentioned from time to time during the course of the negotiations, but only when one side or the other felt it necessary to make it clear that no cession of right had been implied by a passing reference in argument to the question.) ⁵

The mysterious purposes of the Russian court had for a long time concealed the British refusal of Russian mediation from the Americans in St. Petersburg, and it was not until May of 1814 that Ghent was suggested as a place of direct negotiation and not until three months later that the commissioners met there to begin their discussions.¹⁶ Had maritime questions been the only ones in issue the negotiation might have successfully closed within a week of its beginning.
But war had raised in the minds of British ministers considerations of policy which would require five months of what at times could only be called wrangling for their settlement.

During 1813, beginning with the retreat from Moscow, the campaign against Napoleon was fast approaching its climax. The excitement of these events makes it unsurprising that the American War became even more of a side-show than it had been at its beginning. American naval victories had inflicted a temporary humiliation on Great Britain, but the slow, sure operation of the British blockade effectively rendered nugatory any advantages, if not feelings of pride, Americans may have hoped to have gained from them. As an instrument of policy, the blockade's only purpose was to induce in Americans a desire for peace, and as we have seen the motives behind military strategy in America remained in character defensive where necessary, punitive where possible. The engrossing interest of the spectacle on the Continent, a feeling that American war would die naturally with that in Europe, and more important British commitments there, all precluded an effort in America commensurate with an extension of war aims, but even prospects of victory over Napoleon did not suggest at this time the possibility of any such extension. Thus, although hints exist that
individual members of government were aware of advantages that might be gained by success in the war with the United States, there is no indication that official policy changed during 1813. The war was defensive, maritime rights were to be maintained, an amicable arrangement through negotiation was sought. With respect to territorial demands later put forward at Ghent, it is important to note that in December 1813 the Cabinet stated Britain's goals to be encompassed in a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*\(^{17}\).

But however uninterested British ministers might have been initially in changing the grounds of war against the United States, there were interested groups, both in Britain and in British North America, engaged in bringing to the attention of the public as well as of the government what were felt to be obvious and pressing reasons for just such a change. These groups were of course aided by the animosity created or revealed by the war. Their proposals were aided by the general feeling that America should in some way be punished. Fur traders pressing for boundary revision or Indian territory, Canadian merchants hoping for a share of the West Indies trade hitherto dominated by the United States, saw their opportunity to influence public opinion and the government in their favour. Their proposals were widely published in the press, and their views presented to the Ministers through the Board of Trade.
and the Secretary for War and the Colonies, Lord Bathurst.\textsuperscript{18} The course of the war was also bringing these questions into greater prominence. Since the gradually more effective operation of the blockade had begun to limit American activity at sea, the area of conflict along the Canadian borders increased in comparative importance, and American defeats during 1813 held out the possibility of some decisive action by the British armies.

If memorialists based their appeals on grounds of Imperial defence only in order to best serve their own interest, such appeals had nevertheless a strong claim on the attention of those in government who might be concerned with the future protection of British North America and, more indirectly, probable renewal of American war in every instance of European conflict in which Britain was involved. An increased military effort was the first requirement of a policy directed to the solution of these problems. No concrete territorial demands appear to have been contemplated before the middle of 1814, but a decisive military victory would, it was felt, provide a salutary lesson, American memory of which might in the future serve in itself as partial protection for Canada. Thus we see in the British government a growing inclination during that year not to rush matters but to wait on events in the hope that some advantage might be gained from them.
During the early months of 1814 other factors were working to confirm the Government in this mild wish. Events on the Continent were coming to a successful conclusion. Napoleon's defeat, if not certain until the very end, became daily more probable. America had expected to profit from Britain's involvement in Europe; she might now anticipate suffering from Britain's new-found freedom. Like most Englishmen, Ministers would no doubt appreciate the justice of this reversal and might believe themselves in a position to capitalize on it. Even before Napoleon fell plans were proceeding for the transfer of large numbers of Wellington's Peninsular veterans to America, directly and without their even touching in England.19

It is not surprising that a shift in emphasis from defensive to offensive war should occur. Assuming inveterate British hostility, many Americans found no other cause than their own government's proven ineptitude. What, in fact, requires some attempt at explanation is why such a shift should have been so slow in its operation and, basically, so half-hearted. Certainly many practical circumstances worked against a determined effort in America - the still thorny problems of continental settlement required the British presence, war expenses were continuing to mount. Yet even taking these factors into consideration, one still senses a certain reluctance in the government to engage in large-scale operations against the United States. (There is in
the sources no open statement of such a sentiment. It can hardly be studied in detail or its causes be more than suggested.) Perhaps Ministers, remembering the Revolution, feared that the task was a hopeless one. Perhaps the explanation lies in a lack of interest, a feeling that nothing was to be gained worth the probable cost. And perhaps the source of this reluctance is to be found in real, if obscured, feelings of good-will towards the United States — (indeed, of the major political figures of the time only Canning evidences an antagonism that could be expected to prosecute the war with full vigour). A number of the members of the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, had been associated with what Bradford Perkins has called the First Rapprochment of 1796-1805, and we may be justified in regarding as at least a partial reflection of their attitudes those rather conventional expressions of a desire for the resumption of amicable relations that so frequently prefaced the public pronouncements of the government during the war.

Such an attitude, whether deriving from habit, conviction or sentiment cannot be dismissed as a factor in British policy, but it most emphatically was not itself a policy nor could its existence in such a general form do more than modify the course of the development of British intentions. Those intentions were plain in their general purport before the
British commissioners arrived in Ghent. The war by its very existence had made it necessary for the government to consider the problems of Canadian defence, and the negotiations for peace were to reflect the military experience of the previous two years as well as to demonstrate many of the essentially non-military aspects of the relative positions of Great Britain and the United States in North America.

The government naturally looked, as it had characteristically done in its relations with its overseas possessions, to Canadians or to its own officials in Canada to provide some indication of what was considered most necessary for their own defence. We have seen the representations made by Sir George Prevost and by General Isaac Brock for stipulations in the favour of the Indians to be included in the Treaty of Peace. The idea of an Indian barrier state that Prevost advanced was not a new one, and it was put forward in several of the Memorials which reached London from Canada or which were the product of mercantile pressure groups in London itself. There is unfortunately no indication of the discussion, if any, which preceded the inclusion of suggestions for an Indian barrier state in the instructions to the British commission at Ghent.

The general purpose, beyond that of meeting the just expectations of allies, was clear however and was directed to getting military and strategic advantages in North America
which would somewhat offset the American preponderance there and which would provide some increase of security for those provinces. The clearest indication of the development of such a purpose can be seen in the instructions which in the spring of 1814 were dispatched to Sir George Prevost and to Governor Sherbrooke of Nova Scotia.23

The general impetus for this policy surely came from Canadian interests. Before the war had been six months old a group of merchants had requested that in the negotiations for peace the government should:

...establish such Regulations, both in respect of Boundaries, Military posts, and Fishing Stations, as may, in future, secure the Canadas and the Sister Colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, from the Aggressions of the Government and Citizens of the United States...24

We have also seen the initiative taken by Governor Sherbrooke in the occupation of Machias and Castine. It was in the spirit of these intentions that the British government framed its instructions for the negotiation, but it is extremely likely however that the government could not be considered as wholly committed to the attitudes which its policy reflected.

The considerations we have described were tending, during the months immediately preceding the negotiation, to coalesce into a policy directed to the containment of American expansion. Such intentions, deriving ultimately
from Canadian sources, received no final formulation. That Lord Liverpool or Lord Castlereagh would have accepted either the statement or the execution of a policy which, had it been successful, might have placed Great Britain in the role of the arbiter of peace in North America is doubtful, but we must account the pressure of logical conclusions (from a desire to gain security for Canada) not the least important in the preparation of the position from which the British were to face the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent.

'Extreme' views thrown out for discussion are often valuable in determining the attitudes of particular interests and in showing how far the logic of a government's intentions might carry it if only the means were available for their execution. Nor is the interest which such views have for the historian entirely theoretical. For in drawing back instinctively from the great commitments which would be involved in a policy of containment, the British government was not less inclined to feel its attractiveness and, by a curious failure of reasoning, to retain particular limited goals which had lost much of their purpose by the failure of the more general policy to achieve final definition or acceptance. Thus the proposal for an Indian buffer state was put forth, the 'after-image' of an intention. Thus it faded because it did not, as we shall see, correspond to any view of North American reality on which the government was prepared to act.
A desire to limit strictly the aggressive expansion of the United States came nearest to an expression in a draft of instructions to the British commissioners at Ghent which was not used and in the instructions which Lord Bathurst directed to the General in command of the expedition against New Orleans. It is probable that the draft instructions represented the views of the Colonial Office and more particularly its minister, Bathurst, who appears, during the course of the negotiations at least, to have been more firm in maintaining the original positions of his government than were his colleagues. And the tendency of Henry Goulburn (the most active if not the senior member of the commission at Ghent) to interpret his instructions in terms of an 'extreme' policy and his reluctance to recede from that interpretation no doubt marks the impress, in a somewhat inflexible mind, of convictions firmly developed in the Colonial Office, of which he had been Under Secretary since 1812.25

The draft instructed the commissioners at Ghent to make very precise territorial demands of the Americans. British possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay must be accepted; a large portion of Northern Maine must be ceded to Great Britain to give her territory necessary to construct a military road from Halifax to Quebec. Fort Niagara - the place from which attack on Upper Canada was considered easiest - was to be retained by the British.
The Indian boundary was to run along the Wabash and Miami rivers; and since this boundary gave more to the United States than had the Treaty of Greenville Britain desired the cession of Michilimackinac, which would also protect an uninterrupted communication with the Indians. The proposed Indian boundary was to be guaranteed by both the United States and Great Britain with neither able to acquire territory within it. In addition the Northwest boundary of the United States should run from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi in order to secure British access to that river, and finally the boundaries of Louisiana were to be so defined that the United States would be excluded from the Columbia River. Should the American commissioners be provided with no instructions on these points, peace was impossible.26

The instructions for the New Orleans campaign have been treated previously. By 6 September when they were issued Bathurst had become rather wary of making extensive commitments in North America, but he contemplated the possibility of re-establishing Spain in possession of Louisiana or of the independence of that territory. Such a result, if accomplished would have been a decisive check to American westward expansion. It is also possible to see in the very fully developed arguments which the
British commissioners at Ghent put forward to prove American designs not only against Canada but against Spain's North American possessions as well the residue of a desire to put limits to any possible future success of those designs.²⁷

Canadian security: The Indians

The instructions with which the British commissioners were furnished at Ghent reflected the intention of their government to secure from the negotiation permanent defensive advantages in North America. In their final form, however, these instructions contained but a blurred version of the very precise territorial provisions that we have seen in the draft not used. No indication remains of the reasons for the rejection of the draft. One might guess that the draft had represented the views of the Colonial Office, and more particularly Lord Bathurst, acting more or less as the faithful agent of Canadian desires, and that the muchless definite instructions were a product of Liverpool's or Castlereagh's reluctance to commit the negotiation immediately to positions which might become embarrassing to maintain and difficult to retreat from.

Thus, although the belief was firmly stated that the expansive aggressiveness of the United States forced Britain to require boundary revisions in the interests of Canadian defence, the precise nature of her requirements was left initially undefined. As for the question
of the Indians "an adequate arrangement of their interests" was to be considered a *sine qua non* of peace, and such an arrangement was to include "a full and express recognition of their limits". It is unclear from the wording whether the mutual guarantee of Indian possessions suggested by Castlereagh was also a part of the *sine qua non*.  

That these instructions were general in nature was due in part to Castlereagh's desire to see how far the American commissioners might be prepared to go. The British at Ghent, however, found themselves under the necessity of defining their position somewhat more precisely under the questioning of the Americans. Britain wished to include the Indians, stated Henry Goulburn because she felt she must be permitted to judge of the permanency of peace - a statement which carried the implication that any stipulation for the Indians in the Treaty was to have the force of a guarantee for the future. This implication was re-inforced by his further explanation that neither the United States nor Great Britain was to have the right to acquire territory within the Indian boundary to be stipulated. The British commissioners no doubt felt that the inclusion of the Indians in the peace if it was to mean anything at all logically required the recognition and guarantee of boundaries. And although Castlereagh in the more exact instructions that on 18th August he brought with him to Ghent (where he stopped for two days on his way to Paris and ultimately Vienna)
hastened to distinguish between the inclusion of the Indians as the *sine qua non* and an arrangement of limits as a matter for adjustment, he reluctantly assented upon discussion with the commissioners to place the latter question before the Americans as "equally necessary" for a settlement, since this had been stated to be the case in a meeting of the commissioners two days previously. Castlereagh also accepted a proposal made by Goulburn that the Americans must accept at least a provisional article on the subject of the Indians, and if they could not do so the negotiation must be adjourned until they received instructions from America. 30

One cannot help feeling that the British government had no fully considered idea of the implications of and possibilities inherent in the question, and the negotiation appears to have been prepared for with no great thoroughness. Goulburn, for example, did not know until he had been in Ghent for two weeks that his government asked for American disarmament on the Great Lakes. 31 And Castlereagh seems to have contemplated a right of conquest in the proposed Indian buffer state which not only, as Goulburn logically and strenuously objected, rendered the plan meaningless but which would allow American reprisals across the Canadian borders, a right surely little calculated to achieve the expressed aim of removing sources of friction as far as was possible. 32
The threat the British government had seen in Russian offers of negotiation had largely passed; no minister as yet considered the American war an embarassment to Britain's European diplomacy. Yet if Castlereagh was too preoccupied with concerns of the coming meeting at Vienna to assume a greater measure of direction at Ghent, we may fairly see this circumstance as the first faint emergence of one important current nudging British policy out of an intention to see provisions for the security of Canada written into a treaty with America and towards a peace based on the status quo ante bellum.

A factor of more immediate consequence was the determined opposition of the American commission to any suggestion that a buffer state be carved, either in part or wholly, from the territory of the United States. (Although it is possible that they had not considered the point, the British government had apparently taken for granted that the proposed territory was to include lands on both sides of the Canadian-American border. But, in failing to make this clear and by suggesting that the Treaty of Greenville of 1795 be made the basis of a settlement, they had allowed the American commissioners to score a tactical point by claiming that the proposal was contrary to that principle of "perfect reciprocity" which Castlereagh, in suggesting direct negotiation, had stated was to be its basis. This minor failure in tactics is another indication of the lack of thought which was given to the demand
for an Indian buffer state.) 34 Briefly, the American position was that the Indians within the borders of the United States could not be considered as independent of American sovereignty and that the proposed terms were equivalent to a cession of territory as well as sovereignty. This position and the consistent refusal of the Americans to entertain any suggestion of a barrier and, initially, even of the inclusion of the Indians in a treaty of peace were argued with a force that clearly impressed the British negotiators, but the greatest effect was the obvious American belief that no such arrangement as Great Britain proposed could be long permanent. 35

The conditions proposed by Great Britain...are dishonourable to the United States, in demanding from them to abandon Territory and a portion of their Citizens, to admit a Foreign interference in their domestic concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights on their own Shores and in their own Waters. A Treaty concluded on such terms would be but an Armistice. It cannot be supposed that America would long submit to Conditions so injurious and degrading. It is impossible, in the natural course of events, that she should not at the first favourable opportunity recur to Arms, for the recovery of her Territory, of her Rights, of her Honour. Instead of settling existing differences, such a Peace would only create new causes of War, sow the seeds of a permanent hatred, and lay the foundations of hostilities for an indefinite period. 36

Such a frank announcement of an intention not to be bound by the possible provisions of a treaty may have been just cause for protest, but it could not fail to find some acknowledgement, whether open or not, in the councils of a government which
genuinely desired a permanent and peaceful settlement in North America. The success of the American commissioners was due in large part to the ability with which they impressed on the British government that their opposition to the proposed stipulations was an accurate representation of what might be a general reaction in America. Goulburn was later to evidence the effectiveness of their sincerity when he stated:

I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determination which prevails in the breast of every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their territory; but I am now sure that there is nothing which the people of America would so reluctantly abandon as what they are pleased to call their natural right to do so. 37

In answer to the American note of 24 August, however, Goulburn and his colleagues continued to develop the logic of their original instructions. They wished to argue strongly the principle of Indian independence and the necessity Great Britain felt of seeing that this independence should not be subject to United States' policy. Inclusion implied guarantees. 38 But Castlereagh, now in Paris, and the government in London drew back. The former forwarded to Lord Liverpool the proposed communication to the American plenipotentiaries in which the British at Ghent stated their position, and although he maintained that the question was not as the Americans insisted one of principle, he recognised the force with which their argument was put by his awareness that it required a full answer, presumably with a view to eventual publication. Willing, as was Bathurst, to make
American refusal to include the Indians in the peace a basis for the continuance of war in pursuit of what were to him obviously more important territorial arrangements, he nevertheless suggested the possibility of separating the question of peace with the Indians from that of their boundaries. 39

The Prime Minister, however, while not averse to continuing the war to gain concessions on the Canadian borders was very reluctant to do so by publicly presenting the British position on the Indians, as developed at Ghent, as the cause of the rupture of negotiations which he saw as imminent. He felt, said Liverpool, the extreme importance of making the American government responsible and wished to avoid the popularity which that government might gain if Great Britain persisted in pursuing a policy that would convert the struggle into one of desperation. It was in light of these considerations that he declared, somewhat unfairly, that the negotiators at Ghent had taken an erroneous view of their government’s intentions. The distinction he made between the inclusion of the Indians in the peace as the sine qua non and the question of boundaries as merely suggested for discussion echoed Castlereagh and was specifically stated in the further instructions sent to Ghent by Lord Bathurst. These instructions showed, as well, further relaxation in the British position; the inclusion of the Indians lost the implication of future guarantee (the explicit proposal for which was quietly dropped) and was now presented merely as a reflection of Britain’s desire that her allies be accorded a just and
honourable peace. With such a change of emphasis, the further suggestion that the boundaries determined by the Treaty of Greenville be the basis for an arrangement lost most of its significance. 40

Liverpool, indeed, increasingly showed the power of the American arguments in his obvious uneasiness over the demand to include the Indians in the treaty. He did not suggest that they be abandoned, but he clearly realised that Great Britain was committed on a point which should it cause the break-up of the negotiation would involve the honour of both countries and make any future arrangement much more difficult. That Britain might well see herself bound to a perpetual and dangerous interference in the unstable affairs of the Indians had been one of the unexplored aspects of her original proposals; Liverpool, in coming, if tardily, to an awareness of this, was to find his concern opened on to what it was possible to regard as a general principle of Anglo-American relations. 41

Whether in particular or in general terms, the British government had been given an indication of the consequences of its Indian policy by the reaction it had elicited from the Americans. Although the latter might justly have claimed a diplomatic victory, argument played less part in that victory than did this illustration of an attitude shared, it appeared, by the majority of Americans. A persistent bias in British thinking about America was thus touched. For British policy on the eve of war, British strategy during the war, had given
abundant examples of an abiding concern with American public opinion. The British government retreated on the issue of the Indians because they believed that the American people would support a war in which the chief issue had become the creation of an Indian buffer state.

Neither Liverpool or Castlereagh professed anything but scorn for the vagaries of the American public mind, but they could not ignore the effect with which it might be marshalled against them and thus its importance as a factor, a permanent factor, in the prospects for Canadian defence. No military victories, no Indian boundary, could free the British government from having to take into account the fact that the United States had a population ten times that of the Canadian provinces. Commitment to a military or territorial solution to Canada's defensive problems involved the danger of encouraging an American antagonism that might make the numerical superiority of the United States more than a merely potential threat to Canadian security. Demands which roused the Americans now or which were likely to be a source of future conflict defeated their own ends.42

The government desired, in its retreat, to reach a position which could not be used to inflame American opinion when the apparently inevitable break came. To do so they were forced to abandon a significant part of the policy of containment with which they had entered the negotiation. An since the break-up of the negotiation did not in fact occur the retreat was lasting. Unlikely as they might have been in August 1812
to endorse it, they had in practice already come half-way to agreement with the American contention that

The best security for the Possessions of both Countries will be found in an equal and solid Peace, in a mutual respect for the rights of each other, and in the cultivation of a friendly understanding between then. 43

The same considerations as governed the retreat on the issue of the Indian boundary may have led the government to recede somewhat, at the same time, from its demand for an exclusive military possession of the Great Lakes. 44 Castlereagh had originally justified this by making a statement that, in a broader context, described Britain's main motive in the negotiations.

...the views of the British government are strictly defensive. They consider the course of the lakes, from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, both inclusive, to be the natural military frontier of the British possessions in North America; as the weaker power on the North American continent, the least capable of acting offensively, and the most exposed to sudden invasion, Great Britain considers herself entitled to claim the use of those lakes as a military barrier. It is quite obvious that a boundary line, equally dividing these waters, with a right in each State to arm, both upon the lakes and upon their shores, must be calculated hereafter to create a perpetual contest for naval ascendancy, in peace as well as in war - a species of conflict which is likely to be productive of an extent of expense and jealousy, equally to be deprecated by both Governments. 45

The situation required that no American naval forces be allowed to sail the waters of the lakes and that there should be as well a demilitarized zone on the American shores. The
British position on this subject was argued with little change during the first month of the negotiations as were the American objections, the latter being based first on an assertion that the proposal contradicted the "perfect reciprocity" which was the supposed basis of negotiation and secondly on a denial of Britain's need for such a provision. Liverpool finally, in a letter of 11 September to Bathurst, suggested that the British demand be modified to require only the retention of Michilimackinac, Niagara, and Sackett's Harbour, the last of which might be given up if the Americans could be brought to agree to the first two.

While Liverpool stressed that the Americans should be made aware that Britain had thus relaxed her insistence on an exclusive military possession of the lakes, his statements on the modifications to be presented on this subject as on that of the inclusion of the Indians in a treaty were accompanied by a determination to maintain the British position (even to the point on the latter question of a rupture of the negotiation) and to rely on the results of the campaign in Canada to bring the Americans to a more yielding frame of mind. For the considerations which had led to the softening of earlier demands were not absolute. If the retreat on the question of an Indian territory testified to the importance ministers placed on reactions in America to what took place in Ghent, they only felt more confident when once negotiations had been put on a basis with the justice of which Americans could not fail to be impressed. No further retreats by the British
government can be attributed to a direct concern with what Americans might or might not think; yet the logic of the situation once accepted continued to make itself felt in a number of demonstrable if small ways and no doubt continued to be a general unexpressed factor making for peace.

Canadian security: uti possidetis

It should be stressed here also that the decisions recorded in the correspondence of ministers as having been made by the government were not by any means immediately or clearly transmitted to Ghent. It was apparently the purpose of the government, having reached what it regarded as a position of some strength, to prolong the negotiation by a slow retreat covered by argumentation in order to prevent a rupture while at the same time giving an opportunity for news of events in America to arrive. This use of time can be seen in Liverpool's reference to Sackett's Harbour, a place which had been suggested to Prevost as one of the principal objects of his efforts. The Prime Minister no doubt felt that the way laying something of a trap for the intransigence of the American commissioners.

The American commissioners say that they cannot agree to our having the exclusive military possession of the Lakes. This proposition we have declared our readiness to modify in our note of the 4th inst. Is it expedient now to state to them our ultimatum? Certainly in my judgment not if the question of the Indians is not likely to be settled satisfactorily. If this question could be arranged, might we not then make a demand of Niagara, Michilimackinack and Sackett's Harbour, and, if these were granted, propose to waive any question about the territory of maine?
The American commissioners would in this case direct their whole reasoning (if they were sincere in desiring peace) against our claim to Sackett's Harbour as a position not in our occupation, and which therefore we could have no right to demand. This would give us time. We might hear from America in the interim. If we did not, we might then decide whether we would insist on Sackett's Harbour or be contented with the other positions. At all events it is material that they should be informed that we have agreed to modify the principle of the exclusive military possession of the Lakes as far as can in any reasonable degree be consistent with our own security. 50

The same hope of gaining a military success that might influence the negotiations which we have seen in the instructions to Governor Sherbrooke and to Sir George Prevost was equally evident in those transmitted to the General in command of the New Orleans expedition. 51 To secure some position which either might be demanded as the price of peace or used for bargaining was one of the chief purposes expressed there. The occupation of Machias and Castine in Maine, which Sherbrooke had so readily effected, had already, as we have seen, been used in an attempt to get American acceptance of boundary revisions. And now, in late September, the arrival of the news of the British victory at Bladensburgh and the occupation and burning of Washington, while it signalled no permanent territorial gain, was regarded as likely to bring the American commissioners more quickly to accept the existing British position. 52 While Bathurst hastened to instruct Goulburn and his colleagues that this victory made no different to the statement of the British position, we can sense nevertheless in the correspondence the
increased confidence which resulted from it. 53

It is now impossible to tell whether or not the ultimatum which was soon after presented to the Americans on the subject of Indian inclusion in the treaty was due to a feeling of strength; but Goulburn indicated as much in attributing American acceptance of the ultimatum to the arrival of news of their defeat. 54

(Thus, on 13 October, the American commissioners finally agreed to a provisional article including the Indians in a general pacification. Although the present study is concerned primarily with British policy, it might be well to mention here retreat from an extremely fully argued refusal to allow the British to treat for the Indians was due to an awareness, equalling that of their opponents, of the inconveniences attendant upon the continuation of the war that led them to consider carefully the grounds of any threatened break-up of the negotiation.) 55

Since the beginning of the negotiation Lord Castlereagh had been able to continue little further to it, but he expressed his approval of the ground at which it had arrived. His belief in the "growing value of Canada" sanctioned the tendency of his government to stand firm during September and October in its demands for boundary revision for the protection of those provinces. 56

Liverpool, however, wished to clarify British determination even further, and in a long communication to Goulburn dealt point by point with his views on those aspects of the British
situation in general which the Americans might consider sources of weakness to be exploited in the bargaining at Ghent. A communication from the British government on such a subject could readily be interpreted as an attempt to mask real anxieties which might become only more obvious in the process of being explained away. (Goulburn, at any rate, appears not to have transmitted these views to his opponents.)

Liverpool's warnings of the destructive power of Admiral Cochrane's fleet and his threat to increase the vigour of the British armies represented indeed the conviction and intention of the British government but might, coming after stalemate at Baltimore and defeat at Plattsburgh, have had something of a hollow ring in the ears of the Americans, who would surely have found it rather ingenuous of the Prime Minister to suggest that the efforts of the United States could in the future be limited to defence only.

Liverpool also wished to disabuse the Americans of any reliance they might be inclined to place on the state of British finances or on prospects of direct aid from a European power. Even should an American war cost ten million pounds annually it could be carried on "without any increase of debt or any addition of taxes." The continuance of the property tax, he went on, was an evil but one which the experience of twenty years of the greatest vicissitudes had shown the country could endure; and should the Americans reject the terms offered them "the country at large will feel it necessary to support a war, the worst effects of which will
be the leaving them in that state in which they have existed and prospered."

It was, he implied, equally unrealistic of the United States to place any confidence in the intervention of European powers exhausted by a long and expensive war. Should such intervention be eventually forthcoming, "it can hardly be expected ... till after an interval during which America may have lost what it would take her twenty years of peace to recover." 57

With the subject of the Indians disposed of by American acceptance of the provisional article, the government now resumed discussion of the revision of the boundary between the United States and Canada. The original proposal for frontier rectification had been in the form of a demand for exclusive military occupation of the lakes and had been justified primarily by Castlereagh's contention that Great Britain was the weaker power in North America, a form of justification which, after the struggle over the Indian boundary, had been shown to have obviously little effect on the mind of the American commissioners. The demand for military possession of the lakes had been modified, as we have seen, to one for the retention of certain border posts, 58 and Bathurst now (20 October), in response to an opening given by the Americans in their rejection of the original proposal, placed the issue on the principle of uti possidetis - subject to mutual accommodation. Although Goulburn was not to indicate the accommodation proposed until the general
principle was accepted, Lord Bathurst appeared to feel that there was no reason why it should not be.

Britain, in possession of Michilimackinac, Niagara, and a portion of Maine was to retain the first two places but would trade Machias and Castine in Maine for Forts Erie and Amherstberg which were in American possession. Bathurst also repeated the government's intention to retain the Passamaquoddy islands and its hope that it might secure the Halifax-Quebec communication. 59

These instructions were despatched as news of Baltimore and Plattsburg arrived, almost simultaneously, in London. The American commissioners realised, however, that these events did little to change their position, and it was rather gloomily that they contemplated the eventual disruption of the negotiation because of the British insistence on the principle of uti possidetis, a principle which, they said, could not be accepted by the United States. 60 The American opposition surprised and annoyed British ministers; but although Liverpool firmly declared that his government should not relax its demands and in fact felt more inclined than ever to insist on them, 61 he began to show more and more clearly that his anxieties had indeed revealed themselves in the protestations of indifference he had sent to Ghent only shortly before.

Lord Liverpool had already felt the need to justify to the European powers British demands for the inclusion of the Indians in a treaty, and it may have been at his insistence that Bathurst sent to Vienna a resumé of the instructions governing the operation of British forces in Louisiana, a
resumé which stressed the absence of any British intention to secure territory for herself there. 62 Although the Prime Minister in a letter to Castlereagh (28 October) expressed a fear that European nations, and especially Russia, might favour the United States, his greatest uneasiness stemmed in effect British involvements in America had in the hobbling of her policy in Europe. 63 Castlereagh had indicated, before arriving at the Congress, that he expected its deliberations to be protracted; and soon after his arrival, on 13 September, the questions of Saxony and Poland had begun to disrupt the alliance which had so shortly before triumphed over Napoleon. 64 Liverpool had called the latter question one 'of serious embarrassment', and it was due in part to Castlereagh's opposition to Russian demands that the Prime Minister wrote him "We owe it to ourselves not to make enemies in other quarters [than America] if we can avoid it." 65

Liverpool also became conscious that the sum of ten million pounds which he had so confidently stated might easily be found for the prosecution of the American war was more of a stumbling block than he had realised. 66 He must have been aware of the considerations which had led Nicholas Vansittart, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to send Lord Castlereagh in Vienna a summary statement of the government's financial position and of its prospects in that respect for the coming year.

Vansittart described a great drain on the Treasury because of the requirements of the armies in Spain and in
France, a drain halted only by the temporary expedient of the postponement of certain foreign payments, but which was followed almost immediately by extraordinary demands from the Navy Board. And after explaining to Castlereagh how he proposed to raise the necessary money (Two million pounds, which had been taken from that part of the Vote of Credit allotted the Army) he continued, "... you will observe that this plan ... might be deranged by any sudden and unexpected additions of expense." And although he found, in an increase of the revenue amounting to over 2½ million pounds, reasons to consider "our financial prospects sufficiently promising", he also observed:

But we cannot avail ourselves of the favourable circumstances for the relief of the country unless we can bring the American War to a close ... 67

Liverpool, as was his wont, tended to take finance as an aspect of politics and to judge expenditure by the willingness of Parliament and ultimately the nation to sanction it. In this respect the prospect of a renewal of war in Europe coupled with the continuance of that across the Atlantic filled him with apprehension. Although prepared, on 28 October, to see the negotiations at Ghent founder on the issue of uti possidetis, there can be no doubt that the American war had become an increasingly heavy burden to him. Thus we find him, less than a week later, proposing to review the entire course of the government's American policy and showing in his belief that it was not absolutely committed
at Ghent an indication of the direction such a review would take. The observations on the military situation in North America which the Duke of Wellington would shortly make were to fall on ground ready to receive them.

The immediate circumstances of the offer to Wellington of American command were part of European, not American, politics - but incidentally almost he was led to an expression of his views on British prospects across the Atlantic. Those views cannot have been totally unexpected by Lord Liverpool who had, in making his offer, already implied that Wellington's most useful function might be to lend his prestige to an unwelcome but necessary peace with the United States.

Although Wellington had already appreciated that he might have to go to America and had agreed to the eventuality, he resisted such a proposal very forcefully and in the course of his resistance effectively demolished the last remaining justification for the continuation of the American war.

In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of war, to demand any concession of territory from America ... You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack ... Why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any.

One further event no doubt added to Liverpool's desire to hasten the war to a conclusion. For despite all his efforts
to prevent the American government from using the negotiations to gain support for the war in the United States, Liverpool now saw the publication of the correspondence of the early stages by President Madison; the effect was all that he had feared. The Prime Minister, who had recently asserted that the British public demanded more than its government were willing to ask for from America, now found himself faced by an opposition which, however weak in itself, might use a combination of American war and Income Tax to discredit the government.

The Signing of the Treaty of Ghent

...we have determined ... not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory.

We have been led to this determination by the consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna, and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France. We have also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances, and to the difficulties we shall have in continuing the property tax.

Considering the general depression of rents, which, even under any corn law that is likely to meet with the approbation of Parliament, must be expected to take place under such circumstances, it has appeared to us desirable to bring the American war if possible to a conclusion.

From what has passed in Parliament on this subject it is quite evident that the continuance of the war on what is called a new principle would be violently opposed; besides, you are probably aware that it is the Duke of Wellington's opinion that no material military advantage can be expected to be obtained if the war goes on ...

Thus Lord Liverpool gave to Lord Castlereagh a summary of the immediate considerations which led to an abandonment of the last vestiges of an attempt to find Canadian security
through war or diplomacy. The retreat of the British government was due to no new conception of Anglo-American relations nor to a retreat a conviction that Canadian security must, if not on the field of battle or over the bargaining table, be somehow provided for. Yet if the separate and various reasons for this abandonment might initially appear fortuitous and temporary, taken together they marshalled themselves with the force of a general observation that involved certain more or less lasting factors in the relative positions of the United States and Great Britain.

But before discussing these subjects we must first carry the narrative of the negotiation to a conclusion.

No record remains of the instructions sent by Bathurst to Ghent after the government had made its decision to drop uti possidetis as a basis for a settlement, but their effect there and Goulburn's observations on them indicate the anxiety with which a settlement was desired. Goulburn also felt hastened to agreement with the Americans by the need to transmit the treaty to arrive in America before Congress adjourned in March. 74

Nevertheless the outstanding problems, involving the actual possession of disputed territory on the termination of hostilities and the questions of British navigation of the Mississippi River and American claims with regard to her rights or privileges in the Fisheries, remained difficult. With respect to the first, Bathurst, while determined to retain possession of the Passamaquoddy islands was willing to meet
American objections by limiting the application of the article to territories specifically mentioned by the Treaty as being in dispute. On the subject of the Fisheries the American commissioners found their opponents much less accommodating. Not only did Bathurst attempt to argue that the United States had implicitly recognised that the privileges granted them by the Treaty of 1783 had been abrogated by the war, he also insisted on some explicit recognition of the British position, either by a separate written document or by the inclusion in the Treaty of an article specifically stating the question as subject to future negotiation. 75

Yet each retreat of the British government gave added force to the arguments for a speedy agreement of differences, as there became less and less reason to continue the war over the minor points remaining. In addition diplomacy at Vienna was rapidly reaching a critical point as was the financial situation and its political implications at home. Vansittart, a month after his previous letter to Castlereagh, repeated his anxieties with greater force:

... the continuance of the American War beyond another year, would, in the present temper of the country (which is much more likely to get worse than to improve) lead to serious embarrassments and that I consider the renewal of a continental war at all like what we have lately concluded as absolutely impracticable for some years...

... Economy and relief from Taxation are not merely the War Cry of Opposition, but they are the real objects to which public attention is turned. Neither continental arrangements nor even the contest with America much affect the feelings of a nation which, for so many years has been used to view, and sometimes, to apprehend for itself, the most tremendous vicissitudes. The taking of Washington
afforded indeed a momentary triumph: it was felt as a reparation for the supposed insults our flag had suffered at sea. But to the final issue of the War, provided it be not dishonourable, the country is very indifferent.

...The Property Tax ... will be the great Tug of the Session, and as disagreeable to our friends as to our antagonists. Every Engine is already at work to enflame the public mind, and stir up opposition against it... 76

Pressures such as these, added to Goulburn's accurate reading of the temper of the American commission (they would never accept, he stated, a stipulation which expressly excluded them from the Fisheries) which no doubt led Bathurst to withdraw his demand for an explicit recognition of the British position. (19 December) The Treaty of Ghent was signed five days later.
CONCLUSION

The War of 1812 had appeared confused in its origins, disorganised in its strategy, and in its end inconclusive. The causes of the conflict had lain in the circumstantial entanglement of policies that were not so much mutually antagonistic as mutually irrelevant. Great Britain's attention had been directed to and her policies dominated by the need to defeat Napoleon. Although this single-minded purpose might have, in the repeal of the Orders-in-Council, admitted of diversion as regarded the means of its accomplishment, it was never permanently deflected from its goal, in terms of which all other policies were made. Thus American war was merely one of the burdens which the British government found itself forced to accept in furtherance of an object which had in the past required much greater sacrifices. The British right of impressment was held to be of such vital importance to the maintenance of British naval supremacy that the government would endure that burden to retain it. But American war, the obvious must be stressed here, was a burden and had in no way offered any serious opportunity for the achievement of any purpose which the British government had been, initially, willing to recognise.

If the British government was eventually to find that war with the United States suggested, after Napoleon's defeat, new objects for the exercise of determined purpose, its American counterpart had exhausted its own intention in the declaration of war itself. In the United States a nascent expansionism
(not as a fact - it had been that since 1607 - but as an expressed attitude), fed by and feeding on an equally burgeoning sense of national pride, had found a natural but strictly speaking illogical object in what it considered the insults offered by the intention of Great Britain to regulate American trade and by British determination to impress sailors from American shipping. At the same time, the 'War Hawks' who saw in this situation ample cause for war, entertained ideas of the conquest and annexation of Canada, without any sense of the contradiction which naturally was to exercise, in about equal parts, the logic and the anger of Englishmen. American nationalism of the period after the war had been called, with justice, premature. This truth is illustrated by nothing as well as the causes of the war itself. For it was only by becoming attached to maritime issue that expansion could lead to war. Canada was not a legitimate object in the sense that its acquisition was more a matter of idle desire than of necessity. (Yet the combination of national pride and the desire to expand was a potentially potent one, and Lord Liverpool showed foresight in refusing to offer - by insistence on gaining it in the negotiation - an Indian buffer state as an object against which they could focus and find themselves). In effect, the American government accomplished its purpose in showing that it was capable of declaring war.

Certainly the lack of preparation, evidenced in American actions and strategy, the limited enthusiasm of the American
people, indicated that if the conquest of Canada was merely a matter of marching, as Jefferson had claimed, few seemed to care to take more than the first step. Only at sea, appropriately enough, did American pride make the effort to exact recompense for its injury. The few and relatively minor American victories in single-ship combat served as a statement of intention, but they could not, nor could they seriously have been expected to, induce the British to retreat from their position on her maritime rights.

Great Britain did little more than bear the burdens of the war as well as she could for the year of its existence. Her aims were strictly defensive and her means strictly limited by the requirements of European war. As the latter conflict relaxed its demands the forces freed were used primarily to accomplish a purpose limited to punishment. Such a purpose was to continue to motivate British strategy (at least in part) along the American coasts to the end of the war. But at the same time an awareness of American designs on Canada as well as the emphasis given by the war to the purely military aspects of Canadian defence (such as the importance of the Great Lakes) combined to effect a gradual change in British policy and a shift from defensive to limited offensive operations in the strategy which reflected it.

No better general expression of this change can be found than in the instructions to Sir George Prevost which informed him that the object of his operations was to be
'to give immediate protection' and 'to obtain if possible ultimate security to His Majesty's possessions in America'. The British government relied on the use of military force to sanction the demands and suggestions it was to make at Ghent. The first of these was for an Indian buffer state which was to be guaranteed by both nations, the second a demand for the cession to Great Britain of certain frontier posts.

On the question of an Indian state the American commissioners, although eventually forced to agree to the inclusion of the Indians in the peace, were victorious in their diplomacy. But that victory was due only in part to their negotiating skills. In large part it was due to circumstances outside their control. In the first place British policy, while gradually coming to a full formulation of North American policy still bore the marks of the accidental circumstances of its birth in the strategy of the war, and the requirements and consequences of such a policy were not fully realised or fully explored by ministers who had gotten no further than a vague approval of its general tendency. This was what gave the American commissioners their opportunity, for they were confronted at Ghent not with a position fully equipped and fully argued but one which the British government, in effect, invited them to define in their own terms.

But if the Americans exploited the openings for argument thus given them, they might have found words of little effect if faced with the reality of a determined effort by the British
government to make its point by the use of force in North America. To the fact that Britain did not, would not or could not, employ its full military strength in an effort to secure permanent military advantages against America is ultimately due to the failure of British diplomacy at Ghent.

Of the open questions which are argued by the historians of the War of 1812 the causes for British retreat at Ghent have been second only to American motives in beginning the war as a subject of disagreement. It is my opinion that the basic decision for this retreat was taken before the negotiations had even begun. The inadequacy of the forces sent by the British government to America made its intentions, as formulated at Ghent, impossible of achievement; the series of considerations which gradually drove the ministers from their original policy represented successive recognitions that the means were lacking and would continue to be lacking.

For the first year and a half of the North American conflict, the war with France absorbed all but a handful of the available British troops and when the French war was over the commitments of the British occupation in France coupled with threats of a renewal of continental hostilities operated to limit the number of men that it was felt could be spared for America.

We may guess that the original reluctance of the British government to commit itself to a fully worked out policy of containment was due in part to its having been forced to
reduce the number of troops intended for America. It obviously believed that the remaining forces would be adequate to secure limited military objectives which might either be retained at the close of the war or exchanged for other positions in the treaty of peace. It was a not unreasonable objective, taken by itself. Yet in the event it turned out to be founded on a basic misconception of the strategic situation in North America.

Every one of the considerations which eventually brought peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum illustrated the truth of the proposition on which the original proposals for an Indian territory and for boundary revision were based: Britain was the weaker power in North America. What became equally clear was that that weakness was as permanent as it had been for the French in the 1760s whose position curiously enough the British had come in certain respects to occupy some 50 years later.

That British determination to secure tangible guards against future American aggression might merely serve to create an enthusiastic American public opinion in support of its government was one of the considerations which led the British government quickly to withdraw its tentative suggestions for an Indian buffer state. This consideration continued to show itself, if less strongly, during the remainder of the negotiation. Although, after this retreat on the Indians, the Government determined to defend what it considered a strong position in its demand for frontier revision, it none the less began to
feel increasingly strongly both the expense of the war and the effect it might have on the British position in the Congress then in session at Vienna.

It was these considerations which gave Wellington's famous verdict its full effect. Indeed before the Duke stated that he saw no military grounds to justify a demand for American territory, the Prime Minister had felt what he called 'the inconvenience' of the war so greatly that he had recognised that some change of British policy had become necessary. The government was in fact not prepared to make a greater military effort in North America, and in this showed the effect, if not an immediate overt appreciation, of the more or less continuing features of the Anglo-American relationship of which concerns about public opinion in America, Russia meddling, or excessive expenditure were merely the immediate present manifestations.

The existence of war proved that, despite herself, the United States played some part in the European structure of power. No responsible American was apparently willing to consider that his country might seek the active support of any European nation in the present or in any future conflict - such support might indeed be avoided. Yet no responsible British minister could ignore in his calculations the possibility first that American war might again inevitably result from conflicts in Europe, that the United States might choose the opportunity to achieve gains against Canada that a European War might provide, or that difficulties in America might
weaken the policy of the British government on the continent. America's potential for trouble was not so much in the action she might take but in the inordinate expense and difficulty which it would cost Great Britain to oppose her. In this respect the anxiety of Lord Liverpool over the financial commitments of American war are, beyond the immediate fact of the vast expenditure which still arose from the just completed war with France, significant. Any calculation of future possibilities could not omit to consider that the price of any American war might in effect be doubled by hostilities in Europe or that a European war might see the need of additional expense for the defence of Canada.

If such general lessons were not drawn by ministers from the particular considerations to which they testified, Lord Liverpool showed himself aware of more than one of the bases of the policy represented by a return to the status quo ante bellum. In writing to George Canning in justification of the final treaty he stated:

We might certainly land in different parts of their coast, and destroy some of their towns, or put them under contribution; but in the present state of the public mind in America it would be vain to expect any permanent good effects from operations of this nature.

The continuance of the war for the purpose of obtaining a better frontier for Canada would, I am persuaded, have been found impracticable; for when that question came to be argued, it would be stated, and stated with truth, that no additional frontier which you could possibly expect to obtain would materially add to the security of Canada.

The weakness of Canada consists in this; that the United States possesses 7,500,000 people; the two Canadas not more than 300,000. That the
government of the United States have access to Canada at all times of the year, whereas Great Britain is excluded from such access for nearly six months. As long as we have the larger and better army we shall be able to defend the country, notwithstanding all these disadvantages; but the frontier in any case must be of such prodigious extent that it never could be made, as frontier, defensible against the means which the Americans might bring against it.  78

Nothing could be done to redress the balance of power in the long run unless the British government was willing to assume the permanent burden of herself creating, guaranteeing and maintaining a structure of power in North America. Unless this was her goal, any partial attempt would ultimately end in her entire expulsion from the continent. The pressure of the American government had raised the issue. If Britain was to take it up to such an extent that she placed herself in the path of American expansion, and exposed Canada as the object of American ambition, she would be led either to continue her policy until she was fully committed or to abandon the effort entirely.

The negotiations at Ghent represent one facet, and perhaps the most important, of the potential significance of the War of 1812. These negotiations were the working out of the possibilities of a radically new British policy with respect to the United States. The war also offered the possibility of new vigour in an old system of commercial policy. Although one historian at least 79 has seen the Treaty of Ghent as a victory for Free Trade, we can not go that far. It was a
defeat for the attempt of mercantilism to reassert itself, but the final struggle was not to come for a few years. Finally, the war opened the way to a re-direction of the public opinion that must have ultimately sanctioned any re-direction of foreign policy or of commercial policy. The acquiescence of the manufacturing and trading interests directly concerned with commerce with America in a war fought on patriotic grounds shows that they could be temporarily at least brought around. And the commercial connection between the two countries if broken for a long enough period might have re-formed on a much less intimate basis. The complex relationship which was soon to develop between British finance, American cotton growing and British manufacturing might have been established with Brazil or India, for both were beginning to feel the stimulus of British need even in the short time the war lasted.

Yet having outlined the full weight of the possibilities which the war opened and which the peace closed, one must in the end of course come to the conclusion that the eclipse of this unrealised future was not due merely to fortuitous circumstance. We have seen how the realities of long-term strategy in North America meant that a British policy would involve an enormous effort not only of men, money and material but an enormous adjustment of attitude as well. Psychologically, it appears that the British government as well as British opinion was in the end more likely to give up Canada than to re-enter on a contest for North American empire. And although
Great Britain would never be prevented from following her own interest to war by feelings of friendship or habit the mere declaration of war did not in its turn prevent such feelings from having an effect on British policy.

The result of the War of 1812 was in the end to define the strategic conditions under which the Anglo-American relationship might operate. The war, which may be accurately termed a defensive victory for Great Britain, had illustrated the vulnerability of the American coasts and had deflected the future direction of American expansion away from Canada. And the failure of the British demands at Ghent showed the abandonment of an attempt to limit that expansion and an implied recognition of the truth that the best security for Canada lay in the maintenance of peace with the United States, rather than in the taking of extensive precautions against the permanence of American hostility.

In the whole field of activity which the Anglo-American relation covered, the war may be seen primarily as having given an opportunity for new departures, an opportunity that was indeed taken, but not enthusiastically and not successfully. The existence of such an abortive attempt left its traces in a British concern over the state of Canadian preparedness and a British determination to reimpose the Navigation System where it could. But, on the whole, the peace of Ghent is notable because it allowed scope to the influences whose result tended to the development of a closer relationship between the United States and Great Britain.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Extracts of opinion from newspapers and monthly publications

(Unless indicated by the name or otherwise, the newspapers and magazines from which these extracts were taken were published in London.)

(Extracts from monthly publications have been placed at the beginning of the month, before the extracts of newspaper opinion.)

1812

June

6 (Courier) The conquest of the Canadas and Nova Scotia is the favourite project of the Americans, and in their eagerness to undertake it, they forget the dangers to which they expose their own territories, particularly New York, and the possible risk of a separation of the Northern from the Southern states...

However, if America be determined on war, war she shall have, and the guilt of it rest on her head alone - for we have not provoked it, unless it be called provoking it to resort to acts of retaliation against an enemy, and refuse to withdraw them until the enemy have withdrawn the measures that rendered them necessary.

Undoubtedly we deprecate war with America, but we cannot dread it. She had already adopted all the means in her power of hurting us - and she must soon be made to feel how we can injure her. She thinks that we have already enough upon our hands in contending with France - we desired no more certainly - we desired to apply our resources exclusively to the maintenance of those principles which alone can prevent this poor short-sighted Government of America from being, not the Tool, for the tool of Bonaparte they are already, but his victim. But America knows not that the vigour of the British Empire increases with the necessity for exerting it...

We are now the only bulwark of liberty in the world placed between the old and the new world we are contending with both; with one arm we are beating the armies of the master of the Continent of Europe, with the other we shall smite his Prefect on the Continent of America... Let us weigh and compare the additional evils of this new war with the greater and more permanent evils of sacrificing for any temporary convenience or relief, those great principles by which alone we can hope to remain a great, a free, and a prosperous nation... America demands that while we are at war with France we should sacrifice those principles by which our commerce has grown to its present height - that we should in fact surrender our trade into her
hands. Against such insulting and ruinous demands we must contend with the whole force and vigour of the Empire... Let the Government lose the thunder of the British Navy, and we shall soon see the American, like the French flag, swept from every sea.

**July 10** (Liverpool Mercury) ...the repeal of these noxious orders has everywhere revived the spirit of enterprise and industry... In our town the merchant is again cheered with the prospect of the honourable profits of a free and open trade.

The immediate advantages of the Repeal of the Orders in Council have been felt in the manufacturing counties; and while much of the hurry of business is to be attributed to the suddenness of the event, which set free the manufactures of so many towns at once, from the loaded warehouses of every district, there can be no doubt of the continuation of these advantages, in a degree that will ever preserve the manufacturing poor above the impulse of necessity, and, therefore, in a state of quietude and respect for the property of others...

**27** (Caledonian Mercury - Edinburgh) [In reference to a report of an attack on a British frigate] The story excited so much alarm in the city this morning that Mr. Sansom, the chairman of the Committee of American Merchants, waited on Ministers, and the result of the interview, we are happy to find, was very satisfactory. It appears that His Majesty's Government is not disposed to consider this rencontre as an act of hostility on the part of the United States, and therefore no Embargo will be imposed, and no proceedings will be adopted towards America of a belligerent character.

...We are informed that the instructions to Admiral Sawyer are, as much as possible to avoid giving offense to the Republic.

**31** (Courier) After reading the Message of the American President, there are few of our readers who will be of opinion, that the repeal of the Orders in Council will satisfy the American government... For those Orders are only one of the grounds, and hardly the principal ground, of war. The President brings every accusation he can bring against us, and exaggerates and enflames them all. Complaints which have been redressed, charges which have been refuted, are all pressed into the service of his manifesto, in order to meet the different turns and tastes of everybody. Mr. Madison seems to be uncommonly apprehensive of remaining at peace with us... He has a most jealous and resentful temper towards England, as if it was possible that natural ties could be dissolved while we speak one language, and as if England were not now the only bulwark of liberty.
If [the Orders in Council] were the sole, or even most prominent ground of complaint, and if their injustice could be proved upon investigation to be so evident, why were the Congress and the Executive so eager to declare war, when...they might have known that the Legislature of Great Britain had agreed to go into a committee of Inquiry into the Orders?...

A great ground of war is our right of search. Now we have long since abandoned the search of American ships of war, consequently it is wished that we should abandon our search of merchantmen. In the first place, how is it possible that we could know whether they have contraband of war on board if we do not exercise this right? But we take every British seaman from on board their ships - to be sure we do, and so to be sure we shall. No power on earth has a right to absolve a British seaman from his oath of allegiance, or to deprive his country of his services. Why does America resort to a criminal concealment of our subjects, or have recourse to the immoral and mean practise of declaring them to be Americans, merely because they have certificates of Citizenship? - it is this practise which has provided the difficulty of discriminating between real and foreign American citizens...

It is to such claims and pretensions that the Prince Regent's speech, we suppose, alludes, in that part which speaks of the possible, 'preserverence of the Government of the United States in any unwarrantable pretensions.' Against pretensions such as these we have mentioned, the whole country will be unanimous.

August
7 (Liverpool Mercury) The declaration of war...has certainly placed a fresh impediment to the speedy reconciliation of the two nations, however courteously the Americans may receive the abrogation of our Orders in Council. Hostilities will have commenced, and a subsequent irritation on both sides may prevent immediate negotiations; our ministers by delaying to do what was just until domestic miseries forced the causes of commercial distress upon their notice, will probably have subjected the nation to the disgrace of seeing the justice, so tardily offered, rejected with indignation. We say probably, because a people when once they imbibe the sentiments of enmity, do not become instantaneously so calm as to perceive either their own interest, or the general advantages of peace... It is, therefore, unfortunate that the repeal had not arrived previous to the actual declaration.

8 (Cobbett's Political Register) ...an insolent contempt of the Americans, thought by those who hate them, and who would, if they could, kill them to the last man,
in revenge for their having established a free government, where there are neither sinecures, jobs, or selling of seats. This insolence has induced people to talk of America as a country incapable of resenting anything we may do to her; as being a wretched state, unsupported by anything like vigour in government; as a sort of horde of half-savages, with whom we might do as we pleased.

10 (Courier) In the notes upon the revocation of our Orders, Buonaparte says not one word relative to America. But we dare say it will be found that her demands will be nearly to the same extent as his. In fact, though there is less flippancy of style in the American articles than in the French, there is on the whole a great coincidence between them on point of principle. One tells us that he will not be contented with our revocation, unless we accompany it with the abandonment of our system of blockade - The other contemplating the possibility of our revocation, makes the Orders in Council only one and not the most prominent of the complaints against us. We apprehend that it will be found that our revocation will neither conciliate America or France - and that both of them will rise in their demands, relying on the statements of the opposition, that we revoked them because their continuance would have been ruinous to us.

September (Quarterly Review, XV, 193-214) ...If it be asked what object Mr. Madison could have in view by pushing into the foreground of his Manifesto, with so many gross misrepresentations, the question of taking seamen out of American ships, we answer, the greatest that can actuate a weak but ambitious man - his existence as a political character hangs upon the issue of the ensuing election... By the French party and the mob, he was brought into power; by the same party and the same mob only, has he the chance of preserving it...

...most anxiously must we wish the restoration and continuance of peace, and we have had occasion to express too often, to be now under the necessity of repeating our conviction, that the true interests of Great Britain and the United States of America are intimately blended with each other. They can be forcibly separated only by the mistaken policy of their rulers... But the obvious subserviency to France on the part of the American government will, we hope, guard our rulers against mistakes of another description. Concession and conciliation have their limits. War is a dreadful evil, but its calamities are not mitigated, and are likely to be prolonged, by being felt on one side only... Wars have been more usually brought to a happy issue by retaliation, however sanguinary, than by patience, however mild and enduring.
September 3 (Courier) Confident expectations are entertained by many that the revocation of the Orders in Council will satisfy the American government. The Opposition say that it ought to do it and have pledged themselves to support the war if it does not. We shall be glad to find that it does; not because we have any apprehensions with respect to the result of the war; not because we do not think that the haughty tone and presumptuous pretensions of America deserve chastisement; but because the two nations have the same common origin, are descended from the same ancestors, and speak the same language, not a little degenerated, however, by being transplanted to the other side of the Atlantic. But we do not believe that our revocation will satisfy the American government and we suspect that, imputing it to an unworthy motive, they will rise in their demands rather than abandon them... No greater prominence is given to [the Orders] as a grievance than to many other acts and usages of the British Government; and the argument, therefore, of those who have impugned the Orders as being in themselves the chief cause of the hostile spirit of the Americans, and in terms equally strong have commended their repeal as a sovereign panacea for healing every difference between the two countries, falls to the ground. In fact, we have all the proof that any subject is capable of, that the object of the war is less to obtain a repeal of the Orders in Council, than to force a sacrifice of our essential maritime rights, and, consequently, that had the Orders in Council been repealed previously to the American declaration, war would, nevertheless, have been advocated by the American Executive and its supporters, the democrats.

There is one way however certainly in which the repeal of the Orders in Council may disappoint and defeat the wishes and intentions of the President, however strongly they may be for war. In many parts of the United States, in all the sea-ports, the war was extremely unpopular, even before any intimation was given of the probable repeal of our Orders. When that repeal, however, is known, the public voice and opinion may be so decisively pronounced as to oblige the Government, however reluctantly they may do it, to enter into an amicable arrangement with us.

11 (Courier) So deeply in union with the feelings and wishes of the people, were the Government of America in declaring war against this country - that a week scarcely had elapsed after the declaration, before Government were besieged with remonstrances, couched in the most bitter tones of censure and reproach. Already have they produced the effect of lowering the tone of the official American paper...
September
21 (Courier) ...if the American Executive will abolish its fraudulent practices in granting protections, and the rights of citizenship to the British seamen, and if such new laws can be made and will be executed in good faith as the urgency and complexity of the case requires, perhaps the right we have exercised may be modified or suspended. Given up it can never be with safety, for as well might we be required to give up the right of going to war; but it may be suspended on satisfactory conditions; and kept suspended as long as those conditions are faithfully observed. If America by a municipal regulation will guarantee us from injustice, we may then suspend our obnoxious form, and thereby we retain the right... Great Britain would then be the gainer... For one American impressed into the British service, fifty British sailors have been fraudulently protected by America...

24 (Caledonian Mercury - Edinburgh) ...we must be cautious how we take our account of the intentions of the American government from unauthorized individuals. That the repeal of the orders in council will of itself restore tranquility no one can believe, who considers that this does not include all the grievances of which America complained. In every negotiation with this Country the Americans have insisted against the practice of blockading the mouths of navigable rivers or large tracts of the enemy's seacoasts, and of debarring them of course from all intercourse with these prohibited parts; and against the practice also of impressing their seamen into our ships of war. - If these points, however, could be brought to a settlement along with the Orders in Council, there would certainly be a fair opening for peace, and there is some reason to hope for an arrangement of this nature, since Great Britain having agreed to relinquish the principle of blockading without a sufficient force, there can be no further discussion on this subject, and as it is admitted on all hands to be illegal to impress American seamen, though, at the same time, it is no easy matter to distinguish them from British, all that is wanting is, to devise some plan for preventing it, which we should hardly imagine to be a very difficult matter.

October
2 (Courier) ...every communication from America shews, that these orders, tho' made the pretext, were never the real grounds of complaint or the real cause of the war... The Buonapartean principle of 'free bottoms make free goods', is avowed as the grounds of the war and the conditions of peace. To obtain peace, we must give up not the right of search only, but the right of
blockade, except in the interpretation of Buonaparte, America claims to carry on not her own but the enemy’s trade in time of war, and thus to rise on our commercial and political ruin. The real motives of her policy have been a wish to carry on a fraudulent but lucrative trade against the laws of war and neutrality, and a corrupt devotedness to Bonaparte, as the only person who could or would sanction them in their aggressive design upon their neighbors and the maritime and commercial rights of Great Britain.

14 (Courier) We have had the mortification of departing from a great system of policy without having gained anything by it, and our moderation, our over moderation, has no doubt been imputed to an apprehension of the consequences of war rather than to a sincere desire to remain at peace. Seeing us so willing to yield on one point, The American government has inferred, falsely inferred of course, that we shall yield on others. Every man in the kingdom must think we have done enough (satis suaeque we long thought) to evince our desire to remain at peace with America.

16 (Liverpool Mercury) Although nothing pacific has yet proceeded from the Government of the United States, we still entertain the hope that the people of America will urge their rulers to recommence negotiations for the settlement of all the differences between the two countries. It is not in the nature of things for two free nations to carry on protracted wars against each other. What are we to say to the issuance of letters of Marque against American vessels? Is the trade of America to be totally sacrificed to the interests of those who make a trade of war? If so, what calamity must necessarily ensue - the consequences of a winter without employment for the manufacturer, without trade, and without any means of bestowing on the honest and industrious poor, any other bread than the bread of charity, are dreadful to imagine.

November (Edinburgh Review, XX, 451-462) So little is to be gained, and so much to be lost by an American war, that though our preposterous policy has at last brought the disputes between the two nations to this issue, no class of politicians seems wholly satisfied with the result. Strictly speaking, indeed, we have no real quarrel with America; our contest with that power arising incidentally out of our main quarrel in Europe. America invades us in no substantial interest - she crosses us not in any favourite walk of policy - she aims no blows at our prosperity or independence; - and
being excluded from all the common scenes of European ambition, her case afforded, to all appearance, no great scope to the common jealousies of politicians. After a twenty years war with France; however, we are now fairly involved in an additional war with this apparently harmless power, - having for this purpose sacrificed all those ancient connexions of trade which gave the two countries so great an interest in the maintenance of peace... The trade between Britain and America, independent of its profits to individuals, accomplished objects which must ever be dear to the friends of human improvement. ...America... having her whole spare capital embarked in agriculture, must necessarily depend on other countries for a supply of manufactures, in exchange for which they receive an equivalent in raw produce. Such was the nature of the trade carried on with this country; by means of which America, assisted by the wealth and industry of Britain, was left free to pursue the great work of domestic improvement, while Britain found, in the demands of America, ample employment for her overflowing capital and her numerous artisans...

...we have absolutely nothing whatever to gain, and almost everything to lose, in this deplorable conflict. - Since the revocation of the Orders in Council, there is really no principle at issue between the two countries...

America has not possessions that we can take from her - none, we believe, that we have even a desire to obtain. We have no hope, therefore, of acquiring anything whatsoever by persisting in this contest; and we are at war for the naked and barren power of asserting our belligerent rights in our own way; or, to speak more properly, we have turned the last neutral into an enemy, rather than submit to an amicable discussion upon the least oppressive way of exercising a right, the existence of which is not so much as disputed. - Such is the utmost amount of our possible gains: - our losses, certain and probable, do not admit, we fear, of so short an enumeration...

In the first place...we lose our whole trade with America - almost the only foreign trade that was left to us - and at all times worth infinitely more than all the rest put together... In the second place we lose all the men and money that must be sacrificed to the carrying on of this war - at a moment when our finances are confessedly almost inadequate to the prosecution of the other wars in which we are engaged... In the third place, we take it to be one of the certain consequences of the continuance of this war, that we shall either lose Canada forever, to the great disgrace and mortification of the country - or be obliged to abandon the Peninsula. In the fourth place, our
West-India colonies will be starved; and their trade, which so many other causes have concurred to depress, almost entirely ruined by the swarms of privateers which will issue from every point of the adjoining continent; - while our own supplies of grain, in the event of a deficiency at home, and of naval stores in the event of disasters in the North, will be almost entirely cut off. Finally, we shall excite not only a spirit of rooted hostility among a people obviously destined to outnumber any European nation - but we shall train them before their day to the cultivation of their home manufactures, and lose forever that trade which it is our most obvious interest to retain...

25 (Courier) The war will tend to convince America that she is more dependent on us than we are on her. The American party in this country may talk of her establishing internal manufactures, and the means of doing without us; they know the contrary; they know that nature forbids it; that manufactures cannot flourish where a country is but half cultivated; that they are the consequence of perfect civilization, of the highest prosperity; and that they never were the attendants upon young and new and unfledged governments. All countries are more or less dependent on each other; a nation like America more so than any other. This is in the nature of things, in the dispensations of Providence.

December

4 (Liverpool Mercury) Whether we are to attribute this paucity of actual conflicts to the want of vigour in ministers, or to any other cause, we are happy that two nations so mutually serviceable to the interests of each other should find that they cannot carry on offensive warfare with any effect. Britain and America will, we hope, speedily discover how much easier it is to befriend than to destroy.

5 (Caledonian Mercury - Edinburgh) ...There is another topic also insisted on against ministers, namely, that they have not fallen upon America with sufficient vigour, as it is called. But what good could possibly be produced by any useless violence towards America? The Americans take our ships and we take theirs, and it is obvious, that anything beyond this can have no tendency but to irritate and inflame, and to do away the little chance that still remains of bringing the dispute to an amicable conclusion.

18 (Liverpool Mercury) ...offensive warfare is not only uncongenial to America's political situation, but even were she successful in external expeditions, that success would only tend to her injury; a standing army and a fleet, would occasion an expenditure, by which dependencies would be formed, and corruption
would ensue in every department of state.

February

(Tradesman, X, 153) More flattering prospects of trade to the continent daily present themselves, and speculators are very busy in the different manufacturing towns buying up goods for that purpose. Cotton wool and yarn, for the last two months, have been slowly advancing in price; but on the arrival of the accounts of the further successes of the Russians, a most general and spirited speculation took place, both in cotton yarns and goods... The news from the north has given accelerated motion to the spinning wheels, and it has furnished employment for every loom...

...some of the manufacturing districts are profiting in a considerable degree, whilst others appear to be labouring under all the pressure and calamities incident to a state of war.

9 (Manchester Mercury) The capture of two British frigates has so elated the spirits of our transatlantic brethren, that they dream of nothing less than wresting the Trident from Great Britain, and establishing a doctrine that free bottoms make free goods, which would indeed strike a death blow at her commerce and endanger her existence as an independent power... However, notwithstanding the re-election of Madison, we doubt not but the efforts of our powerful fleet, and the direful fate of the French Grand Army will... induce [the American Congress] to listen to the voice of reason, while equitable and honourable terms are yet attainable...

March

19 (Greenock Advertiser) If we ever hope to see a termination to the present unnatural contest with America, we should avoid as much as possible, any measure so obviously calculated, as is the proposed tax, to encourage the infant cotton manufactures of that country.

It too frequently happens that national animosity mistakes the choice of its weapons. - And the last five years of peevish peace with America furnishes a memorable instance of a system of commercial warfare more injurious to ourselves than the enemy... Let us beware of arresting the British loom, of starving the British army; in the vain hope of overturning the American Government by a tax upon Cotton.

22 (Courier) ...if they think such measures [an American law for the exclusion of British seamen from American vessels] will induce us to abandon our right of search
and of taking our own seamen and subjects wherever we find them, they will find themselves totally mistaken. The right of search is one of such vital interest to our power, that to surrender it (we had almost said even to modify it) would be treason. The claim of Britain to the service of her seamen is neither novel or peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance, for which she contends is common to all the governments of Europe.

April 6 (Courier) Is the British character changed? and sensible as it formerly was to the slightest insults and injuries offered by other nations, does it assume the language of humility, and fear of giving offense whenever any question is agitated concerning America. At a time when the most rigourous restrictions are in force against the introduction of any British manufacture into her ports, is it credible that the Government should not be supported in enforcing the old system of annoying and distressing the enemy; and that so far from doing, persons should support a measure tending to encourage the staple article of the provinces most inimical to Great Britain.

...uninformed persons... should not be led away by the abstract notion of a raw material being at all times desirable at the cheapest rate, even from the country of an enemy... A total prohibition is the most obvious measure, but if that should be thought too strong, the article should enter into a fair competition, and a protecting duty imposed...

May (Tradesman, X, 408) ...the victorious progress of the Russian arms has opened several ports in the North of Germany to the British flag, and our merchants have taken the proper advantage of the circumstance to throw in that supply of our manufactures, which were prohibited by the continental system. The trade is, however, still confined to the maritime countries, as the expedition of merchandise into the interior is still attended with the greatest difficulty and danger.

12 (Greenock advertiser) ...with all the intrinsic strength, which our transatlantic adversary is so destitute of, are we behind him in boastful anticipation of what is to be done - and is not done - of projects for his total annihilation, boldly planned but never executed. After years of fruitless negotiation with America - after numerous concessions made in the true spirit of amity - and these failing to have the desired effect - after having kept for many months in those seas an immense and magnificent naval force - we provide our redoubted enemy with all the usual warlike demonstrations of deedless imbecility... Yet unfortunately the impotence is only...
chargeable to ourselves - that our opponent should not have long since felt his courage, like Acres', 'oozing out at every pore', is less to be attributed to his inherent valour than to our mis-placed and ill-timed forbearance. Never, in the course of the political negotiations of this country, have they been so disvested of every consideration of national pride, and national honour, as in our parlance with America... For the sake of commerce with America - of that commerce which, at most, was but a reciprocal advantage, we have made sacrifices, in amount ten fold its deserts - and still continue to bear, when all forbearance is unavailing... After the experience we have reaped - the indignities we have suffered - is not the time yet arrived when we should call for a vigourous and unremitting prosecution of the war...

25 (Manchester Mercury) The people of America are less entitled to commiseration, suffering the miseries of war, than the inhabitants of any other country. Their constitution, purely democratic, vests the whole power in the people. Any demagogue however worthless by flattering the passions of the mob, may obtain a majority over the most worthy candidate supported by the more respectable and well-informed classes of the community. It is admitted that in the school of adversity men best learn to curb their passions; we therefore trust our Admirals will give the American sovereigns full opportunity of profiting by her lectures.

June 11 (Greenock Advertiser) It is somewhat singular, that we are still doomed to hear of the incessant and successful activity of our unnatural foe, while our immense naval armament, under Sir John Borlase Warren, confines itself to the capture of a few insignificant coasting vessels. Will nothing tempt him to use the power he holds in his hands? has the stigma which he has already suffered to be attached to our naval invincibility no power to move his arm? What good object...can this passive forbearance promote? Is the enemy too weak and insignificant to render his chastisement a matter of any importance? Let it be remembered, that if weak, every hour of delay, at this moment, adds to his strength - the partial successes he has acquired, will powerfully stimulate him to make the best uses of these results, to increase his means, and to render...the war popular in a state; and under a government, most difficult to acquire or preserve a unanimity of sentiment among the great body of the people... We could the error repaired before it is too late; though we confess that our hopes of energetic measures being resorted to by Admiral Warren are rapidly decreasing.
July
(Tradesman, XI, 61) No particular circumstance has occurred in the commercial world, since our last Report, on which we can congratulate the country. We look to a peace with America as the surest means of reviving our decaying commerce, and giving fresh vigour to our manufactures. Under the present de¬ ranged state of the continent, it is vain to look for any safe or regular mode of commercial inter¬ course.

September
(Tradesman, XI, 242) We still have not anything to offer of a favourable nature in regard to the commerce of the country. Impediments of an insuperable kind still continue to exist, in regard to the intro¬ duction of British manufactures into the continent, although the demand has in some measure increased, from the opening of the Prussian ports.

The manufactories of Leeds and Halifax are particularly benefiting by the present state of affairs in Spain;... The Norwich manufactory is also comparatively brisk, but the late regulations of the American Senate in regard to commerce have thrown fresh obstacles in the way of the importation of British goods. Until that channel be again thrown open, we must despair of beholding the commerce of the country in its usual flourishing state.

November
(Tradesman, XI, 417) The gloom which has long hung over the commercial relations of this country is begin¬ ning to dispel, and the adventurous merchant sees again those sources opening to his industry and enter¬ prise, from which he has been long excluded by an ad¬ verse train of political events... The manufactory of Lancashire and Yorkshire have experienced in an eminent degree the favourable turn which has been given to commerce by the declining influence of France. In no period of peace was the cloth manufactory in a more thriving condition... In Manchester and Birmingham trade is equally brisk; a considerable advance has taken place in the articles of the former manufactory which arises from the pro¬ hibition of the raw material from America.

22 (Greenock Advertiser) It is now a considerable time since we ceased to animadvert on the conduct of our Government towards that of the United States of Amer¬ ica, Of late, events of the first magnitude in them¬ selves, and of the highest importance, as affecting
our immediate welfare, have occurred on the Continent of Europe; the very favourable prospects which these events have opened to view, naturally throw those of minor importance (among which we may reckon the war in Canada) into the background - the more so as from it no anticipation of conquest might be entertained, and the utmost advantage which could possibly accrue would extend no further than that of enabling us to retain in quietness what we already, with some little struggle, possessed. Thus circumscribed as our views undoubtedly have been relative to Canada, it is not wonderful that the means we employed to effect this purpose have been found too circumscribed to meet these views. In Canada we set out with the intention of confining ourselves solely to the defensive, and when we gained any advantage over a raw and inexperienced enemy, it was deemed inexpedient to follow it up - to repay aggression with aggression. The consequence is, that the enemy having been enabled to gain some advantage over us at points where we were obviously vulnerable, and being allowed to retire from those where we were strongest, which he had the temerity to attack, without paying the due forfeit of his imprudence - the consequence, we say, is that we will now have more difficulty in retaining what we still enjoy, than we expected to have before we were dispossessed of any thing, besides having that to recover of which we have been deprived - with the very comfortable consideration, that our misplaced lenity and under-rated views of the enemy's ability, have given him courage, and strengthened his inclination, to persist in the work of aggression which he has so unwarrantably begun. ...when Sir James Yeo went out to take command of the Lake squadron, he was on the point of throwing up his commission, on finding matters in such a backward state, as to afford no present expectation, and but little future hope, of rendering his naval skill and intrepidity available in defence of our Canadian possessions. By the greatest exertions, however, he was, at last, enabled to meet his adversary, and even to beat him, had not the American commodore avoided giving the opportunity, by running away. On Lake Erie, the patriotic spirit of the Canadians, which, by the bye, has not met with that encouragement from British Government it deserved, had mustered up a little force, and for a while courageously maintained the ascendancy - but failing to keep pace with the vigourous preparations of the enemy, it has at length been overwhelmed, and with it the safety of the Canadas, at least, rendered highly problematical. [American victories and American threats]... and a number of minor disasters, leave little room to hope that any rapid change of fortune will occur to avert or dissipate the dangers which thus threaten Canada on all sides. We long ago spoke of the consequences which might be apprehended from the remissness of our Government in affording the necessary
means for maintaining the ascendancy on the Lakes - the evil now speaks for itself when a remedy cannot so easily nor so successfully be applied, if it even can be applied in sufficient time, and before the evil is past all cure. Surely the case is hard, indeed, when we reflect that, with extremely limited means, the commanders in this arduous service have done much more than could have been expected from them - have struggled against extraordinary difficulties - and would have achieved, at least, the safety of the Canadas, if even an ordinary share of physical strength had, at an earlier period, been placed at their disposal.

We sincerely wish that this subject should become a matter of more general interest than it appears to be at present. We have dazzled our eyes with the visions of glory, conjured up by the relations of the allied successes on the Continent, until we have become blind to everything else. Because we have had a formidable hand in bringing about the splendid success of our neighbors, we have forgotten that there are certain little interests of our own - honourable ones too - which it is our duty to look after, and in which we are assisted by no one, but opposed by a set of recrants, who have wantonly lifted up the parracidi-cal hand against us. But alas! having so many agree-able prospects immediately before us, we cannot think to do them such injustice as avert our eyes for a moment to a matter that has so small a portion of the agreeable in it - a matter of secondary consideration, likewise,- and unworthy the minute investigation of those who assume to themselves the gorgeous titles of 'chastisers of despotism' - 'regenerators of liberty' - 'saviours of Europe' etc. Yet we would hold that Canada, though it were intrinsically of no importance to us, is, in other respects, of the most eminent; if we do not mean to repay ingratitude with kindness, and insult with the most degrading abasement. In the retention of the Canadas our honour is deeply implicated - and though they occupied but an inch of ground, and that inch physically and morally a desert, it would be no less. Next to a vigourous exertion to conquer its safety, should we direct our attention to an equally vigourous chastise-ment of an enemy, who, whatever might be his original motives for breaking the bonds of friendship with us, is, with the name of a republican, as much an enemy to the liberties of Europe and the rest of the world, as Napoleon himself. Is not this a fit subject for chas-tisement?...How does it happen that we put up with in-sults from him, which we would suffer from no one else; and like a froward child, seek to frighten him into due obedience, while the whip, and that lustily too, ought to be applied to his rebellious posterior!...
1813

**December**

(Tradesman, XI, 492) The commercial horizon still brightens. In consequence of the favourable state of affairs on the Continent, the demand for all kinds of British goods has increased to the great benefit of the workmen in the manufacturing districts who have in some places been able to raise their wages twice in a week. Cottons, which have for many weeks past been on the advance are likely to experience a further increase... This great press of business arises partly from the actual demand, and partly from the great changes which soon may be expected to take place in our continental relations. The accounts from Liverpool are of the most cheering nature. Instead of want and misery, and loss of trade, abundance and full employment are within the reach of all, while the want of the American trade, about which so much was said, is remembered only to be the cause of wonder why so much importance was attached to it.

1814

**February**

(Tradesman, XII, 154-5) Seldom has it fallen to our lot to compose a report on the state of the commercial relations of this country, at a time when opinions were so divided, and contradictory as they are at present. Business is certainly doing on the whole, to a great extent, yet in many principal articles nobody will acknowledge that business. Opinions as to the state of the markets are changed almost every hour, and a great determination to sell is reconsidered into a determination to hold... The high prices of many of the articles of our export and import are to be attributed to the speculative disposition of the holders of capital.

1 (Edinburgh Advertiser) The President's speech was... from beginning to end, a compound of canting and hypocrisy, of exaggeration and falsehood, of coarseness without strength, of assertions without proof, of the meanest prejudices, and of the most malignant passions; of undisguised hatred of Great Britain, and of ill-concealed servility and partiality towards France. As for President Madison's warlike denunciations, they are not of a nature to disturb us very seriously. We could wish that America were better governed; her misrule operates as a diversion in favour of the common enemy and employs a British force which would be more gloriously engaged in restoring freedom to Holland, or confirming the deliverance of Spain; but the hour of retribution is at hand, and notwithstanding the gigantic efforts now making throughout Europe, there will
be found a sufficient force to spare to bring a conviction of their errors home to the American government, and punish them for their adherence to a despicable tyrant, and a vile and unnatural system of the most complete slavery.

(Greenock Advertiser) ...a prospect, and that not a remote one, is held out of the differences between the two countries being adjusted to the satisfaction of both. We know of few things which would give us so much pleasure as the termination of this war, against which every feeling of humanity must revolt, though conducted on the part of this country with a forbearance which in almost every other case would be considered dishonourable. The unprovoked invasion of Canada has ranged against each other the children of one race - perhaps kindred in the strictest sense of the word - of the same habits, and speaking the same language. That much misery and mischief have resulted from the conflict can not be doubted; that the quarrels of governments should in this, as in every other case, be partially visited on the inoffensive inhabitants of the spot which becomes the theatre of war, is not more probable than true - but we can not avoid expressing our surprise that Mr. Madison and his dependents should so frequently seek to increase that irritation, which it would better become them to endeavor to allay, by representing the British and their Indian allies in Canada as guilty of the most wanton atrocities in the prosecution of the contest. ...the war against Canada has the most unprepossessing features every way - and as much may be said of the contest with America altogether. To this country it can yield no return for the blood and money expended upon it: at the most it but enables us to keep what we have, and that we are able to do so our successful triumphs in Canada sufficiently evince. We wage it for the maintenance of a principle which we can never entertain the remotest idea of giving up. America covets an accession of territory, while, from the extent she already enjoys, internal divisions, and a separation of it into different governments, are not the least of her fears. - On the waters she can not greatly boast of her naval acquisitions, and may justly lament the destruction of her foreign commerce... The maritime rights of Great Britain, which have been another cause of the war, are respected by every other power, France excepted, and shall America hope to overthrow that bulwark of our national strength? To us the contest on her part appears as causeless as it is vain, and we trust, that the arrangement now made for negotiating a peace is done in the true spirit of peace, and not under the absurd expectation of our compounding, for the sake of her commerce, the established rights which constitute our power and our glory...
March

(Tradesman, XII, 255) From the present unsettled state of the political world little change has taken place in the commercial situation of the country since our last Report. In some departments the same activity continues, and in others a degree of doubt exists whether to hold or sell. In the beginning of the month, on account of the pacific views from America, the demand for cotton became very languid;... but after the accounts that the Embargo Act had passed, holders became more firm and prices advanced... There is every reason to look for a further advance, and the stock in hand is by no means adequate to that demand which necessarily arises from the increased activity in the manufacturing districts. Cotton goods, therefore, of every description are looking upwards, and from the increased demand for those articles for the continent no immediate reduction in the prices can be expected.

April

(Tradesman, XII, 343) During this month we have received a particular gloom over the commercial world... The usually severe season has impeded all intercourse with the Northern ports of Europe... but in the meantime the manufactories are briskly employed in providing that stock which will answer the demand that will happily take place when the communication is again opened... Until the result of the negotiation which is now carrying on between this country and America is made known, there will always be a great fluctuation in the cotton market, as it rises or falls according to the various rumours which are received respecting an adjustment of the differences between the two countries... The stock of cotton on hand is very light, and it is brought slowly to the market, from the idea which is entertained by some leading houses, that the principles of the American negotiators are by no means of that complexion as to induce a hope that peace will result from their mission.

June

(Tradesman, XII, 514) The commercial world is, at this moment, in a vacillating state. The speculators are careful of venturing too far until the treaty of commerce is signed between this country and France, especially as the latter appears by no means very favourable to the introduction of British manufactures. In some particular articles, the state of comparative peace in which we are at present, has tended to produce an uncommon depression, and the continent being, in a great measure, already supplied with our manufactures, occasions rather a flatness in the manufacturing districts.
July
(Tradesman, XIII, 66) Considering the state of peace in which we are now placed with the majority of European nations, and the facility which is necessarily given to the introduction of our manufactures, it is with regret that we state, that an unusual dullness pervades the manufacturing towns. In Manchester the trade is not better than it was in the midst of the war; and our report will not be marked by any particular exultation...until the American market is opened again.

August
7 (Morning Chronicle) ...a spirit of most ferocious hostility prevalent in the ministerial circle...has dictated the Instructions given to the Commissioners. The result is more likely to be, that all parties in America will be united against our inordinate pretensions, than that peace will be the result of their labours. Ministers must know...that the manufacturers of England stand in need of the only market that promises them relief. The return of continental peace has brought no solace to trade. The utter disappointment of all mercantile adventure has woefully proved to us that the continent is exhausted; and that it is only to the westward hemisphere that we can prudently look to for the consumption of our home manufactures...

What we chiefly deplore is the endeavor to keep alive that spirit of rancorous hostility to America which seems to aim at the extinction of the United States, as an independent country... Nothing can be more false than the policy of such a course; nor any thing more disastrous than the attempt would prove.

16 (Morning Chronicle) ...They who think that the Property Tax and other war taxes can be taken off, if this war is to be continued, have not examined the accounts which have been laid on the table of the House of Commons...

Is it a matter doubtful at this day that all the maritime powers of Europe are favourable to the Americans in their question of maritime rights? And from the unsettled state of the Continent of Europe may it not be a desirable thing for some of the powers to see us engaged in this trans-atlantic contest?

17 (Morning Chronicle) Nothing can be more manifest...than...that Mr. Madison has throughout shewn a marked hostility to England, and friendship to France. All his actions have proved it. But surely that is not now the question between us - the important point is whether a new boundary on the side of Canada is an object for which we ought to protract the war to another campaign; for we trust it will not be argued that a nation ought to continue a war out of revenge.
We by no means say that the original cause of the war on our part was not justifiable. On the contrary it was wise, and must always be wise, to maintain our maritime rights; though policy has induced us to leave the point sub silento, rather than to continue a war expressly to secure their recognition. But we say, that the Americans have made no new demands, and that if we have made none the dispute may be easily settled. If, on the contrary, we have demanded the cession of all the Lakes, together with the Indian territory... we have demanded a thing which is likely to unite America against us. This would be as impolitic as our first attempts to impose taxation on America without representation. We should engender a spirit that would make known to the Americans their own strength - we should forward them as a nation half a century - we should open a field for all the disbanded soldiers of fortune in Europe to repair to, and probably engage some of the states of Europe in their favour.

20 (Morning Chronicle) ... if the nation is to be drawn in by the delusion of easy conquest, or by the indulgence of the pitiful passion of revenge, to the continuance of the war with America, all that we have suffered is nothing to the calamities that impend over us - Better to surrender the whole of Upper Canada back again to the Indians and let them fight the battle with the United States, than to bring upon ourselves the consequences of a protracted warfare...

September
16 (Liverpool Mercury) ...In the present circumstances of the war, we cannot think our ministers warranted, in expecting any such cession on the part of America. Neither party has hitherto obtained any decisive advantages over the other; and though our hands are now disengaged by the peace with France, and we may employ our whole energies against our antagonist, yet the unhappy fate of most of our expeditions ought to lead us to be cautious of expecting any great efforts against a people separated from us by so immense an ocean... The property and interests of our merchants during so long and beneficial an intercourse with the United States as preceded the present war, ought to be hostages for the security of towns, the destruction of which would scarcely produce that submission, which our Government seems to exact from the Transatlantic Republic.

October
14 (Liverpool Mercury) Have not these Americans abused the independence they had obtained? Have they not shewn towards Britain a continued spirit of enmity? an illiberal want of confidence in her friendship? an unwarrantable suspicion in all negotiations with her? a remaining
jealousy of her power; an eager desire to strengthen themselves by connecting their interests with those of her most inveterate foes, and a proud gratification in all her difficulties and disasters? ... In reading the public prints and pamphlets of the present time, and in attending to the sentiments of many persons, who discourse upon almost every other subject with liberality, or with due concession to reason, we can not enter into such an investigation without the unpleasant certainty that our opinions will not give general satisfaction ... We do not hesitate to answer ... in the negative. America has not abused her independence—she has shown no mistrust of the friendship of Britain, nor an attachment to the interests of her foes. The disturbed state of Europe, during the last twenty years, has been beneficial to her commerce; this has assisted to place her higher in the rank of nations, than she would have stood had she had the unconfined commercial spirit of the European nations to contend against ... Conquest and accession of territory are contrary to the principles of a republic formed upon the plan of the United States, and in attempting either, their government has shown itself unworthy of their confidence. Still, should republican America displace the present ministers of her executive power, it does not follow that her councils must be either pacific or submissive. The war in which we are engaged with her, will demand all her energies; and though we should consume her maritime towns and carry desolation into her provinces, yet, in struggling for independence, she must put forth that national strength, which has seldom, among any people, in such a cause been found ultimately unsuccessful. ... Our long contest with France placed America in a situation of extreme difficulty; nor could the wisest policy have entirely prevented disagreements between her and the belligerent powers. These difficulties have ceased with the downfall of Bonaparte; and the objects of our contest with the United States have become mere abstract points ... 

(Glasgow Herald) We see no change of circumstances in the course of this war, which should induce our Government to make any advances now which would not have been made with a much better grace at the time when this country was rejoicing at the restoration of peace in Europe ... What might have been justly attributed to magnanimity in our Cabinet at that time will not now meet with the same construction, when the advantages obtained by the enemy have overbalanced what we have gained. But if we cannot give our ministry credit for magnanimity, much less are we inclined to accuse them of despondency—unfortunate as some of
our attempts on the Canadian frontier have been, and vexatious as our maritime warfare has proved, the power of Britain continues in all its awful splendour, and must ultimately destroy its present enemy if it continue the contest unassisted. Turning next to the American government, we see no reason to expect from them greater moderation at this time, than at any other period since the commencement of the negotiation at Ghent. The disgrace of having their capital taken is forgotten in the joy of real or fancied victories; and as to the growlings of the mercantile part of the community at the loss of their trade, upon which we counted a clog in the wheels of government, we have only to look at Lloyd's list, to be satisfied that the Americans have no reason to be dissatisfied with the uses to which their vessels are now turned... It is not, then, in the exterior circumstances of the war that we can perceive the germs of an immediate peace. If it be so near at hand as is supposed by some, it is to the interior of the continental Cabinets that we are to look for its origin. The question of our maritime rights, if we are to believe French papers and French rumours, is to be brought under discussion at the approaching Congress; and from this question the American cause can not be separated...

(Liverpool Mercury) The war, in whatever manner it may terminate, will make a much wider separation in the interests of Great Britain and the United States than that which was supposed to be occasioned in the American Revolution. Indeed in the opinion of many experienced and liberal minded statesmen, the separation of the colonies from the Mother Country, might have been rendered beneficial rather than injurious to the latter. A generous and conciliatory policy might have attached those states to us, in friendly intercourse, particularly as their wants, their manners, and their connexions, led them naturally to look to this land of their fathers for their principal supplies. Unfortunately this feeling did not influence the British administration. Commerce might be continued or increased, but the patronage in all the departments of that extensive colonial government was extinct. It happened, therefore, that during all the thirty years that followed the acknowledgement of American independence, the trade between individuals of Great Britain and the United States almost daily increased, while in all the diplomatic communication, between the ministers of the two governments, a soreness an uneasiness of disposition was discernable. Governments are always more jealous of each other than nations are. The British Cabinet could not forget that the United States owed their independence in a great measure to the interference and assistance of France; and the American administration, aware that it was ever suspected of partiality to the enemy of this country, maintained a tone of peevish complaint in all its negotiations.
...the people of this country felt as if they had lost some honour, which it was necessary to recover. No small degree of revenge naturally mixes itself with such a feeling and this is undoubtedly perceptible in the present state of the public mind. The majority among us openly insist upon the expediency of visiting the Americans with some signal instance of our vengeance, and we are now carrying on a species of warfare on a most extensive scale...for no other purpose than that of inflicting, if possible, an incurable wound on the commercial prosperity of the Americans... The conflagration...at Washington has given the present contest a more violent feature, and some other transactions of a somewhat similar description, committed by each of the belligerents, prove that an irritation subsists on both sides, which is likely to give a most sanguinary aspect to the conflict. A war of this kind will, even with success, reflect very little honour on the victors... We have alarmed and irritated the Americans without having obtained any object conducive to permanent success, and at the same time our failure at Baltimore, our disgrace upon Lake Champlain and at Plattsburgh, together with the melancholy result of our attack on Fort Erie, have encouraged the military spirit of our enemy. We may at an enormous expense protract the war, but the resistance we shall meet with must necessarily increase.

November
2 (Morning Chronicle) [President Madison's message of 20 September]...proves the state of public feeling in America to be strongly and generally roused against us. — When we look back to the high rank in point of martial character which we held in April last...we feel mortified and degraded in now viewing the station which we now hold in the eyes of Europe. The conduct of our Government in the little miserable war with the United States has tarnished the glory we obtained. The Lilliputian Navy, and the raw Militia of America have triumphed over our feeble, ill-advised and ill directed efforts. On the ocean and even on our own coasts, we have been insulted with impunity. Through the total ignorance of our Marine Department, and on the American shores, the impolitic and unjustifiable devastation committed on houses, which were truly regarded as monuments of the arts, has united all parties against us in the States, and has aroused the indignation of the enlightened and civilized part of Europe. What advantage to the real objects of the war could we propose to ourselves by this petty depredation? ...is it honourable for a great nation to act from the principle of revenge?
But the most lamentable, and the weakest part of the conduct of Ministers is, that having set up pretensions to a new boundary, which is sure to inflame the hostility of the Americans, and to draw forth all their resources against us, we made no adequate exertions to enforce the claims that we set up, but suffered the whole year to pass over with petty expeditions, and with reinforcements sent in driblets, while all remonstrances from our friends in Canada were disregarded, our brave troops left in helpless inferiority, with an impotent, indecisive Commander, and the very possessions that we hold endangered by the protraction of the contest.

21 (Morning Chronicle) The documents with regard to the negotiation explain what our demands have been, and the manner in which they have been met by the Americans. So far as appears from these documents we cannot compliment our Negotiators on their adroitness and skill. The demand to include our Indian allies in the Pacification, is undoubtedly just, but the question of a definite boundary for their territory, in the manner in which it is urged, affords no precise idea and the British Commissioners themselves seem to have had no clear conception of the nature of the object they were seeking. The same applies to the demand for a revision of the boundary line between the United States and the adjacent British colonies, which was afterward explained, not to mean an increase of territory, but which in the manner of stating, is confused and scarcely intelligible. The American Negotiators appear, on the other hand, to have assumed a high tone, and to have been sent with no means sufficient instructions. Thus a great delay has arisen, and in the mean time, unfortunately, an unfavourable impression has operated against us in the United States. Our demands in the crude and undigested state in which they appear to have been urged by our negotiators, have unhappily united the before jarring interests of America, and instead of placing any reliance upon internal divisions, we fear we have now to encounter a whole nation. In the State of Massachusetts measures had been actually adopted with a view to the separation of the northern provinces from the confederacy, but on the publication of the terms demanded by this country, this prospect is said to have been abandoned, and the Federalists to have generally declared their intention of supporting the Government, as some of their chief leaders have also specifically arrived in Congress. In this situation of affairs the taxes are said to be voted without opposition, loans raised without difficulty, in short the whole people of the United States acting with one spirit against us. Such is the result of the protracted
mismangement on our part of this disastrous contest - such the coming difficulties of its further continuance. The American Government, it is stated in private accounts, now demand the status quo ante bellum, but have no objection to the arrangement with regard to the Fisheries as it stood in 1783, when the Treaty of Peace was concluded; and with respect to the boundaries of Canada, they are willing to rectify the errors which crept into the former negotiation.

...We must again lament that our negotiators did not state in more clear and precise terms, the nature of their demands. In many cases, the form of expression is everything, and in this instance, the mode of framing the demands appears to have made a greater impression in the United States than the demands themselves, or rather the want of sufficient explanation as to what it was really intended to ask, has led to the belief, that more was required, than it was actually meant to demand. It may be said, that negotiators do not usually develop, in the first instance, the extent of their instructions, but in this case, with a view to the impression to be made on the American people by the publication of the minutes of the conferences, it was undoubtedly of the highest importance, that it should have been at least explicitly avowed what we did not intend to demand... whatever may be alleged as to the impropriety of publishing the details of a negotiation, during its pendency, it cannot be denied that, with such a Government as that which presides in the United States, this ought to have been foreseen, and its effects, as far as possible, provided against, by stating our demands in a manner that could not be mistaken or perverted, and in a tone that would have evinced the real moderation of our views. The reverse of this policy, by careless urging demands, obscurely expressed, which might be afterwards insisted upon to a greater or less extent, but which, in the mean time, conveyed the impression of requiring much, and that in a very high tone, has had its effect, which any one might have foreseen, of embarking this country in a contest with the exasperated population of the United States, and of giving to the American Government the strongest support it could have desired. Nothing can more clearly show the mischievous effects of a vacillating and unsteady policy, or of a departure from the straight forward road of our national greatness.

(Greenock Advertiser) It appears that both in this country and in America the greatest contrariety of opinion exists as to the policy of prolonging the
war - It is evident that there is little left to contend about - nothing worth fighting for - nor any thing which may not be easily settled in peaceable negotiations, provided both parties are sincere in their desire of wishing for peace. But, unfortunately, a bitter jealousy exists on both sides and which the mode in which the negotiations are conducted seems ill-calculated to appease. America imagines that she sees in our demands a secret intention of sapping the foundation of her independence, while we look upon her in the same manner, as intent upon fabricating the means by which, at some future period, she may succeed in ejecting us from our Canadian possessions. Perhaps no such thing as imputed may be contemplated by either government and it would be a pity if an expensive, unnatural, and aimless war should be prolonged merely for want of a candid explanation on both sides, and a mutual concession in those points which have given birth to, or support the suspicions noted above. Should such an understanding be unobtainable - and the sooner it is decided the one way or the other the better - let both parties do their best to come to a reconciliation by dint of blows; and let the hardest knocks obtain that respect which the soundest arguments have failed to do, for it is the height of folly to be dealing out our resources by handfuls, when a judicious application of all our strength would speedily conquer what we deem necessary for the security of our North American dominions.

December

(Times, XIII, 499) Whatever may be the effects of a continental peace in a political point of view, we are not yet able to observe any great favourable change which has taken place in a commercial one...

Until our amicable relations with America are again established we may look in vain for that flourishing state in which our manufactures once stood; for the continental nations are all of them more or less manufacturers, and in some respects rival the productions of this country; but America is still an infant state and is necessarily dependent on other nations for those articles which can only be produced by long experience, and an assiduous attention to science.

27 (Times) It cannot be denied, that the terms of the Treaty are very like what we might have expected from an indulgent and liberal conqueror; but as we have not yet made up our minds to look on Mr. Madison in that light, we cannot easily cherish towards him those sentiments of gratitude which such a character might justly demand - The reflection which will most console those to whom the honour and interest of Great Britain are dear, is, that there is yet a hope that this
disgraceful Treaty may fail of obtaining a ratification
...On [22 December] information was first received in
this country of the letter of Mr. Monroe to Congress,
pledging the Government of the United States to make
no concession of what the writer was pleased to call
American rights. This declaration formed a comment
on the Treaty, which wholly changed its character and
spirit, and indeed directly contradicted the plain
sense of the agreement to waive the discussion of
our maritime rights, and of the prizes made by us,
under that great rule of the law of nature and
nations, retaliation. The Treaty implied that the
questions on both these points were to be set aside
as if they had never had existence. The letter of
Mr. Monroe asserted, that they were to be considered
as hanging in terror over us, the rights being
distinctly asserted by America, and only shuffled off
and evaded by us for the time being. The degrading
manner of terminating the war, the dignity of the
British Crown will not endure. The treaty is a dead
letter until it is ratified on both sides; and we
trust the country will address the Prince Regent not
to ratify it, at least until the offensive and in-
sulting comment of Mr. Madison's letter is done away.

We do not mean to avoid the force of the great
argument for peace, which is grounded on the pressure
of the existing taxes; but all such questions are rel-
ative. The American Government is driven to the des-
perate step of doubling its whole taxation at one
blow; and whilst the country is reeling and struggling
under this financial difficulty, a measure unheard
of until now in the Republic, is put in force - a
military conscription! Again, on the back of this
news, comes the intelligence that the richer and
better half of the States is openly withdrawing it-
self from the Union - and, at such a moment, we
tender to our hopeless antagonist the unlocked-for
boon of peace!

We particularly call the notice of the public
to this consideration, that when the Cabinet acceded
to the proposed Treaty, it must have been ignorant
of the extent of Mr. Madison's financial difficulties,
- it could not anticipate his desperate resort to a
conscription; nor could it reckon on the secession
of the New England States. Ministers, therefore, as
yet stand clear of the impeachment which these cir-
cumstances would throw on the policy of the treaty;
but now that the true state of things in America is
known, it must give our Government pause, it must
arrest the signature, which, once affixed to the
fatal scroll, will elevate Mr. Madison from despair
to all the insolence of triumph, and will in an equal
measure degrade Great Britain, in the eyes of all those
who have hitherto looked up to her with veneration.
December 30 (Liverpool Mercury) It would be difficult to find terms sufficiently strong to express our satisfaction, at the termination of this impolitic contest. We hope, that the pacific beginning will be further improved. At many periods since the declaration of the independence of those states, there have occurred occasions in which a close and solid relation of amity might have been entered into and confirmed between the two nations. Great Britain might have gained more in friendship than she formerly lost in dominion. Instead of this, jealousies have been suffered to arise, and to increase;... All the advantages which, in a mercantile point of view, the North American republic possesses might by conciliation have been our own; by aiming at a control over them, we drive them from us.

Yet, notwithstanding this liberal and obvious truth, we find many writers (even now) insisting upon the necessity of continuing hostilities with the United States, until we have either compelled them to receive our goods on our own terms, or reduced them to a state of commercial and maritime ruin. To suppose the latter attainable by any power we are capable of exerting across the Atlantic, is manifestly to be ignorant of the strength which those states possess, and of the events which led to their former successful resistance against all the efforts made for their subjugation...

Habituated to views of trade which equate war with a contest for commercial ends, the majority of the people of this country have looked upon America as a market which we must monopolize by force of arms. Without ever expecting perhaps the actual surrender of the independence of the United States, there are thousands in Great Britain who have believed that the Americans might have been compelled to receive our manufactures, and to send us their produce upon our own terms. They will not acknowledge in direct terms that they had any idea of the political subjugation of the transatlantic republic, but they have grown up to manhood in the doctrine...that the mercantile subjection of every country can, and ought to be effected, by the maritime superiority of the British Navy. The business which these men would assign to our naval commanders is to compel every port on the surface of the globe to receive our manufactures, and to take care that no produce, capable of being employed in manufacture, should be conveyed to any ports but our own.

It is this mercantile idea of the war that has induced the writer in the Times to indulge in the
expectation of a defection among the United States in our favour... We are taught to regard the eastern states as a portion of the Republic, almost entirely identified in interests with ourselves. [We are flattered] with the assertion, that the constant intercourse, which during many years of the war with France, rendered the inhabitants of the Eastern States participators in British speculations, and strengthened their credit by an reliance on British capital, must have fostered habits and pursuits, never to be broken. Such persons, so deeply implicated in our commercial views, must (it has been directly said) eagerly desire a renewal of alliance with us, upon any terms; such persons, it is pretended, would rather become the colonial agents of British trade, and yield up the political independence of their country, than by supporting the hostilities between the two countries, be the instruments of their own ruin. But, in all these surmises, do not the people of Great Britain reckon too much upon the importance of their own commerce?...

31 (The Bristol Mirror) It has been stated in a respectable evening paper, that the rejoicings which have taken place in different parts of the country were "for the event and not the terms". We may venture to contradict this assertion, so far as relates to our own neighbourhood; we are quite certain that no recent event has given more general satisfaction. We have no doubt, that a great majority of the people of this country are fully aware of the necessity of peace; and though some may consider it disgraceful to Great Britain not to have severely punished America for the detestable attempt she has made to injure, and even to destroy this country, will any one assert that it was our duty, and true interest, to wage eternal war, for the sole purpose of inflicting the punishment so decidedly merited? Whether we consider our own immediate interests, as connected with our foreign political relations, or with our domestic prosperity...we hail the conclusion of peace and amity with America as a great national blessing. It will enable Government (as we hope at a very early period) to relieve the country from that vast weight and severe pressure of taxation which has been so long felt and deplored by every class of the community. The expence of carrying on the contest on a great scale, at such a distance from home, would have been enormous; and it must have become a deep and earnest consideration with Government, whether there was any object possible of attainment - even supposing success to have been unquestionable - that could warrant the infliction or the continuance of such heavy and present burdens upon the nation as would have supported the war.
The real question is, not whether America has been sufficiently punished, but whether peace be not more consistent with the true interests and happiness of England than the continuance of war? If those, however, who are dissatisfied with the conditions of the Treaty on the ground that America has not experienced calamities and chastisements adequate to the enormity of her political sins and iniquities, will take the trouble to refer to facts, they will find that the sufferings and privations of the people of the United States have been of no common kind. If we ask them what America has gained by the war, they must answer—nothing. But what has she lost? Ask the merchant, ask the farmer. Ruin or stagnation in all branches of industry... How does the United States come out of the contest?... Defeated and disgraced! Not one object of the war have they gained.
APPENDIX B: The Cotton trade and the Cotton industry

1. "Statement of Stock and Consumption of Cotton Wool", Tradesman, XII, 205 (March 1814)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Stock 31st December, 1812</th>
<th>Imports in 1813, added</th>
<th>Stock 31st December, 1813, deducted</th>
<th>Consumption 1813</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>60,284</td>
<td>244,284</td>
<td>77,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>41,356</td>
<td>146,356</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow</td>
<td>21,639</td>
<td>32,743</td>
<td>54,182</td>
<td>41,194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stock held by the trade, (out of the above ports), at the commencement of 1813, averaged at 13 weeks consumption, at 6000 bags per week .................................................. 78,000
Ditto at the commencement of 1814, averaged at 6 weeks consumption, at 3000 bags per week ................................................................. 48,000

Total Consumption 1813 [After the deduction of 26,000 bags exported from London] ........ 403,634
Total Importation ........................................... 243,173

2. Extracts of correspondence and newspaper reports.

a. The underlining of the day of the month indicates that the extract comes from the weekly commercial report of the Greenock Advertiser.

b. The remaining extracts are from the records of the McConnell & Kennedy firm of cotton-spinners in Manchester. These records are now deposited in the Lewis Library of the University of Manchester.
Abbreviations:

McG: Letters from William McGavin, the Glasgow merchant who was McConnell, Kennedy’s agent there for the sale of yarn and who also apparently bought and sold raw cotton.

McK: Copies of correspondence sent out by McConnell, Kennedy. Unless otherwise indicated these letters were sent to McGavin in Glasgow.

Mar: Letters from George Marsham, a Liverpool dealer in raw cotton.

1812

June 16 (McG) There is no trade here of consequence at present nor do we expect it soon, unless matters are settled with America.

July 23 (McG) Trade is quite at a stand here, and before sending any more...let us see what we can do with what you have sent.

August 5 (MK) ...several think that America will not persist in hostilities,...however if it is otherwise fine yarn must certainly be higher - As it is probable Sea Islands will advance more in proportion than any other cottons because Brazils & Demararas (which are plenty) may be substituted for other American cottons but can not tend to regulate the price of Sea Islands...

7 (McG) The news of the American declaration of war...has not produced so great a disposition to buy either cotton or yarns as might have been expected...

7 (Mar) There have been very few buyers in the market today, and very little doing...

14 (Mar) ...very little business...

18 (MK) The news from Spain and the North has produced great rejoicings here but very little bustle yet.

21 (Mar) ...some business...at an advanced price.

26 (McG) Very little has been done here for some time, and today we have another view of matters from America, a Flag of Truce. For the last few days the cotton holders have been backward to name a price, that the consumers would look at today they don't stand on such high grounds.

28 (Mar) ...little doing...but...prices...steady.

September 4 (Mar) ...a more regular demand..for the last three days...little fluctuation in price.
September
11 (Mar) ...a good demand for cotton this week.
18 (Mar) ...demand is rather heavy.
25 (Mar) ...a regular demand this week, United States cottons gradually creep up.
30 (MK) As cotton is creeping up we do not see how yarn can be reduced & and until something more decisive is known from America we think it may be as well to continue the prices as they are.

October
9 (Mar) ...little doing...prices...the same.
16 (McG) ...a good deal doing.
16 (MK) Within the last three months Cotton is 4d to 6d per lb, higher & there is now great reason to apprehend that it will still be more, and without a proportionate advance can be obtained for yarn it will be better for many of us to produce less, or entirely stop our works.
19 (Mar) ...a good deal done...at an advance...
19 (McC) The state of trade keeps Cotton much lower than it otherwise would have been under the present state of matters with America - It is mentioned here...that it is the intention of our Govt to impose an additional duty of 3d per lb on American Cotton, when Parliament meets as well as duties on other produce that may come from America.
22 (Mar) The market is steady.
22 (MK, from Robert Graham, Railton, & Co., London agents engaged in the export trade.) Sales are from present appearances likely to be at a stand for some time, which, together with the advance in cotton, should make you firm & careful to produce as little yarn as possible without you have a demand from the home manufacturers that we cannot judge of.
23 (McC) ...Cottons have advanced...however yarns in general do not advance much, there being so little prospect of demand.
30 (Mar) ...very little doing...as there is no speculation the demand has been chiefly for immediate consumption, prices are steady.

November
3 (Mar) ...not much doing...prices steady.
4, (McC) There has been almost nothing done in yarns for a week they make no progress.
6 (Mar) A pretty steady demand...for consumption...
7 (MK) Although there is rather less doing here in cotton there is no reduction in prices.
13 (Mar) ...demand continues regular.
November
20 (Mar) ...the market has been rather dull for a day or two.
21 (MK) Sea Island does not decline in price but there has been very little bought these last two weeks for the fine spinners here are generally working only half time & not likely to do more if Cotton is not lower or yarn higher.
23 (McG) We are glad you have been selling, for the yarn trade here is now literally a standing trade because of a strike of weavers.
28 (McG) The weavers still stand out and are expected to continue for months, unless some unexpected change takes place to enable the Manufrs to pay the prices demanded we shall have little use for yarn this winter.

December
2 (McG) ...under present circumstances it is a pity that so much yarn was sent forwards, but it proves that we cannot see future events.
4 (Mar) Expectation of news from America causes sale of cotton to be postponed.
8 (Mar) ...a great deal doing yesterday..at advanced prices, chiefly..speculation.
11 (Mar) Some of the American Houses have been buying very largely in Cotton today, & there has been generally a great deal doing.
12 (McG) You must pardon us with being so late with your returns but trading has been so hurried for a week or two past that it has not been in our power, people are mad after Cotton and yarn for two days back in particular.
14 (McG) Although nothing doing with the weavers and Manufrs yet the business done in Glasgow for the past two weeks has been immense in goods and yarns &c &c and the day it is so short we could spend it all talking without having anything to write - To day every thing is animated in yarn and cottons on @ of the Accounts from Liverpool and St. Petersburgh.
17 (Mar) On receipt of favourable news from Russia an advance in prices.
19 (McG) Monday, Tuesday and Wed 7 last speculation in Cottons and yarns was carried to a great height - on Thursday and yesterday the minds of people were much lower, but today the price is higher than ever all is bustle on account of the news from Russia and the sales in Liverpool - we stand firm for 7/6 but nothing is doing by Manufrs, the weavers being still more determined.
December
23 (MK, to Thomas McNair, Belfast) In consequence of the very great advance in Cotton particularly Sea Island and the favourable accounts from Russia, there has these two or three weeks past been very large speculations made here in Water & Muir yarn for exportation and of course the prices of yarn are considerably advanced but not more in proportion than cotton. As our stock is considerably reduced and being very much behind with some large orders, it may be some time before we send much to your market except to order, and as your Manufacturers have laid in large stocks at low prices we are afraid that they will be shy for a while at giving the advance.

24 (Mar) ...next to nothing doing this week.
26 (McG) The weavers are still out except a few in Paisley and our sales for November & Dec do shew that there is no real business doing in the way of consuming yarn.

January
3 (Robert Graham, Railton & Co, London agents in export trade, to McConnell Kennedy) As it is not probable the differences with America will be adjusted for some time to come, fine cottons may go much higher in price, particularly if our government should not remain firm in its policy of discouraging the trade attempted by France - At the same time the price is too high for you to speculate on keeping a large stock under the risk of the demand for fine yarns becoming slack.

23 (McG) ...in the early part of the week, yarn was bought up mostly for speculation there being as yet almost nothing wanted by ManufTs.

February
3 (McG) Prices rising bu... at present there is a kind of pause here in Cotton and yarn.
17 (McG) Very little doing here either in yarns or Cottons, holders are notwithstanding firm to their prices.
22 (McG) The advance on weaving and yarn together, makes the manufacturer indifferent about making goods until he gets quit of his old stock and has the prospect of an advance upon the old. However we shall surely have some more demands soon for yarns...

Last week we had a very general disposition amongst buyers of cotton to depress the price with an evident view of investing.

...it appears that our Parliament are nearly unanimous for prosecuting the American War with vigor, and in general it is thought here, that cottons will go up this week.
February

20 London: Notwithstanding the avowed intention of Government to impose a further duty on American cotton..., this commodity has been flat and former rates are scarcely maintained.

March

10 (McG) The demand for yarn continues extremely limited and unless some change takes place soon, we doubt if we shall be able to sell any more.
15 Glasgow: ...dull...less than 440 bales sold.
20 (McG) We are glad that things look better with you.
22 Glasgow: ...about 560 bales sold.
   Liverpool: ...slack demand...1300 bales.
   London: ...in little request.
29 Glasgow: Cotton brisk, nearly 1500 bales sold at some advance.

April

1 (McG) We have advices from London of the determination of Ministers to impose an additional duty upon Cotton 6d or 9d by Neutral vessels and 3d British, which caused a spirited demand for Cotton until yesterday about noon accounts came from Greenock of a Swedish vessel having arrived from New York and four or five more had sailed at the same time and are hourly expected. They are principally loaded with Flax Seed, however it had the effect of putting a complete stand to sales...
   The demand for yarn is limited, not an Exporter has yet appeared in this market, there is one spinner sending out 30,000 lbs, Twist to Hambugh - Our opinion coincides with yours that by & bye Sea Island yarn must get very valuable if trade keeps anything good of which there is a very fair prospect. Upon Monday we had occasion to go through the Cotton market for Demarara, Pernam, Bowed and Sea Islands, and of the latter we could not see above 100 bales worth buying, price 3/3 to 3/8 and the Brokers declare that their constituents have none except what is exposed for sale, suppose however that there are 500 bales kept out of view, it is nothing, if the American coast is to be blockaded.

5 Glasgow: ...sales over 900 bales [Sea Island - 170, New Orleans - 100, Brazil - 210, West Indies - 375] Liverpool: ...3600 bales [Sea Island-100, Bowed - 700, New Orleans - 350, Brazil - 1,030, West Indies - 375]
12 Glasgow: 700 bales [Sea Island - 170, New Orleans - 62, Brazil - 260, West Indies - 190]
   Liverpool: ...rather brisk. 5000 bales [Sea Island - 150, Bowed - 1200, New Orleans - 500, Brazil - 1800, West Indies - 1375]
April
10 Glasgow: 350 bales Bowed - 40, New Orleans - 62,
Brazil - 25, West Indies - 210
Liverpool: 3500 bales Sea Island - 250, Bowed -660,
New Orleans -220, Brazil 1021, West Indies - 880
London: The undecided measures of government, with
regard to the proposed additional duty on American
cotton, in a great measure prevents sales except the
purchases made by the speculative.
26 Glasgow: Limited Sales...not over 500 bales.
Liverpool: ...demand is rather languid... 3200 bales...
Nearly the whole of these sales have been made to the
Trade.
London: ...sales have been limited.

May
3 Glasgow: 300 bales
Liverpool: ...steady demand...4500 bales
London: Limited business...
10 Glasgow: Demand is still slack... 400 bales
Liverpool: Very limited... about 1500 bales
London: ...very limited.
17 (McG) ... at present the appearance for trade here is
very bad, at the same time most general opinion is,
that good Sea Island yarn will by & bye become very
valuable, not only from the price of that cotton but
from the consequent falling off in quantity that may
be expected.
12 Glasgow: 120 bales
Liverpool: 1100 bales
London: ...very little demand
21 (McG) ...we have been endeavoring to effect sales of
your stock, but have as yet failed in the attempt,
trade being very much at a stand here.
...owing to the price of Sea Island yarn the
consumption is much reduced here, by turning the
Machinery upon Pernams and Demarara that formerly was
employed on Sea Island. At Linwood for instance we
have 5/6ths of the Mach'y upon Pernam...and 1/6th on
Sea Island, thus the quantity of lower Nos i.e.
coarser cottons will be increased in the Market
while the other range is decreasing daily. At present
we can go through the Pernam yarn very well, while the
Sea Island is rather like to accumulate, owing much
to the latter being too dear for the present consumpt.

24 Glasgow: ...very flat.
Liverpool: ...very dull.
31 Glasgow: 500 bales
Liverpool: 1000 bales.
June

3 (McG) Trade continues very dull.

2 Glasgow: ...flat. 300 bales. [Sea Island - 10, Brazil - 130, West Indies - 100]
Liverpool: 2500 bales... [Sea Island - 41, Bowed - 500, New Orleans - 150, Brazil - 1865, West Indies - 120]
London: Request limited.

14 Glasgow: Cotton has been in some request. 450 bales.
[Sea Island - 30, Brazil - 180, West Indies - 215]
Liverpool: Cotton in the first three days of the week was brisk, and the sales were extensive, but it has been flat since. [Sea Island - 60, Bowed - 500, New Orleans - 200, Brazil - 1800, West Indies - 660]

21 Liverpool: 7500 bales [Sea Island - 80, New Orleans - 250, Brazil - 4150, West Indies - 860]
Glasgow: 640 bales [Sea Island - 50, Brazil - 240, West Indies - 360]
London: Speculation forms very little part of the sales.

28 Glasgow: Demand steady. 600 bales.
Liverpool: Cotton has been somewhat flat during the week, but the agitation of the question in the House of Commons has made it more lively. 2500 bales.

29 (McG) The trade is extremely dull here and prices of yarns go down. We have not been able to do anything worth having for you this month.

July

5 London: Public sales of cotton did not excite much interest.

5 (McG) We never saw less demand for fine yarn, and no present appearance of its being soon better...

Liverpool: no3 have been falling greatly in price here of late, and a little going off, but such yarn as yours remains almost without inquiry...

12 Glasgow: 600 bales.
Liverpool: ...sales...very trifling. 1800 bales.
London: Demand is estimated at 2000 bales.

17 (McG) We are glad to hear of your stocks going off in Manchester, here we are extremely languid.

19 Glasgow: Dull. 180 bales.
Liverpool: 5000 bales
London: Extensive public sales all to the Trade are estimated at 4000 bales.

26 Glasgow: 450 bales
Liverpool: Demand steady. 4000 bales.

27 (McG) Price will not induce buyers at present to lay in a stock of fine yarn, suppose you were to order us down to 6/6, we don't think we could sell largely, since yours of 8th June, we have been in constant look out not to miss a sale on account of price, and we may just as well take 7/6 as 7/-, when it makes
no difference for any little that is doing - It is our wish, and our interest to sell, but really we find it not possible to go through a quantity of any kind of Georgia yarn, our Linwood is stocking greatly, and would have been much worse if we had not put on 5/6ths the Machy on Pernam, which goes off; but we have not been able for the last six months to keep the 1/6th Georgia yarn going off, and if it does not better soon we shall abandon the Georgia spinning altogether.

August

2 Glasgow: 1000 bales
   Liverpool: 1400 bales
   London: Public sales have been confined to two, chiefly of West India cotton. The private contracts have been very extensive, mostly taken on speculation. The sales are estimated about 15,000 packages, of which little above 4,000 have been purchased by the trade.

5 (McC) A considerable quantity of low Nos are going off... to ST. Petersburg.

16 Glasgow: ...rather brisk. 1100 bales. Sea Island - 5, New Orleans - 50, Brazil - 483, West Indies - 605
   Liverpool: 7000 bales. Sea Island - 230, Bowed - 770, New Orleans - 400, Brazil - 4750, West Indies - 940, India - 670
   London: Demand continues steady.

21 Glasgow: 2000 bales
   Liverpool: .. brisk. 5000 bales. Sea Island - 285, Bowed - 1080, New Orleans - 360, Brazil - 2950, West Indies - 560, India - 180
   London: The business done has been very extensive, amounting to about 8700 bags; above 5000 packages sold since the favourable intelligence of Austria having joined the Allies was received... chiefly taken on speculation, but the remainder... have been sold to the trade. We cannot quote cottons generally at an advance, yet the qualities taken had been previously held at prices which could not be obtained; on receipt of the intelligence from the Continent the prices were realized with facility.

30 (McC) ...to days news of hostilities being recommenced may induce them to buy at... 6/9, under that we shall not go.

30 Glasgow: ...lively... 2700 bales
   Liverpool: 7000 bales.
   London: There is little West India or American Cotton remaining in this market. Real good parcels of Pernambuco and Maranhans [both Brazilian cotton] could not be purchased at the highest prices we have stated; Bahias plentiful. The business... chiefly taken on speculation. The sales estimated at about 4500 bags.

September

4 (McC) Since the news of Austria having declared against France we have had a spirited demand here for yarns under No 80 [i.e., coarse yarns], and cotton has gone off in large quantities chiefly on speculation of better prices.
September

6 Glasgow: 651 bales
   Liverpool: 1200 bales
   [Sea Island - 15, Bowed - 350,
   Brazil - 920, West Indies - 466]
   London: ...very limited. 1500-1600 bales...to the trade.

13 Glasgow: 827 bales
   Liverpool: Dull... 2000 bales
   London: ...demand...limited. The really good qualities of
   Brazil appear to be scarce... Few holders at present in¬
   clined to shew their cotton. Sales...estimated about 1100
   packages are all to the trade.

15 (McG) The accounts respecting the success of the French
   Army in Germany have put a stop to the speculations in
   yarn.

20 Glasgow: ...lively. 1523 bales.
   Liverpool: ...brisk. 4000 bales

25 (McG) ...the news from... Germany is giving a better spirit
   to our manufacturers.

27 London: The prices are improving. The market nearly without
   Maranham and Bahia Cotton of any quality, and good of
   both kinds scarcely to be met with at any price... The
   purchases...were chiefly to the trade, and estimated be¬
   tween 4800 and 4900 packages.

30 (McG) There has been a great deal done here in coarse
   yarns since Friday last, and M0s under 50, but 20s in
   particular, have advanced in general fully 5 pCent —
   we have not yet heard of any advance on fine yarns.

October

2,4,20,30 (McG) [Reports of increased sales at good prices.]

1 Glasgow: Demand...brisk. 1150 bales
   Liverpool: Demand...brisk. 5000 bales
   London: ...extensive business has been effected in the
   cotton market, the country buyers having been attracted
   by the large sale at the India House, and previously
   the purchases were all made by the trade, anticipating
   an advance on the prices.

11 Glasgow: ...brisk. 2200 bales
   Liverpool: ...lively. 10,400 bales
   London: ...the demand continued brisk, the prices still
   improving. So extensive have been the late purchases,
   that it has greatly reduced the quantity in the importer's
   hands, and very few parcels now offer for sale, except
   at an improvement in the quoted currency. The sales esti¬
   mated at nearly 7600 packages, considerably over one
   half to the trade.

18 Glasgow: Demand...lively. 3056 bales
   Liverpool: 2400 bales
   London: Sales...on a limited scale.

25 Glasgow: 742 bales
   Liverpool: Demand...flat. 2100 bales
   London: Demand...towards the end of... week appeared reviving
   for export, and some appearance of a speculative inquiry,
   previously the request had been very limited
November

1 Glasgow: Demand...flat. 444 bales.
   Liverpool: The market...dull, the buyers expecting to purchase at reduced prices.
   London: The cotton market opened heavily, but the holders not at all inclined to give way in price, since then the favourable news from the Continent has greatly enlivened the demand.

3 (McC) We have not one bundle on hand of first quality from No 78 to 124 and could have sold a good deal under 120 at 7/6, but we hear yarns are down in price, in Manchester.

8 Glasgow: Demand...brisk. 1303 bales.
   Liverpool: Demand...steady. 3600 bales. Sea Island - 170,
   Bowed - 750, New Orleans - 200, Brazil - 2145, West Indies - 230
   London: 2800 bales

20 (McC) The demand for yarns in general has not been so lively for the past four days. ...we see that 8/- could now go with ease for Nos under 120.

22 Glasgow: ...excessive demand. 3500 bales.
   Liverpool: Demand...brisk. 11,500 bales. Sea Island - 180,
   Bowed - 2000, New Orleans - 350, Brazil - 7400,
   West Indies - 1200
   London: A considerable demand at the beginning of the week, but towards the end the price of cotton has not kept pace with the rapid advance and the brisk demand for yarn and for manufactured goods. The prices are now improving considerably...

25 (McC) ...the mania continues, which is this moment very strong indeed, particularly for low Nos.

29 Glasgow: ...good demand... 3000 bales.
   Liverpool: ...very brisk... 14,800 bales. Sea Island - 380,
   Bowed - 900, New Orleans - 270, Brazil - 8200, West Indies - 1520
   London: ...business...very extensive... 1100 bales chiefly on speculation; early in the week every description offering at previous currency was eagerly taken, with little or no regard to quality.

30 (McC) ...we are very spirited here.

December

6 Glasgow: Demand...very animated. 4000 bales.
   Liverpool: Demand...very brisk. 20,000 bales.
   London: ...the business done...has been extensive beyond precedent. The sales have been so extensive, that in so wide a market as London it becomes difficult to ascer-
December
13 Glasgow: Demand...very animated. 2600 bales
Liverpool: In the early part of the week the demand was very lively and many purchases were made of Brazil cotton.
London: 2600 bales.
18 (McG) The demand for yarn here is not so lively as it was, at the same time prices are fully supported... We never saw the market so bare of yarn as at the present time, all kinds, we do expect a flatness at the end of the year, but are firm in the opinion that prices will be higher in February and March.
20 Glasgow: 500 bales.
Liverpool: 5000 bales.
London: The market in the early part of the week was without interest... the demand on speculation continues.
22 (McG) Not much business doing here in yarns, nor do we expect much to be done for a few weeks, our minds in general are quite firm as to better prices in the spring, but it depends greatly upon what you do in England.
Liverpool: Demand...animated. 9500 bales. [Sea Island - 380, Bowed - 730, New Orleans - 180, Brazil - 5380, West Indies - 1300]
London: The business done up to...Thursday was limited... the market watched mostly by speculators... On Friday a cargo (a limited one) newly arrived... was immediately taken, and since the Sales have been more extensive. 5300 bales.

January
3 Glasgow: ...brisk demand. 2200 bales.
Liverpool: Demand...pretty animated. 9000 bales.
London: ...prices...down.
17 Glasgow: Demand...dull.
Liverpool: ...3000 bales, the greatest part of which has been purchased by the trade.
22 (McG) ...at present, there is very little doing, but we look for another stir when the season opens, we are frozen up literally, and have had but little communication with the rest of the world.
24 London: ...lively. 19,000 bales
31 Glasgow: ...brisk. [Sea Island - 246, Bowed - 182, Brazil - 2147, West Indies - 1293]
Liverpool: Up to Friday the demand was lively and 8800 bags went off at an improvement of 1d to 1 1/2d, but in consequence of the pacific intelligence received from America, the sales were totally stopped, and only 900 bags have been sold since, at prices considerably reduced.
London: In the beginning of the week considerable business was done and 13,000 packages have been sold at an advance of 2d to 3d but intelligence being received from America that negotiations would immediately take place at Gottenburgh, the demand became less lively and the prices gave way considerably.

February
4 (McG) Wedy we had a great stir in Cottons and yarns in consequence of the news of the American Embargo being confirmed... Every kind of yarn No 90 to 130 is scarce here at present, and higher prices expected as the season opens.
2 Glasgow: On account of the pacific news from America, the demand became very languid and prices gave way 10d to 15d, but after the accounts received that the Embargo Act had passed, holders became more firm and prices advanced 4d. 1200 bales.
Liverpool: The sales extend to 5200 bags at an advance of 2d to 3d on the terrible depression of last week.
London: 5000 bales.
14 Glasgow: There have been no sales of any moment and prices have declined.
Liverpool: 3000 bales.
London: There continues to be much interest excited as to the price of Cotton. The whole sales amounted to 5750 bags, and had cotton been offered at the previous price, more business would have been effected. The holders of cotton are much confirmed in the previous opinion they entertained on American affairs, by the known political views of the deputies appointed to treat with the British Government at Gottenburgh.
18 (McG) Very little business has been done here, either in Cotton, Twist, or Goods, even Colonial Produce is at a stand, all as it were waiting for the result of the present contest in France, with great anxiety for every days Post, and we suppose that trade will remain in the same state until the negotiations are closed - we have no sales of any consequence to quote...
21 Glasgow: The demand is improved. 700 bales.
Liverpool: ...a regular demand...by the trade. 4000 bales.
London: 2500 bales.
28 Glasgow: 1100 bales
Liverpool: ...demand...languid. 3709 bales.
London: The market remained without interest; no request from the trade, and speculators not anxious to purchase, apparently from the firmness of the holders of Cotton to the present currency, and in many cases holding for a further advance. Total sales 500 packages. ...during the present languid state of the market, the holders of cotton feel so confident that only in one instance was a depression submitted to.
March

2 Glasgow: ...very flat.
Liverpool: ...continues dull. 2500 bales.
London: No Cottons are offering at this market at a reduction from the late currency.

9 (McG) We see no prospect of sales until something is arranged regarding peace between the Allies & Napoleon. The yarn market in general is quite at a stand here, and there is no possibility of quoting prices with any degree of certainty, the holders not being disposed to say the lowest price they would take, and of course the buyers decline offering, thus they mutually agree as it were to suspend operations for a time, none disposed to speculate at the present high prices, and the Manuf'rs have good stocks.

Cotton keeps its price, better than might have been suspected under the present prospect of negotiation at Gottenburgh.

14 Glasgow: Demand...limited.
Liverpool: ...brisk... 5300 bales.

21 London: The business done... by private contract, was very considerable. 4600 bales. [No American cotton sold]

26 (McG) We are in daily expectation of hearing from Chatillon, the public anxiety is very manifest here every morning on the arrival of the mail, and should our hopes of Peace vanish, we fear a great depression in price of Goods, Twist, Produce &c - In cotton there has been more done this week than for many weeks past...

28 Glasgow: ...demand...limited, 650 bales.
Liverpool: Demand...very limited. 2600 bales.
London: The market...was without interest; very little business being effected, the trade the only purchasers; speculators making inquiries but not willing to purchase except at a reduced currency which has not been submitted to.

April

4 Glasgow: Demand...flat. 500 bales.
Liverpool: ...continues very dull. 1600 bales.
London: No regular demand from trade...caused a forced sale of Brazilian cotton, and we believe the greatest proportion sold for exportation. 2600 bales.

11 Glasgow: 400 bales
Liverpool: ...flat. 1500 bales.
London: The business done in cotton was not extensive, the trade the only purchasers, with the exception of 200 bales taken for exportation. 1300 bales.

11 (McG) We congratulate you on the great and happy change of Political events, and we may now look forward to some repose in Europe. We may also consider the American War as near an end.
Like the Leipzig accounts, the present good News have come to us during the Preaching time, when many are out of town and warehouse, wherefor we have no business doing; but have not a doubt that tomorrow we shall have a bustle; the present high prices however will prevent buyers from being so very keen as they were, when 120° was 7/6 to 8/6.

We are of opinion that Twist will maintain its price fully, notwithstanding the reduction that may take place in the price of Cotton, the trade of the country at large will revive so much for a time...

18 Glasgow: Demand... flat. 150 bales.
Liverpool: ... flat... 2800 bales.
London: 1400 bales

23 (McG) ...we continue here quite lifeless, and of course prices decline, particularly on low Nos of yarn there is much depression.

25 Glasgow: Demand... languid. 650 bales.
Liverpool: ...spirited demand. 8000 bales.
London: There has been much briskness in the cotton market, the prices rapidly improving; the chief cause is the immediate prospect of an export to France, as Cotton, by the late decree, will be admitted almost free of expense; this circumstance added to the number of purchasers on speculation, on account of the late low prices of cotton, has caused a brisk demand, and the business done extensive. 7000 bales.

May

2 Glasgow: During the week the demand has been pretty extensive; and 2000 packages have been sold. [Sea Island - 120, New Orleans - 60, Brazil - 1377, West Indies - 374]
Liverpool: ... brisk... [Sea Island - 75, New Orleans - 100, Brazil - 4000, West Indies - 140]
London: There continues to be considerable fluctuation in the price. In the early part of the week the demand was fair, and about 1100 packages went off at the previous currency; towards the close lower prices were submitted to and the request became languid.

5 (McG) This week in consequence of the advance in Cotton, the Manufacturers have come more freely into the market for yarn, and a good deal has been sold at such prices as could be got, and more has been obtained in many cases than would have been accepted of last week had offers been made; at the same time we can not with any propriety quote a general advance, holders being very much disposed to quit.

12 Glasgow: Demand... flat. 500 bales
Liverpool: ... flat. 2800
London: ... continues an article of much fluctuation, owing to the present unsettled state of politics as to America. A general impression of an immediate negotiation had the effect of damping the market... Towards the middle... the holders became anxious to
effect sales... On Saturday the sales were more extensive, about 2400.

16 Glasgow: In the early part of the week the demand was very heavy, but since Thursday, the day on which proceedings of the American Congress was announced, there has been nothing done, owing to the uncertainty of the sequel of American affairs. 300 bales.

Liverpool: 6600 bales.
London: ...continued, during all the week, subject to much fluctuation. Sale about 6000 bales.

18 (McG) The depression in price of Twist and Goods... is general. Trade remains very bad here.

20 (McG)...the holders of American produce, and Cottons in general, are panic struck at the accounts of the Embargo being off and prices are merely nominal, but they have still some hope that the accounts are not correct, and if they should be, that our Blockade will prevent any great quantity from getting out, so long as the war continues - Trade remains very dull here.

23 (McG) Trade remains extremely bad here which together with the great depression in the price of Cotton prevents the Manufacturers from buying. Many of the first houses continue to disband their Warpers and Weavers as they come in.

23 Glasgow: Business in every commodity, colonial or manufactured, has continued exceedingly flat during the week, scarcely a sale of anything has been made...

Liverpool: 2600 bales.
London: Owing to the uncertain issue of American affairs, the cotton market fluctuates daily. 2000-2400

26 (MK, to John Beel, Belfast)...prices...are so fluctuating in both cotton & Yarn that of late they have scarcely been the same for two days together.

30 Glasgow: 700 bales...entirely taken by the trade to supply immediate wants.

Liverpool: ...Flat... 2500 bales.

London: Little has been done.

31 (McG)...the prospect at present is very bad, everything in the Manufacturing line is daily declining in price, and everything differently from what we expected from a peace in Europe.

June 6 Glasgow: ...continues to be taken by spinners for immediate consumption. 800 bales.

Liverpool: The demand...more animated than for sometime past. 8700 bales Be a Island - 340, Bowed - 850, New Orleans - 15, Brazil - 6000, West Indies - 300

London: The demand principally by the trade. 3600 bales. Brazil - 2960, India - 370. The new cotton arrived is of a very excellent quality and may be estimated at 1d to 2d per lb superior to former importations from the Brazils.
June 9
(MK) In the course of last week & this there has been some very large sales here of both fine & coarse yarn for exportation.

13 Glasgow: ...without alteration.
Liverpool: 4700 bales.
London: ...there was a revival in the demand for export. The sales amount to 1100 packages, chiefly for export.

16 (McG) Upon the whole we think peoples minds have recovered considerably from the panic, and trade in general bears a more promising aspect, and being in daily expectation of the West India, Bermuda, Demarara fleets which have been long out, we may expect a great quantity of goods to be taken off in July, which will no doubt give additional spirit to our Manufacturers.

18 (MK, to Hamilton & McConnell) Things look rather more pacific. In America... this has produced a little dullness in the Cotton market but no business doing at any price. [sic]

20 Glasgow: 300 bales... the trade merely purchasing to supply their immediate wants.
Liverpool: ...flat, in consequence of the supply expected from Amelia Island. 3000 bales.
London: ...continues subject to much fluctuation.

27 Glasgow: The sales... principally made to spinners. 500 bales.
Liverpool: 5000 bales.
London: ...continues to fluctuate greatly. 3000 bales.

28 (MK, to Hamilton & McConnell) The demand for exportation is rather increasing.

July 2
(MK) We do not look for much variation in yarn at present until we have something from America.

2 (McC) Cottons decline in price here, and the demand for yarn is at present flat.

4 Glasgow: 1000 bales. [Brazil - 100, West Indies - 810]
Liverpool: 5200 bales. [Sea Island - 200, Bowed - 100, New Orleans - 30, Brazil - 2700, West Indies - 630]
London: Sales, primarily for export. 1200 bales.
[Brazil - 490, West Indies - 140, India - 550]

11 Glasgow: 560 bales. [Bowed - 40, Brazil - 227, West Indies - 34]
Liverpool: 5500 bales. [Sea Island - 160, Brazil - 1350, West Indies - 2700]
London: 5600 bales.

16 (MK) There is a good deal more doing in fine yarns these few days past.

18 Glasgow: 700 bales, sold to spinners. [Bowed - 23, Brazil - 333, West Indies - 273]
Liverpool: 6500 bales. [Sea Island - 80, Bowed - 1400, Brazil - 3700, West Indies - 1600]
London: 2400 bales. [Sea Island - 30, Brazil - 1000, West Indies - 230]
July
23 (McG) Trade is very dull here, and prices of Goods and yarns go down regularly.
25 Glasgow: 3000 bales.
   Liverpool: Extensive purchases have been made this week, both by the trade and on speculation. 13,000 bales.
   London: 5000 bales. At very fluctuating prices.
27 (McG) There is very little doing in Twist & goods at present.

August
1 Glasgow: 200 bales.
   Liverpool: Very little has been done this week... The few sales...at a reduction in prices. About 1400 bales.
   London: 3000 bales. Prices down.
2 Glasgow: 850 bales.
   Liverpool: Very dull. 1600 bales.
   London: 4500 bales.
10 (McG) We have again gloomy times here, not unlike 1810 in the outside, yet we hope the result will not be so bad. Several failures here and in Greenock, but particularly at Leith, that town is in very great commercial distress...
15 Glasgow: The unfavourable view of American politics taken by some of our merchants created a demand for their commodities. 1600 bales.
   Liverpool: There has been a steady demand for cotton this week by the trade. 6000 bales.
   London: We mentioned in our last that the prices of American produce, more especially cotton, would fluctuate greatly during the discussions at Ghent; on 19 August, a rumour that the negotiations had been suspended till further instructions should be received from America, caused a great fluctuation, and above 4000 bales immediately changed hands. Total sales 9700 bales.
18 (MK) At the high price of cotton and the low price of yarn - there is very little inducement to spin below No. 110... We are considerably behind with some orders for want of Nos. below 120 to go with the higher, however in a few days we will send some and see what price you can obtain... The foreign demand for yarn is improving & in the course of this week Sea Island Cotton is advanced 2d to 4d.
19 (McG) The failures continue at Leith...
22 Glasgow: 600
   Liverpool: The market opened very lively on Monday morning... 6000 bales.
   London: In the first part of the week there was little or no business doing in Cotton, considerable doubts being entertained as to the reported interruption to
the negotiation at Ghent. On Friday the speculation demand suddenly revived, and, from the purchasers being Houses of the first respectability and information, it was immediately concluded that certain intelligence had been received from the place of negotiation. The request immediately became very animated. About 6000 bales.

22 (MK) The seizure of five vessels with Cotton from Amelia Island on Saturday has caused a very great consternation & Sea Islands is about 2d or 3d higher here today. Should it promote any bustle in yarn we wish you to be selling at the present prices as we are pretty well stocked with cotton.

27 (MK) ... a great deal of cotton has been bought up at 1d to 2d per lb. advance. The cause is thought to be that the negotiation at Ghent is not going on.

29 (McG) The accounts from London, Liverpool, and Manchester all agreeing today that the negons at Ghent are finished without peace being the result, Cotton holders here will not in general have a price.

22 Glasgow: 750 bales. Sea Island - 63, Brazil- 65, West Indies - 500.

Liverpool: The cotton market this week has been in a very fluctuating state. At the beginning of the week, considerable purchases were made on speculation, and prices advanced 3d to 4d a lb. On Wednesday and Thursday some of the early speculators offered their cotton on the market and prices declined 1d to 2d per lb.; On Friday... the speculators were again in the market and purchased from 4 to 5,000 bags, which advanced the prices to those of Monday. 15,000 bales.

London: The business done... was extensive. 8200 bales.

30 (MK) The opinion is gaining ground that the Negotiation is either broken off or likely to be long protracted. Therefore should the result prove so when you receive this... we... request that you regulate the price accordingly.

September

3 (MK) It being now believed that the negotiation is at last suspended, very little Cotton is offered to sale except at very high prices.

5 (McG) The cotton market is languid from the Negons still going on at Ghent.

5 Glasgow: There has been a great demand in the way of adventure. 2500 bales.

Liverpool: In the early part of the week the cotton market was very brisk, and considerable purchases were made. On Wednesday and Thursday the demand entirely ceased. 11,000 bales.

London: ... continues to fluctuate greatly. 3200 bales.

10 (MK) We are only spinning about 60 bales weekly of the second quality & have none here on hand nor do we wish it to accumulate, therefore you may regulate the price by the demand. The speculators in cotton are confounded and not much doing... There is a good deal of enquiry for fine yarns... and several Orders given for yarn to be spun there being almost no Stocks in the Spinners hands.
September
10 (McG) The want of real good yarn No 80 to 120 was never so much known here as it is now, and it requires a deal of reasoning to pacify our Customers, and short yarns in general were never so scarce in our time, although we have frequently seen them higher priced.
12 (MK) As yarn is so scarce with you it is a good time to advance the price. The enquiries for fine yarn from France are increasing very much...
12 Glasgow: 250 bales.
Liverpool: There has been a steady demand by the trade with little fluctuation in prices, 5000 bales.
17 (MK) Sea Island cotton is 4d to 5d per lb. higher than it was three weeks ago & very little good or even middling to be met with.
We shall be glad to hear from you at least twice in the week while things continue in this uncertain state.
19 Glasgow: 1000 bales.
Liverpool: 8000 bales... greatest part of which to trade.
Bowed - 14.89, New Orleans - 20, Sea Island - 251, West Indies - 1750, Brazil - 423.7.
London: The market remained without interest till the close of the week, when a greater disposition to purchase was evinced, both by speculators and by the trade. The news from America has made no alteration in the market. About 5000 bales.
24 (McG) ...not much done in yarns.
24 (MK) The demand continues very good here for all Nos below 130 & all above rather improving. Our stock is very low of all kinds.
26 Glasgow: 800 bales.
Liverpool: The demand very limited. 2200 bales.
London: The news received last week of the capture of the American capital produced less effect on the market than might have been expected. Over 930 bales.
28 (McG) ...we could have made many sales of your yarn No 80 to 100 at 10/- had we had it, indeed such yarn is so scarce that we believe that 10/- or more might be obtained now were it upon hand, and that price demanded; in short the scarcity of such yarn No 70 to 120 is quite unprecedented in our experience. It would appear that nice and fine goods are getting into demand and a great Spring trade seems to be generally expected.

October
1 (MK) Our cotton market is rather duller today & Cottons rather lower at the ports. We have a very steady demand for all kinds of our yarn in this Market & prices rather improving.
1 (McG) We are at a loss here to know what effect the late news from America will have on the Nago's at Ghent, there was no stir in cotton in consequence yesterday.
October

3 Glasgow: Extremely flat... 500 bales
Liverpool: Prices have in some measure advanced a little but the trade is scantily supplied and must come into the market immediately. About 2500 bales.

5 (McG) There is not much demand here at present for yarns in general, but such as yours No 80 to 120 and up continue in good demand for the trade...

8 (MK) As there is a very great demand for fine here & as we cannot send you a sufficient supply under No 120 cannot 10/6 be got for all below that no. We are very confident that the stocks of fine in the spinners and dealers hands here were scarcely ever lower & there is a great deal more enquiry for both coarse and fine today.

Cotton continues without much alteration but the stock of Sea Island being so small it is certain to be higher if there is no change in political affairs.

8 (McG) The yarn and Cotton markets have been dull this week.

10 Glasgow: ...continues flat. 550 bales.
Liverpool: The variety of reports concerning the negotiations at Ghent have affected the Cotton market, prices having fluctuated a good deal, but since the public sales [in Friday] there has been more steadiness. 2500 bales.
London: ...great fluctuation. About 3000 bales.

12 (McG) ...at present we consider it of much importance to keep low stocks.

15 (MK) ...we do not wish to risk holding stocks at present for a trifling difference in price - Was a settlement with America to take place Cotton might immediately be at half the present price & yarn in proportion to the demand.

15 (McG) ...of late a constant anxiety about the arrival of the yarn by the buyers.

17 Glasgow: 900 bales.
Liverpool: About 6000 bales.
London: The market was much affected by American houses, considered to have the first information, turning sellers. 3300 bales.

22 (MK) The demand continues good for both coarse & fine Twist.

22 (McG) The demand this week has not been quite so heavy. The price of low Nos of twist continues to decline in the market and the demand very limited.

24 Glasgow: 700 bales.
Liverpool: In consequence of the seizure of seven sail of vessels having on board 5370 bales of cotton from Amelia Island, that article has generally experienced a rise of 1d per lb. 9000 bales.
London: ...subject to much fluctuation, the prices advancing both on account of the opening the Canal, and also that the negotiations at Ghent were likely to terminate unsuccessfully... 5800 bales.
**October**

25 (MK) We hope you will lose no Sales for a trifling difference in price while the times continue so critical.

26 (MCG) The prices of low Nos of yarn continue to decline.

29 (MK) You will hear of a very great bustle in the cotton market but the cause we have not been able to ascertain.

29 (MCG) ...we feel the demand is not quite so lively this week. Indeed many of our Customers have got their hands pretty well filled, with what they have got, and what is still upon the way. We expect however that many of them will be at us for No 80 to 100 or 110 before we shall be able to give them much, wherefore we think you ought to be forwarding a stock to meet the demand, as a great Manufactory is going on...for the London and Continental Spring trade...

The cotton holders are gaining more confidence in prices, and refuse to sell except upon an advance upon the general prices of the week.

31 Glasgow: 1900 bales.
Liverpool: Considerable business was done on Monday...but since the demand has been very limited. 3000 bales. London: 6600 bales.

**November**

1 (MCG) ...President Madison's speech is in Town, and it breathes great hostility to this Country; at the same time in case it should not be realized that is said, and as the price is high we have thought it right to quit the undernoted of your yarn at which we hope you will be satisfied. For our part notwithstanding the news we should not have been disposed to have bought so high, at the same time the purchasers are Manufacturers and they may bring a profit on the Goods when they are made and sold.

3 (MK) Sea Island cotton is now held here from 4/- to 4/6 & a general opinion that it will be more.

5 (MCG) Since we made the large sale on 1st inst we learn it is partly on speculation, they expect to get at least 1/- per lb. by it; we hope it will be so but we doubt it.

2 Glasgow: 300 bales.
Liverpool: 3000 bales...which have all gone out of the market.
London: 3000 bales.

14 Glasgow:...steady. 800 bales.
London: ...without interest in the beginning of the week. 7050 bales.

16 (MCG) Not much doing during the week either in cotton or yarn.

19 (MCG) ...of Sea Islands we believe there are only 10 bales in Scotland for Sale.
November

21 Glasgow: 1200 bales. Prices up. Liverpool: The recent intelligence from America had the effect of raising the prices of cotton. The demand has since been regular. 5000 bales...nearly all for the trade and for Glasgow.

23 (McG) Yesterday we had the American accounts...and from the impulse given to the Market in general, we hope now to effect 11/- for yarns; some demand more, but we certainly consider it adviseable not to press it too high all at once.

26 (MK) Sea Islands were sold yesterday in Liverpool at 6/-. There is rather less doing in other cottons and at rather reduced prices.

26 (McG) People are not so keen after buying as they were two weeks ago, the price is considered dangerous... The Cotton market is greatly cooled since WedY

28 London: One of the large holders of cotton on speculation determined to make sales last week, which could only be done at a very considerable reduction. The market remains heavy, on account, in some measure, of the currency of Liverpool being below this Market.

30 (McG) The manufacturers are now greatly alarmed at the high price of yarn. We have been on treaty for some lots, but cannot bring them to any specific offer that we can accept.

December

3 (MK) The confident expectation of a Peace with America has caused a very great fall in cotton.

3 (McG) The markets here, or rather peoples minds, are very unsettled both in regard to Cotton and Twist.

5 Glasgow: ...flat. prices...down.
Liverpool: 6500 bales.
London: 3300 bales.

10 (McG) The general expectation of Peace with America has caused an almost complete suspension of Sales, now that impression seems to wear off and if it does we shall have more business next week.

12 (MK) Perhaps there may not be an immediate Peace with America, but certainly the continuation of the Commissioners at Ghent seems in favour of it...& should Peace take place there may be a considerable reduction in the price of yarn.

19 Glasgow: ...flat. 200 bales.
Liverpool: Prices gradually advancing...4500 bales.
London: 2720 bales.

24 (MK) There is now great reason to fear that the American negotiation has no tendancy to lower Cotton soon therefore we are not anxious to press our yarn at the present prices if the rumours prove true...
December
24 (McG) Business has remained extremely flat, and the prices of yarn do nominally decline. A very great desire prevails to press sales, but no buyers of any consequence to be found. There has been almost no cotton sold here for the last four weeks.
26 Glasgow: Flat...only a few parcels being sold to Spinners.
Liverpool:...fluctuated considerably during the week.
London: There is little business doing.
30 (McG) We really do not as yet really know what effect the joyful news may have on yarn, we cannot judge but should it be a decline in price we desire that you will not be the last although we have no inclination to take the lead.

31 (MK, to Nicholas Springle, Daxatt & Divett, London) We presume the increased demand for the Home Manufacture will have a great tendency to keep up the price of yarn & and it may be two or three months before fine cotton is much lower.

January
2 Glasgow: Cotton sold merely to supply the immediate consumption.
Liverpool: Demand...regular. 2600 bales...wholly to trade.
London: Demand...limited. 1300-1400 bales.
January

3 (MK) Yarn seems almost stationary at present but all the buyers are looking forward to a reduction but there is almost nothing doing this week. There does not appear any apprehension here of Madison rejecting the Treaty.

4 (McG) We must wait until the minds of buyers and sellers are more fixed.

7 (MK) ...from the expectation of a great increase in the Home Manufacture & the very small stocks either in the Spinners or Dealers hands in the Country we think there is not much reduction anticipated.

2 Glasgow: Little or nothing has been done.

Liverpool: The demand for cotton has been entirely confined to the trade, who have purchased very sparingly.

London: The market improved considerably, both by the trade and for export. It would appear the stocks of the trade are inconsiderable, as they continue their enquiry at these prices, and no sellers at the currency.

14 (McG) As yet prices of yarn have not come to any settled state in the market, Manuf's expect a very great reduction, and keep off buying, and just so is it with Cotton and Spinners.

16 Glasgow: Cotton is so flat as to render it impossible to quote prices.

Liverpool: We still continue to experience a regular demand. [Sea Island - 146, Bowed - 976, New Orleans - 209, Brazil - 2113, West Indies - 553]

London: 1800 bales.

23 (McG) The demand for yarn remains extremely small. The Manuf's buy only for the weekly or daily consumption and we fear we must give way more than anything we have yet proposed.

Should the Spring bring larger orders from the Continent, it is possible that prices may become more settled but till then it is very likely that we shall have a very unsettled state of prices, and a limited demand.

23 Glasgow: ...extremely flat.

Liverpool: There has been a fair demand...both by the dealers and the spinners, but holders still continuing to press their stocks on the market, prices have almost daily given way. [Sea Island - 120, Bowed - 1852, New Orleans - 75, Brazil - 1023, West Indies - 248]

London: ...continues to give way, 2100-2200 bales.

25 (McG) Cotton is daily depressing in price.

27 (McG) The state of our market remains extremely dull.

28 (MK) Cotton and yarn remain the same. It is great reason to expect that demand in the Spring on the Continent will be more in proportion for fine yarn than for coarse as the import duties into some states are much higher upon coarse Nos than fine.
This is done no doubt with a view to encourage their own manufactures & shews the great necessity of getting the import duty on Cotton repealed.

February
11 (MK) ...very little buying but for daily or weekly consumption & in consequence of the expectation of cotton being still lower & that yarn will follow...
13 Liverpool: ...a fair demand in the beginning of the week, and prices were fully supported. On Wednesday, a considerable number of dealers came into the market, since which the enquiry has continued. The advance may be attributed to the bareness of the stocks in the hands of the dealers added to the scarce supply in the market. 5500 bales.
[Reports of the Cotton markets in the Greenock Advertiser no longer appeared after this date].
15 (McG) We are really doing almost nothing for you this month, we have seldom seen less disposition to buy [yarn]. Cotton continues to decline in price and the Spinners keep from buying except for present need.
28 (McG) The demand for yarn is still very languid, and prices drooping, but we hope for some revival of the demand during the three following months.

March
4 (MK) ...Our market continues fair...for the home trade.
4 (McG) Our trade continues very languid, and Manuf's still hope to get yarn cheaper after the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent arrives.
11 (MK) There is scarcely anything doing here in fine reeled yarn.
15 (MK) ...the joyful intelligence that peace was signed by the American President, but the act of Bonaparte's progress is a drawback & seems altogether a strong admonition to be making sales...
18 (McG) All classes feel very happy at the Peace with America, and had it not been this new business in France, we should have been looking to steady trade for a time - Cotton is expected to be so much cheaper that nobody will buy yarn at present to any extent, to supply the daily need is all.
25 (MK) The prospect of another Continental War with the Tyrant of France are dreadfully gloomy & may soon tend to rankle the old sores in America.
28 (McG) ...it has been impossible for us to sell yarn in quantity... We have been retailing.

All our prospects of steady trade are blasted for the present by the change of matters in France, although we never were fond of the Bourbons yet we should have liked a state of peace from Europe.

April
1 (McG) We were extremely desirous to quit the whole stock to Finlay & Co., but they would not purchase more than what was necessary to fill up a present order being in
expectation of getting it still lower in price before long, indeed from the present state of trade here and the prospects we did not expect they would have given so much as 8/-, had they offered 7/6 or 7/9 for the whole stock we should have supposed it for your interest to have closed with them.

Trade is very bad here, and many of the Manufacturers are parting with their weavers, and some Spinners are upon half time, until the Market be better supplied with cotton and the price lowers.

22 (McG) [Continued bad trade - fear of failures]
APPENDIX C: Two British documents relative to the negotiation at Ghent


It being highly desirable that the conditions of Peace which the Commissioners are authorized to negotiate should not only be such as to put at rest as much as possible the many altercations and disputes which have from time to time taken place between the two nations respecting their respective rights and Boundaries, but that they should so establish the boundaries as not to have in future the Canadas exposed to invasion from the United States, a precaution become the more necessary as the subjugation of those provinces has been the declared object of that Government. It is necessary to instruct the Commissioners with respect to those points on which it is most essential to come to an amicable explanation and distinct arrangement.

During the course of the War with France discussions have arisen respecting the claims which it has been understood that the American Government have brought forward with regard to the extent of their maritime jurisdiction from their coasts. On this point an explanation is desirable. The Commissioners are authorized to express to the American Commissioners the wish of the British Government to agree upon any reasonable distance within which the Maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall be considered as confined it being always understood that the maritime jurisdiction shall be reciprocal as to the respective coasts of the contracting parties.

The doubts which have arisen respecting the river St. Croix have been so happily adjusted after a full discussion by the two Governments in the year 1798 that nothing more will be necessary in that particular than to insert totdem verbis the declaration made by the joint Commissioners in that year.

The islands in Passamaquoddy Bay have long been the subject of discussion. It is however clear that by the Treaty of 1783 they were excluded from the Territory of the United States; the second article of that Treaty specially exempting from the territory of the United States all such islands as "then were or as theretofore had been within the limits of the Province of Nova Scotia" and it having been proved that those islands were and always had been considered as forming a part of that Province.

Doubts have also arisen with respect to the boundary of the Province of Maine and in order to put them at rest it is proposed that the 47th parallel of Latitude shall be considered as that boundary from the point where the present boundary line as claimed by the American government intersects that parallel.
Fort Niagara being the point from whence an attack against Upper Canada can be made with the greatest facility and effect it is necessary that the Fort together with the adjoining territory should be retained by Great Britain.

The British Government are willing on behalf of the Indian nations in alliance with them to consent to the ad-

option of the River Wabash and the Miami of the Lake as the boundary between the territory of the United States and that of the Indian nations. But in consideration of the extension of territory which the United States will thereby obtain beyond that possessed by them in the year 1783 and in order to protect the necessary communication with the Indian nations the island and Fort of Michillimackinac shall be retained by Great Britain. It shall be moreover agreed that the boundary hereby assigned to the Indian Nations shall be guaranteed to them and that neither of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to acquire either by purchase or otherwise from any Indian Nation any further Territory or to change existing boundaries without the consent of the other contracting party.

In order to clear up the doubts to which the Treaty of 1783 has given rise with respect to the Western Boundary of the United States as laid down in that Treaty (inasmuch as a line drawn due West from the North Western point of the Lake of the Woods will not as assumed ever intersect the Mississippi) it shall be stipulated that that boundary of the United States shall be a straight line drawn from the North Western point of the Lake of the Woods to the Source of the Mississippi.

Some such boundary also must be assigned to Louisi-

ana as may exclude the Citizens of the United States from any interference with the British Settlements on the Col-

umbia River.

Although the British Government cannot but be sen-
sible that the renewal of the Treaty of 1783 is liable to many objections on the part of Great Britain and that many advantages would arise from a refusal to renew any part of it, yet being animated with an anxious desire to oppose as few obstacles as possible to the restoration of Amity be-
tween the two countries they are willing to renew the said Treaty provided it be distinctly understood that the pro-
visions of the third Article are in no case whatever to be considered as renewed.

The Commissioners will either insert in the body of the Treaty the third Article of the Treaty of 1794 and the explanatory Article of 1796 or concert with the American Commissioners in drawing up a new Article containing the substance of those two Articles as it may be thought best by the American Commissioners.

The American Commissioners must understand that if they are not instructed to enter into negotiation on these points and that in consequence Peace cannot be concluded Great Britain is by no means pledged not to make further
demands if the events of the War for the protraction of which the American Government will be alone responsible should authorize demands more favourable to the security of the British Possessions in North America.

N.B. In order to put an end to the Jealousies which may arise by the Construction of Ships of War on the Lakes, it should be proposed that the two contracting parties should reciprocally bind themselves not to construct any Ships of War on any of the Lakes; and should entirely dismantle those which are now in Commission, or are preparing for Service.

2. "Memorandum respecting the Negotiations with the United States." British Museum Additional Manuscripts 39365, Liverpool Papers CLXXVI. (This memorandum was apparently drawn up for use in Parliament.)

At the opening of the negotiation the British Plenipotentiaries brought forward among others two propositions as those upon which they conceived the Negotiation likely to turn. The first was that the Peace should be extended to the Indian Nations allied with Gt Britain & that the boundary of their territory should be definitely marked out as a permanent Barrier between the Dominions of Great Britain and the U.S. — An arrangement on this subject was stated to be a sine qua non. The second proposition was a revision of the Boundary Line between the British and American territories with a view to prevent uncertainty and dispute —

Upon the American Plen — stating that they were uninstructed with respect to the first of these points and unable to say (until they knew the detail of the arrangement proposed by Great Britain on behalf of the Indians) how far they could take upon themselves to conclude an article on the subject, we stated to them first in a conference and afterwards in a note the whole views of the British Government both with respect to Indian pacification — and Boundary, & with respect to the boundary between the dominions of the two powers in America.

The substance of this statement was:
That the Indians in alliance with Great Britain should be included in the pacification —
That a definite boundary should be assigned to them.
That the contracting parties should guarantee the integrity of this territory & forbear to make encroachments upon it either by purchase or otherwise.
That the U.S. should not retain any military force on the Canadian Lakes.
That a revision of the North Western boundary of the U.S. and of that which intercepts the communication between Halifax & Quebec should take place —

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That Great Britain should enjoy the free navigation of the Mississippi.

In objecting to these propositions the American plenipotentiaries resisted no less the demand of Great Britain for including the Indians in the Pacification than that respecting the guarantee of their territory.

They stated the former to be a proposition contrary to the principles of Public Law & to the practice of civilized nations that no principle was more universally established than that of suffering no interposition of any foreign power between the Sovereign of a Territory and the Indians resident upon it. They absolutely denied the right of Great Britain to consider such Indians as her allies or to treat for them with the United States or to interfere in any manner with them, & stated that they could not consent to any such interference.* (Marginal note)*The proposition made by the Americans with respect to Indian Pacification differed totally in principle & materially in its terms from that made by us. They agreed indeed to give the Indians peace after peace was made with Great Britain, but they did not specify the terms of that peace nor would they consent to its being so far guaranteed by Great Britain as to form a part of the Treaty of Peace.)

In their note of the 9th September, they for the first time ceased to represent this part of the proposition as inadmissible, but objections to it were nevertheless more or less urged until their acceptance of the Article proposed by us in our note of the 8th October.

In the course of this preliminary discussion Great Britain had waved the proposition made with respect to the guarantee of a boundary to the Indian Nations and that which related to the security of her own frontier - But in return for this concession she had obtained the two main objects 1st that the Indians should be included in the Peace between Great Britain and the United States 2nd that a boundary should in the treaty be assigned to them.

It is observable that the American Plenipotentiaries by acceding to the boundary of the Indian territory as it existed in 1811 twelve months previous to the War between Great Britain & America did in fact admit us to treat for the Indians in their general relation & not merely as our allies which considering the ground of their resistance makes this concession on their part more important - On the part of Great Britain the concession was of her own security in order to obtain that of her allies.

As soon as the Article was settled the American Plenipotentiaries demanded a Projet from us. We offered the remaining points stated at the outset of the negotiation and not yet disposed of; and proposed with respect to boundary to treat on the basis of uti possidetis. To this they objected; we replied, and on the 10th November they delivered in their project.

It contained six articles appointing commissioners to decide on different lines of disputed boundary. In acceding to the principle of their articles we altered the mode
of selecting the commissioners and of deciding on points not
decided by them.

The other articles contained:
1st an abandonment for a limited time of our right
of taking seamen out of Merchant vessels upon an engagement
of the U.S. to exclude from her Service the subjects of all
other powers.
2nd a definition of blockade.
3rd A demand for indemnification for captures under
the Orders in Council and for losses sustained in the course
of the war by the destruction of unfortified towns, etc.
4th A general amnesty to all subjects who might have
favoured the Enemy.
5th A mutual arrangement not to employ Indians in
any future war.

These five demands were altogether abandoned in the
course of the subsequent discussions and we further obtained
the possession of the Passamaquoddy islands during the
interval between the signature of the Treaty and the
decision of the title to them.

Such is the short history of the Negotiation.

It may be objected to the peace that it could have
been obtained many months sooner but for our demands
respecting boundary. To this it may be replied that those
demands gave rise to no delay for the concession respecting
boundary was made at the same time that our demand with
respect to Indian pacification was conceded to us and the
latter being obtained (which was not till the 13th October)
we no longer insisted upon the former - Neither did the
proposal of uti possidetis occasion any delay imputable to
Great Britain. The Americans indeed deferred offering their
projet in the first instance but nevertheless did so after¬
wards altho' the basis was not then abandoned.

Dates will prove that our concessions so far from
being made in consequence of reverses sustained in America
were made at the moment when our successes were the most
brilliant - The ultimatum with respect to Indian pacifi-
cation brought forward in our note of 19th September was
offered with a full knowledge of the success obtained by
Gen'l Drummond in Upper Canada and our modified article
which was ultimately accepted was offered four days after
we received intelligence of the capture of Washington.

If it be said that concession has been on the side
of Great Britain alone it is enough to shew the absurdity
of pronouncing such a judgment on a partial statement of
that part of the negotiation which related solely to the
propositions made by Great Britain or it may be effectually
disproved by adverting to the terms of the American projet.

Some may object to the absence of any stipulation
respecting the Fisheries but it is easy to shew that the
advantages in this respect which America enjoyed under the
late treaty not having been renewed, the omission is a
positive advantage to Great Britain.

The abandonment of the Mississippi navigation requires no defence, the value of that privilege having been destroyed by the occupation of both sides of that river by the A. Govt in consequence of the Union to them of Louisiana. - If weighed also against abandonment by America of the right to fish which she enjoyed under the Treaty of 1783 it cannot be considered as having been given up without an ample equivalent.
FOOTNOTES:

Introduction:


4. For the cultural aspects of this civilization, see L.B. Wright, The Atlantic frontier, Colonial American Civilization, New York 1947; M. Kraus, The Atlantic civilization, eighteenth century origins, New York 1949

Chapter I:

1. quoted in J. Greig (Ed.), The Farington Diary, 8 Vols., London, 1923-28, VII, 239

2. Courier, 6* June 1812 (Inclusion of extracts in Appendix A will be noted by an asterisk placed after the date of issue. Because so much of the comment appearing in the press was extremely prolix, it is sometimes difficult to extract significant passages. To quote such comment in full would impose an unnecessary burden on the reader's patience. On the other hand the 'tone of voice' in which this comment is made constitutes evidence beyond the analysis of argument for British attitudes and opinions. I have therefore included extensive extracts of newspaper opinion in an Appendix (pp. 265-294). The Appendix is arranged chronologically.

3. Courier, 14 September 1812

4. James Hatfield to Thomas Nicholson, 30 June 1812, John Rylands Library English Manuscript 1042/335. Caledonian Mercury, 2, 8, 13, 20 July 1812; 25, 27 August 1812; 28 December 1812; Courier, 3* September 1812.

5. Edinburgh Review, November* 1812; Glasgow Herald, 24 May 1814.

6. These charges were first widely aired in James Stephen, War in Disguise, or the Fraud of the Neutral Flags, London 1805. A more recent version was Courier, 2* October 1812.
7. See, for example, Liverpool Mercury, 23 October 1812.

8. Courier, 1 August 1812. Canning's jibe that the American "Republic was the only nation in the world enlisted on the side of French despotism" may be noted here. His speech was reported in Greenock Advertiser, 21 January 1814. For another, if rather muddled, expression of similar sentiments see B. Francis (Ed), The Francis Letters, London 1901, Vol. II, 373. Although such vague suspicions were widespread, they were not universal. Commented the Liverpool Mercury, 7 August 1812, "We are struck with the impolicy of the constant insinuation that the councils of the United States are under the influence of France... The allusion can have no other purpose than to insult those, whom we are pretending to conciliate."

9. Courier, 10* August 1812

10. One example, among many, of such a complaint is in Felix Farley's Bristol Journal, 30 July 1814.

11. Glasgow Herald, 7 February 1814.

12. David Anderson, Canada; or a view of the Importance of the British North American Colonies, London 1814, p. 2


15. Anderson, op.cit., 247-8

16. Courier, 3* September 1812

17. Cobbett's Political Register, 1 August 1812; Caledonian Mercury, 3 August 1812; Courier, 21*September 1812

18. Edinburgh Advertiser, 26 March 1813.

19. Courier, 10* August 1812

20. Courier, 10 September 1812

21. London Gazette, 6 January 1813

22. Correspondence of ... Viscount Castlereagh, 12 Vols, London 1831-3, IX, 97-98.

23. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 267-270. This aspect of the war, from the American point of view, has been recently fully treated in N.J. Risjord, "1812
Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor,"
William and Mary Quarterly, XVIII (1961), 196-210

25. Cobbett's Political Register, 8* August 1812
26. Morning Chronicle, 17* August 1812; It was a rare ob-
ervation that impressment cost more than it was
worth. See J.M. McCreery to William Roscoe, 5 January
1813, Roscoe MS 2522, Liverpool Public Library
27. Cobbett's Political Register, 8* August 1812, 25 July
1812.
28. Courier, 10* August, 14* October 1812.
29. Morning Chronicle, 27 September 1814, reporting the
speech of a Doctor Fenwick at a Fox dinner in New-
castle. Also Liverpool Mercury, 7 August 1812.
30. Cobbett's Political Register, 25 July 1812
31. Canning's speech on the occasion of his election for
Liverpool, reported in the Glasgow Herald, 30 October
1812.
32. Edinburgh Advertiser, 16 April 1813
33. Canning, quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 30 October 1812;
Melville to Admiral Cochrane, 31 July 1812, National
Library of Scotland MS 1066.
34. Melville to Sir Evan Nepean, 31 July 1812, ibid.
35. Lord Liverpool to Robert Peel, 7 October 1812, in C.S.
Parker, Sir Robert Peel, from his private papers, 3 Vols.,
London 1899, I, 41.
36. Castlereagh to Colonel McMahon, 5 October 1812, in Arthur
Aspinall (ed), The Letters of King George IV, 1812 - 1830,
3 Vols, Cambridge 1933, I, 170
37. Courier, 3*, 11* September 1812
38. Courier, 21* September 1812
39. Even as late as December 1812 one paper continued to pre-
dict a settlement. Caledonian Mercury, 8 December 1812.
40. Cobbett's Political Register, 8* August 1812.
41. Courier, 20, 29 October, 3*, 11* September 1812
42. The importance of sectional antagonism in America was
well-known in Britain even before the beginning of the
war. Courier, 6* June 1812.
"A View of the State of Parties in the United States of America, being an attempt to account for the present ascendency of the French, or Democratic Party, in that Country; In Two Letters to a Friend, by a Gentleman who has recently visited the United States." London 1812

"Observations on American Affairs", 16 September 1812, British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 38363 (Liverpool Papers)

Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, 23 August 1812, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Dropmore Papers, X, 292. Liverpool to Wellington, 7 October 1812, British Museum Additional Manuscripts 38362

Lord Auckland to Lord Grenville, 7 June 1812, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Dropmore Papers, X, 286

Courier, 21, 31* July 1812, 10* August 1812

See Note 44, above.

Cobbett's Political Register, 25 July 1812

Bristol Journal, 27 January 1814

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 26 July 1813. Speech of the Prince Regent

Anti-Jacobin Review, January 1813, p.88

Glasgow Herald, 11 June 1813

R. Dundas to Sir Thomas Cochrane, 2 April, 23 July 1813, National Library of Scotland MS 2265

Croker to Admiral Warren, 9 January 1813, Public Record Office, Admiralty Records, Ad 2/1375. The First Lord's private correspondence with Admiral Warren showed that the interests of the Admiralty played a part in this concern. "...any more naval disasters, more especially if they could be ascribed to want of due precaution, would make a strong impression on the public mind..." Melville to Warren, 4 June 1813, Warren-Melville MS 9629, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.

Lord Auckland to Lord Grenville, 10 January 1813, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Dropmore Papers, X, 322.

Bristol Journal, 14 July 1813

The following account is drawn from Hansard, 26.173-202, 1102-1115.

Edinburgh Advertiser, 16 July 1813; Glasgow Herald, 12 July 1813.
60. Edinburgh Advertiser, 30 July 1813
61. See also Chapter II, pp 92-95, below
62. Edinburgh Advertiser, 26 March 1813
63. Courier, 6* June 1812
64. see Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, New York 1949
65. The issue of the National Intelligencer, 6 November 1813, was, for example, quoted by the Morning Chronicle, 19 January 1814, to prove the view that the American government hoped to get and to keep Canada.
66. Manchester Mercury, 7 June 1814
68. Edinburgh Advertiser, 1* February 1814
69. Ibid, 8 February 1814
70. Greenock Advertiser, 27 May 1814; Courier, 2 August 1814
71. "Having disposed of all our enemies in Europe, the attention of the country very naturally reverts to our enemies, our bitter enemies, across the Atlantic. That a force will be immediately sent out sufficient to drub these braggadocio partizans of Bonaparte into supplications for mercy and peace, we may trust to those Ministers who have so nobly brought to a conclusion the more mighty contest on the Continent." Inverness Journal and Northern Advertiser, 22 April 1814; see also Ibid, 3 June 1814.
72. "The American Ministers...seem ready to negotiate here, and it begins to be rumoured that Madison is not personally violent against England, but is only driven on by his party; this change of language I consider as the first fruits of Bonaparte's retreat to Elba." Thomas Grenville to the Duke of Buckingham, Memoirs of the Court of England during the Regency 1811-1820, London 1856.
73. Glasgow Herald, 7 February 1814
74. Melville to Cochrane, 1 July 1814, National Library of Scotland MS 2265
75. Manchester Volunteer, 29 October 1814
76. The Anti-Jacobin Review, February 1814; Hansard 29.173
77. Manchester Mercury, 4 October 1814; Inverness Journal and Northern Advertiser, 19 August 1814; Greenock Advertiser 4 October 1814
78. For the expression of views that might be characterized as indicating intense irritation with America coupled with a desire for peace, see Greenock Advertiser, 7* February 1814.

79. Liverpool Mercury, 12 August 1814. See also Morning Chronicle, 4 February 1814, which suggests that some compromise of principle might be possible.

80. Morning Chronicle, 27 January 1814

81. Liverpool Mercury, 14* October 1814; see also ibid, 23* October 1814, and 14*, 18 October 1814 for a review of past relations with the United States and an analysis of the causes of the war.

82. Sir Samuel Romilley to M. Dumont, 26 May 1814, Memoirs of Romilley, III, 137; Morning Chronicle, 4 August 1814

83. Hansard, 28,817. Whitbread also remarked on what he regarded as the reluctance of Ministers to begin negotiations with the American Commissioners.

84. Liverpool Mercury, 30 September 1814

85. Courier, 5 August 1814: The Morning Chronicle, 4 August 1814 stated "...there is a spirit of most ferocious hostility prevalent in the ministerial circle." But see Glasgow Herald, 6 August 1814, which was sceptical of the accuracy of these reports.

86. Morning Chronicle, 5 August 1814; see also ibid, 16* August, 8 September (Letter signed 'J.J.'), 3 November 1814.

87. Ibid, 17* August, 8 September 1814

88. Liverpool Mercury, 16* September, 23 September 1814

89. Examiner, 17 October 1814

90. "...many people are very low in London about the war with America and Ministers are declining in popularity." Harriet Davenport to Edward Davies Davenport, 29 November, John Rylands Library, Bromley-Davenport Muniments. The judgment of Francis Horner, Opposition member of Parliament, is interesting in this respect: "I am convinced...the American war...is at present decidedly unpopular. The want of success, announced in so many repeated instances, had gradually weaned the public from their idle dreams of immediate subjugation, for that was the fancy, and in this state of dissatisfaction came that publication of the Ghent negotiations, which produced a great sensation. I have so little confidence in the steadiness of principle of the public sentiments, on matters of war, that if there
were some signal success won by our troops, or our ships over the Americans, I should rather expect to hear again the old cry for chastizement and all the old vulgar insolence. It is a sad misfortune." Francis Horner to John Murray, 10 November 1814, L. Horner (ed), The Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, 2 Vols, London 1853

91. Hansard, 9 May 1814, 27.742 - Speech of Nicholas Vansittart, Chancellor of the Exchequer; 1 June 1814, 27.1045 - for the clamour for immediate demobilization and reduction of taxation; 14 June 1814 - 28.70 for the statement by Tierney that the Income Tax should end in April 1815, since this was the bargain between the Government and the nation; 20 July 1814, 28.797 - Liverpool's speech defending the tax, and Lord Holland's answer; 18 November 1814, 29.344 - Vansittart on the necessity of continuing the tax.

92. "A Common Hall held at the Guildhall on the Subject of the Property Tax", reported in Morning Chronicle, 14 December 1814

93. 17 December - 26 December 1814, British Museum Additional Manuscripts 38260. The Prime Minister also wrote to John Gladstone, in Liverpool, on the same subject. In a rather acrimonious and confused meeting in Liverpool, Gladstone admitted the communication which, for some reason, was deemed improper by his political opponents in that city. Greenock Advertiser, 27 January 1815

94. Supplementary Despatches...of the Duke of Wellington, 12 Volumes, London 1862, IX, 543. Ministers used the fact that the Treaty was not in effect until signed by the American President as an argument for the continuance of the tax. These arguments were recognized as pretexts for delay, and, in any event, would not have been effective for long. Hansard, 29.693, 763-776, 1095-1099. The actual state of governmental finances (as opposed to the problems of public opinion) and its effect on the negotiations are discussed in IV, below.

95. Except where otherwise noted, the following section is drawn from the press comment included in Appendix I, 26 December et seq. Castlereagh's statement is printed in C.K. Webster, British Diplomacy 1813-1815, London 1921, p 297.

96. MeDouall to Bulger, 2 May 1815, quoted in G.F.G. Stanley, "British Operations in the American Northwest", Army Historical Research Society Journal, XXII (1945), 91-106. The similar opinion of a Montreal trader not connected with the fur trade may be seen in James Dunlop to Andrew McNair, 19 April 1815, Dunlop Papers HM Register House, Edinburgh.
Chapter II:


2. Bathurst to Prevost, 4 July 1812, Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office Records (CO), 43/23. The entire despatch breathes retrenchment, but this was of course before American intentions had become known in London.

3. Ibid., 10 August, 1 October 1812. In the first of these despatches, Lord Bathurst indirectly refers to one of the most important limitations on British action in emphasizing the financial obstacles to Canadian defence. He instructs Prevost to refer home any measures entail¬ing considerable expense except in cases in which such reference would be "productive of the most serious inconvenience to the Public Service". The difficulties involved can be seen in W.W. Robinson to Prevost, 30 July 1812, inclosed in Prevost to Liverpool, 30 July 1812. Both letters are printed in William Wood (ed) Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, 3 Vols., Toronto 1920, I, 402-404.

4. Reginald Horsman, "British Indian Policy in the Northwest", Mississiipi Valley Historical Review, XLIV (1958), 71-86

5. Bathurst to Prevost, 10 August 1812, CO 43/23
6. "Affairs look well in America in so far as they are very inactive and we take advantage of it. I hope they will not try their numbers, for we seem terribly deficient." Major-General MacLeod to Major-General Sir Alexander Dickson, 26 July 1813, in J.H. Leslie (ed), The Dickson Manuscripts, Woolwich 1912, p 1019.

7. A.R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest, East Lansing 1958, a very thorough account of military events, exonerates General Hull of much of the blame for his surrender, p 23 et seq.


9. Prevost to Bathurst, 5 October 1812, CO 42/147; Transmitted to Lord Castlereagh, Foreign Office Records (FO) 5/94; Bathurst to Brock, 16 November 1812, CO 43/40.

10. For the history of attempts to solve the Indian problem in this way see A.H. Abel, "The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi", Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1906, Vol I, 233-438. This study deals primarily with the subject after 1815 and only as it is concerned the American government, but the account of the question as dealt with at Ghent, pp 260-275, stresses what the author believes were the unappreciated merits of the plan presented by the British. Interesting references to the background of the idea of an Indian barrier before the War of 1812 occur in A.L. Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America, New Haven 1940, 92-93 et seq.

11. For an account of Brock's life and death, see F.B. Tupper, The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, London 1847.


13. The effectiveness of the Indian contribution is measured and found wanting in G.F.G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812", Canadian Historical Review, XXXI (1950), 145-165.


before and during the war are described in J.W. Pratt, "Fur Trade Strategy and the American Left Flank in the War of 1812", American Historical Review, XL (1935), 246-273.


18. The Instructions to Sir James Lucas Yeo, 19 March 1813, Admiralty Records (Ad) 2/1376, on his assuming command on the Lakes, direct him to consider himself under Prevost for the employment of his forces and are concerned primarily with administrative detail.


21. C.P. Stacy, "Commodore Chauncey's Attack on Kingston Harbour, November 10, 1812", Canadian Historical Review, XXXII (1951), 126-138, describes the cautiousness that from the beginning marked the contest on Lake Ontario. Neither side was willing to risk a decision without a prior certainty of success. See also the same author's "The Ships of the British Squadron on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814", Canadian Historical Review, XXXIV (1953), 311-323.


23. Warren to Melville, 7 October 1812 (two letters of this date), Warren-Melville Mss 9626.

24. Melville to Bathurst, 7, 28 December 1812, National Library of Scotland Mss (NLS) 3835.

25. Warren to Melville, 7 October, 5 November 1812. Warren-Melville Mss 9626. See also G.S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, Toronto 1950, 244-248.

27. Graham, *loc cit.,* Warren was given command of the United Halifax, Jamaica and Leeward Island stations, because it was believed that the war with America required such over-all direction of operations. Croker to Hamilton, 3 August 1812, FO 5/83.


29. For descriptions of this state of affairs see Mahan, *op cit.,* II, 14-23, 177-187, 193-208.

30. Bathurst to Admiralty, 27 November 1812, Ad 1/4223; Croker to Warren, 25 March 1813, Ad 2/1375.


32. Croker to Warren, 10 February 1813, Ad 2/1376.


34. Warren to Melville, 18 November 1812, 26 October 1813, Warren-Melville Mss 9626. The Admiral also suggested that the slaves be armed and that "...the terror of a Revolution in the Southern States" might "...produce a good effect in that quarter.", *Ibid.,* 25 February 1813.

35. Bathurst to Beckwith, 18 March 1813, Co 43/23.


38. Croker to Warren, 30 March 1813, Ad 2/1376.


40. See Croker to Warren, 9 July 1813, Ad 2/1377, for Instructions on the interception of American men-of-war returning to port. These instructions were repeated to Admiral Cochrane when he assumed command in 1814. Croker to Cochrane, 10 January 1814, Ad 2/1379.

41. Liverpool to Wellington, 7 October 1812, British Museum Additional Manuscripts (BM AddMss) 38362.

42. See Warren's remarks quoted in Mahan, *op cit.,* II, 332.

43. Another interesting purpose may be noted in Admiral Cochrane's intention to use the war as an opportunity
to recruit for the West India Regiments at the expense of American slave owners. The opportunity, he said, never would present itself again. Cochrane to Warren, 8 March 1814, NLS 2326.

44. Bathurst to Admiralty, 28 May 1813, Ad 1/4225.

45. Admiral Keith to the Duke of Wellington, 16 May 1814; Ad 1/1375; Bathurst to Prevost, 14 April 1814, CO 43/23; David Milne to George Home, 30 January 1814, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report of the Home Papers, 1902, p 161.


47. Bathurst to Prevost, 1 July 1813, CO 43/23.

48. Cochrane to Cockburn, 27 May 1814, NLS 2346.


50. The victory at Washington, wrote Lord Bathurst to General Ross, was "...creditable to His Majesty's arms, and...well calculated to humble the Presumption of the American Government, which contrary to the Real Interests, and as it is believed contrary to the prevailing wish of the Nation, has involved that country in an unnecessary and unjust war against His Majesty." 29 September, WO 6/2. Cochrane's statement was part of a despatch in which he again states his expectations with regard to the slaves, WO 1/141.

51. See, for example, Mahan, op cit, II, 332-336. The expedition is described and analyzed, 336-350. A more recent, but no more lucid, account of operations in the Chesapeake is Ralph Robinson, "New Light on Three Episodes of the British Invasion of Maryland in 1814", Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVII (1942). The question of who is to be given credit for the idea of the operations on land is examined at length here and re-opened by F.R. Mullanly in "The Battle of Baltimore", Maryland Historical Magazine, LIV (1959). The idea was too obvious and too frequently mentioned to be considered the property of any one individual.


53. Cochrane to Griffith, 30 May 1814, NLS 2349
54. Bathurst to Prevost, 15 December 1813, CO 43/23. Further instructions with respect to Lake Huron are referred to in Goulburn to Barrow, 4 January 1814, Ad 1/4228.

55. Prevost to Cochrane, 11 May 1814, NLS 2326. The talks broke off because of Prevost's inability to include the Atlantic Coast in the terms of the proposed armistice and because of American reluctance to allow rupture of the negotiations in Europe to be considered the only admissible grounds for a dissolution of an armistice. The correspondence from Prevost to London on this subject is found in CO 42/156.

56. Bathurst to Prevost, 11 July 1814, CO 43/23.

57. Bathurst to Prevost, 4 June 1814, CO 43/23.

58. The fullest and most recent account of the Battle of Plattsburgh is found in W.H. Heinrichs, Jr, "The Battle of Plattsburgh, 1814 - The Losers", The American Neptune, XXX (1961). An attempt to rescue the reputation of Sir George Prevost was made in W.R. Colden, Some Account of the Public Life of the Late Sir George Prevost, London 1823.

59. Bathurst to Sherbrooke, 28 April 1814, Ad 1/4229; Croker to Cochrane, 29 April 1814, Ad 2/1360; Cochrane to Horsford, 19 June 1814, NLS 2346.

60. Bathurst to Sherbrooke, 6 June 1814; Sherbrooke to Bathurst, 18 August 1814, CO 217/93. A full account of this operation and the purposes behind it is G.P.G. Stanley, "British Operations in the Penobscot in 1814" AHRJ, XIX (1946), 168-178.

61. Cochrane to Captain Pigot, 25, 27 March 1814; Cochrane to Governor Cameron (Barbados), 25 March 1814; Proclamation to the Creek Indians, 28 March 1814; NLS 2346. A vague promise later made that "your rights will not be forgotten if you are true to yourselves", Cochrane to the Creek Indians, 29 June 1814, NLS 2346.

62. The extended correspondence on this subject is found in Ad 1/4360; see also Bathurst to Ross, 10 August 1814, WO 6/2. Cochrane was fond of systems of diversion, for he proposed attacks by the Indians on the back country of Georgia as well as by Admiral Cockburn along the coasts of the southern states to coincide with that on New Orleans. Cochrane to Cockburn, 1 October 1814, NLS 2346. He also suggested to Major Nicolls in Florida that he "...enlist in the War some of the white inhabitants called Crackers and incorporate them with the
Indians. They may be promised lands and protection after the war is over." Cochrane to Nicolls, 3
December 1814, NLS 2356. See also Cochrane to Lambert,
17 February 1815, WO 1/143.

63. J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 13 Vols,
London 1902-1930, X, 150-151. The charge probably
originated with Lt-Col G. Wrottesley, The Life and
Correspondence of Sir John Burgoyne, London 1873.

64. Bathurst to Ross, 6, 10 September 1814. It is possible
that the government may also have been thinking of
Louisiana as a gateway through which the United States
could influence the South American revolutions. Such
suggestions were made in the British press, and the
War of 1812 saw the obliteration of that influence
where it already existed. The defeat of the Essex
off the coast of Chile had the immediate effect of
lowering the position of the American consul there
much to the benefit of British interests. CC Griffin,
The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish
Empire, 1810-1822, New York 1937; 42-68.

65. The correspondence between London, Paris, and Vienna
on the subject is printed in The Supplementary Des-
patches... of the Duke of Wellington, 12 Vols,
London 1862, IX, 404, 405, 416, 429, 430, 449; and
in The Correspondence... of Viscount Castlereagh,

66. For a description of the military measures taken in
Canada between the end of the war and 1871, when
British regular troops were withdrawn from Canada, see
C.P. Stacy, "The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier,
1815-1871", American Historical Review, LVI (1950),
1-18.

67. See Appendix C.2, below. The disappointment of the In-
dians of the Northwest is described in G.F.G. Stanley,
"British Operations in the American Northwest", AHJ;
XXII (1943), 103-106. Instructions were also sent to
encourage the southern Indians to accept the peace.
Bathurst to Packenham, 27 December 1814, WO 6/2;
Cochrane to Lambert, 25 February 1815, WO 1/143.

68. Memorandum on the Peace-Time Establishment of the Army,
17 May 1814, BM Add.33365; Even before the war had
ended the British government evinced its concern in
the instructions to Captain Owen, who replaced Sir James
Yeo in command of the naval forces on the Canadian
Lakes, 12 December 1814, Ad 2/1380. For later British
activities see the article by C.P. Stacy noted in 66,
above.
69. Bathurst to Prevost, 29 October 1813, 12 July, 15 September 1814, CO 43/23.

70. Bathurst to Drummond, 15 September 1814, 20 March 1815, CO 43/23. Advertisements appeared in several Scottish newspapers - for example, Caledonian Mercury, 25 February 1815. It was also expected that a large emigration from Ireland would take place. Memorandum to Sir Robert Peel, November 1814; Bathurst to Peel, 28 December 1814, BM AdMss 40241 (Peel Papers), Goulburn to Peel, 21 January 1815, AdMss 40242; Peel to Bathurst, 16 January 1815, BM AdMss 40027. A History of British settlement policy in Canada is H.I. Cowan, British Emigration to British North America 1783-1837, Toronto 1928.

71. Murray's career and connection with Canada are briefly described in G.S. Graham, "Views of General Murray on the defence of Upper Canada, 1815", Canadian Historical Review, XXXIV (1953), 152-166, in which a letter and a memorandum from Murray to Melville, 27 March 1815, are printed from the Melville Papers in the Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Further letters in this correspondence are found in NLS 3851, from which the references to the suggestions concerned Kingston have been taken (25 March 1815). Bathurst's early concern was evidenced in Bathurst to Prevost, 10 August 1812, CO 43/23.

Chapter III:

1. One of the most interesting accounts of Pitt's plan is in V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, Vol I, London 1952, Chapter IX, 448-492.

2. The fact was generally recognized in Britain. See, for example, Liverpool Mercury, 28 October 1814.

3. Courier, 28 July, 1812, gives accounts of the reception in meetings in Leeds and Manchester. The following is typical of the opinions of the commercial community: "I hope and there are several sanguine persons here who have the same expectations that the present favourable omens which the abandonment of the ruinous system of the last years has produced may anticipate still more fortunate results for the commercial world. Whether the change in the public councils is to be attributed to fear, avarice, or conviction it is foolish to argue about." —— to Thomas Nicholson, 30 June 1812, John Rylands Library, English Mss 1042/335. Other more formal expressions of pleasure abound in the Brougham, Roscoe, and Whitbread Papers. See the latter manuscripts, 3859-3870. (Bedfordshire Record Office)


7. Thomas Attwood to Henry Brougham, 10 August 1812, Brougham Mss 19143, Library of University College London, reported that "The merchants of Birmingham are shipping their goods to the United States with as much confidence as ever."

8. The Roscoe Mss, Liverpool Public Library, contain numerous statements of this belief, some dating over six months after war had been declared. See also James Hatfield to Thomas Nicholson, 23 July 1812, John Rylands Library, English Mss 1043/338; and Henry Brougham to Lord Grey, 9 September 1812, Brougham Ms 2; Thomas Thorneley to Henry Brougham, 22 July 1812, Brougham Ms 32589.

9. William Roscoe to Henry Brougham, 20 July 1812, Brougham Ms 32313; Crouzet, *loc cit*

10. Roscoe to Brougham, 25 July 1812, Brougham Ms 2314; Thomas Thorneley to Brougham, 3 August 1812, Brougham Ms 16574; Roscoe to Brougham, 13 August 1812, Brougham Ms 32315.

11. Brougham to Roscoe, 3 January 1813, Roscoe Ms 501.

12. Alexander Baring to William Roscoe, 26 August 1813, Roscoe Ms 506; see also F. Corrier to Roscoe, 8 January 1813, Roscoe Ms 1043.

13. Attwood to William Roscoe, 12 October 1812, Roscoe Ms 153. With respect to Liverpool, see the statement of J. A. Picton that "...the majority of the inhabitants, notwithstanding the loss of American trade...continued loyally faithful to the government, and gave their unstinted support in all public measures." in his *Memorials of Liverpool*, 2 Vols, London 1873, I, 336.

15. Glasgow Herald, 25 September 1812; see also Manchester Mercury, 7 December 1813, for the expression of similar views in a large town meeting in Manchester.


17. Liverpool Mercury, 23 October 1814.


19. Tradesman, September 1812, IX, 238; William Roscoe to Henry Brougham, 24 August 1812, Roscoe Ms 492.


23. Extracts from the correspondence of this firm have been included in Appendix B, p 295-321. They trace the effect of the American war on its business 1812-1814.

24. John Joseph Dillon to Lord Sidmouth, 18 December 1812; Home Office Papers, Public Record Office, 102/22. For the effect of this strike on the cotton trade, see Appendix B, 23, 28 November, 2, 26 December 1812.


26. T.S. Ashton, Iron and Steel in the Industrial Revolution, Manchester 1951, p 151. Evidence of this may be seen in the records of the Dowlais Iron Company, Glamorgan County Council Record Office, Cardiff - for example, JJ Guest
to Thomas Kirkwood, 24 February 1813, William Taitt to J.J. Guest, 2 April 1813. This last letter talks of the forced reduction of prices because of the very depressed state of the trade. This industry did, however, appear to benefit directly from the war, since depression in it was ended, later in 1813, by large government orders for cannon and shot. Ashton, op cit, 152.

27. Swayne & Wiggan (Bristol iron merchants) to J.J. Guest, 18 August 1813, Dowライス Iron Company Letter Books, 1813, f. 231.


31. Brougham to Roscoe, n.d. 1812, Ms 524 Roscoe Ms.

32. A.B. Bell (ed), op cit, 27 January 1813.

33. W.R. Copu, "Nova Scotian Trade During the War of 1812", Canadian Historical Review, XVIII (1937), 141-155; Crouzet, op cit, II, 842-852.

34. See Appendix B, below. G.W. Daniels, The early English cotton industry, Manchester 1920, p 154.

35. See Appendix B, below, June - December 1812

36. 20 December 1813, Board of Trade Records, 5/23; Letterbook, George Franklin & Co. 1814-1820, in the possession of the Imperial Tobacco Co., Bristol (I was unable to consult these documents. The reference is taken from the guide to manuscripts concerning American history which will be published by the British Association for American Studies, the proofs of which I was very kindly allowed to see); "Tobacco imported with price per lb. 1812-1815: 1812 - 15 million lbs, 6d, 1813 - 13.6 million lbs, 14d, 1814, 10.5 million lbs, 27d, 1815 - 13.2 million lbs, 16d", Parliamentary Reports, Accounts and Papers, 1829, XXV, 373.

37. Glasgow Herald, 10 January 1814

38. Appendix B, 3 January, 22 February 1813.

39. Appendix B, for the decline of stocks in 1813, Appendix B, 1 April 1813.
40. BT 1/71, November 1812.
41. Bathurst to Liverpool, 3 October 1812, BM AdMss 38250.
42. London Morning Post, 2 April 1813
43. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 28.613-615; Liverpool Mercury, 26 August 1814; see BT 5/23 for correspondence on the legality of this trade.
45. Edinburgh Advertiser, 4 May 1813; Glasgow Herald, 24 May 1813; Courier, 5 April 1813.
46. Glasgow Herald, 22 March, 24 May 1813
47. Glasgow Herald, 17, 19 March 1813
48. Glasgow Herald, 19 April 1813, Letter signed "Manufacturer"
50. Alexander Baring, Hansard, 10 May 1813
51. "...in our best times with America, temporary advantage to our manufacturers was purchased by a double loss to our colonial shipping.", Glasgow Herald, 17 May 1813.
52. Hansard, 28.613-615
54. Hansard, 10 May 1813
55. Glasgow Herald, 19 March 1813.
56. "An appeal to the public, on the admission of cotton wool from the United States into Great Britain, by the joint committees of the shipping interest and of the West India, East India, Brazil and Portugal trade." printed in Glasgow Herald, 30 April 1813
57. Charles Lyne, on cit, 15, 26-27; Courier, 5 April 1813; Glasgow Herald, 22 March, 7, 26 April, 7 24 May 1813; London Morning Post, 31 March 1813; Tradesman X, 492.
58. Hansard, 28.613-615; Scot’s Magazine, February 1814; Morning Chronicle, 1 November 1814; Glasgow Herald, 28 January, 19 August 1814; Liverpool Mercury,
26, 29 August 1814; James Nicholson to Benjamin Thomson, 15 December 1813, John Rylands Library, English Ms 1042/383. See Also Appendix B.2.

59. Hansard 26.613-615; Robert Thomson to James Nicholson, 7 August 1814, John Rylands Library, English Ms 1042/406; Scot's Magazine, November 1814; BT 1/43, 4 October 1814.

60. 24 November 1814, BT 1/43

61. Glasgow Herald, 27 January 1815

62. For a survey of the history of Britain's cotton supply, see Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol II (1940), 225-227.


64. The Colonial Policy of Great Britain, considered with Relation to her North American Provinces...by a British Traveller, London 1816, p 87.


66. Hansard, 27.688

67. Galpin, on cit, 23

68. Ibid, 13-14

69. Ibid, 194

70. Dundas to Sidmouth, HO 102/22, 12 November 1812;

71. Galpin, on cit, 81-82; Hansard 29.1009

72. Cobbett's Political Register, 29 August 1812.

73. W.F. Galpin, "The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula", American Historical Review, XXVIII (1922), 24-44; BT 1/71 - 21 November 1812; BT 5/22, 8 December 1812; FO 5/93, 12 September 1812.

74. Hansard, 29.1219

75. Glasgow Herald, 10 January 1814.

76. James Dunlop, merchant in Montreal, to Mrs Janet McNair, 14 January 1813, Dunlop Letters, HM Register House, Edinburgh.
77. "...The forces employed in the Canadas (and I have reason to believe a great part of the population of these provinces) are very much in want of flour. And I had hoped that...I should have been enabled to supply them through the medium of Licenses with that and other necessary articles...from the United States." Governor Sherbrooke of Nova Scotia to Admiral Cochrane, 18 May 1814, NLS 2326. See also Wood, on cit., I, 155, 191, 236-7.

78. G.S. Graham, Seapower and British North America, 1783-1820, Cambridge (Mass.) 1941, p 141.

79. David Anderson, Canada: or a View of the Importance of the British American Colonies, London 1814, 224.

80. Galpin, Grain Supply..., 208-211.

81. Anderson, on cit., 271

82. Ibid, 70, 179

83. BT 5/24, 21 April 1814


85. FO 5/103, May 1814

86. James Dunlop to Mrs McNair, 30 March 1813, Dunlop Papers, National Register House, Edinburgh.

87. A.C. Wardle, Benjamin Bowring and his Descendants, London 1938, p 23, describes the prosperity of St. Johns, Newfoundland, during the war.

88. Graham, Sea Power..., 251.

89. BT 1/86, 18 December 1813

90. "British Traveller", on cit., 74

91. Morning Chronicle, 15 January 1814, reported that the members of a Committee of Newfoundland traders waited on the Prime Minister to request that the United States be excluded from the Fisheries, but that they received only a general reply indicating that attention would be paid to their proposals.

92. See Chapter IV, below.

93. BT 5/23, 16 August 1814
The importance of the United States as a market for British manufacturers and West India planters was emphasized by the complaints of Halifax merchants when this trade was closed by Admiral Cochrane's extension of the Blockade to New England. Petition of Halifax merchants, 12 May 1814, NLS 2326. The truth of this distress was affirmed by Governor Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke to Cochrane, 14 May 1814, NLS 2326.

105. BT 5/23, 25 October, 28 December 1813
106. BT 5/24, 7 August 1815
107. Anderson, on sit, 274
108. Ibid, 168
109. Ibid, 73, 136, 198
110. Ibid, 14
111. James Dunlop to Mrs McLair, 11 March 1815, Dunlop Letters, HM Register House, Edinburgh
112. Vansittart to Castlereagh, 26 November 1814, BM AdMss 31321 (Vansittart Papers)
113. John, Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, London 1784, p 1
114. "British Traveller", on cit, 123

115. Sheffield, on cit, 66

116. Glasgow Herald, 26 April 1813

117. Sheffield, on cit, 193, 304

118. Lord Sheffield himself recognized their debt to him. Referring to Anderson's pamphlet, he called it "uncommonly good" and went on to say, "I cannot do less than admire it, because it seems taken from my shop, at least it adopts all the principles, with a considerable amelioration, by taking the Line of Mountains into the Lakes, and all the Lakes within our boundary." Sheffield to Sir John Stanley, 30 October 1814, printed in J.H. Adeane and M. Grenfell (eds), Before and After Waterloo, London 1907.

119. Glasgow Herald, 16 April 1813

120. "British Traveller", on cit, 131

121. In one industry particularly concerned with American competition, that is shipping, the years of war showed, in fact, a significant increase in activity, but it is impossible to tell whether this was, in fact, due to the elimination of the competition or to other factors. For the data, see Ralph Davis, "Seamen's Sixpences: An Index of Commercial Activity, 1697-1829", Economica, NS XXXII (1956)

122. Galpin, Grain Supply..., 120

123. Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, Paris 1953, p 376

124. Although recovery was slow in some industries and was not accomplished until the actual opening of Continental markets in the Spring of 1814, many of the factors which had made 1811 and 1812 years of industrial unrest were no longer present. See W.W. Rostow, "Social Tension Chart", Journal of Economic History, I, 219


126. Admiral Cochrane to Admiral Griffith, 30 May 1814, NLS 2349

127. Glasgow Herald, 24 May 1813

128. Brougham Papers, (The exact reference to this letter was accidentally destroyed)
129. A Barclay, Gottenburgh, to McConnell & Kennedy, April 1813, McConnell, Kennedy to Johann Fisher & Co., Hamburgh, 29 June 1814; McConnell, Kennedy Letterbooks.

130. Morning Chronicle, 4 August 1814

131. Robert Thomson to James Nicholson, 7 August 1814, John Rylands Library, English Ms 1042/406

132. Glasgow Herald, 17 October 1814

133. Liverpool Mercury, 23 September 1814

134. Liverpool Mercury, 16 September 1814

135. Hansard, 29.562; Liverpool Mercury, 28 October 1814

136. Hansard, 29.562

137. Cobbett's Political Register, 8.161-173

138. Liverpool Mercury, 28 October 1814

139. Ibid.

140. Hansard 30.597

141. Hansard 30.588

142. Hansard 30.597-607

143. T. Thorneley to Henry Broughan, 6 November 1813, Brougham Ms 16575 includes a letter from an American correspondent describing the improvements taking place in manufacturing there. There was a real basis for the anxiety felt in Britain on this subject. See K.W. Porter, The Jacksons and the Lees, two generations of Massachusetts merchants, 2 Vols, Cambridge (Mass), 1937; G.S. Gibb: The Saco-Lowell Mills: Textile machinery building in New England, 1813-1842, Cambridge (Mass), 1950, pp 3-17.

144. "British Traveller", op cit, 117

145. Ibid, 115

146. Ibid, 113-117

147. Hansard, 30.511

148. Hansard, 30.500

149. Caledonian Mercury, 2 January 1815

150. HO 42/126, 13 September 1815; James Norris to Viscount Sidmouth, 19 September 1813, printed
in A. Aspinall (ed), The Early English Trade Unions, London 1949

151. Edward Baker to Francis Place, 9 July 1815, B/Adiss


153. Caledonian Mercury, 31 December 1814

154. Manchester Mercury, 10 January 1815

155. 12 January 1815, reported in Caledonian Mercury, 16 January 1815

156. Robert Thomson to James Nicholson, 6 April 1815; John Rylands Library, English Ms 1042/426

157. Caledonian Mercury, 31 December 1814

Chapter IV:

The following abbreviations will be used in the footnotes to this chapter:


BFSP: British and Foreign State Papers, Vol I, London, 1841

CC: The Correspondence, Despatches, and other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, edited by his brother, Vol X, London 1853

CD: Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington, edited by his son, Vol IX, London 1862

HMC Bath: report on the Manuscripts of Earl Cowdray, Historical Manuscripts Commission, London 1923

1. Castlereagh to Admiralty, 8 July 1812, directing that the Navy should not act with hostility towards American ships, and 6 August 1812, enclosing proposed draft of a letter from Admiral Warren to Monroe; FO 5/93.

2. Castlereagh to Russell, 29 August 1812; Russell to Monroe (describing a conference with Castlereagh, 16 September 1812), 17 September 1812; Castlereagh to Russell, 18 September 1812; BFSP 1473-1491.
3. BFSP, 1493-1501
4. BFSP, 1533-1543, FO 5/98
5. Castlereagh to Cathcart, 14 July 1813, CC, IX, 34
6. Castlereagh to Metternich, 29 January 1814, CC, IX, 203
7. C.K. Webster, (ed), British Diplomacy, 1813-1815, London 1921, Castlereagh to Cathcart, 27 September 1813, p. 31-33.

8. The American conflict with Spain in the Floridas was perennial, but it had been worsening in the months before the Anglo-American war broke out. Soon after the Americans declared war, the Spanish government approached the British ambassador to suggest that Spain might associate herself with Great Britain in hostilities against the United States and to request that her grievances with America be considered at any future negotiations. Fernan Nunez to Castlereagh, 23 August 1813, FO 72/149, 6 July 1814, FO 72/165; Castlereagh to Fernan Nunez, 30 July 1814, FO 72/165

9. Castlereagh to Fernan Nunez, 30 July 1814, FO 72/165
10. Castlereagh to Monroe, 4 November 1813, BFSP, 1543-44; See also the communications between Alexander Baring, Castlereagh and Gallatin, relative to a direct negotiation and a choice of location. FO 5/98

11. Castlereagh to Baring, 8 October 1813, FO 5/98
12. Ibid. See also Liverpool's agreement, 17 October 1813, FO 5/98

13. Castlereagh to Commissioners, 28 July 1814, CC, 67-72
14. Goulburn to Bathurst, 9 August 1814, WSD, 177-179; Castlereagh to Commissioners, 14 August 1814, CC 86-91. For the American view see BFSP, 1612

15. See, for example, Bathurst to Commissioners, 18 October 1814, CC, 168-170
16. For an account of the wanderings of the Americans and the delays to which the negotiation was subjected, see C.F. Adams, (ed), The Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 Vols, 1874-1877, II, 620-249

17. Minute of Cabinet, 26 December 1813, FO 139/1
18. See the various memorials in FO 5/103
19. Admiral Keith to the Duke of Wellington, 16 May 1814
A admiralty records 1/137; bathurst to prevost, 14 april 1814, CO 43/23.


22. For example, "memorial...of the fur trade" may 1814, FO 5/103.

23. See chapter II, pp 115-120, above.

24. "the memorial of the committee of merchants, interested in the trade and fisheries of the british north american colonies", 14 december 1812, FO 5/83.

25. The rather testy character of goulburn is interestingly illustrated in a letter he wrote from ghent to Robert peel, in dublin. after talking of "my banishment to ghent", he says "living secluded from all society is what you may have experienced, but living in american society is a misery which you have yet to come." he describes the vulgarity of americans, which is never so evident as when they effect to be genteel, and their table manners, which he finds equally unpleasant. he ends, "in short I abhorred the americans when I came here, and from having seen more of them I abhor them more." goulburn to peel, 30 october, 1814, BM AdMss 41240.

26. Instructions "not used", FO 5/101. this document is in appendix C.2, below.

27. See chapter II, pp 122-123, above.

28. castlereagh to commissioners, 28 july 1814, CC 67-72.

29. commissioners to castlereagh, 8 august 1814, FO 5/102; goulburn to bathurst, 9 august 1814, WSD, 177-179.

30. castlereagh to commissioners, 14 august 1814; CC 86-91; british commissioners to american commissioners, 19 august 1814, BFSP, 1591-1594; castlereagh to liverpool, 28 august 1814, CC 100-102.

31. 21 august, 1814, goulburn to bathurst, WSD 188-189.

32. castlereagh to liverpool, 28 august, 1814, CC 100-102; goulburn to bathurst, 21 august 1814, WSD 188-189.

33. american commissioners to monroe, 9 august 1814, BFSP 1588-1591.
34. Castlereagh to Commissioners, 14 August 1814, CC 86-91;
American Commissioners to British Commissioners, 24
August 1814, BFSP, 1595-1601.

35. American Commissioners to British Commissioners, 24
August 1814, 9 September 1814, BFSP, 1595-1601, 1606 -
1613.

36. BFSP, 1600

37. Goulburn to Bathurst, 25 November 1814, WSD, 454

38. Proposed Note to American Commissioners, 26 August 1814,
WSD, 191-196; Goulburn to Castlereagh, 26 August 1814,
CC 99-100.

39. Castlereagh to Goulburn, 28 August 1814, WSD, 196;
Castlereagh to Liverpool, 28 August 1812.

40. Liverpool to Wellington, 2 September 1814, WSD 211-213;
Liverpool to Castlereagh, 2 September 1814, WSD 214;
Liverpool draft, printed in C.D. Yonge, The Life and
Administration of Liverpool, 3 Vols, London 1868,
II, 64-67, was substantially that sent to Ghent,
Bathurst to Goulburn, 1 September 1814, WSD 245-249

41. Liverpool to Bathurst, 11 September 1814, WSD 240;
14, 15 September 1814, HMC Bath, 286-289

42. Castlereagh to Liverpool, 28 August 1814, WSD 192-193

43. American Commissioners to British Commissioners,
9 September 1814, BFSP, 1608.

44. Liverpool to Bathurst, 14 September 1814, HMC Bath,
286-288.

45. Castlereagh to British Commissioners, 14 August 1814,
CC 89-90

46. American Commissioners to British Commissioners,
24 August 1814, BFSP, 1599

47. Liverpool to Bathurst, 11 September 1814, WSD 240

48. Liverpool to Bathurst, 15 September 1814, HMC Bath, 289-
290.

49. Liverpool to Bathurst, 30 September 1814, HMC Bath,
294-5.

50. Liverpool to Bathurst, 14 September 1814, HMC Bath,
287

51. See Chapter II, pp 122-123 above
52. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 23 September, WSD 278-279; Liverpool to Wellington, 27 September, WSD 290-291

53. Bathurst to British Commissioners, 27 September 1814, CC 138-139

54. Goulburn to Bathurst, 21 October 1814, WSD 366

55. American Commissioners to British Commissioners, 13 October 1814, BFSP, 1630-1633.

56. Castlereagh to Bathurst, 4 October 1814, HMC Bath, 296

57. Liverpool to Goulburn, 21 October 1814, BMAdMss 38572

58. Liverpool to Bathurst, 14, 15 September, HMC Bath, 286-289

59. Bathurst to Commissioners, 20 October 1814, CC 172

60. American Commissioners to British Commissioners, 24 October 1814, BFSP 1635-1636.

61. Liverpool to Bathurst, 24 October 1814, HMC Bath, 302.


63. Castlereagh to Liverpool, various letters, September and October 1814, C.K. Webster, op cit, 193-219

64. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 26 October, 1814, WSD 332-3

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Vansittart to Castlereagh, 17 October 1814, BMAdMss 31321

68. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 2 November 1814, WSD 401-402

69. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 4 November 1814, WSD 404-405

70. Wellington to Bathurst, 4 November 1814, HMC Bath, 303

71. Wellington to Liverpool, 9 November 1814, CC 186-189

72. See the press comment on American reaction to the publication. Appendix A, November 1814

73. Liverpool to Castlereagh, 18 November 1814, WSD 438-439
74. Goulburn to Bathurst, 25 November 1814, WSD 4:52-455
75. Bathurst to Commissioners, 6 December 1814, CC 214-217
76. Vansittart to Castlereagh, 26 November 1814, BM AdMss 31321.
77. This is not to accept the view of S.F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, New York 1949, p 202 that the Cabinet Minute of 26 December 1813 represents the intentions of the British government in committing them to the status quo ante bellum. This minute was prepared for Castlereagh's guidance in negotiations in Europe, and the statement made there may have been more for the consumption of Britain's allies. Certainly it did not prevent the government from putting forth much more extensive views at Ghent.
78. Liverpool to Canning, 28 December 1814, WSD 513-514.
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