THE NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY AS RAISED BY THE CONFLICT OF THE TEACHING OF McLEOD CAMPBELL AND WESTMINSTER THEOLOGY.

by

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This is a study in historical theology and therefore it has been felt advisable to deal with the thought of McLeod Campbell as it was developed within its own particular historical context. Previous studies have all too often approached his teaching from what followed it rather than what went before.

The First Part of this study, therefore, deals with an area previously almost totally ignored. McLeod Campbell’s family background reveals to us his independence of mind. The study of his theological education, which was extremely orthodox, prepares us for nothing new in his thought. However, in his thorough grounding in the Scottish common sense philosophy of his time, we may see the seeds of later developments in his thought. Previously his affirmation that his philosophy professor, George Jardine, was his “Intellectual father”, has not been given due weight. His approach to theological inquiry was deeply influenced by the Scottish common sense form of empiricism in which he was trained.

The study which we have undertaken of his early “Row Teachings” is yet another area of his thought which previously has not been dealt with adequately. Yet, in these early teachings we see the roots and motives of much of his later thought.

Part Two deals with the background of the actual historical conflict which arose around his early teaching and which led to his deposition from the ministry of the Church of Scotland, in 1831. The exact charges against him are shown to lead us to a long struggle in Scottish Theology. This struggle took place within the context of the federal theology of the Westminster Standards and characteristics of this federal type of theology are discussed. We then turn to the Ramist Aristotelian background of federal theology. This form of Aristotelianism which was particularly strong in England and Scotland during the formative period of federal theology is shown in its application to theology to have rationalistic and moralistic characteristics contrary to the “common-sense” empiricism of McLeod Campbell’s training.

The second part of the thesis ends with a chapter on the possible sources of influence on his thought. Here the similarity of his method with that of Thomas Erskine, with an important reference to David Hume, is dealt with. So too, is the Platonic tendency in Erskine’s thought which separated their teaching. Before the positive influences on McLeod Campbell’s thought are studied, certain “false trails” of influence are disposed of. These “false trails” of interpretation have previously led to great misunderstanding of McLeod Campbell’s thought. When we turn to positive influences on his thought, we find that his “Row Companions” have been ignored far too much and particularly the Puritan author, Henry Dornay. It was this man’s influence on “union with Christ” and practical abandonment of federal theology which gives us entry into a pre-Westminster theological tradition that influenced McLeod Campbell. We deal with Calvin, Luther, Early Protestant Confessions in this regard. We also see it reflected in Scots theologians such as James Fraser of Brae, Thomas Boston and John Colquhoun.

The Third Part of the thesis deals with his later writing and begins with a chapter on “Christ the Bread of Life”, a much neglected work on the Lord’s Supper. It reveals to us the continuation of earlier themes which appear in his more famous book on “The Nature of the Atonement”, published five years later. The concluding chapter deals with the last of McLeod Campbell’s writing and here we see clearly that the “conflict” which had originally been with Westminster theology was now with a new and more Subtle foe. We see McLeod Campbell’s attitude to the challenge of modern science, philosophy and historical criticism of the Bible. Once again we see in his answer the continuing influence of the intuitionist form of empiricism in which he had been trained. Our conclusion is that McLeod Campbell marks an age. Not the age of
liberal theology as some have thought, but rather the age of recovery of the Biblical and Reformation knowledge of the freeness of God's grace and the "wholeness" of our salvation in Jesus Christ.
To my wife, Margaret.
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PREFACE

Since it is the author's belief that a preface should be short and to the point, we shall indicate without delay the major line of argument of this thesis. The intention is to understand some of the major issues in regard to theological inquiry, as seen in the theology of John McLeod Campbell. These issues were raised mainly in his conflict with the "Calvinist Orthodoxy" of the Westminster Standards and in the last decade of his life, by conflict with secular agnosticism.

The thesis is divided into three parts. In Part One we deal with McLeod Campbell's personal background and training for the ministry, and his teaching in Row Parish from 1825-1831, for which he was deposed from the ministry of the Church of Scotland. Chapter One establishes his thorough grounding in the Scottish common sense philosophy and his extremely orthodox theological training. It also reveals to us something of McLeod Campbell's independence of mind. Chapter Two deals with his earnest evangelical approach to his Row pastorate and his early doctrines of "assurance of faith" and the universality of the atonement. By a thorough study of his sermon material from this early period we are given particular insights into his theological method.

In Chapter Three we continue this study of his sermons and are enabled to discover the development of a consistent system of thought. We note especially an amazing Christocentricity in his thought, and a very clear foretaste of his later and more famous
teaching. Indeed, Part One is important precisely because previous scholarship has not taken into account McLeod Campbell's family and educational background nearly enough in evaluating his thought, and has almost completely ignored his early teaching.

Part Two deals with the background of the conflict between McLeod Campbell's teaching and that of his opponents. Chapter Four begins with the explicit charges against him and by studying their background, reveals a lengthy struggle in Scottish Theology. This struggle took place within the context of the federal theology of the Westminster Standards and we first deal with the characteristics of this type of theology. We then turn to the Ramist Aristotelian background of federal theology and are enabled to understand something of its rationalistic and moralistic influences. We conclude this chapter by discussing McLeod Campbell's heresy trial. Chapter Five concludes the section on the background of the conflict by dealing with the sources of his thought. This means giving great emphasis on his life-long friendship with Thomas Erskine and the three biographical works he affectionately referred to as his "Row Companions". It also entails, however, a criticism of the "false trails" which have been taken in understanding his theology in terms of influences either completely removed from, or antithetical to, his views. This makes way for a concluding discussion of the tradition in which he stood - that is, the long theological tradition of "union with Christ". It is important to understand these influences and sources before we study his
later teaching, in order to put it in its proper perspective. It is our intention to understand the method which lay behind his teaching and not to stress his sources, for his great independence of thought is one of his major contributions to theology.

Part Three, which deals with what might be referred to as his "later theological writing", begins with Chapter Six discussing his first book written explicitly for publication. That was "Christ, the Bread of Life", published in 1851 and republished in a larger edition in 1869. This book is important, not only in revealing a doctrine of the Lord's Supper very similar to Calvin's in many regards, but also an underlying similarity of understanding of the relation of word or symbol to the reality signified. Chapter Seven goes on to discuss McLeod Campbell's great work, "The Nature of the Atonement", which was published in 1856 and has since gone through seven editions¹ and had a very wide and diffuse influence in British theology. This chapter deals first with the criticism he made of "Calvinistic" theology and then with his positive theological work by which he wished to replace it. What we find there is a continuation and development of his earlier Row teaching with its Christocentric emphasis on the positive content of revelation. Chapter Eight discusses the major themes recurrent in his writings later than the "Nature of the Atonement". These are the challenges thrown at the Christian faith by modern science,

1. It has gone through more than seven editions. Before the 1958 edition (incorrectly called the 4th) it went through six editions and at least three "reprints". (This information from an 1915 "reprint").
philosophy and historical criticism of the Bible. We find there a concern for the pastoral and "spiritual" aspects of theology which cannot be ignored, and which must have a continuing influence on theological method.


I acknowledge the inspiration and guidance received from Rev. Professor T. F. Torrance and Rev. Professor J. McIntyre. My thanks too, to the Librarian and staff of among others, the New College Library, the National Library of Scotland and the University of Edinburgh Library. As is usual, I claim the copyright of all inadequacies.
CHAPTER 1 - McLeod Campbell's Background

John McLeod Campbell has been acclaimed at many times and in many places as one of Scotland's greatest theologians. Yet, for his early theological thought, he was deposed from the ministry of the Church of Scotland that he loved so well. What were the factors that lay behind this conflict? Particularly, what differences in theological method lay unexpressed beneath this unfortunate occurrence? To answer these questions, we shall begin this study by looking at McLeod Campbell's personal, philosophical and theological background.

This study of McLeod Campbell's thought is written on the presupposition that Christian thought, like all other thought, is influenced to a very large degree by its time and place in history. Karl Barth, in writing about the place of dogmatics in human thought, has said that it "...is not a thing which has fallen from Heaven to earth. And if someone were to say that it would be wonderful if there were such an absolute dogmatics fallen from Heaven, the only possible answer would be: 'Yes, if we were angels'." Very few people today would argue that the theological, philosophical or religious thought of the last century was perfect, that it had "fallen from heaven". Nor can it be claimed that McLeod Campbell's thought

escaped being limited by the time and place in which it occurred in history. His thought was limited to a large extent by the theological, philosophical and religious categories of thought and mode of expression available to him.

While it must be admitted that McLeod Campbell's thought was limited to a large extent by the thought of his age, it is the concern of this study to show how and why he came into conflict with that thought, and to what extent he was able to rise above it. In conjunction with this aim of showing at what points he was able to break through the confining limits of the Christian thought of his time and occupy what he considered to be higher ground, we shall also attempt to understand how McLeod Campbell went about bringing others to this new understanding. We shall attempt to understand what he meant when he wrote that "...we must be careful not to plead with others on lower ground than that on which we stand ourselves; viz., the ground on which we feel that our Lord stood, when he came to men in the Father's name, and complained that so coming he had not been received by them".¹

Home and Family Influences.

In considering the influences on McLeod Campbell's thought, first place must be given to his home and family


¹
life. He was born in 1800 at Kilninver, Argyll, Scotland. His father was the Rev. Donald Campbell, a Church of Scotland minister. John was the oldest of three children when his mother died in 1806. His letters indicate the close family bonds that existed all through his life. There was, however, a particularly close bond existing between him and his father - no doubt due in part to his being the eldest child in a home without a mother. A friend referred to his father as having been in a sense, both a father and a mother to him. Both the warmth of their relationship and the theological significance ascribed to it by John can be seen in a letter to his father in 1836. In apologizing for a delayed letter he writes:

You indeed were tried in that my letter was so long in getting to you. It was a call to trust your son to the Heavenly Father, who, having given you a father's heart, must have Himself a father's heart in perfection; for "he that formed the eye shall he not see?"

1. John McLeod Campbell, Reminiscences and Reflections (London: Macmillan and Co., 1873) This book contains much valuable information on his early life. There is an "Introductory Narrative" by his son, Donald Campbell, which is particularly helpful in learning about his education. Hereafter cited as Reminiscences.
2. John McLeod Campbell, Memorials of John McLeod Campbell, being selections from his correspondence. Edited by his son, the Rev. Donald Campbell. 2 vol. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1877). These volumes contain well over 1,000 edited letters to family and friends. They shall hereafter be cited as Memorials.
3. Reminiscences, p. 4, refers to his father's 84 year old mother having lived with the family from 1806 till her death in 1818. John at that time referred very lovingly to her and her "tenderness".
5. Idid. p. 133
A father's heart is indeed a beautiful work of God; and I can bless God that the specimen of which I have had to do is what it is; although the only parent who cannot err, and, therefore, the only parent who can be implicitly followed, is God Himself.

McLeod Campbell's father was born in Skye and educated at the University of Aberdeen. There he is said to have done well in his studies, acquiring a "familiar acquaintance with Virgil, Ovid and Horace..."1 This classical education played a part in John's early education, for although he attended the Parish School, his father also took part in it. At the age of eight, John was reading Caesar and a few years later his Sunday task was to learn by heart one of George Buchanan's Latin Psalms.2

At Aberdeen, McLeod Campbell's father also studied under Dr. George Campbell, who gained fame as an antagonist of David Hume. In later years, John had occasion to study George Campbell's work and his comment to his father is of interest to us. He wrote:3

I had a very rich treat lately in your friend, Dr. Campbell's "Lectures on Rhetoric". Had he written directly and professedly on the philosophy of mind, he would have left a more valuable system than Reid, Stewart or Brown. I feel a peculiar delight in Campbell. From his having been your professor, I feel as if he had been my own.

1. Reminiscences, p.1
2. Ibid. p.2
3. Ibid. p.7 (a letter to his father from Edinburgh in February, 1824)
It is not strange that John felt attracted by George Campbell's philosophy, for it was of the same school of Scottish "common-sense philosophy" in which he had by that time been educated at Glasgow University. As for evaluating George Campbell's potential above that of Reid, Stewart and Brown, it should be noted that Thomas Chalmers arrived at the same conclusion.¹

The theological education of McLeod Campbell's father had centered in the rationalist theologians, Archbishop Tillotson and Samuel Clarke. Here too we can see how he influenced his son. Late in life (1870), John wrote - "My early school was that of Tillotson, as embodied in my beloved father's teaching in the pulpit and out of it".² John goes on in this same letter to describe how he moved away from this theological position. He describes the transition as being "...from giving the first place to good works to giving that place to faith".³

Since McLeod Campbell described his early "school" as being that of his father's favorite, Tillotson, it would be worth our while to gain an impression of that man's thought. Archbishop Tillotson (1630-1694) was a leading figure in the 17th century Latitudinarian movement in the Church of England. Tillotson and his fellow Latitudinarians might be considered the successors of the Cambridge Platonists.⁴

3. Ibid.
These Cambridge men had in common the rejection of the Calvinism of their time. There is some evidence of their friendly relations with the Arminians in Holland.¹ This relation may be exaggerated however, for there was at this time a general tendency among Calvinists and Arminians alike to rationalism and moralism and it is this characteristic which was handed on to the Latitudinarians. Indeed, it might be said on behalf of the Cambridge Platonists that despite their insistence that "...the state of religion lies in a good mind and a good life' ...they had suffused their preaching of morality with a mysticism markedly lacking in their prosaic successors".² It has been argued that the moralistic preaching was made necessary by the lack of moral restraint which arose in reaction to the strictness of the Puritan Commonwealth. No matter how such preaching was justified at that time, or later, there is little doubt but that it often descended to the level of worldly wisdom and prudence. Norman Sykes cites a lucid example in...

Tillotson's principle that "all the duties of the Christian religion which respect God are no other but what Natural Light prompts men to, excepting the two sacraments and praying to God in the name and by the mediation of Christ;" and his precept concerning the priority of natural duties, "for I think myself obliged to deal plainly and to be so faithful to mothers as to tell...

² Sykes, From Sheldon to Secker, p. 149
them that nursing their own children is a
natural duty and of a more indispensible
obligation than any positive precepts of
revealed religion.¹

Tillotson "...still gave allegiance to the prevailing
view of revelation as the disclosure of certain divine
Truths. But he regarded these extras as a sort of republic-
ation of natural religion".² He stressed both natural and
revealed religion but clearly asserted that both were
grounded on reason. When reason became the master of
revelation it was no wonder that natural religion and natural
"duties" were stressed. They presented fewer problems,
they were more "reasonable" than the assent to the mystery
of revelation required by orthodox Christianity. It is not
difficult to see how it could come about that both deists
and their orthodox opponents of the next century could claim
Tillotson as their spiritual father".³

McLeod Campbell's father was, in fact, an orthodox
minister in the Church of Scotland. He was a "Moderate".⁴
There were at that time two "parties" in the Church of
Scotland. The "Moderate" group to which the older Campbell
belonged was the larger and controlling group in the Church

   II, p.310
2. H.D.McDonald, Ideas of Revelation, (London:Macmillan and
   Co.,1959), p.38
3. Ibid.p.17 cites several examples of deist tributes to
   Tillotson "On the fly-leaf of Toland's Christianity not
   Mysterious, there is a quotation from the Archbishop which
   serves as a text for all that follows. Tindal has some
   fourteen extended passages from Tillotson's work in his,
   Christianity as Old as Creation. In one place he refers
   to the renowned ecclesiastic as "the incomparable Tillotson".
   Anthony Collins, likewise contends that Tillotson is the one
   "whom all English free-thinkers own as their head".
and continued to be so until the Disruption in 1843. The other "party", the "Evangelical" or "High" group, was smaller at the turn of the century but increased in size up to and after the Disruption. When McLeod Campbell described these groups in 1827 he did so in the following terms.¹

I do believe that there is a dawn of better times on our church; that the moderate men and high men are alike to give place and to be succeeded by truly spiritual men, who will have no object in all they do but the winning souls to Christ. And, oh, I do trust that such a band of ministers will be produced in part, not by the removal, but by the conversion of many who are now slumbering upon the downy pillow of moderation, or storming in the popular clamour of high-flying church contention...

McLeod Campbell has here captured the "feeling" of the two groups, a feeling which characterized much of the period leading up to the Disruption. In regard to the teachings of these groups, he later (1871) on reflecting on his reasons for not joining either group, declares that they seemed to do injustice to what was good in the other... "and to see its evil through a magnifying party-feeling. Their watchwords, severally, were "Faith" and "Works", but the former watchword did not imply any real Antinomianism, neither did the latter imply any rejection of the Atonement".²

McLeod Campbell admitted, however, that he did feel more attracted to the side which made the demand for faith its prominent teaching ("the Evangelical" party), "...faith as opposed to works in that controversy, the opposite parties

1. Ibid. vol. I, p.43
2. Reminiscences. p.181
in which seemed to themselves, severally, to side with St. Paul or St. James; or at least the one party to read St. James by the light of St. Paul, - the other to read St. Paul by the light of St. James". ¹

University Education-Philosophy

John McLeod Campbell entered the University of Glasgow in November, 1811. He was eleven years old at this time and this new scene must have made a great impression on him. An interesting article reflecting on the "College Life at Glasgow", writes of²...

Boys of eleven or twelve years old; men with grey hair, up to the age of fifty or sixty; great stout fellows from the plough; men in considerable number from the North of Ireland; lads from counting houses in town, who wish to improve their minds by a session at the logic class; English dissenters, excluded from the University of England, who have come down to the enlightened country where a Turk or a Buddhist may graduate if they will...

He spent the next six years in the "Arts Classes" and then three more in the Divinity Hall. His studies in "Arts" at that time would include Latin, Greek and Mathematics, but would be heavily weighted on the side of Philosophy. He studied Logic, Moral Philosophy and Natural Philosophy. In 1815 he shared a prize in Logic "For the best specimens of Analysis and Synthesis, on various Subjects of Philosophy and of Taste, and for distinguished eminence and proficiency in the whole

1. Ibid. p.180
business of the Class". 1 In 1816 he shared another prize for class work and essays in Ethics. 2 His serious application to the study of Philosophy is not surprising for two reasons. Firstly, he had in Professor George Jardine, a teacher who earned the respect of a great number of his students. 3 Secondly, the curriculum at that time was in favour of Philosophy. The Scots students in Jardine's day received a double dose of Philosophy.

The idea was that, in the class of Logic and Metaphysics, the chief preoccupation should no longer be, as traditionally, Formal Logic, but that Theory of Knowledge, Perception, Universals, Causality, should receive most attention; and also that the class of Moral Philosophy should not be wholly taken up with ethics and allied subjects, but should approach the question of the foundations of ethics only after taking up the first half of the course with a discussion ... of the central questions of the Theory of Knowledge. 4

The combination of the fact that Philosophy was one of the first subjects studied in University, with this "double-dose" approach was that "...in the peculiar conditions of Scottish education, Philosophy was the first of the higher subjects in which students would receive a thorough grounding and become intellectually confident". 5 Because this is true, it is all

1. W. Innes Addison, Prize Lists of the University of Glasgow-1777-1833. (Glasgow: Carter and Pratt, 1902)
2. Ibid.
3. Memorials I, p. 3, refers to the fact that in later life, McLeod Campbell referred to Jardine as his "intellectual father". A short but rather critical summary of Jardine's life and work may be found in James McCosh, Scottish Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1875) pp. 316, 317
5. Ibid. p. 12
the more important to know in what type of philosophy it was, that John McLeod Campbell and his fellow students were receiving "a thorough grounding". Fortunately we can gain a very good idea of what Jardine taught from his Outlines of Philosophical Education, published one year after McLeod Campbell left the Arts Faculty. In this book, Jardine contrasts his teaching both in terms of method and content, with the classical method of teaching Aristotle. He refers to the great hold Aristotle had on religious thought, stating that, "From this unnatural alliance between the philosophy of Aristotle and the cause of Revealed Religion, the authority of the former, as might have been expected, became every day more extensive and irresistible; until, in process of time ... it was accounted nothing short of heresy to dispute any of his opinions". Jardine argued further that the method of disputation using Aristotelian logic had tended to extend the life of that philosophy.

...nothing, perhaps, contributed more to the continuance of the ancient Logic and Metaphysics, as a part of the Academical course in all our Universities, than the practice of disputation... which, whilst it formed an essential article among the things appointed to be taught in the schools, was universally regarded as the chief path to distinction and preferment among the more advanced students. Academical degrees could not be obtained without the candidates having previously published, and defended a thesis according to the Aristotelian Dialectics, in the presence of the whole University. Candidates for Fellowships or Professorships were required to contend for these appointments in syllogistic disputation. Bursaries or exhibitions were awarded on the same principle; and this mode

1. George Jardine, Outlines of Philosophical Education, Illustrated by the method of teaching the Logic, or First Class of Philosophy in the University of Glasgow (Glasgow: A. and J. Duncan, 1818)
2. Ibid. pp. 9, 10
of electing Professors, continued in the University of Glasgow, till near the beginning of the last century.  

His view of Aristotelian philosophy can be seen in his reference to the "Lofty pretensions, the general principles, and the undefined but magnificent conceptions of the old school..." He gives the chief credit for the destruction of the "Doctrines of the Schools" to Lord Bacon. "This distinguished writer far surpassed, in knowledge and sagacity, those Continental Philosophers who first lifted their head against the Ancient Logic; and, accordingly, he succeeded where they had failed, and not only levelled with the ground the Stately Edifice upon which they had commended the Assault, but, what was incomparably more difficult, he erected in its stead a Building at once more Noble and more Durable."

We may say then, that Jardine begins to trace his philosophical ancestry with Lord Bacon. He traces it through Locke, Hume and several philosophers related to the Scottish school of common-sense and concludes with Thomas Reid.

In truth, although Lord Bacon, as has been already observed, applied his Method of Induction chiefly to Natural Science, the Spirit of his Philosophy was soon, likewise, extended to the Study of Mind. Mr. Locke, in his Essay on the Human Understanding, trode exactly in the Path which Lord Bacon had pointed out; ... It is true, indeed, that neither Locke nor any one of the great Philosophers who have succeeded him in this Department, viz., Hutcheson, Hume, Smith and Reid, has left any System or Treatise on the Art of Reasoning, as peculiarly applicable to Mental Inquiries; but their Works contain some excellent Specimens of the Baconian Logic...

1. Ibid. p.14  2. Ibid. p.15  3. Ibid. p.143
The Volumes of Hume, for example, making allowance for a little artful Ingenuity, sometimes resorted to by him, in answering objections, present the most perfect Specimens of close Reasoning and Logical Deduction; but no one of the great Men now mentioned, has shown himself a more intelligent, or more faithful Scholar of Bacon, than the late venerable Dr. Reid.¹

Jardine identifies himself extremely closely with Reid, even to admitting that he is biased, having studied under him and been a close friend. His thought was so influenced by Reid, "...as to make it now extremely difficult to distinguish Thoughts and Sentiments suggested by that excellent Author from those which may have been derived from other Sources".² In associating his views with Reid, Jardine places himself fairly well in the centre of the school of Scottish common-sense philosophers. The best short summary of the interests and views of this school which the author of this thesis has found, is that by G.E.Davie, who has specialized in the study of Scottish Metaphysics. He points out that Reid and his followers all had much the same conception of the task of philosophy as had David Hume. They all tended to agree with him that the Traditional problems of philosophy were concerned with whether a given "natural belief" might be defended by an appeal to "experience" in some wide sense. The divisions in the Scottish school of common-sense philosophy arose from the different answers as to how this defence might be conducted.

On the extreme left we find the characteristic answer of Hume that the common-sense beliefs, for all that they can never be renounced, are sometimes nevertheless ultimately indefensible, being in fact contradicted by experience. Then somewhat to the right, the middling answer of Reid, Stewart, Hamilton and the

1. Ibid. p.157  2. Ibid. p.158
bulk of the school was that while beliefs of common-sense are not inconsistent with experience, and are not logically discredit-able, they are nevertheless defensible in empirical terms only up to a certain point, and contain in fact an irreducible element of mystery. According to Reid and his school, it is inherent in the nature of the belief in an external world or in the mathematical ideals to envisage facts not contained in the sum of the various elementary experiences involved in the genesis of these items of the common-sense, and this peculiar and fundamental fact of self-transcendence is held by Reid and most Scottish philosophers to be an ultimate irrational mystery. Finally, thinkers such as Brown and Ferrier regarded the mystery-mongering of Reid and Hamilton as a very ineffective reply to Hume's scepticism, and proceeded to exploit the possibilities of a full-scale rational justification of common-sense...

Davie admits that the distinctions drawn here between the "sceptical", "intuitionist" and "rational" tendencies are only true in an approximate way. It is fairly accurate, for example, in regard to the School's favourite problem of belief in an external world, but it does not hold to such an extent in regard to other questions. "For example where morals are concerned, Hume was not in the least sceptical and was often intuitionist; and Ferrier too, in discussing morals, was more intuitionist than rationalist".  

Now, it is not the concern of this study to enter into questions of detail in the history of Scottish Philosophy or to settle disputed interpretations of that history. However, it will be helpful in our understanding of McLeod Campbell's

1. G.E.Davie, The Democratic Intellect, p.275
2. Ibid.
thought to see the general concern and teachings of the philosophy on which he was weaned. One of the characteristic features of the philosophy which he was taught was that it dealt with many of the questions that David Hume had attempted to answer. Hume's answer to the problem of belief in an external world, was interpreted by Thomas Reid and his followers as leading to scepticism and atheism. It has been said of Reid that with few exceptions, no other philosopher greatly mattered to him but Hume, and all the others were interpreted in terms of Hume.1 Pringle-Pattison wrote a book comparing the common-sense philosophers to Emmanuel Kant and in the title referred to both as Answers to Hume.2 Indeed, in a letter written to Hume, Reid describes himself as "...your disciple in metaphysics. I have learned more from your writings in this kind, than from all others put together".3 It was indeed because they held so many views in common that Reid was brought to disagree with Hume. Reid considered Hume's principles to be those commonly received by philosophers; "...principles I never thought of calling in question until the conclusions you draw from them in the Treatise of Human Nature made me suspect them".4

Reid accused Hume of only being half sceptical in that he doubted the existence of minds and bodies but did not doubt

2. (Andrew Seth), Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Answers to Hume, (London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1885)
3. From a letter to David Hume, in Thomas Reid, Works, 6th ed. (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1863) vol. I, p.91
4. Ibid.
"...the existence of his own impressions and ideas". Reid declares that the belief in the existence of impressions and ideas is as little supported by reason as is the existence of minds and bodies. What Hume did not understand was that there were certain "first principles" upon which reason is based, which therefore reason could not properly attack. These principles are the principles of common-sense. This appeal to common sense is not as it has sometimes been thought, merely an appeal to the opinions of "the vulgar". It is, Reid would have said, "...an appeal from some of the learned to the rest of mankind on matters and only on matters in which superior understanding gives us no additional competence, and an appeal from the theory to the practice of the dissidents, from their extraordinary to their ordinary beliefs". For example, Reid would say that the belief in an external, material world is older and of more authority than any principles of philosophy. In fact, "It declines the tribunal of reason, and laughs at all the artillery of the logician. It retains its sovereign authority in spite of all the edicts of philosophy, and reason itself must stoop to its orders." If reason will not serve common sense, then it must become her slave. If it seems that there is a conflict between reason (philosophy) and common sense beliefs, this is only because

1. Ibid. vol. I, p.129
2. N.Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London:Macmillan, 1941)pp.3-4 esp. considers the common-sense philosophers to have thought of Hume as much more sceptical than he actually was. They caricatured him, he maintains.
3. Grave, op.cit., p.123
4. Reid, vol. 1, p.127
5. Ibid.
reason can be misused.\(^1\) In a later writing, Reid makes clear his understanding of their relationship by saying that "It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense".\(^2\) The relationship between common sense and reason can be thought of as two offices of Reason. "The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are".\(^3\) As Grave pointed out, these might be called reason's intuitive and deductive functions. The first function Reid calls common sense (because he says it is commonly found in mankind, and has been given the name common sense before). These two aspects of reason arise from different sources.

The first is purely the gift of Heaven. And where Heaven has not given it, no education can supply the want. The second is learned by practice and rules, when the first is not wanting. A man who has common sense may be taught to reason. But, if he has not that gift, no teaching will make him able either to judge of first principles or to reason for them.\(^4\)

These first principles, or common sense principles, apply not only to the question of the existence of the external world, but to all of life. Reid and his followers were also extremely interested in their role in morality, for here too, they felt that Hume's views led to scepticism. The explanation of what is meant by first principles here applies mutatis mutandis to the other concerns of life.

1. Grave, *op.cit.*, p.115
2. Reid, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p.425
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
express them in other words. I can illustrate them by examples and authorities, and perhaps can deduce one of them from another; but I am not able to deduce them from other principles, that are more evident.¹

He goes on to support his views by appealing to the wider experience of mankind, saying that he has found the best moral reasonings of both Christian and heathen authors to be founded on these principles. These principles may be likened to mathematical axioms in that while true in themselves, they become understood by use. When it is asked from whence they originate, it is answered that they are from our nature"...our Moral Judgement or Conscience, grows to maturity from an imperceptible seed, planted by our Creator".²

As far as the existence of God is concerned, it is plain and may clearly be seen from the nature of the creation. Reid uses the argument from design and even quotes part of one of Archbishop Tillotson's sermons as a lucid example of this argument's force.³ The man who can deny that the "effect" (the creation) has such a character as to infer a purposive and intelligent "cause" (the Creator), should in consistency, see no evidence for any intelligence at all in the world, except his own, according to Reid.⁴

In looking briefly at Reid's views, we have gained an idea of the interests of the common sense philosophers, and more especially of that philosopher most influential in George

1. Ibid. vol. II, p. 640
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. vol. I, p. 460
4. Ibid.
Jardine's classroom.

It is worthwhile, however, looking at the work of another philosopher of the same school, George Campbell of Aberdeen. He had been McLeod Campbell's father's professor, and when John was studying in Edinburgh in 1824, he referred to Campbell's "Lectures on Rhetoric" in terms of the highest praise. He evaluates his potential above that of Reid, Stewart or Brown. In his "Philosophy of Rhetoric", Campbell has a chapter on "...the different sources of Evidence, and the different Subjects to which they are respectively adopted".

Campbell divides all evidence into two kinds, intuitive or deductive. Intuitive evidence itself may be divided into three sorts. The first sort of intuitive evidence are the truths of "pure intellection" or metaphysical Truths. Campbell places all axioms of mathematics and geometry under this heading. He declares that they are all in some respect reducible to the axiom "Whatever is, is". They are not deduced from that axiom "...for they have in like manner that original and intrinsic evidence, which makes them, as soon as the terms are understood, to be perceived intuitively." The second sort of intuitive evidence are the Truths of consciousness or "physical" Truths. Campbell calls them truths

1. Reminiscences, p.7 the quotation is cited in the work, supra, p.3
2. George Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: Wm. Tegg, 1850) p.35, although McLeod Campbell referred to this book as "Lectures...", there is no doubt but that he meant this book.
3. Ibid, p.42
4. Ibid, p.36
5. Ibid, see also Grave, op.cit., pp.117,118 where he discusses in some detail Campbell's distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions.
6. Campbell, op.cit., p.42
of consciousness because they arise from consciousness. From consciousness we receive absolute assurance of our own existence and of that "...in regard to the reality of his sensations and passions, and of every thing whose essence consists in being perceived". Campbell explains that by the firm belief in sense, which he has called consciousness, he meant no more than to say that "...I am certain that I see, and feel, and think, what I actually see, and feel and think ... my conviction is reducible to this axiom, or coincident with it, "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time".

The third sort of intuitive evidence are the truths of common sense or "moral" Truths. This source of knowledge is common to all mankind and even a madman cannot lose it entirely. The truths of common sense are such as "Whatever hath a beginning hath a cause" or "there are material bodies independent of the mind's conception". The principle of causation ("Whatever hath a beginning hath a cause") is unique amongst these principles in that its denial is not only false but contradictory, although Campbell cannot explain why. Most of these truths, are however, unlike those of the intellect (mathematical axioms) and of the consciousness (of the senses) in that denial of them does not manifest a contradiction. The truths of common sense are, however, not provable in this manner. It is possible, for example, that the statement "that the course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it is today" could be false, if the course of nature changed the very next moment. It is possible "

1. Ibid.p.37  2. Ibid.p.41  3. Ibid.p.42  4. Ibid.p.40  5. Ibid.p.41
that I am the only being in the universe, and that there is no such thing as body".\textsuperscript{1} Campbell says such contradictions of common sense are physically possible but says that he agrees with the philosopher who said that thus \textquoteleft\textquoteleft...to maintain propositions, the reverse of the primary truths of common sense, doth not imply a contradiction; it only implies insanity'.\textsuperscript{2}

Because common sense belief differs from the other types of intuitive evidences in this regard, Campbell is willing to call them "instinctive" rather than "intuitive": "I have no objection to the term; nor do I think it derogative in the least from the dignity, the certainty, or the importance of the truths themselves. Such instincts are no other than the oracles of divine wisdom".\textsuperscript{3} All life and existence, all reasoning and science, depends on these first principles. If it is denied that there are first Truths then there can be no Truth at all. These three forms of intuitive truth are all natural, original and unaccountable. "All reasoning necessarily supposes that there are certain principles in which we must acquiesce, and beyond which we cannot go - principles clearly discernible by their own light, which can derive no additional evidence from anything besides. On the contrary supposition, the investigation of truth would be an endless and a fruitless task; we should be eternally proving, whilst nothing could ever be proved; because by the hypothesis, we could never ascend to premises which require no proof".\textsuperscript{4}

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. p.42 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.
Apart from the three sorts of intuitive evidence, Campbell spoke of a second kind of evidence, the deductive evidence. Deductive evidence is of two sorts, demonstrative or scientific evidence, and moral evidence. These two sorts differ in the following regards. Firstly, in that they are concerned with abstract truth "...or the unchangeable and necessary relations of ideas". Mathematical statements are of this sort. The other sort, moral evidence, is concerned with "...the real but often changeable and contingent connexions that subsist among things actually existing". "Caesar overcame Pompey" and "the sun will rise tomorrow" are given as examples of moral evidence.

A second difference between them is that moral evidence admits degrees of truth, while demonstration does not. A demonstrative truth is either true or false. Actual truth, or matters of fact, which moral evidence is concerned with, may exist in various degrees. In moral reasoning, we ascend from possibility to probability to moral certainty.

The third difference is that in demonstration there can be no contrary proofs, while in moral evidence there are almost always contrary evidences. "There are contrary experiences, contrary presumptions, contrary testimonies, to balance against one another". The greater weight of evidence on one side of a question proves that side to be more probable than the other.

The fourth difference exists in that a demonstrative proof consists of one connected argument, while a moral argument may be made up of many, complicated and differing evidences. Each

1. Ibid. p.43  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. p.45
evidence in a moral argument adds its weight to the whole, while a single demonstrative argument, if sound, is enough. Demonstrative argument is absolute in its authority, but narrow. Moral argument is concerned with matters of fact and ranges through the whole of human life. Because of this wide importance of moral argument, Campbell goes on to consider certain types of moral argument. He deals with the evidence of experience, analogy, testimony and the calculation of chances. The latter type of argument he mentions briefly as a "mixed" type of argument which is partly based on demonstrative mathematical arguments and partly on experience. He does not deal very fully with analogy either, because he considers it to be reasoning from indirect experience. As it is merely a remote manner of arguing from experience, Campbell obviously considers it a feeble form of argument and says that it "...is hardly ever honoured with the name of proof". He mentions its use as a defensive argument and points to Butler's Analogy as a fine example of this.

Campbell emphasizes the role of experience in moral argument. By experience he means the inductive method of observation. For that reason, experience cannot deal with unique occurrences but must be built on a great number of instances. The faculties on which experience depends are sense and memory. Knowledge gained through the senses must be stored by the memory in order that generalizations may be made. The evidence of experience, Campbell calls "...the criterion of all

1. Ibid. p.53
moral reasoning whatever".  It is for instance, the evidence of experience which avails in natural theology. He declares that, "Spirit, which here comprises only the Supreme Being and the human soul, is surely as much included under the notion of natural object as body is, and is knowable to the philosopher purely in the same way, by observation and experience". This same wide definition of what is open to observation and experience is seen in Reid who is noted for providing a "faculty" or mode of knowing corresponding to almost every aspect of human life.

The other form of moral evidence which Campbell discusses at some length is what he calls testimony. He declares that although testimony has been held by some to be based solely on experience, he cannot agree, except, in so far as veracity of the witness is known by experience. Experience is concerned with general truths. Testimony, on the other hand, is concerned with particular occurrences. When experience is applied to the discovery of truth in a particular instance, its evidence is called presumptive. But when we have ample testimony, we may be considered to have positive proof. "Testimony is capable of giving us absolute certainty ... even of the most miraculous fact, or of what is contrary to uniform experience". Testimony is the basis of the evidence we have in revealed religion "... as far as it is to be considered as a subject of historical and

1. Ibid. p. 52
2. Ibid. p. 53
4. Campbell, op. cit. p. 54
5. Ibid. p. 55
critical inquiry, and so discoverable by natural means".¹

It is very clear that George Campbell's types of "evidences" are dependent on the thought of David Hume. Although Campbell's division between intuitive and deductive evidences leads him to place evidences of the sort of mathematical axioms under both categories, his division of deductive evidences into demonstrative and moral evidences would seem to serve his purpose, except for those intuitive first principles which he asserts are required to know anything at all. Apart from these first principles, he appears to be concerned with the truth that is arrived at by consideration of the "relations of ideas" and the truth arrived at by observing "matters of fact".² This twofold distinction obviously is based on Hume's famous statement that, "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact".³ Campbell follows Hume in stating that propositions referring to "relations of ideas" are capable of absolute certainty because they are either true or false and cannot be true if their contrary can be demonstrated. He also follows Hume in declaring that there are various degrees of certainty in regard to propositions concerning "matters of fact", because the contrary of an existent in the universe is "possible".

1. Ibid. p.56
2. George Campbell uses both these terms—"relation of ideas" and "matters of fact", see above, p.22
Hume and Campbell part company at this point, however, for here Hume declares that all reasoning concerning "matters of fact" is founded on the relation of "cause and effect" and then goes on to give "cause and effect" a status which the common sense philosophers considered uncertain and could not accept. George Campbell, for instance, referred to cause and effect as one man's intuitive ideas and even went so far as to give it the certainty of those truths whose denial is "not only false but contradictory" although he could not explain why.

Campbell again could be said to follow Hume in the large role he assigns to "experience" in knowledge yet once again he differs at a vital point, in including "Spirit" as a reality which may be observed and experienced as much as "body" may. In this way, Campbell allows "natural theology" within the scope of his empiricism. But what about "revealed" religion? The Christian revelation is a unique occurrence and in his definition of "experience", Campbell admitted that knowledge was gained through a great number of occurrences. Once again Campbell's answer is confident. The "Testimony" of others may be accepted as evidence. The veracity of the witness is an important factor in determining whether or not we will accept this testimony, but once their veracity is known, we may have ample proof, yes, even "absolute certainty". The unique "facts" of the Christian revelation may therefore also be known with "absolute certainty" on the basis of testimony.

1. above, p.24
2. above, p.24
It can easily be seen that the common sense philosophy held a very optimistic view of man's power to "know" and thereby offered to those who held it either the opportunity for constructive theological thought, or for a conservative smugness about views already held. Insofar as it emphasized observation and was concerned with "matters of fact" it could be considered a liberating and even fruitful partner in theological work of the sort in which McLeod Campbell was engaged. On the other hand, insofar as it acted as merely a negative reaction to Hume's disturbing so-called "scepticism", it offered the danger of leaving "first principles" unexamined. As we shall see, McLeod Campbell took the former path and spent the whole of his theological life deeply concerned with the observation of "matters of fact" and the "first principles" that underlay theological thought. We shall also later see how he was even quite directly influenced by the modes of thought of his early philosophical training.

University Education-Theology

In 1817 McLeod Campbell entered the Glasgow Divinity Hall. In a letter written to his father in December, 1817, he gives the following account of his studies:

I never had so much to do. I rise at six and sit up till twelve. The following is the distribution of my time:—From six to eight in the morning, French at home; from eight to half-past nine I walk (but this hour will soon be occupied with the Natural Philosophy, where I must make up what I lost last year1); to ten breakfast;

1. This is a reference to a fever which prevented him from attending College during part of the Season, 1816-1817.
ten to eleven, Hebrew; eleven to twelve, read some English author at home; twelve to one, Divinity Hall; one to two, Private Latin; two to three, French Class; three to four, dinner; four to five, Natural History Class; from five to six, read a chapter in the Greek Testament (and if I fall behind during the week make it up on Sunday); six to eight, Hebrew; eight to nine, Political Economy; nine to twelve, supper and reading for the Divinity Hall. Thus I am completely engaged, even though I have my preparation for the French done with candlelight in the morning. If I am ever to get into habits of study, this winter - and I hope I may continue them.¹

It should be noted that with the exception of Hebrew and Divinity, these subjects lay outside the prescribed course of study. While still a student of divinity at Glasgow, and later at Edinburgh, he also studied Political Economy, Natural History and Chemistry.² He did well in Divinity, although considering his later achievements, not perhaps as well as might be expected. This might easily be explained by his wide interests and extra-curricular studies. He did, however, win a prize for an essay in Divinity in 1819, and another for an essay on Hebrew poetry in 1820.³

McLeod Campbell's professor of Divinity while at Glasgow University was Stevenson MacGill. MacGill held that chair from 1814 until 1840 and it is likely that as a young man, he would be considered a "moderate".⁴ By the time of his election to the chair of Divinity, however, he apparently was able to gain

1. Reminiscences, p.3
2/ Ibid. p.5
3. Addison, Prize Lists of the University of Glasgow.
the support of the "Evangelical" party for this post. It seems likely that he did not engage in the party divisions of his time, as that would accord with his advice to young clergymen. This advise took the form of "...the only successful book of his career", "Considerations addressed to a Young Clergyman" (1809). This book was enlarged and published in 1820 as "Letters to a Young Clergyman". The tone of this book appears to this author to be rather more moralistic than evangelical but that may be due to the subjects discussed. They are the dangers which face the young clergyman in terms of Pride, Vanity, Worldliness, Uncharitableness, Party Spirit, Levity of Company, Indolence, Indiscretion and Spiritual Indifference. It is interesting, however, that his "Evangelical" biographer, Robert Burns, refers to his sermons as "...distinguished more or less by evangelical views and accurate observation of life and manners". The "more or less" which qualified his reference to MacGill's evangelical tendency, he makes more explicit elsewhere by referring to a lack of warmth or "unction, as the French call it...". He feels that these sermons suffer from the lack of a "...more pointed appeal to the consciences and the hearts of dying men".

If his biographer felt that MacGill's sermons were cold, he did nonetheless describe his theological lectures as abounding

1. H.M.B. Reid, The Divinity Professors in the University of Glasgow, 1640-1903. (Glasgow: MacLehose, Jackson and Co., 1923) p. 296.
2. Ibid. p. 289.
3. Stevenson MacGill, Letters to a Young Clergyman.
5. Ibid.
"...in sound information, and enlarged views of evangelical truth..."¹ MacGill's own outline of his courses follows his division of students into two classes, a junior class comprising those in first year, and a senior class of those in the second, third and more informal fourth year. The junior class received lectures,

...first, on the principles of evidence, with a special view to the proofs for natural and revealed religion: second, on the necessity of revelation: third, on the nature of the different kinds of proofs which might be afforded for a divine revelation to those who were immediately addressed - and to those who lived at a distance, or in a different age. Under this head are considered various questions respecting internal evidence, and the evidence of miracles. Fourth, the evidences for the Mosaic and the Christian dispensations are stated and illustrated at a considerable length; and the objections to their divine authority are considered and removed. Fifthly, the books which claim to be received into the canon of Scripture are stated, and the authority on which their claims are rested, examined and estimated. Lastly, the nature and the proof of the inspiration of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are pointed out and illustrated. The Lectures of this class are concluded by some advices respecting the manner in which the Scriptures should be studied.²

The senior class lectures were spread over three Sessions:

The lectures of this course commence with stating and illustrating the several duties of a student of theology, his dangers and temptations, and those dispositions with which he should enter on the study of divine Truth. They next point out the

1. Ibid. p. 102  
2. Ibid. pp. 70, 71
difficulties which must be expected, and the causes from which these proceed, -
direct the attention to the style of the
scriptures, - to the MSS, of the Old and
New Testaments, - to the ancient and
modern versions, their history, character,
and authors, and to such ancient and
modern writings as may aid in the critical
study of the sacred books. The lectures
are then directed to the statement and
illustration of the DOCTRINES AND DUTIES
of Christianity, arranged both according
to the nature of the subjects, and to
certain great successive eras in the
divine dispensations. With these are
joined the statement and consideration
of the principal opinions and controversies
to which they have given rise. 1

However true Burn's observation that, "The error of over-
expansion in their theological course, seems to be inseparable
from Scots professors of divinity...." 2 may be in general, it
was certainly true of MacGill. In his later years, MacGill is
said to have lamented "...the error into which he had fallen
in the first, putting together of his lectures; that, ... in a
word, of putting into the system almost everything that could
be made to bear upon it..." 3 His general plan was to begin with
a session on "evidences" and follow this by "a system" of
divinity. This was a common practice of both the 18th and early
19th century. The same plan was used by the earlier "Moderate"
theologian, George Hill and by his son, Alexander Hill, who
followed MacGill at Glasgow from 1840 to 1867. 4 Thomas Chalmers,

1. Ibid. p.72, more detailed outline of his courses is found in
Appendix A
2. Ibid. p.101
3. Ibid.
4. George Hill, Theological Institutes, (Edinburgh: Bell and
Bradfute, 1803) and Lectures in Divinity, (Edinburgh: Waugh and
Innes, 1821) 3 vol.
as an "Evangelical" theologian, was consciously guided by the
work of George Hill and said of it, "...I am not sure if I can
recommend a more complete manual ... While engaged in the
preparations to which I am now called, I have repeatedly
consulted him..."1

The system of "evidences" which was the introduction and
basis of John McLeod Campbell's theological training was based
on presuppositions which would not be new to a person brought
up on the teaching of Tillotson and common sense philosophy.2
Both held that natural religion could not be denied by any
"reasonable man" and that if the revealed religion of the
Scriptures were examined fairly, it too would be accepted. The
"reasonable man" was the major premise; sufficient rational

1. Thomas Chalmers, Preflections on Butler's Analogy, Paley's
Evidence of Christianity, and Hill's Lectures in Divinity
(Edinburgh: Sutherland and Know, 1849) p. XVIII. Chalmers was
a student of Hill's at St. Andrews.
2. There is evidence that Tillotson and Samuel Clarke, whom
Campbell's father had studied, were still extremely popular
with students of John's day. In 1813 Robert Muir had
published The Preacher's Assistant (Glasgow: A. Napier, 1813).
The subtitle was "...being an index to the texts of the
most approved Sermons and Lectures, Ancient and Modern". This
book, dedicated "To the Students of Theology in the University
of Glasgow, the Following work, undertaken at their suggestion
and executed under their Patronage...", was based on the Library
of the Glasgow Divinity Hall. This book has one hundred pages
with lists of texts from Genesis to Revelation down the left
hand side of the page, and suggested "Sermons and Lectures"
down the right hand side of the page, contains some three
thousand, five hundred entries. A random sampling of the
suggested authors revealed that by far the most common entries
were the names of Tillotson and Samuel Clarke! There are a
number of sermons by Knox suggested, but there is no reference
to any work of John Calvin. The skeptic might have cause to
note a Calvinism without Calvin!
"evidence" to persuade a "reasonable man" of the truth of Christianity was the minor premise; and the conclusion was to be a Christian. Perhaps the best example of the type of argument presented to the "reasonable man" are from an amazing Summary of Principal Evidences by Beilby Porteus, a Bishop of London. This book was recommended as a manual of religion by Stevenson MacGill, and H.D. McDonald has recently referred to its presenting all the arguments of the general literature on the subjects and the Bampton lectures in a "sort of grand finale". Porteus summarizes his argument by saying:

"...when we consider the deplorable ignorance and inconceivable depravity of the heathen world before the birth of Christ, which rendered a divine interposition essentially necessary, and therefore highly probable; the appearance of Christ upon earth at the very time when his presence was most wanted, and when there was a general expectation throughout the East, that some great and extraordinary personage was soon to come into the world; the transcendent excellence of our Lord's character, so infinitely beyond that of every other moral teacher; the calmness, the composure, the dignity, the integrity, the spotless sanctity of his manners, so utterly inconsistent with every idea of enthusiasm or imposture; the sublimity and importance of his doctrines; the consummate wisdom and perfect purity of his moral precepts, far exceeding the natural powers of a man born in the humblest situation, and in a remote and obscure corner of the world, without learning, education, languages, or books; the rapid and astonishing propagation of his religion, in a very short space of time, through almost every region of

1. The testimony of Stevenson MacGill to the Universities Commission, January 5, 1827, Evidences, Universities of Scotland, vol. II, University of Glasgow (London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1837) p. 66
2. H.D. McDonald, Ideas of Revelation -1700-1860, p. 147
the East, by the sole efforts of himself and a few illiterate fishermen, in direct opposition to all the power, the authority, the learning, the philosophy, the reigning vices, prejudices, and superstitions of the world; the complete and marked opposition, in every essential point, between the character and religion of Mahomet, exactly such as might be expected between truth and falsehood; the minute description of all the most material circumstances of his birth, life, sufferings, death, and resurrection, given by the ancient prophets many hundred years before he was born, and exactly fulfilled in him, and him only, pointing him out as the Messiah of the Jews and the Redeemer of mankind; the various prophecies delivered by Christ himself, which were all punctually accomplished, more especially the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans; the many astonishing miracles wrought by Jesus, in the open face of day, before thousands of spectators, the reality of which is proved by multitudes of the most unexceptionable witnesses, who sealed their testimony with their blood, and most inveterate enemies of the Gospel; and lastly, that most astonishing and well-authenticated miracle of our Lord's Resurrection, which was the seal and confirmation of his own Divine Origin and that of his Religion: when all these various evidences are brought together, and impartially weighed, it seems hardly within the power of a fair and ingenuous mind to resist the impression of their united force. If such a combination of evidence as this is not sufficient to satisfy an honest inquirer into truth, it is utterly impossible that any event, which passed in former times, and which we did not see with our own eyes, can ever be proved to have happened, by any degree of testimony whatever. It may safely be affirmed, that no instance can be produced of any one fact or event, said to have taken place in past ages, and established by such evidence as that on which the Christian Revelation rests, that afterwards turned out to be false. We challenge the enemies of our faith to bring forward, if they can, any such instance. If they cannot (and we know it to be impossible), we have a right
to say, that a religion, supported by such an extra-ordinary accumulation of evidence, must be true; and that all men who pretend to be guided by argument and by proof, are bound, by the most sacred obligations, to receive the Religion of CHRIST as a real Revelation from God.¹

The system of "evidences" which McLeod Campbell was taught was not unlike that represented by the above quotation from Porteus. Indeed, the many volumes of "evidences" studied at that time all contained much the same material and the same arguments often quoted directly from the same authors. James Walker later spoke of the fact that Scottish theology was not as fruitful of works of "evidences" as was the English theology. "In volumes of sermons which have gone into oblivion, and in pamphlets perhaps yet to be found in the great libraries, you will find, no doubt, a considerable amount of apologetics of a sort - proofs of the resurrection, discussions of the reasonableness of a divine revelation, answers to particular deistic objections; but we have nothing like those English works on evidences which, if they are now in some measure superseded, were so effective in their day".² It is undoubtedly true as he later shows, that some Evangelicals did not have a high regard for "evidences" but it would be difficult to make this case against the ascendant Moderates of the Eighteenth century. The Moderate, George Hill, produced one volume on evidences followed by two on Divinity. The "Evangelical" Chalmers, produced

two volumes on evidences, and two posthumously were published on Divinity which included a large section on evidences. Stevenson MacGill, an Evangelical, spent the whole of the first year of his Divinity lectures, plus part of the second, on evidences. It is obvious also that the common sense philosophers were engaged in a large measure in guarding the philosophical presuppositions on which arguments based on testimony, miracles and "common sense", could be used in support of revealed religion. It might be true to say that English theologians were more original, or more influential than Scottish theologians in producing "evidences" to support revealed religion, but however true this is, the theological education of Scottish students in McLeod Campbell's time was introduced on the bases of "evidences", produced both by English and Scots.

The "system of divinity" which followed upon the "system of evidences" in MacGill's lectures is interesting from the point of view of the arrangement of the doctrines taught. It can be seen from a study of their arrangement (see Appendix A) that they follow with very few and minor exceptions, the arrangement of the Westminster Confession. That is, the subjects are Holy Scripture, (Chapter I of the Confession), God (Chapter II), the Decrees of God, (Chapter III), Creation, (Chapter IV), Providence, (Chapter V), The Fall of Man, Sin and Punishment, (Chapter VI), God's Covenant with Man, (Chapter VII), Christ, the Mediator, (Chapter VIII) and so on. There are some asides in regard to historic controversies and pastoral advice but otherwise the
arrangement is the same, but in slightly different terms. MacGill first dealt with the canon and inspiration of Scripture (Chapter I of the Confession), "...the Attributes of God...", (Chapter II), "...the designs, plans, and decrees of God..." (Chapter III), "...the works of God, the creation..." (Chapter IV), "...the doctrine of Providence..." (Chapter V), "...the first state of man...the fall of man from innocence, the nature of the punishment threatened..." (Chapter VI), "...the plan of mercy and recovery..." (Chapter VII), "...the nature and dignity of the Saviour..." (Chapter VIII), and so on. He seems to have varied from the arrangement of the Confession in teaching about the Holy Spirit after treating the doctrine of the Son (the Westminster Confession while teaching about the Holy Spirit has no section on that doctrine). Directly after treating the doctrine of the Holy Spirit he went on to the doctrine of the Trinity (which the Westminster Confession had dealt with in its second chapter). He then resumed the discussion of the threefold work of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King.

In every regard then, it seems likely that McLeod Campbell received an extremely orthodox training in Westminster theology. The major point to be made concerning the arrangement of these lectures and the Westminster theology they reflect, is the place occupied in them by the Divine Decrees. McLeod Campbell's later conflict could largely be said to be with this doctrine and its controlling place in the Calvinist theology of his time. Karl Barth has pointed out that the placing of the doctrine of
predestination closely after the doctrine of God, and preceding directly the doctrines of creation and the remaining contents of Confessions and dogmatics, was to some extent the classical form of Reformed orthodoxy in the seventeenth century.

We find this arrangement in the Irish Articles of Religion (1615) and the Westminster Confession (1647). Amongst dogmaticians we find it in Polanus, Wolleb, Wendelin, H. Alting, A. Heidanus, F. Burmann, F. Turrettini, P. van Mastricht, S. van Til and others... The arrangement was not that of Zwingli, or Bullinger, or even Calvin himself. Nor was it the arrangement followed by most of the Reformed confessions. And not quite all the Reformed dogmaticians of the 17th century adopted it.1

It should be noted that both the "Moderate" theologian, George Hill,2 and following him, Thomas Chalmers,3 made reference to the fact that they had departed from the "order of the Confession of faith...", both of them in fact discussing the Divine Decrees in a section dealing with "...The Remedy brought by the Gospel..."4 or "...the Extent of the Gospel Remedy..."5 It is significant that when McLeod Campbell's Row preaching was being so strongly attacked, it was mainly by "Evangelicals", (MacGill's party). The "Moderates" whose theology might be typified by the teaching of George Hill were

2. G. Hill, Theological Institutes, p.vi
3. T. Chalmers, Preflections on Butler's Analogy, Paley's Evidences... and Hill's Lectures in Divinity, p.XVIII
4. Op cit. p.68
5. Chalmers, Institutes. vol.II, p.345ff
not so upset. McLeod Campbell wrote that "Dr. Chalmers has, indeed, said that, 'The Moderation was not half so excited against me as the Evangelicals'." Thomas Chalmers, himself a highly individual "Evangelical", was one of the few men who did not support his deposition from the ministry in 1831.2

John McLeod Campbell completed his course at Glasgow in May, 1820 and at the same time passed his "trials" before the Presbytery of Lorn. In July, 1821, he was licensed to preach by Presbytery and soon after preached his first sermon, in Gaelic, at Kilninver.3

It was not until September of 1825 that he was ordained minister at Row. In the years between his graduation and his ordination, he preached frequently for his father and neighbouring ministers. He considered going to Oxford for further study but decided against it when he found that he would have to subscribe to the religion of the established church in England. He spent some time in Edinburgh, where amongst other things, he attended some lectures on universal history given by William Hamilton; read Campbell's "Philosophy of Rhetoric", some works of the common sense philosophers, Reid, Stewart and Brown, and studied thoroughly, Butler's Analogy.4

This latter book is worth discussing for two reasons. The first is that Butler's Analogy was undoubtedly one of the most

1. Memoriais, vol. I p. 78
2. McLeod Campbell, Nature of the Atonement, see E.P. Dickie's Introduction, p. XIII. Incidentally, it should be noted that he did nothing to prevent it either.
3. Reminiscences, p. 5
4. See Below, chapter 5
influential theological works ever written in Britain. McLeod Campbell admired it and in his later years would compare more recent apologetic works to it, not often to their advantage. The second reason why it is worth mentioning is that while he certainly never openly rejected Butler's method, McLeod Campbell in practice, thought along different lines. He thought of the Christian faith in terms of "Internal Evidences" rather than in terms of the analogy between natural and revealed religion. As we shall see, he followed more closely his friend, Thomas Erskine's thought, than Butler's in this regard. With this in mind, we may now turn to the *Analogy*. Since it is best appreciated in its historical context, it should be remembered that its English author, Bishop Joseph Butler, (1692-1752) was generally considered to be the most eminent of the opponents of the Deists. The Deists, we should recall, were eighteenth century rationalists who believed in "God" but not in any unique revelation or supernatural scheme of salvation. For them, reason alone was to be the judge of belief and though they felt compelled by reason to accept the arguments of natural religion, they refused to accept the desirability or need for revealed religion, that is to say, for religion as revealed in Scripture and taught by the Church. Butler's book was entitled, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*.1 Butler took the same philosophical ground as his Deist opponents in that both stood in the empiricist tradition.

The first part of the *Analogy* argues for natural religion, and it would therefore presumably be accepted both by Butler and his opponents. The arguments which Butler uses are based on analogy and are, as he admits, only probable in their conclusions. But to human beings "...probability is the very guide of life". This same probability is used daily in our interpretation of nature and when we move by analogy to religious doctrine it should be considered acceptable. An example of his combination of empirical observation and its application by analogy to religious doctrine is seen in his argument for immortality. When we look at nature we see that birds and insects pass through various stages of life. We see "...birds and insects bursting the shell, their habitation, and by this means entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are instances of a general law of nature." But adult human beings have passed through several stages already (in the womb and in infancy) which are very different from their adulthood, and, "Therefore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy of nature: according to a natural order...of the very same kind with what we have already experienced."

This type of argument is used to establish natural religion.

2. *Ibid.* p.16  
This religion consists principally in the belief in a future life in which men will be held responsible for their life on earth. Men now stand under moral obligations which they should know by the exercise of their reason and in the future state they will be rewarded or punished according to whether or not men have done their duty. Butler assumes that God's existence is not denied and having shown the moral nature of man's life on earth and his responsibility for it to God in the life to come, he turns to revealed religion. Why is it Necessary? It has two main functions. Firstly, it is a republication and reinforcement of "...natural or essential religion". Secondly, it adds some distinct precepts. "For, though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it". These two principles are of interest to us because they sum up pretty well the generally held view of the relation of reason and revelation which McLeod Campbell was taught. There is no question about the necessity and usefulness of the knowledge gained from the observation of nature. Reason clearly leads us to the knowledge of God. At the same time man through his reason and conscience should clearly recognize his duties toward God. Reason and conscience and nature are all from God and all testify to him. It would generally be agreed that without revelation man should still know God, the Father, and his obligations to Him. In Scripture is revealed man's

1. Ibid. p.180
2. Ibid. p.188
relation to the Son and the Spirit and man's obligations due to this relation.¹ What if these duties conflict? What if the knowledge gained by revelation differs from that gained by reason's observation of nature? Perhaps the answer to those questions could be given on behalf of Tillotson, the common sense philosophers, and the vast majority of Scottish divines at the time McLeod Campbell was educated, by the simple statement that such a difference was impossible. In Butler's words, "...If in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real one".² This did not, in their view, mean that all that man could know about God was known in natural religion. Reason had its limits and revelation could add new knowledge. But if it was knowledge which could not contradict reason, was not reason the judge and authority of what God could reveal? And if the knowledge gained by revelation was merely to be added to what men already knew in such a way as not to contradict men's previous knowledge, did this not necessarily mean that revelation must take the form, and fit the patterns of existing thought? The point where this general pattern of religious thought might be related in a most damaging way to the doctrine of grace was in the understanding of the relationship of God in his three persons, to man. The

¹. Ibid. p.189  
². Ibid. p.200
general religious thought of the time accepted it as a presupposition that reason could know God the Father. God the Son was, however, known at a later stage, that of the added and reinforcing level of "revelation". This general presupposition meant that reason's knowledge of God the Father was the basis, the uncontradictable basis of knowledge, to which the revealed knowledge brought by Christ must be added and, if need be, accommodated. The Westminster doctrine of Divine Decrees, was quite conformable to this view, for it too saw man as originally and basically related to God the Father in Creation and Providence, and only subsequently under the "special decree" of election and reprobation, related to the Son and the Spirit. It is McLeod Campbell's questioning of such presuppositions of the religious thought of his time to which we turn in the next two chapters; but first let us briefly evaluate the significance of his early life and education in preparing him for the conflict.

Observations

It would seem, as we look back over John McLeod Campbell's early life and preparation for the ministry, that there were few reasons to expect that his thought should differ from his contemporaries. After all, the education he received was that received by scores of other young clergymen. There is no question but that his thought cannot be explained merely by these early influences on him. It might be argued that he had a peculiarly close relationship to his father and that this later influenced him to stress the Fatherhood of God. There
have been many such close relationships in history and they
have tended just as often as not, to produce a close conformity
of thought. The fact that his "early school was Tillotson", as
was his father's, might be argued in support of this view.
However, there is evidence that his mind was not at rest in
his father's "moderation" and even before 1821 some of his
friends were afraid that he was becoming "too High", that is,
an "Evangelical".1

McLeod Campbell was obviously very interested in philosophy
during his university training. He later referred to George
Jardine (his philosophy professor) as his "intellectual
father" and he continued to study the common sense philosophers
on his own in Edinburgh after leaving university. Here again
there is nothing particularly unusual in that his contemporaries
were also receiving a training in the same philosophy. Indeed,
the same philosophical thought had spread to France and America.
It should be emphasized, however, that McLeod Campbell took
his philosophical studies seriously and it is recorded that he
approached them with a certain amount of independence.2 This
independent thinking was indeed emphasized in Jardine's class-
room, as it was his hope to enable his students to deal with
"first principles". The students learned how to apply these

2. Ibid. vol. I, p.3 refers to his having disagreed with his
philosophy professor in a class paper. He argued his case
so well that although the professor did not agree, he
highly commended him.
first principles in all areas of life through the themes set in Jardine's Logic class. When these themes are examined, it is found that they "...are often concerned less with pure philosophy than with the problem of applying first or philosophical principles to literary, historical, linguistic and economic subjects".1 Combining the dominating position of philosophical studies in the university curriculum, with this far reaching application, we can see how it might have provided McLeod Campbell with the mental attitude and equipment needed for his theological thought. Our study of his theological thought, will make it apparent that he is not attempting to make superficial amendments, but feels himself to be dealing with "first principles" of basic importance.

When the common sense philosophy is looked at from the point of view of content, it is remarkably respectable even today. It stood generally in the empiricist tradition which has prospered with the growth of influence of modern science. Its potential influence on McLeod Campbell might be seen not only in what it said but in what it did not say. Standing in the empiricist tradition, it stressed inductive observation as against speculation. It therefore stood for an "openness", for a spirit of investigation governed by objective "matters of fact" and not by speculation. Its area of concern was largely related to problems raised by David Hume, although it may

1. G.E.Davie, The Democratic Intellect, p.17
have misinterpreted him in considering his view to be the reductio ad absurdum of scepticism, it had, at any rate, both a healthy respect for reason, and a healthy recognition that reason had its limits. It was in fact, truly scientific in that it insisted that although our senses may be deceived as Hume pointed out, so may our reason be deceived, and "...that errors we fall into with regard to objects of sense are not corrected by reason, but by more accurate attention to the informations we may receive by our senses themselves".¹ The translation of this method of observation, in its proper manner, to the region of religion, with its proper object, might help us understand McLeod Campbell's theological thought. It would be difficult to determine what influence he might have felt from the courses in science which he took as "extras". Certainly his correspondence shows a continuous interest in science and the relationship between science and philosophy.²

The Divinity course which he received from Stevenson MacGill was not unusual in any way, unless, if there are degrees to conformity, it was "extremely" conformist. It likely would have neither offended nor particularly delighted either Moderates or Evangelicals. As much as we know of McLeod Campbell's theological reading, it was orthodox for its time. He would undoubtedly have met English dissenters at Glasgow University but there is no indication he was influenced by them. Although

². e.g. Memorials, vol.II, pp.168-172
he was never a narrow denominationalist, there is every indication that he loved the Church of Scotland, and, as we have seen, declined studying at Oxford University when he learned that he must sign a religious pledge which would make it impossible to minister in the Church of Scotland. He felt personally, that there was nothing unusual in his theological creed, when in 1825 he was placed in the Parish of Row. In the following chapter we turn to examine his Row pastorate.

1. Reminiscences, p.10, this, from a letter written in 1831.
CHAPTER II - McLeod Campbell's Row Teaching

"It is now my painful duty - painful, indeed, beyond expression - to pronounce the solemn and deliberate judgement of the General Assembly. In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the sole King and Head of his Church, and by virtue of the power committed by Him to it, I do now solemnly depose Mr. John McLeod Campbell, minister of the parish of Row, from the office of the holy ministry".1

So spoke the Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland at a quarter past six, on the morning of July 25th, 1831. We shall be concerned with the charges against McLeod Campbell, on which presumably he was tried, found guilty and deposed, in Chapter IV. They might be expressed here briefly under two heads, firstly, that "assurance is of the essence of faith", and secondly, that Christ’s atonement was universal, or more simply, that "Christ died for all men". Before we study the charges against McLeod Campbell in detail, however, it will be of great interest and benefit to us to attempt to understand the nature of his teaching in Row Parish2 from 1825 to 1831, the period for which he was condemned and deposed from the ministry.

In order to understand this thought, we shall be required to

Since the proceedings against McLeod Campbell are numbered separately for the proceedings in each Church Court, the proceedings will henceforth be referred to as Proceedings I, Proceedings II, and Proceedings III, corresponding to the proceedings first in Presbytery, then Synod and finally in General Assembly.

2. pronounced "Roo"
examine it in the context of his pastorate. It might well be said that his great pastoral concern was one of the major factors in the development of his thought. We must keep in mind the tremendous earnestness with which he undertook his pastoral duties in Row Parish. Writing very near the end of his life, he referred to an incident which occurred at the close of the first day of his pastoral visiting. "I have never lost the feeling of the impression made on me ... when the aged inmates of the last house to which I had been, came with me to the brow of the height on which their cottage stood; and the one solemnly said, 'Give us plain doctrine, for we are a sleeping people;' and the other solemnly quoted the words, 'Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life'."

The Development of His Thought

As to the doctrines which McLeod Campbell taught in 1825, when he began his ministry in Row Parish, he felt they were nothing out of the ordinary. In regard to Church politics, however, he felt that he was distinguished from his young contemporaries "...by a deep conviction of the practical evils which had arisen from party feelings, and by a determined purpose to hold personally a perfect neutrality". His sole desire was to be a faithful pastor to those to whom he was sent. He was soon aware that there was an "absence of living religion..."

1. Reminscences, pp.89, 90
2. Ibid. p.10
among his people, yet he held no particular theory or view as to why this should be.¹

His own understanding of personal religion was a mixture of those views which he had later come to feel certain were "vital godliness", mingled with "...erroneous views of the relative places of seriousness and true holiness".² It would not be true to say that McLeod Campbell had no doctrinal convictions when he came to his Row pastorate, but he describes the fact of an Atonement and the necessity of Regeneration as "...the only points which had any distinct prominence as realities in my mind".³ As far as McLeod Campbell could recall, at this time he had not really weighed the question of whether "...Christ had died for all, or only for the elect, or any of the other questions on this subject which have since so engrossed my attention".⁴ This lack of conviction extended to the doctrine of Election, where McLeod Campbell said "...I was content to hold it simply as a matter of fact, and to excuse myself for not considering it much, by regarding it as a mystery; and I believe that in point of fact I was practically and in real feeling unfettered by it, in declaring to my fellow sinners so much of God's love as I then knew myself".⁵

McLeod Campbell considered that two decisions he made as to how he was to carry out his pastoral duties had an important influence on subsequent events. The first decision was that

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.11
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
he would use no assistance in preparing his sermons but the Bible. He wrote, "I never read any sermons on Texts which I selected before beginning to write myself; nor did I consult any Commentary, unless in seeking to ascertain the precise translation of the original".\(^1\) When he was first "licensed to preach", he would often spend ten or twelve days preparing a sermon.\(^2\) Now that he was in the pastorate he did not have as much time as that to spend on sermon preparation. He felt quite sure that without the use of sermon helps he would soon run out of material, in which case he would be forced to seek the aid of the labour of others! But this did not occur. He found, instead, that whenever he ran into difficulties in sermon preparation, that when he went "...to God in prayer, instead of feeling that I had run out of topics or illustration, I found the preparation for each successive Sabbath occupy less time than that of the previous one: until at last it was a very common thing with me to write out fully two discourses of from thirty-five to forty minutes reading each on the Saturday".\(^3\) He admits elsewhere that the preparation of these sermons occasionally spilt over into the early hours of Sunday morning, but even then it was not a burdensome task. He was anxious to express the thoughts stimulated by his parish work and his "...writing flowed on with the freedom of extempore speaking when the heart is full".\(^4\) Soon indeed, he gave up altogether the practice of

1. Ibid.
writing out his sermons and found that it did not hinder his preaching. McLeod Campbell did feel that his preaching was injured when it became a matter of controversy. He felt himself forced to be defensive and his sermons "...lost much of the sweet pastoral tone which close contact with my people and their need gave to my ministry for more than the half of my short Row life".¹

The relationship between his preaching and his pastoral visiting which McLeod Campbell mentioned, brings us to the second decision in regard to his pastoral duties, which he felt affected his thought. This was the decision he made immediately on his induction, to "visit the parish with resolution".² He determined to make all of his visits of a religious nature, and thus avoid the error of making people think that religious discussion was only for times set apart for the purpose. This decision influenced McLeod Campbell's mind in that it made him aware that religion involved all of life, and it made a demand on those whom he visited in that it "...soon made it apparent how much it was the fact that though willing - so to speak - to give a little of their time to God, that they might with the less disturbance from conscience enjoy themselves in the rest of it, they had not yet been taught to "count all things loss for the excellency of the knowledge of God in Christ Jesus'".³

¹. Ibid.
². Reminiscences. p.12
³. Ibid.
The combination of these two approaches to his pastoral duties, what McLeod Campbell described as "...my exclusive study of the Word of God and my exclusive intercourse as the servant of God with man..."¹ soon led him to see that God demanded personal religion of men, and that this demand was seldom met. This discovery influenced his preaching which he described as "chiefly researches" into the reasonableness of God's demands, the consequent sin in not meeting these demands, and the various devices of Satan by which men were enabled to live at peace in an evil way.² McLeod Campbell felt that his early ministry was of benefit to his people, but he saw its greatest benefit in that it prepared him for the long struggle for truth that lay ahead.

For in that time of quiet dealing with individual souls, the process went on of coming to know practically the need of man awakening to the consciousness of alienation from God, and seeking the peace of a true reconciliation. No forming by much reading an acquaintance with what had been thought and taught in the past, neither any amount of free exercise of my own mind in weighing theological questions, could in the least have been a preparation for my subsequent work such as my pastoral experience at Row has been, - that pure pastoral experience which was simply a "ministry of reconciliation". As compared with what is engaged in as the study of Divinity, it was in some sense the Baconian direct contact with nature in the substitution of induction for speculation. It has, I feel, been a gain to me and not a loss that my pastoral work thus stood first in order, and that my thinking has been stimulated by the exigencies of that work, and not by any love of

¹. Ibid. p.13  
². Ibid.
speculation or craving for originality.1

McLeod Campbell, in reflecting on his earliest teaching, felt that his work was carried out on two presuppositions, both of which he "...experienced rather than thought of".2 He entered his work with the "...unquestioning faith that the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy him for ever",3 and "... in the unquestioning faith of the Divine gift of Revelation, and of its inestimable value in connection with the will of God that we should glorify and enjoy Him".4 McLeod Campbell admits that he did not hold these views consciously and clearly at first, and if pressed "...would probably have rather turned to questions of Evidences, such as engage us in our preparatory studies".5 The confidence in the Divine authority of Revelation was present early, he recalls, but not explicitly. However, it developed greatly due to his exclusive study of the Scriptures in sermon preparation. He did not refuse the use of other peoples' thought in his sermon writing because of any set purpose in his mind, "...but because I found the Scriptures speaking clearly enough for my need; and as to what remained dark I was contented so to leave it".6 This method of preparation gave him the experience of receiving "all that was life to my own soul" in this way and led him to see that this same

2. Reminiscences, p.124
3. Ibid. p.123
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p.124. Above Chapter I, pp.31-36
6. Ibid. p.125
revelation was not received with a living faith by his people. It was this fact that "...had practically the same effect on my teaching as would be produced by a purpose to leave all that I had ever read on the subject of Evidences out of account, counting only on the internal authority of truth".¹

It was a matter of great comfort to McLeod Campbell when he looked back on his Row preaching to see that it had been based on the internal authority of truth and had not depended on Evidences. This was particularly so when historical criticism was shaking the whole system of Evidences in the middle of the nineteenth century. McLeod Campbell was thankful "...that from the first my teaching proceeded on ground which Historical Criticism could not touch! - ground also which it was righteous and reasonable to take in dealing with a people in possession of the Bible, and whose responsibility as to accepting it or refusing it must turn, not on its history, of which they were incompetent to decide anything of their own proper knowledge, but on its own contents, and what it teaches man concerning God, and the duty God requires of man".²

On reflection, McLeod Campbell admits that in his Row ministry, he gave "special interest" to the Scripture passages which he felt made clear "...the end of man's being as the glorifying of God and enjoying of Him".³ For this reason he neglected large portions of Scripture, and concentrated on other

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. p.126 3. Ibid.
parts, in both his preaching and private discussions. Again, this was not done with a set purpose. He did not desire to make distinctions between the inspiration of the various parts of Scripture nor to make any reflections on passages generally interpreted mystically or relegated to the region of thought in which Election and Predestination are discussed. He mentions the fact that he did not wish to engage his people's thoughts with questions which might disturb their minds which were just awakening to the importance of Salvation. Even those keenest about such questions would rather avoid the situation where the people distressed themselves, and embarrassed their teachers "...by taking up the subject of Divine decrees with a personal reference to themselves".¹ He illustrates the character of his early teaching by saying that in his catechising he "...chiefly dwelt on the offices of Christ as a Prophet, a Priest, and a King, as expressing the relation in which all were to regard Him in reference to themselves".²

McLeod Campbell declared that the sum and substance of his early teaching could be expressed in a few words, "What God wills man to be, and what God has done, is doing, and will do if we yield ourselves to His will, in order that that will may be realized in us".³ He found that when he preached this Divine ideal for man to his people that the first result was that those

1. Ibid. p.127
2. Ibid. a foot note indicates Questions 23-26, in the Shorter Catechism.
3. Ibid.
who were earnest felt condemned by the realisation of the
distance between what they were and what God willed them to
be. There was, of course, the temptation on their part to
ignore this combined judgement of "Conscience and Revelation", and
excuse themselves on the ground that the ideal was too
high, and human nature too frail. He found, however, that
those who were earnest did not want to abandon this high hope
of what God willed them to be. But he also found that the
high standard which he presented to his people was working as
the law and not as gospel. "As a law, and simply a righteous
demand on God's part, the will of God for us is a light which
only reveals what is wrong, but brings no deliverance - no
help to becoming what is right (Romans VII); while, as the
Gospel, the same will has in itself the power, being welcomed
in faith, to realise itself in us". Thus, the Divine ideal
which he preached, he found received "more in fear than in
hope", and that whatever he preached, his people heard only as
another demand on them to be, and not as the secret of the
gospel as to how to be. "Of this they themselves had no
suspicion; they said, and honestly, that they did not question
Christ's power to save, neither did they doubt the freeness of
the Gospel or Christ's willingness to save them; all their
doubts were as to themselves". This last statement made it
clear that they conceived that there was something which they

1. Ibid.p.130 2. Ibid.p.131 3. Ibid.p.132
had to do, a condition they must fulfil before they could consciously enjoy salvation. "This something they attempted to speak of as repentance, faith, or love, or "being good enough", which last expression gave really the secret of their difficulty. Christ was to be the reward of some goodness - not perfect goodness, but some goodness that would sustain a personal hope of acceptance in drawing near to Him". ¹ In this way the Gospel became a law and the call to trust Christ became an additional demand, and not the secret of the power to fulfil the obligation to love God and man.

When McLeod Campbell came to see this clearly, he saw that his task was to "...fix their attention on the love of God revealed in Christ, and to get them into the mental attitude of looking at God to learn His feelings towards them, not at themselves to consider their feelings towards Him".² In this way his hope was that they should see that they could not save themselves by a blind effort, no matter how earnest, but rather should "come under the natural power of the love, the forgiving, redeeming love which was set before them".³ McLeod Campbell did not think that it was merely the Calvinistic preconceptions of his people which led them to such difficulties, although he admits that they were taught these beliefs at an early age. He simply says that, "I do not remember that it was so, though I have had theological fatalism fallen back upon when other attempts to evade my urgency in pressing the obligations of

¹. Ibid. pp. 132, 133  
². Ibid. p. 133  
³. Ibid.
religion have consciously failed; and, while the excellence of the ideal of what ought to be was not denied, the obligation to be it was rejected on the ground of Divine predestination".  

This was merely an excuse and it was not this that was met with in earnest minds. The real problem was in the conception of free grace. The difficulty was in apprehending that God loves us irrespective of what we are, "...sustained by the contemplation of what He both wills us to be and is able to make us". When this is realised we no longer attempt to make Christ ours by some mental movement on our part, but know Him to be ours by the grace of God which gave Christ to die for us while we were yet sinners. It was against the rejection of this free grace of Jesus Christ which McLeod Campbell had to battle. He was led in fact to consider it the subtlest form of self-righteousness which presented "not being good enough" as a reason for not rejoicing in Christ. The way McLeod Campbell met this problem was to insist that those who said they believed in the "all-sufficiency of Christ as a Saviour", had "the feelings of peace and joy in believing in Him which could alone accord with the reality of such a faith..."  

In order that we may understand what was different in the answer McLeod Campbell gave to the question, "How do I know that I believe as I ought?", from the answer given by his contemporaries in Scotland, he tells some of the similarities and

1. Ibid. pp. 133, 134  
2. Ibid. p. 134  
3. Ibid  
4. Ibid.  
5. Ibid.
differences he found. He warns first of all that "...the Westminster Confession of Faith or the Catechisms of the Church would be quite misleading documents, if any proposed to accept them as historical evidence with reference to the first half of this century, - more misleading than they could be as to the second half..."¹ The reason why they are so misleading as guides to thought in the first half of the century is that the silence of the past might be interpreted as acquiescence, whereas by the second half of the century there was much open questioning and protest. McLeod Campbell refers to the actual Calvinistic teaching which he encountered in the first quarter of the century as calling men to a simple and exclusive trust in Christ as opposed to trust in oneself. This teaching attempted to guard men from trusting in good work, even to insisting that men not be self-righteous by considering their faith something to be trusted in. This they called "making a Christ of our faith".² Such a simple and complete trust in Christ was acknowledged to produce peace with God, and such peace and joy in believing was considered to be the glory of God. This, however, only if there was no self-deception present and against such self-deception there must be certain safeguards. One such safeguard was the nearness of death. A dying man who used the language of complete trust and confidence in Christ was a case for great thanksgiving. In some cases such a confidence might be acknowledged even in a

¹. Ibid. p.145  ². Ibid. p.146
perfectly healthy man. In reference to his own teaching then, McLeod Campbell insists that, "It was, therefore, no new teaching to call on men to rise from the thought of what they were in themselves to the contemplation of free grace revealed in Christ, to believe and rejoice". Although thus far, there was no disagreement, the thought of McLeod Campbell's day went further and said that although this confidence in Christ when seen in the dying, and if real, in the life of healthy people, was welcome, yet it was the distinction of the few. It was in this insistence on the great desirability of this confidence and the fact that it was real in only a few that McLeod Campbell saw a contradiction. If such a confidence arose from what was seen in Christ and not in myself then why must it be real in only a few? Why should it not accompany the faith of all? "The more I meditated on the secret of the power of faith to give peace in death, or strength for the Christian life, the more I was convinced that there was here a real contradiction, and that the faith which gave peace in death and in life, - the faith which worketh by love, and purifieth the heart and overcometh the world, - had this power simply by reason of what it was in itself, and not because of anything special and individual in some men".

The contradiction which McLeod Campbell speaks of came out clearly in the supplement to the teaching of absolute and exclusive trust in Christ. This was the system of Evidences

1. Ibid. p.147  
2. Ibid.  
3. The context of McLeod Campbell's writing generally makes clear the distinction between these "pious" Evidences and the "Biblical Evidences which we have spoken of up to this point.
by which one was to determine whether or not his confidence was not self-deception. This type of teaching said that while peace with God might not be experienced as the direct effect of faith, yet that faith might still be saving and might be ascertained to be so by two other, and in some sense secondary fruits. "These other fruits were in themselves doubtless most important, and to others - to all outside - they were the proper evidence of the reality of faith; for they were the elements of the new life - love to God, love to man, all the Christian graces. But the natural - indeed necessary - effect of this teaching on the man himself, who anxiously questioned the reality of his own faith, was to turn the mind in on itself and its own consciousness of goodness, and with a most discouraging result". So it was that teaching that man should look to Christ and not to himself, became turned back to looking to oneself to be sure that the "fruits" were there. McLeod Campbell saw this as a contradiction. He describes this artificial suspension of faith in order to test its reality by examining its fruits, by likening it to "...turning off the water which moves

1. Ibid. pp. 184, 185-refers to Jonathan Edward's Religious Affect¬ions as an example of this type of teaching. It was given to Campbell by a friend on January 1, 1827.  
2. Ibid. p. 148, R.H. Story, Life of Story, p. 105 n. has the following rather amusing note on "Evidence" preaching: "The preaching of this search for "Evidences" was most perplexing. Thus one min¬ister who used sometimes to have a sixteenth section in a dis¬course on Assurance would state that, if you loved God, you might be sure that you were in "a gracious state"; and if you did not love Him, still if you loved his people, you were safe: or, again, if you did not love his people, but regretted that you did not love them, and so on, and so on, ad libitum".
the wheel of a mill to see whether the motion generated be
the right motion; - that is, in effect, to withdraw the moving
power in order to test the character of the motion". 1

McLeod Campbell's teaching that men should not look to
themselves but to God to determine whether they had salvation
led him to the doctrine commonly called "Assurance of Faith". He was led to this doctrine having "...seen that the want of
it precluded singleness of heart and eye in the service of God,
and then having found in studying the Epistles to the first
Christian Churches, that its existence, in those addressed was
in them taken for granted, and in every practical exhortation
was presupposed. I accordingly began to urge on my own people,
that in order to their being free to serve God - in order to
their being in a condition to act purely, under the influence
of love to Him, and delight in what he is, their first step in
religion would require to be, resting assured of his love in
Christ to them as individuals, and of their individually having
eternal life given to them in Christ". 2 He describes his preach-
ing late in 1826 as taking this character, but it was not until
the summer of 1827 that he first found that offence had been
taken at his carrying "...the subject of Assurance too far" 3
At first his teaching was not branded heretical and as far as
he was concerned, it was successful in that the high ideals which
he pressed upon his people had not previously been attained, but
were now resulting from the demand for true faith. Late in
1827 McLeod Campbell heard that his teaching was creating a

1. Ibid. p. 149 2. Ibid. p. 19 3. Ibid.
sensation in Glasgow. The charge was being made that his teaching was Antinomian. When he heard that a Glasgow minister had chosen to address a theological society there on "Assurance of Faith", he felt it was his duty to attend and explain his views if given the opportunity (he was not a member). He felt the minister's essay was very temperate but full of principles with which he could not agree. He was asked to speak and he discussed the subject freely and left the meeting with the impression that he had been heard fully and freely. The following week he had been offered the chance of preaching a sermon for a Glasgow charitable institution, and took the opportunity to set forth his views again, this time consciously guarding them against the charge of Antinomianism by the selection of "Sanctify them through thy Truth" (John 17:17) as his text. Most of the ministers of Glasgow were present and it is from this occasion that McLeod Campbell dates the opposition to his teaching on Assurance.\(^1\) Apparently the Glasgow ministers were shocked to find that their discussion of the preceding week had not shown their brother the error of his ways! At this time there was not organized opposition in the parish of Row, but it soon developed.

As we have seen, McLeod Campbell's intention was to preach the Gospel in such a way as to make clear the free grace of God. In order to do this, he felt that he must teach men to look only to Christ to know that their sins are forgiven and not into

1. Ibid. p.21
their own hearts. From a letter written in the spring of 1828, we gain a clear idea of his teaching on this subject. He admits that in the past he had used words and expressions which could be misunderstood but what he means is that it can be said to every man, "I do not ask you to believe anything, but what I know to be true concerning you; and if you believe concerning what God has done for you what I believe, you would be rejoicing in the Lord". This rejoicing in the Lord is not something that is seen only in the dying and in a few extremely pious individuals but is the result of believing what Christians believe and is therefore to be found in all who believe. This rejoicing is based on the assurance that what faith believes is true. McLeod Campbell distinguishes between these facts which faith believes and other secondary facts that arise out of believing. "When we say that faith is the simple belief of facts resting upon the authority of God's word, we mean that we press men to believe only what are facts, whether they believe it or not. Certain other facts will arise in their believing, but the facts which we ask them to believe are already facts..." and to doubt these facts is to make God a liar. The fact that Christ has suffered for all and that all men have forgiveness and eternal life in Christ is such a fact,

1. R.H. Story, Life of Story, pp. 113-117. This letter is of great interest because it was written to caution Campbell's friend, Robert Story, from expressing the doctrine of "Assurance of Faith" in such a manner as was "without apostolic sanction" and which would be misunderstood.
2. Ibid. p. 114
3. Ibid.
which is true concerning us whether we believe it or not. He emphasizes that this forgiveness and eternal life is in Christ.

"But out of Christ there is neither life nor forgiveness. God has given us eternal life, and pardon as the first consciousness of that life, but this eternal life is in His Son, and so in Him as to be inseparable from the knowledge or belief of Him". It is the work done by God in Jesus Christ that is a fact independent of us. In order for men to participate in this fact they must have knowledge of it and this knowledge comes through faith. Both the fact of what God has done in Christ and the fact of believing this are important, but it is also important how they are related to one another.

The facts that are prior to belief, true, and which are properly the objects of belief, are that Christ died for the sins of every man, and that therefore everyman has access to God through Him; coming in which way a man comes sinless, and not only sinless but clothed with the righteousness of God. The facts that emerge or arise, or become existences in believing, are that the soul becomes alive in Christ, and is pardoned and justified. I therefore do not say "believe that you are pardoned or justified", anymore than "believe that you are alive to God", because these are not yet facts. But I say, "believe that Christ died for your sins and rose again for your justification, and that in Him you have pardon and righteousness". And if the person whom I address believes this, then will he have confidence towards God and rejoice in the Lord.

It is obvious that McLeod Campbell's teaching on "assurance of faith" is not a teaching which could stand alone. It demanded the development of those facts which are prior to belief.

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. p.116
are they? - and how do we know them? - are questions which are not answered by saying that believing them we may rejoice. The secondary fact that we do rejoice makes it all the more desirable to seek to understand more fully the what and the how - Fides quaerens intellectum. Fortunately, there is available an ample supply of McLeod Campbell's sermons from his Row pastorate to provide us with his answer to these questions. These sermons are as we would expect, concerned with the questions which had become matters of controversy. They are doctrinal or "teaching" sermons and while they do not attempt to present a complete system of doctrine, they do approach McLeod Campbell's main concerns from different angles and thereby not only illumine these central concerns, but also give us a good idea of the surrounding theological landscape on which these central concerns are built.

Scripture and God

McLeod Campbell's teaching was based on his own personal experience with Scripture. He had surprised even himself by finding that when he prayerfully prepared his sermons

1. While there are available several volumes of Sermons which may date in part from the 1825-1831 period of the Row pastorate, we have felt it best to limit the material used in the following sections to material definitely arising in whole from that period. This Sermon material is from two sources, Sermons and Lectures, 3rd ed. 2 vols. (Greenock: R.B. Lusk, 1832) and Notes of Sermons, 3 vols. (Lithographed, Paisley: J. Wallace, 1831). The printed Sermons and Lectures shall hereafter be cited as S.L. and the Notes on Sermons as Sermons. As the pagination of Sermons is by sermon and not by volume, the first number after Sermons will be the volume number, the second the sermon number, the third the page number, e.g., Sermons 1, IV, p. 2 is page 2 of sermon 4 in volume 1. S.L. has merely the volume and page number.
on the basis of study of the Biblical texts, he had not run out of material, but rather had received "all that was life to my own soul". This experience coupled with his realization of the unhappy religious condition of many of his parishioners, led him to see that there was a fundamental difference between his attitude to Scripture and that of many of his people. They had been taught to approach Scripture on the basis of the rationalistic evidences of the type which McLeod Campbell had also been taught by Stevenson McGill. McLeod Campbell's teaching had, in fact, though not by intention, ignored these arguments which were intended to provide authority for Scripture. He had proceeded on the basis of "the internal authority of Truth". He had not held a theory about the authority of Scripture but he had found in his own experience and the experience of those who were, like himself, willing to accept humbly what Scripture taught, life and peace and reconciliation with God. It was this personal and pastoral experience which was a "ministry of reconciliation" and which McLeod Campbell called a "substitution of induction for speculation".

It was McLeod Campbell's recognition of the internal authority of the Truth of Scripture which brought him into conflict with the "pious evidence" preaching of his time. He had found that faith as described in the Bible was not something to be sought in the heart of man, and tested on the ground of "good works". Faith, as McLeod Campbell saw it in Scripture, was a confident looking to Jesus Christ and his free grace, and therefore to turn to look to one's own heart was to turn away from the source of faith and create a religion of "works".
McLeod Campbell speaks of the authority of Scripture in terms which were common to his time. It would be quite unfair to argue that his language indicates that he held certain views of inspiration put forward in later controversies. It should be remembered, however, that after the rise of Biblical historical criticism, he was thankful that his early teaching was on such a basis as not to be affected. It would not be unfair, however, to state that he held that the Scriptures had the authority of God because God spoke through its words. He could refer to "...the words of the Holy Ghost..."\(^1\) or the "...statements of the Holy Ghost..."\(^2\) in the Bible. He refers to Paul in one place as "...the inspired penman..."\(^3\) It is obvious that the Bible has some importance merely as a source of information, and this aspect of its value to McLeod Campbell can be seen in his reference to it as "...the record..."\(^4\) He does not appear to distinguish between the authority of the Old Testament and the authority of the New Testament. Referring to the Old Testament, he asserts that "...the word of the Lord to them (people of the Old Testament) is the word of the Lord to us; just as their words before God were like our words, so his word to them is his word to us".\(^5\) His view that the Bible as a whole had a common authority leads him to state that in Psalm 36, "...it is Christ who speaks..."\(^6\) But the Bible contains more than

1. S.L. vol. I, p. 171
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 138
3. Sermons, I, IV, p. 1
5. Ibid. vol. II, p. 149
6. Ibid. vol. II, p. 7
a collection of isolated words and statements. While there are admittedly "different parts", yet they make up one "...system of Truth..." McLeod Campbell does not deny that people may have difficulty in seeing the underlying unity of Scripture. They certainly will if they insist on assigning opposite and contrary meanings to different passages, but to do so is to misunderstand "...the one everlasting gospel..." Rather than proving a contradiction in the Scripture, such difficulties indicate something about the person who has them.

...consider what you are to learn concerning yourselves, from your finding such difficulty in harmonizing the various forms of expressions used. What does it imply as to you? It implies a want of entering into the mind of God in Christ; it implies a want of being in the secret of the Lord. 

...If, therefore, the Apostles appear to contradict each other's statements, if the forerunner of our Lord appears to say something different from our Lord himself, or if our Saviour appears to contradict himself in different passages of Scripture, you are not for a moment to suppose that the one passage is opposed to the other, but that you do not yet understand the matter; for if you did, you would see that the passages are in perfect harmony with each other.

In order to avoid such contradictions, we must admit that the Bible is not to be interpreted literally, or unmetaphorically, at all points. McLeod Campbell refers to "...different similitudes..." in the Bible to teach us of Christ and his work. He declares that we are exposed to the temptation to extend these metaphors further than God intended and warns us that,

1. Sermons, I, IV, p.2
3. Ibid.
This is an error because there is no comparison of Christ, and the condition of men through the work of God in Christ, to anything to which the comparison is made in Scripture that holds in every point. It is always some special thing that is intended to be taught in such comparison, and we are not to expect to find a correspondence in everything. This is very obvious in regard to many of the comparisons but it is true in regard to all — and if we desire to be instructed rightly by any of these we must seek to be guided to that special thing which they are intended to teach.¹

He makes this particular point in discussing the parable of the labourers being hired for the vineyard, and gives several examples of false understandings of this parable, such as that it refers to heavenly rewards, concluding that its point in fact was "...that they were not to compare themselves with others and enquire who had the greatest claim on God."²

In other places in his preaching he insists that certain texts must be interpreted literally. He does this, for example, where the Bible speaks of Christ or God, being "in us".

Any who know what it is that is meant by Christ dwelling in us by the Spirit will see that these are no figures, merely intended to express some thing great or excellent: but that these are to be taken literally; ...that these are not metaphors - that these are not expressions used to set forth something else than their plain meaning indicates; but that they are just to be taken literally as they are, and that this was the great object of God in taking human nature into union with his own nature, that through Christ, there might pass into those whose nature he took, the very nature of God...³

In situations where it is not clear whether a metaphorical

1. Sermons, 3, XXXV, p.2
2. Ibid. p.3
3. Sermons, 2, X111, p.4
or a literal approach is to be taken in understanding a text, then presumably the principle that there is an underlying, non-contradictory unity to scripture would operate. But what is the underlying unity of scripture on which this principle depends? McLeod Campbell spoke of "...the first principles of the doctrine of Christ".\(^1\) Obviously he felt that there were such "first principles". As we study his teaching we shall attempt to discover what these principles are.

Regardless of what determined the specific exegesis of a specific text, it is clear that McLeod Campbell intended that his teaching should be Biblical. He declared that he asked "...no man to believe anything but what the Bible tells him".\(^2\) He mourned the general decline in respect for the message which he came to proclaim.

> It is an awful thing that has come upon this country, that people have ceased, altogether, to expect to hear the words of God from the lips of men. This is not the sin of the ministers any more than of the people, nor of the people any more than of the ministers; but it is the sin of both; and an awful sin it is, that men should come to hear the word of God as one man would come to another; and so they have their own opinions; each leans upon himself, and feels all the consequences of one who thinks himself a judge of what is right, and of what is wise.\(^3\)

For McLeod Campbell, the Bible was where he heard God speak and when he preached from the Bible, then God spoke through him to his people. He interpreted it as pride to question the word

1. *Sermons*, vol. II, p.189
2. Ibid. vol. I, p.19
3. Ibid. vol. II, p.70
of God, to "...sit in judgement on that word of God which is to judge you!" So too, he saw it to be pride that moved people to reject his message as merely "opinions", for he spoke not with his own authority but with God's.

If I were to say, Be not proud, for I would speak to you, then you might say, What art thou, that pride should bend before thee? But it is the Lord who has spoken. You are not accustomed in this place to be told things as mere opinions; or as my opinions; but you are accustomed to be told. Thus saith the Lord - This is the word of God - This is the truth of God. You are accustomed to the language of certainty; you are accustomed to hear me speak as one speaketh who proves that he has God's authority for what he says; and this is the one great reason for requiring you to hear in a lowly spirit. Be not proud, for the Lord has spoken. What Lord? Your Lord, and your God - your Creator, and your Redeemer, and your Judge: He who called you, out of nothing, into existence; He who has sustained you by his power; He who has redeemed you with his blood; He who is about to judge you. He is the speaker.

If McLeod Campbell was insistent that the Bible and his preaching based on the Bible had the authority of God, he was equally insistent that this authority was not merely that of words, but of that reality to which the words pointed, "It is not words or names, but things, realities, that you have to do with. It is not the keeping by the name of God, of Christ, that is the real religion, but the having to do with the one true God who is revealed to us in the one True Saviour".

McLeod Campbell emphasises that faith is to be spoken of

1. Ibid. vol. II, p.127
2. Ibid. vol. II, pp.125, 126
3. Ibid. vol. I, p.26
largely in terms of knowledge. However, faith is not merely satisfied to accept the words of Scripture as such. Faith must press through to the reality, the things, "the one true God" of which Scripture speaks. "Faith is expressive of the condition of mind when the things which God has revealed in his words are before the mind as realities".¹ McLeod Campbell draws a wide distinction between a doctrine being known and seeing it as a reality. "Faith included knowledge; but there is a distinction between them. Not that Faith is not knowledge: but that there is a knowledge which is not faith".² The kind of knowledge that is not faith he generally describes as a matter that is believed as a subject of speculation or meditation. He repeatedly affirms that faith is not an attitude based on a possibility. It is based on the actuality that exists outside our minds. "The inward state that is needed is that you should rejoice in that outward thing".³ He emphasizes this objective aspect to faith because he has found that secular meanings of that word had coloured people's understanding of it in its religious usage. Both "hope" and "faith" were associated with ideas of uncertainty in people's minds. All their lives people used these words in a sense that implied uncertainty. They consider it to be the human situation that all our plans and opinions have an element of uncertainty present. Our plans may not succeed, promises may

1. Sermons, I, IV, p.2
2. Ibid. I, IV, p.3
3. Ibid. 3, XXVIII, p.7 "Wherever Faith exists, the matter believed is to him who has it a present reality, not a subject of speculation, or of meditation or of contemplation: but a subject that is a present reality and the reality of it, not the description of it, is what constitutes the difference between knowledge and faith". Ibid. I, IV, p.3
not be kept, our opinions may be wrong. "A thousand times every day are we obliged to act upon things not absolutely certain - upon probable, presumptive evidence, and so we come to regard the expression, I believe it, as almost the same with I am not sure of it; for when the materials of my judgement, when the means of knowledge I possess are in their nature uncertain, it is obvious that my faith must partake of that uncertainty". When this way of thinking is brought over into religion it means that there can be no certainty, and therefore according to McLeod Campbell's definition of faith - no faith. If faith is, as McLeod Campbell says it is, the knowledge of the reality, or actuality of that which is believed, then the reality must either be believed to be a reality or not. All the uncertainty that is present in the secular world must disappear before a person may be said to have religious faith. This uncertainty in the secular world may have been well grounded but it is different in religion. "Faith and hope, in religion, have a reference to the words of God, and these are sure and steadfast; and there is, therefore, no reason why they should be uncertain things here... when God speaks and promises", ...the uncertain ground of faith or hope is no longer present.

It is interesting to compare that teaching of McLeod Campbell with the common sense philosopher, George Campbell's teaching, on the reliability of testimony. The philosopher was willing to argue that testimony can give "absolute certainty ... even of the most miraculous fact..." He also admits that the

1. S.L. Vol. I, p.142  
2. Ibid.  
3. Above, Chap. I, p.20
value of the testimony depends on the veracity of the witness. The philosopher, Campbell, in considering such testimony to be the basis of the evidence of revealed religion, is speaking, however, of those historical evidences which McLeod Campbell discarded. McLeod Campbell is very much aware, however, of the uncertainty of men's lives which makes it difficult for them to consider anything to be more than probable. When this worldly way of thinking is applied to Scripture it means that God is thought of as being as unreliable as men are! McLeod Campbell saw that the testimony of God is to be believed, not because of our experience with men, but because God is God and his word is backed up by his character.

In discussing the authority which one had for claiming religious certainty, McLeod Campbell would thus distinguish between the words used to express religious beliefs and the reality, or the object, to which these words pointed. This reality is God Himself and it is He, his present reality which guarantees certainty. How then are we to reach certainty on a religious matter?

True it is, no doubt, that a person is not to take up an opinion on such matters without certainty that God has spoken it, but it is equally true that the means of certainty God has furnished in the very word which he speaks. That that which ought to commend it to every man's conscience is in the very face of the message: and therefore while no man ought to take it without proof that it comes from God, so no man after hearing the gospel has any apology for hesitating one moment to receive it. You have no excuse for one moment's delay for this reason: that the proof that it is from God is just in the thing itself - that the glory of God is shining in the face of Jesus and that when this is clearly represented to you in the Gospel, if you recognise it not
you are denying God his glory.1

The glory of God which shines "in the face of Jesus" is the clue to the proof that exists in the thing to be believed. That which is to be believed is not only a reality. It is a reality of a certain character. The reality which faith is concerned with is a person,2 the living God. It is when the living God revealed in Christ is apprehended, that saving faith occurs. "It is not as if you had certain conceptions of what is alleged about God, so as that you know what the doctrine is that is taught us - in this there is no life - but it is this, that you should have this as your apprehension of a living being - that it should be love in a person - holiness in a person - righteousness in a person - that you are apprehending; and that thus you should feel yourselves having to do with one whose character it is that he loveth you, and who liveth and moveth, and acteth according to his character".3

God in the Flesh

When McLeod Campbell would seek to point us to where we may see the "internal authority of the truth" of the Christian teachings, he points us to Jesus Christ. One of his most popular expressions for this purpose is the use of the Biblical phrase, "the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ". In this phrase we see the heart of his answer as to how men may know God. God has revealed Himself and his purpose for men in the humanity of

1. Sermon 1, XII, pp.40, 41
2. Ibid. 3, XXXIII, p.11
3. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.28
Jesus Christ. McLeod Campbell emphasizes that one of the great purposes of the incarnation was simply to make God known to men. "I know well that people are little accustomed to have it set forth to them, and little accustomed to consider, how much the discovery of God to us was the great object of Christ's coming into the world. But the Scriptures tell us plainly, that those who are wandering from God, are alienated through the ignorance that is in them - that therefore they are led captive of Satan at his will; and the Scriptures tell us plainly that Christ came to reveal God".¹ He would have us beware of looking at the work of Christ merely as a demonstration of God's power.² Rather it is a work that reveals the character of God in its unity. Christ came to reveal the Father as He already was. "...do not imagine that, Christ the Son, came to change the Father: he came to reveal the Father - he did not come to make God kind, but to show us God's kindness - "Herein God commendeth his'(that is God's)'love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us".³ The fact that Christ does not change God's attitude towards us reveals to us that there never was any conflict in God's character between his "attributes".

- There is a oneness in God's attributes and God's character - a oneness which makes it to be true that mercy is righteousness - that truth is mercy - that righteousness is truth - in short that there is a bringing them altogether in the statement that "God is love", ... - that they have one root and one substance - an act of judgement in God and an act of truth. We are too much in the way of thinking of them as if they were

1. S.L. vol. II, p.75
2. Ibid. vol. II, p.189
3. Ibid. vol. II, p.76
opposites which the blood of Christ brings together. But the blood of Christ does not bring opposites together. The blood of Christ proves that they are not opposites. It does not reconcile conflicting feelings in the heart of God.¹

The reason why we can trust that the knowledge of the feelings of "the heart of God" has truly and actually been revealed to us in Christ, is that Jesus Christ is God. McLeod Campbell bluntly declares that Jesus Christ is God in our Flesh.² He does not hesitate to say that "Jesus Christ is God".³ In Jesus Christ "...you see your Creator revealed in your Redeemer".⁴ It is for this reason, that Jesus Christ is God that there can be no question but that God is love. "Those who, like me, and some hearing me, have been exposed to all the arts by which Satan tries to shut out the light of the glorious Truth, that God is love, will know how sweet, and soothing, and comforting it is to flee from all men's reasonings, and vain philosophy, and just to look at the cross of Christ, and see the blood streaming from his side, and remember that Christ is God. This settles the question - Christ is God, and Christ died for our sins".⁵

While McLeod Campbell insists that it is objectively true that Jesus Christ is God in the Flesh, real belief is not merely a matter of giving bare assent to this fact. The nature of

1. Sermons, 3, XXVII, pp. 20, 21
3. Ibid. vol. I, p. 11, p. 188
4. Ibid. vol. II, p. 86
5. Ibid. vol. II, p. 85
belief must arise from its object. "The record which God gives concerning his Son, is a statement which is not in the man who does not believe it, for he is rejecting it; but he that believes it has it in him, it enters into him in believing. It arises out of the nature of the witness or testimony believed, that when believed it is in me, in a deeper sense than that in which any other testimony is in me, in my believing it". In addition to the fact that the nature of belief is determined by the nature of that which is believed, so also the nature of the thing believed must be understood from itself. McLeod Campbell illustrates this by dealing with the nature of "eternal life". The problem as he sees it is that people have various preconceptions as to what is meant by the Biblical expression "eternal life". People in fact interpret it to mean just whatever they are looking for. "If people understand these words, 'That eternal life as with the Father', they would see that whatever this gift of God is, they must be taught of God what it is - that it cannot be anything they could have anticipated, and that therefore their own anticipation, formed and cherished in their natural darkness, must have been perfectly erroneous". Again, in another place, McLeod Campbell says that eternal life is "... something which was with God before the worlds were made, making it manifest that the gift which God is conferring upon you, is not anything of which you could have had the most distant conception, it being a life which was with God from eternity".

There is a radical difference between God and man. McLeod

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 5  
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 6  
3. Ibid. vol. I, p. 174
Campbell often expresses this in terms of "life" (which may be considered an ontological reference) and in terms of "light" (which may be considered an epistemological reference). Throughout his writings, his books and his letters, we find him quoting from Psalm 36, where it reads, "For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light". McLeod Campbell says of certain texts that in them we see God's estimate of himself" "...and therefore as that which we are to believe of our God, upon the authority of God Himself". He explains, therefore, that when we speak of sharing the life of God in Christ

...let no man feel as if we were putting man on a level with God in any thing. No, let no man feel as if this participation put away the distance between God and the creature. It does not. The fountain is with God, and we are only streams; and as that is the case nothing springs from us - nothing goes from us to Christ, but all comes through Christ - the fountain is with God.

Just as McLeod Campbell insists on the distance between God and man in terms of "life", and on the movement of this "life" solely from God to man, so also he treats "light" in the same manner.

...'in Thy light shall we see light' - not in our light, but in thy light we shall see light. Observe this, especially those of you who say, "How shall we see as God sees?" "In thy light shall we see light", and it is with thy knowledge that we shall know. Here is God's pre-eminence - It is thy light not ours. And here is the error in which men are - they think it humility to be contented to be ignorant, while God thinks it humility to be contented to be taught.

We can see that just as the movement of God's "life" is from God to man, so the movement of theological thought should be in this direction. This explains why McLeod Campbell insisted that his people in Row parish must come to these religious questions with a teachable spirit. He declared that there is a line "...between those who bring everything to the judgement-seat of their own previous knowledge, and their own previous discernment in divine things; and who have not the feeling that they have anything to learn, but think themselves already wise - ...and the persons who know that, of themselves, they can understand nothing rightly; and ... always come to the contemplation of what is set before them with the feeling that they have much to learn, that there is much which they need to be taught and much which God may yet teach them".¹

McLeod Campbell insists, therefore, that the natural man does not know God as the "uncreated God", although this God is revealed in Jesus Christ.² He declares that Paul proclaimed to the Athenians a God whom they ought to have known, but whom they did not know because their eyes were shut. They were not blind, in that they could not see if they chose to, but because they chose to keep their eyes shut and not know God, and therein lay their sin and guilt.³ If this implies that men are free to know God but choose not to, there are also places in McLeod Campbell's writing that imply that although at one point man may have had it within his power to open his eyes and know God, now he has

1. Ibid. vol.II, pp.69,70
2. Sermons, 3, XXVII, p.33
3. Ibid. 3, XXXIII, p.4,5
lost that power and is under the power of the Devil. Generally, however, he wants to insist that the reason why men do not worship God is because they are unwilling to. They do not want God to reign over them, but prefer to be gods to themselves. Men have no excuse for hiding from the revelation of God for, "...wherever there is a human being, who has come the length of exercising reason, and who is ignorant of God, the fault is not in any defect in revelation on the part of God, but in an unwillingness to know God". This unwillingness to know God in his revelation is seen in the way men reject the claims of God revealed in his word, on the grounds of "common sense", or "rational views of religion, the right interests of man, ... the notion which men have in their natural state". McLeod Campbell insists that common sense cannot make you understand a thing is supernatural.

The natural man looks at everything in a way that distorts it. For example, the relations of parents to children and the whole range of family relations are intended to act as a schoolmaster to lead us to God. The natural man looks at them in a fleshly way and makes them something evil and different from what they are "...as appointed of God, and what they are as redeemed back again to God...as relationships known in the Lord, and cherished in the Lord..." The natural man sees the relationships of life through the distortion of the flesh, in the same

1. Ibid.3, XXVII, p.38
2. S.L. vol. II, p.348
5. Ibid. vol. II, p.338
way in which a person looking through stained glass finds the colour given to whatever he looks at.¹ This distortion of man's thinking, this predisposition of man's mind, has more weight in determining whether or not a man will believe, than the proof offered on behalf of the belief.

And it is not one prejudice that stands in the way: but the whole amount of all the associations which his mind has been acquiring from infancy, and accumulating day by day, month by month, and year by year - all the importance he attaches to what the world will think and say - all the importance he secretly attaches to the gratifying of his own selfishness and pride - all this arises, and gathers its might, and opposes his receiving of that Truth, which, when it enters in, casts out self. This then, is the principle, that if you would be taught, you must be willing to receive the Truth: and if willing, you must be content to receive it, even although it should cause you to reject all that you have hitherto chosen: and, therefore, our Saviour says, You must make up your minds to this, otherwise you cannot be taught by me: you cannot hear my voice, so long as you are listening to worldly interests, and parents, and friends, and things about you, saying, Do not believe it.²

Every man has to make the choice of whether he is willing to humble himself and be taught by the voice of the Saviour, or listen to other voices. For this reason, all our presuppositions must be questioned because, "Although my inclinations are no proof of any thing, yet are they mightier than a proof - yet have they a power to make me reject the Truth, so long as I do not make up my mind to reject them."³

McLeod Campbell taught that the Gospel did not bring new

information to be added to, and accommodated to, previous information that we have. He illustrates his point by saying that becoming a Christian is not like a man learning to be a mason and then afterwards becoming a weaver, the new information being added to, but not influencing, the old. The Christian has been brought from darkness to light and finds that all "...his former knowledge was ignorance, that it was altogether erroneous, that it was not really knowledge - that he had been choosing the things which he ought to have rejected, and neglecting the things which he ought to have chosen. It is not as if I came to you in the way in which any person would come to you to explain how the tides flow, or the earth goes round the sun - it is not coming thus with some addition to your knowledge: but it is coming as the apostle came, to inform you that you are quite wrong in all your judgements and feelings concerning all things."

Obviously there is in McLeod Campbell's mind a wide difference between what the world calls knowledge and what the Bible calls knowledge. He admits this, and says that it is almost like having the use of a different sense. For example, the knowledge one has from touch is different from the knowledge one has from smell. Now suppose another sense were added by which one could come to know some quality of things around, which without this sense one could know nothing about. "This is the case in regard to the change which takes place when the preaching of the gospel is blessed".2 To know the Gospel requires the

1. Sermon, 3, XXXIII, p.9 2. Ibid. 3, XXXIII, pp.6,7
appropriate spiritual mode of knowing.

One fundamental reason why the two forms of knowledge are different is because they are not dealing with the same matters. Religion does not deal with questions merely of Truth and falsehood, but with persons and their power which stand behind Truth and falsehood. "It is not with principles that we have to do, but with persons. I entreat your attention to this that it is not with evil principles but with an evil being that the wicked have to do, and that there is a living person whom the righteous serve, that is God."¹ To learn spiritual things, we must receive spiritual discernment, and "...it is with other eyes than you naturally use; eyes which the learned and philosophic mind needs to receive just as much as you - it is a spiritual discernment - the Teaching of the Holy Ghost".² Only those can understand who are taught of God.³ We must be taught by this person.

Among the prejudices which McLeod Campbell taught his people to reject, are religious doctrines which they had learned from their childhood without understanding. It is no use saying that when a person is brought up with certain ideas, he is thereby excused from the responsibility of examining and understanding these beliefs. The traditions of men must not be allowed to weaken the effect of the word of God. No man may hide behind these traditions because, "God is speaking, by his Spirit, to every man, in every country, and in every age..."⁴ How does God speak to every man if every natural man has shut his eyes to the light and is under the power of the Devil? This apparently

¹. Ibid. 3, XXXIII, p.11
². S.L. vol. II, p.103
³. Ibid. vol. I, p.119
⁴. Ibid. vol. II, p.448
presents no problem in McLeod Campbell's view because "...God has given you a conscience, and has spoken to you by his Spirit, through that conscience". He says that all men have a law written upon their consciences which remains after it has ceased to be written upon their hearts. This law which remains is not enough, however, to lead men to be humble and contrite as God desires. This is because the heart blinds the conscience and teaches it "...to give good names to evil things". The heart may, on the other hand, be made humble and contrite and be conformed to the law written on the conscience. This is accomplished by the work of the Gospel which finds both the heart and the conscience in an evil condition, but through the power of the Spirit, brings knowledge of forgiveness.

McLeod Campbell teaches that the law is written on the natural conscience but that the Gospel, which is required to restore the conscience, is not, "...until it be written there by the Holy Ghost, in faith, it is not there at all: and therefore it is a thing that people have no preparation for. If a person only believes what he knew beforehand, it is not faith at all". The law within people joins with the testimony of God in accusing them and they therefore have no difficulty in acknowledging that the law is from God, but the Gospel is not written within and must be accepted on Faith.

It does not always seem clear that McLeod Campbell means

1. Ibid. vol. II, p.450
2. Ibid. vol. I, p.104
3. Ibid. vol. I, p.105
4. Sermon I, V, p.20
5. Ibid. I, V, p.19
by "conscience" and it does not always seem that he is consistent in what he says about its use. At times it would seem that it has been damaged and must be renewed, and at other times it seems that it speaks a word of God to us quite clearly. In one place McLeod Campbell would seem to say that it is superior to the witness of the Bible. If "...the Bible contradicted my conscience, then I might reject the Bible because it professes to be a word of God, and I have previously got a word from God in the conscience and one word of God cannot contradict another therefore if it contradicted conscience its claim to be from God must be false".¹ However, the context in which he says this is where he is arguing the reality of sin and it may be understood as emphasizing that the law in men's hearts is valid and corresponds to Scripture if Scripture is correctly interpreted. He had earlier suggested a hypothetical misunderstanding of forgiveness of sins to mean that sin is not real.²

His general view of the role of conscience may be illustrated from what he said in differentiating between a good conscience and self-righteousness. Self-righteousness is man looking at himself and describing how he feels in himself. The "answer of a good conscience" is a different matter.

The word answer implies just responses - echoing - it is just like light reflected - it is as if you were to say of the light of the sun falling on a mirror and cast back again - the image that the brightness reflected was "the answer of light". In this way the answer of a good conscience towards God implies as it were a voice coming forth from God, and a voice in us

1. Ibid. 3, XXVIII, p.20  
2. Ibid. 3, XXVIII, p.19
meeting the voice of God. I wish you to see that there is a considerable importance in this word "answer" because it directs attention to a transaction between the soul and its God - because it does not fix your attention on a state of the soul, looking to the man by himself and considering what the man is in himself - but fixes attention on a state of the soul taking God and the man into account. ¹

Conscience then involves a relationship between God and man. "The man is spoken of as a being listening to his God speaking and replying to the voice of his God". ² To listen to God means to have your will determined by His will and it is this argument of wills that gives one a good conscience. ³

The Humanity of Christ

We have seen how McLeod Campbell insisted that in the incarnation, God Himself had come into our flesh and how natural man, man "outside Christ" will not understand this. God as revealed in Christ does not "fit" into autonomous man's plans for himself, therefore he either ignores Christ or distorts the gospel to fit his own preconceptions. Natural man seeks, for example, to speak of religion in the categories appropriate to "principles" while God has revealed Himself as a person. Yet despite autonomous man's attempts to deny or distort God's revelation, God still speaks to man through his conscience and seeks the answer of a harmonious will and a good conscience.

1. Ibid. 3, XXVIII, pp. 11, 12
2. Ibid.
3. McLeod Campbell's use of "conscience" to apply to the direct relationship of God and man is seen in his later writings. See the discussion below, Chapter 7, pp. 321 ff, 359 ff.
McLeod Campbell admits that natural man thinks in such a way that he can only consider the claims of the Christian religion to be mystical and incomprehensible. But, since it is the nature of the object which must dictate how it is to be understood, the natural man must allow himself to be taught to think in accordance with the object of faith. The Christian faith is centered in "...the mystery of God manifested in the flesh: and this mystery you must be made to enter in..."1 It is in regard to this mystery of the incarnation, that McLeod Campbell found what he considered to be the foundation truth of all that he taught. This basic truth was in regard to

...the subject of our Lord's humanity - the subject of our Lord's having taken our nature just as we have it - flesh and blood, just as it exists in you and me. Though this is the last in the order in which I have myself been instructed, yet it is the foundation truth of all... Out of this springs as a necessary consequence, the universality of the atonement - out of this springs, as a necessary consequence, the love, the reality of love in God to all, as the cause of the atonement - and out of this springs the reality of sin in all, as the cause, in respect of man, of the atonement, - out of this springs the fitness of the language that "we are the sons of God" - out of this springs the propriety of speaking of men as having the mind of God in them, while dwelling in flesh and blood.2

Our concern, at present, is to understand how this fundamental truth of Christ's having taken our human nature, just as we have it, will affect our theological thinking. It will, in fact, make a most radical difference to our thinking for as McLeod Campbell said, "...out of this springs the propriety of speaking of men

1. S.L. vol. II, p.100
2. Ibid. vol. I, p.436
as having the mind of God in them..."1 This emphasis on men having the "mind of God" or "mind of Christ" in them is central in his teaching. Obviously, it is of the greatest importance if men can "think like" God. McLeod Campbell is in fact, saying no less than that man can think from a centre in God rather than from a centre in himself. He clearly taught, as does Scripture, that we are to have the mind in us that was in Christ. This means that we are to think about God and man as Christ did. But because Christ is God, to think as He thinks is to think as God thinks. McLeod Campbell says that this is "to have God with us always",2 as if we were walking through the countryside with a man, and whatever I saw, or whoever I met, I would look into the man's face to see what he thought of the thing or person. If we met a stranger, his character would be hidden from me, but by looking to my companion's face, I could see how he reacted. If my companion frowned, he would indicate some evil in the man that I might not discern. If he smiled, it would indicate some holiness in the man too deep to be discerned by me. So I would be completely guided and taught by my companion. It is this being taught completely by God that McLeod Campbell wants us to learn from this illustration.

Now, to walk in the light of God's countenance, is to go to and fro in the light of God's countenance - not as in the light of mine own eyes: but always to look in God's face, and see what He thinks of everything, and so be taught. You may ask how can I see the face of God, or how can I see God's face in that way in which you say I

1. Ibid.
2. Sermon, 3, XXVII, p.30
may as the face of a brother man? I answer that you may see it because God's mind is always revealed in Christ, in the form of a man's thoughts and feelings, and because the Spirit of Christ is ever near, and ever with you, to take of the things that are Christ's and shew them unto you. It is to shew you Christ's face, and through his own Spirit you are seeing the face of Christ, and seeing therefore the feelings and mind of Christ - you are thereby seeing the feelings, face, and mind of God; so that having Christ, God manifested in the flesh, I have it in my power to walk in the light of God's countenance.¹

God's will is revealed to us then, through the humanity of Christ. Through his thoughts and feelings, through what we learn from "his face", we have the possibility of knowing God's thoughts and feelings, "God's face" or character. We should have known this without Christ but because we are blinded by sin it was necessary for God to accommodate himself to our condition.

"Sin has interposed a curtain between us and God: while this curtain remains, God is misconceived of, thought of as our enemy, because we are His enemies, and so on. Revelation removes this curtain and discovers God in Christ having accommodated Himself to our case as sinners, and in infinite love assumed a character or wrought a change on his own aspect which makes Him as accessible to us sinners as He would out of Christ have been had we never sinned".² This teaching that God has made Himself accessible to us in Christ is fundamental to the teaching of Calvin and Luther. For example, the emphasis on seeing things

1. Ibid. 3, XXVII, pp.30,31
2. R.H. Story, Life of Story, p.115, (from a letter Campbell wrote in 1828)
with the eyes of God and not the eyes of men is similar to Luther's teaching of "coram Deo". This was one of Luther's ways of expressing the fact that theological thought must have its centre in God and not man. It is not necessary to assert that McLeod Campbell gained this insight from Luther for Luther himself knew that he was returning to a Biblical conception. "For this word is frequent in the Scriptures", "In the sight of God", "In the presence of God", "before God". 

McLeod Campbell not only argues that we must have the "mind of Christ" but he repeatedly points us to the bodily actions and even facial expressions of Christ to teach us what was in his mind. Can we be certain of what was in Christ's mind, what his intentions and his "feelings" were by reflecting on His physical characteristics and actions? McLeod Campbell apparently believed that through the Holy Spirit we could understand Christ not only by His teaching but also by the actions of his human flesh.

Because McLeod Campbell so often uses the illustration of human actions and expressions to teach what Christ's "feelings" and intentions were, it is of great interest to see that one of the central concerns of the common sense school of philosophy was with "natural signs". Thomas Reid taught that language includes all those signs by which men attempt to communicate to others their thoughts, purposes and desires. There are two kinds

2. see Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, pp.151 ff.
of such signs. Firstly, those mutually agreed upon - for example, much of our spoken language - these are artificial signs. Secondly, there are such signs as have a meaning prior to all compact or agreement, and these "natural signs" which all men understand by the principles of their nature. Reid argues that "...if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and, therefore, there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented".¹

So it was that Reid could take it to be a "first principle", "that certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind".² In this manner, the problem of the knowledge of other minds is easily solved for Reid. We know them through their self-disclosure in "natural signs" which are "...so many openings into the souls of our fellow-men, by which their sentiments become visible to the eye".³ It must be some such understanding of men's ability to comprehend the thoughts, purposes and feelings that lay behind facial expressions and physical action, that led McLeod Campbell to express his teaching in this form. It is quite important if McLeod Campbell did

2. Ibid., vol. I, p. 449
3. Ibid., vol. II, p. 574
hold a view of "natural signs" similar to that of his common sense philosopher friends. These "natural signs" are not understood on the basis of conventions of society. Unlike most spoken language, their meaning is not merely assigned to them by convention, but rather they are understood from themselves. They are self-evident. Their meaning is not determined by their coherence with an "artificial" system of thought. They convey their own meaning in themselves. On this basis we can see how once Christ's divinity is confessed, we can enter deeply into the knowledge of this person, Jesus Christ, through his humanity. See "...how our Lord's having taken our nature, and having wept over our misery, and our very persons, with human tears, and groaned with human groans, is fitted to tell the tale of God's love".1 "I wish you to see in this work of Christ viewing His feelings as those of God to man, how it is fitted to make us know the unknown God, and to make us see Him who is invisible, to make us enter through the language of human heart and feelings, into the secret of the mind of God."2 McLeod Campbell expressed this teaching of the revelation of the mind of God through the humanity of Christ very clearly at his trial. There he said,

The doctrine I hold is, that the Son came to reveal the Father - that he that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father - that he that knoweth the Son knoweth the Father that hath sent him - that no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son revealeth him. That therefore it is in Christ that we see God - that in Christ we see God in our nature. It is not

1. S.L. vol. I, p.455
2. Ibid. vol. I, p.456
merely seeing God in our flesh that is the seeing God, but it is the seeing the mind and actings of God in our flesh - it is not the mere fact that Christ is God as well as man that makes it true that in Christ we see God, but it is that going along the page of inspiration - reading the inspired ministry of our Lord Jesus Christ, when I see the expression of a feeling, I am warranted to say this is the feeling of God - when I see an action performed, indicating a motive, I am warranted to ascribe that motive to God - that in everything I am entitled to go from the Son to the Father, and so to form my conception of the Father by the Son - otherwise the incarnation is no revelation of God to me at all, and the actings of Christ do not discover to me the Father, and the seeing and hearing Christ may be without my seeing or hearing the Father.

McLeod Campbell goes on to argue that when we hear Christ's teaching, we consider what he says - his words - to be the words or teaching of God the Father. If this is the case, "...what entitles us to draw a line between the actions of Christ and his words?, or what entitles us to say that the motives of Christ's actions are not the motives that exist in the heart of God? - what entitles us to separate between his words and his actions? And surely if we are not entitled to separate his words and his actions, still less are we entitled to make distinctions among his actions; and least of all, to separate from the rest that which is the greatest of them, viz. the atonement". On the basis then of the consistency between Christ's words and His actions and the fact that both reveal God's intentions, he can argue that God loves all men. For example, Christ taught that we should

1. Proceedings, II, pp.181,182
2. Ibid. p.182
love all men when he taught man to love "his neighbour as himself", and as his actions were consistent with his teaching, he himself, as obedient to the law of God, loved all men.\textsuperscript{1} Once this love of God to all men is established, McLeod Campbell considers it arbitrary to say that it applies to all Christ's actions but not the atonement. We can see how on the basis of this understanding of the importance of the relation of word and action, he was led to stress the whole movement of the incarnation as the basis and presupposition of the atonement. We have seen how this way of thinking was quite consistent with the Scottish common sense philosophy and we shall show in Chapter V how McLeod Campbell may well have been influenced in this regard also by the thought of Thomas Erskine.\textsuperscript{2}

Having learned the "mind of God" through Christ's humanity, it is living with the "mind of God" that constitutes the Christian life. McLeod Campbell illustrates how the life of Christians is lived in the actual experience of God's mind directing them, by telling of a group of people living in a lowly glen surrounded by high mountains. They are living in a dense mist and moving about in darkness, while there is above the mist, pure light and sunshine. Suppose them to be connected with one, who has been down among them, and has ascended above this mist, and is living under the pure sky, and in the bright and glorious sunshine, and that, through continual looking to him, it is possible for them always to live in him - seeing with his eyes, what he is seeing - and so, while, in the place

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1. Ibid., p.184, the same argument occurs in \textit{S.L.} II, pp.445,446
2. \textit{Below}, Chapter V, pp.244 f.
where they lived, they saw nothing, yet, by looking through him, they were really, in point of feeling, raised above the darkness and mist with which they were surrounded. So the Holy Ghost coming into us does, by the very process of showing us Christ, raise us up to dwell in heavenly places, and makes us to live above the mist and darkness, and to see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.¹

Christian experience, thus defined, does give one assurance of the Truth of Christianity. "...I do not say that I add to the revelation in the Bible; but only, that having Truth as a life in me, I am in a condition to add my testimony to that of the Bible...The Truth must first be received as a little child; must be believed, simply because it is the witness of God: but in being received, it places a man in the condition of being able to put his seal that God is true."² In fact, if the Truth of Christianity is not thus experienced, it is not really known at all. McLeod Campbell insists that, "You cannot love what you do not know - you cannot love a picture, a word, a name. It must be a real thing you love..." If a person says he really does love Christ and the state of things which he brings, "...that it is a thing his heart clings to, it must be a thing into the knowledge of which he is brought, and it must be experimental knowledge - or it is no knowledge at all".³ The kind of experience of which McLeod Campbell speaks is of a unique kind. Indeed, he says that it is "...a thing perfectly opposite to all previous experience".⁴ We cannot simply carry our ways of thinking and

4. Ibid. I, X, p.27
feeling over into the region of religion. Christian experience is unique in that you forget yourself altogether. It is to forget yourself and to "...see the glory of God, and to know the harmony of his character, and to see his love, his holiness, his righteousness, and his Truth, and all the beauties of the Godhead shining in the face of Jesus Christ, and rejoicing in it".¹

Here we see the common sense empiricist emphasis on experience - there "must be experimental knowledge - or it is no knowledge at all". But it is a unique kind of experience, because it's determined by the nature of its unique object - God revealed in the humanity of Jesus Christ, through the Holy Spirit.

Observations

McLeod Campbell's teaching cannot be understood apart from his experience with the Bible. He found that when he allowed Scripture to present its object in its own categories, and allowed himself to be taught by it, he found peace and life for his soul. But it is quite obvious that McLeod Campbell was not satisfied to understand Scripture in terms of the "relations of Ideas" which it contained, but saw that it was speaking of "matters of fact" to be believed. Or as he said, it was not dealing with principles and contemplations, but with persons and communion. The language of Scripture was meant to teach men to think about God, in the way God intended to be thought of, and might even be referred to as "...the language of your God".²

¹. Ibid.
². S.T. vol. I, p. 350
McLeod Campbell is aware that, "God is not visible: I never saw him, I never heard his voice. It is not a being visible to my eyes, but to my mind, that I worship; and what my mind sees is the character of God: and to see the true God, is to see a God of the character not that I may foolishly conceive or wish God to have, but that is revealed in the inspired writings; and he is an idolater who is worshipping a God of any other character". It was the purpose of Scripture to point to where this character of God is revealed and that place was the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.

McLeod Campbell stresses that it is in the humanity of Jesus Christ that God is revealed. God in taking upon himself our human nature in Christ has accommodated Himself to the region of human experience where we may know Him. In Christ we are not only taught by what He said, but perhaps even more fundamentally, by His human expressions and His actions. This way of thinking of Christ, as well as being self-evidencing, also points to a dynamic, living conception of revelation. This shall be developed in the following chapter where we see how McLeod Campbell emphasized the whole "history" of Christ.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of this revelation of God in the humanity of Jesus Christ, was that mankind could share in the "mind of God". Since God and Christ are one, the fact that we can share in Christ's mind means that we can share in God's mind. We may be said to be enabled by Christ, to think as God thinks about God and man. Man is enabled to think from

a centre in God and need not depend on his autonomous reason. This movement of thought from God to man may be understood to follow the movement of the incarnation. The "life", the very nature of God which man may share in Christ, flows from God to man. So too, the source of "light" is with God. It is this fact, that the Truth of the Gospel is grounded in God Himself, that ultimately lies behind its self-authenticating nature. It is for this reason too that McLeod Campbell considers it necessary to attack "natural man's" use of reason in religious questions. Here it is that we may see the contribution which the empirical tradition has made to theological enquiry. McLeod Campbell makes it very clear that while men's experience in the world and their ways of thinking are adequate in the world, they are disastrous when applied to God.\(^1\) He insists that the object of faith must be understood in a way appropriate to itself. He makes this point by saying that it is almost as if a sixth bodily "sense" were required and this spiritual capacity to understand its spiritual object, he speaks of in terms of the work of the Holy Spirit.

1. Campbell's general position is not very different from that of Luther and Calvin who both give reason a large role in its proper place. (see T.H.L. Parker, *Doctrine of the Knowledge of God* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1952)p. 131 ff. Luther especially has been charged with "irrationalism" but it is a superficial judgement. Paul Watson in *Let God be God!* (London: Epworth Press, 1947)p. 86, writes, "It is in virtue of his reason, Luther holds, that a man is worthy to be called and is, a man. Reason is a "natural light" that is kindled from the "divine light" and above "all other things in this life, it is something excellent and divine". It is the discoverer and governor of all arts and sciences and "whatever of wisdom, power, virtue and glory is possessed by men in this life". About reason in this sense of the term, Luther can wax almost lyrical. What he condemns is the use men commonly make of their reason, when they apprehend, judge and discourse about matters pertaining to God and their own relationship to him".
CHAPTER III - McLeod Campbell's Row Teaching

From the point of view of theological inquiry, the important thing is not that McLeod Campbell spoke of "revelation" but that when he did, he pointed to Jesus Christ. It was in the movement of God to man in the man Jesus Christ that McLeod Campbell saw the centre of all Christian doctrine. No matter whether he is expounding the doctrine of providence, or atonement, or eschatology, his thought centres in what we learn from Jesus Christ. We learn not only from Jesus' words but also from His actions, for His teaching and His life are a consistent unity. In fact, His very life itself in which He does His work of Atonement is grounded in His act of incarnation. In order to express adequately this "matter of fact" which the Christian is called to proclaim, McLeod Campbell uses the categories of thought in which Scripture witnesses to it. That means that he speaks of the concrete reality of the Person of Jesus Christ. He does not treat Him as a principle or as an example of a general truth, but rather as a particular, concrete, reality to be witnessed to in particular, concrete categories of thought. We shall turn now to see how he carries this out in dealing with the "history" of Christ, especially when he defines the "love" which Christ has come to reveal.

The "History" of Christ

McLeod Campbell insists that we see that God is love and as we have seen, he points us to the humanity of Jesus Christ to determine the meaning of the word "love". The word "love" cannot be understood in its fullness apart from the work of
Christ. Even "Creation could not fully manifest the love of God". 1 It was love in God to create, but to know what we mean when we say that God is love, we must look to the work of Christ.

The man who knows the history of the atonement, has learned from that work what the love of God is - what God means when he speaks of love - what is meant by saying that God is love - "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins". Love is a feeling cherished towards a being; and if we would know what that feeling in God is, we may see it working or acting in the work of Christ; and looking at this work, we see what the word means. Now, Christ died for the enemies of God, and Christ is God in human nature, and his object was to reconcile these enemies to God. Here, then, was love - a desire to bless his enemies - and to bless them by making them partakers in his own blessedness. 2

From looking to Christ’s work we see what God is like, we see God’s character revealed by that work to be love, and that love to be the kind that blesses enemies. The very fact that God wishes to bless his enemies, means, however, that he does not wish them to remain in their evil state. The kind of love which Christ teaches us is in God, is the kind that desires men to be removed from their evil state of captivity to sin, the flesh and the devil. Christ’s work shows us that God’s love is a redeeming love that is not satisfied to leave men in their sin but seeks to release them from its captivity and bring them to Himself as sons. McLeod Campbell frequently expresses this purpose of God in terms of men participating in God’s life or

nature. So, "...when God declares that he has given us eternal life, I understand him as meaning nothing less than his giving us a participation in this very life which he had from all eternity. And the whole history of the incarnation of God has its explanation in this, as the great purpose which God had in view". 1 But while God loves us and wishes to bless us with this gift of life, he cannot so long as men cling to sin. God hates sin and this rejection of sin is what we call holiness. McLeod Campbell goes even so far as to define God's holiness in terms of love, "...his love of goodness..." 2 but his major emphasis is that God hates sin "...as a pure condemnation of evil as it is in itself..." 3 His point is that God is not "getting even with" the sinner when the sinner suffers, for "...in that it is God in our nature who is the propitiatory sacrifice, the atonement declares that God makes sinners miserable merely because of his hatred to sin". 4 But McLeod Campbell does not attempt to make an easy separation between sin and the person who sins. "It is not the sin, simply, that is considered by Christ, but the person who sins. He not only sees the thing which is an abomination to him, but he sees also a person guilty of this thing; and his interest in the sight, is not simply interest which arises from his love of a good thing, and his hatred of an evil thing, but is the interest which arises from his love to the person in whom is this evil thing". 5 McLeod Campbell insists that God's love is not earned by any good in us but is "...love to our persons

1. Ibid. vol.I, p.8  
2. Ibid. vol.I, p.11  
3. Ibid. vol.I, p.11  
4. Ibid. vol.I, 1.12  
5. Ibid. vol.II, pp. 286, 287
apart from what we are..."1 Our sin does not prevent God being interested in us, "...it only affects the character of that interest: making love to be a holy longing over us, that we should be delivered from sin".2 It is this love of God to us that we see in Jesus Christ's yearning over us and wishing that we should be delivered from sin. But because Christ is truly human, this yearning love and condemnation of sin is at the same time his human response and agreement with God. McLeod Campbell taught that Jesus Christ not only manifests the love and holiness of God to man, but that at the same time he is the head and representative of man to God. Just as we are all connected with the first Adam, so we are all connected with the second Adam, Jesus Christ.3 He is "our brother, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh..."4 This fact is of vital importance because it means that everything that Christ did both in his humiliation and his exaltation, he did for us.5 This means that the history of Christ is of importance to us.

This then, is the history of Christ.
He came forth from the bosom of the Father; he came into the world; he became a man; he was born of a woman; he was born under the law; he was in our condition, in our nature, in our world, exposed to the attacks of Satan, our great spiritual foe: in this condition he constantly showed an unchanging and uncompromising hatred of all sin, and choice of all goodness; he showed an unbroken devotedness and love to God; he showed a continued and unchanging, holy

1. Ibid. vol. II, p.287
2. Ibid. vol. II, p.287
3. Sermon, 1, XI, p.1
5. Ibid. vol. II, p.255
tenderness and yearning of heart towards the children of men; he showed his love to his Father by the most deep and bitter sorrow, because his Father's name was not honoured; rivers of water ran down his eyes, because men kept not the law of his God; and he showed his love to man by his bitter grief, for man; weeping over Jerusalem, and saying, Oh that thou hadst known, in this thy day, the things that belong to thy peace! After having lived this life of holy loving devotedness to the glory of God, and to the true interests of men ... he concluded the whole by his death on the cross. In that death he declared the same thing which he had declared during his life ... so that his death was just the completing of that great work of the revelation of God which was contained in all his life.

This is the first part of the history of Christ, but before we proceed to see what McLeod Campbell says of the rest, it should be noted that he gives a great emphasis to the life of Christ as well as to Christ's death. This history of Christ begins with his coming from "The bosom of the Father" and becoming man. This "history" of Christ may be considered a movement that begins from eternity and in its first part, ends on the Cross. McLeod Campbell's great concern is to show that the purpose of redemption is seen in Christ's life as well as his death. In fact, Christ's life and death are not two different things but rather they are one, the death being the conclusion and completion of this life of humiliation. In another place, McLeod Campbell wishes his hearers

...to see the difference between Christ's condemnation of sin in the flesh, by his righteous life in flesh, and Christ's condemnation of sin, in his dying for sinners. This last would not, of itself, have been a manifestation of the evil in

1. Ibid. vol. II, pp. 252, 253
us - of the nature and character of the evil. It would have been merely a general tendency that we are not what we ought to be; but Christ coming into our flesh and being perfectly holy in it, was a broad and distinct manifestation of what is wrong in us, and a continual declaration of what that is which God condemns.¹

Such a distinction between Christ's life and death may be thought to separate them, but in fact, this distinction serves much the same purpose as the distinction between active and passive obedience in orthodox Reformed theology,² which intended that the importance of both might not be neglected.

The life and death of Christ, McLeod Campbell refers to as Christ's humiliation, and it is obvious that he sees Christ as a man of sorrows yearning with holy love over the sins of the world. That he should be holy in our flesh, and sorrow over our sins, is not merely an incidental part of Christ's work. It is quite central, firstly, in that it shows us what God thinks of our sin, and secondly, that it teaches us how we should regard sin.

And how was Christ in the world? As the great confessor of its sin. He was in the world as condemning sin in the flesh. Above all, he suffered and died and thus expressed his Amen to God's righteous sentence upon sin. Now this is to have the mind of Christ, that we should confess the sin that is in mankind, as Christ confessed it. There is this difference between Christ and us, that Christ, being perfectly holy, had no personal sin to confess; but we have the

¹. Ibid. vol. I, p.342
2. Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (E.T.) (London:G.Allen and Unwin,1950), p.467. See especially, however, Calvin's Institutes, II, XVI, 5 where Calvin clearly sets out the importance of "the whole course of his (Christ's) obedience".
mind of Christ concerning sin, when we see our sin as Christ saw it, and feel about it as Christ felt, and confess our sin as Christ confessed it for us.1

Once again we see McLeod Campbell's emphasis on the "mind of Christ" that men are to have in them, and this time it is in order that men may think correctly about sin. First of all, it is that men may see the costliness of sin. Christ revealed God's hatred of sin and His longing that men might be delivered from it by His suffering and death. To think as Christ thinks about sin is to agree with God in this condemnation of sin.

Equally important with this aspect of Christ's work as revealing God's condemnation of sin in which we are to participate, is that by Christ's work we are enabled to look at our sin. This very work of Christ which reveals my sin, reveals it at the same time as forgiven. McLeod Campbell insists "that the very work of Christ, which shows me my sin, as having been a barrier between me and God, shows me that barrier as already removed. This is the reason why seeing and knowing Christ is a provision for my being contrite; because, as a thing forgiven, I can look my sin in the face, and so learn its deformity."2 McLeod Campbell is teaching that a man must be reconciled to God in order to be able to face his sin and see it seriously as the evil thing it is. Natural man does not have this power to face his sin in all its ugliness, and still come to the conclusion that he may rejoice that his sin is forgiven. Natural man, man apart from the Gift of Christ, cannot be truly humble and contrite, - that

1. Ibid. vol. II, p. 238
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 103
is, face his sin and confess it. ¹ It is in fact a spiritual
discernment to know sin and it requires the work of the Holy
Spirit.² On this view of sin, and its confession, McLeod
Campbell is forced to ask how it comes to pass "...that humility
and contrition of spirit are so often demanded as prerequisites,
before there is any warrant to say, 'Christ died for me, Christ
has the Spirit for me'. Had they been prerequisites, they were
prerequisites which we never could have had".³ Here we see how
the autonomous reason of the natural man's way of thinking makes
him distort the free grace of the Gospel. They think that it
is not enough that they believe and insist that they must do
something to merit salvation. "They are willing to do something,
if we would tell them what to do; and they suppose we call them
to do something, when we say believe; but in their hearts they
are not willing to believe the love that God has manifested to
them, that Christ has already put away their sins..."⁴ McLeod
Campbell observes that a man could preach Socinian or Arminian
doctrine without their being any enmity aroused, but that when
he dared to preach the free grace of God there was great indigna-
tion.¹ The whole problem is that people come to the Bible with
preconceived ideas of what they need and when they don't find
that, cast it aside. They take "...up a wrong notion of what
God intends for man, instead of entering into God's own intention.⁶
This is particularly distressing since Scripture uses a variety
of expressions - such as come, look, believe, hear "...all to
prevent your fixing on the act of your own mind, and to fix your

¹. Ibid. ². Ibid. vol. I, p. 104 ³. Ibid.
attention on the object, which is Jesus Christ... Why is it that when such expressions are used in religion, they turn people's attention away from the things spoken of, to themselves? It is not by looking for evidence of repentance and sorrow for sin in our own hearts that tells us of God's forgiveness, but by looking to Christ's sorrow and suffering for us, we learn at one time God's condemnation of sin and his yearning love which forgives us. But we must submit ourselves to this truth outside ourselves before we feel its power. This is true of all knowing. There can be prior objections to truth, but once the truth is experienced, these objections vanish.

When men are humbled to receive any truth, all the objections to it vanish. Thus it is in conversion. Before conversion, ten thousand difficulties arise. How can God love men who are sinners? How can God forgive them when they have done nothing to merit forgiveness? Can it be so safe to remit sin? Because men have no experience of divine love, they thus object; but the moment they believe that God has forgiven them through the blood of Jesus Christ, all their difficulties vanish.

Christ's incarnation, earthly ministry and death are not the end of this "history" of Christ. That was merely "...his history till his death; and then the fact of his resurrection, and his being exalted to the right hand of God, and the fact

1. Ibid. vol. I, p.172
2. There is an arresting similarity in the manner in which McLeod Campell treats religious "knowing" and the way in which the common sense philosophers discussed "first principles". Just as he taught that you cannot believe if you insist on asking "how", and fill your mind with difficulties rather than its proper object in Jesus Christ, so the common sense philosophers taught that if you continually question the "first principles" of knowing, you will never know.
3. Ibid. vol. I, p.254
that that man, Jesus of Nazareth, who was, upon earth, a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief - persecuted of men, and suffering at their hands an ignominious death, now sits on the throne of God; now possesses all power in heaven and earth; now reigns and rules over all upon his Father's throne.\(^1\) McLeod Campbell emphasizes that it is not enough to say that Christ is God, we must also realize that his manhood now reigns in glory. "Oh be not satisfied with words in these matters - be not satisfied with holding it as a doctrine that Christ is God; but seek to understand, and realise, to your own minds, that the very person who was upon this earth, Jesus of Nazareth, that very person who was crucified on the cross - that very person who was laid in the grave, is now reigning, in the glory of God, on the throne of God.\(^2\) The reason McLeod Campbell emphasizes the manhood of the risen Lord is that this risen humanity is ours, bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh. What Christ did, he did for us "...in the judgement of God, Christ did not suffer as a private person, but as a head and representative, so, also, all rose when Christ rose; he rose not as a private person, but as a Head.\(^3\) Because Christ offered himself as our Head and representative to God, and because God accepted him as such, the barrier between man and God has been removed.

\(\ldots\)Christ, the Son of God, God in our nature, God over all blessed for ever, and made of the seed of David according to the flesh; this Lord Jesus Christ, did, as the head and representative of the family of mankind, offer himself without spot to God, as a living sacrifice, wherewith God was well pleased; and God in acceptance of this sacrifice, this

\(^1\) Ib\(\text{id.}\) vol. II, p.253  \(^2\) Ib\(\text{id.}\) vol. II, p.254  \(^3\) Ib\(\text{id.}\) vol. II, pp.95,96
holy offering of Christ, did remove absolutely, unconditionally, without waiting for us to say whether we desired it or not, the barrier between Himself and us; and gave to us Christ, on the ground of whose work the barrier was removed to be a living way of access, having the Holy Spirit for us, for that end...

McLeod Campbell is not satisfied merely to say that Christ took "human nature" up into the Godhead, he insists that Christ took our human nature there. If Christ is to be our representative then he must truly represent us - even to taking upon himself our flesh as it actually is.

...God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh. The first thing is, he took the flesh, that very flesh which occasioned the weakness of the law, to please God. Mark what is here said. I am not stating simply that Christ took our human nature, but that he took our nature, just as we have it - just as those had it in whose case it was that the law was weak through the flesh - he took that very flesh which made the law weak.2

The teaching that Christ took upon himself our fallen human nature has been questioned in the past, in fact, McLeod Campbell's friend, Edward Irving, was deposed from the ministry of the Church of Scotland for teaching an exaggerated form of the doctrine in 1833. McLeod Campbell was not charged with teaching this doctrine at his heresy trial in 1831, yet it was at that time considered to be a heresy.3 This teaching was

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 101
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 340
3. This teaching was condemned in the Assemblies of 1830 and 1831. In 1831 the same Assembly that deposed McLeod Campbell, deprived Mr. H.B. McLean of his licence as a probationer for teaching this doctrine. It was mentioned as one of McLeod Campbell's"errors" after his trial but it was not one of the charges against him at the time as he had feared.
called a speculation by its opponents. Yet is it not one of the best examples of the empirical approach to doctrine? What man has ever seen any human nature other than ours? Where in Scripture does it state that Christ had a different human nature than ours? McLeod Campbell insists that Christ was sinless and what more need be or can be said? On the other hand, Scripture says Christ was made sin, and a curse for us. It also says clearly that he was tempted and there must surely be some question as to whether a hypothetical unfallen humanity could be tempted? If you desire to maintain the notion of an unfallen humanity are you not driven back to some such error as the Roman doctrine of the immaculate conception of Mary, or even more logically, an infinite regress of immaculate Marys?

McLeod Campbell insists that it is in no vain speculation to say that Christ took upon himself our sinful humanity but rather that it is consistent with saying that he took flesh at all. "To say that Christ took my liability to hunger, and cold, and nakedness, and to deny that he took my sinful flesh, is to give me a high-priest that will sympathise with me in lesser matters, but not in great things. Every child of God knows that what he needs is a high-priest who can understand his inward trials, and his continual conflict with the world, the flesh, and the devil". McLeod Campbell stresses the fact that Christ cannot sympathise with that which he does not know, and you can feel a pastoral concern directing his thought in this direction.

Jesus Christ has "experienced" our human condition and therefore

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 347
has "experimental" knowledge of our condition. This is important because Christ Himself in our human nature was Himself supported by the sympathy of God the Father. We, therefore, may look at Christ's life to see how we are to think about God's sympathy for us. Christ reveals to us the feelings God has towards us and at the same time, what our response to these feelings should be. It is vital that we understand first the nature of the "feelings", this "sympathy" of God with us, in order that our responses may be that which the nature of its object seeks. It is for that reason that,

...the sympathy of Christ with us, in our conflict, while thus a relief as sympathy, is to be felt by us as precious because it gives personality to holiness. Nothing is more fatal to the love of God in us, than our conceiving of God just as if he were a goodness, a holiness or a love, and losing the apprehension of God's personality: nothing is more fitted to bring us into the condition of contemplation instead of that of communion. When, in our conflict with sin, we are not merely thinking, This is a good cause, and this is the right thing, and these are the right feelings; we are knowing God as a person.

We may also say that McLeod Campbell emphasises Christ taking up our nature as we have it because of a principle of representation which he states as follows:

Some men say there is a sufficiency in Christ, though he only died for some. This is an awful mockery of God. A Sufficiency in Christ beyond the actual atonement! There can be no such sufficiency. The sufficiency and the intrinsic value of it are quite different things. The value is in what he was; the sufficiency was his doing it as a representative, and cannot extend beyond those whom he represented.

In this passage, McLeod Campbell is referring to the extent of the atonement, yet surely although he distinguishes between value and sufficiency, the principle that, that which was represented in the actual atonement is the limiting factor, applies to both. We can see how this applied both in regard to the condemnation of sin in the flesh and to the love which God feels towards men. McLeod Campbell not only argues that if Christ did not die for all men then we cannot say he loved all men, but even more, that if Christ died only for some then we have no proof of the sin of the rest. But although Christ's life and death is certainly a condemnation of sin, it is more than that. It is also a sacrifice in order that we might be delivered from this evil.

If not done as a sacrifice, the fact itself would merely leave us where we were. It would shed light on the evil of our state, but would not have granted us deliverance from that evil. But when we see Christ doing this as a sacrifice for sin - when we see him coming into our nature, and taking it up, and presenting it holy to God, and doing this as a sacrifice for sin, then our thoughts are turned to the history of sin, and to the fact that he is not the only being who has this flesh.

When our thoughts turn to the question of who have this flesh which Christ took upon himself and cleansed, the answer is that the whole human race does. McLeod Campbell, therefore, argues that "...it was not for a mere display of the power of the Son of God, taking an unclean thing and making it clean, that Christ came and took our flesh, but that he came with

1. Ibid. vol.I, p.430  
2. Ibid. vol.I, p.342
reference to those who were dwelling in this flesh, and for them shed his blood”.  

For McLeod Campbell it is obviously an important matter to hold that the flesh which Christ took upon himself was our sinful flesh, the flesh of all mankind, because it was this flesh that Christ had taken up and made holy. The fact that Christ did this for us, as our head and representative is our only plea before God. "God saw once, and only once, all that he wished to see—all the light and holiness that he wished to see in men. This he saw in Jesus Christ, in whom he could rejoice with an infinite joy..." 

McLeod Campbell was obviously accused by some of his hearers of creating an unnecessary speculation about how Christ's human nature was holy. They asked why he should speculate about how it was holy, when he was willing to admit that it was holy from Christ's conception to his death? His answer is that he is concerned to teach his people how to be holy and that it is only Christ's holiness in our nature that makes our holiness possible.

What is more, the fact that Christ was holy in our nature makes invalid our excuses about how his nature was different from ours. He said, it was necessary because,

...I am sent to teach you repentance.

Because I am sent to teach you to be holy and because I know no other way in which you can be holy but through the Spirit of Christ; and because I know of no other way in which you can be made to look to Christ to present you holy but by seeing how his human nature was presented holy. As long as you do not know that this human nature has thro' the eternal Spirit been presented holy, you are not in a condition to be holy,

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 343  
2. Ibid. vol. II, p. 128
you feel an insuperable difficulty in thinking of your own nature.\footnote{1}

It was through the Holy Spirit that Christ was presented holy, but now Christ has the Spirit to give to men. God has "...given you Christ, a holy high priest, touched with a fellow feeling of your infirmities, once tempted in every point like as you are, but who overcame all temptations, and now has a present strength for you to enable you to overcome..."\footnote{2} He is merely teaching, as both Scripture and Calvin did, that Jesus Christ is both our justification and our sanctification.

We have seen that McLeod Campbell frequently refers to Christ as our high priest and his life and death as a sacrifice. It is of interest to see how he understands the use of these terms in the Old Testament. When he explains the place of sacrifice in the Jewish religion, he says that their purpose was to cleanse the people so that they could worship God. The Jewish people, despite their uncleanness, were put in a position to have that uncleanness taken away and to draw near to God in worship. McLeod Campbell says that if men had understood that this was the object of an atonement or a propitiation for sin, they would not have difficulty in seeing how this could be done for those who are lost. Through the blood of Christ provision has been made for men to worship God. If men do not make use of this provision, if they refuse to offer worship to God, then they will be punished, just as men of the "Old dispensation", for despising

\footnote{1} Sermons, 3, XXI, p.18; also S.L. vol.I,301 "...we are saved from the worshipping of the human nature of Christ, as if it were in itself good, when we are made to see that it was not in itself different from our nature, although always holy by the Holy Ghost".
\footnote{2 Op.cit. vol.II, p.134}
the provision of the earthly sanctuary, were stoned. So "... we are taught to expect that when God has made provision for men in order that they may worship Him and give Him glory, God will punish those who despise this provision".  

On the basis of this understanding of the sacrificial system, we may understand Christ as our high priest, representing us within the Temple.

In the service of the Temple while the high priest was alone within the veil, the people were without, but in Truth both were engaged in one act of worship, and so it is now; for the members of Jesus all participate in the worship which their great high priest is rendering to the Father within the veil. There is but one Spirit, and the Spirit in which Jesus within the veil is honouring, worshiping and glorifying the Father is the same spirit which is in all the members, so that it is one great work of giving glory to God through the living Head Christ Jesus.

It is McLeod Campbell's contention that God's intention in giving men Christ is to restore men to the worship and fellowship of God, that led him to see great difficulties in the currently held doctrines of the atonement.

The Work of Christ - Our Substitute

It was particularly in regard to the current teaching on the substitutionary aspect of Christ's work that McLeod Campbell came to see a fundamental error. He did not deny that there was a substitutionary aspect to Christ's work, rather he said that "...the great foundation of the Gospel is the shedding of the blood of the just for the unjust ... this distinctly implies a

1. This discussion in Sermon 3, XXXVI, pp.16,17
2. Ibid. 3, XXXVI, p.23
substitution - this distinctly implies one bearing something for others - the just bearing for the unjust. This is a subject upon which there existed much error..."¹ McLeod Campbell admits that the righteousness of God demanded "misery in the experience of the sinful children of men ... if man had lived, apart from Christ - if man were contemplated as continuing in being, apart from the work of Christ - no doubt the body would have died, but the Spirit would have lived; and there was a misery which would have told forth in the history of that spirit, continuing to exist forever, the enmity which God bore to sin".² The suffering which was due us was the curse which God put upon sin. McLeod Campbell does not deny that Christ suffered and that he suffered for us. His suffering was indeed "...the suffering of one being for other beings, and was a substitution of suffering; and was a suffering instead of what would have been; but for the shedding of his blood".³

It is at this point that he disagrees with many of his contemporaries. He is willing to speak of Christ's suffering but he insists that Christ did not suffer what man actually would have suffered. He suffered in a different way from the way man would have suffered because his character was different from that of man, the sinner. Christ's suffering was holy suffering.

Christ's sufferings took their character from what Christ was. He was in our nature but not as we would have been in it apart from his work. He was in it as the holy One of God therefore what Christ endured was a holy suffering. In every part of his

1. Sermons, 3, XXVII, p.5  
2. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.6 see also 3,XXVII,p.22 and S.L.vol.II,p.323  
3. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.7.
endurance there was only holiness. There was neither goodness nor wickedness in
pain by itself; but the pain of the holy
Jesus, being always a thing endured by
him in his holy acknowledgment of God,
and in his holy condemnation of the evil
of man, all this made it to be holy
suffering.1

This point is very well taken. Any view of Christ's
sufferings which makes it appear that God wishes to extract
a certain amount of pain to satisfy his "justice" makes God
a bully. What McLeod Campbell wishes to emphasise is the
character of Christ's sufferings, - what they were meant to
teach us of God's character. He emphasises once again that we
must look to Christ to learn what God is like. "...if you would
indeed give God glory, you must know that God - you cannot
praise an unknown God. ...if you would know God it is in Christ
Jesus that you must see him. Out of Christ you cannot know
Him - and if in Christ you would see him, it must be through
the apprehending of the work of God in Christ and through the
seeing of the mind of God in Christ; - and that you see in know¬
ing the feelings which God expresses in Christ".2

The major point that we must understand is that while it
was necessary for Christ to suffer, he did not do so grudgingly
but with the mind of God.3 Christ does not have his suffering
forced upon him, he is not merely an instrument in God's hand,
but rather he gladly and freely takes upon himself his entire
history of suffering and exaltation. He does this not in order
to change the mind of his Father, saying "...I love these
creatures better than my Father and will be content to suffer

1. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p. 8  2. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p. 9  3. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p. 8
for them in order to win this favour for them, but he says I enter into my Father's sorrowing for their sin and his longing to see them holy, and I can thankfully receive from my Father the command to come and do his will in order to their salvation.¹

It is this complete harmony between the mind of God the Father and Christ the Son that determines the character of the sufferings of the Son. It shows that what God seeks is righteousness and not merely to collect a debt of pain.² "The mere agony which Christ endured if it be contemplated just as agony, affords no explanation. The mere agony which Christ endured would lead people to feel as if God were capricious and cruel - just taking a certain quantity of pain from one being in place of a certain quantity of pain in another".³ What makes Christ's suffering righteous is its character, and its character may be seen in terms of its intention. What Christ's suffering is meant to do is to make peace between God and man, that we "should be found together", that "...the Just One, who suffers, and the unjust for whom he suffers should ultimately rejoice together in the Lord God that the holy man Jesus Christ, God in our nature, shedding his blood for the remission of our sins, and we the unholy breakers of the law, for whose sins his blood was shed, should ultimately be found together, in this condition that His fulness should be flowing into us - that His love should be received and abiding in our hearts, and that he should be rejoicing over us, and that we should be rejoicing in Him - therefore it was a righteous transaction".⁴

1. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.12
2. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.14
3. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.15
4. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.19
Once again we have one of McLeod Campbell's rare illustrations; this time based on the relation of a father to a son. He says that if we were to see a strong man beating a weak child we might consider it a case of gross cruelty. But if we knew that the man were the father and the child a son and that the boy is being chastised that he might become a good child and happy with the father - then it would be a different case. So it is that if we are merely told that Christ is a Holy One suffering for the unholy it cannot seem right. But, if you see that the intention behind allowing Christ to be put to death by wicked men, is that these same wicked men, these murderers, should as members of his living body be brought "...as members of the entire Christ rejoicing together in the holy love of that God under whom this is taking place, then you have in the blessed and glorious result the explanation why God should have permitted such a thing, and you see how it has been altogether a righteous proceeding..."\(^1\)

The error in thinking which McLeod Campbell sees as most prevalent is that which sees the atonement as having as its object, not this dwelling together of God and His creatures, but rather that men should be delivered from suffering. If Christ's suffering is seen to be just that amount which men would have had to suffer throughout eternity if Christ had not suffered for them, then the atonement must be limited, or all men must be finally saved. If Christ suffered an amount of punishment equal to that which all men would have deserved, then none of these

1. Ibid. 3, XXVII, pp. 19, 20
men for whom he died can receive punishment, for that would be
to the infliction of punishment twice for the same sin, which
would be injustice.\(^1\) Therefore, on this presupposition, to say
that Christ suffered and died for all men would be to say that
no man will now be punished for his sin.

On the other hand, if we again take the presupposition that
Christ's suffering is of just that amount needed to free men
from eternal punishment, and add to that our observation that
not all men are in fact saved, then we must conclude that Christ
did not suffer and die for all men. These men who are not saved,
are by definition not saved from punishment and it is impossible
to think of God requiring suffering from Christ for any who shall
themselves suffer.\(^2\)

The error lies in thinking that Christ suffered in order
that men might avoid punishment, rather than recognising that
his object was to take them out of their sins and restore them
to God and as a result of \(that\), deliver them from the wrath to
come. "This is a vital error because it leads to all the other
errors of limiting the atonement - of having a false ground of
assurance - and of feeling as if the Son were more merciful than
the Father. All these errors are to be referred to this root,
that they don't know what an atonement is - but they take a
carnal, a mercantile, and an arithmetic view of it - they calcu-
late it as it were by figures, and think, in this way to measure
the value and sufficiency of that sacrifice which Christ offered
for the whole world".\(^3\)

McLeod Campbell says that those who hold this false "mercantile" view of the atonement do not even attempt to prove their doctrine by quotations from the word of God. 1 This is where their trouble stems from; they wish to oppose their notion of the will of God to the clear witness of the Bible. Here we can see that the "mercantile" measuring of amounts of punishment was part of a causal way of thinking of the will of God that ended in scores of contradictions.

...instead of taking God at his word when he says he loves the world, and willeth not the death of a sinner, and expresses his interest in all men, you will try to prove by your reasonings and your inferences, that what is the plain meaning of God's word cannot be its real meaning, because men perish. While God is seeking in every word of the Bible, to leave man's destruction at man's door, how will you dare to leave it at God's door? How will you dare to make God responsible for the perishing of those who perish? O do you not see that if you do so you are in very truth making God responsible for the sin of all who sin? Wherein is the difference? Men say the will of God - why then have we sin? Why then have we liars? - thieves - robbers? And if you must admit that these things are against the will of God, why not admit men's perishing is against the will of God? 2

1. Ibid. 3, XXXVI, p. 13  It is interesting to note that in the Nature of the Atonement written some twenty-five years after these sermons, McLeod Campbell defends John Owen against unjust criticism for his use of "mercenary" language. "The mere language of commerce, viz, "purchase, ransom", etc., is not Owen's, but that of the Scriptures..." Nature of the Atonement, p. 57

McLeod Campbell was aware of course of the difference between the use of such language and an entire theory dominated by it;

2. Ibid. 3, XXX, p. 10
Here is the great difference between the application of the empirical method as we see it in McLeod Campbell, and its application by the natural man. McLeod Campbell "...takes God at His word..." His authority is Scripture and the history of the man Jesus Christ to which it witnesses. His opponents argue from the fact that "...because men perish", that is God's will. Their authority, their "object" is the world and not God and His Word to men.

**God's Love and Providence**

McLeod Campbell was aware that the current doctrine of the substitutionary aspect of Christ's work was based on misconceptions of God's character. It seemed to teach of a God the Father who was a stern Judge demanding a certain amount of punishment, and of a Christ the Son who was merciful and paid the price. There tended to be this fundamental "split" in the personality of God and the relationship between the Father and the Son tended to be thought of basically in legal and mercantile categories. McLeod Campbell considered these categories and ways of thinking to be wrong and obscure the unity of character and will of the Father and the Son. He claims that some live under the delusion"... that some parts of God's character are opposite to other parts - his justice, for example, opposite to his mercy, and his holiness opposite to his goodness, tenderness and love", but this is not so, "...they are all one thing - one manifestation of this great Truth that God is 'love'."¹ McLeod Campbell argues that rather than give love its proper place as an attribute of God, men have

¹ *S.L. vol. II*, p.14
tended to emphasise all the other attributes. "They would narrow this which is the foundation of all, and extend the rest".¹ He declares that men "make a full circle" of God's justice by declaring that the law condemns every man and exposes all to punishment. So also God's holiness and truth are thought of as unlimited. "While you make a complete circle of all God's other attributes, why will you make this attribute of love but a part of the circle?"² His answer is that the sinner is not convinced of his sin and reconciled to God by these other attributes - but only by the love of God. "The secret is this - It is not God's justice - it is not God's holiness - it is not God's Truth that is the instrument of convincing a sinner of his sins - that is the instrument of forcing him out of his sins and bringing him back to God, but it is God's love".³ Because it is God's love that threatened the sinner, he tries to avoid it by making it an indefinite, impersonal, mysterious thing.

They will not deny that God is love, but they will throw God's love at a distance; they cast a mist around it, and so they reduce themselves to the condition of seeing no proof that God loves them. There is they say, love in God to some persons, they do not know who, but they have no proof that they themselves are the objects of that love; and after they have thus accomplished the object of having a conception of God's character without including in it any thing personal to themselves, then they say it is all a mystery, and with this word they shut out inquiry, appear to themselves to express humility, and thus escape from experiencing the power of the manifestation of the glory of God, as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ.⁴

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 191
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 192
3. Ibid. vol. I, p. 192
4. Ibid. vol. I, p. 191
It is the impersonal concept of God that McLeod Campbell is opposed to. The category of thought which seemed to present the greatest challenge to the personal conception of a God who is in actuality a living being, was that of power. He does not deny that God is powerful, but he resists the tendency to make this power overshadow the character which it is to serve. McLeod Campbell denies that it is to power that we are to trust, no matter how piously it is thought of.

Is it to power merely we trust? Is it to strength? To one who is mightier than we, and of whom, therefore, we are afraid, because he is a being who could destroy us? ... Such homage as springs merely from the feeling, "I am dependent upon him", God acknowledges not. It is offering an insult to God: It is saying, "If I could be independent, I would not depend upon him".

It is of interest to note that writing later in his life (1868), McLeod Campbell makes a reference to the theologian who emphasised "absolute dependence" as the central religious "feeling" of the Christian. This is the only direct reference McLeod Campbell made to Schleiermacher and it is a very acute criticism of how philosophical concepts can endanger the acknowledgment of God's character as personal. Referring to Schleiermacher, he wrote that,

As to religion, he never lost altogether what his early Moravian training had quickened in him, and its power seemed greatest towards the close; but his faith rather acknowledged God as the source of all that others were to him — of his own and their capacities of love — than as hearing and responding to the love which says, My son, give Me thine heart. He

1. Ibid. vol.I, p.189
thought he was able to co-ordinate his religion and his philosophy...but I could not but fear that his philosophical difficulty as to the personality of God affected his heart's Godward movements. 1

Over against emphasising man's dependence on God's power, McLeod Campbell emphasised that all God's attributes and actions were to be understood and interpreted by the knowledge of God's love. Indeed, there is "...no one part of God's acting, from the beginning to the end, that any man can have a right apprehension of who does not know that God is love". 2 He found it necessary in his preaching, to emphasise this fact very often with particular reference to the understanding of God's providence. He found that many people had a fatalistic, impersonal view of history. Often they might hide this by pious reference to the fact that "God does all things for his own glory". For McLeod Campbell, this was not good enough - what did they mean by God's glory? Did these words not often mask an ignorance of God's character?

...we must know what the glory of God is, before we can understand what we are saying when we use such language, as that his own glory is the object of God's acts ... glory is neither more nor less than the manifestation of excellence ... And what is the excellent thing in God, the manifestation of which is his glory? It is this that God is love. 3

1. Memorials, vol.II, p.202. McLeod Campbell's point may be illustrated from Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, (E.T.), (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928) where he deals with God's attributes first under the heading, "God is Holy" and "God is Just" and then merely adds a short Appendix on the "Mercy of God". There he says that "To attribute mercy to God is more appropriate to the language of preaching and poetry than to that of dogmatic theology" (p.353). How far this is from McLeod Campbell!
2. S.L. vol.I, p.189
3. Ibid. vol.I, p.190
McLeod Campbell saw the love of God to be present in all of life, and God as directly concerned with his world. He contrasted the personal thanksgiving of the Psalmist with the impersonal recognition of blessings which he met from his parishioners. The Psalmist said, "How excellent is thy loving-kindness, O God!" He saw in God's preserving man and beast, just the loving-kindness of the Lord; and he did not say to himself that there was comfort and plenty because of second causes; but because of God's loving-kindness. ¹ The problem, as McLeod Campbell saw it, was that people were separating between God's actions, and God's character (his feelings). They had in their minds that God was working out some plan in the course of events, but that He was not concerned personally with them.

You are little aware to what a fearful extent men have come to separate between God's actions and God's feelings - to what a fearful extent they have come to look on what God does, not as revealing us what God feels, but just as if were some blind fate or necessity that was producing events. I refer to the general feeling, that things happen in the natural course of events - that they come to men in the course of God's providence - that things are just brought about while God is pursuing some plan, or seeking to accomplish some object of his own, and not seeing that they happen to them because of God's thoughts about them, and because of God's love to them. ²

The theology of McLeod Campbell's day generally considered the doctrine of election under the broader aspect of Divine decrees. This meant that it was closely related to the doctrine of Providence. It is interesting to see that in his Row preaching, McLeod Campbell would still refer on the odd occasion to

¹ Ibid. vol. II, pp. 16, 17  ² Ibid. vol. II, pp. 14, 15
"election". ¹ When he does refer to election it is not certain what he means, and in one revealing passage we find him clearly in difficulties by his use of this term which meant one thing to his hearers, and increasingly meant something different to himself. He begins by distinguishing between the character of God and the purpose of God in election. He said that the

...revealed character of God is perfectly a distinct thing from that purpose of God in election, according to which God has brought those who are in the light into the light in as much as they know not why they are brought but the light if God revealed for God is love and election is not a thing that shows us character in God, it shows us the sovereign God, but the character is revealed in that which is before the election - not before in point of time: because all things are with respect of time the same with God - yesterday, today and forever - but before it in arrangement for the redemption is first and out of it comes the election.²

In regard to Providence in general, McLeod Campbell had deprecated the separation of God's action from God's character, but here he tells us that it must be done. He further confuses us by saying that here we see "the sovereign God", or in other words, the power of God. But he has emphasised elsewhere that we must not separate God's attributes so simply, and he has particularly emphasised the danger presented in making God's power dominant. In this passage he has isolated election as a case of power separated from character, and has in consequence to separate election and redemption. We can see here the rather ambiguous use of the term "redemption", which was later to be

¹. Ibid. vol. II, p. 364; Sermons, 1, III, pp. 15, 16
². Sermons, 1, III, pp. 15, 16
regretted. We can also see that he is struggling with a concept of election which cannot be retained consistently in his thought. He has been at pains to insist that God's love is unlimited and is the basis of God's character and that this character can be seen in God's acts in Providence. Yet the "elect", the result of God's action in election, were by definition, only a limited number. It has always been a fact that if you look at humanity as a whole, only a limited number have been Christians, even in name. There have always been those who refuse the gospel and would not be pleased to be called "Christian" even in an honourific sense. According to the thought of McLeod Campbell's time, and, at this period at least, of McLeod Campbell himself, it would be quite reasonable to argue that God's love is unlimited and election is limited. But it must be remembered how infrequently McLeod Campbell spoke of election. In practice the speculative doctrine of election had been replaced by the Biblical emphasis on God's taking up man in the humanity of Jesus Christ. This positive teaching removed the necessity for speculation. One reason, however, why the narrow doctrine of election would have been generally accepted, is that the same empirical tradition which aided McLeod Campbell in establishing an objective doctrine of God with so many Biblical characteristics, can equally lead one to base doctrines on "experience" in a general sense. The empirical method can have a fruitful application when the object which is allowed to present itself is God in Christ revealing Himself. It can also, however, support the "common sense" thinking of the "natural man" with which McLeod Campbell found himself
in conflict. When the empirical tradition takes as its "object", the material world of the natural man and imparts its questions and therefore its presuppositions to theology, there is bound to be confusion. Doctrines such as McLeod Campbell's view of the Atonement had their object in Christ. The doctrine of election found itself all too easily (although not necessarily) supported on the basis of empirical observations of the world.\(^1\) Karl Barth has discussed this problem in a very striking manner in his *Church Dogmatics*.\(^2\) There he points out that when men look at the world around them and see that only some men are Christians, they ask how this fact is to be explained?

And how especially is it to be explained that there seem to be those who either outwardly or inwardly cannot hear the Gospel? And if this is a fact, what is its bearing on our understanding of the other observation, that there are some who do seem actually to hear the Gospel? To answer this the Bible is consulted (although only in a secondary capacity), and it is shown that some are elected by God and some rejected. But this raises the further question: Is it right to go to the Bible with a question dictated to us by experience, i.e., with a presupposition which has only an empirical basis, in order then to understand the statements of the Bible as an answer to this question, which means chiefly as a confirmation of the presupposition which underlies the question?\(^3\)

We can see in McLeod Campbell's preaching that he did not base his views of Providence on the empirical observations of

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1. As in *Calvin's Institutes*, (L.C.C.ed) III,XXII,7, "If all men in general bowed the knee before Christ, election would be general; now in the fewness of believers a manifest diversity appears". This is in sorry contrast to Calvin's emphasis elsewhere that Christ is the "mirror" of election.
3. Ibid. II, 2, p.38
the world which are available to the natural man. He recognised that there was a wide difference between the way that the natural man and the Christian look at life. The two could look at the same occurrence and come to distinctly different interpretations of it. What one man would consider a great misfortune or a disaster, a Christian might see as a just condemnation of sin.\(^1\)

As far as the Christian is concerned, everything that happens in his life is from the hand of God and fitted to make him a better person. This is not so, however, apart from Christ for he teaches us what to know and feel and think in every circumstance. "Nothing could happen to us that would not send us to Christ, and not a single ray of light would we receive from Christ that would not continually be fitting us to understand what is going on about us."\(^2\) McLeod Campbell says that there is "...a continual connection between the event coming from God and the work already done in Christ..."\(^3\) and that the one sends us to the other and vice versa. "Oh, what a sweet and holy going backward and forward, between Christ in glory and the world around us..."\(^4\) He makes it clear, however, that this movement is one in which the world, and its events, are interpreted from Christ and not the other way around. What the world, and its events, gives us is the experience of the Truth of what we see in Christ.

Let me be alone - separated from all outward things without any human being - untempted by anything that can gratify the flesh - just alone, looking at Christ as now at the right hand of God, and considering the history of his coming

1. Sermons, 1, XI, p. 5
2. Ibid. 3, XXV, p. 15
3. Ibid. 3, XXV, p. 14
4. Ibid.
there - and from what am I learning? I am learning, not from the world, not from my own heart, not from anything about me, but from what I see in Christ. ... Then look at the change, that is made when I come into contact with my own heart, - with the world about me - with the devices of Satan - with all the sickness and death - with all the curse that is upon human life. ... There is in Jesus a light to enable one to go through all the darkness of the enemy. ... I was told before that this was provided for me in Christ but now I have the experience of the power of it.

Because the Christian can see, or should see, the hand of God in every event, and interpret every event from what he learns of God in Christ, there is a preparation for him to see that God's love extends to every man. It should be clear from providence alone, that God's love is given to sinners. "If you had been accustomed from your childhood, to see that every breath you drew - every morsel you ate - every comfort you enjoyed, was a manifestation of forgiving love - was love to a sinner - was love to an enemy who deserved it not; then when one came and told you that Christ died for you, while you were yet a sinner, you would be ready to believe it, because you would have been accustomed to see that this is in accordance with what God has always been doing - that every kindness from him has been to the unthankful and the unworthy, for there never was any deserving in us".

If McLeod Campbell can argue for the love of God seen in Providence as a preparation for seeing just as wide a love in Christ, he can also argue that Providence would not even be a fact for those outside of Christ, except for Christ. In Christ

1. Ibid. 3, XXXV, pp. 10, 11
2. S.L. vol. II, p. 17
all men have a standing with God that they do not deserve according to strict righteousness. "...to conceive that men for whom Christ did not die, are just now receiving from God, light, and rain, and food, and raiment, is to conceive of God as departing from the strict law of his righteousness without any explanation being furnished". 1 McLeod Campbell's explanation is that Christ did die for all men and that independent of what may be said about election, no man can deny that all men have proof that God loves them. While providence tells us of the wideness of God's love, it also presents us with the problem of God's righteousness in being merciful to sinners - this mercy and righteousness can only be understood finally in the work of Christ. The interpretive "key" to understanding Providence is the revelation of God in the humanity of Jesus Christ.

The Work of Christ - Christ Has the Spirit for You

We have already noted that the "history" of Christ does not end on earth. Through his humanity He has revealed God to man and represented man to God in a life of love and humiliation. But now this same humanity has been exalted to the very throne of God.

The man Christ Jesus, our brother, bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh, is, at this moment upon the throne of the Almighty God. And observe he is there,

1. Ibid. vol. I, pp.367,368. The goodness of God to all men had earlier led the Scots Covenanter theologian, James Fraser of Brae, to speak of a "common redemption" in addition to the "special redemption" of the elect. McLeod Campbell's argument at this point is not new although there is no necessary evidence that he developed this argument or any other under the influence of Fraser of Brae. See the Appendix to Brae's Treatise on Justifying Faith, (Edinburgh: Wm. Gray, 1749), p.159 cf. and Chap. V, pp. 278 ff.
not because he is God, for that was his eternal glory; but he is there in his human nature - he is, in his humanity, exalted to that high place... seek to understand, and to realise, to your own minds, that the very person who was upon this earth, Jesus of Nazareth, that very person who was crucified on the cross - that very person who was laid in the grave, is now reigning, in the glory of God, on the throne of God.  

Christ's earthly ministry enabled me to learn God's character. Now that Christ has been exalted his work continues and it is simply to give men the Spirit that they might share that revealed character. "God's character is revealed in the actual work of Christ - the work of Christ, now that he has ascended upon high, is to give me the Spirit, and the reason why Christ has the Holy Spirit for me, is to enable me to dwell in the light of this revealed character". It is not enough merely to observe God's character as revealed in Christ. We are meant to receive that character, to participate in the gift of that life. "God's gift is said to be life - eternal life - the life of God. This life of God as life in man, was manifested in the life of Christ. This same life is in you when the Spirit is revealing the glory of Christ in you; and so Christ lives in you".

Christ's life and death have actually taken away the condemnation from men, but men must share the benefits of this work. This they do through the provision of the Spirit. McLeod Campbell frequently uses the two-fold statement "Christ's work has taken away your condemnation and Christ has the Spirit for you". Theoretically, it is possible that men could "know" all that is

1. Ibid. vol.II, pp.253,254  
2. Ibid. vol.I, p.16  
3. Ibid. vol.I, p.184  
4. Ibid. vol.I, p.15
contained in Christ for their salvation, and still be forced to ask the question, "How do I make it mine?" This is not in fact the case, for Christ has all the provisions for salvation, including the gift of the Spirit for men. Christ is in Himself a Mediator and "...there is in Christ all that is necessary to my having communion with God."¹ To doubt this and to ask whether

...a person might know all that is contained in Christ and say, "all this is desirable and lovely, but how am I to make it my own?" in that case, I would require a new, an additional mediator between me and God, for Christ would not be enough...How does Christ enter into any man? Believing the truth, he hath the Son in him; for it is written, "he that believeth hath life", as well as, "he that hath the Son hath life". These two are different statements of the same thing, for Christ dwells in the heart by faith.²

To know Christ is to have His life dwell in you by faith; to have his life dwell in you, you must know Christ by faith. It seems a circular argument but it hinges upon the fact that it is impossible for the natural man and depends upon the gift of God. The light by which we are to learn is God's light, not ours, and it is therefore not humility to say that I do not know God, but rather it is humility to be contented to be taught by God.³ So too, the life which must dwell in us is not ours, it is not from us. The fountain of life "...is with God, and we are only streams; and as that is the case nothing springs from us - nothing goes from us to Christ, but all comes through Christ - the fountain is with God".⁴

These two terms, "light" and "life" describe dual aspects of the work of the Spirit of Christ. Christ has taken away the

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 17 2. Ibid.
barrier between the sinner and his God and now the Spirit is provided to give us the knowledge and strength to return. Even repentance is not something we do by ourselves. McLeod Campbell says that many of his opponents have thought of repentance as something which removes the barrier between sinful man and God, but that truly it is "...the going back when the barrier was removed". It is not, however, something we do apart from the Spirit of Christ. "...repentance is not a thing that can exist apart from or before the Spirit of adoption: but coming to repent and coming to cry, Abba Father, and coming to approach God as a child are the same thing". Because even repentance is the gift of God through the Spirit, there is no excuse for rejecting the gift of the Spirit, - if it is rejected there is no more provision for this is what is the sin against the Holy Ghost -doubting its power to give us victory. "Every man has provision made for him that he should confess Christ; and the call to confess Christ is addressed to him, as to one for whom Christ has the Spirit; if he despises this call, he is casting off his own responsibility - he denies the power of the Holy Ghost to give him a victory over sin; and so, in this dispensation of the Spirit, he is sinning against the Holy Ghost, and so is guilty of that for which there is no remedy - with regard to which there is no further provision".

We can see more clearly how the Spirit works when we look at His role in worship. We are commanded to give glory to God but we might well argue that we do not know what that means.

1. Ibid. vol. I, p. 331
2. Sermons, 3, XXVII, p. 42
When we look at Christ's life we can no longer say that we do not know what it means to glorify God, because he has taught us by his example. He lived in dependence on the strength of the Holy Spirit. If we say that Christ lived the life he did of glorifying the Father because of the strength he had, the answer is that he has that same strength in us.¹ When dealing with the question of how we are to worship God, McLeod Campbell gives an illustration to show how the strength provided by the Spirit is related to our own. He says that most people think of the work of the Spirit as if He were another man who comes along and sees us attempting to lift a heavy weight. The weight is too heavy for us to lift by ourselves so we receive the help of the Spirit and are able to lift it. So it is that people think that there is a similar co-operation in the worship of God,² but this is not so. "Man has no part in it, for the Spirit of God does the whole. There is no worship of God at all in that which is the man's part. Is there a mystery in this? The mystery is thus apprehended in experience, that, while the man feels that he is the worshipper, he also feels that the whole worship, not a part of it only, is the work of the Holy Ghost".³ McLeod Campbell does not consider it correct to speak of God's help or assistance in worship, rather "...I ask of you to come and worship God in the Spirit, not by the help of the Spirit".⁴

¹. Ibid. vol.II, p.132
². "Worship", according to McLeod Campbell "...implies much more than occasional prayer and contemplation. It includes the whole life of the Christian". Ibid. vol.I, p.28
³. Ibid. vol.I, p.29
⁴. Ibid. vol.I, p.29
What McLeod Campbell insists upon is that every believer has the Holy Spirit dwelling in him. He insists also that this Holy Spirit is nothing less than the divine nature, the life of God, dwelling in the believer. This is not so merely metaphorically, or merely in reference to its source, but in fact.

You must recall what has been often said to you about what life is. The spiritual life in man is one with the life that is in God. ...There is but one spiritual life, that eternal life, which was with the Father before the world was...not a life of God's giving simply: but a life which is one with the life of God. In the same way when it is said that we are made partakers of a divine nature - this does not mean that we receive a nature which is the gift of God - but a nature which is God's own nature.

Does this mean that the believer becomes God? McLeod Campbell insists that he remains a creature. "The believer has the divine nature in him, because he has the divine Spirit in him, at the very time he is not God but a creature..." If Christians are creatures in whom the divine nature dwells, how do they differ from Christ? Christ took our creaturely flesh upon him, our identical fallen human nature in McLeod Campbell's view, how then do Christians differ from him? He apparently sees the difference in terms of Christ's complete dependence on the Spirit and the Christian's varying faithfulness.

I am not the flesh. I am not the Spirit - I myself have a personal existence separate from both. In my natural state I have but the flesh. In the gift of Christ we have the Spirit. Our Lord Jesus Christ was precisely in the same condition. He had the flesh and he had the Spirit - but he ever

1. Sermons, 2, XIII, p.3
chose the Spirit and crucified the flesh, and his life was a perfectly holy one because he always and entirely lived in the Spirit. Every unrenewed sinner is just exactly the reverse of Christ living altogether in the flesh just as Christ lived altogether in the Spirit. Every Christian is a mixture of both these, at one time sowing to the flesh and at another sowing to the Spirit.1

Christ made his flesh holy by his life in the Spirit. Can Christians then think of their lives as being as pure and holy as Christ's? No, for not a single act has come forth from us as it came forth from Christ.2 No man can crucify his flesh, and make himself holy, by good resolutions. It is not by our strength but Christ's that we are holy. "Holiness is no imitation, but a participation of the Spirit of Christ - not a drilling and disciplining the flesh to ape what Christ was through the Spirit, but a having the same identical Spirit...."3 Christians must remember this fact and also that they are living in the same flesh in which before their conversion, they served the devil, and in which he still tempts them. They will have to live in this flesh until they die or Christ comes again. Until that time they must remember that the flesh, "...is not sanctified - not made a better thing - a less difficult foe to contend with - by the continuance of our conflict with it. We may come more into the condition of habitually walking in the Spirit, and so the man be sanctified; but that of him which is the flesh, continues with him, until the end, as it was at the first..."4

We must admit that our flesh is not sanctified by us because

3. Ibid. vol. I, p. 365
4. Ibid. vol. I, p. 362
we do not constantly choose to live in the Spirit as Christ did. 
We never learn to live towards God as perfectly as Christ did. 
Yet, "There is a deep mystery in the fact that although the 
answer of a good conscience towards God is not seen in the members 
of the body of Christ that perfect thing which it was in Christ, 
yet is it still a saving thing. There is an indissoluble union 
between us and Christ in our having been brought to have this 
answer toward God although it never was in us the exact thing it 
was in Christ". The indissoluble union between us and Christ 
is based on the fact that Christ himself is in the Christian, and 
the Christian lives by Christ in him, 

...not Christ thought of - not Christ 
contemplated, but Christ, the living 
Christ, at the right hand of God, 
actually as truly present in his body, 
as my blood is, at this moment, in my 
hand. Just as my hands and feet have 
in them the same blood that is in my 
heart, and it is all one blood, so the 
members of Christ's body have in them 
one Spirit, and that is Christ's Spirit; 
that Spirit which is now dwelling in 
the glorified head Christ Jesus, and 
comes down upon them from this high 
priest, as the oil poured on the head 
of Aaron ran down to the skirts of his 
garments. 

McLeod Campbell insists that when the Bible speaks of Christ 
dwelling in us by the Spirit, the language is intended to be 
taken literally, and not as metaphorical. God's intention in 
taking human nature into union with his own nature, in Christ, 
was that his very nature might pass into those whose nature he 
took. It is because McLeod Campbell sees this union as God's 

1. Sermon, 3, XXIX, p.9 
2. OP.CIT. vol.II, p.102 
3. OP.CIT. 2, XIII, p.4
intention, that he is not satisfied with a concept of imputed righteousness which would have people think that God is satisfied to "assume" righteousness in men. McLeod Campbell says no, God wants to see the reality of holiness. "...it is an awful conception concerning the church, that the head may be holy, and the whole body polluted; and that the righteousness of the head is just imputed to the members instead of seeing that the righteousness of the head is in the body, through the Spirit of the head being in the body".¹ Because the Spirit of Christ is in believers, these believers are in Christ and it is as members of Christ's body that God looks upon Christians. Christ presents all Christians as part of Himself before the Father. The true conception of our being included in Christ and part of Him is that, "...Christ is our living head - that the Spirit of Christ in us makes us know ourselves a living part of Christ, and that the clear exhibition of Christ himself in glory is the exhibition of one great whole, Christ being the head in the church in glory, as also on earth; we being the members of his body and that this great manifestation is in the sight of God and our Father".² This fact is not of peripheral interest to McLeod Campbell, indeed, he declares that "there is no one part of the truth that has more strengthening and purifying power than that which I am just now referring to".³

McLeod Campbell saw the importance of stressing that in the incarnation, there is a union of Christ with man, before that

2. Sermons, 1, IV, p.26
3. Ibid.
union with Christ through the Spirit. Many of his contemporaries seemed to speak of the work of the Holy Spirit in election merely in terms of power. This came about from their insisting that a man must repent and believe first, and then from that, infer that he has "an interest in Christ".\(^1\) In order to prevent this repentance and belief on man's part from seeming to be a "work" which "merited" salvation, they insisted that it was a work of the Spirit and therefore without merit. But McLeod Campbell insists that it is not the work of the Spirit to make man holy first and then show them Christ - but rather to show them Christ as already theirs, and thereby make them holy. If the former were the true account of the work of the Spirit,

...then the Spirit has reduced Christ to nothing at all. For if we have repented before we have known Christ, what need have we of Christ? If we are made holy before we view with an open face, as in a glass, his glory - if we are brought back to God's side before we are able to say Christ has done all for me, then what is the use of Christ at all? None whatever. But this is not the truth of God. The truth of God is that in which all the glory is given to Christ, while yet the work of the Spirit holds its own place: and, in this way, that when the Spirit sanctifies, it is by the revelation of God in Christ as not imputing sin to me...\(^2\)

The Holy Spirit leads us to understand and to enter into that union with Christ which common sense and natural reason cannot make us understand. It is the mystery of

...the Son of God taking me up, and joining himself to me, through the Spirit; I present this mystery of having a nature properly my

1. S.L. vol. I, p. 128
2. Ibid. vol. I, p. 130
own, which I received from my parents, and another nature, which is also mine by the gift of God, which is mine in Christ and which I receive continually from Christ, and the actings of which in me are not my actings but Christ's. I present this mystery of one person, thinking through the power of another person, and feeling through the capacity of another - this mystery of another who is distinct from me, and yet united to me; and by whose power I think, and feel, and understand.1

Because this mysterious union is the manner in which the Christian is related to what Christ has done for men, McLeod Campbell often speaks of the relation between Christ and the Christian as "participation". This union between Christ and the believer is so close that McLeod Campbell argues that the holiness and righteousness which was in Christ cannot adequately be spoken of merely as being imputed to believers. "It was not God's object that we might do without the righteousness of the law, the righteousness of the law being imputed to us. It is here said, 'fulfilled in us', not imputed to us; and the object of God is, not that Christ should have a righteousness which might be imputed to us...but that the righteousness of the law might literally be fulfilled in us".2 Christ's holiness was not in order that men should not need to be holy themselves, but in order that they should be holy. Here we can see how closely McLeod Campbell related justification and sanctification. Justification is by faith, but that faith gains its definition from Christ. He answers the question as to the condition of believers by saying that the "...first command is, Look unto Jesus;

1. Ibid. vol.II, p.101  
2. Ibid. vol.I, p.337
and the actual state of believers is, their continually looking unto Jesus".¹ In other places he says that "...Faith, or belief, is just believing what God says".² These two statements are not contradictory, for when we look to Jesus we see one who believed what God said. "I beseech you then, to remember that Jesus lived by faith, that he was the perfect believer, that he was the author and finisher of our faith..."³ McLeod Campbell emphasises the "...echo to God's judgement of things which must ever be in the judgement of a child of God..."⁴, and that, of course, was seen in Jesus Christ. It is in and from Jesus Christ that we learn the "mind of God" and it is just this "mind", the reality of our thinking this way, which is faith. "It is important you should see that God deals with realities, that you may yourselves be brought to deal with realities; and that God is justified in giving us the footing which we have under Christ, and in placing us under grace, and in announcing to us the forgiveness of our sins - that he is justified in placing us on this footing, just because of the fact, that if we apprehend ourselves to be on that footing, we have faith to recognise ourselves in that state, we are thereby made righteous before God, with that righteousness which is by faith".⁵

If McLeod Campbell does not appear to make as wide a distinction as usual between justification and sanctification, that is because he is fully aware of their underlying unity. They are both part of that one redemptive purpose of God and they are

1. Ibid. vol. I, p.55
2. Ibid. vol. I, p.265
3. Ibid. vol. I, p.391
4. Ibid. vol. I, p.355
5. Ibid. vol. I, p.357
both grounded in the "participation" of the believer in Christ. They are both fully realised "in Christ" and as the believer participates in Christ he shares these benefits. Here too we see why McLeod Campbell attacks "imputation" when it makes justification and sanctification out to be mere "legal fictions". They are not fictions but realities in Christ and the believer participates in these "real" benefits of Christ through faith.¹

The Work of Christ - The Judge

It is of interest to see what place eschatology had in McLeod Campbell's thought during the Row period for several reasons. In the first place, his teaching that Christ died for all men implied to some of his hearers that all men would be saved regardless of their character or belief. From studying McLeod Campbell's teaching on the last things, it is clear that he did not teach such a universal salvation. A second reason is that his preaching about the second coming was much more frequent and urgent than is common today. There is good evidence that McLeod Campbell directed more attention to eschatology in 1830 and 1831 than he had earlier, or indeed, would later in his life. In a sermon preached on February 14, 1830, he tells us that his subject, the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ "...is one to which I hitherto directed very little attention. I have more than once merely referred to it, and made some statements concerning it: but I have never yet fully entered into it, chiefly because I was never in a condition to do so before".²

1. See Chap.VI where McLeod Campbell expounds this view in his discussion of the Lord's Supper.
In his Farewell Sermon to his parishioners of Row (August 15, 1831) after his deposition from the ministry, he again refers to this subject, this time saying that he regrets not having preached constantly or fully enough "...the near approach of Christ, and the day of judgement..." McLeod Campbell goes on to say that he would not withdraw anything that he had preached concerning the pardon of sins, the assurance of faith, or Christ's human nature, but that the great burden of his message should be "...that Christ is coming - that the judgement is near at hand - that the Judge standeth at the door - that soon, very soon, very, very soon, Christ shall appear...and shall overwhelm with swift destruction those who have rejected the record of his love, and refused to bow down and worship him in this day of grace".

The increasing emphasis on eschatology which may be seen in the last years of McLeod Campbell's Row pastorate may be explained in many ways. There was certainly a general interest in such questions due to the teachings of Edward Irving. A person seeking to give a psychological explanation might suggest that excitement created by nearby groups claiming the gift of tongues and other spiritual gifts, influenced McLeod Campbell. Another person might suggest that the increasing persecution which he suffered for his earlier teachings, made the second coming of personal interest to him, just as it was to persecuted Christians in earlier times. However, without any need to speculate as to a reason for such teachings, it can be noted that large portions of the New Testament are interested in these matters, and that

1. Ibid. vol. II, p.275
2. Ibid.
McLeod Campbell was interested in teaching a Biblical message. It might also be said that since McLeod Campbell held that there was unity to the message of the Bible, he would be forced to deal with all the aspects of theology in order to make this unity evident. Certainly, many of his enemies misunderstood what he taught in regard to salvation, and in making the future implications of his teaching on the atonement clear, he would be forced to deal with the questions of the second coming and the last judgement. But there is at least one other reason that McLeod Campbell gives for making his teaching about the last things clear. That is that he found that people were constantly confusing what he called the objects of faith (what Christ has done) with the objects of hope (what Christ will do). For example, those who denied universal atonement had put Christ's mercy way off into the future as an object of hope and not seen that it is a present fact. In this way the object of faith (Christ's mercy) was deprived of its actuality and the real future objects of hope (eschatology) neglected. "My meaning is, that the things which God has done in Christ, Christ having taken away sins by the shedding of his own blood, and having ascended up on high, and received gifts for the rebellious, that these are the objects of faith: those of hope are that Christ is to judge the world, that Christ will come again..." ¹

It must therefore be noted that McLeod Campbell approaches eschatology on the basis of what he feels he already clearly understands in regard to the work of Christ. He stresses "...

¹. Ibid. vol. I, p. 279
the importance of coming to the study of the second advent through right views of the first".¹ The right views of the first advent, are, as we have seen, the experienced reality of that which Scripture teaches about Christ and his work. Quite simply, we cannot love Christ's second coming if we do not understand and love His first coming. But McLeod Campbell also makes it clear that we cannot fully understand what God is doing in Christ unless we know His purpose in doing it. We must, for example, know that God intends to restore us to fellowship with Himself, to understand the substitutionary aspect of the atonement correctly. So it is that what God intends to do, reflects back on what he has already done and helps me to understand it. "It is because what is past and present is an unfinished manifestation of God; and because unless I see that in which it results, I have not the complete manifestation of God...this knowledge of what God is to do; is the means of enabling me to understand what God has done, and is doing".² McLeod Campbell even goes so far as to say that if we do not know the future part of God's action, we cannot know anything of God at all. If we do not know what God intends in the future, we must also be "...incapable of rightly knowing the past or present..."³

His major emphasis in regard to the future judgement is that man is at present living in a "day of grace" which is given as an opportunity for repentance. This is a day in which God is

1. Ibid. vol. I, p.231
2. Sermons, 2, XIII, p.6
3. Ibid. 2, XIII, p.8
not imputing sin to men, but it is also "...a day which is fast
coming to a close, and the word is seek the Lord while he may
be found and call upon him while he is near. The day of the
Lord hasteth - all the signs shew it".¹ This day of grace, a
time when man has an opportunity to repent, has been brought
about by the work of Christ. Christ has tasted Death for every
man, and so run out the curse which apart from him would still
rest upon all of mankind for breaking God's law.² In other
places, McLeod Campbell teaches that God's curse still remains
upon sin, and it might be said that man's circumstances are that
he exists under a suspended curse, and under grace. "Had we
been connected only with the first Adam we should have had a
curse alone; but being by the ordination of God placed under Him
who is our Head and has tasted Death for every man - being all of
us connected with the second Adam we are also under grace".³

This "day of grace" will not last forever. As we have seen,
McLeod Campbell declares that its end is drawing near soon.⁴
As long as the "day of grace" lasts, then man may repent and take
advantage of the provision for life and godliness which is given
us in Christ. "But when the day is come in which matters are
fixed for eternity, even the day of the righteous judgement of

1. Ibid. 1, IX, p.17. In another place he says there is only one
   sign - the antichrist - and that has come in "the papal
   Apostasy". (Ibid 1, I, p.20)
2. Ibid. 3, XXVII, p.22; S.L. vol. I, p.13
3. Ibid. 1, XI, p.1
4. McLeod Campbell makes an interesting reference to the "second
   coming" when he declares that Christ coming in a bodily form
gives us a "comparison" (we would say analogy) whereby we can
speak of heaven in terms of what we know on earth. Here we see
McLeod Campbell"s preference for the concrete, particular language
over "...airy, indefinite conceptions..." S.L. vol. I, p.228
God, then it is no longer "Repent", it is "Depart ye cursed".  

McLeod Campbell insists that the present condition of the human race is that God has forgiven the sins of all men, but that this is not an eternal and permanent situation. There shall be a judgement. For the present, God treats all men as if they were innocent and seeks to have them return to Him. If they do not, then when this period of time in which they may repent is over, they will be judged accordingly. When they are judged, however, they will not be judged by the law, but by the Gospel. It is Jesus Christ who will be on the Judgement seat. He has brought us the day of grace by "taking death in his hands" and therefore "...all shall be raised, the good and the bad; not by the Father, but by the Son, because he tasted death for every man. The second death is the penal result of the judgement - the first death, the wages of sin, being destroyed. I.Corr. XV, 26 and Rev. XX, 14".

The fact that we shall be judged by the Gospel is stressed by McLeod Campbell because we are at present under grace having been removed from under the law. We could not return to God by means of the law. The broken law was like a broken bridge over which I could never return to God. But now, "...the cross of Christ, the new and living way, occupies its very place. Christ who took away sin, is now the mediator, the middle way, the path between God and man; and we live under a constitution

1. Ibid. 3, XXVIII, p.32
2. S.L. Vol.I, p.119
3. Ibid. vol.1, p.180, Sermons I.V, p.20
5. Ibid. vol.1, p.181
6. Ibid.
of things, in which sin is not imputed to any man, in which every man is on the footing of perfect innocence in the way of coming to God. This is the result of the work of Christ; and if any man looks to God, he sees no other God than God in Christ".¹

Campbell utterly denies that when God put men under his forgiveness in Christ, he therefore forfeited his right to judge them. If God was entitled to punish men for breaking the law, how much more was he entitled to do so, when they rejected the gospel.² In rejecting the gospel, they refuse his great love and the blood of Christ shed to allow them to come to God.

To those who love God, the judgement is not an unpleasant thing but rather "a great comfort and delight". If there were no judgement then God might as well throw away his government of the world and let sin and holiness take their own course. No one could be sure and comforted by the thought that the interests of Goodness are not looked after in the universe. "But when I see God putting away men's sins, that they may return to him, and judging them afterwards, according as they have or have not returned, then I see a glory to God in his whole plan".³

Observations

In looking over the whole range of McLeod Campbell's Row teaching, one must be impressed by the way he consistently expresses doctrine in active, concrete, personal categories. He takes radically seriously the view that Christ is the object of faith. As such, he allows his object to dictate how it is to be known, and the categories in which this knowledge is expressed.

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. vol.I, p.182
The real power of his teaching cannot really be appreciated until it is compared to the theological thought of his day. In our next chapter we shall turn to the scheme of federal theology which was held by his opponents. It is very noticeable that McLeod Campbell did not attack a great number of the major doctrines of this theology. He simply ignored it and went about his positive theological work. For example, he did not attack the doctrine of a "covenant of works" and he very seldom attacked the common doctrine of election. Yet, both these doctrines belonged to an abstract and impersonal system of thought. We have seen in Chapter One how McLeod Campbell was trained in a confident form of empiricism. What we have seen in Chapters Two and Three is how McLeod Campbell's training made it possible for him to remain "open" to the proper object of faith, Jesus Christ. In doing this he showed an awareness that even the empiricist ways of thinking could be wrongly used in theology. In bringing the ways of thinking of the natural man into theology, empiricism lost its proper object. It did not think in a way appropriate to its object (Jesus Christ) and thereby was not true even to its own best insights. In Chapter Four, however, we turn to a theological scheme based largely on abstract, speculative, Aristotelian ways of thinking. As in all philosophies, there was an element of empiricism present, but there was also an overwhelming drive to emphasise logic. We turn then from an emphasis on "matters of fact" to an emphasis on "relations of ideas".
CHAPTER IV - The Standpoint of His Opponents

The Proceedings Against McLeod Campbell

It was in the summer of 1827 that McLeod Campbell first learned of objections against his teaching on assurance, with its great emphasis on Christ as the object of faith. Later in that year he made his views clear to his fellow ministers in Glasgow and from that time the opposition to his teaching began taking a more organised form. Late in 1828 a petition against him was refused by Presbytery, but only because it lacked a date. Early in 1829 there was a petition sent to Presbytery signed by three or four individuals condemning McLeod Campbell's teaching but there was also a much larger counter-petition sent in his support and the earlier petition was withdrawn. Several other petitions of a similar nature were not accepted, but by this time McLeod Campbell's teaching was a matter of wide interest. There began a battle of pamphlets and sermons that lasted several years. These were attacking McLeod Campbell, supporting him, and against both him and his enemies.

In March, 1830, a petition against McLeod Campbell was received by his Presbytery, and in July the Presbytery visited

2. E.G., George Barclay, Strictures of Two Sermons...2nd ed. (Glasgow: M.Ogle, 1830) and Robert Burns, Gairloch Heresy Tried... 2nd ed. (Paisley: A.Gardner, 1830)
3. Anon., Extracts on Faith from the Writings of the Reformers, 3rd ed. (Greenock: R.B.Lusk, 1830), Anon., The Catechist... extracts from the Reformers, 2 parts (Greenock: R.B.Lusk, 1830)
4. Anon., Candour:...an impartial examination of the Row heresy, (Glasgow: W.R.McPhun, 1830) Anon., Christianity and Calvinism, 2nd ed. (Glasgow: J.Heddermick, 1837). Both of these tend to sympathise partly with McLeod Campbell.
Row to hear him preach. As a result of this visitation, a libel was prepared condemning McLeod Campbell's teaching. He and his friends at each stage of the action taken against him, took exception to the way in which the matter was handled, and the form and content of the charge against him. Nevertheless, the charges against McLeod Campbell's teaching were found to be proven by the Presbytery of Dumbarton in March, 1831, by the Synod of Glasgow and Ayr in April, 1831, and by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May, 1831. The result was John McLeod Campbell's deposition from the holy ministry.¹

The form the charges took against McLeod Campbell is interesting because it gives us quite a clear picture of how his teaching was understood by most of his contemporaries. The charges declared that

...the doctrine of universal atonement and pardon through the death of Christ, as also the doctrine that assurance is of the essence of faith, and necessary for salvation, are contrary to the Holy Scriptures and to the Confession of Faith approved by the General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, and ratified by law in the year sixteen hundred and ninety; and were moreover condemned by the fifth Act of the General Assembly held in year seventeen hundred and twenty, as being directly opposed to the word of God, and to the Confession of Faith and Catechism of the Church of Scotland...²

The doctrines which McLeod Campbell was accused of teaching were basically two. These may be briefly referred to as

1. McLeod Campbell did not feel himself a minister after his deposition. "This was shown when at a public banquet the Toast of the clergy was given and he, to the great indignation of his cousin, Norman McLeod, stood up among the laity". J.H. Leckie, "The Nature of the Atonement", Expository Times, (February, 1929) p.200
2. Proceedings, I, p.1
"universal Atonement" and "Assurance of Faith". These doctrines are said to be opposed to three different authorities: firstly, the Holy Scriptures, secondly, the Confession of Faith (The Westminster Confession) and thirdly, an act of the General Assembly of 1720.

The Marrow's Teaching

The inclusion of the act of the General Assembly of 1720 as an authority which condemned the teachings which McLeod Campbell taught is of vital importance. It indicates the way in which McLeod Campbell's teachings were understood by his opponents and thereby gives us entry into a long standing struggle in Scots theology that, in fact, is not irrelevant to this present day. The act of 1720 referred to is the one which condemned the teachings of the book entitled, Marrow of Modern Divinity.

It is indeed remarkable that from the first time the question of McLeod Campbell's teaching was discussed in the General Assembly in May, 1830, to the very last speech by his opponents in the General Assembly on the night he was deposed, his views were said to be identical with those condemned by the act of 1720. The attitude of McLeod Campbell's opponents was quite openly that "...this is not the first time that these doctrines have appeared in the Church - that they are known, and that their name is known - that they were the subject of special condemnation at an ancient period - that they were again revived, and again brought under your notice last Session; having previously acquired a particular name, and having been specified

1. Ibid. III, p.67-69  
2. Ibid. III, p.142,143
and condemned in a particular publication".1

It is of interest that this same charge of Marrow teachings had come early in a contemporary debate which occupied the pages of the extremely influential and extremely orthodox organ of the Evangelical party in the Church of Scotland, the Edinburgh Christian Instructor. This debate was on the subject of "Assurance of Faith" and originated in a letter written by "Anti-Gallicus" in September, 1828.2 The letter condemned the teachings of certain "French Prophets". These people are charged with jumbled Antinomian teachings. The Continental protestant church was criticised for allowing such heresies, and "Anti-Gallicus" proudly stated that, "As to one point, viz., the assurance of hope being of the essence of faith, that has been disposed of long ago ... We have done our duty at Liverpool".3

The response to his letter was immediate.4 One reply made it clear that the "French Prophets" meant mainly M.C. Malan, who had recently been admitted a member of the Secession Church. (It should be observed that the early leaders of the Secession Church were amongst those whose teaching was condemned by the Act of 1720). Another letter disassociated Malan's views from Liverpool and all three correspondents argued for "Assurance of Faith" - one quoting the Bible, the Westminster Confession and

1. Ibid. III, p.72 The "particular publication" is, of course, the Marrow.
3. Ibid. p.629 The reference to Liverpool was to the deposition of a Mr. Thom in the Scots Church in Liverpool for heretical teaching. See John Gillies, Short Reply to Rev. David Thom's Pamphlet, etc. (Liverpool: A. Ficken, 1825)
Larger Catechism, and also the Scots Confession of 1560. Early in 1828, "Anti-Gallicus" replied and mentioned the Marrow in relation to M. Malan and the Secession Church. The debate soon became the centre of interest in the Edinburgh Christian Instructor for in 1828, nine of the twelve issues contained letters or articles on the subject. The controversy continued into 1829 and in February, the editor and leader of the Evangelical Party, Dr. Andrew Thomson, ended a letter with this note:

The question discussed above is very important. But O that our correspondents who write upon it would recollect that there are other important questions, to which we must devote some space and patience! EDITOR.

It seems the editor was shorter on patience than on space, for the debate continued. Its nature changed somewhat in early 1830 and while there was still interest in the subject of "Assurance of Faith", McLeod Campbell's name and the "Row Heresy" or "Gairloch Heresy" he represented, became the target for attack. These attacks continued up to the time of McLeod Campbell's deposition. It is interesting that a very full series of articles on the Marrow Controversy began to appear two months after his deposition. These articles are by Thomas McCrie and are very thorough but what is of added interest is the way they end. McCrie mentions the "recent controversy" but does not feel he

1. Ibid. p.758
2. Ibid. vol.27, (March, 1828) p.206
3. Ibid. vol.28, (February, 1829) p.99
should comment on it. He does, however, say that in relation to the Marrow Controversy, these recent disputes "...have a remote connexion with it..." This is an extra-ordinary comment to make. The proceedings against McLeod Campbell had proceeded on the assumption that what his accusers thought was McLeod Campbell's teaching was what they thought was the Marrow teaching. It boggles the imagination to think that they may have understood neither! When it is remembered that Thomas Chalmers excused himself from taking part in McLeod Campbell's trial (either to oppose or defend) on the grounds that it would take "...a whole month to have mastered the recent authorship on these topics and to have prepared myself to my own satisfaction for taking part in the deliberations of the Assembly regarding them", it seems strange that lesser theologians in the Assembly should have been so confident of the issues involved. That the proceedings against McLeod Campbell should be based on the assumption that he was saying what the Act of 1720 condemned the Marrow for saying, is even harder to understand when it is observed that Dr. Andrew Thomson, the Evangelical leader, and editor of the Edinburgh Christian Instructor, had some sympathy for the Marrow and felt the Act of 1720 to be unsound. In a

1. Ibid. vol.I,(new series)(February,1832)p.94. When questioned in 1834 about this relationship, T. McCrie definitely stated that there was no relationship. British and Foreign Evangelical Review, vol.XXXIII (1884) page 718, hereafter called B.F.E.R.
2. Thomas Chalmers, Letters,vol.III,p.291 Chalmers's reticence in condemning McLeod Campbell is more understandable when it is remembered that the Marrow of Modern Divinity received his warmest recommendation at the time of the great "revolution" in his life in 1811, see Hugh Watt, Thomas Chalmers and the Disruption. (Edinburgh:T.Nelson,1943) p.37
book published in 1830, he claimed that the doctrines of universal
pardon and assurance of faith as seen in Thomas Erskine's writ-
ings, (Thomson thought McLeod Campbell a follower of Erskine),
were totally different from those of the Marrow. He wrote that,

In my own opinion, the language used in
the Marrow of Modern Divinity is frequently
unguarded, and the doctrinal statements
sometimes incorrect, unscriptural and not
accordant with the Standards of our Church.
But I also think that the Act of the
General Assembly is liable to similar
objections - that the alarm occasioned by
the Marrow doctrine was somewhat greater
than was necessary - and that it led to
declarations as unsound as anything in
the productions by which it was executed.¹

If the Act of 1720 condemning the Marrow was considered
important enough to include in the charges against McLeod Campbell
and the Marrow was understood to contain McLeod Campbell's teach-
ing, (rightly or wrongly) then it is worth our trouble to study
the book and the controversy.

The book itself was written in 1645 by E.F., (thought to
be Edward Fisher) but neither the author nor his life are known
with certainty. The book's teachings were aimed mainly at
determining the correct relationship between law and grace.
This discussion was set in the context of Federal Theology which,
like the Westminster Confession, spoke of two covenants between
God and man: the first being a Covenant of Works made with all
mankind in Adam before his fall,² the second being a Covenant of

¹. Andrew Thomson, Doctrine of Universal Pardon, (Edinburgh: W. Whyte,
1830) note, EE, p. 479. McLeod Campbell was aware of this inconsist-
ency and raised it in the trial, Proceedings I, p. 178
². Edward F(isher), The Marrow of Modern Divinity, (ed. by G.G. McCrie)
(Glasgow: D. Bryce and Son, 1902) p. 18 cf. Westminster Confession,
Chap. VII, sec. II, "The first covenant made with man was a covenant
of works, wherein life was promised to Adam, and in him to his
posterity, upon condition of perfect and personal obedience",
Grace made in Jesus Christ,¹ with believers. The discussion concerning the relation of the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of Grace is presented in the form of a discussion between Evangelista, a minister of the Gospel, who presents the author’s views and therefore has the best of the argument; Nomista, a legalist; Antinomista, an antinomian; and Neophytus, a young Christian. The author states his intention as being that of stating the doctrine of Free Grace while avoiding the errors of legalism and antinomianism. He endeavoured to walk between them "...as a middle man betwixt them both, and to show unto each of them his erroneous path, with the middle path by faith in Christ, as a means to bring both unto it, and so to reconcile them together".²

The author's material consisted largely of quotations taken "...out of godly and approved authors..."³ The fact that the Marrow’s authors, and indeed the book itself were approved, is seen in the fact that it received the imprimatur of Joseph Caryl, a Puritan Divine who had been appointed by the Westminster Assembly to revise and approve theological works for the press. Caryl referred to it as, "...a Discourse stored with many necessary and seasonable Truths, confirmed by Scripture, and avowed by many approved Writers: All composed in a familiar, plain, moderate stile, without bitterness against, or uncomely reflections upon

1. Marrow, p.33 cf. Westminster Confession, Chap.VII, sec. II, "Man by his fall having made himself incapable of life by that covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the Covenant of Grace; whereby he freely offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in him..."
2. Marrow, p.9
3. Ibid.
others; which Flies have lately corrupted many boxes of (otherwise) precious Oyntment".\(^1\)

The authors who are quoted include some early Fathers, Calvin, Luther, and Beza from the Continent and such Englishmen as Lightfoot, Hall, Reynolds, Goodwin, T. Hooker and Perkins.\(^2\) (These men were considered as "Modern Divinity" in 1645). The reader is struck by the fact that although the Federal doctrine of a Covenant of Works does not underly the writings of Luther and Calvin as it does the Marrow, yet it is the teaching of these men on the doctrine of free grace that is central. This fact is important to remember when considering the Marrow controversy which arose in Scotland after the book was first published there in 1718. Hugh Watt has written that,

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\text{This re-issue of the Marrow is the first prominent Scottish book since 1560 in which Luther and Calvin stand side by side and reinforce each other ... a careful reading discloses that Luther is the author most frequently quoted in the first, the significant part of the Marrow. He is cited at least 46 times, and though Calvin seems to come second, I cannot find more than a score of definite references to him.}\(^3\)
\]

The Act of 1720 collected passages out of the Marrow and placed them under the following headings:\(^4\) (1) Concerning the Nature of Faith, (2) Of Universal Atonement and Pardon, (3) Holiness not necessary to Salvation, (4) Fear of Punishment and

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1. Ibid. p. IV (Facsimile of original imprimatur of 1645).
2. C.G. McCrie's edition of the Marrow has a helpful Appendix which contains a short biography of these authors, pp. 366-390.
Hope of Renewal not allowed to be motives of a Believer's Obedience, (5) That the Believer is not under the Law as a Rule of Life. These five headings were composed by the General Assembly's Committee which prepared the Act of 1720 and quotations from the Marrow followed them. In many cases these quotations seem to be merely good Protestant doctrine, often indeed the most striking of them being quotations of Scripture! But as we have pointed out, the Marrow is largely composed of quotations from the Reformers "...and some of the boldest expressions, and those which gave greatest offence, were the very words of Luther, and of Bolton, Rogers and Preston, three learned and pious divines of the Church of England".¹ In addition to the above condemnation, there was a specific condemnation of six Antinomian Paradoxes which were as follows: (1) A believer is not under the law, but is altogether delivered from it, (2) A believer doth not commit sin, (3) The Lord can see no sin in a believer, (4) The Lord is not angry with a believer for his sins, (5) The Lord doth not chastise a believer for his sins, and (6) A believer hath no cause, neither to confess his sins, nor to crave pardon at the hand of God for them, neither to fast nor mourn, nor humble himself before the Lord for them.² Now it must be admitted that the Marrow contained these Antinomian Paradoxes but it was quite aware of their difficulty and indeed, it was to clear up their difficulty that they were included in the Marrow. After they were enumerated, Evangelista declares,

These points which you have now

mentioned have occasioned many needless and fruitless disputes, and that because men have either not understood what they said, or else not declared whereof they have affirmed. For in one sense they may all of them be truly affirmed, and in another sense they may all of them be truly denied. Wherefore, if we would clearly understand the Truth, we must distinguish betwixt the law as it is the law of works and as it is the law of Christ.

This distinction between the law of works and the law of Christ is developed earlier in the Marrow, and it is explained as follows, "The one saith, Do this and live; and the other saith, live and do this. The one saith, Do this from life... The one is delivered by God as He is a Creator out of Christ, only to such as are out of Christ: the other is delivered by God as He is a Redeemer in Christ, only to such as are in Christ". This distinction of the two forms of the law was quite necessary in federal theology because as we see here, there is a fundamental difference between man's relation to God, his Creator, and God, his Redeemer. This distinction which lies behind all federal theology will be dealt with later, but for now it should be said that it is apparent that the General Assembly's condemnation of the Marrow, reveals a sharp division of theological presuppositions and intentions. The wide support the Marrow received previous to this condemnation and subsequent to it makes one question its condemnation. While many would question some of its

1. C.G. McCrie's edition of the Marrow, pp. 180, 181
2. Ibid. p. 145. The Marrowmen's answers to the Queries of the General Assembly Concerning their doctrine is well worth study. Their reply to Query XI concerns this division of the law. They find support in the Westminster Confession, chap. XIX, sec. 6. See the Appendix to the Marrow edition with Thomas Boston's notes.
wording, this criticism holds true of most any theological work, and the answer to its condemnation must lie in a lack of sympathy with the doctrines it is attempting to express. This fact can be demonstrated by a number of occurrences in the Church of Scotland in this same period of history.

The Presbytery of Auchterarder, in an attempt to prevent legalistic preaching, had drawn up a proposition which it required all students applying for licence, to sign. This proposition read, "I believe that it is not sound and orthodox to teach that we forsake sin in order to our coming to Christ". Though this wording is perhaps unfortunate, it was obviously an attempt to prevent repentance from becoming a "work" that merited salvation. This proposition became known as the "Auchterarder Creed". In 1717, a student protested at being required to sign it and the case came to the General Assembly. The proposition was condemned forthwith by that Assembly as "unsound and detestable". What is of interest is not so much this case in itself as the great contrast between the way it was dealt with, and the case of Professor Simson of Glasgow. Simson had been charged with teaching Arminianism and Pelagianism in 1715 and though it appeared in evidence that this was true, the General Assembly of 1717 merely reprimanded him, finding "...that he had vented some opinions not necessary to be taught in Divinity, used some expressions which bear, and are used by

1. Although one argument against the "Auchterarder Creed" was that Presbyteries could not be allowed to fix doctrines, later anti-Narrow propositions were condoned!
adversaries in, a bad and unsound sense, and, for answering the objections of adversaries, had used some hypothesis that tend to attribute too much to natural reason, and the power of corrupt nature..."¹

If it appears from this that Arminianism was dealt with in less severe terms than evangelical Calvinism, it is even more enlightening to discover that Simson was again brought before the General Assembly in 1727, again dealt with patiently, this time for Arian teaching, and finally in 1729, suspended rather than deposed.²

It was in such a theological setting that the Marrow was condemned. If the fact that the evangelical Calvinism of the Marrow and the awkwardly stated "Auchterarder Creed", were quickly and directly condemned is seen against the more tolerant attitude to Arminianism, Pelagianism and even Arian tendencies, then the explanation might merely appear to be that Calvinism was dying in Scotland. In fact, there is a third influence present in these controversies and this influence is best seen in the person of Principal Hadow of St. Andrew's. Hadow represents a third force in the theological scene, for while he was the

first to raise his voice against the Marrow he was also an opponent of Simson. C.G. McCrie says, "The theology of Hadow was a narrow hyper-Calvinism, largely moulded upon that of the Dutch theologians in the end of the seventeenth century." McCrie goes on to describe this hyper-Calvinism as based on a narrow doctrine of grace, and resulting in a cold theology and cold relations with men. "Hyper-Calvinism is not a creed for a man to grow warm and eloquent about, to be earnest in pressing home upon the acceptance of others; it is not a gospel of "good tidings of great joy to all people".

1. J. Hadow, The Record of God and Duty of Faith (A Sermon before the Synod of Fife, April 7, 1719) (Edinburgh: John Paton, 1719). It should be noted that while Hadow's criticism was the first in Scotland, the first attacks on the Marrow came as early as its third edition in 1646. This English controversy concerning the Marrow can be seen in D.M. McIntyre's, "First Strictures on 'The Marrow of Modern Divinity'," Evangelical Quarterly, vol. X, (January, 1938) pp.61-70. McIntyre points out that Richard Baxter criticised the Marrow, (p.67). This is of interest because it relates the Marrow to the Antinomian - Neonomian controversy that took place in England in the late 17th century. This controversy centred around the republication of Tobias Crisp's "Christ Alone Exalted." This work, composed of sermons, was considered to be Antinomian by Richard Baxter when first published in 1643-1646. The whole controversy was re-opened when the sermons were republished in 1690. Baxter's follower, Daniel Williams, Gospel Truth Stated and Vindicated, attacked them as Antinomian. Williams, in turn was charged with teaching a new form of justification by Works. The controversy was quieted by an irenic work by the Dutch Federal Theologian, Herman Witsius. This book is available in English translations as Conciliatory, or Irenical Animadversions on the Controversies Agitated in Britain under the Unhappy names of Antinomians and Neonomians. (Glasgow: M. Ogle, 1807). It is interesting to note that at least one commentary on this controversy states that, "By the end of the debate, the Presbyterian body was committed to Arminianism and Independency to a stricter Calvinism." Olive M. Griffiths, Religion and Learning, (Cambridge: University Press, 1935). This book deals with the movement of English Presbyterian thought from rationalistic Calvinism to Unitarianism.


3. Ibid. p.715
preaching of a grace which did not extend to all men and turned to what was relevant to all men - the law. "...they betook themselves to something else which applies to all, appeals to all, something broad and deep, wide as the race, lasting as the eternities. They became preachers of duty, of the moralities, of the honest, the true, the good, the beautiful". According to McCrie, this preaching became well known "...under one designation in their day - that of legal, and is better known under another since that time - that of moderate". We may now turn to the theological background of the Marrow controversy, particularly to see how rationalism and moralism were related to a narrow doctrine of grace.

Federal Theology

If Arminianism and Pelagianism appear to be completely incompatible with Calvinism by definition, there is no definition of Calvinism which would wish to rule out completely the place of reason in theology. There would undoubtedly be discussion concerning reason's proper role in relation to revelation, but none would deny that it has a place. How then do you determine the point where reason has so large a place that the theology becomes "rationalistic"? Yet, if there was ever a theology that became rationalistic, it was the hyper-Calvinism as typified by Principal Hadow. He was not alone in his views, for the system of thought which he held was merely a form of

1. Ibid, pp. 715,716
2. Ibid. p.716
what was known as "federal theology" or "Covenant Theology". This is not surprising since the Westminster Confession exhibits federal theology.\(^1\) Now, in saying that the Westminster Confession exhibits Covenant or Federal Theology (and both these terms have been applied to the same system of theology), we are not saying merely that the idea of Covenant is expressed. The idea of covenant is Biblical and all Protestant theology which has any claim to a Biblical basis must take it into consideration.

T.M. Lindsay gives us some idea of the difference which can take place in the use of the idea of covenant when he distinguishes between its use in the older Scots theology, and its later use in Federal Theology. He states that its original use was to express in a vivid way the essence of God's promises to his people. Its use in Federal Theology became much more definite and logically precise. In fact the earlier use of "covenant" to refer to God's promises "...was one of the improper ways of using it, according to Witsius and the other Federalists. In the Covenant Theology, the covenant is a contract, a bargain, a mutual agreement between parties with respect to something; and this way of defining the main idea colours the whole system".\(^2\) This idea of covenant took on all the marks of a business transaction. "It implies contracting parties, terms of contract, and certain symbolic actions which are the accompanying sanctions or guarantees".\(^3\) But in fact, the great differentia of Federal

1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (E.T.) IV/1, p. 59, declares that federal theology was first given Confessional Status in the Westminster Confession. It should not be forgotten, however, it can be seen in a relatively undeveloped stage in the Irish Articles of Religion (1615) which the Westminster Confession (1647) followed in many regards.
2. T. M. Lindsay, "Covenant Theology", B.F.R. vol. XXVIII, (1879) p. 524
3. Ibid. p. 525
Theology was not merely this legalistic way of defining the relationship of God and man, but the fact that there are two covenants to be considered. "The differentia of Federalism consists (1) in the ruling place given to the idea of covenant, and (2) in the peculiar relation which the one covenant bears to the other".1

The two covenants to be considered were the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of Grace. Each of these may be considered in terms of its contracting parties, the terms of contract and its guarantees. The Covenant of Works was always the first to be considered because of its precedence historically. Its contracting parties were God and man. The terms of contract were that if man, as represented by Adam as their federal head, would obey the law, then he would obtain eternal life. The bargain contains both this promise of benefit on the condition that the rule is carried out and the threat that it cannot be won in any other way. The guarantees of the bargain took the

1. Ibid, p.523. Lindsay's definition of Federalism seems preferable to that of Heinrich Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert, (Gotha:F.A. Perthes, 1837) vol.1,p.143ff where he refers to the early school of German Reformed Theologians who taught, (1) a single covenant concept which gave unity to their system, (2) an associated concept of the believer's mystic "union with Christ", and (3) deduced its doctrine of perseverance from these doctrines rather than predestination. Among these teachers he mentions Olevianus and Ursinus. One must ask if these characteristics do not also apply in large measure to John Calvin? Surely the distinguishing mark for the development of federal theology must be when the one covenant which Luther, Melanchthon and Calvin spoke of, becomes two covenants, one related to nature, law and natural reason, the other to Redemption and Grace. The significance in this regard of men such as Olevianus and Ursinus, would seem to be when they began to speak of two covenants of contrasting Substance. (see Below, Chap.4 pp also Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, art. "Covenant Theology", pp.219,220)
form of outward and visible signs or sacraments and were "... according to Cocceius, the possession of Paradise and the Tree of Life; while Witsius added as third and fourth guarantees, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and the Sabbath. These signs served to remind man of the good promised in the covenant, and of the duty and obligation which the covenant imposed on him".¹

When the federal theologians came to discuss the Covenant of Grace there tended to be more fundamental disagreements than were apparent in their discussion of the Covenant of Works. Most orthodox Federalists, such as Cocceius, said the parties to the Covenant of Grace were God and Christ, as the second Adam. Others said it was between God and man. "The orthodox Federalists maintained that God's people are absolutely dependent upon God's grace in salvation, and that the covenant was outside them, as it were, between God and Christ. Arminian Federalists on the other hand, always insisted that in some sense, man might be said to work out his own salvation, and so was one of the contracting parties".² There was also a difference between those who said it applied to all mankind and those who limited it to the elect. Yet another distinctive group were those who spoke of two covenants besides the covenant of works, one between God and Christ, another between God and the elect. It is of interest that the Westminster Confession speaks of a Covenant of Works and a Covenant of Grace but not of this third Covenant. However, it should be noted that the Sum of Saving Knowledge which accompanied the Westminster Standards in Scotland, speaks of the

1. Ibid. p. 326
2. Ibid.
covenant of Works and then of two more Covenants, that of Redemption between God the Father and Christ the Son in eternity, and that of Grace between God and the sinner in time. This division of the Covenant of Grace into a Covenant of Redemption and a Covenant of Grace was to have serious theological implications and it is therefore important to realise that "...The Sum of Saving Knowledge (1650), which is not a Westminster document, but was almost as well known to eighteenth and nineteenth century Evangelicals as the Shorter Catechism..."¹ had such wide influence. A rather amusing, but not unimportant sidelight is that up to 1744 a printer's error made it appear that the Sum of Saving Knowledge was, in fact, a work of the Westminster Assembly. The importance of the error and of the Sum of Saving Knowledge can be seen in that, "Subsequent to 1650 nearly all Scottish editions of the Confession include the Sum, which does not appear to have ever been issued as a separate publication".² Because the Sum played such an important role in Scots theology, often acting indeed as a more or less official theological interpretation of the Westminster Standards, it is interesting to see C.G.McCrie refer to the federalism of the Sum by saying that it ...

is objectionable in form and in application. Detailed descriptions of redemption as a bargain entered into between the First and Second Persons of the Trinity, in which conditions were laid down, promises held out.

and pledges given; the reducing of salvation to a mercantile arrangement between God and the sinner, in which the latter signifies contentment to enter into a covenant, and the former intimates agreement to entertain a relation of grace, so that ever after the contented, contracting party can say, "Lord, let it be a bargain," such presentations have obviously a tendency to reduce the gospel of the grace of God to the level of a legal compact entered into between two independent and, so far as right or status is concerned, two equal partners. The blessedness of the mercy-seat is in danger of being lost sight of in the bargaining of the market-place; the simple story of salvation is thrown into the crucible of the logic of the schools and it emerges in the form of a syllogism.  

If there was a great deal of discussion concerning the parties to the Covenant or Covenants, there was very little anxiety as to the terms of the Covenant between God the Father and Christ the Son. These terms were conceived of on the basis of the Covenant of Works. As the Marrow said, "...either man himself, or some other for him, must perform or fulfil the condition of the law, as it is the covenant of works, or else he remains still under it in a damnable condition: but now Christ hath fulfilled it for all believers..." or as T.M.Lindsay expresses it, "The Father demands the obedience of the Son even unto death, and upon condition of that obedience promises him in his turn that he should be head of the elect in glory, Christ is obedient unto death, and in consequence, God gives him the Kingdom and the holy seed". Those who spoke of this one

1. Ibid. p.72
2. The Marrow of Modern Divinity (ed. with Boston's notes) p.56
3. T.M.Lindsay, "Covenant Theology", B.F.E.R., p.527
Covenant of Grace tended to think of Christ as having fulfilled all its terms, while those who thought of the Covenant of Grace as between God and man, and supplementary to the Covenant of Redemption in eternity, tended to make man's entering the "bargain", an additional condition. The guarantees of the Covenant of Grace are the sacraments of the Old and the New Testaments. Circumcision and the Passover in the Old Testament and Baptism and the Lord's Supper are external symbols "...in which God confirms the Covenant of Grace, and by which He seals it to believers under its various dispensations".1

Having seen Federal Theology in its general outline, it will now be worth our while to attempt to fit it into its historical perspective before we discuss it more deeply.2 Federal Theology is usually connected with the name of John Cocceius (1603-1669) in whose Summa doctrinae de foedere et testamento Dei (1648) it reached what might be referred to as its classical and most systematic form. Undoubtedly he and Herman Witsius (1636-1708) whose De Oeconomia foederum Dei cum hominibus was published in 1677, were among its most influential exponents. Both of these men's writings, along with those of Thomas Boston (one of the Marrowmen) must be considered among the major influences in maintaining Federal Theology in Scotland,3 but

1. Ibid. p. 527
2. In addition to the works referred to below we should also mention Otto Ritschl, Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus, vols. Ill, IV (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1926, 1927) and especially the excellent work of Ernst Bizer, Historische Einleitung zu Heinrich Heppes Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche (Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1938)
obviously they were not the first Federal Theologians. Neither Luther nor Calvin can claim this distinction for they both taught that there was one Covenant of Grace. Calvin, for example, speaks in his *Institutes* of one Covenant of Grace with two dispensations,¹ and makes no mention of a Covenant of Works. Karl Barth sees the first introduction of the Covenant concept in Zwingli’s defence of infant baptism in 1526.² While the use of the Covenant concept is important, we cannot actually refer to that as a form of federal theology, for it lacks the distinctive character of teaching of two Covenants (one of Works, the other of Grace) and the systematic connection of doctrine to their inter-relationship. It may be noted that Bullinger also taught using the Covenant concept of a "...foedus Dei aeternum with the whole human race, which did not cease to be a covenant of grace, or to apply to all men, because of the intervention of the law of the covenant with Israel".³ Barth sees the origin of the distinction between a Covenant of Works and a Covenant of Grace.

1. John Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 10, 2. Chapters 9, 10 and 11 of Book II, make Calvin’s position clear on this question.
2. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (E.T.) vol. 4/1, p. 56. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Covenant concept had a place in pre-Reformation Theology. This is seen in Irenaeus’ work which appeared in their first printed edition in 1526 (Edited by Erasmus) Early Christian Fathers (L.C.C. ed. vol. IX London: S.C.M. Press, 1953) p. 354. For example, in Irenaeus’ rather strange list of evidence as to why there should be only four Gospels he adds "...four general covenants were given to mankind: one was that of Noah’s deluge, by the bow; the second was Abraham’s, by the sign of circumcision; the third was the giving of the Law by Moses; and the fourth is that of the Gospel, through our Lord Jesus Christ". (Ibid. p. 383, cited from *Adversus Haereses*.) This reference is interesting not only because of its reference to "covenant", but also because it suggests the historical covenant "epochs" later developed in federal theology.
3. Ibid. p. 57
in the combination of the Covenant concept with a primitive lex naturae. This idea which came into Reformed Theology from Melanchthon, led to the one covenant being suddenly divided in Musculus' teaching "...into that of a foedus generale, the temporal covenant of God with the universe, the earth and man as part of creation, and the eternal foedus speciale, which embraces all the elect from the beginning of the world as the true seed of Abraham, and which is split up into three periods, ante legem, sub lege, post legem. Notice the part allotted already to the Law as a principle of order". Barth sees the twofold concept more apparent in Ursinus in 1584. He teaches of a foedus naturae known to man by nature and a contrasting foedus gratiae which is not known by nature. We can see already that what was to develop into the Covenant of Works is wider in scope and more easily known than that which was to develop into a Covenant of Grace. Law, which could be known by autonomous reason, was given the dominant place which, in the Reformers, had been occupied by Grace.

If the roots of the later, more developed Federal Theology may be seen thus on the Continent, the actual development was very much encouraged by scholars both in England and Scotland. The name of Robert Howie should be mentioned. He studied at Herborn under Olevianus and in 1591 published a thesis at Basel, De Reconciliatione Hominis cum Deo. Olevianus had published a

1. Ibid, p. 58. Although a good number of scholars have associated this introduction of lex naturae into Protestantism with Melanchthon, it should be noted that this notion was common prior to the Reformation. It is well to remember that theology did not begin in 1517.
2. Ibid, p. 59
commentary on Galatians in 1581 which dealt very clearly with the distinctions between a *foedus legale* and *foedus gratiae*. Howie, who was Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, and later succeeded Andrew Melville as Principal at St. Andrews, followed Olevianus closely in his teaching. Another Scot who went even further towards Federal Theology was Robert Rollock, (1555-1598) first Principal at the University of Edinburgh. In his *Quaestiones* (1596) and *Tractatus de Vocatione Efficacii* (1597), he is said to have been the first in Scotland to use the precise phrase *foedus operum*, "Covenant of Works". This phrase in fact occurs as early as 1585 in a work by the English Puritan, Dudley Fenner, (1558?-1587). Among English Puritans, some of the earliest Federal Theology can be found in the sermons and works of William Perkins (1558-1602) and John Preston (1587-1628). However, the honours for being the British theologian most responsible for the development of Federal Theology must surely go to William Ames (Amesius) (1576-1633). This English theologian taught theology in Holland in his later life. His work, the *Medulla S.S. Theologiae* (1623) was translated into

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
English in 1639 as the Marrow of Sacred Divinity. Not only was his work very widely read but there is no doubt but that he had a large influence on John Cocceius, who was, in fact, a pupil of Ames. There were many other English works of Federal Theology, among them a work on the Covenant of Grace by John Ball which was published with a preface signed by some leading members of the Westminster Assembly at the very time the Westminster Confession was being framed. Archbishop Usher, whose work on the Irish Articles of Religion has been shown to have had great influence on the Westminster Confession was also the author of a book of Federal Theology.

This brief survey of the growth and influence of Federal Theology has dealt with the development of the doctrine of a Covenant of Works and a Covenant of Grace up to the time of their most systematic exposition by Cocceius, Witsius and Thomas Boston. The important division of the Covenant of Grace into a Covenant of Redemption in eternity and a Covenant of Grace in time, can be traced in Scotland to the work of David Dickson

1. Ames' influence was world-wide. The copy of his Marrow which the author has used was published in 1642, the year before the Westminster Assembly met. It is published "...by order from the Honourable the House of Commons". G.D.Henderson, Burning Bush, p.71, points out that Ames' Marrow was used as a text in Scotland "...well into the nineteenth century".
3. See Professor Mitchell of St.Andrew's, Westminster Confession of Faith, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh:H.Cameron, 1867)
and James Durham.1

In 1637, Dickson taught of three covenants, (Redemption, Works and Grace) in his Therapeuta Sacra (not published until 1656). James Durham taught the same in his sermons and in his Revelation (1658) he referred to the Covenant of Redemption as "...This good and gracious bargain that's past betwixt the Father and the Son, which is wholly mercy, is brought to the market and exposed to sale on exceeding easy and condescending terms and that to corrupt sinners".2 We can see here the same mercantile figures of speech that are so apparent in the widely influential Sum of Saving Knowledge which accompanied the Westminster Standards. Durham and Dickson are thought, indeed, to have been its authors.

In evaluating Federal Theology as a whole, it must be granted that it had the merit of relating doctrine to history, as T.M.Lindsay pointed out, "The Covenants were categories which were used to translate the timeless into the temporal, the ideal into the historical, what belonged to a past eternity into the present moment of time".3 Karl Barth credits Federal Theology with being ahead of both medieval and Protestant scholasticism in that "...it tried to understand the work and Word of God attested in Holy Scripture dynamically and not

1. It is worth noting that the Scot, John Cameron (1579-1625), who followed Gomarus at Saumur in 1618, and whose work lay behind "Amyraldianism", taught three covenants. In April, 1608, he maintained a series of theses at Heidelberg, "Die triplici Dei cum Homine Foedere..." cf. Cameronis Opera Theologica (Geneva: Jacobi Chouet, 1642) pp. 544-551. He spoke of a foedus Naturae, foedus Vetus, and foedus Gratiae.

2. cited in G.D.Henderson, Burning Bush, p. 70

3. T.M.Lindsay, "Covenant Theology", B.F.E.R., p. 535
statically, as an event and not as a system of objective and self-contained Truths".  

1. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, (E.T.), 4/1, p.55
Son "...in which the Father represents the righteousness and
the Son the mercy of God, the latter adopting the function of
a Mediator and pledge in the place of man". There are, in
Cocceius' system, three more abrogations of the Covenant of
Works but in these we return to earth and history.

In Cocceius we see most clearly the problem which federal
thelogians had in using the Covenant of Works as their starting
point. He is clearer than most others in expressing its dominat-
ing function by terming even the Covenant of Grace an "abrogation"
of the Covenant of Works. However, he saw the difference in the
nature of the Covenant of Grace and attempted to express it by
giving it an eternal, non-historical status. In giving the
Covenant of Grace this special status, however, he lost the
benefit of what we have stated to be federal theology's great
merit, that is, its expression of theology in dynamic historical
terms and he lay in danger of creating a mythological basis for
grace.

It is at this point that we can see the reason for the
development of a third Covenant added to the Covenant of Works
and the Covenant of Grace. Those who considered the eternal
covenant between the Father and the Son to be insufficiently
related to mankind in history, added the third covenant between
God and the elect through Christ. Much of the controversy con-
cerning Antinomians and Neonomians in fact was reflected in
different views on the question of whether or not there were
two or three Covenants. As we have seen, in the writings of

1. Ibid. p.60
Dickson, Durham and the *Sum of Saving Knowledge*,¹ this third Covenant between God and man tended often to be expressed in terms taken from the market place. Undoubtedly, this was done with a sincere desire to communicate Christian doctrine, but in fact it tended towards an Arminian view of man's ability to enter into such a "bargain". In both the English Antinomian-Neonomian controversy, and the Scottish Marrow controversy, much of the debate really centered around the question of how far conditional language should be used in reference to the Covenant of Grace. All would agree that there were conditions which man must fulfill in the Covenant of Works between God and Adam, but those who held that the parties to the Covenant of Grace were God the Father and Christ as the second Adam, also held that "...one of the most important considerations in the compact into which He entered with the Father was that the Holy Spirit should be granted to the elect to make possible a faith of which they were incapable by nature. It would seem, then, an abuse of language to speak of any condition to be fulfilled on the part of the elect as distinct from Christ..."². On the other hand, those who taught three covenants spoke of "...the covenant of

1. It is of interest that in 1830, one of McLeod Campbell's leading opponents (Dr. Burns, author of Gairloch Heresy Tried, 2nd ed., 1830) published an edition of the Westminster Confession plus the *Sum of Saving Knowledge* (B.C.I., vol. XXX, Febuary, 1831, p. 129)

Redemption entered into between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of Grace made with the elect through Him.

The Covenant of Grace, no less than that of Works, they regarded as conditional, the difference being that in the former case the sole condition was faith in Christ, which faith was itself made possible by the gift of the Spirit.¹ The situation was in no way helped by the fact that the Westminster Larger Catechism had spoken of faith as a "condition",² while at the same time teaching only two covenants. The real problem was whether the concept of covenant was to be turned into a "contract" on the analogy of the business world of that time, or to be understood as "communion" in its Biblical usage.

There was one other outstanding result of speaking of a covenant of works as the starting point in a system of theology. That was that whether or not the intention was to speak of a gracious relationship between God and man, the inter-Trinitarian relationship of the Father and the Son was thought of in legal categories. The God of the Covenant of Works was conceived of as a stern Judge related to men in terms of law, and God the Son, was thought of more and more in contrast; almost in opposition, to the Father, the more he was thought of as being gracious. The distinction between the persons of the Godhead became so great that Ames, for example, could speak of faith and repentance as having different objects. "...for faith is properly carried into Christ, and by Christ unto God; but repentance is

2. Westminster Larger Catechism—answer to Question 32.
This severe separation of the Father and the Son, the one being a Judicial figure, the other merciful, even affected the language which one might properly use in speaking of Christ's heavenly intercession. Even the astute Thomas Halyburton, aware as he was of the dangers of rationalism and legalism, declared, "Christ's intercession, tho' 'tis represented as a Prayer; yet it is not strictly so: But in as far as it concerns himself, 'tis a Claim of Right, tho' as other legal Claims, out of a Regard to the Majesty of the Judge, it's managed in Form of a Prayer...or rather it is represented in Condescension to our Capacity, after this Manner: The Way of Transacting Things in Heaven, betwixt the glorious Judge and Advocate being above our Reach."3

Here we see that even when it is acknowledged that Scripture speaks of Christ's intercession in the personal category of prayer, Thomas Halyburton can assure us that this is merely a condescending way of speaking. We do not really know much about such things he says. But while saying this he confidently speaks of "legal claims", "Transactions", "a Judge and an Advocate", all mercantile and legal categories. What has happened here is that beginning with the non-Biblical concept of a "Covenant of

1. Ames, Marrow of Sacred Divinity, p.113
2. Thomas Halyburton, Memoirs, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: A. Anderson, 1715) p.199. "I dread mightily that a rational sort of religion is coming in among us; I mean by it, a religion that consists in a bare attendance on outward duties and ordinances, without the power of godliness; and thence people shall fall into a way of serving God, which is mere deism, having no relation to Jesus Christ and the Spirit of God."
Works" concerned with the law and made with God the Creator, the Biblical concept of a "Covenant of Grace" has had to take second place. Not only was a fundamental dichotomy of Justice and Mercy read back into the God-head, but the wider, all embracing categories of law overcame the narrower secondary categories of Grace. The business world's legal contracts were read back into eternity! What is involved here is not only the use of non-Biblical categories,' but the desire for a system, a coherent set of doctrines which satisfy logical rules of non-contradiction. What we see are philosophical presuppositions which lay much greater emphasis on the "relations of ideas" than on discovering "matters of fact". We shall now turn to the philosophical background of Federal Theology where we find in Ramist logic and rhetoric just such a concern.

Ramist Philosophical Background of Federal Theology

While the origin and development of Federal Theology cannot be fully understood except as the result of a great many different causes, there would seem to be enough evidence available to substantiate the claim that one of those causes was a particular form of logic and rhetoric which became popular at the same time as Federal Theology was in its formative stages. This philosophical movement was known as Ramism and is named after a Frenchman, Pierre de la Ramee, better known by his Latin name Petrus (or Peter) Ramus, (1515-1572).

1. No study of Scottish theology's use of the term, "covenant" can avoid mentioning such non-theological factors as the political use of this term. See particularly S.A. Burrell, "The Covenant Idea as a Revolutionary Symbol: Scotland, 1596-1637", Church History, vol. XXVII, no. 4, (December, 1958) pp. 338-350.
Early in his life, Ramus was impressed by the confusion and lack of clarity in scholastic logic and traditional rhetoric and it was his intention to remove these barriers to communication. He set out towards this object by criticising the scholastics for having falsified Aristotle and even went so far as to claim Aristotle had erred on certain points. A modern student has said that "...his revisions seem now to be little more than a scholasticism with certain procedures newly emphasised, and certain re-organisations effected". In his time, however, his revisions seemed more spectacular and seen in the context of the Reformation, they would appear to be another threat to the authority of the past, and even more directly, to the theology of the Church of Rome which was largely expressed in Aristotelian terms. The Theological significance of Ramus' work on logic and rhetoric was increased when he became a convert to Protestantism and it gained immeasurable impetus when he was one of the martyrs of the St. Bartholomew's

Day massacres in 1572.  

Now it is not our intention to study Ramus' logic and rhetoric in detail2 for that is a study in itself and has been

1. Walter J. Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory*, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958) has done a bibliographical survey which shows the wide influence of Ramism. It is worth our while to report some of his findings to demonstrate the significance of Ramus' work. Ong has found 262 editions of Ramus' *Dialectic* and 166 editions of his *Rhetoric*. His findings back up Howell's conclusion that the greatest period of Ramist influence came between 1572 and 1620, for in that period by far the greatest number of Ramus' works appear. Since we are interested in the Ramist influence prior to the Westminster Assembly, we shall note that the following number of Ramus' works appeared between 1572 and 1650. We shall first name the country and then state the number of editions published there during this period. France - 6; Spain - 2; Alsace - 4; Low Countries - 14; Switzerland - 17; Britain - 24; Germany - 144. The Ramist works in Germany were published mainly in the Calvinist parts. The significance of Ramism continued in Britain well past the time of the Westminster Assembly but its continuing influence up to that time may be seen in the publication of five editions of the Dialectic between 1631 and 1640 in Great Britain. (The above figures are tabulated in Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue*, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958) p.296. Certainly the Irish Articles of Religion of 1615 (notice that they are pre-Dort!) which have been shown to be so similar to the Westminster Confession, were written during a period of undeniable Ramist influence both in England and Ireland.

2. It must be obvious that this discussion of Ramus and the influence of his teaching is only indicative and not exhaustive. There were many who defended Aristotle in his more common scholastic form. Philip Melanchthon revised Aristotle's logic and rhetoric and as well as outright opposition to Ramus from his followers, there were also those who attempted to combine their views. These men were known as "Philippo-Ramists", "Mixts" or "Systematics" and their attempt at compromise in England is described in Howell, (p.282 ff). Yet another, but later, movement in logic resulted from the publication of Descartes Discourses on Method in 1637 (Ibid, p.342 ff) and the Port Royal Logic after 1664. The movement of philosophy that followed the publication of Francis Bacon's Advancement of Learning in 1605 is no less important in the long run, although no English logic based directly on his thinking, was published before 1700. (Ibid. p.365). George Jardine, of course, traced the assault on Aristotelian speculation back to Bacon. Above, Chap.1, pp. 11 to 13.
done from various points of view elsewhere. 1 There are, however, certain striking characteristics of his views, which when pressed further by those who followed, became characteristic of Ramism. One of these characteristics was a strong confidence in reason. This confidence extended to religious questions and indeed it could be said that for Ramus, logic was "...the chief instrument of man in the quest for Salvation. In fact, the strength of Ramus' passion for this subject can be inferred from his own statement that God is the only perfect logician, that man surpasses the beasts by virtue of his capacity to reason syllogistically, and that one man surpasses another only so far as his address to the problem of method is superior". 2 His views make a great contrast to those of the empirical tradition and the Scottish common sense philosophers in that he does not consider induction as a species of argument alongside the syllogism - at this point departing also from scholastic logic. Howell points out, however, that, "If his procedure in this respect seems far

1. The most thorough study of Ramus and his work is by Walter J. Ong, S. J., Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1958) the same author of the Ramus and Talon Inventory, (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1958). It should be remembered that Ong is a Roman Catholic and that Ramism was a highly controversial subject. More directly relevant to this study is Wilbur Samuel Howell's Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, (mentioned above) which deals with Ramus' influence in Britain during the period when federal theology rose and began to decline. Ramus' influence in American Puritanism was earlier noted by Perry Miller, and Thomas H. Johnson, The Puritans, (new York; American Book Company, 1938) and Perry Miller, The New England Mind—the Seventeenth Century, (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press (first published 1939), 1954). Earlier studies tend to be too uncritical, e.g., F. P. Graves, Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, (New York; Macmillan, 1912) and Charles Waddington, Ramus—sa vie, ses écrits et ses opinions, (Paris; Ch. Meyrueis, 1855)

from progressive, it should be remembered, not only that the
time was not yet ripe for sciences based upon experiment,
observation, and the minute description of particulars, but
also that a logic of induction in advance of that time would
have had no influence. However, that may be, it is clear
that Ramus gave a far lower place to induction than to syllog-
ism, saying "...that lower forms of life like spiders and ants,
despite their sensory adjustment to their environment, can
conceive of nothing by using a middle term, and can draw no
conclusion by properly comparing and disposing such a term in
the figure of a syllogism. Certainly, he adds, "-certainly
this part in man is the image of some sort of divinity". It
would seem quite fair to declare that Ramus was far more
impressed by and concerned with, the "relations of ideas", than
with "matters of fact".

Undoubtedly Ramus' greatest influence lay in what he had
to say concerning "method". Howell thinks that Ramus had an
important part to play in the long debate on method that was
taken part in by Bacon and Descartes. But when the Ramist
emphasis on "method" is discussed the first thing that should
be remembered is that as Ramists used the term, it meant the

1. Ibid. p.159. It has been argued that Ramus made a contribution
to modern scientific method. cf. R. Hooykad, Humanisme, Science et
The argument is not convincing, but no matter what is thought of
Ramus himself, we would argue that "'Ramism' in the proper
sense soon degenerated into a new dogmatism, soon animated as
it was by a narrow 'esprit de sysstemé. It was Ramus' logic
rather than this advocacy of science and mathematics, that
appealed to them". (p.128)
3. Ibid.
method of communicating knowledge, or the method of exposition, rather than the method of discovery or research. The Ramists "...are interested rather in the art of persuasion and exposition than in the art of discovering Truth..."¹ This emphasis on "method" in teaching is interesting for at least two reasons. Firstly, because it is based on the assumption that there is little difficulty in knowing. It reflects a confidence in the ability of man to know and in the "knowledge" which man currently holds to be known. This means, secondly, that the form of presentation is dictated relatively more by the desire for communication than by the character of the subject matter. Ramus himself, in fact, taught that there were two types of method, the natural and the prudential. His definition of method in general was that ideas in any treatise or dispute should be arranged in the order of their conspicuousness, the most conspicuous things being given first place, and less conspicuous things being given subordinate places. "While both the natural and the prudential methods, as explained by Ramus, fall under his definition, and are governed by it, the natural method attempts to arrange ideas according to their degree of conspicuousness in an absolute sense, whereas the prudential method attempts to arrange them according to their degree of conspicuousness in the consciousness of the inexpert listener or reader".² In fact, Ramus gave very little place to the prudential method. It was to be used with a sluggish audience or under peculiar

circumstances but the "natural method" or "method of teaching" was to be preferred to it. We can best understand this natural method by citing a translation of his explanation of it.

The method of teaching, therefore, is the arrangement of various things brought down from universal and general principles to the underlying singular parts, by which arrangement the whole matter can be more easily taught and apprehended. In such method, this alone has to be prescribed: that in teaching the general and universal explanations precede, such as the definition and a kind of general summary; afterwards follows the special explanation by distribution of the parts; last of all comes the definition of the singular parts and clarification by means of suitable examples.

To say this more simply, I shall use a familiar example. Let us suppose that all the rules, definitions, and divisions of grammar have been ascertained, that all the examples used in grammar have been found, and that all these things have been truly and correctly "judged". Let us suppose that all these prescriptions are written out, each on a separate little ticket, and all of these thoroughly mixed in an urn, as for a game of blanque. Now I ask what part of dialectic would teach me how to put together all these mixed-up precepts and to reduce them to order. There is no need here of dialectical invention to discover the precepts for all have been found and all the parts tested and judged. There is no need here of syllogism, because what is true here is already understood. Therefore, method and a sure way of arrangement alone is required, and art (doctrine) shows us the one simple method which locates the universal and general things first, then the special and secondary afterwards. Let your dialectician, then, by the light of method first pick out from the urn the definition of a grammar, because nothing in all these prescriptions is more general, and set it in first place. Grammar is the art of speaking well and of writing well. Next let him look for the parts of grammar in the same urn and locate them in the second step, after the universal definition. The parts of grammar are four: orthography, etymology, syntax, and
prosody. Then let him separate out the definition of these parts...  

It is generally agreed that Ramus did not intend by this method to advocate a deductive mode of argument over the inductive mode. His great desire was to communicate. There were, however, certain assumptions on which his method was based, such as that the cause of a thing was more evident than a statement of its effect, or a general and universal is more evident than a particular or a singular. It was this assumption that led him to arrange ideas in the descending order of generality.

Ramus's method was also accompanied by several other characteristics which made its presence rather obvious. The first characteristic was that when ideas were being arranged in their descending order of generality, they tended to be divided by twos. Although Ramus himself did not stress this "dichotomizing", and, indeed, as the example above shows, did not necessarily follow it, "dichotomizing" became a characteristic of many of his followers. According to their use of this method it seemed "...as if any given idea had only two members, one completely insulated from the other". This process of "dichotomizing" became a subject for controversy. Francis Bacon summed up the exasperation of many at such a rigorous "method", by saying that,

3. Ramus was by no means the first philosopher to "dichotomize". Plato did it and was criticised for it by Aristotle. It is also found in Boethius, Porphyry and John Major.
"Men of this sort torture things with their law of method, and whatever does not conveniently fall in these dichotomies, they either omit or pervert beyond nature, so that, so to speak, when the seeds and kernels of science are springing forth, they gather so many dry and empty husks".1

The other characteristic of the Ramists was their use of charts to illustrate how all the parts of knowledge could be related to other more general parts. Perry Miller declared that, "The logic of Ramus was, from one point of view, simply a schematic arrangement of logical terms, its emphasis was always on laying out in a series..."2 This is seen clearly in its charts, for they indicate that "...this logic was built up as an architectural unit, all its parts fitting together, represented on this chart exactly as a house may be represented in the architect's plan".3 When it is considered that Ramist theologians use these charts to lay out systems of theology it is worth pondering Ong's criticism that "...Ramist dialectic represented a drive toward thinking not only of the universe but of thought itself in terms of spatial models apprehended by sight. In this context, the notion of knowledge as word, and the personalist orientation of Cognition and of the universe which this notion implies, is due to atrophy. Dialogue itself will drop more than ever out of dialectic. Persons, who alone

2. Perry Miller, New England Mind-17th Century, p. 125. Perry Miller and Ong both have many splendid examples of these charts. The charts indicate the "dichotomizing" tendency very vividly.
3. Ibid.
speak...will be eclipsed insofar as the world is thought of as an assemblage of the sort of things which vision apprehends—objects or surfaces". It might be argued that the personal aspect of knowledge and more particularly of theological knowledge had been lost before Ramism and that Ramist thought and method was merely a symptom of this loss. However, it seems certain that Ramism had a tendency towards an impersonal approach to knowledge.

What is of interest to us in this work is not the philosophical tendencies of Ramism in itself but the influence these tendencies had in the theology of its time. More particularly we are concerned to know whether Ramism had any influence on federal theology. We know that Ramism and federal theology both began around the middle of the sixteenth century but is there any evidence of their inter-relationship? Closer study reveals

2. Notice must be given to the article by Jurgen Moltmann, "Zur Bedeutung des Petrus Ramus fur Philosophie und Theologie im Calvinismus". Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, vierte folge VI, vol. LXVIII (1957) pp. 295-318 (hereafter Z.K.G.). He attempts to show the influence of Ramus on Calvinist and federal theology. He lists Beza, in Geneva, Ursin, Pareus and Keckermann in Heidelberg, Lubbertus, Comarus, Voet and Maccovius in the Netherlands, Dumoulin in Sedan and Chamiero in Montauban as Aristotelians. But Olevianus and Tremellio in Heidelberg, Zwinger and Polanus in Basel, Bullinger and Gualter in Zurich, Johann Sturm in Strasbourg, Molanus in Bremen, Nathan Chytraeus in Rostock and Donellus in Altdorf, Piscator, Alsted and Alting in Herborn, Cameron and Amyrant in Saumur, and finally the Cambridge puritans such as Temple, Perkins and Milton as Ramists. (p. 296). He observes that Ramist influence began within Calvinism but became associated with the reaction against the Geneva Orthodoxy of Beza. He cites as examples of this the Ramist influence in late Zwinglianism (Bullinger, Bualter, Molanus); Heidelberg-Herborn federal theology (Olevianus, Piscator, Naso); heretical humanism (Curione, Castellio, Dudith) in the 16th century. Also, Arminianism (Wtenbogaert, Arminius); Amyraldism (Cameron, Amyraut) and what he calls the English-Netherlands early pietism
that there is very good evidence to show that Ramism had an influence in forming federal theology. Too many of the men who were influential in the rise of federal theology were also Ramists for this to be a mere coincidence. It must first be said that in general "...though Puritan literature abounds with condemnations of scholasticism, almost no limits can be set to its actual influence. At every turn we encounter ideas and themes which descend, by whatever stages, from medieval philosophy, while the forms of thinking, the terminology, the method of logic - though this was believed to have been drastically revolutionised in the sixteenth century - were still duplications of medieval habits, modified but not transformed".  

While this continuing scholasticism was openly Aristotelian in some cases, it appears that it also continued in a form more acceptable to many Protestants in Ramism. The Ramist could attack Aristotle, scholasticism, and Rome in the name of a man (2. page 196 continued) (Perkins, Ames) of the 17th century. (pp.296, 297). However, Moltmann goes too far in ascribing significance to Ramus' unoriginal, Zwinglian, not widely read theological work. (Ong, Ramus, Talon Inventory, shows that Ramus' Commentary on the Christian Religion went through only four editions, all from the Wechel's press in Frankfurt. It was one of the least published of Ramus' sixty separate works and it was the only theological one). He seems also to depend too much on Charles Waddington's pioneering and somewhat over-enthusiastic presentation of Ramus as an empiricist and a significant anti-Aristotelian. Certainly Ramist federal theology and Beza's Aristotelian orthodoxy became assimilated too early and too fully for this theme to be maintained. One important point he raises, however, is that the rationalism and moralism of the humanistic scholasticism of Ramism could equally support the views of Amyraldians and Arminians as Calvinists. Indeed, we must ask if in the long run it did not tend to bring a hidden Arminianism into Calvinism? We are referring, of course, to the rationalistic and moralistic tendencies we saw above, pp.167 - 170.

who had argued with Aristotle and been martyred by Rome.

Since federal theology gained one of its most enduring victories in Scotland, it is interesting to note the wide and lengthy influence of Ramism in that country. It was, in fact, a Scot who was the first to publish Ramist logic in Britain. Roland McIlmaine of the University of St. Andrew's published Ramus' Dialectic in Latin in 1574 and in the same year the earliest English translation of Ramus' chief work on Logic. McIlmaine emphasised Ramus' method. He declared that it was based on first placing what is most clear, and then less clear and so on, "...it continually procedethe from the generall to the speciall and singular... The definition as most generall is first placed, next followethe the division, first into the partes, and next into the formes and kyndes. Every parte and forme is defined in his owne place, and made manifest by examples of auncient Authors..." In McIlmaine we also see the tendency of Ramus' followers to stress "dichotomies" more than Ramus did. He stressed that Ramist logic was a theory of communication and he goes on to show various professional men how they may use it. He hopes to help the clergymen use this method in his preaching.

If you are a divine, says MacIlmaine, you will have to accommodate the principles of Ramistic logic to your own special needs. Thus, instead of beginning your sermon with a definition, as the strict method of logic would dictate, you begin instead with a statement of the sum of the text you have

1. W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p.179
2. Ibid. p.183
3. Ibid. p.186
taken in hand to interpret. Next you
divide the text into a few heads, so
that the hearer may better remember
your discourse. Next you treat each
head in terms of the ten places of
invention, showing causes, effects,
adjuncts, comparisons, and so on. Lastly,
you make your matter plain and manifest
with familiar examples and authorities
from the word of God. 1

Although McIlmaine would seem to have been among the
earliest Ramist advocates in Scotland, he was by no means the
most influential. That honour must go to Andrew Melville.
Through his efforts, the Ramist logic spread through the
Universities of Scotland. 2 It is obvious that the early federal
teologian, Robert Howie, could have avoided some Ramist
influence as he followed Andrew Melville as the principal of
St. Andrew's (McIlmaine's University, we should be reminded). 3
This is the case also, in regard to Robert Rollock, who was
among the first to use the term "Covenant of Works". He too
was a student at St. Andrews, but with the opening of a new
university in Edinburgh, he was made its first Principal. He
began by teaching philosophy but later turned to theology. Both
his own training and that which he gave his pupils was built up
around the medieval system of disputations. The texts he used

1. Ibid, p.184
2. See Robert S. Rait, "Andrew Melville and the Revolt against
   Aristotle in Scotland", English Historical Review, vol.XIV
   (1899) pp. 250-260
3. James Kerr Cameron, Letters of John Johnston and Robert Howie,
   (Oliver and Boyd: Edinburgh, 1963) is an excellent source of
   information of how both Ramism and Federal Theology spread.
   Howie studied under Olevianus and Piscator at Herborn from
   1585 to 1588, (p.XXIII ff.). Both Olevianus and Piscator had
   been influenced by Ramus when he was at Heidelberg from 1567-
   1570 (p.38). It should be noted that this was after Olevianus
   had done his work on the Heidelberg Catechism, it is neither
   Ramist or Federal Theology.
in teaching philosophy were largely Aristotle but also included some Ramist commentary. In fact, he too, was a Ramist,¹ and in one of his sermons we can see a typical Ramist attack on Aristotelians. Rollock says such people try to judge carnally that which is spiritual.

Out wil he cum, ane Thomist, ane Scotist, that hes the spreit of ane man onlie, and ane very subtile, or rather ane Sophistical Spreit, ane humane Philosopher, and he will judge of the gospell of Jesus Christ, and turne it over in humane Philosophie. They have turned the gospell of Jesus to Aristotle, all their writings ar bot spreitles. Thair is not sa muckle as ane smel of the Spreit of Christ in them all.²

Despite this attack on the Aristotelians, his work too, has many of the characteristics of scholasticism, modified, however, by Ramist influences. It is of interest to us that the editor of his Works comments that the outline of his system of divinity seems "...to be both logical and complete. If it be compared with the Confession of Faith by the Westminster Divines, it will be found to follow very nearly the same order."³

It should be remembered that Aristotelian philosophy held sway in Scotland all through the seventeenth century.⁴ Ramism, as we have seen, was hardly more than a modification of it. We saw in Chapter 1 how McLeod Campbell's philosophy professor had stressed that Aristotelianism had held its ground until it finally crumbled under the blows of Bacon, Locke, Hutcheson,

2. Ibid. p.388
3. Ibid. p.XIII. The outline of his system is found on pages 22-28
4. See G.D. Henderson, Religious Life in 17th Century Scotland, p.120 ff. cap.p.132
Hume and Thomas Reid. 1 This would certainly seem to be the case for Norman Kemp Smith could say that, "Up to the 17th century philosophy as studied in the Scottish Universities was a rudimentary version of Aristotelianism, supplemented, perhaps, by the logic of Peter Ramus". 2 In fact, it would seem that when David Hume attended the University of Edinburgh for the 1723-1724 session he received a mixture of "...Scholasticism with Ramism". 3 Since this is the case, it may be said that from the time of the rise of federal theology with Robert Howie and Robert Rollock in the late 16th century, even beyond the time of the Marrow Controversy, (1720), both the rise and development of federal theology had taken place in a Scotland which largely thought in a scholastic, Ramist manner. This is not to deny that federal theology could be held by those who were not Ramists, or that Ramists could hold other than a federal form of theology. But at least it could be said that Ramism and federal theology showed a high degree of compatibility. One might even venture to say as Perry Miller does of the Puritans of New England, that most Ramists held federal theology, and

1. Above. pp.11-13
2. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p.23
3. Ibid. p.24 n1. The demise of Aristotle in Scotland may be seen to be around the middle of the 18th century. Rev.Dr.Lee protested to the University Commission of 1826 that Jardine had exaggerated Aristotle's influence by giving the impression that he was still taught in Scottish Universities. "...In point of fact, the logic of Aristotle has not been a subject of lectures at Edinburgh since 1730, and at St.Andrew's and Aberdeen, it was discarded already about 1750", cited in G.B.Davie, Democratic Intellect, p.25
most federal theologians were Ramists.\(^1\)

If this is true in the Scotland which embraced the Westminster Confession, it seems true also in the case of the Puritan divines who framed the federal theology which found its way into that Confession. Speaking of the period from 1574 to 1700, W.S. Howell, writes of almost a "...complete monopoly for Ramus's logical and rhetorical theory in England in the early part of that epoch and ... a position of considerable weight throughout".\(^2\) He goes on to say that although St. Andrew's in Scotland appears to have been the first centre of Ramism in Britain, Cambridge University was not far behind.\(^3\) Ramism was accepted less cordially at Oxford, yet "...the influence of Ramus at Cambridge was more fruitful and more persistent even though no more actual than at Oxford".\(^4\) Our interest, however, is not simply in Ramism but more directly in the relation of Ramism to federal theology. It is of interest, therefore, to find that one of the earliest English Puritan federal theologians was also one of the earliest Ramists. Dudley Fenner, whom we noted as having used the term, "foedus operum" (Covenant of Works) as early as 1585, was a Cambridge Puritan who served as chaplain to English merchants in Holland. In 1584, he had

1. While continental theology is not directly relevant to this study, it should be noted that very influential Continental Protestant theologians were also influenced by Ramus. Indeed, the Calvinist parts of Germany and Holland were real centres of Ramist thought. There were, of course, various "types" of degrees of Ramists. When this is understood it seems fair to say that theologians such as Polanus, Piscator and Keckermann were Ramist. See Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, p.295 ff.
3. Ibid. p. 189
4. Ibid. p. 193
published anonymously, The Artes of Logike and Rethorike, which was thoroughly Ramist. Indeed, "The logical doctrine in this Treatise is an unacknowledged translation of the main heads of Ramus's Dialecticae Libri Duo, although these heads are illustrated, not from the classical authors whom Ramus used, but from the Bible". Similarly, the rhetorical teaching is directly based on Ramist doctrine. His was the first English volume which contained both the reformed logic and the reformed rhetoric of the Ramists. All his theological writings reveal very clearly the Ramist Method in their precise definition and continual "dichotomizing".

It is interesting to note that William Perkins was also a Ramist, for it is difficult to think of a Puritan divine more influential than Perkins. William Haller declared that, "No books, it is fair to say, were more often to be found upon the shelves of succeeding generations of preachers, and the name of no preacher recurs more often in later Puritan literature".

Among the influences of Ramism on Perkins, we may note the emphasis on communication as seen in his Arte of Prophecying (Latin, 1592, English 1606). This widely read book on preaching shows direct Ramist influence in its suggested division of the

1. Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logike and Rethorike, (no city or publisher, 1584)
2. W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p.219
3. Ibid.
4. Some of these accompany his Artes of Logike...to illustrate Method. (see Appendix "B" for an example) It is also clear in his Sacra Theologia (Amstelodami:Henrici Laurenti (first ed. 1585) 1632) and in Certain Godly and Learned Treatises... (Edinburgh:Robert Walgrane, 1592)
One would also note the use of the charts, typical of Ramism to explain doctrine in Perkins' Golden Chaine. In addition to Perkins, Cambridge turned out such Puritan Ramists as Antony Wooton, George Downham, and William Gouge. The latter is of interest because he exemplifies the continuing influence directly upon the Westminster theology. Gouge was a Puritan and a Ramist. He taught logic and philosophy at Cambridge and held a post there as a Divine during much of the period between 1607 and 1653. He played a leading role in the Westminster Assembly as a member of the committee in charge of preparation of the Confession and as an assessor of the Assembly.

Nowhere, however, do we see the combination of Ramism and federal theology more clearly than in William Ames (Amesius). He wrote a number of books directly on Ramism but what interests us the most is his classic Medulla S.S. Theologiae, (Marrow of Sacred Divinity.) The full title of this book in English was The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, Drawne out of the holy Scriptures

1. W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 206
3. The edition of Usher's Body of Divinity which the author has at hand, contains an introduction by a John Downname (London: published by "divers godly Christians", 1670). As well as recommending the Work's great value he commends "...the Work itself, or the manner of the Author's handling it, which is done so soundly and solidly, so judiciously and exactly, so methodically and orderly, and with that familiar plainness, perspicuity and clearness, that it giveth place to no other..." This is followed by four pages of extremely "dichotomised"charts outlining the book's contents. It is not clear whether the chart is the work of Downame or Usher. The work itself is presented in the form of a Catechism. In the book itself, there are several charts of doctrine. (pp. 17, 333, 354)
and the Interpreters thereof, and brought into Method. The last word is used in the Ramist sense. This fact is also revealed by the large folding chart in the front of the book which illustrates Ames' system of theology, beginning from the dichotomy that Divinity "...Hath two parts...", Faith and Observance. In the back of the book we are treated to an additional twenty-four pages of tables of doctrine. Ames was aware that there were those who would criticise his method. He knew that there are some "...who will condemn the care of Method, and Logical form as curious and troublesome. But to them a sounder judgement is to be wished, because they remove the art of understanding, judgement, and memory from those things, which doe almost onely deserve to bee understood, known, and committed to memory". It was this very practical concern to have theology in a form that was easily teachable and easily memorable which lay behind much of the influence of Ramism on federal theology. One of the great arguments in favour of federal theology was its systematic simplicity. Once the two covenants were grasped in their basic simplicity, then all other doctrine could be related easily to them. This same desire would explain why it was that the covenants tended to be thought of in a mercantile form which damaged their Biblical character. Quite apart from any theological usage, the term covenant was gaining a secular meaning through its use by Hobbes and Grotius but, of course, its greatest content of meaning came from its

1. William Ames, Marrow of Sacred Divinity, (London: House of Commons, 1645) P.11
political use in Scotland. The National Covenant of 1638 and the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643 were such vital events in the life of Scotland and the Church that they could not help but colour the general conception of what a covenant was. What they taught, of course, was not the free grace of God but the role and responsibility of man in history. Their influence along with that of such theology as is found in the _Sum of Saving Knowledge_ with its emphasis on the conditions necessary on man's part for salvation could not help but obscure the doctrine of Free Grace.

After it has been agreed that it is an admirable intention to desire to communicate Christian doctrine, we must ask whether this desire cannot in fact endanger the Christian message? Can it lead to such an insistence on a "system" that the content of the message is threatened? Can it lead to the use of categories of thought which are indeed understood but which distort or lack some vital element of the Christian message? There is no doubt but that federal theology did, in fact, endanger many of the insights of the Reformation which it would not have intentionally endangered. Even the strong points of federal theology, such as its concern with history could be lost when it became too schematic, too impersonal.

Certainly the "method" of presenting doctrine by moving from the general to the particular could not help but influence

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theology being thought of more in general "abstract" terms than in "concrete" particular terms. It is difficult to see how the Biblical and Reformation emphasis on the Person of Christ could be faithfully treated in abstract terms. Similarly, it is difficult to see how once we have moved down the "descending order of generality" to speak of particulars, these particulars could help but be interpreted in the light of what had gone before. It seems hardly possible to do justice to the "particular" covenant in the blood of Christ, by speaking of it in terms of some general, and perhaps extra-Biblical, abstract concept of what a covenant is. Even if one attempts to emphasise grace, does not such a method almost demand a "general concept" of Grace and if so, does the Bible not speak of grace in the particular categories of a Person and his acts? But since Ramism emphasises both the place of reason and the importance of presenting doctrine beginning with the most clear and distinct parts, how could Law fail to be presented more clearly than grace? As all the federal theologians knew, Law can be grasped by natural reason, Grace demands revelation. Law by Ramist "method", has a great advantage as the starting point of a system.¹

It might also be asked, for example, if Ramism did not aid the Calvinist emphasis on Providence in impersonal terms, which

all too easily fell over into a philosophical doctrine of necessity? Could such a simple matter as the insistence that ideas break down into "dichotomies" have led to, or enforced, a "Covenant of Works", "Covenant of Grace" dichotomy? Could it have enforced the unfortunate "elect", "reprobate" dichotomy which dogged theology from Augustine to Calvin?¹ Such questions are not easily answered. But it can be said that "The great difference between Calvin and the so-called Calvinists of the seventeenth century is symbolised by the vast importance they attached to one word, "method". Systematic organisation of the creed had indeed been of great concern to Calvin, but never the obsession it was to his followers".²

Westminster Theology, Scripture, and Church

We have seen how McLeod Campbell's teaching was condemned on the grounds that it was the same as the Marrow teaching. He denied that charge and as we can see from his teaching in chapters two and three, he was correct. Although both the Marrowmen and McLeod Campbell were fighting for a doctrine of free grace, he had discarded the system of federal theology which they did not break free of. The other two charges against him were that his teaching was opposed to the Westminster Confession and Holy Scripture. He honestly felt that his teaching was not opposed to the Westminster Confession. Before his trial he wrote, "...I have no wish to leave the Church of Scotland. I

2. Terry Miller, New England Mind - 17th Century, p.95
see no church theoretically better; and practically they are all on a level. I agree with you in thinking my teaching more according to the standards than that of those who differ with me... As to the extent to which there is anything new in my views, I think I have a distinct conception of it, and when I go back to the writings of Luther and Calvin, I find it not great..."

1. Insofar as the Westminster Confession was a system of federal theology, he was mistaken in thinking his teaching was compatible. However, in regard to the Reformers and in other aspects of the Westminster Confession, he was closer to the Truth than his opponents knew. The Westminster Confession is not an extreme theological statement in that although it does speak of only a certain portion of mankind being elect, it nowhere says specifically that Christ died only for the elect. It does not say that Christ did not die for all men. McLeod Campbell pointed this out and argued from history that as the Westminster Confession was meant to be a broadly based Confessional statement, it would not teach such a narrow view which was never held by all Puritans. Of course, McLeod Campbell was attempting to say something more than that the Confession left this matter open. He was convinced that Scripture demanded that it be taught that Christ had died for all men. Even so, it must be admitted that he had a real insight into the moderate nature of the Westminster Confession in regard to the extent of the Atonement. Later in the century the minutes of the Westminster Assembly were discovered and they revealed that, in fact some leading members of the Assembly had...

debated on this very point. ¹ Amyraldian views of the extent of the Atonement were held by some leading Calvinists.² These men could speak of the Atonement being universal hypothetically but not really and yet were still acknowledged as within the Calvinist fold. Unfortunately, Calvin himself while never saying that Christ had not died for all men, and in fact, in many places saying He had, spoke in such a manner that this question received only an ambiguous answer when referred to his writings.³ Unfortunately, however, the question was answered for most Calvinists in the manner of the Moderate Theologian, George Hill, who taught that it was the "fundamental principle" of Calvinism that Christ had not died for all men.⁴

Ironically, however, McLeod Campbell was not tried strictly on the basis of the teaching of the Westminster Confession for if he had been, then his teaching would have had to be refuted on the basis of Scripture. The Westminster Confession teaches that all human councils and synods can err,⁵ and that presumably not only referred to General Assemblies but also to the Assembly which drew up the Westminster Confession! It further teaches that the basis of judgement in cases of disputed doctrine would

5. Westminster Confession, Chap. XXXI, see IV, reads, "All synods or councils since the apostles' times, whether general or particular, may err, and many have erred; therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be used as a help in both".

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⁵ Westminster Confession, Chap. XXXI, see IV, reads, "All synods or councils since the apostles' times, whether general or particular, may err, and many have erred; therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be used as a help in both".
be not itself, but Holy Scripture. In McLeod Campbell's case, however, this teaching was not followed. In fact, time and time again in his trial, McLeod Campbell was told in very certain terms that he was not to suggest that his doctrine be tested by Scripture or earlier Protestant Confessional Statements. These were irrelevant! He had signed a Confession of the National Church and the National Church had the responsibility to see that he either taught in accordance with what he had signed or get out. In fact, this argument is raised so frequently and strongly that it definitely appears as the overwhelming argument against McLeod Campbell. There were many rather irrelevant arguments, such as that McLeod Campbell was not eloquent, too young, or was simply dishonest, however, no other argument was expressed with such frequency and force as that which was based on McLeod Campbell's having contracted into the National Church. This argument was so crass, that it might be considered non-theological, but on the other hand, it might best be understood as the predominant rationalistic doctrine  

1. Ibid. Chapter I, sec. IX and X, X reads, "The supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures".
2. "We are far from appealing to the word of God on this ground; it is by the Confession of Faith we must stand; by it we hold our livings", Proceedings, I, p.XXIX, also Proceedings, III, pp. 69, 74, 75, 85, 87, 170.
3. Proceedings, III, p.139. "He has, as it seems to me, no aptitude for the luminous exposition, the subtle dialectics, the clear and convincing ratiocination which form the accomplished polemic."
4. Ibid. I, p.XXIX, "Some of us might have been his father; and, without any great arrogance, I may say, that we had as much divinity as he has before he was born; and we may be allowed to have made some addition to it during the thirty years he has been in the world".
5. Ibid. III, p.102
of the Church.

The growth of such a doctrine of the Church is a subject in itself but both the substance of such a view and McLeod Campbell's awareness of its presence, is seen when he calls his opponents to remember that "...being the Church of Christ, and taking to ourselves that name, we are not on the footing of a political association, or of any society of men, whose band of union is a compact agreed on among themselves. Yet in what has often been said on the subject of Standards, and uniformity of doctrine in the Church, this seems to have been forgotten".¹ McLeod Campbell's pathetic plea throughout the trial maybe seen in his words, "...as a minister bound to feed the flock of Christ which he has purchased with his own blood...I solemnly beseech you to judge me by the word of God..."² He argued that "...the Church at no time has contained all the light that is in her living head - that of the fulness that is in Jesus Christ there has been a part at any time in his body, as a living thing".³ Because this is true,

If a Confession of Faith were something to stint and stop the Church's growth in light and knowledge, and to say, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther", then a Confession of Faith would be the greatest curse that ever befell a Church. Therefore I distinctly hold that no minister treats the Confession of Faith aright, if he does not come with it, as a party, to the word of God, and consent to stand or fall by the word of God, and to acknowledge no other tribunal, in matters of heresy, than the word of God. In matters of doctrine, no lower authority can be recognised than that of God.⁴

1. Ibid. III, p.46  
2. Ibid. III, p.63  
3. Ibid. II, p.203  
4. Ibid. II, p.204
He warned his brethren in the Synod that they were "... not discharging a duty like that of lawyers seeking to apply acts of Parliament; but as those who are called on to pronounce whether certain doctrines are true or false - are in the word of God or not in the word of God - as those, in other words, who are called to the high responsibility of judging that word, of which the Lord has said, that that word shall judge you in the last day".  

His opponents' argument, that if he wanted to teach something different from them, all he need do was leave the Church of Scotland, and he would be free to teach what he liked, he considered to be encouragement to sin! "...I hold that Schism, is sin. Schism is leaving the visible Church, and I hold that dissent is schism; and it is upon this ground that I would feel, however much I might differ from the Church, that I had no right to leave the Church."  

McLeod Campbell's opponents saw their task in very simple terms. Dr. Cook, the leader of the Moderate Party said, "I do not think there was ever a simpler proposition submitted to this Assembly. There is the libel, and there is the Confession of Faith; and we have just to say is the set of propositions upon the same subjects contained in the Confession of Faith? (hear! hear!)..."  

What in fact happened was that his opponents

1. Ibid. II, p.232
2. Ibid. III, p.46
3. Ibid. III, p.143. The conservatism of Mcleod Campbell's opponents can be seen in a review in the Edinburgh Christian Instructor in 1831 of "Dr. Dewar on the Atonement", E.C.I., vol.XXX, (May 1831) pp.327-337. The reviewer (in the same month in which Mcleod Campbell was deposed) congratulated Dewar on not introducing any novelties because "...nothing could be more absurd than to suppose that any thing new remains to be taught", (p.327).
would take his words about the extent of the atonement or the assurance of faith and fit these words into the logic of their system of thinking. Time and time again it was argued that if Christ had died for all men, then all men must be saved. In their eyes it would be mocking the Sovereign power of God to say that some men for whom Christ died were not saved. Some at least, were willing to admit that in a certain sense it could be said to be "...Scripturally true..." to say that Christ had died for all men. But this "one sense" did not amount to much more than the "hypothetical" universalism of Amyraldism and would certainly not satisfy either McLeod Campbell or most of the General Assembly.

McLeod Campbell was aware that his method of expressing himself was not without fault. He was aware too, that he could have expressed his thoughts in a manner less likely to cause offence. Before his trial he had written,

...I know that, as you say, I might publish - yea might preach - the truth without challenge if I avoided two things: innovations in language, such as saying that all are pardoned, and personal interrogations, such as, Are you born again? Do you know yourself to be a child of God? But I would pass without challenge only because I would not be understood: because, through false associations formed with right words, I might be saying the right thing and yet convey a false meaning.2

In his sermons, he had illustrated how the word "believe" had been twisted to imply something man must do, rather than

1. Ibid. III, p.129
the looking to the thing which has been done for man. In his trial, he pointed out how the words all and world had been read in a narrow sense to speak only of the elect. He knew these words had different uses but their context makes their use clear. He said, "I know that the expression, 'the whole world has gone after him', is quoted as showing a use of the word in a limited sense..."1. But this was no reason to take this obviously colloquial usage into other contexts. In McLeod Campbell's view there was no excuse for taking "world" in any but its plain sense in John 3:16 and John 17 (Christ's prayer "that the world may believe...").

On the other hand, McLeod Campbell admitted that he used some words in an unusual sense. He used "universal pardon" in such a manner, but he had also carefully explained the meaning he had given to his use of these words. He even admits that "...the prevailing use of the expression in Scripture, is not that use of it which I profess to have made".2 Although he did not choose his words merely for the sake of argument, yet "... if this house should this day find that I have been right in teaching that Christ died for all - that the atonement was made for all men - that thus the barrier between every man and God was removed - that the perception of this truth of God does imbolden a man to rejoice in God - that then I shall give God thanks for such a finding, although there should be connected with it the declaration, that in saying that all men were pardoned, I was making an unwarrantable use of words".3

2. Ibid., III, p.55
3. Ibid.
Why did McLeod Campbell use these words, which, after all, he was willing to abandon? It was because he was not concerned with the words as such, with a text of scripture or even many texts as such, but with the doctrine that "...is embodied in the whole of God's revelation of himself to man". He was interested in expressing faithfully the revelation that lay behind the words, and for that reason he was forced to use words in an unusual manner. He found that the old words, perhaps even more Biblical words, had lost their proper meaning.

I found that, in the process of time, words fully expressive of an unqualified and unconditional gospel, have so lost their meaning, that people, in hearing them, have felt no real freeness to be expressed. I have seen that men have declared, as to themselves, and taught others, that the gospel was truly unconditional - that the love of God was given freely, and that there could be nothing on our part to entitle us to any confidence in God, who, at the same time, have had no personal assurance towards God. How did this arise? Their words, if they had any meaning, implied that they were certain there was no reason why they might not rejoice in God; but their hearts told another tale - their feelings and their actions told another tale; and they have confessed that they did not feel in a condition to rejoice in God. What could be the secret of this? Just that the words in themselves, so expressive of freeness, had lost that meaning; otherwise, they would have been rejoicing in that free unbought love of God of which they spoke.

Why was this? Apparently even those who used the language of "free salvation" still had their hearts "...under the power of a conditional system of God's favour...". they believed that

1. Ibid. I, pp. 38, 39.
2. Ibid. III, p.55.
"...the believing and the repenting did, somehow or other, remove some present obstacle".¹ They felt as if God's love was suspended upon an act of theirs and that it was not personal until they "...had made it personal".² McLeod Campbell knew this to be false, "...that it is altogether a personal word which God speaks to sinful men; and that the Word made flesh is a personal Word, and that the name of God, revealed in the work of Christ, is the name by which God would have every man to know God; and that name is the name of one loving, and freely forgiving sinners".³

The thought has often been expressed that it was unfortunate that McLeod Campbell was condemned at his trial because he had merely used some unhappy expressions. We can see here, that from McLeod Campbell's point of view, his words were not chosen accidentally and that there lay a deep theological motive for their use. He found that the words he might have used, even words of scripture, had been used in a system of thought alien to what he saw Scripture to teach. Language always has a conventional aspect, and it might be said that the conventional language of Calvinism was of little use to McLeod Campbell. If he used that language then "relations of ideas" of the Calvinist system obscured the "matters of fact" to which McLeod Campbell desired to bear witness. His alternatives were either to try to use the old language of Scripture and theology and accompany them with his own definitions, or to use new language, less directly Scriptural but implying that which had been lost in

1. Ibid. III, p. 56  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. III, p. 59
the meaning of the more Scriptural language. In his trial we see McLeod Campbell attempting to redefine the word "redemption" because he felt its uses in the Westminster Confession could be misleading;¹ and also lengthy attempts to explain his use of the term "universal pardon".² As we have seen, his opponents were not interested in any such definitions or explanations. They were sure his errors were those of the Marrow no matter what he said to the contrary. They were bound to try him by the Westminster Confession, and that meant their interpretation of that "system" of theology. (In fairness to the Westminster Confession it must be questioned whether they were not more rigid than at least part of that Confession's drafters meant it to be.) When these factors are considered, it is little wonder he was found guilty by a vote of 119 to 6 on an "Evangelical" party amendment to depose rather than merely suspend him.³

Observations

It may be sincerely questioned whether Westminster Theology was a really living statement of faith to many in McLeod Campbell's day. The Ramist Aristotelian philosophical background out of which it grew had long given way to empiricism. Empiricism had, of course, already given orthodox theology a great challenge. Certainly the empiricism of Locke had found a rationalistic application in the Deists. What was new about McLeod Campbell's teaching, was not that it was influenced by empiricist principles, but that he stood firmly within the Biblical and Reformed

¹. Ibid. I, p. 51 ff.  ². Ibid. I, p. 32, ff.  ³. Ibid. III, p. 174
tradition. He took seriously the fact that God revealed himself to men through the human flesh of Jesus Christ. This was his object of faith and he allowed it to dictate how it was to be known, and what ways of thinking were appropriate to it. He let the fact determine the idea which it was meant to express.

It is not surprising to find, as we turn to Chapter five, that McLeod Campbell was not the first to come to teach many of his views. All men are to some extent empiricist. No one has ever thought only of "relations of ideas" and not at all of "matters of fact". Indeed, many of the Puritan divines who held a federal scheme of theology were Biblical scholars of unquestionable greatness. Certainly however, a theology which was formulated by men who held a philosophy that gave as little place to induction and as great a place to general categories, formal logic, and "dichotomies" as Ramism did, could not help but be tempted into many quite unBiblical modes of expression. In Chapter Five we should be prepared to find therefore, that McLeod Campbell was influenced by people who like himself broke away from the use of general, abstract and static categories of thinking and turned to particular, concrete and dynamic categories of thought more adequate to the Person and work of Christ. We shall find also that he was aware of a continuing tradition of pre-Ramist, pre-federal theology teaching that went back to the Reformers Luther and Calvin and their great Biblical teaching.
CHAPTER V - Possible Influences on McLeod Campbell's Thought

Thomas Erskine

It is early in 1826 that we may begin to trace a new influence in the life and thought of John McLeod Campbell. At this time, when the earnest young pastor was busily engaged in his duties in Row parish and before the clouds of controversy had gathered over his head, we see the first reference to a name which must always be associated with that of McLeod Campbell. That is the name of Thomas Erskine of Linlathen (1788-1870).

Erskine was related to the great eighteenth century Evangelical, John Erskine. He was educated in Edinburgh and Durham and then graduated from Edinburgh University and was admitted to the Faculty of Advocates in 1810. On the death of his brother in 1816, he succeeded to the estate of Linlathen and at that time he left Edinburgh and the Bar. His Christian conviction at this time is reflected in the fact that before he retired, he prepared a paper on "Salvation" which, however, was not published until 1825, as an introduction to the letters of Samuel Rutherford. It was not in regard to this essay that McLeod Campbell refers to Erskine but to a larger and it might be said, far more important work. That work was Erskine's Remarks on the Internal Evidence for the Truth of Revealed Religion which was published in 1820. This book had a world-wide influence as it went through nine English editions in nine years and was translated into both

French and German. One of the truly ironic facts concerning this book's wide acceptance was that although, as we shall see, it contains the groundwork for the attack on Westminster theology, it received an extremely favourable review in the Evangelical party's Edinburgh Christian Instructor. This review declared that Erskine had argued in "...so masterly a manner, that we do not think it possible for any unprejudiced person to rise from a perusal of the book without the most perfect acquiescence in its conclusions". It saw that Erkine's approach was influenced by inductive philosophy, and so made the following brave boast, "...the Internal Evidence for Revelation rests on the very same ground as that much and deservedly admired examplification of the inductive philosophy, the Newtonian system itself...give us facts, say the opponents of the Internal Evidence. So say we - give us facts; and give us but one fact inconsistent with this system and we will admit that we have misunderstood it; we will change - at least we will modify our creed." Although this readiness to modify the creed did not prove the case, it must be admitted the reviewer saw at least some of the book's implications.

McLeod Campbell read this book in 1826 and wrote of it to his father, saying,

I have lately been reading a book, which I shall take home with me if I cannot get it sooner sent, Erskine's "Internal Evidences", which is the only book with that title which

3. Ibid. p.248 4. Ibid. p.251
deserves the name, as it is really an extracting of evidences from the peculiarities of the scheme itself; and in it a topic on which we once had some conversation is put upon its proper basis, - I mean the connection between the doctrines and the morality of the Gospel. He feels it a most dangerous thing to receive them both but as two distinct things; and his language, which you remember was mine, is, "I don't say, believe the one, but remember you must also do the other but, believe the one, and because you believe the one do the other. Yea, examine your belief and you will find it the firmest basis upon which morality ever rested".

Here we see not only McLeod Campbell's high estimate of the work but also the fact that his mind was highly receptive to it and that he had been facing the same questions and arriving at much the same answers as Erskine. This is important to remember for although Erskine in this book and others, expressed ideas which both he and McLeod Campbell were to hold, neither man considered the other a disciple. It was, in fact, not until 1828 that Erskine and McLeod Campbell met personally. Erskine had heard McLeod Campbell preach at that time and was thrilled by what he heard. When he learned of the gathering storm of controversy hanging over McLeod Campbell's head he resolved to assist him and so went to help him in Row parish. He returned to Row parish for the summers of 1829 and 1830 and taught and

wrote in McLeod Campbell's defence. It has already been observed that neither man considered the other a disciple and McLeod Campbell wrote, "That historical independance which we mark when two minds, working apart and without any interchange of thought, arrive at the same conclusion, is always an interesting and striking fact when it occurs; and it did occur as to Scott and myself; and also as Mr. Erskine and me, and I believe too, as to Mr. Erskine and Scott". (The Scott mentioned is A. J. Scott, a mutual friend.) While such a statement must be largely true, it seems quite impossible that two such fertile minds, struggling with the same problems, should not influence each other. It must be remembered that McLeod Campbell first read Erskine's Internal Evidence early in 1826 and Erskine on his part, did not encounter McLeod Campbell until 1828. Certainly the benefits of the shared interest of these two men must first have come to McLeod Campbell, but that in itself does not prove that after they met, Erskine on his part was not influenced by his new found ally. Certainly the two became the closest of friends and must have influenced and encouraged each other. It must be clearly stated, however, that if Erskine did influence and encourage McLeod Campbell, it was, most probably, in regard to the manner and method of theological inquiry. The similarity of their approach to theological inquiry may be seen in Erskine's Internal Evidences, which McLeod Campbell praised

so highly in 1826. Erskine explained the purpose of his book as being to "...analyse the component parts of the Christian scheme of doctrine, with reference to its bearings both on the character of God and on the character of man; and to demonstrate that its facts not only present an expressive exhibition of all the moral qualities which can be conceived to reside in the Divine mind, but also contain all those objects which have a natural tendency to excite and suggest in the human mind that combination of moral feelings which has been termed moral perfection". Erskine argues that the Bible presents men with a morally perfect God and with the necessary moral stimulants to produce "...in the mind a resemblance to that high character which is there portrayed..." He declares that his theory of internal evidence is like Bishop Butler's in that it is founded on analogy. Butler had answered objections against revealed religion by pointing out that similar difficulties could be raised against natural religion. Erskine declares that his purpose is quite different in that he means to show "...that there is an intelligible and necessary connexion between the doctrinal facts of revelation and the character of God (as deduced from natural religion), in the same way as there is an intelligible and necessary connexion between the character of a man and his most characteristic actions; and farther, that the belief of these doctrinal facts has an intelligible and necessary

1. T. Erskine, Internal Evidences, p. 16
2. Ibid. p. 18
tendency to produce the Christian character, in the same way that the belief of danger has an intelligible and necessary tendency to produce fear". 1

One of the presuppositions of Erskine's argument is the reality of moral obligations and at this point he expects complete agreement from those who accept natural religion. It is obvious from this presupposition that his book, as was Butler's, is written for those who already believe in a God but not necessarily in the Biblical revelation. He declares that insofar as natural religion is concerned with the moral character of God, it is based on the reality of moral obligations and clothes...

...the Supreme Being with all the moral excellencies of human nature in an infinite degree. A system of religion which is opposed to these moral obligations, is opposed also to right reason. This sense of moral obligation, then, which is the standard to which reason instructs man to adjust his system of natural religion, continues to be the test by which he ought to try all pretensions to divine revelation. 2

This is what Erskine calls the first "reasonable test of the truth of a religion - that it should coincide with the moral constitution of the human mind". 3 He goes on to declare that there is a second test of the truth of religion and that is that it should coincide with the natural or ..."physical constitution if the human mind". 4 By this he means that human minds are so constituted that they are able to receive "...certain impressions from certain objects when present to them". 5 Thus, he argues,

1. Ibid. pp.20,21. 2. Ibid. p. 22. 3. Ibid. p.23
4. Ibid. p. 24. 5. Ibid. p. 23.
without any reference to moral judgement, human minds are open to impressions of love and hate, fear and hope when certain corresponding objects are presented to them. So it is that the actions attributed to God by any system of religion must be such an object as when present to the mind would stir the affections and influence the character. If it cannot, it is useless. If the doctrines influence the character, but in an undesirable way, it is worse than useless, "But if they can be shown to be such as have a necessary tendency to excite these natural emotions on the behalf of goodness, and to draw the current of our affections and wills into this moral channel, we are entitled to draw another argument, from this circumstance, in favour of the truth of that religion; because we may presume that God would suit his communications to the capacities and instincts of his creatures".¹ It is this correspondence between the revelation and the capacity of the human mind to understand and be affected by it that Erskine terms the test of the natural or "...physical constitution of the human mind".² But there is one further test. There is much evil in the world and there are many bad passions in the human mind. The events of life all around make a great many impressions on the mind. The third test of a religion is whether it is accommodated to the reality of human life. This it is when "...it offers pardon without lowering the standard of moral duty; when its principles convert the varied events into opportunities of growing in conformity to God...",³ This third criterion Erskine calls the test of the "...circumstances in

1. Ibid. p.24. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.
which man is found in this world".  

Biblical religion meets all three of these requirements.

Erskine goes on to declare that a man in this world may blind and distort his conscience and act in this life in a way according with principles not accepted by God. He may even get along quite well in this world but he will not prepare himself for heaven. "The joys of heaven are described in Scripture to consist in a resemblance to God, or in a cheerful and sympathising submission to his will; and as man naturally follows the impulse of his own propensities, without reference to God, it is evident that a radical change of principle is necessary, in order to capacitate him for that happiness". He illustrates this by referring to a Puritan, who living under Cromwell, was happy because the will of the Government and his will were agreed. But when Charles the second came to power and the Puritan was forced to live near the gay and decadent Court, he was unhappy because of his continual encounter with principles opposed to his. So it is that men living under the Government of God must live in accord with His will or sooner or later come into conflict with it. It is therefore of the greatest importance for men to learn of the character of God for the "...object of Christianity is to bring the character of man into harmony with that of God". But, when we look into creation or providence to learn God's character, we can find arguments for various characters. We can perceive that God is generally solicitous for man yet the fact

1. Ibid. p.25
2. Ibid. p. 39
3. Ibid. pp.4, 42
4. Ibid. p.49.
"...that the greatest natural evil does not always fall where moral evil is most conspicuous, whilst it gives rise to the idea of a future state, does nevertheless obscure, in some degree, our ideas of the Divine character". 1 We may indeed arrive at the conclusion that God is loving and holy but these views have the quality of metaphysical speculation. "It marks the distinctions of right and wrong; but it does not efficiently attach our love to what is right, nor our abhorrence to what is wrong. We may frequently observe real serious devotedness, even amongst the professors of the most absurd superstitions; but it would be difficult to find a devoted natural religionist". 2 The reason is that even these absurd superstitions are better fitted to the natural constitution of man. Natural religion, however, merely wounds a man's conscience by its demands for holiness. Man is thrown into despair and either lowers the moral standard so that he may meet it or hates God the lawgiver. 3 From the observation of nature all that we derive are abstract notions and "visions of the intellect" rather than "...efficient moral principles in the heart and conduct". 4 What we need to excite and interest our minds and hearts is to learn God's character "...in a history of definite and intelligible actions". 5 It was therefore to assist us in our weakness

...and to accommodate his instructions to the principles of our nature, God has been pleased to present to us a most interesting series of actions, in which his moral character, as far as we are concerned, is fully and perspicuously embodied. In this

1. Ibid. p.51  
2. Ibid. p.52  
3. Ibid. p.52  
4. Ibid. p.54  
5. Ibid. p.55
narration, the most condescending and affecting and entreating kindness, is so wonderfully combined with the most spotless holiness, and the natural appeals which emanate from every part of it, to our esteem, our gratitude, our shame, and our interest, are so urgent and constraining, that he who carries about with him the conviction of the truth and reality of this history, possesses in it a principle of mighty efficiency, which must subdue and harmonize his mind to the will of that Great Being whose character is there depicted.  

God's character is thus revealed in the New Testament. There we are shown God not only to be an over-ruling authority but also as loving. And indeed, the appeal of this powerful and "amiable Being" is also revealed as putting forth his power and character on our behalf and "...it is on these grounds that we are called on to love, to obey, and to imitate him". The intention of the Gospel is to bring man into harmony with God and the way in which this is done is through its operation on the human heart in its various conditions.

It addresses the learned and unlearned, the savage and the civilized, the decent and the profligate; and to all it speaks precisely the same language. What then is this universal language? It cannot be the language of metaphysical discussion, or what is called abstract moral reasoning; for this could be intelligible to few, and it could influence the character of fewer. The principles which it addresses ought evidently to be such as are in a great measure independent at the extremes of cultivation and barbarism; and, in point of fact, they are so. They are indeed the very principles which Mr. Hume designates to be "a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce

1. Ibid. p.55  
2. Ibid. p.56.
or to prevent". (Inquiry into Human Understanding, sect. v, part 1.) Its argument consists in a relation of facts: If these are really believed, the effect on the character necessarily follows. It presents a history of wondrous love, in order to excite gratitude; of high and holy worth, to attract veneration and esteem; It presents a view of danger, to produce alarm; of refuge, to confer peace and joy; and of eternal glory, to animate hope.

Here we see a direct appeal to David Hume. It should be noted that Erskine's language in many places is close to that of Hume but that his thought (particularly concerning cause and effect)2 is quite consistent with that of the common sense philosophers. The teaching that God may be known through the observation of the history of his actions may also be expressed in terms of the knowledge of other minds through bodily expression and actions.3 Here too, we see a specific reference to the character of the Gospel as a "matter of fact", The quotation which Erskine makes from Hume's Enquiries is from the section where Hume makes a strong plea for the necessity of fact over against abstract argument. Hume declared that "...if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with each other, the whole chain of inference would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence".4 We cannot arrive at knowledge of reality by arguing from ideas

1. Ibid. pp. 57, 58
2. Ibid. p. 1
3. Above, Chapter II, p. 93 ff
to facts, but rather we must let facts determine our ideas. So it is that Hume argues that, "All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object". Belief, then is the necessary result of placing the mind in certain circumstances. "It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent". It is this "intuitive" aspect of Hume's teaching which the common sense philosophers developed while discarding what they considered to be his "scepticism".

Guided by this emphasis on fact over against idea, Erskine made use of the greater natural appeal of fact over against abstract ideas. He declared that even the "...cry of a child will produce a greater movement, in almost any mind, then twenty pages of unanswerable reasoning". Erskine further illustrates this fact by referring to a group of men walking along the seaside and coming to a dangerous pass. Only one of them knows of the danger, but when he informs his friends they refuse to listen and travel on. How is he to persuade them? His words have been ineffectual; he must act. This he does by going before

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. pp. 46,47
3. T. Erskine, Internal Evidences, p.63
them and meeting the certain death which lies in wait. This, of course, persuades them. At the cost of his life he has shown them both his nobility and their peril. Their reaction must be both to admit their folly and gratefully acknowledge their deliverer. So it is with men who walk with God in the world. They are walking in the way of danger. God's character may be seen in Creation and Providence and through their consciences but they have disregarded these appeals. What more could God do? "God became man, and dwelt among us. He himself encountered the terrors of guilt, and bore its punishment; and called on his careless creatures to consider and understand the evil of sin, by contemplating even its undeserved effects on a being of perfect purity, who was over all, God blessed for ever".1

Erskine goes on to illustrate how God is both Father and Judge by telling of a King who made a law against adultery in which it was declared that the guilty person would have both his eyes removed. The very first offender was his son. After much difficult and distressing thought, the Father who was also Judge, solved the problem. He commanded one of his own eyes to be pulled out and one of his son's. So it was that the son came to see his crime in a new light. It not only brought him painful consequences but was "...the cause of a father's suffering, and an injury to a father's son."2 So too, in the Gospel, the Judge became the judged. "The Judge himself bore the punishment of transgression, whilst he published an amnesty to the guilty, and thus asserted the authority and importance and worth of the law,

1. Ibid. p.66 2. Ibid. p.68.
by that very act which beamed forth love unspeakable, and knew no obstacle but the unwillingness of the criminals to accept it".1

The purpose of the pardon of the Gospel is to appeal to the hearts of men and so a sacrifice was necessary in order that that appeal might be strong. By the sacrifice of Christ, men are taught both to hate sin and love God and thereby have their character transformed to become like God's. This can be seen in the resurrection and ascension of Christ as "the representative of our race", for this reveals both God's approval of Christ's work and the nature of heaven. It is not to be thought of as an "undefined ease and enjoyment" but it is a "...defined and intelligible happiness springing from the more perfect exercise of those very principles of love to God and man, which formed the character of the Master and still constitute his joy".2

Because the Bible reveals God's purpose to be to have men partake of His moral likeness, it is necessary for them to know God's moral character in the clearest possible way. For that reason the acknowledgement of abstract ideas of God is insufficient. In practice, it does not produce the effect of an acknowledged fact. The Bible does not deal with abstract ideas or "harmless generalities". It speaks of God as a dynamic "living Being". The question Erskine asks is why those who profess to hold abstract ideas which are equivalent to the Bible's teaching, do not acknowledge this living character which is revealed to them

1. Ibid. p.72  
2. Ibid. p.74.
there. "...in truth they do not believe nor love this abstract idea of God, else they would also believe and love the living character which corresponds to it. The real conviction of the truth of the abstract idea would necessarily contain in it the conviction of the corresponding truth".¹ Is it not reasonable then, that God should communicate his character "...not in the form of abstract propositions and general terms, which are by the construction of the human mind, incapable of producing any real and lasting effect upon us, but by that way which coincides with our faculties of apprehension, - that is, by the way of living and palpable actions..."²

But if God's communication of Himself is so clearly and powerfully present to us in Christ, why do men reject it? The reason quite simply is that Christianity puts obligations on men, which are not present in the acceptance of abstract truths. God's revelation not only reveals to us the highest of moral virtues, it calls upon us to participate in these virtues. There is, however, another reason why men do not accept the Gospel, and that is because of the method by which doctrines are presented. In the Bible, doctrines are presented to us as "...demonstrations or evidences of some important moral feature of the Divine mind, and as motives tending to produce in us some corresponding disposition in relation to God or man".³ We are shown the conduct and will of God towards us and we are moved to accept it not only as desirable but also as true. In the Bible the moral truth and natural adaptation of doctrine to the human mind are presented as

¹ Ibid. p.81  ² Ibid. p.83  ³ Ibid. p.91
part of the great purpose of God that His character be known and
determinative in the lives of men. But in the creeds and church
articles, doctrine is presented in a different manner. These
tests and summaries of doctrine largely arose from the desire to
prevent false opinions and are not stated in the context of
their redemptive purpose.

The doctrines contained in them therefore are not stated with any reference
to their great object in the Bible, -
the regeneration of the human heart, by
the knowledge of the Divine character.
They appear as detached propositions,
indicating no moral cause, and pointing
to no moral effect. They do not look
to God, on the one hand, as their source;
nor to man, on the other, as the object
of their moral urgency. They appear like
links severed from the chain to which they belonged...¹

Erskine gives the example of the way in which the doctrine
d of the Trinity is presented in Protestant Confessions. It is
stated in terms of essence and of the mystery of three in one
but is divested of its scriptural context and cannot possibly
impress our minds with the Divine character. "The abstract fact
that there is a plurality in the unity of the Godhead, really
makes no address either to our understandings, or our feelings,
or our consciences".² On the other hand, the obscurity of the
doctrine is removed when we are told that "God so loved the
world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believ-
eth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life".

This tendency to present doctrine other than in the form and

¹. Ibid. pp. 93, 94  ². Ibid. p. 96.
with the intention with which it is presented in the Bible is seen also in regard to the doctrine of the Atonement which is the great subject of revelation. "All the other doctrines radiate from this as their centre".\footnote{1} This doctrine quite simply tells us the history of how God descended from His throne of Glory and took upon Himself the fragility of humanity and revealed to us the mind of perfect God and perfect man. Christ died as the representative of sinners so that his holy nature could declare sin forgiven.\footnote{2} Now this "...divinely constituted Head of the human family has been raised from the dead, his sacrifice has been judicially accepted, and he has been crowned with immortality in his representative nature".\footnote{3} This history of the atonement has revealed to us God's character and will in order that we may enjoy spiritual life and peace. But this only follows insofar as the work of Christ remains as a reality in our minds. We must look to the work of the atonement and enter into the mind of God revealed there for, "We cannot long continue or retain any moral impression on our minds separate from the object which is fitted to produce this impression".\footnote{4} Erskine declares that it seems impossible that anyone should misapprehend the doctrine of the atonement but in fact it has sometimes been so presented that it appears that God demands a certain amount of punishment for a certain amount of sin, "...but that while he rightly exacts this punishment, he is not so much concerned whether the person who pays it be the real criminal or an innocent

\footnote{1} Ibid. p. 101
\footnote{2} Ibid. p. 104
\footnote{3} Ibid. p. 105
\footnote{4} Ibid. p. 110.
being, provided only that it is a full equivalent; nay, that he is under a strange necessity to cancel guilt whenever this equivalent of punishment is tendered to him by whatever hand.¹

Erskine declares that this error has arisen by pressing too far the analogy between a crime and a pecuniary debt.² This is not the view of the Bible and it arises from "...separating the actions of God from the intention manifested in them towards men".³ "In fact, this doctrine undermines the divinity of Christ as much as Socinianism, inasmuch as it makes a separation between the views and character of the Father and those of the Son".⁴

All of this arises from "...the unaccountable and most unfortunate propensity to look for religious information anywhere rather than in the Bible".⁵ This is the same insistence that we see in McLeod Campbell that the empirical method must find its proper object in Scripture and not in the world.

Another problem which arises from not allowing one's doctrine to be determined by God's action in the work of the Atonement is the confusion between faith and works. Some would like to think that because of the Atonement, God has mitigated the strict purity of his law. They would, therefore, seek to offer him a sincere obedience, but not one such as was demanded before they professed faith in Christ. Such a sincere obedience generally means "...in the human judgement, that degree of obedience which it is convenient to pay".⁶ It is, however, perfect obedience which is required and though it is never attained in this life

¹. Ibid. p. 118  ². Ibid.  ³. Ibid. p. 119  ⁴. Ibid. p. 120  ⁵. Ibid. p. 117  ⁶. Ibid. p. 122.
"...the seed of it may be attained and may take root in the heart; and it has an eternity before it, to grow and flourish in". On the other hand, there are those who think that justification is achieved partly by Christ's work and partly by our obedience. The work of Christ is an added supplement to human merit and added as a reward for diligent obedience. On this basis our own actions become the object of our thoughts rather than the act of God in Christ. Having ourselves as the object of our thought can lead only to either pride and self-confidence or the deepest despair. "The work of Christ is the sole ground of hope, and is therefore the chief object of thought; and the impressions emanating from this object sums up the Christian Character". If a man could of himself obey God, it would be as if a sick man could heal himself without the physician. But in the Gospel we are "...not called on to obey, in order to obtain pardon; but we are called on to believe the proclamation of pardon, in order that we may obey".

When we look at the Old Testament, we see the same truth in regard to the character of God and man. Although this truth is exhibited through the obscurer medium of types and shadows and prophecy, it was also taught through sensible objects in the institution of sacrifice. It still pointed to the same fact and taught the same principle. "The fact was, the death of Christ for the sins of the world; the principle was, that God is at once just and merciful, and that these attributes of his nature

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid. p.126  
3. Ibid. p.128.
are in joint and harmonious operation". 1 In practice, many of the Israelites forgot the fact to which their ceremonies pointed, but even so, there still remained some principles which they could learn from them. Erskine warns us however, that it is not satisfactory to separate Christ's person and his teachings and merely think of him as a great teacher. If Christ was not God, then his life and death do not necessarily teach us anything about God and thereby makes Scriptural references to our gratitude and confidence in God mere empty words "...if Christ was not God, there is no necessary or natural connexion between the belief of his death and the excitement of such sentiments in our hearts towards God; while, on the supposition that he was God, the connexion is most distinct and unavoidable". 2

It was noted that one of the presuppositions of Erskine's Internal Evidences was that his readers would admit the reality of moral obligations and moral principles. He has been attempting to show the correspondence between these principles and the real fact of God's character as revealed in His actions in the history of Jesus Christ. Although one of his presuppositions is that we may not prove the reality of facts by means of ideas, but must test our ideas by fact, he is aware that his readers may not understand this, and think of Christian doctrine as merely a system of fine principles well suited to the human mind. "I would be doing a real injury to the cause I wish to advocate, were I to be the means of conducting any one to the conclusion that Christianity is nothing more than a beautiful piece of moral

1. Ibid. p.130 2. Ibid. p.138.
mechanism, or that its doctrines were mere typical emblems of the moral principles in the Divine mind, well adapted to the understandings and feelings of men". ¹

Erskine shows himself to be fully aware of the danger of separating the principles and facts of Christian doctrine. He is well aware that men may say "I accept the principles but not these unnecessary facts". Therefore, he insists that it is not merely on the basis of a personal desire that he speaks of these facts. They are grounded in God's character.

...supposing the Bible to be true, God was under the moral necessity of his own character, to act as he is there represented to have done. The acts there ascribed to him are real acts, not parabolical pictures; They were not only fitted and intended to impress the minds of his creatures - they were also the necessary results and the true vindications of his own character. This belief is inseparably connected with a belief of the reality of Christ's sufferings; and if Christ's sufferings were not real, we may give up the Bible. ²

It is not only the efficacy of what the Bible teaches but its reality that is vital. Nowhere is this more true than in regard to the reality of Christ's being the representative of sinners. The fact that He is both Judge and victim enables men to approach Him confidently and the fact that he continues to represent men in heaven means that "...the link which binds heaven and earth together is unbroken, and that this great representative does not in the midst of glory forget what he felt when he was a man of sorrows below". ³ This relation

1. Ibid. pp. 148, 149  2. Ibid. p. 149  3. Ibid. p. 150.
between the believer and Christ tends to spiritualise the whole life of the Christian and produce in him the character of Christ. This actual spiritual union of Christ and his people gives a far deeper spiritual interest to men than could the most exalted abstract teaching. We know something of his present glory and joy and are enabled in this vale of tears to enter into his mind and sympathise with his feelings and triumph in his universal dominion. "He once suffered for us - He now reigns for us. His people were once represented on the cross at Calvary, and they are now represented on the throne of heaven".¹

Just as the doctrine of Christ's representative nature is of the greatest importance, so too is that of the work of the Holy Spirit. Erskine argues that the Bible does not tell us "the mode of operation" of the Holy Spirit but that it is clear that the Spirit never acts except through the doctrines of the Bible.² The Spirit's work is not opposed to reason and indeed, may not be distinguished in our consciousness from argument or motive. Any doctrine of the Spirit which leads us away from studying the Bible with a deep sense of our need for God to teach us, is false. We are not to fill our minds with difficulties about how the Spirit operates but rather look steadfastly to the free grace revealed to us in the atonement. "As the gospel confines the influences of the Spirit to the Truths contained in the written word, there is nothing to fear from fanaticism. The Holy Spirit does not now reveal anything new, but impresses what is already revealed".³ Erskine goes on to

1. Ibid. p.151  
2. Ibid. p.152  
3. Ibid. p.162.
argue that if seen properly, the world would appear to be a school in which the principles of the Bible are inculcated. Every event can teach us of love to God or man and thus every event can be made "a step towards heaven". Indeed, it appears that "...the heart of man, the Bible, and the course of Providence, have a mutual adaptation to each other; and hence we may conclude, that the same God who made man, and encompassed him with the trials of life, gave the Bible to instruct him how these trials might be made subservient to his eternal happiness". Erskine concludes by discussing the relation of God's character to miracles and here he argues that the belief of the miracles of the New Testament does not constitute the faith of a Christian. "These miracles merely attest the authority of the messenger, - they are not themselves the message..." This argument is important not only in regard to miracles but in regard to external evidences in general. Erskine says that, "No one who knows what God is, will refuse to receive a system of doctrines which he really believes was communicated by God: But then, no one in the right exercise of his reason, can, by any evidence, be brought to believe that what appears to him an absolute absurdity, did ever in truth come from God". External evidences are of no use to a man in such a state. He must be brought to the Bible and shown that it contains in it "...the development of a mighty scheme, admirably fitted for the accomplishment of a mighty purpose..." When a man sees the harmony and beauty of the doctrines of Christianity, he will see their truth "...whether

1. Ibid. pp. 175, 176
2. Ibid. p. 184
3. Ibid. p. 186
4. Ibid. p. 187.
it has actually been revealed in a miraculous way or not; and if he finds that the fact of its being inspired really enters into the substance of the system, and is necessary to it, he will be disposed to believe that too.¹ When in science we accept the probability or improbability of a new idea, it is by comparing it with those things we already know. Likewise, the basis for our Christian belief is near at hand. It consists in the "...feelings of our own hearts, in the history of ourselves and of our species, and in the intimations which we have of God from his works and ways, and the judgements and anticipations of conscience".² We are not mere spectators of these things but rather find it important to determine the principle which explains and connects them all. This we find in the character and will of God.³

The similarity, both of content and method, between this work of Thomas Erskine in 1820 and the sermons of McLeod Campbell in 1830 and 1831 is striking at point after point. The insistence on the revelation of God in Christ being expressed in concrete, active, personal categories appropriate to that revelation is remarkable. There is strong emphasis on using these Biblical ways of thinking over against the "abstract propositions and

1. Ibid. p.201
2. Ibid. p.203
3. It is interesting to see how McLeod Campbell in a preaching situation says much the same thing in regard to the relation of miracles and the authority of Christ in the Scripture. "If you had ever so many miracles, you at last come to God's character; and there I would have you to begin; for it is in the manifestation of God in a way worthy of himself, which you have in the face of Jesus Christ, that leaves the most illiterate in the country without excuse if he does not fall down and worship God as he is set forth in the gospel". (S.L., I, p.444.)
and general terms" of many of the creeds. Such differences as
may be seen between Erskine's method and McLeod Campbell's may
largely be explained by the fact that the Internal Evidence was
written as an apologetic to those who already accepted moral
principles but not the fact of God's character revealed in Christ
which gave meaning to them. McLeod Campbell, on the other hand,
is preaching, and this, presumably, "from faith to faith". The
fundamental similarity between the two men's answer to the
question "how does God reveal Himself to men" may be seen even
more clearly in a passage from Erskine's Brazen Serpent, publish-
ed in 1831. By this time the two men had been friends for nearly
three years and mutual influence is highly possible. In any
case, Erskine, (in words which well could be McLeod Campbell's
at this same time!) says,

In the former dispensations, it was the
spoken word that gave the light, but now
it is the substantial word made flesh.
But our knowledge of the power of the
light, is intimately connected with, or
arises mainly out of, the word being made
flesh. Actions are our only measure of
mind and feeling. And, therefore, whilst
the word continued to be only a spoken
word, we could not rightly enter into the
mind and feelings of God towards us...in
the history of the word made flesh, we
have a concentrated history of God's
actions towards our nature, our flesh;
and thus we have a standard by which we may
at all times measure the mind of God towards
ourselves and every individual of the
nature. For that which the divine nature did
to the human nature in Christ, was done to
him in character of head and representative
of the human nature; and, therefore, is to
be considered as indicating the mind of God
to every man.\

1. Thomas Erskine, Brazen Serpent, (2nd ed., Edinburgh: Waugh and
Innes, 1831) pp. 32, 33. Compare with McLeod Campbell's teaching in
1830, 1831 in Chap. II, pp. 96 ff.
Erskine argues that God raised this part of humanity to the very throne of heaven in order that "...he may fit it to become a fountain of eternal life for that whole nature, of which it is a part, and in which he personally dwells". It was for this purpose that our nature had to suffer in the person of Jesus. It was fallen nature and lay under condemnation for its sin. "He came into it as a new head, that he might take it up out of the fall, and redeem it from sin, and lift it up to God; and this could be effected only by his bearing the condemnation, and thus manifesting, through sorrow and death, the character of God, and the character of man's rebellion; manifesting God's abhorrence of sin, and the full sympathy of the new Head of the nature in that abhorrence, and the eating out the taint of the fall, and making honourable way for the inpouring of the new life into the rebellious body". So it is that "...the remission of sins is just as efficient prospectively as it is retrospectively". The basis for his argument is, of course, the incarnation which incidentally he refers to as "...this movement of the Son..."

We noted in McLeod Campbell's teaching that the participation of believers in Christ is not only founded on the incarnation, but also on a spiritual union through Faith. This too, we see in Erskine for he declares that, "Jesus has taken our flesh, and

1. Ibid. p.33
2. Ibid. p.34
3. Ibid. p.80. Was it from Erskine that McLeod Campbell gained his titles for Chap. III and VII in the Nature of the Atonement? ("Retrospective Aspect of the Atonement", "Prospective Aspect of the Atonement").
4. Ibid. p.62.
become one flesh with us, in order that we might be one spirit with him. These are the two bonds. All men are necessarily connected with him by the first bond, namely, the flesh, - and all who believe in the love which produced that first bond, became connected with him by the second, namely the Spirit, and these only".1

In comparing the teaching of McLeod Campbell and Thomas Erskine, the fact that Erskine's later writings taught universal salvation, raises the question of how this teaching arose, and why McLeod Campbell did not follow him in this matter. The answer would seem to lie in the fact that Erskine's thought was influenced in a fundamental manner by his study of Plato. His love for Plato is very evident in his writings and letters2 and indeed, in one place, he even goes so far as to say that, "If you know the Gorgias of Plato, you will understand me when I say that I learned the meaning of justification by faith from that dialogue, before I saw it in St. Paul".3 In the collection of papers included in the Spiritual Order published after his death, Erskine repeats this assertion and expands it. He declares that "...Socrates meant to teach that man's truest wisdom was to commit himself unflinchingly, and without regard to present ease and comfort, to the instruction and guidance of a divine wisdom,,

He had within himself the consciousness of an infallible guidance, and knew that it was only by entire subjection of himself and all his selfish imaginations to it, that he could profit by its

1. Ibid. pp. 97,98
2. T. Erskine, Letters, e.g., pp.327,n2,345,351,352
instructions".  

Erskine declares that Socrates undoubtedly identified this guidance with the "Ruler of the Universe" and "...found in it the assurance that the Ruler of the Universe was occupied with the purpose of making him righteous, an assurance which enabled him to welcome everything which befell him, and to look for divine light and instruction in all; and thus he was justified or set right by that same faith which put St. Paul right also".  

It is this purpose of education which Erskine developed into the basis for his argument for Universal Salvation. "The purpose of all punishment being education is surely the true argument..." to defend Universal Salvation.

McLeod Campbell's reaction to Erskine's teaching is interesting not only in that it confirms that he never held the doctrine of Universal Salvation, but also the grounds on which he could not accept it. McLeod Campbell declared that he could not outright reject Erskine's view, but that he felt difficulties which Erskine did not. He is glad to see the question an open one, particularly since "...of the two directions of thought (in reaction against the popular creed here), I feel that both as a Scriptural question, and as one of Christian philosophy, the conception of final restitution commends itself incomparably more to me than that of annihilation...". But, McLeod Campbell was not pleased by Erskine's Spiritual Order and considered that it could not but "... do injustice to his memory".  

2. Ibid.  
3. T. Erskine, Letters, pp. 434, 435  
5. Ibid. vol. II, p. 294.
always clear that though he did not fully accept the book's argument, he was impressed by the spirit of it. "The reading now of the book as a whole still leaves the same impression that I received when he read portions of the manuscript to me; viz., that it is an imperfect representation of punishment that resolves it into the desire to reclaim. But the conclusion at which he arrives is not necessarily affected by this defect; for that other element in punishment which he seems not to recognize does not necessarily involve the ordinary doctrine". 1

McLeod Campbell frequently mentioned that no other man was as close to him as Erskine and this "...not withstanding of differences in our understanding of many passages of Scripture and even in our thoughts..."2 He advised Erskine to read his own earlier books in order to correct his later teaching. McLeod Campbell observes that Erskine's teaching of the "restitution of all things" had a place in his teaching even before he knew him, but that what he had earlier held as a hope, had later become an essential.3 If Erskine was at points unduly influenced by Platonism, nonetheless he had remarkable gifts of deep Biblical and theological insight. McLeod Campbell was quite properly wary of this late development in Erskine's thought, but there is little doubt but that he gained a great deal of Biblical understanding from this long friendship.4

1. Ibid. vol.II, p.317
2. Ibid. vol.II, p.198
3. Ibid. vol.II, p.199
4. Consider for instance, Erskine's thought in the Spiritual Order, p.36, that revelation was made in both its objective subjective aspects "...in the person of Jesus Christ. It has been said that there is in the eastern mind less demand for the accurate distinction between the object and the subject in
False Trails

Before we proceed further in determining some probable influences upon McLeod Campbell's thought, it would be well to dispose of some false notions. One such notion is that he was a disciple of Edward Irving.\(^1\) While the two men were friends, McLeod Campbell would have nothing to do with the sect formed around Irving's teachings and indeed, in his letters he strongly attacks them. Probably the reason for the allegation of discipleship is because both men taught a universal atonement, stressed Christ's humanity and pointed to pre-Westminster theology as more Biblical than that Confession.\(^2\) However, the fact is that such evidence as there is of possible influence, seems to point to McLeod Campbell's having influenced Irving. The story is told of Irving, McLeod Campbell and his friend, A. J. Scott, walking down the shores of Gairloch in the summer of

4. (continued from page 248) religious thought than in ours; and it sometimes almost seems as if in Paul's hand, the righteousness of faith becomes itself the gospel. This however is quite natural. Christ is himself both object and subject in Christianity. He both shows forth the Father's loving purpose which is the ground of all faith, and he lives by the faith which rests on that purpose. He is thus both the gospel itself, and in him is shown forth the righteousness by faith which is the most precious product. Thus whilst he is the object of faith as the Revealer of the Father, he is also the exerciser of faith as the Truster in the Father".


1828 when Irving exclaimed,

"I see what you mean, Sir". and then stated satisfactorily, the doctrine of the universal love of God. On that very day, in preaching at Roseneath, he proclaimed it for the first time. Speaking afterwards of this to a friend, he said: "Till I came to acknowledge the unlimited love of God, I was always finding myself striking against something or other, like a fish in a tub; but now I am in the ocean".1

Another name which perhaps even more unfortunately, has been mentioned with McLeod Campbell's is that of Hegel. Hegel's name is generally introduced with that of Edward Caird; Caird, of course, was a well known Hegelian and because McLeod Campbell in one of his letters refers to a visit from "...my young friend, E.Caird...", it is thought he was influenced by him. In fact, this reference to a visit takes place six years after the Nature of the Atonement was written.2 Indeed, since E.Caird was born in 1835 and McLeod Campbell's book was written by 1855,3 to assume that E.Caird influenced it is ludicrous. He did not graduate in theology until 1854,4 and McLeod Campbell was very unlikely to learn much from him before 1855! Certainly in later years, McLeod Campbell mentions E.Caird, but by this time McLeod Campbell's views were formed and indeed, he declares that he does not know German philosophy very well. In 1866 he wrote that "...my friend, Mr. Edward Caird, gave his inaugural lecture as professor of Moral Philosophy ... with much of what he said I

2. Memorials, vol.II, p.12, the Visit was in March, 1861.
3. Ibid. vol.I, p.265
had entire sympathy. ... It is very difficult in a time like this to do justice to men of a school which one does not know well: and I know the Oxford school but in part". 1 In 1867 we find McLeod Campbell admitting that he does not know Kant well and cannot see the stepping stones from Kant to Hegel, "But as I suppose I have a living Hegel in Caird, I shall apply to him for light here; as I now know what I need light on". 2 Possibly this notion of the influence of Hegel through Caird was generated by J.H. Leckie. In his book on the Hegelian, Fergus Ferguson, he makes McLeod Campbell out to be a Hegelian who reacted against the "dryness" of the Scottish common sense philosophers. 3 Undoubtedly, these were Leckie's feelings, but he had no grounds to ascribe them to McLeod Campbell.

We may now turn to a third name which has been related to that of McLeod Campbell in a misleading way - and that name is Jonathan Edwards. It must certainly be granted that Jonathan Edwards had a broad influence on the theology in Scotland in the eighteenth century and later. 4 The question at hand is what influence he may have had on McLeod Campbell's theology. G.D. Henderson has gathered together what evidence there is to make a case that Edward's was an importance influence on McLeod Campbell. 5 When the development of his thought is studied, it

1. Memorials, II, p.158
2. Ibid. vol. II, p.174
seems, however, that the references McLeod Campbell made to Edwards can best be interpreted in another light. We know, for instance, that McLeod Campbell was given a copy of Edwards' *Religious Affections* in 1827 by a friend who considered McLeod Campbell's doctrine of assurance to be dangerous as leading to false assurance. McLeod Campbell's reference to this book, while honouring its author, merely cites it as an example of the system of pious "evidences" which he considered to be wrong.1 Another book by Edwards was his *Life of David Brainerd*,2 one of the three books which Campbell affectionately referred to as "his Row companions". Brainerd was a close friend of Edwards, (engaged, in fact, to one of Edwards' daughters) and in his writings he highly recommended Edwards' *Religious Affections*. Brainerd had been converted during the "Great Awakening" in America and subsequently gone out as a missionary to the Indians in America. His *Life* is composed mainly of his Diary and letters, and the witness of this saintly and determined missionary is impressive even apart from his particular theological position. He does, in fact, teach an evangelical form of Calvinism which McLeod Campbell always had the highest respect for. We have an interesting attestation of both the affection McLeod Campbell felt for Brainerd and the theological differences between them in one of McLeod Campbell's letters during the height of his theological conflict when he wrote that "...our dear glorified

1. Reminiscences, pp. 184, 185
brother Brainerd, who was not only in labours more abundant but in feelings more exalted than any of us, would not have presented the Gospel message as we now do..." McLeod Campbell indeed admits that Brainerd would have disapproved with "a godly jealousy", yet, 'The conviction that it would be so does not in the least shake me in the conviction that God has permitted me to see more nearly as it was in the apostolic form..." 1. McLeod Campbell's respect for, and yet disagreement with, Edwards and Brainerd is also expressed in the Nature of the Atonement in 1856 in terms of the strange disharmony between the love for all men shown in these men's lives, and their teachings that Christ died only for an unknown few. McLeod Campbell declares that,

In Brainerd's case, indeed, as also in the case of his master Edwards', this contradiction between the faith of the head and the love of the heart, is the more remarkable, in that, that faith was not taken up blindly, or without much reasoning and weighing of all that it involved. How marvellous it appears that such reasoners did not give to their understandings the help that they might have found in their own spiritual consciousness, and making, so to speak, an axiom of the love to man that was in their own hearts, and reason from it, as a simple uneducated man did, who, when the doctrine of the universality of the atonement was first introduced to the attention of a prayer and fellowship meeting of which he was a member, when others were arguing against it, said, "I cannot refuse it, for I feel that when I have most of the spirit of Christ in me I feel most love to all men; and I cannot believe that the spirit of Christ would move me to love all men if Christ did not love all men Himself." 2

It would seem strange that McLeod Campbell's thought could

be said to be based on the teachings of men with whom he was in such basic disagreement, yet the thought is often expressed that the "...Nature of the Atonement, one of the few great books produced by Scottish theological effort, is based upon a very appreciative though critical study of the American Scholar's (Edwards') teaching". The basis for such a statement is, of course, that in the Nature of the Atonement, McLeod Campbell quotes Edwards' Satisfaction for Sin, Chapter II, 1-3 where he writes that,

"God could not be just to Himself without this vindication, unless there could be such a thing as a repentance, humiliation and sorrow for this (viz. sin), proportional to the greatness of the majesty despised", for that there must needs be, "either an equivalent punishment or an equivalent sorrow and repentance" - "so," he proceeds, "sin must be punished with an infinite punishment, thus assuming that the alternative of "an equivalent sorrow or repentance" was out of the question."

McLeod Campbell seizes on the alternative of an equivalent sorrow and repentance and develops this idea as one of the major themes of his book. Edwards had assumed this equivalent sorrow and repentance to be out of the question and developed his ideas in terms of punishment. If McLeod Campbell's doctrine of the nature of the atonement is to be said to be based on the development of this alternative found in Edwards' Satisfaction for Sin then it must be proven that he did not state this alternate or

2. Nature of the Atonement, p.137
"equivalent" way of meeting God's justice before he had read or heard of these thoughts in Jonathan Edwards. We have seen how McLeod Campbell's earliest contact with Edwards was a combination of spiritual admiration and theological disagreement. Certainly, he was occupied with the study of Edwards in order to write his historical section on Calvinist thought on the doctrine of the Atonement which made up the early chapters of the Nature of the Atonement. The real point at issue, however, is whether it is not more likely that McLeod Campbell had already in a large degree developed his doctrine of the nature of the atonement along the lines of Christ's sorrow and repentance for us, before he read these sentences of Edwards'. If this was the case, then on finding such an alternative in such a highly esteemed author, it was still a gold-mine. He had found a valuable chink in the armour of the leading theologian of his theological enemies, and he exploited it for all it was worth in his book! In this light, his friend, Erskine's comment in 1856 makes great sense. "You have been most happy in finding, in such a universally recognized Calvinistic authority as Edwards, the basis of your great argument. This will give your book an advantage which it could not have had by any mere address to reason and conscience". One needs merely to stress the words "finding in", "Calvinistic authority" and "your great argument" to understand the use he made of these

1. According to his son Donald, McLeod Campbell's reading for his analysis of Calvinism was done "...in the winter of 1853-54; and he made very full notes and analysis of the works which are referred to in the course of the book". Memorials, I, p. 261
sentences from Edwards. The fact that McLeod Campbell "used" Edwards' words but was not dependent on him is stated clearly in the Notes at the back of the Nature of the Atonement. McLeod Campbell tells how the deepening awareness of his conclusions on the subject of the nature of the atonement lead him to write on it. But first he felt he should study what others had written on it. So with this object in mind he read more closely than ever before the teachings of Luther and older and modern Calvinists. "My endeavour was to discuss any element of truth present in what I read, and to separate it from the error with which it might be combined; and thus, the words of President Edwards, "either an equivalent punishment or an equivalent sorrow and repentance", suggested to me that that earnest and deep thinker had really been on the verge of that conception of a moral and spiritual atonement which was occupying my own thoughts".¹ This merely supports the fact that McLeod Campbell had presented the major aspects of his argument long before 1856. We find in his preaching of 1830 and 1831 the expression of thoughts concerning Christ's suffering and repentance on behalf of sinners that could be straight from the Nature of the Atonement - or should we not say, vice versa.² In fact, in the Notes he added to the second edition of his book in 1867, he distinctly asserts that "It is about forty years since the moral and spiritual nature of the atonement first dawned on my mind".³ That would push the

date back to 1827 - the middle of his Row pastorate. We will now turn again to more probable influences on McLeod Campbell's thought.¹

"Row Companions"

In many places throughout his later writings and letters, McLeod Campbell makes reference to three "Row Companions". For example, in the same year in which he completed his Nature of the Atonement he wrote in a letter of ". . . my Three Great Row companions, in the Row House . . . and in the cottage at Shandon before then, - Henry Martyn, David Brainerd, Henry Dorney".² He declared that these three had influenced him more than any other of his reading. He declared them to be ". . . the most realised as Christian benefactors among those who had slept in Jesus before I knew the Lord, and who were known to me only through the record of their lives".³ He knew these men through their biographies and autobiographies. We have already mentioned

1. The wide spread misunderstanding of the influences on McLeod Campbell may be seen in some of the names associated with his in John T. McNeill's History and Character of Calvinism, (New York: Oxford Press, 1954) p.398. "Campbell had been trained in Scottish philosophy under Sir William Hamilton, through whom he was favourably introduced to Kant. He was not un instructed in Hegelianism, whose Scottish interpreter, Edward Caird, was his friend. Jonathan Edwards was among the theologians whom he cited and honoured. He had affinities with Schleiermacher". When McLeod Campbell was 67 he declared Kant's thought difficult and "... new to me", Memorials, vol. II, p.176. As we saw in Chap. I, McLeod Campbell considered George Jardine to be his "intellectual father". We have just seen his relation to Hegel, Caird and Edwards. His only reference to Schleiermacher was a criticism, (Memorials, vol. II, p.209).
2. Memorials, I, p.269
3. Ibid. In a letter of 1869, he speaks of Martyn, Brainerd and Dorney as "... a trio who shared with my Bible the whole of my reading . . ." in his early Row days, Memorials, vol. II, p.239.
David Brainerd as a close friend of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards' *Life of David Brainerd* was a "best seller" in its time. Its appeal, along with that of the life of Henry Martyn, can be explained not only by the fact that both men preached evangelical doctrine, but by the absolute dedication seen in both their lives. McLeod Campbell's dedication both to Scripture and to his pastoral duties could not help but be deepened by such "companions". The third "Row Companion", Henry Dorney, (1613-1683) was not nearly as well known as Brainerd and Martyn, but in his book, *Divine Contemplations and Spiritual Breathings*, we may find a point of contact with a theological tradition which with its emphasis on the doctrine of "union with Christ", was much closer to Luther, Calvin and Scripture than was federal and Westminster theology. Dorney, a Puritan layman, wrote a number of religious tracts, whose central theme was always that which he chose as the title of one of them, "A Discourse on Union with Christ". We can find in his book one place where the scheme of federal theology was briefly outlined, but generally it is put into the background by the great emphasis on union with Christ. Dorney emphasises, for example, that through the incarnation, Jesus Christ has become the object of the believer's faith, "...Jesus Christ, in being Mediator, took our Nature (viz. that human Nature that is in every Person of Mankind) into immediate Union with the God-

head dwelling in his Person, so this Jesus Christ, God and Man (in the Relation he bears to the Father and the Spirit, and they to him, in their mutual Concurrence in this great Work of Mediation) with him, having sealed and anointed him thereto, that he might completely effect it, he is the true immediate Object of a Believer's Eye..."1. He stresses that both justification and sanctification are found in Christ. "God begins my Righteousness and Freedom in Himself, and brings it forth in the Person of Jesus Christ: I must begin it there also; and as it is perfected in Him, I must perfectly suck it thence, continuing perpetually at that Breast, Heb.X.14, never expecting to have it mended, by any thing I could do, though it were the obeying of the whole Law, Gal.II.16, for my Obedience is but the Obedience of a stained Nature..."2. The basis of man's salvation is that God himself has taken up our humanity in Jesus Christ. As Dorney expresses it, God does this only for the elect, although he admits that it is the nature of all mankind that is assumed.

...that the Justice of God against Sin and Sinners may be preserved, and yet the Elect Remnant saved, God himself, in the Person of the eternal Son, assumes the Nature of Mankind into the Union of his Person; and, in that Nature, pays to his own Justice all the Debt which this Elect Remnant, among the rest of fallen Mankind, had involved themselves into; ...the Union is so near betwixt him and them, that whereas he is the express Image of the Father, and having all Power committed to him, he stamps upon them the Image of God, viz. Righteousness and true Holiness; which becomes theirs only through Union

1. Ibid. p.86  
2. Ibid. p.90.
with him, and do only exist in their existing in him; which Existence is wrought by the Holy Spirit, forming him spiritually in their Hearts (as it formed him bodily in the Virgin's Womb) which Formation of Christ in their Hearts becomes a mystical, spiritual and true Union betwixt him and them.1

This union with Christ with its basis in the incarnation, also has a second aspect in this spiritual union by faith. Does man by his faith bring about this union? No, rather, "Faith springs from this Union in order of Nature, but in order of Time, 'tis brought forth with it. There can be no Faith, or any other Grace, till the God of all Grace hath taken the Soul in actual union with himself."2 Dorney argues that "...the Person of the Mediator remains distinct from the Persons of the Redeemed, and are not mixed, but united through the Spirit..."3 Yet this union is real. Reason rebels against this and insists that sin cannot be forgiven by this "...naked Reliance on Christ's Person..."4 So it is that "...the Spirit of Bondage ...by the advantage of my own Sin, pleads rationally against my Peace, till Faith comes with the Tongue of the Learned, and pleads the Mystery of Free Grace, against the Plea of Reason; and the Righteousness of Christ, and his Holiness, against Sin and Guilt".5 Dorney makes it clear that he is trying to be faithful to Scripture in saying that it is "...Christ, in whom the Almighty God receives this believing and renewed Person into that Union and true real Nearness, which is shadowed forth in the Scripture of Truth, under

1. Ibid. pp. 184, 185 2. Ibid. p.201 3. Ibid. p.105 4. Ibid. p. 91 5. Ibid.
the terms of Father and Child, ... Husband and Wife, ... Vine and Branches; yea, as one Body consisting of Head and Members..."1. It is on this basis then, that Dorney speaks of the believer's relation to Christ and he is able therefore, to speak of the Christian's life in personal terms. Although he does not stress the term "...mind of God...", yet his exposition of man's life in living participation with Christ, makes it clear that man's thought and actions are to have their centre in God revealed in Christ. Dorney declares that from the union of the believer with Christ,

...it followeth, that no Action, State or Condition of such a renewed Person (whether it be inward or outward) is so entirely (sic) his own, and of private Concernment to himself alone, as it was before; his Sins were more entirely his own Damage before; now they wound his Relation, and grieve Christ, Ephes. IV, 30. he sinned before against the Law of God, he now sins in all his Miscarriages against Christ also, I Cor. VIII, 12. and against the Law of his Relation to him, Ezek. XVI, 38. he bore his own Guilt before with Distraction and Horror, now Christ bears if for him before his very Eyes, and melts his Heart into Remorse at the Sight of such a Spectacle, Zech. XII, 10. his sins made him wander still farther and farther from God before, now they are made (contrary to their own Nature) to scourge him into the fresh Application of Jesus Christ, by whom he draws near to God, Psalm XXXIX, 30, 31, I Peter, 111, 18 in all his Afflictions he was alone before, now Christ is his Partner, Isaiah XIII, 9 ...2

We can see in Dorney the use of those particular, personal categories of thought which the general and abstract thinking of Federal Theology had tended to overshadow. We see the emphasis on the Person of Christ which is so characteristic of Biblical

1. Ibid. pp. 185, 186
2. Ibid. p. 186.
and Reformation doctrine. In fact, here we find that dynamic relationship of the incarnation to the atonement which is so basic to the teaching of both Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell. But it must not be thought that Dorney was the only possible influence in this direction. There are grounds for asserting that McLeod Campbell was influenced by a long tradition of theology which had these characteristics.

The Tradition in Which He Stood

The tradition in which McLeod Campbell stands might best be described as that Reformation and Biblical tradition which emphasized the doctrine of union with Christ. The common presupposition found in the various forms of this doctrine is its insistence on the inter-relationship of the incarnation and the atonement. As well as having Biblical roots and having come to find clear expression in the Protestant Reformation, this doctrine was emphasized by the Fathers of the early church. When this fact is recognized, can we find evidence that McLeod Campbell was influenced by Patristic studies? Geddes MacGregor asserts that, "It seems plain that he was very much better read in the Fathers of the early Church than were the vast majority of his judges". He goes on to declare that he knew he had behind him Clement, Cyprian and Augustine. Most of what MacGregor says here is probably true. It seems very unlikely that he would need to know very much about the early Church Fathers to surpass the knowledge of the majority of those in the General Assembly! But

if this statement is meant to indicate that McLeod Campbell was well grounded in Patristic literature, then it is a misleading notion. It has been pointed out\(^1\) that the basis for this statement is not, in fact, anything McLeod Campbell wrote, but an addition to the *Proceedings of the Trial* made by his friend and publisher, R.B. Lusk.\(^2\) Lusk, in this same place, goes on to support the doctrine of universal atonement and assurance of faith from writings by and about the Reformers. He quotes Luther, Latimer, Becon, and Jewell and then Edward William's *Essay on the Divine Government* to the effect that Calvin also taught that Christ had died for all men. His quotation from William's work includes quotations from Calvin's Commentaries and reference to the fact that in his last will Calvin had referred to Christ's death for the "...sins of the human race..."\(^3\)

**John Calvin**

As we shall see, McLeod Campbell quoted from Calvin's *Institutes*, and from Calvin's *Catechism* in his trial defence.\(^4\)

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2. *Proceedings, III*, pp. 181, 182. McLeod Campbell never considered himself well read in the area of Patristics. In fact, he admitted in regard to the Nature of the Atonement that "...I cannot doubt that such an acquaintance with the Fathers as some enjoy would have enabled me to engrat my book on the past with some advantages". (Memorials, vol. I, pp. 273, 4).
3. It was obviously these parts of Lusk's writing which led Geddes MacGreggor to write "...Campbell had not neglected the study of Calvin himself, and seems to have been familiar with Edward William's Essay on the Divine Government and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace" ... "which notes that Calvin was only 27 when he wrote the Institutes and in his will at 54 wrote that Christ had died for the sins of the whole world". "Row Heresy", *Harvard Theological Review*, (October, 1950), p. 290.
However, apart from these few references and his statement in 1831 that there was not much difference between his teaching and that of Luther and Calvin, he virtually never mentions John Calvin. This is very noticeable since he several times wrote sections of his books on Luther's teaching and a large part of his Nature of the Atonement deals with early and later Calvinists but not Calvin. Nowhere does he make any extended contrasts between Calvin and the "Calvinists" of his day, yet this difference is very great and very significant. There are, of course, great differences between certain of McLeod Campbell's teachings and certain of Calvin's. But the overwhelming fact is that there are also very great similarities. This is true, not only in regard to certain central concerns which both hold in common, but in regard even to particular modes of expression. It could be argued that it is significant that while McLeod Campbell attacks Calvinists, such as Owen and Edwards, he never attacks Calvin. But surely it is equally significant that he never praises him or uses him against his opponents as he used Luther and the "equivalent repentance" passage from Edwards. As far as similarities of thought and expression with Calvin are concerned, this could be accounted for on the basis of his reading of Calvinists such as Dorney and Brainerd. The points where he is closer to Calvin than most "Calvinists" of his day can equally well be

1. John McLeod Campbell, Memorials, vol. I, p. 64
explained by the simple fact that the source and norm of McLeod Campbell's thought was the Bible. Calvin, of course, was one of the greatest Biblical exegetes in history and if McLeod Campbell, surrounded by the traditions of "Calvinism", found his way to teachings closer to Calvin, can this not simply be explained by the fact that both of these men were closer to Scriptural modes of thought than were the "Calvinists"? This question of how great a direct relation there was between Calvin and McLeod Campbell must remain something of a mystery, but this makes it none the less interesting to look at a number of points on which there was a common emphasis as over against the "Calvinists" of that day. The greatest similarity can be seen in that both men taught the fundamental basis of the atonement was to be seen in the incarnation. According to Calvin, sin, "like a cloud" has estranged men from the Kingdom of Heaven and God found it necessary to provide a mediator who could bridge the wide gap between men and Himself and bring them near.

The situation would surely have been hopeless had the very majesty of God not descended to us, since it was not in our power to ascend to him. Hence, it was necessary for the Son of God to become for us "Immanuel, that is, God with us" (Isa. 7:14; Matt. 1:23), and in such a way that his divinity and our human nature might by mutual connection grow together. Otherwise the nearness would not have been near enough, nor the affinity sufficiently firm, for us to hope that God might dwell with us.¹

The sole purpose of the incarnation was God's purpose "...to restore the fallen world and to succour lost men".² In

1. Institutes, II, XII, 1, (L.C.C. translation)
2. Ibid. II, XII, 4.
order to fulfill this purpose however, it was necessary for
Christ to purify our sinful flesh by his perfect obedience in
life and death. Calvin asks "...How has Christ abolished sin,
banished the separation between us and God, and acquired
righteousness to render God favourable and kindly towards us?
To this we can in general reply that he has achieved this for
us by the whole course of his obedience".  

Calvin also
emphasises that this obedience is in our flesh and through the
Holy Spirit.

Truly, Christ was sanctified from earliest
infancy in order that he might sanctify in
himself his elect from every age without
distinction. For, to wipe out the guilt
of disobedience which had been committed
in our flesh, he took that very flesh that
in it, for our sake, and in our stead, he
might achieve perfect obedience. Thus,
he was conceived of the Holy Spirit in
order that, in the flesh taken, fully
imbued with the holiness of the Spirit, he
might impart that holiness to us.  

Calvin stresses the fact that all this has been done for
us, for it is merely stupidity to suggest that Christ came to
merit anything for Himself. Yet this fact raises the question
of how all that Christ has done in Himself can be shared with
men? It is this question which Calvin turns to in Book III of
his Institutes. There he begins by asking,

How do we receive those benefits which the
Father bestowed on his only-begotten Son -
not for Christ's own private use, but that
he might enrich poor and needy men? First,
we must understand that as long as Christ
remains outside of us, and we are separated

1. Ibid. II, XVI, 5
2. Ibid. IV, XVI, 18; also II, XII, 4
3. Ibid. II, XVII, 6.
from him, all that he has suffered and
done for the salvation of the human race remains useless and of no value for us. Therefore, to share with us what he has received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within us.1

This "union with Christ" comes about through the Holy Spirit. George Hendry unfortunately exaggerates the distinction between the relation established by the incarnation and this "bond" of the Holy Spirit, "...by which Christ effectually unites us to himself".2 Hendry declares that Calvin "...is introducing an entirely new theme, the union of Christ and believers, as head and members in his body, the Church. This is a different union from that which was established between Christ and humanity by the incarnation".3 Calvin, in fact, goes on to explain that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ and has been given into the hands of the Mediator by the Father.4 Not only that, but as we have seen, the Holy Spirit is the same Spirit by which our humanity was sanctified in the incarnation. The work of the Holy Spirit is to bring men faith which Calvin defines as "... a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon hearts through the Holy Spirit".5 From the side of God it can be said that the benefits of Christ are made ours by the Holy Spirit, and from the side of man it can be said that these benefits are received

1. Ibid. III, I, 1
2. Ibid.
3. Gospel of Incarnation, pp. 69, 70
5. Ibid. III, II, 7.
by faith. Here again we may see a fundamental consistency in the teaching of McLeod Campbell and Calvin for both insist that Christ is the object of faith. In Calvin this teaching is very clear in most places, yet becomes blurred on some occasions when he speaks of election. Generally however, it must be agreed that Calvin insists on the certainty of faith. Just as McLeod Campbell taught that we should look to Christ and not into our own hearts for "pious evidences", Calvin taught that

...if you contemplate yourself that is sure damnation. But since Christ has been so imparted to you with all his benefits that all his things are made yours, that you are made a member of him, indeed one with him, his righteousness overwhelms your sins; his salvation wipes out your condemnation; with his worthiness he intercedes that your unworthiness may not come before God's sight. Surely this is so: We ought not to separate Christ from ourselves or ourselves from him. Rather we ought to hold fast bravely with both hands to that fellowship by which he has bound himself to us. ...Not only does he cleave to us by an indivisible bond of fellowship, but with a wonderful communion, day by day, he grows more and more into one body with us, until he becomes completely one with us.

Like McLeod Campbell, he admits that this faith may be severely tested, "...certain interruptions of faith occasionally occur, according as its weakness is violently buffeted hither and thither; so in the thick darkness of temptations its light

is snuffed out. Yet whatever happens; it ceases not its earnest quest for God".  

The reason for the certainty of faith is therefore not anything in man, but the fact that it is grounded in God. In this regard Calvin often speaks of election in such Christocentric terms that one wonders why it was necessary for him to speak of Divine Decrees beyond the election revealed in Christ.

...those whom God has adopted as his sons are said to have been chosen not in themselves but in his Christ (Eph. 1:4); for unless he could have them in him, he could not honour them with the inheritance of his Kingdom if they had not previously become partakers of him. But if we have been chosen in him, we shall not find assurance of our election in ourselves; and not even in God the Father, if we conceive him as severed from his Son. Christ, then, is the mirror wherein we must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election.2

While McLeod Campbell very rarely speaks (even negatively) of "election" and a "covenant of works", his very concentration on the Person and work of Christ, make his views similar to Calvin's, when Calvin is speaking most Christocentrically. Calvin's teaching that Christ is the "mirror" of our election has in practice the same result as McLeod Campbell's concentration on Christ as the object of faith. Calvin indeed declares that Jesus Christ is the object of faith even in the Old Testament Dispensation. This is quite consistent, of course, with his teaching that there is one Covenant of Grace. The substance of that Covenant is seen in Jesus Christ. But this teaching is not accompanied by any "covenant of works". This point is

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. III, XXIV, 5.
important for it means that both Calvin and McLeod Campbell, while using legal figures of speech, could also speak of a "real" spiritual "union" or participation between Christ and the believer.

**Martin Luther**

Another interesting possible influence on McLeod Campbell is that of the Reformer, Luther. We know, for instance, that before his trial in 1831 he made a study of Luther's and Calvin's teachings and declared that "...As to the extent to which there is anything new in my views, I think I have a distinct conception of it, and when I go back to the writings of Luther and Calvin, I find it not great..."¹ Later in his life when he was reminiscing on his Row teaching, he stated that though his first understanding of the true relation of faith and works, and of how man should have peace with God "...was not received through Luther, or any teaching but that of the New Testament, I always remember the bright shining of the light of the Gospel which there was to me in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galations, - an experience renewed many years afterwards, when my reading on the subject of the Atonement led me to re-peruse it with care as well as with intense pleasure".² This later careful study of Luther's Epistle to the Galations found its way into the Nature of the Atonement as Chapter II, the "Teaching of Luther".³ This chapter is of great interest in that it reveals that many of the

2. John McLeod Campbell, Reminiscences, p.173
3. Op.cit., vol.I, p.261, informs us that the substance of this chapter on Luther was written in June, 1854.
central insights of his Row teaching as well as of his great book, are also among Luther's central emphases. It is interesting to see that McLeod Campbell recognizes that Luther did not write with the systematic concern of a speculative theologian "...when Luther speaks of the law and the Gospel, - of the righteousness of works, and of the righteousness of faith, it is not as a speculative theologian, reasoning out principles to their conclusions, and arranging the parts of a system in their due relations". He is speaking of spiritual realities which he has experienced. The vividness and picturing form of his speech is quite startling: yet it is in no sense figurative or rhetorical; for he is keeping as close to the simple expression of his mental and spiritual perceptions as he can. This realistic, rather than merely figurative way of speaking, extends to his teaching on the Atonement. So it is that he speaks of Christ's having identified himself with men in terms of a real fact. This conception of Christ as the one man, having present together in Himself the sin of all other men, and His own righteousness, Luther endeavours in all possible forms of speech to present as an actual fact, and as what justifies, and underlies such statement as that, "the Lord laid on Him the iniquity of us all". There is no doubt in McLeod Campbell's mind but that Luther conceived of it "...as a reality, and not as a legal fiction". Just as Luther presents Christ's victory in terms of this reality, so too he presents the results of this victory in

1. John McLeod Campbell, Nature of the Atonement, p.33
2. Ibid. p.34
3. Ibid. p. 36
4. Ibid. p. 37.
terms of "...that root conception of Christ's identifying of Himself with us". Because of this identification all Christ's "...own proper endowments..." are ours. Freedom and righteousness, life and sanctification are all ours. "They are all ours as Christ is ours..." Christ our life, with all these endowments is presented to our faith as already ours. "Faith does not make these high endowments, the elements of the gift of Christ, ours; they are ours by the gift of God. Faith apprehends them, accepts them..." McLeod Campbell sums up this presentation of the doctrine of "union with Christ" as it is found in Luther by saying that, "I do not feel that I can more pointedly express Luther's conception of faith than in saying, that it lifts us up into Christ and makes us one with Him, both in our own consciousness, and in God's judgement of us; - as we were, before faith, one with Him in God's gracious desire and purpose".

Another aspect of Luther's teaching which McLeod Campbell considers substantially true is his teaching concerning the relation of law and the gospel. "The essence of the difference between the law and the gospel, as conceived of by Luther, seems to be shortly this: - that the law reveals man himself to man, - that the gospel reveals God to man: - that the law brings man to self-despair, in order that the gospel may teach him faith and hope in God. Therefore, in the gospel and not in the law, is God to be seen and known". This is so even though if man were not a sinner he would understand that the law, as a demand for

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. p. 38
4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. p. 41.
love, reveals a God who is love. This revelation of a God who in His very nature is love is the purpose of the Gospel. But the nature of God is not grasped by reason or understood in the light of law but is found where God has set His will out to men, in Christ. Here McLeod Campbell quotes a long passage in which Luther emphasizes the revelation of God is to be understood through the incarnation. Luther tells us if we would seek to know God's nature to

...begin thou there where Christ began, viz. in the womb of the virgin, in the manger, and at His mother's breasts, etc. For to this end He came down, was born, was conversant among men, suffered, was crucified, and died, that by all means He might set forth Himself plainly before our eyes, and fasten the eyes of our hearts upon Himself; that thereby He might keep us from climbing up into heaven, and from the curious searching of the divine majesty. Whosoever thou hast to do, therefore, in the matter of justification, and disputest with thyself how God is to be found that justifieth and accepteth sinners; where and in what sort He is to be sought; then know thou that there is no other God besides this man Christ Jesus...1

This emphasis on the incarnation underlying the atonement of course is characteristic of McLeod Campbell. But this emphasis on the revelation through the humanity of Christ is also central and here we see how in Luther, as in McLeod Campbell, it was meant to prevent wild speculation and "curious searching" as to God's nature and will. This emphasis is important in preventing men from going "behind the back of Christ" to look at

Divine Decrees and the Mystery of God. It is this positive emphasis on God's movement to men in Christ which gives "election" an evangelical content in both Luther's and McLeod Campbell's thought, and prevents abstract philosophical speculations.

Yet one more point in Luther's teaching on the atonement was noticed by McLeod Campbell. That was "...the weight which he lays on the personal appropriation of the atonement as of the very essence of Faith". Luther not only taught that Christ was wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption for men and as such offered freely to men, but that to believe this and appropriate it was the same thing. In teaching that Christ had given himself for our sins, Luther insisted that we take the "our" personally. It is easy to speak of what Christ has done to sin in general or for other men's sins, "But when it cometh to the putting to of this pronoun our, there our weak nature and reason starteth back, and dare not come nigh unto God, nor promise to herself that so great a treasure shall be freely given unto her". Luther declares that men's reason would have them bring to God a "counterfeit sinner", a sinner who has no feeling of sin. But he argues that unless we come to Christ as those who need a physician to be healed, not with sins we have vanquished but with our "invincible"sins, we cannot truly say this our which "...being believed may swallow up all they sins".

After mentioning all this that he has to be thankful for in the teaching of Luther, McLeod Campbell declares that in regard to the nature of the atonement, "...he does not offer much help

1. Ibid. p.45  
2. Ibid. p. 46  
3. Ibid. p. 47.
towards a clear intellectual apprehension of it".\(^1\) He is certain that Luther was aware of the spiritual realities in the work of the Atonement and therefore is not thinking merely of a "legal fiction". Yet, his language does not do justice to the realities of which he speaks. McLeod Campbell's conclusion is that "... if there be not a true sense in which Christ did bear on his spirit the weight of our sins, and all our evils, and did deal with the law of God as so bearing them, seeking redemption for us, - and did triumph in so doing by the might of righteousness, Luther's marvellous teaching of justification by faith alone is left a superstructure without a foundation".\(^2\)

**Early Protestant Confessions**

Apparently McLeod Campbell was fully aware of the difference between the teaching of Luther and Calvin and that of his opponents. Indeed, one of the interesting aspects of his heresy trial defence was that while he argued constantly that the ultimate test of doctrine must be Scripture, he did not neglect marshalling a great deal of support for his views from the Confessional Statements of the Protestant Church. He declared that he intended to present his views as the "Truth of God" and then to direct the Assembly's attention

...to the history of the teaching of the Church on these subjects; not at all referring to them as giving one single jot of additional authority to the doctrine I state, but, in the first place, out of the thankfulness to God that he has preserved the light of truth in his Church from age to age, however partial it has been, and however dim its burning; and, second, because I would seek, in as far as in me lies, to

1. Ibid. p.47  
2. Ibid. p.49.
remove every obstacle to the reception of the truth itself which may exist in the minds of any.\(^1\)

In fact, he saw that in regard both to "assurance of faith" and the extent of the atonement there was a difference between these earlier Protestant Confessions and the Westminster Standards. "...the general tone of all the earlier Confessions has been the acknowledgement of the love of God in Christ as a love to all men: but that the silence of our present Confession may not be interpreted to its discredit, I would consider its history with reference to the previous Confessions to which it is immediately related..."\(^2\) McLeod Campbell was on sure historical ground in interpreting the Westminster Standards by what preceded them. There is little doubt but that his opponents read the view that "Christ did not die for all men" back into the Westminster Standards. As the Minutes of the Westminster Assembly were not discovered until later in the nineteenth century, McLeod Campbell did not have their support to argue that the Westminster Standards left this question open. He reached this conclusion, however, by comparing these Standards to the earlier Protestant Confessions which speak in many cases quite clearly of Christ's death being for all men of the whole world. Among the Confessions which he quoted was the earlier Scots Confession of 1560 and the Geneva and Heidelberg Catechisms, both of which had been in common use in the Church of Scotland. From the Heidelberg (or Palatine) Catechism, for instance, he gained

1. *Proceedings II*, p.180
support for the doctrine of Christ's death for all men from Question 37; "What believest thou when thou sayest, He suffered? Answer; That in the whole time of his life which he continued here upon earth, but especially in the end thereof, he sustained, both in body and soul, the wrath of God against the sinne of all mankind". From the Confession of the English Congregation at Geneva he could quote that "...thus of his free mercie, without compulsion, he offered up himself as the onlie sacrifice to purge the sins of all the world". He gained the same kind of support in regard to the doctrine of assurance of faith. He quoted for instance, from the Scots Confession of 1560, "Regeneration is wrocht be the power of the Holy Ghost working in the hartes of the elect of God ane assured faith in the promise of God reveild to us in his word, by whilk faith we apprehend Christ Jesus with the graces and benefits promised in him". In this regard he also quoted Calvin's Catechism which put the question "...What is further required besides our placing confidence in God, and having as assured knowledge that he is Almighty and perfectly good? The answer is in these words, "that every one of us be fully assured in his conscience that he is beloved of God, and that he will be both his Father and his Saviour".

McLeod Campbell quoted a great many more of these early Protestant Confessions in his defence but their details are not

1. Ibid. I, p.58
2. Ibid. I, p.59
3. Ibid. I, p.63
what interest us.\(^1\) What is significant is that he was aware of the fundamental rift between the Westminster theology of his day and the earlier theology of the Reformation period. It would be quite unwarranted to declare that his quotations from these materials indicate that they were even a moderately important influence on his theological thought. Rather, he used them as confirmations of what he found to be taught in Scripture. It is quite clear that they did not hold any a priori authority for McLeod Campbell, but rather were useful witnesses to Biblical doctrine.

**James Fraser of Brae**

McLeod Campbell was by no means the first Scot to notice the fundamental difference between the theology of the Reformers, the Scots Confession and the early Continental Confessions and that of the Westminster Theology.\(^2\) James Fraser of Brae (1639-

1. Amongst the Confessions he quoted were the Westminster Confession, Larger and Shorter Catechisms, 39 Articles, Scots Confession, Palatine Catechism, Calvin's Catechism, Solemn League and Covenant, later Helvetic Confession, Davidson's Catechism, Augsburg Confession, Confession of Saxonie, Confession of Wirtemberg, Anglican Book of Homilies, Catechism of the Reformed Church of Holland, Patrick Hamilton, The English Reformer Becon, Calvin's Institutes and even the Decretals of the Council of Trent.

2. As well as the names which we deal with in this chapter, McLeod Campbell was aware of many more Calvinists who struggled with the problem of a doctrine of Free Grace. He mentions in one place, besides Thomas Boston, Barclay the Berean, McLean the Baptist, Glass and Sandeman, Marshall and Harvey (sic) as men who had seen the fallacy in "evidences" (probably "pious evidences"), (Memorials, vol.I, p.58). Many of these men were of a sectarian spirit and have little interest to us today. But their struggle to express the doctrine of Free Grace is significant. As evidence that there has always been an awareness of this struggle, we shall mention an interesting book published in 1881. It is David C.A.Agnew's, *Theology of*
1698) was a Covenanter who noticed this difference and attempted to correct it through his writings. It is difficult to say how much he influenced McLeod Campbell but it is certain that McLeod Campbell knew of his work. R.B. Lusk, his publisher, and friend, had added an appendix from Fraser of Brae's *Treatise on Justifying Faith* to the pamphlet which Thomas Erskine had written in McLeod Campbell's defence in 1830. Extracts were also included with a collection of sermons which McLeod Campbell contributed to. Fraser of Brae is important in that he taught that in some sense assurance is of the essence of faith or else faith is made a work; and that this correct understanding of faith is based on the extent of the atonement. In regard to Assurance of Faith, he was as certain as McLeod Campbell that this was the doctrine of the Reformers, but that subsequently "...we slipped out of the good old way, where *Calvin, Luther* and the first Reformers walked". In another place in defending the doctrine, he refers

2. (footnote continued from page 278) *Consolation*, (Edinburgh: Ogle and Murray, 1881). He traces a tradition of theological thought which emphasizes the objective consolation of the Gospel from Luther, the Heidelberg Catechism, through Crisp, Walter Marshall, The Marrow and the Marrowmen, James Hervey and many lesser known men. It is not a very well written book but it contains some useful biographical material in its second part. The best source to understand this struggle is the Report of the Baptism Commission to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (1958). This shows clearly the Old Scottish theological tradition prior to the Westminster Standards and the change that took place with the increasing influence of federal theology.


2. Thomas Erskine, *Extracts of Letters to a Christian Friend by a Lady with an Introductory Letter*, (Greenock: R.B. Lusk), 1830 - (with an appendix by the publisher from *A Treatise on Justifying Faith* by James Fraser of Brae.)


directly to the "...judicious Calvin ...in his third Book of Institutes...". This, of course, is the place where Calvin expounds in classic fashion, the doctrine of "union with Christ". In defending the belief that Christ died for all men, he insists that men must not build their faith upon men's opinions but that, "Luther and all his Followers are for it, so are many Calvinists; many of the reformed French Divines; most of the Professors of Saumure..." and several modern British Divines. While, like McLeod Campbell, he was aware of the fact that Christ died for all men, he does not express this in the manner McLeod Campbell did. His views seem rather to follow more closely those of the Professors of Saumur whom he mentioned. Their view was termed Amyraldism, and while it could speak in one sense of a universal reference to Christ's work,

The universal reference is theoretical or hypothetical; the limited reference to the elect is practical and real. Christ's work has real reference only to those who are saved. This placing a hypothetical universal reference round the limited reference in the work of Christ is the distinctive feature in the theology of Amyraldus.

This Amyraldian attempt to do justice to the fact that Calvin spoke not only of "the elect" but also of Christ's dying for all men, seems to have influenced Fraser of Drae to speak of a "common" and a "special" redemption. "He maintained that there was a common redemption, but not a universal redemption as the Arminians believed and taught; and he insisted that this distic-

1. Ibid. p.53
2. Ibid. part II, p.251
tion between common and universal is vital. A common redemption in his view left room for a special redemption in which none but the elect have a share, while a universal redemption sets both elect and reprobate on the same level.\footnote{Fraser of Brae worked within both this elect-reprobate dichotomy and the general scheme of Federal Theology but he was, as has been pointed out, aware of the earlier theology of the Reformers. He sensed indeed, that there was a tremendous amount of legalism and rationalism in the Theology of his day. This legalism and rationalism troubled his conscience but here he "...was much helped by Luther on the Galatians, and Calvin's Institutes; something more by that Book called The Marrow of Modern Divinity..."\footnote{James Fraser of Brae, Memoirs, (Edinburgh:T.Lumisden, 1738), p. 305} He was also helped by other old writers but especially by reading the Scriptures. He goes on to say, "I perceived that our Divinity was much altered from what it was in the primitive Reformers' Time: When I read Knox, Hamilton, Tindal, Luther, Calvin, Bradford, etc., I thought I saw another Scheme of Divinity, much more agreeable to the Scriptures and to my Experience than the Modern."\footnote{Ibid. See also Faith Treatise, part II, p.43.} He was fully aware of the errors of the Antinomians, but they, in fact, were not the danger..."I perceived a Gospel-spirit to be in very few, and that the most Part yea of Ministers did wofully confound the two Covenants, and were of the Old Testament Spirit; and Little of Glory of Christ, Grace and Gospel did shine in their Writings and Preaching. But I abhorred and

1. Duncan Fraser, James Fraser of Brae, (unpublished Ph.D.Thesis, Divinity Faculty, University of Edinburgh, 1944), p.562  
3. Ibid. See also Faith Treatise, part II, p.43.
was at Enmity with Mr. Baxter, as a stated Enemy to the Grace of God, under the Cover of opposing some Antinomianism". Fraser of Brae had great insight here, for he really foresaw the struggle that was to take place in the Marrow controversy. It was largely through Baxter and his disciple, Williams, that the Neonomian teachings spread through Britain and triumphed in Scotland in the Marrow Act of the General Assembly in 1720. He was aware that the entire scheme of theology was different from that of the Reformers yet he did not apparently notice that instead of the Covenant of Works and Covenant of Grace which he saw being confounded, they taught only one Covenant of Grace!^2

Thomas Boston and John Colquhoun

Amongst the earlier Scots theologians who emphasized the Reformed and Biblical doctrine of union with Christ, one of the most influential was Thomas Boston (1676-1732). W. Adams Brown points out that he "...wrote a Treatise on the covenant of grace, which was often republished both in England and in America, and had the rare compliment paid it of being embodied, with scarcely the change of a word, in a work written nearly a hundred years later (J. Colquhoun, Treatise on the Covenant of Grace), not, indeed, without handsome acknowledgment on the part of the

1. Ibid.
2. Before leaving Fraser of Brae, it is worth noting the similarity between his definition of faith and that of McLeod Campbell. Brae wrote, "Faith being an Eccho, or an Answer to God's Call in the Gospel, it must therefore have, in the Nature of it, that which answers that Call: If therefore we would understand the Nature of Faith, we must take our Measures by the Call of God in the Gospel, of which Faith is the Eccho: What God declares in the Gospel, that Faith must assent and say Amen to...", Faith Treatise, part I, pp. 10, 11.
borrower". These men are both of interest to us in that they reveal the place the doctrine of union with Christ could take within federal theology.

McLeod Campbell mentions Boston as one of a number of men who saw the error in demanding pious evidences, and refers to work by both authors in defending his doctrine of assurance of faith in his heresy trial. Since Colquhoun (1748-1827) is so uncommonly dependant on Boston, a discussion of Boston's thought may be considered to deal with both men.

Thomas Boston was one of the leading Marrow-men who were condemned by the General Assembly Act of 1720. He was greatly influenced by the Marrow of Modern Divinity and McLeod Campbell read his edition of this work, to which Boston had added commentary. Other major influences on Boston's thought included Luther's Galatians and the work of the pre-federal theologian, H. Zanchii. He was aware of the growth of moralism and rationalism and declared the Reformers "...are in effect looked upon as a parcel of well-meaning simple men, whose doctrine must be reformed over again, and rendered more agreeable to reason. A rational religion


is like to be the plague of this day".  

Although Boston saw these dangers and was deeply desirous of being a Biblical theologian, he did not question the framework of federal theology. It was, as far as he and his contemporaries were concerned, Biblical.  

What Boston did attack, however, was the third covenant which was to be seen in the federal theology of Dickson, Durham and the Sum of Saving Knowledge. He objected that the covenant of redemption and the covenant of Grace are not two but one covenant. He knew that he had the Westminster Standards on his side in this matter and quoted them in his argument. The point which he wished to make was that the covenant of Grace was unconditional...As we saw in Chapter IV,  

those who taught the third Covenant tended to make faith a condition. Boston taught that Christ had fulfilled all the conditions. "Dead souls cannot perform any condition for life at all which can be pleasing to God. They must needs have life before they can do anything of that nature, be it never so small a condition: Therefore a conditional covenant for life, could not be made with sinners in their own persons."  

While he thus attempted to defend a doctrine of Free Grace, his thinking was determined enough by the "Calvinistic" doctrine of election that he never taught anything else than that Christ

1. Ibid. cited p.62
2. They were aware of the objection that the Bible does not speak of a covenant of works with Adam. e.g., Nomists, in the Marrow declares, "But, sir, you know there is no mention made in the book of Genesis of this covenant of works, which, you say, was made with men at first". This is from the edition with Boston's Notes. (p.9).
4. Boston, Covenant of Grace, p.27.
died for the elect. He said, for example, "There is no universal redemption, no universal atonement. Jesus Christ died not for all and every individual Person of Mankind but for the Elect only." What Boston was willing to say, however, was that Christ was given as a "free gift and grant" to all sinners. This expression which was used by the Puritan, Culverwell, occurs in the Marrow Act of 1720. The fact that Boston felt compelled to use this expression was that his thought was Biblically enough controlled for him to recognize that the gospel was proclaimed to all men. And yet as we have seen, his doctrine of election would not allow him to declare that Christ had died for all men. Hyper-Calvinists, like Hadow, were willing simply to allow their thought to be determined by their doctrine of election. You simply could not in any sense say that Christ had died for all men. He had not, - only for the elect. Boston, however, managed to avoid this "logic" of election by speaking of the mystery of election, and a growing emphasis on union with Christ. He wanted to hold that Christ's death was sufficient for all, but he died only for the elect, because it was efficient only for them. Christ is like a physician who offers to heal all freely, but only those who employ him are healed. Although Boston would reject the language of the Amyraldians, this position does not seem to be fundamentally different from their view that there was a universal hypothetical reference to the Atonement, and a limited real

1. Bruggink, Thomas Boston, p.187
2. Boston, Covenant of Grace, p.43
3. Ibid. p.347
4. Ibid. p.345.
Certainly Boston never rejected the Federal framework of his theology, or the "Calvinistic" doctrine of election, but he did influence theology towards a more Biblical presentation by his use within the federal framework, of the doctrine of union with Christ. In presenting his doctrine of Free Grace he insisted that all the conditions of salvation had been achieved by Jesus Christ. His thought as to what Christ had done in Himself is very similar to that of Calvin. He teaches that Christ's righteousness must be understood in three parts: His holiness of nature, His righteousness of life (active obedience) and his satisfaction for sin (passive obedience). He likewise teaches that this righteousness is not merely imputed to believers but actually participated in by "union with Christ".

Christ comes into the dead soul by his Spirit: And so he is passively received; even as one, having a power to raise the Dead, coming into a House, where there's none but a dead Man; none to open the Door to him, none to desire him to come in, nor to welcome him. But Christ being thus received, or come in, the dead Soul is quickened, and by Faith embraceth him; even as the Restorer of the dead Man to Life, would immediately be embraced by him, and receive a thousand Welcomes from him, who had heard his voice and lived...thus the Union betwixt Christ and the Soul, is completed; Christ first apprehending the Soul, by his Spirit; and then, the Soul thus apprehended and quickened, apprehending him again in the Promise of the Gospel, by Faith.

What is so fundamentally important about this presentation

1. Above, p.280
of "union with Christ" within the framework of federal theology, is that over against the forensic imputation which is so pervasive in federal theology, it presented the more Biblical notion of incorporation. This, of course, is what McLeod Campbell was concerned with when he attacked mere "legal fictions" and demanded that theology speak in the realistic categories of Scripture. Boston insists that the "union with Christ" is real and not merely metaphorical. Indeed, in at least one place he would seem to be fully aware that forensic imputation had led to legalistic thinking. He declared that there were some, who "...to advance their legal scheme of doctrine, acknowledge no other union but a relative one betwixt Christ and believers, such as may be betwixt persons and things wholly separated...But...there is a real, true, and proper union betwixt Christ and believers..."1. It must not be thought, however, that Boston abandoned the language of legal imputation. Both ways of thinking stand side by side on his pages. What did happen though, was that by giving this incorporational content rather than mere metaphorical meaning to "union with Christ", he mitigated many of the features of the federal theological framework within which it was set. For this reason, he may be seen as an important figure in the movement towards a recovery of the more Biblical and Reformation categories which had been obscured, if not forgotten, in federal theology.

Observations

We have taken the liberty of suggesting possible influences on McLeod Campbell's thought, between an analysis of his early thought and an analysis of his later thought. This has been done purposely. One reason is that it affords an interesting contrast to the background of federal theology. But yet another reason is that it is important to see the consistency of the major themes that run through both McLeod Campbell's early and later teaching. Much damage has been done to a proper understanding of his thought by those who interpreted his thinking by what followed it, rather than by what preceded it! For example, we shall find that having dealt with the background of his thought, we can see a much greater significance in his small book on the Lord's Supper.

On looking back over the possible influences on McLeod Campbell's theology we can notice certain common characteristics. One such characteristic is that whether we look at Luther, Calvin, Henry Dorney, Fraser of Brae, Thomas Boston or Thomas Erskine, there is an emphasis on the objective nature of what has been done in Christ's work of Atonement. There is, similarly, a common emphasis on the necessary relationship of the incarnation to the Atonement. The incarnation is not an act of bare power or an incomprehensible mystery but rather may be understood as having a soteriological purpose. Indeed, it is this intention to redeem men that makes it necessary to understand that Christ's Person and His works must be held together. Who He is and what He teaches (by work and action) are inseparably bound together.
Now these may appear to be obvious statements because they are so fundamental, but in practice, they have dramatic results. In the following Chapter we shall see how they imply that revelation is rational. It is not mere mystery that demands an external authority to explain it. Rather it is self-evidencing. The authority lies within the revelation itself. Herein lies the great dividing point between Biblical and Reformed thought and the authoritarian claims of Rome.
CHAPTER VI - Christ, the Bread of Life

After his deposition, McLeod Campbell began his greatest activity as a preacher. He lived with his father at Kilninver, preaching in that neighbourhood, until the end of 1832. He then went to Glasgow and began to preach there in 1833. He had suffered ill health during his student days and he became ill again in 1836. However, this did not deter him from arranging for the construction of a Chapel in Blackfriar's Street in Glasgow and this was built by September, 1837. He continued in bad health and partly for this reason he and Thomas Erskine went to France early in 1838. When he returned he married (September, 1838) and was blessed with not only a fine wife but also several children. He suffered a great deal at the death of one of these children, his father and his brother and in fact his health was affected. These were among the factors that made him reluctantly give up his regular preaching and turn instead to writing.

It was not until 1851 that McLeod Campbell published the first of his works that was written especially for publication. This was, Christ the Bread of Life: an attempt to give a profitable direction to the present occupation of thought with Romanism. The title of the book was chosen to indicate that the book's subject was the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation and sacrifice in contrast to the Protestant doctrine of the Lord's Supper. It would be well to remind ourselves what McLeod Campbell was referring to as "...the present occupation of thought with Romanism".

2. Ibid. vol.I, p.102
3. Christ the Bread of Life...(Glasgow:Maurice Ogle and Son,1851).
J.R. Fleming neatly summarised the situation in Scotland in 1843 by declaring that,

A leading feature of the time was the violent antipathy to Roman Catholicism. This was due to several causes. The Roman Church, emancipated only since 1829 from civil disabilities, was using its freedom in ways that were very offensive to Protestant sentiment. The increasing immigration from Ireland brought a band of priests in its train. "Puseyism", as it was usually called at that period, was usually looked upon as a conspiracy to convert England and ultimately Great Britain to Rome, and its progress was viewed with nervous alarm. This was the year when Dr. Pusey was suspended from preaching because of what was believed to be his advocacy of Transubstantiation, and when John Henry Newman practically bade farewell to Anglicanism.¹

The book itself, while containing much that is of great interest, is written in such a way that several readings are demanded to even catch the major thrust of its argument. McLeod Campbell was very disappointed in the book's initial reception. Many people complained that his writing was not as clear as his speaking. He felt that perhaps he had condensed his argument too much. Writing to Erskine in 1852, he expressed the problem in a sentence which is dreadfully similar to many of the sentences in his book. He declared that "...Suggestions which have been made, have in some cases, appeared to me to attempt clearness by leaving out subordinate thoughts, or leaving unexpressed shades of thought which have demanded expression from me, as needful to the due guardedness and absolute correctness of the statements

made; while as to the demand in other minds, it may be that they would be better omitted, and their omission would be a gain, as leaving the statements more broad, and not the less substantially correct. 1

Roman Doctrine of Transubstantiation - a Physical Mystery

McLeod Campbell centres his teaching on John 6:27-58 where he sees the central theme to be our participation in the life

1. Memorials, vol. I, pp.240,241. (Letter of March 31, 1852). Perhaps it is this unreadableness which has led this book to be ignored by those who admired his Nature of the Atonement. It seems unfortunately to be the case that very little regard has been paid to any of McLeod Campbell’s early teaching. This has led to misunderstanding. For example, Robert S. Paul, The Atonement and the Sacraments, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961) unfortunately repeats R.C. Moberley’s criticism that McLeod Campbell did not link his doctrine of the work of Christ with Pentacost, the Holy Spirit and the Lord’s Supper, (p.148). While apparently both men ignore the fact that just three years previous to the publication of the Nature of the Atonement, McLeod Campbell had written Christ the Bread of Life directly on the Lord’s Supper, there is some point to their criticism. That is, dealing deeply with the subject at hand, he often seems to fail to present his teaching in a comprehensive manner. For example, he acknowledged his brother’s criticism that he should deal with the sacrament of Baptism along with the Lord’s Supper, (Memorials, vol. I, p.234). Note however, that he deals with baptism in a manner similar to his treatment of the Lord’s Supper in Sermons 2, XVI, pp.15ff and Nature of the Atonement, pp.366 ff. In regard to his ignoring a doctrine of the Holy Spirit, it can be seen that it played an important part in his Row Teaching, and indeed continued to do so in his teaching of union or participation with Christ. What happened in his later writings, is that often this doctrine along with many other of his presuppositions, was taken for granted. To those who knew him and his thought thoroughly this presented no problem. But at a time when a humanistic influence was threatening the Divine personality of the third Person of the Trinity (e.g., see Thomas Chalmers’ Institutes, vol. II, p.463 ff where he openly denounces a "polemical" insistence on the Divinity of the Holy Spirit in favour of a "moral influence" doctrine). This silence was unfortunate. Unquestionably this has been a factor in the widespread misunderstanding of McLeod Campbell. Perhaps here we can see a warning that a Christocentric doctrine of the Holy Spirit should be explicit lest it give way to a humanistic moral-influence theory on the one hand, or an irrationalist Pentecostalism on the other.
of Christ expressed as our eating His flesh and drinking His blood. He declares that spiritual understanding is necessary to grasp what is meant by "eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ" and so he feels it necessary to clear the ground by disposing of inadequate views. First, he disposes of the Roman teaching that this declaration by Christ refers to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper. In fact, both this teaching and the Lord's Supper "...refer to the same spiritual reality, that ordinance setting forth in act, what this passage sets forth in word. They both declare the manner of the life which is by the faith of the Son of God, using our experience of the conscious process of eating and drinking to illustrate the self-appropriating movements of the will in receiving and in feeding upon the spiritual food, which is our Lord's broken body and shed blood; thus helping us to conceive of the intimacy of our union with Christ...". Because both this teaching and the Lord's Supper point to this spiritual reality of union with Christ, it is harmful to direct this teaching to the ordinance

1. The crucial text, John 6:53 "...unless you eat the flesh..." is interpreted by Calvin as referring to Christ's person and communion with his flesh. He quotes Augustine's Christian Doctrine in support of this view. (Calvin's Institutes, IV, XVII, 6). We find the same quotation from Augustine in the Scot's preacher, Robert Bruce's sermon on the Lord's Supper in 1589. (Robert Bruce, The Mystery of the Lord's Supper - Sermons on the Sacrament preached in the Kirk of Edinburgh in A.D.1589. (Translated and edited by T.F.Torrance) London: James Clarke, 1958), p.123. This edition is cited because it is the most accessible and readable and contains a historical and theological Introduction. It shows the continuing influence of Calvin's Doctrine of the Lord's Supper.

2. Christ the Bread of Life, pp. 14,15.
as if it were "...itself the ultimate object..."\(^1\) of these words. This not only weakens the meaning of these words, but damages the doctrine of the Lord's Supper by making it something to be understood from itself and not as pointing beyond itself to our participation in Christ.

This understanding of the Lord's Supper by itself in isolation from the spiritual facts to which it is intended to point entails a doctrine of faith which is contrary to that of Scripture. Faith according to Paul is concerned with "Truth" and "knowledge". It is "...an apprehending, and a growing in the apprehension of, the glory of God in the Gospel; and so it is a passing into light, and an advancing in light; and that light the highest light, a seeing light in God's light".\(^2\) When, however, the Roman Catholic demands assent to the statements, "This is my body", "This is my blood", as if they refer to a physical mystery, they seek a faith which is merely the acquiescence to authority and not the spiritual discernment of a spiritual truth. The difference between such an assent to authority concerning a "mystery", and the Biblical teaching of faith as the apprehension of a spiritual truth "...is a difference in kind, not in degree".\(^3\) So long as the Church teaches that the sacrament is to be understood from itself, it does not matter greatly whether you say to me, "..."You must believe that

1. Ibid. p.16. Calvin agrees in seeing the primary reference in John 6 as being Christ Himself, "...he declares himself to be the bread of life, of which he who eats lives forever... the Sacrament sends us to the cross of Christ..." (Institutes, IV, XVII, 4).
2. Ibid. p.17
3. Ibid. p.18.
literally this is Christ's body", or say to me, "You must believe that mystically this is Christ's body", the important fact remains, that what I am required to exercise, is, a faith about the bread and the wine as the medium in which I receive Christ, and not a faith that simply contemplates Christ, and realizes that he is my life". 1 Transubstantiation, Consubstantiation, mystical presence, it does not matter which of these views are held, - so long as you present some sort of "physical mystery" to be assented to, you are taking men's eyes from the proper object of faith, Jesus Christ. McLeod Campbell declares that he can quite easily see why people who concern themselves with such a way of thinking become Roman Catholics, - if you are looking for a physical "mystery", the Roman view is simpler and more self-consistent than Protestant imitations.2

McLeod Campbell declares that he cannot go along with those Protestants who attack transubstantiation because it contradicts our bodily senses. They are right in so far as they go, but they do not go far enough! What is really important is that it contradicts man's higher spiritual sense "...that faculty or perception which distinguishes him as a spiritual being - the inhabitant not merely of a physical, but of a spiritual universe - that in man which makes him capable of knowledge not of nature only, but of nature's God".3 McLeod Campbell describes the Lord's Supper as taking place at two different levels, the one to be recognized at the level of bodily senses, the other known at the higher level of the spiritual senses.

1. Ibid. p.19 2. Ibid. p.21 3. Ibid. p.21.
When partaking of the Lord's Supper, I, by my bodily senses, take cognizance of the bread and wine, and know what they are, as I intentionally and consciously partake of them; while with my spiritual nature, I deal with the spiritual realities which they symbolize, and discern the Lord's body broken for me, his blood shed for the remission of my sins, which I thankfully receive, and consciously feed upon, as the spiritual food of the divine life. The two processes are quite distinct. They are both experienced realities. In neither is there any mystery.1

Just as we trust that our bodily senses correctly inform us that the bread and wine are really bread and wine and have not been physically changed, so we may be equally confident that "...the spiritual realities which I have spiritually discerned, the spiritual food of which I have consciously partaken, was just what to my spiritual apprehension it appeared; existing as a spiritual existence altogether in the region of spirit, and not clothed with a material form or existing in the material substance which to the outward senses is bread and wine".2

McLeod Campbell is aware that someone may ask why it is not possible to hold a faith which feeds directly on Christ and a faith which assents to a physical "mystery" at the same time. The answer is that these are not merely different "degrees" of faith but also different "kinds" of faith. This different "kind" of faith is related to a different kind of eternal life. The eternal life contained in a physical mystery has nothing to do with a conscious apprehension of Jesus Christ. Indeed, it has nothing to do with knowledge of any kind but is only the sub-

1. Ibid. p. 22  
2. Ibid. p. 22.
mission to authority. However, eternal life has to do with the
direct faith of Christ and fellowship with Him. Those who
would attempt to combine these two different concepts of eternal
life and two different concepts of faith are trying to serve God
and mammon and can only do so on the basis of self-deception.¹

Having declared that the Roman teaching of Transubstantiation
is but a poor substitute for the reality of receiving eternal
life in union with Christ, he goes on to declare that Roman
Teaching of the second part of the Mass as the "unbloody
sacrifice" or "eucharistic offering of Christ" is likewise a poor
substitute for the reality of a life lived in union with Christ.
He considers it completely logical that, "That which was believed
to be, through transubstantiation, the body and blood of the Lord,
men fed upon as the food of eternal life. They then proceeded
further to offer it in the eucharistic offering to God, that he
might accept it as their highest worship, and might, in acceptance
of it, manifest the highest grace..."² These two aspects which
both are presented as "physical mysteries" in the Roman teaching
correspond to the Protestant spiritual apprehensions of "receiv-
ing him as the bread of life, which hath come down from heaven"
and "praying in Christ's name". "What we receive from God, in
Christ, as eternal life, is what, being fed upon, and so becoming
our own actual life, we offer to God in worship".³ The Christian
lives his life being led by the Spirit of God and therefore the
worship of the Christian is worship in Spirit and in Truth. Since
we are born of God, in our prayer we ask things according to his

¹ Ibid. p. 31  ² Ibid. p. 36  ³ Ibid. p. 37.
will. McLeod Campbell thereupon expresses his teaching on prayer in terms of the "mind of Christ" which was so characteristic of his teaching in 1831. He declares that, "Thus is it the mind of Christ which we present to the Father. Thus is Christ, who, through the Eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot to God, and was accepted as the one and sufficient sacrifice for sin, presented anew in all prayers of Christians, in so far as these are a participation in the spirit of Christ - a form of the life of Christ in them".  

McLeod Campbell attempts to sympathize with those who hold Roman or similar views of the Lord's Supper. He declares that they evidently have a deep longing for the eternal and the invisible. But this longing is not deep enough, for its being satisfied by a "mystery" reveals a satisfaction with a via negativa which worldly men hold. "It asks, indeed, for a hold of the invisible and the eternal; but it does so with mere fleshly negative conceptions of these, as the unknown opposites of seen and temporal; and not, as apprehending in the spiritual, the essentially invisible and eternal. Though it demands a religion and solemn transactions with God, it can be contented with assumed transactions with an unknown God". 

McLeod Campbell is firmly within the Reformed tradition in insisting that faith

1. Ibid. p.38. In a letter of 1865, he declares that in the early Church...Christ, accepted as their life, was offered up in worship, - that life ascending to God as worship. If it is true that "we live; yet not we, but Christ in us", it is true that we offer ourselves living sacrifices; yet not we, but Christ in us. For what does God accept as our true worship? Is it not Christ? Memorials, vol.II, pp.82,83.
2. Ibid. pp. 42,43.
is not mere negation or escape from the problems of this world, but rather is centered in a positive knowledge of Christ. He will admit that the voice within these people utters, "Some sense of the unsheltered feeling of an intelligent being, realising that there is a supreme ruler of the universe, and yet having no hold of his favour... but "...that voice indicates not that deeper sense of desolation which pertains to the human spirit yet ignorant of God - the sense of being an orphan while God is not known as a Father, and which prepares a welcome for Him who comes to reveal the Father".1

Eternal Life

McLeod Campbell declares that the Roman doctrine of Transubstantiation is based on the same false literal understanding of Jesus' words that led the Jews to misunderstand Him.2 But Jesus revealed to his disciples what he meant by saying that we must eat his flesh and drink his blood. He did this by the example and teaching of his own life. He taught that there was "...a parallelism between his own relation to the Father, and our relation to himself..."3 With this in mind we can connect his teaching that, "As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me", with His teaching that "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work". We can see that as Christ's meat was to do the will of the Father, so our meat is to do His will.

Here, once again, we see McLeod Campbell insist that it is

significant what we have in common with Christ. He points out that Christ obeyed in His humanity for the "...will of God fulfilled in humanity, is eternal life for humanity...". This fact gives Christ's words peculiar power in our hearts. "Our Lord not only speaks with divine authority: he speaks, so to express myself, with human authority also". But McLeod Campbell cannot say this without equally emphasizing the difference between Christ and us, for our salvation equally depends on his divinity. "His humanity pronounces to our humanity as the fixed and certain law of the well-being of all humanity, that which it is itself through its connection with his divinity. The comfort to us of faith in our Lord's humanity depends on our faith in his divinity; for the interest to us of the eternal life seen in his humanity depends on his power to impart it to us - to sustain it in us".

So we see that eternal life to Christ meant the Father's will, and to us it is "the Father's will fulfilled in him". The process of feeding is paralleled also, for in His case it was His doing of the Father's will and in our case it is doing Christ's will. Feeding on Christ in the Spirit is a movement of the will. It is more than a matter of the intellect, it involves also the will. "Speaking less strictly, meditation on Christ, occupation of heart and mind with his love - with his work and its results, may be thought of as feeding upon Christ, but this they are not in themselves; this they imply only insofar as they are issuing

1. Ibid. p. 65
2. Ibid. pp. 65, 66
3. Ibid. p. 66
4. Ibid.
McLeod Campbell insists that to receive His life to be our life means to receive His will to be our will. God does not demand our wills without giving us His life and does not give us His life without demanding our wills feed upon Him. He is aware that men who are spiritually alive may not have recognized this submission of their will to the will of God as a conscious event. "The explanation is partly in the history itself of this bending of the will, viz.: that it is the effect of a spiritual apprehension of Christ which naturally occupies more attention than this its effect; so that the man who, through beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, is changed into the same image, is more occupied with the glory which he is beholding than with the change in himself which it is making; and yet would that glory give him no peace but in working that change. Let him but be disobedient to the heavenly vision and his peace will forthwith depart."2

Protestant Imputation - A Moral Mystery

What McLeod Campbell is concerned about is doctrines of justification which make Christ so remote from the Christian that they really do not do justice to the Biblical language about our participation in Him and our feeding on His will. "What I recognize in the record of primitive Christianity - what I desire to see, but do not see, even in some of the most unequivocal

1. Ibid. p.68
2. Ibid. p.72.
records of living Christianity with us, is, the acknowledgment of the directness of the demand which the Gospel makes on the will".1

McLeod Campbell gives as an example of the inadequate type of teaching he opposes in the following passage:

The faith ... which saves, also sanctifies. It produces not peace and confidence towards God alone, but also holiness. Not merely is the work of Christ trusted in: his example is also followed. Not only is forgiveness of sin received through his blood, but deliverance from the power of sin by the Spirit is also God's gift to us in him; and we have no right to regard our faith as a saving faith unless its soundness be proved by the fruit which it bears.2

He declares that the first part concerning justification is good but that the later demand for sanctification is wrong. What is one thing in Christ has been presented unduly as two.

McLeod Campbell declares Biblical thought speaks of "...one thing, not two, but one, simple and uncompounded - a life given; that life received - lived. The elements of this life we may conceive of as many, but as a life it is one thing - the one thing needful; and as it is one thing, so to receive it is one movement of our being, implies one direction of our attention, one thought, one care".3 What has happened is that the one concrete life given us in Christ has become abstracted and torn apart in thought. Justification and sanctification have been so carefully distinguished and separated that they must later be labour-

1. Ibid. p.75
2. Ibid. p.75; 2nd ed. p.102; in neither place does he give the source of the quotation.
3. Ibid. p.78.
iously and anxiously harmonized. When they are thus separated, he asks if justification can fail to become a trust in the work of Christ "...carefully separated from every element of self-consciousness or recognition of anything acceptable to God in the spiritual condition of the individual?", and sanctification merely "...the culture of Christian graces - that culture of them to which a man sets himself as to an employment altogether distinct from his trusting in Christ for salvation?" McLeod Campbell is forced to declare, "Therefore, I say, that the great reality of eating the flesh of the Son of Man, and drinking his blood, is not to be defined either in the language in which men have spoken of justifying faith, or in that in which they have spoken of sanctification, though I do not doubt that it has been present, not unfrequently, in the experience which has been described as one of these, and also in that which has been described as the other". What McLeod Campbell is insisting upon is that God accepts men as righteous because of the reality of their having Christ as their life. In this one gift of eternal life in Christ men receive both righteousness and sanctification and "...know Christ as 'made of God unto them wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption'".

1. Ibid. p. 78. Certainly one of the influences toward this abstract treatment of justification and sanctification was Ramist Aristotelianism. Speaking of the Ramist tendency in regard to the Lord's Supper, J. Moltmann in Z.K.G. (p. 308) remarks, "Diese Wendung von der Sache zu ihrer Wirkung, von der Person zu ihren Werk, von der Substanz zu ihrer Relation ist typisches Merkmal ramistischen Denkens. Nicht Christus in Person, sondern sein Satisfaktionswerk ist Quelle des Heils".

2. Ibid. pp. 79, 80
3. Ibid. p. 80.
This passage of Scripture, he declares, presents "...the one eternal life given to us in the Son of God in four elements and aspects; and to separate the righteousness spoken of from the rest, and to represent it as ours on a totally different principle from that on which they are ours, regarding it as imputed, while they are imparted, seems at once unnatural as an understanding of the Apostles' words, and a separating between our confidence towards God and our participation in the life of Christ, that all real experience of that life would teach men to reject...."¹ McLeod Campbell recognizes that those who speak of imputation of righteousness to ungodly men do so with the intention that faith itself should be a power to produce godliness.² But he does not consider that this teaching does justice to the "simplicity which is in Christ". It is based on a misunderstanding of the subjective and objective in religion. He teaches not merely that both elements must be present but that the objective must directly determine the subjective.

If what we are called on to know and believe, the objective in religion, be truly conceived of, that which we are called on to be - the subjective - is already before us; and to be it, is the imperative demand addressed to us by what we know and believe. This indeed seems practically denied when it is felt necessary to say, "It is not enough that you believe what you are required to believe: you must also be what you are required to be". But there can be no doubt that the objective demands the subjective as truly as the subjective presupposes the objective.³

So it is that McLeod Campbell considers as inadequate, views of the grace of God which do not discern in the freeness of the

1. Ibid. p.81  2. Ibid. p.82  3. Ibid. p.83.
love of God "...or in the nature of the gift given, enough to exclude boasting on the part of the receiver of the gift. Hence carnal expedients to exclude boasting, and more especially the change in the conception of justifying faith from being that of the reception of Christ as our life to that of a naked trust in his work for man as a ground of acceptance with God". 1 What he is urging is not that we should trust in any way in our own works over against Christ's works. But that rather than simply trusting in Christ's works we trust in the whole Christ, not his works alone, "...but the eternal life in Christ which took form in his work". 2 Humanity could in no other way have attained to God but in the eternal life given in the Son of God. "No other conscious condition of humanity is nearness to God but that which is presented to us in the humanity of Christ". 3

The relationship between grace and obedience, McLeod Campbell illustrates by the Biblical passage where the Father declares "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased: hear ye him". The first part of this passage declares that God's favour rests upon Christ; the second part declares that we participate in that favour when we "hear" Christ.

So we receive life in hearing the Son in obedience to the drawing of the Father; life both as viewed in itself, the fellowship of the mind of Christ; and as viewed with reference to the divine favour, participation in that favour which rests on Christ. So, whether we think of life as the reality in Christ, the law of the spirit of the life that is in Him; or as the favour and acceptance and personal acknowledgment of God, one direction is given to our attention - on one thing is our hope fixed, viz., that obedience

1. Ibid. p.84  2. Ibid. p.88  3. Ibid. p.87.
to the will of Christ — that receiving him as the Lord of our spirits — that eating his flesh and drinking his blood of which I have been speaking.1

It is not enough for men to be told that God looks at the bare work of Christ and not at us at all, while we are directed to look to the Holy Spirit to provide holiness in us that we may see the Lord. McLeod Campbell believes he can explain the inadequacy of this teaching by referring to the region of conscience in man. When we are without Christ, our conscience condemns us. It condemns us personally "...and however Scripture may have been instrumental in awakening conscience, or in helping us to understand the condemnation addressed to us by conscience, no one is regarded as spiritually convinced of sin whose conviction that he is a sinner is not immediate and direct, — the result of seeing himself in the light of truth, — and not a doctrinal inference from the statements of Scripture".2 It should be noted here that McLeod Campbell is not denying the importance of Scripture in relation to conscience, but rather he is insisting that it is not abstract statements of Scripture, but the direct relationship to the realities to which Scripture points that convicts the sinner. As the divine displeasure was testified directly to the conscience, so the divine pleasure at Christ, and the conviction that we, in Him, are righteous in God's sight is not "...a doctrinal inference from the statements of Scripture; but the immediate and direct result of seeing ourselves in the light of truth. As the divine testimony within was formerly

1. Ibid. p. 88, 89
2. Ibid. p. 89.
against us, it now is for us, "the Spirit bearing witness with
our spirits that we are the sons of God". ¹ This is in contrast
to a doctrine of imputed righteousness which makes the divine
favour a mere "mental reference" of the work of Christ on our
behalf and provides no direct testimony of the conscience at all.
It therefore fails to provide as deep a foundation for the peace
enjoyed by the conscience as it provided for the sense of guilt
and condemnation which preceded it. ²

This unsatisfactory doctrine of justification which would
not have us receive Christ's life to be our life but rather
would impute his work to us; and the corresponding confusion
introduced into the region of conscience whereby divine condem¬
ation for sin is direct, and the divine favour is indirect, has
harmful affects in worship. When men end their prayers with
the expression "in his name" and "for his sake", they often seem
to be asking for what they want on the basis of Christ's merits.
They fail to see that Christian prayer is a form of eternal life.
"It is the eternal life which comes to us through the Son,
ascending from us through the Son - the Son in us honouring the
Father - the worship of Sonship - as such grateful to the Father¬
who seeketh such worship". ³ The nature and essence of our prayer
is meant to be "...its harmony with the divine will..." ⁴ When
we pray asking "for Christ's sake", we must understand, therefore,
that we are not meant to be seeking something from God which for
its own sake he would not grant. It is the oneness of our prayer
with the will of our ascended Lord that is important. "In its

¹. Ibid. p.90
². Ibid.
³. Ibid. p.93
⁴. Ibid. p.95.
most imperfect lisping of the Father's name, the life of the Son in us is that same life on which, in our Lord at the right hand of the Father, the light of the Father's countenance ever shines".  

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**God, Bible and Church**

We have seen how the Roman doctrine of the Mass leads to and depends on the teaching of an infallible Church. Because the Mass is a physical mystery, it demands an infallible interpreter. Protestants, however, take the wrong approach when they merely point out that the Roman teaching is contrary to the Scriptures. "Surely it is one thing to know that the Bible is true, and another thing to know that I myself am in the light of the Truth that is in the Bible. To say I judge for myself as to the meaning of what I read, is, as respects certainty, to say nothing, unless I can add that I myself am infallible".  

The real complaint against Rome is not simply that in claiming infallibility it is taking the place of the Bible, but that it is usurping the place of the living God.

The Romanist looks to the Church to interpret the Scriptures that he may certainly know the meaning of what he reads: the man of God expects and waits upon the teaching of God, and so expects to understand that which he reads. For in God's light alone does the individual human spirit see light clearly - of Romanism, however varied the forms of error which it presents, this is the root evil - that it addresses not conscience, neither directs men to the living God, to be taught of him.

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1. Ibid. p.97  
2. Ibid. p.101  
3. Ibid. p.102.
In 1869, a second edition of *Christ the Bread of Life* was published. It is of interest, first of all, in that it contains the teaching of the first edition with very little change. McLeod Campbell wrote a Preface and Contents pages for it and apparently attempted to express himself more clearly in some places. The only really significant change was the addition of a third part to his argument. He entitled the first part, "Relation of the Lord's Supper to the life of Faith"; the second part, "Feeding upon Christ considered as expressing the part of Man's Will in Faith"; and the new third part, "Development of the Mass from the Lord's Supper". This third section shows that he had done some thinking about the language used in the early liturgies of the church. On fact, after *Christ the Bread of Life* was published in 1851, he continued his interest in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. In 1852, for instance, he had a long discussion with the former Anglo-Catholic, Manning. In 1853, he wrote a long letter in which he discussed the study of the early liturgies found in Bunsen's *Hippolytus*. In 1860, we again find him refuting some of the assertions of Anglo-Catholics.

His major point both in his letters and in the addition to the second edition of his book was that the early Christians obviously knew the reality of living day by day in participation in Christ. There was no danger that they would mistake the

2. Ibid. vol. I, pp. 244-250
3. Ibid. vol. I, pp. 325-327.
language used about the elements for the reality they signified. It was only natural, therefore, that they should speak of the Lord's Supper in terms analogous to the words of institution.

"This doubtless was the case; but no use of such language by the early Christians can prove more than our Lord's own words, prove I mean, that if our Lord in speaking of the bread and wine as His body and His blood is not accepted as implying that the bread and the wine then in His hands were actually His body and His blood, neither can similar words used by the early Church be regarded as having more than a symbolic import".1 What happened obviously is that later the divine life became less real to people and "...symbols were in the course of time confounded with and then substituted for what they symbolised".2 When this way of thinking was reached "...and it may have been reached long before it became the faith of Transubstantiation, and may have passed through the gradually deepening shades of assumed mystical presence by which we see Transubstantiation arrived at now - then a new function in the economy of salvation was ascribed to the sacred ordinance: and this implied a new faith".3

When he expounds the positive aspect of his teaching on the Lord's Supper, McLeod Campbell declares that it takes its meaning

1. Christ the Bread of Life, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan and Co., 1869), pp.152,153. This way of arguing that the Lord's Supper is to be understood from the Biblical event is commonly found in the Reformers. Peter Martyr, for example, declared that "I am persuaded that when the Apostles heard the Lord in the Supper say of bread, "This is my body", they fixed their eyes not on the bread but on Christ Himself", cited by Joseph C. McLelland, The Visible Words of God - A study in the theology of Peter Martyr, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), p.185 ff. Also, Calvin, Institutes, IV, XVII, 23.

2. Ibid. p.153

3. Ibid. p.154.
from Christ's intention. "Being enabled by the Holy Spirit to partake in the divine ordinance in spirit and truth we are conscious of communion in the body and blood of the Lord, and know that our outward act has its true inward spiritual meaning in the sight of God who sees the heart. Thus the Holy Spirit makes the bread to be to us the body and the wine the blood of Christ according to the Lord's meaning in so speaking of them".  

So it is that the prayer of the early Church that the Holy Spirit should make the bread the body and the wine the blood of Christ "...contemplates not an action of the Holy Spirit on the bread and the wine, making them to be the body and the blood of Christ, but an action of the Holy Spirit on the spirits of the faithful making the bread to them the body and the blood of Christ, i.e., making the eating of the bread and the drinking of the wine to be to them the occasion of that spiritual feeding on Christ, and communion in His body and blood, apart from which the outward act of communion would be an empty shell". While admitting the "divine fitness" of the material sign to symbolize the spiritual reality, he declares, "The distance between the two regions, that in which the sign exists, and that in which that which is signified exists - might of itself be enough to prevent any transference to the sign of what is proper to that which is signified".

We can see that McLeod Campbell's later thought on the Lord's Supper did not lead him to reject his earlier views. His

1. Ibid. p. 173  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. p. 177.
intention was to teach a doctrine based on the Biblical evidence. The doctrine found in liturgies and doctrinal statements was to be tested by Scripture rather than the other way around. The ultimate ground for doctrine was the living God speaking through Scripture directly to men.

**Similarity to Calvin**

Both in regard to the attack on Roman doctrine and Protestant doctrine, it can be said that McLeod Campbell's intention is positive. He attacks the Roman doctrine of Transubstantiation because it threatens a correct understanding of faith and faith's proper object. Similarly, he protests against Protestant teachings which do not do justice to their object. What is of great interest is that almost point by point, both in regard to what he negates and what he affirms, he is at one with John Calvin. We must again assert that the question of a direct relation to Calvin remains a mystery. So too, we must emphasise that both men held their positions because they considered them to be Biblically grounded.

McLeod Campbell denounced the idea of a "physical mystery" of any sort taking place in the elements because this demanded that faith become less than knowledge, - a mere acquiescence in an absurdity. So too, Calvin had argued. "Madman, why do you demand that God's power make flesh to be and not to be flesh at the same time! It is as if you insisted that he make light to be both light and darkness at the same time!"  

Apostles could have been "...so ready to believe what all reason rejects: that Christ was sitting at table under their gaze, and, invisible, was contained under the bread?"  

This attack on a faith which does not have an aspect of knowledge (or light) is common in Calvin. He declares that "When faith is called knowledge it is distinguished not only from opinion, but from that shapeless faith which the Papists have contrived; for they have forged an implicit faith destitute of all light of the understanding. But when Paul describes it to be a quality which essentially belongs to faith - to know the truth, he plainly shows that there is no faith without knowledge."  

Because this element of knowledge is important in faith, it is wrong that faith should be taken from its proper heavenly object and stopped short at the earthly sign. We ought not let our confidence "...inhere in the sacraments, nor the glory of God be transferred to them. Rather laying aside all things, both our faith and our confession ought to rise up to him who is the author of the sacraments and of all things". As in McLeod Campbell, Calvin too insists that while there is a parallelism between the sign and the truth it signifies, these two things must not be confused.  

...as Augustine has shown...the sacrament is a worthless thing if it be separated from its truth, so in another place he reminds us that in the very joining of these we also must have a distinction, lest we cling too tightly to the outward sign...  

1. Ibid. IV, XVII, 23  
3. Institutes, IV, XIV, 16.
He points out two vices which are here to be avoided. The first vice is for us to receive the signs as though they had been given in vain, and by destroying or weakening their secret meanings through our antagonism, to cause them to be wholly fruitless to us. The second vice is by not lifting our minds beyond the visible sign, to transfer to it credit for those benefits which are conferred through the Holy Spirit, who makes us partakers in Christ; conferred, indeed with the help of outward signs, if they allure us to Christ; but when they are twisted in another direction, their whole truth is shamefully destroyed.¹

As we can see in the above quotation, Calvin is not satisfied to create a "mystery" by means of literalism or via negativa.² It is the positive content of his teaching of union with Christ, that demands that we look in faith to Christ to be made "...partakers in Christ...", rather than merely to outward signs, whose whole purpose is to point beyond themselves to Christ. When this is understood, then we see that McLeod Campbell's attack on the Protestant "moral mystery" of justification and sanctification, is in many ways a return to what Calvin taught. For as we saw, McLeod Campbell attacks Protestant doctrine for unduly rending apart justification and sanctification, rather than showing their basic unity in the one life of Christ. What he is attacking is the notion that believers are related to Christ merely by legal imputation and ignoring that they are incorporated in "union with Christ". How similar this is to Calvin's teaching that in mystical union "...Christ, having been made ours, makes

1. Ibid. IV, XIV, 16
2. Christ's use of bread as a sign was "...a sure and clear consolation for the disciples, as it is for us, one not wrapped up in an enigma". (Ibid, IV, XVII, 23).
us sharers with him in the gifts with which he has been endowed. We do not, therefore, contemplate him outside ourselves from afar in order that his righteousness may be imputed to us but because we put on Christ and are engrafted into His body - in short, because he deigns to make us one with Him. For this reason, we glory that we have fellowship of righteousness with him".  

Calvin would agree that because sin accuses our consciences directly, so too we must have direct knowledge of the favour of God to give us peace. It is for that very reason indeed that he insists that imputation and a legal element be part of a doctrine of justification. He shows that the New Testament usage demands this legal aspect and quite correctly declares that "Anyone moderately versed in the Hebrew language, provided he has a sober brain, is not ignorant of the fact that the phrase arose from this source, and drew from it its tendency and implication".  

The aspect of imputation must be kept in the doctrine of justification, "...because it is very well known by experience that the traces of sin always remain in the righteous, their justification must be very different from reformation into newness of life (cf Rom.6:4). For God so begins this second point in his elect, and progresses in it gradually, and sometimes slowly, throughout life, that they are always liable to the judgement of death before his tribunal".  

It is because Calvin insists that there be this eschatological tension in the life of the Christian, that he also insists that justification must be absolute, or there

1. Ibid. III, XI, 10  
2. Ibid. III, XI, 11  
3. Ibid.
can be no peace for the conscience.  

Calvin knew well that Christians only partly share in Christ's purity in this life. He taught that the gap between the partial righteousness of Christians in this life, and that entire righteousness which is alone pleasing to God, must be filled by the imputation of the entire righteousness of Christ to believers. The alternative to this was that Christians would attempt to fill the gap by their works and "...faith totters if it pays attention to works, since no one, even of the most holy, will find these anything on which to rely".

We have remarked that both Calvin and McLeod Campbell rejected the locality of the body of Christ in the elements. So too they both rejected the Lutheran alternative of the ubiquity of Christ's body. They both teach that the locality of Christ's body is in heaven. This is important because it is in this humanity that men come to share in Christ's benefits.

...when the Source of life begins to abide in our flesh, he no longer lies hidden far from us, but shows us that we are to partake of him. But he also quickens our very flesh in which he abides, that by partaking of him we may be fed unto immortality. "I am," he says, "the bread of life come down from heaven. And the bread which I shall give is my flesh, which I shall give for the life of the world". By these words he teaches not only that he is life since he is the eternal Word of God, who came down from heaven to us, but also that by coming down he poured that power upon the flesh which he took in order that from it participation


in life might flow unto us.\(^1\)

Calvin's motive in asserting that the locality of Christ's vivifying flesh was heaven was basically to do justice to the Biblical language concerning the ascension. He felt that this teaching best preserved the doctrines of the resurrection of the body and of the second coming of Jesus Christ.\(^2\) It also thereby maintained a true eschatological tension in his doctrine of the sacraments. It is perhaps this eschatological tension that is missing in McLeod Campbell's doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Although he never held a doctrine of perfection in this life, his attack on imputation is excessive. He seems not to emphasize enough that while we participate in the righteousness of Christ, this is always in a very real sense an "alien righteousness". While Biblical thought demands the emphasis which we find on union or participation with Christ, it also demands that a real place be given to imputation.

**Observations**

The exposition which McLeod Campbell gives us of the relation of the sign and the thing signified in regard to the Lord's Supper, is of great benefit in understanding his general position in regard to theological inquiry. For, in discussing the relation of the sacramental sign to the truth it signifies, he gives us a clue to his view of the relation of the verbal sign to the truth it signifies. He declares, for instance, that the words of Christ's teaching and the Lord's Supper "...refer to the same

1. Ibid. IV, XVII, 8
spiritual reality, that ordinance setting forth in act, what this passage (John VI) sets forth in word". ¹ No doubt he would agree with Calvin who quotes approvingly Augustine's statement that "...words are nothing but signs". ² In 1845, on visiting the Roman Catholic cathedral in Antwerp, he made the interesting comment that, "The crucifixes recalled to me the representations of our Lord's sufferings which I had often heard from Scotch ministers in the addresses to communicants at the Table. There is no difference between an image or painting, and the image or painting which is by words to the imagination". ³

He emphasises two points in regard to the relationship of the sign and the thing signified. The first is that there is a parallelism or suitableness between them. He emphasises the rationality of revelation. Revelation can be understood, and indeed, it must be understood to be revelation. However, this rationality is based on the truth signified. The truth is known from itself, on its own basis, or as he says, "in its own light". This is true whether the signs be verbal or sacramental. In either case, the thing signified is the same, The object of faith does not change and because it does not change, the faith required to apprehend it does not change. The object of faith determines the mode of knowing.

This leads to his second major point, which is that the sign and the truth signified must be distinguished and not allowed to be identified and thus confused. Just as the

1. Christ the Bread of Life, 1st ed. p.14
2. Institutes, IV, XIV, 26
sacramental sign must not be thought to "contain" in itself its meaning, but finds its meaning in what it points to; so verbal signs (e.g., Biblical or theological language) must not be thought to be "truth" in itself (as propositions) but find its meaning in its object. Once more we see a basic emphasis on "matters of fact" over against the "relations of ideas".

But before we move on to discuss McLeod Campbell's great work on the Nature of the Atonement, we should raise a major criticism of his thought. In comparing his discussion of the Lord's Supper to that of Calvin, we note that while he insists on the use of the integrating category of "life", he seems not to speak of the believer being fed by Christ's "vivifying flesh" in the way Calvin did. Now, it might be thought that the category "life" would include flesh and spirit, yet it seems that McLeod Campbell does not make this clear. Indeed, his emphasis on the "spiritual" nature of the Lord's Supper and the atonement seems not to do justice to the wholeness of Christ's life. His criticism of the undue separation of justification and sanctification might be applied equally to his own excessive separation of flesh and spirit. Perhaps his neglect of this aspect of the wholeness of Biblical thought explains his silence on the Church as the "body" of Christ. Perhaps it also explains a neglect of a healthy incarnational emphasis on what later became known as the "social gospel". One of the great needs of the Church of his time and ours is the strong personal gospel which he taught and a strong social concern which he neglected.¹

¹. It should not be forgotten that McLeod Campbell lived in and near industrial Glasgow during the worst part of the horrors of the Industrial Revolution. Yet, neither his works nor his letters reflect a deep concern.
CHAPTER VII - The Nature of the Atonement

McLeod Campbell began writing his great work, The Nature of the Atonement, in the winter of 1853-1854. The first edition appeared in 1856. Like all his written work, it is not easily read but is full of profound insights. In order to understand the basic aspects of his method, as seen in this book, it will be helpful for us to begin by discussing his rejection of the "Calvinistic" theology and its method.

Rejection of "Calvinistic" Theology

1. Indirect evidence for direct.

We have seen throughout McLeod Campbell's teaching an insistence on the rationality of revelation. Revelation is rational, or understandable, on its own basis. In the Nature of the Atonement, he attacks those who would falsely relate faith and understanding. He declares that there are those who display intellectual arrogance by demanding "internal evidence" at every step in theology, and those who fall into the opposite error of considering "the internal light of the Gospel" as something quite apart from faith. "I believe the former little realise how much more they believe than they understand; and I believe the latter as little realise how much their reception of what they believe depends ultimately upon what of it they do understand, and spiritually discern to be of the glory of God".  

It is the light which is in the grace of the gospel which at the same time satisfies our faith and our understanding.

1. Nature of the Atonement, p.3.
we must look to the gospel (to Christ who is the gospel) for "...the way in which God was to accomplish the desire of his love for us we could not have of ourselves anticipated, but God himself must make it known to us". 2 If we then ask where and how God makes his will known to us, the answer is "in the Gospel and through our conscience". McLeod Campbell declares that "...the gospel alone sheds clear and perfect light on the evil of man's condition as a sinner, conscience fully recognises the truth of that revelation of ourselves which the gospel makes to us". 3 We are to wait upon "...the teaching of the Spirit of God in conscience..." 4 Once again we see that consistent emphasis on "conscience" that runs throughout McLeod Campbell's teaching. Frequently he uses the term "consciousness" which did not appear so often in his early writings, but its use is so close to that of conscience as to defy distinction. In both cases the usage is extremely theological. By that I mean that both terms are used as the correlate of another term, such as God or Gospel or Holy Spirit. Conscience or consciousness are used to refer to the relationship of God and man. As McLeod Campbell wishes to teach a "moral and spiritual atonement" it is doubtful if these terms can be described any better than to say that they refer to the "moral and spiritual" relationship of God and man. This use of the terms in such a theological manner is important. It means, for instance, that he is not speaking of some biological or psychological constituent of man.

1. Ibid. p. 249
2. Ibid. p. 5
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. p. 6.
Neither is he speaking of something which is basically "socially conditioned". That is not to say that he defines these terms in a completely individualistic manner. He makes it clear in one of his notes to the second edition that he does not accept the modern "individualism",¹ in metaphysics and psychology. It is certain that conscience and consciousness would both have a "horizontal" reference for those in Christ. But the fact remains that they have a primarily "vertical" reference in his usage and are not determined by society's definition of morality or modern psychological definitions of awareness.

It is in fact this "direct" theological definition of the relationship of God and man that leads McLeod Campbell to rebel against much of the theological argument of his day. In place of theology being based on this direct relationship of God and man, he saw that much theological thought was based on inference from observation of the world and history. For example, even the proper understanding of conscience had been lost by indirect arguments. It has been argued that the world-wide occurrence of conscience and sacrifice, testifies to the necessity for an atonement. Certainly this is an arresting fact. Not even the fact that these sacrifices were often to "...devils and not to God..."² can deny that. These practices, however, can be said to indicate that man is ignorant of God and "...the determination of this controversy must be sought elsewhere than in the

1. Ibid. p.401. On page 9 he argues that those who understand "the nature of conscience" will understand "...how much the more matured Christian mind of one man may, without dictating, aid the faith of another man..."
2. Ibid. p.7.
historical fact which is its subject".1

Yet another indirect argument which he rejects is the argument from the analogy of historic incidents of "heroic self-sacrifice" where the person concerned felt he was fulfilling divine requirements. The problem McLeod Campbell points out is that an analogy has both acceptable and unacceptable inferences. For example, in this case it might be inferred that God was an angry deity requiring propitiation. On the other hand, he admits that if "...we are to conclude that the spirit of self-sacrifice in the victim was recognized as constituting the virtue of the sacrifice, there is here unquestionably a marvellous ray of light..." but adds, "...from the midst of that gross darkness..."2

When it comes to arguments based upon the history of Christianity, rather than the general history of religion, McLeod Campbell finds himself in a somewhat more difficult position. On the one hand he does not hold a purely individualistic view of conscience and therefore feels great weight in the evidence of the experience of other Christians. He declares that it is easy to put aside arguments based upon the dark efforts of heathens to propitiate an unknown God, but that it is a powerful argument when we look "...to the experience, recorded by themselves, of those who, in all ages of the Church, and closest communion with Him, and who have professed that they have seen a glory of God in the cross of Christ..."3. After having looked at this argument in a very favourable light, he is forced to conclude however, that "...no man will or should accept the doctrine

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. p.8 3. Ibid.
of the atonement because it has commended itself to the consciences of others while it does not as yet commend itself to his own".1

Even when McLeod Campbell turns to the Bible itself he insists that the atonement accomplished in Jesus Christ must be studied from itself. This means that we should not come to the Bible with a preconceived view of atonement taken from general religions, or even Christian history. But it also means that we must be aware of our use of the Old Testament view of Atonement. He clearly distinguishes the atonement accomplished in Christ and the Old Testament view of atonement. "When I speak of the light of the atonement itself I mean, the atonement as accomplished; I do not mean the atonement as foretold merely and typically prefigured. For, although the typical sacrifices of the Mosaic institutions intimated the necessity for an atonement and in some sense its form, they did not for they could not, reveal its nature".2 He is, of course, using the term "typical"

1. Ibid. p.9
2. Ibid. p.121. We find Markus Barth in Was Christ's Death a Sacrifice? (Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No.9) (Edinburgh:Oliver and Boyd, 1961) declaring that 'The equation: Christ's death was a sacrifice, is never found in the Bible - and this for good reasons. The seemingly logical procedure for establishing and proving this equation would apparently be to start from a general (be it pagan, Old Testament, inter-Testamental, Jewish,Greek or more recent,) concept of sacrifice and to work forward to the conclusion: "If this or that is a sacrifice, then Christ's death is - or is not - a sacrifice"(p.47) However, Markus Barth goes on to point out that "Not even the Epistle to the Hebrews follows such a procedure. Hebrews speaks about sacrifice only in the light of Christ's sacrifice...And though...an attempt was made to listen to the Old Testament chapters on their own terms, it is factually and practically due to the "lifting of the veil" by the New Testament, that glimpses may have been caught of what distinguishes Old Testament utterances about sacrifice from other (pagan) sacrifices. 2 Cor.3:7-18 shows that Jesus the Lord's revelation by the Spirit is presupposition, Legitimation and command to "read Moses" otherwise than ignorance,
in its formal usage in the exegetical method called typology. In typology, events in the Old Testament are kept within their historical context, yet are said to be the "shadows" of a "reality" occurring in the historical context of the New Testament. The "shadow" in the Old Testament is generally referred to as the "type" and the "reality" in the New Testament as the "antitype". His meaning is clear when he says that "After we have traced and recognised the points in which the types prefigured the antitype, we have still to inquire and to learn by the study of the antitype itself, what the reality is of which such and such things were the shadow". What he is saying is that the event in the Old Testament is only an analogy of that event in the New which it prefigures and should not be pressed to equivocity. It is both like and unlike the New Testament as a whole and on the supposition of a common pattern to which every book of the Bible contributes its share, typology has again come into its own" (p. 47 n.1).


2. Ibid.
Testament event. But the New Testament event must be studied in its own right to determine its own nature. He declares that "It may seem superfluous to insist upon this inadequacy in the type to reveal that which, from the nature of things, can only be learned from the antitype. But how often have the points of agreement between the type and the antitype been dwelt upon, as if to see that agreement was to understand the atonement..."1 His argument is that the New Testament has thus been forced into the mould of the Old. The analogies have been pressed too far. For, "In the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is not upon the coincidence between the type and the antitype, but upon that in which they differ, that the Apostle insists; - and the antitype is recognised by him as indeed the antitype contemplated, because it is seen to have in it that reality of atoning efficacy which was not in the type".2

McLeod Campbell's use of typology is by no means unimportant for one of his great achievements over against the Calvinists was his integrating of the categories of "sacrifice" and "sonship". He argued that in the Old Testament sacrificial system the blood of victims was shed not in order to deliver the people from punishment, but in order to cleanse and purify them for communion with God. "Not the receiving of any manner of reward for righteousness, but the being holy and accepted worshippers, was the benefit received through being sprinkled with the victim's blood. In the light of this centre (sic) idea of worship, therefore, are we to see the sprinkling of all things with blood, and the

1. Ibid. p. 122
2. Ibid. p. 123.
remission of sins to which this related".\(^1\) It follows then that "...when we pass from the type to the antitype, we find worship the great good set forth to us, - that worship in spirit and in truth which the heart of the Father craves for, - that worship which is sonship, - the response of the heart of the Son to the heart of the Father".\(^2\) Thus it also follows that it is not merely guilt that prevents men from worshipping God, but the actual condition of their minds which are in a state of enmity against God. So it is reasonable that the nature of Christ's sacrifice is his life, Himself, in which sonship is perfectly present. He offers the mind of sonship to God, and it is accepted. But he does this as the representative of men, as their High Priest who intercedes on behalf of all men. Thus the mind of sonship towards God is seen also as the mind of brotherhood towards men and Christ not only fulfills what the heart of God the Father desired to see, but also the law of love to God and man. Thus because He fulfills the filial relationship, Christ fulfills the sacrificial categories and the legal categories of the Old Testament.

McLeod Campbell by no means limited himself to typological exegesis of the Old Testament. He acknowledged that some events in the Old Testament were meant to give meaning directly. For instance, the "moral" atonement he saw in the preventing of the plague by Phinehas (Numbers XXV,10-13) he took to be a historical event with theological significance in itself. "As compared with any other light that the Old Testament Scriptures shed on

1. Ibid. p. 180  
the subject of atonement, this incident has the special
importance of not being a mere instituted type, but a reality
in itself". ¹ McLeod Campbell declares the incident of Phinehas'
atonement teaches us that it is not death that makes atonement,
"But the moral element in the transaction - the mind of Phinehas-
his zeal for God - his sympathy in God's judgement on sin, this
was the atonement, this its essence".² Important as this event
is in history, it must be said, however, that its importance for
McLeod Campbell was increased because its interpretation coincid-
ed largely with that of Christ's work.

It is an exposition of Christ's work which occupied the
largest part of the Nature of the Atonement. And here it should
be noted that McLeod Campbell very seldom uses any other than
Biblical language. Although he does speak of Christ's human
nature and divine nature, he does not speak openly of the logic
of Chalcedon, but rather assumes it. But even in using the
Biblical language, he is aware that these words can bear differ-
ent meanings to different hearers. It is difficult for anyone
to realise fully the great contrast between life and death, light
and darkness, sin and righteousness. These words must not be
thought to be merely words, but must be understood to describe
realities. "The very words we use, though we know them to be
the right words, we use with the consciousness, that they have,
in our lips, but a small part of their meaning. If we set our-
selves steadfastly to study their use in the Scripture, and
listen with open ear and heart to the interpretation of them,

1. Ibid. p. 119
2. Ibid. p. 120.
which conscience, under the teaching of the Holy Spirit, accepts, we find these awful realities of evil and good, becoming gradually more and more palpable and real to us; so that they come to be felt as the only realities, and existence comes to have its interest entirely in relation to them.\(^1\) McLeod Campbell is quite serious about these words taking their meaning from our inductive study of Scripture for he is fully aware that we may let our "habitual thoughts and feelings" control our thinking. If, for example, we let our experience in the world define good and evil we will not come to distinguish them clearly for "... it presents neither the unmixed evil of which the Scriptures speak, and to which conscience testifies as man's sinful state, nor the unmixed good, which the Scriptures reveal, and which, in the light of conscience, we recognize as eternal life."\(^2\)

Men's ordinary ways of thinking must be lifted up. Man must be raised up to see the realities of which Scripture and conscience speak, or there can be no true sorrow for sin and yearning for eternal life. It is easy for anyone to say he is a sinner if all it means is that he admits that he is imperfect - a mixture of good and evil. And as long as sin is not a serious thing, then neither is forgiveness. The problem really arises when the sinner becomes convinced of his sin for then forgiveness becomes extremely difficult. We discover in regard to forgiveness, that "...when we really come to understand that we need it, we find it most difficult to believe in it."\(^3\) While McLeod Campbell is aware that young Christians may

\(^1\) Ibid. p.16  
\(^2\) Ibid. p.17  
\(^3\) Ibid. p.11
not fully understand the realities of sin and grace, he insists that those who do not understand these as radical opposites will not be able to follow his argument. Therefore, he states without qualification "...that the testimony of Scripture as to the reality and guilt of sin, and sinner's dependence upon free grace for pardon, has a clear and unequivocal response in conscience; the recognition of which response on the sinner's part is the proper attitude for his mind to assume, in listening to and weighing the doctrine of the atonement". 1

We can see in McLeod Campbell a concentration on the direct relationship of God and man in determining the nature of the atonement. He rejects the determination of this doctrine from general religious history. He even rejects indirect arguments from Christian experience in general. The source of his doctrine is the witness of Scripture, but even here he stresses a typological exegesis of the Old Testament which points forward to the New Testament. And when he studies the New Testament's witness to the Work of Christ, we see an emphasis on the reality to which the words point — a reality which is quite distinct from what men have generally experienced in this world.

2. Abstraction for actuality.

In criticising the current doctrines of the atonement, McLeod Campbell repeatedly emphasised that they had been led into error by their "abstraction". He frequently uses this term, but the argument is much the same whether he uses it or not. For instance, he begins his discussion of the Calvinism of John Owen and Jonathan Edwards by noting Luther's warning "to abstain

1. Ibid. p.12.
from the curious searching of God's majesty. Not by "searching" but by knowing Jesus Christ do we come to know God. "How sound Luther's judgement was in sending us to Jesus, that in Him we might see and embrace God manifested in the flesh..."\(^1\)

It was thus, by their knowledge of the ministry of Christ, that the Apostles were prepared to understand the meaning of his resurrection. McLeod Campbell goes on in a beautiful passage to describe what he thinks was Luther's experience of Christ—and incidentally leads us deeply into his own.

Luther in telling us "to go straight to the manger, and embrace the Virgin's little babe in our arms," expresses a sense of God's approachableness, as divested of all terrors and revealed in the simple confiding attraction of love, which we feel full of instruction. We can conceive the long self-tortured monk, who had sought God earnestly but ignorantly, thinking as he tells us, of Christ as an exactor and judge, as now, in the light of love, contemplating the infant Jesus, and saying to himself, "This is God, thus does God come among men:," and, while the whole life in the flesh of which that is the dawn, passes before him in thought, and he traces the Lord's path from the manger to the cross, and then on to glory, we can conceive of him as repeating to himself - "This is my God, in this God am I to put my trust;" and we can understand how, while contrasting what he is thus consciously learning of "the true God and eternal life" with all the results of men's "curious searching of God's majesty" with which he was not unacquainted, he would treasure up his own conscious experience, - to minister it to others for warning and guidance.\(^2\)

McLeod Campbell assures us that he does not want to brand Owen and Edwards' teaching as "curious searching" but he does

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1. Ibid, p.52
2. Ibid. McLeod Campbell's appreciation of Luther in the Nature of the Atonement has been dealt with fully above, Chap.V.
think that "...it would have been well that they had used the life of Christ more as their light".¹ He insists that he is not opposed to philosophy, and indeed considers Christianity to be the "highest philosophy", but the only adequate training for this "highest philosophy" is that which the apostle John had "...when following the footsteps of Jesus, listening to His words, seeing His deeds, and, from time to time, favoured to lean upon His breast"². He goes on then to quote I John 1:1-3 which is so important to his case for the revelation through the humanity of Jesus Christ that it is worth quoting here.

"That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of Life: (For the life was manifested, and we have seen and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us:) that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us: and truly our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son, Jesus Christ". McLeod Campbell's point against the Calvinists is that rather than learning of God from His revelation in Christ, they began their argument from what they thought they knew of the Divine Attributes. These presupposed Divine attributes then determined, and he would say distorted, their view of the work of Christ. Thought about the Divine Attributes should be "...engaged in after the due study of the life of Christ".³ He argues elsewhere that "...surely this is the right course in order that untested

¹. Ibid. p.53 ². Ibid. ³. Ibid. p.54.
preconceptions may not mislead us; for even as to the abstract question - "What is an atonement for sin?", it is surely wise to seek its answer in the study of the atonement for sin actually made, and revealed to our faith as accepted by God". Even if the question is abstract and general, the answer is concrete and actual in the history of the work of Jesus Christ. Even "...general conceptions of the divine mercy and benevolence" are not adequate, for although they are true as far as they go, they "...come altogether short of the love of God to us in Christ Jesus". What has been worse, however, is the abstract treatment of God's justice and law. McLeod Campbell criticises the classical Calvinism of Owen, Edwards and even Chalmers for abstracting God the Lawgiver from God the Father and thereby not seeing that what pleases God as Father pleases him as Lawgiver. "...this is what is not understood when the legal perfection of Christ's righteousness is thus abstracted from the law of the spirit of the life of sonship in Christ Jesus..."

Yet an even graver problem presented by the arguments of Owen and Edwards concerning the Divine Attributes, is that in abstracting God's justice from His love, they have failed to show that He is love at all! We have seen in Chapter IV how the Westminster Theology related all men to God's justice in the covenant of works, and only the elect to God's mercy in the covenant of grace. McLeod Campbell remarks on this when he declares that,

...while they set forth justice as a necessary attribute of the divine nature,

1. Ibid. p.119  2. Ibid. p.171  3. Ibid. p.73.
so that God must deal with all men according to its requirements, they represent mercy and love as not necessary, but arbitrary, and what, therefore, may find their expression in the history of only some men. For according to their system justice alone is expressed in the history of all men, that is to say, in the history of the non-elect, in their endurance of punishment: in the history of the elect, in Christ's enduring it for them. Mercy and love are expressed in the history of the elect alone.¹

But McLeod Campbell states that it is quite clear that "...an arbitrary act cannot reveal character".² We may be reconciled to an act we do not understand in itself, by what we know elsewhere of the actor's character. But if we are told that the act is arbitrary - that he that performs it does so because "...he wills it because he wills it..."³ we cannot learn from that act anything of his character. Now, the doctrine that the work of Christ has had reference only to the elect, and that the grace which it embodies was only grace to them, and that they were elected, and the non-elect passed over arbitrarily, or at least on no principle of choice that can be made known to us, or at all events is made known to us, - this doctrine makes the work of Christ as presented to the faith of human beings strictly an arbitrary act".⁴ It may be replied that God does not tell us to expect to understand his actions. But this is McLeod Campbell's whole point! If this be the case then what God has done has left us ignorant of "Himself", and therefore "...so far as the acting of which He gives us no account is

1. Ibid. p.63  
2. Ibid. p.64  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ibid.
concerned, He is to us the unknown God". 1 The work of Christ does not show God to be love, but to be arbitrary:

He also criticises the later Calvinists for looking at the atonement merely as "...a grand moral display, illustrative of God's condemnation of sin and delight in holiness". 2 McLeod Campbell does not deny that it is such a display, but he insists that it is much more than that. He criticises their view as being an "...abstract atonement for sin..." 3 that does not consider the particular aspects of man's sin and God's purpose.

But even when Christ Himself is studied, there is a danger present in abstraction. This danger is seen when Christ's life and His righteousness are unduly separated. The doctrine of imputation is based upon such an abstraction. It first separates Christ's righteousness which remains apart from believers, from the effects of His righteousness which is imputed to believers. But McLeod Campbell argues that "...the perfect righteousness of the Son of God in humanity is itself the gift of God to us in Christ - to be ours as Christ is ours, - to be partaken in as He is partaken in, - to be our life as He is our life..." 4 What he is arguing against is not abstract thinking as such. He knows very well that it is necessary and indeed he declares that, "Abstractly considered, and viewed in itself, the divine righteousness that is in Christ must be recognised as a higher gift than any benefit it can be supposed to purchase". 5 What he obviously is saying is that abstract thinking be recognised to

1. Ibid. pp.64,65 2. Ibid. p.93
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. p.154 5. Ibid.
be thinking and not confused with reality. We may abstractly think about Christ's righteousness "viewed in itself" but we must remember that in reality it is inseparable from Him. We may distinguish in thought, what we admit to be an aspect of a whole in reality. Holiness, truth and love may be abstractly contemplated but in reality they are "...the elements of the eternal life given to us in Christ our life, and in respect of which He is "made of God unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption".¹ The undue separation of Christ's life and righteousness has led to great confusion. It has led, for instance, to "...reducing the meaning of the words, 'eternal life', to the conception of an unproved future endless blessedness that awaits us as those who trust in Christ's merits, not a spiritual state into which we enter in receiving the knowledge of God in Christ. Thus confusion and perplexity are introduced into the whole subject of righteousness and eternal life, when, this life being admitted to be given, righteousness is not recognised as simply an element in that gift, or rather an aspect of it".² This is a very interesting explanation of why "realised eschatology" has been so little emphasised and "future eschatology" has been abstractly dealt with and therefore been considered rather meaningless.

McLeod Campbell considers yet another Christian doctrine to have been treated too abstractly. The abstract treatment of the nature of the atonement has led to an abstract doctrine of faith. Because a legal conception of atonement has led to a

¹. Ibid. p.155  
². Ibid. p.156.
doctrine of limited atonement, it became necessary to develop teachings concerning how a man could "appropriate" Christ. He refers to the teaching of John Owen who taught that there were four successive acts or steps of faith, each one with a scriptural authority. Some people can take the first step, other the first two, and so on... while as to those who take the whole four, their having taken them has become a ground for that personal appropriation of Christ, as their own Saviour in particular, which was not afforded by the revelation made in the gospel message..."1 McLeod Campbell notes the attempt to improve the doctrine of faith by men like Thomas Boston2 and Thomas Chalmers, but he considers all these attempts to be "...a departure from the simplicity of faith..."3 and none really answers the need for certainty of a personal interest in Christ which a limited atonement creates.

In opposition to the abstractive tendencies of Calvinist theology, McLeod Campbell pointed men to what they might learn of God from the "life of Christ". In the one life of Christ we learn that the holiness and justice of God, and his Fatherhood and love, are but "...two aspects of spiritual reality".4 The nature of this one reality as revealed in the atonement has a necessary aspect. God is not arbitrary. His nature determines in a necessary way, our relationship to Him. Our way of satisfying the holiness of God "...must have its nature determined by the nature of holiness; so a way to the Father must have its

1. Ibid. p. 60
2. Ibid. p. 61
3. Ibid. p. 63
4. Ibid. p. 90.
nature determined by the nature of fatherliness". We must come to the atonement "...not venturing in our darkness to predetermine anything as to its nature, but expecting light to shine upon our spirits from it..." Although the nature of the atonement is not what we would like it to be in our darkness, it reconciles us to itself. Indeed, it might be considered to be one of McLeod Campbell's first principles that it must reconcile us to itself by itself or we are judging what God had done by something superior to it. "...clearly understood, the statement is felt to be self-evident, that the will of God must reconcile us to itself by the power of what it is, or not at all. Therefore, that the Son reconciles us to the Father by revealing the Father is not only a way of salvation full of Glory to God, but is, in truth the only possible way". He admits that he has been assuming that the Fatherliness of God is antecedent to all that God does. "In assuming, as I have been doing, a relation of men to God as the Father of spirits, antecedent to, and to be regarded as underlying their relation to Him as their moral governor, I have, in like manner, been calculating on a response from the depths of humanity". If this assumption is true, then there is a necessary logic which can be seen lying behind the

1. Ibid. If speaking of "necessity" in relation to God makes one uneasy, it is worth observing the truth of one of James Denney's typically brilliant insights. "...Though it may seem presumptuous to speak of necessity where God is in question, we must remember that the only alternative is to pronounce God exlex - without law - which is as good as to abandon thinking altogether". (Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), p.7).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p. 342
4. Ibid. p. 346.
incarnation and the atonement. "If we are in very Truth, God's offspring, if it is as the Father of our spirits that He regards us while yet in our sins, it accords with this that the Father should send the Son to save us, that the Son should propose to save us by the revelation of the Father, and that our salvation shall be participation in the life of sonship".  

McLeod Campbell holds that this priority of the Fatherliness of God is true, is in fact, "...the truth of things..." He therefore sees what he calls a "natural" rather than an "artificial" relationship between the work of the atonement and the believer's receiving of its benefits. This "artificial" relationship is that of abstraction and the resultant doctrine of imputation which we have discussed above. The "natural" or "direct" relationship is that of "participation" through faith.

When this "natural" and "direct" relationship to Christ is not understood, we see the abstract doctrines of faith arising, with their well meaning, but unavailing attempts to prevent faith being considered self-righteously. However, by their very act of drawing attention to faith, they conflict with their own intention. Faith should not look to itself but to the gift of eternal life in Christ. "And the faith which apprehends this gift as given, excludes boasting, because it occupies the spirit, not with itself, but with the gift which it apprehends". The nature of this gift which is the object of our faith, prevents any self-righteousness on our part. What Christ reveals is a

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid. p.353  
3. Ibid. p.113  
life of sonship and "... in its own nature, and apart from its derived character as existing in us, the confidence of sonship is essentially and necessarily the opposite of self-righteousness". 1 Because the plan of salvation is based upon God's character and will, there is a necessity running throughout it. Because of the actuality of God's character, the actuality of man's sin and need, and the actuality of the redemption provided in Christ, there is a necessary character to the doctrine of the atonement. It is not arbitrary, because God is not arbitrary.

3. Penal for filial obedience.

We have seen how McLeod Campbell criticised the "Calvinists" for their use of indirect rather than direct evidence, and for their tendency to abstraction rather than letting their thinking be determined by the actuality of the revelation of God in the life of Christ. He spoke of their having a "system" which had the power to distort their study of Scripture, 2 and "habits of thought", 3 which made it difficult for them to understand his teaching. The central aspect of the way in which these tendencies combined to distort the nature of the atonement, was in leading men to think of Christ's suffering as penal. We shall deal later with his own teaching which utilised what he felt were the correct filial categories, but we should note that he felt that it was something more than tradition which led men to choose the penal categories. "... there is much less spiritual apprehension necessary to the faith that God punishes sin, than to the faith that our sins do truly grieve God. Therefore, men do more easily believe that Christ's sufferings shew how God can punish sin,

1. Ibid. p. 355 2. Ibid. p. 200 3. Ibid. pp. 10, 133.
than that these sufferings are the divine feelings in relation to sin, made visible to us by being present in suffering Flesh".¹ He thinks that Thomas Chalmers is quite correct in speaking of a "natural legalism" which makes it difficult for men to receive the Gospel.² Unlike Chalmers, who was afraid lest this natural sense of God as Judge should be lost in the sentimental piety of "...contemplating the relation between God and man simply as a family relation..."³ McLeod Campbell was more afraid that the idea of "the Lawgiver" should be thought to be a higher and more basic idea than that of Father. He is not satisfied to see these put on the same level. He says clearly that he has condemned the "...subordinating of the Gospel to the law. I am now contending for the due subordinating of the law to the Gospel".⁴ The Calvinists have falsely "...fixed upon the obedience of Christ as the fulfilling of a law, and the life of sonship in which this fulfilment has taken place, is left out of view. But that life of sonship, is, in reality, what ought to be prominent; and the proper value of that fulfilment of the law, besides the honour which it accords to the law, is, that it is a demonstration of the virtue and power which is in sonship".⁵ Instead of seeing that men are given what is fundamentally a filial standing in Christ, both the older and modified forms of Calvinism have seen man to be given a legal standing and thereby have had their doctrines of the atonement "...determined by man's relation to the divine law".⁶

1. Ibid. pp.140, 141  2. Ibid. p.71  3. Ibid. p.72
The Calvinism of Owen and Edwards was based on the principle that God's nature demanded justice, and that this meant that the individual's sin must be punished and righteousness rewarded. To escape the eternal misery awarded to sin, the sinner must "...in the person of Christ, endure the misery thus due to sin, and fulfill the righteousness of which this blessedness is the due reward". The sinner having (in the person of Christ) satisfied God's justice, cannot be punished himself and will receive the reward of righteousness. On these principles, when the life of Christ is studied, "All that is of the nature of pain and suffering in the history of our Lord...is set down as penal suffering - the punishment of the sins of the elect". Similarly, all that is seen of righteousness and holiness in the life of Christ is thought of as accomplishing the perfect righteousness which gives the elect a claim to eternal blessedness. But if it is wrong for a man to be punished for sins for which Christ has already accepted the punishment, then justice demands that Christ only suffered such an amount of punishment as to cover the sins of those who accept his work for them (the elect). This brings us to another principle of the older Calvinists. It is that Christ's suffering must be either the same amount of the same suffering as the elect were exposed to (Owen) or the same amount of an equivalent form of suffering (Edwards).

We have seen that McLeod Campbell rejects this teaching as based upon extra-Biblical and abstract notions of what an atone-

1. Ibid. p.55  
2. Ibid.
ment is. It simply does not do justice to the facts, and particularly to the fact of God's love. But in disposing of these older Calvinists, he by no means dealt with the recent modifications of Calvinism which had reacted against many of the central assertions of the older system. For one thing, these modified Calvinists held that Christ had died for all men and not for the elect only. Consequently they also rejected the notion of "absolute" or "distributive" justice which insisted on the same or equivalent amount of suffering in Christ as would be expected from those He died for. They also rebelled against the idea that Christ became a criminal in His Father's eyes through the imputation of man's sin to Him. Finally, there is a difference in their emphasis that those who perish do so because they will not accept Christ, and not because a salvation was not provided for them.

Clearly McLeod Campbell could find much to agree with in these modified Calvinists. He certainly welcomed their teaching that Christ died for all men and their rejection of an imputation of sin to Christ. But they were much stronger in regard to what they rejected in the older Calvinism than in what they put in its place. Their major emphasis was that the divine nature did not demand "absolute" or "distributive" justice but that it was

1. In the Nature of the Atonement, he does not even bother to enter into the "scripture argument against the limitation of the atonement..." (p.60). He obviously assumes the reader knows the weight of these arguments. James Denney was greatly mistaken in thinking that McLeod Campbell's emphasis on "personality" meant that, "The questions once so fiercely debated about the extent of the atonement have no meaning". The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, (London:Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), p.119.
satisfied by "rectoral and public justice". That is, the suffering of Christ was not significant because of its amount, but because of who it was who suffered, "...whereas, in the earlier Calvinism the divinity of the Saviour is contemplated as making possible infinitely great sufferings endured in time, - the needed substitute for sufferings that would have been infinite in that they would have been eternal, - on this system the divinity of Christ is regarded as giving infinite value to any suffering of His; so that the value of the sufferings would be infinitely great though its amount were infinitely small".  

The concept of "rectoral and public justice" built upon this relation of suffering to Christ's divinity is illustrated by one of these writers who tells of a Judge who once said to a criminal, "You are condemned to be transported, not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen".  

This "rectoral and public justice" is seen therefore to be largely a moral influence theory. Yet, McLeod Campbell is willing to take seriously its claim to be concerned with justice and says that if it is to have any moral basis, it must ultimately rest upon and refer to absolute justice. "In other words, unless there be a rightness in connecting sin with misery, and righteousness with blessedness, looking at individual cases simply in themselves, I cannot see that there is a rightness in connecting them as a rule of moral government".  

Even though this modified teaching does not openly admit that Christ's sufferings are penal, its teaching

1. Ibid. p.77
2. Jenkyn, (pp.175, 176) cited p.80
3. Ibid. p.80. The underlining is mine.
is basically the same as the older Calvinism in this regard. If Christ's suffering is penal in the sense that Owen taught, being "...the same that those for whom he suffered were obnoxious to; - or as Baxter, with Grotius, held, - equivalent; - or as Dr. Jenkyn holds, "different in nature, and kind, - in quantity and degree". If they were penal, then that those for whom he suffered should be punished themselves, must still suggest the idea sought to be avoided, of sin twice punished".1

McLeod Campbell illustrates the underlying similarity between the older and the modified Calvinism by citing a number of examples of the same teaching when the details of Christ's suffering are actually spoken of.2 He points out that Edwards, representing the older Calvinism, and Stroud, Pye Smith, Jenkyn and Payne, representing the modified Calvinism, all speak in general terms of the Father as inflicting wrath on His Son, or as abandoning Him in His suffering.3 That is, their general concepts are of punishment or penal suffering. He then turns to the similarity of treatment in regard to the actual nature of Christ's sufferings. Once again he first deals with Edwards and he is very pleased to note that when Edwards speaks particularly of Christ's actual experience he does not say "...either that God looked on Christ in wrath, or that Christ felt as if

1. Ibid. pp.81,82. Although J.K. Mozley, Doctrine of the Atone- ment, (London: Duckworth, 1915) is wrong in declaring that McLeod Campbell does not mention Grotius (p.190), it is noticeable that he does not mention the fact that the concept of "rectoral and public justice" is usually traced back to Grotius.
2. Ibid. pp.83,89
3. Ibid. pp.84,85.
He did.¹ When he turns to the teachings of the Modified Calvinists he finds that this is also true of their teachings. He finds that "...the same relief which is felt in interpreting the general expressions of Edwards in reference to the divine wrath which Christ suffered, by the details of Christ's actual sufferings which he specifies, is again experienced in passing from the general expressions of the modified Calvinists to the illustrations of these which are offered".² He has found a basic inconsistency in Calvinist thought. These men have all held general, abstract notions of atonement which were penal. They have also, all spoken of the particular, actual sufferings of Christ in such a way as to deny that the Father was punishing the Son, or that the Son thought that he was being punished.

McLeod Campbell does not criticise these Calvinists so much for misunderstanding the nature of the sufferings of Christ, as for ignoring their nature, allowing them to be seen simply as sufferings and permitting them therefore to be fitted into a general scheme of a penal character. They have not understood the nature of these sufferings according to the necessity of their own actuality but rather have ascribed to them a penal character "...without necessity as respects their own nature, - I believe in contradiction to their own nature..."³. They have failed in not venturing "...to assume anything as to the actual consciousness of Christ in suffering, or as to the actual mind of the Father towards Him..."⁴ We may now turn to see how McLeod

1. Ibid. p.88 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. p.90 4. Ibid. When one reads the philosophical discussion of punishment in such a fine book as A.C. Ewing's, The Morality of Punish-
Campbell develops his teaching in regard to the nature of the atonement by making such an assumption as to the "actual consciousness of Christ" and the "actual mind of the Father".

Mystery and Faith

As is so often the case, the place to begin McLeod Campbell's great book on the Nature of the Atonement, in order to understand its major thrust, is the last chapter. There he tells us the purpose of his book and some of its limitations. The purpose he declares is "...not with the interest of theological controversy, but as a man communing with his brother man, and giving utterance to the deep convictions of his own heart as to the spiritual need of humanity, and the common salvation".1

Perhaps even more interesting are the limits which he kept in view in writing his book. When we consider his attack on the "physical mystery" of transubstantiation and the "moral mystery" of legal imputation in Christ the Bread of Life, written just a few years earlier, it is significant that he declares that he had not "...attempted to divest the subject of the atonement of all mystery".2 He quickly explains that "The assumed merit of..." (Footnote 4 continued from page 347) ment, (London: Kegan Paul, 1929), one is struck by the wide gap between this subject in a secular context and in a theological context. Certainly Ewing is correct in protesting against a system of punishment which would allow the innocent to suffer in the place of the guilty, yet in the theological context, no doctrine of the atonement would be adequate which did not admit that Jesus suffered, "The just for the unjust". Is not part of the offense of the gospel this "ethical" offense?

1. Nature of the Atonement, p.385
2. Ibid. p.374.
a blind faith, in addition to the error implied in all idea of merit on our part in relation to God, involves the absurdity of expecting to please God by exalting one of His good gifts, to the depreciation of another gift..."1 He insists, therefore, that both revelation and reason are gifts of God and must be given their proper place. Certainly reason can be falsely exalted but the remedy is not to deny reason, but "...that we should hear the voice of God in reason as well as in revelation - that God in whose presence no flesh shall glory".2 Both reason and revelation have their mysteries and to shrink from mysteries is merely to shrink from deep thinking about our human existence. McLeod Campbell declares that there are limits to the "light" and "darkness" around us. Certainly it would be wrong to attempt to push beyond that limit, but equally, it would be wrong to make the area of light too small. "...would not this be to refuse to use a portion of the grace of God to us, and be one form of folding in a napkin and hiding in the earth a talent of which an account must be rendered?"3

The mystery which McLeod Campbell saw before him in dealing with the nature of the atonement, had aspects which he felt were within the limits of light, and aspects beyond those limits. First he clearly defines the work of Christ in terms which are characteristic of the doctrine of "union with Christ". He defines this work as "...His participation in humanity, and our participation in the divine nature through Him,..."4 Now when this

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. p.375
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. p.376.
work of Christ is studied we find aspects which are beyond the light and properly in the region of mystery. "That region, whether as respects reason or revelation, is the divine and the infinite..."1 But McLeod Campbell declares that insofar as the atonement is considered "...simply as a transaction in humanity"2 it belongs to the region of light. "It is not in this transaction, viewed in itself, that mystery was to be expected, or could exist, but in that relation of the Son of God to man which this transaction presupposes. This relation, whether we contemplate it as participation in our flesh, or as that relation to us in the spirit in respect of which Christ is our life...is indeed a mystery as to its results".3 McLeod Campbell is saying that we cannot know the "how" of the incarnation, or the believer's participation through the Holy Spirit in Christ's work, but that the actuality of these realities is presupposed in his argument.

He does not mean to imply that we can know only Christ's humanity but rather that it is through Christ's humanity that we come to know His divinity. He argues that, "The divine perfection of sonship in humanity, presented in Christ to our faith, is in respect of its perfection, what leads us up to the mystery of the divinity of Christ as truly as His power to quicken and sustain sonship in spirit and in truth in us does".4 Note that this perfection of sonship in humanity "leads us up to" His divinity. It is not in itself his divinity, for "...the manner of being of God"5 remains a mystery. We are led up to the "line of meeting" between God and man "...and while we expect to

1. Ibid.  2. Ibid.  3. Ibid. p.377
4. Ibid.  5. Ibid. p.378.
understand what pertains to the human side of this line and to the divine nature as in humanity, we do not expect to understand what is on the divine side, and pertains to the acting of God as God". On this basis he quite consistently argues that our knowledge of the Trinity is limited by revelation. But he makes it clear that God's being is not thereby limited by human finitude. "As to that ultimate mystery which our faith receives in believing in God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, while in itself eternal, and irrespective of all finite existence, we can only be called to the study of it in its manifestation in connexion with man".

While we cannot understand "how" God acts in Christ, the fact of the divinity of Christ is a necessary presupposition for our understanding the Gospel. In fact, apart from who Christ is in Himself, it would be impossible to believe what the Gospel declares He is to us. "I cannot believe in one as my life, of whom I am not warranted to think as God; while, remembering that in God I live, and move and have my being, I seem prepared to be told - I had almost said to understand - that the divine life of sonship is what I am to live in and by the Son of God as my life".

McLeod Campbell asserts that all men are related to Christ "... as He in whom they all have the life of sonship..." We should note that he declares that all men have already this life in Him. He then points out that Paul preached to the Athenians of the unknown God whom they ignorantly worshipped, saying that "in Him they lived, and moved and had their being". His point is

1. Ibid.  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. p.379  
4. Ibid.
that the language of Scripture speaks of a "...parallelism of these relationships to the Father and the Son..." and therefore leads us to acknowledge the divinity of the Son.

Yet once our relation to God through the Son of God is acknowledged, it does not remove, but rather deepens, the other mysteries of our human existence. For example, the fact that sin exists is not removed by the knowledge of the fatherliness of God and his provision for our participation in a life of sonship in Christ. Indeed, the moral and spiritual mystery of sin is only increased by our knowledge of the infinite love of God. While this contradiction between what man is and what God wills him to be is a mystery, this is not enough to force us to abandon the fact for the sake of a more rational acceptable "relation of ideas". "The faith of the fact, however, is demanded by what is highest and deepest within us, which forbids our grasping at a seeming intellectual consistency of thought, at the expense of denying this contradiction, and accepting all the fearful moral and spiritual results which such denial involves".2

While the doctrine of the atonement is surrounded by such mysteries concerning our human existence, none of these mysteries are such that they must first be solved before we can go on to understand the atonement. Rather we must first understand the atonement and then we may "ascend upwards to questions connected with the name of God the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, or meditate on the present or future of man, the due preparation for these regions of thought is the exercise of faith in the

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. p.382. The underlining is mine
actual condition of things which the Gospel reveals..."¹ So it is that McLeod Campbell has written his book without first solving such mysteries as the union of God and man in Christ, the mode of participation of believers in Christ, and the existence of sin. This does not mean that he has ignored them. Rather he has presupposed them and hopes by drawing upon the light which he has seen in the nature of the atonement, to illumine them.²

The Divine Life in Humanity

We have seen how McLeod Campbell speaks of a line between what man may know and what he may not know. We are led up to this "line of meeting" between God and man "...and while we expect to understand what pertains to the human side of this line and to the divine nature as in humanity, we do not expect to understand what is on the divine side, and pertains to the acting of God as God."³ It is therefore by observing the human life of the "divine nature as in humanity" that men come to learn that which God wishes them to know of Himself. Because this actual life in humanity is so important, McLeod-Campbell is forced to admit that even the private life of our Lord, prior to His short ministry, is of great interest. But how are we to learn of this? There is not much recorded in the Bible concerning "...

1. Ibid. p.383 (underlining mine).
2. It is difficult to see how George Hendry (in the Gospel of the Incarnation, pp.82, 83) could think that it was not until after criticism of the first edition of the Nature of the Atonement that McLeod Campbell was led to a "profound realization" of the relation of the incarnation to the atonement. He even declares that in the introduction to the second edition he left the matter with a "...brief allusion and did not go on to demonstrate how the atonement, as he understood it, was bound up with the incarnation: (p.83). In reality, the entire book is about this relationship.
3. Ibid. p.378.
so large a proportion of our Lord's whole life on earth". Are we then to construct "fictitious narratives" intended to meet our natural desire for information? McLeod Campbell's answer is that the life of which he is speaking is the actual life of Christ and not a mere record. This desire for "fictitious narratives"

...has been a part of the error of not seeing that that life itself as it abides in Him who lived it and not the mere written record pf that life is our unsearchable riches which we have in Christ. When the promise is fulfilled to us, that the Comforter would take of that which is Christ's, and shew it unto us, this acting of the Comforter is not limited to what is recorded. He takes from the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, stored up for all humanity in the Son of God, - revealing the life of Him who "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin", in its relation to our individual need, with that minuteness of application of which that life, thus revealed to us in the Spirit, is capable, but of which no written record could be capable.

This passage is of interest for a number of reasons. We may note first that we may see here that Christocentric doctrine of the Holy Spirit that was so clear in his Row teaching. The Spirit reveals Christ to us and through Him we come to participate in all that which is "...stored up for all humanity in the humanity of the Son of God..." Yet, a second point of interest is that this passage may be seen to indicate that McLeod Campbell thought of the Bible's relation to Christ as being analogous to the relationship between the sign and the thing signified in the sacraments. We noted in regard to his Row teaching, his insistence that the hearer pass beyond his words to a knowledge

1. Ibid. p.247  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid.
of the realities of which he was speaking. We saw this emphasis in *Christ the Bread of Life*, where his major emphasis is that the elements of the sacrament are meant to point to the reality of "union with Christ" and not to themselves. This same insistence that men pass beyond the words of Scripture to the realities which they are intended to speak of, may be seen in the *Nature of the Atonement* as this passage indicates.¹ If this argument were expressed in philosophical terms, it might be expressed as the teaching of a direct intuitive relationship between the knower and the known. Where the knower is separated from the known by a physical sign or language, he passes from the sign to the thing signified. In fact, this was the philosophical position of the Scottish school of common sense philosophers. We have seen in Chapter II how the problem of the knowledge of "other minds" was solved through the doctrine of "natural signs".² This teaching was based on the view that "Nature hath established a real connection between the signs and things signified; and Nature hath also taught us the interpretation of the signs - so that, previous to experience, the sign suggests the thing signified, and create the belief of it".³ This relationship between the sign and the thing signified holds true in relation to language as well as the physical world. In the "natural" language of the face, gestures and tone of voice "...the signs suggest the thing signified, and create the belief of it".⁴

1. Ibid. pp.16,17
2. Above, Chapter II, p.94 ff.
This is true also of the "artificial" language which has been established by convention. This "direct" intuitive relationship by which the knower passes immediately from the sign to the thing signified, is indeed one of the central characteristics of the philosophy in which McLeod Campbell was trained. This might explain in part his reaction against the abstractive tendency in "Calvinism" and his confidence in "matters of fact".

It is important to remember that when McLeod Campbell is speaking of the "life of Christ" he is not referring merely to the historical record of that life but to the actual life. This is absolutely necessary if we are to understand what he means when he refers us to the "actual consciousness of Christ" and the "actual mind of the Father". We must understand that for McLeod Campbell, revelation takes place objectively in the actual life in humanity of the Son of God. He would not deny that Scripture, the Holy Spirit, and faith have an important part to play but they play this part when they do not draw attention to themselves, but point to the actuality of Jesus Christ. When we look at the life of Christ we see its outward physical form but we must look more deeply still, into the inner life which lies behind this external life. The inward life of Christ and its outward form are both parts of a unity and help us to understand each other. "...the life of Christ had an external history and took an outward form from the successive circumstances in which our Lord was placed, from the manger to the cross, according to the divine ordering of His path. And while this history can only be understood in the light of that inward life of which it
has been the outward form, the contemplation of the outward form must help our understanding of the inward life..."1. This inward life was the "life of sonship". This is the same life which the Son of God had with the Father before the world was, now come into humanity. The Son has thus revealed his nature to be self-sacrificing love in the very act of His incarnation. This we cannot understand very well because it is prior to his life in humanity, but in humanity this love "...acts according to its own nature, and must needs bear our burden and work and suffer for our salvation, and this in ways which we who are human may understand, and shall understand in the measure in which the life of love becomes our life".2

The "life" of Christ is not newly created in the incarnation, but is made known to man in humanity through the incarnation. His "life" is the same "eternal life" which He had with the Father before the world was.3 McLeod Campbell defines the nature of this life which is eternal life by calling it "...that life which lies in God's favour..."4. The favour of the Father is so essential to this life that this life cannot be said to exist where the favour of the Father does not exist. He speaks of "...the favour of God - that favour which is life..."5. But this life in the favour of God, or, this favour of God which is

1. Nature of the Atonement, p.242. Perhaps we may detect that undue emphasis on the "spiritual" over against the "fleshy" or "bodily" in McLeod Campbell's distinction here between the "outward form" and the "inward life" of Christ. We have noted this tendency in his view of the Lord's Supper. See Chapter VI, Above, p. 319
2. Ibid. p.127
3. Ibid. p.126
4. Ibid. p. 97
5. Ibid. p. 96.
life, has both objective and subjective aspects. On the part of the Father, it is love to the Son, on the part of the Son, it is "consciousness" of this love. This love from the Father evokes a response from the Son. This response is trust and confidence in the Father. This response is thus known in the "consciousness" of the Father and the Son. In other words, "eternal life" is this conscious Fatherliness, Sonship relationship which exists eternally between God the Father, and God the Son. But in the incarnation, the Son reveals this relationship to mankind through his humanity. Through His human consciousness participating in this "eternal life", this eternal "fatherliness-sonship co-relate" is made known to men.

Sonship - Fatherliness Co-Relate

So it is that God "accommodates" Himself to man by revealing "sonship" "...in our nature and in our circumstances..." and thereby makes it possible for us to speak of God's nature. In fact, it might well be said that the whole of McLeod Campbell's doctrine of the nature of the atonement revolves around this central teaching of the "...co-relativeness of sonship and fatherliness...". He declares that, "I have said above that the Son alone could reveal the Father - for, indeed, manifested sonship can alone reveal fatherliness...". He elsewhere insists that,

The great and root-distinction of the view of the atonement presented in these pages is the relation in which our redemption is

1. "co-relate" rather than "correlate" has been used simply because it is McLeod Campbell's usage.
2. Ibid. p.250
3. Ibid. p.348
4. Ibid. p.168.
regarded as standing to the fatherliness of God. In that fatherliness has the atonement been now represented as originating. By that fatherliness has its end been represented to have been determined. To that fatherliness has the demand for the elements of expiation found in it to be traced...¹

Indeed, he declares that "...a conviction like that produced by the internal light of axiomatic truth" shines from the conceptions, "Fatherliness in God originating our salvation: the Son of God accomplishing that salvation by the revelation of the Father; the life of sonship quickened in us, the salvation contemplated..."² McLeod Campbell is well aware that Calvinists acknowledged that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, but he feels they put too much emphasis on this implying the simple fact of Christ's divinity. They did not do justice to the manner and nature of the revelation of God's love by thus emphasising its greatness "...and yet neither is its greatness known while its nature is not understood..."³. Its nature, he points out, is sonship - a co-relative term. He argues that "A servant may make us acquainted with his master; a subject may make us to know the lawgiver and king to whom he owes allegiance; the Son alone could reveal the Father. "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son revealeth Him".⁴ McLeod Campbell emphasises that the Son comes to us as the Son, we do not merely call Him the Son, or feel that he is like a Son "...but, seeing the perfection of sonship - like the perfection of fatherliness - as divine, and eternal, and, as respects the Son of God, only

1. Ibid. p.338
2. Ibid. p.344
3. Ibid. p.344
4. Ibid. p. 73.
manifested in humanity and not then come into existence..."1. We may therefore argue from our knowledge of this eternal sonship made known to us in humanity, back to the eternal fatherliness of which it is a co-relative. But according to McLeod Campbell, the nature of this sonship is not only revealed to men in Christ's humanity, but more specifically "...by the consciousness in His own humanity of a knowledge of the Father..."2. Just as the human consciousness of other men is open to our understanding, so also is Christ's human consciousness. We have seen, however, that McLeod Campbell uses "consciousness" in an extremely theological manner. He is not thinking of a biological or psychological faculty, but that relationship between God and man. As we pointed out above, consciousness and conscience appear to be the correlates of terms such as God, Holy Spirit or gospel.

At this point, it might be helpful to show how McLeod Campbell's emphasis on "consciousness" and direct revelation through the "Fatherliness-sonship" correlate were by no means beyond the grasp of those trained in the Scottish common sense philosophy. In regard to "consciousness", it should be noted that it was given a very large place in this philosophy. Sir William Hamilton, for instance, declared that "In all legitimate speculation with regard to the phaenomena of mind, it is Consciousness which affords us at once, (1) the capacity of knowledge; (2) the means of observation; (3) the point from whence our investigation should depart; (4) the limit of our inquiry;

1. Ibid. p.334  2. Ibid. p.164.
(5) the measure of its validity; and, (6) the warrant of its truth". Hamilton criticises Thomas Reid for considering consciousness to be "...a separate and specific faculty of self-knowledge...". Certainly McLeod Campbell's use of "consciousness" is wider than a reference to a faculty of self-knowledge. He uses it of Christ's knowledge of His Father and of our knowledge of Christ. It is given this specifically theological meaning in its specifically theological context.

McLeod Campbell in speaking of the relationship between the Father and the Son, insists that this be thought of as a direct relationship. This is a direct relationship expressed in terms of their mutual consciousness of its filial nature. The fictions of imputation and the so-called demands of satisfaction cannot be allowed to obscure this direct conscious knowledge of love and trust. But the direct trust of the Son in the Father's love is all that is open to men's direct observation. Men can know Christ's human consciousness as they know the human consciousness of themselves and other men. How can they know the Father's consciousness? The Father's consciousness is not in humanity, and therefore, not directly open to human understanding. McLeod Campbell's answer is that we know the Father through the Son. Sonship as revealed in Christ implies Fatherliness. Christ's knowledge (or consciousness) of the Father is direct, but ours

2. Ibid.
3. George Campbell used "consciousness" in a wider sense than Hamilton declares Reid did. See above, Chapter I.
4. See Chapter II, p. 94 ff where we discuss the "common sense" answer to the question of how we know "other minds".
is mediated by Him. We look at Christ the Son, and "read off" knowledge of the Father from Him. McLeod Campbell's thought goes beyond this, of course, for he declares that through faith we actually "participate" in Christ and are made to share in Christ's sonship. In this way we share in Christ's consciousness of the Father and know Him directly as the "Father of our Spirits". Would this talk of direct and co-relative knowledge of God mean anything to those acquainted with Scottish common sense philosophy? Certainly McLeod Campbell's thought is basically Biblical and we need go no further than the text, "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son Reveal-eth Him" to see that. However, when this is recognised, it must be admitted that his intuitive empiricist approach must have had a special appeal to those brought up on similar philosophical views and this applies to his insistence on direct knowledge. Thomas Reid, for example, said that, "Of some things, we know what they are in themselves: our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we know not what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things" of these our conception is only relative". 1

We have seen McLeod Campbell's emphasis on direct knowledge. We have seen too how our knowledge of the quality of sonship in

1. Reid, Works, p. 513. Sir William Hamilton argued that since all knowledge is relative, "It would be better to say direct and indirect". (p. 513, 62). Hamilton, of course, had a special use for the notion of "relative" knowledge and obviously wished to preserve the term for that use. See S.A. Grave, Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 126 ff.
the Son, implies the co-relate fatherliness of God the Father.

McLeod Campbell's emphasis is that this knowledge becomes direct as we participate through faith in the Son. Certainly there is no example of this teaching in the common sense philosophers. McLeod Campbell's teaching involves the "mysteries" of the Trinity and Christ's union with men which he assumed as facts, but acknowledged to be beyond the "limits" of autonomous human understanding. With these limitations in mind, it is still of interest to see that Reid taught that men might have relative knowledge of "...qualities or attributes essential to the thing", without direct knowledge of "the thing". It is the method of argument that is of interest to us. S.A. Grave describes it as, "One term only of the relation is presented, and its correlative and the relation read off intuitively from it". This is as concise a description as possible of McLeod Campbell's argument for the "...co-relativeness of sonship and fatherliness...".

It is of interest in light of his emphasis on the human consciousness of Christ to see that he adheres "...to the conception of a progressive development of the eternal life in our Lord's human consciousness...". What he means is that "It is obvious that all by which the pressure of our sins on the Spirit of

1. Reid, Works, Ibid.
2. Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, p. 198
3. Nature of the Atonement, p. 348
4. Ibid. p. 289. This emphasis on a progressive development of eternal life in Christ's human consciousness is an important contribution to use of dynamic categories in dealing with Christ's life. It preceded the use of the notion of development as noted in Isaac Dorner, P.T. Forsyth and H.R. MacKintosh by George Hendry, Gospel of the Incarnation, p. 96 ff.
Christ was increased and He was brought into closer contact with them and deeper experience of the hatred of the darkness to the light must have given a continually deepening character to Christ's dealing with the Father on our behalf; - giving an increasing depth to His response to the divine condemnation of our sin, causing that response to be rendered in deeper agony of spirit, and, at the same time, rendering His persevering intercession a casting Himself more and more on the further and deeper depths of fatherliness in the Father. It is not immediately apparent how one can hold the notion of a "developing" consciousness of eternal life and the notion of a "perfect" filial obedience at the same time. Does not the notion of development imply, at the very least, movement from a "less" perfect to a "more" perfect consciousness? This is not necessarily so, for as we have seen, what McLeod Campbell is speaking of is a deepening of trust in accordance with the deepening of demands. Just as the fatherly demand for trust increased (or developed) so the filial response increased. The obedience of sonship is a dynamic concept. The demands of the Lawgiver in the penal ways of thinking might be thought of as static and therefore as not allowing any "development" in response, but as we have seen, McLeod Campbell has rejected these categories. Rather than implying any change in Christ's human consciousness, the idea of development implies a deepening continuity. This is very important to his argument for he wishes to insist that the love which is characteristic of fatherliness, and the trust

1. Ibid.
which is characteristic of sonship, continued all the way from the beginning of Christ's life to the end. This means that the Father loved the Son during his private life in Galilee, his public ministry, his agony in the Garden, and his suffering on the Cross. It means that the Son trusted the Father during all his life and did not cease to trust Him in the Garden of Gethsemane or on the Cross. This continuity of the consciousness of sonship is indeed the crucial point at issue between McLeod Campbell and the Calvinists. He argues that at no time did the Father think of the Son as being an object of his wrath. And at no time did the Son regard Himself, as the Calvinists argued, as bearing by imputation the wrath of God deserved by sinners. Quite apart from the moral and spiritual objections to such a "legal fiction", McLeod Campbell feels that there are intellectual difficulties in conceiving of a "double consciousness". "I admit that intellectually it is a relief not to be called to conceive to myself a double consciousness both in the Father and in the Son, such as seems implied in the Father's seeing the Son at one and the same time, though it were but for a moment, as the well-beloved Son to whom infinite favour should go forth, and also as worthy in respect of the imputation of our sins of being the object of infinite wrath, He being the object of such wrath accordingly; and in the Son's knowing Himself the well-beloved of the Father, and yet having the consciousness of being personally through imputation of our sin, the object of the Father's wrath".1

1. Ibid.p.313. It is of interest to read the sermons of the Row period where McLeod Campbell is struggling with the notion of the "curse of God", e.g. Sermons 3, XXIII, p.9ff.
It was in the interest of arguing for the continuity of the life of sonship in Christ that McLeod Campbell discusses the importance of the private life of Jesus Christ before He entered His public ministry. 1 The whole of His ministry was a "...giving glory to the Father in being manifested sonship..." 2 In the Sermon on the Mount as in his other teaching, "The foundation of every counsel is our filial relation to God". 3 This continuity of sonship throughout Christ's life and teachings does not end as his suffering increases, but rather deepens. He insists that what we see in the Garden of Gethsemane is not the abandonment of the father-son relationship but its deepening. Speaking of Mark 15:36 ("And He said, Abba, Father, all things are possible unto thee; take away this cup from me, nevertheless not what I will, but what thou wilt"), he declares that, "In this awfully intense prayer we have to mark its alternative nature, and that latter part was as truly prayer as the former: the former uttering the true and natural desire to which He was conscious as contemplating that which was before Him in the weakness and capacity of suffering proper to suffering flesh; the latter uttering the desire of the spirit of sonship, being that which was the deepest, and to which the other, while consciously realised, was perfectly subordinated". 4 McLeod Campbell interprets "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt", as "...the Father's will was welcomed, the bitter cup was received from the Father's hand as the Father's hand, and in the strength of sonship the Lord drank it". 5

1. Ibid. p.247 2. Ibid. p.250 3. Ibid. p.249
When it comes to interpreting the sufferings of Christ on the Cross, he quickly rejects the interpretation which depicts them as merely physical as "...a knowing Christ after the flesh". He notes that there has been a recent tendency to play down the sufferings of Christ by "...rashly admitting the justness of a comparison of them with other cases of suffering inflicted by man on man". In order to escape this way of thinking, others have taken the position that the cup which Christ took contained the wrath of God. McLeod Campbell's argument against this point of view is twofold. Firstly, he shows that the parallels to the reference to the cup in other Gospels teach of the Father's permitting, rather than causing the Son's sufferings. He asserts that "While John records the words..."The cup which my Father gives me to drink shall I not drink it?", Matthew gives these - "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father and He shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?". Words which, as well as all else, suggest, not a wrath coming forth from the Father, but a power of evil which the Father permitted to have its course".

1. Ibid. p.255
2. Ibid. p. 256
3. Ibid. p.257. An important work on Wrath in the Bible is in the Kittel article. H.Kleinknecht, J.Fichtner, E.Stahlin, et al, Wrath (Bible Key Words from Kittel) (London:A.&.C.Black, 1964). There it is pointed out that an affirmative answer to the question, "Has Jesus tasted God's Wrath for us" is given by Beck,Holtzmann,K.Barth, Otto and Procksch. The negative by Ritschl, W.Hasenzahl and Althaus (pp.131,n.1.132). The article by Stahlin admits that "...Jesus' passion is never connected directly with God's wrath; at any rate it is never said expresis verbis that Jesus stood under the wrath. On the contrary, it is stated expressly (Luke 2:40,52; Mark 1:11, Matt. 12:18,17:5), thatἔκδοκε εἰς κάψις rest on Jesus from beginning to end". (p.132) Stahlin also notes, however, that "...perhaps Jesus himself gives a hint in his allegory of the fire in Luke 23:31. Even Jesus, although he is "green wood", will be thrown (i.e.by God) into the fire,
It could be argued that it was not loving of the Father to permit the Son to suffer but that would be to ignore the fact that both the Father and the Son are of one mind in thus condemning sin and loving sinners. "We can see how it was fit that He should be exposed to suffer at the hands of wicked men what would be a measure at once of man's rejection of God, and of the forgiving love of Him who could die for His enemies: and we can see how as a revealing of the Father this must take place in the power of the life of sonship, that is to say in the strength of the Son's conscious oneness of mind with the Father..."¹.

Yet a second argument against interpreting the cup of Christ's sufferings as referring to the wrath of God, is that the disciples were called to share the same cup. McLeod Campbell does not enter into the difficulties which this fact would present to the penal substitutionary doctrine, but they are considerable.

(footnote 3 continued from page 366) i.e., the judgement of wrath". (p.132 n3). Certainly it must be acknowledged (as McLeod Campbell did) that it "...belongs inextricably to the message of the N.T. that by Jesus' death deliverance from the wrath to come is guaranteed and therefore freedom from the present wrath is granted as well, and this is decisive; for wrath is the real power that destroys". (p.133). What is particularly interesting in regard to McLeod Campbell's argument is the way in which repentance and baptism are linked as the means of escape from divine wrath. "It is not the opus operatum of baptism which saves - everything depends on genuine μετανοια, which accepts God's verdict by taking upon itself the judgement of wrath in the symbol of baptism, and which proves its genuineness precisely by the κεφαλή it bears". (p.130). This understanding makes John the Baptist's baptism of Jesus an important and understandable witness to Christ's life of repentance. It also explains the way in which Biblical thought could conceive of repentance "absorbing" God's wrath, particularly when Christ referred to his death as a "baptism". (See Nature of the Atonement, pp.136-137 for McLeod Campbell's discussion of "wrath" and its "absorption" by "repentance").

1. Ibid. p.261
2. Ibid. p.260.
Quite simply, if the cup Christ drank was the wrath of God, and the disciples were called to drink it also, that means that they were to share in the wrath of God. This is, of course, the very opposite of what the penal substitutionary doctrine meant to teach. McLeod Campbell simply points out that Christ, in looking forward to his suffering and death, had taught his disciples "Ye shall drink indeed of my cup, and be baptised with the baptism that I am baptised with"; plainly preparing them for that fellowship in His anticipated sufferings which His words on the former occasion, as to the necessity of "bearing His cross", had equally implied. Christ had indeed prepared his disciples to share the fellowship of his sufferings - his cup and his cross - rather than telling them to believe in order to avoid suffering! No one would hold that when he called them to share his "cup" and his cross, he called them to share the wrath of God!

When it comes to understanding Christ's suffering on the Cross, McLeod Campbell admits that although the Gospels detail the "outward history", they do not give us much help "...to see that 'hour' as from Christ's side". Christ's words, "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me", have often been interpreted as showing that in Christ's mind His suffering was that of the Father's wrath endured under the imputation of men's sin. McLeod Campbell considers this to be a false understanding of these words, for they are generally recognised to be the first words of the 22nd Psalm and should therefore be interpreted according to the "...tone and character of the psalm, as a whole". His

1. Ibid. p.260  
2. Ibid. p.276  
3. Ibid.
point is that the sufferer in the 22nd Psalm begins by calling God His God and ends by declaring his trust in God. What does McLeod Campbell say about the words "Why hast thou forsaken me?" He interprets these as referring to the delay in God's acknowledging the prayer of the sufferer. Yet the sufferer continues in prayer and in the faith that it will be answered. But wicked men ridicule and torment Him "And this is while the depths of the utter and absolute weakness of humanity are proved by the sufferer as by one cast entirely upon God and puts not forth one effort on his own behalf, nor gives place to one movement of self-relying energy or self-dependent strength of the flesh..." There then comes the turning point where we see that the sufferer's unbroken trust has been answered. His experience of God's justification of those who trust Him is not different from the father's of

1. McLeod Campbell's treatment of the "cry of dereliction" in the deeper context of Christ's continuing trust in the Father has raised a great deal of criticism. R.C. Moberly, J.K. Mozley, and L.W. Grensted all consider his argument to be unconvincing. Grensted is representative of this criticism in saying that "...he sees in it all the confidence of the later verses of Psalm 22, an expression not of despair but of glad assurance. But this is to separate Christ from that fallen humanity with which He is one, a humanity separate from God and in despair, by the fact of sin. McLeod Campbell implies that Christ cannot have entered into this separation. But, if not, was he perfect Man?" (Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement) (Manchester: Longmans, Green, 1920) p.334). In dealing with this criticism, it should first be pointed out that McLeod Campbell consistently emphasised the revelation of God through the humanity of Christ and in His own teaching, at least, emphasised His assumption of our fallen humanity. But he was also insistent that Christ never was Himself a sinner. In asking that McLeod Campbell teach that Christ actually was separated from His Father is he not asking that Christ sin? Is not the despair of man, his so-called "God-forsakenness", due to the fact that he forsakes God? Is not this forsaking of God the very definition of sin? McLeod Campbell would teach that Christ felt a yearning sorrow proportionate to this deepest despair of man, but never that Christ sinned.

Israel. "That of God to which they were witnesses, has been, through the divine dealing with Him, only more deeply revealed: as we see in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the testimony of the cloud of witnesses, connected with that of the Lord Himself, as "the author and finisher of faith", i.e., He whose faith perfects the revelation of that in God which we have to trust".¹ McLeod Campbell's major point is simply that personal trust in God is the most conspicuous and pervading element in this psalm. There is no ground for arguing that what the sufferer is suffering is the wrath of God. Indeed, the verse, "For He hath not despised nor abhorred the affliction of the afflicted; neither hath He hid His face from him; but when he cried unto Him, He heard", is considered by McLeod Campbell to "...preclude the possibility of such a misconception as completely as if chosen for that purpose..."². This verse would certainly make it difficult to think that it was the Father who caused the suffering, and it explicitly denies the conception of God as having abandoned or "hid his face" from His Son. While this conception of Christ's suffering is utterly rejected, McLeod Campbell does not deny that part of this suffering's intensity might be due to the power of death and the devil. In this regard, however, he "...must be silent as to positive statement, not seeing that anything is revealed..."³. But if this interpretation be held then it must also be held that, "...these fiery darts have been met by Him with the shield of faith in the Father's fatherliness, and can have had nothing at all to do with the real aspect of the Father's

1. Ibid. p.279  2. Ibid. p.280  3. Ibid. p.282.
McLeod Campbell teaches that the cause of Christ's suffering was "...the enmity of the carnal mind to God". He suffered at the hands of wicked men. The fact that God permitted this suffering (as did Christ Himself in freely submitting to it), in no way proves that He looked at His Son in wrath "...for nothing simply permitted - nothing external to God Himself - nothing that was not in the divine aspect towards Christ..." could be said to be the interruption of the loving sonship-fatherliness relationship. But to conceive of God inflicting His wrath on the Son hits at the heart of this relationship "...the wrath of God as coming forth towards Christ would be indeed the touching of that very life in the Father's favour, whose excellence and might was to be proved at so great a cost". We have seen above how McLeod Campbell disposes of the interpretation of texts which might be said to argue that Christ suffered the wrath of God. But he began his discussion of this view, by pointing out that this view was the defence taken from charges that Christ's suffering was just like any other man's, and indeed, some men had suffered more physical pain. If he holds that Christ's suffering was caused by men, how can he deny these charges? His defence is that his critics have forgotten the infinite difference between men's way of thinking and "...the mind in which Christ

1. Ibid. 2. Ibid. p.261 3. Ibid. p.262 4. Ibid.
suffered..."1. He says elsewhere that "The sufferer suffers what he suffers just through seeing sin and sinners with God's eyes, and feeling in reference to them with God's heart".2 If we understand this then it completely alters the penal way of thinking and "...the suffering of Christ becomes to our minds not the measure of what God can inflict, but the revelation of what God feels; that which the Son of God in our nature has felt in oneness with the Father, that into the fellowship of which He calls us in calling us to be sons of God".3 This suffering arose "naturally" out of Who He was. The source of pain was the sinfulness of sin and the misery to which it exposed sinners and His suffering was the sorrow of holiness and love beholding such a condition. His divine nature therefore increased his suffering "...in proportion to His holiness and love".4 McLeod Campbell illustrates his point by comparing the reactions of two different kinds of people to "evil treatment". On the one hand, a proud and independent person may put up with a great deal of enmity with little discomfort "...because they meet pride and unbrotherliness in the strength of pride and unbrotherliness".5 On the other hand, if a person loves others as he loves himself, and continues to love them despite their unkindness, then his suffering will be great and will increase commensurate with the amount of hatred encountered, and the measure of love in his heart. It was "...His love to those who crucified Him...as in itself the deepest capacity of suffering..."6 that explains the

1. Ibid. p.263  2. Ibid. p.117  3. Ibid. p.312
deep intensity of his suffering.

We see that the Father-Son co-relate is the key to McLeod Campbell's interpretation of the nature of the atonement. The developing 'consciousness' of this sonship in Christ's humanity is the path which our reason must follow in order to understand what took place in the actuality of the atonement. When we think through His life in terms of His sonship, we see that something really happened through His perfect filial obedience. Something which even the incarnation alone could not accomplish. "The sonship was there perfect all along; yet something came to pass, something was developed in the humanity of the Lord in each successive outcoming of the obedience of sonship under suffering; something which the Father had desired to see in humanity and now saw, and which the incarnation, simply as such, had not accomplished, but which was being accomplished as the life of the Son in humanity progressed under the Father's educating of him as the Captain of our salvation".¹

Man's Participation in Sonship

Something objective happened in the atonement² in that

1. Ibid. p.300
2. The objectivity of McLeod Campbell's teaching has been seen by Robert S. Paul, The Atonement and the Sacraments. Unfortunately he deals with him in a chapter entitled 'The Attack on objectivity', but in concluding his chapter he corrects this impression by declaring that both McLeod Campbell and Horace Bushnell held objective views of the work of Christ. "Yet both were responsible for undercutting the traditional forms in which objectivity had been stated and thus opened the door to the kind of subjective thinking that they denied and deplored". (p. 161). Another scholar who apparently understood McLeod Campbell's intention to do justice to both the objective and subjective aspects of the atonement was J.S. Candlish, The Christian
through the Son's life in humanity, something entirely new was
created and revealed in history. Not only was God revealed to
man in a form accommodated to man's condition and appealing to
his nature, but man himself actually partook of sonship. "For
the revealer of the Father is also the revealer of man, who was
as made in God's image". Indeed, Christ, "...alone ever lived
in humanity in the conscious truth of humanity". But this "truth
of humanity", this revelation of what man is meant to be, does
not reveal that all men have this "capacity" for the righteousness
seen in Christ's humanity. Man, by himself, man in his
sin, does not have this "capacity" to please God and to live in
His favour as Christ did.

This high capacity of good pertaining to
humanity, is not indeed to be contemplated
as belonging to us apart from our relation
to the Son of God. For although in one
sense it is quite correct to speak of the
righteousness of Christ as the revelation
of the capacity of righteousness that was in
humanity, a capacity that remained to man
although hidden under sin; - in truth,
humanity had this capacity only relatively,
that is, as dwelt in by the Son of God; and
therefore, there was in the righteousness of
Christ in humanity no promise for humanity
apart from the Son of God's having power
over all flesh to impart eternal life.3

(footnote 2 continued from page 373) Salvation (Edinburgh: T.&.
T.Clark, 1899). He briefly cites McLeod Campbell as an example
of the "mystical" theories of the atonement which do justice
to both the objective and subjective aspects of the Biblical
document of "union with Christ". (p.50). It is interesting
that his contemporary, T.J.Crawford of the Old College, Edinburgh,
did not sympathise with, and it may be added, did not under¬
stand, McLeod Campbell's teaching. The Doctrine of the Holy
Scripture respecting the Atonement, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: Wm.

1. Ibid. p.160
2. Ibid. p.301
3. Ibid. p.160.
Christ's righteousness in humanity entailed His fulfilling what sinful man with his mind at enmity with God would not and could not do. He lived a life of perfect sonship in humanity. This life consisted of that conscious turning from sin and turning to God which is repentance and faith. Christ turned from sin and condemned it as God the Father condemned it. He thought of sin as His Father thought of it - with hatred of what it was in itself and with sorrow over what it had done to men. Men standing alone are not able truly to repent of their sins. They are tempted to the excesses of excusing their sin too lightly or of despairing of having their repentance accepted by God. They may even come to see that their motive for repentance was basically the selfish one of wishing to escape punishment. "So that the words of Whitefield come to be deeply sympathised in, "our repentance needeth to be repented of, and our very tears to be washed in the blood of Christ".  

Just as the Son in humanity repents on behalf of man, so He also believes on behalf of man. McLeod Campbell refers to  

1. Of all McLeod Campbell's critics, perhaps J. Scott Lidgett came the closest to understanding what McLeod Campbell meant in speaking of Christ as having repented on behalf of men. Although he did not view it in its context of "union with Christ", he did declare that "As the everlasting affirmation of the true life, the death of Christ is the perfect expression of the spiritual intention of those who, through repentance, abandon the false". (The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement, 2nd ed. (London: C.H. Kelly, 1895) p.178). He does not seem to understand, however, that McLeod Campbell sees the whole life of Christ (including his death) as the living out of a perfect repentance. This is seen in his complaint that "...the chief stress is laid upon a declaration: The perfect "Amen" or confession made to God on behalf of man. But surely the demand of God is for actual fulfillment rather than for declaration". (p.179).  

2. Ibid. p.144.
Christ's faith as "...that deep, multiform, all-embracing, harmonious Amen of humanity, in the person of the Son of God, to the mind and heart of the Father in relation to man..."¹.

Christ's Amen to the mind of the Father may generally be described as trust, "...the simple faith of that original fatherliness of the Father's heart, which He had come forth to reveal and to REVEAL BY TRUSTING IT".² It can be seen that McLeod. Campbell sees repentance and faith as parts of the unity of the response of the Son's life to the Father. Repentance refers to the Son's concurrence in the Father's condemnation of sin, and His sorrow over sinners. Faith refers to the trusting in the Father's love, and obedience in bearing the suffering which that trust brings in a sinful world. It is interesting to notice how critics have tended to miss the significance of Christ's faith on behalf of men and criticised the "vicarious" repentance in McLeod Campbell's teaching. Their argument has been that McLeod Campbell has quite inconsistently condemned the "fiction" of Christ's bearing imputed punishment for men's sin, and yet created the "fiction" of His repenting for men. They argue that part of repentance is the "consciousness" of one's own sin and that Christ's repentance is inconsistent with His sinlessness. They also argue that it is simply impossible for one man to repent for another. These arguments are based on the fact that each individual Christian is clearly expected to have "repented" and "believed" himself, according to the Biblical witness. Now, the first thing that should be said in McLeod Campbell's defence is that he has not

¹. _Ibid._ p.225  
anywhere denied that men must each personally repent and believe. In fact, he insists that the individual must add his Amen to the Amen of the Son. "The Amen of the individual human spirit to the Amen of the Son to the mind of the Father in relation to man, is saving faith...And the certainty that God has accepted that perfect and divine Amen as uttered by Christ in humanity is necessarily accompanied by the peaceful assurance that in uttering, in whatever feebleness, a true Amen to that high Amen, the individual who is yielding himself to the spirit of Christ to have it uttered in him is accepted of God".1

The battle concerning his teaching of "vicarious" repentance generally centered in his assertion that "All the elements of a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man - a perfect sorrow - a perfect contrition - all the elements of such a repentance and that in absolute perfection - all - excepting the personal consciousness of sin".2 McLeod Campbell thinks that his opponents held that he "represented what Christ felt and confessed to the Father as a substitute for repentance in us, offered to the Father to save us from the necessity of repenting, as Christ has been represented as bearing the punishment of our sins as a substitute to save us from punishment..."3 His reply is simply that "...this is not my teaching; and all that I have represented as the atonement remains untouched..."4 He declares that his use of the word repentance will have validity in the "personal experience" of those who accept his teaching "...for every such individual sinner will add the 'excepted'
element of 'personal consciousness of sin'. But, if the consciousness of such repentant sinner be analysed, it will be found that all that is morally true and spiritual and acceptable to God in his repentance is an amen to Christ's condemnation of his sin...

McLeod Campbell gives a good illustration of how a father might accept one child's "repentance" for another's sin. He says, "Any father who has ever been privileged to have one child pleading for forgiveness to another child for an offence which has been unkindness to the interceding child himself has here some help to his faith in his own experience". (p.234) This illustration might be extended to show how although the Father and the interceding "Son" had forgiven the offending child, the offending child must add his "Amen" of repentance before he accepts the forgiveness, with its implicit judgment that he needed forgiveness! McLeod Campbell makes it clear that he does not consider repentance (and we may add, faith) impossible to the sinner, absolutely. "...I have not spoken of repentance as impossible to the sinner absolutely, but only apart from Christ. To man as related to Christ repentance is possible, just as holiness, and righteousness, and love are possible". This brings us back to his argument that although righteousness (including repentance and faith) is impossible to sinful man as such, it is an actuality in Jesus Christ and therefore becomes possible for men. Its possibility is founded upon its actuality in Jesus Christ. Even then it is not under man's control, or within his grasp apart from God. For here we see the necessity

1. Ibid. p.398
2. Ibid. p.398.
of McLeod Campbell's presupposition of the divinity of Christ. There was "...in the righteousness of Christ in humanity no promise for humanity apart from the Son of God's having power over all flesh to impart eternal life". We must ourselves add our Amen of faith and repentance to Christ's Amen to His father, but we find the permission and the strength to do this when we look to Christ's work and intercession for us. Our relation to Christ may therefore be said to be that of imitators to an "example", but it is more than that. Indeed, the expression "example" may be misleading. Rather we are related to him in terms of "participation". Christ is the vine and we are the branches. There is a real bond between Christ and men. This is a double bond of flesh and spirit. "But if we see this double relation as subsisting between Christ and men, if we see Him as the Lord of their spirits, as well as partaker in their flesh, that air of legal fiction, which, in contemplating the atonement, attaches to our identification with Christ and Christ's identification with us, so long as this is contemplated as matter of external arrangement, will pass away, and the depth and reality of the bonds which connect the Saviour and the saved will bear the weight of this identification..." Because of His love and will to redeem sinful men, the Son of God has identified Himself with them through the flesh and the spirit.

Observations

We have now discussed the major characteristics of McLeod

1. Ibid. p.160  2. Ibid. p.182  3. Ibid. p.330
Campbell's Nature of the Atonement. It can be seen that his method and his content are inseparable. His method, in fact, is to allow the content to govern its own presentation. He did divide his work into retrospective and prospective aspects, and Christ's dealing with men on behalf of God, and His dealing with God on behalf of men. This division is undoubtedly of help in understanding his views, but as James Denney pointed out in regard to this later division, there is a certain degree of artificiality in this treatment "...For there is just one body of fact to deal with - namely, the life of Christ...we do not get new material under the two heads, but only a new point of view". McLeod Campbell would agree with this emphasis on the unity of the life of Christ and indeed insists upon it many times in his book.

When we look at the presuppositions on which his discussion is based, we find that these are basically three:

1). a Trinitarian doctrine of God,
2). a doctrine of man as sinner,
3). a redemptive purpose in God which is manifested in:
   a) the mystery of the incarnation of Sonship in humanity, and
   b) the mystery of the participation of men in this eternal Sonship through the Holy Spirit.

At times the explicit Fatherliness-Sonship co-relate may seem to obscure the role of the third person of the Trinity but it is always present, and most clearly in the mystery of men's

participation in the life of Sonship in Christ. McLeod Campbell does not question the actuality of his presuppositions nor does he attempt to answer the "how" of their actuality, but rather describes the "how" and our knowledge of the actuality as the work of God through His Holy Spirit.

We have pointed out in many places in this chapter the emphasis on the "direct" relationship of the knower to the "known" which is characteristic of the intuitionist empiricism of the Scottish common sense philosophy. McLeod Campbell was not unique in being trained in this philosophy nor was he unique in being a theologian. He was unique, however, in his deep Christocentric emphasis. If we compare his thought with that of Thomas Reid we find that Reid's defence of the faith was based on natural theology. The "object" of his knowledge was the world. Thomas Chalmers was an enthusiastic defender of this same philosophical position, but he dealt more with "conscience" as an autonomous "capacity" of man, and with religious "principles". McLeod Campbell's thought differed in that his "object" was neither the "world", nor man's capacities of mind or spirit. He assumed all of these to point to God but in fact his "object" was the Holy Scripture, or more precisely, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, or more precisely yet, the living reality of Jesus Christ to which the Scriptures pointed. This deep Christocentric emphasis is extremely important. As D.M. MacKinnon has said so well, Christology is,

...the name of something that sets in motion,

and keeps in restless activity, the whole work of the characteristically Christian theologian. The question that sets him going, and that indeed underlies and controls his every task, is the besetting riddle: "What think ye of Christ?"; this is not one question among many, any more than in the heyday of the classical physics the so-called "law of causality" was properly regarded as one law among many; rather, just as the "law of causality" was the form of all laws by which the workings of physical nature were thought to be set out, so the question concerning the Christ insinuates itself into every theological discussion and debate, transforming them and twisting them often in directions otherwise unthought and unforeseen.1

It is in fact because of the centrality of Christ to McLeod Campbell's teaching that it could be wished that he had set his teaching on the "nature of the atonement" in a wider theological context.2 There are many unanswered questions concerning the relationship of this doctrine to other doctrines. This makes an intensive study of his earlier Row teaching all the more important as he never repudiated this teaching and in many cases it suggests a continuity of thought.3

Undoubtedly one of the great accomplishments of his argument is the manner in which he has been able to integrate a great number of Biblical categories of thought. He thought together the categories of repentance, faith and obedience into the larger category of life. This category of life he integrated with the

2. This does not mean, however, that R.C. Moobey's criticism of McLeod Campbell for neglecting the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the sacraments is fair. See Above, Chapter VI, p. 291 n.
3. See Chapters II and III Above.
categories of law and sacrifice, from the Old Testament and the love of Christ seen in the New Testament.

The whole of his exposition is then set forth as a purposeful movement of redemption. This "movement" begins in the eternal Trinitarian relationship of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit; is revealed in history by the Holy Spirit in the Fatherliness-Sonship co-relate in the humanity of Christ; and is completed in the Son bringing "many sons to glory" in participation in His life through His Holy Spirit. While he does not speak of "election", this very "movement" of God towards men in love contains the central motive of that doctrine. Indeed, yet another of the strengths of his teaching is his insistence on the "prospective" aspect of the atonement. That is, if we may speak of "election", then he would insist that we deal with what it is that man is elected "to". He saw the purpose of "election", the purpose of God's redemptive action, to be that sonship revealed in the humanity of Jesus Christ "... such an atonement as that which the Son of God has actually made, cannot be contemplated but as in its very nature pointing forward to the divine end in view".1

Throughout his exposition he is concerned with the relationship of knowledge and reality. "Conscience", "consciousness", and "mind" are correlated with "God", "light", and "Holy Spirit" in such a way that it is clear that knowledge and redemption are inseparable. Indeed, if it be asserted that they are not related then it is not necessarily the case that redemption is irrational?

McLeod Campbell's view was that while redemption was not "through" 1. Nature of the Atonement, p.151. (underlining mine).
reason, it did not ignore reason. Redemption is ultimately grounded in the mystery of God, but because God had chosen to reveal Himself to men, men could not ignore this revelation. They must indeed think about it as honestly as they possibly could and this meant not only admitting the limits of their knowledge, but also not hiding behind a false humility as an excuse for not believing that which is revealed. McLeod Campbell wrote at a time when men looked at statements as being "true" or "false". They had, therefore, not the comfort of "verification principles" which would allow them to declare a view to be neither "true" nor "false", but "meaningless". The rise of "verification principles" which rule theological statements out of court as meaningless, no matter what they say, had not come during McLeod Campbell's time.

One of McLeod Campbell's great theological strengths was his Christocentric teaching. He understood that to be a Christian meant to be related to Jesus Christ. But while this was a great strength in his teaching, it also was a point of controversy. The problem arises in all generations, how this relationship is to be expressed. The language one uses to attempt to express this relationship is, of course, limited by the time and place in which one lives. The language of the New Testament is limited in this manner. Nonetheless, the relationship of the Christian to Jesus Christ is, to say the least, "described" in the New Testament. This relationship is described in several ways. One way is to speak of Christ and the Christian as being in Lord-Servant relationship. That is, the Christian is related in terms
of obedience to Christ who has given teachings to be obeyed. Yet a second relationship is that which enlarges the area of obedience from that of verbal teachings to that of verbal teachings and personal obedience. That is, both the words and the humanity of Christ are to be obeyed, or better still, imitated.

While these two forms of relationship are clearly present in the New Testament, there is also a third form equally present in "description" and it would therefore be thought, equally deserving and demanding of attention. This is the language which speaks of Christ as participating in the Christian, and the Christian as participating in Christ. This is the language of "union with Christ". It not only includes the notion of obedience to Christ's words and imitation of his humanity but also union with Him through His divine person. If a person does not accept this language and its obvious presuppositions, then he would not be able to accept McLeod Campbell's theology. McLeod Campbell realised this and yet he was unwilling to leave the presuppositions of "faith". It is this basic understanding of theological method that puts McLeod Campbell so firmly in the tradition of Luther and Calvin, and so clearly a fore-runner of Barth's criticism of much of nineteenth century "theology".¹ This statement will be borne out in the following chapter where we see for the first time his attitude to the increasing attacks of science and historical criticism on the "orthodox" attitude to Scripture.

The question which McLeod Campbell felt he must face was how the Christian was to deal with these new and difficult problems which people felt must be answered before they could believe.
CHAPTER VIII - Later Writings and Conclusions

When we turn to McLeod Campbell's writings after the Nature of the Atonement, we find that there is a great similarity of subject matter in them all. This is not surprising since certain new problems had arisen in the theological world. It is also easily understood due to the fact that these writings were all completed in the last decade of McLeod Campbell's life. His teaching did not vary greatly during these last years of his life. This may be explained both by the fact that his views had been shaped by many years of deep theological thought, and also by a declining physical vigour.¹ It is not really too profound a comment to say that in many ways his later writings have less of interest to us than the Nature of the Atonement. After all, that book was the product of over forty years of deeply concentrated thinking. This thought had begun under the pressure of pastoral need and bitter persecution. By the end of his life he had by no means lost his pastoral interest but the foe had changed. No longer was it necessary to do battle with the hardened creed of fellow Christians, who though differing in many significant regards, held still more significant beliefs in common. The new foe was not even easily identified.

Certainly one aspect of the challenge thrown to all Christians in the middle of the nineteenth century came from science. Modern

¹. Memorials, vol.II, pp.48,99, are examples of references in 1863 and 1865 to his ill health limiting his work. He was troubled by illness throughout his life (See Above, pp.27 and 290), but he quite naturally was weakened to an increasing extent in his later life.
science seemed to many to offer a world view contrary to that of the Bible. A direct frontal assault on certain Christian doctrines seemed to be implied in certain scientific views. Darwin's *Origin of the Species*, published in 1859 seemed to challenge the whole Christian view of Creation and Providence. McLeod Campbell's great interest in science and keen perception of the major issues led him to see that Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, (published in 1830) was pointing to just such a challenge. In a letter to his brother in 1852, McLeod Campbell declared that any discrepancy "...between any real fact and the intimations of revelation can only be apparent ...". But none the less, he foresaw the challenge. "...Our God is able to shed full light upon the seeming contradictions; but if He should not, let us not the less firmly hold what we know to be true that light in which our deepest and highest consciousness of certainty is experience. I say I do not feel much sensitiveness on this subject; but in the present state of our knowledge, I confess I should be sorry to hear of human remains found in the earlier strata".1

The greatest shock for the British Church came, however, with the publication in 1860 of *Essays and Reviews*. This publication revealed that men within the Church were applying the most rigorous standards of historical criticism to the Holy Scriptures. This seemed to many to be undermining the authority of Scripture. We can well understand in the light of this, why McLeod Campbell wrote a reply to *Essays and Reviews* in 1862. This book he entitled

Thoughts on Revelation with special reference to the present time.¹ In fact, this book dealt with the question of the authority of Scripture, the relation of scientific to religious thought and philosophical objections to the knowledge of God. These same questions are dealt with in the Introduction and Notes to the second edition of the Nature of the Atonement in 1867 Reminiscences and Reflections which he had not completed before his death, but which was edited by his son, Donald, and published in 1873. Because these later works of McLeod Campbell deal with the same questions and repeat the same views in regard to theological inquiry, we shall not be too concerned to treat them separately, but rather let their teachings complement each other.

The questions which McLeod Campbell dealt with in his later writing were the problems raised for religious people by the new developments in science and philosophy. These developments were, of course, reflected in the increasingly severe application of historical critical methods to the Holy Scriptures. We shall see how McLeod Campbell’s answer lay in the assertion that there were different levels or spheres of human existence in which every man lived. While the claims of science and philosophy must be met, so too must the claims of the equally real and equally direct sphere of religion. He insisted that there was a directly personal relationship between man and God. This relationship is seen in the clear claim which Jesus Christ makes on all men. McLeod Campbell is not willing to relegate the reality of the

claim of faith to some secondary position after science and
philosophy have had their questions answered. For that reason
he objects to any theological method which would hold religious
questions open until the "Previous Questions" of science and
philosophy had been answered. Such a method would mean that
religion was only left to answer what science and philosophy
could not - God would become only a "God of the gaps". McLeod
Campbell's criticism of the undue elevation of "previous
questions" to the point where they became superior to the direct
relationship of a man to the living Lord is seen explicitly in
his attitude to the Interpretation of Scripture. There we see
how he does not object totally to historical criticism. He is
indeed critical of the Bibliolatry which often blindly attacked
historical criticism. But he demands that Biblical exegesis be
"spiritual" - that is, it must be suited to its object. It was
McLeod Campbell's experience of over forty years that when he
approached Holy Scripture humbly with a teachable spirit and in
the expectation that God Himself speaks there - that he found
the divine light always broke forth. It is for this reason
that we conclude the discussion of McLeod Campbell's later
teaching by referring to the need for humility in theology. In
many ways his own theology was bold and aggressively positive,
yet this boldness was based upon the fact that theology carries
on by listening. The Christian teacher must listen and teach
his people to listen. There is no separation of a teaching
Church and a listening Church. The whole Church listens and it
is as it hears that it is constrained to boldly proclaim what
it hears.
Regions of Man's Existence

McLeod Campbell deals with the "conflicting" claims of science, philosophy and the Christian faith in terms of their relationship to the individual human being. He declares that, "As I am an intellectual being I am capable of science; as I am a moral and a spiritual being I am capable of moral and spiritual knowledge. My intellect, my moral nature, and my spiritual nature, have all their several parts in my faith in God; their voices are one to me".\(^1\) This twofold consciousness as in man both makes possible and necessitates that the nature of faith should be such as to satisfy this consciousness. "...my consciousness as an intelligent being qualifies me for the conception of an intelligent First Cause of all things, and at the same time necessitates the faith that accords with this conception; and, in like manner, that my moral consciousness and my spiritual consciousness quality me for the conception of the moral and spiritual elements which enter into my idea of God, and also necessitate the corresponding elements in my faith".\(^2\)

In yet another place, McLeod Campbell deals with what we might call three "regions" of man's existence. "The physical, the metaphysical, and the spiritual, are to me three regions in each of which I have some feeling of knowing where I am, - while I keep, so to speak, in its centre..."\(^3\). This threefold circle which surrounds man is elsewhere spoken of as three different "regions" but this time on different levels. In the Introduction

2. Ibid. vol.II, p.171
to the Nature of the Atonement, McLeod Campbell speaks of the regions of Science, Theism and Religion. He asserts that, "As it appears due obedience to a voice of reason and to necessities of thought to rise from Science to Theism, so do I believe is there a corresponding necessity in reason and the constitution of our being, for rising from Theism to Religion..."1. Here we can plainly see that Science corresponds to the physical, Theism to the metaphysical and Religion to the spiritual regions of man's existence. McLeod Campbell considers all these "levels" or circles to be important. They should not be confused but must all be both acknowledged and yet kept within their proper bounds.2 The challenge which science was making to Theism and Religion was largely due to its improper use.

As long as science claims to do no more than to extend our knowledge of nature as it is, so both enlarging our vision and increasing our power, - it occupies a sphere its right to which is undeniable, and its use of which is most beneficial. But another and much higher function is now claimed for science; and it not only pronounces that such and such facts are, but it so knows all that can be known about them as that it can declare what is compatible with them; and not only this, but that it can prophecy what must be from what is; as if it knew why what is, is, or knew a necessity for its continuing to be, and an impossibility of anything else taking its place. In this it seems to me to go beyond its measure in its own proper region; and to pass from its proper function of observation of what is to ontological questions as to the ultimate nature of what is.3

1. Nature of the Atonement, p.XXXV
2. Thoughts on Revelation, p.139
McLeod Campbell is quite confident that the appearance of "design" in the physical world "...suggests to us a designing mind..."\(^1\). He assumes that if man's reason is properly used it will lead him from seeing the laws of nature as merely reflecting the uniformity of nature to the conception of a Godhead. This movement from Science to Theism is based on man's intellectual capacity and may stop short at a mere "...contemplative position in God's universe..."\(^2\). Herein, lies the difference between Theism and Religion, for in Religion we are concerned with "...the active occupation of our own special place as God's offspring..."\(^3\). The passage from a secular to a Theistic interpretation of natural law is not always made. But the passage from Theism to Religion is even more infrequently achieved. "The circle of those is not large, who, looking around them on the reign of law under which we find ourselves, feel it enough to see that reign as a subject of scientific interest, not rising from it to God. There is, however, a larger circle who ascend from Science to Theism, and feel the Divine interests of the works of God, who yet do not advance from Theism to Religion"\(^4\). It must be said that Religion requires Theism as "...the foundation, underlying it as that on which it must rest or not be at all"\(^5\). On the other hand, McLeod Campbell admits, "How blindly the religious instinct has wrought, how unworthy of the true God have so often been the approaches made to Him, in what ignorance of that in which He delights men have

1. Nature of the Atonement, p.XXXII,  
2. Ibid. p. XXXV  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ibid. p. XXXIX  
5. Ibid. p. XXXVII.
sought His favour..."¹ Yet the Kingdom of God makes a claim upon men. Its distinguishing characteristic is the knowledge of God as Father and "We see the Father when we see the Son, not merely because of identity of will and character in the Father and the Son, but because a father as such is known only in his relation to a son".² So we again see the centrality of the fatherliness-sonship co-relate.

The kingdom of God as it asks our faith is seen in Christ. The conception of God as Father, and of a relation to Him which is sonship, is seen realised in Christ. The Son of God is seen revealing the Father as the Father, by being in our sight the beloved Son in whom the Father is well pleased. What therefore we are called to judge is whether this is a reality. As we look on Him who has thus come to us in the Father's name, hear His words, trace His path, do we find ourselves in a condition to accept His claim, to believe that God is a Father, that Christ is His Son, and that life seen in Him is the life of Sonship. In so high a matter the warrant for faith must be as high as the demand for faith.³

If the warrant for faith must be as high as the demand for faith, so too the demand for faith must be as high as its warrant. For that reason "...we must be careful not to plead with others on lower ground than that on which we stand ourselves; viz., the ground on which we feel that our Lord stood, when He came to men in the Father's name, and complained that so coming he had not been received by them".⁴ Christ assumed that His claim over the lives of men should have a response in their hearts. This is really McLeod Campbell's major point in regard to these

1. Ibid. p.XL
2. Ibid. p.LII
3. Ibid. p.XLI
4. Ibid. p.XLIII.
"regions" of existence - no matter what difficulties or questions arose at the lower levels of existence, Christ still has a "direct" claim on the faith of the individual.

"Previous Questions"

He notes in many places in his later writings the current tendency "...to regard all questions on the subject of Religion as open questions..."\(^1\). This tendency engaged a great deal of his interest in his posthumously published *Reminiscences and Reflections*. There he wrote sections dealing with "Previous Questions", and "Faith and Doubt". He notes that these questions were not even asked during the earlier part of the century, but that now such questions as "Is the supernatural believable", "Is a revelation possible", "Is God known", "Is He even knowable" are asserted to be previous questions which must be answered before faith is possible. These questions have arisen from "...Historical Criticism, Science, Psychology, Metaphysics, - all names of important realities which have a true claim to be branches of human knowledge - paths of thought not forbidden. Therefore, no one who believes in God, and who accepts the claim of the Scriptures to be a revelation from God to man, can regard any evil results attending on these paths as inevitable - or such as can be escaped only by shutting them up".\(^2\) Indeed, if truth is honestly pursued in the regions of Science and Metaphysics it will be consistent with truth in the higher region of Religion. "Truth in all regions must be consistent with itself. And therefore no legitimate conclusion of Metaphysics or Science can

contradict the Divine intimation to man of the Divine will for
man".¹ Science and Metaphysics have, however, no right to act
as the judges in religious matters or to demand that religious
faith be suspended until they have settled certain questions.²

"Such a demand would find its only parallel in a demand to
suspend our faith as to our own and each other's personality,
or as to the existence of the external world, on the questioning
of Metaphysics".³ It is quite noticeable that McLeod Campbell's
argument is parallel to that of the common sense philosophers'
reply to the "scepticism" of Hume. Their questioning of the
sanity of those who demand the uprooting and examination of "first
principles"⁴ is even mirrored in his assertion that, "If when we
assume that we are God's offspring, any would have us to take
up as a previous question the Fatherliness, or even the very
existence of God, we must contend for the recognition of both as
belonging to a healthy and right state of mind".⁵ A practical
example of where Metaphysics and Science were making an unfair
demand that "their" questions be settled before theology could
proceed, may be seen in the criticism of a reviewer who declared
that McLeod Campbell's views of a "doctrine of mediation, - in
the strict sense implying transactions with God on behalf of men,
as well as in the opposite direction, - cannot be harmonised with

¹. Ibid. p.211
². Thoughts on Revelation, p.58 declares that to give up our basic
beliefs for apologetic reasons "...would be as if a geometrician
were to give up the axiomatic character of his axioms, and let
his truth be held an open question".
⁴. See Above, Chapter I, p. 21
⁵. Thoughts on Revelation, p.31.
the modern individualism". The reviewer, went on to accuse him of working with a philosophical "realism". McLeod Campbell declared that he felt both "individualism" and "realism" to be a "Scylla and a Charybdis" between which he had *unconsciously* but safely steered. It is important to note that he not even intentionally avoided these conceptions. He simply was not working with these philosophical categories. "I have had no conception of an "individualism" which made my personality so cut me off from Christ that I could not, except by a moral or a legal fiction, represent Him to myself as under the pressure of my sins, both confessing them before the Father, and pleading with the Father on my behalf. I had no conception of a "realism" which represented humanity as one whole in such a sense as would have lost to me my personality..." McLeod Campbell saw no contradictions in the Biblical language. "In the words of St. Paul, 'I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me', the assumption of the relation of Christ to humanity along with a recognition of our personal individuality, presents to my mind no aspect of contradiction; while my sense of the redeeming love for which I am a debtor requires for its fulness, alike the personal consciousness of the words, "Who loved me and gave Himself for me", and the faith of personal union with Christ of the words "I live, yet not I.

2. Ibid. p.402.
but Christ liveth in me". All St. Paul's representations of our relation to Christ are pervaded by the same element of what, in the light of modern individualism, would, it appears, be regarded as a contradiction..."1. But this "seeming" contradiction had come about due to Biblical criticism moving from the realm of philosophy to that of psychology and metaphysics. While this movement was good in that it took men's minds away from mere "words" to what these words "meant", it was overstepping itself in declaring that "...an apostle may have meant what he seems to mean, but may have been mistaken because of the limits within which he thought."2 If it does not go so far as to imply an error in Christ's thinking, it certainly does assume the apostle to have been as ignorant of the nature of human personality as, for example, Luther with his "realism" was. By the standard of modern individualism, the language of the Bible in regard to union with Christ could be allowed to mean no more than what men mean when they speak "...of a presence of Socrates in Plato".3 But modern thought is going beyond its proper limits in thus limiting how God may choose to relate Himself to men.

With a due sense of our intellectual limits, a due reverence for conscience, and the faith that spiritual things are only spiritually discerned, I should have no fear of psychology or of metaphysical thought, even in its most difficult region of ontology, any more than I have of scientific investigation, so long as it is realised that, "through faith we know that the worlds were framed by the word of God". Science, venturing beyond its due limits, may seem to itself entitled to sweep away our faith in the supernatural, and so speculation in the region of mind, going beyond its due limit, may preclude faith in the atonement by the assumed

1. Ibid. p.403  
2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid. p.404.
impossibility of such a thing in consistency with the manner of our being as persons. But as Science never can reveal the living God to us, nor by its analysis reach to anything, visible or invisible...of which it can say, "This is God"; so neither can metaphysical thought reveal to us the manner of our own being as God's offspring; who live and move and have our being in Him, or the relations to us into which the Eternal Son has come that He might be in us the life of Sonship.1

McLeod Campbell is quite clear that there are not any so-called "previous questions" which can demand that a man deny his faith in order to test its validity. It does not do justice either to God or to the honest sceptic to deal so tenderly with difficulties as to imply that "...unbelief was more reasonable than faith".2 This would only lead to the view that doubt pertains to "...a higher order of mind than simple faith..."3 and would lead to self-righteousness. He adds, however, (and we cannot help but think of his Row heresy trial) that this is just as bad as the "...self-congratulations of a blind orthodoxy ..."4.

He explains that he wrote the Nature of the Atonement from the side of faith, for those who believe that they may believe. He made a great number of assumptions in his book but he did this with the full realisation that some would not grant these to start. "...yet my hope has been that the manner of considering them will be in effect a successful argument for their reality. For I believe that Christianity has its highest and

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid. p.XXIII
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
ultimate evidence in what it is; that therefore to illustrate any element of Christianity successfully is to establish its claim on faith". An illustration of this method may be seen in the manner in which he presupposed the atonement was based on the incarnation. In this regard he felt that he had answered "...Anselm's question, "Cur Deus homo", by the light of the divine fact itself as to which the question is put: instead of seeking an answer, as he has done, in considerations exterior to the fact". He is clearly using the categories of theology in the expectation that his reader can understand them. Yet he knows that the understanding required by faith may not "make sense" to all men. "...I am not to be regarded as seeking to recommend the doctrine of the atonement by what might be called a bringing it down to the level of the human understanding. I seek rather to raise the understanding to that which is above it, and to that exercise of thought on that which is spiritual in which we feel ourselves brought near to what is divine and infinite, and made partakers in the knowledge of the love which passeth knowledge". This necessity of raising of men's understanding in order that they may understand the Gospel is the very reason why faith does not abandon its ground. If faith descended to doubt then it could not raise doubt's understanding but would only affirm doubt's suspicions that faith was not real after all. No, faith makes a claim on all men and they must either meet this claim or refuse it. "...we must be careful not to plead with others on

1. Ibid. p.XXIV
2. Ibid. pp. XXV, XXVI
3. Ibid. p. XXVII (the underlining is mine).
lower ground than that on which we stand ourselves; viz., the
ground on which we feel that our Lord stood, when He came to men
in the Father's name, and complained that so coming he had not
been received by them". 1  McLeod Campbell likens his demand that
spiritual truth be spiritually discerned to the development of
inductive science. The study of spiritual truth without recogni-
tion of its spiritual nature "...must be attended with a risk of
wandering into speculative thought not coming into contact with
spiritual realities - a risk not unlike that to which scientific
speculation was exposed, and from which it suffered, before the
obligation of coming into contact with facts in inductive
investigation was understood". 2  What he is insisting upon is
that the object of faith be understood from its own nature. If
this is done then it will be found that it contains its own
authority and that of the Church 3 or of "mere logic" 4 will not
be necessary to authenticate its claim on men's lives. "If God,
presented to the faith of man as He is, is not to be identified
by the light of what He is, is not the idea of a "Revelation" a
contradiction, and faith an impossibility? This is the simple
statement of what, as a moral and a spiritual axiom, I see to
underlie all reasonable demand for faith on the part of God,-
all just condemnation of unbelief as resting on man". 5

Interpretation of Scripture

While McLeod Campbell was aware of the challenge of science

1. Ibid. p.XLIII
2. Thoughts on Revelation, p.121
and metaphysics, he saw that the most direct challenge to the Christian faith came from Biblical historical criticism. This criticism was shaking the faith of those who held a view of verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. He sympathised with these people and wrote that:

...if I am satisfied that men are learning only truth from the Bible, and that that truth they are feeding on by a living faith, - not resting in the mere holding of an historical creed, - I would far rather let them live and die in their wrong theory of inspiration, than risk disturbing their life-giving faith in the attempt to correct their theory. Not that I would forbid this attempt to convince scholars, made wisely, and the matter being kept in its proper place. I would expect good only from the correction of such an error, assuming its existence. Still I would deprecate such discussions as tend to suggest the thought: - 'Then I have believed the Bible too readily, I must endeavour to suspend my faith in what it has taught me until I purge my Bible by the help of historical criticism, and ascertain what portions are trustworthy, and what are not'.

Evidently it is his great pastoral concern which governs his thought on this question. He realises that if the Bible is approached with historical questions, it can only yield historical answers. What he is concerned with is that people should approach the Bible to be taught by God. He argued that "Surely the Bible addresses itself to something else than our capacity of historical criticism, and our recognition of God speaking in it must be on altogether other than this...". He realised that although historical criticism could not prevent people from extracting religious principles from the Bible, this was not enough. The

1. Memorials, vol.II, p.64
2. Id. p.8.
great danger was that the direct personal relationship between God and man might be replaced by mere religious principles, "...attributes of God, as moral and spiritual laws, being substituted for a personal God. No doubt the attributes are in the highest sense laws, the laws of the Divine nature; and the faith of them as sure and abiding, is an essential element in our faith in God. But our faith is in a person. "They that know thy name, will put their trust in Thee".  

1. He saw the danger inherent in abstracting knowledge of God from the concrete reality of His revelation in Jesus Christ. "We err in seeking to separate the Eternal Life from its divine form, or attempting to receive it as an abstract knowledge of God rather than a knowledge that is made apprehensible for man in Jesus Christ. Hence it is the most simple faith in the facts which the gospel reveals quickens the mind of Christ in men; while much philosophic meditation on the elements that mind, and their nature as essential to salvation, often issues more in the admiration of this ideal than in fellowship with it".  

2. While McLeod Campbell saw the dangers of historical criticism to people's faith both in making them question the fact of revelation, and in inducing them to defend the faith on the basis of abstract principles not dependent on history, he also saw the danger of Bibliolatry. In fact, he wrote twelve pages attacking Bibliolatry as an introduction to Thoughts on Revelation, (1861), but changed it before printing to a discussion of the self-evidencing light of revelation. "I do not doubt that if I teach

1. Ibid. p. 9
2. Ibid. pp. 81, 82.
any one the true excellence of Revelation, I shall in doing so have sufficiently exposed that wrong estimate which underlies Bibliolatry.\(^1\) He obviously felt that there were many who held a false view of Biblical inspiration, and it is noteworthy that he included a small section on inspiration in Thoughts on Revelation. There he declares that an "Inspiration of Revelation" is necessary. The "facts" of Christianity demanded special "Inspiration" on the part of the apostles "...the whole spiritual aspect has been invisible, and could only be known to man by Revelation".\(^2\) What really distinguishes the apostles from those who followed them "...is that this mystery was revealed to them, and has been made known to us only through them".\(^3\) He stresses that our great interest is in the "facts" the apostles witness to us, but these facts, by "reflex effect" imply inspiration in the apostles. Both in their case and ours, we must ascribe a role to the Holy Spirit for we must "...understand how inward divine teaching is related to what comes to us from without, the former enabling us to receive the latter, but not superseding it..."\(^4\). The authority of the Bible lies in its message and those who say that it depends on the Church, because the Church in determining the canon determined what is Scripture, are mistaken.

Our faith in the Bible in no respect turns upon any supposed infallible guidance enjoyed by the framers of the Canon. None of the great men, Luther, Calvin, or the rest whose names have been

1. Ibid. p.17
2. Thoughts on Revelation, p.83
3. Ibid. p.90. 4. Ibid.
quoted, as one doubting the claim to the place in the Canon of one portion of Scripture, and another of another, ever felt these historical doubts in the least affecting their faith or the value of the Bible to them. How could they? It filled them, and held them, and ruled them, by its own divine light, as it should us.¹

But while this belief in the "Inspiration of Revelation" is important in order that we may not prejudice our understanding of the divine light from Scripture, there is another complementary form of "Inspiration" that is equally important. That is the "Inspiration of the Divine Life". This is merely another way of expressing the work of the Holy Spirit in each individual in union with Christ. In a passage which is very reminiscent of the Nature of the Atonement, he declares that Christ's life was conscious

...life in the Holy Spirit. For this sonship we learn to see and know in that life in Christ which is the light of men. Our attention is fixed upon it in its relation to ourselves by the voice from Heaven which says of Jesus, "This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased; hear ye Him". And though the visibility of this life of sonship...is but imperfectly pictured in the record of our Lord's life on earth, we learn enough from this record to understand the high character of that sonship as communion with the Father, hearing His voice, abiding in His love, and therefore only to be known in the Holy Spirit.²

And so we likewise are to be taken up into the "Divine circle". "The Father drawing us to the Son, the Son revealing the Father; - these are Divine actings in the Holy Spirit".³

The view that McLeod Campbell wished to hold in regard to

1. Ibid. p.98  2. Ibid. p.132  3. Ibid. p.134.
Biblical inspiration was such as would protect the substance of the Biblical witness while not demanding verbal inspiration of every word. This is clear in his remarks on the use Paul makes of quotations from the Septuagint, and the fact that most readers only know the Bible in translation. He asks, "Are we not taught by these facts that the responsibility connected with the possession of Revelation turns upon the substantive truth revealed, - not on the precise words in which it is conveyed?"¹

While he objected to scholars raising merely sceptical doubts as to history,² he more particularly attacked the attitude of those who considered Scripture unreliable because of their own preconceptions. He declared that, "What I am jealous of is, not the conclusions of fair criticism, but certain assumptions as to what is antecently believable and unbelievable, which hinder fair criticism..."³ He particularly pointed this out in regard to critical views of the Resurrection which considered it impossible for, "No evidence can prove an impossibility or command our attention while offered to prove what we regard as an impossibility".⁴

McLeod Campbell did not reject "fair criticism" but he considered that spiritual understanding was necessary even for this. While he recognised that this might be considered personal religion, he held that "...it is also a mental key to the meaning of Scripture even as a subject of critical study".⁵ In a most interesting passage, he even refers to this as "spiritual

2. Ibid. p.41
3. Ibid. p.31
4. Ibid. p.123
5. Ibid. p.72.
criticism. He writes,

You know that I expect much as to the elucidation of Scripture from a study of the Scripture in the faith of the harmony and cohesion of Truth, which it is the appropriate task of what I may call "spiritual criticism" to discuss and trace - a task to be pursued hopefully irrespective of textual criticism or historical criticism. Nor is my own being unfurnished for either of these the reason of my venturing to proceed without them as being what alone is open to me. I have now the experience of exactly forty years in this path of study of the Scriptures; and my assurance of being in the light of what I read has grown with the gradual increase of my apprehension of the meaning of the Scriptures sought and reached in this way. That is to say, the portions of Scripture which have seemed to me to have their meaning fixed by the very character of the meaning which they have suggested, have given forth that meaning with more and more clearness the longer I have dwelt upon it. Also, the meaning of some passages so reached has immediately shed light on other passages; and this not only because of the unity in the teachings of the individual men, but also because of the unity in the teaching of the Spirit of Truth who spoke by men. This unity, when discerned, is the highest evidence that what we read is inspired by the Holy Spirit, as well as the clearest proof that we are come to the light of what we read.¹

He mentioned that this growing knowledge of the Truth revealed by Scripture had been his own experience. He elsewhere mentions that if he had accepted his first impression of what the Bible said in regard to Election, he might never have reached the Truth. Indeed, he still, in 1861, did not understand the ninth chapter of Romans but was convinced that when he did, there would exist a harmony with his teaching elsewhere.² He declares

1. Ibid. pp. 101, 102  
2. Ibid. p. 11.
that "...I might have rested in much rejection of Scripture if I had felt at liberty to refuse portions in which I did not see what was of God; while these very portions have afterwards come to seem to be full of divine light. This has been my experience as to the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and my hope is that it may yet be so as to the ninth".

Humility

McLeod Campbell's personal experience of having come to understand Scripture after long and patient study, led him to understand that temporary difficulties, of whatever nature, must not prevent the Christian from "listening" humbly to Scripture. The teacher especially must have the proper attitude to the Gospel he proclaims. He will not claim the authority for his message, but will let his message carry its own authority. "I mean preserving the mental attitude of listening, and inviting the people to listen also, as to that which, if they listen, they can hear, and will hear continually more and more distinctly the more they are exercised in patient, reverent listening. If the teacher is really in any measure successful in what respects himself here, he will be found in that measure speaking because he hears; and the awe of hearing, and the confidence that comes in being taught of God, will impress that character on his teaching which will give it the right authority, and no more". The Christian teacher is a witness to what he hears and 'The authority-the right to be listened to-is in the voice itself'. Because the

1. Ibid. p.30
3. Ibid. p.227.
authority is in that to which the Christian witnesses, he must be humble before God, but bold before men. In a letter in 1869, he declares that he has been pained by the criticism which,

...speaks of the confidence of those who say what they say as certainly learned from God, as if this were to claim a familiarity with God's mind, as with the mind of "one in the next street". He (Matthew Arnold) does not use this lowering comparison in reference to the sacred writers, I know. He uses it with reference to the confidence with which systems, extracted from or built on the Scriptures, have been set forth. But the assumption of a revelation, when realised (producing "solemn sweet reverence in the things of God", as my old Row favourite, Henry Dorney, speaks) is far enough removed from the feeling of having "one in the next street" to quote or refer to. Nearer than "the next street", even nigh to our spirits within, and yet above us high as heaven is above the earth, is God felt to be when the words of apostles address themselves to "every man's conscience in the sight of God", and we hear as those who wait on the teaching of God, and who are open to that action of God in our spirits by which true outward teaching becomes to us "spirit and life". 1

McLeod Campbell held that faith must be a living relationship, and saw this as an important point to be kept to the fore in religious controversies. He was aware that men might hold a real and living faith in an unsatisfactory intellectual form, and that a dead faith might be expressed in an impressive rational form. He discussed this anomaly in many places and held, "That religious truth, while in its substance spiritual, has its suited intellectual form which best clothes it, we do not doubt; but we are constrained to distinguish between the intellectual form and the spiritual substance, by seeing sometimes the most unexception-

able intellectual form held in the absence of the spiritual reality, and, at other times, the unmistakable presence of the spiritual reality in combination with an intellectual form of thought which is defective, and in part erroneous".¹ But while we must recognize the undoubted Christian faith of those who hold teachings different from ours, yet the intellectual form of our beliefs is important. This is the case because there is an important relationship between thoughts concerning God and the righteousness which He seeks in us. Our intellectual faith is a response to its object and therefore is a part of the total response of man to God. "The relation of faith to righteousness, then, is the relation of our response to God, - to God's voice to us. It is thus a reflection of the Divine righteousness. A reflection which is one with what it reflects is righteousness - a living reflection from and in the whole man - thought and will, intellect and spirit".² It is fitting that we should conclude this section with these words for they are the last which McLeod Campbell wrote before his death a week later, in February, 1871.

Conclusions

One important question which is raised by modern tendencies in theology and apologetics is for whom these disciplines are undertaken? One recent author has pointed out that there often threatens to develop a dangerous chasm between the theological thought which informs evangelism and the apologetic thought directed to intellectuals.³ This chasm between the theology of

1. Thoughts on Revelation, p.188
2. Reminiscences, p.269
the "masses" and the apologetic to the "elite" can grow to such a proportion that these two efforts are in conflict and commit "treason" to each other by denying what the other holds inviolable. Certainly McLeod Campbell's thought is that of a theologian of the Church, a theologian of the "masses", whose primary motive is evangelism. It is as such that he is understandably wary of "intellectuals" upsetting the faith of humble people to whom the Christian faith is a living and a real thing. Indeed, it is quite clear that in his own way McLeod Campbell is launching an evangelical offensive against those who over-emphasise man's rational capacity. He sees Christianity as something which involves the "whole man". Certainly he is to be listened to by our generation of Protestant scholars. If the Church was not aware of it previously, it should by now have recognised that it has lost the ear of the vast majority of the "working classes" or the "masses". It will have to become something more than a gaggle of college dons at prayer to regain these people.

If we may turn to his thought as a whole, we may say that one of the most apparent features of McLeod Campbell's writings is the consistency they reveal over a long period of time. Certainly his sermons of the Row period have an earnestness and urgency that distinguishes them but as McLeod Campbell pointed out, "What ... has most impressed a different character on my Row sermons as compared with my books, is the personal appeal incident to dealing with my people, and the constant endeavour to bring them to a point".1 It is of great interest to learn that

at least one of his life-long friends considered his Row sermons to be his best teaching and McLeod Campbell did not entirely disagree. In fact, he admitted, "And so it was in some respects; but I know that what Dr. Scott calls my "matured" teaching is an advance, and has the special advantage of doing more justice to what others have taught".1 This latter comment about the "advance" seen in his later teaching is expressed in his discussion of the D.D. which he was awarded by his alma mater, the University of Glasgow, in 1868. He and his friends considered this act to be in some measure a reversal of his deposition from the ministry in 1831, although he added that he did not "...at all imagine that what was rejected in 1831 is intelligently and in its totality accepted now; but that at least some of it is, and in God's good time more will be".2

There is much more that could be said of the theology of McLeod Campbell and of its most important contribution to the understanding of theological inquiry.3 But before we turn to make some concluding observations, it would be fitting to pay tribute to McLeod Campbell's work in the words of a fellow Scotsman, who though differing from him theologically, stands in that long tradition of Christian saintliness which evidently must have something to do with porridge and heather. It was James Denney who said,

3. The question of how wide an influence McLeod Campbell has had on other thinkers is most difficult to measure. It is most adequately dealt with in George H. Tuttle's The Place of John McLeod Campbell in British Thought Concerning the Atonement, (Doctoral Thesis, Emmanuel College, Victoria University, Toronto, Canada, May, 1961).
Of all books that have ever been written on the atonement, as God’s way of reconciling man to Himself, McLeod Campbell’s is probably that which is most completely inspired by the spirit of the Truth with which it deals. There is a reconciling power in it to which no tormented conscience can be insensible. The originality of it is spiritual as well as intellectual, and no one who has ever felt its power will cease to put it in a class by itself. In speculative power he cannot be compared to Schleiermacher, nor in historical learning to Ritschl, and sometimes he writes as badly as either; but he walks in the light all the time, and everything he touches lives.¹

This indeed was the case, for it is light and life as seen in the face of Jesus Christ that is characteristic of McLeod Campbell’s thought.

¹. Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation, p. 120.
CHAPTER IX - Conclusions

In this work we have approached the question of theological inquiry in McLeod Campbell's theology from the point of view of a study in historical theology. We have, therefore, dealt at considerable length with the theological and philosophical context of both his own and his opponents' thought. We have seen McLeod Campbell in conflict with the Calvinistic orthodoxy of the Westminster Confession and with the incipient liberal theology of the nineteenth century. And in the background of the struggle we have seen the movement of philosophy from Ramist Aristotelianism which lay behind Federal theology to Scottish common sense empiricism on which McLeod Campbell was weaned. It is in the context of these conflicting influences that we have undertaken to arrive at an understanding of theological inquiry as seen in the thought of John McLeod Campbell.

It may seem strange to have gone this far in discussing McLeod Campbell's theology from the point of view of theological inquiry without first having defined what is meant by "theological inquiry" or its companion term, "theological method". But this has been done for a reason. The reason is that if we were to establish an a priori definition of what theological method was before we looked at his teaching, then it would be that original definition which was actually being discussed, which was actually
judging his thought and which finally would deliver its verdict. A.E.Taylor pointed this out in declaring that, "The true character of any scientific method can, of course, only be discovered by the actual use of it; a preliminary disquisition on the nature of a method not previously exhibited in actual use is apt to be at best sterile, and at worst a positive source of prejudices which may subsequently seriously hamper the process of investigation".1 Surely the value in such a study as this is to let McLeod Campbell tell us what his theological method is. What were his particular insights in regard to method? What were some of the influential philosophical and theological factors in determining his course?

Before we discuss McLeod Campbell's major insights in regard to theological method, it would be well to state in at least a provisional manner what we mean by "theological inquiry" and "theological method". By the use of the term "theological inquiry", we intend to indicate an interest in how the theologian goes about seeking knowledge. Theological inquiry is part of human inquiry in general, but it merits the limiting term theological in so far as it is centered in seeking knowledge of God. The term "theological method" is one which could be developed at great length. Indeed, the various meanings given to this term could be the subject of a thesis in its own right. There seem to be, however,

1. A.E.Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics, (London; Methuen and Co., 1927) p.38
two major and somewhat differing meanings given to it. On the one hand, it is used to refer to the "way" of seeking knowledge of God. On the other hand, it has been used to refer to the "way" of communicating or transmitting knowledge of God. These two emphases are not mutually exclusive, but the relative emphasis is important. For example, the Ramist use of the term "method" which we have shown to have had a direct influence on Calvinism, emphasized method in terms of communication. When method is used in this sense it tends to emphasize the coherence of doctrine or what Hume called the "relation of ideas". It is not in this sense that we seek to understand McLeod Campbell's theological method, for such an emphasis was not his. Indeed, this difference in emphasis was one reason for his conflict both with the Westminster theology of his youth and with the liberal theology of his later ministry. Both of these theologies had in common a rationalistic tendency which arose at least partly out of an earnest desire to "communicate" the faith. The simple Calvinist logic of election, the neat framework of Federal theology, the conditional doctrine of grace, all had the merit and appeal of being easily communicated. On the other hand, the doctrine of free grace,

1. Prof. Torrance has pointed out that Ramus tried to make Aristotelian logic into a formal method of discovery. In a comment to the author he stated, "...the emphasis on 'logical analysis' meant that if a thing was brought into clear logical order that was a method not only of setting it out and communicating but of laying bare new realities - quite mistaken of course, for there can be no formal logical method of discovery".
the wholeness of our salvation in Jesus Christ, and Christ's work for all mankind are not so simply presented or readily accepted.

Similarly the "new" theology of the later part of McLeod Campbell's life sought to present the Gospel to men "where they were". But McLeod Campbell saw that a faithless reading of Scripture could only end in faithless results. The elevation of the philosophical and psychological disciplines to the point where they raised "previous questions" which must be answered before theology could proceed was a denial of the realities with which theology dealt. McLeod Campbell saw that in the earnest desire to communicate the faith, both "Calvinism" and the "new" theology had deserted theology's own proper grounds. Faith in Jesus Christ is not grounded upon logic or metaphysics or psychology but upon Jesus Christ Himself. The method or "way" of seeking knowledge of God was to trace the "way" of Jesus Christ. McLeod Campbell declares that, "As we look on Him who has thus come to us in the Father's name, hear His words, trace His path, do we find ourselves in a condition to accept His claim, to believe that God is a Father, that Christ is His Son, and that the life seen in Him is the life of Sonship".¹ He realized that this attempt to let the divine realities he encountered in biblical study bear witness to their own truth, apart from external authorities, was not going to

¹. Nature of the Atonement, p.XLI see above pp.90ff, p.237, pp.355ff
command the faith of all men. But a faith based on less than the truth of God Himself, a light which was less than the light of God, was ultimately falsehood and darkness. That is why he warned that "...we must be careful not to plead with others on lower ground than that on which we stand ourselves; viz. the ground on which we feel that our Lord stood, when He came to men in the Father's name, and complained that so coming He had not been received by them". 1

He was aware of the increasing tendency to make theology a philosophical abstraction from the simple facts of the Gospel. There were those who were pleased to acknowledge the incarnation as an abstract principle but seemed intellectually embarrassed by the atonement. They separated form and content, and keeping the "form" of the incarnation, rejected the "content" of Jesus Christ and the atonement. McLeod Campbell declares himself to be against our substituting our own deductions for the facts of the gospel. 2

It is natural and right to ascend from the facts of historical Christianity to the principles and laws of the kingdom of God which these facts make known to us. But, if this has been a sound process of thought, to descend again in order to rest in these facts with a confirmed faith must also be natural, and what we shall rejoice to do. And so it is with the Apostles. St. Paul says, "God commendeth His love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us", and the language of St. John is,

1. Ibid. P.XLIII
2. Federal theology recognized both the incarnation and the atonement but imposed a highly systematic form upon them, by fitting them into its own legal and moral patterns. McLeod Campbell sought to let the inner logic of the incarnation and atonement inform his entire exposition.
"Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins". Both Apostles see the love of God not in the incarnation simply, but in the incarnation as developed in the atonement.¹

If McLeod Campbell objected to a merely abstract understanding of the incarnation, he was no less opposed to a merely abstract relationship of the believer to the work of Christ. There was a logic to the incarnation and atonement that ran from beginning to end, from purpose to result. Here again the "form" of the incarnation could not be separated from the "content" of the atonement. There were those who chose to emphasize the content of the atonement but in doing so neglected its form in the incarnation. McLeod Campbell declared that

...to stop at the atonement, and rest in the fact of the atonement, instead of ascending through it to that in God from which it has proceeded, and which demanded it for its due expression, is to misapprehend the atonement as to its nature, and place, and end. It has been truly said, that men have perverted creation, and instead of using it as a glass through which to see God, have turned it into a veil to hide God. I believe the greater work of redemption has been the subject of a similar perversion.²

McLeod Campbell emphasizes that our thought must "ascend" from the work of Christ to its origin and purpose and then "...descend from the work of Christ to its results, and, viewing these as its fruits, see that work as means to an

1. Ibid. pp. XXIX, XXX
2. Ibid. p. 333
This going forward to the result is inevitable if we go back to where redemption has its origin in the divine mind.\textsuperscript{1} This movement of our thought, of course, follows the movement of the incarnation, but this redemptive movement only finds its completion in the believer. The completion of the purpose of the incarnation and atonement comes when the believer yields himself to the facts of the Gospel — and is himself moulded by the atonement. "This movement in our inner being — this moulding of us to itself — the atonement, apprehended by a true and living faith necessarily accomplishes; and its tendency to secure this result, is one element of our faith..."\textsuperscript{2}

Here we can see the empirical tendency of McLeod Campbell's method. He is greatly concerned to preserve the natural and direct relationship of the incarnation to the atonement. He is equally anxious to emphasize the natural and direct relationship of the atonement to the believer. He sees this natural and direct relationship in the "facts of the Gospel" and he resists abstracting form and content in such a way as to separate and divide in thought that which is one in reality. The result is that he attempts to have the movement of his thought follow the movement of the incarnation and the atonement. His "verification" comes in the Christian's consciousness of "...harmony and simplicity".

\textsuperscript{1} Ibid. p.334
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid. p.335
and beauty in the natural relation of the atonement to Christianity..."1 When a man through faith is laid bare to the Gospel there takes place, "This movement in our inner being - this moulding of us to itself".

We must note that the believer's role is passive - the subjective is determined by the objective here as elsewhere in his thought. The Christian's "experience" is objectively grounded and not a matter of romantic "feeling" or a subjective valuation. It is not a matter of assimilating our faith to some pattern of abstractive ideas obtained from some other source, or to some "relation of ideas" that limit our thought by the demands of coherence. Rather McLeod Campbell's faith is determined by a direct intuitive empirical relationship to the "facts of the gospel". The logic of the natural relationship of the incarnation to the atonement and of both to the Christian believer are what determine his thought. Theological inquiry, for McLeod Campbell, is the intellectual unfolding of the movement that takes place in divine reality in the incarnation and atonement. By this movement he means to trace the logic of the incarnation all the way from its origin in God to its result in the believer. The believer's point of contact, or of direct experience, is the work of Christ "moulding us to itself", but faith intuits an inner logic which by its natural

1. Ibid.
harmony, simplicity and beauty supports our faith.
Theological inquiry for McLeod Campbell is truly *fides quaerens intellectum*.

If we understand McLeod Campbell’s approach to theological inquiry in this manner, it helps us to see the place of vicarious repentance in the work of Christ. In the direct, personal, intuitive relationship of faith the believer finds himself moulded by the work of Christ. But that work is complete in itself. Christ in Himself has done everything for the believer, and His sorrow for sin, His turning from it, His trust in His father is for the believer. The Christian’s "experience" is that when he believes in Christ, he believes with Him and assimilates everything that Christ has done for us in Himself. As we have shown in Chapter V, McLeod Campbell has brought a new emphasis to the old Biblical and Reformed teaching of "union with Christ". It would be foolish to suggest that he was not influenced by this tradition. But we have good reason to suggest that similar attitudes towards, and experience with, Scripture lie at the root of the similarity.

We have attempted to show in the body of this study how McLeod Campbell struggled to communicate to people the message of the Gospel and get them to encounter the same living divine realities as he had. This encounter was direct, intuitive, and personal in its deepest sense. That
is, it was an encounter in which the believer was cast entirely upon God Himself in His self-revelation. In order to "communicate" this encounter, which he had had with divine realities through the Scriptures, McLeod Campbell stayed almost entirely within the categories of thought he encountered in the Bible. He refused to make a philosophical or psychological "reduction" of the Gospel. He would not cast aside the Biblical message as primitive, while retaining its philosophical essence, as some of his continental contemporaries were doing. He did not use the term "experience" as a subjective, romantic notion as some of these same men did. The experience of which he spoke was objective, it was of divine realities as real as bricks. At the centre of his message there always stood the person of Jesus Christ, in whom the form and content of the Gospel were irrevocably united.

Very clearly there were changing elements in McLeod Campbell's thought. For example, the pressure of persecution affected his early teaching in several characteristic ways. It is perhaps more aggressive and confident than his later thought. One wonders if he dealt sympathetically enough with those who questioned him. Yet, there is also something present in his earlier thought which is lacking in his later thought. That is the systematic or comprehensive aspect. In his earlier thought he was forced by the criticism of
his opponents to form a coherent pattern of teaching. He was forced to develop the logic of his thought. This was good in that it undoubtedly revealed to him how far he could go before saying, "God forbid", with Paul. There is no doubt but that his later work, even his great book on the atonement, leaves many questions unanswered and demands a wider context such as is found in his earlier teaching.

However, what must be emphasized in order to appreciate his contribution to theological inquiry are the basic insights which underlay all his work. Certainly one of McLeod Campbell's greatest achievements was to break out of the mould of the rationalism and moralism of the federal theology of the "Calvinists". In doing this, of course, he drew closer to the Biblical theology of the Reformers, Luther and Calvin. This raises the question of his relation to the pre-Reformation doctrine of election which became "embedded" in history in the covenants of federal theology. Since the "Calvinist" doctrine of election was developed before the federal theology, it would seem certain that the former influenced the latter. Indeed, federal theology can be thought of as a "rationalism" in history of the logic of double predestination. Through the "law" of the covenant of works it presented a rational principle to explain the damnation deserved by all men. Through the satisfying of the legal demands of God in Christ, it
presented a rational principle to explain the salvation of the elect. It was the "logic of election" and not the "logic of incarnation" that governed the system of doctrine which grew up. The "logic" of the incarnation is that Christ took upon Himself the humanity of all men "since there is no difference between the humanity of a saintly sinner or a sinful sinner" and by cleansing it and lifting it up to the Throne of God, made a living way for all men to come to their heavenly Father. There is "mystery" in both "logics". The logic of election leaves us with the mystery of God's "choosing" some and rejecting others. The mystery of His arbitrariness. The "mystery" of the logic of the incarnation is how God's love can be so great that He forgives all men and opens a way to their salvation despite their sinfulness. This is accompanied by a second "mystery" of why and how men can refuse so great a love, that is, the "mystery" of sin increases in proportion to the "mystery" of the greatness of God's redeeming love.

McLeod Campbell chose the "logic" of the incarnation and worked it out in a masterly fashion. He saw that the place where this logic was revealed was the life of Jesus Christ. That is why his insistence that Christ is the

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1. The whole question of the relation of logic to Universalism and Election may be helpfully studied in T.F. Torrance's, "Universalism or Election?", Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. II, (1949), 310-318.
object of faith is so vital. This "inner logic" of the incarnation and atonement as it took place in Jesus Christ, he attempts to lay bare in intellectual form in his theological work. The "logic" of his theology he intuits from this "inner logic" of God's acts in Jesus Christ.

McLeod Campbell held natural theology to be valid throughout his life. He never rejected it and indeed considered its rejection to be both false and dangerous. Yet, the fact is that his concentration on Christ, the object of faith, allowed no real place for natural theology and led to a rejection of it in practice. For example, his rejection of the rationalistic "evidences" which were the foundation of the theology of his day was unintentional but thoroughgoing. He saw in a practical way that when men looked to the world, to their own hearts, or even into the Scriptures, apart from Christ, for the source of their doctrine, they could not help but distort the light of the glory of God seen in the face of Jesus Christ. Just as in his early sermons there is a concentration on the movement of the life of Christ through his incarnation, humiliation and exaltation, so in his later writings this same theme shines through. There may remain the question of whether he did not overly emphasise the "spiritual" life of Jesus over against the Jesus Christ who redeemed us body and soul. And here again it may well be argued that there is a
stronger balance in his earlier sermons with their emphasis on Christ's assumption of our fallen humanity and his work in lifting up and purifying our flesh. But once this is said we must still be thankful for McLeod Campbell's emphasis on the place of Jesus Christ at the centre of all doctrine. There is never any doubt that it is the one man, Jesus Christ, to whom he is bearing witness. If much theology of his time and later turned the Gospel into abstract principles and something remarkably like current popular philosophical movements, he at least cannot be charged with this. Although he most frequently used the categories of thought found in Scripture, he was influenced by the philosophical training of his early years. He used philosophical and psychological notions such as "consciousness" and "co-relate", but he did so in such a manner as to be an example to us. He submitted these notions to the mastery of Biblical thought in a way which we must constantly endeavour to do. Indeed, his use of the intuitive empiricist approach of the Scottish common sense philosophers is of major importance.

Yet our argument is not that we have found that at every point McLeod Campbell's thought was influenced by the intuitive empiricism of Scottish common sense philosophy.
We have shown many parallels. However, empiricism as seen in the Scottish school of common sense philosophy is not a neatly or strictly defined approach. We cannot expect it to be understood in terms of later "verification principles". It had sceptical, intuitionist and rationalistic forms and these were not always kept separate. If such terms as "empiricism", "experience" and "consciousness" are used in a rather broad sense, that is because that is the way they were used in Scottish common sense philosophy and in McLeod Campbell's work. They gain their specifically theological content from their particular use in McLeod Campbell's work. But, our real point is that the objectivity which this philosophy sought and the objectivity which McLeod Campbell sought were of a similar nature. Neither considered it necessary or, in fact, possible to begin with a thoroughgoing scepticism. The nature of the object to be known, determined how it was to be known. This meant, for McLeod Campbell, that the believer's encounter with the incarnate and atoning Christ through Scripture, was both the ground and guarantee of his faith. God Himself revealing Himself through His Son was His own evidence and there were no other grounds on which He could

1. We discuss his philosophical education above, pp. 9-27, and some of the parallels mentioned are on pp. 54, 67, 75-77, 94-96, 218-219, 359-362, 393 and 401.
2. See above, pp. 13, 14.
be tested and approved.

Both Scottish common sense philosophy and McLeod Campbell's theology may be accused of a "naive" realism, but, if so, it was a naïveté which on the one hand promoted scientific discovery,¹ and on the other, allowed McLeod Campbell to make a theological "breakthrough" comparable to the Reformation. Indeed, this mutual development of science and theology had occurred at that time also. A strong case may be made for the development of a truly scientific attitude in the Reformers: diligent study of Scripture and their critical historical study of the early witness of the faith.²

McLeod Campbell's insistence that the grace of Jesus Christ is something so disarmingly, and yes, even shockingly new, that natural man will rebel at it, is an important insight which is constantly met in Scripture and which he found to be true in his own experience. Indeed, his own empirical experience of the truth and power of the witness of Scripture to the living God is something which cannot be over-emphasised, yet which cannot be adequately described on paper. However, it is clear

1. The fact that the nineteenth century was a great one for Scottish scientists has been pointed out by G. E. Davie, *The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and her Universities in the Nineteenth Century,* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1961).
that McLeod Campbell is speaking from "experience". The "matters of fact" which he had thus experienced are the basis for his "relation of ideas".

One of his most characteristic insights was that neither the objective nor the subjective aspects of theological knowledge could be ignored. His constant emphasis is the truly empirical one that the objective must determine the subjective. Yet, it was also his concern that the Christian faith be personally experienced and appropriated. It is for that reason that the insight of McLeod Campbell and his friend, Thomas Erskine, that Jesus, in His representative rôle, had fulfilled the subjective and the objective rôle in revelation is of such great importance. He saw that men turned the grace of the Gospel into a new law and made faith a final work - a final fulcrum point by which a man was to lever himself into heaven. He saw that the Apostles had not so believed and his own experience taught him that he had not either. Christ had done it all. Christ was not only the Christian's justification, he was also his sanctification. Jesus had repented for him, Jesus had believed for him, - and all the sinner must do is receive the gift of His life, - the whole Christ. It was McLeod Campbell's attempt to remedy the rationalistic and legalistic doctrine of his Scots contemporaries that makes him of interest to us today. His
own work certainly is not without weaknesses and needs some of the balancing elements which were allowed to lie dormant even in his own early teaching. But he marks an age. Not the age of liberal theology as some have thought, but rather the age of recovery of the Biblical and Reformation knowledge of the freeness of God's grace and the "wholeness" of our salvation in Jesus Christ. It seems apparent that these are insights which must be regained and restated anew in each generation. If the study of McLeod Campbell's approach to theological inquiry can assist us in our generation, that would be an extra reward. But perhaps we might indicate a number of points where McLeod Campbell's thought could well give us guidance today.

His approach to theological inquiry would give us grounds to question much of present-day theology's dependence on patterns of philosophical thought rather than the pattern of thought seen in the "logic" of the incarnation and atonement. Neither Heidegger nor Hegel should be allowed to determine what theology may say. Certainly some of their insights may be used, just as McLeod Campbell used some of the insights of the philosophy of his time. But these insights must be reshaped and redefined by the Gospel.

Yet another recent approach to theology would suggest that God can only be meaningfully spoken of as "in the depth" or in some similarly immanent manner. McLeod
Campbell by no means denied the immanence of Christ, any more than did the entire tradition of "union with Christ". Rather, he maintained it in a most warm and personal manner. But his emphasis on the facts of the Gospel beyond ourselves, on the objective determining the subjective, and on the eternal purpose and origin of our salvation prevents any such onesided subjectivity. Perhaps some of the onesidedness of this "new" theology is due to an excessively nominalistic approach to religious language. It would almost seem that some theologians are so busy disputing words and grammar that they give little thought to the realities beyond these words. If McLeod Campbell may be accused of a naive realism, perhaps it is something like this realism that is required to counteract the currently popular naive nominalism.

And, finally, we might suggest that McLeod Campbell's concentration on the person and work of Jesus Christ provides a healthy balance to the resurgent interest in social and moral issues. All too often the person and work of Christ are associated with a pietistic, individualistic type of theology that is of no earthly value. But at the same time, most forms of the social gospel tend to be accompanied by liberal humanistic theologies that hardly deserve the name.

We have pointed out that McLeod Campbell's ethics had a basic flaw due to his unnecessary separation of flesh
and spirit, but at the same time they have a potential strength due to his understanding of the unity of the incarnation and the atonement. It might well be the case that the reason why it was necessary to wait for Karl Barth to lead us towards a truly theological basis for ethics, was because of the separation of the incarnation and the atonement. Those who over-emphasised the atonement to the neglect of the incarnation tended often to be excessively pessimistic about human nature and therefore concentrated on saving individual souls from the general mass of corruption. On the other hand, those who gave undue weight to the incarnation possibly neglected man's need for the atonement and were, therefore, bound to see their more optimistic hopes dashed. It might be hoped that a truly theological ethic would include the deep concern and involvement in human life reflecting the incarnation, while at the same time giving a proper place to the harsh realism and suffering love which we see in the atonement.

In conclusion, we can only hope that McLeod Campbell's works will be more widely read in future. He is by no means the strictly dated, amateur theologian with the eccentric view of repentance that he is sometimes made out to be. Rather, he deserves an honoured place among
Protestant Biblical theologians. And, insofar as it is in a large degree precisely at the point of method that truly Biblical theology stands apart from all other possible theologies, we may hope that this study of theological inquiry as seen in his works, will help him gain his proper place.
APPENDIX "A"

Stevenson MacGill, in testifying to the Commission on Scottish Universities, outlined his course of lectures and these are of interest in showing the content and method of Scottish Theology in the early 19th century. MacGill held the chair of Divinity in Glasgow from 1814 to 1840. John McLeod Campbell studied under him from 1817 to 1820. (This appendix referred to above, p.31).

"The Divinity class comprises a course of four year's lectures. The students of that class consist of young men in different stages of improvement, in the first, second, third and fourth sessions of attendance. For various reasons, I find it to be my duty to separate these students into two great divisions, namely, a junior and a senior class. The junior class comprises students of the first year; the senior class comprises students of the second, third and fourth years. The junior class receives lectures upon the evidences of revealed religion.

The course commences with stating the general principles of evidence, their application to the proofs of natural and revealed religion; then the nature and force of those kinds of proof which may be brought for divine revelation, and the questions respecting them, - first, in reference to the persons before whom the proofs were directly presented; secondly, in reference to the persons who lived in a different age and country. I next consider the nature of proof arising from internal evidences; the character of the persons pretending to be divinely commissioned; miracles; prophecy; the mutual support of those evidences to one another; the evidence of testimony applicable to miracles; Mr. Hume's reasoning considered and refuted. I next proceed to give lectures on the probability that a revelation would be given; the necessity of a revelation, from the character and state of man, and from facts in the history of the world. I then proceed to the evidences produced for revelation; first, the evidences for the Mosaic dispensation; secondly, the evidence for the Christian dispensation. Under the first of these heads I bring forward the proofs for the genuineness of the books of Moses; then the evidence from the nature of the doctrines and the precepts taught to the people of Israel; the nature of the law of Moses considered under three heads - the moral, the civil, and the ceremonial law. Then I consider the proofs arising from miracles wrought in confirmation of that law and their evidences,
with the corroborations of the leading facts of the Old Testament, from the traditions and writings of other nations. I then proceed to the evidence arising from the prophecies of the Old Testament, proving the divine origin of the law of Moses. Lastly I proceed to certain auxiliary evidences from the state of the people, from the effects produced upon them and mankind by their religion and their history. I next proceed to the Christian revelation. I first consider the internal evidences; secondly, the evidence from the character of Christ; thirdly, the evidence of miracles; fourthly, the evidence of prophecy; lastly, auxiliary proofs arising from the propogation of Christianity, with which I consider Mr. Gibbon's secondary causes. Then the proof arising from the change produced upon believers of the Gospel at its first publication; from the effects of Christianity in succeeding times, both upon individuals and upon the laws and manners of nations, and the harmony of the Old and New Testaments in doctrine and design, in precept, in facts and characters. I next proceed to the objections against the revelations of the Old and New Testaments; the objections arising from the limited nature of revelation as to time and extent, from the mode of communication, and the supposed obscurity and inelegance of the style, and want of methodological arrangement: I shew the manner, language, style, and arrangement, to be best suited to the great purpose for which revelation was intended. I conclude this course of lectures with advices respecting the manner in which the Scriptures should be studied. This concludes my lectures to the first class.

In regard to the Senior Class of students attending the second, third, and fourth sessions, I commence with lectures on the canon of Scripture; on the nature and proofs of inspiration; on the language of the Old Testament, its idioms, its peculiarities, its history, its written character, and the various kinds of writing of the Old Testament; the Septuagint translation and other Greek translations; the Talmuds; the Jewish writings, illustrative of facts and opinions. I then consider the language of the New Testament, its peculiarities, the causes of those peculiarities, the style, and its general distinguishing character; the versions of the New Testament, especially the Syriac, the Latin, and the English translations, the collation of manuscripts, and the general result of the collation. I then proceed to the doctrines of revelation. I begin with the Attributes of God, the questions connected with these, especially relative to his justice and goodness. I then proceed to give lectures upon the designs, plans, and decrees of God; next upon the works of God, the creation, the antiquity of the world; questions connected with it; the beings created, connected with our system; angels, inferior beings, men. I then proceed to the doctrine of Providence, its nature and its evidence; and to the objections that have been brought against it. I next proceed to consider the views revelation gives of the first state of man, his character, his moral and intellectual powers; the degree of knowledge which he might possess; his external situation; the suitableness of the
Scripture account of the character of God, and its agreement with the traditions of nations. I consider the objections, arising from the supposed variety of our species, to our being derived from one parentage. Together with corroborations of the Scripture account on the subject, from Tradition, language, and moral effects. I next proceed to the fall of man from innocence, the nature of the punishment threatened, the immediate and future consequence of sin; mercy mingled with judgment; intimations of a Deliverer; questions connected with the sin of man. I then proceed to consider the present state of mankind, the effects of the fall of man upon the human species generally. Here four opinions are considered - first, the Pelagian, that it has no influence on the state or character of man whatever, and the error of this pointed out; secondly, the opinion that it extends to temporal external effects, but no effect upon the character - the error of this opinion; thirdly, the fall of man, but that it has no influence on the future condition of man; this is shown to be inadequate, and in some respects inconsistent; fourthly, the corruption and necessary influences of that corruption upon the future condition of mankind, unless counteracted by a countervailing system. I next proceed to consider the present state of man; the influence and existence of evil beings considered; the effects of example and custom, personal transgressions, and the effect of these upon the internal character; our relation to God, and our future condition. I then proceed to a consideration of the plan of mercy and recovery; this acted upon from the introduction of sin into the world, under different dispensations in which divine mercy was exercised, preparatory to the last, and forming successive parts of one great system; the ends to which this plan is directed, its suitableness and adaptation to the state of mankind. This finishes the second section.

The third session commences with observations upon the difficulties to be expected in our consideration of some of the doctrines of revelation and the study of the Scriptures. These difficulties are of two kinds; some will disappear as our understanding and knowledge improve; some will continue or attach to our conceptions while we remain in our present state of being. The cause of these difficulties; the first arise from our comparative ignorance, and from inattention, according to our moral and spiritual character; with the use of the proper means, as we increase in maturity of judgement, and acquire more just ideas of our own state, these difficulties will gradually disappear. The second class of difficulties arises from the inadequacy of our present faculties, and from that partial discovery of divine truth, which must attend a scheme so vast, and still in progress. In some subjects even new faculties may be required to be unfolded or bestowed. These difficulties are not peculiar to revelation, but are to be met with in ordinary objects and facts, which are daily presented, and are to be met with in the doctrines of natural religion, as well as those of revelation. Knowledge may be of the highest importance to us, though attended with circumstances for which we cannot account,
or which we cannot fully comprehend; illustrations of this. After these introductory lectures, the subject of the former session is renewed. I proceed to consider the great agents by which the plan of salvation is affected, and first, the nature and dignity of the Saviour. Three principal opinions on this subject are considered; the Socinian, the Arian and the Catholic; subordinate differences under each of these classes. No dispute respecting the truth of Christ’s humanity. The Socinians consider him to be simply a human being; they differ with one another as to the degree of perfection and excellence of his human nature. The proofs of his regal office; the design and extent of his spiritual power and government; first, the kingdom of the Son of God considered, with reference - first, to its present objects and operations; secondly, to an eternal state. We consider the views, both of a doctrinal and a practical kind, presented by the plan of the Gospel, accomplishing under the present administration of the Messiah. These relate - first, to men who are not brought under subjection to its government, and the participation of its privileges; secondly, those who have fully recognised their relation to him, and subjected themselves by faith in him and their Saviour and Lord; the means, external and internal, to bring men under the power of the dispensation of grace. Faith in Christ, its nature, and questions respecting it; repentance, its nature, extent and necessity; the doctrine of justification, its nature and necessity, as the commencement and introduction to our privileges and hopes; sanctification, its nature and extent; the means of grace various; selections and illustrations of some of these; private, family and public prayer; the Sabbath; the ordinances of the Gospel, Baptism, and the Lord’s Supper. I then proceed to consider the duties of the subjects of the kingdom of Christ; duties of man viewed in his general character and relations, enforced by the views of the Gospel, taking the ordinary division of duties, according to the object to which they are especially directed, - our duties to God, our brethren, and ourselves; duties of man, arising from his state as sinner, and from his relation to a dispensation of mercy, carrying on for his restoration and final happiness; lastly, relative duties, especially those of a general nature, arising from the relation of a family, and secondly, from his political relations; economics and politics considered, as they are affected by Christianity.

I then proceed to the lectures of the fourth session. I proceed to consider the state of man after death; views of immortality from reason and observation, the knowledge of man upon this subject under the Mosaic dispensation; the doctrine of the Gospel on this subject; the intermediate state between death and the resurrection - questions upon this subject; the completion of the plan of grace; subjection of all nations to the influence of the Gospel; the second coming of the Son of God; the resurrection; the final judgement; the separation of the righteous from the wicked; the final state of the wicked - questions connected with it; the state of the righteous; union of those whom the Saviour hath renovated and perfected with one
another, with the angels in Heaven, in one great empire unto God; the destruction of this present state of things, succeeded by a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. The lectures conclude with views of the qualifications for a minister of the Gospel, and the duties which a minister is appointed to discharge; ..."

Taken from the testimony of Stevenson MacGill to the Universities Commission, January 5, 1827, Evidence, Universities of Scotland, vol. II, University of Glasgow, (London: W. Clowes and Sons, 1837), pp. 55-57.
APPENDIX "B"

An example of "...opening certaine partes of Scripture..." according to the Ramist "Methode". This example is from Dudley Fenner's, Artes of Logike & Rhethorike, (1584). He brought the Epistle of Philemon into "Methode", (verses 1-5 are reproduced here. He deals with the whole epistle in a space six times that required for these five verses.) (This appendix referred to above, p. 203).

The entrance of this Epistle hath two parts. (The inscription or title.

(Prayers.)

The inscription ssetteth downe, (The persons which doe write.

(The persons to whom it is written.

The first person which doth write is Paule the principal writer, who is described by the adioint captive: which adioint is declared by the cause Christ, that is, by a change of name of the cause for the effect, Christ leading him to prison by his Spirit. And the second person which doth write is also declared by his proper name: Timothee: and an adioint (sic) of relation, a brother, that is, by a Metaphor one of the Christian religion.

The persons to whom he writeth, are first (The husband.

(The wife.

Seconde (The Minister.

(The Church.

The man is described by his proper name Philemon: by his adioint beloved, & by his effect, worker together with us. The woman is also described by her proper name, Appia, & her adioint
beloved. The Minister is also described by his proper name, Archippus: and his adioint, a fellow souldier: that is by a Metaphor, a fellow Minister. The Church is declared by the subiect, (sic) which is at thy house.

The prayers are (The Salutation. (Thanksgiving. The salutation is set downe, first by the matter of it, which hee wisheth to them whereof the parts are grace, that is, ful favor of God, peace, that is by a Sinechdoche of the special for the general, al prosperity both of soule and body. Secondly, by the forme, from God the father, and from Christ. Al which is disposed in a coupled axiome.

The Thanksgiving is described, first by the subject, my God: that is, whom onely I doe serve and hang upon: Secondly by the adioint, alwaies making mention of you in my prayers. Thirdly by the efficient cause, hearing of your love and faith. Both which are declared by their proper subjectes, whiche you have towards our Lorde Jesus Christ, and love towards al Saintes. And all these are disposed in a coupled axiome.
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**ADDENDA**


