Factional Politics and Political Development in Uganda and Kenya since Independence


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Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Edinburgh

1994
Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been researched and composed by me, and that the whole work is entirely my own.
And while the pythons of sickness swallow the children
And the buffaloes of poverty knock the people down
And ignorance stands there like an elephant,

The war leaders are tightly locked in bloody feuds
Eating each others liver.....

OKOT p'BITEK
Song of Lawino, 1966

To state that Africa has had its share of bad politicians and bad men would be banal if critics [do] not simplify so many of the continent's problems down to a consideration of parochial, power-hungry personalities, and go so far as to declare that the tendencies towards authoritarianism and one-party systems can be explained by the supposed fact that personal love for power has been the prime motive of politicians.

IRVING MARKOWITZ
African Politics and Society, 1970
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I am forever grateful to my wife Josephine Iziku for her tolerance and encouragement. In spite of her own busy schedule with work and studies, she has been closely involved in the work at every stage and shared with me all the agonies, frustrations, excitements and hopes associated with preparing a thesis of this nature. She has also been my most incisive critic, and pointed out the missing ‘a’s and ‘n’s throughout the drafts.

All the ideas, arrangements, arguments, mistakes, omissions, exaggerations and any other shortcomings that remain in this work are entirely mine.

JAMES APPE
Edinburgh, September 1994
This is a critical evaluation of the politics of Uganda and Kenya from 1960 to 1990. It reviews the political developments of the two countries from a statistic perspective and focuses mainly on the personal power relations among the leading politicians. The aim is to account for the dynamics of factional politics and its effects on political change and state stability. The concept of political clientelism is used to provide the theoretical framework. The study sees factionalism as a process, with clientelism and spoils politics as products, and suggests that although factional politics inevitably leads to spoils politics and instability if left uncontrolled, it can also be utilised into clientelism under certain conditions and this can provide the basis of state stability. This proposition is then used to account for the different political experiences of Uganda and Kenya since independence. It argues that in Kenya Kenyatta’s ability to control factional politics and manage personal power relations among the leading politicians led to the establishment of clientelism as a system of rule, which in turn ensured a measure of stability. By contrast, it suggests that Obote’s inability to control competition among his ministers only led to the intensification of factional struggles and the forging of temporary and conspiratorial alliances and consequently to instability.

The thesis is not a field research project, but a reflection on the literature on the politics of the two countries in an attempt to reinterpret their political experiences a new way. It is loosely divided into three parts. Chapters 1-3 is a general introductory section of the topic and the concept of clientelism. Chapters 4-7 is a more systematic review of politics in the two countries between 1960 and 1970, and focuses primarily on the dynamics and effects of factional politics on state stability. Chapters 7-10 discusses the successor regimes and their response to the legacies of the 1960-70 decade. The prospects of clientelism and stability in the two countries from the mid-1980s, and probable trends up to the year 2000, are also discussed.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Africa Contemporary Record</td>
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<td>ARB</td>
<td>Africa Research Bulletin</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPK</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEDEMU</td>
<td>Federal Democratic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>Forum for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONASA</td>
<td>Front for National Salvation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNA</td>
<td>Former Uganda Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>General Service Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBEA</td>
<td>Imperial British East Africa Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADU</td>
<td>Kenya African Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAU</td>
<td>Kenya African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAF</td>
<td>Kenya Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCA</td>
<td>Kikuyu Central Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPU</td>
<td>Kenya Peoples Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>Kabaka Yekka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Consultative Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCCK</td>
<td>National Council of Churches of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Executive Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUYO</td>
<td>National Union of Youth Organisation</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Resistance Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>Tanganyika African Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces</td>
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<td>UDM</td>
<td>Uganda Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>UFM</td>
<td>Uganda Freedom Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>UNLF</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>UNRE</td>
<td>Uganda National Rescue Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNU</td>
<td>Uganda National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Uganda Peoples Congress</td>
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<td>UPM</td>
<td>Uganda Patriotic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRB</td>
<td>State Research Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>State Trading Corporation</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Theme and Approach

The Origins of the Idea for the Thesis

The origins of this study can be traced to one of my undergraduate courses on African development at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts, between 1986-1990. My main interests were in political change and the causes of state instability in Africa after independence. Professor Frank Holmquist and I had endless arguments about what issues and themes needed to be emphasised in the study of African political history and development since independence. I was critical about the near-neglect of personal power struggles, and the emphasis on 'social forces', class conflict, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

I was of the view that proper recognition and emphasis should be given to the pursuit of power and the personal power relations among the leading politicians. Factional struggles, the outcome of this pursuit of power, I felt, have been the main driving force behind political change, and causes of state instability, and that for a proper understanding of politics in Africa, it is important to examine the effects of such struggles on political development. And this is what I intend to do here. In a sense, therefore, this thesis is the amplification of the argument I inconclusively tried to put forward to Professor Holmquist in 1986-90.

In this I have been encouraged by a number of books and parts of books I have since read about political stability in Africa, notably Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Chabal (1992), Sandbrook (1985), Allen et al (1989) and
Fatton's (1987) article on clientelism in Senegal. In their work on politics in Africa, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) have pointed out the importance of personal considerations on the part of leaders in political development, and have suggested that the formal institutions such as political parties, and state bureaucracies, have been turned to serve, in the first instance, the needs of the leadership rather than the other way round (pp. ix-x). They have observed that politics in Africa 'are most often a personal or factional struggle to control the national government or to influence it', and that this struggle is only 'restrained by private and tacit agreements, prudential concerns, and personal ties and dependencies rather than by public rules and institutions.' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:1). This is a view I entirely agree with, and will show, by examining the experiences of Uganda and Kenya, the effects of such political behaviour on state stability.

The thesis is not based on fieldwork, but is a discussion on the political developments of Uganda and Kenya since independence, in an attempt to account for their political experiences. It focuses more on personal power relations among the leading politicians, and less on other factors. It is an attempt to explain the apparent paradox in the political experiences of the two countries after independence. The political paradox I mean here is the almost opposite political experiences of the two countries after independence. At least according to the theories of development and modernisation (discussed in detail later), the differences in their political experiences after independence cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of their historical evolution into statehood, or on the basis of their prospects at independence.

Uganda and Kenya became independent at about the same time, respectively in October 1962 and December 1963. During the colonial period, they were both 'developed' or 'guided' by the same colonial power,
Britain. Uganda was styled a Protectorate and Kenya a Colony, but these appellations had no practical effect on their developments because of the uniform formulation and application of colonial policies. (See for example Hailey 1950; Morgan 1980). In Kenya, European settlers had an early influence and some control on the political development even after 1945 (Throup 1978; Berman 1990; Berman and Lonsdale 1992). But that control technically ended with independence in 1963, when political power was assumed by Africans. It was in the power of the new leaders to redirect the political course of Kenya and they were therefore ultimately responsible for what happened after 1963. On this basis, while the impact of European settlement and the social, economic and political effects (such as the Mau Mau struggles of 1950-1960), should not be ignored, it can be said that history and political development of the two did not in themselves quite warrant the different experiences they have had after independence. This is especially so since the development of administrative institutions, such as the civil service and local administration to promote 'good governance' in both countries followed a broadly similar pattern. (Chapter 3).

But by 1980, less than twenty years after independence, their political experiences had moved in opposite directions as far as stability and economic progress are concerned. Kenya was then usually described as a success case in Africa in both stability and economic progress, while Uganda had joined the other extreme category of failed states. Its history since independence has been a story of failures, violence and profound instability, with frequent changes of regime. The numbers and manners of regime changes in the two in fact illustrate their different experiences as far as state stability is concerned. Whereas Kenya has had only one, peaceful and constitutional change of regime since independence, in
August 1978, Uganda has had eight: in May 1966, January 1971, April 1979, June 1979, May 1980, December 1980, July 1985 and January 1986. Moreover, the changes of regime in Uganda have been by means of coups or quasi-coups since all of them, from substantial to overwhelming degrees, involved the military.

Why have their political experiences been so different after independence? What has propelled their developments in opposite directions? Why has Uganda experienced long periods of instability? And how can we account for their experiences and differences? These are the questions I intend to answer in this thesis. To do this I will examine the effects of factional struggles among the leading politicians and relate them to political changes and stability from 1960 to 1990.

But before embarking on a discussion of the effects of factional struggles, I would like to briefly spell out the deficiencies of the earlier approaches of modernisation and development in explaining the paradox in the development of the two countries.

The Early Approaches

During the first two decades of independence (1960-1980), research in politics in Africa focused mainly on the supposed 'transition from colonial dependency to independence, and from traditional tribal units to modern states' (Markovitz 1970:1). State-building, national integration, the transfer and operation of institutions like parliament and the modernisation of the civil service, along with the one-party state debate, were the main themes. (On this see Irving Markovitz’s (1970) introduction to, and the collection of, 30 articles on politics in Africa in the 1960s). The modernisation approach saw political leaders, with the
aid of political institutions like political parties and the civil service, as the main agents of this transformation (Cartwright 1983:23-40). Attention therefore focused on the capabilities of leaders and the political institutions to affect change, and on the problems they encountered in the process (Apter 1965:180-202; Kingsley 1963:301-317). This approach then led to the identification of a set of 'crises' and 'challenges' facing the leaders in their tasks. The leaders themselves and the personal relations among them never became a subject of examination. African leaders came to assume the image of saints toiling day and night for the betterment of their societies.

This theme was promoted principally by American political scientists, especially James Coleman and Leonard Binder. (For more detail, see the collection of essays edited by James Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, 1966). Nation-building, that is, making a nation out of the several ethnic groups which colonialism had brought together, and promoting economic development, were seen as the main challenges (Liebenow 1980:3). Consequently much effort has gone in understanding them on the part of the researcher, who assumed that the leaders were likewise preoccupied in overcoming these problems. Markovitz (1970:9) has stated that, if political leaders in Africa were not 'wholly responsible', they were at least sufficiently 'responsive to the wishes of their constituents more than to their [own] interests because of the nature of their occupations and their own concerns [for the welfare of the people]' (p. 9, emphasis retained).

In addition to failing to recognise that the pursuit of power and its attendant benefits as ends has been a part of the problem, these approaches have had the additional effect of drawing attention away from the struggles among the political leaders for the leadership itself and the
effects of this on stability. In particular, they have not helped in explaining why, if African leaders have been committed to the betterment of their countries, the countries have not developed in the ways and to the extent predicted. This is the major failure of these early approaches.

Some Recent Approaches

Fortunately these earlier approaches are no longer popular, and new approaches which promise to be better tools for the analysis of political development in Africa have been adopted. For example, Jackson and Rosberg’s (1982) theme of ‘personal rulership’ has, in more recent years, been taken up by scholars in the effort to reassess Africa’s political experiences since independence (Chabal 1992; Bayart 1993; Joseph 1991). The importance of power relations in political change in Africa has been recognised and stressed (Bayart 1993). Also a number of scholars have proposed that attention should focus more on factional politics since it is this, and not other development issues, that has most profoundly affected political development in Africa since independence, and consequently has been the primary cause of political changes and instability that most African countries have experienced since (Keller 1991:50-3; Ndegwa 1992:42-5).

Chabal (1992:217-232) and Bayart (1993:10-179) have suggested that the pursuit of ‘hegemony’ in the state, or the quest to dominate the apparatus of the state for the purpose of retaining power has been the primary preoccupation of leaders in Africa, and that this is the root cause of instability in the continent. Joseph (1987) also sees this as the root cause of Nigeria’s political problems since independence. The notable difference in Joseph’s approach is that while Chabal talks of the pursuit of power
and domination as ends, Joseph sees the quest for domination primarily as means of economic gain. Politicians, in his view, struggle for the control of the state in order to use its resources for themselves and their relatives. But the two writers agree on the fact that the primary aim of leaders is the domination of the state rather than its development, a view which I share. The effect of this pursuit is that, in Bayart’s words, ‘at the bottom, the [political] actors organise themselves in factions to gain or conserve power at the various echelons of the social pyramid, and this competition is the very stuff of political life’ (Bayart 1993:211).

The Aims of the Thesis

This thesis is an attempt to make a modest contribution to the debate. As noted in the abstract, the work in not a piece of field research, but a critical reflection on the literature on the politics of Uganda and Kenya. It is an effort to reinterpret their experiences in a new way. In their recent work entitled Political Stability and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (1990), Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Rainer Siegler have seen stability as resulting from ‘the interactions of political and economic factors’ (pp. 1-2). Their basic thesis is that a stable political climate promotes economic development and this in turn helps promote political stability.

The present work takes a different view in that it sees personal power relations as more important in accounting for stability and instability. Its aims are, firstly, to demonstrate the importance of factionalism in African politics, and secondly to suggest a method of approach in analysing the effects of factionalism on political change. For as I will show in a moment, the major changes in Africa since
independence have not been the transformations predicted by the modernisation theories, but rather the change from relative stability in the early 1960s to profound instability from the mid-1960s, then back to comparative stability in the 1970s and 1980s.

The thesis attempts to show that the problems and crises thus identified (including the lack of integration and economic development) have been mere symptoms of factional struggles among the leaders, rather than the causes in themselves. The thesis argues that this has been primarily due to the effects of factional politics, and then proceeds to demonstrate how this actually happened by following, on a comparative basis, the experiences of Uganda and Kenya up to the early 1990s.

Factional Politics and Its Effects

The thesis uses the concepts of factional politics, clientelism and spoils politics to analyse and explain the political change in the two countries. So far writers in the ‘recent approaches’ category mentioned above have not gone beyond recognising the effects of factional struggles on political change and suggesting that it can be used to account for political changes in Africa. There has thus been no systematic examination of the effects factional politics on the political development of any African country. The few exceptions with substantial focus on factionalism as a central force in change are Bienen (1974) on Kenya; Clapham (1976) on Sierra Leone and Liberia; Mutibwa (1992) on Uganda, and the first part of Allen et al (1987) on Benin. The first three authors describe the effects of factionalism on stability without discussing the role of clientelism, while Allen sees it as a ‘system’ of political recruitment and a basis for party or personal support. However, most of the scholarly articles that have discussed factional
politics have done so without relating it in a systematic way to political changes or stability.

Recently, however, Fatton (1987) has made an interesting observation about the role of clientelism in politics in Senegal, and noted that although clientelism undermines the authority of the state, at the same time, (because clientelism is particularly entrenched in that country), it has become the major means of political change and may even be necessary for democratisation. The effects of clientelism in the political process has also been noted O’Brien (1971; 1975), in both pre- and post-independence Senegal; and Allen (1989) in pre-and post-independence Benin. Diamond (1984) sees clientelism in Nigeria in terms of its influence in class formation. In this study I will however limit myself to a discussion of the effects of clientelism on state stability, not its potentials for democratisation. The concept of political clientelism, its relation to political change, and its application to research as used in this work, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Part of the reason for the failure to use the concept of clientelism for a systematic analysis of political change lies in the failure to distinguish the political, as opposed to the anthropological, importance of clientelism, as well as the failure to clearly distinguish between the two forms of clientelism.

The effect of the borrowing of anthropological works has been the use of local patron-client ties as models for clientelism at the national level. Lemarchand (1972:68-89), for example, discusses the effects of factional struggles in general theory as it might affect change in countries in tropical Africa as a whole. In the main, factional politics has been seen as an (illegitimate) end, not as a dynamic process generating political change, and referred to mainly in order to demonstrate the political
backwardness and failure of democracy in a given country (Medard 1982). I will argue, after Bayart (1993), that ‘factional struggle does not belong to the periphery of political systems [but] is the mainspring of [political] evolution and vibrates at the heart of the State of which it is the true dynamic’ (p. 211).

The focus is primarily on the two outcomes of factional politics, namely, clientelism and spoils politics. As Jackson and Rosberg (1982:1) have observed, the consequences of factional politics ‘have usually been increased political instability and occasionally the deterioration of the game of politics into “fights” among personal and factional contenders for power’. The term “spoils politics” as used throughout the thesis refers to what Jackson and Rosberg describe as “fights” in the above quotation. (Also see Chapter 2).

The argument is that at independence the two countries – like other African countries previously under colonial rule – were left with institutions that did not command the allegiance or respect of the leaders and the people alike, or capable of defending themselves against abuse. Institutional norms were therefore easily disregarded in the pursuit of personal interests. The leaders were therefore able, to use Clapham’s words, ‘to pursue their interests independently of, or in opposition to, any conception of public interest, and .... are prepared to subvert or circumvent the ... procedures of the state in order to do so’ (Clapham 1982:1). Such open misuse of the ‘procedures of the the state in the pursuit of personal objectives has in fact been the norm rather than the exception in many countries in Africa. In Uganda, for example, Obote unilaterally abrogated the 1962 independence constitution and replaced it with a new and more authoritarian one in 1966 just in order to prolong his term in office. (See Chapters 4 and 5).
This quest for domination and other related factors inevitably led to factional politics. For as the leader seeks to establish his hegemony over the state and other politicians, the other politicians, equally propelled by the desire to dominate, resist and fight back in order to secure dominant positions for themselves. This struggle is what Bayart (1993) quoted above has rightly identified as the real stuff of political life. The other related factors included the demands of local communities (especially community leaders who were patrons of sorts). These local leaders too had to look for persons higher up to assist them in realising their demands.

The thesis will argue that it was the different capabilities of the political leaders in controlling or regulating the factional struggles among their ministers (Chapters 4-7), that led to the different political experiences of the two countries. Whereas in Kenya factional politics was successfully regulated into clientelism by Kenyatta and led to a measure of stability, in Uganda Obote was unable to control factionalism, which instead resulted in spoils politics as the leaders struggled amongst themselves without anyone being able to call them to order. A more structured discussion of the relationship between factionalism and clientelism as exemplified in Kenya, and the relationship between factionalism and spoils as exemplified by Uganda, is provided in Chapters 4 and 5 below. The concept of spoils politics and its relation to clientelism is explained more fully in Chapter 2.

Structure of the Thesis

The study views political changes from an internal perspective, focusing on actual politics 'on the ground'. The political process itself is seen as the springboard and cause of change. I focus on the post-colonial period,

Besides this introductory first chapter, there are 9 other chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of clientelism, its relation with factional politics and its use as an analytical concept, and explains how it is used in this thesis. The aim here is to more clearly distinguish 'clientelism' as used in this study from its other uses in the literature on interpersonal power relationships, particularly in the fields of anthropology and sociology. I also discuss both clientelism and spoils politics as variables of factional politics and their relation with each other, showing how and why they come about, their effects on the political process, but in particularly their relationships to stability and instability.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the political background to the emergency of factional politics in Uganda and Kenya. I argue that the colonial institution failed to evolve into indigenous institutions in the two countries, with the result that at independence a situation of weak institutions resulted. I first discuss the relationships between weak institutions and factionalism. The pre-colonial forms of political organisation among the peoples in the two countries are reviewed. The chapter shows how and why the attempt by the colonial administrations to promote and adapt the pre-colonial systems as their agents or partners in administration through the system of indirect rule failed in most areas in Uganda and Kenya. The chapter shows how the development of the colonial administration, especially the manner and pace in which African representatives were introduced in the legislative councils, did not make the Africans identify themselves with the institutions of government as their own. It also reviews the period after the Second World War, and shows how the first political parties, for historical reasons, were beset by factionalism.
Chapter 4 is an account of the actual development of factionalism among the political parties at independence, and the effects this had on the positions of the ruling political parties, the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and their leaders, Milton Obote and Jomo Kenyatta. It explains the weaknesses of UPC and KANU in terms of the promotion of factional interests by the various politicians, and shows why and how clientelism and spoils politics resulted, respectively in Kenya and Uganda.

Chapter 5 explains the different ways in which Obote and Kenyatta responded to the factional struggles around them. It argues that the starting point of the differences between the developments of the two countries was the different manners in which central authority was asserted over the various factions. It shows how in Kenya factional politics was ‘stabilised’ by the establishment of mutually beneficial relationship, that is, clientelism, between Kenyatta and the political notables, thus leading to state stability; and how in Uganda clientelism failed to evolve due to Obote’s inability to regulate factional struggles; and how this resulted in spoils politics. Chapter 6 discusses the the management of clientelism in Kenya, showing and describing particularly its establishment as the major system of rule under Kenyatta, to the extent that it undermined both KANU and parliament.

In Chapter 7, I contrast Kenyatta’s position with that of Obote. The chapter shows how Obote’s inability to forge reliable clientelist alliances led him to resort to and subsequently rely on authoritarian and violent means to remain in power, thus exacerbating factional struggles, and how

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1 The term ‘notables’ as used throughout this thesis refers to the men who rose as the main political leaders among, and came to be seen as the representatives of, the various ethnic groups in the two countries at or around the time of independence. All were men who either in government or in opposition played major roles in national politics and who were looked upon as district, and in cases, regional, leaders. A notable example was Oginga Odinga.
spoils politics and the stability of the state resulted from this. Considered here are the factors leading to the promulgation of the centralised Republican Constitution of 1967 and how its imposition paved the way for Idi Amin’s coup in 1971. I argue that Obote’s failure to control factional struggles among the political notables, and his instability to establish a more reliable clientelistic relationship between himself and any important section of the Uganda society, forced him into a single-minded alliance with the military as the only means of retaining power, and this was what proved to be his political undoing.

In Chapters 8 and 9 I discuss the problems and prospects that faced the successor leaders, Idi Amin and Daniel arap Moi. I argue that despite the changes of leadership and regime in Uganda and Kenya respectively in 1971 and 1978, the legacies of the past continued to influence politics in the two countries. Clientelism continued in Kenya and spoils politics in Uganda because, in both cases, the legacies of the past remained strong and dominated the two leaders. I argue that the stability that Kenya enjoyed after (and despite) Kenyatta’s death in August 1978 was due to the clientelist system, and Moi’s own success as leader at this stage was also due to the fact that he inherited a well-established clientelist machine. With regard to Amin I argue that although he succeeded more than Obote did in establishing (by fear) clientelistic links between his regime and important elements both in the armed forces and the rest of the population, these links were neither durable nor reliable. The result was even more instability because not only was the semblance of order and normality maintained by force or fear of it, but also because Amin became the only person that politically mattered in the country and his government was a sort of a one-man government, with no roots in the society. The chapter further argues that Amin’s policies left him open to
the dangers of spoils politics just as Obote's authoritarianism had prior to his fall in 1971.

Chapter 10 is on the future prospects for clientelism in Uganda and Kenya. It considers the impact of Obote's second overthrow and the rise of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museveni to power in Uganda in 1986. It argues that, due to the very different system of political organisation under the NRM, such as Resistance Councils (RCs) and the periodic elections, spoils politics is likely to come to an end in Uganda, and how it would probably be replaced by clientelism, and possibly institutionalised politics. It suggests the conditions under which any of the three could occur. The chapter argues that in view of Moi's style of personal intervention in everyday politics after 1982 and his appointment of marginal politicians in powerful positions, the future of clientelism in Kenya is in doubt; and that it is more likely to be replaced by spoils politics. The chapter suggests that, therefore, Kenya is more likely than Uganda to experience instability in the years ahead.

The Conclusion argues for more focus on factional politics and the use of the concept of clientelism in analysing political development in Africa. It suggests that the dynamics of factional politics should be examined in greater detail, focusing primarily on its main variables, clientelism and spoils politics, as they provide better prospects for a more realistic assessment of political developments in Africa.
CHAPTER TWO

The Concepts of Clientelism and their Applications

In this chapter I will discuss the concept of clientelism, its relations with factional politics and spoils politics, the way it affects state stability, and its use as an analytical concept. There are six loose subdivisions. The first section discusses, in theory, political institutions. The aim here is to explain how weak institutions create the conditions that may lead to the emergence of clientelism in a state. The second section discusses the various definitions of the concept of clientelism, the ways it has been used in the social sciences, and the controversies over its use in political science research. In particular I distinguish between the ways the concept is used by anthropologists in ‘anthropological’ situations, and by political scientists in ‘political’ situations. The remaining sections describe what constitutes political clientelism, the relationship between clientelism and spoils politics, the ways in which clientelism may be described as a system of rule as well as its role in, and relationships with, the formal state institutions like the civil service and parliament, and party. The ways as an analytical concept is used in this thesis are also explained.

Political Institutions and Stability

For our purpose here, we may define a political and administrative institution after Sandbrook (1985) and Huntington (1968). Sandbrook states that a political institution is a ‘valued and stable procedural rule or
organisational device for resolving disputes, selecting leaders and making authoritative decisions’ (Sandbrook 1985:xi). And according to Huntington (1968), a given society is said to have a political institution if, over a period of time, it has evolved a ‘universally’ accepted system of resolving disputes among the members as well as for running public affairs. For an institutionalised reference point to govern all conduct and resolve public and private conflict will be present in such a society. In kingdoms such an institution is symbolised by the king. But in a community without a king, or where there are several kings forcibly or otherwise encompassed in one community, no such institution is automatically present, and one must be created and established if order is to be ensured. Viable institutions therefore ensure good order and consequently stability. At all times there are thus arrangements for ‘maintaining order, resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders and thus promoting community among two or more social forces’. (Huntington 1968: 8-9).

The basic characteristic of a well-established political institution is that it must be self-regulating, and capable of preserving itself. It must command the respect and support of the members, or be capable of compelling anyone to do so. Its preservation depends on no force other than that they embody. The British political system, at least in its capacity to cope and response, may be cited as an example of well-established and effective political institution. For all public political functions are at least generally seen to be conducted according to the established and accepted rules. Any individual or sectarian attack on it would fail. Well established political institutions thus ensure stability by controlling personal excesses and irregular or improper behaviour by those in power. 1 A viable political

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1 Richard Nixon’s resignation in fear of imminent impeachment in 1976 over the Watergate scandal is a good example of a well-established political institution defending itself against individual abuse. On the weakness of Zaire’s political institution, see Young (1994).
institution responds effectively when control itself failed. In many African states, institutions have a weak capacity for both control and response, such as in Zaire. The political systems of the new states of Africa and elsewhere in the developing world, by contrast, generally lacked the self-regulating faculties of an effective institution. In the absence or weakness of a common reference point, individual and factional interests are pursued independently and the states are often used to satisfy the interests of individuals rather than the other way round. Prime ministers or presidents may abrogate the constitutions with impunity. As already noted in Chapter 1, the ease with which Obote abrogated the independence constitution of 1962 in 1966 indicates the absence of a viable political institution of Uganda at that time.

How the African states became independent with weak institutions will be discussed later in this chapter. At present I am concerned with establishing how institutional weakness may lead to clientelism. Where the government institutions are weak (for instance when court orders are not obeyed and cannot be enforced, when the police will not enforce order), the government of the day 'cannot always claim effective monopoly of force throughout its territorial jurisdiction' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:2-3. See also Migdal (1988) for various descriptions of weak states). The capacity of rival groups to challenge the legally or otherwise instituted government, or that of members of the government itself to manipulate the institution for their personal ends, is increased. As the various groups lay claim to the state for communal or even sectarian or personal fulfilment, factional struggles occur amongst them. Out of this struggle, clientelism and or spoils politics emerge, depending on the manner and capacity of the government respond to factional struggles. (Chapters 5 and 6).
A state with weak institutions is also vulnerable to military coups if, as it usually happens, the officer corps of the army gets involved in politics and becomes either (as a group) the rivals of the established government or the ally of a rival group. It is also common, depending on the history and nature of the army and its interaction with the civilian leadership, for the officer corps itself to become factionalised. Omara-Otunnu’s (1987) study of the Uganda Army for example shows that prior to Amin’s coup in 1971, serious factionalism had occurred in the Army from 1974. (See Omara-Otunnu 1987, Chapter 7, also Decalo 1976). Also in the 1960s, because the factionalism in the civilian administration of Balewa had already spread to the military, the Nigerian army disintegrated into various factions after the coups of January and June 1966. The leading officers were unable to agree amongst themselves on who should become head of state. The conflict threatened the survival of Nigeria itself, and had to be resolved by a civil war. (See for example, Obasanjo 1980; Joseph 1991).

In any case, in a situation of weak institutions, the government usually uses or seeks to use the military for political support. Coups are in the first instance manifestations of weak institutions even if their occurrence further weakens and perpetuates the weakness of these institutions. The prevalence of military coups d’etat and dictatorships in Africa since independence indicates the basic weaknesses of political institutions in the new states. (Decalo 1976:27-37). The instability and economic decay in the new states of Africa and other third world countries have for this reason been seen as a result of the institutional weakness in these countries. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982:1-23; Sandbrook 1985:112-129; Huntington 1968:192-8).

The main reason for this is that in states with weak institutions, both the end and the means of politics become personal as there is no
significantly established institution to regulate political behaviour or to worry about in the pursuit of personal interests.

Definition of Clientelism

As noted in the introduction, clientelism is a variety of interpersonal power relationships collectively known as patron-client relationships. Patron-client relations are usually defined as relationships of exchange between two or more peoples of unequal status, wealth or power, but in which everyone somehow benefits, at least in theory. The better off person is the patron and the less well off is the client. On this see the collection of essays in Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981); Schmidt et al (1977); Gellner and Waterbury (1977) and Clapham (1982).

From the above works, three distinct concepts of clientelism may be identified. One is the personal link between the actors, which may best be described as patron-client relationships. This is found at both anthropological (that is, isolated or local) and political (national) levels. Technically the relations in both settings may be alike, but the uses to which they are put are quite different. The second concept, arising from the first, is the uses to which the links are put by the actors. It is this which primarily distinguishes political clientelism from anthropological patron-client relations, and may more properly be called clientelism. The third is the political system, or systems, that evolve out of the persistent use of clientelism, and may be distinguished by describing it as political clientelism. In this work I am concerned with the second and third concepts, though the terms "clientelism" and "political clientelism" are loosely and somewhat interchangeably used in the text.

Lande (1977:xx) defines the patron-client relation as 'an alliance
between two persons of unequal status, power or resources', in which each person 'finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself'. The most basic of the patron-client relations is the dyadic relationship. This involves only two persons, the patron and the client, or a patron and a group of clients. A particular feature of a dyadic relation is that it usually involves no competition either among patrons for clients or clients for patrons; and if competition occurs it remains between the persons involved and does not affect the wider society. (Foster 1977:15-27; Lande 1977:xii-xxxvii). But the definitions offered in the literature on the subject are largely a recycling of the same definition. Compare Lande's definition above with that offered by Lemarchand (1972:69), which sees it as 'more or less personal relationship between actors ... or set of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence'. He also adds that the relationship has to be 'based on conditional localities and involving mutually beneficial transactions'. (See also Kaufman (1974); Scott (1977:92); Weingrod (1968:376), and Powell (1970:412). The critical difference here is Lemarchand's expansion to encompass a set of actors'. For as I will show in a moment, it is the dynamics of this expanded form of the patron-client relationship (its management and effects) that constitute clientelism.

The (dyadic) patron-client relations can more accurately be described as clientages rather than clientelism. In a clientage the clients are usually tied to the patron by conditions beyond their control (poverty, religion, custom, for example) and are powerless or otherwise unable to end their bondage. The relationship is therefore not exactly voluntary as the concept of patron-client relations seems to suggest, even if the client does not complain about it, since some relations are forced on them by harsh environmental conditions. Derrick's (1975) account of modern slavery in
and around the Sahara Desert in north-west Africa shows a relationship where the slaves (clients) are theoretically free to leave their masters (patrons), but they choose not to since they have nowhere else to go. They have come to accept it as their fates to be permanently in a state of slavery. (pp. 25-30. See also Newsweek, 4 May, 1992, pp. 9-15).

The difference between clientage and clientelism is that whereas clientage denotes a fairly fixed relationship in an equally fixed environment, clientelism denotes a relationship that is more fluid and in an equally fluid environment. It is the dynamics of the (clientelistic) patron-client relations that constitute and perpetuate the phenomenon of clientelism, particularly when the critical resource of the bargain is political power.

**Anthropological and Political Science Uses**

Anthropologists and political scientists use the concept of clientelism in different ways. Also, despite the indiscriminate application of the term in "anthropological situations", what anthropologists are concerned with can more accurately be described as clientage rather than clientelism, because clientelism more appropriately denotes a process over time. But, as already noted, since anthropologists have used the concept for a longer period of time, political scientists often utilise these earlier works even when the situations to be analysed are quite different. For this reason it is important to first distinguish the anthropological uses of the term and put them aside. It must be emphasised here that unlike anthropologists who are concerned with localised relationships between patrons and clients, I am concerned with a system dominated by clientelism at the regional and national levels. The basic differences between clientelism as used by
anthropologists and that used by political scientists and sociologists are noted in the following sections. In general the anthropological use of the term denotes a dependence relationship of the master-servant type.

'Anthropological' Clientages

In the anthropological use, patron-client ties essentially mean a dyadic relationship. In a dyadic relationship, such as that between a master and servant or a group of servants, there is usually no third party between the patron and client and the relationships become static and enduring, and even legalised, and amounts to an "ownership" of the client by the patron. In Derrick's (1975) studies already referred to, due to the particular severity of conditions in the Sahara, the boundary between "client" and "slave" has eroded and the clients consider themselves as belonging to the patrons, obligated to them for life and generations.

The less severe, and most common type of this kind of relationship is between a ruling class (and therefore land-controllers) and peasants, in a society dependent on subsistence agriculture, cattle-rearing or a combination of the two. Such societies have provided the settings for some of the major studies of clientelism: The works of Rene Lemarchand on Rwanda are good examples. (Lemarchand 1972; 1976). Here the relationship is based on the principle of reciprocity as each party needs the other: the patrons need (or rather exploit) the clients to maintain a high status and increase their wealth, and the clients need for protection. Patron-client ties in the anthropological meaning of the term may be grouped into four categories: feudal, patrimonial, mercantile and 'saintly' or religious. (Scott, 1977:91-113; Lemarchand, 1972:73).

Feudalism clientage is the most typical of the four and was quite
common in traditional African societies. In this type of clientage, the link between patron and client rests mostly on religious and ideological considerations, and is enforced by the ecological realities of the society, such as the scarcity of resources. In a feudal clientage, the patrons are usually the only party that benefits materially, since the clients pay taxes, gifts and offer free labour in return for protection or blessing. The relationship between the Tutsi and Hutu in pre-independence Rwanda is a good example of feudal clientage. Here patron-client ties were institutionalised into a system called *buhake*, in which the Hutu peasants were bound to the Tutsi aristocrats for a lifetime and often for generations. (Newbury 1988; Lemarchand 1972:72-4). Since the Tutsi aristocrats held total monopoly on both land and animal resources, the peasant Hutu were permanently destitute. They thus had no choice but to seek protection from hunger and starvation. In extreme cases, feudalist clientage can quite easily degenerate into actual slavery, as in the Sahelian case already mentioned.

In less harsh conditions, custom and culture can replace economic needs as the basis of the feudal relationship. The bonds between the king (the *Kabaka*), his chiefs and their subjects in traditional Baganda society is a good example. Because the Baganda believed Kintu, their ancestral Kabaka came from heaven, to be close to the Kabaka was a privilege and a source of gratification. Moreover, as Fallers and Richards (1964:273-4) have recorded, 'a client is praised for his deference and loyalty to the Kabaka and his subordinate chiefs'. Both types of relationship depend on face-to-face contact between patron and client, as is also the case, but to a lesser extent, in patrimonial clientage, to which we now turn.

Patrimonial clientage is strictly of a political nature. It is most commonly found between a king or emperor and local notables in the
outlying provinces. Since kings and emperors are, by the nature of the institution of monarchy, one-person rulers, their control of the kingdom or empire depends on this sort of link. The king, emperor, emir, or sultan, as the case may be, is the grand ‘patron of patrons’. The powers of the emirs over the population, and the political organisation as a whole in northern Nigeria before and even after independence were examples of control through patrimonial clientage (See Whitaker 1966). Ethiopian politics under Emperor Haile Selassie can be cited as the best example of government run through patrimonial clientelism. As Clapham’s (1969) detailed account shows, all authority emanated from the Emperor who appointed all the principal officers from the members of his family (see especially pp. 28-33). Marriage ties involving the king in person or his children, and the children of the notables, may also used to strengthen and perpetuate the clientelistic bonds (Markakis 1974:1-49). A patrimonial ruler is also invested, often by himself, with uniqueness and mystical qualities not found elsewhere in the kingdom or empire. These ‘qualities’ (which may include deification) in time become important means of controlling the masses.

Other forms of clientage common in traditional society include mercantile clientage, ‘saintly’ clientage, and Islamic trading networks across the Sahara. Mercantile clientage is purely commercial in purpose and application although it could be used for political purposes. In this kind of link, the most important person is the middleman whose primary function is to coordinate trade between the trader and consumers. With institutionalisation of trade and development of transport, mercantile clientage appears to have not survived the modernisation process in Africa. (Lemarchand 1972:74-7) But middlemen of various descriptions (such as trade union leaders) continue to have important roles in the
modern political process. (Sandbrook 1972:3-27). This reference to the
middlemen in mercantile clientelism may help in the appreciation of
their position later on in this study.2.

Saintly clientage is mostly found in Muslim societies in the Middle
East and North Africa. The patron’s power rests on the conviction of the
clients that their salvation depends on his intercession with God on their
behalf. The patron also distributes needed resources (for example seeds or
even land) among his followers. (O’Brien 1975). The important power of
Muslim clergymen can best be appreciated in terms of this type of
clientage. A good sub-sahara African example of saintly clientelism is the
“system” of “maraboutism” in Senegal and Mauritania. In Senegal, the
marabouts, or religious leaders, had for a long time organised themselves
into sects called brotherhoods. The best known and most powerful of these
was the Mouride Brotherhood (O’Brien 1971; 1975). The Mourides
controlled land, markets and seeds, and the peasant Wolof people had to
pay taxes, gifts and offer their labour in exchange for these goods. French
colonial administrators used the marabouts to reach and administer the
rural areas, thus not only giving them additional powers over the peasants
but establishing links between them and the state.

This can be compared to appointed or recognised chiefs in British
colonies, who were vastly empowered in the implementation of the policy
of indirect rule discussed in Chapter 3. Had the appointed East African
chiefs been religious saints like the marabouts of Senegal, their influence
in political development after independence may well have been just as
great. To this day the marabouts have remained an important part of

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2 Islamic trading networks, such as those which ran across the Sahara Desert and which
used to provide a life-line for both middlemen and patrons, have declined in importance. The
total monopoly exercised by kings and their relatives at the coast has been largely broken,
since many more merchants can now provide the goods middlemen in the interior can use.
The concept of an all-powerful patron is no longer as strong as it used to be.

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clientelism in Senegal, and clientelism has become a sort of a political system. Or at the least it has become established as the oil that lubricates the wheels of national politics. (O’Brien 1975:59-81, 87-109; Villalon 1994:163-193).

To approach the understanding of clientelism as a political process (that is, political clientelism) along the above lines is unhelpful. The notion that a definition of clientelism ‘in the harder sense’ is a prerequisite to an effective application of the concept as an analytical tool is misleading. The need for such a definition arises from the limits of the anthropological definition (the patron-client dyad) as a tool of analysis of a wider society. Restricting the definition to the individual or ‘observable’ relationships would impose the same limits on the concept. It would mean boxing oneself into a corner unnecessarily. Other multifunctional concepts in the social sciences, such as “conflicts”, “diplomacy”, ‘democracy”, “lobby”, “authority”, are not defined in the harder sense, and yet they are widely used as analytical concepts. If for instance we are to restrict the definition of democracy to Lincoln’s famous axiom that it is a ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’, and then attempt to find such a government, we will find that it does not in fact exist.

Political Clientelism

The variety of clientelism we are concerned with here differs significantly in scope, aims and in the kind of goods and services exchanged, from the traditional clientelism discussed above. The conditions which gave rise to this form of clientelism in Uganda and Kenya will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The main characteristic of the political clientelism is that the cultural or economic relationships between a client and his patron of the pre-independence period became power, that is, political, relationships. Patrons now perceived the clients as the basis of political power since the latter had the vote. Clients likewise see patrons not merely as providers of their basic needs, shelter, food and protection. They now attached themselves to patrons in the hope of participating in gaining access to the resources controlled by the politicians through the state. Newbury (1988:117-174) notes that in Rwanda the establishment of colonial rule 'altered the powers of the chiefs and accelerated the growth of social stratification', and consequently the Tutsi 'nobles' who had long kept Hutu peasants, suddenly began to compete amongst themselves for more Hutu clients because there were now additional (political) benefits associated with the number of a chief's clients. More resources would for example be provided by the state for the chief to distribute.

Once economic clientelism was supplemented by power clientelism, patrons of the old order now became the clients of other more powerful (or higher) patrons from both within and outside the local area. Someone aspiring to be a minister for instance would act as the patron of a notable person, who will in turn work to ensure that the politician gets the votes of those over whom he has influence.

Description of Clientelism

Such informal 'contracts' eventually and structurally (in successful clientelism) extend to the president and his cabinet. This is why, as we will see in Chapter 3, most of the leading and initially successful nationalist politicians in Uganda (Wilberforce Nadiope, George Magezi, Felix Onana,
Grace Ibingira) and Kenya (Kenyatta, Mbiyu Koinange, Charles Njonjo, Oginga Odinga) were either through individual efforts or family links patrons of sorts during the colonial period.

In 1963, Otema Alimadi, a member of the Acoli District Council in Uganda was appointed to the United Nations (UN), and a by-election became necessary. Obote’s UPC party, anxious to prevent the election of the opposition Democratic (DP) candidate, resorted to drastic measures to ensure the UPC candidate won. According to Leys (1967:74), only two days before the election, ‘several central government ministers visited the division... and announced that the Gulu-Patiko road would be taken over by the Ministry of Works [and] a tractor began work on the road the following day’. O’Brien (1975:177) records that in Senegal the government usually made sure that ‘preferential access to administrative favours [was] given to those saints who were deemed to have a large body of followers’. At one time the state reportedly spent up to £100,000 to influence the votes controlled by one local patron (p. 177). See also Chinua Achebe’s famous short story, ‘The Voter’, in Girls at War (London: Heinemann, 1960) which describes how politicians use “campaign boys” to bribe local chiefs and elders to ensure they obtained block votes from the areas under their control.

A systematic occurrence of incidents of this kind constitute political clientelism, and can provide a prism through which an understanding of the political process of a given state can be analysed since, as Kaufman (1974:284) has noted the relationship ‘constitutes in some instances the most important basis of interest articulation and political control’. In Benin (formerly Dahomey), for example, Allen (1989:22) found that, ‘as a means of mobilising the electorate, clientelism has few equals, especially after 1957 when ... Dahomean [Beninois] politicians controlled the main
source of goods, the state.’

Elections are a particularly relevant medium through which to observe clientelism as a political process. (Barkan 1987; Allen et al 1989; Joseph 1991). During elections the phenomenon becomes more manifest. Whether the elections are between parties for an alternative government, or within the party in single-party political systems, patron-client ties play an important role in the calculations of politicians seeking elective offices. Barkan (1987) finds widespread use of clientelist ties in all elections in Kenya from independence to 1984. He concludes that the main function of elections in Kenya (and other single-party states) is to enable the government to maintain its clientelist links with the people. The elections provide a periodic opportunity for the government to end its links with those who do not toe the party line, and renew and reaffirm its ties with the people. The result has been the establishment of ‘a series of patron-client networks that tie key elements of the ... peasantry, particularly small landowners, to the Kenyan state’ (p. 215)\(^3\).

The relationship between clientelism, factional politics and spoils politics is illustrated in Figure 2.1. What links these three phenomena is that all of them result from competition for power among leading politicians. According to Huntington (1968:412-3), factionalism is the phenomenon where ‘politics involves a small number of people competing with each other in a large number of weak, transitory groups. The groupings have little durability and no structure. They are typically the projection of individual ambitions...’ Factionalism is thus a temporary

\(^3\)This is of crucial importance and we will come to it from time to time in the study. By getting rid of those who do not toe the party line through the use of the party bureaucracy, the civil service, legislative amendments and intimidation, KANU has kept a loyal clientele of MPs and thus control of the state. Obedient MPs are better for the leadership than popular ones who are seen as a threat to the party machine. This explains the frequent assassinations of popular MPs throughout Kenya’s history. KANU’s survival tactics can be summed up by Machiavelli’s notion that it is better for a prince to be feared than loved.
phenomenon, and confined even more to the political elites than is the case with clientelism.

Whereas competition in clientelism is aimed both at gaining and holding power, that in factional politics aim at gaining power only since, in theory at least, it is possible only in a situation where power is open to competition. Thus factional politics usually becomes manifest in competitions for positions in political parties.

Coercion, Ethnicity and Clientelism

There is some confusion about the relationship between clientelism and ethnicity, and their functions in factional politics. (Powell 1970:411-425; Roth 1977:167-179; Lemarchand 1972:69-72). There is also a controversy over whether coercion, rather than rewards, can constitute the basis of clientelism. Ethnicity and coercion are widely regarded as a means of political control in Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries. But the two are not regarded as constituting clientelist politics. Powell (1970) writes:

Patron-client ties clearly are different from other ties which might bind parties unequal in status and proximate in time and space, but which do not rest on the reciprocal exchange of mutually desired goods and services - such as relationships based on coercion, authority, manipulation and so forth. (p. 412)

If we were thinking of the nature of patron-client relationships for its own sake, then coercion may not count as a part of clientelism because the relation does not rest on the notion of voluntarism (or at least of consent). But here we are concerned with the function of clientelism in the political process and coercion must be regarded as a part of clientelism.
The reason for this is that obedience induced through threats provides the regime, or an individual politician, with the same kind of support as by voluntary association based on reciprocity. This is the case both at the higher horizontal level of the clientelist exchange among MPs and downwards from MPs to their clients below. The Kenyan case may illustrate this. Tamarkin (1986), after describing the method by which Kenyatta controlled his MPs as ‘the carrot and stick policy’, goes on to say: ‘For those who choose to ignore the carrot and prefer confrontation to cooperation the government’s stick steps in. The immunity of MPs is rather limited and they are exposed to the government’s coercive measures’ (pp.304-5). In 1975, Kenyatta threatened to ‘trample underfoot’ and ‘mow like grass’ MPs who criticised the government after the popular MP and government critic J.M. Kariuki was murdered. The effect of such measures was the demoralisation of MPs and their inducement into submission.

Clientelism, therefore, if it is well organised and regularised, can act as a system of rule, and play the rule of a formal political institution in resolving conflicts and disputes in the manner described by Sandbrook (1985) and Huntington (1968) mentioned at the beginning of this section. The ways in which clientelism can act as an institution in the place of, or alongside, the formal state institutions like the civil service or the ruling political party, will be discussed in a moment. It would suffice to note here in passing that the effective use of clientelism as a system of control and rule in states with weak formal institutions is a widespread phenomenon, and has been observed elsewhere. For example, Chubb (1982) found that in Italy, the everpresent threat of instant Mafia violence usually ensured that

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The murder of J.M. Kariuki is a significant example of the measures the regime was prepared to take to protect itself. I will comment more on it when discussing the politics of regime management in Kenya.
Figure 2.1

The Relationship Between Factionalism, Clientelism and Spoils Politics

INSTITUTION
Strong = Stability Absent or Weak

FACTIONALISM

Clientelism may provide the basis of a viable institution

CLIENTELISM

Factionalism controlled by clientelism

SPOILS POLITICS

Reform or revolution turns spoils into clientelism

Failure of clientelism leads to spoils

No reform = Disorder

Sketch by the Author
their approved candidate always won in city or even national elections. Walston (1988) also describes how the various Mafia groups routinely use fear to ensure that their own members or preferred candidates got the support of the people in local and national elections in Italy. The support of the client, no matter how the patron obtained it, is therefore be seen as a part of clientelism in this study.

The Analytical Application of Clientelism

The analytical value of the concept of patron-client ties to the study of national politics is still a matter of debate among scholars. Critics have argued against it in a variety of ways. Some have argued that as a concept clientelism excludes other social conflicts from discussion because it focuses fixedly on a few and well ordered interpersonal relations, for example, class or religion. (See the discussion of these criticisms by Lemarchand 1981:7-15).

There are also contrasting views in the literature on clientelism concerning its prevalence in the political process and its use in the study of large-scale politics. Writers who acknowledge the importance of clientelism in politics in the developing countries at the same time question its value as an analytical approach. Medard (1977) for instance writes: ‘Clientelism has been found practically all over the [African] continent in the form of patron-client relationships and political patronage [and] is instrumental as a way of articulating the centre and the periphery’. He further notes that ‘... clientelism is the foundation of any constitution or consolidation of a political centre’ (p. 165-6). But the general thrust of his argument is against the use of clientelism as an analytical tool. ‘These (above) reasons are not sufficient, however, as [clientelism] does not cover
a number of related but distinct elements' (p.171). One of such related elements is what he calls neo-patrimonialism.

Waterbury (1977:330) also questions the analytical value of clientelism on similar lines. His objection rests on two main arguments. First, since several elements combine to constitute the patron-client relationship (e.g: class, kinship, power), it is not possible to know which of them is more important in the relationship. To approach the study of politics of a given state through clientelism would be giving the concept a prominence it does not in fact deserve. Secondly, he argues that there ought to be a clientelist system through which to view a society. The emergence of this 'system', according to him, is also impossible because of the changing nature of the relationships. The importance of patrons changes from time to time; someone who is a patron at one time may cease to be so at another time. The 'introduction of competitive [elections in] politics', he writes, means that a particular patron does not always monopolise the 'scarce or desired resources', and his relations with those who support him in a competition election cannot therefore be described as that between a patron and clients. Clapham (1982:30) also sees the emergence or identification of 'clientelistic political systems' as a prerequisite to an effective use of the concept as a research tool.

Others have argued against the way the concept is applied in research by academics 'for all seasons ... quasi-univerally to a multiplicity of relationships in a wide diversity of social and economic formations' (Gilsenan 1977:167). In his study of the patron-client relations between sheiks and the peasants in a remote village in north Lebanon, Gilsenan concludes that the concept has no analytical value. His reasons are that the ties are themselves a result of local conditions or ideology, and confined to the locality. They are moreover mere symptoms of the existing conditions,
not their causes. As such, he argues, to seek to understand society through such ties 'obstructs a deeper analysis of social structures in quite fundamental ways' and that as a part of local ideology it 'cannot be used to analyse itself' (p.168).

To some extent, the above argument is valid. Patron-client ties of the dyadic type in isolated and peripheral areas which do not extend to the national political system have no links with, and therefore little relevance to, the politics of that country. The author describes Akkar, the site of his study, as one of the 'underdeveloped peripheral provinces that ... formed effectively a political and quasi-autonomous enclave' (p. 168). This is a type of patron-client ties in which the clients are in effective fiefdom of the patrons. Besides, while technically they constitute patron-client relations, they do not produce clientelism because the "clients" have no choice of or sanction against the patron. A few African examples of this sort of relationship may be cited here. The relationship between the rulers (sarakuna) and the ruled (talakawa) in the Hausa states of northern Nigeria from the 16th Century up to the time of independence is similar, because the rulers were regarded and treated as divine. (See for example Dudley 1986; Whitaker 1970:37-121). The relationship between the Kabaka and other lesser chiefs and their subjects in of Buganda, even for quite sometime after independence, provides another example of "voluntary bondage".

By their very nature, clientages are also durable and fairly crisis-free, because they depend on limited and often fixed exchange. The ambition of the clients extends no further than the need to please the patron since there are no other resources beyond him.

The above arguments have been selected because they raise two important and common issues of concern in the literature on clientelism.
(See also Lemarchand, 1972; Scott, 1969; Gilsenan, 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). First, the confusion between clientelism in the traditional society and clientelism as a political process in modern African states is very much in evidence. The writers quoted above clearly have in mind the variety of clientelism found in the traditional society when it is the modern political process they are thinking of studying. Although certain aspects of the traditional form of clientelism have survived independence the transformation has rendered such relationships functionally different even if it still involves the same set of individuals or groups. Secondly, the writers all insist on a more exacting definition of clientelism ‘in the harder sense’ so as to enable the construction of a ‘theory of clientelism’ (Clapham, 1982:31).

It is therefore premature to dismiss wholesale the relevance of patron-client ties to political development in the developing countries, or the analytical value of the concept in the study of national politics, on the basis of what it means or does not mean in isolated traditional societies. To do that, to use a common expression, would be throwing away the baby with the bath water. The critics of its analytical value often conceive clientelism in the anthropological sense, and try to apply it to analyse a modern political process. Unless we clearly distinguish between the local and isolated (anthropological) and national and systematic (political) uses of the concept, it becomes difficult to appreciate its value as an analytical concept and as a political process. This point needs to be borne in mind especially since clientelism as a process is multifunctional. Also active clientelistic politics occurs periodically when there is a need to mobilise supporters at elections times. Moreover, even for analysis the

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5 ‘Harder sense’ refers to what may be called the technicalities of the patron-client exchange, such as observing and recording the flow of goods from the patron to the client, and measuring the degree of support a given good may ‘buy’ in the process.
concept is used to describe or analyse a variety of functions, such as the distribution of goods by the state to the peripheral regions. As a theory it is therefore used in the discussion of concepts such as resource allocation, class formation, state-society relations, ethnic solidarity, and, of course, the dynamics of factional politics. (See for example Diamond 1987:578-86. For a discussion of these uses, see Lemarchand 1981:7).

It has also been suggested earlier that for analytical purposes the scope of clientelism needs to be broadened beyond the anthropological micro-level definition. For the same reason, ‘ethnic politics’ is here treated as a part of clientelism, or at least it is seen as complementary rather than contradictory to clientelism. The reason for this is that ethnicity has a potential for enhancing clientelism, just as clientelism reinforces the ethnic bond, especially in situations where the political culture is fluid. For example, when the Kamba leader Paul Ngei broke from KANU to form his African People’s Party (APP), the rest of the Kamba people also left KANU en bloc and joined the new party. Ethnic groups should therefore be considered in terms of their possible provision of pools of clients for prominent patrons. The manner in which prominent politicians in Kenya and Uganda used their ethnic roots as power bases will be discussed in Chapter 3.

I will argue that for the purpose of analysis, clientelism is best visualised as a phenomenon, with the stress firmly on its general and collective impact rather than on the particulars and technicalities constituting the relationship. It is the “manifest clientelism” that influences political change. For this reason the importance of clientelism in the political process does not depend on its having become a single compact system covering the whole country. On the same basis I further argue that it is a bit hasty to conclude that there is no such a thing as a
'clientelistic system' or that such a system cannot emerge because of the short life-span of the patron-client relations in a society characterised by competitive elections. Consider the following situation. During an election, patron A wins office with the support of a block vote of clients x. But during the next election, x changes allegiance and supports another candidate, patron B. A ceases to be a patron, but x are still clients. Moreover, the influence of clientelism in the political process is not diminished but actually intensified, as for instance by A trying to reclaim his previous clients or recruit new ones.

A conscious disengagement from the anthropological definition is needed if political science is to find the concept useful as an analytical tool. In this thesis I will therefore consciously disengage myself from the trappings of the anthropological definitions, and use the concept to denote a political process. Also it needs to be spelt out here that it is the effects of clientelism on political change that I am interested in, not its technical aspects as an exchange mechanism.

The Advantages of the Concept of Clientelism

It will be an extravagant claim to say that the above constitutes a 'theory of clientelism', and no such claim is made here. What I have tried is to roughly sketch out ways in which the concept of clientelism can be used to explain the effects of factional politics in political change. The effectiveness of this approach will be demonstrated later throughout the thesis when explaining the political changes in Uganda and Kenya since independence. However, we may briefly spell out major advantages over the early development and modernisation approaches. In the earlier theories, politics in Africa, for example, was seen as largely responding to
external or unfortunate developments over which the political actors had little or to control (Chapter 1). Development, dependency and modernisation studies generally saw politics in Africa as material for testing theories rather than as a process that required the formulation of theories more related to what actually happened. Chabal (1992) is correct therefore in observing that these approaches were interested in 'finding out how the evolution of the new African nations fitted the theories of development than in understanding politics in Africa' (Chabal 1992:12).

Perhaps even more serious for the analysis of politics in Africa is the fact that these earlier approaches drew attention away from examining what actually happened on the ground. On this I agree with Ndegwa (1992:43) when he says that these approaches overlooked or ignored 'important elements and subtleties that constitute and propel politics and social relations in African countries'.

In any case the most profound experiences of African countries since independence have not been the transformations from traditional to modern societies predicted by these theories. Taken as a whole the major change has been the transformation of the states from relative stability at independence in the early 1960s to profound instability in general in the mid 1960s, and a persistent instability for a large number of states thereafter. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Decalo 1976; Sandbrook 1985).

We define stability in the broadest terms to mean that stable states are those where central state authority remains intact, with the government capable, by whatever means, of maintaining public order. A good indicator of state stability in this sense would be the frequency and manner of regime changes: whether the changes are peaceful,
constitutional or violent by means of coups. The capacity of regimes to manage crises is also a good indicator. Sandbrook (1985:117) has defined unstable those countries which ‘experience two or more episodes of political violence (revolution, rebellions, coups, insurrections) within a decade’. Already by 1975, for example only 16 of the 44 independent states in sub-Saharan Africa had not experienced coups or were still under civilian administration (Decalo 1976:10-11).

Taking this as a rough guide, African countries may be divided into three broad categories according to how they experienced stability or instability. At one extreme are those countries which have enjoyed relative stability. Botswana is the best example of these, followed by Tanzania, Senegal, Zambia, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, the Gambia, Malawi and Kenya. In the middle are those which have had a balance between periods of stability and instability, but have remained continuously intact and functional. Ghana, Benin and Togo are examples. On the other extreme are those where instability has been the norm rather than the exception; those countries which have had long periods of ineffective or nonexistent administration and state authority. Zaire, Chad, Somalia, Liberia and Uganda can be cited as examples.

It is also worth noting here that most of the problems identified by the earlier theories as facing African countries were actually the result of factionalism. The problem of nation-building, or integration, for instance, which Liebenow (1980:3) says is ‘central to our understanding the others’ is largely a product of factionalism. To take an extreme example, the attempted secession of Biafra from Nigeria between 1967-70 was a serious challenge to the integrity of Nigeria. But Obasanjo (1980) blames the personal ambitions for power of the Biafran leader, Colonel Ojuku, as largely responsible for failure to resolve the crisis arising from the January
1966 coup and the outbreak of the war. In his view Ojuku ‘wanted to rule an independent state at all costs [and] deceived the people he claimed to love’ to support him and the cause of Biafra (p. xiii). This comment, coming from Ojuku’s opponent, may be too parochial: nevertheless, it draws attention to the pivotal role the pursuit of personal and factional interests can play in the destiny of a country.

Somalia is another good example of how factional struggles lead to state instability regardless of how ethnically ‘integrated’ the state is. The population of Somalia is almost entirely Somali, and they speak the same language. Yet the factional struggles among the leaders have ripped it apart: and since there are no ethnic groups which the notables could adopt as their causes, they resorted to the next sub-unit, the clan. Therefore, clan, ethnic, and region alliances are not in themselves political problems unless factional struggles make them so. (See Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of how this happened in Uganda and Kenya).

The issue to consider now is how, since politics in Africa since independence has been dominated by factional struggles, leaders have actually managed to govern, with some states like Kenya (1965-1978) enjoying a measure of stability.

‘Institutionalisation of Clientelism’

All post-independence African political systems utilise clientelism, but their fates have been remarkably different, from the stability enjoyed by countries like Tanzania to extreme instability in countries like Somalia. This study is concerned in part with how such different fates emerged, and takes Uganda and Kenya as examples. In Kenya, stabilisation was achieved, in large part, through the institutionalisation of clientelism as a
system of rule. In Uganda, where clientelism failed, a pattern of spoils politics developed instead, thus undermining the political system created in the 1960s. These two processes, which are by no means uncommon elsewhere in Africa, are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 below.

As we have seen, clientelism is essentially an informal and private power relationship designed for gaining and maintaining public political power (Clapham 1982:1-34). For this purpose the leader usually undertakes a set of reforms linking him to the various important institutions and persons in the state in a clientelistic network (Migdal 1988). When the patron (in this case the political leader), by using his clientelistic networks, has gained power, strengthens the same networks to maintain his position over a period of time, or as long as he is able to do so. When this happens we can say, at least for the period that his power and rule are maintained by clientelism, that clientelism has been "institutionalised" in that state and that it is, or serving as, the institution of rule. This is because the role of institutions as defined by Huntington (1969) and Sandbrook (1985) referred to at the beginning of this chapter, such as resolving disputes, all come to be performed by clientelism.

Institutionalisation of clientelism therefore refers to both the successful strategy of establishing clientelistic networks for the purpose of rule and the outcome of the prolonged retention of power by this means. Therefore, even though most leaders rely on clientelism, its institutionalisation does not happen often. In 1966, for example, when Kenyatta sensed a threat to his position within KANU from Oginga Odinga, he relied on his major clients (or at least those who identified their interests under his leadership for the time being, such as Tom Mboya), and the Provincial Administration and the party as a whole, to
destroy Oginga Odinga in the “Little General Elections” (Gertzel 1970; Mueller 1984).

In speaking of the institutionalisation of clientelism, however, it is important to stress one point. This is that clientelism can be said to be institutionalised in a given state only over a specific period of time, and only in a tacit sense. As a private system it cannot be openly or formally adopted as the institution of state and must therefore remain invisible. Also not all issues will need to be resolved by resorting to the clientelist ties. There will always be roles for the formal state institutions, especially the civil service.

The best way to explain how clientelism can be institutionalised is to draw an analogy with a political machine. (For an account of political machines as systems of rule, see Powell 1969:1142-1158). A political machine is in fact essentially a condensed form of clientelism, because it rests on strong informal links tying together persons with common interests and aims. Like clientelism, a political machine remains ‘a non-ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work in it’ (Powell 1969:1144). Political machines operate well in small-scale and isolated political situations, such as in city or town council governments.

Formal Institutions and Clientelism

A well established and maintained clientelist system encompassing the whole state, and under the control of a powerful individual, as in Kenya under Kenyatta (Chapter 6), can become a clientelistic machine, and hence
an institution. Once that has happened, we can say that clientelism has become institutionalised as a system of rule, until the time clientelism itself disintegrates at which it will cease to be an institution or machine.

Clientelism as a system of rule cannot be discussed without mentioning the roles of the formal state institutions like the civil service and parliament. For even in states where politics is dominated by and largely run through clientelism, the roles of some of the formal institutions remain important as part of the whole administration.

This is particularly so with regard to the civil service. Indeed, the establishment of clientelism as an effective system of rule in a state usually strengthens and reinforces the civil service, at least in its technical capacity to be effective. The reason for this is that it is usually through the civil service that clientelism can be most effectively established and operated. It is quite impractical to attempt to establish clientelism outside of, and therefore in opposition to, the civil service. In its role as the main watchdog of the state, the civil service can quickly undermine and render the network obsolete. To establish a effective clientelist system, it is therefore necessary to take over or assimilate the civil service. The service will lose its formal 'independence' and becomes a part of the clientelist system.

As far as the civil service is concerned, the establishment of clientelism will have two possible effects. Either civil servants "enter" the clientelistic network and become patrons and clients in their own right, such as has happened in Nigeria (Joseph 1991; Diamond 1987). In this position they become competitors with others to gain and exercise power, and accumulate resources. When this happens, the civil service becomes inefficient and corrupt, since it will be caught up in political rivalries and divisions. The likely result is spoils politics, because the leader will lose
control. The other alternative is that the administrators become part of the clientelist system of rule, but without themselves playing any active role as clients or patrons in their own right. The civil service is invariably linked directly to the President or his equivalent (as happened in Kenya under Kenyatta). When this happens, the civil service can remain efficient since it only performs as as the agency of the President.

In Kenya under Kenyatta, for example, the civil service, especially the powerful Provincial Administration, was turned into the main agent of the presidency through the appointment of loyal clients in strategic positions like Provincial Commissioners, District Commissioners and District Officers (Gertzel 1966; Bienen 1974. See also Chapter 6). As far as the civil service is concerned, therefore, clientelism assimilates it in order to be effective and the two become functionally indistinguishable from each other.

The relationship of clientelism with political parties and parliaments is a little different from that with the civil service. While to be effective, clientelism will need to undermine the formal rules of the party in power so that what the party does ostensibly as a part of its formal functions according to the written rules becomes largely underhand manoeuvres on behalf of the party leader. The same can be said of parliament. Since the ruling party and parliament will always contain members who are not the clients of the leader, it is difficult to turn them solely into agents of the leader. They can however be used and undermined by clientelism because the leader’s allies would seek to frustrate their opponents, who in turn may rely on the formal rules of the party or parliament and constitute themselves into “defenders of normality”. Factional struggles therefore develop within these organisations, even when clientelism is the system that “gets things done”
in the state. The relationship between clientelism and party/parliament is more that of confrontation than cooperation.

Functionally, therefore, clientelism tends to undermine both parliament and party when it is well established. The roles of party and parliament, but particularly that of parliament, become that of protest. The political party and parliament do not become agents of clientelism in the same way that the civil service does. It was in this sense, due to the strength of clientelism in Kenya under Kenyatta, that both KANU and the Kenya parliament remained weak throughout Kenyatta’s rule. (Leys 1975).

**Spoils Politics and Clientelism**

When institutionalisation of clientelism is absent, or has failed, factional struggles will continue unchecked and deteriorate into “fights”. (See Chapter 1). This leads to increased instability and political disorder in the state. For institutionalised clientelism functions as a system of control against factional struggles, and can be the basis of support for a faction or individual, as well as a basis for state stability. If factional struggles within a state are not contained or controlled by an effective institutionalised system of clientelism, the struggles spiral out of hand as the various factions or individuals continue struggling for state power and state resources. When this stage of an absence of control is reached and the state and its resources become the object of continuous struggle and plunder, the “phenomenon of spoils politics” ensues.

Spoils politics is therefore a situation where all the various factions in the state freely struggle for power without actually seizing control of it over a period of time. The competition becomes intensive and inclusive, on the basis of “winner takes all”, and leads to violence. And since control
of the state is the object of the factional struggles it becomes considerably weakened. Each faction acts as a law onto itself and against the other factions. In short, spoils politics is a modern political equivalent of a Hobbesian state of nature.

Somalia since 1991 (and before) is a good modern example of a state 'fallen victim' to spoils politics. For when the long-serving President Mohammed Siad Barre fell from power in 1991, the very idea of a focal reference point in Somali politics was removed. Not that Siad Barre had been in effective control of the state before he fell. But at the very least, when he was in office, there was the idea, if not the reality, of a head of state, and a grand if weak patron, who was theoretically able to rely on some of his clients to ensure that some of his orders were carried out. His fall removed both the concept and reality of control. The various armed factions have been struggling for control of the state since, each with its own rules and territory within Somalia. Had Siad Barre been able to establish and control an effective clientelist system in Somalia as Jomo Kenyatta did while he was president of Kenya (see Chapter 6), Somalia might have been spared the agonies of spoils politics it has been experiencing in recent years.

Spoils politics has been a major cause of state instability in Africa because there have usually been factions within each state capable not only of defying but also of threatening the formal leader in charge of the state. 'State weakness' in Africa as some writers call it (Migdal 1988, Jackson and Rosberg 1973), really refers to the existence of spoils politics in the continent. In his study of of how weak states can become strong ones Migdal (1988) is basically talking (though without mentioning it) of the process by which state recover from spoils politics. According to him, weak states are those 'with a melange of social organisations, many having
their own rule-making ability’, and such states ‘have witnessed stiff resistance to leaders’ efforts to use the state as a political control’ (Migdal 1988:207). Migdal sees a weak state as one in which the leader lacks the ‘ability to use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what [he] wants’ (p. xiii).

The Relationship Between Clientelism and Spoils Politics

The general relationship between factionalism, clientelism and spoils politics is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The figure shows what happens when factional struggles are left unchecked because of the lack or weakness of institutionalisation of clientelism. The relationship between clientelism and spoils politics can be further clarified by considering it alongside the concept of prebendalism, that is, the practice of using the state as a source of material gain. (On this see Joseph, 1991). Prebendalism is a type of political behaviour in which the state is seen primarily as a source of economic gain for those who operate the state machinery as well as their relatives or kinsmen. In prebendal politics, ‘a state official is given the right to attach a certain portion of the tribute of the state and use it for his or her own purpose’ (Joseph 1991:189). Appointments to public service are either ‘sold’ in the form of bribery or given to relatives, who in turn will use their new positions in the same way, and so on. A well established government official, such as a permanent secretary of a ministry, would over time, build a powerful position in his post since most of the important positions would have been filled by his appointees, who remain loyal to him. Prebendalism and clientelism are therefore broadly similar,

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7 This has been a common phenomenon in most Africa countries. In Uganda for example, it is quite common nowadays to promise to give the whole of your salary of the first one or two months to the person within the department responsible for appointments before you can hope to get a job in most government departments (Personal information, April, 1995).
with the important distinction that whereas clientelism is primarily concerned with the pursuit of political power by using economic resources as a means to that end, prebendalism is concerned in the main with economic gain, and using politics only as a means to that end, and order to safeguard an already well established position within the state apparatus for the practice of prebendal politics.

The concept of prebendalism a outlined above helps in the understanding of the concept of spoils is that it is the ‘prebends’ of the state, whether to be attained through political power or otherwise, that factional competition, as already noted, is largely about. The relationships is summed up as follows.

Prebendalism is a state of affairs where the state is seen and treated as an economic reservoir to be used for individual and collective gains. As in clientelism the pursuit is facilitated and made possible by institutional weakness when the state is unable to prevent or punish those abusing the formal rules. Clientelism in this regard is the activity involving the distribution (in an orderly or at least organised manner) of the resources in a prebendal state, for the political benefit of the patron and clients in the manner described above. Spoils politics then refers to the uncontrolled and intense competition for the resources in a prebendal state when clientelism has failed to establish ordered channels for distribution. Spoils politics occurs and exists when a prebendal state is left open and at the mercy of the various factions.

From Spoils Politics to Clientelism
Spoils politics, more than clientelism, is transitory and usually has a shorter life-span. It can be turned back into clientelism in a number of ways. In some cases spoils politics has been checked in Africa through
one of three means before it plunged the state in utter disintegration like that in Somalia mentioned at the beginning of this section. The ways in which spoils politics can be checked include the reestablishment of control by one of the factions and then forging clientelist ties; a military coup, and through a revolution. Also, in very rare cases, spoils politics can be 'coordinated' among the various factions, but with the state remaining unstable for as long as the phenomenon lasts, as has happened in Zaire.

The second option of reclaiming the state from spoils politics is a military coup, either by the armed forces independently or in alliance with one of the factions. Amin's coup against Obote in 1971 (see Chapter 7) was a response to, or at the least a manifestation of, the unchecked factional struggles from 1965 that threatened to plunge Uganda into even more serious crisis. The military coup in Nigeria in 1966 was also in responses to spoils politics (or prebendalism as Joseph (1991) describes it). Major Kaduna Nzeogwu, who led the coup, stated that the coup was aimed at 'the political profiteers, the swindlers...who [sought] to keep the country permanently divided they can remain in office as ministers.' (Joseph 1991:71). As a result, the leading personalities who 'sought to keep Nigeria divided' while remaining at the heads of powerful regional factions, the prime ministers of the Western Region and the Northern Region, as well as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the federal prime minister were immediately killed. The termination of Major Kaduna Nzeogwu's coup by another coup in June 1966 simply shows that the first coup had failed to establish an effective control over spoils politics. The whole question of asserting not only authority but also Nigeria's physical identity as a state was to be settled in the bloody Civil War from 1967 to 1970.

In rare cases a revolution that is internally organised or promoted externally can sweep away all the warring factions and set up a new order.
The rise of Yoweri Museveni to power in Uganda in 1986 (see Chapter 10) can be seen as a revolution in response of the long period of state malaise due to factional struggles and spoils politics.

Another, even rarer response to spoils politics is to allow it to continue unchecked but in a 'coordinated' manner. This can be done for example by a tacit dividing up the state among the main factions, who amongst them continue using the state as reservoir. In Zaire, Mobutu has since the late 1970s retained political power essentially by opening up the state for plunder by few powerful individuals and factions. Since he did not interfere with their activities, spoils politics continued and Zaire as a state has been very weak. Indeed, in the opinion of some writers, Zaire has ceased to exist as a state in the conventional sense. Young (1994:262) has for example observed that in Zaire, 'naked power and bribes erode the law... The state ... has lost much of its effective grip, because its legal directives are ignored, except when they seem to be opportune'. The experiences of Somalia, Zaire, and more recently Liberia and Sierra Leone, illustrate what happens to states at the mercy of spoils politics.

Conclusion

I am concerned here with clientelism as a political phenomenon and its effects on change and state stability. The emphasis on the macro-level politics and change is in order to preserve and perhaps amplify the analytical value of clientelism (see below). There are two reasons for this. First, although clientelism as a phenomenon, in the developing countries at least, encompasses the whole political spectrum of the state from the local to the national level, it is usually managed at the very top of the national leadership, and its effects on political change occur at the national
(See Chapters 5-6). The second is that it is impractical if not impossible to assess the impact of clientelism on political change by focusing on its dynamics at one or a set of localities, such as a district or a province, or group of them. Client politics in a municipal or city council for instance would not affect a political change at the ministerial level unless the mayors (as local patrons), are themselves clients to ministers or the head of state. Local clientelism in city governments in the United States can illustrate this point. Johnston (1979:387) notes that between 1971 and 1974, the city council in New Haven, Connecticut, distributed jobs as gifts to build political support. But due to the clear division between the different levels of government in the federal system of the United States, these forms of clientelism have little if any impact or influence on the national political process. By contrast, in Kenya for example, the Nairobi City Council may constitute a machine of sorts, but is functionally a part of the national clientelist system.
CHAPTER THREE

Political Developments During the Colonial Period, 1920-1960

In the introduction it was noted that an effective political institution is the one able to regulate or mediate the actions of the members within the community of which it is an institution, such that the collective behaviour of the members promotes and leads to the collective good of the community. Factional politics and therefore clientelism, both of which involve and thrive on the use of public resources for personal benefit, are thus undermined in an ideal institution. It was further suggested that the what led to factional struggles among the leading politicians at independence in Uganda and Kenya was the lack of viable institutions.

In this chapter we are concerned with the background to the rise to factional politics in the two countries at independence. For this purpose I will review the political developments of the two countries from the 1920s to 1960. The aim is to demonstrate that no territory-wide institutions evolved in the two countries during the colonial period and to show how colonial policies instead entrenched ethnic particularism to the extent that at independence the national political parties, including KANU and UPC, were necessarily coalitions of the various ethnic groups and their representatives. My argument is that, due to this failure, there was no strong political institution in these countries at independence, and that this encouraged and enabled the rise of factional politics among the nationalist politicians. The dynamics of factional politics in turn led to clientelism in Kenya and spoils politics in Uganda (See Chapters 4-7).
The chapter is loosely divided into two main sections. The first section is a review of the major factors that prevented the evolution of viable, indigenous institutions in Uganda and Kenya after the establishment of colonial rule. Here I will focus on the issue of African representation in the colonial institution, in particular on the policy of indirect rule and the development of local governments, and their effects. In the last section I discuss the formation of national political parties after the Second World War, indicating particularly the influence of factionalism among the nationalist politicians.

Historical Roots of Weak Institutions

When Britain established its rule over the territories of Uganda and Kenya at the end of the 19th Century, like other colonial possessions, they were ruled as a part of the British Empire. Legislative councils were set up in Kenya in 1905 and in Uganda in 1920, but these remained a part of the British institution because Africans did not participate in them. It was only towards the end of the Second World War that the first Africans were appointed to councils in both countries, in Kenya in 1944 and in Uganda in 1945 (below).

As institutions, the colonial governments in Uganda and Kenya were coherent and fairly well-established even in the territories. But at the same time they had feeble roots within the East African societies: they were and remained until independence extensions of the British political institution with their roots in Britain. The attempt to assimilate the pre-colonial institutions by developing structural links between them and the colonial institution, for example by appointing chiefs as local agents of administration under the system of indirect rule succeeded more in
establishing local power bases than in creating territorial institutions, which the colonial authorities specifically guarded against, in favour of gradual and guided development from the local level. The concept of nationhood was thus undermined while local identity was nurtured and strengthened.

The late and minimal participation by Africans in the colonial administration at the national level also meant the colonial institutions were never indigenised. This in turn meant that as an institution the government remained alien to the people. The African peoples, leaders and laymen alike, did not regard the concept and institution of national government as theirs. As such, political participation after independence came to be viewed at best as a chance to further promote the locality at the expense of the centre, and at worst as an opportunity for communal or personal promotion or enrichment rather than in order to serve. Since the institution of government did not command the respect and loyalty of the people, and had no committed guardians as the colonial administrators, it was open to abuse. The result was that, once Africans took over the task of government, politics was immediately dominated by factionalism among the leaders over the pursuit of personal ambitions, rather than by a spirit of consensus on what was best for their countries.

**Pre-Colonial Political Systems in Uganda and Kenya**

To understand the failure of the colonial administration to promote the evolution of national political institutions in Uganda and Kenya from the 1920s to independence, it would be helpful briefly to look at the type of political organisations that existed in this region in the pre-colonial period.

On the basis of their pre-colonial political and social organisations,
the peoples of East Africa may be divided into two: those without kings and those with kings. The first category, and by far the largest, had what anthropologists call stateless or acephalous political systems. In Uganda the Lugbara, Acoli, Langi, Iteso, Alur belonged to this category. In Kenya, the Kikuyu and all the major ethnic groups also belonged to this group. Here the largest political community was the clan, followed by the sub-clan, the village and the family.  

The clan was however the weakest political unit because its only, and periodic, involvement in the affairs of the people occurs at times of inter-family disputes, or, as in the Acoli, when there was inter-clan strife. The family, under the eldest man in the lineage, constituted the most powerful unit. The family had the ultimate power of punishment, and decided whether to refer a matter to the clan. Among the Iteso, for example, it was reported that ‘anyone who repeatedly broke the accepted order of society or anyone who brought defamation to his or her [family head] would be ostracised’ Webster et al 1973:167). 

Of this group, in East Africa, only the Kikuyu came close to constituting a compact community or what in theory might be called a distinct nation-state. But their political organisation was just as segmentary. In terms of political organisations the Kikuyu were just like other more scattered groups like the Acoli and Langi and the Lugbara of Uganda. The ‘wider [Kikuyu] community was of little practical importance in day to day life, ... segments of [the clan] were more significant’ (Muriuki 1974:113). They had no chiefs, and were opposed to the idea of chieftaincies, since a person’s status in the community was always judged 

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1 For details the forms of political organisations in stateless societies in Africa, see Forbes and Evans-Pritchard (1940); Middleton and Tait (1958); Mair (1962); Southall (1953) on the Alur; Middleton (1960) on the Lugbara; Evans-Pritchard (1971) on the Azande in Sudan; Dyson-Hudson (1966) on the Karamojong; Tosh (1978) on the Langi; Girling (1960) on the Acoli; Muriuki (1974) on the Kikuyu, and many other anthropological accounts of the major ethnic groups in Kenya.
by individual achievements, not by birth or association with family. According to Berman and Lonsdale (1992:337), the Kikuyu 'believed that public authority came from private achievement, power from virtue'. Kenyatta's account in his anthropological study of the Kikuyu, Facing Mount Kenya (1961 Edition) bears this out. He wrote that individual liberty was greatly valued in traditional Kikuyu culture: 'a man was a man, and as such he has the rights of a man and liberty to exercise his will and thought in a direction which suited his purpose as well as of his fellow men' (p. 212). The notion of centralised authority such as in kingdoms was therefore alien to the Kikuyu. (See also Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:145-154). The only strong commonly held value in traditional Kikuyu culture was largely religious, in that every one of them recognised Mumbi as the mother of all Kikuyu.

The Kikuyu were divided into loose cluster of clans, but authority in these clans lay with a special committee, a council of elders, called the kiama. The clans were however often divided by animosity and seldom acted together, this further made Kikuyu country as a whole a severely segmented society. (For a lively account of such inter-clan animosity, see Ngugi wa Thiong'o, The River Between, 1965). This council was made up of members over 40 years of age, those who had retired from warriorhood. The kiama was concerned with all aspects of Kikuyu custom and politics. Positions of influence in the society could be reached only after one was a member of the kiama, and such an elevation rested on personal achievement such as bravery, prowess in battle, wisdom or good conduct, since appointment to the kiama was not hereditary.

Although the Kikuyu recognised no chiefs, it was possible for exceptionally talented persons to rise above a kiama or a clan, and be accepted as leader by several clans at once. In other words, it was possible to
become a Kikuyu hero and leader when one had qualities which were 'universally' respected and accepted. Persons who reach this status were called *athamaki*. Kikuyu history has been full of such individual rises to prominence. In the 1890s, a man called Waiyaki attained such political status among the Kikuyu. Also Harry Thuku, a Nairobi clerk in the 1920s, became a Kikuyu hero in his confrontation with the colonial government. (Thuku 1970). Jomo Kenyatta himself may be regarded as a latter-day *athimaki*. But while in theory it was possible for such persons to institute themselves as chiefs, the important point for our purpose here is that chieftaincies had not evolved among the Kikuyu by the time British arrived.

In the kingdom category the Baganda, with their highly organised and hierarchic system of rule, were the outstanding example, and can be taken as representative of this group as a whole. These kingdoms, all of which were under an effective and absolute king were in effect compact nation-states.

At the head of the Buganda system was the *kabaka*, who ruled with the help of series of lesser chiefs, whom he appointed and who were directly responsible to him. The whole kingdom was thus tied into a compact political unit. (Apter 1961; Fallers 1964. See Southwold's *Bureaucracy and Chiefship in Buganda* [no publication date]; and Fallers (1965) on the Busoga).

Buganda's pre-colonial political system (which the British left largely intact and relied upon for administration), had clearly understood and well defined rules to govern every inhabitant within the kingdom (Kagwa 1969). The *kabaka* delegated power through the system by a hierarchy of chiefs of various grades and authorities (Richards 1982:8-19; Apter 1961:90-98). The counties, called *sazas*, constituted the main
administrative units, of which there were historically 20. The county chiefs
got their authorities directly from the kabaka. Each county was further
divided into subcounties, and these into parishes. Since the kabaka
appointed and dismissed chiefs, and held the power of life and death over
everyone, the system was kept compact and stable. Also since chieftaincy
was a hereditary function, there were few succession competitions even
between the sons of chiefs, and these did not affect the stability and
effectiveness of the system as a whole. It was over these different systems
of political organisation that the British imposed their colonial
administration.

In the kingdoms the local systems of administration were preserved
and used as agents of colonial rule in the system of indirect rule. In the
non-kingdom areas, chiefs were appointed, in emulation of the kingdoms,
and with a view to establishing compact systems of local rule to serve the
colonial administration as in the kingdoms. (Low and Pratt 1960:163-241).
The system however failed since kings and kingdoms cannot be planted
and grow among people just like trees.

Colonial Chiefs and Indirect Rule

As in West Africa ² the British ruled their East African territories through
the system of indirect rule. The system consisted of using the then ‘existing
indigenous political machinery to every extent possible in the
administration’ of the territories (Burke 1964:33). In practice this involved
the use for the purpose of local government ‘those men whom the people

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² The policy of indirect rule was widely and most effectively used in West Africa among
the Emirates of northern Nigeria, where Lugard, the architect of the policy, was governor
and later High Commissioner of federated Nigeria after the amalgamation of 1914. The
south eastern region, with no traditional chiefs, was ruled through appointed chiefs, called
Warrant Chiefs. Nigeria thus provides the best African example of the application of the
policy over both acephalous and kingly societies.
were accustomed to obey' (Low and Pratt 1960:163). Most of these chiefs were appointed, since societies like that of the Lango, Acoli, the Kikuyu, the Iteso and the Masai did not have chiefs.

The policy of indirect rule was designed in part to adapt the pre-colonial institutions to modern conditions in partnership with the colonial institution. Donald Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika from 1925, was one of the strongest supporters of the policy. In his report to the Colonial Office in 1927 (quoted in Morris and Read 1972:3), he expressed the philosophy behind the system when he wrote that he 'attached the greatest possible importance' to the policy, and went on to elaborate:

I believe that by [it] we shall secure, as far as is humanly possible to foresee how, the political and the social future of the natives in a manner which will afford them a permanent share in the administrative of the country on lines which they themselves understand, building up at the same time a bulwark against political agitators and arresting social chaos of which signs have already manifested themselves in other countries similarly situated.

Another aim of the policy was to undermine the influence of African nationalism as represented by what Cameron referred to as 'political agitators': organisations like the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in Tanganyika and Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) in Kenya. In its implementation, however, indirect rule was not a success as far as the promotion of national institutions from the existing pre-colonial systems was concerned.

Whereas indirect rule was meant to pave the way to the evolution of such institutions by retaining the local institutions, for example chiefs, as the primary agents of colonial rule, in practice the application of the policy had different, if not exactly opposite, effects. In hierarchical societies like the Hausa Emirates in Northern Nigeria, where the traditional
political machinery under the emirs was strong, the system succeeded in ensuring effective British control over the people. (Whitaker 1970:40). But at the same time it made the integration of Nigeria difficult, both then and later. The creation of local institutions around appointed, or existing chiefs in the case of kingdom areas like Buganda, merely solidified ethnic parochialism, which made the establishment of territorial (later national) institutions or even consciousness difficult.

In the first place, the persons appointed chiefs often had no local recognition as such (Tosh 1978:150-153). Their offices therefore did not command the loyalty or respect of the people. This was not only due to the absence of traditional chiefs in stateless societies. It was rather that, since the basis of appointment as a chief was loyalty to the colonial administration, in most cases men other than those respected locally were appointed chiefs over the recognised headmen. This practice also led to inter-clan animosities within the same ethnic group, especially when, as it often happened, a person from an undistinguished clan was appointed chief over those whom, in accordance to lineage system, he and his clan were subordinates.

In Tanganyika in 1934, for instance, the Bonde people, over whom the District Commissioner appointed a descendant of an immigrant, were so incensed that only four months after his appointment they tried to kill him (Wills 1993:61-2). Further, when 'no local chief [or person] of sufficient ability or loyalty could be found' persons from outside the clan or even outside the ethnic group were appointed (Low and Pratt 1964:177). Local complaints at such appointments were usually not addressed as long as the appointed chiefs did their jobs (tax collection for example) and remained loyal to the colonial administration. The colonial administration 'treated the appointed chiefs as if they had a customary
and autonomous claim over the loyalty of the people' (Hailey 1950:178).

Thus, instead of winning the support of the population, the appointments of the chiefs alienated the people from the colonial state, especially since some of the appointments were a favour of the colonial administration for services rendered against the Africans during 'pacification' campaigns. An example of this is the case of a Kikuyu chief called Kinyanjui, who was loved by the British but very much hated by the people over whom he was appointed chief. According to Tignor (1974), Kinyanjui first came in contact with the British as 'a guide in punitive expeditions for the Imperial British East Africa Company'. And after the British government took over responsibility for Kenya from the IBEA and established a protectorate and 'needed a strong man to take charge of the administration' they made Kinyanjui 'paramount chief of the Kikuyu' (Tignor 1976:46). From the people's point of view, Kinyanjui did not have the qualities they admired. Most of the colonial chiefs among the Kikuyu in fact rose to power in a similar way. For example, two of Kinyanjui's askaris were later appointed chiefs over different clans (Tignor 1976:46).

Secondly, the chiefs, appointed or recognised local headmen, now had vastly increased powers and changed functions. Nyangira (1970:3) has noted that this was the main cause of the antipathy towards the appointed chiefs in Vihiga Division of Kakamega District in Kenya. The new functions included the collection of taxes and maintenance of law and order. All these were strange to the people, especially since the colonial administration, to which the taxes went (in Uganda at any rate) was seen and referred to as the "English government" (Morris and Read 1972:35). Also headmen in the pre-colonial setting had usually only settled disputes among family members or conducted religious functions. The requirement for the new chiefs to intervene and even arrest did not go
well with the people, especially since in order to enforce laws and collect taxes, a special police forces, called *askaris*, were set up under the control of the chiefs.

Some chiefs had their own agendas and used the colonial administration for their own ends as much as they were used, and the relationship between them were not always that of collaboration. Masai chiefs in Kenya in particular were more on the side of the people than that of the administration, largely because they were opposed to the transformation of their societies (Tignor 1976:62-3). But having problems with or opposing some colonial policies did not endear the chiefs to the people. For one thing, such chiefs were often dismissed and replaced with more loyal ones. In Machakos District in 1923, for example, the district commissioner fined, imprisoned or removed from office over one-third of the chiefs for offences like ‘corruption and negligence of duties’ (Tignor 1976:61). In Murang’a District, between 1944 to 1953, 14 chiefs out of 34 were dismissed from office. (Throup 1987:146-7t). Indirect rule and the system of chiefs did not therefore provide a link between the pre-colonial systems and the colonial administration.

In the limited sense that indirect rule did actually impose colonial rule on the African populations and made that rule effective, it may be said to have succeeded. But in terms of its role in the evolution of indigenous political institutions, it was a failure. This was particularly the case in the acephalous societies. The reason for this was that although the chiefs appointed were local men, the institution they represented was an alien institution wholly without any roots in the local society. As agents of an alien institution, the chiefs were de-indigenised by the institution instead of them indigenising the institution, as the British had hoped. The crucial issue was that by the time of the nationalist movement after
the Second World War, the chiefs had been entrenched strongly enough at the local level, and were able to have a grip on local political developments. It was the chiefs who provided the nucleus of parochial politics and thus politicised ethnicity.

**African Representation in the District and Legislative Councils**

The Legislative Council of Kenya (then known as the East African Protectorate) was set up in 1905 largely in response to the pressure of the European settlers, who wanted to have a say in the running of the protectorate so as to be able to safeguard their farming and commercial interests (Harlow and Chilvers 1965:1-55, 209-265; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:18-34. See also Hailey 1950). The only section of the population to be represented at the early stages were the settlers, who elected their first representatives in 1907. Although the Council was weak as a policy making body and its decisions were subject to the governor's approval and Whitehall veto, the settlers at least saw it as their institution. This is an important point to note when thinking about the ability of the Council to evolve as a national African institution, because it developed primarily as a settler institution. Moreover, the settlers actively guarded against any attempt to incorporate Africans in the system of government almost up to the time of independence (Throup 1987:18).

The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), formed in the 1920s, pressed early for African representation by Africans in the Legislative Council, but this was refused because members the KCA were regarded as political agitators (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:93-6). Thus, until 1935, African interests were represented in the Legislative Council by two 'sympathetic' Europeans, appointed by the governor. African interests
were in theory represented in the Legislative Council from 1923, but in practice this meant little to the Africans since to them, and in actual fact, there was little difference between the Europeans representing them and the others in the council. In 1932, in response to pressure from KCA and in order delay direct representation by Africans for the time being, the number of Europeans representing African interests was increased to two. These representatives were missionaries, who were supposed to know the African people better and to have their interests at heart. The exclusion of Africans from the Council was based on the dubious reason that there were no Africans qualified enough 'to take their places in a body occupying the position attained by the Kenyan Legislative Council' (Hailey 1950: 209). It was only in 1938 that two unofficial African members were appointed to the council to represent the interest of the African community.

But this time, however, African nationalism had already developed, and not only "outside" the colonial institution, but in opposition to it (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:188-198). The result was that when the colonial administration started the process of introducing Africans into the Legislative Council after the end of the Second World War, owing to antipathy between itself and African nationalism (represented by the KCA/KAU), the Africans so appointed, like the appointed chiefs in the indirect rule system, were seen as collaborators or stooges, rather than representatives.

In 1948, the number of Africans increased to four, all of whom were nominated by the governor from a list submitted by local authorities. Although this was regarded by the colonial authorities as a progressive development, in terms of African representation it was purely decorative because they were not elected and too few in numbers. The number of elected representatives in the council was 17; but none was African since
the four Africans were all nominated unofficial members. The Indian community was allowed to elect 5 members, the Arabs 1 member. The estimated population of Kenya in 1948 was 5,373,470, of which 5,219,865 were Africans, 123,080 were Asians, and only 30,524 Europeans. In the legislature, the Africans who made up over 97 percent of the population were not represented. In institutional terms, the state belonged to the tiny number of Europeans who made up only 0.57 percent of the total population.

The Legislative Council in Uganda had a similar history, if a less eventful one, to that of Kenya. Uganda did not have a settler community like Kenya, but still commercial activity was in the hands of immigrant European and Asian individuals. It was pressure from the business community that led to the establishment of the Legislative Council in the first place. In 1920 the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, made up entirely of European and Asian businessmen, petitioned the Governor, Sir Robert Croydon, for a say in the administration of the protectorate (Apter 1961:162). An Order-in-Council established both the Executive Council and the Legislative Council in 1920, and when it first met in 1921, it had an all-European membership. The Governor, however, wished to encourage Asian participation since they were playing an important role in the economic development of the colony, for example as cotton-ginners, and asked the Indian Association to nominate one member. But the Indian Association rejected the request and demanded two members instead of one (Apter 1961:168-9). The Asian position remained vacant until it was filled in 1926 by a nominated Hindu. Thus when Europeans and Asians were getting actively involved in the government of the territory, the Africans in Uganda were not allowed even a representation by Europeans like that in Kenya. (Sathyamurthty 1986:202-290; Burke 1964:33-9).
Africans entered the Legislative Council for the first time only in 1945, when three Africans were nominated to it. But these nominees, it should be noted, were not the representatives of the African population or African nationalism as such. They were more the ex-officio representatives of the rulers of the kingdoms. Of the three representatives, one was nominated by the kabaka of Buganda; one position was to be filled in rotation by the 'prime ministers' of the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, by turns, and one was to be the administrative secretary-general of the districts of 'either Busoga, Bukedi, Bugisu or Teso, each to serve in turn' (Apter 1961: 169). Thus, like that in Kenya, African representation to the legislative council in Uganda was largely decorative. Moreover, since they were the appointees of their kingdom governments, they saw themselves as representing the interests of the kingdoms rather than the whole territory. Since the concept of nationhood was already weak, this method of representation made it weaker still while the districts and kingdoms were politically strengthened, and the colonial administration developed in a political world of its own. As in Kenya, it was only after the Second World War that Africans in Uganda were introduced in the system of government. But this was only at the district level in district councils which helped in solidifying ethnic particularism more than it did in the promotion of a national institution.

Consequences of Indirect Rule

The result of the exclusion of Africans in the political process was they were forced to seek political expression outside the colonial institution. This was the basis of the many political associations, such as the KCA set
up in 1924 and TAA. (On the TAA see Iliffe 1979:405-513). As protest movements these associations opposed the colonial administration, thus further, at least psychologically removing the African people, whose interests they championed, from the state. These associations were in fact the nuclei of the nationalist political parties which later assumed political power at independence. If these African led associations were allowed to evolve in territory-wide organisations, perhaps they might have established the basis of national institutions. (On this point see Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:188-233). For in the early 1930s, the KCA (from which KANU evolved), had promising prospects of developing into such a national institution, because (according to Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:137), it had ‘branches in all districts in the central Kenya and in many arts of the Rift Valley’. (For a detailed history of the KCA and its evolution into KANU through KAU, see Spencer 1985. See also Berman 1990; Lonsdale and Berman 1992).

To a very large extent, the colonial administration failed to correctly assess the true representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people, and suppressed or otherwise ignored the very forces through which it could have assimilated the population in the colonial institution. Organisations like the KCA and TAA in Tanganyika were turned against the colonial institutions early, and they carried the people with them. Obote also started his political activities in the Young Lango Association, formed in 1944 to oppose the appointed chiefs in the district. These associations were formed mostly by younger, educated and "progressive" persons who wanted, among other things, 'a share in district affairs and native administration' (Gertzel 1974:28)

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3 TAA, unlike KCA, was more nationalistic in outlook. One reason for this was that no overriding political issue affected a particular locality or ethnic group as for example the land issue affected the Kikuyu in Kenya. Tanganyika also did not have many large and antagonistic ethnic groups.
Therefore, both in Kenya and Uganda, the administration of the colonial state prevented the articulation of a common African cause in a way which the people could have identified with. The important basis for institutional development - consensus, common destiny, unity - remained absent. In Kenya, the 'chosen few' subsequently, just before and after independence, managed to come together and identified their collective interest with the state, as collaborators or Home Guards during the emergency.

The major cause of the lack of institutionalisation was the failure of the British to assimilate nationalist African leaders, such as Harry Thuku and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, into the colonial institution at an early stage. Instead, nationalist leaders were considered a nuisance, and the colonial administration chose or created local rulers as their agents in the mistaken belief that all the local rulers were the true representatives of the people and were the spokesmen for their aspirations and that the local institutions could be adapted into modern national institutions under British tutelage and in partnership with the colonial institution.

Localisation of Political Developments, 1945 to 1960

In at first excluding nationalist leaders from the colonial institution, and then suppressing them, the British missed an opportunity to promote the evolution of an indigenous and territory-wide institution during the colonial period. Worse, in promoting local and appointing rulers in the system of indirect rule they established local and ethnic-based institutions, which proved difficult to assimilate into a national institution and provided the basis of factionalism.

In 1945, a Labour government came to power in Britain. The Labour
Party was openly more sympathetic to the idea of independence for the colonies than the Conservatives. Thus, while the policies of the Labour government towards the colonies was not as revolutionary as it was feared (or hoped), the change of government nevertheless led to a new and more optimistic mood within the colonies. The developments starting in 1945 took place against this background.

After the Second World War it became clear to the British that their African colonies would have to be granted independence sooner rather than later. The war and the depressions of the 1930s had weakened Britain economically and she could no longer afford the high costs that colonialism required (Throup 1987:15-24; Colonialism in Africa vol. 2, 1914-1960, pp. 450-502). Moreover, after the end of the Second World War, self-determination and freedom for colonised peoples became an issue in international politics, and ‘world opinion’, as represented by the League of Nations, and perceived United States opposition to colonialism, all combined to make it easier to retreat from the colonial adventure. British decolonisation policy was therefore not well planned in advance, and had no definite policies for decolonisation when the process started. Its idea of developing national institutions to take over the government of the colonies was to strengthen the districts as the base of national institutions.

Whether this strategy would have led to the evolution of viable national institutions in the long run is open to debate. What happened was that independence came before these local institutions, based on district councils, were integrated, with the result that there was an institutional void at the centre. Neither the prewar concept of “trusteeship” for the gradual development of African politics under British control nor the panic “training for self-government” policy adopted after the Second World War, had planned a rapid transfer of power to
Africans at the national level, which the African nationalists demanded, and which was conceded to them only in the late 1950s. (Throup 1978).

The political developments of Uganda and Kenya between 1945 and 1960 were characterised by rapid succession of events. For the colonial authorities, in the second half of the 1950s, the previous notion of independence to the colonies in 30 or 40 years' time ha increasingly became untenable. Britain realised it would have to grant independence to the Africans sooner.

The question then became how best to hand over power to the Africans. Britain saw itself as preparing the two countries (and its other African colonies) for "responsible government". The exception here was Kenya, because until the mid 1950s, part of the plan had been that the colony would develop as a settler country, with perhaps selected African elite class as junior partners. Before the outbreak of the Mau Mau struggle, therefore, the pressing problem for the colonial administration was not African nationalism, but settler pressure for "self-government" (Throup 1987:16-21). The outbreak of the Mau Mau struggle however interrupted and made the plan untenable.

The Concept and Policy of 'Good Government'

The policy adopted towards the colonies was that of continuity and slow evolution to independence. In Uganda the adopted policy was that of promoting the gradual evolution of 'good government'. (Lee 1967). There were two broad objectives in this policy. The first was to engineer local government reform throughout the colonies as a prerequisite for independence. This was designed to close the gap between government and the people in time for independence. As we have already seen, the
colonial state up to 1945 remained an alien institution stationed among the Africans. (I use "stationed" rather than the more common "established" or "imposed" because the latter gives the misleading idea that the colonial state was forcibly but somehow effectively established among the African peoples. In fact the colonial state hardly had any roots within the societies and had a life of its own, independent of local conditions. It is more appropriate to see it as having been stationed there). Hence the need to develop a political institution from the local level to tie up with it.

With these objectives, the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent out a famous dispatch to all the colonial governors in Africa, in February 1947. This document formed the basis of local government reform in Uganda and Kenya. The general thrust of the policy was the establishment of efficient and democratic local institutions, 'capable of managing the local resources ... and commending the respect and loyalty of the people' (Apter 1961: 236). It was hoped that the national institution that would somehow result from the convergence of these local institutions would likewise 'command the respect and support of the people' of the whole countries and thus be a viable national institutions. The attempt to create the Legislative Council at Entebbe out of the members of the various kingdom governments was seen as a way of achieving this.

However, the practical implementation of this policy, similar in Uganda and Kenya in their general thrust, had the opposite effect, in both territories, as I will show in a moment. It merely further solidified ethnic particularism. The reforms included the introduction of direct elections to both the district and legislative councils; the emphasis on the district rather than the province as the most important political unit; making the

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*Dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the African Territories, 25 February, 1947.*

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legislative assemblies more representative by increasing the number of directly elected members, 'africanisation' of the civil services, and appointment of Africans to minor ministerial positions. The reforms in Uganda proceeded more or less according to plan, and consequently succeeded in solidifying local identities more than that in Kenya, in part because the kingdoms were already solid political units. In Kenya the reforms were overtaken by a dramatic growth of African nationalism from 1945-50, when it flared up in violence. (History of East Africa 1976:65:140). To this we now turn.

Local Government Reforms and the Rise of Local Notables, 1945 to 1960

Local government reform, the process by which the district governments were made more representative of the people, started seriously in Uganda in 1949, when the Local Government Ordinance, 1949, was enacted. This ordinance formed the basis of the progressive empowerment of the kingdom and district councils. But before that time some tentative efforts had already been made towards that end, by gradual and controlled introduction of non-Europeans in both the Legislative and Executive Councils. The Executive Council was first opened to non-Europeans in 1947 when an Asian was nominated to it as an unofficial member.

The African Local Government Ordinance granted more responsibility and executive powers to the district councils which had hitherto been only advisory bodies since they were established by the African Authority Ordinance of 1919 (Burke 1964:38-9). The main feature of the 1949 ordinance was that the other districts outside the kingdoms were given similar executive powers that had existed in the kingdoms. District councils were formally set up in all the districts in the country,
with powers to make binding by-laws for all the Africans in the district, and direct election to the district council was increased so that on average every 1,000 inhabitants had one elected representative.

In 1948, Provincial Councils were set up above the districts, thus constituting, it was hoped, a physical growth of the institution of government from the local to the territorial level. But by this time the districts had institutionally developed to such an extent that they had become the focus of loyalty; the Provincial Councils seemed somewhat artificial institutions above them (Apter 1961:238-9). Since most districts geographically coincided with ethnic spread while the provinces encompassed several districts, and District Commissioners were closer and more directly involved with politics at the district level than the distant Provincial Commissioners, the provinces were largely decorative institutions. The districts became the institutions of the people while the provincial administration together with the colonial government at Entebbe, then the capital, remained, in their view, the “English government”. Burke (1964:39) is right in concluding that the 1949 Ordinance in effect provided ‘a legal basis for the institutionalisation of parochial tribally based local institutions’.

The District Administration (District Councils) Ordinance 1955, provided for the enlargement of the district council in which the majority of members would be directly elected, thus introducing the element of active competition for positions in the councils. The introduction of elections to the district councils and the focus of political activity at the district level, in themselves serious setbacks for the evolution of territorial institutions, was followed by two other developments that added to the weakening of the centre. The first of these was the 1955 Ordinance provided for appointment boards to be set up in each district for
the purpose of making all appointments in local government. (Burke 1964:41; Apter 1961:299; Relationships Commission Report, 1961:19-21). Members of the boards, who had the additional power to discipline and dismiss officials, were to be elected by and from the district councils. In both political status and direct political influence, the districts became more important. The second was that the 1955 ordinance provided for the election of African representatives to the Legislative Council and made the district councils electoral colleges, and thus effectively the gatekeepers for any political advance from the districts to the national level. The Kingdoms nominated their representative while the secular districts, the district councils were responsible for the elections. Of the kingdoms Buganda had 5 representatives, Busoga and Ankole each had 2, while the eastern, northern and western provinces each had 3. (Apter 1961:400-413). The effects on factional politics will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Direct elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1958 in most districts of Uganda, but not in Buganda as the lukikko (parliament) boycotted the elections. This election increased the membership of the council, as it was meant to (Relationships Commission Report, 1961:22-4). But the enlarged council was in effect the various district councils combined. Members were not only elected by the district councils, but in many cases those elected were sitting members on the district councils. Milton Obote and C. Obwabgor, later to be prominent members of UPC, were both chairmen of their respective district councils in Lango and Teso. The Buganda representative was the katikiro (prime minister) of the lukikko, Michael Kamalya-Kagwa (son of former Katikiro Apollo Kagwa). Notable members from the districts include: George Magezi (Bunyoro); John Bahiiha (Toro); John Lwamafa (Kigezi), and Caesar Katiti and Grace
Ibingira (Ankole). As we will see in due course, all these men, except Katiti, were to become heavyweight local notables in the UPC under Obote after independence. (Chapters 4-5).

In Kenya, as already noted, the progress of local government reform from 1945 was frustrated by settler politics. The reforms were therefore largely, until 1952 at any rate, a product of the struggle between the Colonial Office and settlers in Kenya. (Throup 1987:53-6). From 1952 it was the Mau Mau struggle which had become the greater challenge to the colonial administration, and consequently had greater impact on the pace and magnitude of constitutional changes thereafter. (History of East Africa 1976:109-155; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:227-319).

African representation in the Legislative Council by Africans began in 1944, when the Governor appointed the first African, Eliud Mathu, a Kikuyu, to it. (As noted on pp. 50-1, since 1924 African interests had been represented in the council by one European appointed member). It had become clear by this time that the notion of Kenya as a settler country could not be achieved in the face of African opposition. The policy of the Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell (1944-1952) now aimed at the development of Kenya on a multiracial basis, in which all racial groups would be represented, but with the Africans as “wards” of the European settlers (Rosberg and Nottingham 1961:198-200; Throup 1987:46-7).

In pursuit of this policy, in 1948 the number of nominated Africans was increased to four members, and then to six in 1951. But multiracialism meant very little in practice, because before 1950 there was no elected African member, and the appointed members were not the true representatives of the people since their very appointment depended on their agreement with, or at the least their being amenable to, the administration’s strategy. Also it was not until 1951 that the first African
was appointed to the Executive Council. (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1953:150).

But at this time the constitutional process was overtaken by African protests over land rights, and agitation for more representation in the Legislative council (Rosberg and Nottingham 1961:212-6). Two events lay behind these agitations and more active political behaviour among the African population. The first was that in 1944, the KCA was reconstituted into KAU, a new and more effective political party. The second was Kenyatta’s return from Britain in 1947 and his election as president of KAU.

For the Africans, it was KAU rather than the nominated members who truly represented their interests, because Mathu and his colleagues in the Legislative Council had been unable to effectively address their land grievances or take up the issue of kipande, a version of South African passbooks which Africans had to carry, introduced in Kenya in the 1920s. 5

KAU’s effort to achieve political change by reform was frustrated since it was outside the political process. African agitation for land rights however continued and by 1950 had turned to violence. The Mau Mau struggle had in effect already begun. The government associated the growing violence with KAU/Mau Mau. When for example in June 1952 a local chief denounced the increasing violence and crime at a meeting organised by KAU, he was later killed, which confirmed the government’s suspicion that KAU was coordinating Mau Mau: the chance for KAU and the government working together was lost. (Ingham 1962:406-7; Spencer

5Kipande was actually a policy or system of controlling the movement of Africans in order to provide cheap labour to European farms. The Africans naturally objected to the policy and especially its physical symbol, a ‘registration certificate’ placed in a small, solid metal container, which ... hung from the neck of the owner on a piece of string. To the African they were a perpetual reminder of their inferior status’ in their own country. The kipande ‘remained a political issue up to and throughout the emergency’ (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:45).
1985:202-235). It was in these circumstances that the new Governor, Evelyn Baring, declared a state of emergency over Kenya in October 1952.

Major constitutional reform during the emergency included the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954. This constitution was in effect an attempt to practically implement the policy of multiracialism pursued by Governor Mitchell. In particular it proposed the setting up of a multiracial government, with one African, two Asians and three Europeans, to be followed by the election of eight African representatives to the Legislative Council directly by their constituents, but on a restricted franchise: the richer one was, the more votes one could cast. It was a conservative constitution and discriminated in favour of the rich at the expense of the overwhelming majority of the people. The African nationalist politicians cooperated because in their view the holding of direct elections in itself was a significant step forward, and not with the method of the elections or the constitution. But since the organisation of territory-wide political parties had been outlawed and Kenyatta in prison, the elections, held in 1957, merely established the local notables (the political big-men) in their respective areas. Men like Daniel arap Moi (Rift Valley), Oginga Odinga (Nyanza) Ronald Ngala (Coast), were the first elected members.

As far as the development of national political parties was concerned, the election of these Africans at the heads of the provinces was a curse rather than a blessing. They thereafter entrenched their holds over the provinces. Back in 1953 the government had banned KAU and outlawed all territory-wide political organisations. Further, with the Mau Mau struggle at its most intense from 1953, and the most politically active people especially in the Central Province in detention centres, organisation of political activities beyond a district or location was impossible. (Bennett 1963:132-145). Moreover, the arrest and detention of Kenyatta and most of
the KAU leaders in 1953 had created a leadership vacuum in Kenya in the same way as the banning of territory-wide political organisations created a general political vacuum. It was these vacuums that the provincial notables rose to fill when they were elected to the Legislative Council. The case of Tom Mboya was slightly different, because he was not a provincial notable: he was more of an urban (Nairobi) notable and his constituency was the city population and the trade union movement. But he was still a notable like the others (Goldsworthy 1982; Bennett 1963; Sandbrook 1972:3-27).

Thus, like in Uganda, local government reforms in Kenya served mainly in strengthening the periphery and weakening the centre. The colonial administration failed to mould the disparate political forces in each country and to give them a common identity and destiny. For the result of this failure was that with the approach of independence the political leaders, since they had no national bases, relied on their local bases of power, and led to the emergence of local-based political parties from the mid 1950s in both countries. This in turn led to factional politics among the parties as well as among the individual local notables within the parties.

Political Parties, Nationalist Leaders and Factional Politics

In Kenya, because of the ban on national political parties during the emergency, political party organisation on territorial basis started only in 1960, and KANU and KADU were formed. When KAU was banned in 1952, all African political organisations were prohibited until 1955; and even after that no party was allowed to organise above the district level. The result was the emergence of many district based political parties
between 1955-1957. As we will see in the next chapter, these parties had already become locally prominent, with a corresponding rise of local notables in the districts. The result of this development was that of the 11 major parties that contested the 1961 elections, only KANU campaigned for national unity. The rest actually campaigning in favour of localisation and against nationalism (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:120-125).  

The exception here was Mboya, because the notable in his Nyanza province was Oginga Odinga. Mboya, however, was also a notable of sorts, except that he had a more national political power base, especially in Nairobi and to some extent Mombasa, in the trade unions he had built during the 1950s. His local political party was the NPCP. (Sandbrook 1972:6-27; Goldsworthy 1982: Chapters 1-2). It was in fact the NPCP which ensured his election to the secretary-generalship of KANU in the face of stiff opposition from Oginga Odinga and the other notables, and he won by a single vote over Oginga's preferred candidate, Arthur Ochwada. (Goldsworthy 1982:144).

In Uganda the first national party was the Uganda National Congress, formed in 1952 by Ignatius Musazi. Although the UNC preached and made attempts to organise nationally, it was not successful in this attempt. Due to the emphasis on local developments already reviewed, the idea of a national political party pressing for self-government for the whole country at that time was not taken seriously. It was in fact none other than Obote, then member of the Lango District Council, who in 1954 attacked the UNC's nationalist ambitions, and wrote that what was needed

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6 Notable among the parties formed during this period were the Nairobi District African Congress of Argwings-Kodhek (with a trade union backing); the Nairobi Peoples Convention Party (a breakaway faction of Argwings-Kodhek's party, led by Mboya); Mombasa African Democratic Union; Central Nyanza African Democratic Association; South Nyanza African District Association; Nakuru African Progressive Party; Taita African Democratic Union, and various others with ethnic or district bases (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:31-40; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966:313-9).
was ‘immediate Local Self-Government in Uganda’ rather than a national one (Karugire 1980:150). The Democratic Party, formed in 1956 was the second national party, but its close links with the Catholic Church made it unpopular in Buganda and may have hampered its efforts to expand nationally. The DP and UNC may therefore be seen as opponents on religious grounds. After the Legislative elections of 1958, the elected members formed another national party, called the Uganda National Union (UNU) in 1958. But since these were merely district representatives, factional interests were already rife among them and the UNU broke up almost immediately between “radical” and “conservative” wings, respectively led by “commoners” like Obote and Obwangor and “royalists” such as Grace Ibingira, George Magezi and W. Nadiope. It was the radicals who came together to form the UPC in 1960, and elected Obote as its first president. How he fared in this position in an independent Uganda will be discussed in the next chapter.

Low (1962:12-3) blames the ‘tardy emergence of political parties in Uganda’ on the quality of leadership, and the lack of knowledge of ‘western political organisations’ by the party leaders, as none of them had spent years studying overseas, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria did. This argument is untenable, because in the first instance, as the above review shows, the leaders were themselves captives of the political history of the country, which rendered them largely ineffective in realising their aims. The same historical conditions hampered Kenyatta, with all his legendary leadership qualities and in spite of his ‘political training’ in Britain for ten years.

The emergence of factional politics and its attendant variables of clientelism, spoils politics, dictatorship and corruption may therefore be explained by the fact that, to use Colin Ley’s phrase ‘the idea of a national
interest was weak because the idea of a nation was new' (Leys 1970:341). Attitudes towards the central government as an alien institution did not change. Was the independent government any more their's than the colonial one? Chinua Achebe’s poignant comment about the attitude of elite Nigerians to their independent government in the early 1960s is very telling in this case. In No Longer at Ease (1960) he writes: 'In Nigeria the government was always 'they'. It had got nothing to do with you or me. It was an alien institution, and people’s business was to get as much from it as they could without getting in trouble’. (p.30). Although to some extent these attitudes were shared by the officials who performed public duties in the kingdoms, chieftaincies and the colonial administration, the fear of punishment from the ever present representatives of these institutions (the king, the chief and the colonial administrator) acted as sufficient deterrent. At independence there was however no guardian angel. In the next chapter I will discuss the effects of factionalism on the politics of Uganda and Kenya from 1960 to 1964.
CHAPTER FOUR

The Trappings of Factional Politics and its Effects, 1960-1964

During the first few years of independence, the politics of Uganda and Kenya were trapped in factional politics and both the ruling political parties and their leaders were in relatively weak positions. It was suggested in earlier chapters that institutional weakness leads to factionalism because it encourages and enables political leaders to pursue personal and sectarian interests, and not the collective interests of the government, party or the state. The ideals of nationalism, that is, the promotion of the good of the state as the end of politics, is thus sacrificed for the practical and more attainable goal of promoting one’s own interests.

In this process, alliances based on ethnic and regional identities would emerge, each pressing for its share of the national cake. Allen (1987:3) has rightly observed that, in such a situation, the ‘factions endeavour to control the regional [party] leadership, if not the national leadership positions, in order to ensure that the faction concerned can control as much as possible [of the state resources] for allocation to its members’, a process which in turn ‘creates lines of division within the party’. Even when the ruling party emerges in a dominant position and establishes control over all the influential offices which exist, it becomes the battlefield of the struggles by its own members, which will weaken it as a party and renders it incapable of evolving into an effective institution of government.

In a multiparty political system, such as in Uganda and Kenya at the
time of independence, the struggles may be both intra-party (within the dominant party) and inter-party (between it and other political parties which are themselves similarly divided). As one party struggles against the other, divisions within the states are increased, since the parties would in any case have been formed on ethnic and regional basis. (For a more detailed discussion of this process, see Sandbrook 1972b:105-6). The result is that the centre becomes weak as it struggles to meet or oppose the claims of the various factions. The positions of the leaders of the ruling parties are also constantly under threat. Political development is therefore trapped as the various leaders struggle 'to gain or conserve power' in order to control the vital apparatuses of the state (Bayart 1993:210-2).

This, as I will show in a moment, was the situation in Uganda and Kenya between 1960 and 1964. It led to the fragmentation of the nationalist political parties in both countries in 1960: for example both the UNC and KANU split up in various factions. Struggle among the notables for the leadership of especially UPC was also widespread, notably between 1960-1964 (Mujaju 1976:450-1). To some extent the notables in Kenya also struggled briefly for the leadership of KANU before Kenyatta's release from prison in August 1961 (Odinga 1967:181-204; Goldsworthy 1982:101-6, 111-148). The result was that in 1960-1964 UPC and KANU struggled against regional and district factions, and Obote and Kenyatta, as leaders, also fought to assert their authorities over the parties or at least the state. Consequently, resolution of factional conflicts preoccupied the leaders and their political developments were trapped. It can be said that, in general, it was the product of factional politics that propelled the politics of the two countries forward during this period, and not any planned political programme.

In this chapter I will discuss the magnitude and effects of
factionalism on the politics of the two countries between 1960 and 1964. There are four short sections. In the first I will discuss the division of the political leaders into different factions and parties on the eve of independence and its effects. In the second I will discuss factionalism within the UPC and KANU, and the effects this had on the positions of Obote and Kenyatta. In the third section I discuss various claims made by these factions on the centre and how this contributed to its weakness. The last section is a general commentary on the implications of factionalism for the political developments of the two countries. How the governments responded to the problem of factionalism will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The Split of the Political Parties

One of the first major effects of factionalism was the division (or rather fragmentation) of the political parties on the eve of independence. The splits occurred because as independence drew closer in 1958-9, the political leaders jockeyed amongst themselves to secure strategic positions. UNC, the first nationalist political party in Uganda, broke up in 1960. The three main factions within it were UNC-proper under Ignatus Musazi, UNU of the notables from the west of the country, and the nationalist wing led by Obote. Each became a separate party of sorts. But in March 1960, UNU and Obote's faction merged to form the UPC (Low 1961:18-46). The same thing happened in Kenya when KANU also "broke up" almost before it was formed in 1960, with Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi, who had both participated in previous meetings to prepare for the formation of an "Uhuru Party" left, disappointed by the positions on the executive council they were elected to during their absence. They subsequently formed
KADU as the vehicle for their political ambitions (Gertzel 1970:10-19).

It has sometimes been suggested, presumably on the basis of pronouncements by the breakaway leaders, that these splits were somehow based on principle. The breakup of UNC, for example, is said to have been caused by the fact that it was dominated by Baganda, and ‘the undistinguished leadership’ of Musazi, its founding president (Low 1961:31; Mutibwa 1992:13). In Kenya it was said that KADU emerged because KANU not only neglected the interests of minority ethnic groups, but was also threatening to dominate them too since it was led by Kikuyu and Luo politicians (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:37-40).

But in both cases, these excuses were covers for the pursuit of personal political ambitions. The breakaway leaders had previously been members of the parties (or the same nationalist movement in the case of KANU) when independence was still far off. In the case of the UNC, though the leading members were from Buganda, the party itself was opposed to Buganda isolationism. In fact within Buganda it was regarded as an enemy especially by the Mengo establishment (that is, the *lukikko* and the chiefs who supported the Kabaka) (Low 1962:17-22). For another, although the party had Baganda leadership and was largely based in Buganda, it was a nationalist party and had opened branches in most districts throughout the country when it was formed, including in Acoli District and Obote’s own district of Lango where a branch was opened in 1952. Its expansion outside Buganda, especially in Lango district, was a great success. In Lango the party grew so fast that by 1960 it was the largest and best organised party in the district. In the 1960 district council elections, for example, it was able to field a candidate for each of the 43 seats in the council, and won 38 seats against only 2 by DP and 3 independents. (Burke 1977:255; Gertzel 1974:34-45). Indeed Obote himself
was elected to the Legislative Council in 1957 as an UNC candidate. In theory, therefore, UNC, with the additional advantage of its capacity to carry a substantial portion of the Baganda with it, might have provided the basis of integrating the nationalist politicians in the country if it had not been for the force of factional interests. In any case the fact that UNC was never able to organise into a cohesive political party was due in the first place to the growing factionalism in it, especially after the 1958 Legislative Council elections when non-Baganda politicians (the representatives of the districts in the north, west and east of the country), joined it. (On this see Sathyamurthy 1986:394-7). Musazi's 'undistinguished leadership' itself was more likely a result of the other leaders refusing to be led than a case of personal shortcomings. The problem was factionalism not domination, because even if the other leaders feared domination, such fears were a result of factional interests.

As for Moi and Ngala, the idea of a protest against Kikuyu/Luo domination was made a political issue merely to save their faces. For just under a year after independence, in November 1964, they voluntarily dissolved the party when they realised it was not, in opposition, going to give them any control of state resources or power. Both men thereafter rejoined KANU and became prominent members in it. Moi in particular became the most staunch supporter of Kenyatta within KANU (See Chapter 6).

Factional politics of this kind has been observed elsewhere in Africa at the time of independence. In Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leonean Peoples Party (SLPP) of Milton Marghai, which was already 'a very loose coalition of local elites', broke up as independence approached and Siaka Stevens eventually formed his own All Peoples Congress (APC), so that at independence in 1961 he become leader of the opposition, adopting the
hinterland as his main political cause (Clapham 1976:14).

For the moment I will take leave of the other political parties, DP and KADU, and follow the factionalism within UPC and KANU. For as parties of government and controllers of all the state resources, they became the arenas of competition and factional struggles.

Obote and the UPC Notables

As we have seen, the UPC was a product of factional struggles within the UNC and the Legislative Council from 1958 to 1960. It was basically a party of leaders because the notables who formed it were the elected representatives of their respective District Councils. But from its foundation in 1960 to the end of 1962, it presented somewhat a united and nationalist front, and took pride in its claim to be the only nationally-oriendated party that at the same time represented African nationalism within the country. (Low 1962:46-8; Sathyamurthy 1986:394-7). A number of factors accounted for this early show of unity. The external appearance of unity in the party was however largely due to circumstances other than any wish or desire for unity on the part of the leaders.

The first was that the exact shape of Uganda's political future was not yet settled and the course events would take was not known. The leaders adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Secondly, the party was outside the political arena. After the 1961 elections political power and its attendant resources were in the hands of the DP who formed the internal self-government (1961-1962). There were as yet no spoils to fight over. Third, Buganda and its isolationist tendencies as projected by the Mengo government was still sufficiently threatening. The very powerful position of the Kabaka compelled them into a sort of union. The point may be
made here that if there was no external pressure on the notables, the UPC might well not have progressed to the stage of forming the first independent government of Uganda in October 1962. The party was held together by ‘negative’ forces pushing them together from outside. For instance, the famous alliance with the Kabaka Yekka (KY) party which brought it to power, like its formation in 1960, was forced upon both parties by negative politics: their hatred for DP and desire to wrest power from it at all costs. The KY hated DP because they felt that the DP leader, Benedicto Kiwanuka, insulted the kabaka by setting himself outside, an potentially above him. Kiwanuka was also a Catholic and a "commoner" and the prospect of him becoming prime minister was not acceptable to supporters of KY. “Feeling against DP in Buganda remained intense’, Mutesa later wrote, ‘and it was our vision of life under [a DP] government as the worst of all possible futures that led us astray’ (Mutesa 1967:159-160).

But after UPC formed the government in October 1962 on the backs of KY, the fear of Buganda rapidly receded and disappeared altogether in 1964 with the breakup of the alliance with KY. It had been strengthened by defections from DP and KY members throughout 1963, and since the opposition DP had been reduced through defections to only 16 MPs from the original 24, the DP posed no political threat. The grudging cooperation that had hitherto, in public at least, characterised the relationships among the notables now gave way to open hostility, particularly over the issue of leadership. Perhaps the logic was that Obote had served the purpose for his election in 1960 and it was time he made way for those waiting in the wings. Or, more likely, he was accumulating too much power and entrenching his position in the leadership.

1Kabaka Yekka means “the Kabaka Alone”. It was a party formed in 1961 by the chiefs of Buganda and was almost exclusively committed to the promotion of Buganda and the protection of the Kabaka’s position.
Four of the notables – Ibingira, Magezi, Nadiope and Kirya – who had elected Obote leader in 1960 had become dissatisfied with him for one reason or another. Ibingira had been a leading member of UNU before its merger with Obote’s wing of UNC in 1960. He had ambitions for the leadership of UPC himself and from the beginning he regarded Obote as unsuitable to be leader (Ibingira 1973 256-272; Mujaju 1976:456-7). Magezi had been Secretary-General of UNU, and the first Secretary General of UPC (March-August 1960), but in August he was defeated for the post by John Kakonge, a younger man also from Bunyoro. As Secretary General Kakonge was theoretically the second most powerful man in the party. To Magezi in particular the idea of Kakonge replacing him as Bunyoro's “Big Man” was not welcome. Nadiope, who by his own admission had supported Obote for the leadership in the hope that he would be ‘controllable and usable’ (Mujaju 1976:456), had failed to get Obote’s firm promise that he would become the President of Uganda in 1963 when the Governor General left.

By 1963, therefore, the factionalism in the party had been articulated into two broad factions: one led by Grace Ibingira, Minister of Justice, and the other (a more uncertain one) around Obote. (Mutibwa 1992; Sathyamurthy 1986. See also the recently launched and Kampala-based magazine, Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993, pp. 5-10). As a relative of the king of Ankole and thus a “real” notable, Ibingira was backed by some of the notables as Obote’s replacement. In time Nadiope, Magezi and Kirya, for their different but related reasons, became his associates. The objective of the Ibingira faction was the removal of Obote from power. This faction had the added advantage of having Mutesa and the entire Mengo establishment on their side. As already noted, Mutesa had agreed to the UPC/KY alliance as the lesser of two possible dangers and his relations
with Obote had never been cordial. Moreover, he had not yet given up the idea of Buganda independence, and saw Obote as a stumbling block to it.² To make matters worse, Obote’s strength in parliament had increased due to defections from DP and KY, and he was in a position to hold the proposed referendum that would return the “lost counties” of Bungagaizi and Bugaza to Bunyoro in or after 1964 as stipulated in the constitution. The two counties, together with a large swath of land between Bunyoro and Buganda, had originally belonged to Bunyoro, but were annexed and given to Buganda by the British in the late 1890s as a reward for Buganda’s assistance in the fight against Kabarega, the king of Bunyoro. The Bunyoro had repeatedly but unsuccessfully petitioned the colonial administration for their return.

At independence it was recommended that the independent administration should, at least two years after independence, hold a referendum to determine whether the people in the counties wished to be reunited to Bunyoro or remain a part of Buganda. Since the population of the two counties was overwhelmingly Banyoro, there was no doubt about the outcome of the referendum. Mutesa therefore needed no persuasion to support any anti-Obote faction. Ibingira also had allies in the army. His brother, Major Barnabas Katabarwa was a high ranking officer at that time and worked directly under the army commander, Brigadier Shaban Opolot, another of his allies, and a friend of Mutesa (Omara-Otunnu 1978; Mutibwa 1992. See also the recent account of the events at that time by Opolot himself in Veteran Yearbook, June-September, 1993, p. 8).

Thus, in Uganda in 1960-4, we have a situation where the cabinet is divided into hostile factions and the president and prime minister are in a

² Already Mutesa had declared Buganda independent twice: in 1960 and again on 8 October 1962, the eve of Uganda’s independence. The date is particularly telling and indicates Mutesa’s desperation at that time. In his opinion, Buganda had entered an association with Uganda on 9 October as an independent state (Mutibwa 1992: 34-5).
state of enmity. Smooth functioning of government became difficult. More ominously still, factionalism had spread into the armed forces, as was evident by the suspected and feared alliance between Ibingira, Mutesa and the two army officers, Opolot and Katabarwa. Obote’s alliance with Idi Amin from 1964 (see Chapter 7), was itself a part of this polarisation of forces between the two factions. What we need to note here is that the growing factionalism reduced Obote to resorting to the same measures as his opponents were doing, such as the forging of conspiratorial alliances for survival. He held power but no authority over the other leaders, the concept of undisputed undisputed and authoritative leader had eroded. How he responded to this threat and with what consequences will be discussed in the next chapter.

Another factor that contributed to Obote’s weakness was that the UPC was organised in such a way that he could not use it for control, as Kenyatta was able to do with KANU (Chapter 6).

Organisational Weakness of UPC

Structurally, UPC was organised almost as if to ensure that the centre remained perpetually weak. In a small country like Uganda it might be expected that a party committed to national unity would have led the way in demonstrating the spirit of cooperation and unity to the people. But this was not so. The force of personal interests in the party was reflected by the fact that when elections of party officials was completed, four vice-presidents were elected, one for each region, as follows. John Babiiha of Toro kingdom for the Western Region; Nadiope from Busoga for the Eastern Region; Oola from Acoli for the Northern Region and Luande from Buganda for Buganda Region (Mujaju 1976:455).
Since the party was hardly organised at that time, the creation of so many prominent positions (designed to satisfy as many of the leadership as was possible), was a serious liability to Obote as the national leader. The result was that Obote was merely a co-leader, and cut off from the regions. A clash with any of the leaders meant the loss of the entire district by the party. For example, in February 1962 Chemonges, MP for Sebei county, changed to DP when Obote failed to give a firm pledge that he would establish Sebei as a separate district from Bugisu after independence (see below). In the same year Nadiope threatened to pull out the eight MPs from Busoga from the party unless Obote and the party supported him for the office of president of Uganda at the departure of the governor general in 1963 (Mujaju 1976:457). As Obote could not afford, because of the UPC/KY alliance, to offend the Baganda by not giving the presidency to Mutesa, he offered Nadiope the vice-presidency instead.

Y. M. Chemonges and Sebei District (1960-66)

The case of Y.M. Chemonges, the notable from Sebei District from 1960 until his death in 1966, may illustrate Obote's relationship with the UPC notables during this period (on Chemonges see Young 1977:290-304).

Sebei was created a district only in February 1962 during the period of internal self-rule by the DP. It had been one of the counties of Bugisu District throughout the colonial period. Bagisu men were appointed chiefs among the Sebei by the colonial administration during indirect rule, but the Sebei did not seem to mind this: it was a colonial institution and the Sebei probably felt it had little to do with them. But after Bugisu District Council was given wider powers and responsibilities for local services and development projects by the District Administration (District
Councils) Ordinance of 1955 (above), the Sebei became interested in what the council’s activities and in who ethnically the councillors were (Uganda Protectorate 1961). Sebei resentment against Bagisu “domination” grew as they felt that the Council neglected their needs in developing roads, health services and other development projects (Young 1967:294). They also now resented the appointment of Bagisu chiefs and teachers in Sebei. In 1960, in order to reduce expenditure in accordance with a central government directive, the Council withdrew planned road extension projects a promised ambulance to Sebei. The incident led to a demand for a separate district by the Sebei.

It was at this stage that Chemonges, a Sebei who had worked as an inspector in the Kenya police, took up the case of a separate district for Sebei. According to accounts, in December 1961 Chemonges, with a spear and shield in hand, confronted one of the assistant district commissioners, and demanded that Sebei should be proclaimed a district on the spot. Chemonges was tried and fined, but his boldness made him popular with the Sebei, and encouraged more acts of defiance against Bugisu District, including the refusal to pay taxes from 1962 (Young 1967:296). In the 1961 elections which established self-government in Uganda, Chemonges stood as the UPC candidate in Sebei county and won about 85 per cent of the votes over his two Bagisu opponents. But when Benedicto Kiwanuka, the DP leader and prime minister of Uganda during the brief internal self-government period before full independence in October 1962, created Sebei a separate district in February 1962, Chemonges changed to DP, so as to be in a position to tap Central Government resources on behalf of the district, and because Obote was opposed to the creation of more

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3 This is also known as Sessional Paper No. 3 of 1960, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in Certain Areas of Bukedi and Bugisu Districts of the Eastern Province During the Month of January 1960, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1961.
districts which he felt encouraged ethnic particularism. Again in the 1962 elections which brought KY/UPC to power, Chemonges won 86 percent of the Sebei vote as DP candidate; but DP was not in power this time, so he changed to UPC again. In 1962 Sebei elected its constitutional head, the Kingoo, and Chemonges was elected to the post unopposed. He was now an MP, a minister, and chairman of the Sebei District Council and and the constitutional head, all rolled in one. The significance of this was that, as the sole political lord of Sebei, UPC and even Obote were in no position to operate within the district without Chemonges' cooperation.

Thus, in Uganda, between 1960-1966, Obote had no control over the UPC notables, just as the government he led had little to no control over the districts, which remained the fiefdoms of the notables. This led to a situation where, from 1963 to 1966, UPC had a collective leadership, but no effective leader (See, for example, Sathyamurthy 1986:430-451; Mujaju 1976:443-467). Accordingly, the period was characterised by intense struggle for the leadership of the party and country, between two loose factions that developed around Ibingira and Obote. Behind Obote were those ministers from non-kingdom regions of the country, such as Adoko Nekyon from Lango, Felix Onama from Madi, while Ibingira’s allies were from the kingdom regions, notable among whom were George Magezi from Bunyoro and Nadiope Mathias Ngobi, both from Busago. It was the antipathy between the two men, and their struggle for the leadership of the party and country, that more or less influenced the political development of Uganda in the early 1960s.

Various alliances were forged for or against one or the other. Obote’s support for Kakonge can be explained by the fact that both of them were “minors” compared to the other notables. Kakonge in particular depended on his abilities to survive politically. As already noted his parliamentary
seat in 1961 had been in Buganda and not Bunyoro. He therefore did not have the kind of local power base the others had. It was a case of the weak coming together for survival in the face of threats from the strong. In 1965, after Ibingira’s detention, Obote appointed Felix Onama, another minor notable, to the post of Secretary-General of the party for the same reason. He dared not appoint anyone with stronger political power base than himself, for fear that he might be elbowed out of power by the appointee.

Kenyatta and the KANU Notables

As in UPC, factionalism was rife in KANU in 1960-64. That is to say, factional struggles continued unchecked. In fact, factionalism within KANU was more widespread than in UPC because while UPC was a coalition of local leaders, KANU was a coalition of both local leaders and local political parties. (See Chapter 3). In all delegations from 30 political organisations attended the meeting at which KANU was formed representing the district political parties.

Factional conflicts in KANU had two main bases: ideology and personal/ethnic, although the two bases often overlapped. Factionalism that arose over ideology was inherited from KAU. When Kenyatta returned from Britain in 1947 and was subsequently elected president of KAU, frictions arose between him and the more radical members of the party, led at that time by Bildad Kaggia. KANU thus all along had radical and moderate wings, which after independence continued to be a basis of friction (Spencer 1985:145-200; Kaggia 1975:80-3). Oginga Odinga became associated with the radicals, and the rest of the leaders remained on Kenyatta’s side. However, since the moderate group around Kenyatta were able to undermine the radicals through ‘isolation and exclusion’ from
positions of power, the ideological divide of the party was more of an irritant than threat. (Good 1968:115).

Of greater impact on KANU’s weakness was the personal/ethnic factionalism. There was Oginga Odinga at the head of the Luo, Gichuru representing the Kikuyu and Ngei and Ngala respectively the Akamba and Coastal peoples. There were also men like Mboya with urban power bases in Nairobi, and Moi, who represented the interests of the smaller ethnic groups. From 1960 to Kenyatta’s release in August 1961, the party nearly broke up due to the struggle for the leadership. Mboya, who was suspected of scheming to become leader of the proposed “Uhuru Party”, started quarrelling with the other leaders even before KANU was formed, since ‘at least some of the party’s founders intended to exclude him from a position of national leadership’ (Bennett and Rosberg 1961:38). When eventually the executive council was elected, Oginga Odinga became vice-president, James Gichuru acting president and Mboya secretary general, but they continue to quarrel. Early in January 1961 Gichuru for example suspended Odinga from his post, on the grounds that Odinga was allowing foreign interference in the affairs of the party. It was only Kenyatta’s election to the leadership of the party that perhaps preserved it. Good’s assessment of his role is accurate when he writes that if ‘any single leader held responsibility for KANU’s development, it was Kenyatta’ (Good 1968:116; See also Gertzel 1970:16-7). However, Kenyatta did nothing more than keep the party from actual disintegration, because factionalism within it continued unchecked.

What perpetuated factionalism in KANU also had to do with its organisation. Since KANU was a coalition of district notables with their parties, its branches remained stronger than the headquarters even after it was in government. In 1961, it had as many as 30 branches. This was the
number of delegations that had formed it at Kiambu the previous year. The chairmen of the branches were the district notables, and were moreover represented on the party's governing council. In terms of sheer numbers the branch chairmen could, if they wished, outvote the few members of the elected executive council. Election to the executive council was moreover done by a delegates conference, consisting of delegations from the branches selected by their respective chairmen. The party was hooked on the districts and the centre remained weak, encouraging indiscipline and factionalism.

The party as a means of serving Kenya was only a secondary consideration, after personal and factional motives. The issue of personal motives in politics is complex. A politician may fight to become leader of his party, but not necessarily because he believes in the party ideology or the good that the party can do for the country. More likely it is because he knows that a position of leadership would enable him to acquire personal rewards, such as wealth. In terms of personalities, KANU’s weakness was due to the fact that it was made up of men who were, or considered themselves and acted as if, they were bigger than the party. The party existed to serve these men rather than the other way round. The party’s rules and constitution were disregarded. Bennett and Rosberg (1961:42), sum up the problem of personalities that beset KANU during this period nicely, in the following words.

Factions were fostered in a competition for influence and control of the party; they then became an end in themselves; their success being more important to certain leaders than the success of the party as a whole. As KANU branches evolved from previous local district associations, many took on the characteristics of local autonomous parties, sending delegates rather than representatives to the national

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4 KANU in fact did not have an 'authorised' constitution. According to Bienen (1974:82), there were in the middle 1960s a number of different versions of the party's constitution. As these versions were not dated, it was not possible to know which was the authoritative one.
governing council.

But while factionalism in the party kept it weak and disorganised, this did not undermine the position of Kenyatta, nor encourage the other notables to challenge him. The party’s weakness as an organisation likewise made it useless as a route to challenge the leader, through, as we will see in Chapter 5-6, Kenyatta was able to use as an agent of control. This was the great difference between the positions of Obote and Kenyatta as far as party factionalism was concerned. Since he could not stop it, Kenyatta allowed factionalism to flourish in KANU, but carefully set the government above the party (Bienen 1974:81-7). Therefore, no matter how weakened the party was, and no matter how powerful a notable became within a party, neither was in a position to pose a threat to Kenyatta. KADU’s early dissolution also made KANU the only political arena, so that a notable who had ambitions for party leadership faced the difficult task of forming a new party.

Whereas in Kenya most local politicians needed to associate themselves with Kenyatta even in their own districts to enhance their own popularity (the clear exception here was Oginga Odinga, who, as I show below, was politically self-sufficient and did not need any association with Kenyatta), in Uganda Obote the leader needed the local notables more than they needed him. Factionalism and the weakness of KANU proved to be an advantage to Kenyatta, while the weakness of UPC and factionalism were to Obote’s disadvantage. For instance in 1965 KANU also created 8 vice-presidents, (one each for the seven regions in addition to Oginga Odinga). But this was designed to undermine Odinga Oginga, who since 1960 had been the sole vice-president and built some following within the party. The arrangement strengthened Kenyatta’s position because it
ensured that there was no alternative focus of power so close to him in the party. Moreover, whereas Kenyatta imposed the diffusion of power from a position of strength, Obote had to accept the same from a position of weakness.

Oginga Odinga and Nyanza Province

Nyanza Province under Oginga Odinga provides a good example of regions as political fiefdoms of the notables. Odinga’s stronghold Central Nyanza District, subsequently became the political nerve centre of the whole of Nyanza Province. He had started building himself in 1946 when he set up the Luo Thrift Trading Corporation, to help Africans to establish small businesses in Kisumu, where, according to Odinga (1967:80), Asians dominated trade and ‘Africans did not own a single business’. It opened a string of shops and a few hotels in the town and other centres in the province. It also owned and published a weekly paper, the Nyanza Times. By the 1950 Odinga had established himself as the undisputed leader of Nyanza and the Luo people: in 1953 he was elected president of the Luo Union, their “national” political party.

Following the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, and opening of the Legislative Council to directly elected African members, Odinga was the obvious choice for Nyanza. It was through Odinga that KANU spread to Nyanza Province after the party was founded in March 1960. Indeed at first it was thought that KANU was a part of the Luo Thrift Trading Corporation because the party branch offices were set near, and often operated from the offices of the former. (Lonsdale 1968:146n). Although he portrayed himself as a nationalist (Oginga 1967), the substance of his politics, as that of other politicians in Kenya (Chapter 5-6), was provincial
and local. During the campaign for the 1963 elections, for example, Odinga concentrated his campaign speeches mostly on rural development issues in Nyanza, such as cooperative farming and small trading enterprises (Gertzel 1970:101-2).

In Chapter 6 we will discuss how his strong hold on Nyanza led to the development of conflicts between him and both Mboya and Kenyatta, and how it led to his eventual expulsion from the party in 1966.

**Factionalism and the Independence Bargains**

Besides increasing conflicts among the political leaders and the effects of this on the ruling parties, factionalism trapped political development by the demands it placed on the centre to satisfy district and provincial particularism. The reason for this was that in the pursuit of their interests, the politicians adopted their respective ethnic groups and districts as their causes. In a more conventional political setting, the pursuit of political ambitions can produce positive results for the state because political competition revolves around issues other than personalities. In the Western democracies, for example, a politician may pursue his or her ambitions by adopting a certain ideology or issues like the provision of education or health as the cause. The adoption of the districts had the unfortunate effect of pitching the districts in Uganda and provinces in Kenya against the central governments, just as the political notables were pitched against Kenyatta and Obote.

It was against the background of these factional struggles, and in order to accommodate or contain the claims of the various factions, that prior to independence the leaders in both countries had to bargain hard amongst themselves on the “terms” of independence at the Lancaster
House constitutional talks in London between 1960 and 1963: Kenya in January 1960 and February 1962; and Uganda in November 1961 and again in June 1962. (Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1960; *Uganda Relationships Commission Report*, 1961; Gertzel et al 1969). The result was that the constitutional settlements at these talks were not only confusing and unworkable, but left the central governments, in legal terms, under considerable control by the provinces and districts. Uganda’s relationship with Buganda was for example described as federal, that of the kingdoms of Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro were semi-federal, while the other districts had normal or unitary relationship with the central government. Kenya had a similarly decentralised and even more confusing constitution. These are discussed below.

**Federal Constitution and the UPC/KY Alliance in Uganda, 1962-1964**

Uganda’s independence constitution of 1962 represented a considerable surrender to the periphery and surrender to the demands of Buganda. Uganda was formally divided into 5 kingdoms and 10 districts, each with varying degrees of autonomy. The kingdoms were defined as federal states within Uganda, with their own governments and services. Although the National Assembly was described as supreme, the legislatures of the kingdoms were in fact above it. It was stated that after 'full independence, the Assembly would become a sovereign legislature, subject always to the entrenched rights of the kingdoms and other restrictions in the constitution (*Relationships Commission Report*, 1961:62, emphasis added)

The Buganda lukikko in particular was given 'exclusive powers' to make laws for Buganda with regard to the public service, taxation, the powers

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and duties of ministers of its government and its own national holidays and festivals. The few areas in which the central government had jurisdiction within Buganda were external affairs, defence, passports, professional qualifications and external trade (Uganda Protectorate 1961:34-5; Sathyamurthy 1986:416-7). It was granted twenty-one members in the National Assembly (formerly Legislative Council), which it had the option to elect directly or nominate through the lukikko (its parliament), and 3 members for Kampala to be directly elected.

The constitution also provided for the election of constitutional heads in each district to raise their status to a par with that of the kingdoms. The secular districts were not granted the right to indirectly elect their representatives, but this was not a problem since the notables in each district and the district councils were in a position to ensure that the notables themselves, and nobody else, were always elected. As a result, none of the districts objected to Buganda indirectly electing its representatives. Only the DP, and for its own interests, opposed the plan and stood for direct elections nationally, and for a strong central government.

The most significant immediate direct result of these constitutional provisions was that the elections of June 1962, held to determine the independence government, had an inconclusive outcome. None of the parties (UPC, DP and KY) were able to form a government alone, leading to the ill-fated UPC/KY alliance (1962-1964). Anticipating such an outcome, the two parties had at the end of 1961 made a plan under which UPC undertook not to contest any seats within Buganda in the 1962 elections so that the twenty-one places granted for Buganda under the constitution

6"Secular districts" to distinguish them from the kingdom districts. Before the abolition of kingdoms in 1966 and breaking of Buganda in 3 districts, the kingdoms also constituted administrative districts.
would be filled by the lukikko’s nominees.

The scheme worked and KY was able to nominate all twenty-one representatives to the National Assembly. The DP won only 3 seats within Buganda and 21 elsewhere in the country. The UPC/KY alliance therefore formed the government, with DP in opposition. The strength of the government in the National Assembly at independence on October 1962 was 67 seats against the DP’s 24. Although the alliance was consistent with the politics of factionalism, it was unfortunate because it undermined the government’s freedom of action. In theory, if KY-Buganda had not been granted as many as 21 indirectly elected seats, the alliance might not have been necessary since either DP or UPC could have emerged strong enough to rule alone.

The constitution lasted for a while because the UPC was in no position to change or even threatened to change it. For within the UPC-led government, the KY members could defend it as a way of safeguarding Buganda interests. Their support was necessary for any constitutional change, which required a majority of 75 per cent in both the lukikko and the National Assembly. Furthermore, within the government itself, Obote’s fifteen member cabinet included 5 KY members, two of whom held the important ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs (Jorgensen 1981:218-9). As representatives of the lukikko they could not support any anti-Buganda move by UPC.

The main preoccupation of the central government was sheltering itself, and ensuring that it did not collapse. This effort necessarily involved appeasing the notables whose demands were the reason for the centre’s weakness, and this again involved giving additional powers to the districts. As I will show below in the case study of Sebei District between

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7Actual result was UPC, 37 seats; DP, 24 seats and KY 21 seats. But the constitution provided for 9 specially elected members. Of these the UPC had 5 and KY 4.
1860 and 1964, the politics of factionalism led to the accumulation of power by districts and district notables which they did not have at the time of independence.

**Regionalism in Kenya**

Like Uganda, Kenya started independence with a severely decentralised constitution known as *majimbo* (or regionalism). This provided for a power-sharing between the central government and regional governments. The country was divided into 7 provinces: Nyanza Province, Southern Province, Northern Province, Coastal Province, Central Province, Rift Valley Province and Nairobi Province. Constitutionally the provinces were almost autonomous mini-states with their own governments, each of which had the attributes of a national government: they had their own regional assemblies, with both legislative and executive powers; separate police force; independent financial control, and control over land.

The regions derived their power direct from the constitution, not from the central government. The central government itself was divided into a lower and an upper houses (or the "commons" house for Kenya as a whole and the "lords" house for the provinces). Members of the lower house were elected directly by their constituents, but the upper house was indirectly elected by the districts.

To change the constitution in any way required a 75 per cent majority in each house, and to change it in ways that would affect 'the entrenched rights of regions or districts' a majority of 90 per cent of the upper house was required. (Kenya Colony and Protectorate 1961:129). The upper house therefore held virtual powers of veto in regard to
constitutional amendments, and by projection over policy formulation. The only areas in the regions where the central government had unrestricted jurisdiction were defence, international trade and major economic development projects. Even for the purpose of maintaining law and order, or in order to pursue criminals, the central government could legally act only at the invitation or consent of the regional government concerned.

The complex legal details of which power belonged to which level of government did not by themselves present KANU with many problems. At any rate, the party did not implement the majimbo constitution, or adopt it as the legal instrument. That the majimbo constitution remained on the books as long as it did was due to the fact that KANU lacked the constitutional means of removing it. If the party ha its way, the majimbo constitution would never have entered the legal books of Kenya. The main reason for the brief operation of the constitution was that as a party KANU was too divided to implement policies that, individually, the members approved of in principle, out of fear that their cooperation might strengthen their opponents within the party itself.

From the time of internal self-rule and the whole of the first year of independence, the Kenya government was in no position to act decisively against the constitution because most of the politicians fought for their local power bases at the expense of the centre. KANU sought without success to establish its authority over the regions and ambitious ministers within the parties of the coalition. Moreover Ronald Ngala, the KADU leader, was at that time the minister of regional administration, responsible for centre-regional relations. As KADU supported regionalism, Ngala was in a position to frustrate KANU’s declared policy of destroying the regional assemblies, and actually tried to weaken the centre even more.
in favour of the regions. According to Oginga Odinga, the vice-president, Ngala was able to 'dismantle the centralised machinery of administration and transfer it to the regions' (1967:234). While this, coming from Ngala's opponent, may be an exaggeration, it does show the amount of frustration within the KANU leadership against the regions.

Implications for Obote and Kenyatta

Although the weakness of KANU and UPC as parties of government was not the most serious problem the new states faced during their first years of independence, their central roles as governing parties made their abilities or weaknesses crucial to the immediate and future development of the two countries. It fell on them to manage the new states. The manner in which they set about the task of 'nation building' have had important bearings on how the states have developed since.

It was the the manner in which the leaders of the parties sought to overcome their weaknesses that led to the forging of clientelistic ties. Obote was, from the beginning, unable to establish a formal or recognised pattern whereby resources necessary for the maintenance of patron-client relations could be seen to be controlled and dispensed by him. To put it another way, he was unable to gain direct control over political resources, and became a competitor in patronage politics. His problems were compounded even here by the fact that, as a minor notable, he had to compete with other other notables with more established holds on local politics in their districts. The other prominent politicians within UPC remained his equals or superiors; as a result the party had a sort a collective leadership, which only increased factionalism. Kenyatta, on the other hand, guarded his position as the grand patron, with unwritten but
clearly understood rules of who would get political resources and who would not. Kenyatta also had the option to use the constitution as a political weapon if necessary, and this increased his existing strength, an alternative not open to Obote. The terms of the UPC/KY alliance tied Obote's hands: for the time being the constitution was not a weapon he could use. This was the essential distinction between the two leaders as far as the construction and management of patron-client relations was concerned.

A final point to note is the availability of political resources to KANU and UPC. This is important when considering why Kenyatta was more successful in establishing and managing clientelism than Obote. In this regard, the extent to which the two governments controlled economic resources was critically important. The government of Kenya had control of substantial economic resources, including control of land. In the next chapter we will discuss how Obote and Kenyatta responded to the problem of factionalism around them between 1964-1966.
CHAPTER FIVE

Politics of Local-Central Relations and its Effects, 1964-1967

We have noted that the strength of the party notables in both Kenya and Uganda derived from their dominant positions in the districts, in particular from their control over, or at least influence on, the district administrations. This was especially so in Uganda. The danger of there being several mini-states within the two larger ones was becoming a reality.

The response of the central governments to this situation was to attempt to wrest control of the district administrations from the notables. In the two years from mid 1964 to mid 1966, the central governments systematically undermined the relative autonomy of the provinces and the districts, and UPC and KANU had become, in different ways and to different degrees, the dominant centres of power. In Uganda, by the end of 1964 the party’s strength in the 92-member National Assembly had increased to 60 from the original 41 at independence and all the district councils were controlled by UPC councillors (Sathymurthy 1981). In Kenya, the dissolution of KADU in November 1964 left KANU the only political party, and Kenya had become a de-facto one party state.

But there were important differences between the positions of Obote and Kenyatta after the undermining of the oppositions. Due to the different methods used in overcoming opposition to the centres, the impact of the assertion of central control on factionalism in the two countries was quite different. Factionalism intensified in Uganda and the
notables become potentially more dangerous to Obote, while in Kenya Kenyatta’s position was strengthened and made more secure.

In this chapter I will discuss the process and methods by which UPC and KANU undermined the power of the districts and provinces, and how Obote and Kenyatta asserted their control (through not authority) over the parties. There are three main sections. In the first I will demonstrate how the assimilation of the districts in Uganda strengthened rather than weakened the notables against Obote. In the second I will show how, in contrast, the undermining of the provinces in Kenya through the civil service strengthened Kenyatta’s position against the notables. In the last section I will comment on the implications of the ways in which factionalism was contained, and assess the relative positions and strengths of Obote and Kenyatta within their respective parties and governments.

Increased Factionsm and the Power of the Notables in Uganda

As already noted, in Uganda the districts were the most important political units, their positions being constitutionally entrenched in the Independence Constitution of 1962. The political importance of Uganda’s district councils, as far as their relations with the Central Government was concerned, had rested to a large extent on their powers to make appointments to public offices in the districts. After the District Administration (District Council) Ordinance of 1955 (discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), local appointments boards were set up in each of Uganda’s 15 districts under the control of the District Administration. The district councils therefore controlled all the important resources in the district, such as jobs, contracts and licensing. As we will see in a moment, this was in stark contrast to the developments in Kenya, where these very resources
were shifted in the hands of the Provincial Commissioners; and since the Provincial Commissioners were directly appointed by Kenyatta, he retained control of the resources. Also in Uganda, provincial councils, which could have provided alternative source of employment and patronage as in Kenya, were abolished in 1955. The supervisory post of Provincial Commissioners were abolished in 1962 and the roles taken over by District Commissioners. (Burke 1977. See Figure 5.1).

Furthermore, as in most developing countries, there was hardly any prospect of meaningful employment outside the civil service. District administrations became the key to anyone’s advancement. And herein lay their political importance to the notables: whoever controlled them politically was assured of power. With the commitment of the UPC Government to a strong central government, control of the district councils was therefore an important objective in the calculations of national politicians. As a result from 1962 the party notables, with the active support of the Government, became heavily involved in district council politics. But it is important to stress that it was individual ministers, often on their own behalf and in their own districts, who established UPC as the dominant party. This helps to explain why, even when the UPC had severely undermined DP influence in politics after 1964, Obote as leader remained weak, while Kenyatta remained strong as leader although KANU was a weak party organisationally.

In terms of hierarchal set up, a district administration at that time was divided into two branches. One was the legislative branch (the District Council) and the other was the executive branch (the District Administration). After independence the practice during the colonial period continued, and the district councils were democratically elected within the districts, and made local laws in addition to providing local
services (see Chapter 3). But the implementation of Central Government regulations, the signing of contracts and any liaisons with bodies outside the districts, were the responsibility of the District Administration, a body consisting of three non-councillor officials – the Secretary-General was the chief executive, assisted by the Assistant-Secretary General and the Financial Secretary. The positions of these officials were laid down in the Local Government Ordinance of 1962, enacted before full independence by the DP caretaker government, and retained by KY/UPC after independence. It was stipulated that these three officials were ‘elected by the district councils by a direct majority’ (Sathymurthy 1981:51).

But this changed in 1962 when the District Administration was placed under the Ministry of Regional Administration. It was by the simple expedient of taking away the power to elect these officials from the district councils that UPC control was established over the district. The UPC notables wanted to eliminate DP influence from the districts. For while in the National Assembly the government held a comfortable majority of the DP, and KY members in the coalition posed no threat to UPC, the situation in the districts was different. In Acoli District, for example, DP was the majority party, and the struggle between the two parties made administration impossible for long periods. Inter-party struggles and quarrels over the election of the three officials in Teso, Kigezi and Bunyoro similarly affected the smooth running of administration. (Leys 1967:92-5; Sathyamurthy 1981:105-120; Burke 1977).

By 1964 the Minister of Regional Administration had taken powers ‘to choose the Secretary General and the Financial Secretary from a list of names submitted by the council’ (Sathyamurthy 1981:51). Even the District Council Chairman and Administrative Secretary (the latter being the executive officers), were now appointed by the Minister in this manner.
Figure 5.1

Structure of Local Government in Kenya, showing direct control from the Office of the President

Note: Since 1968 the third tier (local Councils) have been abolished

Figure 5.2

Structure of Local Government in Uganda, 1962-1973, showing no direct control by the Chief Executive

Source: Sketch by the Author, from Robertson, 1982
The Minister also took powers ‘to speak ... at any council [meetings] and to appoint a chairman to any council which failed to do so [and] keep such a chairman in office in spite of any council resolution to remove him.

The ministers who held the Regional Administration portfolio between 1962 and 1967, C. Obwangor (1962 -1964) and J. Lwamafa (1964 -1967), were largely responsible for extending UPC control over the districts. But this “party penetration” was uncoordinated by the party, and resulted in strengthening individual UPC MPs rather than the party, and less still Obote. (See Burke 1977; 1967; Sathyamurthy 1981). The basic characteristics of the UPC as a coalition party of powerful district notables was not only maintained but also promoted, with a corresponding weakening of Obote’s position.

The Ministry of Regional Administration was thus able to ensure that in each district these important offices were filled by active UPC supporters, which in this local setting meant the supporters of clients of the district UPC notable. Also, the criteria for their appointments were party affiliations and support, and the recommendation of the notables, and not merit. In February 1964, for example, Obwangor, acting on behalf of Felix Onama, the MP for Madi District, appointed T. Akuti as District Financial Secretary even when the whole council opposed his appointment (Bundy 1977b:279-84). As Sathymurthy (1981:50-51) has noted, the appointment of civil servants for the purpose of political expediency had led to the complete politicisation of the Uganda civil service even before the 1967 republican constitution. As already noted, these appointments in the final analysis merely increased the powers of the local UPC MPs. For while in theory the politicisation of appointments in the civil service helps in strengthening the position of the leader, as it did in Kenya under Kenyatta, the effect in Uganda in relation to Obote’s position
was different. This was because the appointees remained the clients of the respective district notables, not Obote’s direct clients. As such his opponents within the party were strengthened, which further weakened his position.

Two conclusions may be drawn on the assumption of the appointment powers by the local notable in the name of the Central Government and the ends to which they applied these powers. First, UPC dominance was established in the districts and DP influence was undermined in district politics through these political appointments. In every district the Minister of Regional Administration naturally used his powers to the benefit of the local UPC notable even if there was no direct personal benefit for in it for him. Secondly, a sort of order was imposed on district politics through the elimination of DP influence and neutralising the disruptive activities of uncooperative UPC members in district politics, especially in districts like Acoli. The segmentary pre-colonial political system of the Acoli had promoted loyalty at the clan level, so when districts were imposed over several clans, intense clan and sub-county competition made district government almost impossible. (Leys 1967; Bundy 1977). But their most important effect remained the strengthening of the local UPC notables against the centre. (Compare Figure 5.3)

An example of how the position of local notables were strengthened may be noted here. In 1964, Obwangor appointed Lakidi, MP, and Obita for chairman and deputy chairman respectively to the Acoli District Council in the face of opposition of the majority of the councillors. Obita’s support in the district council was only half that of the other candidate, Akera: but since Akera was an opponent of Lakidi, and had aligned with the DP in a previous vote of no-confidence in the UPC Secretary General of the
council, P. Oola. Obita’s appointment thus eliminated both DP and anti-Lakidi influence in the council. (Bundy 1977:36-7). Also in 1965, in the face of fierce opposition from the members of Kigezi District Council, Lwamafa, the Minister of Regional Administration and Kigezi UPC notable, chose his friend, Bitakaramire, as chairman of the council. (Connor 1977:236-7).

In Madi District, although the District Council was predominantly UPC, and all the names submitted to the minister were those of UPC members, some council members did not like the eventual appointment, on the grounds that one official had only recently defected from DP, and a delegation went to Kampala to protest. But the minister, Obwangor, ‘simply told them that he had consulted the Honourable Onama, the Minister of Internal Affairs [MP for the District], who had agreed to the appointments, and so the decision was final’. (Bundy 1977b:283). Sathymurthy (1981: Chapter 3) recounts intervention by the Ministry of Regional Administration in similar situation in Kigezi and Toro during the same period.

The last Central Government legislation designed to perpetuate UPC hold over the districts was enacted in 1967 - the Local Administration Act, 1967. This act primarily aimed at incorporating the former kingdom areas, including Buganda, into a uniform local administration system with the rest of the country after the crisis of 1966 and the subsequent abolition of kingdoms. Buganda was divided into three districts - West Mengo, Masaka and Mubende - which brought the total number of districts in the country up from 15 to 18. But a significant, though somewhat unnecessary, clause was the requirement that henceforth teachers could not become district council members. It was not particularly necessary because the UPC was already in an unassailable position in the districts. The significance of
the act was that the removal of teachers from district council politics was a severe blow to the DP. At both national and local levels DP politicians were mostly teachers. Although teachers were fairly well represented in Uganda politics as a whole – for example 34.6 per cent of the candidates in the 1962 National Assembly Elections were teachers (Uganda National Assembly Elections, 1962) – most of them tended to be DP and Catholic. In Acoli District in the same year, ‘all 21 elected [DP] councillors were Catholics – and about 80 per cent of them teachers in Catholic schools’ (Bundy 1977:32).

**Effects of UPC Success on Obote’s Position**

The success of UPC in undermining DP and extending its control over the districts in 1962-1964 led to increased conflicts and factionalism within the party leadership. As the party became “externally” stronger with increased resources, competition for the control of these resources among the leaders increased proportionately. They supported the party and even praised Obote in order to use both of them. The leaders flocked to the party merely because it was the best-resourced arena, not to support a cause or the party itself, but to compete over the resources. They now more or less controlled the party rather than the other way round. Glentworth and Hancock (1973:240) accurately describe this situation and Obote’s position during this period:

Ministers, district commissioners and even some permanent secretaries saw themselves, and were regarded, as the chief patrons and protectors of their localities, and in accordance with the system their relatives and clients came to Kampala or gathered at district headquarters to claim their appointments, promotions and financial rewards...For ... Obote it meant that as chief patron he could widen his power base [but] without being completely secure or certain about his following.
It was this situation which undermined Obote's position as leader, forcing him to throw himself in the on-going factionalism in order to survive. His intervention was a critical step because it effectively put his position as one of the prizes in the factional struggle. In fact, as I will show in a moment, it was precisely his intervention, and the effort to settle the leadership question, which precipitated the series of events leading to the 1966 crisis. For until 1966 the question of who was the effective (rather than the formal) leader was not settled.

Establishment of Presidential Control in Kenya

In Kenya, the problems of central-local relations was resolved in a simple but highly effective way: by eliminating the "relationship" itself, so that the Central Government and the various units of local administration became one and the same thing. The provinces, which the majimbo constitution had made as the political fiefdoms of the notables, were taken over by Kenyatta, and turned into administrative rather than political institutions. This undermined their importance to the notables since they no longer provided routes to the top. The notables were, so to speak, rendered politically homeless because the ground was cut off from under their feet. They thus needed Kenyatta's support more than the other way round. What Kenyatta needed and used was not therefore the notables, but the Provincial Administration; and not KANU or Parliament or even the Cabinet, but the Presidency itself (On this see Bienen 1974; Gertzel 1970; Mueller 1976; Karim and Ochieng 1980; Throup 1987). Below I look at these two important instruments of presidential control, the Provincial Administration and the Presidency, in some detail. In shifting these two
agencies, Kenyatta was able not only to avoid reliance on the party, but also to actually control it, or when convenient, to ignore the factional struggles within it.

The Provincial Administration

At independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a well developed Provincial Administration. The Provincial Administration had acted as the major agent of control to the colonial Governor especially during the difficult days of the emergency and "Mau Mau" uprising, when the colonial administration used it 'to ensure stability and the continuation of British rule' (Mueller 1984:402; See also Bienen 1974). The administration of Home Guards, detention centres, and new villages set up during the emergency had required the strengthening of the Provincial Administration, so that at independence it had become a highly efficient machinery of government.

Besides, the Provincial Administration that Kenyatta inherited was to some extent more powerful than it had been during the colonial days. The KADU-led coalition government during internal self-government (May 1963-December 1963), due to its commitment to and in order to make the majimbo constitution work, had sought to weaken the centre by transferring powers to the regions (Odinga 1967). Constitutionally, therefore, the provinces constituted sorts of mini-states within Kenya during that brief period. But Kenyatta, rather than dismantling their powers (which in any case he could not have easily done), chose to 'take them over' and turn them into his agents. In terms of central-local relations, therefore, Kenyatta was the colonial Governor reincarnated, with the provinces as his agents rather than competitors. In fact Kenyatta
has sometimes been described as "the last colonial Governor of Kenya" because of this position (Bienen 1974:77).

The hierarchal set up of the Provincial Administration is shown in Figure 5.2 (p 96 above). Under the provincial commissioners were district commissioners at the head of each district, each with district officers, senior district officers and assistant district assistants. Below the district assistants were chiefs and sub-chiefs. Before independence and during the period of internal self-government, it had been under the Ministry of Home Affairs. But in 1964 it was transferred to the Office of the President, presumably because Oginga Odinga, them Minister of Home Affairs, attempted to turn it into a political weapon for his own use by seeking to institute more direct links between the national executive and the civil servants so as to undermine the Regional Authorities (Gertzel 1966:202-4).

Under the new arrangement, the Provincial Administration was headed by the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, who was also Secretary to the Cabinet, and who reported directly to the President Kenyatta. The appointment of chiefs and sub-chiefs was the responsibility of the President, who selected them from a list of names submitted by the district commissioner concerned. The provincial commissioners, being appointees, had no independent power base, nor could they create any as they were not allowed to engage in any form of party political activity. Unlike the District Administration officers in Uganda, the provincial officers in Kenya were therefore not available as clients for the district notables. The KANU notables were thus cut off from real political support from their own areas because open support for a politician by a civil servant carried severe potential sanctions. They had to do Kenyatta's bidding, even if that meant, as it often did, acting against the local KANU party leader, MP or a minister. In 1965 Mboya spelt out these sanctions as
including ‘dismissal .. reduction of rank or seniority ... stoppage of increment and retirement’ (Gertzel et al 1969:357). Such threats from the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, as Mboya then was, acted as sufficient deterrent. This was why, as already noted, they did not become the agents of local political notables as in the case of district officials and UPC notables in Uganda.

In fact the two groups were in perpetual conflict because each ‘believed that it was the legitimate representative of the people’ (Gertzel 1966:202). The effect of this was that the strength of the provinces became the strength of the President. And since the Provincial Administration controlled political resources, for example licensing, registration of business, societies and clubs, as well as issuing permits for the organisation of meetings and rallies, they held effective power over the local politicians. The Provincial Administration worked closely with the local agents of the Registry of Societies, a branch of the Attorney General’s Office, and ultimately under Kenyatta’s control.

The Presidency

Within the Government itself KANU notables were also deprived of real power. Unlike in Uganda, all the important political functions in Kenya were concentrated in the Presidency and in loyal hands. Just as Kenyatta controlled the individuals in the Presidency from above, the Presidency as an institution controlled the whole country, in an intricate clientelistic network. KANU was relegated to the background. Its importance became largely as a recruiting arena into one of these central institutions and into politics in general. (I will return to this in Chapter 6). Now I turn to look in some detail at the individuals who constituted the Presidency.
From independence in 1963 Kenyatta had built around him a small but powerful group of confidants on whose loyalty he relied entirely. This was the group sometimes called the "Kiambu Group", "KANU A", the "Court" or the "Gatundu Group". The significant thing about the group was that all the members came from Kiambu District in Kikuyu, and each had an intimate personal relationship with Kenyatta, and collectively they made up the presidency. (See Karim and Ochieng 1980; Murray 1968:44-8; Throup 1987:46-50). It consisted of Mbiyu Koinange, Kenyatta's brother-in-law and head of the Provincial Administration, the Special Branch (GSU), and the Police; Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta's nephew, personal physician and at different times minister of defence and foreign affairs, and Charles Njonjo, the Attorney General. Their relationship to Kenyatta was that between a patron and his clients. Collectively Kenyatta could not do without them because they were stronger than him and sometimes made decisions without his knowledge. But individually each depended on the President. If Kenyatta wished he could dismiss or demote any one of them. This was especially true of Mungai and Njonjo, because unlike Koinange they had no independent political power base.

None of the other important politicians who at one time or another assumed prominent positions in Kenya politics during Kenyatta's presidency, such as Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Mwai Kibaki, Joe Murumbi and Moi, were so close to Kenyatta. Moi, Mboya, Odinga and to some extent Kibaki each had his personal power base in their respective districts (unions in the case of Mboya) and could not be treated as loyal clients. They were excluded from the inner cycle when convenient.

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1This is important because it "sounds" as though Mboya's assassination in 1969 involved some of Kenyatta's powerful clients, without his being able to anything about it, either before or after. (See Goldsworthy 1982:264-279). In terms of the exercise of power, Kenyatta's relationship with these particular notables was like that of a knight on his impulsive horse in the wilderness: he could direct the horse but dare not hurt it seriously as he depends on it to carry him home.
The relationship between Kenyatta and the top politicians in the government was demonstrated in May 1968 when the President had a sudden heart attack. For two days no one except Mungai, Koinange, Njonjo and Moi (then Vice-President) knew of Kenyatta’s condition. ‘The other cabinet ministers were told nothing, and the government remained silent...’ (Murray 1968:44). It was these politicians within the government who ruled Kenya on behalf of Kenyatta. His open disengagement from everyday politics indicated his confidence in them as clients. Since his political survival was also the survival of these clients, they worked to ensure just that.

Even the dissolution of KADU and establishment of a republic in 1964, which in theory should have posed a threat to Kenyatta’s position because of the increased number of notables within one political arena, in practice strengthened his position. The political paradox after the establishment of Republic in 1964 was that the ruling party, KANU, remained weak and poorly organised, while the government, centred around Jomo Kenyatta, became progressively stronger. The weakness of KANU as a party of government was thus amply made up for by and simultaneously reinforced the strength of the government itself as the organ of central control. The positions of these two organs of state, party and government, were such that unlike in the more conventional settings where the government depended on, and in theory derived its power and essence from the party (for example in Uganda and Tanzania before 1970)

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2 A myriad of examples of the importance of TANU in Tanzania can be cited. After the 1964 army mutiny, TANU established organisational links with the most important forces in the country, such as the military, the civil service and youth organisations. The Arusha Declaration required MPs to toe the party line. Also in 1962 Nyerere resigned from the prime ministership specifically to reorganise the party; thus emphasising its importance to the government. In Uganda, as already noted, Obote was unable to make his government stronger than and (had he tried) independent from the party.
the Kenya government derived its essence from, and depended on, the Presidency. The government could, and to a large measure did, function "without" the party. As such the widespread factional in-fighting within the party did not affect the ability of the government to govern. Neither did it lead to the weakness of the government as it did in Uganda. The contrary was the case because the relative unimportance of the party meant that the government became 'the real thing', able to build itself support as it wished and on its own terms and without bothering about party regulations.

The successful shift of power from the party to the government early on is important in understanding the political stability of Kenya after independence. For if power had remained in the party, the competition for it among the politicians would have overwhelmed the political process (as it did in Uganda), because of the absence of a well-evolved political institution in the country to act as a reference point and the coalition nature of KANU itself, coupled with the sheer diversity of Kenyan society. The shift of power also made it easier for Kenyatta to establish patron-client relations on a less risky and therefore more durable basis because it was clear that no one except himself as head of government was in charge. The diffusion of power among the notables who made up the UPC in Uganda had led to Obote's weakness as leader since few needed him politically as he was himself a competitor for the resources of patronage. In Kenya Kenyatta avoided this trap.

The Positions of Obote and Kenyatta in a Comparative Perspective

In Kenya, the firm control over the Provincial Administration by the Presidency, and Kenyatta's personal control over the Presidency itself,
meant that the notion of political control was real. The concentration of power at the centre in the hands of Kenyatta, not KANU, also meant that in the final analysis there was an institution able to regulate political issues at all times. Factionalism was not reduced, but it was dispersed to the political periphery and kept there, because the Presidency (the institution) and the KANU (the political arena) had became separate with the party under, and not above, the Presidency. KANU became a tool for the needs of the Presidency. The Government made no secret of where real power lay, nor of the fact that KANU was considered relatively irrelevant compared to the Presidency. This preference of the Presidency as the centre of power was explained by Mboya in 1964 as follows. ‘KANU leaders have decided that it is the government that will be the ... authority in the land, and the ruling party ... must become the instrument aiding the government in its tasks and efforts’ (Good 1966:119). This sent the message to any ambitious politician that one’s best chances of political advancement lay in being loyal to the Presidency.

For Obote Kenyatta’s position was a political luxury beyond his wildest dreams. For reasons already discussed Obote was unable to establish effective control over UPC and remained dependent on it. This was one of the decisive factors which made the political developments of the two countries so different after that date. “Centralisation” in Uganda was not really centralisation because UPC dominated the country without centralising power in the hands of the Government or Obote. Worse, power was dispersed in different hands within the party. Therefore, once the opposition parties were eliminated from effective competition within this arena of power and state resources, competition within the ranks of UPC intensified. Factionalism in Uganda was therefore tragically concentrated at the centre. It important to bear in mind Obote’s position of
Figure 5.3
Patron-Client Relations in Kenya after independence, showing Kenyatta's overall control

Figure 5.4
Obote's Relations with the UPC Notables

Sketch by the Author
weakness in understanding the manner he and the government responded to the series of crises from 1964 to 1966. These crises included the army mutiny of January 1964; the break-up of the alliance with KY (August 1964); the resolution of the issue of the "lost counties" of Bunyoro (November 1965); the "gold allegation", and finally the destruction of the kingdom of Buganda in 1966. The last was followed by the establishment of a unitary state in the interim constitution of 1966.

To a large extent all these crises were related, with one leading, often directly, to the other. As leader Obote had to jump trains to reach any destination. In view of both the number and seriousness of the problems Obote survived, the period has sometimes been called a revolutionary period, and seen as a blessing for Uganda. (Young 1966; Obote 1969; Adoko 1970). In the view of these writers, the period was the era in which Uganda finally solved its major problems of regional and factional particularism and achieved unity. It is true that by the end of 1966 the central government had technically established its control over Buganda, the army and to some extent the party, but in the final analysis these successes were more of a curse than a blessing when the country's long term interests are considered.

For regardless of Obote's temporary triumphs, Uganda's political experience between 1964 and 1966 provided the basis of unstable political development. What might have happened if Obote did not succeed must remain anybody's guess. It was the manner of the resolution, and how they provided the basis of further instability, rather than the resolutions themselves, that need to be considered.

Obote's attempt to free himself from their control and establish his domination became confused in a series of alliances from the very beginning. Obote's first alliance was with Kakonge from 1960 to 1962. But
he was forced to abandon Kakonge to the Ibingira faction in 1964 and from that time he was more or less in a fluid position. From 1964, he had apparently shifted his alliance onto his fellow-Langi politicians, Adoko Nekyon, Akena Adoko and Felix Onama, and, by association, Idi Amin and the army. The effect of these alliances on the party was that instead of 'growing' into a viable political institution, the UPC progressively disintegrated.

It was against the background of factional struggle for the leadership of the party that the 1966 crisis broke out. While a number of events contributed to the 1966 crisis, the most important event was the fall of the UPC-KY alliance in August 1964, and the holding of the referendum over the "lost counties" and their subsequent return to Bunyoro later that year. One of Mutesa's reasons for agreeing to the alliance in the first place had been the hope that it would act as a restraint and prevent Obote holding the proposed referendum on the future of the counties and returning the two counties to Bunyoro. To salvage his reputation within Buganda, Mutesa adopted a confrontational attitude towards the Central Government, and appears to have had both military and constitutional plans for removing Obote from power. The constitutional strategy manifested in the famous "gold allegation" motion brought in parliament by Daudi Ocheng, with the encouragement of Ibingira. Daudi Ochieng accused Idi Amin, and two of Obote's closest associates, Onama and Nekyon, of illegally obtaining gold from Congo (now Zaire), and called for an investigation into the affair. Ocheng was the Secretary General of KY and a close intimate personal friend of the of Mutesa. Ibingira, as Minister of State, UPC Secretary General and Leader of the Cabinet, allowed the motion to proceed after the UPC Parliamentary Group had rejected it off hand when it was first suggested. (Adoko 1970).
Obote’s political weakness was further demonstrated by his response to this threat. Instead of fighting back constitutionally and in parliament, he opted (which he had to in order to survive), for the summary arrest and detention of Ibingira and his associates, and thus put an end to the debate. (Ibingira 1980; Mutibwa 1992). From the end of 1965 Obote resorted to force and authoritarian measures to rule and retain power. His unilateral suspension of the constitution of 1962 in February 1966, and forcible arrest of five cabinet ministers to prevent an imminent vote against him in the “gold allegation” motion were manifestations of authoritarianism. The military action against Kabaka Mutesa three months later, in May, was in his view the final and triumphal act against the Ibingira faction of the party. But contrary to the popular view that Obote consolidated his hold on both the military and UPC after 1966 (Omara Otunnu 1987:66-90; Mutibwa 1992:42-69), what actually happened was the destruction of the Ibingira faction; factionalism continued within his own alliance. His relations with the military, which occupied most of his time from 1966 to his overthrow in 1971, was less than that of a patron and clients.

Conclusion

The success of Kenyatta as a patron, and therefore the basis of political stability, also had much to do with the shifting of power within the government. The shift of power from party to government represented only the ‘outer’ level but in itself was not that important because without any future shift of power the government would have been subject to factionalism and collapse. The relationship between the government and the presidency is therefore important in the understanding of patron-client
relations. KANU depended on the government, which in turn depended on the Presidency, which in its turn depended on the personality of Kenyatta. This was the skeleton of political Kenya. Personalities came and joined the various institutions, the party, government and Presidency, but the institutional order remained unaltered. Even after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Moi simply stepped in the President’s shoes. Despite claims that he ‘destroyed’ the “Kenyatta State” (Throup 1987) the chain of relationships remained the same, serving the state throughout the presidencies of Kenyatta and Moi. Thus Oginga Odinga’s “rebellion” proved ineffective against the institutional skeleton (1966); the state survived the assassinations of Tom Mboya (1969), J.M. Kariuki (1975), Robert Ouko (1988), and an attempted coup d’etat (1982).

The enduring durability (so far) of the Kenyan state has been attributed to the role of Kenyatta as a father figure around whom the diverse forces in the country found unity. (Bienen 1974:72-80). While Kenyatta enjoyed a high degree of popularity until his death and the respect he enjoyed was a factor in Kenya’s stability, this was not solely, or mainly, due to the emotions of devotion. More important was the political structures Kenyatta set under himself once he became leader in 1963. For even if Kenyatta were to become a hated figure (as he became in some sections of his own Kikuyu people after the assassination of J.M. Kariuki in March 1975 (Weekly Review: 7 March, 1975; 9 June, 1975; Throup 1987:48-9; Tamarkin 1978:309-300; ACR 1975-1976:B2201-2), those who might have wished to threaten him politically would have to grapple with more than just their loyalty to him. Loyalty was therefore a convenient but not the

3 This is not to say that it is the institutions – the presidency, government and party – that have clients. It is to stress the importance of these institutions in the ability of the politicians controlling them to recruit clients for themselves. For example, if power had rested in the party rather than in the presidency, Kenyatta himself would have failed as a patron.
essential basis of political stability in Kenya. Kenyatta had constructed a
tight patron-client network that stretched from the presidency through the
government, KANU, to the rural areas. He had ensured that the heads of
all the important institutions of state were tied to him, directly or
indirectly through subordinates. More will be said about the management
of these relationships in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER SIX

Clientelism, Its Management and State Stability in Kenya
1966 - 1975

As we noted in Chapter 5, clientelism had failed to evolve in Uganda due to Obote’s inability to assert his authority over the UPC notables. Factional struggles not only continued but also expanded into other sectors of society, for example the civil service and the military. After the crisis of 1966, but especially after the introduction of the Republican Constitution of 1967, politics in Uganda consisted primarily, to use Bayart’s words, of ‘forging alliances in order to regain or retain power’ (Bayart 1993:211) as an end. In short, factional struggles had deteriorated into spoils politics, in which the winning faction, Obote’s wing of UPC, sought to exclude all other factions from positions of power.

In Kenya, in contrast, Kenyatta had succeeded in generally asserting his authority over the various factions. Factional struggles were transformed into clientelism as a result. As the political experiences of the two countries from 1966 have been very different, their experiences are best considered separately. (See Figure 5.3).

This chapter is concerned with developments in Kenya from 1966 to 1975. It discusses how clientelism emerged as the principal system of rule in Kenya and how it was maintained in that position, so that it remained viable. It is generally a theoretical discussion of how clientelism as a system of rule can be managed. It discusses how Kenyatta maintained it through an elaborate system of control and rewards as well as coercion. For control I suggest that the regime’s access to economic and political
resources made it possible for it to recruit supporters by offering these resources as patronage to those who mattered to it. On the coercive side I argue that Kenyatta succeeded in maintaining clientelism in part because he was willing and able to continue using the constitution as a means of control and also to eliminate his opponents physically if necessary.

The easiest way to appreciate the role of clientelism in state stability in Kenya is to see it as a political institution that under Kenyatta’s guardianship displaced the other institutions that in a conventional setting might have been the primary agents of rule, namely, KANU and Parliament, and the Cabinet. Under Kenyatta both KANU and parliament were weak, and ceased to function as governing institutions. (Bienen 1974:64-78; Tamarkin 1978:297-320; Miller 1984:34-63).

“Institutionalisation of Clientelism” in Kenya

Clientelistic politics, on the other hand, was so well institutionalised that it subordinated these formal institutions. It made them subordinate because in effect parliament, KANU and the Cabinet became primarily the means for recruiting clients for the regime, which controlled access to both of them for this purpose. In this capacity KANU and parliament served the regime rather than the country. Their primary roles were in the regulation of the clientelist system as gates into and out of it; and therefore also in institutionalising and maintaining clientelism. It was in this capacity as the dominant institution that it ensured state stability. As Huntington (1968) has argued both a viable institution and a degree of participation by the population in that institution are necessary for stability of a given state.

For a more detailed discussion on how clientelism as a system of
rule may be said to be institutionalised, see Chapter 2. With regard to Kenya, the displacement of the formal political institutions, KANU, parliament and cabinet by clientelism was important and need to be stressed. If, as in some countries (notably in Italy), clientelism becomes merely an alternative institution alongside the formal state institutions, the effect would be a perpetual instability. If each institution (including clientelism) remained strong enough to undermine the others, the consequence would eventually undermine the viability of each, and ultimately destabilises the whole political system. For example, if Kenyatta established his clientelistic network outside the provincial Administration in Kenya, his agents and the provincial commissioners, performing their formal duties, would be in perpetual conflict. Such competition was avoided in Kenya because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, even within the provinces the provincial commissioners, representing the Presidency, were stronger than the local MPs, who represented KANU.

The viability of clientelism was also ensured, since though it was supreme, it was not insensitive to potential opposition. It was above KANU, but not in opposition to it. As such Kenyatta was able to absorb substantial opposition forces within his clientelist system, at the same time as he undermined those he could not absorb. KADU was dissolved in 1964 and its former leaders became Kenyatta's clients, so to speak. The radical wing of KANU, led by Odinga and Kaggia, were undermined and the leaders politically destroyed. Also when Mboya was assassinated in 1969, the emergence and possible 'institutionalisation' of trade unionism as a powerful organisation in Kenya was prevented. Instead, in recognition of the dangers of opposition to the state and the rewards in supporting it, the various factions became eager to show their support to Kenyatta, which strengthened both his position and clientelism as a system of rule. The
central position this development had accorded to Kenyatta in Kenya politics is clearly borne out in the following observation by the *Weekly Review* of 27 October, 1975:

The temptation on the part of the various political factions within KANU has been to present themselves as more loyal to the President than the other factions. It’s an age-old process of politics ... and has been a constant feature of national life since independence. It speaks very well for the strength of the President, for he is looked upon as a measure of national loyalty... (p. 4)

Management of Clientelism

But it was not enough merely to establish clientelism as the dominant institution. Like other institutions it had to be managed by its own unwritten laws to ensure its own stability in order to ensure that of the state. The instability of empires and other feudal institutions arise from the fact that they are controlled through static forms of clientelism which are incapable of regulating themselves. In a patrimonial clientage, for example, patrons and clients are ‘fixed’, often kinsmen. As a system of rule it remains insensitive to the surrounding political environment. The result is that the state becomes detached from the population as a whole because of the lack of links between them. Since it has no mechanism for absorbing sections from “outside” even on a minimal and periodic basis, public discontent may grow and this is in turn often met by repression. Repression in fact becomes the only state response to threatening developments around it. Revolution would result in the long run. The fall of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia in 1974 is a good example. The progressive disintegration of Zaire since the early 1980s and the political stagnation of Malawi are other cases in which the institution of clientelism
has not been managed. (We will see in Chapters 9 and 10 how the failure to properly manage clientelism under Moi led to this development in Kenya from 1982).

Clientelism in Kenya has however avoided becoming stagnant by constantly reaching out for new clients. There were three major and established systems in which this was done. The first was by the distribution of land and other economic resources, such as retail trade, from the early years of independence. By the 1970s, Kenyatta had already established a narrow but powerful base of support for his regime out of those who had steadily benefited from state patronage.

The second was the celebrated and officially-sanctioned Harambee system of promoting rural development through self-help projects. These projects acted as the means of distributing state resources to the people through selected politicians as the agents of the state. They provided a machinery through which the people as well as the politicians received the rewards of their support of the regime. (See Widner 1992:60-62, and pp. 144-6 below for details).

Entwined with Harambee projects in the regulation of clientelism were the regular elections to which politicians were subjected. As a "movement" it became an important part of electoral politics: a part of the campaign for politicians, and a basis on which the electorate judged whom to vote for. Consequently, elections became the major means by which the regime regulated clientelism because it was able to simultaneously reward loyalty and punish dissent without appearing nepotistic and repressive.

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2 Harambee is a Swahili word meaning roughly "lets pull together", and was used by Kenyatta both as a political philosophy and a rallying slogan. (See Widner 1992:60-110; Thomas 1985; Holmquist 1984, and many others).
Thus elections, through essentially client-recruitment exercises, were an important part of managing the clientelistic system.

Finally, the regime was able and willing to protect the institution of clientelism from ‘external’ attack by ensuring that those it could not bring under its clientelist umbrella were prevented, by any means, from undermining the system. The fates of Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuki, to which we will refer from time to time in this study, illustrated this. (Goldsworthy 1992; Miller 1984; Tamarkin 1978),

Land and Trade Transfer Programmes

In Kenya, perhaps more than other African countries, independence meant more than just the transfer of political power to the nationalist politicians; it also meant the transfer of substantial economic resources that were previously in settler and Asian hands. Thus the politicians who gained power also gained control of economic resources to distribute. Distribution involved the transfer of several categories of land as well as retail and wholesale trade that had been in the control of Europeans and Asians respectively. The Africanisation of the civil service, which opened up career opportunities for Africans, also provided the government with patronage to give.

Landlessness was a sore problem at independence, but it was matched by the availability of land for distribution under the control of the government. With the end of the Mau Mau struggle, former fighters returned from the bush and needed land. European farmers also dismissed most of the Africans who had been working on their farms out of fear that after independence the government would either fix higher wages for farm labour or enact laws making it impossible for them to dismiss the
“squatters”, thus adding to the landless pool. (Leo 1981:201-112). As for the availability of land, in addition to land the government acquired as a result of the land reform programmes of the 1950s, new lands came in its possession with independence. Some European farmers, fearing what they regarded as the “hazards” of African majority rule wished to sell their lands and emigrate. The colonial administration’s response was to purchase land from the European farms for distribution to landless Africans. Britain, the World Bank and the then Commonwealth Development Corporation provided financial assistance to purchase farms from Europeans for the purpose (Leo 1981:201; 1978:621-2; Wasserman 1973:133-48).

The use of land as a political weapon was not new in Kenya. The massive land consolidation programme started in 1953-4 had aimed at building up middle-class farmers, or “yeomen” as agents of the administration. The idea was to give them property so that they would not engage in subversive acts since they would have much to lose if violence intensified or continued. The administration therefore started a policy of registering land and giving titles of ownership to Africans more as a part of the policy of winning the war against Mau Mau than promoting agricultural production. (Berman 1990:366-8. See also Throup 1987a; Rosberg and Nottingham 1966).

This was by no means the only land the government controlled. Following the much discussed Swynnerton Plan of 1954, (See, for example, Mohiddin 1981; Coldham 1978:614-627; Harberson 1971:231-251; CO/822/9713), the colonial government had started a massive land consolidation and registration programme designed to give titles and tenure on land owned by Africans. The largest and by far best known of

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3 This reference is to documents held at the Public Record Office, Kew, in Surrey.
the land transfer programmes was the Million Acre Scheme, designed to settle 35,000 families. This was designed to transfer parts of the formerly "Scheduled Areas" to selected African farmers. (Wasserman 1973:133-48; Harbeson 1971:231-151; Leo 1978:219-238, 1981:201-222). The various settlement schemes brought under government control a total land area of about 1.5 million acres, which included about a fifth of the former White Highlands, and comprised as much as 4 percent of all agriculturally suitable land in Kenya. (Leys 1975:74-5; Hazlewood 1979:29-52) Implementation of the scheme started in 1961, with somewhat over ambitious programme to settle some 2,400 farmers on small and large categories of farms, or 'yeoman' and 'peasant' farms respectively. The attempt was a failure, however, in part due to inadequate funds and only small number of farmers were settled by 1962. Thereafter a series of more manageable methods of land transfer were adopted. The programme was hardly implemented by the time of independence and it was left to Kenyatta to undertake its implementation.

In its implementation, land consolidation was subsequently used as a form of political control on the lines started by the colonial administration and openly employed during the emergency. Kenyatta continued the policy of land control in the same way and it seems for the same purpose that the colonial administration used it. He continued to reward loyalty and punish 'opposition'. Bildad Kaggia, who advocated scrapping the land consolidation programme altogether and giving land free, fell out with Kenyatta and was dismissed as an assistant minister in 1965. (Odinga 1967). In addition there were smaller sub-divisional settlement schemes under government control. These were for people

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4 Large or 'yeoman' farms were those designed to yield income of £250 or more per year and small or 'peasant' farms were those designed to yield around £100 per year after repayment of loan and other charges. (Leys 1975:74).
who previously had been squatters on European farms. According to the 1970 -1974 Development Plan, ‘by the end of 1968 approximately 13,000 of these squatters had been settled on a total of 29 squatter settlement schemes in the Central, Coast, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces’ (p.207). Yet another scheme involved the transfer of the government’s 19 large-scale, loss-making “collective farm” at Ol Kalou. The farms, 57,000 acres in all, were bought by the government between 1964 and 1965 but had failed to make the expected profit under central management. In 1968 it was divided up among the 2,000 families ‘living’ on it. By the time settlement of Africans in the Million Acre Scheme ended in 1970, about 34,000 farmers had been settled under the various programmes. (Kenya: Development Plan 1970 - 1974, pp. 199-201).

Land consolidation did not involve transfer of land from one control to another as did the Million Acre Scheme and the other schemes, but the establishment of titles through registration meant a sort of government control because it could, as it often did, deny registration to anyone it chose through the land control boards responsible for registration. Wilson (1972:133-5) in fact found that these land control boards usually considered applications for titles on political rather than economic grounds. Political control involved, as it did in the colonial practice of the mid 1950s mentioned above, both courting favour and punishing dissent. Persons suspected of opposing the government, like those suspected of supporting Mau Mau, were prevented from getting any land. The land control boards were under the provincial administration, with the relevant provincial commissioners as chairmen. It was thus ultimately under the control of the presidency.

The programme to expand African retail and wholesale trade combined with the transfer of land to give the regime effective power of
patronage. Although on a very small scale, the promotion of African traders through the issue of licenses, provision of loans and credit by the government meant that retail and wholesale trade became yet another of the sectors the government was able to use its influence as a form of patronage to those it favoured. Of the 17,000 - 19,000 licensed traders doing business in Kenya at 1960, there were ‘hardly any Africans’ in the more profitable ranks of traders, who were predominately Asians (Leys 1975:150). The government set up loan programmes to ‘move Africans out of [their] marginal position on the unprofitable fringes of commerce’ (Ibid). One loan programme, called the Joint Loan Board Scheme, involved the central government and local authorities and paid out loans of between £200 to £300 to enterprising African traders. Larger loan programmes were also available to qualified African traders. In 1967 the government passed the Trade Licensing Act to protect these nascent African traders by giving them monopoly over certain specified goods. But the major agent through which government controlled retail and wholesale trade was the Kenya National Trading Corporation, set up in 1965.

The political importance of the settlement schemes and trade expansion were far more significant than the statistics suggest. The political objectives in both trade and land transfer far outweighed the economic objectives. Wasserman (1973:136) has thus said of the land transfer programmes: ‘The land schemes were the government’s major method of “letting steam out of the boiling kettle”’. Africans in Kenya had been more severely deprived of economic resources during the colonial rule than those in either Uganda or Tanzania because the economy had been controlled by foreigners. Despite its comparatively large size, only about 17 percent of the land in Kenya is suitable for agriculture; the most fertile parts of which was taken up by the ‘White Highlands’ and
'scheduled areas' from which Africans were barred. The opening up of these created in the Africans a corresponding fervent eagerness to acquire property. The Kenyatta regime was able to manipulate this situation to its advantage by using the distribution of resources under its control as patronage for political support.

A major feature of Kenya politics after independence has therefore been the distribution of economic resources and other opportunities under government control with political rather than economic objectives. Beneficiaries from the land and trade transfer programmes have been the supporters of the regime. The relationship between political interests and economic interests in Kenya — that is, the relationship between the 'political class' and the 'economic class' — have always been very close. Politics and capitalism have merged, or at least overlapped in both objectives and membership. The regime in Kenya has always promoted the interests of the capitalist class, who in turn have provided the regime with its strongest support. (Tamarkin 1978:310 - 320; Swainson 1980; Leys 1978, 1981; Langdon 1988).

A brief look at the origins of the capitalist class and political class may make the relationship between the two clear. KANU was more than just an off-shot of KAU and its predecessor organisations. It was KAU renamed, with the same membership and objectives. The formation of KAU in 1944 was encouraged by the colonial administration, which wanted an organisation of 'responsible' — which meant propertied — Africans to advise Eliud Mathu, the only African appointed to the Legislative Council at that time, on the feeling of Africans in Kenya. Despite the almost immediate emergence of militant and radical wings in KAU, it was the moderates an elite organisation whose members were judged to have an interest in the stability of the colonial administration,
headed by Kenyatta and Mbiyu Koinange, that eventually controlled political power. (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966; Odinga 1967:79-99; Spencer 1985). The "true" KAU, that is, the moderate as opposed to the militant and radical wings, later re-emerged into the core of KANU that constituted the independent regime. The KAU militants, under Dedan Kimathi, had broken away and formed the Land Freedom Army ("Mau Mau"). The remnants of the radicals within KANU were led by Odinga and Bildad Kaggia.

It was the elite class that primarily benefited from the land and trade transfer programme both before and after independence. The overwhelming majority of the Africans were not able to obtain the loans and credits for the purchase of land controlled by the government. Hazlewood (1979:35) has observed that government officials, 'by pressure and trickery, or by taking advantage of official positions, ... acquire[d] large holdings, often with the help of bank loans'. Critics of the government were sometimes bought off by offers in land and business. The practice of buying off critics and rewarding loyalty by offers of economic benefits was clearly evident in Kenyatta's much discussed attack on Bildad Kaggia in April 1965, when he criticised him for 'wanting free things' instead of using his position to acquire personal wealth with the help of the state. (See for example Bienen 1974:70-76). Kaggia, as we have seen, was one of the radical 'socialist' politicians who had not sacrificed his principles for the allure of personal affluence. Kenyatta was clearly scornful because Kaggia continued to talk for others instead of enriching himself. This was an open invitation to Kaggia to join the club of the elite-politicians.

Land and trade transfer programmes helped the regime to build up a capitalist class as its base of support. But this base was too narrow, centred in the urban areas and in the Central Province. The danger still remained
of the regime becoming isolated and vulnerable to attack from politicians if they take up the cause of the overwhelming majority of the people still outside. The rise of J. M. Kariuki as champion of the people and critic of the regime in the early 1970s illustrated this danger. As Widner (1992:100-109) notes, in as wider sense, Kariuki tapped on the frustrations of the disappointed and made himself their champion, and therefore a potential challenge to Kenyatta’s position. This was however forestalled by the regime through Harambee projects, through which the rich gave (or at any rate appeared to give) to the poor, and helped the regime to expand its base of support around the country.

Self-Help Projects and Elections

A part of the wealth the politicians and businessmen received were channelled to the people through self-help or harambee projects, which since independence have became a part of Kenya’s national life. For this reason self-help projects have been seen as the major (sometimes the only) link between the government and the people. (Thomas 1985; Holmquist 1984:72-91; Barkan and Holmquist 1989:359-380; Lamb 1984; Lonsdale 1992). These links are on a reciprocal, take-and-give basis. They are not technical and dead wood ties like one finds in feudal systems where the agents of the centre are merely planted in the rural areas. As Thomas (1985:67) has noted, self-help projects in Kenya have acted as mechanisms for the exchange of resources from the centre for political support from the rural areas, and thus have ‘permitted a marriage between the desires of the elites for a strong power base in the rural areas, and the desires of the local communities to promote and secure their own interests’.

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Self-help projects therefore maintained clientelism in Kenya in two major ways. One, because they facilitated exchange of resources between the local communities and politicians. The state was thus linked to the people in a reciprocal relationship. The people were able to make their demands on the state and these demands had to be met somehow. Second, self-help projects have acted as determining factor in elections which, as I will show in a moment, were the major method of regulating political clientelism. Candidates are often elected or rejected on the basis their actual contributions or potential abilities in self-help projects in their constituencies. The failure or poor record of an incumbent may also act against him and in favour of a challenger. Self-help projects have thus made local politics real and meaningful to both sides, and become 'the principal activities by which political leaders and aspiring leaders seek to obtain power and advance their political careers'. (Barkan and Holmquist (1989:360)). As a favourable verdict of the population was necessary for any political advancement, the projects have afforded the population with power and ensured the flow of services and other benefits at the same time. This is why self-help projects have been taken seriously by the regime, the politicians and the people alike since independence.

The system worked to the advantage of the state because the politicians who did not or could not contribute substantially to development projects in their loyalties faced defeat at elections (below), and since for a politician to contribute he had to "beg" the funds from the Harambee Fund controlled by the Office of the President. Furthermore, under the Public Order Act (see below), even MPs needed licenses to address people or organise meetings in their own constituencies. In the early 1970s, Harambee meetings were defined as political meetings and

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5For a systematic analysis of the origins, philosophy, implementation and political implications of self-help projects in Kenya since independence, see Thomas (1985).
therefore subject to licensing by the district commissioners concerned. Since the district commissioners were under the control of the Office of the President, they could deny a politician a license under orders from high. (Widner 1992:94-100).

By the mid 1970s, local lobbies, in the form of formal organisations at the sub-location level, sprouted up all over Kenya, solely for the purpose of lobbying politicians into assisting in self-help projects in their respective communities. Each of Kenya’s 40 districts had an average of 345-400 local self-help organisations. Any politician judged to be bad or ineffective in delivering services to the area was unable to escape the criticism of these watchdogs and stood at risk of retribution in the next general elections. This forced the politicians to be responsive to the local demands. Self-help projects therefore provided the basis of the bond between the people and the state: a ‘movement’ which regulated and ‘shaped the rules of Kenya’s clientelist political system [and] imbued that system with a measure of legitimacy’ (Barkan and Holmquist 1989:361). Self-help projects also have helped in promoting development in the rural areas to the benefit local inhabitants on the one hand, and on the other, of transferring the focus of politics away from the centre, to the benefit of the regime.

Deflection of Criticism from the Regime

The close ties between elections and self-help projects made it necessary for politicians to concentrate on local issues during campaigns, and development projects in their constituencies while in office. It was pointless to focus on national political issues, such as constitutionalism,

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6 A sub-location is the ‘smallest unit in the Kenya administrative system’, in area about ‘two to five square kilometres’ (Barkan and Holmquist 1989, footnote, p. 361)
socialism or Africanisation. Self-help projects therefore had the additional benefit of deflecting criticism from the regime and confining competition to the constituency level. This further strengthened Kenyatta's already strong position in the country as it became pointless to criticise him and his government. In the 1974 elections, the powerful and long-serving Foreign Affairs minister, Njoroge Mungai, campaigned on the basis of his achievements as Kenya's international spokesman and of being for ten years in charge of Kenyatta's personal health and failed to win. (ACR 1974-1975) The restriction of debate to local issues had the effect of limiting competition and challenge at the constituency. This shift of focus made it easier for Kenyatta to dominate, while at the same time enhanced his status as the grand patron who was "above politics", and made his government more secure in a number of ways.

In the first place, discontent was kept local; the chances for a nationwide anti-government organisation was eliminated. Secondly, the regime was better placed to deal with its critics at the local level rather than the national level, through the use of the massive machinery of the Provincial Administration, the Attorney General's office, the Register General of Societies office, and the Police. This was the political fate of Oginga Odinga from 1965. Politicians who could not be frustrated at the local level, such as Mboya and Kariuki, had to be assassinated to remove the threat they posed to the regime. In each case these assassinations reflected badly on the government and the regime. Self-help projects therefore made it possible for the regime to avoid taking such extreme measures against its opponents.7

7 Both Mboya and Kariuki had, or were building, what may be described as national constituencies, and were too prominent to be controlled at the constituency level. In fact before his assassination in 1969 Mboya fought off several attempts to strip him of power in his 'constituency' – the trade union movement of Kenya. See Murray (1968). Compare this with the case of Oginga Odinga, who was powerful but had his power base at the constituency level and in Nyanza Province.
Combined with the holding of regular elections, self-help projects became an institution in the management of clientelism just as clientelism was the institution in the managing of the state. To understand the significance of general elections in Kenya, it is more useful to ask what functions they had in terms of regime support than it is to concentrate on statistical analysis. The elections in Kenya have been, with the exception of the “Little General Election” of 1966 and the 1992 one, one-party elections. As non-competitive or semi-competitive elections they offered no opportunity to the voter to elect an alternative government, nor the choice of policies or ideology. (For a discussion of semi-competitive elections, see Hermet, Rose and Rouquiet 1978). The choice was among a set of individuals. Their importance lay in the fact that one’s success depended on one’s loyalty to Kenyatta and the government. The elections were therefore a means by which the Government strengthened its clientelist networks. (For more detailed discussion of general elections in Kenya since independence, see Hermet, Rose and Rouquiet 1971; Hyden and Leys 1972:389-420; Barkan and Okumu 1978, and Barkan 1987:213-237, 1979:64-92).

Following Oginga Odinga’s attempt to establish the KPU as an alternative arena for the pursuit of political competition in opposition to KANU in 1966-1969, the electoral rules were tightened to ensure the further strengthening of Kenyatta’s position. Only those candidates nominated by a registered political party may stand for election (thus independent candidature was ruled out; independent minded and ‘disloyal’ politicians were quickly screened out by the KANU machinery). Also all (KANU) candidates were required to swear loyalty to Kenyatta and KANU, and to openly declare their support for the policies of the party and the constitution of the country. (Barkan 1988; 1978; ACR 1974-
If a candidate was technically disqualified for any reason, only Kenyatta could grant such a candidate clearance to participate in elections again. The prerogative exercised by Kenyatta in deciding who could contest elections was important both psychologically and in practical terms. He could also 'rescue' someone from the political wilderness.

It has been argued, principally by Scott (1972) that the dependence of patron-client relationships on the continuous flow of resources from the patron to the client is inherently unstable especially if the patron, as in the case of Kenya, happened to be the state. This is because the need to satisfy the clients deflects state resources away from other projects or even drains them up altogether. Also commenting on Kenya, Barkan (1978:107) has warned of the same danger, in the case of Kenya:

As a greater proportion of those winning elections in Kenya actually seek to fulfil their constituents' expectations the total sum of demands which these political entrepreneurs will make on the centre, and on the clientelist linkage structures themselves, may be more than these nascent [clientelist] institutions can bear.

The exhausting or decline of resources may indeed occur as the demands on the state by MPs to satisfy their clients at the local level cannot be consistently refused without throwing the whole relationship in jeopardy. As state resources are limited, the need to satisfy client demands may compel the state to take measures that hurt the whole country or even render it bankrupt. To increase revenue the government may raise taxes, reduce the salaries of its employees, lower the price of some important commodity that it has to pay to farmers, all of which could lead to widespread hardships.

However, these conditions did not lead to instability and state collapse in Kenya because the regulatory role of elections in the clientelist
system. In the first place, the dissatisfaction of the electorate would be deflected from the state to their own MPs who failed to deliver goods expected of him. The severest sanction from the the people have been the replacement of an MP with a more promising one, and so on. The regime’s relationship with the people have been maintained by the sacrifice of a number of the ‘middlemen’.

Corruption is the more likely negative outcome of a clientelist system. It would inevitably result since the diversion of state resources to support the clientelist network will introduce competition among the patrons themselves for access to resources. When this happens, the number of beneficiaries are likely to become fewer and higher up in the structure, posing a real danger of a alienation between the state and the patrons. In Kenya, however, self-help projects and elections somehow maintained the centre-local relationship.

**Coercion: Defending the Clientelist Machine**

The regime’s willingness to apply coercion was also important in ensuring state stability in Kenya. It was important because it protected the clientelist machine through which the regime ruled the country. Clientelism in Kenya might have remained a viable institution due to the regular elections and self-help projects. But without the coercive measures it would still have been vulnerable to attack from outside. This danger was real in the case of Oginga Odinga and Mboya, who each had their own clientelist machines under themselves. (Chapter 4). In response to this danger Kenyatta employed coercive measures to protect the system and avoided the dangers of destabilisation. The political destruction of Oginga Odinga from 1964 to the banning of his KPU in 1969, and the fate of Tom
Mboya in 1969 were but the few tragic manifestations of the coercive measures. Mboya’s death and the ostracism for Odinga in fact fitted the regime’s strategy and may have ensured stability. (For a discussion of the use of coercive measures against government opposition in Kenya, see Mueller 1984; Ghai 1967; Gertzel 1970; Tamarkin 1978; Goldsworthy 1982a).

Anatomically, Kenyatta’s “carrot and stick” policy of state control may be divided into three sections. On one extreme Kenyatta often made use of his undisputed charm and patronage to lure supporters and opponents alike into the regime by the offer of incentives — jobs, etc. The holding of regular elections, and self-help projects, were integral parts of this policy of offering rewards and distributing them. Next to this was a grey area, a sort of a political limbo where, depending on one’s conduct, a politician may either be diverted to the benefits of the carrot or condemned to the pain of the stick. Bildad Kaggia was in this grey area when Kenyatta made his “What have you done for yourself” attack in 1965. Some have interpreted this speech as proof of Kenyatta’s involvement in and encouragement of corruption (Ngugi 1981). But it was more likely that Kenyatta was pleading with Kaggia (who was present with ‘his’ elders 8), to see more sense and join the club instead of pursuing the fruitless policy of ‘free things for everyone’. The last resort included severe sanctions, including death (Tamarkin 1978).

Coercion acted as an effective protection for Kenyatta’s clientelist

8 This mattered. Among the Kikuyu (as among many other African peoples), self-asserting is considered as an important virtue. And this is measured in terms of what a person actually does for himself, rather than by some fine speeches he may make about social justice. Kenyatta’s intention seems to have been to prod Kaggia towards the party line by portraying him as a failure in front of his own people. People expected politicians to ‘do things for themselves’ and whoever refrains is considered abnormal and unworthy of support. Compare this with the fictional situation of ‘the man’ in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born (Heinemann 1969), and with the very contrasting attitudes of the people of the village of Anata towards their corrupt MP and minister Chief Nyanga, and his challenger, the honest and young Odili Samalu, in Chinua Achebe’s A Man of the People (Heinemann 1966).
regime in two important ways. In the first place, the knowledge that the state had the means of punitive sanctions and was prepared to use it frightened away potential challengers. Secondly, dangerous opponents were eliminated, in some cases physically, thus ensuring the survival of the clientelist state. So even if coercion did not play a significant role in recruiting clients, it at least enabled the state to protect itself from disintegration.

Coercion, either through the threat or actual use of force is not popularly accepted as a feature of clientelism because the resulting relationships are not based on consent and benefits only one side, the patron. In a traditional setting where the patron well-established and it is the client who normally initiates the relationship (see Chapter 2), coercive measures may not constitute clientelism. But in a more modern setting like Kenya, where patrons face competition from, and are thus themselves threatened by other patrons, coercion is an important factor, at least in the maintenance of clientelism, but also in recruiting clients. For instance, the mafia in Italy built clients primarily through coercion. Walston (1988:14) notes that during elections in Italy, the people in Mafia areas 'quite willingly' vote for the candidates of the mafia in order to be on the safe side. The mere knowledge that the one seeking office was a mafia candidate was 'enough to constitute a threat'.

The Instruments of Coercion

The most distinctive characteristic of regime control in Kenya has been, under Kenyatta, the government's ability to portray its excessive powers as legitimate and constitutionally exercised. Repression has been made legal. Repression has not been due to the abuse of the constitution; rather
it has been due to the exercising of the powers of an abused constitution. The Kenya constitution has had a series of amendments since independence, and each amendment increased the coercive powers of the government. From a weak beginning at independence in 1963, the constitution had by 1970 been transformed into a formidable instrument of control. ‘If the constitution of 1963 had erred on the side of a weak government ... now it errs on the side a too strong a government’ (Ghai 1967:11. It is true that even before independence KANU had vowed to strengthen the constitution because of the trappings of the regionalism structure, but the ability to change the constitution tempted the regime to turn it into a weapon against its opponents. For example, amendments to the constitution were made with a record breaking speed after Oginga Odinga broke from KANU and formed KPU in March 1966. By the end of that year alone no less than four amendments were made to the constitution (Gertzel 1970:145, 174-6). The constitution became more an instrument of control by the regime than an instrument for governance.

To begin with, some of the most coercive laws of the colonial period were retained after independence, and used for the same purpose for which they had been designed. Notable among these were the Societies Ordinance of 1952 and the Public Order Ordinance of the same year. (Okoth-Ogendo 1972) The Societies Ordinance and the Public Order Ordinance were designed to fight against the “Mau Mau” uprising by frustrating its organisation. The Societies Ordinance resurrected as the 1965 Societies Act. Political parties and all their branches were required to apply individually for registration before they were considered lawful organisations and allowed to organise. One of the requirements for registration was that an organisation should not be prejudicial to public order and should not hold views not in conformity with any law in force
in Kenya at that time (Mueller 1984:409). The agents of the Registrar General interpreted these already loose requirements in any way they chose. Thus, even though KPU was registered as a political party by the Registrar General, an overwhelming majority of its branches were refused registration. (See Table 6.1). This explains in part the poor showing of the KPU in the “Little General Elections” of 1966. (See Table 6.1)

Table 6.1
KANU and KPU branches registered and refused registration between 1966 and 1969

(Due to printing error, the table is upside down)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KANU Registered</th>
<th>KANU Refused</th>
<th>KPU Registered</th>
<th>KPU Refused</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Utilised by the Author from a more detailed table on the pattern of party branch registration, in Mueller 1984:411
Apart from these retained laws, most of the amendments to the independence constitution, as already noted, were openly intimidating to anyone who did not support the government. The 5th Amendment to the constitution, enacted soon after Odinga broke away from KANU in March 1966, for instance required any serving MP who changed parties to resign from parliament and fight a fresh election. This was followed by the Local Government (Amendment and Special Provisions) Act of 1967. This was essentially an extension of the 5th Amendment Act (which only concerned MPs) to the rural areas to control officials in the various levels of local government. It required councillors and civil servants at the provincial, district and county levels who supported or sympathised with KPU to resign their council seats.

These were the major instruments of control at the disposal of the regime, and were employed in the political destruction of two of the regime’s most threatening enemies, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga. Odinga’s break with KANU has often been attributed to his disagreement with the government’s general economic policy, or to his being a “tribalist”. A more likely cause, however, was the intense harassment he was subjected to within KANU right from the time of internal self-government in June 1963. As for the formation of KPU, as a national figure he could not just have walked away from KANU into the political wilderness. He needed a political party he could use both as a refuge and to hit back at the regime. This played into the eager hands of Mboya, Njonjo and Kenyatta, because it made the fight against Odinga legitimate and even patriotic.

The zeal with which Mboya spearheaded the destruction of Odinga

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from 1963 when he became Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs was consistent with the political competition between the two in particular and within KANU in general. Right from the beginning in the late 1950s Odinga and Mboya were locked in a battle for the second position in Kenya politics. By 1960 Odinga was openly accusing Mboya of trying to prevent the release of Kenyatta so that he, Mboya, would become leader of independent Kenya. Whether this was true or not, and some scholars have discounted it (for example, Goldsworthy 1982), it is nevertheless consistent with the politics of factionalism.

After independence Kenyatta established his authority over the notables, but the degree to which each of the political notables came under him, and considered themselves under him, varied widely. Mboya and Odinga were the least assimilated of the leaders. Each of them had an independent political power base – Mboya in Nairobi and other towns through a network of trade unions which he headed, and Odinga in western Kenya among the Luo as already seen. They therefore continued with their old rivalry within KANU. Their struggle was made more intense as the question of succeeding Kenyatta was always present after independence. It was this which led to their undoing one by one, because Kenyatta was able to play each off against the other when the time suited him. Kenyatta stood to gain from the demise of both men because they represented a threats to the clientelist institution he had set up, though not directly to his position as leader while he lasted. This is why the fate of the two men should more accurately be seen as the work of the clientelist system under Kenyatta rather than that of Kenyatta personally.

10 The KADU leaders, Moi and Ngala, may have put up a brave show of independence from Kenyatta in forming KADU, but this was a desperate and superficial act into which they were pressed by settler interests and Britain. Their political positions were precarious, as was confirmed by their quick return within the KANU fold and their becoming, especially Moi, almost fanatical supporters of Kenyatta.
This is an issue which needs to be stressed. Although Kenyatta made a number of scathing attacks on Odinga and KPU, Odinga’s real enemies were the other members of KANU, especially the so-called conservative or moderate wing of the party, (which happened to include both Mboya and Kenyatta). It was this group which stood to gain most from Odinga’s demise. Kenyatta’s ‘fight’ against Odinga was largely symbolic, although as a member of KANU he worked as anyone else against KPU as a party.

The merger with KADU for a brief period had introduced a third aspirant to the number two position. This was KADU leader Ronald Ngala. As leader of a former opposition party, Ngala considered himself the second man in the country and eventual successor to Kenyatta. His efforts to put himself firmly in the second place from the start involved a strategy to undermine Odinga’s position with the aim of elbowing him out. Odinga in fact attributes the origins of misunderstanding between him and Kenyatta to Ngala’s strategy. The assassination of his advisor and tactician, Pio Gama Pinto, in February 1965, has also been blamed on a group within KANU headed by Ngala (Odinga 1967:287). Part of the strategy also included labelling Odinga as a communist. But these attempts to undermine Odinga seemed to have failed. The causes he fought for – the provision of land to the landless and Africanisation of the economy – were real issues which the people of Kenya understood. There was a danger he could seriously embarrass and undermine the government if the amateurish campaign against him continued without being able to effectively silence him. The famous 1965 Sessional Paper 10: *African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*, was designed to take off some of the sting of Odinga’s attacks on the government’s economic policies. But this too had little effect on Odinga’s popularity. Kenyatta was therefore faced with the difficult task of having ‘to keep Odinga under
control without making him a martyr to [the] Luos’ (Attwood 1967:239). This was why the government finally chose constitutional means to undermine Odinga, a campaign that was carried out almost faultlessly by Mboya and Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General, and culminated in the “Little General Elections” of 1966.

Odinga’s break with KANU has often been attributed to his disagreement with the government’s general economic policy, or to his being a ‘tribalist’. A more likely cause, as noted, was the intense harassment he was subjected to within KANU right from the time of internal self-government in June 1963. Of this Odinga said in his resignation letter to Kenyatta in March 1966: As for the formation of KPU, as a national figure he could not just have walked away from KANU into the political wilderness. He needed a political party he could use both as a refuge and to hit back at the regime. This played into the eager hands of Mboya, Njonjo and Kenyatta, because it made the fight against Odinga legitimate and even patriotic.

It was the political pragmatism of Mboya and Kenyatta that brought them together against Odinga. In letting Mboya take on Odinga, Kenyatta avoided getting directly involved in the old factionalism which could have undermined his position as the grand patron. On his part Mboya more than got even with his old enemy and promoted himself to the number two position in the process. Also if Mboya was not centrally involved in the fight against Odinga, there was the danger he might strengthen himself independently of KANU and would become far more difficult to control. A powerful Mboya outside the party was far more dangerous than if he remained within the party fold where his abilities were utilised to strengthen the party. But once Odinga was removed from the scene, Mboya’s abilities and ambition became less an asset than a
liability and threat to the clientelist system.

This was a real dilemma for Kenyatta. He could not have taken Mboya's side against his trusted clients in the presidency because collectively they were more important to him than Mboya. Also if Mboya was forced out of KANU like Odinga, there was the danger of his forming (or reforming) his proposed Labour Party of Kenya. His assassination meant continuity with the Kenyatta state, and may have, in theory, contributed to stability in Kenya.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Spoils Politics in Uganda and the Fall of Obote 1967-1971

In Chapter 6 it was suggested that from 1967 Uganda’s politics were dominated by the continued struggle within the winning alliance in the 1966 crisis, and that this struggle deteriorated into spoils politics. It was this development which continued for the next three years and climaxed in the military coup of January 1971, when Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin, the Army Commander.

In this chapter I will attempt to demonstrate that Obote’s fall was a direct result of factional struggles that had been a part of party politics since and before independence. I shall argue that the coup was the result of the conflicts within the UPC between Obote and his erstwhile allies who fell out with him after the 1966 crisis, in particular over the concentration of power in the presidency in the Republican Constitution of 1967. The chapter has three sections.

First, as the coup has usually been seen in terms of Obote-Amin conflict theories in isolation of other factors, I will critically review the literature on the coup in order to put Amin’s position within the phenomenon of spoils politics in proper perspective. In the second section I discuss the constitution of 1967 and how its imposition led to a gradual division of the party in two pro-and anti-Obote factions, and show how the military, but especially Idi Amin, become involved in the polarisation of forces. In the third section I discuss Obote’s feeling of insecurity as a result of the division of the party, noting particularly the political and military strategies he pursued to overcome the threat to his
position, and then spell out how the coup happened in the process.

**Amin Revisited**

Due largely to the eloquence and truth 1 of the famous 18 points issued by the Army on the day Obote was overthrown, and charges issued by Obote in Singapore and Dar-es-Salaam and counter-charges issued by Amin in Kampala (ACR 1971-1972: B226-7), the coup of January 1971 is often seen as the result of a power struggle between Obote and Amin, the Army Commander, which Obote somehow lost. The divisions within the UPC are sometimes acknowledged, but this too is often seen as the result of the assumed power struggle between the two men. The overwhelming view among scholars is that the coup was *caused by* the estrangement between Obote and Amin. Gingyera-Pinycwa (1978:247) argues for example that the coup happened because ‘sometime in 1970 Obote and Amin, who had at one time been personal and political friends...fell out’.

Other scholars have attempted to explain the coup in class and even psychological terms. Martin (1972:87-8) sees it as the result of the Army’s long resentment at Obote’s open favouritism of the General Service Unit (GSU). Omara-Otunnu (1987:8-1) takes the view that Amin’s closeness to Obote since the 1964 mutiny played a part in the coup, due to what he describes as “familiarity syndrome”: the notion that Amin had become so familiar with the corridors of power and the persons who held it that he was no longer afraid to take it for himself. (See also Glentworth and Hannock (1972); Mutibwa 1992)). Much of the debate on the coup has

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1 The 18 charges were, so to speak, true because Obote’s government was involved in or associated with the grievances the Army raised. But these issues were used as propaganda to establish a rapport between the new rulers and the people. The military government was to get involved in the very crimes, and more besides, after it came to power. It was first read on Radio Uganda on 25 January, 1971. See Uganda Government, The First 366 Days,, Entebbe, 1972).
therefore focused on what precisely caused the rift between Obote and Amin, and on which factors were more important than the others in precipitating the coup, and not on whether the actual causes of the coup lay elsewhere.

It is also important to note that from the beginning Amin said and has maintained that he did not plan the coup. He claimed it happened spontaneously when a certain major Musa discovered a plot against him by pro-Obote soldiers and launched a counter attack against this ‘coup’ initiated by Obote at Jinja the night of 24 January. (Mitchell and Miller 1972; Twaddle 1972). Also according to Mitchell and Miller (1972:49-63) Amin was out of Kampala, on a hunting trip at the Karuma Falls area in the north, until late on the night of the coup. It is unlikely he would have gone hunting in the north of Uganda on the very day if he had planned to take over the government. Further, Amin’s behaviour during the first few days of the coup suggests he found himself in that situation by chance, regardless of the immediate release of the carefully selected 18 points.

It was indeed not until 20 February, a whole month later, that Amin took the title of president, before that time he was referred to only as head of state. It seems he saw his goal as that of someone called upon to reorganise the country then go back to the barracks. But some of the UPC ‘old guard’ apparently saw him as a figure head preparing the way for them to take over. (Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993). It was also significant that the first council of ministers Amin appointed consisted predominantly of civilians who were known opponents of Obote and his allies, but only one army officer, Lt. Col. Obitre Gama, besides Amin. (For a full list of Amin’s first cabinet, see ACR 1971-1972:B228, and The First 366 Days, 1972:2-4). This civilian domination has been seen as a honest effort on the part of the Amin to tap civilian skills in running the country.
But it was more likely a case of civilians who had assumed power behind the armed forces still enjoying power under its protection. The coup had put an end to an already ailing regime, and Amin’s ‘original idea was to retain Obote’s cabinet ministers, or at least most of them’ and the Army as a whole did not show interest in government until much later. (Kibedi 1974:46). A popular rumour at that time had it that Amin unsuccessfully tried to make Onama president. The Amin-Obote conflict theory, by treating the conflict independently, tends to give Amin a role in Uganda affairs he did not play until perhaps \(^2\) after the coup.

Obote’s own explanation of why the coup happened also does not tally with the theory of long-term conflict between the two men. According to him, Amin acted to preempt prosecution for the embezzlement of ministry of defence funds and the murder of Brigadier Pierino Yere Okoya and his wife, who were shot with a high velocity gun at Gulu in January 1970. Before leaving Uganda on 11 January 1971 for the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, Obote was known to have demanded written explanations of these charges by his return. (Twaddle 1972) This would suggest that the entire crisis leading to the termination of the government was compressed within a period of days rather than weeks or months.

Attempts have also been made to explain the coup in ideological terms. Lofchie (1972:19-35 has for example suggested that the coup was a class response to Obote’s ‘move to the left’ crusade. According to this interpretation, the Army saw Obote’s socialist posturings as a threat to their privileged position, and acted in order to safeguard its corporate interests. Martin (1972:95-7) sees the coup as the ‘termination of a long

\(^2\) ‘Perhaps’ because even after the coup the extend to which Amin was effectively in control and responsible for major actions or decisions is debatable. See Chapter 8. Also see Grahame (1978).
sequence of frustrations within the Uganda military establishment. He argues that this frustration 'generated protest by the fact that the Army was used as the main political support' for the regime without adequate rewards.

These class and protest views are misleading because they miss the point. Firstly, the Uganda Army was not a coherent force, and had no class consciousness to take a class action even if they understood the 'move to the left'. If there was any consciousness it was ethnic, not class in the Army as well as in the general population. The more educated officers in the Army, who could perhaps have felt apprehensive about their positions, remained pro-Obote. According to Omara-Otunnu (1987) the Army found the Common Man's Charter incomprehensible, if somewhat exciting. Amin's supporters were predominantly from the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), few of whom could have even read the document anyway. A class act would also have involved a longer period of incubation and planning, which is wholly inconsistent with the suddenness of the coup. (See also Chick (1972) for an effective counter-argument to Lofchie's class theory).

The protest theory: while it is true that from 1966 the Army was used to enforce the emergency in Buganda, it was not the first time that they have been used for such law-and order operations. From earlier, especially between 1960-1964, the army was used to maintain order among the Bakonjo/Bamba and the Batoro in western Uganda. (Martin 1972; Veteran Yearbook June-September, 1993). It was also used in border patrols along the Uganda-Sudan border in the north, the border with Zaire (then Congo) at various points including West Nile, and on the Uganda-Rwanda border in the south. While it is clear that the Army was overstretched by these engagements, it is not clear whether this led to a serious frustration.
On the contrary they may well have enjoyed the activity afforded by these engagements. (It is also interesting to note that Mittelman (1975) has suggested that it was precisely because the Army found itself unoccupied around 1970 that it overthrew the government for recreational reasons!) As for the inadequacy of rewards, the Uganda Army, especially the lower ranks that carried out the coup, were the best paid at that time in the entire east and central African region (Lee 1969). After 1966 the Army was handsomely provided for in successive budgets. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:78-91).

The protest theory is an attempt to see the coup in terms of the 1964 mutinies in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (as it was then called). The mutineers in these cases demanded improvements in pay and conditions of service, and as such their action might be described as class protest. But the situation in 1964 was in no way applicable to the conditions of Uganda in 1971. For one thing in 1964 the armies acted as one, and they were protesting in the first instance against their British commanders, not the governments. Indeed in Uganda, as in Kenya and Tanganyika, the government was not able to find a unit opposed to the mutineers so that to put it down British forces had to be flown in.

The Coup of 1971 in Perspective

It would be misleading to see the coup in isolation from the political tensions that arose over the imposition of the 1967 constitution, and without linking it to the divisions within the party and to Obote's prominent opponents. If the UPC had been a united party, even mutiny involving the commander of the Army would not have led to the sudden and utter disintegration of the government. In 1964, for example, Nyerere
was able to disband the army that mutinied and created an entirely new force, the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Force (TPDF) in its place. The 1971 coup occurred and succeeded because the conflicts in the party had spread to the Army. How this happened will be discussed below, after reviewing the resentment of the notables at the accumulation of power in Obote’s hands in the 1967 constitution. Regardless of Amin’s high profile role at that time – (‘Idi Amin provided a reassurance to all who hoped for a decisive move from within against Obote’ (Mutibwa 1992:93) – without him a coup of sorts involving Obote and his opponents could have happened in Uganda at that time. For factionalism among the politicians had weakened the government to such an extent that a major political upheaval, leading either to Obote’s fall or to the demise of his opponents, had become inevitable. The coup was therefore a particularly disastrous outcome of factional struggles (see p. 152 below).

Amin became Obote’s opponent by his association with the “old guard” (whose identity will become clear in due course), and until the coup he remained, in the view of Obote, an obstacle to be removed or a prize to be won in the political struggle within the party. For example, a few days before the coup, Basil Bataringaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs, sent his Permanent Secretary to Singapore to inform the President did not regard Amin and the Army by themselves as dangerous even at that late hour. Instead he ‘gave orders for all those who had been at a secret meeting [just before the coup] – they included two of his ministers – to be arrested, but he specifically ordered that General Amin was not to be detained but to be reasoned with after the arrests’ (Twaddle 1972:105; ACR 1970-1971:B189-90).

Parallels have correctly been drawn between the 1966 crisis and the coup, as well as the Army reshuffle of 1965 when Amin was made Chief
of Staff in place of Shaban Opolot, who was described as Chief of Defence Forces, and the appointment of Suleiman Hussein as Chief of Staff in late 1970. Opolot, as seen in Chapter 5, was demoted in order to break the power of the Kabaka and the Ibingira faction with whom he was aligned. He was already openly identified, and was identifying himself, with the Ibingira faction which was threatening to topple Obote. I suggest that it is more plausible to see Amin’s “upward demotion” in 1970 as a move to deprive the other faction of a military ally. Obote had tried unsuccessfully to remove Onama from the Ministry of Defence in late 1968 for the same need to break up the alliance between the two men. (Kiwanuka 1979:26).

Amin and the Army were the means by which Obote was overthrown, rather than the cause of his downfall. The estrangement between Obote and Amin was merely the symptom of a deeper political malaise.

It is also said that Israel, Britain and the United States engineered the coup because they were displeased with Obote for various reasons. On this see Omara-Otunnu (1987:95-6); Nabudere (1980:71), and many others. On the basis of comments by retired Israeli and United States intelligence and military officers, Ibingira and Mamdani have concluded there was foreign, especially Israeli involvement, however limited, in the coup. (Mamdani 1983:29-32; Ibingira 1980:174-7). But whatever the degree of foreign involvement, the causes of the coup were domestic. Foreign ‘involvement’ was probably limited to either declining to warn Obote, misleading him about the true state of affairs or encouraging the anti-Obote forces; and as such their collusion cannot count as one of the causes. Ibingira’s assessment of the real causes of the coup is therefore entirely convincing. He argues (Ibingira 1980:177):

It is remarkable that the connection between the 1971 coup d’etat and the 1966 crisis with its subsequent constitutions and policies
The Republican Constitution of 1967

The Republican Constitution of 1967 was basically an attempt to legitimise and legalise the powers Obote had seized by force in the 1966 ‘revolution’. The powers which Obote arrogated to himself in this constitution may be justified during a state of emergency, but not in a free country at peace. Contrary to his hopes of uniting the country by the concentration of power in his hands, the constitution led to the disintegration the government, the party and country.

Mazrui (1975:18-20) has claimed that the constitution was a collective product of the UPC in a spirit of consensus and openness. In fact it was a vengeful constitution imposed by force and designed to establish and perpetuate authoritarianism. Even Mazrui admits that ‘members of the ruling party were expelled for their opposition’ in these same ‘open’ discussions. (Mazrui 1975:20). When Obwangor, the Minister of Planning and Economic Development, disagreed in 1967 over the concentration of too much power in the hands of one man, he was thrown in jail. Abu Mayanja and Rajat Neogy, editor of Transition magazine, were detained in October 1968 because Mayanja published his views on the constitution in the magazine. Mayanja’s article was highly critical of the powers Obote took for himself in the constitution and predicted that the constitution was not ‘likely to result in national unity or the stability of the state, two of the
objectives that, according to President Obote, [it was] designed to achieve (Mayanja 1968:20. See also ACR 1968-1969:234-5)

We have seen (Chapters 4 and 5) that Obote’s weakness against the UPC notables had been in part due to the fact that the notables were the effective dispensers of patronage in the districts. Obote now took exclusive powers of appointments at all levels of the public service in Uganda. Article 104 (1) provided him with the ‘power to appoint persons to hold or act in any office in the public service’, whether in the central, district or urban administrations in Uganda. He was empowered to ‘exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices and to remove such persons from office’. Even the appointment of chiefs in the local and county councils were now his prerogative (Article 124). As if these were not enough, Obote had the power to compulsorily retire any person in ‘any branch of the public service’ so as to ‘cause vacancies that could appropriately be filled by other more fit persons’ (Article 127 (1)). (See The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1967).

In practice his powers were far more extensive than these technical provisions convey. For instance, he appointed all permanent secretaries to all the ministries, who in turn were responsible for recruitment in their respective ministries. The heads of the (national) Public Service Commission, Teaching Service Commission, and District Service Commission, were also appointed by him (Article 103). As these officials were responsible for every appointment within their domain, technically Obote was the ultimate dispenser of patronage in Uganda. The question was not whether he intended to use his powers of appointment in this way; but rather that he had the potential to do so, and that his opponents believed he would do so.

The emergency powers provided for in the interim constitution of
1966 were resurrected into the Emergency Powers Act 1967. This gave the president unlimited powers of imprisonment and detention without trial. He could order the restriction or deportation of any person, even legally take possession of their property, all in the name of public safety. (ACR 1968-1969:230-235). The inspector-general of police, whom he appointed, was by law obliged to carry out any arbitrary or otherwise directions the president may give, and the 'question of whether any, and if so, what directions have been given shall not be inquired into in any court of law' (Article 69 (1-3)). It should be noted that at that time the whole of Buganda was under a state of emergency, with road blocks manned by the Army a daily fact of life. The GSU under Akena Adoko also had agents in every public office, or so it was believed. The effect of all this was directly to Obote's disadvantage. He became the personification of state power. As that power was not diffuse, he was held responsible for every repressive act done in the name of the state. His almost complete abandonment even by his ministers at the time of the coup, and the joy with which the coup was received in the whole country, bore testimony to the hatred he had generated in the country because of the concentration of power in his hands in the constitution.

The problem for Obote, and which may have led to a more confrontational style on his part, was that he was unable to induce obedience in spite the powers he had. Even the knowledge that he was prepared to use them against his opponents failed to imbue him with the "natural" authority which Kenyatta for example enjoyed. Kenyatta had ensured that at least his real opponents were in no position to challenge him. Obote's closest allies were not his clients and he had no authority over them. He held power but not much authority to sanctify the power and its use. This point needs to be stressed because it is crucial to our
understanding of why a coup happened in Uganda, but not in Kenya where Kenyatta held similar if not more power. The manner in which Obote took his power was a factor: it was taken during competition from among his equals. Since the notables did not give up their right to it, power continued to be a matter of competition, and the coup should be seen as Obote’s loss of that power in the competition.

Concentration of Power and Disintegration of UPC

As far as state stability was concerned, the concentration of power in Obote’s hands had an overall negative effect. It has been wrongly suggested that the concentration of power in Obote’s hands had a positive effect as the president used his new powers for reconciliation (Mazrui 1975:7-21; Gingyera-Pinycwa 1978:133-4). This view appears to be based on a highly flawed understanding of what genuine reconciliation in the Uganda of the day should have involved. Mazrui writes thus:

Even the decision to abolish all the kingdoms, instead of just the kabakaship, was a venture in reconciliation. There was a feeling that the Baganda would be less ready to accept the abolition of their king [sic] alone than the ending of all kingships. Collective republicanism was a more reconciliatory gesture than discriminatory republicanism. (p. 19).

Even if this had been Obote’s honest belief, the fact remains that neither the Buganda nor the other kingdoms accepted their abolition.

The concentration of power at the centre led to intensification of conflict between Obote and the notables within the party on one hand, and to a multiplication of the points of conflict in the country at large, on the other. These conflicts in turn led to open confrontations and destabilisation. As Barongo (1989) has rightly pointed out, because Uganda
is a plural state, political stability can be ensured in it only through a constitution that is tolerant to pluralism: a constitution that pays attention to some degree to the interests and demands of the various groups. But the concentration of power at the centre in the 1967 Constitution was inconsistent with plural harmony. By making everything happen at the centre, the various groups were brought into direct conflict. Before, for example, a person had the chance to look to his local notable, or get a job in the local government system in both kingdom and non-kingdom areas without reference to the centre (Chapter 5). But now all had to compete with one another at the centre to get a job (say) in the public service. Competition over the limited jobs available led to insecurity, hatred and actual as well as assumed nepotism. Local conflicts were no longer resolved locally but found their way to the centre. The powers of appointment in the district administrations was particularly important as a source of conflict.

As already noted the major reason for Obote’s weakness had been the power of the notables, which was based on their control over their respective districts. It was not surprising therefore that notables like Obwangor were totally opposed to the constitution from the start. They had enjoyed considerable autonomy from party and government control (Chapter 5), but the constitution now threatened to deprive them of this autonomy by eliminating the concept of local notables altogether, in the name of national unity. In taking powers of appointment in district councils in direct challenge to the notables in their own territories, Obote stirred hornets’ nests. The president could now legally enforce decisions in their political fiefdoms without any reference to them: their powers and credibility as local patrons were eroded. Given that the constitution had made Obote and any of his decisions above the laws of the land, and in
dread of the Emergency Powers Act, the notables had no legitimate and formal means of getting back at him. The only course open to them was to revolt. To this I will return in a moment.

A general alienation and detachment of the people from the state was another unfortunate result. According to Mutibwa (1992:66), the relationship between the people and the government was so bad that 'many businessmen, lawyers, teachers, doctors and others from all walks of life (including students) were detained'. In this climate, even some non-political detentions were liable to be interpreted as political ones, which did not improve the people’s perception of Obote and his government. Rather than encourage Obote to explore new avenues of cooperation and methods of winning the people over, his unpopularity propelled him towards even more forceful measures.

Spoils Politics and Polarisation of Power

It was in these circumstances that the hitherto underground opposition to Obote from the aggrieved notables within the UPC began to appear in more articulate form in the polarisation of forces within the party, the country and the Army, leading to the coup three years later. Had there been some degree of power-sharing with the notables, some of Obote’s excesses might have been checked. Also he might have kept some of his friends who had stood with him during the crisis of 1966. But he chose to rely on the constitution instead. It did not take long for an alliance of the oppressed, including Buganda and a section of the Army, to emerge against him and to oust him from power. (For this development, see Gukiina 1972).

During 1968 anti-Obote feelings in the party had already articulated
into a visible if somewhat dormant opposition. This splinter group came under the informal leadership of Felix Onama, the powerful Secretary General of the party and Defence Minister. He was also one of Obote’s most ambitious ministers.

Besides his known ambition for leadership of the country, there was also a constellation of several factors which contributed to the emergence of Onama as leader of the anti-Obote elements. The first was that as Secretary-General of UPC he was the second most powerful man in the party and government, but more crucial was the fact that he was in control of the Army. His powers alone were sufficient grounds for a conflict between him and Obote. Thus Onama’s fears for his own position and future may have forced him to look for protective alliances. In this his close relationship with Amin and the Army was very important, and seems to have been the main cause of the fallout between him and Obote. The almost legendary notion that the Uganda Army had been under Obote’s personal control and that he had nurtured it for political support since the 1964 mutiny or earlier is misleading in detail. It was Onama who had been, in the first analysis, Amin’s mentor, and therefore in more direct control of the Army.

He was the only minister responsible for the Uganda Army from independence until the end of Obote’s government. It was Onama who had agreed without consulting Obote to the increase of wages for the Army at the 1964 mutiny (Grahame 1980:78). It was to Onama that Amin had looked for protection, (and who had protected him) during the famous gold allegations in 1965-6 (Mitchell and Miller 1972:59). Furthermore, as a fellow “Sudanic”, Onama and Amin were ethnically closer than Obote and

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3 Shaban Opolot, former Commander of the Uganda Army, for example has described Onama as ‘a very ambitious man who wanted to rule the country’ (Veteran Yearbook, June-September 1993, p. 9).
Amin could be. True, as long as Onama also supported Obote, the President could be assured of the full support of the Army; but in a conflict between the two, it was not difficult to see where Amin’s first loyalty would lie. Nobody knew this better than Obote and Onama did. The establishment and promotion of the GSU as an alternative armed force under Akena Adoko was linked to this situation. Obote wanted to have access to an armed force direct rather than with the cooperation of another possibly hostile minister. With Amin fearing for his position in the Army and Onama for his in government, the two men were naturally drawn together for protection. And this unexpectedly provided hope for the anti-Obote faction in the party.

There was no clear anti-Obote faction to speak of at that time: however, as we have seen, the concentration of power in Obote’s hands in the Republican Constitution had divided the party and gradually a pro-Obote and ‘the rest’ factions had emerged. This other group were known in Uganda as the ‘old guard’. Twaddle (1972), who searched for the identities of the ‘old guard’ came up with no definitive answer. ‘Upon inquiry this category of... politicians proved somewhat elusive, sometimes being defined as those politicians who had supported Obote only halfheartedly during the confrontation with Mutesa II in 1966, sometimes being equated with those currently [in 1970] rivalling him for supreme power’ (p.102). At the beginning of 1969 it was observed that ‘Onama was operating on behalf of elements within this [anti-Obote] group in order either to reduce Obote to size or remove him’. (Mujaju 1976:462; Mutibwa 1992:71; Willetts 1975:299; Kiwanuka 1979; ACR 1970-1971:B187).

If Obote had been patient after 1966 and used his new powers carefully and in collaboration with the other UPC notables, he might have preserved his position at least for a while. His mistake was to try to take all
from all, including from the notables who had been on the ‘winning’ side in 1965-6. This, instead of reproducing spoils politics which might have provided a limited degree of stability, still further destabilised the regime, and threw spoils politics itself into peril. For like clientelism spoils politics can be managed to at least prevent the collapse of the state. With skilled leadership it can even be transformed back into clientelism. In theory at least, and subject to local variation, a ‘spoils’ regime can prolong its tenure in office under certain conditions and may even create and maintain a semblance of state stability. Factors as the leadership skills of the head of state; military support (either domestic or external or both); sudden economic windfalls, can prevent the regime from plunging into utter chaos. The weakness of the regime’s opponents can also help in this. Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens (1968-1986), Sudan under Ja’afer Numeiri (1969-1985)⁴, and Zaire under Mobutu are examples where spoils politics had become the established ‘system’. In 1967 Obote had none of these and his legendary leadership skills failed him. For in taking power away from the UPC notables as well Obote in effect invited revolution, and with himself as the object of that revolution, which in this case happened to be a military coup.

This development was quite consistent with the dynamics of politics of spoil. Revolution is one of two ways (the other is reform) in which a country can recover from the malaise of spoils politics. Obote tried reform and failed, a revolution was therefore the next logical alternative. That this revolution was carried out by the Army was somewhat coincidental and owed to Uganda’s peculiar circumstances at that time.

In response to the growing factionalism in the party and Army

⁴ These ideas are condensed from teaching model worked out by Chris Allen, of Edinburgh University’s Politics Department. I am most grateful for this and his other works on the subject of clientelism.
sometime during 1968, Obote was forced to explore ways and means (which I will discuss in more detail a moment) of putting up another alliance he could more confidently rely on. He had realised that the Army was no longer in his camp, so he pursued two complementary political and military strategies. These were designed to establish his control over the Army and the party.

Obote’s Strategies for Dominance and Fall, 1968-1971

The political strategy was the attempt at social engineering, the whole range of which was encompassed by the “move to the left” policy adopted by the UPC in 1968. The military strategy was to undermine Amin’s potential as an ally to his opponents, by removing him from effective control of the Army and at the same time forging an ethnic-based alliance between himself and the Army. The estrangement between him and Amin came about as a result of this dual policy. Amin had became the target because for both the military and political strategies to succeed, it was necessary to either neutralise or eliminate him first.

Obote’s political strategy was to present himself as the unchallengeable leader of the party, and thus publicly undermine his opponents. The starting point was the much discussed UPC Annual Conference in Kampala in June 1968. (See Mutibwa 1992; Gingyera Pinycwa 1978; Omara-Otunnu 1987; Mittelman 1975, and many others). The leaders of Tanzania and Zambia, as well as high level delegations from Kenya and Zaire attended. In a gesture to the Army and Police, and to demonstrate that the party encompassed everybody in the country under his leadership, Obote arranged for Amin and the Inspector-General of Police, Erineyo Oryema, to address the conference. But what was directly relevant with
regard to his relationship with the Onama faction was that at this conference Obote was reelected party president for a further period of seven years. It was further established that the party president would automatically be the president of the republic, which shut the door to the leadership ambitions of his opponents for the next seven years. Also in a direct challenge to the authority of Onama, the organisation of the party, including the power to appoint its officials even at the branch (county) levels, was transferred from the Secretary-General to the President. (Branch officials were until then elected within the counties). Onama was deprived of the means to use the party to his advantage.

The period from 1969 to the end of 1970 was filled with political activity, with Obote trying to carry out this political strategy. In addition to frequent tours 'to meet the people' around the country, Obote produced 5 political papers in his 'move to the left' programme. According to the flagship document, the Common Man's Charter, the aim of the whole programme was 'the creation of a new political culture and a new way of life, where the people of Uganda as a whole... are paramount'. (Clause 11). The primary aim of the document was political because it sought to destroy the power bases of the notables. Omara-Otunnu (1987:88) has rightly observed that the 'move to the left' was Obote's 'response to the threat to his leadership from the right-wing of the UPC' and was designed 'to broaden [his] political base in the country'. Hence the emphasis that the people, and not their representatives, was paramount. It only succeeded in arousing his opponents into more articulate and open opposition. The major legacy of this document is that it led to the heightening of tensions in the country, with everyone feeling threatened.

Even more important in the continuing war was document number 5, entitled Proposals for New Methods of Election of Representatives of
the People to Parliament, and published in July 1970. The main provision was that candidates would have to stand in four parliamentary constituencies all at once – a ‘basic’ constituency and the three others ‘national’ constituencies – one in each of the four regions of the country. (Cohen and Parson 1973; Willetts 1975:286-298; ACR 1970-1971:B190-2). A Presidential Election Commission, a committee of five ‘wise men’ appointed by Obote and not by the party, was to screen and approve all candidates. This committee had the power to overrule the party-appointed Electoral Commission. Obote justified this arrangement on the grounds that the Electoral Commission, being a party organ, ‘would be subject to influence by sitting MPs and could not be relied on’ (Willetts 1975:190). It was a well known fact that only a handful of Obote’s opponents would have retained their seats if the elections had not been interrupted by the coup. African Contemporary Record noted that ‘the President ... did not ... make any secret of his hope that the elections would rid him of at least 50 per cent of his present colleagues’ (ACR 1970-1971:B187). Mujaju 1976:426).

The military strategy was less complex. This was essentially a strategy to drive a wedge between Amin and Onama. It began late in 1968 when, as already noted, Obote unsuccessfully tried to remove Onama from the Ministry of Defence in order to cut his link with Amin. (Kiwanuka 1979:26). His removal would have at a stroke separated him and Amin, leaving Obote to deal with them one by one, but particularly to detain or dismiss Onama without fearing any retaliatory action by Amin. The attempt and its failure (Onama refused to be moved) in fact constituted attempted coups of sorts by both men against each other. Onama’s reluctance to be moved, and his ability to actually refuse to be moved, from his ministry also testified to both his fear of and strength vis-a-vis Obote. This event set the two men on an irreconcilable course
and may have helped bring Onama and Amin even closer together. If before the two had been professional and perhaps ‘ethnic’ friends, now they became political friends as well, in a mutually defensive alliance against Obote. Obote, in turn, became fearful and obsessed with them.

As happened prior to the 1966 crisis, the battle for the control of the Army now started in earnest. And since Amin and Onama, united in fear and ‘well armed’ could not now be separated, Obote sought to undermine Amin. The strategy was if possible to win over the Acoli in the Army and place the whole Army under largely Langi officers. To promote the comparatively younger and less experienced Langi officers over the heads of the more experienced Acoli officers when the Acoli made the bulk of the Army was a dangerous gamble. It risked turning the Acoli in the Army from their hitherto passive grumbling into his active enemies as well. For despite their numerical superiority, very few Acoli men were in high ranking positions, something they resented very strongly.5 ‘Obote overcame [this problem and] the well-known hatred and mistrust between the Acoli and the Langi by presenting the presence in the army of the Sudanic people, headed by Amin, as the ‘external’ threat to all the Nilotics’ (Mutibwa 1992:71-2).

The extent to which this tactic succeeded in bringing the Acoli and Langi together or turning them collectively against Amin and his allies at that time6 can only be guessed. It is however clear that, having rightly or

5Later in July 1985, Obote was overthrown by Acoli officers because he had the effrontery to appoint Smith Opon Acak, a Langi as Chief of Staff to replace another Langi (Cyeti Ojok). The Acoli wanted Bazilio Olara Okello for the post. It was Bazilio Okello himself who drove for three days from Gulu to overthrow Obote in Kampala (Omara-Otunnu 1987:157-169).

6At that time because some of the most chilling manifestations of ethnic politics in Uganda’s history have been attributed to this ‘policy’ or at least interpreted along this line. This includes the wanton slaughter of Acoli and Langi in the Army and outside during Amin’s regime (1971-1979), and the almost complete destruction of life in the West Nile region during Obote’s second regime (1980-1985). (See Gingyera-Pinycwa 1989 and Ibingira 1980). This however belong to another aspect of ethnic politics and it is not my intention to pursue it in detail here or later in this study.
wrongly drawn this conclusion, both Amin and Onama believed it and their fears of a Langi-Acoli ethnic alliance directed specifically against them increased. In this climate of fear every slight move by either camp was bound to appear enormously significant. For instance when Obote asked whether Amin was, as alleged, responsible for the murder of Brigadier Okoya in January 1970, the later went livid with anger. (The lively exchange which took place between the two men is reported 'approximately' in Mazrui 1975:153). He saw it as a part of Obote’s plans of turning the Acoli in the Army against him. In fact he must have believed from the start that Okoya was killed for this purpose. Speaking with some feeling in 1971 in Okoya’s home town of Gulu in front of Acoli elders, Amin said:

He [Obote] planned the same [1966] tactics against me with regard to the murder of Brigadier Okoya whom I recruited in the Army. Okoya was a houseboy before. I am telling you this today. I was the one who promoted him. I regarded him as my son. Obote and Akena thought the killing of Okoya and his wife would unite the Acoli and the Langi in order to crush the rest of the people of Uganda. And because of the death of Okoya, Obote succeeded to pull all the Acoli to his side. (UG 1972:52).

The next strategy was to put the Army, like the GSU and Special Forces, under Langi leadership. In September 1970, in ‘the most far-reaching reorganisation of the military’ (Omara-Otunnu 1987:90), Amin became (by definition advisory) Chief of Defence Staff; Brigadier Suleiman Hussein, an Obote supporter, was made Chief of Staff, thus effectively in command of the Army. Other notable promotions and appointments were that of Tito Okello and David Oyite Ojok (who were later to command Obote’s guerrilla army against Amin). Oyite Ojok was promoted from a Major to Lt. Colonel and appointed Quartermaster General at the Uganda
Army Headquarters. In the words of one scholar, this was 'intended at one blow to take the wind out of Amin’s sails by shifting him from [the] position of effective command of the army'. (Kiwanuka 1979:36-8).

Although this observation is technically correct, it does not tell the whole story because it sees no link between the reshuffle in the wider context I have suggested at the beginning of this chapter. I draw attention to this again here because such observations perpetuate the Amin-Obote conflict theory as the cause of the coup. In the same way Willetts (1975:299) is rather too modest when he says this was done ‘so that less reliance needed to be placed on Amin’. The aim of the reshuffle was more than that. It was calculated to eliminate Amin’s potential as an ally to Obote’s opponents. Willetts may however be right in adding that ‘At some point the two men [Onama and Amin] decided to work together and strike at Obote’. They may well have done this, although it seems their aim was to wait for Obote to take the first move, and then defend themselves. Obote’s mistake was to forget that if you threaten a cobra, it is more likely to strike at you than glide away cowed. The slightest move of the finger is liable to precipitate retaliation. And this was what happened in January 1971.

The Coup: Precipitating Factor

What precipitated the coup was Obote’s sudden decision to bring charges of murder and corruption against Amin in January 1971, and his demand that a written reply to them should be ready by his (never to be) return from Singapore. The way Amin perceived this move has already been discussed. But Obote decided to bring charges against Amin at that precise time for slightly different reasons. For in the final analysis the charges were a part of Obote’s strategy against Onama, in which hopefully Amin
too would have fallen. He would have killed two birds with one stone. If Amin was convicted of the murder of Okoya, Onama’s political teeth would have been knocked out. Also if Amin appeared in court, as the minister of defence, Onama was bound to be dragged in court as well to explain the disappearance of funds and thus be disgraced. Even if he escaped imprisonment – a very unlikely prospect – he would certainly have lost all chance of being elected in the proposed elections in April 1971.

There are two points which confirm the above conclusion as to why Obote brought the charges at that time. First, Okoya had been murdered a whole year before and no such written statement had been demanded from Amin. Indeed when Obote asked Amin whether he was responsible for the murder a year earlier, Amin had denied and even offered to go voluntarily to Luzira Maximum Security Prison if Obote believed he was responsible, whereat the president dropped the matter (Mazrui 1975:153). Secondly, the financial irregularities in the Ministry of Defence, as well as other ministries, have been widely known facts in Uganda all along (Mutibwa 1992).

Equally important was the surprising decision to charge Amin, and not Onama, for the financial irregularities of the whole ministry. As Amin was not in charge of Ministry of Defence accounts, it was clear that the matter would have crept to Onama. When the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Oboth-Ofumbi (soon to be Amin’s minister of defence), was called before a parliamentary public accounts committee in December 1970, he explained that ‘the Ministry of Defence had taken a decision that no figures would be given out and the Ministry of Defence means everybody who is a part of the Ministry’ (Mitchell and Miller
It is clear that the charge was a tactical move to smear (or expose) Onama, and both men knew it. It probably took so long for Obote to raise the matter because he may not have had the guts to openly challenge Onama. The Army reshuffle of September 1970 had however tactically changed the realignment of forces under the two men. It seems that in January 1971, having been emboldened by the recent Army reshuffle, Obote felt in a sufficiently strong position to go on the offensive against the Onama faction. The charges against Amin constituted the tactical opening shot by Obote. Unfortunately Amin interpreted this as the long-expected move to remove him from his job, and fought back, thus precipitating the coup.

The following is, it seems to me, the sequence of events that culminated in the 'coup'. 1. Being fully aware of the consequences of bringing Amin to court, his supporters - including two cabinet ministers - meet at Amin's house to consider what to do. The meeting is discovered although it is not known what they have decided. 2. Basil Bataringaya, Minister of Internal Affairs, his Permanent Secretary Ntende, Inspector-General of Police Oryema, Chief of Staff Suleiman Hussein and Col. Oyite Ojok meet to discuss the meeting at Amin's house. Ntende is sent to Singapore to brief Obote. 3. Obote issues orders for the arrest of the 'plotters', possibly with instructions on how to prevent Amin interfering with the arrests.

As the last involved a strategic deployment of Army units out of Amin's control, it led to Army movements. Amin is informed and, because of fear, must have believed it was the long expected move against him by Obote. To protect himself and his position as Commander of the

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Uganda Army, he decides to remove Obote to institute another, more friendly government with himself still the commander of the Army.

The coup has to be seen as the result of a triple failure in Uganda’s political development since independence. First the failure to evolve a political institution which could have resolved conflicts. Second, the failure of clientelism to evolve as an alternative institution, as it did in Kenya. The failure of clientelism had plunged the country into spoils politics which Obote somehow failed to manage, thus throwing the country into chaos, with the various factions engaged in a perpetual tug of war with each other. The brawl between the pro-Obote and Onama/Amin forces that led to the coup the night of 24 January, 1971 was the first military clash in the tug of war between the two factions that had started in 1968.

We have to accept that Amin was correct in saying that he did not plan a coup, although he must have planned some kind of action against Obote designed to preserve his post at the head of the Uganda Army. The effects of politics of spoils had paralysed the political process, and created deep fear and suspicion. It was this climate, more than anything else, that was responsible for the coup. Consequently Obote’s fall was a direct result of the failure of clientelism in Uganda.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The Successor Regimes: Problems and Prospects

The different political developments of Uganda and Kenya during the first decade of independence continued to affect and shape their politics even after the change of regimes, respectively in 1971 and 1978. The change of regimes (the manner of the change in the case of Kenya) influenced by their past legacies. Both the manners of succession, and the prospects and challenges of the successor regimes represented a continuation of the past. Thus spoils politics continued in Uganda and the clientelist system in Kenya remained viable at least during the first two years of the change. Also the efforts Moi and Amin made to "break with the past" during the early stages of their rule (discussed below) were not successful, and in each case they were dominated by the past. Uganda’s spoils politics continued on its downward spiral and deteriorated into chaos during the first few years of Amin’s rule. In Kenya, the past, or “Kenyatta’s shadow” was so strong at the beginning that Moi found it necessary formally and forcefully to acknowledge that he was merely “following the footsteps of Kenyatta” by adopting the slogan Nyayo (“follow the footsteps”). (Widner 1992; Tamarkin 1979:21-37; Khapoya 1980:55-6). As I will argue below, it was only after 1980 that Moi appeared to have redefined Nyanyo to mean following his footsteps.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the political changes under the two successor regimes during the first few years against the background of the developments of the past. The aim is to demonstrate the resilience
of spoils politics and clientelism once they became established "systems" of rule. I will first discuss Amin's regime from 1971 to 1974, and explain how and why Amin was unable to establish a new political order that was more accountable than Obote's despite his promise to do so immediately after he took power. After noting that his regime was a continuation of the spoils politics that started under Obote and equally beset by factional struggles, I will explain how he nevertheless came to last for a relatively long period in power.

The section on Kenya discusses the continuing legacy of the past on Moi's leadership from 1978 to 1980. I will first discuss those factors prior to Kenyatta's death which made Moi's succession inevitable, so as to stress further my argument that the well-established clientelist system in Kenya dominated and circumscribed political action. We will then look at Moi's first efforts to break free from the grip of the 'old' system and his attempts to forge new alliances and make himself the effective and undisputed patron in the same way that Kenyatta had been. The political backlash which resulted from this in the form of a challenge to his authority from his erstwhile fellow-clients in the Kenyatta state (notably from Charles Njonjo) will be discussed in Chapter 9.

UGANDA
Mere Change of Guards, 1971-1974

As already noted in Chapter 7, Amin's coup was a product of spoils politics and not a response against it. For this very reason his regime failed to put an end to it; instead spoils politics became even more manifest under him. Therefore, although in theory the coup, to the extent that it was a change of regime, could have institutionalised a new order, in
practice this became impossible. In understanding Amin's failure to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the coup to establish a new order, Uganda's immediate political experiences needs to be emphasised. The effects of spoils politics, authoritarianism, and the forging of negative ethnic based alliances practised under Obote especially from 1967 to 1970, proved a liability for the military. Even before the military regime could consolidate its hold on the country, the old political rivalry appeared on the scene, threatening to relegate it into the background. The Army therefore responded and became a distinct faction in the struggle for power. This, combined with Obote's looming shadow from Tanzania, kept Amin under threat and survival rather than political programmes became his main preoccupation. The third factor was Amin's personality and policy contradictions, which made it impossible for any consensus to be formed around him or with his participation. We now look at these factors in some detail.

Resurrection of Factional Politics and the Army's Response

The coup was in fact merely the defeat of the pro-Obote faction in the competition for power after 1967. After the coup the leadership of this faction moved into exile, but had supporters inside the country (repeatedly purged by Amin). Immediately after Obote's fall, however, the defeated Ibingira faction of the early 1960s surfaced, intent on reestablishing itself in power either behind or in the place of the military (Kibedi 1974). Amin had announced that his aim was to organise elections and hand power back to civilians, which encouraged factionalism still further. Therefore, although Obote's overthrow evoked popular support for Amin (Uganda Government 1972), especially in Buganda, the Baganda celebrated the fall
of Obote rather than the rise of Amin, and the happy honeymoon did not lead to a lasting marriage between the military and the civilian population. (For a comment on celebrations in Buganda in support of the coup, see Mutibwa 1992:83-4).

At first it looked as though a workable and positive partnership was emerging between the Baganda and the military government, especially since Amin’s first political moves were all popular in Buganda. He unbanned political parties and invited exiles to return home. He released 55 prominent politicians that had been imprisoned by Obote, including Ibingira and his fellow former cabinet ministers, and members of the Baganda royal family. (ARB January, 1971; ACR 1971-1972; Uganda Government 1972). Amin also lifted the state of emergency that had been over Buganda since 1966 (and the rest of the country from December 1969 after Obote was shot and wounded in Kampala). The very day after the coup he announced that the body of Mutesa, who had died in poverty in London in 1969, would be brought home for state-burial, and on March 31 the body arrived at Entebbe Airport and was buried according to Buganda custom on 4 April.

Amin also moved swiftly and scored some notable goals with the business community and (by Uganda standards) the rich, who again were mostly Baganda apart from the Asian business class. For example, in March 1971 Amin reversed Obote’s socialist policies enacted during the “move to the left” period and decreed that the 60 percent state ownership of private enterprises Obote had set would be reduced to 49 percent instead. This pleased the business class, the industrialists and those politicians who were opposed to the move to the left. (Omara-Otunnu 1978:102). Trade union leaders in Kampala and even students at Makerere University, came out in support of Amin. (Mutibwa 1992:84). (Langlands 1978:8;
However, it soon became clear that it was not a blank cheque of support for the military regime. Competition for influence in the new regime amongst those who had crowded around Amin became intense. Wanume Kibedi, a self-proclaimed socialist and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Amin’s government from 1971 to 1973, later noted that at the initial stage the ‘conservatives’ tried to take over effective power from Amin. He wrote:

Reactionary politicians of the right were around Amin in those early days, and even before the cabinet was appointed, they were pressing him to revoke the republican constitution and revert to the 1962 pre-independence constitution’ (Kibedi 1974:46).

The military saw a threat to its own position because Amin appeared to be too amenable to the demands of the politicians. As already noted, there was only one Army officer, Lt. Co. Obitre-Gama, in Amin’s cabinet at that time. This realisation altered the relationship between the soldiers and the civilian politicians from that of (in theory at least) cooperation to competition. Senior officers, keen to preserve their new positions in power, fought back.

While it is not clear if Amin personally was aware of these schemes and concerned about them, the army officers who had put him in power were. Their response, as already noted, was to enter the competition themselves and decisively behind Amin. On 20 February, in a long and carefully worded statement (Uganda Government 1972:41-5), the army officers declared their ‘full confidence’ in Amin, promoted him to the rank of full General and ‘urged’ him to take the title of president. In a clear snipe at the politicians the officers warned ‘everybody that the period of political activities has been suspended in the national interest and
everybody (sic) engaging in political activities during such period of suspension would be dealt with severely’

The brief honeymoon was over, and whatever chance there might have been for a military-civilian cooperation or partnership, was gone. Now if spoils politics was to be checked, it had to be done by the efforts of the Army alone, and this was how Amin’s personality contradictions became a factor in the continuation of spoils politics. He was neither used to nor cared for the form of procedure of government and his intervention prevented the evolution of any form of system under which an institution could evolve. Instead he opted to rule by decrees. In mid March 1971, Amin enacted the Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree. This decree gave powers to any soldier to arrest persons for offences against public order, and even to search the homes, offices and motor cars of suspected persons. As Mazrui (1973:3) has observed, by this decree the regime ‘sought to claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ as a political weapon. The Army had made itself the master of the situation: as the most powerful faction, it took all from all.

The Penal Code (Amendment) Decree of 17 March, 1971 decreed that ‘unlawful gathering’ was henceforth a felony punishable by seven years of imprisonment. What constituted ‘unlawful’ gathering was up to any soldier to determine. The Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree of 17 March, 1971 (see above), granted full powers of arrest and search of any person without warrant to any soldier in uniform. The Suspension of Political Activity Decree of 17 March, 1971 ‘abolished’ politics. Under this decree, any form of political activity, except by the soldiers, was suspended. All persons previously associated with political activity were required to get permission before leaving the country.

As Omara-Otunnu (1987:103) has commented, the army ‘took
advantage of the situation to engage in indiscriminate harassment of the civilian population for their own ends'. In pursuing their own interests thus, the army set itself against the civilian population, and put an end to the possibilities of genuine cooperation of the people with the regime.

The Army as a Faction Under Threat

Amin did not feel secure, however, despite the powers of the Army and his own unchallenged position at the head of the Army and the Government. An important factor in this was Obote’s looming shadow from Tanzania. The former president still had allies both inside the army, the country and outside. Amin’s feeling of vulnerability influenced his actions and style of rule (such as the killings of real or imagined enemies), which in turn became a factor in the political development under him.

True or not Amin believed that Obote had united the Acoli and Langi members of the Armed forces against him, and since these two groups still made up the bulk of the Army, his feeling of insecurity was real. Four of Uganda’s immediate neighbours, Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi had denounced Amin and proclaimed their support for Obote. (ARB February 1971). Support for Amin came only from West Africa (Ghana especially). The danger existed that these external forces would link up with the pro-Obote section in the army. Indeed, according to the Uganda Government, plans for a three- or four-pronged attack on Uganda involving Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda and possibly Zambia were already being worked out in Dar-es-Salaam. The countries implicated all denied this claim (ARB February 1971:201-5), but Amin certainly feared such a possibility.

In February 1971 Obote visited Sudan from Tanzania. There, with
the cooperation of President Nimeiri, he opened a military training camp for his guerrillas at Owiny-KiBul, in the south, 45 miles from the Uganda border. 'From there he contracted soldiers and civilians in Uganda ... to go and join him in the Sudan' (Mutibwa 1992:87). At about the same time, some 1000 soldiers loyal to Obote followed him to Tanzania and joined a training camp near the town of Tabora. (ACR 1971-1972). Though it now appears the Sudanese support for Obote was primarily designed to put pressure on Amin to end his own support of the Anya Nya guerrillas fighting against the regime in Khartoum rather than an undiluted support for Obote in the same lines as that of Tanzania, it nevertheless put pressure on Amin since he was once again feeling as trapped as he felt just before the coup in 1969-70. This fear was understandable considering that Tanzania and Sudan virtually hemmed Uganda between them in the north and south.

Furthermore the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had refused to recognise his regime. Uganda’s delegation to the Addis Ababa Council of Ministers meeting late in February, led by Foreign Affairs Minister Wanume Kibedi, was refused admission. (ARB February 1-28, 1971). At the same time the venue for that year’s OAU summit, planned to be held in Kampala, was changed to Addis Ababa.

**Amin's Personality and Policy Contradictions**

These developments put Amin in the same situation, as far as his feeling of insecurity was concerned, as the one before the coup. His response was not to be cowed, but to hit back at real or imagined enemies. The result was the almost wholesale slaughter of Acoli and Langi in the armed forces, and many outside, in a series of waves of killings that began immediately after

Kibedi (1974), who knew Amin intimately, attributed the subsequent disintegration of the country to Amin’s personality. He describes Amin as having a dual personality. One side of him was charming, friendly and reassuring. This side was also endowed with immense capacity to convince. But the other side of Amin was ruthless and brutal. While this is largely true, it is not altogether adequate to explain Amin’s transformation as described above. Of far more importance in understanding his subsequent moves was his other duality, that of being both a soldier and a politician at the same time. This came about after and as a result of the coup. The combination of these two functions in a man of Amin’s nature and office at that time was to produce extraordinary contradictions in his policies both at home and abroad. This politician-soldier duality was important in understanding the way he responded to the problems he faced once he became president.

The problem was that Amin lacked the skills of the politician he had inadvertently become. He was a political joyrider who got caught up in a traffic jam he could not negotiate through. Since the factors I have touched on above mitigated against returning the country to a civilian administration, he was forced to rely on the skills of the soldier in him to do a politician’s job. As if to emphasise the dominance of the soldier over the politician in him, the entire cabinet was enrolled in the Army and subjected to military drills every morning before starting work (Ravenhill 1974). Military drills were introduced in many departments of work and in every school throughout the country, including, (if not regularly), Makerere University (Langlands 1977).

Amin was thus unprepared and unsuitable for the political tasks
that events had tragically conspired to place in his charge. He literally set out to run the government by action and force, elevating 'action' and 'force' into policy and even sanctifying them into a sort of principle. But Amin's method of control and governance through force was so erratic and lacked pattern. It cannot be reduced to the Machiavellian principle of control through fear rather than love, because his rule was simply without method or plan. Failure was therefore inevitable. Mazrui (1973) touches on this issue when he writes:

For many Ugandan soldiers [and Amin] the coup was their first moment of national heroism... They were trained in the techniques of killing and maiming... But a coup is not a system of acclamation. It is an event. When the event receded into history, the soldiers had once again to face the issue that their training had been for manipulating fear rather than manipulating love' (p. 10).

The Army's intervention in the political process was catastrophic, although not entirely surprising. A number of factors can account for the poor performance of the Uganda Army in government, which was particular to the development of the Uganda Army itself. For not all military governments in Africa have been so bad, or led to the destabilisation of the state as it did in Uganda. General Olusegun Obasanjo for example ruled Nigeria from 1976 to 1979, and his regime can be considered a success by Nigerian and African standards. For instance in 1979 he peacefully handed power to a democratically elected civilian administration of Shehu Shagari. Also Gamal Abd el-Nasser's rule in Egypt (1954-1970) was even more successful: Egypt became prosperous because of his social reforms. One factor for the poor performance of the

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Amin regime was that the Uganda Army was developed essentially as a back up force for politicians in the factional struggles since independence, and lacked the character of a professional army. (Omara-Otunnu 1987; Decalo 1976:173-230). Moreover, within the Army it was the most unprofessional NCOs that took over power. The regime therefore succeeded only in bringing out the worst of factional politics. It can be compared to Samuel Doe’s administration in Liberia from 1980 to 1991. Doe was only a Master Sergeant when he took power in 1980, and to the end of both his regime and himself in 1991 Liberia remained very unstable.

The prominent, above-the-law position to which the Army has been elevated was another factor in the continuation of instability. For having failed to develop a partnership with the politicians, the Army still had the option to penetrate the general population. This it attempted from 1973, but the attempt, rather than winning the people, alienated them from the regime.

**The Administrative Reorganisation of 1973 and its Effects**

Just as Obote had retained his position by ‘allowing’ the UPC notables to do as they pleased before 1966, army officers in Amin’s Uganda were generally above the law. Therefore, although Amin centralised the chain of command in his own hands, his immediate subordinates remained largely independent, and authority within the Army itself disintegrated. The granting of the powers of arrest without warrant to soldiers reduced the effectiveness and even relevance of the police force, who in theory at least, still represented the concept of civilian authority.

At the beginning of 1973 the regime made an effort to re-establish
the system of representative government abolished in 1971. In January Amin announced a programme of administrative reorganisation to bring the military nearer to the people and perhaps improve relations between them. He claimed that Obote’s government had been too aloof from the people and declared 1973 ‘year of the people’. (For the ‘philosophy’ and details of this administrative reorganisation see Amin 1976; Mutibwa 1992:108; ARB 10, 191973; ACR 1973-1974; Martin 1974). In February the five regions into which the country was administratively divided were further divided into ten administrative units called provinces. Each province was under a military governor appointed and directly responsible to Amin instead of the minister of provincial administration. Each province was further divided into new districts under either military or civilian district commissioner. The number of districts was 38. There was at least one military unit in each district, under battalion commanders. It was these battalion commanders, rather than the administrative district commissioners, who were directly responsible for the districts in their areas (ARB October 1973:2760). The battalion commanders also controlled the local branches of the State Research Bureau (SRB), the most powerful and feared of Amin’s security organisations. Both the Military Police and another security organisation, the Public Service Unit (PSU), were above the regular police force. They were answerable not to the district commissioner but to the provincial governor, and thus ultimately responsible to Amin.

It should be noted here that even before independence, the Uganda civil service was a well-developed system, with well-trained and competent district commissioners. The district commissioners were generally on good terms with the people and were looked to as protectors.

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2 For a discussion of the roles and functions of the various security or paramilitary organisations under Amin, see Khiddu-Mukabuya (1989).
Had Amin utilised the existing local administration system as partners of his regime in the administrative reorganisation of 1973, a more meaningful link between the regime and the people might have been established. For in theory, the reorganised administration had the potential to establish a working relationship between the regime and the people. The subordination of the district commissioners to the battalion commanders made this impossible.

At the end of 1973, before the new system was properly established, the battalion commanders dismissed all the county chiefs and organised the 'elections' of new ones, with only 'suitable' candidates eligible to stand. In Madi district, for example, 24 out of 25 existing chiefs were dismissed and replaced by new ones, many of them soldiers from other parts of the country who did not understand the language and customs of the people they represented. All in all about 720 soldiers, many of them of the rank of private, were appointed to act as chiefs throughout the country. (ACR 1973-1974:B291). According to some accounts the sitting chiefs who had been appointed on political party basis, especially those who supported UPC, were killed by the soldiers (Martin 1974:216).

The civilian police had during 1972 ceased to have any influence. As a contemporary record noted: 'The police - looked upon with mistrust by Amin - was repeatedly purged in 1972; their officers were as little immune from the SRB as were civilians'. (ACR 1972-1973:B273). In May 1973 Amin the Ministry of Internal Affairs, under which the police fall, was made a mere department within the Ministry of Defence. The Military Police, another agent of state control, became the primary law-enforcement agency.

From the regime's point of view, the attempt was successful because it spread the military presence in all the districts down to the county level.
It fulfilled one of Amin's aims, that of controlling the country through the Army as opposed to the civilian local government organs. But for the other declared purpose of the reorganisation, the re-marriage between the regime and the people, the attempt was not only a failure but had the opposite effect. It merely improved the state's capacity to repress the people in the most remote areas. It was the completion of the military occupation of the country.

The Expulsions of the Asians, Israelis and British

During the second half of 1972, Amin made one major political decision which, in combination with other events at that time, affected the future of his regime and that of the country as a whole. These included the sudden expulsion of his erstwhile friends, the Israelis, from Uganda in February 1972; the expulsion of British as well as some Ugandan Asians in late 1972, and the invasion of the country by Obote's People's Army from Tanzania in September. Also early in early 1973 Amin expelled the British from Uganda. With the exception of the expulsion of the Asians and Obote's abortive invasion attempt, these developments had largely external ramifications. The importance of the expulsion of the Asians lay in Amin's use of their abandoned properties as patronage within the Army, and a few selected civilians who became the ally of the regime. On the expulsion of the Asians, see Twaddle (1975; Uganda News, September 1972, pp. 3-16; Mutibwa 1992:80-92; Mamdani 1983:38-94; ACR 1972-1973:B303-6, and others).

The significance of the expulsions as far as the survival or support for Amin's regime was concerned was that after the Asians left, all the businesses formerly owned by them were taken over by the government.
and distributed as patronage within the country. Reliable figures are hard to come by, but according to estimates between 3,000 and 4,000 businesses were distributed within three months early in 1973. (ACR 1972-1973:B304-5). Besides businesses, the homes of the departed Asians were also given away, as well as ‘tea and coffee estates, garages and large hotels.’ And this ‘system of personal patronage ... produced a new class of entrepreneurs.’ (ACR 1972-1973:B303). In addition to the direct distribution of business to individuals, the regime had the chance of rewarding support by appointments to management positions to the larger businesses it had taken over. This category of large businesses included the giant Madhvani Industrial Group, the Mehta Sugar Estates. Added to this were the British and American companies nationalised when Amin expelled them from Uganda in 1973. Also in an effort to show that the regime was winning the "economic war" and actually creating "black millionaires", Amin ordered banks to give loans to support business ventures by Ugandans. The Uganda Commercial Bank in particular, and others 'were pressurised to support uneconomic companies against their will' (Commonwealth Secretariat 1979:113). However the government succeeded in setting up new companies in this way. For example, many new private and public companies were set up in Uganda during 1974 (For the list see Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979:114-5, Table 9.1).

The State Trading Corporation (STC), which held a total monopoly of the export-import trade, had already became a subject of competition among the officers. In response to this competition, Amin had, at the end of 1974 broken the STC into eight specialised companies. This was done in order to provide patronage to more officers: for the break-up made it possible for most of the leading officers to control at least one company. And as I will show in Chapter 9, business rivalry among the officers, later
played a role in Amin's fall in that it encouraged the emergence of “business associations” and potential political factions within the military at the time the crisis with Kenya's closure of its border after the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in July 1976.3

The economic war enabled the regime to penetrate society as a whole and thus recruit a tiny class of civilian support. With the administrative reorganisation just discussed in place, civilian recruitment was comparatively easy. The newly installed local chiefs, members of the civil service and other professionals around the country received shops and small businesses free from the state. (Mutibwa 1992:115-7). These subsequently identified their interests with that of the regime. These were the so called Mafuta Mingis, whose aspiration, in Amin’s words, was to become ‘black millionaires’.

But a distinction needs to be drawn between the civilian and military beneficiaries of the economic war in their relation to the regime (or more precisely Amin). The concept of reciprocity defined the relationship between Amin and his military supporters, but not that with the civilian opportunists. These were simply used, and consequently dispensable if the need arose. But as they owed their properties solely to the regime, and their association with the regime had alienated them from the people (mainly as a result of envy), they came to identify themselves and their survival with that of the regime, as dependents. Many became informers or full-time agents for the SRB and PSU.

(Mamdani 1983). Even if they did not help in the breakup of any genuine anti-government nests, their association with the government through the SRB, and the fact that the local battalion commanders did not bother to check any information they received and meted instant ‘justice’ on whoever was accused, meant that the *Mafuta Mingis* to a large extent kept the fear of the regime alive throughout the country. They therefore contributed in making it possible for Amin to lord it over the people for so long. As a base of support the *mafuta mingi* class was not of much significance, since few people benefited directly. The importance of the economic war was the fact that, as in Kenya, the knowledge that the regime had patronage to offer, which led to a more ostentatious showing of support by those who wanted rewards. As I will show in Chapter 9, the real support for the regime, and the reason for its relatively long survival, lay elsewhere within the top ranks of the Army.

**KENYA**

**Survival of Clientelism and Continuity (1978-1980)**

In Chapter 6 we have noted that the basis of political stability in Kenya was the clientelist system centred around Kenyatta, and that as an institution in its own right this system had developed to the extent where it was able to defend itself, that is, it had become self-regulating while remaining viable as a system of rule. (See also Tamarkin 1978; 1979; Leys 1975; and Khapoya 1979) It is true that Kenyatta dominated this system during his time, but it is also true to say that Kenyatta himself was dominated to a large extent by the system as everyone else, in the same way a vehicle carries both the passengers and the driver. Stability had become dependent on playing the rules of the system right: Kenyatta might have been able to
disrupt the system if he chose, but this would not have been either in his or the country’s interest.

Since the clientelist system was self-servicing and had become a stabilising force, only its disruption would have led to chaos, and not the demise of one of the members, however prominent. This is why, as we shall see in a moment, Moi succeeded Kenyatta without disrupting the system. In fact it was those who tried to prevent his succession who were defeated: first in the “Change the Constitution Campaign” in 1976, and again in an alleged coup plot in Nakuru at the time of Kenyatta’s death in August 1978. (ACR 1978-1979:B267; Karim and Ochieng 1980; WR 18 October 1976; Widner 1992:115-137).

But just as the past legacy helped Moi to succeed Kenyatta, it also made it difficult for him to break from the system during the first few years, or to be ‘his own man’. For instance, the first cabinet was purely Kenyatta’s last cabinet. Even the ministers of the previous regime, with the exception of three whose ministries were either abolished or merged, remained unchanged after the succession. Only one new minister was brought in the cabinet, Stanley Oloitiptip, to take over the Home Affairs ministry vacated by Moi himself. (ACR 1978-1979:B272-3 and ACR 1977-1978:B266-7; Khapoya 1980; Tamarkin 1979). Contrary to arguments by Jackson and Rosberg (1985:45-70; 1982:1-25) that “personal rulers” in Africa’s “weak states” dominate the political system and that the systems respond to the whims of the leaders, the case in Kenya, and to some extent that in Uganda, demonstrated that the systems hold sway over the leaders. It was the system rather than its operators that was, in the final analysis, the most influential actor. For example, (see Chapter 7), in 1969 Obote was unable to use his authority as leader of the government to remove Felix Onama from the Ministry of Defence. Had the ‘system’ of
spoils not weakened Obote's position and strengthened that of Onama, there would have been little problem in shifting him to another ministry or dismissing him altogether should he refuse to be moved.

Moi's previous weak position within the clientelist system was another factor in the preservation of continuity. As an 'outsider' he was not in a position to disrupt it when he came to power, and became for the first few years even more dependent on it than Kenyatta had been. In understanding Moi's succession and the peaceful transition the legacy of the past needs to be emphasised.

Domination of the System

The first factor that helped the transition process was the fact that Moi was the heir apparent. The widespread view that Kenyatta died without naming a successor may be literally correct, but is analytically misleading. Moi's position was so self-evident that there was no need to make announcements about it. As Khapoya (1978:17) has pointed out: 'Moi was really the front runner to succeed Kenyatta from the very beginning [of his vice-presidency in January 1967]'. When Mboya emerged as an alternative front runner, he was eliminated in 1969, an act which, as noted, was a part of the preservation of the system.

While real power in Kenya had always been in the hands of the Gatundu court under Kenyatta, the stability of that power in their hands was safeguarded by a delicate alliance involving Gatundu and the rest of Kikuyu, as well as two of the most important peripheral ethnic groups - the Kalenjin and Akamba, and headed respectively by Moi and Paul Ngei. It was this Gatundu/Kikuyu-Kalenjin-Akamba alliance that had helped to

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*This is a recurring theme in the discussion of pre- and post-Kenyatta politics in Kenya. See for example Murray (1965); Khapoya (1978); Leys (1975).*
create stability in the country. (Throup 1987:34). Given the importance Kenyatta attached to unity since and before Kenya became a Republic in December 1964, his commitment to the alliance with these two leaders was understandable. To have left Moi outside the system posed the dangers of an anti-Kikuyu alliance comprising the various peoples of the Rift Valley Province and Nyanza Province, the second and third largest ethnic groups, respectively the Luo (14.6 percent of the population in 1969) and Luhya (13.6 percent). The 1966 ostracism of Oginga from KANU and the assassination of Mboya in 1969 had eliminated effective Luo representation in Kenyatta’s state, and turned them into something like an opposition to the state itself. (On this see Goldsworthy 1982a). If Moi was not incorporated into the state, the danger existed of an anti-Kikuyu alliance involving in particular the Kalenjin, Luhya and the Luo, who are in any case closely related and inhabit a continuous geographical area. Such a development would have pitched the Kikuyu against “the rest”.

Besides Kenyatta had good reasons for fearing such a development because since he joined KANU in 1964, Moi had provided a bridge between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu peoples, and this prevented land clashes between them. Under pressure for more land, the western Kikuyu had expanded into the Rift Valley at the expense of the Kalenjin, but more especially Moi’s own Tugen, in whose territory (or so they claimed) the immigrant Kikuyu town of Nakuru lay. For although Nakuru is not in Kikuyu country, Nakuru District and town had been predominantly Kikuyu since the 1920s, following the influx of squatters into the area during World War 1 to escape from the exactions of the government nominated chiefs. (Throup 1987:44-5; Kanogo 1987. See also Chapter 2 on the reaction of the Kikuyu to some of the appointed chiefs). As Throup (1987:44) has observed, from a ‘Kikuyu perspective, Moi appeared to be the most
important Kalenjin leader who had to be compensated elsewhere if a confrontation was to be avoided.

Moi's succession can also be seen as epitomising the greatest rewards that a political client can claim from his patron. In view of the above it was something he earned. None of the other clients had offered so much to Kenyatta, nor *voluntarily* served him as loyally as Moi did. The other members of the circle, Mungai, Koinange, Njonjo and Gichuru, had to serve Kenyatta either because they had little chance outside his shadow or because some were members of the 'Royal Family'. But Moi had a choice, as demonstrated by his break with KANU in 1960 to form KADU. His rejoining of KANU in 1964 was a strategic decision, but nonetheless voluntary.

In fact Kenyatta needed Moi more than the other way, even through the *Mzee* was infinitely more powerful. For within Kikuyu itself, not all the notables and districts supported Kenyatta. Without Moi Kenyatta would have had to depend on some or the "real" notables,\(^5\) such as J.M. Kariuki, Mwai Kibaki and Bildad Kaggia. The political status of Kiambu and possibly Kenyatta would have diminished somewhat. Anti-Gatundu alliance of the rest of the Kikuyu, or even in alliance with other peoples, would have ended Gatundu domination and Kenyatta's state. As we shall see shortly, it was the alliance between Mwai Kibaki, (a Nyeri Kikuyu) and Moi that finally defeated the Gatundu challenge to Moi's succession. For these reasons, at least since 1968 Moi not only had been the heir-apparent, but his position had been protected with Kenyatta's blessing. The assassinations of Mboya in July 1969 and J. M. Kariuki in March 1975 had the effect of strengthening his position further.

The assassination of Mboya enhanced Moi's position in two respects.

\(^5\)The 'real' notables were the key members of Kenyatta's inner circle, the men who controlled the Presidency. (See Chapter 5).
In the first place, it removed the ablest of the potential challengers to his bid to succeed Kenyatta. As we have seen in Chapter 6, Mboya’s ambitions, capabilities and the nature of his cross-country power base, especially his power base in the trade union movement, made him a threat to Kenyatta’s clientelist system itself. As Miller (1984:44-5) has noted: ‘By 1969 [Mboya] was truly a national politician, appealing for unity across ethnic lines ... and posed a threat if his broad appeal hid serious presidential aspirations. (See also Sandbrook 1972:22; Goldsworthy 1982a:264-275, and 1982b). Secondly, the assassination alienated not only the Luo but also Mboya’s supporters throughout the country, increasing resentment against the ruling oligarchy. Although Moi was vice-president it did not make things any more complicated for him. He was a part of Kenyatta’s inner circle, but he was not of it. As the outsider the assassination made him the less evil of the ‘gang’, and therefore less unacceptable as Kenyatta’s successor than the next most likely candidate – Kenyatta’s nephew Mungai.

The assassination of Kariuki had the same effect as that of Mboya on Moi’s prospects of succession. The difference was that Mboya’s assassination improved Moi’s position in a general way, while that of Kariuki improved it in a more particular way. Mboya’s assassination had pitched the Kikuyu as a whole against ‘the rest’, or more particularly the Kikuyu against the already marginalised Luo. Kariuki’s assassination however pitched the Kikuyu against Kikuyu. Kariuki had made himself the spokesman for the poor in both Kikuyuland and the rest of Kenya, and was therefore the self-declared opponent of the ‘Royal Family’. He has been described as ‘a powerful MP and ... leader of the unofficial opposition in parliament’ (Miller 1984:51-2). He also ‘made no bones about his aspirations to the presidency’ (Nyong’o 1983:32-3). His open criticism of
Kenyatta and the initial official attempt to cover up his murder, confirmed the suspicion that the 'Royal Family' was directly responsible for his death. (WR March 17 and 24, 1975; June 9, and many other issues; Throup 1987:48-9; Tamarkin 1978:315-6). It is therefore significant, but not surprising, that it was Kikuyu support, but more appropriately anti-'Royal Family' Kikuyu support, that ensured Moi's smooth succession.

Moi was also helped by the rivalry among the court itself. For neither the court nor the whole clientelist system was as cohesive and efficient from the mid 1970s as it had been before 1970. The system had deteriorated into a sort of crisis. Before his assassination J.M. Kariuki was charging that politicians diverted contributions to their own use instead of giving them to the people. Corruption became rife among top politicians and their agents. This was particularly so in the allocation of land in the Rift Valley during the government's programme to expand agricultural production in the area between 1972 and 1975. This was a period characterised by the ' politicisation of the land market' (Widner 1992:80). Land was allocate on the basis of political support, not on the basis of need or the ability and qualification of the recipient to make the best agricultural use of it. Indeed Kariuki was not slandering the system under Kenyatta: he was exposing what went on within it. Kenyatta's apparent inability to check corruption, the excesses of the security forces (see for example Ngugi wa Thiong'o's account in Detained: A Writers Prison Diary, Heinemann, 1982), alienated the rest of Kikuyu against the Gatundu oligarchy. Also since Kenyatta was already very advanced in years and in ill-health, competition within the inner circle for succession ensured that Moi faced no united opposition from the family. (Chege, Independent Kenya). The split between Njonjo and Mungai at the top of the clientelist pyramid was particularly important in this, as demonstrated
by the failed "Change the Constitution" campaign in 1976, where the two took opposite sides. Had they stood together, Moi’s succession could have been easily prevented, whatever the consequences.

Failure of the ‘Amend-the-Constitution’ Campaign, 1976

But the resilience of the clientelist system was best demonstrated in the failed attempt to amend the constitution in 1976 in order to prevent Moi from succeeding Kenyatta. It was a test case for the strength for the strengths of one faction and that of the system as a whole, and needs to be described here.

On 22 September 1976, Kihika Kimani, the MP for Nakuru North called for the amendment of the section of the constitution on succession, such that ‘any person who succeeds a president who vacates his office for any reason would himself be elected in a general election’ (WR 18 October 1976). Had it been considered and passed, the amendment would have reverted the law of succession to what it was in the independence constitution of 1962 (Gertzel 1970; Murray 1968). Under the existing law the vice-president takes office for the grace period of 90 days, after which the President would be elected by parliament.

Since it was clear the campaign was designed to prevent Moi’s succession, it provided a rare opportunity for the articulation of the factional lines, and for Moi’s supporters and enemies to come out in the open. On October 8, 1976, Stanley Oloitiptip, a Moi supporter, proposed that parliament condemn the campaign to amend the constitution as ‘unethical, amoral and bordering on criminality’; 92 of the members present supported it, out of a total parliament membership of 170. (Tamarkin 1979:24; ACR 1976-1977:B219). Inside the Gatundu Court,
Mungai and Gichuru supported it. The Akamba strongman Paul Ngei was another supporter. However, all public debate on the matter ended when Njonjo, who ‘supported’ Moi⁶, issued a statement to that effect early in October. The statement said that it was ‘a criminal offence’ to discuss the question of succession because it implied that some politicians wished to ‘compass, imagine, devise or intend the death or deposition of the president’. Njonjo also warned that the ‘mandatory sentence for any such an offence by a citizen [was] death, and any person who aids in such an offence by being an accessory after the fact of it is liable to imprisonment for life’. (quoted in The Weekly Review 18 October, 1976). A few days later the full cabinet had an emergency meeting, and a statement was issued ‘reiterating’ Njonjo’s statement of the amendment of the constitution, and the matter ended there.

This development demonstrated one of the benefits of well-established clientelistic system, its ability to transcend and destroy ethnic loyalties that Lemarchand (1972) draws attention to. Although I do not agree with most of what Lemarchand says about the relationship between ethnicity and clientelism⁷, he is in one case right when he says that ‘Clientelism may in some cases weaken the strength of ethnic identification and [this] in turn affect the shape and stability of clientelistic networks’. The essence of a clientelistic relationship is its reciprocity, and how useful a client and patron are each to the other. If therefore a relative or a member of the same ethnic group is in no position to offer support or reward, patrons and clients will ally themselves with “outsiders” who are able to offer them what they need. The boundaries of ethnicity are therefore transcended.

⁶ Njonjo’s support, as I will show in the next chapter, was a tactical move to project himself.
⁷ See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of this.
Thus the general resentment against the Kikuyu over Mboya’s assassination, the particular resentment against the Gatundu Court over the assassination of Kariuki, the rivalry between Njonjo and Mungai as well as those between the political notables in each constituency, all combined to enhance Moi’s succession prospects, and made it a foregone conclusion even before Kenyatta died on 22 August, 1978. In the absence of these factors Moi’s succession would have been in severe doubt if not impossible.

The Aftermath: The Period Of Wait-and-See, 1979-80

Despite, or because of, his being the candidate favoured by the system, Moi subsequently became a prisoner to it during the first few years of his leadership. For one thing he had political debts to pay to those who had supported him. The same indebtedness which made this caution necessary and an asset at the same time became a liability. In particular Moi was in danger of remaining a figurehead or being overthrown by the same Njonjo faction that helped him into power. Of his main two Kikuyu supporters, Njonjo and Kibaki, Njonjo was the more powerful and dangerous (see below). He was therefore both a political friend who had to be appeased up to a point, but beyond that point a political enemy to be watched and destroyed at the right time. Miller (1984:89) has stated that part of Moi’s success in gaining the presidency was that he brought in Njonjo and Kibaki on his side. Although the support of these two men was critical to Moi’s success, as already noted, it would be more accurate to see the relationship between the three at that early stage (1978-9) as that of interdependence: before 1979 Njonjo was in stronger position than Moi as he, Njonjo, had more cards to play.
Once he was sworn in as President at the end of 1978, however, Moi faced a real dilemma as to how to overcome the problem of interdependency or ‘triumvirate leadership’ imposed by the system. As President he had the power to alter the system in any way he chose. His dilemma was that the system had ensured his success so far, and as such upsetting its delicate balance carried the risk of weakening his own position. He had been, and to the extent that the system held sway, was still a guest within it, and his success had been helped only by the division between Njonjo and Mungai’s faction. (Indeed Moi’s position in 1978-80 was similar to that of Obote in 1960-63, because both men were helped by the factionalism around them). It was a situation he could not leave unchanged for long, however. The second problem was therefore how to make himself master of the system without changing it. As I will show in due course, it was the option of making himself the patron of the system without destroying it that Moi chose to pursue. It involved his ridding himself of dependence on Njonjo, which in turn made it necessary to forge new alliances.

**Moi’s First Moves to Undermine the Gatundu Group**

Given the above, Moi’s first moves were tactically against the Gatundu group, and not Njonjo, whom he still needed as a shield. To attack Njonjo early and directly was like boring a hole under the boat by which he, Moi, was crossing the stormy waters of Kenyan politics. He therefore started by undermining the Kenyatta family and its associates from 1980. At the same time he expanded his political constituency from mainly Kalenjin or Rift Valley base to encompass the whole country. (I will discuss this in detail in
a moment). For by first eliminating the threat of the Gatundu Group\textsuperscript{8}, and expanding his constituency nationwide, Njonjo’s value as an ally would be undermined and he would then become dispensable.

The undermining of the Gatundu group began very early in Moi’s leadership by the tactical demotion of Mbiyu Koinange to the relatively obscure ministry of natural resources in November, 1978. (Khapoya 1979:55-6; ACR 1978-1979; African Confidential 19, 17 August 25, 1978 p. 1). The significance of this change was that at a stroke Moi had removed the instruments of state control from the Kenyatta family. Koinange had been in charge of the all-important provincial administration. As already noted, in Kenya there has historically been a close relationship between the civil service and the executive. President Kenyatta in particular had relied on the civil service as an agent of control (Chapter 5, above; Mueller 1968; Gertzel 1966). At a time of a major political change, the service was therefore indispensable to order and stability, and it was therefore important to ensure that it was at the side of the new leader. Although during the Kenyatta era the permanent secretaries in the various ministries exercised considerable influence and sometimes had power over their ministers, they were all controlled at the Office of the President by Koinange, the Minister of State - hence their power. It was in this sense that Koinange’s removal was a significant political act, because by the very nature of their office within the Presidency, ministers of state in Kenya have been functionally the extension of the Presidency. Individuals who filled the post had to be truly loyal to the particular President. As minister of state Koinange was also responsible for the GSU and internal security, the two organs that constituted the most important instruments of state control. In fact even before Koinange was removed, Moi ensured that he

\textsuperscript{8} For a discussion on the Gatundu Group, see Chapter 5, pp. 104-6.
had the loyalty and support of the individuals who controlled these organisations, namely: Mr. Kanyota (Head of the GSU), Major General Mulinge (Commander of the Army), and Bernard Hinga (Commissioner of Police). (Tamarkin 1978; ACR 1978-1979).

Moi followed the demotion of Koinange with an attack on Njoroge Mungai and other influential members of the Kenyatta family. For despite his defeat in the bid to succeed Kenyatta, Mungai retained some political clout. He remained chairman of both the Nairobi branch of KANU and that of the government owned National Pipeline Company to which Kenyatta had appointed him in 1975. More directly, he was the flagbearer of the Kenyatta family (On this see Karim and Ochieng 1980). He was the potential presidential candidate of the supporters of the change the constitution campaign in 1976.

The strategy of undermining the Gatundu faction involved more than direct attacks on their members. Moi simultaneously sought to expand his base of support countrywide. For example on 12 December, 1978, the anniversary of Kenya’s independence, he released all political prisoner of the Kenyatta era as a sign of goodwill. The release of political prisoners after changes of regime has been a common feature in Africa (Amin, as noted already, also released political prisoners). But in Moi’s case the release had a political significance beyond the ordinary because it helped his anti-Kiambu strategy. As Widner 1990:131) has pointed out, the significance of freeing the prisoners was that it had the ‘practical effect not only of demonstrating goodwill but also of reviving the careers of some potential allies against a Kiambu-based coalition.’ After the release Moi tried to reach a rapprochement with the Luo people who had been hostile to the Kenyatta regime, by a limited rehabilitation of Oginga Odinga. In 1979 Odinga was appointed chairman of the Cotton Lint and Seed

Moi also tried to present himself as a man of the people in contrast to Kenyatta’s aloofness and elitism. He took a more active part in self-help projects, at which he made tactical ‘generous and spontaneous contributions’ to impress upon the people his generosity (Nyong’o 1983:34). He initiated a literacy campaign and abolished school fees for primary education. On another initiative tried to improve youth representation in KANU. Late in 1979 he established a KANU branch at the Nairobi University (Miller 1984:89).

The policy of progressively reducing Kikuyu dominance in favour of a more representative distribution of power continued in the economic sphere. Under Kenyatta capitalist accumulation and therefore economic power had been the preserve of a few wealthy Kikuyu symbolised by the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA). The alliance between economic and political power in during the Kenyatta era was such that his regime was seen as the era of ‘GEMA-domination’. During that time ‘[GEMA] banks gave easy loans to middle class functionaries ... to buy residential houses in the urban areas [and] ‘advanced loans to commercial farmers and ... commodity producers.’ Furthermore, banks helped in ‘state projects within which sinecures were created for the supporters of the regime’ (Nyong’o 1983:34-5).

With the assistance of Finance Minister Mwai Kibaki, Moi pursued a policy of economic liberalisation, designed to open opportunities for more people. This involved the withholding of state patronage from business and other (political) financial projects in Kiambu. As a result,
after Moi took over power, most of GEMA-controlled institutions collapsed. (Hyden 1987:177-136). Notable examples were Andrew Ngumba’s Rural and Urban Credit Financial Company and the Mutakino Farmers Company based in Nakuru. The two institutions were involved in the buying and reselling of land, an ‘like so many other land-buying institutions [were] used to accumulate capital for the purpose of subsequently serving short-term political interests’ (Hyden 1987:127; see also Throup 1987:58-9)

In the arena of high politics, the general elections of 1979 provided Moi with an opportunity to further strengthen his position. As much as 60 percent of the new MPs were new entrants; although this change was not much different from the average percentage change of MPs in general elections in Kenya, it was important because (as was to be expected) the changes favoured Moi at the expense of other factions. Many of the MPs who had supported the proposed constitutional change as well as former members of KPU together with Oginga Odinga, were prevented by the KANU machinery from contesting. As most KPU leaders were in any case imprisoned and released by Moi, they had to seek presidential clearance to contest elections and this was simply refused. Besides Oginga Odinga, Achieng Oneko, George Anyoma, Masinde Muliro and Waruru Kanja were refused clearance (Nyong’o 1983:35). Khapoya (1979:17-32) has shown that for the first time since independence the Gatundu stronghold on the cabinet was broken due to the increase of non-Kikuyu cabinet ministers.

The strategy to undermine Kikuyu, but especially Gatundu Kikuyu influence in politics reached its height in mid 1980, when the government suddenly abolished GEMA. The stated reason for the abolition of GEMA was that it was a ‘tribal’ organisation and therefore a bad influence for national unity. But the real reasons went much bigger and was linked to
the new anti-Kikuyu strategy already mentioned. (Widner 1992:140-145). In the words of one commentator, the ban represented ‘the pursuit of specific targets by general means’. The undeclared aim was to ‘check the political and financial advancement of certain individuals not loved by the Moi administration’ (African Confidential 21/21, October 15, 1980, p.1. See also W R 8 August, 1980). The senior members included the most powerful and richest of the people from these four districts. The organisation’s involvement in politics, as noted already, was demonstrated by the fact that it was at a GEMA meeting that the “change-the-constitution” campaign of 1976 was launched. The leading campaigner, the Nakuru North MP Kihika Kimani, was both the chairman of the Nakuru branch of KANU and secretary general of GEMA. Other notable members included Njenge Karume, the chairman and close personal friend Kenyatta; Duncan Ndegwa, the Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, James Gichuru, Mbiyu Koinange and Ngengi Muigai. (Karim and Ochieng 1980:56; W R 8 August, 1980; AC 15 October, 1980, and others).

Backlash
But the steady decline of Kikuyu influence had a negative effect on the relationship between Moi, Njonjo and Kibaki, but especially that between Njonjo and Moi. The strengthening of Moi’s position in the country represented a threat to Njonjo’s ambitions because the president no longer needed him as much as he did in 1978. There was no longer any doubt as to who the real boss was. It was at this stage that Njonjo appears to have decided to go on the offensive. Whether he feared for his position because of the president’s increased powers and confidence, or he simply decided it was time to make a bid for power independently from other factors, is not clear. But in May 1980, Njonjo resigned his post as attorney general and
entered parliament as an elected politician. But instead of appointing him to a powerful cabinet post, Njonjo was given a new and largely decorative portfolio as Minister of Constitutional Affairs. (ACR 1980-1981). The reasons behind such a move by a politician who was already very powerful, as well as for his appointment to an insignificant post by the President, were both clear.

Before 1980, as an appointed rather than elected politician, Njonjo did not have any solid geographical power base. Thus, despite the fact that he held massive legal and bureaucratic powers as attorney general and political power broker in Nairobi, he had nothing apart from these. His power throughout his long tenure of office had rested on his being needed by the president of the day. Due to the paradox already referred to, however, neither he nor Moi was comfortable in their relationship with each other. It was correctly noted that Njonjo’s new status as an elected politician ‘injected a new sense of tension in the political atmosphere’ (AC 14 June, 1980).

In the next chapter we shall see how Moi reacted to this new challenge to his leadership and with what consequences.
CHAPTER NINE

The Successor Regimes: Crises and Disintegration

In Chapter 8 we noted how the successor regimes in Uganda and Kenya attempted to consolidate themselves in power during the first few years. But what they succeeded in doing was merely to consolidate their positions in office, but not necessarily in power. They continued to face challenges to their authority. The attempted coup against Moi at the beginning of August 1982 was but one manifestation of the threats to his authority and position. The challenge remained for Moi to make himself the undisputed patron of his erstwhile fellow-clients. For Amin, since his regime was divorced from the people and depended on the military, the primary challenge was how far he could continue manipulating the top military officers in his favour without being challenged.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the responses of Amin and Moi to the challenges they faced after ‘consolidating’ their positions in power, and to evaluate the effects on their relationship with other officers and politicians. In the section on Uganda I argue that Amin’s long survival and sudden fall in 1979 were both the result of factionalism within the top ranks of the Army. First I explain how Amin consolidated his power and why he survived for such a long period in office, by analysing his relations with members of the Defence Council. After this I will discuss the disintegration of the Defence Council and the polarisation of and the subsequent fall of Amin. The section on Kenya discusses the period from 1980 to 1987 in two waves. In the case of Kenya I argue that Moi’s failure to
make himself the effective patron of Kenyatta’s clientelism encouraged him to be more authoritarian and repressive, and that the growing instability Kenya has experienced from the early 1980s has been a direct result of this. First I discuss the major political events of the period: the attempted coup and expulsion of Njonjo from both government and KANU in 1983-4. After this I interpret Moi’s role as a patron and suggest the probable trend of clientelism as a system of rule under him.

UGANDA
The Survival of Amin’s Regime to 1975

When Amin came to power the general verdict among some observers was that his regime would not last for more than a couple of years (Africa Report, March 1972, p. 5; Short 1973: 34-35). In defiance of such predictions Amin’s regime survived for 8 long years, and might have lasted longer were it not for the intervention of the Tanzanian Army. The irony of this, on the surface at least, was the regime’s surprisingly quick end in 1979. For within 6 months (October 1978-April 1979) of the outbreak of hostilities between the two countries, Amin’s regime was wiped out. Surprising as both the long survival and sudden collapse of the regime may seem, the two developments were consistent with the nature of a regime characterised by spoils politics. Such a regime, since it thrives on short-term strategies, has no long term policy strategies which might make the rulers appreciate the need to integrate with the society. There were therefore no institutional roots within the society to make it subject to social changes that might weaken it; and at the same time this lack of roots renders it vulnerable to a large scale or sudden attack.

A closer examination of what constituted Amin’s regime, or how it was constituted, suggests that there is nothing surprising about either its
long survival or quick collapse. The reasons were the divorce between state and society and the concentration of power within the Defence Council, and in Amin’s hands within the council itself. Only the physical removal of Amin might have led to the removal of the regime. It was a spoils regime in full bloom: Amin the winner took all from all and was nearly everything. Beyond the physical Amin, there had ceased to be a regime in Uganda long before April 1979.

Amin’s position during the last few years in power can be compared to that of Mobutu in Zaire, but especially that of Mohammed Said Barre of Somalia before his fall in 1990. In Somalia, power was concentrated in the hands of few relatives around Said Barre, and like Amin but unlike Mobutu, Barre failed to control or impose his authority and his regime collapsed. Mobutu, on the other hand, has managed to ensure that all his closest associates have always been under his firm control and dependent on him: within the inner circle he has remained the effective patron. In spite of armed rebellions against the central government in the north-east, south-east as well as in Katanga Province to the south, and the fact that government has long ceased to function in most parts of the country, Mobutu’s hold on power has remained. (Young 1993; The Independent, 18 February 1994, p.18). The reason is that the resentment against his regime and the armed struggles in the peripheral areas have been unable to find allies within the inner circle. The opposition groups, which include many of Mubutu’s former clients, have also been severely weakened by intense factionalism. But for Amin, even the Tanzanians and Uganda exiles did not combine forces to overthrow him in 1979 (See Chapter 10), the disintegration of the Defence Council itself would probably lead to his fall sooner than later.

To understand the long survival of the regime, it is therefore
important to shift attention away from the relationship of the regime with the population, and focus on Amin’s changing relationships with the army officers who constituted the core of the regime. State-society relations were unimportant in understanding his survival because the people had no powers of sanction against the regime’s misuse of arbitrary powers. The interests of one either ran parallel to that of the other, or when they met were in potential conflict. But as the regime was all-powerful, this potential conflict posed no threat to it. This explains why in the end it was the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF), an entirely external force, that ended Amin’s regime in April 1979.

Ethnicity Revisited

Omara-Otunnu’s (1987) study of how Amin survived in power for so long remains the most detailed treatment of this subject to date. His analysis has a particular and useful distinction from other commentaries on the subject, such as Mamdani (1983); Martin (1974) and Nabudere (1981). Mamdani (1983), for example, attributes Amin’s survival to ‘fascism’, while Nabudere (1981) has suggested that the support of imperialist countries have been more important. Hansen (1977) and Kiwanuke (1979), and many other writers, have seen ethnicity as the most dominant factor. Omara-Otunnu also subscribes to the notion of external assistance and ethnic solidarity as contributing factors in Amin’s survival, but his emphasis is mostly on the personal power relations and the shifting alliances within the Defence Council and the military as a whole. This focus is correct because as we have seen the divorce between the regime and the people meant that the regime remained the only area, apart from an external force, where it was theoretically and practically possible to
remove Amin and then perhaps overthrow the regime. For this reason and discussion of Amin's survival must not only focus on the shifting alliances within the military leadership but must also be confined to it.

It may be recalled that factional politics and clientelism both undermine the usefulness of ethnic based alliances in the long run. In spoils politics, ethnicity is an insecure basis of support. The legendary struggles and animosity between the two principal Luo leaders in Kenya, Oginga Odinga and Tom Mboya, is a case in point. Indeed it was Mboya rather than Kenyatta who was more directly responsible for the destruction of Odinga's party KPU in the "Little General Elections" of 1966. (Widner 1992:135; Goldsworthy 1982:241-6; Mueller 1976, and others). Clientelism and spoils politics in the first instance thrive on personal rather than corporate interests.

This is not to say that Amin discouraged ethnic alliances or hesitated to use the ethnic card. It is simply that because of the temporary nature of alliances in spoils politics power relations becomes personalised. Individualism rather than collectivism becomes more important. Therefore, no alliance is durable or permanent enough to become the defining factor in power relations when national politics is dominated by spoils politics. As ethnicity is a long-term phenomenon, it becomes subject to the sways and disruptions of spoils politics. It was this temporary nature of alliances in spoils politics that made it necessary for Amin, in the words of Omara-Otunnu himself, to 'consolidate his position by juggling around top military personnel. In this way no one was afforded enough time to build up a sphere of influence in a particular post' (p. 126).

This strategy would not have been necessary if ethnicity already provided, or indeed could have provided, Amin with a secure base of support. It is true that most of the senior officers appointed by Amin were
from the West Nile region and thus ethnically related to Amin. But as one (West Nile) officer was juggled around and replaced by another officer (say also from West Nile), the individual factor becomes more significant than the ethnic factor as both officers are from the same group. Amin’s attempts to rely on his fellow West Nile officers failed to provide him with a secure base of support because the officers so appointed had their own ambitions. In fact it was the officers from West Nile who subsequently became the major internal threat to Amin. Most of the major attempted coups against Amin were led by officers from this area. Rank and position within the military hierarchy and relationship with Amin and other officers were more important.

Lt. Col. Valentine Ochima was the first senior officer to be killed in the factional struggles. He was Amin’s first Chief of Staff and an Alur from West Nile. Because of the strategic importance of this position, most of the officers who were appointed to it lasted for only short periods, some for only months. In understanding Ochima’s fate, an allowance should therefore be made for this as his successors too did not have better luck. The commander of the Air Force, Col. Wilson Toko, also from West Nile, was another officer to fall foul of Amin early in the regime. In April 1973 Toko led an attempted coup against Amin which failed (ACR 1973-1974:B272). Yet a year later, in April 1974, another coup attempt was made by Brigadier Charles Arube, an ethnic Kakwa like Amin. By some accounts this was the most serious coup attempt made during Amin’s eight-year rule (Mutibwa 1992:106-107). Arube was shot dead on Amin’s orders. The willingness of Arube to lead the coup and Amin’s readiness to kill him on the spot contradicts the notion of reliable ethnic based alliances in in political power struggles: ethnicity as a factor in Amin’s long survival, while it should not be discounted, should not be exaggerated either.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEADER(S) OF ATTEMPTED COUP</th>
<th>POSITION/RANK OF LEADER(S)</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP OF LEADER(S)</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1971</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Ochima</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, General HQ; Secretary to the Defence Council</td>
<td>Alur (West Nile)</td>
<td>Suspected plot, in collusion with fellow-Alur politician Mr. Valentine Ovonji. Col Ochima was killed in 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1973</td>
<td>Col. Gad W. Toko Major Terebe Beka Lt. Col. Flusa</td>
<td>Commander, Air F. Chief Signals Officer Commander of Nalire Regiment</td>
<td>Lugbara (West Nile)</td>
<td>First major coup attempt. All officers suspected of involvement sent on enforced leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1974</td>
<td>Brigadier Arube Lt. Col. Elii</td>
<td>Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces Governor, Buganda Province</td>
<td>Kakwa (West Nile)</td>
<td>Primarily a move against Brig. Malera, whom Amin appointed Acting Chief-of-Staff in Arube's absence. Arube was killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1974</td>
<td>Captain Kisule Ft. Lt Kaponga Captain Isumba</td>
<td>Officers in the Air Force</td>
<td>Baganda Baganda</td>
<td>The aim was to kill Amin and restore the Kingdom. Foiled with the help of the Air Force Commander, Brig. Guweddeko, himself a Baganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1977</td>
<td>Exiles in Kenya</td>
<td>Former politicians</td>
<td>Luo</td>
<td>The plot was uncovered. It important because it resulted in the death of Archbishop Janan Luwum and ministers Oryema and Oboth Ofumbi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arube’s action epitomises the real problems in Amin’s relationship with the military officers. It now seems that Arube had some personal grudge against the then acting chief of staff, Brigadier Hussein Marela, one of the Sudanese officers and hated for his high-handedness. Amin’s reasons for putting him in this strategic post was that as Marela had no power base in Uganda, he posed no threat to the president himself. In fact this was the tactic Amin used to retain power because his most loyal supporters, and therefore one element in his survival, were all Sudanese. (See Table 9.1 Table 9.1).

Arube’s action epitomises the real problems in Amin’s above). It was in fact a case of mercenaries supporting a foreign ruler to subjugate his own people. Amin used these mercenaries as shields against some of the ambitious Ugandan officers, who, if they took power, had better chances of instituting a new regime because of their nationality and the support they could expect. It was the manipulation of persons rather than ethnicity that kept Amin in control of the regime and the country for so long.

The State Research Bureau (SRB) and Paramilitary Forces

As Sudanese soldiers of fortune, with no geographical power base in the country, they had an interest in keeping him in power. It is important to draw this distinction as in current Uganda historiography everyone in the north of the country, except the Luos, are bundled together and misleadingly called Nubians, upon whose support it is supposed Amin’s regime depended (Omara-Otunnu 1987; Kiwanuka 1979; Hansen 1977). However, the officers with bases in Uganda, such as Toko, Arube, Mustafa Adrisi, Col. Toloko and others at one time or another supported Amin,
but subsequently each fell out with him. As we will see in the next section, from early 1976 Mustafa quarrelled with Amin over the prominent, almost autonomous, positions of the Sudanese officers surrounding the president.

Early in his regime Amin created and controlled several paramilitary forces on which he relied to control opposition and protect his regime. The best known and most feared was the SRB. But there was also an expanded Military Police force, a Public Service Unit (PSU) and an Anti-Smuggling Unit under the control of a former British officer Bob Astles.

Estimates have put the number of full time active members of the SRB over 3,000, but it also had hundreds of part-time and occasional members. (Khiddu-Mukubuya 1989:147-8; Omara-Otunnu 1987:109-112; Mamdani 1983:42-6). The SRB was set up in 1971, first known as Military Intelligence Unit under Amin’s direct control in the President’s Office. Its activities soon expanded around the country and even abroad: it ‘posted its personnel as and when it pleased, within government departments, institutions, the private sector and Uganda’s embassies abroad’. In its dealings it was the ‘accuser, judge and executioner all in one’ (Khiddu-Mukubuya 1989:147).

The SRB and PSU can be described as mercenary forces because they were under Sudanese officers Amin had brought into his army, such as the long-time head of the SRB, Farouk Minaawa. The head of PSU likewise was a Sudanese called Ali Towelli. Other high ranking Sudanese officials upon whom Amin relied heavily were Brigadier Taban, Lt. Col. Sule, Major Juma, the commander of the important Malire Mechanised Reconnaissance Regiment. Another of Amin’s close associates, and member of the Defence Council was Major Isaac Maliyamungu, who is
sometimes referred to as a Kakwa to emphasise the ethnic factor in Amin’s regime, but was in fact a Zairean. The paratroopers regiment, of which Amin was particularly fond, was commanded by another Sudanese and a member of the Defence Council, Lt. Col. Sabuni. (Mutibwa 1992:106-8; ACR 1974-1975:B306-7; Mamdani 1983:40-44).

Mamdani’s (1983) account of the organisation and activities of these organisations is only one of many:

These agents and informers were the eyes and ears of the ... regime. As one commentator has put it: ‘The SRB was really like God, for it was found everywhere’. Like the army, the SRB had a dual character. On the one hand, it functioned as an institution of the state, designed to detect any opposition in action or speech. Anyone, neighbour, friend or relative, could be an agent or an informer. As a result, political discussion outside official circles was silenced. On the other hand, there was an individual dimension to the terror unleashed by the SRB or PSU. The SRB card endowed its owner with the power of the state... (p. 43-4).

As the district headquarters of the SRB were often within the military units established as a result of the administrative reorganisation of 1973, the control was therefore extensive and total. As far as the prevention of opposition to the state from within the country was concerned, these organs were successful and it would be correct to say Amin owed his survival to a large degree to their activities.

This is where the importance of the Defence Council and the few officers who constituted it comes in. The only organisation from within the country that could have removed Amin from power was the SRB. This it did not do for two important reasons. The first was the “mercenary” nature of the SRB’s leadership. The second was the regime’s ability to keep members of the SRB satisfied by direct handouts and allowing them to have a field day forcibly taking things from the
As for physically removing Amin, it was tried several times (above), but Amin had a reputation for eluding would-be assassins by elaborate plans. Accounts say that he seldom spend two consecutive nights in the same place, and often spent a single night in two or more places to avoid getting killed. It was also his practice not to give advance notice of his movements. All known assassination attempts, and there were many, failed. Recorded assassination attempts were made against Amin in 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978; with sometimes several times in one year. (Respective issues of *African Contemporary Record*)

Therefore, Amin’s regime survived for a long time in part because of its fragmented organisational structure: the various individuals from ministers to battalion commanders, and centres of power (ministries, provincial administrations and barracks), remained largely autonomous, wielding the power and authority of the government but not accountable for them. Also the divorce between society and state meant that any serious threat to the regime could have come only from within the military itself. But the fear of the SRB and the Military Police, and Amin’s practice of constantly reshuffling his top officers, restricted the scope of serious internal threat. But from about 1976 the Defence Council itself began to disintegrate, a process which eventually led to Amin’s overthrow in 1979.

The establishment of the provinces and “military districts” in the administration reorganisation of 1973 had eroded the concept of unified central control by Amin or the Defence Council. In contrast to the relations between the Presidency and Provincial Administration in Kenya under both Kenyatta and Moi, the provincial governors and battalion commanders in Uganda remained largely autonomous. Amin was their
man in Kampala rather than they his men in the provinces because they acted much as they pleased: Amin only endorsed their acts. According to his own directive, the provincial governors were ‘the supreme bosses of their provinces’ and required them only to be ‘personally responsible for his security when he visited their provinces’ (ACR 1974-1985:B308).

The autonomy of the provincial governors, Amin’s reliance on them for control, and the relationship of the provinces with the centre was one cause of disintegration. The arrangement encouraged competition between, rather than cooperation, with the centre and the provinces collectively became alternative, rather than subordinate, centres of power. For example, one of Brigadier Charles Arube’s allies in the attempted coup in March 1974 was the Governor of Buganda Province, Lt. Col. Elly. (Mutibwa 1992:107; ACR 1974-2975:B308, B310-1). Lt. Col. Elly’s readiness to participate in a coup against Amin demonstrated how fast relations with the centre could deteriorate: he had been appointed only in the previous year.

Disintegration and Fall of Amin’s Regime, 1976-1979

In accounting for the disintegration of Amin’s regime, we need to focus on the disintegration of the Defence Council itself, and its collapse as the nucleus of the government, and not on the ‘galvanising of internal opposition’ or external factors as Omara-Otunnu (1987) and Nabudere (1981), among others, have suggested. The disintegration of the Defence Council and Amin’s fall were a product of the dynamics of factional politics discussed in Chapter 5. No matter how tight a monopoly a winning faction may hold on power and its use, factions are bound to emerge within that faction itself and sooner or later the leader’s own
position may become the prize of competition unless, as Kenyatta did, a clientelistic system is established to regulate power relations. Thus Obote fell in 1971 in spite of the concentration of power in his hands in the Republican Constitution of 1967 and repressive measures against opponents. The same process of gradual polarisation of factions that led to Obote’s fall in 1971 in fact contributed to Amin’s fall in 1979.

Prelude to Fall, 1975-1976

The period from 1975 to middle of 1976 was comparatively peaceful with Amin secure in power. One reason was that after Arube’s coup attempt in 1974, Amin carried out another purge in the army and made changes in the position of the top commanders. The purges eliminated or silenced real and imagined opponents. The changes also achieved a desired effect because Lt. Col. Marela, whose appointment as Chief of Staff was one factor in Brigadier Arube’s coup attempt in 1974, was retired from the army in 1974 and the post of Chief of Staff went to Mustafa Adrisi. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:129; Mutibwa 1992:107-8). Mustafa was at that time a colonel, and had apparently no personal political ambitions; therefore Amin considered him to be a safe pair of hands. His appointment had had a healing effect, if temporarily.

Secondly, on the surface at least, the full effect of Amin’s “economic war” had not yet affected the Army as adversely as the rest of the population; on top of which they were enjoying the only “fruits” of the economic war, namely, in corruption. There was already a lack of essential commodities like salt and soap in the country as a whole, but as the military and the people lived in different worlds socially, politically and economically, what was happening to the people did not affect or
concern the Army: the special shops in the barracks still had goods not available to the rest of the population. The scarcity of goods in the shops was in fact advantageous to the military, since hoarding goods and selling them to the people at inflated prices made lucrative business. At the beginning of 1975, for example, a kilo of hoarded sugar sold for over six times of its official price; and cars were selling 'at four times the prices they fetched two years' before in 1972-3. (Africa, March 1975, p.45; ACR 1974-1975:B320). It was the years of magendo with most people practically trying to become 'black millionaires' and the Army officers and mafuta mingis who had benefited from the seized Asian properties were fully content. Any attack on Amin was interpreted as an attack on themselves and their privileged position. The soldiers saw the continuation of as a part of their own interests and survival.

The third reason was that from June 1975 to June 1976 Amin was the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU): the hosting of the year's Summit Conference in Kampala and Amin's election as chairman somehow improved his domestic conduct, and it also kept him too busy with matters concerning Africa (such as the independence of Angola) to pay much attention to the squabbles within the military. (ACR 1975-1976; Mamdani 1983:72-4). But in June 1976 Amin handed over the chairmanship of the OAU to Prime Minister Rangoolaan of Mauritius in St Louis. The hand-over marked the end of his 'glory' days and the beginning of his fall.

The eventual collapse of the regime in April 1979 was hastened by a series of events, with one leading to the other, which started with the raid by Israeli commandos on Entebbe Airport on 3 July 1976. The raid happened while Amin was still at the OAU meeting in Mauritius. Three days before the raid, on 28 June, members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Air France aircraft with 80 Israelis among the a total of 246 passengers, and flew to Entebbe. There they demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli and other countries in exchange for the hostages. It is not clear whether Amin wished to side with the Palestinians, as the Israelis claimed, or merely wanted to negotiate a peaceful solution to the crisis, as he claimed. *(ARB* July 1976:4101-4109). Apart from the fact that Amin had lost international credibility, there was little time for him to establish his position on the crisis. His well-known anti-Isreal and pro-Palestine posturing made it impossible for him to claim impartiality. The ransom demand was not negotiated because the Israeli response was to carry out a military raid to free the hostages. *(Africa* July 1976, pp. 14-18; Mutibwa 1992:111-2).

It has been claimed that the most important effect of the raid was that the exploding of the myth of Amin’s military invincibility, and that this hastened his fall. According to this view, once it was demonstrated that the Uganda Army could be so easily beaten, opponents of his regime from within the country and outside became more bold (Mutibwa 1992; Omara-Otunnu 1987). This view seems to be a part of the tendency retrospectively to interpret the Amin regime, and it is misleading. In the first place, there was at that time no opposition group in Uganda large or organised enough to want to militarily take on Amin. Any armed opposition was either underground or lacked the capacity to take on the regime. And even if there was such a groups with the capacity to carry out military operations against the regime, as a part of the armed forces, they would not have needed an Israeli raid to demonstrate to them the military capacity of the Uganda Army.

The most important effect of the raid, as far as Amin’s fall was concerned, was the clash with Kenya. Kenyatta had until then
maintained a grudging but officially friendly attitude towards Uganda, even though Amin had intermittedly annoyed Kenya throughout the previous year over territorial claims (Uganda Government 1976; Kiwanuka 1979:146-152). It was the raid that soured relations between them and brought the two to the verge of war, over the fact that Kenya had provided a base for the Israelis to mount the attack. Amin threatened to invade Kenya, and Kenyatta responded with what amounted to an economic blockade of Uganda. Immediately some 200 lorries carrying oil to Uganda were stopped. The Kenya government also demanded prompt payment for ‘all goods received and to be received from Kenya’ (ARB July 1976:4106).

The effect of this temporary economic squeeze on land-locked Uganda was far-reaching: it led to increased hoarding by the top military officers, and to a conflict of economic interests among them. This in turn brought into the open the animosities within the top military officers, but in particular they precipitated the clash between Amin and General Mustafa.

**Disintegration of the Defence Council, 1976-1978**

A period of disorders and lawlessness within the Army followed the economic squeeze by Kenya. Now the soldiers also experienced the lack of essential commodities. Since the military and *mafuta mingis* depended for their trade on oil and other goods shipped to Uganda through Kenya, the stoppage affected them where it hurt most, and some of the soldiers started seizing oil from filling stations and oil tankers they could find. This particularly affected private traders from Kenya on the way to Rwanda and Zaire. The companies were forced to stop operations. This
effectively put an end to the flow of any oil to Uganda.

It was at this stage that General Mustafa, Vice-President as well as Minister of Defence and Internal Affairs, tried to establish order within the armed forces. He travelled around the country making tough speeches on law and order, and called on some commanders to investigate any more ‘disappearances’ of both civilians and soldiers and punish those responsible. In his capacity as defence and internal affairs minister he directed battalion commanders to report directly to him acts of lawlessness among the soldiers under their command. When the Commissioner of Prisons failed to account for reported disappearances of prisoners, Mustafa dismissed him without reference to Amin. It was reported for example that ‘Adrisi strongly condemned the actions of some of the same security forces in looting property and in using roadblock checks for demanding bribes ... and warned against military officers who use their positions to break the law’ (ACR 1976-1978:B441). This ‘crusade’ was probably a sincere effort intended to instil law and order and rehabilitate the image of the soldiers in the country. But Amin probably saw his boldness as a threat, while his (Amin’s) opponents saw Mustafa Adrisi as their hope. Back in 1976, for example, it was Mustafa who led a group of 30 army officers and asked for the resignation of the military government in order to allow the establishment of a civilian administration (New African June, 1978, p. 56). An anti-Amin faction gradually articulated within the Defence Council around Mustafa Adrisi.

Four close associates of Amin, three of whom were prominent members of the Defence Council, fell out with him at this time. They were General Isaac Lumago, at that time Army Chief of Staff; Moses Ali, Minister of Finance; Col. Nasur, Commander of the Malire Mechanised Regiment in Kampala, and Farouk Minaawa of the SRB. All the three had had a
long commercial partnership centred around the Uganda Motors Ltd. company and the Ministry of Finance, and involving the import and distribution of vehicles and spare parts. (New African June 1978, 56; ARB April 1978:4825). Ostensibly it was therefore a business association, but for Amin the alliance was a clear threat, and his response to this threat, like Obote’s response to the Onama-Amin threat in 1970, was to lead directly to his fall.

On 10 April, 1978, at a meeting of the Defence Council, all Cabinet ministers and Permanent Secretaries, Amin accused the four officers, but particularly General Mustafa Adrisi, of disloyalty, citing their readiness to act without his authority. He reinstated Sentamu, the dismissed Commissioner of Prisons and dismissed Kassim Obura, whom Mustafa Adrisi had appointed in Sentamu’s place. Isaac Lumago, the Chief of Staff was also dismissed because of his association with Mustafa Adrisi. Another of Mustafa Adrisi’s known supporters, Col. Juma Oris, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was also dismissed on the same day. (ACR 1977-1978:B434).

It was clear that Amin was in fact preparing to move against Mustafa, by first isolating him from his allies, which as noted was the same strategy that Obote had used as a preparation to move against Onama before the coup of 1971 (Chapter 7). Thus when Mustafa was involved in a near fatal car ‘accident’ in Kampala on 19 April 1978, only 9 days after these dismissals, there was no doubt among his supporters that it was an assassination attempt set up by Amin. In fact Mustafa Adrisi’s bodyguards opened fire and killed several people on the spot (ARB April 1978:4825). The crash left him crippled and he was taken to Cairo for treatment. (Rowe 1988:275). But even before his condition was known, Amin himself took over the ministries of defence and internal affairs. Mustafa Adrisi was
technically cut off from power, but what Amin apparently did not reckon with was the popularity of Mustafa Adrisi within the Army and the political backlash his treatment would generate within the country and against the government.

It was while Mustafa Adrisi was still in Cairo that the struggle between his and Amin’s supporters came into the open inside Uganda, but especially in the various barracks around the country. The factional division of the Defence Council was reflected in a division of the armed forces into a broad pro-Mustafa Adrisi and pro-Amin factions, thus seriously threatening Amin’s position. According to Omara Otunnu (1987:140), even before Mustafa Adrisi returned to Uganda a group of Lugbara soldiers mutinied in Kampala, demanding Amin’s resignation in favour of Mustafa Adrisi. Mutibwa (1992:113) has recorded that at this point that ‘at least four senior officers went to Amin ... and asked him point-blank to step down and hand over the government.’ The officers who had asked for his resignation were not even arrested, but they knew they were marked men. ‘To escape [Amin’s] wrath, but wishing to continue opposing him, the officers went and joined up with the Simba Battalion in Mbarara, which they used as their defensive base against Amin.’ (Mutibwa 1992:113). The move to Simba Battalion by the “rebels” was militarily dangerous. After the abortive invasion from Tanzania in 1972, Simba Battalion was heavily mechanised to be in readiness for any possible invasion from Tanzania. It was sufficiently strong to take on any unit that Amin might have sent against it.

After the reorganisation of most powerful regiment in Uganda, the Malire Mechanised Regiment in Kampala in 1973, Amin had depended for protection and defence of Kampala entirely on the SRB/GSU, the small Marines on Lake Victoria, plus his so-called Suicide Regiment. Military
barracks in outlying areas either supported him only halfheartedly or not at all. The Air Force at Gulu in the north, and the Chui Battalion in the nearby town of Kitgum, were both known to be his opponents and supporters of Mustafa Adrisi. So were the barracks at Tororo in the east and of course Mbarara in the south west. For the first time the dangers of a clash among the battalions was real.

The struggle between the two factions played a critical role in the war between Uganda and Tanzania that led to Amin's downfall. The minor mutiny, and the use of the Simba Battalion as a defensive fortress against the government by the four officers was the critical step. One version had it that Amin decided to distract the attention of Simba Battalion by ordering it on a 'military adventure' to attack and annex the Kagera Salient from Tanzania, and to loot and carry home booty for themselves (Omara-Otunnu 1987:141). Another version was that his option was to 'smash' Simba Battalion, and accordingly 'sent' Chui Battalion, based at [Kitgum], to attack it (Mutibwa 1992:113-4). In view of the fact that the "rebel" officers were hiding at Simba Barracks, Mutibwa's version seems to be the more probable one. It is equally probable that the Chui Battalion, since it supported Mustafa Adrisi, went to Mbarara to defend rather than fight against the battalion. Precisely how this expanded to an attack on the Kagera Salient is not clear.

It has sometimes been suggested that Amin's fall was precipitated by the killing of Archbishop Janani Luwum and two of Amin's cabinet ministers, Oboth Ofumbi and Erineyo Oryema, in February 1977. (Africa March 1977, pp. 28-30; Omara-Otunnu 1987:138-9). Accounts differ as to the precise reasons why Luwum, Oryema and Oboth-Ofumbi were killed at once. According to Amin they were plotters in collusion with guerrillas in Kenya (Uganda Government 1977). Omara-Otunnu (1987:138) sees it in
ethnic terms, as a part of Amin’s anti-Luo strategy: ‘It is significant that the two other personalities were [also] Luo-speakers’. But an account that appears to be consistent with the general political climate of unpredictability and fear resulting from the anarchic situation has been offered by Mutibwa(1992), and had to do with Amin’s heightening sense of insecurity. The brush with Kenya had resulted in Kenyatta allowing opposition to Amin to organise more openly than he had hitherto done. Early in 1977 Amin learnt of plans, coordinated in Nairobi, to stage a coup against him. Archbishop Luwum apparently knew of these plans but refused either to be involved in it, as requested, or to inform Amin about it, as Amin thought he ought to have done. ‘What led to [his] death was the fact that he did not tell Amin of this plot’ (Mutibwa 1992:112). As for the two ministers Amin apparently thought that as they were Luos they were naturally involved in the plot.

But the Archbishop’s death should more properly be seen as a tragic symptoms of the political uncertainties at that time, rather than a cause of his fall. The killings were condemned world-wide (described in Mutibwa 1992:110-114), and this may have given some boost to the internal and external opponents of the regime, but it was the internal conditions of the regime that had led to the killings. Amin had killed other prominent people throughout his regime, as already seen in Chapter 7, but none of them led to the his fall.

Otherwise, the forces that eventually overthrew Amin had no tangible organisational links with any faction or political influence inside Uganda before 1979. In any case it was the Tanzanian government that coordinated the war against Amin, and Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces (TPDF) that carried it out. The Uganda group, a constellation of various exiled guerrilla fighters collectively called the Uganda National Liberation
Army (UNLA), were so divided amongst themselves that it was only in March 1979 when Amin’s fall was imminent that they first met at Moshi in northern Tanzania to form a common front, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). The UNLF was an umbrella organisation, a hastily forged alliance of exiled opposition groups from the USA, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. Most of them had never been heard of inside Uganda, and even the leader they elected, Professor Yusuf Lule, according to none other than Yoweri Museveni himself, was not politically known to many of the numbers present at Moshi. (Mutibwa 1992:127). How the UNLF under Lule embarked on the task of government in the face of increased factionalism and spoils politics after Amin’s fall and the developments thereafter will be considered in detail in Chapter 10. We now turn to look at developments in Kenya after the collapse of the uneasy triumvirate leadership at the beginning of 1980.

KENYA
Fall of the Triumvirate Alliance and Economic Problems to 1980

The major events to which Moi reacted may be briefly described here, to provide a basis for the discussion that follows. From 1978-80 Kenya suffered economic hardships, which led to political discontent and student riots at the University of Nairobi. From 1980-1982, corruption among ministers was rife and Moi apparently failed to check it, leading his critics, such as Oginga Odinga, to call for multi-partyism. Mwakenya an underground opposition organisation, also became active against the government. Repressive measures to silence critics follow, and KANU was declared the sole party in June 1982. The coup attempt in August 1982 was the next major event in the set, followed by the campaign against
Njonjo from 1983-4.

Economically the period from 1980 to 1983 was bad for Kenya. The country’s trade deficit, which at the end of 1978 was $389 million, increased to $791.5 million at the beginning of 1982 (ACR 1981-1982). This put severe constraints on Moi’s hopes of diversifying the economy out of the hands of the few rich in order to enable more Kenyans to benefit economically. His populist policies as well as the attempt to promote agricultural production alongside if not at the expense of the expansion of private and public enterprises were checked by the economic hardships. This problem was made worse by the fact that the last two years of Kenyatta’s rule (1976-1978) had seen an economic boom. This was brought about in part by a temporary and large rise in world prices of coffee due to the reduced world supply of the crop, which arose as a result of the destruction of Brazil’s coffee by frost during the previous year and the civil war in Angola. Smuggling of Uganda coffee and exporting it as Kenya produce also helped the economy (Independent Kenya, 1982: 56-60).

The 1975-77 boom had benefited those Kenyatta had selected as partners of the state: workers in the public sector, urban businessmen, and agricultural workers in the Rift Valley Province and in the Western Province. Whereas in the Central Province GEMA promoted a capitalist class based on manufacturing and small scale industries, in the Rift Valley Kenyatta promoted an agriculture-based capitalist class dependent on the export of agricultural products. During the ‘struggle for the Rift Valley’ massive government resources were diverted in the province to create business and jobs (Widner 1992:75-106). The “struggle” refers to the process by which Kenyatta sought to expand his base of support in the province to

1 'Capitalist class' is used here in a loose sense. The term is used here after Diamond (1987:569-600) and refers to, in the Kenya of the day, 'a category encompassing those [with] similar economic motivation because they [had] similar economic opportunities, even if class consciousness, class solidarity or class action [did] not exist'.

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counter the threats posed by populist politicians like J. M. Kariuki from 1970 to 1975. This expansion was aided by the economic boom. Also as Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:48) have pointed out, during this period ‘state bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises expanded and state employment and other patronage spending were used as source of social control.’

So the economic problems Moi faced required both transformation and increasing production. It was the first time in the political development in Kenya that economic control and political control were in different hands. Before independence the colonial administration had allied with the settlers, who controlled the economy; and after independence Kenyatta had allied with the Kikuyu capitalists, and foreign capital, who to a large extent controlled the economy. Moi took political power without economic control and the establishment of an alliance between the new political class an the old economic class was his greatest economic problem. As Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:92) have noted on the relationship between the state and public and private economic sectors, ‘unlike Kenyatta, Moi found few of his cohorts among the leadership of the two major growth sectors and this prevented [him] from using the state ... to systematically nurture those sectors’. Moi’s agricultural policies, aimed as it was at undermining the wealth and political power of the Central Province (Throup 1987) likewise favoured the Rift Valley and the Western Province, and often the same set of individuals that he had sought to promote against the GEMA capitalists. Like a stepfather to grown-up children, he had to struggle harder to win their confidence and support.

It was these people who were affected by the economic hardships. It was also this group of middlemen, in alliance with their former political
allies now being undermined by Moi, who were probably behind the urban unrest from 1981, either for the purpose of securing more concessions from the government on their own behalf or if possible removing it for the benefit of Moi’s political opponents. According to Bates (1987:79-80):

The leaders of the cooperative movement, their patrons in the national bureaucracy, the officers of the Ministry of Cooperatives and provincial politicians, all saw the [economic] crises as an opportunity ... The politicians saw it as an opportunity to attract resources from the national government that could be channelled to their constituents. Both the provincial politicians and Ministry of Cooperatives saw the crisis as an opportunity to forge political bonds with the new national government.

Moi’s response to this threat was understandably political rather than economic. For instead of helping agricultural production as a long term economic strategy, for example by supporting coffee and horticulture farmers, he opted for the short term political gain by undermining the economic importance of the rural agricultural cooperatives and the cereal boards that Kenyatta had promoted 2.

The government took over responsibility for local distribution from the boards, ‘and restricted the permissible levels of local consumption... The Treasury also allocated funds to hire road transport to haul the grain... in the urban centres’ (Bates 1987:77). In 1980, Moi negotiated $30 million in food aid from the United States. Maize imports between 1980-1 amounted to shs. 1.000 million, and Kshs. 2,500 million. (ACR 1881-1982:B204; Independent Kenya 1982:65). These were deposited in the depots of the cereal board for distribution, ostensibly to be released in controlled quantities to impress upon the consumers that it was the

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2These are the local branches of the national bureaucracy sometimes called the Maize Board, whose function were to purchase cereals and distribute it to the rural areas, and which maintained ‘a series of depots and purchasing centres around Kenya’ (See Bates 1987:76-92)
government that was coming to their aid rather than the “old” board.

But this practise led to corruption as the officers involved, from the ministerial level to the local level, engaged in grain hoarding and selling in addition to other corrupt practices, but since these were Moi’s “political shields” he was powerless to stop them. 'In spite of continued revelations in the press about large-scale corruption... by cooperatives involving large amounts of money... hardly any of the accused office-bearers were brought to court'. The only prominent person to be tried and convicted for corruption at that time was the former GEMA leader, Khika Kimani. (ACR 1982-1983:B171).

It was against this background that the coup of 2 August 1982 occurred. It was led by a section of young officers in the Kenya Air Force. They seized the Post Office, Broadcasting House and other strategic installations. The officers constituted themselves into the Peoples Redemption Council and announced the fall of Moi’s government. Many people in Nairobi, especially students from Nairobi University and Kenyatta University College, went in force to support the coup. Looting and general confusion followed until loyal government forces, led by the Army and the GSU, counterattacked and put the rebellion down, with heavy loses of life. One account had it that so many people, a large portion of them students, were killed that all the city mortuaries were full. But in its effort to present the coup attempt as a mutiny by a small group of hooligans, the government put the number of dead as low as 200.

The ‘Njonjo Affair’ of 1983-1984

Currie and Ray (1986:47-59) have suggested that student riots at the University of Nairobi and general unrest in the urban centres by alienated
youth were the principal causes of the coup. While students and the young in Nairobi were the first and most enthusiastic supporters of the coup and accounted for most of the dead in its suppression (Miller 1984:94; ACR 1982-1983:B181), it would be more accurate to see the coup as an outcome of the power struggle, engineered by Moi’s “economic stepchildren” in alliance with his more powerful political enemies. The fact that Njonjo was attacked and then politically destroyed by Moi shortly after the coup attempt was not a coincidence.

It may sound odd to talk of the re-emergence of Njonjo in in 1980 since for almost twenty years from independence in 1963 he was always at the centre of the country’s political life as Attorney General. The term is used here to denote Njonjo’s emergence not as a political heavyweight, but as a potential leader of Kenya in the same way as Odinga (between 1960-1966), Mboya (1960-1969) and Moi (from 1967) had emerged before him. This reemergence immediately put him in a competing position with Moi for the leadership of Kenya, and the coup attempt, as noted, cannot be analytically separated from this struggle. Njonjo’s re-emergence and its implications for Moi’s position, and Moi’s reaction to it were the springboard of the major political events in the country from 1980 to 1987.

The best way to understand Njonjo’s fall in the middle of 1983 is to disengage a little from the event itself and view the whole process from a distance. The pattern of events leading to his fall were in fact different stages in the unfolding drama: they were not only related but one also led to the next. It is in this sense that Miller (1984:98-9) has described Moi’s as the “cyclical era” in Kenya’s political development. In the face of events happening around it, the ‘concern became one of shoring up the government, not [finding] ways to accommodate protest’; consequently the
government 'became confrontational, more aggressive and more extreme' (p. 98). Moi's style of rule itself became an actor in politics, and its interaction with events around it produced the politics of Kenya as we know it.

It was within this climate that the growing mistrust between Moi and Njonjo turned into an open suspicion. As far as Moi's relationship with his ministers were concerned, an important effect of the attempted coup was the increase in his suspicion and fear towards some of his more powerful and independent minded allies. And since Moi was apparently unable to discover the cause of the coup to his satisfaction, his mistrust increased. Moi felt betrayed by the internal security services, the CID, the Special Branch, to say nothing of the Air Force itself. For it was later discovered that it took a long time for the Special Branch to respond to the coup, and the CID had failed to notify the government that a coup was imminent (Currie and Ray 1984:571).

As Attorney-General the CID had been under Njonjo, and he had close relations with Ben Githi, the Commissioner of Police, Peter Mbuthia, the Commandant of the General Service Unit and Peter Kariuki, the Commander of the Air Force. Ben Githi and Njonjo were particularly close and have had long standing political and business interests. In April 1982, for example, the two were accused together in parliament for conspiring to overthrow the government of President Albert Rene of the Seychelles Islands on behalf of or in collaboration with South Africa (ACR 1982-1983:B175). The government of the Seychelles had complained of Kenyan collaboration in the attempted invasion, and the fact that Moi allowed an open accusation against Njonjo suggest that he had already decided to go on the offensive. As Widner (1992:147) has observed, 'over the years Njonjo had accumulated sufficient political powers, as chief of several of
the country’s internal security services, to constitute a threat to the president.’ These three were the first and highest ranking officers to be tried and convicted for involvement (through deliberate inaction) in the coup (Currie and Ray 1984:571-580).

Therefore, four months after the coup attempt, in December 1982, Moi attacked Njonjo in parliament for accumulation of too much political power, even though at that time he was no longer attorney general (Widner 1992:146). This development can be compared to Amin’s attack on Mustafa Adrisi in April 1978 for acting without his authority (above). The importance of the attack was that it was it symbolised the fact that Moi and Njonjo were no longer allies and was also a signal to the other politicians anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to Moi to attack Njonjo. Accordingly, in the same month, a number of MPs from the Rift Valley Province and Western Province joined the attack on Njonjo. Martin Shikuku, the MP for Butere accused Njonjo of disloyalty to Moi and asked for his resignation in December 1982. To show that he was behind Shikuku’s attack, ‘on 22 January 1983 Moi became a member of the Butere Development Fund, and promised personal appearances at [fund raising events] in Luhya districts.’ (Widner 1992:147). Therefore by the time Moi openly floated the idea of a “traitor” being groomed by unnamed foreign powers for leadership in Kenya in May 1983, the grounds for Njonjo’s demise had already been planned. He was subjected to formal parliamentary inquiry. He subsequently resigned from Parliament in July 1983.

The Njonjo affair provided Moi with the chance to both rid himself of a potential opponent, undermine Kikuyu political influence or threat and at the same time consolidate the links with new his allies. The snap elections of September 1983 was called, in Moi’s own words, to ‘clean up
the political scene’ and the result appears to have just achieved this, since those ‘cleaned’ from the scene were either the allies of Njonjo or those not openly loyal enough to Moi. The election provided the chance to forge new allies. After Njonjo’s fall, Moi in fact visited Butere and ‘raised Kshs 3.1 million for Shikuku’s Butere Development Fund.’ (Widner 1992:147-8). Both Shikuku and Elijah Mwangele, the other Luhyia MP who had supported Njonjo’s fall, were given ministerial positions in the government after the elections of September 1983: Shikuku became an assistant minister in the Office of the President, and Mwangele was promoted from Minister of Tourism to the more senior post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (ACR 1982-1983:B188-9). Known Njonjo allies, such as the Masai politician Stanley Oloitiptip, and the Kikuyu G. G. Kariuki, were both removed from the new cabinet. To plant his own man among the Masai, Moi appointed Professor George Saitoti straight to the cabinet as Minister of Finance and Planning. The cabinet was now clearly more Nyayo than ever before (Compare ACR 183-1984:165-8 and ACR 1982-1983:B188-9).

For the next few years, until 1987, Moi’s power was not challenged by any prominent politician. But afterwards struggles ensued within the new alliance itself, which led for example to Mwai Kibaki’s sudden demotion to the Ministry of Health in 1988. I shall discuss this new development in Chapter 10. Meantime will evaluate the viability of clientelism as a system of rule in the light of the changes under Moi just discussed.

Kenya’s political experience from 1980 was characterised by a creeping disintegration of the clientelist system up to the mid-1980s, and

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3 Nyayo is the political slogan adopted by Moi in place of Kenyatta’s Harambee. It roughly means ‘follow in the footsteps’. At first it seemed to have been Kenyatta’s footsteps that Moi exhorted Kenyans to continue following, but after 1981 it evidentially meant his own footsteps. (See Widner 1992).
then a form of coercive authoritarianism thereafter. The following is a general review of the various stages of the disintegration of Kenyatta’s institutionalised clientelism during Moi’s leadership, but especially after the purge of Njonjo and his supporters in 1983-4.

Creeping Disintegration of Clientelism, 1980-1987

It is important to note once again that the Kenyatta clientelism was in essence a Kikuyu clientelism. It was essentially a Kikuyu clientelism in the sense that Kenyatta’s most reliable allies were Kikuyu (see Chapter 6). Whether they were more reliable because they were Kikuyu is a moot point, because during Kenyatta’s rule they saw him as their patron and the means for their own political advancement. Moi was in it but not of it, and his success had been due to the political struggle between Njonjo and Mungai. As I will show below, due to the realignment of alliances after Kenyatta’s death, forceful measures became almost the only option if he was to maintain power. He thus unavoidably sowed the seeds of the disintegration in the process of consolidating his hold on power both before and after the attempted coup in 1982.

Had he been willing or able to forge an alliance with the Luo, then with the support of a segment of the Kikuyu under Kibaki, Moi might have freed himself from his continuous fear of a Kikuyu plot. But he failed to rehabilitate Oginga Odinga from the political wilderness and instead preferred to make the Rift Valley Province his sole base of power by promoting the Kalenjin and Luhya, with selected ‘guests’, to prominent posts. The problem was that Kalenjin group was neither as cohesive as Kenyatta’s Gatundu Kikuyu, now under Moi’s firm control as the Family was under Kenyattas’s. Moi’s new allies from the early 1980s included the
following: Elijah Mwangale (Luhya, and Minister of Tourism, later of Foreign Affairs), Justus ole Tipis (Kalenjin, Minister of State in the President’s Office and KANU National Treasurer), Simon Nyachae (Luo, Minister of State and head of the Civil Service), Nicholas Biwott (Kalenjin, minister of the President’s Office, later of Energy and Regional Development), Mwai Kibaki (Vice-President and Minister of Finance). The new alliance was thus too faction-ridden to provide the basis for stable clientelism. It was for example, Elijah Mwangale who in 1985 led the fight against Mwai Kibaki, which eventually led to his dismissal in as vice-president in 1986 (Widner 1992:154-8; W R 22 February 1985:6-7).

Kenya’s political development from 1980 must be seen against this background because it was Moi’s search for a more secure base of power that dominated and determined his policies. The introduction of multipartyism at the end of 1991 was in part a result of the failure of clientelism and Moi’s response to this failure. Recent claims (Kihoro 1992, Sunday Times, 27 December 1992; Malinda 1992:190) that it was political pressure from donor countries, and withdrawal of aid that forced Moi to agree to the formation of opposition parties may be technically correct only in regard to the timing of the announcement in November 1991, but does not tell the whole story. The donor countries themselves responded to the political conditions in Kenya.

A number of developments can be cited as contributing factors for the emergence of this crisis. Besides the tactical mistake in failing to forge an alliance with the Luo, Moi’s style of rule made it impossible to wield even the allies he had in a cohesive force. His personal intervention in the political process (in contrast to Kenyatta’s behind-the-scenes or

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4 Practical impossibility would equally be accurate, but I prefer tactical mistake because Moi did not seriously try to rehabilitate Odinga, without whose participation an Luo-Kalenjin/Luhya alliance was impossible.
'patrimonial' style was a factor in this). His style of personally intervening in the political process combined with a rather compulsive use of the presidential prerogatives of ministerial changes had the effect of increasing rather than reducing factionalism. It was for example Moi who touched off the purge against Njonjo (1983-4), when on 9 May 1983 he floated the idea of a traitor plotting to overthrow the Kenya government. Although he left it to other MPs to mention Njonjo's name as the traitor, and kept a low profile as ministers accused and counter-accused amongst themselves to show who were Njonjo's friends or who were more nyayo, he was never an arbitrator in the affair thereafter. Within a fortnight of the 'traitor' allegation, on May 17, he announced that the proposed 1984 election would be brought forward to September 1983. (ARB May 1983:6843; NA July 1983:22-3). He was therefore unable to build and sustain an image of the all-powerful and leisurely detached patron necessary for orderly clientelism because his authority, though not power, diminished. (Compare Sandbrook 1985:90).

This mattered, because it was largely due to his personal interventions that throughout the decade Moi has been unable to convince his opponents, and to even larger extent the general public, that he had nothing to do with some of the worst manifestations of factional politics in the country, such as the periodic assassinations of prominent persons. According to Lonsdale (1992:19), for example: 'Many Kenyans felt their suspicions of political collusion in the death of Bishop Alexander Muge in a traffic accident confirmed when his widow's white cockerel attacked the President three times when he called to offer his condolences'. The widespread "ethnic clashes" in the Rift Valley Province late in 1992 (Africa Watch 1993, and various issues on Weekly Review), have also been blamed on Moi. Some of the "warriors" were said to have been 'dropped
and assisted by government helicopters' (Kihoro 1992:31).

The overuse of the presidential prerogatives of ministerial reshuffles to bring in his supporters and drop opponents was another form of frequent intervention which had the effect of eroding Moi’s authority. ‘The dropping of ministers and reshuffling the cabinet as well as public offices is a normal, almost routine activity’. (NA September, 1985, p. 28). Reshuffles were carried out in 1980; 1981; 1982 (February, August); 1983 (September elections); 1984 (September, November); 1985 (April, August); 1986 (April). (ACR 1980-1981; 1981-1982:B192-193; 1982-1983:B187-189; 1983-4:B166-167; 1985-1986:B330-331). This was itself a symptom and further cause for clientelist crisis because the new recruits themselves sought to entrench their positions in power. Simon Nyachae, who was appointed to head the Civil Service in 1984 ‘quickly assumed a position of authority second only to the President’s (ACR 1984-1985: B261).

The use of the constitution, expulsions from KANU, and the presidential prerogative of ministerial change for control was not new in Kenya. As already noted in Chapter 6 and elsewhere (Mueller 1984; Ghai 1969; Okoth-Ogendo 1972; Gertzel 1970), Kenyatta himself had used these options to greater extent. But Kenyatta’s use had been more subtle in that he avoided open personal involvement. When considered alongside Moi’s personal interventions in the political process, his resort to these options consequently appeared to have been from a position of weakness rather than a strength – a serious admission for one aspiring to be a patron.

Mwakenya Activities and Resort to Repression

The activities of ‘Mwakenya’, an underground movement which operated
mostly in the cities of Nakuru, Kisumu, Nairobi and other centres in the Central Province between 1982-1987, was another factor in the disintegration of clientelism in that it challenged the authority of the regime without the government being able to suppress it. Also the fact that there was an underground movement opposed to him increased Moi’s suspicion of his allies.

The campaign of the movement consisted of distributing anti-government information through its pamphlets, such as *Mzalendo*, *Mpatanishi*, *Pambona* and *Mwakenya* (Currie and Ray 1986; *Weekly Review*, 2 January, 1987; 13 March, 1987, and 10 April 1987). But following the government’s decision to crack down on it in April 1986, the movement took some initiatives and carried out several sabotage acts. In July 1987 three former members admitted destroying telephone lines and derailing a train near Nakuru on behalf of the movement. By then over 60 people had been jailed for belonging to it, most of whom were former students and intellectuals at the universities. (*WR* 13 March 1987; Amnesty International 1987:55-8, Appendixes II and III).

While Mwakenya and its methods of selective sabotage and pamphleteering did not present a threat the regime, it nevertheless had a significant political impact. It propelled the government towards a greater use of repression, which in turn reflected badly on the leadership of Moi both in Kenya and abroad. The hunt for Mwakenya supporters was also turned into a political witch-hunt. For example in April 1987, Oginga Odinga himself was accused of belonging to the movement. Detainees were also tortured beaten while in custody, to extract information for political use. Peter Njenga, a Nakuru businessman, died on February 22 at Kenyatta National Hospital after being tortured by the security forces. (*WR*, 13 March, 1987; 10 April, 1987, p. 6).
Mwakenya may have failed in its objectives of removing the Moi regime and setting up a new socialist order in Kenya; but made a contribution to political change in Kenya. For example, it was the increased repression under the regime that has been a factor in the introduction of multipartyism at the end of 1991. This development will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TEN

Alliances in the 1980s and After: Developments and Prospects

To the extent that a viable clientelist institution stabilises factional struggles, we can say that the political fortunes of Uganda and Kenya "changed places" during the last years of the 1980s. The inability to regulate personal power relations in Uganda has been the major cause of instability from independence; and in Kenya factionalism was institutionalised into clientelism upon which its stability had to a very large extent rested until the early years of the 1980s. We can say that the fortunes of the two countries changed places in the sense that in the late 1980s factional politics increasingly became a threat to Kenya's stability as it has been to Uganda's in the past.

Whereas in Kenya the period saw the deterioration of the clientelist system into a crisis of clientelism, and to the verge of spoils politics, the trend in Uganda has been in the opposite direction, towards a gradual recovery from spoils politics after the advent of the NRM/A of Yoweri Museveni to power in January 1986. Under the NRM/A the prospects for the evolution of a clientelist system or even institutionalisation (for example under its no-party system), have been, in theory, improved. But Moi's interventionist style from 1980 onwards have tended to encourage spoils politics or state collapse and discourage clientelism.

The purpose of this last chapter is to describe these changes, and to assess the prospects for state stability in the two countries in the 1990s. In
the section on Uganda I discuss the post-Amin regimes of Lule, Binaisa and the Military Commission between 1979 and 1980, and the second Obote administration to the rise of the NRM/A in 1986. The aim is show how different the NRM administration has been from previous regimes in its capacity to control factional politics and provide the basis of stability. The section on Kenya discusses and accounts for the steady deterioration of clientelist relations under Moi from the early 1980s, and assesses the prospects for stability in the 1990s. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of factionalism in Moi’s “Nyayo” alliance of 1983-4. The section ends with a reflection the introduction of multipartyism at the end of 1991 and the elections that followed in 1992.

UGANDA:
Amin’s Fall and the Intensification of Factional Struggles, 1979-1985

Amin’s removal from power in 1979, contrary to the hopes of most Ugandans, did not put an end to the spate of spoils politics and its accompanying disorders of weak or nonexistent central authority, corruption, general lawlessness, and economic collapse. Not only did spoils politics continue, but in a sense it became worse than during Amin’s regime. Under Amin, despite the autonomy of the provincial governors and battalion commanders around the country, state power was at least used in the name of Amin. Also if he chose, Amin was capable of bringing any of the officers under control or physically eliminating them. But after his fall, especially during the first years, there was no clear centre of authority in Uganda and state power “lay on the ground” to be competed over by the various factions.

Amin’s overthrow itself, like his rise in 1971, was a product of the
ongoing spoils politics. The physical force that removed him was external, but the politics that both led to and followed his overthrow was internal, through the exiled politicians. As we have seen in Chapter 9, the war with Tanzania started against the background of serious factional divisions within the Army and the Defence Council. Even if Amin fell without the intervention of the Tanzanians, factional struggles would have continued in Uganda, regardless to what type of government, military or civilian, was set up. The return of the exiles only made it worse.

If Tanzania could have occupied Uganda and imposed its authority on the various external and internal factions spoils politics might have been checked, at least in theory. But Tanzania’s declared aims, for the understandable reason of not wanting to get overly involved in the factional struggles within Uganda, were limited to ‘punishing Amin’ and assisting the establishment of a new administration in Uganda by exiled Ugandans (ARB, April 1979:5223). As Mudoola (1988:280) has observed, ‘Tanzania could have entered Kampala and proclaimed a new Ugandan leader. But this would have been bad politics and would most probably have alienated forces within Uganda’. Tanzania’s intervention thus merely provided a cover for the pursuit of factional interests by the Ugandans, and the old factions were left to struggle to fill up the political vacuum created by Amin’s fall.

Under these circumstances, for two main reasons, spoils politics actually increased. The first was that the fall of the Amin meant that all political offices in the country were open for occupation, which led to the intensification of competition among the exiled politicians in filling them. Besides, as mentioned above, was that there was also no overall authority to facilitate an orderly manner of the ‘occupation’: Tanzania had
a theoretical authority, but it could not have intervened effectively without compromising on its stated aims. Second, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), the organisation that formed the first post-Amin administration, was a loose and faction-ridden coalition. Also since it was only an interim administration charged with organising a general election (ARB, April 1979:5222; NA, May 1979:16), the strengthening of personal or group interests for the elections became the overriding preoccupation of the various factions. They lost sight of the needs for reconstruction or cooperation.

In fact factional struggles in Uganda in 1979-80 bore a striking similarity to the struggles in 1959-62. (See Chapter 3). In both cases the political leaders were more interested in getting into power. Also the political vacuum created by Amin’s departure was similar to that left by the departure of the British. Owing to the intensity of the struggles and the absence of institutions to regulate them, the first administrations following each period were both weak coalition governments: UPC/KY in 1962-1964 and the UNLF administrations from 1979-1980.

The Lule, Binaisa and Military Commission Regimes, 1979-1980

The UNLF was not only a loose association of many organisations. The main organisations that made it up were also hostile towards one another. It therefore failed to become an organ of rule. Unlike KANU under Kenyatta, it had neither an all-powerful presidency, or a civil service through which the leaders could control the different factions.

In addition to the main factions, UPC, DP and others, there were also ‘so many others that mushroomed here and there as the end of
Amin’s regime drew nearer.’ (Mutibwa:1992:126). The UNLF confederation consisted of 22 organisations. The only thing they had in common was vaguely described as ‘the Moshi spirit’, after the northern Tanzanian town in which they met.¹ This spirit amounted to no more than the common desire to see Amin removed and to partake of the spoils thereto. The factional interests resulted in the UNLF as a body remaining weaker than its constituent parts. This ensured that the governing organ, the National Executive Committee (NEC), remained weak.

The most powerful of the constituent parts of the UNLF were the Military Commission and the National Consultative Council (NCC). The Military Commission consisted of six members under the chairmanship of Paulo Muwanga, with Yoweri Museveni as vice-chairman. Other members included Oyite Ojok, chief of staff of the UNLA, and Tito Okello, its commander. Both Paulo Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok were pro-Obote and UPC. The NCC was the interim parliament and consisted of all members of the UNLF, and had the power to overrule all the president’s decisions. It was under the chairmanship of Edward Rugumayo, and controlled by the “radicals”, politicians opposed to both the UPC and DP. Therefore, although the NEC as the cabinet theoretically held executive powers, it was in fact the weakest “committee”. Its efforts to make itself independent from either NCC or Military Commission control led to the removal of the first two post-Amin presidents, Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, within short periods of their election to power.

Lule lost power on 20 June 1979, only after 68 days after becoming president, and Binaisa in May 1980, after serving for less than one year. (ARB, June 1979:5297-5201). The ostensible reason for Lule’s removal was his decision to make ministerial appointments without consulting the NCC, in accordance with the 1967 Republican Constitution. But even without such “mistakes” it is hard to see how he could have lasted in the face of the factionalism within the UNLF. As Mudoola (1988:285) has pointed out, ‘Lule had fallen because he was not acceptable to the power-brokers within the UNLF; Binaisa, because he did not have the ability [or] time [to plan] the removal of his opponents’. (On this see also Omara-Otunnu 1987:152). As this observation makes clear, the first priority, even for the president, was not the solving of the serious insecurity and economic problems that the country was then experiencing, but the ‘removal of opponents’.

Both the rise and fall of Binaisa were determined by the uncertainties of power relations in spoils politics. Binaisa in fact won the presidency like winning a prize in a lottery. He had returned to Uganda from the USA to lobby Lule for his appointment as Uganda’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York. But Lule was dismissed even before the two men could discuss the matter. Because each faction tried to impose its candidate, there was a stalemate. So the ‘NCC members were pleased to learn that Binaisa was in town’ (Mutibwa 1992:130-132). He had no friends in the NCC and was not even seeking power at that time. It was in fact to prevent power from falling in the hands of Rugumayo that Binaisa was hurriedly drafted in as a candidate and elected. But in May 1980, less than a year after becoming president, he was removed by a coup led by Oyite Ojok.
The cause of Binaisa’s fall was the so-called ‘umbrella formula’ – his insistence that the proposed 1980 elections should take place under the auspices of the UNLF. Under this plan all candidates would have stood as individuals and not as representatives of any political party. This would have automatically ruled out the reorganisation of the old political parties, and prevented the participation of Obote and a return to multi-party politics. Most of the NCC members voted in favour of the umbrella formula, in part because most of the members did not see any roles for themselves in either the UPC or the DP, and were also opposed to Obote. Paulo Muwanga and Oyite-Ojok, on the other hand, opposed the umbrella plan because it conflicted with their strategy of bringing Obote back to power. This precipitated a period of intense power struggle between the Military Commission and the NEC, which eventually ended with Binaisa’s overthrow by Oyite Ojok in May 1980. (Low 1988:49-50; Mudoola 1988:282-4).

The events leading up to the coup, when Binaisa sought to weaken the Military Commission and strengthen his own position. In February he dismissed Muwanga from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but under pressure from the NCC, Muwanga was later appointed as Minister of Labour. At the same time Museveni was demoted from the Ministry of Defence to that of Regional Cooperation. But this strategy did not remove the UNLA from control of the Military Commission because Oyite-Ojok remained Chief of Staff. Oyote-Ojok’s control of the UNLA was such that Binaisa had no practical authority over the forces without his support. Therefore, in March Binaisa made a surprise visit to Kenya and conferred behind closed doors with President Moi. According to New African (April 1980, p. 32), Binaisa’s visit had two main aims: first, to prevent the
shipment of unauthorised arms to Uganda, then at the docks in Mombasa and marked "Farm Machinery" to conceal the true identity of the contents. The weapons were destined for Uganda, but without Binaisa’s prior approval or knowledge. Secondly, Binaisa was keen to get military assistance from Moi: either a contingent of the Kenyan Army to replace the Tanzanians, (whom he feared were supporting UPC), or to support him in case of a confrontation with Oyite-Ojok. But as we have noted, Moi had his own problems in the economic and leadership crisis, and declined to get involved in Uganda.

Early in May Binaisa decided to go on the offensive, and in a surprise reshuffle appointed Oyote-Ojok as Uganda’s ambassador to Algeria. But as if to confirm the president’s weakness and the supremacy of the Military Commission over the NEC, Oyite-Ojok refused to take up the appointment. (ARB February 1980:5585; NA, January 1986:20; Africa, June 1980:20-21; Mutibwa 1992:130-7). Although Binaisa insisted on Oyite-Ojok’s going to Algeria, he had no means to enforce the order. The power struggle ended with Binaisa’s overthrow by Oyite-Ojok on May 11 1980.

The Military Commission immediately took over supreme power and constituted itself into a government with Muwanga as Head of State and Museveni his Deputy. Even the NCC, which had come to regard itself as kingmaker, was in no position to stop the seizure of power the Military Commission declared that its seizure of power and all its decisions were irreversible by any authority, and not subject to challenge in any court of law.

The Military Commission ruled Uganda from May to December 1980. Its primary objective and "achievement" was bringing Obote back to power, and little else. From the beginning it openly prepared the way
for Obote's return: UPC supporters were placed in strategic positions. More than half of the 30-member "broad based" cabinet it appointed consisted of UPC members. (ARB May 1980:5683). Also one of its first legislative acts was to scrap the umbrella formula which Binaisa had instituted for the elections scheduled for October 1980. In fact the Military Commission and UPC supporters never took the umbrella formula seriously, because even when Binaisa was preaching the idea, plans for Obote's return were going on. It was not a coincidence that on 27 May, only two weeks after the Binaisa's fall, Obote returned to Uganda from Tanzania to launch his campaign for the 1980 elections. And with his allies in complete control of state power, and the UNLA behind him, his return to power later that year was a foregone conclusion. The elections should therefore be seen as the climax of the struggles for power in post-Amin Uganda that had started at the formation of the UNLF at Moshi in March 1979.

The Second Obote Administration, 1980-1985

The second Obote administration (1980-1985) proved even less capable of establishing an orderly administration than his first (1962-1971). For despite his weak position in relation to the UPC notables during his first administration, he led a legitimate government and outside Buganda he enjoyed some popular support. Uganda as a whole was also in a more ordered state at that time, economically and politically.

The second administration not only enjoyed very little support inside Uganda: it was also actively opposed from the beginning. Of the main political factions, only the DP agreed to participate in Parliament
and its leader, Paul Ssemogerere, became Leader of the Opposition. This was ‘in response to Obote’s promise to give them the post of Deputy Speaker and the nomination of four of the Specially Elected Members’. (Mutibwa 1992:151). The importance of the DP participation was that the regime was given some legitimacy and international acceptance. This enabled it to receive much needed financial support from donor countries, especially the United States and Britain. Also Obote’s declaration that the Asians Amin had expelled in 1972 were free to return and reclaim their properties was specially popular with Britain. (Furley 1989:284-5).

Otherwise Obote’s real constituency remained the military. But the problem was that the UNLA itself was divided, mostly along ethnic lines between Acoli and Langi soldiers, respectively under Tito Okello/ Bazilio Okello and Oyite-Ojok. Although the Acoli and the Langi had militarily and politically cooperated in the fight against Idi Amin, they were divided and antagonistic towards one another. Since Obote needed the cooperation of the Acoli to rule, the antipathy further weakened the regime. This division was brought in the open over the appointment of a new chief of staff after Oyite-Ojok’s death in December 1983 (below). Also Vice-President Paulo Muwanga, the regime’s supposed man in Buganda, was dislike by the majority of the Baganda and his participation in the regime did not make Obote any more acceptable to the Baganda. The fact that Paulo Muwanga became Prime Minister after Obote’s overthrow by the two Okellos in 1985 suggest that, as in 1967-70, the polarisation in the party had extended to the forging of alliances within the Army perhaps as early as 1981.

Obote’s authority was also further undermined by the start of a
guerrilla war against it by Museveni and his NRM/A and other armed groups (see below). The importance of the NRM resistance went beyond distracting the attention of the government and the Army. The fighting and Obote’s preferred solution of defeating his opponents militarily rather than reaching a political solution with them created frictions between him and some of his supporters, particularly Paulo Muwanga. Muwanga’s dilemma was that the Lowero Triangle, where most of the war was fought, was in Buganda, and as a Baganda himself it became difficult for him to support Obote’s “scorched earth” method of winning the war, which involved indiscriminate destruction to cut off the guerrillas from their base of support. Frictions therefore developed between the two men early in the administration. By the middle of 1981, Muwanga had started private consultations with the NRM, which drew them further still. (ACR, 1985-1986:B466; ARB June 1981:6089; NA March 1985:12; September 9185:14).

The policy to pursue a military rather than political solution to the guerrilla warfare of the NRM became a factor in Obote’s eventual fall. The operations in Luwero was only the best known of many military operations against rebels undertaken by Obote’s government from 1980. Of a shorter duration but no less intense was the devastation of districts in the West Nile region in 1980-1981. The rebel groups in West Nile included the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) led by Moses Ali, and Former Uganda National Army (FUNA). Operations against these by the UNLA reduced the whole region to rubble (Gingyera-Pinycwa 1991:44-64). The result was that by 1985 nearly a million Ugandan were in exile in the surrounding countries. Sudan and Zaire alone had between them about half a million refugees. (Pirouet 1988:249-50; Harrell-Bond 1986).
Therefore, by the end of 1984 international support for the regime had waned, and the popularity of the NRM/A had increased both at home and abroad. A critical report by Amnesty International in 1985, entitled *Uganda: Six Years After Amin* (Amnesty International 1985), exposed the poor human rights record of the regime. The US State Department described the situation in the "Luwero Triangle" as 'horrendous' and stated that from the time Obote took power in 1980, between 200,000 and 300,000 civilians had died at the hands of the soldiers (Pirouet 1988:249). Dropped by his international allies and threatened at home, Obote was isolated. The disintegration of the UNLA had also deteriorated by this time: it was no longer an effective fighting force and divided into Acoli and Langi factions.

Oyite-Ojok’s death in a plane crash on 3 December 1983 threw the unease Acoli-Langi alliance that held the UNLA together into confusion. There was a widespread belief that the ‘natural’ candidate for the post of chief of staff was Brigadier Bazilio Okello, the second most senior Acoli officer in the Army after Tito Okello, the Commander, and was at that time the Commander of the Northern Brigade based at Gulu. But as already suggested, Bazilio Okello was, or was suspected of being, on the side of Paulo Muwanga. Besides Bazilio Okello and Obote had for a long disliked each other both politically and personally. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:160). So Obote appointed Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier) Smith Opon-Acak, a fellow Langi, as Chief of Staff.

The appointment of Lt. Opon-Acak was not therefore purely or

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mainly for ethnic reasons, as has been suggested (for example, in Mutibwa 1992:162-3). It is more likely that Obote wished to have someone he could easily control at the head of the army. As we have just seen, the two Okellos and Muwanga were in favour of finding a peaceful, as opposed to military, solution to the conflict with the NRM/A. It was Oyite-Ojok and Obote who had favoured and pursued a military solution. The more likely reason the selection of Opon-Acak was Obote’s belief that as a relatively unpoliticised officer Opon-Acak would be more amenable to his presidential wishes. Another advantage was that Obote’s opponents were unlikely to find Brigadier Opon-Acak a useful ally.

But the “rebuff” of Bazilio Okello increased tensions between the Langi and Acoli in the armed forces. Obote’s overthrow in fact started as a factional fighting between Acoli and Langi troops within the UNLA (NA September 1985:14; Omara-Otunnu 1987:162-3). The outcome of this tension was that a year later, in July 1985, Bazilio Okello and General Tito Okello revolted and overthrew Obote for the second time and installed a Military Council with General Tito Okello as Head of State.

The success of the Okello coup demonstrated Obote’s loss of control. That a coup was imminent became known almost one month before it actually took place but Obote was unable to prevent it. Bazilio Okello started preparations for the coup at the beginning of July at Gulu. When Obote learnt of it all he could do was to announce Bazilio Okello’s dismissal on radio; and was unable to enforce the order when it was ignored. (Omara-Otunnu 1987:164-5). Also unlike most coups the Okello coup started some 400 miles away from the centre of power and took a whole three days to arrive in the capital, meeting no resistance. In fact
according to an "eyewitness" account Obote and Opon-Acak were deserted even by their bodyguards and escaped to Kenya disguised as traders on a lorry carrying sacks of coffee. (New African November 1985, p. 6).

Tito Okello's administration, which ruled Uganda from July 1985 to January 1986, was known as the Military Council. It was a brief administration and largely uneventful in terms of political development. It was bogged down even before it set up a government by the continuing resistance of the NRM/A. Apart from its attempt to incorporate Moses Ali’s UNRE and the FUNA forces from the north, it did little that it could be remembered by. Its only “achievement” was the signing of the Nairobi Peace Accord on 17 December 1985 with the NRM/A and other smaller opposition organisations that had been fighting Obote’s government in various parts of the country. Under the accord Museveni was to have become Vice-Chairman of the Military Council and a new national army was to consist predominantly with members of the UNLA and NRA. But the accord was never implemented, with the result that the NRM/A overthrew the Military Council in January 1986. (See the reproduction of the full text of the Nairobi Accord in Omara-Otunnu 1978:168-203, Appendix C).

An Assessment of the NRM/A Administration, 1986-1990

Museveni’s rejection of the terms of the Nairobi Peace Accord may be seen, in retrospect, as the turning point in Uganda’s politics, because apart from containing factional struggles, it provided a basis for the institutionalisation of clientelism, if not a chance for the evolution of a
real political institution. If the accord had been implemented, it would have meant the absorption of the NRM into the vicious circle and a continuation of the old struggles. The NRM/A triumph in January 1986 was unlike all the other previous changes of government. In that its seizure of power was not just another episode within the existing spoils politics. The Okello coup of July 1985 can hardly be described as a change of government because apart from Obote's removal from power, nothing else changed by way of policy or the effectiveness of administration. January 1971 and July 1985 were therefore mere episodes in the progression of spoils politics.

Even if, as some have argued, the NRM itself was motivated by factional interests (Omara-Otunnu 1992:448-452; 1987:175-181), its administration since seizing power has tended to undermine rather than encourage factionalism of the kind and on the scale Uganda had seen after independence. If the NRM is seen as Museveni's faction, it has nevertheless demonstrated a capacity to assimilate other factions in a way previous administrations failed to do.

Also since coming to power the NRM has developed a new approach to politics by introducing a new method of administration. As soon as it took power in 1986 it introduced new structures with the aim, among others, to 'encourage participatory democracy' by incorporating everyone the political process. Museveni's regime can be compared to that of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana since 1982, and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (until his death in 1989): all of them made sharp breaks with long periods of spoils politics. Resistance Councils and Resistance Committees have been established at every level from the village to Parliament. (NRM 1990; Nsibambi 1991:279-269; Smith 1993:18-39;
Resistance Councils act as the legislature and Resistance Committees as the executive. At the village level, called Resistance Council I, all persons aged 18 and above are members of the council, who elect the Resistance Committee, who hold office for two years. Village Resistance Committees then constitute the next (parish) Resistance Council, whose Committee in turn constitute the next, and so on. (NRM 1990:1-3). The whole system of government is therefore structurally tied together. Perhaps of far more importance in discouraging spoils politics or factionalism is the fact that the office-bearers are elected directly by the people who know them well, not appointed by the president or any district notable.

Also the danger of disruption at any of the various levels is undermined, or can be immediately prevented since Museveni and the National Resistance Council (NRC) have remained supreme and hold ultimate power of sanction. As Mudoola (1991:234) has observed, 'in establishing the Resistance Councils, the NRM has made it quite clear where sovereignty lay.' Whether or not the institution that would eventually evolve under such a system will be democratic or not is another matter (for which see Kasfir 1991:247-278).

The controlled introduction of popular participation in the political process by the population is a beginning of gradual institutionalisation. It would be accurate to say that it has also lifted the country out of chaos into a form of clientelist politics in transition. There is a good chance that at least clientelism would evolve, even if it does not lead to institutionalised form of politics. In the first place, the NRM/A has made and enforced certain changes which encourage orderliness and therefore slow evolution of the political process. The ban on political party
activities immediately after it took power has been a positive development towards institutionalisation because it discourages overt factionalism, and should have a cooling effect on the country’s overheated political climate. The ban has discouraged, or at the very least did not encourage, factional conflicts in the same way as happened under the old orders. The introduction of periodic elections to the NRC as well as the lower tiers of RCs system also has encouraged participation in politics by the population. Unlike in the 1980 elections run by the Military Commission, elections under the NRM seem to have been fair and free (apart from the banning of political party activity), and elections have become an integral part of the process of institutionalisation. In commenting on the people’s attitude to their role in these elections Kasfir (1991:258) found that after the 1989 election there was a ‘widely held belief that voters had a significant impact in the function of the new assemblies.’ (See also Mudoola 1991; Smith 1993).

The absorption of selected opposition groups within the NRM has not weakened its authority or that of Museveni personally. Museveni does not owe his position to them either collectively or individually, and none of them is the equal of the NRM/A: they joined on the NRM’s terms rather than through negotiated compromises. Technically his authority is unchallenged and he could do whatever he wishes with any of the factions the NRM/A has since assimilated. Although this constitutes a danger of dictatorship, it also provides chances for the evolution of clientelism, since political power is centralised and controlled, and not open to competition.

If Museveni’s motives remain patriotic rather than personal, he has it within his power to develop a non-personalised institution,
although the dangers of dictatorship or even factionalism that might undermine the system remain. As a Ugandan who has observed the system throughout has observed, stability or instability depends on whether ‘the right buttons or the wrong buttons are pushed’ by Museveni (personal information).

Whether Museveni would use his positions to successfully establish and manage a clientelist system as Kenyatta did from 1963, or whether he would, as it seems so far, use his position to nurture the evolution of a political institution to which all political players would become accountable, remains to be seen. The chances for both clientelism through the series of Resistance Committees (RCs) from the village level up to parliament, are good. Much depends on unforeseen developments, and there are at least three, which if fulfilled would result in institutionalised politics.

The first is if no credible leadership challenge is mounted against him. Any such challenge would inevitably make him feel threatened and force him to care more about his personal position than the political development. The result would be a gradual or rapid degeneration of clientelism into spoils politics. Secondly, it depends on his willingness and capacity to disassociate the NRM from the NRA. Their association is so close that the NRA to date appears to be a personal army. This creates fear and mistrust on the part of the others and encourages arrogance on the part of Museveni. If he is willing and able to turn the NRA into a truly national army, under a new name if possible, then the chances for the evolution of a political institution will be increased. The third is Museveni’s willingness to freely submit himself to on open, fair and free election, and his capacity to respect the results if he should lose. So far all
the elections have been for parliament without himself standing or being contested against.

**KENYA:**

**Developments From 1988 and After**

The demotion of Mwai Kibaki and therefore, in Moi’s view, the removal of a potential challenge to his position in the short term, did not mean a consolidation of the presidential hold on power. Kibaki had been the last notable Kikuyu representative in Moi’s government, and his removal broke the delicate balance of forces that had held politics together in the country. His removal heralded the technical end of the old clientelism and the beginning of a potential new and more uncertain one centred on the Rift Valley Province with the Western Province, represented by Elijah Mwangele, as the principal ally. But the danger was that Moi had, in the process of establishing this new alliance, given too much power to his allies: subsequently he became more and more in their control rather than the other way round.

The demotion of Mwai Kibaki after the 1988 elections was primarily the result of personal power struggle between him and Foreign Minister Elijah Mwangele. Mwangele made no secret of his schemes against Kibaki and had ‘at one time declared his ambitions to become Vice-President’ himself. (ACR 1985-1986:B328). Moi condoned and supported Mwangele against Kibaki, it has been suggested, because he had grown suspicious of Kibaki in part because Kibaki had ‘remained politically aloof and was less than zealous in condemning government critics’ (Malinda 1992:189). It is also said that Moi also feared that ‘with Njonjo out of the picture’ the Kikuyu might turn to Kibaki as their leader.
and thus sought to divide the Kikuyu in order to rule them' (Widner (1992:148). However, it is more correct to see Kibaki’s fall as a part of Moi’s inability to control his new allies than a result of his personal fear of Kibaki. Personal fear on the part of Moi was more real in the fall of Njonjo than in that of Kibaki. The Kikuyu themselves opposed Kibaki even in his own district of Nyeri because he had had failed to “protect” or promote their interests within the regime. (ACR 1987-1988:B315). The campaign against Kibaki was also helped by the active participation of prominent Kikuyu opposed to him.

The campaign took the form of sponsoring the rise of other leaders in Nyeri District, Kibaki’s political stronghold. The two men chosen were Kariuki Chotera, a former Mau Mau leader and chairman of the Nakuru branch of KANU, and Ngumbu Njururi, the MP for Karatina town in Nyeri district (Throup 1978:54-55; Widner 1992:149; WR 8 March 1985:6-7). From February 1985 there started what has been called “political tourism” in Nyeri: Kibaki’s opponents from Nairobi attended self-help projects in his constituency in his absence and without his approval or knowledge. The affair led to a period of public quarrel between Kibaki and Mwangele and the Kikuyu politicians being groomed as alternative leaders in Nyeri. At one point Mwangele warned Kibaki that ‘none of us is indispensable’; but Kibaki’s attempts to protest his loyalty to Moi passed unheeded by the President. ‘The strange aspect of this seemingly innocuous affair was that Moi failed at any point to say publicly where he stood in the controversy, or to damp down the conflict, let alone to express his confidence in his Vice-President’ (ACR 1985-1986:B328; ACR 1986-1987:B324).

After the elections of March 1988, Kibaki lost his position as Vice-
President, was replaced by Josepha Karanja, then the Vice-Chancellor of Nairobi University. But Karanja himself lasted in the post for only one year. In May 1989 he was dismissed and replaced by George Saitoti, the Minister of Finance.

This loss of control was also manifested, between 1988 and 1990, in increased corruption among the ministers Moi relied on, as well as in continued and increased repression by both the security services and KANU. KANU in fact became an unofficial alternative police force specifically to defend the regime’s interests. According to Widner (1992) ‘KANU’s police functions expanded ... as early as 1987 [when it was] announced that the police would receive assistance from members of the party.’ Subsequently, the activities of the youth wingers expanded to searches in the houses of suspects and monitoring ‘public places, such as bars, hotels and restaurants (p. 170).

The repression in turn encouraged a corresponding hardening of attitude towards the government by its critics and opponents. Prominent church leaders also joined in the criticism of the government, and eventually became the regime’s chief critics. The suppression of legitimate opposition had meant that only the Church was left in a position to protest against the social ills that had resulted. (WR 10 May 1991:8-9; 27 September 1991:11-15; 8 May 1992: 20-22; Lonsdale and Kihoro 1992; Widner 1992:190-5).

Towards the 1992 Elections

It was against this background that the call for multipartyism and the elections of December 1992 took place. But the road to the elections was a

Bishop Muge was the first prominent figure to openly declare his opposition to the policies of the regime, and subsequently became its harshest critic. Already by 1988 he was a marked man because of his criticism of the regime’s human rights record. When he was warned by Justus ole Tipis, Minister of Internal Affairs, Bishop Muge said that he would continue speaking out against human rights abuses because in Kenya only he could ‘say things that other people do not want to say because they will get into trouble with the politicians’ if they did so (ACR 1988-1989:B234-5; Widner 1992:190). So when he was killed in a suspicious motor-car accident on the highways of Kenya, many felt that the government had a hand in his death (Lonsdale 1992).

Robert Ouko was killed February 1990, but his death cannot be seem merely as an attempt by the government to silence a critic, in the same way as that of Bishop Muge. Ouko was more than a critic. He was a real threat, not necessarily because he might have had his eyes on the presidency: it was his anti-corruption drive that made him a threat especially to Nicholas Biwott, then Minister of Energy and Industry, who was eventually implicated in the murder in an inquiry conducted by officers of Scotland Yard (WR 10 May 1991:12-14; 27 September 1991:15-6;
In addition to demonstrating the extent of corruption in Moi’s regime and the lengths those involved were prepared to go in order to “protect” the practice, Ouko’s murder also illustrated the weakness of Moi within his new alliance. Although no specific reason has been proved for Ouko’s murder, the inquiry by Scotland Yard have suggested two reasons that overlap: there was a personal disagreement over foreign business contracts between Ouko and Biwott, and Ouko was about to submit a ‘detailed report for the President in connection with corruption in which ... Biwott was the principal [culprit]’ (Malinda 1992:191). Yet Moi felt unable to act against Biwott for quite a long time, and jailed him only briefly after mounting pressure following the Scotland Yard inquiry. As Holmquist and Ford (1992:99) have pointed out, this was probably because ‘Biwott [held] incriminating evidence over the President’s head and Moi [could not] afford to alienate him.’

Ouko’s death also led directly to the introduction of multiparty politics at the end of 1991. At first the government put out the idea that Ouko had committed suicide (without explaining how a dead person could set fire to himself). After this was discounted (WR 27 September 1991:15), it was unwilling or unable to punish the principal culprit.

**Multipartyism and the 1992 Elections in Perspective**

Holmquist, Weaver and Ford (1994:100-102) have concluded that the introduction of multipartyism in Kenya has been in response to democratic forces and therefore represented a victory and hope for democracy not only in Kenya but in Africa as a whole. ‘Whatever [would be] the course of democratic transition efforts, it is clear that popular protest under the banner of democracy changed the fundamental ... forms of rule in Africa’ (p. 100). This assessment tends to both be too optimistic about the chances of democracy in Africa and give too much credit for the changes in Kenya to the “democratic forces”. The change in Kenya was mainly in response to the crisis that had developed in the political system, and not necessarily to a wish or desire for democracy on the part of both the government and its critics. External pressure, particularly the threat to cut off aid by the leading donor countries like the United States, has also played a role in forcing Moi to accept multipartyism. Kihoro (1992) in fact sees this as the most important single factor. But it is important to consider the roles of these factors alongside the threat posed by the disintegration of the “Nyayo” alliance, and Moi’s need to “clean up” the political scene. In any case Moi agreed to the elections firstly to ward off criticism, ensure the continued flow of aid and consolidate his hold, rather than in order to promote democracy. Democracy, like socialism and capitalism, were merely adopted as rhetorical ideologies in the factional struggles, particularly by those who controlled the leadership of FORD. As we will see in a moment, the conduct of the government and opposition leaders during the campaign (such as the pursuit of personal interests that led to the break up of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) coalition and the
government ethnic cleansing tactics that left thousands dead) did not advance the cause of democracy; and multipartyism has left Kenya no more democratic than it was before.

The establishment of controlled dictatorship in the late 1980s and the introduction of pluralism have been an integral – and in this case chronological – part of the disintegration of the clientelist system. In short, the introduction of multipartyism and the elections were a particular response to this crisis, and differed from other responses in scale and magnitude: though its scale and magnitude themselves reflected the scale and magnitude of the crisis. Since coming to power in 1978, Moi had as we have seen depended on regular shake ups of the system to give him “a new mandate” or a breathing space. These changes reflected his need to regularly reaffirm his relationships with the allies of the time. In 1991-2, owing to the extent of the “sickness” of the system, an all-shake up was necessary, hence multipartyism and the elections. It can indeed be compared to the snap general elections of September 1983 in that both were forced on Moi by a threat to his position. In 1983 it was Njonjo’s ambitions, or the fear of it. But in general it was in response to two developments that threatened to engulf him. Moi’s willingness to submit himself to an election was also encouraged by the divisions among the opposition groups. In addition to making him confident of victory, it provided an opportunity to reunite the Kalenjin behind him, forge new alliances by incorporating selected politicians and silence his critics for a while.

By the end of 1991 Moi had run out of ideas or options for survival, as reflected in some of the more desperate measures he and his allies adopted to retain power. And these were not merely the deploying of
KANU youth militants as an alternative police force discussed above, but more sinister measures. In 1991, for example, the chairman of the Nakuru branch of KANU recommended ‘government supporters to visit beer halls and cut off the fingers of those who made the two-finger multiparty salute’ (Makinda 1992:191). But the tactics failed to silence the critics, though they succeeded in inciting violence on a massive scale in support of the status quo.

Thus, Moi survived the elections and remained president mainly due to the lack of unity (therefore, by extension, the strength of factionalism) among the opposition parties. The FORD opposition coalition hopelessly disintegrated when the elections were promised. The problem was that despite their opposition to Moi and KANU, FORD was made up of those notables who had over the years fallen out with the Moi/Kenyatta regime. When the coalition was formed, Oginga Odinga was elected its chairman (through not the candidate for president. This post was left vacant). Other officers include Masinde Muliro (Luhy, as Vice Chairman); Martin Shikuku (Luhy, Secretary General); and the Kikuyu politicians Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba. Had they been able to stand together they would have presented a formidable opposition to KANU, but the regional/ethnic divide of Kenya made this impossible. FORD can in fact be likened to UNLF in Uganda: like UNLF the notables and factions who made it up ‘had nothing in common apart from their opposition to Moi.’ There was also the Democratic Party (DP) of Mwai Kibaki. The formation of DP ruled out even a united Kikuyu opposition to Moi, which might have been capable of dislodging him. (WR 3 July, 1992:3-9; 8 May 1992:4-14; Holmquist and Ford 1922:106-7; Malinda 1992:191-2). In an important way, Moi’s agreement to allow the elections
and multipartyism was influenced and perhaps made possible only by the knowledge that he would not face any serious united opposition.

Before the elections FORD in fact broke up in factions, two of which became known as FORD-A (FORD-Asili) and FORD-K (FORD-Kenya), led respectively by Kenneth Matiba and Oginga Odinga. The whole electoral process therefore was primarily power play and had little to do with democratisation. The election rules were likewise designed with the divisions in the opposition camp in mind and to ensure that only Moi could have won. The rules stated that the president was to be directly elected by the voters and not by delegates of the parties (who could be bribed due to their limited numbers). To be elected president, a candidate had to win at least 25 per cent of the popular vote in at least five of the country’s eight provinces. (W R 3 July, 1992, p. 6; 5 June 1992, pp. 16-8).

None of the FORD candidates and even Kibaki of the DP, since they were all district or provincial notables, could have expected to win 25 per cent in five provinces.

Besides, prior to the election itself, Moi and KANU engineered “ethnic clashes” to ensure that the party retained power, with tragic consequences. The so-called ethnic clashes started at the end of 1991, at about the time Moi announced his willingness to allow multiparty politics. His opposition to the introduction of pluralism had rested on the argument that such a system encouraged ethnic clashes, and the ethnic clashes turned out to be an attempt by Moi to ‘fulfil his own prophesy in his lifetime’ (Lonsdale and Kihoro 1992:11). But the clashes had a practical function far more relevant to the elections than fulfilling a prophesy. The violence, *Africa Watch* (1993:12) has observed, was ‘a manifestation of the government’s new method to maintain power’ at all.
In fact, Kalenjin politicians, before resorting to incite ethnic clashes, had pressed for a return to majimboism so as to ensure their continued hegemony in the Rift Valley, not caring that such a policy could lead to the break up of the country as a whole. 'The most virulent proponents ... of majimboism include[d] Vice-President George Saitoti; MP Nicholas Biwott; Minister for Local Government William ole Ntimama, and MP for Eldoret South, Joseph Misoi' (Africa Watch 1993:13). As noted, these were Moi's new allies. The bishops of Kenya told Moi in a joint pastoral letter in May 1992 about the need to act against these men and stop the clashes. They told him that in Kenya 'every citizen has the right to live in any part of Kenya and dwell in peace an security. [But at] present you seem to be securing the interests of a small clique of a rich and powerful men who are surviving at the cost of life, blood and misery of thousands of small people' (WR 8 May, 1992, p. 21).

As far as the election was concerned, the purpose of inciting the clashes was to clear constituencies of potential supporters for the opposition parties. It therefore constituted a rigging of the elections on a massive scale. The target of the attacks were predominately Kikuyus and Luos living in the Rift Valley Province, and who were more likely to vote for the opposition FORD-A, FORD-K or DP parties. Politicians hired, trained, and even paid the attackers, who included men from the country's security forces. According to the report of the Parliamentary Select Committee set up to investigate the clashes in 1992, the attackers 'were paid sums ranging from Kshs. 500 [$6.50] for safe return from the clash front; Kshs. 1,000 to 2,000 [US$12.50 50 $25] for killing one person or burning a grass-thatched house, and Kshs. 10,000 [US$125] per permanent house burnt (Africa Watch 1992:30). This, combined with bribery of voters
by Moi. Banks were set up to provide instant “loans” to induce the poor to vote for Moi. In some cases KANU officials actually voted on behalf of some of the electorate in remote areas. According to the Guardian (30 December 1992, p. 7) at Ngong, 'a queue of 2,000 agitated and illiterate voters had to state their intentions to officials in front of party leaders. Poll officials then crossed the ballot papers on the voters’ behalf.' This was real politics and it was how Moi survived and won the “democratic” elections of December 1992.

Moi’s strategy proved correct; he won 36 percent of the popular votes to a combined count of 64 percent for his opponents, but took 100 seats in the 188-seat parliament, plus 12 additional seats that he appointed. (Africa Watch 1993:9). This reflected in part the fact that in most constituencies in the rift valley the ethnic cleansing programme had scared opponents of KANU to vote for the opposition, and was partly due to the fact that the opposition parties were urban-based and had no organisation or influence in the far-flung and more sparsely populated areas in the north, north-east and the Coast.

What the introduction of multipartyism has done is to provide another chance for Moi to create a new clientelistic alliance incorporating Kenya’s various subnationalties, as Kenyatta did from 1963. Political direction has since hovered between three possibilities: continuation of a weakened clientelist system, its deteriorating into spoils politics and, less likely, its evolution into an institutionalised system, especially since the formal introduction of multi-party political system and the elections of 1993. The most likely outcome is that the clientalist system would continue in its weakened form until at least the year 2000.
CONCLUSION

The Role of Clientelism in Politics in Africa

This study has demonstrated that interpersonal power relations among the leading politicians in Uganda and Kenya have been the most important factor in the political development since independence. It has shown that it was their quest for the control of the state that has provided the main momentum behind political change. This quest for hegemony, as Chabal (1992) calls it, has affected and to a great extent undermined the formal institutions like the civil service, parliament and political party. Constitutional changes have often been undertaken primarily for the purpose of safeguarding the position of the leaders and not in order to improve governance of the state for the greater good of society. Examples are the imposition of the Republican Constitution of 1967 on Uganda by Obote, Amin’s numerous military decrees during the first years of his regime (1971-1979), and constitutional amendments in Kenya n 1965-1969 as well as during much of Moi’s early years in office.

In politics in Africa as a whole, personal power struggles have been the dynamic force in political change because power is often pursued as an end, and not for the betterment of society. This is true of the overwhelming majority of African states, although the intensity of the struggles and their outcome varies from one country to another, and from time to time. The Sorry political states in which countries like Somalia, Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone have found themselves in have been the result of factionalism.
Clientelism, as a system of rule, has been shown to have the capacity to check factional struggles and provide a measure of stability in states whose politics are dominated by factional struggles. This happens when factional struggles are effectively controlled by a dominant leader, as happened in Kenya under Kenyatta. But if factional struggles are not controlled, spoils politics and instability are the inevitable outcomes, as in Uganda. The experiences of Uganda and Kenya represent only two extreme examples of the good and bad effects of interpersonal power struggles on the stability or instability of the state.

The study has also shown that the application of clientelism as an analytical concept in African politics has distinct advantages over the earlier theories of modernisation and underdevelopment in that the concept of clientelism enables us to systematically focus on personal relations. The advantage of clientelism in the study of political change in Africa is that it can account for the changes which the modernisation and dependency theories have failed to explain in a satisfactory manner. The focus on interpersonal power relations within the political systems also avoids the contradictions between the predicted trends in Africa’s political development in the early 1960s and the actual experiences that it has had. For example, a notion that Mobutu of Zaire has been committed to the development of Zaire and the betterment of Zairean society as his political objectives cannot be reconciled with the sorry state his country has been in under his rule. (Young 1994; Chazan et al 1991:184-188). The experiences of Liberia and Somalia likewise cannot be explained by saying that Charles Taylor General Mohamed Farah Aidid have been motivated by the need to develop their countries more than their personal interests. The same is true of Sierra Leone, not only in recent years but since independence (Clapham 1976) Since clientelism focuses on the way personal relations
influenced political action, and how such relations are regulated, it is likely to remain a useful paradigm for the proper understanding of Africa’s political development in the independence era.

The earlier theories of political change of the 1960s and 1970s – modernisation, ideology, dependency and underdevelopment – are for this reason in various degrees either irrelevant or inadequate for a systematically consistent explanation of the political changes in the newly independent states in Africa. Their inadequacy is that, as imported theories, they obscure or deny altogether the influence of indigenous political activities in shaping political change. (Keller 1991:50-53; Ndegwa 1992:42-45). The dependency and underdevelopment theory for example can not explain why the once deposed Obote was able to come back to power in 1980, only to be disposed again in 1985 and by the same army that had fought on his side against Amin. Nor do they account for the different experiences of countries under the same (dependency) conditions. For instance why have there been so many coups in Uganda (in 1966, 1971, 1979, 1980 and 1985) but none in Kenya or Tanzania?

Clientelism as an Analytical Concept

The effective use of clientelism as an analytical concept depends on how it is defined, and the society to which it is applied. In general the current use of the concept faces two special difficulties. The first difficulty arises in distinguishing between pre-and post-independence forms of clientelism, and determining the relationships between the two in the independence era. In Senegal, for example, the traditional forms of clientelism not only survived in the independence era, but has tended to dominate the ‘modern’ forms of clientelism (O’Brien 1975). It is therefore not easy to
distinguish where anthropological clientages ended and where modern political clientelism started. This is one of the issues that presents special difficulties in the analytical application of the concept.

The second difficulty is the relationship between clientelism and ethnicity, which often overlap. For while ethnicity provides the ‘natural’ domain for the forging of clientelist relations because members of the same ethnic group already have a group identity and real or assumed group interest it does not by itself provide a secure basis for clientelism in the long run. Clientelism thrives on the satisfaction of the interests of those constituting the relationship, and not on ascriptive group identity. Since it is normal for members of individuals belonging to the same ethnic group to have different and conflicting interests, the pursuit of these interests weakens ethnic solidarity and sometimes renders ethnicity unreliable as a basis for clientelism. (Lemarchand 1972:83-90). Special care is thus needed in explaining the apparently contradictory relationships between Kenyatta and Charles Njonjo and Moi, which cannot be seen entirely either in clientelistic or ethnic terms. A proper understanding of these two set of overlapping relations is one area that needs separate and urgent research. However, the difficulties do not undermine the analytical qualities of clientelism, because this largely depends on how it is defined.

When it is ‘precisely’ defined to refer only to the interpersonal relations of the master-servant type of the traditional, pre-independence setting, clientelism as a theory has a limited applicability in understanding national political changes in the independence era. But the extension of this relationship to the national power structure through the local patron’s relations with other higher persons at the district, regional and national level, necessitates the broadening of the concept to encompass not only all the different levels of such relationships, but also the conflicts
it inevitably produces, and the result of this conflicts on the political well-being of the state. When defined in this broad way, clientelism can be successfully applied to research and can provide a better understanding of political changes.

**Clientelism as a System of Rule**

The effectiveness of clientelism as a method of rule depends on the strength of clientelist ties within the ruling alliance, but in particular on how the ties are managed. Centralisation or decentralisation of power thus determines the strength or weakness of clientelist ties and, by projection, the stability or instability of the state. Although he does not mention it, Migdal (1988) is really talking about the capacity of clientelism to provide and maintain state stability when he writes that

in societies with weak states a continuing environment of [factional] conflict has dedicated a particular, pathological set of relationships within the state organisation itself, between the top state leadership and its agencies... [Ties which] ... in turn have shaped the very nature of the insinuation of state institutions (p. 207).

The greater the degree of centralisation, or more precisely, the grip on power by the president/patron, the easier it is to regulate the clientelistic ties. Since the relationships can be effectively regulated from a strong centre, a dominant person with unchallenged political authority is indispensable to the viability of clientelism as a system of rule. The successful regulation of interpersonal relations from the centre results in the establishment of clientelism as a political machine which, for a given period, performs the role of a conventional institution in its own right, as happened in Kenya during the Kenyatta years (1963-1978).
Senegal provides another African example of the resilience of the clientelist system once it is firmly established. Since clientelism was already well entrenched through the network of intricate saintly relationships between religious leaders and the population in much of Senegal before independence, President Leopold Senghor decided to relied on these ties even through he was a Catholic and the ties were controlled by Moslem Mourides. (O’Brien 1975; Fatton 1986). The Senegalese experience is another example where the system dominates the leaders rather than the other way round. For Senghor, like Moi from 1978, could not have disregarded or dismantled the existing system without seriously undermining his own position in power. The succession of Abdou Diouf (a Muslim and therefore of the system) after Senghor reinforced the relations between the state and the system rather than threatening it, to a greater degree than Moi’s succession did in Kenya in 1978.

As a political system clientelism has certain advantages. It was the capacity to weaken ethnic alliances, and its orderly development can provide an alternative basis of unity. This is because clientelist relations are based on reciprocal interests, and not solely or mainly on ascriptive factors like ethnicity. Its capacity to straddle ethnic and regional boundaries reduces the dangers of ethnic associations. The efforts of the northern-based National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to recruit leading politicians from other regions of the country during the 1978 elections, for example, was a clear attempt to expand the clientelistic base of the party and thus strengthen it nationally (Joseph 1991:147-150). And in this the NPN was partially successful, because it recruited Alex Ekwueme, a leading politician from the east, who served as Vice-President in the government of President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983). Moi also owed his succession to clientelism rather than ethnicity, since he came from the Kalenjin ethnic
group and Kenyatta’s clientelism was based largely on the Kikuyu Purely
ethnic alliances as a basis of power leads to a hegemonic domination by the
most powerful ethnic group, a development which is potentially divisive.
For example, if Kenyatta had relied exclusively on ethnicity as the basis of
his power, he could have established a Kikuyu hegemony, but this would
have carried the dangers of more destabilisation and possibly civil war in
Kenya, as the experience of Nigeria in the mid 1960s has shown.

The major disadvantage of clientelism as a political system is that,
firstly, the interests of the alliance in power becomes more important than
that of the state as a whole. Clientelistic governments therefore encourage
maladministration. The second disadvantage is that the management of
clientelist relations diverts the scarce state resources to maintain the
system, leading to corruption and the emergence of a handful rich people
in a poor country. Weak leaders also become too dependent on their
“clients”, and authoritarian measures to maintain the regime. This
happened during Moi’s regime in Kenya from the mid-1980s. Despite its
disadvantages to the state of promoting personal interests rather than that
of the country as a whole, in the absence of viable institutions, clientelism
is a better alternative system of rule than continuous factionalism.

The successions of the late 1970s in Uganda and Kenya have
introduced new personalities on the political scene, and new alliances in
power. Clientelism, through somewhat modified, has not been eliminated.
At the present the future of political stability, either through
institutionalised politics or clientelism, looks better in Uganda than in
Kenya. The chances for Moi to forge a clientelist alliance under himself as
Kenyatta did from 1963 are remote. In the first place he does not have
Kenyatta’s dominant authority and his years of repression has made him
very unpopular. In the second place his Kalenjin alliance is a minority
alliance, and cannot pull the other ethnic groups as guests in the same way as Kenyatta's Kikuyu alliance was able to do. Moreover, multiparty politics provide other centres of power in the various other political parties and KANU no longer enjoy a monopoly as the only avenue of advancement. Power is likely to remain open for competition both amongst KANU members and with the other political parties. Stability in Kenya will therefore come only when the country evolves institutionalised politics under multipartyism, but the time when this will happen is not close.
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