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Halal Scots;
Muslims’ Social Identity Negotiation and Integration
in Scotland

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PhD in Sociology
The University of Edinburgh
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Declaration

This is to clarify that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed: Reza Bagheri
Abstract

The past three decades have seen increasing interest in the integration of Muslims as the most visible ethno-religious minority group in Britain. Previous research reported that Muslims in northern parts of England, for instance, had developed separate rather than integrated lives (Cantle 2001: 9). Though more recent surveys have reported an emerging change in such trends (Simpson 2012), Muslims in the Scottish context established a more mixed and integrated way of living with the majority from the outset, (Hussain and Miller 2006: 19) which was associated partly with the smaller population of Muslims in Scotland (Penrose and Howard 2008: 95). This qualitative research looks at the different identity negotiation and integration strategies of Muslims, and introduces the idea of ‘Halal integration’ which entails fitting into society while maintaining religious identity. This refers to the life of many Scottish Muslims, Halal Scots, who integrated into many aspects of Scottish society whilst maintaining their religious identity and practices. One example of such integration was the construction of hybrid or multiple social identities that constitute both Scottish and Muslim identity (Saeed et. al. 1999: 836; Hussain and Miller 2006: 150; Hopkins 2008: 121). Other examples were adopting alternative ways of socialising such as meeting at cafés, running family and social events in non-alcoholic environments, and taking part in voluntary and charitable work. This study, thus, explains important barriers and pathways to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. The research involved 43 semi-structured interviews with Muslims who were differentiated by generation and gender. Most existing studies of Muslims in Scotland have focused on major urban areas such as Edinburgh and Glasgow (Hopkins 2004; Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee et. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009). My study will therefore extend such research by comparing the experiences of Muslims across Scottish major cities and small towns. It will thus deepen our understanding of Muslims in Scotland. This thesis suggests that even though religion played an important role in their integration and identity negotiation, other factors such as nationality, ethnicity, racism and Islamophobia also played a significant part. It also suggests an emerging shift in the second generation Muslims’ economic, educational and social integration into Scottish society.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London, have placed Muslims’ integration in the UK under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, has long been a matter of debate in Britain (Modood 2005, 2007; Parekh 2008;Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Hopkins 2011). This debate has revolved around the maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. Recently, for instance, David Cameron (British Government 2011), Britain’s Prime Minister, announced at the Munich Security Conference that ‘under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.’ Critics of multiculturalism (including Cameron) mainly refer to Muslims - the most visible faith minority in the UK - as being less integrated into the wider society than people from other minority groups. As both Vertovec and Wessendorf (2010) and Parekh (2008) argue, most critics of multiculturalism support their arguments by giving examples which refer to Muslims, who are shown to be disloyal. Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice has sometimes even been perceived as a national identity threat and this has resulted in discrimination and harassment of Muslims (Goodhart 2004; Chakraborti and Garland 2009: 45). These concerns are not new; researchers point to concerns about Muslim identity that date back to the 1970s (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985: 307; Modood 1994). It is since 9/11, however, that questions of loyalty to Britain have moved beyond ‘which cricket team you support’ (Ghosh 2013) to seeing Muslims as potential enemies within (see Ahmad 2003). Such narratives present a homogenous picture of Muslims in Britain, but their identity strategies and practices are complex and complicated; varying in relation to different factors (such as ethnicity, religion and nationality). The Scottish context, for instance, counters such accounts and provides an interesting case of Muslims’ integration; Halal integration. This

1 This is a very important Islamic term which means ‘permitted; that has been prepared in a ritually appropriate way’ (Esposito 2011: 243) according to Islamic rules. Even though this term may be used in the context of Muslim majority countries to refer to permissible food and drinks, however, in the context of western countries, Muslims (as it was evident in this research) use the term to refer to all matters in their daily life such as Halal dating and Halal music (Esposito 2011). The term ‘Halal integration’ was used by one of the participants in this research for the first time to refer to his
peculiar type of integration refers to practicing Muslims’ main strategy of integration: which was fitting into the society within Islamic boundaries. This thesis argues that many Scottish Muslims can also be referred to as *Halal Scots* because they have integrated into many aspects of Scottish society while maintaining their religious identity and practice. Although many practicing and devoted Muslims in Scotland maintain their distinctive religious identity and practice like elsewhere in the UK (Ameli *et al.* 2004), much research indicates that they have also built a strong sense of identification with Scottishness (Saeed *et al.* 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). Highlighting the importance of the Scottish context, this study unpacks the complexity of Muslims’ identity and integration in Scotland.

As mentioned above, the first most publicised case of interest in Muslims’ identity and integration came with the rise of Muslim identity in the late 1970s. In different ways, events such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Salman Rushdie fatwa in 1989, the 1991 Gulf War, the 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London – both reflected and influenced the rise of Muslim identity. Many studies have pointed to the increasing importance of religion as a significant identity marker amongst Muslims in Britain (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 1994). Different explanations such as the public devaluation of Islam and the rise of political Islam have been associated with this increasing importance (Gardener and Shuker 1994; Ballard 1996; Anthias 2001; Archer 2003). The importance of religiosity was also highlighted in the work of some other researchers (Jacobson 1997b; Hopkins 2007), and was seen to affect Muslims’ social identity and practice. Others, however, noted that even though religion plays an important part in Muslims’ social identity formation, religion was only one part of their multiple or hybrid identities (Hopkins 2007; Sarah and Kidd 2010). Other factors such as ethnicity, nationality, and ‘race’ can also affect Muslims’ identity formation and negotiation. For example, the significance of nationality was particularly highlighted in the Scottish context. Many studies (Saeed *et al.* 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011) emphasised Muslims’, especially attempts to mix with others within Islamic boundaries. This was the starting point for my thinking about the best term to explain practicing Muslims’ integration in Scotland.
young Muslims’, identification with Scottishness. The above cited studies suggest that many Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hybrid identities drawing on religion, ethnicity, nationality, and more commonly with the combination of religion and nationality; Scottish and Muslim. These studies also suggested that Muslims in the Scottish context have more affiliation and connection with Scottishness than Britishness. It has also been found that Scottish Muslims’ identification with Scottish sub-state nationality has persisted despite Muslims’ tendency in England for example to identify with British, not English, identity (Hussain and Miller 2006). These findings highlight the importance of the Scottish context in providing an inclusive idea of Scottishness to which Muslims can feel that they belong. However, other studies (Bond 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) suggest that in the everyday understanding of Scottishness, racial and ethnic markers are still important. For example Hopkins (2007: 72) suggests that Muslims may feel excluded due to the ‘salience of race as a marker of social difference’. This is mainly due to the double sidedness of Islamophobia as a cultural racism, which targets Muslims’ racial and cultural characteristics (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). Hopkins (2004) argues that Muslims in Scotland, as elsewhere, were racialised as Asians. These racialised Muslims were also culturally othered to the secular West (Hopkins 2004: 259). By studying the importance of religion, ethnicity, and nationality in Muslims’ social identity negotiation, this study highlights how Muslims affiliate with Scotland or distance themselves from Scottishness.

It is however important to note that the importance of the above markers - religion, ethnicity, and nationality - in Muslims’ identity formation is not homogeneous and could vary in strength and salience. Phinney (2003), for example, argues that the strength of minority ethnic people’s identification with their ethnic groups and/or their country of residence can be varied; each identity can either be strong or weak, or identification with both can be high. While studying Scottish Muslims, Hopkins (2007) also found that young Scottish-Muslims’ identification with their religion and their country of residence was varied in strength, nature, and meaning. Furthermore, Muslims’ self-conceptualisation can also be context dependent and subject to change
due to the importance of different social factors. For example, Turner and his colleagues (1994: 454) argue that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference’. Therefore, the extent and degree of identification with any identity marker (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and subject to difference. Little attention, however, has been paid to unpacking the different importance, meanings and strength of these identities and the extent to which they can be changed (Hopkins 2007; 2008). This research, thus, by studying the importance of religion, ethnicity and nationality, discusses the different importance, meanings and strength of each of these markers in Muslims’ social identity negotiation in Scotland. Social identities can also be affected by sociological issues such as generational dynamics (see Ballard 1994; Jacobson 1997b). As Phinney (2003: 63) argues, ethnic identities are flexible and ‘subject to change along various dimensions; over time or across generations in a new culture, in different contexts’. Therefore, this research also discusses the importance of generational dynamics in affecting first and second Muslims’ self-conceptualisations.

It has been also argued that people’s identity is highly affected by the way in which others accept or reject that identity (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Hopkins et. al. 2011; Hopkins 2011; Thompson 2012) because identity non-recognition can have negative social consequences for those whose identities are denied (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; Thompson 2012). For example, Ballard (1996) argues that Muslims’ inter-group identification – as Muslim - is partly a reaction to external rejection by the white majority. This study therefore, discusses the importance of the feeling of being denied or rejected, and how such feelings can affect Scottish Muslims’ identity negotiation.

**Muslims in Scotland**

The existing literature shows that Muslims, as the largest non-Christian faith group and the largest visible ethnic/faith minority group (Scottish Government 2005b), constitute around 1.4% of the population of Scotland with 77 thousand people
(National Records of Scotland 2013a: 32). This particularly highlights the visibility of the Muslim community, which can affect their experience of racial discrimination. It is, however, important to note that contemporary Islam and Muslims in Scotland come in different forms due to differences of ethnicity, culture, denomination, and generation (Siddiqui 2006), thus research needs to be sensitive to the heterogeneity among Muslims. For example, in terms of ethnic diversity, even though the Pakistani community constitutes two-thirds of Muslims in Scotland (Scottish Government 2005b: 13), there are small proportions of Muslims from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, Iran and the North African states (Siddiqui 2006). In regards to birth place, around half of Scottish Muslims were born inside the UK (Scottish Government 2005b) and just under half of Scots who come from Pakistani families were born in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). Due to the importance of birthplace as a marker, being born in Britain in general, and Scotland in particular, can affect these Muslims’ sense of identification with Britishness and Scottishness (McVie and Wiltshire 2010). Those who were born outside of Britain may find their claims to British identity coming under question, and in particular, those who were born outside of Scotland may find their Scottishness challenged (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010). In terms of economic integration, they are rather poorly integrated. They suffer from the highest unemployment rate at 13%, which is nearly double the overall unemployment rate for Scotland (7%) (Scottish Government 2005b). Therefore, it can be concluded that Muslims’ visibility, low socio-economic status, high unemployment rate, and the fact that they make up the majority of the non-white and non-British born population, can reflect the problematic and challenging process of their identity negotiation and integration in Scotland. All these factors can affect and actually challenge Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and social-economic integration, which will also be discussed in this study.

**Integration**

The most important aspect of this study is to explore the importance of Muslims’ religious identity and practice to their integration. The significance of religion in Muslims’ integration is, however, a matter of debate. For example, Joppke (2012)
argues that the religious identity of practicing Muslims creates boundaries for Muslims’ cultural and social integration. This can be associated with the central role of religion for many Muslims and the way they live in Britain (Modood 2005; see also Esposito 2011: 158). Some others, however, argue that Muslims’ identity politics can play an important part in their civic integration. For example, Choudhury (2007) and Meer (2010) argue that Muslims’ religious identity can be an important trigger for better civic integration. Furthermore, Hussain and Miller (2006) illustrate that Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a tool of integration rather than separation. In this study, I discuss how Muslims’ religious identity and practice can limit their integration, particularly their social integration; whilst for the second generation on the other hand, Muslim women’s religious identity can play an important part in their civic integration and their challenging of patriarchal ideas. It is, however, important to note that other social and structural issues such as deprivation, generation, discrimination, and Islamophobia can also affect integration. For example, Berry (1997) suggests that the experience of discrimination and prejudice is a major factor that makes integration potentially stressful. More specifically, Fekete (2008) suggests the importance of Islamophobia as a primary barrier to integration. This study discusses how Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia and the dominance of alcohol in Scottish culture can limit Muslims’ socio-economic integration.

Highlighting the importance of generational dynamics, Phinney (2003: 63) argues that integration, or acculturation, can differ ‘among generations, as indicated by the differences that can be observed between immigrants and their children and grandchildren’. Taking this into consideration, this study discusses how second generation Muslims can be more integrated than the first generation. Such integration can also be affected by gender dynamics. For example, previous research pointed to a gendered process of exclusion in observing that Muslim women are less likely to be employed and to have higher education achievements (Scottish Government report 2005; Netto et. al. 2011) due to racism and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 1999; Cassidy et. al.2006; Lewis 2007). The importance of this gendered process in Muslims’ economic and educational integration and the way which second generation Muslims deal with these issues are discussed in this study. This leads to
the next focus of this study that explores the importance of different factors, including Muslims’ religious identity and practice, on their experience of exclusion and/or Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust 1997).

Islamophobia

For some writers, Islamophobia, also known as anti-Muslim racism and discrimination, is not only grounded in religious discrimination but actually consists of both colour and cultural racism (Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013). In this sense, Muslims are first racialised and then a certain culture—which is already vilified—is attributed to them (Modood 2005). Empirically, this argument is supported by research which found that both Muslims’ racial and religious/cultural appearance can be a basis for their discrimination (Hopkins 2004b; Virdee et. al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al.’s 2007; Kyriakides et. al. 2009). The racial aspect of Islamophobia was better highlighted when some white British/Scottish converts experienced how their whiteness came under question when they wore the hijab—in the case of women—or grew a beard—in the case of men (Kose 1996; Franks 2000, Moosavi 2014). By highlighting the religious and cultural aspects of such experiences, some researchers also found that Muslims’ religious identity and visible appearance as a Muslim played a key part in their experience of Islamophobia (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). Thus this research, by analysing fully practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia and racism, highlights the importance of Muslims’ religious identity and practice in Islamophobia. Anti-Muslim discrimination, Islamophobia, can also take different forms in different contexts (Bennett 2000). For example, previous research (Hopkins 2004a) suggests that there is a feeling among some Muslims that anti-Muslim racism can be higher in areas where there is a high density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In contrast, several researchers suggest that ethnic minority people including Muslims—are at greater risk of racism in rural and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). This study, by studying Muslims’
experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in smaller Scottish cities and towns and then comparing them with those in Scotland’s major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, highlights the major differences of experiences and perceptions and also discusses the importance of the low or high density of the Muslim community in the experience and feeling of Islamophobia.

**Research Questions and Method**

This study, therefore, aims to investigate the importance of different factors - most specifically religion - in Muslims’ identity negotiation, integration, and experience of Islamophobia. In doing so, it firstly explores the importance of religion, ethnicity, and nationality in Muslims’ social self-conceptualisation. Considering the importance of racial and cultural boundaries in defining Scottishness, this study will explore how they affect Muslims’ identification with Scottish national identity. Due to the highlighted significance of religion as an identity marker, especially amongst young Muslims, this study discusses different explanations for such importance. It also explores the importance of religious practice and identity - alongside other social/structural factors such as discrimination - in affecting their integration in Scotland. Finally, it explores how Muslims’ religious expression and practice can affect their experience of Islamophobia and social exclusion. These objectives, thus, lead to three main questions in this research:

- What are the barriers and pathways to Muslim integration?
- How do Muslims negotiate their social identities in Scotland?
- What have been Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia?

Most studies of Muslims in Scotland tend to view Muslims as a homogenous community without taking any of their internal differences into account (e.g. Hussain and Miller 2006) or focus on particular sub-categories, such as young Muslims (e.g. Saeed et. al. 1999; Hopkins 2004; 2007). Additionally, most studies have only been carried out in a small number of areas, and predominantly in major urban areas such
as Edinburgh and Glasgow (e.g. Saeed et. al. 1999; Hopkins 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee et. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009). Other research (de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Plastow 2012) instead only focused on rural areas. Considering the heterogeneity of Muslims in Scotland and the importance of geographical, generational, and gender dynamics among Muslims\(^1\), this study will particularly investigate the importance of each of these factors in Muslims’ social self-identification, experiences of Islamophobia, and socio-economic integration in turn. My research, therefore, encompasses different Muslims (based on generation and gender differences) in different geographical contexts in order to capture the diversity of their experiences. Although Muslim populations in Scotland are to some degree concentrated in the largest cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh, it is important to note that a large minority of Muslims do not live in those places and so this study will give voice to these groups.

This study, therefore, contributes to the understanding and explanation of the complex relationship between religion, nation, and ethnicity in Muslims’ social self-conceptualisation in Scotland. By highlighting the impacts of majorities’ inclusionary/exclusionary attitudes towards Muslims’ self-conceptualisation, it will offer further insights into the concept of non-recognition and its social impacts on Muslims’ social inclusion/exclusion, which is less studied. It will also shed light on the understanding of everyday racism and Islamophobia in Scotland. By taking geographical, generational, and gender issues into consideration, this study also contributes to the literature that highlights the diversity and heterogeneity of Muslims. Putting these all together, this study makes a contribution to a deeper understanding of Muslims’ everyday lived experiences in Scotland, especially to their experiences of social integration. Concerning more practical and policy-making areas, this study’s findings can, generally, offer further insights into how to build an inclusive national identity and promote equality (especially in relation to Muslims

\(^1\) Other differences among Muslims, such as ethnicity, age, or sect/school of thought, are not taken into consideration because the existing studies of Muslims did not find any important differences in the above issues. Additionally, the findings of my research did not show any significant difference associated with those factors. This study, however, continued recruiting Muslims from different backgrounds, but the main focus of selective sampling and data analysis was based upon geographical, generational, and gender dynamics [this is explained further in the methodology chapter].
and other ethno-religious minorities), which is one of the Scottish Government’s main policy concerns (Scottish Government 2005a).

The Structure of the Research

Outlining the structure of this study, Chapter Two begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the study and looks at the key conceptions of identity, Islamophobia, and integration. This chapter will begin with theoretical debates about the social self-identification of minority ethnic/faith people and then review the importance of religion and nationality in Muslims’ identity negotiation. Second, it will conceptualise how the conception of ‘race’ can be rearticulated in the wake of the emergence of cultural racism and Islamophobia. Then, it will review major multicultural accounts of the discussion of integration and conceptualise the importance of religion and religious identities in Muslims’ integrational strategies. Chapter Three, drawing on the existing literature, brings out the Scottish dimension of the above issues and reviews Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To locate these issues in the Scottish context, this chapter will also review the literature in order to outline Scottish nationalism, racism, and multiculturalism. To this end, this chapter firstly provides a brief historical outline of Muslims’ presence in Scotland and highlights the key demographic features of Scottish Muslims. Then, it will review the discussion of Scottish national identity and review the existing literature on its inclusive or exclusive nature. Thirdly, it offers a discussion on Muslims’ social self-identification and discusses the importance of Muslims’ national and religious identities. Then, it reviews different accounts of the presence of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland and discusses Muslims’ experiences in relation to this issue. Finally, it outlines Scottish multicultural approaches to different minority groups and reviews the important factors that affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland.

Chapter Four describes the design, synthesis, characterization and evaluation of research methods in this study. This chapter discusses and explains the methodological approach and perspective of this study to studying Muslims’ social
self-conceptualisation, experience of Islamophobia and integration. Then it outlines research questions and interview topic guides. This chapter also charts data collection and sampling methods and discusses the importance of key variables in this study; generation, gender, and location. Finally, it explains the method of data analysis, and also discusses ethics, access, and positionality. To start presenting and discussing empirical data, Chapter Five discusses the importance, meaning, and strength of nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity negotiation in Scotland. To this end, it firstly examines the importance of nationality in first generation participants’ social identity negotiation in Scotland. Then the significance of ethnicity and ethnic identities is explained. It will also discuss the importance and strength of religion. Moving onto second generation participants’ identity negotiation, it discusses the importance of nation, ‘race’, ethnicity, and religion in turn and finally it comes to a conclusion by comparing the importance of these markers in each generation. Chapter Six explores Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia and discusses the importance of different factors influencing their experiences. This chapter firstly details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims in Scottish major cities. Secondly, individual and institutional Islamophobia is discussed, and finally, the conclusion is made that socio-economic factors are more important than the density of the Muslim population. The next chapter, by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in Scottish towns and small cities and comparing that with those in Scottish major cities, highlights the major differences of experiences and discusses the importance of low or high minority population density in the experience of Islamophobia. This chapter firstly details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims in Scottish towns and small cities. This chapter will also chart key differences relating to each participant and compare individual and institutional Islamophobia across Scottish cities and towns before concluding.

Chapter Eight discusses the importance of different barriers and pathways, including Islamophobia, to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. It will first detail and discuss barriers into Muslim integration which can be characterised as structural/social and cultural barriers. This chapter will then discuss how issues of
cultural understanding and respect, expressed as the main pathway to integration, could aid Muslims’ integration.

Chapter Nine discusses Muslims’ main strategy, namely *Halal* integration, to socialise and interact with the mainstream society while maintaining their religious identity. This chapter begins by exploring participants’ economic and employment integration in Scotland. Second, this chapter details participants’ educational achievements. In this section, the importance of second generation Muslim women’s religious identity in challenging cultural barriers for their greater educational integration is highlighted. Finally, participants’ social integration through social friendship and shared and sporting activities is outlined. The last chapter provides a conclusion and presents the major findings on the key variables concerning Muslims’ identity, experience of Islamophobia, and integration. It will reflect on the limitations of the study, suggest avenues for further research, and offer some recommendations.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework; Integration, Islamophobia, and Identity

Introduction

This chapter will provide a critical review of the existing literature and introduce the key conceptual issues of integration, Islamophobia and identity. The major task of this chapter is to conceptualise the possible relationship between *Muslim identity* and experiencing Islamophobia and integration. To this end, this chapter will review major multicultural accounts of the discussion of integration and conceptualise the importance of religion and religious identities in Muslims’ integrational strategies. Second, it will conceptualise how racism can be understood in light of the emergence of cultural racism and Islamophobia. It will then discuss how ethnic/faith people, mainly Muslims in this study, negotiate their social identities and review the importance of religion and nationality in their identity negotiation. These theoretical debates and arguments are used to inform the analysis of my findings in later chapters.

Integration and Fitting in: Social and Cultural Barriers

The importance of integration lies in the diverse population of many countries that have to deal with different ethnic or cultural minority groups. As Kelly (2002) states cultural diversity or multi-cultural society refers to societies with more than one religious, national or ethnic culture. Britain has become a multi-cultural society via the immigration of people from different cultures, more visibly non-white and from outside Europe (Modood 2007). The growth of immigration from former colonies since the 1960s created the need to reconcile the conflicting demands between wider society and immigrants’ newly established communities. The new minorities often sought to maintain their own ways of life and also to teach such ways of life to their children, while the host country sought to maintain a sense of common national identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding a way for a society to incorporate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their aspirations
to maintain cherished ways of life and at the same time maintain itself as a (historical) community of common belonging. Therefore, incorporation of these new members into society was a question of growing importance. Different scholars’ responses to this question mainly revolved around the concepts of assimilation and integration. Assimilation was defined as a process in which the newcomers become similar to their host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas the term integration, mainly proposed by multiculturalists, was defined as a state of recognition and respect (Kymlicka 1995; Hall 2000; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007).

Integration is contested as a term and there is no single definition or theory of immigrants’ or minorities’ integration (Castles et. al. 2002; Phillimore and Goodson 2008). However, as mentioned above, one common theoretical approach to integration was distinguishing integration from assimilation (Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007; Pfeffer 2014) or parallelising them (Brubaker 2001). The main intellectual debate on how to approach newcomers was also between assimilationists and multiculturalists. As Parekh (2006) notes the response of different governments might be in one of two ways, multiculturalist or assimilationist (monoculturalist); each in turn capable of taking several forms. Governments that take a multiculturalist approach might ‘welcome and cherish [cultural diversity], make it central to its self-understanding, and respect the cultural demands of its constituent communities’ but those governments that take an assimilationist response might ‘seek to assimilate these [different] communities into its mainstream culture either wholly or substantially’ (Parekh 2006: 6). Park and Burgess famously (1969: 735) define assimilation as ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life’. In contrast, the conception of integration from the multicultural perspective means a state of ‘recognition and respect’ in which both the majority and the minority have to make an effort to achieve greater integration and respect one another’s culture (Ameli and Merali 2004, Modood 2007). As Modood (2007:48) argues, integration ‘is where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing (or not trying) to integrate’. It is, however, important to note that the
interpretation of integration was not the same even amongst multiculturalists. For example, the state of recognition and respect was conditional amongst liberal multiculturalists. Crucially, the important condition for liberals is the insistence of individual rights (Kymlicka 1995; Kennedy 2013). From their perspective, minorities’ cultures are recognised and respected as long as they are consistent with individual rights (the main difference between liberal and communitarian multiculturalists is discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Fekete (2008: 1) argues that ‘the problem of integration, in other words, lies in the interpretation of integration itself’. By highlighting the stand of different types of multiculturalist theories on the issue of integration and assimilation, Hall (2000: 210) describes how, for instance, ‘conservative multiculturalism insists on assimilation of difference into the tradition of the majority whereas the liberal multiculturalism seeks to integrate different cultural groups into the mainstream and pluralist multiculturalism formally enfranchises the difference between groups along cultural lines and accords different group-rights to different communities within a more communal or communitarian political order’.

Distinguishing assimilation from integration, Pfeffer (2014) suggests an important account which worth quoting at length. He (2014) proposes three main distinctions; first, ‘there is a fundamental normative difference between a host society that invokes laws to incorporate its immigrants in a way that is respectful of, and is willing to celebrate their diverse practices (which is indicative of integration) and a host society that seeks to attenuate differences between minorities and the host society’. Second, ‘assimilation is often a unidirectional process insofar as it places most of the expectations on immigrants. … Conversely; integration ought to be viewed as a dialogical process meaning that it should be achieved through the cooperation and deliberation of both actors’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). Finally, ‘integration can be defined on the basis of participation in, as opposed to degree of similarity with, the host society. … However, just because integration requires convergence on liberal democratic values does not mean that cultural groups need to give up traditional practices’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354).
From a more normative perspective, in their theoretical approach to cultural diversity, most multiculturalists refer to multiculturalism as equal recognition (Kymlicka 1995; Kelly 2002) and respect (Taylor 1992; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007) of different cultures. In this perspective, which is commonly accepted by both communitarians and individualists, culture has an important and significant role to play. For example, Taylor (1992: 42) as a communitarian multiculturalist, argues that ‘the potential for forming and defining one’s own identity, as an individual, and also as a culture […] must be respected equally in everyone’. In general, multiculturalists believe that culture has a significant role in the formation of individuals’ identity and self-understanding. Hence, different cultures and group differentiated rights in multicultural societies should be recognised and accommodated in order to achieve individuals’ freedom and equality as they are two of the most basic commitments of liberal democracies (Kymlicka 1995). It is in defining the conception of self and the impact of culture on a person’s identity and self-understanding that the debate and distinction between communitarian and individualist multiculturalists takes place.

Kelly (2002: 6) points out that communitarians such as Charles Taylor (1985), Michael Sandel (1982) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), criticised the narrowly ‘atomistic’ and ‘asocial’ nature of the person which John Rawls’ (1971) liberalism represents. These communitarians, in contrast to Rawlsian and contractualist liberalism, argue that the conception of the person in Rawls’s liberalism ‘presupposes that the person or self can be detached from all the contingent aspects of personality provided by society, history, culture and family without undermining its capacity to choose its ends or the rules that should govern its interactions with others’ (Kelly 2002: 6). Communitarians further argue that individuals and their identities are attached to and shaped by their culture and social context (Parekh 2006; Young 1990). Communitarians also see culture as a significant identity-conferring association and consider group membership to be prior to individual identities (Kelly 2002). It is however, important to note that this is a complicated issue and even some liberals such as Kymlicka agree with the important role of culture and group membership in affecting one’s identity (Kymlicka 1995).
Liberals, in contrast, criticised communitarians for overstating the role of culture and social context in individuals’ self-understandings, and thus for seeing the person as unable to revise his/her ends (Kymlicka 1995). Liberalism, and consequently liberal multiculturalists, provides an ideology which is based on individual rights (Kennedy 2013). Even among liberals there are differences in how group differentiated rights and individual rights are approached. Some, such as John Stuart Mill, insist on a homogenous culture, and others such as David Miller, insist on the conception of a shared national identity (Kennedy 2013). As Kymlicka (ibid.: 74) points out, some individualists go further and reject multiculturalism or group differentiated rights on the grounds of *abstract individualism*, where the individual’s freedom and autonomy are valued over and above the group’s. However, Kymlicka (1995: 75) argues that ‘minority rights are not only consistent with individual freedom, but can actually promote it’. He (Kymlicka 1995: 83) further supports the *importance of culture* on the grounds of individual freedom and autonomy, and points out that ‘freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our *societal culture*′ not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us’. Therefore access to a societal culture is essential for individual freedom, and because most people have a deep bond to their own culture, they have a legitimate interest in maintaining this bond (Kymlicka 1995). Nonetheless, Kymlicka (1995) makes apparent his distance from communitarians and their assertion that the person cannot revise his/her ends, when he states that ‘people can stand back and assess moral values and traditional ways of life, and should be given not only the legal right to do so, but also the social conditions which enhance this capacity’ (Kymlicka 1995: 92). The important implication of these theoretical arguments is that the role of culture in the person’s identity formation, either as a factor that shapes the person’s identity (communitarians) or as a factor that provides meaningful choices and supports the person’s identity (liberals), is undeniable and should therefore be recognised and accommodated by the government and public institutions. The core difference between liberals and communitarians concerns the notion of whether the

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1. Kymlicka (1995:75) believes that the modern world is divided into “societal cultures whose practices and institutions cover the full range of human activities, encompassing both public and private life.”
person can revise or contest his/her own culture or own ends. Communitarians believe that the person is attached to his/her own ends and culture, while liberals insist that each person can and should have the right to revise and contest his/her culture and ends (Kymlicka 1995). Considering the importance of culture in the formation of one’s identity, Chapters 4 and 7 discuss how the public devaluation of Islam and Muslims - in the form of Islamophobia- can contribute to the strength of Muslims’ religious identity and inter-group relationships in Scotland.

Immigrants’ and ethnic/faith minorities’ integration is also debated and theorized from more practical and functional aspects that highlight the interaction between the social and functional dimensions and the influence of the state (Korac 2003). In Britain, Ager and Strang (2008: 179) argue that integration has been considered to be part of the discussion of social inclusion/exclusion and race relations. From this perspective, the importance of social and structural barriers to integration was highlighted. As Ager and Strang (2008: 181) argue, the conceptions of inclusion and exclusion were associated with ‘policy measures that use the metaphor of removing barriers to integration.’ The Refugee Council (1997: 15), for example, described integration as ‘a process which prevents or counteracts the social marginalisation of refugees, by removing legal, cultural and language obstacles and ensuring that refugees are empowered to make positive decisions on their future …’. The importance of structural barriers to minority ethnic/faith groups was supported by empirical research. Berry (1997), for instance, suggested that experience of discrimination and prejudice are major factors that made integration potentially stressful. Hale (2000) observed that certain factors such as language, employment and housing hindered Vietnamese migrants’ economic and social participation in mainstream society and acted as barriers to effective integration. Hickman et. al. (2008: 190) found that fundamental issues such as deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination are central to ensure the cohesion of the social fabric of British society. Trevor Phillips (2011), the chair of Equality Rights Committee, also argues that minorities’ integration is affected by discrimination and economic policies and that integration mostly happens in the workplace. Thus, those immigrants and ethnic/faith minorities who suffer from racism and inequality in different aspects of society or are unemployed will be less likely to integrate because they have no
opportunity to do so. More specifically, Fekete (2008) suggests the importance of Islamophobia as a primary barrier to Muslims’ integration. Taking the importance of social and structural factors into consideration, Ager and Strang (2004) proposed a working definition of integration – mainly in relation to refugees - which was well attended and adopted in many empirical studies. They define an individual or group to be integrated within a society:

> when they achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc: which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities, and are in active relationship with members of their ethnic or national community, wider host communities and relevant services and functions of the state, in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship in that society (Ager and Strang 2004: 9).

This working definition of integration was used by Ager and Strang (2004) to develop a working framework in order to study the indicators of integration in the UK. This framework is structured around ten key domains that were found to be central to the integration of refugees. Employment, housing, education, and health are four domains, grouped as markers and means, which presented the major areas of attainment that are recognised as critical factors in the integration process (Ager and Strang 2004: 3). Social bridges, social bonds, and social links, - grouped as social connections - stressed the importance of relationships to the understanding of the integration process (Ager and Strang 2004: 3). Language and cultural knowledge alongside safety and stability presented key facilitating factors for the process of integration (Ager and Strang 2004: 4). Rights and citizenship is the final domain under the heading ‘foundation’ which presented the ‘basis upon which expectations and obligations for the process of integration are established’ (Ager and Strang 2004: 4). It is important to note that the housing and health domains of this definition were not examined in this research due to practical issues and its lack of relevance to the main focus of this research; the importance of religion. This comprehensive definition of integration encompasses functional and social factors that inform my investigation of the importance of structural and social barriers to Muslims’
integration in Chapter 8. However, it is important to note that this policy-focused definition does not include the importance of ‘relationships with the host community, the importance of retaining one’s own cultural connections, shared values and the need to ensure safety and security’ (Phillimore and Goodson 2008: 309). This leads to another approach to integration that highlights the importance of relational and cultural issues.

In contrast to the above authors who highlighted the importance of social and structural barriers, others highlight the significance of some religious boundaries and cultural barriers that affect Muslims’ integration. As mentioned earlier, religion and religious identity for many Muslims is central to their sense of who they are and how their behaviour in all spheres of life should be (Jacobson 1997b). Similarly, Modood (2005) argues that religion is central to many Muslims and that therefore any new ways of living in Britain and becoming a part of British society have to ultimately be justified in terms of compatibility with the Muslim faith and the welfare of Muslims. The centrality and significance of the religion of Islam in observant Muslims’ life is related to the crucial emphasis of teachings of Islam upon rightful and correct action (Jacobson 1997b; Esposito 2011). Esposito (2011: 158) argues that ‘throughout history Islamic law has remained central to Muslim identity and practice, for it constitutes the ideal social blueprint for the believer who asks, “What should I do?”’

The teachings of Islam, as a complete system of guiding beliefs, has comprehensive coverage that includes ‘regulations ranging from religious rituals to marriage, divorce and inheritance to setting standards for penal and international law, provided a common code of behaviour and connection for all Muslim societies’ (Esposito 2011: 158). It is, however, important to note that Islamic laws were always subject to different integration, and sociologically, Muslims’ religious practices were never uniform. The important of beliefs and religious practice can be conceptualised by Park’s (2007: 320) argument that for individuals for whom religion is important, religion ‘forms a core part of their meaning system, influencing their global beliefs, goals and sense of meaning in life’. In this sense, religious social identities function as ‘guiding beliefs’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010: 67) which shapes devoted people’s lives. As mentioned earlier, the comprehensive coverage of the teachings of Islam provided pervasive and clear religious boundaries that can contribute to the strength
and coherence of expressions of religious identities (Jacobson 1997b). Such pervasive religious boundaries can also affect Muslims’ social integration, affecting their wider social relations with non-Muslims - the majority - and their daily life (Jacobson 1997b). Joppke (2012) also argues that the religious identity of practicing Muslims creates boundaries for Muslims’ cultural and social integration. For example, there are a set of regular and formal practices through which the majority of practicing Muslims make a commitment to such as reading daily prayers, fasting during Ramadan, and attending Friday prayers at the local mosques (Jacobson 1997b). The practice of such rituals, especially by devoted Muslims, can make Islam a significant element of daily life and thus ‘directly impinge upon relationships with non-Muslims’ (Jacobson 1997b: 250). Jacobson (1997b) argues that the necessity of eating a Halal diet and abstinence from alcohol are the religious prescriptions that inevitably have an effect upon a large number of Muslims in Britain. For illustration, Jacobson (1997b) highlights the differences in socialising patterns between Muslims and non-Muslims and suggests that the dominance of drinking alcohol in the social lives of most young Britons can result in the isolation of Muslims.

Taking the impact of social and cultural factors on immigrants’ or minorities’ integration into consideration, several diverse forms of integration have been proposed. Parekh (2008:85), for example, argues that integration can be partial, limited, or thin, as society is multilevel (political, economic, social, moral, and cultural), and that immigrants or ethnic/faith minorities might integrate at some of these levels, but not all. For instance, immigrants or ethnic/faith minorities might integrate fully into economic and political life but prefer to maintain the separation of some aspect of their cultural and communal lives. Some integrationists reject limited integration; but Parekh stresses that ‘immigrants might wish to, and indeed have a right to, retain parts of their cultural identity, and integration could and should be thin, limited mainly to society’s common institutions’ (Parekh 2008:86). The way in which immigrants and/or ethnic/faith minorities integrate into the wider society can differ from each other as well. As Modood (2007) argues, a single sociological model for a multi-ethnic or multicultural society is not possible because minority groups are likely to vary not just by dimensions such as differential cultures, identities, economic and skill profiles, racism, and political targeting, but also the
extent to which they are even groups. Some groups may be more mixed in terms of relationships and joint activities with non-group members and may exercise relatively little effort to reproduce the group culturally or politically, but for other groups who may not be at all ‘separatist’ or eschew civic participation, the transmission of a community or a diasporic or faith identity at least into the next generation may be very important (Modood 2007: 45-6). In sum, no minority group can be a model for all others, and there is no right to insist that some minorities’ lifestyle, behaviour, and manner should be the form of integration to which other groups should adapt themselves. ‘So, the ultimate meaning of multi is that specific policies, complexes of policies and multicultural institutional arrangements have to be customized to meet diverse (as well as common) vulnerabilities, needs and priorities’ (Modood 2007:46). This study, in Chapters 8 and 9, therefore, examines Muslims’ integrational strategies and will discuss the importance of different structural and cultural barriers to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Muslims’ distinctive practices and identities may lead to their discrimination, which is discussed in the next section.

**Cultural Racism and Islamophobia**

Muslims’ experiences of exclusion as the most visible ethnic/faith minority group can be conceptualised in the discussion of cultural racism and Islamophobia. I start with the former; the issue of racism has been viewed and studied from different levels and perspectives such as scientific (Rex 1986), historical (Mama 1995; Miles 1989), political/structural/institutional (Rex 1986; Miles 1982), psychological (Allport 1979; Brown 2010) and sociological (Gilroy 1987; Miles 1989). From a scientific perspective, racism was related to biology: genetics and phenotypes. Miles (1989: 79) defined racism as a process of racialisation where there is ‘signification of some biological characteristic(s) as the criterion by which a collectivity may be identified . . . as having a natural, unchanging origin and status, and therefore as being inherently different.’ Historical perspectives place a similar emphasis on biological characteristics; and both scientific and historical racism have been categorised as *old* racism. The *old* racism was more biological and also related to the
colonial discourse which regarded *black* ‘races’ and skin colours as inferior racial groups and the *white* ‘race’ and skin colour as the superior racial group. For example, according to Banton (2000: 62), early nineteenth century accounts of ‘race’ were based on the erroneous assumption of distinct and biologically ordered hierarchies where ‘those with black or brown skin were thought to be at a lower stage in the evolutionary process than white people’. These scientific and biological accounts of ‘race’ and ‘racial’ differences have been contested and discredited over time by many scientists and sociologists alike. For example, Montagu (1997) argued that holding such beliefs in racial differences was a tragic myth that led to many oppressive, destructive and inhuman actions. Racial differences cannot be embedded in or represent any innate predispositions of different groups, and as Miles (1982) proposes, the conception of ‘race’ is simply a descriptive term which can only cover phenotypic variations such as differences in skin colour. As a result of such comprehensive discrediting of scientific racism, Modood (2005: 27) argues that we have seen the emergence of ‘a racism based on cultural differences, on the natural differences preference of human beings for their own cultural group, and on the incompatibility between different cultures - the mixing or coexistence of which in one country, it was alleged, was bound to lead to violent social conflict and the dissolution of social bonds’. The biological approach to ‘race’ has declined but, as Bilton *et. al.* (1996: 237) argue, ‘race’ is still used ‘as a basis for inequality and it also remains a potent basis for our identity formation; it shapes our sense of sameness and difference’.

The ‘new’ racism, in contrast to *old* or *colour* racism is more related to cultural differences. For example, in highlighting the emergence of ‘new racism,’ Martin Barker (1981) describes it as a phenomenon which defines groups not as biological types but as cultural communities, talks of the incompatibility of cultures, and based its arguments on notions of difference rather than superiority. For Modood (2005) *cultural or new racism* means a characterization of a racial group and disadvantages of that group based on their culture, not on their biology. He further argues that such cultural racism ‘directed to a racialised or racially marked group may involve an antipathy to the group because it is perceived to be an *alien* culture rather than merely an inferior one’ (*ibid.*). *Culture and difference,* thus, are key issues in *cultural*
or *new racism*; cultural racism stigmatises and others people with different cultural characteristics such as name, dress, and religious practices. For Balibar (1991: 21), ‘new racism’ presents a ‘need to purify the social body to preserve *one’s own or our* identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion.’ Such representations are articulated around the stigmatising of otherness (Balibar 1991).

Although *culture* and *difference* are central in the discussion of *new racism*, the older marker of ‘*race’* has not faded in this new era of cultural racism. Malik (1996), thus suggests that elements of *culture* and/or *ethnicity* have just been taken to act as homologues of ‘*race’*. Within this discourse, racial and ‘natural determinacy finds its homologue in signifiers of trans-historical bonds which preclude the national membership of individuals construed as ‘ethnically fixed’ and thus their ‘ethnicity’, as identified by names and/or religious practices, dictates that they have no choice but to remain within their ‘ethnic’ group, and thus outside/inside ‘the nation’ in question’ (Kyriakides *et. al.* 2009: 292). Further to this interlink between racial and cultural elements in *new racism*, Modood (1994: 4) also notes that *cultural racism* builds upon *colour* racism by using cultural differences such as religion constructed ‘from an alleged British or civilized norm to vilify or marginalize or demand cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer *colour-racism’*. For Modood (2005:11), *cultural racism* is not ‘a proxy for racism but a form of racism’ and suggests that ‘*race’* is not just about colour, and racialisation has to be based on some features of people related to physical appearance and ancestry; otherwise racism cannot be distinguished from other forms of groupism. Modood (2005:11) concludes that ‘physical appearance is central to *race*, but, as in the case of *cultural racism*, it can be a marker only and not necessarily denote a form of determinism’. Therefore, *cultural racism* ‘draws on physical appearance as one marker among others, but is not solely premised on conceptions of biology in a way that ignores religion, culture and so forth’ (Meer and Modood 2009: 344). South Asians, who are predominately Muslims and the most visible non-white group, are ‘a principal object of racist victimisation’ and *cultural racism* as a ‘certain culture is attributed to them, is vilified, and is even the ground for discrimination’ (Modood 2005: 7). Therefore, Modood (2005: 7) argues that researching discrimination or harassment against Asians, particularly Muslims, requires ‘a conceptualization of racism that includes *cultural racism* as
well as colour racism and an understanding that Asians suffer a double or a compound racism.’ This leads to the discussion of a more specific and particular form of cultural racism, Islamophobia, which first racialises Muslims and then vilifies their culture and religion.

Islamophobia as a Cultural Racism

In recent years, Islamophobia has been the defining example of cultural racism, targeting Muslims as an ethno-religious minority group. Previously, it was mostly anti-Semitism, targeting Jews (Modood 2005; Werbner 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer 2013). There has been a considerable scholarly attempt to draw an analogy between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the discussion of racialisation of ethno-religious minorities (Werbner 2005, 2013; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Weaver 2013). The most publicized definition of Islamophobia is provided by the Runnymede Trust’s Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI), which describes Islamophobia as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims,’ and further elaborated the proposal of eight possible Islamophobic mindsets (Runnymede Trust 1997). More specifically, it equates Islamophobia with closed views which are itemized in eight main features; the first feature of Islamophobia is seeing Islam or Muslims as ‘undifferentiated, static and monolithic and as intolerant of internal pluralism and deliberation’ (Runnymede Trust 1997: 5). The second view is seeing Islam as other and separate and have nothing in common with other cultures; and the third item is seeing Islam or Muslims (‘them’) as inferior to non-Muslims (‘us’) (Runnymede Trust 1997: 6). The fourth item is seeing Islam as an aggressive enemy; the next is seeing Muslims as manipulative; after that is rejecting criticism made by Islam of ‘the West’ rather than debating it; seventh is defending discrimination against Muslims; and finally, the last is accepting anti-Muslim hostility as natural and normal (Runnymede Trust 1997).

Despite positive attention and use of this definition, it also received some critiques. For example, it was said that the term Islamophobia ‘reinforces a monolithic concept of the complex of Islam, Islamic cultures, Muslims and Islamism, involving ethnic, cultural, linguistic, historical and doctrinal differences’ (Ozanne 2006: 283, see also
Halliday 1999). The most important critique was proposed by Halliday (1999: 898), who claimed that Islamophobia attacks Muslims as people, not the religion of Islam as a culture and faith, thus the more accurate term is not Islamophobia but ‘anti-Muslimism.’ He pointed out that the term Islamophobia ‘misses the point about what it is that is being attacked; Islam as a religion was the enemy in the past in the crusades or the reconquista. It is not the enemy now … The attack now is not against Islam as a faith but against Muslims as a people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term’ (Halliday 1999: 898). In response, Meer and Modood (2009: 341-2) argue that Halliday’s critique ignores the fact that ‘the majority of Muslims who report experiencing street-level discrimination recount … that they do so when they appear conspicuously Muslim more than when they do not’. Meer and Modood (2009: 342) highlight the overlapping and interacting nature of anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, by writing that since hostility can result from wearing Islamic dress, it ‘becomes irrelevant - if it is even possible - to separate the impact of appearing Muslim from the impact of appearing to follow Islam. ’The argument proposed by Meer and Modood (2009) was supported by empirical findings (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014), suggesting a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. More specifically, the study by Lambert and Githens (2010: 35) that examines anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK, suggests that such crimes ‘often take place in the vicinity of a mosque or against Muslims wearing Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic beards or, in the case of women, hijabs, niqabs or burkas.’ Taking the importance of interlink between the anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice into consideration, Moosavi (2014: 1) rightly defines Islamophobia as ‘stereotypical generalisations about Islam and/or Muslims that can result in Muslims being discriminated against or harassed’.

For many writers, Islamophobia is a form of racism and is more specifically a result of racilisation of Muslims that contains cultural/religious hatred (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). Cultural prejudice against Muslims and/or Islam mainly revolves around the issue of the so-called West-Islam dichotomy. As Kundnani (2007:100) notes, the
public aspect of ‘anti-Muslim’ racism is embedded within the state response to the so-called ‘war on terror.’ In this sense, cultural racism or Islamophobia is mainly based on the association of Muslims with terrorism and on the perception of detrimental and alien properties in Muslim culture and religion. For writers such as Bulmer and Solomos (2004), the new racism has focused on the rise of identity politics in which racialised subjects are effectively o thered due to social or cultural characteristics assigned to them. Identity politics is central here, thus racialised subjects - such as Muslims - are viewed as ‘belonging’ or ‘not belonging’ to a particular society based on a certain characteristics, such as skin colour or the assumed detrimental alien properties of items of traditional dress such as the Hijab or the Jilbab (Bulmer and Solomos 2004). Other researchers such as Chakraborti and Garland (2009: 45) similarly found that religiously motivated hate crimes in the UK are often based on the ‘alien characteristics of the Islamic faith and its perceived threat to secular, and often mono-culturalist images of national identity.’

What links Islamophobia to racism is seeing all Muslims as a racial group and assigning stereotypical religious/cultural characteristics to all, regardless of their real racial/ethnic and religious background. Modood (2005: 11), by providing some examples of anti-Semitism, argues that ‘religion can be the basis of racialisation as long as the religion of a group can be linked to physical ancestry and descent.’ One illustration of racialisation of Muslims was through the reconstruction of the ‘Asian.’ Brah (1996: 169) notes how the discourse of ‘the Asian’ was reconstituted through the foregrounding of ‘the Muslim.’ More recently, the racialisation of Muslims has occurred through the construction of discourses based around the ‘Paki’ (Modood 2005: 35) or being ‘Pakistanised’ (Kose 1996: 135), in which the Pakistani background is ascribed to all Muslims. Even the white British/Scottish converts are sometimes called Paki (Kose 1996; Franks 2000; Moosavi 2014) because they have Muslim identity markers such as wearing hijab [headscarves], in the case of women, and having beard, in the case of men. Since the majority of British Muslims in general, and two-thirds (67%) of Muslims (Scottish Government 2005b) in Scotland are Pakistani, and also because South Asian culture has had a large impact on the development of Islam in Britain (Meer 2010), Muslims in Britain are often racialised as ‘Asian’ or ‘Pakistani,’ and in a more offensive way than ‘Paki.’ For Brah (1996:
9), the discourse of ‘Paki’ is a post-colonial discourse which ‘signified the inferiorised other right here at the core of the fountain head of Britishness.’ Moosavi (2014: 4) argues that calling all Muslims - even the white British converts - regardless of their real ethnic or racial background, Paki or Pakistani, is to a stereotypical extent ‘where Islam is thought of as a ‘Pakistani religion’ or part of South Asian culture.’ The racialisation of Muslims was more explicit in the case of the white British/Scottish converts who ‘lose their whiteness’ once they convert to Islam (Moosavi 2014: 3). For Franks (2000: 922-3), name calling and racial abuse against white Muslims is a ‘kind of racism by proxy, but further [developed], because of the identification of Islam with South Asian or Arab ethnicity, the white Muslims are perceived to be race-traitors by white supremacists.’ Franks (2000: 926) considers such abuse as a ‘re-manifestation of an already existent kind of racism.’ Racialisation is a central element in facilitating the emergence and appearance of Islamophobia because as Moosavi (2014: 3) argues, ‘without this process of (re)racialisation, Islamophobia would not have any basis to develop since ‘white’ converts, like Muslims in general, would not be marked out as having an inherent difference that leaves them vulnerable to being targeted with a specific prejudice which we term Islamophobia.’ The importance of Muslims’ religious identity and appearance in their experience of Islamophobia is discussed in Chapters 6 & 7. The importance of religion and religious identity is not limited to Islamophobia, and as mentioned earlier, it can play a significant part in Muslims’ everyday life and in social interaction with majority group members. In the following section, I conceptualise the importance of different factors in the construction of Muslims’ social identities.

Social Identity and self-Identification: Hybrid and Context Dependent

Ethnic/faith minority people’s self-identification or identity negotiation has mostly been conceptualized (see also Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; Phinney 2003; Ysseldyk et. al. 2010) within the framework of social identity theory, which theorises ‘the relationship between the individual and the group’ (Hogg and Abrams 1998: 6). The founders of this theory, Tajfel and Turner (1986), define social identity in terms
of group membership and one’s sense of belonging to a social group. Tajfel (1972: 31) puts forward the argument that social identity is ‘the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups with some emotional and value significance to him of the group membership.’ In this sense, self-conceptualisation is based on both an individual’s knowledge of group membership and the emotional or value-related aspects of such membership (Tajfel 1972; 1981). Within this framework, ‘social identity and group belongingness are inextricably linked in the sense that one’s conception or definition of who one is, is largely composed of self-descriptions in terms of the defining characteristics of social groups to which one belongs’ (Hogg and Abrams 1998: 7). In this sense, self-conceptualisation ‘comprises the totality of self-descriptions and self-evaluations subjectively available to the individuals’ which is relatively distinct constellations called self-identifications (Hogg and Abrams 1998: 22). Self-identifications, however, can be mutually inclusive and may even contain some self-descriptions that are contradictory (Hogg and Abrams 1998).

Saeed et. al. (1999) and Robinson (2009) argue that previously self-identification of ethnic minority groups has usually been conceptualised in the literature mainly in terms of ethnic identity or as an option between two identities, thus tending not to accommodate the possibility of bi-cultural identification. However, there were some authors who argue that people, including ethnic minority people, can identify with two or more groups (Hutnik 1991, Verkuyten 1992, Saeed et. al. 1999; Phinney 2003) and thus, their identity strategies can be related to identification with both majority and minority groups (Hutnik 1991). For example, Phinney (2003) argues that ethnic minority people can identify with both their ethnic groups and their country of residence. Such identification can be either strong or weak, or equally high in relation to both identities (Phinney 2003). Hall (1992: 309) argues that these new identities are more plural and diverse because individuals have access to ‘a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification…making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse.’ Accordingly, most minority groups in the context of a multicultural society may construct multiple, hyphenated
Consequently, for example in the case of Britain or Scotland, a unitary British or Scottish identity - especially in relation to immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities - is unlikely (Modood 2005). It is also important to note that for Scots in Britain, national identity has always been a complicated issue and there is no unitary identity (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009:1). Discussing minorities’ different approaches, Saeed et al (1999: 825) propose four possible strategy outcomes for ethnic minority people’s identification with the majority and minority groups: a) ‘dissociation - high for their ethnic minority group, low for the majority group; b) assimilation - high for the majority group, low for their minority group; c) acculturation - high for both the ethnic and the majority group; d) marginality - low for both their minority and the majority groups’. Ethnicity and nationality, however, are not the only identity markers to which migrants feel that they can belong. Some studies (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; Change Institute 2009) particularly highlighted the importance of religion as a significant identity marker amongst minority ethnic people, particularly young Muslims. For example, while surveying British Muslims’ self-reported identities, Hutnik (1985: 307) found that 63% of South Asians, and more significantly 80% of South Asian Muslims, asserted their religion as an important identity marker (different explanations for the rise of religion as a significant identity marker are presented later in this chapter). Chapter Five discusses the importance of different identity markers - mainly ethnic, national and religious - in Muslims’ self-identification, and charts discourses of exclusion and belonging in contemporary Scotland.

Further to the inclusiveness of social identities, Turner and his colleagues’ (1994: 454) argue that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference.’ Therefore, the extent and degree of identification with any identity markers (such as country of origin, country of residence and religion) can be varied and subject to difference.

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1 According to Hussain and Miller (2006: 147) ‘hyphenated’ identities link two quite different elements and dimensions of identity; often two unrelated nationalities or culture and nationality’ whereas the ‘nested’ identities, on the other hand, link two or more levels of the same concept, such as territory when it includes Scottish & British or Glaswegian & Scottish & British & European.
Additionally, Saeed *et. al.* (1999: 824) listed a variety of authors (Gilroy 1987; Bhaba 1990; Schlesinger 1991; Hall 1992b; Frable 1997) who argue that ‘identity is not something that is fixed and static but that is continually evolving and changing.’ McCrone (2002: 316) likewise argues that ‘identity is not to be understood as a badge or label that is pinned on us at birth or at school [but] as a complex set of cultural markers [for] a game of identification and identity construction’. Ameli and Merali (2004: 20) also point out that ‘identity is a matter of choice. It is not an issue of what one has to be or does not have to be.’ All these accounts insist that identities are *self-chosen* and can be used as a tool for particular purposes, such as social and national inclusion. Understanding the meanings or strength or salience of any form of group memberships - such as ethnic, national or religious - has mostly been conceptualized in the discussion of social identity theory proposed by Tajfel (1972) and Turner (1986) (see also Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et al 1999; Phinney 2003; Ysseldyk *et. al.* 2010). For example, Phinney (2003: 68) argues that ‘the most fundamental aspect of ethnic identity is its strength and valence, or how strongly and positively individuals feel about their group membership.’ Within this framework, this study discusses the different strength of Muslims’ identification with their ethnic, national, and religious identities. In the following section, I discuss two theoretical explanations in the literature for the significance of religious identities amongst Muslims in Scotland in particular, and in the UK in general.

**Religious Identities: Reactive or Internal?**

In conceptualising the rise of religion as a significant identity marker for ethnic minorities, (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 1994) complex and diverse reasons have been proposed (Hussain and Choudhury 2007). For example, Ballard (1996) argues that identification with religion is a reaction to external rejection by the white majority. In this sense, the growing identification with religion was because Muslims felt the religious aspect of their identity was under attack and denied by the white majority. In this research, the importance of the religion of Islam as a ‘useful vehicle for political mobilisation’ is highlighted (Hussain and Choudhury 2007: 18). Gardner and Shukur (1994: 164) also find that ‘Islam provides both a
positive identity, in which solidarity can be found, together with an escape from the oppressive tedium of being constantly identified in negative terms.’ This theory, which I call the reactive hypothesis, has also been used or supported by other writers. For example, Saeed et al. (1999), by utilising social identity theory and the reactive hypothesis, explained the significance of religion amongst young Scottish Pakistanis. In highlighting the importance of public devaluation of Muslims and Islam, Saeed et al. (1999: 26) cited Turner’s (1985) hypothesis that ‘majority group public devaluation of a personally important social identity results in more intergroup solidarity on the part of the minority/devalued group, and that this is a mechanism which allows the minority group to increase intergroup differentiation and to maintain its self-esteem’ (cited in Saeed et. al. 1999: 26). Saeed et. al. (1999: 26) argue that ‘reactions to threat or perceived notions of threat are affected by the importance of social identity to the individuals involved.’ In this regard, the significance of religion (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Modood 1994) was linked to the rise of political Islam, especially after political events such as the Salman Rushdie fatwa in 1989 and the 7/7 bombings in London, and international matters such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the 1991 Gulf War (Saeed et. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007), and the 9/11 bombings in New York. This led some young British-born Muslims to reinvent the concept of the Ummah, the global community of Muslims, as global victims (Modood 2005).

From this perspective, all of the above events led many to think of themselves for the first time as Muslims in a public way, and to think that this choice was important in their relation to other Muslims and to wider British (and international) society (Modood 2007). Those initially termed Pakistani (mainly living in England) were re-categorised first as Asian and then as Muslim (Modood 2005). Anthias (2001: 626) also argues that new British Muslim identity ‘is not confined to an ethnic group, but is an amalgam, neither purely religious nor specifically ethnic, that may be linked to forging identity as a culture of resistance.’ Archer (2001: 87), in her study of young Muslim men’s identity negotiation in four schools in England, suggests that constructing Muslim identities ‘rather than just being a reaction to white racism’ can be actively ‘engaging with white society, rejecting whiteness and British identity through identification with a strong religion that unifies young Muslims from
different Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds.’ She also relates strong religious identification with resisting ‘popular stereotypes of weak and passive Asian’ (Archer 2003: 50). Strong identification with religion could ‘provide a source of pride, solidarity and status among Muslims’ (Archer 2003: 53). Archer also argues that Muslim identity supersedes national identities such as Bangladeshi, Pakistani (2003: 49) and British identity (2001: 87). Even though it is the most applied, the reactive or resistant interpretation of Muslim identity is not the only explanation for the rise of religion as a significant identity marker.

By dismissing the importance of religiosity or the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, Samad (2004: 17 - cited in Hussain and Choudhury 2007: 17) argues that religious identity becomes ‘prominent as people, particularly second generations, become British.’ Samad (2004: 17 - cited in Hussain and Choudhury 2007: 17) suggests that the loss of linguistic skills of South Asians makes identification with their parents’ country (such as Pakistan) less significant and thus Muslim identity becomes more important. In contrast to Samad and the above writers who highlight more the reactive aspects of Muslim identity, other authors point to a more positive and internal role for religion in forming people’s social identities (Jacobson 1997b; Ysseldyk et. al. 2010; Park 2007). For these writers, religion as a system of meaning or a system of guiding beliefs, can frame social identities ‘through the increasing importance of the relevant group membership to the self-concept’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010: 61; see also Park 2007).

For example, Ysseldyk et. al. (2010: 60) writes that ‘as a social identity anchored in a system of guiding beliefs, religious affiliation should serve a uniquely powerful function in shaping psychological and social processes.’ Ysseldyk et. al. (2010: 60), proposes within the social identity theory framework that ‘the unique characteristics of a group membership inextricably linked to a religious belief system (even compared with other ideological belief systems) may be essential to explain why religiosity is often embraced with such tenacity.’ Highlighting the importance of a comprehensive system of meaning provided by a religion, Park (2007: 320) also argues that religiosity can provide ‘a comprehensive framework for perceiving, understanding and evaluating their experience as well as organising and directing their behaviour.’ For Ysseldyk et al (2010: 61), the significance of religious social
identities lies in the unique characteristics of religion - compelling affective experiences and a moral authority that cannot be empirically disputed - which can ‘lend this particular social identity a personal significance exceeding that of membership in other groups.’

From a more empirical perspective, Archer (2001) highlighted some positive internal characteristics of Islam that could result in a stronger association with Muslim identity. She argues that ‘the association of Islam as strong and Muslims as all one could imply conversely that the boys were challenging British white culture as weak and divided’ (Archer 2001: 87-8). For example, in her study, the more cohesive Muslim families were distinguished from unstable and constantly reconstituted white families (Archer 2001: 88). In this sense, the increasing association with Muslim identity was not only a matter of rejecting racism (in the form of resisting British or Asian identities) because it also highlighted the importance of religion which could provide a source of pride, solidarity and status for Muslims (Archer 2003: 53). Jacobson (1997b: 238) also argues that ‘the special significance of religion lies in the fact that Islam, by and large, is central to their sense of who they are: they affirm their belief in its teachings and regard it as something in relation to which they should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life and which therefore demands of them a self-conscious and explicit commitment.’ Jacobson (1997b: 239) argues that the importance of religion for young British Pakistanis is manifested in the ‘universal relevance and applicability’ of Islam and its clear-cut ‘social boundaries’ compared to the importance of ethnicity, which is related to particular places and has increasingly permeable boundaries. The process of boundary construction amongst Muslims is related to the teachings of Islam which places special emphasis on ‘correct action’ (Esposito 2011: 159). This emphasis on correct and rightful actions means that ‘to be a devout Muslim one must behave in certain, explicitly defined ways; and therefore a Muslim is obliged to express his or her belonging to the Muslim community, and detachment from non-Muslim society, in an especially concrete and unequivocal manner’(Jacobson 1997b: 248). The crucial emphasis on rightful actions in Islam, which covers all aspects of life, can create social differences that ‘distinguish observant Muslims from non-Muslims’ on a daily basis (Jacobson 1997b: 248). Jacobson (1997b: 248) suggests that Muslims’
commitment to many religious actions ‘contribute to the collective construction and maintenance of religious boundaries which act to preserve and enhance the integrity of the religious community and the internal logic of expressions of religious identity.’ In this explication of the significance of this relation, special weight is placed on religiosity and the notion of practicing and observing religion. In this sense, the rise of religion as an identity marker can be associated with the rise of religiosity or becoming a more practicing Muslim, especially amongst second generation Muslims. From this perspective, Islam offers not just a sense of belonging but a code of practice as well. As I mentioned earlier, one important part of ethnic/faith minority people’s self-identification or identity strategy is identification with the majority group or the country of residence. In the next section, I conceptualise the importance of national identities and the significance that can be attributed to such identities.

National Identities: Non-Recognition and its Impacts

National identity can play a significant role in a multicultural society as it cultivates a common sense of belonging among diverse communities, binds individuals and generations, and makes a united community (Parekh 2006; Miller 1989). On the other hand, multiculturalism, either as a theory or policy, is intended to promote ethnic or religious minorities’ integration into wider society (Kymlicka 1995; Modood 2007) alongside accommodating their cultural rights and respecting their cultural identities. Minority groups may also wish to integrate into the larger society in order to be accepted as full members of it (Kymlicka 1995). To associate with a national identity, people need to base their identities upon national identity markers: ‘any characteristics associated with an individual that they might choose to present to others, in order to support a national identity claim’ (Kiely et. al. 2001: 35-6). These characteristics are very important in the construction of national identity. From a sociological perspective, identification processes can be considered either as a being process that uses identity markers such as birth and ancestry, or as a choosing process that uses identity markers such as residence and citizenship
The former process of identification is mainly associated with ethnic or racial identities, while the latter process is associated with civic or liberal identities. Bond (2006: 611) points out that residence, birth, and ancestry are the three most prominent markers of national identity; however, the salience of these identity markers in the formation of national citizenship varies in different countries. At the social and individual level, it is mainly indigenous people who use birth and ancestry markers for their identity claims, while ethno-religious minorities and immigrants may instead use residential markers (Hussain and Miller 2006: 12). The birth identity marker, however, is not exclusively used by indigenous people because those ethnic/faith minorities who were born in a host country, for example in the case of second generation minorities, can also use birthplace to reinforce their identity claims. Minorities’ claims for national belonging may not be accepted by the majority unless they see such claims and markers as genuine. As Bond (2006: 610-11) argues, ‘the claims to national belonging of those characterised by difference (not least with respect to national and ethnic origin) may be problematised by the beliefs which the majority hold about the validity of such claims.’ As Jacobson (1997) argues, the exclusion of ethno-religious minorities may be due to the persistence of ethnic or racial boundaries that socially constrain national belonging to categories such as Britishness, Englishness, or Scottishness.

Non-recognition (Taylor 1992) can happen in different forms and levels such as political, institutional, and social. To conceptualise the notion of non-recognition, it is essential to start with the conception of recognition and its importance for one’s identity formation. For Honneth (1995: 92), ‘practical identity-formation presupposes inter-subjective recognition.’ In other words, developing a sense of self requires that one is recognized by others. Honneth (1995: 92) argues that ‘one can develop a practical relation to oneself only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee.’ Similarly, Taylor (1992: 64) argues that our sense of self is ‘formed by recognition’ and that this is the recognition that forges identity. He (1995: 231) further claims that ‘my own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.’ Thus, ‘individuals can only have positive attitudes to themselves if those with whom they interact value them in specific ways’ (Thompson 2012: 225).
These communitarian multiculturalists argue that if any society (in its institutional meaning) or others (as individual fellows) do not recognise such identities, one’s ‘positive understanding of self that they have acquired inter-subjectively’ (Honneth 1995: 131), may be destroyed or distorted. Furthermore, Taylor (1992: 25) also points out that non-recognition of a person’s identity or culture by others ‘can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.’ Taylor (1995: 226) further argues that non-recognition ‘can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred.’ In the worst case, non-recognition can lead to serious psychological problems such as self-hatred and may lead people of difference towards alternative identities in less intense cases. This is what I found in the case of those Muslims who find their Scottish or British national identities questioned, challenged, or denied.

At a more social level, for Honneth (1995: 134), the ‘denigration of individual or collective ways of life…robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to attribute social values to their own abilities.’ Those who have their identity claims ridiculed or questioned, for instance, will find it harder than others, whose collective identity is taken for granted - namely the majority - to have their social existence and social identity widely valued by society. It is here that the importance of Islamophobia and racism, as I conceptualized it earlier, come to interplay with the conception of non-recognition. People who experience or fear violent attack, because of their racial or cultural differences, ‘will lose the sense that their identity is stable and continuous over time, and that the environment in which they find themselves is safe and secure’ (Thompson 2012: 227). Goodall (2007: 96) suggests that ‘[e]xtreme racism denigrates people and represents them as inferior: they ... become targets of hatred or contempt.’ Further to such physical and violent abuse, verbal and speech abuse and harassment can also lead to the marginalisation of racial or ethno-religious minorities. As Parekh (2006: 214) argues, ‘hate speech stigmatises its target by ascribing to it a set of constitutive qualities that are widely viewed as highly undesirable’ thus victims can be ‘degraded’ and even ‘demonised.’ Thus, non-recognition, in all its possible practiced forms such as verbal and physical abuse, can undermine the self-confidence that is the ‘vital prerequisite’ (Honneth 2003: 138) of all positive attitudes to one’s self-understanding.
To sum up, according to multiculturalists such as Taylor (1992; 1995), Honneth (1992; 1995; 2003), and Parekh (2006), non-recognition is a form of denial and disrespect of one’s identity and social and cultural being that can affect their self-image and self-realisation, and may also result in their social exclusion. As McCrone and Bechhofer (2008) argue, one’s national identity is greatly affected by how one’s claims are regarded by others and if one’s identity claim is rejected, this may lead to social exclusion. Hence, Honneth (2003: 174) argues that ‘[t]he justice or wellbeing of a society is proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition under which personal identity-formation, hence individual self-realization, can proceed adequately.’ Due to the importance of the recognition of ethno-religious minorities’ identity and culture, we return to the key concept of the nation. Considering the importance of civic bases and the recognition of hybrid identities, Chapter 5 examines how and on what bases Muslims negotiate their national identities and explores if their Scottish or British identities are regarded as valid claims in the society. This leads to the conclusion of this chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter, by highlighting the notion of hybridity and context-dependence in ethnic/faith minority groups’ social self-identification, presented that their hybrid identities can be varied in strength and valence. It also conceptualised that Muslims’ religion, particularly among practicing Muslims, can play an important part in their social self-identification. This chapter argued that the significance of religion as an identity marker amongst Muslims – especially practicing and second generation - can be either due to the public devaluation of Muslims as Islamophobia, or due to the significance of the religion of Islam as a system of guiding beliefs which provides clear social boundaries that are distinctive from mainstream society. This chapter also argued that Muslims’ religious identity and practice can be a ground for Islamophobia. It was discussed that as a result of a process of racialisation, all Muslims, regardless of their ethnic background, can be associated with a specific ethnicity and religious practice and thus be discriminated against and/or harassed. This chapter also presented the theoretical debates between multiculturalists and
assimilationists on the question of how to incorporate immigrants and/or ethnic/faith minorities into a host society. It was identified that multiculturalists highlight the importance of recognition and respect of ethnic/faith minorities’ culture and identity, whereas assimilationists emphasise the need to blend in with the majority. This study also presented theoretical accounts about the practical and functional aspects of integration and highlighted the importance of social and structural factors on ethnic/minorities’ integration. Considering the major task of this study, this chapter highlighted some of the literature that conceptualises the importance of religious and relational issues on Muslims’ integration. It was asserted that Muslims’ religious identity and practice, particularly in the case of practicing Muslims, can provide religious boundaries for their social integration. To conclude, these theoretical accounts conceptualise the importance of religion in Muslims’ social self-identification, experience of Islamophobia, and limited social integration. These concepts will inform the findings of this study on the above issues. This leads to the next chapter, where I highlight the Scottish context within which these issues are presented and provide an overview of Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and socio-economic integration in Scotland.
Chapter 3: Context: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Racism in Scotland

Introduction

In the last chapter, I conceptualised the importance of different social and cultural factors - with a specific focus on religion - in the discussion of social self-identification, Islamophobia, and integration. In this chapter, drawing on the existing literature, I highlight the Scottish context of these issues and review Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To locate these issues in the Scottish context, this chapter will focus specifically on Scottish nationalism, multiculturalism, and racism. More specifically, this chapter firstly provides a brief historical outline of Muslims’ presence in Scotland and highlights the key demographic features of Muslims. Then, I will review the discussion of Scottish national identity and review the existing literature on its inclusive or exclusive nature. Thirdly, this chapter discusses Muslims’ social self-identification and discusses the importance of Muslims’ national and religious identities. Then, I review different accounts on the presence of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland and discuss Muslims’ experience of Islamophobia. Finally, it outlines Scottish multicultural approaches to ethnic/faith minorities and reviews the important factors that affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland.

Muslims in Scotland: Historical and Social Presence

At the beginning of the twentieth century, many colonies introduced legislation to restrict immigration, although immigration to the UK remained relatively free (Maan 1992). Even though Muslims’ migration to Britain dates back to a century before the twentieth (Ansari 2004), the main wave of Muslim immigrants came to the UK after 1945 in the post-Second World War era (Gilliat-Ray 2010). Indians and Pakistanis made up the first major wave of immigration to Britain in the twentieth century, bringing Hinduism and Sikhism as well as Islam (Siddiqui 2006). It is, however,
important to note that Britain has seen in previous decades, for example, Irish and Caribbean migration. The first Muslim immigration to Scotland occurred in the 1920s, which set the trend and laid down the foundations for the settlement of the present Asian community (Maan 1992). From the 1920s, Indians, a sizeable proportion of whom were Muslim, began to settle in Scottish industrial towns such as Edinburgh, Glasgow and Dundee (Siddiqui 2006). The economic prosperity of Britain during the 1950s brought a greater number of Muslims from Pakistan to Scotland, and this led to subsequent immigration over the years for both economical and family reasons (Siddiqui 2006). By the 1950s, there were about 600 Asians in Scotland. However, increasing Muslim immigration saw this number rise to around 4,000 by the end of 1960 (Siddiqui 2006). Most Muslims came to Scotland after the partition of Pakistan and India. The first wave of Muslim immigrants from Pakistan and India came primarily to act as cheap and unskilled labour for Britain’s manufacturing industries. However, there were some professionals and students, particularly in medicine, who came to develop their field or continue their studies (Siddiqui 2006). Apart from the large number of Indo-Pakistani Muslims (National Records of Scotland 2013a: 11), Scottish Muslim society is composed of other newcomers - mainly from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Turkey, Iran, and the North African states (Siddiqui 2006) - who constitute a very small proportion of Scotland’s Muslim population. Therefore, the Scottish Muslim communities are newly established communities whose first members mostly came to Scotland as cheap labour and later joined the Scottish working class. This length of residence, however, can enable Muslims to possess a residential marker for supporting their Scottish national identity.

Turning to the key demographic features of Muslim communities, it is important to note that much data in this review is drawn from the findings of the 2001 census, which was the first large-scale source of data available on ethnic/faith minority groups in Scotland since 1991 (de Lima 2005). Some general statistics have been drawn from the 2011 census findings, which are the latest features on ethnic/faith minority people, but as more focused analysis of the 2011 census findings is pending.
I draw on other available sources. In terms of population and ethnicity, Islam is the most common faith in Scotland after Christianity, with around 77 thousand people describing their religion as Muslim (National Records of Scotland 2013a: 32). Muslims constitute around 1.4% of the population of Scotland (National Records of Scotland 2013a: 32) and constitute the largest non-Christian religious community with more than half (56%) of the non-Christian religious population (National Records of Scotland 2013b: 3). According to the analysis of ethnicity in the 2001 Census, over 70% of the visible ethnic minority population in Scotland was Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese or Other South Asian). The Pakistani community is the largest BME (Black Minority Ethnic) group in Scotland at 0.63%, representing just under one third of the visible ethnic minority population in Scotland and two-thirds (67%) of Muslims (Scottish Government 2005b). These statistics reflect the visibility of Muslims in Scotland. The importance of Muslims’ visibility was highlighted in previous research (Allen 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014), suggesting a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiencing Islamophobia. This consideration will be examined in Muslims’ experience of racism and Islamophobia in Chapters 6 and 7.

Another significant statistical point on Muslims’ population is with regard to their geographical distribution. Around 79% of Scotland’s Muslims live in large urban areas and 13% in other urban areas; more specifically, 42% live in Glasgow, 16% in Edinburgh, 7% in Dundee and the rest in other parts of Scotland (Scottish Government 2005b). These statistics reflect the fact that only a small number of Muslims are living in Scottish small towns which are predominantly white majority areas. Some research suggests that ethnic minority people, including Muslims are at greater risk of racism in small towns and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). Living in such areas may affect their social and national inclusion/exclusion, thus the importance of Muslim population density is discussed in Chapter 6 and 7.

For example, I draw on the work of Netto et al (2011), who reviewed Poverty and Ethnicity in Scotland.
In relation to birth place, around 50% of Muslims were born inside the UK (Scottish Government 2005b: 13). More specifically just under half (47) of Pakistanis – which constitute the majority of Muslims in Scotland - were born in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). In relation to ethnic group, only around 7% of Muslims are white and the rest are non-white (Scottish Government 2005b). More specifically, two-thirds (67%) of non-white Muslims are of Pakistani origin, around 12% are other South Asian, 3% Caribbean and African, and 10% are of mixed background and from other ethnic groups (Scottish Government 2005b). These statistics show that around half of the Muslim population were born inside the UK, which may affect their sense of belonging to Britishness. In particular, due to the significance of the birthplace marker to everyday understandings of Scottishness, being born in Scotland can affect the sense of Scottishness among those Muslims who were born there (McVie and Wiltshire 2010). The other side of this coin is that the other half of Muslims were born outside of Britain, thus lacking the most important marker to be seen as British, birthplace. These people and even those who were born elsewhere in the UK, such as England or Northern Ireland, may find identifying with Britishness and Scottishness to be challenging (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010). In this study, those Muslims who were born outside of the UK will be considered to be first generation Muslims and those who were born inside the UK will be considered to be second generation Muslims [the rationale for this categorisation is discussed in the next chapter]. This research explores which identity markers that the first generation and the second generation Muslims utilize to support their Scottish identity claims, and whether such claims were accepted by the majority or not; if not why not.

In terms of socio-economic position, according to the Scottish Government analysis of the 2001 UK Census in the Scottish context, the Muslim community has the youngest age profile, with around 90% of the population being under 50. Approximately 60% of Muslims are in the age range of 16-49 (Scottish Government 2005b). Almost 78% are of the working age population (defined by the 2001 Census as people aged 16-74) and they have the highest unemployment rate at 13%, which is nearly double the overall unemployment rate for Scotland (7%) (Scottish Government 2005b). Similarly, the most recent report (Poverty by Ethnicity and
Country 1999-2008) by Netto et al. (2011) found that employment rates are particularly low among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, especially among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in Scotland (the importance of gendered process of exclusion is discussed in more detail in the next chapter). This report also found that the highest rate of poverty (income, before housing costs, below 60% of median) in Scotland for Pakistanis/Bangladeshi was 50%, followed by Blacks with around 40%, Mixed with 25%, Whites with 20%, and Indians and Other Asians with around 15% (Netto et al. 2011: 16). Muslims also have the highest level of self-employment after Sikhs (33%), at 29% (Scottish Government 2005c). This was compared to other ethnic/faith minority groups such as Jews with 27%, Buddhists with 20%, Hindus with 14%, and Christians with 13% (Scottish government 2005c). The report of Netto et al. (2011) also notes the high level of self-employment amongst visible ethnic minority communities more generally. This was consistent with the wider report (European Monitoring Centre – EUMC - 2006), which shows that Muslims are often disproportionately represented in areas with poor housing, their unemployment rates are higher than average, and they are often employed in jobs that require lower qualifications and are in low-paying sectors. This was despite the fact that unemployment and self-employment rates were particularly low amongst other white minority groups in Scotland such as A8 migrants1 (Netto et al. 2011). This may suggest racial discrimination against visible ethnic minority groups, predominantly Muslims, which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

In terms of educational attainments and achievements, the European Monitoring Centre (EUMC) (2006) reported that Muslims’ educational achievements across European countries, including the UK, falls below average. It is, however, important to note that more nationally-focused reports (such as the Scottish Funding Council) suggested that Asian Pakistanis, predominantly Muslims, had the second highest number of full time students amongst the ethnic/faith minority groups in the Pupil Census in 2012 (Scottish Government 2013b). This report also showed that ‘in further education, the proportion of ethnic minority students in 2010/11 was 4.8%,

1 This abbreviation stands for ‘the eight Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004’ Netto et al. 2011: 6).
with African and Pakistani students being the largest ethnic minority groups (Scottish Government 2013b: 17). This is in line with accounts that conceptualise Asian young men, predominantly Muslims, as *academic* (Hopkins 2009: 300) and ‘behavers and achievers’ in school (Archer 2001: 81).

These statistics, therefore, indicate that the Muslim community have a low socio-economic status. It is, however, important to note that some authors considered Asians to be more middle-class (cited in Archer 2001: 81- Cohen, 1988; Connolly, 1998; Gillborn, 1990; Gilroy and Lawrence, 1988; Mac and Ghaill, 1994; Rattansi, 1992). This suggests that the category of ‘Asian’ is not a homogenous category and need to be clarified and unpacked (see for example Ballard 1994). Hopkins (2009: 301) further argues that ‘many ethnic minority groups in Scotland do not experience the poverty and disadvantage that is often associated with the circumstances of such groups in some cities in England.’ This is a comparative context, thus the findings of this research can contribute to the understanding of potential similarities and differences. Hopkins found that the majority of participants in his project\(^1\) were relatively middle class (Hopkins 2009). Although the large scale surveys point to the lower socio-economic status of Muslims, Hopkins’ and Archer’s accounts illustrate the fact that Muslims in Scotland, like elsewhere in the UK, constitute a heterogeneous category. As Modood (2003) and Meer (2012) argue, the Muslim category is an internally diverse category. To sum up this section, the above statistics point to factors that can affect and actually challenge Muslims’ self-identification with Scottishness and their social-economic integration. This leads to the discussion of Scottish national identity features and how Muslims identify with Scottishness.

*Scottishness: Inclusive or Exclusive*

Scottish governments (including the current administration) have tried to build an inclusive sense of Scottish nationhood. One way of promoting this inclusive sense of Scottishness has been to launch multicultural campaigns such as ‘New Scot’, ‘One

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\(^1\) This is from 11 focus groups and 22 interviews with young Muslim men living in the cities of Glasgow and Edinburgh.
Scotland, Many Cultures’ and ‘Scotland Performs’ (Scottish Government 2004; 2005a; 2007). The importance of these campaigns is discussed later in Chapter 6. The more celebrated form of Scottish national identity is also strongly affected by Scottish elite nationalism, which has been described as civic and benign in form (Hussain and Miller 2006: 27). Hussain and Miller (2006: 27) purport that ‘in the 1990s, Scottish nationalist and devolutionist elites were united and consistent in proclaiming their vision of an inclusive Scotland.’ After devolution in 1999, Scottish multicultural programmes have explicitly attempted to promote an inclusive sense of Scottishness. Nationalist and devolutionist elites, who were very sensitive to the dark side of nationalism, ensured that post-devolution politics were not racialised and determined to define a new inclusive nationalism (Hussain and Miller 2006). For whatever reasons, ‘as the most dominant voice of nationalism in Scotland, the SNP tends to promote a version of nationalism which sees everyone living in Scotland as having a valued contribution to make, regardless of ‘race’, ethnicity or place of birth’ (Hopkins 2008: 120). In this sense, Scotland provides a good instance of a civic and residential basis for being Scottish (Kiely et. al. 2005). However, evidence (Hussain and Miller 2006; Bond 2006) suggests that the majority of the population is not as multicultural or inclusive in its perspective as the nationalist elites. As Bond (2006: 610) argues, ‘even those who enjoy full formal citizenship may still, in the eyes of the majority, be excluded from belonging to the nation in which they reside.’ Citizenship, thus, could give people a sense of belonging even as this belonging could be challenged or misrecognised. Previous research (Runnymede Trust 1998; Bond 2006; Meer et al. 2012; Blackwood et al 2012) suggests that ethnic minorities’ sense of belonging to the host country could be questioned based upon their differences, despite their formal citizenship status. Such exclusion may be based upon differences in birthplace, origin, ancestry, culture, religion, and/or language. Similarly, Jacobson (1997a; 1997b) highlights the persistence of three ‘boundaries of Britishness’ - the civic, the racial, and the cultural - and shows how, for example, British Pakistanis can be excluded on these grounds.

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1 Two possible reasons are to assert Scottish moral superiority over the English and to gain the widest possible consensus to achieve independence (Hussain and Miller 2006: 27).
Even though the new sense of Scottishness – at its state and elite levels is based on civic and inclusive markers, at the street level, racial and ethnic markers such as birth and ancestry markers have still been used by people as primary markers of Scottish identity. By analysing the result of a survey (Criteria for being Scottish) in 1997, Bechhofer and McCrone (2009: 74) show that 65% of Scots see the residence marker as very or fairly important, 73% the ancestry marker, and 82% the birthplace marker. A recent Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2009) showed the same result as 1997, with 82% of Scots seeing birthplace, 73% ancestry, and 65% residence as very or fairly important determinants of Scottishness (Reicher et al 2010: 15). Bond (2006), in his analysis of the findings of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2003), argues that although ancestry and ethnicity are generally considered to be less fundamental to national identity, ‘these more ethnic criteria are widely regarded as relevant and important, and thus those who lack these markers may have their Scottishness called into question’ (Bond 2006: 623).

On the one hand, minorities - especially those who were born outside of Scotland - use residential markers to include themselves within Scottish society. For instance, Hussain and Miller’s (2006: 155) study revealed that more than four fifths (83%) of Pakistanis assert that residence regardless of birthplace and ancestry is the necessary criterion for being ‘Scottish’. On the other hand, two thirds (64%) of majority Scots regard birthplace as a necessary criterion for being ‘Scottish’ (ibid.) All of these findings confirm that although various Scottish governments have attempted to build a new sense of Scottishness based upon civic and inclusive bases, for a majority of Scots, birthplace and ancestry are still the most important determinants of being ‘Scottish.’ It is important to note that second generation Muslims acquire the birthplace marker by being born in Scotland. Thus this can imply a potential inclusion for second generation Muslims, but nevertheless, the importance of other issues such as the continuation of racial markers or religious differences may affect their claims to identity, which are discussed in Chapter 5. Accordingly, it seems that Scottish multicultural policies may have had little or perhaps no impact on changing majorities’ perceptions of the bases of Scottish national identity. However, as Reicher et al (2010) argue, a fairer and more inclusive Scottish reality will only be achieved by changing people’s conceptions of their national identity. This study will
build upon existing studies of Scots’ perceptions of Scottishness by exploring the reasons for Muslims’ social and national exclusion. Consequently, it will explore what identity markers they use to belong to Scottish society. In the next section, I review the existing literature on Muslims’ social self-identification processes and discuss in particular the importance of religion and nationality in their identity negotiation.

Muslims’ Social Identity in Scotland: Muslim and Scottish

Different studies suggested that Muslims’ social self-identification in Scotland is hyphenated or hybrid; drawing on religion, ethnicity, and nationality (Saeed et al 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). The above cited studies particularly suggest that identification with Scottishness and Muslim identity is more common than identification with other identity markers such as ethnicity. For example, in the early study by Saeed et al (1999: 836) of sixty-three school children from Pakistani background, they found that ‘Scottish-Muslim’ was the most popular identity. In their study of 759 ethnic Pakistanis living in Scotland, Hussain and Miller (2006: 150) offered respondents four ‘hyphenated’ identities from which to choose. They found that 44% of respondents chose Scottish Muslim, 23% British Muslim, 15% British Pakistani, and 12% Scottish Pakistani. This means that more than a third chose British and more than half of them chose Scottish. Hussain and Miller (2006) also found that Muslims in Scotland tended to identify with a Scottish sub-state national identity, despite Muslims’ tendency in England to identify with a British and not an English identity. Similarly in his qualitative research of 11 focus groups and 22 interviews with young Muslim men in Glasgow and Edinburgh, Hopkins (2008) found that the vast majority of his respondents self-identified as Scottish Muslims and drew upon a range of markers of Scottishness in making such claims. Hopkins (2007), however, argues that Muslims’ affiliation with religious and national identities varies in strength, nature, and meaning, and that little attention has been paid to unpack the different importance, meanings and strength of these identities.
Unpacking these multiple or hybrid identities, the importance of different issues such as ethnicity, ‘race’ and religion come into play (Hopkins 2007: 78). One of the most significant factors was the importance of religion in forming Muslims social self-identification (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et al 1999; Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; Change Institute 2009; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). For example, in the study of Saeed et al. (1999: 830) for the majority of respondents, religion was the most important marker of their identity because 97% chose Muslim identity which was ‘more than double those choosing Pakistani identity.’ It has also been argued that commitment to religion and religious identities can affect identification with other identities such as ethnic and national identity. For example, Hopkins (2004: 265) showed that some young Scottish Muslims simultaneously ‘include themselves in the perimeters of Scottishness, whilst also excluding themselves from belonging completely within boundaries of Scottishness.’ Distancing from complete belonging within the boundaries of Scottishness was mainly due to having different ancestry, a different religion, and not drinking alcohol in pubs (Hopkins 2004). Hopkins (2004: 266) argues that, as a result, ‘many young Muslim men possess fragile Scottish national identities.’

As mentioned in the last chapter, different theories and explanations have been proposed to explicate the significance of Muslim identity, which can be summarized in relation to two main explanations; reactive identities and the rise of religiosity. Explaining the significance of religion in the Scottish context, Saeed et al (1999: 26), for example, associated the significance of Muslim identity with the reactive identities (proposed by Gardner and Shukur 1994; Ballard 1996; Anthias 2001; Archer 2003) that highlight the importance of both the public devaluation of Muslims and political events. The latter explanation, the rise of religiosity, was highlighted in the study of Jacobson (1997b) that pointed to the more internal role of the religion of Islam as a meaning system and guiding belief system in forming Muslims’ social identities. In this explanation, religiosity and commitment to religion was very much crucial. In line with this explanation, Hopkins (2007: 78) found in his qualitative research that young Muslims’ narratives of their religious identities tended to focus on ‘doing Islam and being Islamic’ and ‘being a proper Muslim.’ It is important to note that Hopkins (2007) also highlighted the relevance of the first
explanation; reactive religious identities formed as a result of the public devaluation of Islam and/or Muslims. He found that young Muslims’ narratives about their religious identity were also focused on ‘the clarification of what the young men see as the true meaning of their religious faith countering the constant (mis)representation of their religion’ (Hopkins 2007: 78). This may suggest that there can be a combination of reasons underlying the significance of religion in Muslims’ social self-identification. For example, it can suggest that the public devaluation of Islam as well as the internal characteristics of Islam itself go hand in hand in making Muslim identity a significant identity marker. This association, however, needs to be examined; this is the task of Chapter 5.

Religion was not the only factor that could affect Muslims’ social self-identification. Other issues such as racism and Islamophobia were also highlighted in the literature as contributing to the strengthening of Muslims’ inter-group identities or weakening their sense of belonging to their host countries (Hopkins 2004). It was also discussed that religious identity and practice can play a part in discrimination against Muslims (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). It is to this that I now turn.

Racism and Islamophobia in Scotland

For many people, Scotland seems to be free from racism and any ethnic discrimination. However, it seems that the idea that Scotland is free from racism is actually a myth, resulting from factors other than the absence of racism per se. As Penrose and Howard (2008) argue, the idea that Scotland is free from racism stems from two assumptions: that the presence of visible minorities is a prerequisite to racism, and that the degree of racism in any given society is directly proportional to the size of its non-white community. Accordingly, as Scotland’s minorities were largely invisible and formed a very small proportion of the society prior to the 1980s, it was ‘relatively easy to maintain the illusion that racism did not feature in Scottish society’ (Penrose and Howard 2008: 95-6). Therefore, racism was a hidden phenomenon in Scotland until the early 1980s, when the number of visible ethnic
minorities increased from 38,000 to almost 52,000 people, which represented around 1.0 per cent of Scotland’s population at the time (Penrose and Howard 2008: 96).

During the 1980s, racism appeared gradually. For instance in 1987, a report revealed that over 80 per cent of Indian and Pakistani people interviewed in Glasgow had experienced racist abuse, while 20 per cent had been victims of physical attacks (Walsh 1987 cited in Penrose and Howard 2008: 96). There has also been evidence of institutional racism in the legal system and the police force (Weston 2005). Penrose and Howard (2008) argue that the new attitude and response to racism shifted after a coincidence of some factors including: the election of New Labour in 1997, which had liberal attitudes towards immigrants and paid attention to cultural diversity; racial equality and social inclusion; media coverage of the growing number of racial attacks in Scotland; and finally, the changing political context in Scotland. The Scottish Government recognises that racism today is experienced by many communities - including both visible and non-visible minorities - and that it can take different forms, including direct, indirect, and institutional (Scottish Government, One Scotland). Illustrating this, Reicher et. al. (2010) pointed out that the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2006) shows that Scots’ attitudes towards the government’s policies to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities is not inclusive, and that Scots ‘may not value fairness and inclusiveness to the extent that they themselves often like to think’ (Reicher et. al. 2010: 14). Furthermore, government evaluations of the ‘One Scotland’ campaign suggest that there has been limited success in changing attitudes and that exposure to racism actually increased over the campaign’s duration (TNS System 3 2006). Ethnic minority people in Scotland continue to report high levels of racially motivated crime (Clark and Moody 2002; Moody and Clark 2004; Scottish Government Statistical Bulletin 2010). From a more sociological perspective, many studies also highlighted the development of racial exclusion in Scotland (Bond 2006; Virdee et. al. 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010). The launch of the One Scotland, New Scot and Scotland Performs programmes itself betrays an awareness that many ordinary Scots might not be as multiculturalist as the government and the Parliament (Hussain and Miller 2006). In the following section, I specifically review Muslims’ experience of discrimination and Islamophobia.
Muslims’ Experiences of Islamophobia: Less Islamophobia in Scotland?

As mentioned above, various researchers have studied racism against ethnic minority people in Scotland (Miles and Dunlop 1987; Bowes, McCluskey and Sim 1990; Bailey, Bowes and Sim 1995; Arshad 1999, 2003a; Kelly 2000, 2002, 2003; Bond 2006; Virdee et al. 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et al. 2009; Reicher et al 2010). Some research, more specifically, studied anti-Muslim racism (Hopkins 2004; Virdee et al. 2006; Kyriakides et al. 2009). Little research, however, has specifically studied Islamophobia in Scotland, except the research carried out by Hussain and Miller (2006) and, partly, the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys (2003; 2006; 2010) and El-Nakla et al.(2007). This may suggest a low or small presence of Islamophobia in Scotland, as indicated by Hussain and Miller’s (2006) research. Even though it was found to be less Islamophobic than the majority of England, however, Hussain and Miller (2006: 55-6) found that half of the majority of Scots feel that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland; half doubt Muslims’ commitment to Scotland; and four-fifths1 feel that Muslims’ first loyalty lies outside of Scotland.’ They also found that ‘a third feel “some economic resentment towards Muslims and express socially exclusive attitudes towards them.”’ These opinions suggest considerable rates of (perhaps latent) Islamophobia in Scotland. They also highlight that Islamophobic attitudes have been more focused on national distrust towards Muslims (with 79%) and fears for national identity (with 52%) than economic resentment (with 30%) and social exclusion (with 32%) (Hussain and Miller 2006: 56).

An analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), in parallel to the findings of Hussain and Miller (2006), suggests that ‘despite the recession, concerns about national identity [with 49%] remain potentially a more important source of discriminatory attitudes than do concerns about the economic consequences of immigration [with 31%]’ (Ormston et al. 2011: 78). For example, only 15% of

1 53% of majority Scots felt that ‘Muslims could never be really committed to Scotland’ and 79% felt that Muslims are ‘more loyal to other Muslims around the world than to other people in this country’ (Hussain and Miller 2006: 54-6).
respondents believed that ‘a Muslim is very/fairly unsuitable to be a primary school
teacher’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 30) and only 23% ‘would be unhappy if a close
relative were to form a relationship with a Muslim,’ whilst just under half (49%)
agree that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in
Scotland’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72). Therefore, by highlighting the importance of
identity concerns, the analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010)
suggests that ‘there has been no significant change in discriminatory attitudes
towards Muslims since 2006, which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than they
were in 2003’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72).

The importance of identity concerns or national mistrust towards Muslims may lie
in Muslims’ visibility and constant display of distinctive religious identity and
practice. For example, Hopkins (2004b: 268) pointed out that the most intense form
of exclusion that Scottish Muslims experience is racism and discrimination, which is
‘often down to their race and physical appearance, and is therefore something they
have little control over’ (Hopkins 2004b: 268). El-Nakla et al’s (2007) study that
examined Scottish Muslim women’s experience of discrimination and Islamophobia,
found that many Muslim women experienced discrimination on the ground of their
skin colour. However, racial differences were not the only basis for discrimination
and/or harassment of Muslims. For example, by highlighting the importance of
Muslims’ religious visibility (in Islamophobia), Hopkins (2004b: 263) suggests that
‘Muslims who openly display markers of their religious identity [such as wearing
hijab in the case of women and maintaining a beard in the case of men] are more
likely to experience exclusion than Muslims who restrict displaying markers of
Muslimness.’ El-Nakla et. al. (2007) also found that Muslim women felt that their
religious appearance, especially when wearing a headscarf or face veil, was
responsible for their abuse and discrimination. As mentioned in the last chapter, the
importance of visibility and display of Muslim religious markers was highlighted by
other studies across the UK (Hopkins et. al. 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens
2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). Thus Muslim experiences of exclusion and
racism, more accurately Islamophobia, are not limited to racial or religious
appearance, and so the importance of cultural difference is also highlighted.
In their qualitative study of looking at the relationship between ‘race’ and nation in a multi-ethnic neighborhood of Glasgow, Virdee et. al. (2006) highlighted the importance of some cultural factors such as accent, dress, and mannerisms in defining Scottishness (see also Kyriakides et. al. 2009). In this study, which was focused on both Muslims and non-Muslims’ views, they found that these cultural signifiers contest the historically founded racialised referent of Scottishness. They also, however, found ‘negative ascriptions such as terrorist and extremist which reinforce…the original racialised referent of Scottishness as whiteness’ (Virdee et. al. 2006). For example, the white respondents did not see religious beliefs as incompatible with Scottishness, but asserted that wearing a hijab or a burqa, which represent or symbolize values like fundamentalism and oppression, are incompatible with Scottishness (Virdee et. al. 2006). Therefore, Virdee et. al. (2006) argue that even though the racialised foundations of Scottishness are culturally hybridized by new markers such as accent and name, other cultural codes serve to place Muslims outside of the Scottish identity.

In sum, the reviewed accounts of Islamophobia and Muslims’ experience of exclusion in this section suggest the persistence of racial and cultural boundaries in defining Scottishness, which can exclude Muslims who may be perceived as foreigners, others, or significations of fundamentalism. In Chapters 6 and 7, this study will discuss the importance of these boundaries in the lived experiences of Scottish Muslims. Muslims’ experience of exclusion and/or maintaining distinctive cultural and religious practice can affect their integration in Scotland. In the next section, I review the discussion of Scottish multiculturalism and present Muslims’ integration in Scotland.

Scottish Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Integration

Modood (2007) argues that Britain has become a multicultural society through the immigration of people from different cultures into Britain, most obviously those who are non-white and from outside Europe. The growth of immigration from former colonies since the 1960s created the need to reconcile the conflicting demands
between the wider society and immigrants’ newly established communities. The new minorities often sought to maintain their own ways of life and to teach such ways of life to their children, while the host country sought to maintain a sense of common national identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding a way for the society to integrate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their aspirations to maintain cherished ways of life and at the same time maintain itself as a historical community of common belonging. Multiculturalism appeared to many people to be one of the main ideologies that took minority equality seriously. For example, Kymlicka (1995) developed his theory of Multiculturalism on the basis of equality and autonomy, and others emphasised equality and respect of different cultures (Taylor 1992; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007). It guided the attempt to promote the equality of different cultural, ethnic, and religious groups by promoting the values and cultures of ethnic minorities. Thereby multiculturalism became a politically and ideologically significant movement in the 1960s by its rejection (especially amongst South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans) of the assimilationist demand of the wider society (Parekh 2006).

Scotland has also followed a path of multiculturalism. Hussain and Miller (2006) argue that Scotland has historically experienced two kinds of multiculturalism: old multiculturalism and new multiculturalism. Old multiculturalism, which was separatist and institutional, mainly applied to Irish Catholics and Jews (Hussain and Miller 2006). It was primarily Irish immigration that led Scotland to establish multicultural state institutions in which a faith-based and state-funded education system was set up by the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918 (Hussain and Miller 2006: 32). Old multiculturalism was always a controversial issue because it highlighted separatism and difference rather than integration. Despite its controversy, faith-based education still applies to the Catholic, Episcopal, and Jewish communities1. The then future first Minister and Scottish National Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond (The Herald 21 April 2005) attempted to justify old

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1 Scotland has more than 400 publicly funded Roman Catholic schools as well as three state-supported Scottish Episcopalian schools and a publicly funded Jewish school (MacLeod 2008).
multiculturalism, by stating that ‘it would be wrong to end an agreement which was entered into in 1918 to bring Catholic schools into the public school system, without the full consent of the Catholic community.’ The separatist and old multiculturalism has not in practice applied to Muslims because they did not show a great deal of enthusiasm for state-funded faith schools. Although there are more than 400 state-funded faith schools in Scotland, to this day, Muslims do not have any state-funded faith schools (MacLeod 2008). Salmond and local councils (particularly in Glasgow) have declared that they will support the establishment of a Muslim state-funded faith school if there is a sustainable demand by the Muslim population (ibid). However, Muslim parents have never demonstrated enough of a demand for a separate school. Most Scottish Muslims support the teaching of all major religions in state schools (Hussain and Miller 2006) rather than the establishment of separate schools. It seems that although many Scottish Muslims seek to maintain their own culture, they mix with the mainstream majority and reject the idea of separate life or establishing an area where they form a local majority.

With regard to new state multiculturalism, as Hussain and Miller (2006) point out, Scotland is far less separatist today than it was in the early twentieth century. Multicultural policies in Scotland have attempted to recognise and accommodate the cultural and religious priorities of ethnic minority groups within a wider collectivity, and thereby make “an important contribution to stimulating positive interaction between them and the wider population, and challenging exclusionary practices’ (Audrey 2000: 238). Since 1999, Scottish governments (4 administrations) have implemented multicultural policies with two important purposes: building an inclusive national identity, and promoting equality and the fight against racism. The Racial Relation (Amendment) Act of 2000\(^1\) (RRAA) was passed soon after the Scottish Parliament and its Executive\(^2\) took power. To promote it, they

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1 Immigration and equal-opportunities legislation are reserved for the UK parliament, but Scotland’s parliament can promote its visions; RRAA was passed by the UK parliament in November 2000 (Penrose and Howard 2008: 98).

2 After devolution in 1999, the new government was established with the name of Scottish Executive, and after the Scottish election in 2007, the new administration (SNP minority government) rebranded itself as ‘The Scottish Government’ (Scottish Government 2011).
enthusiastically monitored equal-opportunities provision and launched a programme centered on an explicitly multiculturalist slogan: *One Scotland, Many Cultures.* The main goals of this campaign were to promote the idea of cultural diversity and to challenge racist language, behaviour, and attitudes in Scotland (Penrose and Howard 2008). The campaign began in September 2002 by raising awareness of racism and promoting understanding of the contribution that other cultures have made to Scotland in the past and present (Scottish Government 2005a). Campaign materials included signs on public transportation and billboards, as well as messages communicated via radio, television, and cinema (Scottish Government 2005a) with the aim of mainstreaming the idea of diversity and equality in Scotland. The more recent broadcast campaign that was begun in 2005, also referred to as Wave 5, aimed to expand the definition of Scotland and Scottishness (Scottish Government 2005a).

Another initiative was the *New Scots* or Fresh Talent Scheme, which focused on retaining new immigrants to meet the challenge of long-term population decline in Scotland by creating conditions whereby more people from outside Scotland would be attracted to work and live there (Scottish Government 2004). This initiative attempted to foster an inclusive sense of Scottishness and to promote equality. As the Scottish Government declared, ‘we will strive to make Scotland a tolerant, open and diverse country, one where all Scots, regardless of their background or origin, feel at home’ (Scottish Government 2004: 22). In keeping with these programmes and initiatives (particularly ‘One Scotland’), the current SNP government launched another programme called ‘Scotland Performs.’ This started in May 2007 and was intended to measure and report on the progress of the Scottish Government in ‘creating a more successful country, with opportunities for all to flourish through increasing sustainable economic growth’ (Scottish Government 2007). The implication of these programmes is that Scottish multiculturalism and equality policies, in parallel to the Scottish elite’s nationalism, follow the same path of promoting the idea of cultural diversity and challenging racism in Scotland. In the next part, I review the literature on Muslim integration in the Scottish context.
Muslims’ integration in Scotland: Limited Integration

Muslim integration - especially their social integration - has been less studied by scholars, with the exceptions of the British Council Scotland Survey (2010) and in part the study of Kidd and Jamieson (2011). There were two studies (Masud 2005; El-Nakla et. al. 2007) that particularly focused on Muslim women’s integration in Scotland. Drawing on the findings of these studies, I outline different proposed barriers and path-ways to Muslims’ integration. The qualitative part\(^1\) of the British Council Scotland Survey (2010:30) explores how both Muslims and non-Muslims had a similar conception of integration, defining it as a policy of acceptance, respect, and also contribution to society, but they found it more difficult to describe what integration meant in practical terms. Highlighting the importance of the distinction between integration and assimilation, this survey showed that Muslims felt that; ‘if integration was defined as complete assimilation then they could never be fully integrated because alcohol was seen as a key part of the Scottish way of life and Muslims are forbidden to drink alcohol’ (British Council Scotland Survey 2010:30). This can suggest the importance of Muslims’ religious considerations in integration and thus suggests that the dominance of alcohol in Scottish culture can function as an important barrier to Muslims’ further integration. This research also revealed that Muslim respondents asserted that if the term integration means taking part in most aspects of Scottish life, living and interacting with non-Muslims, and contributing to society ‘while still being free to observe their beliefs and customs,’ integration would be a more acceptable concept for Muslims (British Council Scotland Survey 2010:30). Similarly, Hussain and Miller’s (2006:146) study showed that Pakistanis were willing to integrate to Scottish society but not to assimilate, and were eager to contribute to the culture of the new Scotland but not to adopt the culture of the old Scotland. However in her study of Muslim women’s voices, Masud (2005) found that Scottish Muslim women felt that they were being forced to change their behaviour as a consequence of the London bombings to avoid being labelled as ‘terrorist’ (Masud 2005). This was supported by the findings of the British Council

\(^1\) This research consisted of a quantitative large scale telephone survey with 1006 respondents, and a qualitative study of 7 focus groups involving Muslims and non-Muslims across Scotland.
Scotland Survey (2010) which showed that Scottish Muslims have a very strong feeling that integration in Scotland is largely a one-way process, and 'they were the only ones making the effort to adapt to Scottish life’ while it should be a two-way process (2010:30).

Highlighting path-ways into integration, the British Council Scotland Survey (2010:31-2) discovered the importance of a range of different social issues that revolve around improving mutual understanding and interaction. These issues were: developing a better understanding of each other’s respective beliefs; customs and cultures by education: close friendships developed by children; providing opportunities for non-Muslims to visit and learn more about Islamic customs and rituals; having more opportunities to interact; providing alternative activities such as sport and interfaith groups; and the reporting and portraying of Islam and the Muslim way of life in a more positive or balanced way by the media (British Council Scotland Survey 2010:31-2). It is important to note that the central role of mutual understanding and increasing awareness in eliminating barriers was highlighted in other research. For example, Hussain and Miller (2006: 59) showed that those Scottish people who knew ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims were 25 per cent less Islamophobic compared to those who knew ‘nothing at all.’ The results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) also lend support to the importance of familiarity with Muslims in the context of personal relationships. This research showed that the percentage of people who would be unhappy with a Muslim forming a long-term relationship with a close relative (29%) dropped almost by half (16%) just because they knew a Muslim person (Ormston et. al. 2011: 27). With more focus on Muslim women’s integration, El-Nakla et. al. (2007) suggested that despite Muslim women’s willingness to work, they are much less likely to be employed and face further barriers than other women. They found that Scotland’s Muslim women’s reduced participation in the labour market was due to various barriers such as: limited appropriate childcare; a lack of understanding of Islamic requirements by employers; poor English language skills; and the women’s lack of confidence, interview skills, and experience of CV writing (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). Pointing to the importance of sociological factors, the British Council Scotland Survey (2010), for example, highlighted the significance of generational differences. The quantitative
part of this survey (2010: 24) found that more than half (58%) of its respondents\(^1\) agreed that most Muslims in Scotland are integrated into everyday Scottish life and that just over a quarter (27%) disagree with this. In qualitative data from the British Council Scotland Survey (2010:31), both Muslims and non-Muslims strongly agreed that younger generations of Muslims were more integrated than previous generations and that this was perceived to be a natural process, which was attributed to the fact that more and more Muslim and non-Muslim children have grown up together and this therefore increased exposure to one another’s culture encouraged understanding and respect. This data indicates the importance of generational differences in Muslims’ integration. I will take this point that younger generation Muslims are more integrated into consideration during the research and will try to explore to what extent this is the case. To sum up, the existing literature suggests that Muslims in Scotland are willing to integrate; however, their integration can be affected by different religious and social factors. Taking this into consideration, I will discuss the importance of these barriers in Muslims’ educational, economic and social integration in Chapters 8 and 9.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I discussed how the existing literature pointed to the combination of both nationality and religion in many Muslims’ social self-identification as Scottish Muslims. Particularly, the significance of Muslims’ religion as an identity marker was highlighted by some authors. Reviewing different accounts of the significance of religion, I conclude that there can be a conflation of reasons in the significance of religion in Muslims’ social self-identification. For example, it can be suggested that the public devaluation of (see e.g. Gardner and Shukur 1994; Shaw 1994; Ballard 1996; Saeed *et. al.* 1997; Anthias 200; Archer 2003) and the internal characteristics of Islam as a complete way of life and a guiding belief system (see e.g. Jacobson 1997b; Hopkins 2007), can go hand in hand in making religion a significant identity

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\(^1\) In the quantitative survey, 1,006 respondents were interviewed between 18\(^{th}\) and 21\(^{st}\) February 2010.
marker. It was also discussed that religion was not the only factor that can affect Muslims’ social self-identification. Racism and Islamophobia were also highlighted in the literature as contributing to the strength of Muslims’ inter-group identities and/or weakening of their identification with their host countries (Hopkins 2004). The importance of Muslims’ visibility was also highlighted and it was suggested that religious identity and practice can play an important part in Islamophobia and exclusion of Muslims (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014). The continuation of racial and cultural boundaries in defining Scottishness was specifically highlighted as contributing to the exclusion of Muslims who may be perceived as others. Experience of exclusion and/or maintaining distinctive cultural and religious practices can also affect Muslims’ socio-economic integration in Scotland. The existing literature suggests that Muslims in Scotland were willing to integrate rather than to assimilate. It was also highlighted that their integration can be affected by different religious and social factors such as lack of alcohol consumption, discrimination, and low qualifications and skills. This contextual framework informed my research questions and sampling, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Methodology

This qualitative research aims to explore different factors - such as religion, ethnicity and nationality – that affect Muslims’ social self-identification, experience of Islamophobia, and integration in Scotland. To this end, this research has adopted an abductive research strategy, a qualitative approach, and the Grounded Theory method for data collection and data analysis. I will deal with these issues in turn in this chapter.

Research Design: Strategy and Approach

A coherent research strategy should follow the best procedure and approach for answering the research questions and for dealing with the research objectives (Blaikie 2000) whilst fitting the researcher’s epistemological and ontological viewpoint. Therefore I adopted an abductive strategy, which has the ability to deal with both descriptive and explanatory questions (Blaikie 2000) that this research addresses (in describing Muslims’ social identity negotiation and explaining its influences). Blaikie (2000: 115-6) argues that an abductive strategy ‘entails ontological assumptions that view social reality as the social construction of social actors and its epistemological assumptions regard social scientific knowledge as being derived from everyday concepts and meanings, from socially constructed mutual knowledge.’ As this study is designed to understand the different meanings of Muslims’ social identities, the abductive strategy enabled me to understand the in-depth meanings of their different identity markers such as religion, ethnicity, and nationality. This strategy will be also useful in relation to the explanation and understanding of the impact of different factors on Muslims’ identity negotiation and integration, because it seeks ‘to discover why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, the symbolic meanings, motives and rules, which provide the orientations for their actions’ (Blaikie 2000: 115). As this study’s questions and objectives require a more
in-depth understanding of Muslims’ experiences and accounts rather than merely providing quantities, this study took a qualitative approach to data collection and analysis. A qualitative approach is better associated with the abductive strategy and enabled me to understand the social interaction of research subjects in context as well as the significance of Muslims’ perceptions of majority attitudes, in order to understand how these perceptions impact their sense of belonging to Scottish society. The explanation of Muslims’ national identity construction and negotiation within a multilevel social interaction (majority group members, institutional practices and minorities themselves) can be best achieved through detailed, complex, and rounded data, rather than the kind of broad surveys and standardised questionnaires that have tended to be used in the literature referred to in the literature review (see for example Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006). As Punch (1998) states, by looking at social realities holistically - comprehensively and regarding their complexity - qualitative research can place social issues in their proper context.

Such qualitative data was derived from qualitative, semi-structured, interviews in which individual’s experiences, perceptions, and attitudes will be the main source of data gathered (Blaikie 2000). Qualitative interviewing usually involves in-depth, and semi-structured or loosely structured forms of interviewing and is also one of the most commonly recognised forms of qualitative research method (Mason 1996). To study Muslims’ identity negotiation and lived experiences, qualitative interviewing is a well-known method and is used by many researchers in the field (Jacobson 1997a, 1997b; Hopkins 2004b, 2007; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). For example, Jacobson (1997b: 239) argues that ‘a great deal can be learnt about the question of identity by paying close attention to the details of individuals’ definitions of their own situations.’ In this regard, Muslims in this research were asked to report their views, perceptions, attitudes, experiences, and motives concerning their social identity negotiation, experience of racism and discrimination, and integration and interaction with mainstream society. As Rubin and Rubin (1995) point out, qualitative interviewing is a way of finding out about others’ feelings, views, experiences, and reconstructions of events in which the researcher did not participate. This method was chosen because it enabled me to explore more in-depth views and attitudes through interactive interviewing and probing. As mentioned in previous chapters, Muslims’
social identities are context dependent and subjected to change in different social contexts; so exploring such flexible identity negotiation through qualitative interviewing helped me to discover deeper aspects of their social identities. Although ethnographic or observational methods would normally be complementary to qualitative interviewing, I was not able to use such methods for different reasons. For example, language issues (as English is not my first language) and lack of access affected my decision to choose qualitative interviewing rather than ethnography because language barriers could have negatively affected my effective communication with people under study, and effective communication is important for ‘good ethnographic research’ (Fife 2005: 72). The nature of my research questions, which were more explanatory, did not require me to gain a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) or to make a close engagement with Muslim communities. Additionally, there were also practical reasons. Doing ethnographic and observational research can be very time and resource consuming (Mason 1996). As Fetterman (1989: 45) points out, ‘the ethnographer lives and works in the community for six months to a year or more, learning and seeing patterns of behaviour over time.’ However, my time and resources were limited. Moreover, I was not experienced in ethnographic and cultural anthropological research methods, thus considering all of these issues, it was not advisable to use these techniques (Creswell 2007).

I conducted 43 in-depth and semi-structured qualitative interviews with different Muslim individuals. Being semi-structured, they offered the interviewees time and space to reflect on the topic discussed and to offer their own input concerning particular events or situations. Being in-depth, they enabled me to get close to the Muslims’ meanings, interpretations, and accounts of the social inclusion and integration in which they have been involved (Blaikie 2000). The method of semi-structured interviewing was chosen instead of structured or standardised interviews or questionnaires because these kinds of enquiries generally force interviewees to choose from pre-existing categories or positions to which they may not feel they belong or may not wish to belong. By increasing the level of interaction between researcher and researched, semi-structured interviews give more space and room for the interviewee to present or create his/her views, perceptions, and attitudes. For instance, as cultural racism is sometimes implicit compared to explicit biological
racism\textsuperscript{1}, investigating experiences of such racism requires the researcher to interact with the interviewee and to probe deeper to discover how feelings about and experiences of both kinds of discrimination can affect their wider integration into the society. As the final point of this section, it is important to say that interviews were held with individuals who were willing to talk and who had different perspectives in order to represent a range of views on the subject under study (Rubin and Rubin 1995:66). In the next section, I reflect on the research questions and on the operationalisation of research objectives via the use of qualitative interviews.

\textit{Research Questions and Interview Topic Guides}

As mentioned in previous chapters, the main task of this study is to explore and explain the importance of different factors - with a focus on religion - in Muslims’ identity negotiation, experience of Islamophobia, and integration. Considering the first part of this objective, this thesis aimed to explore the importance of different factors such as nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity construction. It examined how the above factors can affect Muslims’ social exclusion or inclusion into Scottish society. To deal with the second part of the main objective, this study aimed to explore Muslims’ experiences of any religious or racial discrimination in Scotland and to explain the importance of social different factors in such experiences. Finally, it sought to discover the development of their integration and explain the importance of different barriers and path-ways to their socio-economic participation in the society under question. These objectives, thus, lead to three main questions in this study:

- \textit{How do Muslims negotiate their social identities in Scotland?}
- \textit{What are Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia?}
- \textit{What are the barriers and path-ways to Muslims’ integration?}

\textsuperscript{1} Differences between cultural racism and biological racism were explained earlier in Chapter 2.
To operationalize these research questions, a range of subsidiary and interview questions were developed in the form of a topic guides. To present this topic guide, I start with the issues concerning the first major research issue - Muslims’ social identities - which is the main focus of this research. This is mainly due to the importance of Muslims’ social identities, particularly religious identities, which were the most likely to affect their experience of Islamophobia (Hopkins et. al. 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) and their integration (Jacobson 1997b; Modood 2005; Joppke 2012). First, in order to capture participants’ sense of belonging (identification with) rather than the simple act of labelling (identification of) (see for example Saeed et. al. 1999), respondents – who all self-identified as Muslims - were asked to describe their identity as they wished to be identified. This acknowledged the importance of self-description in social identities (Tajfel 1972; Phinney 2003). As Hogg and Abrams (1998: 7) argue, ‘one’s conception or definition of who one is, is largely composed of self-descriptions in terms of the defining characteristics of social groups to which one belongs.’ They were then asked to clarify what made them choose those identities in order to explore the identity markers they used to support their social identities. Second, to explore different meanings and the strength of Muslims’ different social self-identifications, participants were asked to comment on the importance of their religion, ethnicity, and nationality for their identity and how these elements could relate to or co-exist with one another. This was an attempt to understand of the strength of one particular identity marker over others. This study also sought to understand the relationship between experiences and/or feelings of exclusion and Muslims’ national identity negotiation (Gardener and Shuker 1994; Ballard 1996), therefore they were also asked whether they think their Scottish or British identities are widely accepted; if yes/no, how they felt or experienced that. This research also aimed to explore both subjective and structural meanings and factors in Muslims’ identity negotiations, therefore the importance of generational dynamics (Ballard 1994; Jacobson 1997b; Phinney 2003) was taken into consideration by interviewing first and second generation Muslims (the importance of generational dynamics is discussed in more detail later in this chapter).
Dealing with the second main research question, this research began with an open-ended question to see whether participants had any experience of discrimination and racism in Scotland. Due to the likelihood of unfamiliarity with the term Islamophobia (Kidd and Jamieson 2011) and also to avoid leading participants into conflating all forms of discrimination as Islamophobia and religious discrimination, they were broadly asked to comment on any experience of discrimination and racism. Then, they were prompted for more explanation by asking questions like what, where, when, and why in order to elaborate the underlying foundations of their experiences of racism and/or Islamophobia. It is important to note that the analysis of participants’ responses showed that they experienced both racism and Islamophobia, but many of their experiences of individual and personal discrimination were related to Islamophobia as their religiosity and cultural characteristics – specifically as Muslims – were targeted and othered. However, they tended to describe both experiences under the terms ‘racism and discrimination’ rather than distinguishing between racism and Islamophobia. In contrast, reflecting on the media’s misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, the majority of respondents specifically referred to the term Islamophobia to explain such institutional and public discrimination.

To deal with the final research question, respondents were first asked to clarify/offer their views on the term ‘integration.’ This was mainly to find a common ground to discuss Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Then, they were asked to comment on the pathways and barriers to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Given the importance of Muslims’ religious identity - especially amongst practicing Muslims - in their social life and the importance of alcohol in Scottish culture, they were probed further on how they might integrate and interact with majority Scots. Finally, with regard to their actual socio-economic integration, they were asked to comment on challenging issues such as unemployment and self-employment (Scottish Government 2005c; Netto et. al. 2011), and women’s employment and higher education (El-Nakla et. al. 2007). This leads to the next section, where I discuss my data collection and sampling method.
Data Collection and Sampling

As mentioned above, the main method used to carry out this research was qualitative interviewing. The process of data collection and data analysis in this study is influenced by the Grounded Theory method due to its well described, well organised, and systematic process of qualitative data analysis (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In order to achieve the first milestone of Grounded Theory, theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz 1995), this study did not adopt any specific theory or hypotheses before the data collection stage because the theoretical chapter was mainly developed after the completion of data collection and data analysis. Thus, the initial literature review and theoretical chapter were only used to inform the development of categories and concepts that were embedded in the data. I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews with different Muslims (based upon four key variables namely religiosity, generation, gender and location). These in-depth interviews started with a topic guide, but relied on open ended and broad questions with prompts and probes. The length of interviews varied (from 120 minutes to 30 minutes) based on respondent’s time and the length of discussion, but most of the interviews (30 out 43) generally lasted around 40 minutes.

The target population of this research was Scotland’s Muslims, who currently define and describe themselves as Muslim, whether by religion or ethnicity, upbringing or culture. As this research also aimed to investigate Muslims’ sense of belonging to Scottish national identity, it was essential to focus on those who had a legal or emotional basis to make such claims. For example, having British citizenship (Runnymede Trust 1998; Bond 2006), being born here, or living here for a long time (Bond 2006; Hussain and Miller 2006) can make Muslims feel they belong to Britain in general and/or to Scotland in particular. Therefore, the basic criterion for sampling participants, after being self-described as Muslim, was having British citizenship or permanent residence in Scotland. The latter criterion was also taken into consideration to exclude those temporary immigrants such as students who just wanted to stay for a specific time in Scotland and then return to their home country. It is clear that such people would be less likely to have a sense of belonging to Scotland. Thus, it would be misleading to include these Muslims in the sample.
even though they might be easy targets and more accessible than Muslim citizens. The former criterion, however, needs more clarification which I provide in the following part.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the category ‘Muslim’ is ethnically, socially, and denominationally a diverse category. Even though this study did not adopt a representative sampling method, I gained access to different participants from different ethnic, social and denominational backgrounds in order to reflect such diversity. For example, in terms of ethnic background, 28 were of Pakistani origin, 5 Iraqi, 5 Kenyan, 2 Malawian, 1 Egyptian, and 1 of Lebanese background. There was also one white Scottish convert woman whose father was an Iranian, but as she was brought up with her white Scottish mother as a non-Muslim, she considered herself to be a white Scot. In terms of social differences, these respondents came from different social positions such as employed (16), self-employed (15), students (7) and - in the case of women - housewives and social volunteers (5). Educationally, they were also different; 14 with Standard Grade, 22 with higher education degree, and the rest had primary education from their country of origin (only in the case of first generation participants). In terms of denomination, they were also from different backgrounds; the majority were Sunni Muslims (31) and a minority were Shia Muslims (12).

The most important characteristics of these Muslims, however, lay in their visibility and religiosity, which was the focus of this research. To start with the former; for example, previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) suggests a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. This was also evident in the study of Lambert and Githens (2010), in which it was shown that anti-Muslim hate crime and attacks often take place in the vicinity of a mosque or against Muslims wearing Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic beards, or in the case of women, hijabs, niqabs or burkas. Muslims are visualised by these visible symbols (Esposito 2011) or signifiers and markers (Hopkins et. al. 2007), and may thus be targeted for Islamophobic discrimination or harassment. It is however important to note that it was not only religious visibility that can affect Muslims’ social exclusion. There is
some evidence (Hopkins 2004a, 2004b; Virdee et. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009) that suggests the importance of racial appearance (e.g. skin colour) in Muslims’ experience of discrimination and racism. It was in this way that all participants in this research were either racially or/and religiously visible. Such a distinction can contribute to the better understanding of anti-Muslim discrimination in Scotland; whether in the form of religious discrimination (Islamophobia) or racial discrimination, or a combination of both (cultural racism).

The second most important characteristic of Muslims that can also function as an important variable is religiosity and the degree of commitment to their religion. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Muslims’ religion plays an important part in Muslims’ identity and practice (Modood 2005; Esposito 2011). It is however important to note that the level of religiosity or commitment to religion was not the same amongst all Muslims. Despite self-identifying as Muslim, there might be some people who do not practice the religion or only practice some rules rather than making a full commitment. For example, in their study of social integration and religious identity expression among Dutch Muslims, Maliepaard and Phalet (2012) suggest a distinction between religious identification and religious practice (meaning commitment to daily worship and dietary practice). Ameli et. al. (2004: 21) also highlighted the diverse level of Muslims’ religiosity to reach a range of Muslims from ‘devout practitioners to cultural and secular Muslims’. In this regard, they divided Muslims into ‘highly practicing’, ‘practicing’, ‘secular’, ‘cultural’, and ‘Do not care about Islamic values at all’ (Ameli et. al. 2004: 26). Revealing a relationship between religiosity and discrimination, they (Ameli et. al. 2004: 26) found that the experience of discrimination amongst highly practicing Muslims (87%) and practicing Muslims (84%) was higher than the experience of discrimination amongst secular (74%) and cultural Muslims (75%). Jacobson (1997b) also highlights the importance of religiosity in their social identification and integration in her study of British Muslims. Jacobson (1997b: 251-2) suggests that the adherence to Islamic dietary law, for example, can be a way for most-devout Muslims to maintain a ‘sense of difference and distance from non-Muslims and strong solidarity with the minority,’ whereas for less-devout Muslims, it may be a ‘symbolic gesture of belonging to the group that does not (at least at this stage in their lives) translate into
a willingness to create a significant social distance between themselves and their non-Muslim peers.

In this research, with regard to the importance of religiosity, participants are divided into three main categories of practicing, less-practicing, and non-practicing. Practicing Muslims are those participants who make a full commitment to the religion and observe Islamic law, especially the 5 pillars of Islam; ‘Iman (articles of faith), salat (daily prayer), zakat (charity), sawm (fasting during Ramadan), and hajj (pilgrimage)’ (Meer 2010: 59). These pillars of Islam are prescribed by the Quran (Muslims’ holy book) to all practicing Muslims to follow, which present ‘the core and common denominator that unites all Muslims’ (Esposito 2011: 18). In contrast, non-practicing Muslims are those people who identify themselves as Muslim in terms of culture, ethnicity or birth, (Ameli et al. 2004: 21) but however do not practice any religious observances such as the 5 pillars of Islam or the Islamic dietary law. The less-practicing Muslims are those who do not fit into the first two categories. More specifically, it refers to those people who identify themselves as Muslim but do not practice all Islamic rules - for example, they do not read daily prayer or fast in Ramadan but do still practice some other rules such as foregoing alcohol consumption and consuming only Halal meat. These people may also name their children with Muslim/Arabic names and wish for them to grow up with more commitment to the religion of Islam (like in the case of Kathryn and Hamid in this research), and thus send them to Islamic centres to study Islamic teachings. This factor was more pronounced in relation to Muslims’ integration rather than in their experience of Islamophobia or identity negotiation. Based on this variable, I interviewed 38 practicing Muslims and 5 less-practicing participants (Kathryn, Hamid, Zainab, Akram and Ehsan). As the main way of contacting and reaching Muslims was through Islamic centres, Islamic student societies, mosques, and my Muslim friends, I did not have access to any non-practicing Muslims. Those with no commitment to Islam usually would not attend any of these places, making getting access to such Muslims harder than practicing or less-practicing Muslims. It is however important to note that even though this study could not access non-practicing Muslims, the comparison between practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ experiences and attitudes highlighted the importance of religiosity and suggested the
importance of further research on non-practicing Muslims. There were also some other sociological factors such as generation, gender, and location which can affect Muslims’ identity and integration, and were thus taken into consideration. It is to these that I now turn.

**Key variables: Generation, Gender and Location**

**Generation**

The first important variable in the sampling was the significance of generational dynamics. For example, research on ethnic minority religious groups in the UK has highlighted the significance of generation to self-perceptions and forms of behaviour. Phinney (2003) argues that immigrants’ ethnic and national identities can change over time, context, and across generation. Phinney (2003: 63) also argues that acculturation changes can ‘occur among generations, as indicated by the differences that can be observed between immigrants and their children and grandchildren.’ Jacobson (1997b) also points to the complex ways in which young Muslims negotiate their identities in different contexts. The differing values associated with the private and public spheres may require second generation Muslims to develop different identity strategies and to switch cultural ‘codes’ (Ballard 1994: 33).

Studying migrants’ integration by analysing political trust and satisfaction in 24 European countries, Maxwell (2010) also found that first generation immigrants have the most positive attitudes, while second generations have a similar level of political trust and satisfaction as native-origin individuals. These findings may suggest that as the second generations adopt linguistic, educational, and social aptitudes over time, the process of integration would only concern the first generations. However, Pfeffer (2014: 355) argues that ‘questions of integration do not simply disappear once the second generation has grown up.’ By highlighting the long-term and intergenerational nature of integration, Modood (2007: 35) argues that any theory of integration should include the ‘status and concerns of post-immigration ethnic and religious minorities.’ Additionally, in studying second generation immigrants’ integration in the U.S, Ramakrishnan (2004) found distinctive socioeconomic outcomes such as educational attainments and incomes between this generation and
other generation immigrants. Ramakrishnan (2004: 380) argues that the second
generation outcomes were viewed as ‘central to the understanding of immigrant
adaptation and progress’ by many scholars. Turning back to the Scottish context, the
result of McVie and Wiltshire’s (2010) survey of Muslim and non-Muslim youths’
experiences of racism, discrimination, and social marginalisation in England and
Scotland showed that generational dynamics can lead to inter-generational conflicts.
For example, the significance of the birthplace marker to everyday understandings of
Scottishness may make second generation respondents more likely to claim a
Scottish identity. However, other factors that are relevant to both first and second
generations such as length of residence and commitment to place have also been
identified as leading people to feel Scottish (Bond 2006, McCrone and Bechhofer
2008).

In this study, first generation Muslim refers to those participants who immigrated
to Scotland and have non-native parents. In contrast, second generation Muslim
refers to those participants who were born in Scotland and have non-native parents.
Those who were born to one native and one foreign parent, the so-called ‘2.5
generation,’ (Ramakrishnan 2004: 380) are not included in the second generation for
two reasons. Firstly, I could not access sufficient 2.5 generation Muslims in Scotland
(only finding one example). Secondly, mixing these two categories can be
misleading as Ramakrishnan argues that ‘scholars should avoid lumping together the
2.5 generation with those who have no native born parents’ (Ramakrishnan 2004:
380) because they differ significantly in socioeconomic outcomes such as
educational attainments and incomes. According to the 2001 Scottish Census, half of
Scotland’s Muslim population (50%) was born inside the UK (Scottish Government
2005b), out of whom 40% were born in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006: 20). This
can indicate that second and succeeding generations constitute around half of
Muslims in Scotland. Interviewing both first and second generation Muslim
participants, therefore, allowed me to assess the importance of generational dynamics
in Muslims’ social identities and socio-economic integration. During this research, I
interviewed 16 first generation Muslim participants and 27 second generation
Muslim participants. Generational dynamics, however, was not the only sociological
factor that can play a part in Muslims’ identity and integration. Gender differences can also have an important role in their integration.

Gender Dynamics

While research by Hopkins has reflected the ‘marginalised voices and identities of Muslim men’ (Hopkins 2007: 63), some studies pointed to the discriminated position of Muslim women. Previous research, for example, reported a gendered process of exclusion in observing that Muslim women are less likely to be employed and to have higher education attainments (Scottish Government report 2005). A more recent report (Poverty by Ethnicity and Country 1999-2008) by Netto et. al. (2011) also found that employment rates are particularly low among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, who are predominantly Muslim. Both structural factors (e.g. discrimination and racism) and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 1999; Masud 2005; Cassidy et. al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Lewis 2007) affect Muslim women’s economic and social integration. In terms of external pressure, previous research that reported Scottish Muslim women voices (Masud 2005; El-Nakla et al 2007) showed that Muslim women have experienced an increase in Islamophobia since 9/11, the Iraq war, and the London bombings. El-Nakla et. al. (2007) found that many Muslim women experienced discrimination as a factor that affected their employability. These women felt that their Muslim identity and appearance played a part in being discriminated against in employment and education (El-Nakla et. al. 2007).

Concerning cultural pressures, Lewis (2007), for example, suggests that young Muslims, particularly young women, are often overprotected by their anxious families. More specifically, Lewis reports that a recurring feeling expressed by young Muslims was the ‘suffocating impact of community pressure exercised by the extended family embedded in clans’ (Lewis 2007: 41). Qureshi and Moores (1999) also suggested that young British Asians live between two sets of cultural values: on the one hand, the social world of family, community, and religion; and on the other hand, the western world as experienced through education and media. They suggest that ‘the Islamic tradition makes any translation between those value systems especially difficult for second generation girls’ (Qureshi and Moores 1999: 318). Lewis (2007) argues that cultural and religious practices play a part in the
educational underachievement among Muslim women. By addressing the experiences of both men and women, this study reflected on these gendered processes and highlighted the importance of gender dynamics in Muslims’ socio-economic integration in Scotland. Based upon the importance of gender dynamics, 31 interviews were carried out with male participants and 12 with female participants. The fewer number of females were mainly due to issues of access. One issue, for example, was my gender because I was a man seeking to interview Muslim women and due to the religious practice of gender segregation that prohibited the free mixing of genders (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 2011) (this is discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Another issue could be their lack of participation compared to Muslim men in Scottish society (Scottish Government 2005b; Hussain and Miller 2006) as a result of language barriers and cultural issues (Cassidy et. al. 2006; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Lewis 2007; Netto et. al. 2011). This leads to the last important variable, location and geographical difference, which I will deal with now.

Location

The last important variable taken into consideration was the importance of location in the experience of discrimination and Islamophobia. Bennett’s (2000) research on youth culture amongst South Asians in England suggests that experiences of discrimination can take different forms in different contexts. In the Scottish context, some research (Hopkins 2004a; Hopkins and Smith 2008) suggests that there is a perception among some Muslims that anti-Muslim racism could be higher in areas where there is a high density of Muslim residents, such as Glasgow. In contrast, Kyriakides et. al.’s (2009) research suggests that in multi-ethnic localities, racialisation is challenged through the use of hybrid codes such as accent, dress, and mannerism (see also Virdee et. al. 2006). Other research, however, suggests that ethnic minority people, including Muslims, are at greater risk of racism in rural and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Masud 2005; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). One possible explanation for this is that the low density of ethnic minority residents in such areas means that there is less community and police protection (de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). While much of the relevant research focuses on Muslims in
urban areas (Hopkins 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Hussain and Miller 2006; Virdee et. al. 2006; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Kidd and Jamieson 2011) where most religious and ethnic minorities are concentrated (Scottish government 2005b), minority communities are also to be found in smaller urban and rural areas in Scotland. This study, by studying Muslims’ experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities and comparing that with those in Scottish towns and small cities, highlights the major differences in experiences and feelings in those areas. It also discusses the importance of the low or high density of the Muslim community and the significance of multi-ethnic localities in the experience of Islamophobia. To this end, 33 interviews in Scottish major cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee) and 10 interviews in Scottish towns and small cities (Falkirk, Stirling, Dunfermline and East Kilbride) were carried out. The significance of this distinction is based on the numbers of Muslims living in these areas; in the former, the numbers of Muslims are at least more than one per cent of the local population and in the latter, it is less than one per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 2013). In the next section, I provide more details on each of these areas.

Scottish Major Cities

The first site in the category of Scottish major cities, where I conducted 17 interviews, was Edinburgh. Edinburgh is a multi-ethnic city and is the capital of Scotland. The 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported the number of Muslims living in Edinburgh City to be 12,434 people, which constitutes 2.6 per cent of the local population. The second site was Glasgow - which like Edinburgh – is a multi-ethnic city. I carried out 10 interviews in Glasgow. The number of Muslims in the city of Glasgow was far higher than any other place in Scotland; 32,117 people, which constitutes 5.4 per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 2013). It is important to note that further to the multi-ethnic make-up of these cities, Muslims in Edinburgh and Glasgow have constructed several mosques, Islamic centres, and other social centres that provide different cultural, social, and religious services to Muslims, and which can thus affect their integration. The next city was Dundee, where the number of Muslims was reported to be 3,875, which constitutes 2.6 per cent of the local population (National Record of
Scotland 2013). Despite not being as high in number as the above cities, Muslims in Dundee constructed a few mosques and Islamic centres. The final site in the Scottish major cities category was Aberdeen, where Muslims constitute 1.9 per cent of the local population with a total of 4,293 people (National Record of Scotland 2013). I conducted four interviews in Dundee and two in Aberdeen. Even though this made for a small number of participants in Dundee and Aberdeen, they did provide insights into the Muslim experience of living in those cities and their experiences are contrasted with the experience of Muslims in Glasgow and Edinburgh. The fewer number of interviews in the last two cities were mainly due to access difficulties and shortage of resources as I was living in Edinburgh and had to travel to these cities for each interview. The significance of these cities is the fact that the larger numbers of Muslims that reside in these areas can result in strong Muslim communities that better provide social, cultural, and religious services for Muslims. The multi-ethnic nature of these cities can also impact on the acceptance and social inclusion of Muslims. This may differ in Scottish towns and small cities.

Scottish Towns and Small Cities

The first site in Scottish towns and small cities was Falkirk, which is a town in the central lowland of Scotland. There were two small and local mosques in Falkirk. One of the mosques was for Deobandi Muslims and another one was dedicated to the Barels. The first mosque was established in 2000 and is the largest one because it is open for daily prayers and has the capacity for 200 people (Punshon 2013), while the second one is smaller (with the capacity of about 150 people) and does not accommodate daily prayers. There is no exact estimation of the Muslim population in this town, but the 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported that the number of Muslims living in the Falkirk council area (which constitutes 42 towns and villages including Falkirk) to be 1,415 people, which forms 0.9 per cent of the population of the region. The establishment of these mosques (which also serve

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1 The Barels and Deobandis are two dominant Sunni sects that form the denomination of the majority of Pakistani Muslims in Britain (Meer 2010: 91).

2 [http://www.mosquedirectory.co.uk/mosques/scotland/falkirk/falkirk/falkirk-north/Falkirk-Muslim-Educational-&-Cultural-Community-Centre-North-Falkirk-Falkirk/333](http://www.mosquedirectory.co.uk/mosques/scotland/falkirk/falkirk/falkirk-north/Falkirk-Muslim-Educational-&-Cultural-Community-Centre-North-Falkirk-Falkirk/333)
the surrounding towns and villages\(^1\) may imply that considerable number of these Muslims live in Falkirk town. Accessing Muslims in towns and small cities was more difficult than accessing Muslims in the major cities. This was mainly due to the lack of any electronic means of communication and contact such as email addresses or an active website, which thus required my personal presence and contact. For example, in Falkirk, I carried out four interviews with Deobandi Muslims. As the second mosque was not open and other forms of communication, such as e-mails was not available, I could not access any Barelvis in Falkirk\(^2\).

The second site was Dunfermline, a town in Fife, where there was only one mosque. This mosque was opened in 1996, and is run by Barelvi Muslims (although open to all Muslims), is open for daily prayer, and had the capacity for 500 people\(^3\). Even though the capacity of this mosque is larger than the mosques in Falkirk, the capacity and the number of mosques in this town is far smaller and less than what is evident in the Scottish major cities. There is no accurate number of Muslims in Dunfermline; however, the 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported the number of Muslims for the Fife council area (which constitutes 75 villages and towns including Dunfermline) to be around 2,591 people, which comprises 0.8 per cent of the region’s population. In parallel to Falkirk, the establishment of an active mosque in this town with daily services could imply that the large number of Muslims in Fife council area live in Dunfermline. The launch of this mosque in 1996 suggests the persistence of a long but small established community in Dunfermline. I conducted two interviews in Dunfermline.

East Kilbride was another site of study, where I carried out one interview. It is a small ‘new town’ in South Lanarkshire, southeast of Glasgow. I could not find any record of a Mosque or an Islamic centre in East Kilbride by searching different

\(^1\) http://www.musalla.org/centres/Falkirk.htm
\(^2\) However, it is important to say that I could access some Barelvis in Dunfermline which meant that I could also reflect their experiences and attitudes.
\(^3\) http://www.dunfermlineislamiccentre.co.uk/, website accessed on 20/6/2014.
Mosque Directory websites\textsuperscript{1} in the UK and there were no formal or informal statistics on the Muslim population there. However, the 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported that the number of Muslims for South Lanarkshire council area (which constitutes over 60 villages and towns including East Kilbride) was around 2,514 people, who compose 0.8 per cent of the region’s population. The lack of any active mosque or Islamic centre may imply a lower number of Muslims and less community support in East Kilbride.

The final site was Stirling, which is a city in central Scotland. There was only one Islamic Centre, known as Central Scotland Islamic Centre, which was established in 1992\textsuperscript{2} and was the central mosque for surrounding areas such as Falkirk. It performed daily prayers and various community education programmes for children as well as adults. As the Muslim community grew ten years later, a larger building was purchased and established, which has the capacity for around 800 people.\textsuperscript{3} The longer establishment of this centre, its centrality for the surrounding areas, and its larger capacity might imply the presence of a long stabilised and large Muslim community in Stirling. The 2011 Scottish Census (National Record of Scotland 2013) reported the number of Muslims living in Stirling council area (which constitutes more than 35 villages and towns including Stirling) to be 578 people, which forms 0.6 per cent of the population of the region. As the numbers of Muslims living in all other cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) were at least more than one per cent of the local population, Stirling, with 0.6 per cent, is studied together with the other Scottish towns that all constitute less than one per cent of the local population. I carried out three interviews in Stirling. To sum up, these figures and information might suggest less ethnic and cultural diversity in Scottish small cities and towns, and also highlight less community support for Muslims in small cities and towns than in big cities.

\textsuperscript{1} More common directory websites such as ‘UK Mosques Directory’, ‘Musalla.org’, ‘Mosques Map: Muslims in Britain’ and ‘Mosque Directory.co.uk’ were searched, however no mosque was found in East Kilbride.

\textsuperscript{2} \url{http://www.stirling.gov.uk/services/community-life-and-leisure/places-of-worship/mosques}, web accessed on 22/06/2014.

\textsuperscript{3} \url{http://www.musalla.org/centres/Stirling.htm}, web accessed on 22/06/2014.
Other differences within Muslims, such as sect or school of thought, were not taken into consideration given that the existing studies on Muslims did not report any important differences on these issues. The findings of my research also did not show any significant difference associated with those factors. Additionally, due to practical issues such as limited time and resources, this study could not cover all of the factors related to Muslims’ identity and integration. I had to concentrate on the most important issues, which the existing literature has either already proposed or my data has already suggested. As mentioned already, the collected data was analysed using the Grounded Theory analysis method.

Data analysis

As mentioned, the processes of data collection and data analysis in this study were influenced by the Grounded Theory method. The main reason for using Grounded Theory analysis method was due to its emphasis on the generation of theories based on the data (Glaser and Strauss 1967), thus in this study, specific effort was used to let the data lead the research analysis. Coding and analysing processes were done based on theoretical sensitivity and concurrent data collection and analysis (Charmaz 1995). All interviews were first fully transcribed and then coded through initial and axial coding process based upon Grounded Theory’s analytical guidelines. More specifically, the coding process started with open/initial coding, which offered initial categories and concepts such as racial abuse, religious discrimination, Islamophobia, assimilatory practice, alcohol, and identity rejection. This stage was rather descriptive and substantial in the way that I started to identify, label, categorise, and to some extent interpret, the experiences, perceptions, and meanings that stood for a specific concept. So working with open coding on 10 interviews allowed many concepts and categories to be identified. Many of these concepts and categories were linked and related to one another in a hierarchical order - for example, Muslim self-conceptualisation could be associated with the importance of religion amongst participants. Experience of racial and religious discrimination could also be associated with the importance of Muslim visibility and the existence of cultural racism. Experience of identity non-recognition (identification with Scotland) based
on different skin colour and religious differences could also imply the importance of racial and cultural boundaries in the everyday understanding of Scottishness. I then moved onto the *axial coding* stage to identify the potential relationship between different concepts and categories, and then develop them into conceptual families (Strauss and Corbin 1990). In so doing, caution was taken not to impose any relationship into the data from my own prior knowledge or existing theories. The identified codes were also kept active by using constant comparison among the codes and seeking to keep a record (annotating in Nvivo) of the context in which the properties/indicators had been constructed by the respondent (Glaser 1978).

Meanwhile, the initial analysis occurred through memo writing in order to keep a record of potential hypotheses and ideas that were generated during coding and initial analysis. Finally through selective coding, the relationship between different issues of social identity, Islamophobia, and integration were developed. The selective and theoretical analysis suggested that Islam can play an important part in Muslims’—especially practicing Muslims’—identity formation and integration. Such distinctive identities and practices can also affect their experience of exclusion and Islamophobia.

Discussing the weaknesses and critiques of Grounded Theory as an analytical method (such as breaking up the narrative flow of data and also losing the deeper meaning embedded in the context by fracturing the data, particularly via open coding processes), it can be said that one way to deal with this problem is memo writing and annotating (in a Nvivo framework), which enables the researcher to keep a record of the context in which these meanings have been generated. As Glaser (1978) points out, in order to keep the codes active, a researcher needs to keep asking some important questions during the coding process. Two of these questions (what is actually happening here? and; under what condition does this happen?) draw the researcher’s attention to the context, which can then be recorded and considered. Another way, which I found quite helpful, was doing a constant comparison amongst different parts of the data and properties in order to find similarities and differences to generate more abstract categories (Strauss & Corbin 1990). This constant comparison kept me aware of different contexts in which different or similar meanings were generated during the interviews. I found that if I had started the
coding/analysis process in a more organised way in the framework provided by Nvivo from the early stage of interviewing, it would have been more helpful and time saving. The only obstacle to have such concurrent interviewing and coding/analysing was the issue of transcribing the interview. Full transcription took a lot of time because I was not native to the English language and was not very familiar with the Scottish accent, as did networking and trying to find more participants.

Access, Positionality and Ethics

Reflecting on the issue of access, I need to say that as there is not an official sample of Muslims, the most convenient way to access Muslims was through university Islamic Societies, mosques, Islamic centres, Muslim organisations, and social groups. As a result, I started to access Muslim individuals through attending and emailing Islamic Societies in different universities such as Edinburgh, Heriot-Watt, Napier, Dundee, and Aberdeen. I also attended some other Islamic centres where personal attendance was required as there were no electronic means of communication. In doing so, I attended Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Dundee Central Mosques; Edinburgh and Glasgow Shiah communities, and the only mosques in Stirling, Dunfermline, and Falkirk. Although this research is not a comprehensive and representative study of Muslims, taking the diversity of Muslims into account and having access to different Muslims - particularly with regard to my key variables - means that such diversity is reflected in the data. I attended these centres several times, circulated my 'Research Participant Information Sheet,¹' and also participated in some of their activities and programmes and talked to some of their members in order to identify my probable participants based on my theoretical sampling and key variables. While conducting the first ten interviews, I found that the best way to access Muslims is through personal and face to face contact because I had a poor response when I contacted some participants through email or Facebook, but when I contacted them in mosques or Islamic centres personally, they showed their interest most of the time and were willing to have the interview at the time. Therefore, I had

¹ This form is provided in Appendices.
to go to these places and make face-to-face contact, which was of course time consuming and costly. This was more relevant in contacting potential participants in Scottish towns where no electronic means of communication – such as active websites and emails - were available. Most of the time, I had to travel to the targeted towns with no pre-arrangement or appointment and spend a full day at the mosque to find someone willing to participate in the study. I conducted 10 interviews using this sampling approach. It is however important to note that this approach can have its own disadvantages. For example, in four cases, participants agreed to speak but they had less time to spend, so these interviews might not have been as far-reaching and deep as had been expected.

Turning to the issue of positionality, I need to say that I have found that, on the one hand, my positionality as a Muslim insider, facilitated my access to Muslims and also meant that they could build trust with me through commenting on religious issues as we shared the same belief and religion. On the other hand, my identity as a Muslim could have put participants in a defensive position on religious issues or led them to show themselves as good Muslims or committed people. To avoid this issue, I really tried to explain in the beginning of the interview that this was an academic study, that I have interviewed different Muslims from different ethnic, social, and religious backgrounds, and that it is normal and usual to have different views on religious issues and religious identities. I also tried not to make any personal comment on people’s experiences during or before interviews to avoid any possible influence by myself. Another thing that was taken into consideration was relying on participant’s personal experiences, which were usually freer from such influences, rather than their opinion unless such an opinion was necessary.

The most important difficulty regarding my access and positionality was assessing female Muslim participants. Usually it is more difficult for a male researcher than it is for a female to gain access to female Muslim participants. Despite being a Muslim and being aware of cultural and behavioural norms in communicating with Muslim females, in the beginning of the data collection, I had some difficulty accessing Muslim women. As my wife is a Muslim and was present in Scotland, I decided to get help from her - as an observer or mediator in some cases – and to ask her to
accompany me during female interviews. Mentioning this in my interview invitation letters was extremely helpful and I started to receive dates for interviews. All the interviews with Muslim women, thus, took place in the presence of my wife. Her presence was also helpful in making the environment friendly as they were trying to make a friendship and to stay in touch even after the interviews. Creating such a friendly environment was helpful in making the female participants feel more relaxed and free to share their experiences and accounts. It is, however, important to note that the presence of my wife as an observer or mediator could have affected interview interaction, generated self-awareness (Sinding and Aronson 2003), and affected participants’ responses. For example, they might have tended to show that they are better Muslims and are more devoted to Islam. This issue was highlighted in the work of Hopkins (2004) by some Muslim participants in his focus group discussion who, for example, said that they do not drink alcohol while in fact they sometimes did. It was also likely that my views, as a Muslim, intervene in the course of data collection or analysis in the form of sympathy with religious issues. To overcome this problem or at least minimise its effects, I tried to design my research questions, data collection and analysis in an ethical manner. By recognising my own views and perceptions, I tried to avoid inserting my views throughout different stages of the research (Robson 2002; Mason 1969). Moreover, as the research was about their experiences of racism and identity negotiation, I tried to only report and analyse their experiences and attitudes in an impartial (as much as possible) and academic way. Member checking (presenting transcripts to respondents), peer debriefing and support (discussion with other researchers and students of similar status), discussion with my supervisors, and presentations at different conferences were also useful means of recognising and overcoming my probable biases during the research (Robson 2002).

In terms of ethical issues, this research was conducted according to the ethical guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological Association. The research did not involve interaction with vulnerable communities or children. The consent and privacy of the specific individuals has been respected. In accordance with University policy, a Level 1 assessment was undertaken with my supervisors. A ‘Research Participant Information Sheet’ is attached (Appendices), in which I explained how the matter of confidentiality and anonymity will be respected
throughout the research and that all the recordings were done with the participants’ permission. For example, in this form, I explicitly explained that the interview would be recorded, but however, any information disclosed during the research interview was treated as confidential, and that their privacy and anonymity was respected at all times. It was also mentioned that any data drawn upon for this study or for other academic articles and conference papers would also abide by strict confidentiality. At the outset of each interview, a consent form was provided where participants confirmed that they had understood that their participation is voluntary; that they were free to refuse to answer any question; that they could withdraw from the study at any time; and only then finally signed the consent form. It is also important to note that in order to respect their confidentiality, all participants’ real names have been changed and pseudonyms have been used in this study. Closing this methodology chapter leads onto the next 5 chapters, where I present and discuss my research findings.

In sum, I chose qualitative approach and semi-structured interviews to answer my research questions because of their capacity to offer valid and reliable information, insight about the subjective meanings of social phenomena, and an entry into networks of social relations (Sinding and Aronson 2003). More specifically, qualitative interviewing helped me to learn a great deal about Muslims’ social identity construction by paying close attention to the details of their definitions of their own situations (Jacobson 1997b). Therefore, this method particularly helped me to produce rich data on Scottish Muslims’ views, perceptions, attitudes, and motives concerning their social identity negotiation and integration. It also helped to gain insight into their lived experiences of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland. With unlimited time and resources, I could have done this research differently. However overall, I fell that this research strategy has produced sufficient data to provide insights into Muslims’ identity formation and integration processes in Scotland.
Chapter 5: Negotiating Identity: Nation, Ethnicity and Religion

Introduction

As I mentioned in previous chapters, the existing evidence seems to indicate that Muslims in Scotland have constructed hyphenated or hybrid identities that draw on religion, ethnicity and nationality (Saeed et. al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011). More specifically, the above cited studies suggest that Muslims in Scotland see themselves much more as Scottish and Muslim than as British. For example, Saeed et. al. (1999: 836) found that ‘Scottish-Muslim’ was the most popular identity amongst some young Pakistani Muslims in Scotland. Similarly, Hussain and Miller (2006: 150), who offered respondents four ‘hyphenated’ identities to choose from, found that more than a half chose Scottish-Muslim, more than a third chose British-Muslim, more than a sixth chose British-Pakistani, and more than a eighth chose Scottish-Pakistani. This could imply that Muslims tended to identify with Scottish sub-state national identity despite Muslims’ tendency in, for example England, to identify with British not English identity (Hussain and Miller 2006). However, little attention has been paid to the different importance, meanings, and strength of these identities or the significance of their identity markers (Hopkins 2007; 2008). As Phinney (2003) argues, ethnic minority people can identify with both their ethnic groups and their country of residence, and that each identity can be either strong or weak, or identification with both can be high. Turner and his colleagues (1994: 454) also argue that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference.’ The extent and degree of identification with any of these identity markers (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion) can be varied and subjected to difference. For example, Hopkins (2007) had previously studied the importance of nation and religion in young Scottish-Muslims’ identity negotiation and suggested that their affiliation with religious and national identities varied in strength, nature, and meaning.
This study discusses the importance, meaning, and strength of these markers in Muslims’ identity negotiation in Scotland by including the importance of ethnicity together with religion and nation. It has been also argued that people’s identity is highly affected by the way in which others accept or reject that identity (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Hopkins et. al. 2011; Hopkins 2011; Thompson 2012). Thus, identity non-recognition can have negative social and psychological consequences for those whose identities are denied (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; Thompson 2012). This study, therefore, seeks to explore whether Muslims’ national identities are accepted by the majority or not and, if not, on what basis Muslims are excluded. It has also been argued that social identities such as ethnic identity are not static and are ‘subject to change along various dimensions; over time or across generations in a new culture, in different contexts and with age or development’ (Phinney 2003: 63). By taking generational differences into consideration, I discuss the importance of these markers amongst first1 and second generation Muslims.

To this end, this chapter will examine firstly the importance of nationality in first generation participants’ social identity negotiation in Scotland. The importance of birthplace and citizenship is discussed in this section. Then the significance of ethnicity and ethnic identities are explained. More specifically, the importance of racial markers and maintaining cultural and social bonds with the country of origin are discussed in this chapter. Turning to the third aspect of participants’ identity, the importance and strength of religion is explored. Moving onto second generation participants’ identity negotiation, I discuss the importance of nation, ‘race,’ ethnicity, and religion in turn and then finally come to a conclusion by comparing the importance of these markers in each generation.

1 As earlier discussed in Chapter 4, in this research, the first generation are those Muslims who were born outside the UK and immigrated to the UK, and the term ‘second generation’ refers to those Muslims who were born in the UK to non-native parents.
In line with previous research (Saeed et al. 1999; Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2007; 2008; Kidd and Jamieson 2011), the data showed that most first and second generation participants, 38 out of 43, constructed multiple or hybrid social identities. Multiple and hybrid identities tended to consist of national (country of residence) and/or ethnic (country of origin) and religious (Muslim identity) identity markers. The overwhelming use of multiple identities amongst participants can be explained by the fact that in living as an ethnic/faith minority community and having connections to different identity sources such as ethnicity, religion, and a new home country, constructing a singular identity was not possible (Modood 2005). This finding contributes to the issue of the multiplicity and hybridity of emerging new identities in multicultural societies (Hall 1992; Modood 2007). The data also suggested that these identities were mainly context dependent. This was more evident when respondents identified with one of identity markers, e.g. Scottish, but when further probed for identification with other identity markers such as religion or ethnicity, they asserted associations with those identities as well. This was evident amongst both first and second generation participants. Starting with the former; for example, Akbar, who was a first generation Muslim man with a Kenyan background that has lived in Edinburgh for 9 years, asserted that he felt Kenyan and then he said that he also felt Scottish:


Question: What about the place you are living in, do you have any sense of belonging to here as well?

Akbar: Yes, definitely; you see my nationality is Kenyan. So, I am Kenyan by my birthplace and my passport but at the moment I live in Scotland. I consider myself Kenyan and Scottish. So, you can say Kenyan-Scottish.

[Edinburgh, 27 year-old]

This quote implies that Muslims can hold different social identities and that the assertion of these identities can vary based on different bases and contexts. In some other examples, respondents explicitly mentioned that in different social contexts, their self-described social identities might change. For example, Shadi, who was a
first generation Muslim woman also of Kenyan background and has lived in Aberdeen, reflected on how she described herself:

My identity is very much mixed up because I grew up in UK basically and I am studying in Scotland now but still my home is Kenya. I see myself Scottish as well or I would say I see myself Kenyan-Scottish-Muslim and British. … But normally when people ask about my identity I say Kenyan or Kenyan-Pakistani because I have got Pakistani background as well. People sometimes see me a Pakistani. I do not look British or Scottish so sometimes it is easier to explain that I am Kenyan because of the way I look or even because of my accent; I do not sound British; I do not sound Scottish. Normally when people ask me I usually say I am Kenyan-Pakistani.

[Aberdeen, 25 year-old]

In this example, Shadi highlighted that her identity assertion changes in response to majority Scots due to her racial appearance. The importance of ‘race’ and skin colour is discussed later in this chapter, but this quote could imply that in this context, in response to majority Scots, Shadi’s self-identity is relegated in favour of an identity which is more acceptable and less challenging. This could imply that some first generation Muslims manage their self-identification and provide different identities in different social contexts according to what they think would be more acceptable. This example also highlights the importance of accent, which is discussed later in this chapter. In another example Asghar, who was another first generation Muslim man from Kenyan background, said that he is Kenyan because of his passport, but when further probed, he asserted that he wished to be identified as Scottish-Asian:

I am waiting for my British nationality, but I am a Kenyan national [right now] or common wealth.

Question: Other than the passport issue, how do you like to identify yourself?

Asghar: In my own mind I like to be classified as Scottish-Asian.

[Edinburgh, 56 year-old]
This quote suggests a considerable difference between Asghar’s identity assertion based on his formal citizenship and passport, and the identity assertion based on his wish and desire. This can also suggest that on these grounds, he may assert different identities in different contexts – therefore in analyzing surveys and questionnaires, analysts should be cautious about the impact of the wording and the context in which questions are asked. Context dependence of social identity assertion was also evident amongst second generation participants. For example, Hakim, who was a second generation Muslim man of Pakistani background and was born and brought up in Edinburgh, said that his self-categorisation changes based on others’ questions or expectations:

Generally, if somebody asks me where are you from, because I know that they are not really asking me to say I am from Scotland and they are really asking about my heritage, so in those cases I guess I am more Pakistani than anything else because my appearance is like that, but if somebody asked me what is my culture, I would definitely say Scottish because I testify the Scottish morals of education and etc.

[Edinburgh, 20 year-old]

In parallel to the example of Shadi who highlighted the importance of others’ expectations in her identity assertion, Hakim also highlighted that his self-identification changes based on others’ perceptions or expectations. In another example, Adil, who was a second generation Muslim man of Pakistani background and was born and brought up in Falkirk, stated that in formal questions, his self-described identity is British, but before that he is Muslim:

In terms of nationality, obviously we are British, but before that I am a Muslim, I see two different things, but as nationality I would say British. … But this can change depending on who is asking and where it is, as you mentioned if it is in academic area or a sort of formal question, and then I am just British … but generally they ask us to clarify anyway as Pakistani; they class us as someone originally from Pakistan.

[Falkirk, 24 year-old]
In this quote, Adil particularly highlighted the importance of the formal context in which he likes to describe himself as British. However he continues that in those contexts he will usually be categorised as Pakistani afterwards. All this, is despite his primary wish to be identified as Muslim first and then British. All the above examples imply the importance of different social contexts for Muslims’ identification. These findings support Turner and his colleagues’ (1994: 454) argument that ‘self-categorizations are variable and context dependent as they are social comparative and are always relative to a frame of reference.’ It was also highlighted that some identity assertions might not be Muslims’ primary identity or the identity they wish to be described with. Identification with different identities, this indicates, can vary and be subject to difference. This supports previous research by Hopkins (2007), which suggested that young Scottish Muslims’ affiliation with religious and national identities varied in strength, nature, and meaning. Thus, to seek a deeper understanding of Muslims’ identity negotiation and its different meanings and strengths, it is important to unpack the complexity of each of their identity markers. It is to this end that in the following sections, I discuss the importance of ethnicity, skin colour, religion, and nationality in first and second generation Muslims’ social identity negotiation.

First Generation

The data showed that a majority of first generation respondents constructed multiple and hybrid identities composed of ethnic, liberal/civic and religious identity markers. This can imply the importance of ethnicity, religion, and country or residence in some first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation. Such association with ethnic markers was due to the salience of birthplace in defining national identity; other issues such as experience of identity, non-recognition, and maintaining cultural bonds with their ethnic origins were also acknowledged as influences. The last two factors were also likely to weakening their sense of belonging to their civic identities (Scottishness/Britishness).

More specifically among the first generation Muslims, 14 interviewees [out of 16] constructed multiple and hybrid national identities; out of these, 10 participants
chose an ethnic-national identity (such as Pakistani-British), three identified with hybrid identities (consisting of a religious, national, and ethnic component such as British-Muslim-Indian), and one identified with a religious-ethnic identity (such as Pakistani-Muslim). The other two participants chose a singular identity that was based on their ethnic/country of origin (such as Pakistani). These figures can imply that the first generation of Muslims in Scotland construct different forms of identity and challenges the perception of Muslims as a homogeneous community. It can also suggest the importance of country of residence (nationality), country of origin (ethnicity), and religion in first generation participants’ identity negotiation.

Importance of Nationality: ‘Scotland is our New Home’

The first point to note about first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation was the importance of residential or civic identity markers. 13 first generation participants [out of 16] identified with their country of residence (Scotland in particular or Britain in general). The identification with Scottish/British national identity was either in a multiple or hybrid way and such association was supported by the use of civic identity markers such as residence and citizenship [having a British passport]. Settlement, having children born and educated in Scotland, setting up business and investment, and marrying someone from Scotland (in one case) were more specific markers used by participants to support their Scottish/British national identity claims. To illustrate this, I start with the example of Akbar who was a first generation Muslim man of Kenyan background that has lived in Edinburgh for 8 years. Akbar, who earlier described himself as Kenyan-Scottish, asserted that settling in Scotland and feeling at home made him feel Scottish:

Question: What makes you feel Scottish?

Akbar: Firstly, living in that place and calling it your home; I left behind my birthplace and I came to live here, I am by birth Kenyan but now by settlement I am Scottish.

[Edinburgh, 27 year-old]
This quote highlights the importance of residence as a marker in Akbar’s identification with Scotland and the importance of birthplace in his identification with his country of origin [the importance of ethnicity and ethnic identities, based on country of origin, is discussed in the next section]. Even though residential and citizenship markers were commonly used by all 13 first generation respondents to support their Scottish or British identity claims, the extent and strength of this association varied. Some of these participants considered Scotland to be their ‘new home’ and left aside the possibility of return to their country of origin. These respondents had stronger identification with their Scottish or British identities. In contrast, there were some other respondents (such as Sajjad, Hamid, Nazir and Samad) who, despite living in Scotland, kept some strong cultural, social, and financial ties with their country of origin and yet still kept the possibility of return open. Additionally there were participants who considered birthplace to be the main marker of determining someone’s nationality, and thus felt more belonging to their country of origin. My finding suggests that, for example in the cases of Sajjad and Emran that are quoted later in this chapter, these respondents saw their children as Scottish because they were born in Scotland. These participants had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic identities than their Scottish or British identities. To begin with the former: for example, Hareb asserted that he felt more belonging with Scotland. Hareb is a self-employed Muslim man who owned two shops in Stirling. He was of Pakistani background and has lived in Stirling for 22 years. Hareb, who already described himself as Pakistani-Scottish, stated that after immigrating to Scotland it has become his home and that based on his residence, he feels Scottish:

I was born in Pakistan but after moving here and living here; now I am Scottish. It is very good living here; wherever you stay is your home. Whenever we go to Pakistan, we just stay for two or three weeks and then we come back here because my work is here; my children are studying here. I feel more belong to here than to Pakistan.

[Stirling, 45 year-old]

In this quote, Hareb highlights his association with Scotland as his new home while considering his association with his country of origin, Pakistan, to only be as a place
to visit in the holidays. This could imply that despite being born in Pakistan, his association with Scotland is stronger than his country of origin. Hareb’s example also highlights the importance of other issues such as working and children’s education in identifying with Scotland. The importance of having jobs and children was also highlighted in other examples. Ehsan was a self-employed Muslim man who owned a grocery shop in Falkirk. He was of Pakistani background and has lived in Scotland for 20 years. He earlier identified himself as Scottish-Pakistani and asserted that as his children were born in Scotland and he is settled there, he thus feels that he belongs to Scotland and has no plan to go back to Pakistan:

I do think of myself as Scottish and never think of anything else … because I am living here and my children are here too. We tried to build our life here; I never felt that I will go back to Pakistan. I know some people feel that way but not me and my all investment is here.

[Falkirk, 42 year-old]

The examples of Hareb and Ehsan can suggest the importance of feeling settled because those who consider Scotland to be their home can have strong identification with their national identities. The importance of planning a permanent residence in Scotland and leaving aside the possibility of return was also highlighted in the next example. Asghar was a self-employed Muslim man who was working as a technician. He was of Kenyan background but has lived in Edinburgh for 10 years. Asghar, who earlier liked to be identified as Scottish-Asian, said that establishing connections with the place of residence and not going back to the country of origin made him feel Scottish:

Basically, staying in Scotland and making family ties and connections can make someone feel Scottish. Like your children being born here or study or work here. These can make me to feel Scottish. So, if you have decided that there is no going back then that is the time you can say that you are Scottish.

[Edinburgh, 56 year-old]

The examples of Hareb, Ehsan, and Asghar can suggest that due to economic and social settlement, the ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979) was no longer a possibility
amongst some first generation Muslims (mainly from Pakistan), and that those who abandon this myth can forge meaningful identities in their new homes. This finding supports previous research by Brah (1996) which suggested that due to family reunion and financial investment, Asians from the subcontinent had to come to accept that their stay in the UK would be permanent. There were, however, some other first generation participants who, because of the salience of birthplace, kept strong ties with their country of origin and kept the possibility of return open. These participants thus had a stronger affiliation with their country of origin and ethnic identities, which is discussed in the next section.

Importance of Ethnicity; Salience of Birthplace

The data showed that all first generation participants had some sense of belonging to their ethnic identities, namely to their country of origin such as Pakistan or Kenya. It is important to note that in this study, respondents’ identification with their country of origin has been regarded as ethnic identity rather than national identity. For many people, especially in the case of majority group members, national identity is closely related to ethnicity but this can be sometimes distinctive and differentiated, especially in the case of ethnic/faith minorities such as Asians or Muslims (Scottish Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008). For example, my data suggested that many respondents, who had multiple social identities, saw their identification with their country of origin as their ethnic identity rather than their national identity, which was Scottish or British. More specifically, those respondents who had British citizenship differentiated between their nationality, which was mainly based on citizenship and passport, and their ‘original’ identity, which was based on their birthplace and ethnic background. Therefore their sense of belonging to their country of residence was related more to their nationality, and their sense of belonging to their country of origin was related more to their ethnicity. To capture the different importance of each of these identities and to avoid confusion between their sense of belonging to their nationality and their sense of belonging to their ethnicity, in this chapter, respondents’ affiliation with their country of origin is considered to be ethnic identity unless any respondent expresses that his/her original identity is also his/her national identity. It was for this reason – to distinguish
between minorities’ national and ethnic identities - that both a national identity question and a ethnic group question was asked in Scotland, England, and Wales’ 2011 Census to ensure that ethnic/faith minorities can express these aspects of their identities (Scottish Government and General Register Office for Scotland 2008; Bond 2011). As was evident in some of the above examples, one explanation for identification with one’s country of origin was related to the salience of birthplace in some first generation Muslims’ understanding of national identity. As mentioned earlier, such affiliation with ethnic identities based upon birthplace was evident in the examples of Akbar, Asghar, and Hareb, but however their identification with their country of residence was stronger than their identification with their country or origin. In this section, I discuss other respondents whose identification with their ethnic origins was stronger than identification with their country of residence. The first example is Emran, who was a self-employed car dealer. He was from a Kenyan background and has lived in Glasgow for 11 years. He said that even though he sees himself as British, deep down he still felt Kenyan:

I am British by being here for all these years [11 years], but if you see me deep down I am still Kenyan because I was born in Kenya.

[Glasgow, 39 year-old]

In this quote, Emran emphasised the importance of birthplace in some people’s sense of national identity. For some first generation Muslims, being born outside of Scotland in particular or Britain in general, means that they are somewhat detached from their place of residence and may thus feel more attached to their ethnic identities. The significance of the birthplace marker was much more evident when the first generation Muslims spoke about their children who were born and brought up in this country. They believed that their children [second generation Muslims] were certainly Scottish or British because they were born and brought up in Scotland. It is important to note that the birthplace marker was not simply based on their place of birth but also referred to their country of upbringing. This was highlighted when some participants pointed to the importance of the education they had received or the cultural and social context in which their children grew up. The first example is Saleh, who was a first generation Muslim man of Egyptian background who has
lived in East Kilbride for 28 years. Saleh, who already identified himself as Scottish-British-Egyptian, said that his children are Scottish and that they should be considered to be Scottish because they were born and brought up in this country:

Many of young Muslims who were born and brought up in this country … They are Scottish … They have been taught that they are Scottish. So, they should stick to this and should be treated as such.

[Glasgow, 65 year-old]

In this quote, Saleh particularly highlights the importance of the education that his children received in Scotland which made them feel Scottish. The next example is Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man of Pakistani background who has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. Sajjad, who earlier described himself as British-Pakistani, explained that based on birthplace and upbringing, his children have more right to be Scottish than their parents:

People who were born and bred here [second generation Muslims] do not actually believe that they are from another country; by hundred per cent they believe that they are British or Scottish because they were born here and they have a right here … they have more right than us [first generation Muslims] to call themselves as Scottish.

[Edinburgh, 49 year-old]

In this quote, Sajjad highlights the importance of the birthplace marker, which can function as an ultimate designation of people’s nationality. As the first generation Muslims lacked this important marker with regard to Scottish identity, they thus saw no right or at least a weaker right to claim such an identity. In contrast, their children who were born in Scotland are definitely presented as being Scottish. The last example is Tariq, who was a first generation Muslim man of Pakistani origin and has lived in Scotland for 7 years. Tariq, who earlier identified himself to be ‘a Muslim then a Pakistani’ even went further and claimed that based on the birthplace marker, his children have no option except to be Scottish:

They were born here; there is no any other way around; they were born here; they are not anything else except Scottish.
In this quote, Tariq highlighted the importance of birthplace, which implies that birthplace determines national identity. The example of Saleh, Sajjad, and Tariq indicates the importance of the birthplace marker amongst some first generation Muslims, and implies that some first generation Muslims have the perception that their children have a very strong affiliation with their Scottish sub-state national identity or would have no other national or social identity except for their Scottish identity. It is important to note that some first generation Muslims shared this emphasis on birthplace with many majority Scots (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010). This may suggest that the greater identificational integration of second generation Muslims into Scottish sub-state national identity; however later in this chapter, I discuss how the second generation Muslims’ identity negotiation is more complicated than this and is subject to variation. Different issues such as ethnicity and religion are also significant in second generation Muslims’ identity negotiation and so is not only limited to the importance of country of birth and residence. Turning back to first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation, the data suggests that the salience of birthplace was not the only explanation for some first generation Muslims’ stronger identification with their country of origin and their weaker identification with their country of residence. Experience of national identity non-recognition was also acknowledged to be one of the factors that could weaken the first generation participants’ identification with Scottish or British national identities. It is to this that I now turn.

National Identity non-recognition; ‘We are still seen as Pakistani’

The data showed that almost all first generation participants experienced some national identity non-recognition in their everyday interaction with majority Scots. In other words, their national identity claims to be Scottish or British were not widely accepted by the majority group members. It is due to this that some participants associated their stronger identification with ethnic identities with their experience of national identity non-recognition. For example, Hamid, who was a taxi driver and
has lived in Scotland for 8 years, said that despite having a British passport, he gets racial abuse almost every day. Such incidents make him feel that his British national identity is not recognised:

I am more Pakistani, but I have British passport too. So, that’s why I am British-Pakistani. But the British passport just gives me the nationality of this country and it does not give me the same rights as others. In some cases yes, you do get the same rights as others but you still get racial abuse [such as being called as Paki]. As being a taxi driver, you get a lot of racial discriminations. Almost all the time, you can see that, even people who you think would not say those kinds of things, they do come up with these things; racist comments, they always pass some comments an you; such as calling you a Paki … you can never be British … I think as long as you have a white colour, there would not be a problem.

[Edinburgh, 28 year-old]

This quote shows that people’s sense of belonging could be challenged or misrecognised based on racial or ethnic differences. This quote could also imply that other white minorities’ British or Scottish identity claims may be less problematised. However, the Scottish Attitude Surveys (2006 and 2010) showed that Eastern Europeans, for example Poles, were also discriminated against in Scotland (Bromley et. al. 2007; Ormston et. al. 2011). The example of Hamid can also imply that national recognition of Muslims, i.e. getting citizenship, may not secure their grassroots social recognition. This finding supports previous research (Runnymede Trust 1998; Bond 2006; Meer et. al. 2012; Blackwood et. al. 2012), which suggested that ethnic minorities’ sense of belonging to the host country could be questioned based upon their differences, despite their formal citizenship status. National identity non-recognition at the grassroots level was also highlighted in other examples. Sajjad, who earlier described himself as British-Pakistani and has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years, said that his British identity was not widely accepted by the majority. He said that after all these years he is recognised only as a Pakistani and not as a British person:

I do not think even most of people here know that we are British; we have the British passport, they still look at us as Pakistanis, it does not matter how many hundred years you live here.
In parallel to the example of Hamid, in this quote, Sajjad highlighted his experience and perception that Muslims are recognised by their ethnic origin, such as Pakistani, rather than by their country of residence. Similarly, Ehsan, who earlier identified as Pakistani-Scottish and has lived in Scotland for 20 years, felt that his and his wife’s Scottish identity was not recognised by indigenous Scottish people due to their racial and ethnic differences:

Mostly they [white Scottish people] say no [you are not Scottish]; whenever you talk to them they say ‘when would you go back home?’ and stuff like that. They think that here never can be our home; that is why they always say when you are going back home but we think there is no chance to go back. … They [indigenous Scottish people] think of those who are white [to be a true Scottish] because … my wife is educated here and she speaks like Scottish people but she is still not accepted as a Scottish person. For example, whenever she speaks with Scottish accent over the phone that is fine but when she tells her name or when they see her, they make a different treatment.

The examples of Hamid, Sajjad and Ehsan can imply that some first generation Muslims had a perception that ‘being white’ was a key criteria for being a true Scottish or British, and thus Scottishness was equated with whiteness. This perception can weaken their identification with their country of residence, as Hamid noted: ‘you can never be British.’ It is important to note that these three participants (Hamid, Sajjad and Ehsan) were from those first generation participants who had daily experience of racism and Islamophobia (the experience of racism and Islamophobia is discussed in the next chapter). Thus, their experience of national identity non-recognition and their weaker identification with British national identity may be associated with their higher rates of experience of Islamophobia. However, there were some other participants with less experience of Islamophobia who still had the perception that their national identities are not widely accepted at the grassroots level. For example Saleh, who was a retired professor that has had rare experiences of racism, stated that based upon his children’s Scottish accent, many
people would think that they are Scottish but once they see them, they would think of them differently:

My children are born in Scotland and should be considered as Scottish. … If anyone hears their accent over the phone or without seeing them, they would say that they are Scottish. However, when they see their colour and appearance they would think of something else such as Pakistani or Asian.

[East Kilbride, 65 year-old]

This quote suggests the importance of the Scottish accent as an identity marker may be overridden by the importance of looks and appearance in defining Scottish identity, thus those who lack such markers, even though they have other markers such as accent and birthplace, would find their national identity claims coming into question. This was consistent with Hamid’s perception that the importance of skin colour and looks is more significant than British citizenship. In another example, Hareb, who was a self-employed Muslim man that has had rare experiences of Islamophobia, said that his children who were born in Scotland, are still not seen as Scottish or British due to their different skin colour:

My children were born here but Scottish white people still say they are Pakistanis even though they were born here but our colour is still different.

[Stirling, 45 year-old]

All the above quotes in this section imply the importance of racial markers in defining the Scottish identity based on the majority’s attitudes. This supports previous research (Bond’s 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) that suggests that racial and ethnic markers are still important to Scottish identity. Bond, in his analysis of the findings of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2003), argues that although ancestry and ethnicity are generally considered to be less fundamental to national identity, ‘these more ethnic criteria are widely regarded as relevant and important, and thus those who lack these markers may have their Scottishness called into question’ (2006: 623). This trend was also evident in the work of McCrone and Bechhofer (2008: 1255), which,
despite being based on limited evidence, concluded that ‘it is harder for non-white people to claim to be Scottish.’ Their more recent findings also highlight that it is more challenging for people who were not born in Scotland, even though they might have other ‘markers’ of identity such as a Scottish accent, to claim Scottish identity (McCrone & Bechhofer 2010).

Although one respondent (Arif) reported that others’ recognition or non-recognition of his national identity was not important, for some other first generation Muslims, others’ non-recognition was significant and had influence. For example, Shadi, who earlier identified herself to be Kenyan-Scottish/British-Muslim and was a Muslim woman, stated that she normally describes herself as ‘only’ Kenyan due to her ‘looks’ and others’ perception that:

Normally, I say that I am a Kenyan … because people see me like that; I do not look British or Scottish so sometimes it is easier to explain that I am Kenyan because of the way I look like.

[Aberdeen, 25 year-old]

This can imply the importance of others’ acceptance/denial and supports the argument that people’s identity is highly affected by the way in which others accept or reject that identity (Taylor 1992; Honneth 1995; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Hopkins et al 2011; Hopkins 2011; Thompson 2012). In another example, Tariq, who earlier identified himself as ‘a Muslim then a Pakistani’ and was a Muslim man, stated he did not identify with Scottish identity because he felt that he would not be accepted as a Scot;

Question: Do you think of yourself as Scottish as well?

Tariq: To be honest no, because at the end of the day we are foreigners; it does not matter what happens; it does not matter if we speak, walk or talk Scottish or English. At the end of the day, they look at you and say you are not from here but for me this is where I stay and this where I live; this is where I earn my money; this where I spend my money; this is where I belong to right now.

[Dunfermline, 28 year-old]
These two quotes show the importance of others’ acceptance or rejection in some first generation Muslims’ national identity negotiation and their resulting stronger identification with their ethnic identities. This supports de Lima’s (2004) suggestion that social exclusion can lead to ethnic minority groups maintaining their cultural identities. The importance of others’ acceptance or denial was also highlighted in the example of Hamid, who said that the experience of national identity non-recognition made him feel like a foreigner even though he liked to feel British:

I consider myself a foreigner, I would like to think I am British, but it does not matter how hard I try to be British but I cannot be a British, because these people won’t let us to be British. … Getting the citizenship of this country would make you think that you are a part of the society, but when something comes up like this [racial comments] you think that no, we can never be a part of this society, you are always different, and they will not let you to become a part of this society.

[Edinburgh, 28 year-old]

Previously, research by Blackwood et. al. (2012) suggested that those Muslims who encountered discrimination by Scottish or British authorities at airports felt that their valued identity, as Scottish/British, was denied and thus they did not feel part of the society. Consistent with this finding, the examples of Shadi and Hamid might suggest that individual identity non-recognition can also cause such feelings amongst some first generation Muslims. There are also some other factors which could be important in first generation Muslims’ ethnic identification.

Maintaining Cultural and Social Ties with Country of Origin: Possibility of Return

Maintaining cultural bonds and ties with one’s ethnic origins and keeping the possibility of return to one’s country of origin could be another factor in strengthening some first generation Muslims’ ethnic identities. As mentioned earlier, some participants (such as Hareb, Ehsan and Asghar) due to economic, social, and family settlement in Scotland left aside the ‘myth of return’ and built their new life and home in this country. However, there were some other first-generation Muslims
who still thought of their country of origin as their ‘home county’ and kept the possibility of return open. For example, Sajjad, who earlier described himself as Pakistani-British, stated that the possibility of going back to Pakistan is still valid:

We [first generation Muslims] may still feel that we are from Pakistan and we can go back there.

[Edinburgh, 49 year-old]

In another example, Hamid highlighted the importance of social exclusion and Islamophobia in stating that there is a possibility of being deported from Britain, thus it is better to have a connection with his country of origin:

I want to feel be British, because we have got everything here, we have got life here, house and everything … but when these things happen [name calling (Paki) and saying go back home] we feel that we are not like them, we come from another country, probably we are not as welcome as we should have been. Because these people, does not matter how good they are with you, in the back of their mind they still are not happy with us being here. Thus, you have to think of having a property in your home county because if the government one day decide to deport all Muslims accusing them as terrorist what would we do.

[Edinburgh, 28 year-old]

In this example, Hamid overstates the possibility of being forced to return to the country of origin, but it does however indicate real fears and concerns. These quotes move us away from the ‘myth of return’ as being the dream of returning to a cherished homeland and suggests it to be more an option to return amongst some first generation Muslims due to their experience of social exclusion and Islamophobia and feelings of insecurity. The data also suggests that both Sajjad and Hamid had daily experience of Islamophobia (the experience of Islamophobia is discussed in the next chapter). They had this perception that their formal citizenship did not lead to them obtaining equal respect and acceptance and they could therefore potentially be rejected by the state on some pretext. Having such an uncertain and unsecure perception about British citizenship was also central to the next example. Nazir, who was a first generation Muslim man from a Pakistani background who has
lived in Stirling for 20 years, stated that his British citizenship could be rejected by the government at anytime and that he can be deported to his country of origin:

I have British passport because we are living in this country but in my British passport it is written that this passport belongs to the government and they can take it off any time they want. They can phone me just now and say sorry we do not want you to hold a British passport anymore.

[Stirling, 73 year-old]

In parallel to the example of Hamid, over-exaggeration is also evident in this quote. Nazir points to the possibility of the government withdrawing passports at any time, but however it does not necessarily mean that they would withdraw citizenship. For example, football hooligans have their passports confiscated before major football events. Nevertheless, these quotes reinforce the significance and value of maintaining financial, social, and emotional bonds with the country of origin in some first generation Muslims’ affiliation with their ethnic identities. The importance of maintaining ethnic culture was also highlighted in the next example. Samad, who earlier identified himself as Pakistani-British-Scottish and has lived in Scotland for 30 years, asserted that his cultural identity is more Pakistani than Scottish:

Even though when I came to Britain, I was small [10 year-old] but my culture is still more Pakistani rather than Scottish or British but their [second generation Muslims’] culture is Scottish or British culture. Their culture is not anymore our culture. Maybe that is why we [the first generation Muslims] think of ourselves as more Pakistani …

[Dunfermline, 51 year-old]

This quote implies a growing generational divide between those who feel more belonging to their ethnic identity and a second generation who are more at home in Scotland. National and ethnic identities, however, are not the only components of first generation Muslims’ multiple and hybrid identities. Religious identity is the third aspect of some first generation Muslims’ identity, which I will deal with now.
Importance of Religion: ‘It is very important but it is not a part of my identity’

The next important issue in first generation Muslims’ identity negotiation is religion. The relationship between religion and identity amongst some first generation participants was more complex than their ethnicity or country of residence. On the one hand, most participants attributed a very important role to religion; on the other hand, there was less self-identification and self-categorisation as Muslim. The data suggested that the use of religion as a source of identity was less common than the use of birthplace or residential markers amongst the first generation Muslims. For example, only 5 participants [out of 16] used religion as a part of their multiple identities. This may imply the lesser importance of religion, as a source of identity, compared to the importance of ethnicity and residence among some first generation Muslims. Weak identification with religion can be associated with first generation Muslims’ understanding of self and national identity. As I discussed, for most first generation participants, birthplace and ethnicity were the most important factors in their identity negotiation. Other identity markers such as religion or culture, thus, had less importance. This should not, however, be interpreted as an indication of lesser practice or commitment to their religion because a majority of participants (14 out of 16) were practicing and visible Muslims. Furthermore, I discuss in later chapters that Muslims’ commitment to the religion plays an important role in their social integration. For some participants, religion was even more important than national or ethnic identity, but it was not discussed or seen to be part of their identity. This was highlighted in the example of Samad, who earlier described himself as an English-Scottish-Pakistani:

   My religion is very important, that is the most important thing to me; more important than anything.

   Question: So, being Muslim is part of your identity?

   Samad: No, being Muslim is the first thing and everything just comes after that; my nationality is afterward.

   [Dunfermline, 51 year-old]
This quote indicates the importance of religion in Samad’s sense of self and implies that the religion of Islam is part of his identity; of who he is and how he acts in the world. This quote, however, implies that some first generation Muslims may not see Islam in terms of identity even though it clearly informs their sense of self. In contrast to the example of Samad, there were two participants who mentioned religion as a part of their multiple identities, and interestingly as the most prominent identity marker. For example, Tariq, who was a self-employed shop keeper and a Muslim man, and earlier described himself as ‘a Muslim then a Pakistani,’ stated that after becoming a visible Muslim, his religion became the most prominent component of his identity:

When I was not a practicing Muslim my identity was Pakistani but after becoming a practicing Muslim, since 3 or 4 years ago, I see my identity first as a Muslim then as a Pakistani … So that is me Muslim and Pakistani …

[Falkirk, 28 year-old]

In another example, Arif, who was an employed nurse and has lived in Dunfermline for 12 years, asserted that his religious identity comes before his national and ethnic identities:

First of all, I am Muslim and then I am Scottish Pakistani … I am proud of being Muslim and being part of the Muslim community; so firstly I am Muslim then nationality wise I am Scottish which is totally different … I put the religion first and there is no compromise on religion.

[Dunfermline, 39 year-old]

These last two quotes suggest the importance of religion for some first generation Muslims. More research is needed to understand why some respondents chose not to describe their identities in religious terms even though it would seem to be central. The identification with religion as a source of identity was more common (or at least more articulated) amongst the second generation Muslims who I deal with in the next section.
Second Generation

In parallel to the first generation participants’ identity negotiation, a majority of second generation participants (24 out of 27) also reported having multiple and hybrid identities. These multiple identities were mainly categorised into three main forms; a third of interviewees (8 out of 24) identified with their national-ethnic identities (such as Scottish-Pakistani); another third felt more attached to their national-religious identities (such as Scottish-Muslim); and a quarter, 6 out of 24, claimed to have hybrid identities, which were constituted by religious-national-ethnic identities. Only three participants identified with singular identities; namely religious or ethnic identities. These figures could suggest the importance of country of residence (nationality), country of origin (ethnicity), and religion in second-generation participants’ identity negotiation. In parallel to the importance of these markers in first generation participants’ social identity negotiation, second generation participants’ identity negotiation was also affected by those same markers. In the next section, I discuss the different meanings and strength of these markers amongst second generation Muslim participants.

Importance of Nationality: ‘Being proud to be Scottish and British’

The first important issue in second-generation participants’ identity negotiation was identifying with the country in which they reside. The data showed that a majority of respondents, 24 out of 27, identified with Scottish or British identity as a part of their multiple or hybrid identities. The association with Scottish or British identity was based upon a range of identity markers such as birthplace, residence, English language, Scottish accent, adopting Scottish/British culture, and Scottish education. For example, Azadeh, who was a Muslim woman, stated that her Scottish identity is based upon birthplace, residential, cultural, and linguistic markers:

I am Scottish-Muslim because I was born here, I live here, my family is here, I speak the language and the local people I meet with or interact with are from here and just the beautiful place Scotland is to belong to.

[Edinburgh, 42 year-old]
Similarly, in another example, Sanaz highlighted the importance of British culture and asserted that her sense of belonging to Britishness is based on residential, educational, and cultural markers:

So, we are Muslims, Asian and from Pakistani origin. All these come into play and then we are British too because we born and brought up here, we know the culture of this country; we have been brought up alongside the British people; we study here, we know how the British culture is for good and bad. We may not agree with all cultural norms but we already know what the British culture is about and we already took the best from British culture.

[Edinburgh, 41 year-old]

Sanaz emphasised in this quote that she had a selective approach to British culture but that her familiarity with it is important in associating with British national identity. This could imply the importance of British culture in some second-generation Muslims’ identification with British national identity. In another example, the importance of the Scottish accent alongside other factors was highlighted. Adil, who earlier identified himself to be Scottish-British-Muslim, stated that his Scottish accent alongside other markers made him feel Scottish and British:

I would really say being born in this country or living among people for such a numbers of years and speaking the language and having the Scottish accent, all that makes us Scottish and British. If anyone hears my Scottish accent, would know that I am Scottish…

[Falkirk, 24 year-old]

In another example, Ahad, who earlier described himself as British Muslim, stated that his English language and Scottish accent were also factors that made him feel British:

I live here and I was born here and English is my first language that is why I call myself British Muslim. … I have got the Scottish accent too … many people when they hear my accent think that I am Scottish.

[Falkirk, 41 year-old]
Ahad’s stress on the Scottish accent echoes Bond’s (2006) work on national identity markers for second generation Muslims. To compare the importance of identification with country of residence between the first and second generation participants, the data suggests that utilising a residential marker was also common amongst the first generation participants; however, the majority of first generation participants lacked other markers such as accent, culture, and education that the second generation participants were more likely to have. Another important difference was the utilising of birthplace to support identification, which was totally absent amongst the first generation Muslims. The birthplace marker, which was the most salient identity marker amongst the majority of first generation participants, was only used to support their ethnic identities. The utilisation of birthplace, accent, culture, and education could imply that second generation Muslims have a stronger identification and sense of belonging to their country of residence than the first generation Muslims. However, the data suggests that even the second generation participants’ identification with Scottish or British national identities could be challenged by national identity non-recognition or by the importance of ethnic or religious affiliation, which could affect the strength of their national identities. In the following sections, I discuss the importance of each of these issues in turn.

Challenged and Questioned Identities: ‘You cannot be Scottish!’

The data showed that over half of the second generation participants (15 out of 27) experienced incidents where their national identity claims were questioned or challenged by some majority Scots. National identity challenges or non-recognition involved questioning or challenging their claims to Scottish/British identity and labelling them mainly by their ethnic/racial backgrounds. There was a perception amongst some participants that despite possession of some Scottish identity markers (such as birth, accent, education, and culture), they were still seen as foreigners or outsiders in the eyes of the majority. For example, Jafar and Fazel mentioned that in many incidents they were considered as or called foreigners by the majority. In another example, Fatima, who was a second generation Muslim woman and brought up in Glasgow, explained how her colleges were shocked to see a player with Asian
background in Highland games. She said that in their view, a Pakistani person is not seen as Scottish and thus should not play in a Scottish team:

I just want to give you a personal story in my workplace, I have a colleague whose background is Asian and he took part in Highland games. My other colleagues, who were indigenous Scottish, were so surprised when they saw him there. They were saying that why an Asian person is taking part in Highland games, he is Pakistani; he is not Scottish. But he was born here, brought up here thus he is Scottish … so, yes some people do not take even those who were born or brought up here as Scottish.

[Glasgow, 32 year-old]

These examples suggest the persistence of racial markers at the grassroots level, which can challenge second generation Muslims’ identification with Scottish sub-state national identity. This supports previous research by Jacobson (1997a) that suggested that the presence of racial boundaries is crucial to Britishness. As mentioned earlier, all of these examples can also support previous research (Bond 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; McCrone and Bechhofer 2008; Kyriakides et. al. 2009; Reicher et. al. 2010) that suggested the importance of racial and ethnic markers to Scottish identity. Although for some respondents (such as Adil and Amir), others’ attitudes to their national or sub-state national identities was not important, there were some participants who particularly raised the issue that their experience of national identity non-recognition affected their sense of belonging to Scottish or British national identities. The first example is Kathryn, who earlier stated that she is proud to be British. She pointed out that her experience of identity non-recognition and racial abuses made her think that it is impossible to be British:

I am proud to be British because I was born here and I have been here for whole my life. However, just because of these issues [racial abuses] there is always a kind of thoughts that you can never be a part of this society ever, you know there can be always something, even walking down the street somebody could just turn around and say anything to you, so it is never going to be like being accepted as British..., even if you say I was born here and I am British, it does not make any difference. It is just the colour of your skin which defines you and at the end of the day you would be called ‘Paki’ .... I spoke to a lot of people … when ask them why do you call me ‘Paki’, they say that ‘you are not white’ …
when I say to them that ‘I was born here though’, they say your parents are not from here. Basically, they want you to be white.

[Edinburgh, 27 year-old]

Kathryn here points to the persistence of ancestry and racial markers in challenging second-generation Muslims’ identification with British national identity at the grassroots level. This supports Jacobson’s work (1997a) that emphasised the importance of racial boundaries to Britishness. This also supports previous research by Bond (2006: 623) that suggested that ancestry and ethnicity are ‘widely regarded as relevant and important, and thus those who lack these markers may have their Scottishness called into question.’ In this example, Kathryn also highlights that experiences of national identity non-recognition weaken her affiliation with British national identity. This implication of national identity non-recognition was also highlighted by other participants. For example, Sadiq, who described himself as only Iraqi, explained how categorising and labelling him by his appearance or ethnic background made him feel frustrated and ridiculed, and thus reluctant to keep identifying as Scottish:

"The inevitable question that they always would ask is ‘where are you from originally?’, that is one of the first questions you will be asked, so it is has never been about ‘what do you do?’… Once, I said I am from Edinburgh and they laughed, then they said ‘no where are you really from originally?’"

[Glasgow, 25 years old]

The examples of Kathryn and Sadiq illustrate how even those participants who were born, brought up, and educated in Scotland can find their national identity claims questioned and challenged due to racial and ethnic differences. Previously, research by McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) highlighted that claiming Scottish identity is more challenging for people who were not born in Scotland. As well as those first generation ethnic minority people, the findings of my research suggest that even the second generation Muslims who were born in Scotland can find their Scottish identity claims being questioned and challenged at the grassroots. This finding supports previous research by Hopkins (2007: 72) that suggested the
‘continuing the salience of race as a marker of social difference’ in the exclusion of some young Scottish Muslims. As evident in the examples of Kathryn and Sadiq, these participants’ national identity claims were challenged and they were instead labelled by their skin colour and ethnic backgrounds. This implies the importance of national identity non-recognition and labelling behaviour in some second-generation Muslims’ affiliation with their ethnic identities. The importance of national identity non-recognition and labelling behaviour in the affiliation with ethnic identities was also highlighted in other examples. Sanaz, who was born and brought up in Scotland, said that she was often labelled as Pakistani rather than British because of her ‘looks’:

Well, I am British, but then I am not a sort of indigenous species of British and obviously being coloured, they would not accept me as British … then being coloured, obviously you are Pakistani … People still class me as non-British to be honest, I mean when they look at me, they think “oh’ she is Pakistani, obviously”, they do not really class me as British, and I know that from people’s perception of me. … Well to be honest, the fact that we are coloured which is very identifiable, so we will be considered as a Pakistani or an outsider.

[Edinburgh, 41 year-old]

In this example, Sanaz highlighted that her appearance and others’ perception of it can affect her national and ethnic identification. The examples of Kathryn, Sadiq, and Sanaz imply that national identity non-recognition and labelling by ethnic and racial background can influence second generation Muslims’ ethnic identities. However, finding national identity claims to be challenged was not limited to the importance of racial and ethnic differences because religious and cultural differences were also reported to play a part. Some participants perceived that their religious identity (visualised mainly by lack of alcohol consumption, lack of gender mixing, wearing the hijab in the women’s case, and having a beard in the men’s case) was a challenge to the acceptance of their Scottish/British identity claims. For example, Ali said that, racial, religious, and cultural markers are all important to be considered Scottish. He especially singled out the issue of drinking alcohol, which is a social norm in Scottish/British culture but is not permitted for Muslims:
They think to be Scottish or British the first thing is that you have to be white, but we are not white… Then you have to follow their culture, their way of life. The biggest obstacle, the biggest difference between us and British people is alcohol. We do not drink alcohol, they drink alcohol and this is something that I think sometimes is used as a metre to measure somebody’s integration, to see how integrated they are. If they drink alcohol with us, then you are okay, if not, so something is wrong with you … Because alcohol is a very big part of their society.

[Edinburgh, 38 year-old]

This quote highlights how barriers to Scottishness may be cultural and social as well as racial. This particularly supports previous research by Jacobson (1997a: 181) that suggested that the presence of three ‘boundaries of Britishness’ - the civic, racial, and cultural boundaries. This also supports the finding of previous research (Hopkins 2004), which suggested how some Muslims distance themselves from complete belonging within the boundaries of Scottishness by highlighting, for example, lack of alcohol consumption. In another example, the importance of hijab as another religious and cultural challenge to national identity is highlighted. Arezo, who earlier described herself as a British-Muslim, explained how her hijab alongside having brown skin played a role in challenging her claim to British identity:

Usually, if somebody looks at me in street they would not think of me as British. There are only a few people who would think that I am British. They obviously do not know my background and only because I wear hijab and I am brown they just immediately think that I must be Pakistani or whatever. Once a lady asked me where you are from and I told her that I am British but I am originally from Kenya and she said ‘how it can be possible; how come you can be British?’ … they think that only white people can be British.

[Edinburgh, 40 year-old]

The example again points to cultural challenges to Scottishness. This supports previous research by Virdee et al (2006) that highlighted the persistence of cultural boundaries of Scottishness and showed how some cultural behaviour, such as wearing hijab and burqa, was perceived as oppression and fundamentalism and thus
considered to be incompatible with Scottishness. Associating hijab with a specific ethnicity or ‘race’ was highlighted more in the example of Azadeh. She explained how her white Scottish Muslim friends’ Scottishness and whiteness was questioned by her fellow Scots simply because they wore hijab:

I have a lot of friends who are white Scottish and they are Muslims. Some of them wear the hijab. Once they do not wear the hijab, people would not give them a second look, they would not put them in any box or category but once you do wear the hijab, even though they are white, people say to them that you are from Pakistan or Tunisia. Because they wear the hijab they must be from somewhere else rather than Britain.

[Edinburgh, 42 year-old]

In this quote, Azadeh highlighted that even white Scots’ national identity can be challenged due to them wearing hijab. This supports research by Moosavi (2014) that suggests that once white British/Scottish people convert to Islam, they ‘lose their whiteness’ and become known as ‘Paki’ (Moosavi 2014: 3). This also supports previous research by Franks (2000: 922-3) that suggested that white Muslims with hijab can be associated with South Asian or Arab ethnicity and ‘perceived to be race-traitors by white supremacists.’ The examples of Arezo and Azadeh can also support the argument that through a process of racialisation of Muslims, all Muslims, even the white British converts, can be called Paki or Pakistani regardless of their real ethnic or racial background (Moosavi 2014). This process of racialisation of Muslims is further discussed in the next chapter. Having Islamic names was another example of cultural and religious barriers to being recognised and accepted as being Scottish/British. For example, Nader said that his Islamic name, in addition to his different skin colour and lack of alcohol consumption, can make others to think that he is not Scottish:

I think regarding my name and my colour some people would not consider that I am Scottish. Other thing is whether you, for example, drink or whether you take part in some of these traditions. These things may also sometimes make them think that you are not Scottish.

[Glasgow, 38 year-old]
The example of Nader implies the importance of cultural boundaries of Scottishness and supports previous research by Virdee et. al. (2006), which suggested that Muslim names can become a racialised code of cultural belonging and associated with terrorism, and can thus, be a basis for discrimination. The examples presented here highlight the multiple barriers to belonging that are based on markers of difference. They show how some second generation Muslims can feel othered as outsiders due to racial and religious differences. This reflects Kidd and Jamieson’s (2011) research that suggested that ‘Scottish Muslims experience feelings of otherness and difference that result from experiences of religious and racial discrimination’ (see also Hopkins 2007). Comparing the importance of national identity non-recognition between the first generation and second-generation participants, the data suggests that in some cases, national identity non-recognition could play a part in strengthening both generations’ affiliation with their ethnic identities. However, it is important to note that first generation participants’ affiliation with their ethnic identities was much stronger than a majority of second-generation participants. In the next section, the importance, strength, and different meanings of ethnic identities amongst second generation participants is discussed.

Ethnicity: Social Imposing or Cultural Identity

The importance of ethnicity amongst second generation participants was seen in their identification with their parents’ country of origin. 16 participants [out of 27] identified with their parents’ country of origin as a part of their multiple and hybrid identities. Probing further, however, it became clear that this identification with ethnic background did not have the same strength and meaning amongst all second-generation participants. For some participants, it was a matter of social imposition and thus not a prominent identity marker, and for some others, it was a matter of choice and family education and thus continued to be the most prominent identity marker. I start with the former. As mentioned above, for some participants, being labelled or considered by their racial or ethnic background was the most important reason for affiliation with their ethnic identities. In this regard, association with ethnic background was a matter of social imposition rather than a voluntary choice. It was acknowledged by many interviewees that one reason they described themselves
according to their ethnic background was their ‘look and skin colour’ and others’ labelling behaviour. Further to the examples quoted in the national identity non-recognition section, Hakim, who earlier identified himself as a Scottish-Muslim-Pakistani, pointed to the importance of others’ attitudes. The example of Hakim was already quoted above but it is quoted here for a different purpose. He was a full time undergraduate student and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. Hakim explained how others’ perception of his appearance and ethnic heritage made him identify with Pakistani identity despite his strong cultural ties with Scottish identity:

Generally, if somebody asks me where are you from, because I know that they are not really asking me to say I am from Scotland and they are really asking about my heritage, so in those cases I guess I am more Pakistani than anything else because my appearance is like that, but if somebody asked me what is my culture, I would definitely say Scottish because I testify the Scottish morals of education and etc.

[Edinburgh, 20 year-old]

This quote highlights that even those second generation participants who were fully integrated with Scottish education and culture and also had stronger ties with their Scottish or British national identities make some affiliation with their ethnic backgrounds due to others’ expectations. The next example is Kasim, who had an undergraduate degree and was working in a bank. He was brought up in Edinburgh and earlier identified himself to be British-Pakistani:

Basically, I am British, that’s how I would describe myself but because of my Pakistani appearance, I am Pakistani too; so yes I would call myself British and then would say Pakistani too. That’s how I would describe myself.

[Edinburgh, 41 year-old]

The examples of Hakim and Kasim could suggest that their affiliation with ethnic identities was not as strong as their affiliation with their national identities. It can be discussed then that the meaning of ethnic identities in these two examples was only skin colour, parents’ country of origin, and others’ expectations. This supports previous research by Jacobson (1997b: 248) that suggested that ‘popular, racist assumptions that being British is a matter of being white can be described as
contributing to an ethnic boundary which is imposed upon the members of the minority community, rather than loosely constructed by the members of the minority themselves.’ However, their national identities included birthplace, school and university, culture, work, and friends and were thus based on birth, education, and culture. As highlighted in the example of Hakim, Scottish identity was also his cultural identity, which implies stronger and deeper attachment to Scottishness than to ethnic identities such as Pakistani. Weaker affiliation and a sense of belonging to ethnic culture and identity are also evident in another example. Ali was born and brought up in Edinburgh, was working in a public institution, and had an undergraduate degree. He described himself as Scottish-British-Pakistani-Muslim, but explained that his affiliation with his ethnic background was not his prominent identity because he felt different from Pakistani people and was therefore more connected to the Scottish or British culture:

The reason that I know I am not fully Pakistani is because when I speak to people from Pakistan, I can tell that their way of thinking, their outlook, their understanding of their surrounding is different to how I look at things, and I am more linked with Scottishness or with Britishness than with Pakistani culture or identity.

[Edinburgh, 38 year-old]

This could imply that for some second generation Muslims, who have strong cultural ties with Scotland or Britain, ethnic identities are less meaningful and weak. In contrast, in the latter form of affiliation with ethnic identities, there was stronger and deeper association with ethnic culture and identity. The data showed that there were two participants who reported that they considered maintaining cultural bonds with their families’ country of origin and family education to be key factors in maintaining and developing their ethnic identities. The first example is Sadiq, who was brought up in Glasgow and was a full time undergraduate student. He, who earlier identified as only Iraqi, stated that through his family and community education, he had developed a strong connection with his ethnic culture and identity:

My family’s whole ethos is very much attached to their country, and they have got no association with the British country. They brought me up as if I was an
Iraqi child. So I was not familiar with these sorts of ideas of being Scottish and so on. Later on through community education and attending our Iraqi Mosques my ethnic culture and identity was developed and got stronger.

[Glasgow, 25 year-old]

In this quote, Sadiq highlights the importance of family education in maintaining his ethnic culture and bolstering his ethnic identity. Sadiq also notes that the importance of ethnic culture resulted in little affiliation or sense of belonging with Scottish identity. Sadiq was one of those respondents who reported national identity non-recognition to mean that he did no longer identify as Scottish, but this quote underlines the significance of family education and culture to this process. The importance of family education and maintaining ethnic culture was also highlighted in the next example. Khabir was brought up in the UK and was a postgraduate student. He described himself as Iraqi-Scottish and said that, even though his mother was Scottish, he was brought up in an Arabic-Iraqi culture, which made him feel more Iraqi than British or Scottish:

I feel more Iraqi so I tell people that I am Iraqi … as my mum is Scottish I do have some sense of connection with Scotland as well but in terms of culture I do not feel a lot of connection to this country [Scotland] because I have been brought up in an Arabic-Iraqi culture. So, I feel more Iraqi.

[Aberdeen, 23 year-old]

The examples of Sadiq and Khabir imply the importance of early childhood socialisation in developing and maintaining some second-generation Muslims’ ethnic identities. This finding supports previous research that suggested that family education and up-bringing were significant in maintaining or developing Muslims’ ethnic identities (Murji 2011). The examples of Sadiq and Khabir also suggest that due to family education and maintaining ethnic culture, these respondents had weaker cultural bonds with Scotland and thus have weaker (in the case of Khabir) or no affiliation (in the case of Sadiq) with Scottish identity. This implies that some second generation Muslims, despite being brought up and educated in Scotland, have stronger cultural ties and identity with their ethnic backgrounds. Second-
generation participants’ identity negotiation was not limited to their country of residence and ethnicity because the third aspect of their identity negotiation was religion. This leads us to the next part of second generation Muslims’ multiple and hybrid identities; religious identity.

Importance of Religion: Central to Muslim Identity and Practice

Religious identity was the second most common identity marker that was utilised by 17 out of 27 of the second generation participants as a part of their multiple or hybrid national identities. The data suggests that those who identified with their religion saw it as the most prominent and important component of their multiple or hybrid identities. For example, Azadeh was one of these 17 participants who asserted that her most important identity was her Muslim identity. She was a practicing Muslim woman and earlier identified herself to be Muslim and British:

I think the most important thing for me is that I am a Muslim; this is something that I feel strongly but I am not just a Muslim. I can be Scottish, I can be British, I can be a part of my wider ethnic community but I think Scottish applies to my identity after Muslim.

[Edinburgh, 42 year-old]

This quote implies that identification with religion amongst some second generation Muslims can be stronger than identification with ethnic or national identities (cf. Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; Archer 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Change Institute 2009). Such importance was also evident in some other examples. Azim, who was a practicing Muslim man, described himself as a British-Muslim-Indian:

My religion is very important to my identity. It is also very important in terms of shaping my everyday life; for example how I should behave and what I should do in my workplace and in everywhere. So, it is the most important thing for me.

[Dundee, 24 year-old]
This example highlights the central role of religious identity for some second generation Muslims and suggests that religious identity can affect Muslims’ social and economic life. The importance of religious identity for Muslims’ social and economic integration is discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. One possible explanation for this importance of Muslim identity can be associated with the special role of religion of Islam, which provides the guidelines for every aspect of Muslims’ individual and communal lives and thus becomes central to Muslim identity and practice (Esposito 2011). This supports the argument that religion, as a meaning system or a system of guiding beliefs, can function as a social identity ‘through the increasing importance of the relevant group membership to the self-concept’ (Ysseldyk et. al. 2010: 61; see also Park 2007). As I mentioned above in the example of Azadeh, the importance of religion could be placed higher than nationality amongst some second generation Muslims. This was also highlighted in the example of Adil, who is another practicing Muslim man who was born and brought up in Falkirk. Adil separated the role of nationality and religion, pointing out that his religion is the most important factor in his life:

In terms of nationality, obviously I am British, but before that I am a Muslim, I see two different things, but as nationality I would say British. The nationality and religion are two separate things, for example you can be a British Muslim, and you can be British anything. But religion is very important to me; how I live my life and everything has to be according to my religion.

[Falkirk, 24 year-old]

All these quotes stress the importance of religion in some second generation Muslims’ identity negotiation. These examples also suggest a stronger affiliation with religion over national identities amongst some second generation Muslims. The importance of religion as a significant marker in some second generation Muslim participants’ identity could also be linked to the rise of political Islam, especially after political events such as the Salman Rushdie fatwa in 1989, and international matters such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, the 1991 Gulf War (Saeed et al 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007), the 9/11 bombings in New York, and the 7/7 bombings in London. The importance of religion can also go higher than ethnic
culture or ethnic identity. For example, some of these 17 participants reported that their religious identities are more important than their ethnic identities. Zahir, who was born and brought up in Scotland and described himself as Scottish-Muslim said that:

It is very important to me to maintain my religious identity and less so I feel for my ethnic identity because my Pakistani cultural identity has almost become diluted because I grew up here and I have got more of Scottish culture than Pakistani culture and that goes to the fact that many Pakistanis who came here might go back to Pakistan quite often so they maintain that cultural identity whereas I do not go back very often. I do not feel a huge affinity to my parents’ country culturally. So, my cultural identity [as Scottish] and my religious identity [as Muslim] are components of me so when it comes down to action then you have to judge those actions or make a decision what you can do based on your personal judgment and what you think is right. For me, my religious identity forms more of the framework of my morality or the process that I go through to decide what to do and what not to do. There might be some cultural things like going to the pub or going out drinking or clubbing where that contradicts my religious identity then I felt that I can choose what to do. But I am not sacrificing my cultural identity because I still consider myself Scottish Muslim. Being Scottish Muslim means that you try to take the good things of being Scottish and you keep the good things of your faith. But you make it clear that as a Muslim this is what we are doing.

[Glasgow, 39 year-old]

In this quote, Zahir emphasised that his cultural identity is more connected to Scottish culture than Pakistani culture, but whenever there is a contradiction between his religious identity and Scottish culture (such as drinking alcohol), his religious identity determines what to do and what not to do. Adil and Zahir reinforce the finding that some second generation Muslims see religion, as a source of identity, as more important than ethnicity or nationality. This backs up other research that showed the importance of religion as a significant identity marker amongst the second generation/young Muslims (Bochner 1982; Hutnik 1985; Jacobson 1997b; Saeed et. al. 1999; Archer 2001, 2003; Ameli and Merali 2004; Hopkins 2007; Change Institute 2009). One possible explanation for this is having no connection to their parents’ country of origin, on the one hand, and on the other hand, they are
being denied full belonging with Scottishness by the exclusive attitudes and actions of some majority Scots. Therefore, religion becomes one strong and positive source of identity that they can claim (see also Ballard 1996; The Change Institute 2009). This supports the theoretical argument that public devaluation of Muslims’ social identity by the majority can result in more intergroup solidarity on the part of the minority group (Saeed et. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007). The examples of Azadeh and Zahir also highlight that even though their primary identity is religious, they still considered themselves to be Scottish. These examples demonstrate that there is no contradiction between being Muslim and Scottish or British, and support Meer’s (2012: 192) argument that Islam is not in contradiction with ‘liberal democratic norms and convictions.’ However, being Muslim or practicing Islam in secular societies may face challenges as discussed in Muslims’ integrational strategies in Chapters 8 and 9.

All participants who reported stronger identification with their religious identity were practicing Muslims. This suggests the importance for practicing and observant Muslims of having a strong *Muslim* identity. The example of less-practicing participants (Kathryn, Zainab and Akram) who did not self-identify as Muslim lends credence to this view. Additionally, the examples of Amir and Arezo, who used to be non-practicing Muslims, also supports the importance of being practicing and observant Muslims for having a strong identification with Muslim identity. By embracing Islam, some second generation participants felt more belonging to the *Muslim identity* and developed a stronger identification with Islam. Amir, who earlier described himself as British-Scottish-Pakistani-Muslim, is a prime example of this:

> As I was becoming a more practicing Muslim, I regarded myself more Muslim than other identities. Now, I see myself more Muslim; so I think my religion is very important to my identity.

[Dundee, 21 year-old]

In another example, Arezo, who earlier described himself as a British-Muslim, stated that after becoming a practicing Muslim, her religious identity became more prominent than her civic identity:
When I was younger, I always said that I am British and that was really who I was. That time, my parents were not very practicing Muslims so in my household it was not a lot of Islam, so I was just a British person and that was it. But as I grown up and look more into Islam, then I became a practicing Muslim myself; I just started to wear the Hijab about 10 years ago, so when I started to do that, I have gone more towards Muslim identity rather than my British identity, so that is what I think of myself more. Muslim identity is more important to me than the British identity.

[Edinburgh, 50 year-old]

These two quotes show that those second generation Muslims who practice and observe the religion of Islam can have a strong affiliation to their religious identities. This supports previous research by Kidd and Jamieson (2011) that suggested that for some Muslims, the importance of their religious identity increased as they increasingly practiced their religion. The importance of practicing Islamic law in Muslims’ religious identity (Esposito 2011) and the examples of less-practicing and non-practicing participants, also imply that those Muslims who do not practice the religion of Islam may not even self-identify as Muslims and instead construct strong bonds to their ethnicity or nationality. However, due to the small sample size, especially with less-practicing and non-practicing participants, confirming this association will require further research.

Conclusion and Comparison

Comparing the differing meanings attributed to, and the strength of, identification with national, ethnic, and religious identities by the first and second generation participants, the data suggests that the importance of nationality amongst first generation participants was mainly based on residential and citizenship markers, and the importance of ethnicity and ethnic identities was mainly based on the salience of birthplace and maintaining social and financial ties with their country of origin. However, the strength of identification with national (e.g. Scottish) and ethnic identities (e.g. Pakistani) varied based on the idea of the myth of return. Those participants (Ehsan and Hareb) who set up their new home and life in Scotland and
did not consider going back to their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their national identities than their ethnic identities. Whereas, those (Hamid and Nazir) who kept the possibility of return open and maintained strong cultural and financial ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic identities than their national identities. It is important to note that the ‘continuing salience of race’ (Hopkins 2007: 72; see also Jacobson 1997a; 1997b), the persistence of cultural boundaries (Jacobson 1997a; 1997b; Virdee et al. 2006) and thus the experience of national identity non-recognition, also played an important part in weakening these participants’ sense of belonging to Scotland or Britain, meaning that some wanted to keep open an option of return. In contrast, the second-generation participants’ identification with Scottish or British national identities was based on a range of markers such as birthplace, education, English language, Scottish accent, and culture. The importance of ethnicity and ethnic identity was mainly related to social imposition (labelling behaviour) or family education. In parallel to the first generation participants’ identity negotiation, the strength and meaning of their identification with national and ethnic identities varied based on family education and ethnic culture. Those respondents (such as Sadiq and Khabir) who maintained strong cultural ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic identities than their national identities. In contrast, those respondents (such as Hakim, Zahir and Kasim) who had closer bonds to their Scottish culture had a stronger affiliation with their national identities than their ethnic identities. This finding suggests the importance of cultural identity and implies that those Muslims whose cultural identity is connected to Scottish culture have a stronger affiliation with Scottish identity. Muslim participants’ identity negotiation was not limited to ethnicity and nationality though as religion and religious identity also played an important part and perhaps the most important part in some cases.

The importance of religion and religious identities amongst first generation participants was interesting; for some, religion played the role of very important belief system but was not reported as being part of identity, whereas for some others, it was the most prominent identity and thus stronger than their identification with nationality and ethnicity. Religion also played a central role in the practices of the
second generation, and also in the observant participants’ identity and practice. For practicing participants, religion was a complete way of life, with which everything else should be in line. For these participants, identification with religion and religious identity was stronger than their identification with ethnicity and nationality. This supports Jacobson’s (1997b: 239) argument that ‘the special significance of religion lies in the fact that Islam, by and large, is central to their sense of who they are: they affirm their belief in its teachings and regard it as something in relation to which they should orient their behaviour in all spheres of life and which therefore demands of them a self-conscious and explicit commitment.’ This lends support to the argument that the special role of religion, particularly Islam, as a meaning system or a system of guiding beliefs, can function as a social identity, and interestingly also as the most important identity marker (Ysseldyk et al. 2010; Park 2007). Salience of religion, as a source of identity, can also be explained for some second generation Muslims by the fact that they had no connection to their parents’ country of origin and that their Scottish identity claims had also been denied by some majority Scots, so religion became the one strong and positive source of identity that they can claim. This supports previous research (Saeed et al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007) that highlighted the importance of devaluation of Islam and Islamophobia in the significance of religious identity amongst Muslims. There were, however, some less-practicing participants who did not mention religion as a part of their multiple or hybrid identities. This implies the importance of practicing and observing the religion of Islam in prompting such strong identification with Muslim identity amongst some second generation Muslims. It can also imply the importance of Muslims’ religious identity for their social or economic integration into society. It is, however, important to note that as the category of ‘Muslim’ is as internally diverse as any other category (Modood 2003; Meer 2012), the implications of adapting such a strong religious identity in Muslims’ everyday life can also be varied. Muslims’ different strategies of integration in Scotland are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9.

The final point that needs to be made is that, as mentioned earlier, the importance of ‘race’ (mainly with reference to skin colour) was also highlighted by some first and second generation participants, which could imply the persistence of ‘race’ and skin colour as a marker of social difference (Jacobson’s 1997a; Virdee et al. 2006;
Kyriakides et al. 2009; Bond’s 2006; Bechhofer and McCrone 2009; Reicher et al. 2010). Putting these findings together adds to the general argument that Muslims’ sense of being part of Scottish/British society or of being outside that society is not only a Muslim issue, but is also related to their perceptions and experiences of how others see them because this is how Muslims experience whether their claims to inclusion are accepted or refused. Interestingly, despite having widespread experience of identity non-recognition at the grassroots level, both first and second generation Muslims still had some sense of belonging to Scottish/British identity. This can be associated with political Scottish nationalism; in other words, with successive Scottish governments that promote and propagate a civic sense of Scottish identity, or it can be associated with the lack of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). This leads us to the next chapter, where I discuss how Muslims’ religious identity and racial differences can be grounds for exclusion and being targeted in Islamophobic incidents or racial abuses.
Chapter 6: Islamophobia in Scottish Major Cities

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the importance of nation, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity negotiation and also pointed out that their religious identity and racial differences can lead to social exclusion and Islamophobia. This chapter takes these issues further by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia and racism. Islamophobia, as a form of cultural racism, can take different forms in different contexts (Bennett 2000). For example, previous research (Hopkins 2004a; Hopkins and Smith 2008) suggested that there is a perception among some Muslims that anti-Muslim racism is higher in areas where there is a high density of Muslim residents such as Glasgow. In contrast, some other Muslims feel that Islamophobia is higher in more segregated areas such Scottish small towns and rural areas. This chapter, by focusing on Scottish major cities where the majority of Muslims reside (and the next chapter by focusing on Scottish towns and small cities) highlights the differences in Muslims’ experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia. To this end, the experience and accounts of 33 Muslim participants in Scottish major cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee) are analysed. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the significance of these cities is the fact that the number of Muslims living in those areas are at least more than one per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 2013). This is in contrast to Scottish towns where the number of Muslims is less than one per cent of the local population (this is discussed in the next chapter). This chapter explores Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia and discusses the importance of different factors that influenced their experiences. As Muslims’ identity and visibility (racial and religious signifiers) is key to their victimisation (Hopkins et. al. 2007; Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014), all participants in this research were either racially or/and religiously visible/identifiable.

This chapter firstly details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims in Scottish major cities. These experiences were places on a spectrum of daily, sometimes, rare, and no experience of Islamophobia. The
importance of different socio-economic factors in each of these experiences is discussed and compared with those in other categories. Secondly, individual and institutional Islamophobia is discussed, and the conclusion is finally made that socio-economic factors are more important than the density of the Muslim population.

**Different Experiences of Islamophobia**

The data suggests that there were diverse *experiences* and complex *feelings* of Islamophobia among participants in Scottish major cities. To begin with diverse experiences, respondents reported two main forms of Islamophobia; individual and institutional (the former was limited to employment discrimination). Second, the data suggests that the experience of individual Islamophobia was varied amongst participants; around two-thirds of participants [20 out of 33] had self-experience of Islamophobia - of whom more than a third [14 participants] experienced Islamophobia rarely/occasionally - and almost a fifth [6 respondents] expressed that they struggled with Islamophobia almost every day. The rest of the participants, more than a third of them [13 out of 33], never had any experience of Islamophobia or any other type of racism. Whilst the sample size was small, it offers insight (Richie et. al. 2003: 251) into the range of experiences of Islamophobia. Putting these figures together; it can be suggested that a majority of respondents (more than two thirds; 27 out of 33) had no or very rare experience of Islamophobia, which might imply less experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. However, dealing with Muslims’ *feelings* and *perceptions* of individual Islamophobia, the data was more complex and diverse. The data suggests that some participants had feelings of Islamophobia in Scotland even though they never experienced it. Others had daily experiences of Islamophobia and thus also had strong feelings. Another group had very rare experiences of it and thus felt that *Scotland is free from Islamophobia, and* some others who also had some experience in the past felt that there is Islamophobia, but its form had changed.

The data suggests that there are firstly different experiences of Islamophobia amongst Muslims, which implies that different factors are involved. Second, it suggests that there are different perceptions of Islamophobia, which might be
constructed not only on the basis of actual experiences but also thanks to media and international events. In this section, by analysing participants’ experiences and perceptions, I will look for any possible explanation for the variation of experiences of Islamophobia and will also seek any possible explanation of any differences between participants’ actual experiences and their perceptions of Islamophobia. To unpack this complexity of experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia and to assess the relationship between them, I divided experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia into four categories; first, daily experiences and pervasive feeling of Islamophobia; second, some previous experiences and feeling of a new everyday or subtle Islamophobia; third, rare experiences and feeling of Scotland free from Islamophobia; and fourth, no experience but feeling of Islamophobia.

Daily Experiences and Pervasive Feelings of Islamophobia

I start with the most intense category, those with daily experience and pervasive feelings of Islamophobia. This group asserted their prevailing experience of Islamophobia by using terms such as ‘all the time,’ ‘always,’ and ‘everyday.’ As the number of these respondents was limited (6 participants) and they all had intense experience of Islamophobia, I will discuss all these participants’ examples to gain a better understanding of the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. I begin with the example of Kasim, who was a second generation Muslim man and has lived in Edinburgh for 32 years. He was of Pakistani background and was also a practicing Muslim with a visible religious identity marker; namely a beard. In terms of socio-economic status, he was employed in a bank. He stated that he experienced a range of racism and discrimination such as verbal abuse, employment discrimination, and social exclusion:

I experienced it throughout my life… my experience of racism and discrimination includes many things for example racial hatred which usually takes place in the street. Another example is social discrimination; when you have been excluded from a community or a group because of your colour. For example, if in making policies in local councils, our views are not heard, that can be a social discrimination. So, that is another form of discrimination, in a way that we are not allowed to have our say even though we are a part of the community. Economically;
where for example going for promotion, I have been stopped; I know it’s because of firstly my name and secondly my colour…

[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 41 years old]

In this quote, Kasim particularly highlighted his racial (skin colour) and cultural/religious (name) visibility as important elements in his experience of racism and Islamophobia. This supports the argument that Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism draws upon both physical and religious/cultural markers (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). The highlighted importance of both racial and cultural factors was also evident from other examples. The next example is Kathryn, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Glasgow and Edinburgh for 15 years. In terms of visibility, she was from a Pakistani background, had a brown skin colour, and she used to wear South Asian traditional dress (Shalwar Kamees\(^1\)). Kathryn was a less-practicing Muslim\(^2\) and had no visible Muslim identity markers such as wearing hijab or going to mosque for daily prayers, however as I mentioned, she had some visible cultural and racial markers. In terms of socio-economic status, she had a standard grade and was part time employed and was living in a council housing flat with her 4 children and her husband. Commenting on her experiences of racism and discrimination, she stated that there is always a possibility of being verbally victimised:

> There can always be something, even walking down the street somebody could just turn around and say anything [such as *Paki*] to you … even if you say I was born here and I am British it would not make any difference. It is just the colour of your skin. … I spoke to a lot of these people; when they just see me they start calling me *Paki*… my real name is Jamilah, people used to call me ‘Jami the Paki’ so I got a

\(^1\) It is a traditional dress of South and Central Asia, especially of Pakistan, which is worn by both men and women which ‘includes a long loose-fitting tunic paired with long loose-fitting pants’ (Dunkel et. al. 2010: 57).

\(^2\) In this research, it refers to those participants who identify themselves as Muslim but do not practice all Islamic rules, for example the 5 pillars of Islam, but still practice some other rules such as not consuming alcohol and consuming Halal meat. This term is used to distinguish these Muslims from practicing and non-practicing Muslims [more explanation of each term is offered in the fourth chapter; methodology chapter].
lot of abuse with that and then changed my name to a more British name; Kathryn. ... So, I have changed myself a lot, on the basis of changing my name and my way of dress too ... I used to wear Asian clothes and I used to wear a scarf when I was going outside but people used to tell stuff to me.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 27 years old]

In parallel to the example of Kasim, Kathryn emphasised the importance of her racial and ex-religious visibility in being targeted for verbal abuse in this quote. She highlights that in her former position as a practicing and visible Muslim women with hijab\(^1\) and an Arabic/Islamic name (Jamilah), she experienced Islamophobic abuse such as being called as ‘Jami the Paki.’ Kathryn’s former position implies the importance of religious and/or cultural visibility in the experience of Islamophobia. This supports previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) that suggested a significant relationship between being visible as a Muslim and experiences of Islamophobia. More specifically, the study of Lambert and Githens (2010: 35) which examined anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK, suggests that such crimes ‘often take place in the vicinity of a mosque or against Muslims wearing Islamic clothes and, in the case of men, Islamic beards or, in the case of women, hijabs, niqabs or burkas.’ The relationship between visibility (racial and religious/cultural) and Islamophobia can be explained by the nature of Islamophobia as a process of racialization of Muslims that contains both racial and religious/cultural prejudice against Muslims (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). To this extent, those perceived as Muslims, based on some visible symbols (Esposito 2011), signifiers and markers (Hopkins et. al. 2007) such as hijab in the case of Muslim women and having a beard in the case of Muslim men, may be targeted for Islamophobic harassment.

Kathryn’s later position as a less-practicing, or in other words an invisible Muslim, however, can imply the importance of racial difference and racism. Due to daily experience of Islamophobia, she changed her name to ‘a more British style’

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\(^1\) A visible marker of a Muslim woman identity
(Kathryn) and changed her way of dress (not wearing hijab anymore) to reduce the number of Islamophobic incidents that she used to experience. She felt that her religious and cultural differences were the main reason for victimisation, thus she decided to adopt more mainstream norms (assimilation) by changing her name and way of dress, and also by constructing a British identity. In this quote, she highlights that even taking such assimilatory steps did not stop her receiving verbal abuse. Considering all of the changes she has implemented, she indicated that she has still encountered racism on the basis of racial difference, namely skin colour. This implies that Muslims can suffer both colour and cultural racism due to their cultural and racial differences (Modood 2005). This supports previous research by El-Nakla et. al. (2007) that suggested that Scottish Muslim women experience both racism and Islamophobia on the grounds of their skin colour or headscarf (hijab).

Although Kathryn’s quote along with all the other respondents’ accounts of racial and ethnic/religious visibility in this category highlight the significance of visibility, Kathryn’s socio-economic status also points towards the importance of another factor. Kathryn’s low socio-economic status is demonstrated by her residential place; council housing areas. She is living in a council housing flat, in a council housing neighbourhood, which is a very deprived area. Her daily experiences of Islamophobia can be associated with this fact. This echoes the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), which showed that ‘those with lower levels of educational attainment, … and those living in more deprived areas of Scotland were all relatively more likely’ to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011: 37-38). Another participant, Hamid, was also living in council housing. Hamid was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Glasgow and Edinburgh for 8 years. He was originally from Pakistan but he had no visible religious markers such as having a beard or going to the mosque every day, and he was a less-practicing Muslim. In terms of employment status, he was a self-employed taxi driver. He explained that he received verbal abuse ‘almost all the time,’ mostly by being called a Paki1:

1 The term Paki refers to a stereotypical discourse which racialises and culturalises Muslims and thus associates all Muslims with the Pakistani background in a negative and offensive manner (Brah 1996; Moosavi 2014) [this was discussed already in the theoretical chapter in more detail].
Being a taxi driver, you get a lot of racial discrimination. Almost, all the time you can see that. Even people who you think would not say those kinds of things [such as being called Paki], they do come up with these things; racist comments. They always pass some comments on you. … I am a taxi driver, people come into taxi and talk about everything, they discuss about everything and it happened so many times, for example they say ‘let’s get stuff from Pakis’. That is how they call us... I have learned a lot as being a taxi driver, because people come in and talk about everything… as if they are not in taxi and they are sitting at house… they do not think what they are talking about, sometimes they say some stuff [such as calling us as Paki] in front of me without realising that I am one of them…

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 28 years old]

This example, like many other examples in this chapter, highlights the importance of the discourse, the Paki, in the marginalisation and stigmatisation of Muslims. In this discourse of prejudice, all Muslims, regardless of their real ethnic or racial backgrounds, are assigned the term Paki, (Brah 1996; Kose 1996; Franks 2000; Modood 2005; Moosavi 2014) which refers to a ‘inferiorised other’ (Brah 1996: 9). As According to Runnymede Trust’s definition, seeing Muslims as others and inferior within the discourse of the Paki, is a form of Islamophobia. Therefore, calling Muslims Paki in this study will be regarded as a form of cultural racism in general, and of Islamophobia in particular. It is important to note that many of the respondents, when they were asked to reflect on their experience of any kind of discrimination and racism, tended to describe their different experiences of prejudice and discrimination (such as racism and Islamophobia) using the term ‘racism’ rather than distinguishing between racism and Islamophobia. This was despite the fact that the analysis of participants’ responses showed that they experienced both racism and Islamophobia, and interestingly, many of their experiences of individual and personal discrimination related to Islamophobia because their religiosity and cultural characteristics - as a Muslim – were targeted and othered. One possible explanation for this could be the use of the term racism in the question, which could have affected their responses. Another explanation could be the likelihood of unfamiliarity with the term Islamophobia (Kidd and Jamieson 2011) or limiting the use of the term to a more political and social aspect of Islamophobia. As I will discuss in Chapter 8
respondents explicitly used the term ‘Islamophobia’ when pointing to the \textit{distorted representation of Muslims in the media}. In this and the next chapter, respondents’ experiences based on their nature and form will fall into different categories; racism, Islamophobia, or a combination of both, and also into different forms of individual or institutional, open or implicit.

Turning back to the above example, Hamid himself particularly highlighted his job, ‘being a taxi driver,’ as both an important factor in his experience of Islamophobia and in having a better understanding of people’s attitudes because they tended to speak about many things in a taxi and perhaps consider it as a private space. This quote, thus, can imply the importance of another factor - specific jobs - in the daily experience of Islamophobia. Commenting on Hamid’s job, it is important to note that it was a form of self-employment that required \textit{daily contact and interaction with many people} and was considered to be a \textit{low level occupation}. Other participants also had jobs with similar characteristics; Ali, Sajjad, and Ghader. I will discuss each of these examples in turn. Ali was a second generation Muslim man and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. In terms of racial and religious visibility, he was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. In terms of employment status, he was employed in a governmental institution but as his father had a shop, he also used to help him in the shop in his free time. Ali stated that his experiences of Islamophobia - mainly being called \textit{Paki} - were divided into two stages, the first type of experience was related to his childhood and happened occasionally, but the second type of his experience was in relation to the time when he worked in his father’s shop where he experienced frequent racial abuse:

Yes, I had some experiences from my young age. To be fair, up until age of 17-18 there have been some incidents, where people said something. There were more in school environment … other than that most people were okay … then when I left school into the world, because my father owned a shop I used to help him in the shop. When you work in a shop, you get so many people in and out, then these people told you that you are different by being racist, by being whatever, swearing, calling you a \textit{Paki}, by causing problems and stuff … . So, yes there were many racist abuses from the time I was working in my father’s shop.

[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 38 years old]
Ali’s example, in parallel to Hamid’s case, also highlights the importance of specific jobs and workplaces - in this case a shop - where he experienced many Islamophobic incidents. This particular job also shared the same features of self-employment, *daily contact and interaction with many people, and a low level occupation*. Like Hamid’s quote, Ali particularly highlights the importance of dealing with many people in experiencing Islamophobic abuses in this example. The next example in this category is Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. In terms of visibility, he was from Pakistan but he had no visible markers, such as having a beard, even though he was a practicing Muslim and went to mosque every day. In terms of employment status, similar to Hamid and Ali, he was self-employed and had a shop. He too highlighted the importance of workplace and the issue of economic concerns:

I have been here for 25 years, you always have argument; when you are in business, you always have some hard time customers or you see other narrow minded people. So, yes, I did experience racism and discrimination for a number of times. For example, people tell us that ‘you robbed this country; before you came here we were okay, since you came …’. They do not blame any other people, they only blame Pakistanis. Any coloured people are being called as Paki; it does not matter where they really are from. They can be from Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia; does not matter where they are from, they are all called Paki.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 45 years old]

The next example is Ghader, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Glasgow for 49 years. In terms of visibility, like all participants in this category, he was from a Pakistani background with a visible cultural identity, wearing Shalwar Kamees. He was also a practicing Muslim with religious identity markers; having a long beard and going to the mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a retired self-employed shop owner (the same features present in previous examples). He said that he experienced Islamophobia ‘everyday’:

Yes I did experience racism everyday and it is still happening too, some people just come to your shop and call you Paki and sometimes people may see you on the street and say that word to you…

[First generation, Male, Glasgow, 63 years old]
These last four quotes particularly highlighted the importance of self-employment (featured as *low level occupation and in daily contact with many people*) in the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. To further investigate this association, I looked through all the examples (33 participants in Scottish major cities), even amongst the other categories of rare or no experience of Islamophobia. There were 6 other self-employed respondents (in other categories), of whom two cases (Arezo and Emran) had some experience of Islamophobia and the rest (Asghar, Akbar, Akram, Hassan) had no experience at all.

To test the proposed association in the first category (the relationship between specific socio-economic status and daily experience of Islamophobia) with these odd cases or outliers¹ (Richie et. al. 2003), I begin with the latter; looking at each of these cases, the data suggests that these cases lacked one or both of the features highlighted in this category. For instance, in the first three examples, participants’ self-employment jobs were technical occupations (in the case of Asghar and Akbar) or a high professional job such as advisory occupation (in the case of Akram), and all these cases also had very few contacts (such as two or three times a week) with their customers. Turning to the case of Hassan, it is important to note that he was working in a ‘Halal shop’² which was next to a central mosque. I would suggest that his main customers would be less likely to be Islamophobic as they would be Muslims or familiar with Muslim culture and religion, otherwise they would not attend such shops. Turning to the former examples, Arezo was also working in a ‘family business’ a fabric shop, which could be matched with the features of self-employment mentioned above. Consistent with the category under study - daily experience of Islamophobia - she also had some experience of Islamophobia, but however, her experiences were limited rather than routine. Commenting on the differences of this example, it can be suggested that perhaps because she was

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¹ This term refers to those cases that do not fit into a pattern or into an association developed by a researcher; in qualitative analysis, these cases ‘should never be ignored’(Richie et. al. 2003: 252).

² It is a store where the Halal meat (from animals slaughtered in Islamic way) and other items and goods mainly from Muslim majority countries such as South Asians, Middle Eastern, African and Arab countries.
working in a fabric shop, she was less likely to have lower class customers who would be more likely to be racist or Islamophobic (Ormston et. al. 2011). To an extent, that could be one influencing factor in the experience of less Islamophobia in this case. Considering the last example, it is important to say that Emran was a self-employed car-dealer who, as he said in the interview, only had a few customers during a week and thus his case does not fit with the identified features of self-employment in the first category. Thus, the unmatched nature of these self-employed examples’ (Arezo, Emran, Asghar, Akbar, Akram, Hassan) jobs as low level occupations that involve being in daily contact with many people does not undermine the importance of self-employment in the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. In other words, even though these examples were also self-employed, having professional jobs and being in contact with either fewer or more fluent costumers could affect the level of their experience of Islamophobia compared to other self-employed respondents who had a low level occupation and were in daily contact with many people.

To discuss the implication of these examples in the first category (daily experiences and pervasive feelings of Islamophobia), the data suggests that issues of visibility (racial, cultural and/or religious), deprived residential areas, and self-employment in low level occupations and in daily contact with many people could have significant importance in the daily experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities. Reflecting on the first factor, as there were many other participants with racial and/religious visibility while having no or rare experience of Islamophobia, it can be argued that although visibility can be considered to be a prerequisite for any Islamophobic harassment, it was more likely to be accompanied by the other factors pointed to above. In other words, these examples imply that those visible Muslims who also work in self-employed jobs with daily contact with many people or those visible Muslims who live in more deprived areas could be more likely to experience high rates of Islamophobia.

Subtle and Everyday Islamophobia
The second category refers to participants who had some experiences of
Islamophobia and had a perception that Islamophobia does exist in Scotland but it is now more *subtle* (Essed 1991; 2002, Moosavi 2014) and implicit. Some participants particularly mentioned that their experience of Islamophobia dated back to their childhood or came from children, which was more verbal and explicit, but now, as adults and in interaction with other adults, they still feel that Islamophobia exists but is now more implicit and people are not so vocal. To illustrate the experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in this category, I start with the example of Hakim, who was a second generation Muslim who was born and brought up in Edinburgh. He was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with visible Muslim identity markers; having a beard and going to the mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, he had no occupation because he was a full time student. Hakim explained that he had some experiences of Islamophobia when he was younger and from other children in his primary school, but although the frequency of verbal abuse later decreased at high school, he could still however feel an implicit prejudice:

> When I was younger, I had some experiences of racism such as being called as *Paki*. So, it was like in school time and getting from other young people but when it comes to high school I would say it dies down, however, you can sometimes see that in people’s eyes.

[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 20 years old]

The next example is Zahir, who was also a second generation Muslim man and has lived in Glasgow for 21 years. Like many other participants, he was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. His main experiences of Islamophobia have been either traced back to his childhood, or that which he has received even now from children, but he generally asserted that Islamophobia has declined. Zahir also felt that Islamophobia could have become a ‘more settled’ form of prejudice amongst adults that is not as visible and vocal as it is amongst children:

> Yes I did have some experiences of verbal abuse; growing up and occasionally even now. I cannot remember the last time; it has been a while ago but people passing on the street may say something [such as *Paki* or terrorist] to you. So, occasionally you may get some comment. Generally, I think it is lesser now; I do not know whether it
was through childhood and children who tend to tease or tend to do that to other people but as adults you do not get it as much or it can be more settled now.

[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 years old]

Zahir pointed to a new form of prejudice against Muslims in this quote by highlighting his feeling of a more settled form of Islamophobia. In using the term ‘settled,’ he meant that the new form of Islamophobia is not as open and visible as it was in the past, but is instead embedded in people’s attitudes and prejudices. This can be demonstrated by examples that highlight people’s looks and stares as indications of new Islamophobia. The next example is Nader, who was a second generation Muslim man who was born and brought up in Glasgow. In terms of visibility, he was from a Pakistani background with a beard and went to the mosque every day. He stated that his experience of Islamophobia, or ‘racism’ in his wording, went back to his younger age but has decreased in recent years. Nader, however, felt that Islamophobia could have turned into a more implicit form of prejudice:

I think certainly I did have especially when I was younger; so yes I had some experiences of racism such as name calling. When you are younger, I have to say it has some negative [impacts]… so, I have to say yes we experienced racism when we were younger; I think in 1980s there was more racism but not in recent years. Either it improved or people are not as vocal or upfront about it as in the past.

[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 38 years old]

These quotes raise two significant points; first, a shift in the appearance of Islamophobia, and second, the importance of children and schools in the development of open Islamophobia. The first implication is supported by previous research by Moosavi (2014: 8) on ‘subtle Islamophobia’ whereby ‘Muslims are confronted by latent hostility and exclusion in their day-to-day lives without it being obvious.’ This new form of Islamophobia can also be explained by Essed’s (1991; 2002) conception of everyday racism in which ‘socialised racist notions are integrated into everyday practices and thereby actualise and reinforce underlying racial and ethnic relations … and become familiar, repetitive and part of the normal routine in everyday life’ (1991: 145). As Essed (2002: 187) puts it, these ‘racial
practices and meaning belong to our familiar world [everyday life] and usually involve routine or repetitive practices. Therefore they can be expected and generalised for specific relations and situations.’ Adopting Essed’s (2002: 187) conception of everyday racism and Moosavi’s (2014) subtle Islamophobia to explain the above quotes (the examples of Nader, Hakim and Zahir), it can be said that these participants drew upon their previous experiences and their general knowledge of Islamophobia to see it as a ‘continuum’ (Essed 2002: 188) that is integrated into everyday practices, such as day-to-day interaction, and continues to discriminate and prejudice against Muslims. They particularly generalised their previous experiences of verbal and open Islamophobia to more implicit behaviours, such as different ‘looks’ or ‘stares’ they encounter everyday, thus perceived them as covert Islamophobia. Such feeling of subtle Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014) was evident in all of the above cases in this category, particularly when they were talking about a new form of Islamophobia which, for example, was not ‘vocal or upfront as in the past’ (in the case of Nader). In the case of Hakim, he pointed to Islamophobic attitudes which ‘you can sometimes see in people’s eyes’ or which are ‘more settled now,’ meaning that it is embedded in people’s everyday practices (in the case of Zahir):

… Now it is like you get some comments from people who are walking on the street or someone stares at you as you are passing on the street.

[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 years old]

To unpack and illustrate the perception of everyday Islamophobia, I discuss another example which can offer more insight to the understanding of everyday Islamophobia in Scotland. This example is Shakila, who was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Glasgow. She had a white Scottish mother and an Iranian father, who died when Shakila was around 8 years-old, and so she was brought up by a white Scottish family, thus she considered herself to be a white-Scottish person. Shakila converted to Islam 3 years ago and, before that, she considered herself to be a non-Muslim Scot. Her experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia are interesting because she can be seen as an ex-insider and as a
current outsider to *majority* Scots. Just like other examples in this category, Shakila had some experiences of Islamophobia in her younger age, mainly due to her father’s background, but after becoming a Muslim later on, her sense of Islamophobia has increased, especially when concerning the issue of the hijab:

As a child, I did get some rubbish in school and even I was told ‘go back to Pakistan’ but actually my mum is from Scotland and only my dad was from Iran, so several things. … Even now, every time I am thinking that I am going to wear my scarf, I read something in the newspaper [e.g. a report on an Islamophobic incident or some Islamophobic articles] then I change my mind. I cannot do it. To be honest, what scares me a lot is getting abuse from people in the street, I believe this is because I probably would be one of the people who were abusing Muslims but I was not a terrible person, I was never a bad person but quite a bad teenager I can say. So, probably I would have been nasty to people and I do not want teenagers to be nasty to me now, I am scared because I know that they can do it because I have seen that and I have done that before. So, I do not want to feel and experience that. So, to me scarf is a big issue. When you put the scarf on your head you look like a different person to other people. For example, my views about Islam were like Muslims are terrorists and women are oppressed.

[Second generation, Female, Glasgow, 30 years old]

Shakila is interesting because she draws on both Muslim and majority perspectives in her perception of *everyday* Islamophobia in Scotland. She had a fear that wearing a visible Muslim identity marker, hijab, would make her a target for Islamophobic attacks; as she used to experience or see before she became a Muslim. This supports previous research by El-Nakla et. al. (2007), which suggested that Scottish Muslim women’s religious appearance -wearing a headscarf or face veil - was important in their experiences of abuse and discrimination. The importance of Shakila’s example lies in her ex-position as an insider to the *majority*, and her current position as an insider to Muslims as a minority group. Her peculiar position may enable her to understand and interpret better attitudes and behaviour of white Scots towards Muslims (including herself). This peculiar position can be explained by the conception of *double consciousness* first proposed by Du Bois (1969) and then developed by Essed (1991; 2002: 176), which reflected Blacks’ special capability to understand ‘racist ideas and interpretations of reality.’ Studying British converts’
experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia, Moosavi (2014: 9) suggests that such understandings and interpretations of racism (and Islamophobia, as a form of racism, too) apply to other minorities too, especially Muslim converts, because they can ‘hypothesise about the presence of prejudice and become skilled at detecting’ racism and ‘this is why the converts’ concern over Islamophobia is understandable, because it is not based on empty sentiment but is rooted in intuition and insight.’ To this extent, Shakila’s interpretations and perception of the new Islamophobia as being more subtle and implicit could be highly significant. As indicated in the above quote, Shakila particularly highlighted the importance of wearing hijab, and thus becoming a visible Muslim, in her fear of becoming a target for Islamophobic attacks. This supports previous research by Franks (2000: 922-3), which suggested that racial abuse against white Muslims, as visualised by them wearing hijab, is a ‘kind of racism by proxy, but further, because of the identification of Islam with South Asian or Arab ethnicity, the white Muslims are perceived to be race-traitors by white supremacists.’ The importance of the hijab lies in its function as an Islamic symbol (Esposito 2011) that indicates women’s ‘Muslim identity.’ Shakila, thus, shows the significance of visibility in the experience of Islamophobia (which I discussed in the first category). Shakila’s example is also important since she did not have any actual experience of Islamophobia. Her fears relate to her previous beliefs and to times when she reveals her Muslim identity by wearing hijab. However, it is important to note that as I discussed and illustrated in the first category, even though the visibility (either racial or religious) was a prerequisite to Islamophobic harassment, it was unlikely to be the only factor in the experience of Islamophobia because other factors such as socio-economic issues and confronting intoxicated people also tended to influence the extent of experiences of Islamophobia.

This example also highlights the real consequences that arise from the perception of everyday and subtle Islamophobia. For instance, some of these respondents had a strong fear of Islamophobic attack against Muslim women wearing hijab. To illustrate this, I refer back to the example of Hakim; based upon his general knowledge of Islamophobia, he stated that as his sisters were wearing hijab, he always had this fear that one day they might be targeted for a violent attack:
All my sisters are younger than me and I am slightly protective about them. To me there is always a fear of being attacked because of their hijab. If they wear a hijab, they may be attacked or if they wear burqa¹, certainly the risk of being attacked will increase.

[Second generation, Male, Edinburgh, 20 years old]

Shakila, thus, chose not to wear a hijab most of the time, and others chose not to grow beards or wear traditional clothes. In another example, Azadeh also pointed to the social implications of such fears and perceptions. Azadeh was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. Azadeh was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim who wore the hijab. She, herself, did not have any experience of Islamophobia but she knew a lot of Muslim women who stopped wearing hijab due to the fear of Islamophobia:

I know a lot of women who fear to go out with their hijab on; they fear what people would say to them and how they would react to their hijab. This was because of Islamophobia and the media misrepresentations of Muslim women.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 42 years old]

These last three quotes (Shakila, Hakim and Azadeh) highlights two important issues; the social implications of the fear of Islamophobia, and the significance of the media in shaping participants’ general knowledge of Islamophobia. To start with the former, these quotes highlight that the perception and fear of everyday Islamophobia that is perceived as a continuum (Essed 2002; Kelly 1989) affects participants’ - especially Muslim women’s - everyday life (such as their way of dress and social integration) due to concerns for their safety and security in the society. For example, Hakim stated that he felt ‘protective’ about his sisters who wear hijab, or in the case of Shakila who stated that she could not overcome her fear of wearing hijab when going out, and finally in the example of Azadeh who stated that many women do not ‘go out with their hijab on.’ This finding supports Kelly’s (1989) concept of a

¹ Generally, it is a form of Islamic hijab but particularly it refers to a ‘garment that covers the entire body’ (Esposito 2011: 233) of a Muslim woman.
continuum of violence. In her study of sexual violence, she argues that repeated experiences or fears can cause a ‘loss of security and safety’ that can affect women’s social integration. Turning to the second issue, these examples particularly highlight the importance of media in influencing these participants’ general knowledge of Islamophobia. For example, in the case of Hakim, he especially highlights the issue of wearing burqa as an important factor in increasing the risk of violent attack against Muslim women. As this interview was carried out in July 2011, and later on in the interview, Hakim raised the issue of the possibility of the ban of burqas and hijabs in Scotland, his feeling and fear might have been affected by the ban on burqas in France in 2010 and the following widespread media and press debate on this ban in other European countries (Esposito 2011). Similarly, Shakila also highlighted the importance of media when she pointed to newspaper articles which made her too scared to wear a hijab. In the third example, Azadeh explicitly pointed to the importance of media in the creation of Islamophobia. Another fact to support this argument is that these participants’ actual experiences of Islamophobia were limited to verbal abuse, but however, their general knowledge of Islamophobia as influenced by media and some international events, was concerned with physical violence. This finding supports Essed’s (2002) argument that the media and newspaper articles can also be part of the process of everyday racism, even though they do not have any direct interaction with the victims [the role of media in the development of Islamophobia is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8].

The second significant finding in this category was the importance of school and children in the development or demonstration of open Islamophobia (namely in the form of verbal abuse). In all of the above examples (Nader, Hakim, Zahir and Shakila as well as in examples of other categories such as Ali and Zainab), they particularly highlighted their experience of Islamophobia during their childhood and school time. As I discussed earlier, one possible explanation for this could be the shift in the appearance of Islamophobia due to political correctness and governmental policies intended to promote cultural diversity, racial equality, and social inclusion (Penrose and Howard 2008; Ormston et. al. 2011). This can imply that in the past (participants’ childhood; almost a period of 15 to 30 years ago), there was more open and verbal Islamophobia and racism, but in recent times due to the increase of
awareness of racism, the number of racial and Islamophobic incidents has decreased. Other examples, however, pointed to recent incidents (at the time of interviewing in 2011) in which participants were targeted and victimized by children or faced discrimination in a school environment. For example, in the case of Zahir, he mentioned that ‘occasionally, even now’ these incidents (getting verbal abuse from children) happen. In another example, Azadeh, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman with hijab, also stated that she recently experienced an incident where some teenage girls in front of a school called her a terrorist:

> When I was going to high school to drop off my kids, when I was coming back a couple of teenagers, a couple of girls were standing there, as I walked passed she said have you got a bomb in your bag, and then I thought okay she is a teenager and just walked further, then she made a noise like a bomb explosion, and I turned and I looked at them and then just passed.

[Second generation, Edinburgh, 42 year-old]

The next example is Kathryn, who was a second generation British born Muslim woman. She was of Pakistani background and was a less-practicing Muslim. Kathryn explained that recently some young children insulted her kids through vandalism and racist graffiti:

> Some people, probably some kids from school, wrote on our door that; ‘Hamid [her son] is a ‘Paki’ and Saffyiah [her daughter] is a ‘B’ word’. I came upstairs and I was like shocked and told my husband you should go downstairs and wipe it. It was horrible; I don’t know how somebody can write that. Somebody called him a ‘Paki’ or whatever while he is only 11 years old. When he came home and saw that he got so upset.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 27 years old]

These quotes imply that children can be more vocal about the prejudiced and Islamophobic attitudes that they might have. The high rate of Islamophobic incidents at schools can be associated with group identities and peer pressure. Confirming these associations, however, requires further research on childhood discrimination and racism. In addition to the examples I provided here, the Scottish Government
(2009) recognized the important role of schools in promoting or denying equality and launched 152 *Islamophobia workshops* in secondary schools across Scotland to tackle the growth of Islamophobia. More recently, the teachers union, NASUWT, (2014) also noted the ‘intensification of Islamophobia in recent years’ that has impacted ‘all pupils/students and staff in schools and colleges,’ and who have provided a published advisory report, *Tackling Islamophobia: Advice for Schools and Colleges*, to tackle the growth of Islamophobia in Scotland as in elsewhere in the UK. The experiences of my participants reinforce the need for such programmes and also highlight the importance of schools and children in the development of Islamophobia or in its opposition.

As well as visibility, another recurring theme in this category was being from the second generation. All participants in this category (Nader, Hakim, Zahir and Shakila) were second generation Muslims. Considering the importance of *double consciousness* (Du Bois 1969; Essed 2002) in the understanding of ‘racist ideas and interpretations of reality’ in everyday racism and Islamophobia, it can be asserted that being integrated into Scottish society economically, educationally, and socially could offer a better understanding of people’s attitudes and behaviour to second generation Muslims. Another important and peculiar theme in the experience of Islamophobia in this category was receiving Islamophobic abuse from normal/typical white Scottish people rather than only from drunks. Therefore, they tended to generalise the issue of Islamophobia as a typical problem that can be associated with all white Scots, while this was vice versa in the next category. In contrast to the first and second category in which the prevailing experience and perception of Islamophobia was reported, the other two categories point to very rare or no experience of Islamophobia. It is to these that I now turn.

**Rare Experience of Islamophobia**

The third category is dedicated to those who experienced Islamophobia ‘rarely’ and felt that Islamophobia is not a serious issue in Scotland. These participants’ experiences of Islamophobia were mainly limited to two or three instances of verbal abuse. These participants also had a perception that Islamophobia is not an issue in
Scotland and that what they have experienced is in exception to the whole country. I called this perception; Scotland free from Islamophobia. To illustrate these participants’ experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia, I begin with the example of Emran, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Glasgow for 11 years. He was originally from Kenya and he was a practicing Muslim with a beard. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a self-employed car dealer. He highlighted that during 11 years of living in Glasgow, he has had just a couple of experiences of Islamophobia, ‘racism’ in his words, which was caused by a ‘drunk’ person. He also highlighted that when the incident happened, another Scottish woman came and supported him and apologised for the incident:

In almost 11 years that I have been here I had just a couple of incidents. In general, Scottish people are very friendly. You will get one or two from those who are drunk or junkies. Once I was in a mall with other two Muslims who came from Saudi Arabia to visit me. One of them was wearing an Islamic hat, a drunk guy came and said ‘you should go back to your country’ or something like that. We did not say anything, but there was a lady; a normal lady; a nice Scottish lady, who came and said ‘do not listen to him, he is drunk’. She told to that guy ‘go away’ and she apologised on behalf. She even did not know that person and did not know us too. We told her that is fine… we know that this guy has lost his sense, so it is alright. We are Muslim and we believe that Islam is peace so we did not it mind it that much. So, generally people are good and even those who do not know you come and defend and support you if something happens which is great.

[First generation, male, Glasgow, 39 year-old]

In this quote, Emran highlighted his perception that the majority of Scottish people are ‘friendly’ and only some ‘drunks and junkies’ might be Islamophobic. Another interesting point in his quote is that he generalises his experience and concludes that ‘generally’ Scottish people are ‘good’ (meaning here tolerant and respectful) and ‘supportive’ (meaning here anti-Islamophobia and anti-racist). These processes of distinguishing and associating were also evident in other examples in this category. The next example is Shadi, who was a first generation Muslim woman and has lived in Aberdeen for 4 years. In terms of visibility, she was from Kenya and had a visible Muslim identity marker, wearing hijab. She was a full time student in the University
of Aberdeen. She stated that she only experienced one incident in 4 years and that was by a person who was drunk:

There is not so much but there is just some hatred in Scotland. I only had once and it was about 3 years ago; there was a drunken man and we were walking down the street with my sister and we were wearing Hijab and he just said something like ‘terrorists’ and walked away. We thought he is drunk and he does not understand what he is saying. Other than that, I had no problem.

[First generation, Female, Aberdeen, 25 year-old]

In this quote, Shadi expressed her perception of there being less Islamophobia in Scotland even though she was living outside the central area where most Muslims are based. However, it can be discussed that as she was a full time student, she might mainly interact with educated people in an academic environment. As I already mentioned, analysis from the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) showed that educated people were less likely to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011). Previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006: 56) also found that to a significant degree (34%); ‘those without qualifications are more Islamophobic than graduates.’ The possibility of having unusual or special experiences resulting from being in the university all of the time or interacting with educated people was also highlighted by Khabir. He was a second generation Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 5 years and in Aberdeen for 2 years. Khabir, who was a full time student in both cities, stated that his experience of no Islamophobia in Aberdeen may relate to his neighbourhood, which is near the university and has more educated people:

When I was living in Dundee I was living in a rough neighbourhood. My neighbourhood was not as affluent and nice as other areas; so you tended to find more people who when see my mum with scarf started to call her something like terrorist or Paki. It happened very few times but the area where you live makes difference as well. Here in Aberdeen, I have only been living in the area which is near to my university and most of people are educated and it is quite a nice area. I might not go to other areas where may differ from my place. I am also quite focused on my studies here so I have not seen any problem. So, maybe that is why Aberdeen to some extent had been more positive than Dundee but I think in general they are similar to be honest.
In this example, Khabir highlights that there is more discrimination and Islamophobia in deprived places (such as where he used to live in Dundee), while there is less discrimination and Islamophobia in affluent places with better educated dwellers (such as the neighbourhood he is living in now in Aberdeen). Therefore the example of Shadi and Khabir, in parallel to the example of Kathryn that was already discussed, implies the importance of education and place in Islamophobia. The theme of ‘Islamophobic drunks’ is also evident in the next example. Sanaz was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 20 years. She was from a Pakistani background and she wore the hijab. Sanaz was a housewife but she was engaged in voluntary work. Commenting on her experience of Islamophobia in Edinburgh, Sanaz stated that she had only a few experiences which were caused by some people who were drunk:

Two days ago we were driving up North Bridges and there were some men; they were 30 or 40 year-old; they have been drinking, we had the car and windows were down and they just said something to us. Normally here in Edinburgh, not in festival time when different people come to Edinburgh, you would not get many comments.

In this quote, similar to the quote of Emran, the processes of distinguishing between the majority of Scots and a few minorities (drunk), and associating Islamophobia with the latter is again evident. Sanaz highlights that in normal situations, there is no Islamophobia in Edinburgh, except for the festival time when many different people come to Edinburgh from different countries. This implies more abuse during the festival time. Another interesting point in her quote, which was absent in other examples in this category, is generalising her perception of no Islamophobia to Edinburgh, not to Scotland. This limited generalisation relates back to her previous daily experiences of Islamophobia in Wishaw, which was a small town near to Glasgow. The last example in the third category is Azim, who was a second generation Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 20 years. He was
originally from Malawi and he was also a practicing Muslim with visible identity markers; having a beard and going to the mosque every day. He had a college degree and was employed. Azim stated that he experienced some incidents in Dundee but generally there was not that much discrimination in Scotland:

Yes, I had some experiences. It is just about some people who are racist and hate you, say for example, if you are friends with somebody and he becomes angry and he starts to be racist against you, and calling you something but generally majority of people are good and there is not that much discrimination in Scotland.

[Second generation, male, Dundee, 24 year-old]

In the above quote, Azim generalises his experiences and concludes that there is less discrimination in Scotland. However, his quote can also imply that anti-racist views are superficial in that even friends can become racist. Discussing the recurring themes in this category, the data suggests that all participants’ experiences were caused by some abnormal or exceptional people, mainly drunks. This supports previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006) that showed that there is less Islamophobia in Scotland than in England. These quotes also suggested that the participants themselves, through a process of distinguishing, were able to make a distinction between the majority Scots and the very small racist minority. Through another process of ascription, Islamophobia was ascribed to abnormal people, thus they felt there was no or less Islamophobia in Scotland (except for the example of Sanaz who only generalised less Islamophobia to Edinburgh). Therefore, the generalisation process in the third category, based on rare and exceptional experiences, led to the perception that the majority of Scots are respectful or anti-Islamophobic. In contrast, this process in the second category, based upon participants’ prior experiences caused by normal Scots and general knowledge of Islamophobia, led to the perception that there can be a subtle and everyday form of Islamophobia in Scotland.

Another factor in highlighting these processes of distinction and ascription was experiencing supportive attitudes from other Scottish people which influenced the association of the majority of Scots as respectful or even anti-racism/anti-Islamophobia. Such views were reinforced when, as in the case of Emran, a Scottish
woman supported him against someone speaking racist abuse. Receiving supportive behaviour from other Scottish people was also evident in the case of Ali (who was presented in the first category), who noted that some students once supported him when an Islamophobic incident happened during his school time. Ali, however, did not have the perception that normal Scots tend to be anti-Islamophobic because he had many experiences of Islamophobia in his father’s shop. Thus, the experience of supportive attitudes by other Scottish people only made a difference when such experiences were not countered by negative ones.

Reflecting on the importance of socio-economic factors that influenced these participants’ rare experience of Islamophobia, in contrast to the first category, no specific pattern or factor was identified. Despite the issue of racial or/and religious visibility that is common amongst all participants in this study, each of the participants in this category were from different social and economic background. However, it is important to note that those participants who were living in or near to universities suggested that living in such areas could have affected their rare experiences of Islamophobia. Additionally, the absence of the factors identified in the first category, namely living in a deprived area or being self-employed in a low level occupation in daily contact with many people, verifies the importance of these factors in one’s daily experience of Islamophobia and the importance of the lack of them in one’s rare experience of Islamophobia. The importance of these factors and any other possible socio-economic factors will also be examined in the next two categories.

No Experience of Islamophobia

The last category concerns those participants who had some feelings of Islamophobia while having no actual experience of it. All of these 13 participants who had no personal experience of Islamophobia, mentioned that they knew that Islamophobia, or ‘anti-Muslim racism’ in their wording, exists and that Muslims can easily be targeted for such incidents. One explanation for such feelings was in relation to their general knowledge and their awareness of experiences of Islamophobia had by relatives and/or friends. To illustrate this category, I start with
the example of Zahra, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 5 years. She was from a Pakistani background and a practicing Muslim who wore a hijab. She was a housewife but she was also active in a few voluntary groups involving Scottish Muslims and non-Muslims. She stated that despite having no experience of discrimination, she is aware of its existence in society and she wants to make sure that her children and other Muslims also do not experience it:

Even though I personally had not any experience of discrimination, I know that discrimination happens, I know that racism and hate crimes happen because I know people; actually I have some friends and family members who looked different and behaved different from what is considered as British and were discriminated. So, I have always been aware of that and I am very conscious of that because of my children who are growing up in this country. The fact that I had no experience, it means that I feel responsible to make sure that everybody else do not experience that … So, I am not complacent at all, I do understand that people have obstacles in their life just purely because maybe the way they speak or maybe the way they look or because they do not do the same things as people around them do they get discriminated. You have several opportunities which were closed to you just because you did not integrate enough… I was mixed with people who are different in Scotland and I am an activist working with different groups…

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 45 years old]

In this quote, Zahra particularly highlights the importance of mixing and assimilation in the experience of Islamophobia. She highlights that some of her friends and family members have faced discrimination just due to their different way of life, but she felt that as she is integrated into society and is active in many voluntary groups (such as Scotland Against Criminalising Communities, Scottish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign, United Against Fascism) involving Muslims and non-Muslims, she has not encountered any Islamophobia or any other form of discrimination. To this extent, she perceived her example to be an exception to the majority of Muslims who might be targeted for Islamophobia on the basis of their cultural or religious differences (lack of mixing, assimilation and integration). This perception of being an exception to other Muslims who may experience Islamophobia was also evident in some other examples in this category. Other
examples, such as Kathryn and Hamid from the first category, however, problematised the association between assimilation and lack of experience of Islamophobia in Scotland. These two participants are less practicing Muslims and have also assimilated into Scottish society by changing their way of life and adopting some Scottish norms such as ‘going to the pub’ and ‘adopter a British name and not wearing hijab.’ Despite such efforts, both respondents have had daily experiences of Islamophobia.

The next example is Khairallah, who was a second generation Muslim man who has lived in Aberdeen and Dundee for 7 years. In terms of visibility, he was from an Iraqi (his father was an Iraqi) and a Scottish (his mother was a Scottish white) background and, like the example of Shakila, he perceived his skin colour to be white rather than brown like other Iraqis. In terms of religious visibility, he did not have any specific markers such as a long beard or going to the mosque everyday despite being a practicing Muslim. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a full time student. In parallel to the example of Zahra, Khairallah also perceived himself to be an exception to the majority of Muslims because he looked like a white Scottish person, thus, he did not experience Islamophobia or any other form of discrimination:

I had no experience of racism or discrimination because my appearance is quite white so from that sense if I was walking down the street no one would actually think that I am Iraqi or Pakistani or something like that. They would not think that….

[Second generation, Male, Aberdeen, 23 year-old]

In this quote, Khairallah highlights the importance of racial visibility in the experience of Islamophobia as he implicitly associates the experience of Islamophobia with visible Pakistani or Iraqi Muslims. He felt that as he resembled Scottish white people, he did not experience any incidents. The next example is Akram, who was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Dundee. In terms of visibility, she was from a Pakistani background and had brown skin colour, but in terms of religious visibility, she did not have any specific marker such as wearing a hijab. In terms of socio-economic status, she was a self-employed advisor. Commenting on her experience of Islamophobia, Akram pointed
out that she does not wear a hijab and probably this is why she was not targeted by any Islamophobic incidents:

No, I did not have any experience of discrimination or racism. Dundee is fine. I have been integrating with people here and we get on very well with one another. I was born in Dundee and lived all my life here and I did not have any problem; I think people accept me and see me as a part of the community. But I just need to mention that I do not wear Hijab. I do not know if that is part of the reason I did not experience Islamophobia because I know Muslim women who wear scarf they are possibly more targeted but I do not wear it. Personally, I did not have any problem but I think if you ask some of my friends they would have some experiences of being called Paki or something like that but again it is just because they wear scarf and hijab. But again I had not any problem, even my friend whom I know and my family members, whom some of them do wear hijab, had no issue at all. So, as I said I had not any problem but I can imagine some people would have some. I think Dundee is very good; I think maybe there is problem in other cities but Dundee is very good; we do not have any problem… There is obviously a lot of larger community in Glasgow and Edinburgh. I think they suffer more prejudice than we do … I think in places where there is larger community of Muslims; we tend to speak together and I do not think they integrate with the Scottish people and they keep to themselves and they tend to separate themselves. I think that cause a bit friction as well; not integrating with the whole community and just keeping to themselves and having their own little groups…

[Second generation, Female, Dundee, 43 year-old]

In this quote, Akram associated religious visibility and integration with her lack of experience of Islamophobia. In the first level of comparison; comparing herself with other Muslim women, she associated her lack of experience of Islamophobia with her religious invisibility (not wearing hijab) as she had this perception that Muslim women with hijab could be targeted more by Islamophobia. In this sense, she considered herself to be an exception to typical Muslim women. This perception was highlighted more when she stated that ‘if you ask some of my friends they would have’ some experience of Islamophobia as they wear the hijab. In the second level of comparison; comparing some of her family members and a friend who also wear a hijab with other typical Muslims living in other cities, she stated that some of her family members and one of her friends who also wears a hijab did not experience Islamophobia. She then concludes that perhaps Dundee is an exception to other
larger cities with more Muslims. In this sense, she associated the experience of Islamophobia with a larger number of Muslims and the possibility of a lack of integration in those communities. However it is important to note that the trend of living in a segregated or isolated area was absent in the Scottish context (Hussain and Miller 2006). The examples of the third category with fully integrated participants challenge this perception as they had some experiences of Islamophobia. Akram had a perception that Muslims, particularly Muslim women with hijab, struggle with Islamophobia but as her self-experience did not support this perception, she perceived herself to be an exception to the typical experience of Islamophobia. Therefore, the experience of other participants in this study suggests that the experience of Islamophobia is more sophisticated than the rather simplistic views put forward in the parallel lives discourse.

Discussing the importance of socio-economic factors in the experience of Islamophobia in this category, the data suggests that these participants (Zahra, Khairallah and Akram) in all the above quotes highlighted the importance of racial and religious visibility and segregation in the experience of Islamophobia. The importance of visibility was also highlighted in other categories; however, examples in other categories suggested that socio-economic factors were more significant to the experience of Islamophobia than visibility alone. Pointing to the importance of segregation and separation in the experience of Islamophobia was new in comparison to the issues raised in other categories. The actual socio-economic status of these participants also suggests that they were integrated into the society; they were all second generation Muslims and linguistically, educationally and socially integrated to Scottish society. For example, in terms of economic integration Akram stated that even though she was self-employed, she had a successful business in Dundee and all of her clients were from a white Scottish background. Khairallah was a full time postgraduate student who also developed a good friendship with many white Scottish people. Zahra was also active in many voluntary groups involving Muslims as well as non-Muslims. The easy association between separation and discrimination, however, is problematised by the second category since all participants in this category were second generation and integrated to the economic, educational and social aspect of Scottish society; however, they experienced some Islamophobic
incidents and also had the perception that there is a new form of subtle Islamophobia in Scotland. Similarly, there were some well-integrated second generation Muslims in the first category such as Ali, Kasim and Kathryn but had many or daily experience of Islamophobia. As I noted already, the association between integration and lack of experience of Islamophobia is particularly challenged by the example of Kathryn, Hamid and Sanaz who stated that their assimilatory attempts (such as changing their names and way of dress) did not stop them experiencing Islamophobia. This may imply that there should be another factor/ other factors in addition to integration that influenced the lack of experience of Islamophobia in the fourth category.

To discuss any possible relationship between experience and perception of Islamophobia in this category, these quotes highlight the importance of the perception and feeling of Islamophobia. These participants, based on their perception (general knowledge) of Islamophobia, highlighted different issues (such as racial or religious visibility and integration) that influenced the experience of Islamophobia, even though they themselves lacked these social characteristics. Consequently, they perceived themselves to be exceptions. This may imply the importance of perceptions of Islamophobia in shaping attitudes and behaviours as well as experience itself. As illustrated, these participants tended to discount their own (lack of) experiences of Islamophobia from the perception and general knowledge that they had about Islamophobia. In this sense, they differed significantly from other categories. In the first category, for instance, the perception of daily Islamophobia was based on participants’ frequent experiences of Islamophobia. In the third category, the perception of Scotland free from Islamophobia or less Islamophobia in Scotland was based on rare and exceptional experiences of Islamophobia. Even though the perception of Islamophobia (the persistence of a subtle and everyday Islamophobia) in the second category was also influenced by general knowledge of Islamophobia, actual prior experience was essential to the creation of the perception of everyday Islamophobia in Scotland. This is not to discredit or downplay the feelings of those in this category, but to highlight the importance of perceptions to feelings of belonging and inclusion.
Types of Islamophobia

Respondents reported two types of Islamophobia: personal/individual and institutional Islamophobia. This chapter suggested that the dominant form of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities was personal/individual Islamophobia. As seen above, the most dominant form of experiencing individual Islamophobia was verbal abuse. Hate speech and verbal abuse has been experienced by interviewees in different social places such as on the street, business premises, and schools. This finding supports previous research (Lambert and Githens 2010; Kidd and Jamieson 2011) that suggested that streets were the most common place where anti-Muslim racism and discrimination takes place generally in the UK, and in particular in Scotland. Considering other forms of individual Islamophobia, none of the participants had any self-experience of violent attack in Scottish major cities and only a couple of respondents had friends who had experienced violent attacks. Additionally, as mentioned above, only Kathryn had any experience of Islamophobic graffiti. The experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities, however, was not only limited to individual racism but was also evident in private institutions, mainly in relation to employment discrimination. It is to this that I now turn.

Employment Discrimination

I should say that this is not a systematic study of labour discrimination and what is important here is the perception of discrimination amongst these participants, rather than the legal and objective facts. The data suggests that there were some perceptions of employment discrimination in private institutions in which some respondents experienced or felt discrimination in the work place during applications for jobs or promotion. To illustrate this, I start with the example of Zainab who occasionally experienced verbal and open Islamophobia; however, she had stronger feelings about employment discrimination. Zainab was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. In terms of visibility she was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim but she did not wear hijab. She, however, had some visible items of ethnic and cultural identity; for example she wore Shalwar Kameez. She had a postgraduate degree from Edinburgh University.
and, in terms of occupation, she stated that she had applied for many jobs but was unsuccessful and had started doing some voluntary work. Pointing to her experience of employment discrimination, Zainab particularly asserted that her racial background and cultural appearance might affect her job applications:

I have applied for many jobs and I have not been that successful, it is difficult to get job straight away… but it is more difficult as a non-white to get job. … I think if you are wearing hijab you will be discriminated against … the outer signs of your religion [such as hijab] will be a base for your discrimination … because employer or people in the interview panel want to see somebody who is like them. If you do not have the white skin colour or you are not dressed in a way that they are dressed, then you are less likely to get the job.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 years old]

She felt that her racialised identity might be influencing her job applications. This echoes research by El-Nakla et. al. (2007) that suggests that Scottish Muslim women’s religious identity and appearance affects their employability. This perception of being discriminated against on the grounds of racial and cultural appearance was also evident amongst other participants. The next example is Kasim, who worked in a bank. Commenting on his experience of discrimination, he explained how he thought that his job promotion had been affected a few times just due to his racial and ethnic background. He also stated that such discriminatory actions were very hard to bring to court because they are very hard to prove:

Another kind of discrimination is economic discrimination where for example I have been stopped from going for promotion. I know it was because of firstly my name and secondly my colour… these are hidden discriminations. The law protects us, but we cannot prove it … If you are doing your job well, and you are doing it to the best of your ability and better than anybody else and you put yourself forward to a promotion and you are not considered compared to other people who are one less qualified and have less ability even though you proved it, and then they get the job, then does not that give you a reason to think that they are discriminating against you? Not only once, maybe three times for the same thing, then it can be a difficult issue to bring up with your superior. So, it puts your name in a situation where you have to consider whether to move from the job or stick with the job. So it is difficult
to quantify and prove it … I mean there are employment laws but you cannot prove it easily.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 41 years old]

This quote, just like Zainab’s example, highlights how even well integrated and successful Muslims’ experiences are filtered through the lens of discrimination. Additionally, consistent with his perception of subtle racism in individual Islamophobia, Kasim highlights his perception of hidden and indirect employment discrimination in this quote, which also implies the perception of subtle institutional Islamophobia. As Modood (2005: 41) describes it, indirect racism as defined by the British Race Relations Act (1976), is ‘a practice or policy [that] may make no reference to race or ethnic groups but may nevertheless disproportionately disadvantage some groups more than others.’ Aligned with this definition; Kasim felt that he was subject to indirect disadvantage due to his racial and religious characteristics.

Another example of the perception of indirect or subtle employment discrimination is the suggestion that racial priorities affect job applications. For example, some participants mentioned that there was a form of unwritten employment policy that prioritises ‘white-British’ applicants over ethnic minority people. To illustrate this, I begin with the example of Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. As I mentioned already, he was a practicing Muslim and was from a Pakistani background. He was self-employed and had many experiences of verbal abuse. Despite such daily experiences of individual Islamophobia, he had a more positive attitude towards Scottish public institutions such as the legal system. Sajjad, however, particularly differentiated between employment discrimination and other forms of institutional racism or Islamophobia by saying that:

Job discrimination is different; I think British people get the first priorities and then if there is any more position, others will get it.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 49 years old]
The next example is Saed, who was also a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Edinburgh for 5 years. He was also from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. Saed was employed and working in the security industry, and had a couple of experiences of verbal abuse. Commenting on his experiences of employment discrimination, he stated that he felt that there is a kind of racial categorisation and human hierarchy that is based on people’s racial and ethnic background:

There are some criteria for job applications for example if you are a British born, you have the first right, then maybe if you are EU citizen or work permit holder you are the second, I mean there are a lot of categories, so many levels of everybody. To apply for a job everybody is not the same, it makes you feel that there is discrimination there.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 31 years old]

These last two quotes highlight the perception of racial prioritisation in the job market. Giving preference to local people in filling jobs may not be considered racist but, Modood (2005: 41) argues, ‘if the local population happens to be predominantly white, the policy disadvantages minority groups. If there are no countervailing justifiable reasons in favour of the policy…then this constitutes indirect discrimination.’ All these quotes suggest a perception of employment discrimination, which could also imply the existence of such indirect discrimination against Muslims in some private institutions over job application and promotions. Given the unsystematic examination of employment discrimination in this study, confirming these associations requires further research. Previous research (Ansari 2002; Ameli et. al. 2004; Change Institute 2009), however, noted the high rate of unemployment amongst Muslims and suggested a high rate of employment discrimination amongst Muslims across the UK. The analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) in assessing discriminatory attitudes within the context of employment indirectly supports my analysis by pointing to the persistence of exclusive attitudes. This survey showed that 31% of its respondents\(^1\) believed that ‘ethnic minorities take jobs

\(^1\) With a sample size of 1366 respondents.
away from other people in Scotland’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 37). With more focus on Muslims and considering the importance of different contexts, this survey also showed that 15% of its respondents believed that ‘a Muslim is very/fairly unsuitable to be a primary school teacher’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 30).

Jacobson (1997a: 191) argues that scientific notions of race have been largely discredited in the late twentieth century, hence support for a racial definition of and boundaries for ‘Britishness, is most commonly manifest in private rather than public discourse and in covert rather than overt statements of views.’ Both the UK Government’s and the Scottish Government’s specific policies to promote cultural diversity, racial equality, and social inclusion (Penrose and Howard 2008; Ormston et al 2011) such as legislating equality Acts - The Race Relations Acts generally in the UK, and the launching of different programmes such as One Scotland Many Cultures in particular in Scotland - can also be effective in raising public awareness of racism. As the TNS System 3 (2005; 2006) evaluation of the Scottish Government’s anti-racism and multicultural programmes showed, there was an increase in the amount of campaign materials and thus in the awareness of racism. However, it could be suggested that such awareness of racism and its legal consequences could just play a part in changing the form and appearance of Islamophobia - turning that to a subtle and indirect form of Islamophobia - rather than eliminating it, at least in the private sector. That argument is particularly supported by the analysis of Scottish Attitudes Survey (2010). This survey suggests ‘no significant change in discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims [in all contexts on question; personal relationship, employment, and cultural diversity] since 2006, which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than they were in 2003’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72).

Considering other forms of institutional Islamophobia or racism, such as Crown Office and police racism, none of the participants in Scottish major cities, even those who had daily experiences of individual Islamophobia, mentioned any experience of institutional Islamophobia. Interestingly some participants, even some of those who had experiences/perceptions of employment discrimination, pointed to the contrary; they showed a general satisfaction with Scottish major institutions such as the legal system, police services, and the Scottish Government, especially pointing to Alex
Salmond’s\(^{1}\) positive position on the issue of diversity in general and in particular regarding Muslims. To illustrate this, I begin with their satisfaction with the legal system. Saed was among those participants who had only rare experiences of Islamophobia and a perception that there is employment discrimination, mainly racial/ethnic prioritising, in Scotland. Commenting on the experience of other institutional Islamophobia, he pointed to the importance of equality in the Scottish law that can protect ethnic/faith minority groups against racism and discrimination:

> Law wise there are some certain rules that make sure that other minority groups can keep themselves safe but when it comes to a person who got some authority but he is a racist person, he would be unwilling to follow the law, but unfortunately he know how to cheat the law as well. Like what I said about employment discrimination and human hierarchy in employing ethnic minorities and Muslims.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, 31 years old]

In this quote, Saed also highlights the importance of individuals within institutions who discriminate against people due to their racist or Islamophobic attitudes. Such attitudes, which may turn into behaviours and actions, exist despite the institution’s anti-racist policies. The next example is Sajjad, who was a first generation Muslim man who has lived in Edinburgh for 25 years. Sajjad, like Saed, had strong feelings about employment discrimination against Muslims, however he felt more positive about other Scottish institutions, particularly the Scottish legal system:

> I have been in court a lot of times like as a witness but never had any problem. Everybody is equal in the court Pakistani or Christian or British or Hindus.

[First generation, Male, Edinburgh, years 49 old]

In both above examples, participants especially differentiated between employment discrimination and any other institutional Islamophobia and particularly highlighted the significance of racial, ethnic, and religious equality in the Scottish law and the legal system. Such equality can be associated with the legislation of the Race

\(^{1}\) It is important to note that Alex Salmond was replaced as first minister by Nicola Sturgeon in 2014 (Johnson 2014).
Relations Acts, which has been implemented across the UK. In contrast, other examples particularly highlight the importance of the Scottish context; their satisfaction with police services and the Scottish Government. Starting with the former, some participants highlighted their satisfaction with police services, especially about developing their relationship with Muslim communities. To illustrate this, I start with the example of Azadeh, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 30 years. She was very positive about the police:

The point that police occasionally come to mosques and Muslim community centres is very positive and important. You can ask your question and get more information about your rights and to know that you are protected in this country. This can help Muslims and communities to build a trust relationship with police which is very important in the functioning of these communities. It is also important in a sense that it gives you confidence to feel that you are safe and secure and if anything happens you will be protected.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 42 year-old]

Significantly here, the police were seen to be proactive in visiting mosques and engaging with Muslims. The next example is Zainab, who was a second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Edinburgh. As I mentioned earlier, she has some experience and perception of employment discrimination in Scotland but she had more positive attitudes towards police forces and the Scottish law:

I think Edinburgh and Lothian and Borders Police\(^1\) have done a lot of good work to make the Muslim community feel that they are safe, in other parts of the country it is not like that. That depends on the hierarchy. People that are making the laws and the senior police manager within the police or within the various institutions, how they value other communities and whether they value the diversity or not [is a different story...].

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 year-old]

By pointing to the importance of local/geographical differences in this quote, Zainab highlights the fact that despite the law and policies in one place as well as even the senior officer - for example in a local police force - have a more

\(^1\) The Lothian Borders Police became a part of ‘Police Scotland’ recently in 2013 (McEwen 2013).
multicultural attitude, there are some individuals within these institutions, as Saed mentioned, who do not value cultural and racial diversity. This implies the significance of individual Islamophobia and also of geographical differences in experiences of Islamophobia. I discussed the former in the last section and illustrated that some participants particularly pointed to a new form of Islamophobia, the subtle and everyday (Essed 1991; 2002; Moosavi 2014), which can stigmatise and ‘other’ Muslims without being vocal or apparent. I will discuss the latter in the next chapter.

The last aspect of some participants’ general satisfaction with Scottish institutions is the Scottish Government, which relates more to the Scottish context rather than the British context. More specifically, some participants pointed to the SNP government’s more welcoming approaches towards cultural diversity, especially towards Muslims, and its effort to promote equality in Scotland. To illustrate this, I begin with the example of Nader, who was a second generation Muslim man and was born and brought up in Glasgow. He was from a Pakistani background and a practicing Muslim. He was employed and had a post-graduate degree. He was among those participants who had some experience of Islamophobia and felt that there was an implicit and covert prejudice against Muslims. Commenting on the Scottish Government’s policies towards Muslims, Nader differentiated between the British government and the Scottish Government:

I have to say that they are better than the most of the British ones; I think they are not bad actually; they are trying to do something [good for ethnic minorities]. I do not know whether it is for gaining more votes, like what most of politicians do, or it is for a greater good. I think they have got some interesting things to put on the society, they are trying to promote the better understanding of Muslims and other minorities and certainly I have more confidence on the SNP than the Westminster government. So, certainly the Westminster government is going backward in terms of promoting the relationship between minorities from 1980s and 1990s up to 2011 that perhaps since September 11 they just totally gone in reverse and so if you see people go more alienated and non-educated, I would say one of the main reasons for that is the government policy. And they are pushing people further and further into the corners and I do not have any doubt about that.

[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 38 year-old]
In this quote, Nader highlights how the British government’s policies lead to the isolation of Muslims and implies that following differing multi-cultural policies of the Scottish Government resulted in more integration. These feelings and perceptions about the Scottish Government could have some bearing on the issue of national identity because it strengthens the affiliation with Scottishness rather than Britishness [this is discussed in Chapter five in more detail]. Indeed, Zahir, who was also a second generation Muslim man and had some experience of Islamophobia, stated that the Scottish Government’s nationalism also includes Scottish-Muslim identity. t Zahir, who was employed and had an undergraduate degree, also asserted that he was proud to have a Scottish-Muslim identity:

I think the Scottish Government has been generally very good and they recognise that part of Scottish identity is the Scottish Muslims. … I am quite proud to be a Scottish Muslim and I am happy to be here and enjoy staying here …

[Second generation, Male, Glasgow, 39 year-old]

Zahir highlights the importance of the political and national recognition of Muslim identity in this quote as a reason to advocate and approve the Scottish Government, which also had some bearing on his sense of national identity. The importance of such political and institutional recognition and respect was also evident in other examples. Zainab for example, had some experiences of individual and employment discrimination in Scotland, but distinguished the SNP from the conservative party:

The SNP is a socialist party … and is a much more diverse and much more open party than the conservative party, for example. For the conservatives, if you are a Muslim and you have lots of money and you are a hardworking person then they will accept you. If you are an ordinary person struggling to pay your bills then they are interested in you, but it does not matter you are Muslim or Christian or atheist, as long as you are standing on your feet you will be accepted by conservatives. For the socialist parties they are about common person so they will do what they can for you regardless of your ethnic or social background.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 44 years old]

Some other participants, mentioned Alex Salmond, the then Scottish First Minister, more specifically as a person who had a better understanding of diversity and
equality. Hassan was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in Dundee for 28 years. Hassan was from a Pakistani background and was a self-employed shopkeeper and had no experience of Islamophobia. Distinguishing the Scottish Government from the British one, he said that:

The Scottish Government is a bit softer than the actual British government. I would say Scottish politicians have a better relationship with Muslim community here and Alex Salmond is a good example of that.

[First generation, Male, Dundee, 37 years old]

In this quote, Hassan highlights the importance of building a positive and supportive relationship with Muslim communities as an example of good policy. That indicated the institutional and political recognition of Muslims. The next example is Rafiqah, who was a second generation Muslim woman and has lived in Edinburgh for 28 years. Rafiqah was from a Pakistani background and a practicing Muslim woman who wore the hijab. She was unemployed but she was working as part of many Muslim women’s groups and organisations. She has had no experience of Islamophobia but knew some Muslims who had. She mentioned Salmond’s welcoming approach to Muslims and Muslim groups, such as Beyond The Veil, as an indication of his respect and promotion of cultural diversity, which can be a solution that will lead to the elimination of discrimination:

I think we can meet up with Alex Salmond any time we want. He is really good and he has very well understanding of our different minority communities, all minority communities. He is very welcoming to minorities and Muslims. If I want to meet him tomorrow in the parliament, he would not say no, which is good. One of the Beyond The Veil went there and he was very nice and very welcoming. That is what we need, are you welcoming to the minority groups and he is. I think that he understands that there is a bit of discrimination and there is a way of overcoming it.

[Second generation, Female, Edinburgh, 36 years old]

One implication of all the above quotes is the demonstrated importance of promoting equality and respecting cultural diversity in making a general satisfaction with, and to some extent admiration for, Scottish major institutions. This is despite
the fact that some of these participants have had some experiences of individual Islamophobia and employment discrimination. Their general satisfaction despite experiencing Islamophobia also implies the importance of institutional and political recognition of Muslims, which was felt by many participants in Scottish major cities. It was highlighted by some participants (in the case of Saed and Zainab) that there might be some individuals who may violate the general policies but are able to differentiate between individual and institutional Islamophobia. I will argue in the later chapters that this institutional and political recognition of Muslims can also have important effects on Muslims’ national identity and integration.

Another implication of general satisfaction with Scottish major institutions, especially the Scottish Government, could be the success of the Scottish government’s institutionally-led anti-racism campaign (Clayton 2005; Penrose and Howard 2008) in the elimination of public institutional racism and Islamophobia. However, as I discussed earlier, the problem of employment discrimination in private institutions is a matter of debate as there was a strong feeling about it among many of the respondents. Employment discrimination might seem to be related to economic concerns and economic recession rather than social factors. However, my research’s findings of subtle Islamophobia (mainly reported by the second category), in studying individual racism suggest the significance of political and social factors, such as media representation, international events, and Islamophobia. Additionally, the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) suggested that ‘despite the recession, concerns about identity [49% agreed with if more Muslims came here, Scotland would lose its identity (ibid: 15)] remain potentially a more important source of discriminatory attitudes than concerns about the economic consequences of immigration [31%]’ (Ormston et al 2011: 78). To the extent that Muslims are the most visible and the largest black and Asian minority group (Scottish Government 2005b), it can be argued that employment discrimination against Muslims can have a more complex foundation than merely economic concerns.
Conclusion

Whilst my sample was small, the qualitative nature of the data allows me to suggest that even though there was little experience of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities, the experience of verbal abuse was more prevalent and serious, especially amongst Muslims with lower socio-economic status and/or residing in deprived areas. This can imply the importance of individual and social aspects in the role and impact of Islamophobia. In contrast to the individual and social level of Islamophobia, many respondents showed a general satisfaction with Scottish public institutions such as government law and the police. This in turn implies the importance of the political and institutional recognition of Muslims, which can have some bearing on Muslims’ national identity (as discussed in Chapter 5) and institutional and political integration (which is discussed in Chapter 9). Less Islamophobia along with this political and institutional recognition of Muslims can be associated with the absence of Islamophobia in the agenda of Scottish nationalism, while its counterpart in England fuelled Islamophobia (Hussain and Miller 2006). The analysis of those with experience of Islamophobia, however, suggests that Muslims’ identity and visibility, especially racial and religious signifiers such as skin colour and having a beard or hijab, were crucial to the experience of Islamophobia. This can be explained by the racialisation process of Muslims in Islamophobic discourse (CBMI 2004; Modood 2005; Meer and Noorani 2008; Meer and Modood 2009; Meer 2013; Taras 2013). As well as the importance of Muslims’ identity and visibility (either racial or religious), some social and economic factors were particularly important in the daily experience of Islamophobia. These factors included living in deprived areas and self-employment in low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people. This matches with the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) that showed that those living in more deprived areas of Scotland and those with lower levels of educational attainment were more likely to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011). As well as the daily experience of Islamophobia that was more open and influenced by socio-economic factors, there were some experiences and perceptions of subtle Islamophobia that referred to more covert prejudice, and were mainly influenced by media and international events revolving
around Muslims and Islamophobia. Daily experiences of Islamophobia and perceptions of *subtle* Islamophobia can affect Muslims’ integration in Scotland, which is discussed in Chapter 8.

The findings of this chapter also suggest that deprived areas and Muslims’ socio-economic status are more important factors than the density of Muslim population per se. Furthermore, less or no experience of Islamophobia in cities such as Dundee and Aberdeen with a smaller Muslim population - the former with 3,875 and the latter with 4,293 people (National Record of Scotland 2013) as compared to cities like Edinburgh and Glasgow - can challenge the importance of the low density of Muslim populations in increasing Islamophobia. These issues are examined in the next chapter by studying Muslims’ experience of Islamophobia in Scottish towns, where they form less than one per cent of the local population.
Chapter 7: Islamophobia in Scottish Towns and Small Cities

Introduction

In the last chapter, Muslims’ experiences and feelings of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities were detailed and discussed. In this chapter, I focus on Scottish towns and small cities. Several researchers suggest that ethnic minority people, including Muslims, are at greater risk of racism in rural and less racially diverse areas (Rayner 2001; de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Masud 2005; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). One possible explanation for this is that the low density of ethnic minority residents in such areas means that there is less community and police protection (de Lima 2001, 2002, 2006; Lambert and Githens 2010; Plastow 2012). This chapter discusses the importance of the low or high density of Muslim communities in experiencing Islamophobia by studying Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in Scottish towns and small cities, and then comparing this with those in Scottish major cities. To this end, 10 interviews were carried out in Scottish towns and small cities (Falkirk, Stirling, Dunfermline, and East Kilbride) where the number of Muslim residents was less than one per cent of the local population in each place. It is important to note that whilst the sample size is small, the rich qualitative interviews can offer deeper insight into Muslims who live in such areas.

This chapter first details and discusses different experiences of Islamophobia among Muslims in Scottish towns and small cities. In parallel to Scottish major cities, the experiences in this chapter cover a spectrum of Islamophobia ranging from daily experience all the way to having no experience. This chapter will chart the key differences that relate to each participant and then compare individual and institutional Islamophobia across Scottish cities and towns before finally coming to a conclusion.
Complexity of Experiences and Feelings

Almost all of the participants\(^1\) (9 out of 10) in Scottish towns and small cities had some experience of Islamophobia. More specifically, three respondents had daily experiences or perceptions of Islamophobia whereas six other respondents only experienced Islamophobia rarely or occasionally. There was also one participant who had no self-experience of Islamophobia, but he was aware of his mother’s experiences. Given the small sample and the qualitative method used in this research, these figures cannot support any definitive association; however, they are able to suggest two different types of experience. In what follows, I discuss the importance of different factors in each of these experiences in turn.

Daily Experiences and Pervasive Feelings of Islamophobia

To unpack the complexity of experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia in Scottish small towns, I start with those who had daily experiences and pervasive feelings of Islamophobia. Three respondents fit into this category; Ehsan, Tariq, and Adil who were all from Falkirk. The first example is Ehsan, who was a first generation Muslim man who has lived in Falkirk for 12 years. He was of Pakistani background and was a less-practicing Muslim who did not have a beard and did not go to the mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, he was a self-employed shop keeper. Ehsan stated that he had many experiences of Islamophobia in Falkirk:

Firstly they pick up your colour and when you say I am Muslim they say bad things to you as a Muslim and when you say I am from Pakistan that is the third bad thing…so, I did have many experiences of racism… I used to go out night times but I do not go that much out [pub] anymore; it was only a few years ago that I experienced some incidents and a physical attack. Since then I never go out anymore because I fear to go out… I know what is happening there anyway; for example whenever there is a fight or anything first of all they chose us to swear at. … It is not only about drunk people even sometimes ordinary people come to the shop and say bad things [such as Paki]. Most of the educated people are fine but maybe there is something inside them which they

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\(^1\) 10 Muslim participants (from Dunfermline, Stirling, Falkirk and East Kilbride) had been recruited from rural and less-diverse areas.
cannot show it but they are nice to us and we are nice to them as well. But mostly they [racist people] are from deprived areas and they say that you take our jobs and if you were not here we could have job. … Sometimes you can feel that they do not treat you as the same as others. I have been working here for years; I bought this shop from a local person [indigenous Scot]; when he was here, he was happy with the sale but when I take over the sale dropped. … I know that you cannot say that by 100%, but I feel the differences…

[Falkirk, 42 years old]

In this quote, Ehsan highlights the high frequency and intense nature of his experiences and perception of Islamophobia, particularly when he asserted that he did not ‘feel safe to go out’ at night. Such fear of Islamophobic attack, which was also evident in the second category of Scottish major cities, could significantly impact on the integration of these Muslims [this will be discussed in the next chapter]. In this quote, he also highlighted several key issues that influenced his frequent experience and perception of Islamophobia such as the importance of visibility, drunks and alcohol, deprived people, and specific jobs – all of which I now deal with in turn. Starting with the first issue, Ehsan highlighted the importance of racial visibility (skin colour) when he stated that he has often been called Paki at the first look - most commonly due to his skin colour. This was consistent with the example of other less-practicing Muslims (namely Kathryn and Hamid) who experienced racism mainly on the basis of their racial attribution (skin colour) in Scottish major cities. However, it is important to note that these participants have also suffered Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism. This was highlighted by the example of Ehsan, where he said that when he reveals his Muslim identity, he receives even more abuse. This shows that some Muslims experience discrimination on the grounds of both racial and religious/cultural characteristics. This reflects Modood’s (2005: 7) argument that Asians, including predominantly Muslims, ‘suffer a double racism.’

As highlighted during the analysis of Scottish major cities, visibility was unlikely to be the only factor that influences the experience of Islamophobia. In parallel with such findings, this quote can also imply that Ehsan’s main experiences of Islamophobia were confined to his workplace and around pubs and bars or from
drunks and from deprived people. Ehsan, in the second part of his quote, stated that he used to go to pubs where he experienced some incidents (including a physical attack). Since then, he has stopped going out at nights because he has not felt safe enough to go out. Other experiences took place in his shop where for example, people come and call him a *Paki*. This implies firstly that his experience of Islamophobia was limited to specific locations. Secondly, such experience of intense (physical attack) and pervasive incidents had a severe impact on his integration because he stopped going to pubs and feared going out at night. In other words, even when some less-practicing or non-practicing Muslims are willing to try to integrate, they may find obstacles in the way of their integration. Another distinctive issue highlighted here was the experience of physical attack by Ehsan, which was not reported in major cities but further research is required to find out whether this is a wider pattern or not due to the limited sample presented here. If it is a pattern, this might be associated with the lack of police protection in Scottish small towns where some respondents also highlighted police discrimination (I discuss this issue later under ‘institutional Islamophobia’).

Another highlighted issue in this quote was receiving Islamophobic abuse, mostly from impoverished people who live in deprived areas. This is consistent with the findings of my first category from Scottish major cities. The next highlighted factor in this quote is the importance of specific types of jobs in experiencing Islamophobia. As mentioned, some people mostly from deprived areas come to his shop and make Islamophobic comments. Ehsan was a self-employed shopkeeper and was in daily contact with many people. This echoes findings in the previous chapter that suggested the importance of self-employment in low level occupations and of being in daily contact with many people for daily experiences of Islamophobia.

As Ehsan had experience of living in Glasgow and Falkirk, he made an interesting comparison between discrimination in these areas. He had a perception that there is less discrimination in larger areas due to the larger population of ethnic minority people and increased community support:

_I was living in Glasgow before coming here. Glasgow was a bit different because there is more community and it is not that bad in Glasgow to be honest because there is more community and more coloured people. So Glasgow was not that bad but here in Falkirk,._
there is not that many people that is why here is more discrimination. In Glasgow you can go with your own friends and you feel secure because you are in two or three people and when you are together they do not say anything to you and even when I am by myself and I am going to a pub or club they do not feel or they do treat me like as I am doing something bad.

[Falkirk, 42 years old]

This quote particularly associated less or no experience of Islamophobia in Glasgow to the settlement of a large number of Muslims in the large cities. However, as noted in the last chapter, there were some Muslims living in larger cities who still experienced Islamophobia on a daily basis. The data suggests that socio-economic and educational factors are more important than community size in the appearance of Islamophobia. Thus, Ehsan’s lack of experience of Islamophobia in Glasgow can be associated with other issues such as his job. Ehsan was not a self-employed shopkeeper when he was living in Glasgow, and none of the respondents in larger cities reported the importance of drinking establishments in their experiences of Islamophobia. The importance of specific workplaces, drinking establishments, drunks, and deprived people was also highlighted by the next example. Tariq was a first generation Muslim man who has lived in Falkirk for 7 years. Like Ehsan, he was of Pakistani background but, unlike Ehsan, he was a practicing Muslim with a long beard and went to the local mosque every day. In terms of socio-economic status, in parallel to Ehsan, he was also a self-employed shopkeeper. Tariq stated that he usually experienced verbal abuse [such as being called Paki or terrorist] from drunks and people who live in deprived areas:

Yes, I had experiences of discrimination and racism and it is normal and common here. For example, when people are drunk; when they are in group and they are staying outside of the pub and they know that they have got only their own people inside the pub if I just pass the pub they will call me a Paki. … Some other people come to my shop and give me a weird look and then start to talk to me in a rude way or ask silly question about terrorism. …some of them are from council areas. In day time people are busy with their life. If you want to go outside into particular places [pubs and bars] especially in night time, you know that you will get trouble especially with my beard. You better not go outside. … A few years ago, when I was working in Glasgow I was no like this [a practicing Muslim with long beard]; I was just a normal person and I
used to wear nice dress and during the day no one said anything to me… but now [in Falkirk] that I build my identity as a Muslim; a proper Muslim [having long beard and wearing Pakistani dress] if I walk down the street, people who do not know me would look at me and understand who I am because I have got a new visible identity. Now people come to the shop and ask me silly questions about Islam and terrorism. Now it is a whole different life.

[Falkirk, 28 years old]

Firstly in this quote, Tariq highlighted the importance of his religious identity as visualised by his long beard in his almost daily experience of Islamophobia. In contrast to the example of Ehsan who was a less-practicing and invisible Muslim, Tariq reported that his religious identity was a reason for abuse (such as being called a terrorist and a Paki). This reinforces the importance of religious visibility in Islamophobic incidents. Previous research (Allen 2010; Lambert and Githens 2010; Meer 2010; Moosavi 2014) likewise associated having visibility as a Muslim with experiencing Islamophobia. In parallel to the example of Ehsan and the findings of the last chapter, the example of Tariq also highlighted the importance of his workplace, drinking establishments, drunks, and deprived people in the experience of Islamophobia. This was highlighted in the above quote when Tariq reported that his experiences took place in his self-employed shop and involved mostly people from deprived areas. This aligns with the finding of the first category in Scottish major cities, which suggested the importance of self-employment in low level occupations in daily experiences of Islamophobia. Tariq stated that some of his experiences of Islamophobia happened around drinking establishments and that some of them happened in his shop, which were caused mainly by drunks or deprived people respectively. The experience of Islamophobia caused by drunks is consistent with the example of Ehsan and also other examples especially in the third category from the Scottish major cities. The casual Islamophobia in and around drinking establishments, however, was not reported at all in the major cities. The last point that was highlighted by Tariq was the importance of deprivation when he pointed to ‘people from council areas.’ This was also consistent with the example of Ehsan and the findings of the first category from Scottish major cities.
The next example is Adil, who had a perception of a subtle and everyday Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014) while only having had rare experiences. Adil was a second generation Muslim man and was born and brought up in Falkirk. He was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a long beard. In terms of socio-economic status, he was employed and had an undergraduate degree. He stated that he only experienced once verbal abuse; however, he always suffered from more covert Islamophobia, especially in his workplace:

Generally, you feel racism and discrimination all the time to be honest. You feel discriminated one way or another, it is not open as such but it is indirectly there. Openly, I had once in my life [being called as Paki] but generally when you go to your office and interact with different people and do your business and everything discrimination is there. You know it is there but you cannot do anything about it. … [For example in my workplace] They would talk to me but again having beard; this makes difference as well, because they do not want to know you if you got beard because they think you are backdated and stuff like that. … I think it is better in Glasgow and Edinburgh because Muslims there interact with the local people [the majority]. In such places there are more foreign people and thus the indigenous Scots are a bit more open or are more welcoming towards Muslims. In big cities such as Edinburgh and Glasgow or any other big cities like Manchester or Birmingham where the indigenous people interact with Muslims or where there are a lot of Muslims there, there is more tolerance. Then, generally you have the more welcoming approach in big cities and they [indigenous people] treat you better.

[Male, Falkirk, 24 year-old]

This quote highlights the perception of subtle Islamophobia (Moosavi 2014), which was understood through feelings of social avoidance due to religious appearance (namely having a long beard). Adil stated that he always felt a subtle Islamophobia in everyday interactions with indigenous Scottish people, who tended to be less welcoming towards him. This was consistent with the second category from Scottish major cities in which such subtle Islamophobia was understood as majority Scots’ ‘different looks’ or ‘stares’ to Muslims. Adil’s socio-economic status was also similar to those in the second category from Scottish major cities; second generation, employed, and educated. However, in contrast to the second category from Scottish major cities in which the general knowledge of Islamophobia being
influenced by media was important in the development of perceptions of everyday and subtle Islamophobia (see Essed 1991; 2002), such general knowledge was absent in the example of Adil. It might be due to this issue that his generalisation of everyday and subtle Islamophobia was limited to Falkirk rather than to the whole of Scotland, whereas the generalisation of the second category from Scottish major cities was at the national level (Scotland). All the above examples reported their perceptions of prevailing Islamophobia, even though their experiences were limited to one physical attack (in the case of Ehsan) and several cases of verbal abuse over many years. This problematises the association between smaller areas and Islamophobia. The rest of the examples who had very rare or no experiences of Islamophobia also questioned the importance of smaller areas in the prevalence of Islamophobia. In the next section, I discuss other examples with rare or no experience of Islamophobia.

Rare or No Experience of Islamophobia

Other respondents [7] had different experiences and perceptions of Islamophobia compared to the above. To unpack the experiences of these respondents, I start with the example of Ahad, who was a self-employed second generation Muslim man and has lived in Falkirk for 34 years. He was from a Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. Unlike previous participants from Falkirk, he did not experience or feel more Islamophobia in Falkirk:

I did not have that many experience of racism or discrimination; maybe once in the blue moon. In this age if they do not like you, they would just pass you and do not say hello to you. You probably can find one or two per cent racist people. …So, I do not have any problem here.

[Male, Falkirk, 41 year-old]

In parallel to the third category from Scottish major cities, this quote attributes rare experiences of Islamophobia to a small minority of racist people. I need to mention that even though Ahad was self-employed, he had rare experiences of Islamophobia. Unlike other self-employed participants, however, Ahad’s rare experiences of Islamophobia can be explained by the fact that he was a skilled worker and was not
in daily contact with many people, thus his job did not match the criteria outlined in
the other cases. This example and the examples of other self-employed respondents
in Scottish major cities with rare experiences of Islamophobia (such as Arezo, Akram
and Asghar) show that self-employment is not a homogenous category. The next
example is Samad, who was a first generation Muslim man and has lived in
Dunfermline for 30 years. He was from Pakistan and was a practicing Muslim with a
beard. He was a retired professional and had an undergraduate degree. He
highlighted that only a minority of people are racist in Dunfermline:

I had some experiences of discrimination and racism. … In some areas you get more
and in some areas you get less. For example you may go to areas with decent and
educated people and you also may go to areas with people who always drink and read
the Sun newspaper and have got a certain idea and they are not even good to each
other to they are not going to be good to you, they would find any excuse to swear at
me so you should be careful which areas you go. For example, if I go out at 12pm
o’clock and some drunks come out of the pubs, they would not be friendly towards
me. Or in some other places even in the day time have these attitudes. …. Most people
do not make bad comments as long as you obey the law and you are a decent person,
the majority people would be decent back to you. There are only small minority
people who are ignorant and abuse others; they may also abuse their own people.
They are mostly working class people or the non-working class who are not working
they say that you came here and took our jobs but that is a small minority. For
example, when the 9/11 happened or the Iraq war happened and the British soldiers
have been killed, I have got certain people who were swearing and shouting at me. So,
in those times, those people became more aggressive but the majority people are
good.

[Dunfermline, 51 years old]

Consistent with the third category of Scottish major cities, Samad associated
Islamophobia to a minority in this quote. That was also in line with the earlier
examples of Ehsan and Tariq. Samad also highlighted the importance of drinking
establishments (where Muslims may face drunks) and deprived areas (where
uneducated, unemployed, and working class people are likely to live). The
importance of the latter issue was also evident in the first category from Scottish
major cities, but the significance of the former issue was not reported in the cities.
Even though the importance of drunks was also highlighted in Scottish major cities, there was no mention of drinking establishments such as pubs and bars. Samad also highlighted the importance of the years after 9/11 in the rise of Islamophobic incidents in this quote, which were the most aggressive incidents he had ever experienced. In this quote, Samad dismisses racists as marginal bigots who are aggressive not only to Muslims, but also to all people including majority Scots. One possible explanation for this is his professional job and his sense of belonging to Scotland and Scottish identity. The next example is Asif, who was a first generation Muslim man who has lived in Dunfermline for 12 years. He was of Pakistani background and was a practicing Muslim with a beard. Asif was employed and worked in the NHS as a nurse. Whilst having had some experiences of Islamophobia, he stated that majority of people are fine:

Recently someone smashed my car and long time ago again somebody smashed my car. The first incident actually happened four years ago when I move to a new place; the first welcome was smashing my car. I phone the police but law is very soft in this country and nothing happened and eventually they came to me and said that they are under age and we will keep eye on them. Furthermore, in another incident my tenant who was from Scottish army made some damage to my property. … Other than these incidents I did not have any problem in these years and other people were fine.

[Male, Dunfermline, 39 years old]

This quote highlights Asif’s perception of racially motivated incidents. He speaks of racially motivated damage to property, which was not reported in Scottish major cities. There was only one respondent (Kathryn) who reported the graffiti on her door that insulted her children (the importance of physical attack in Scottish towns is discussed in the next section). It is important to note that the experiences of Ahad, Samad, and Asif were not much different from the previous category. However the difference was in their accounts of their experiences. In these examples, respondents dismissed Islamophobia as bigotry (in the case of Ahad and Samad) or associate it with a minority of people (in the case of Asif). As mentioned in the case of Samad, this can be associated with their socio-economic ties with Scotland being stronger than those in the previous category. For example, Ahad was a skilled self-employed worker who has completed his Standard Grade in Scotland, Samad was a retired
professional and has completed his undergraduate degree in Scotland, and finally, Asif was a NHS nurse. These ties can have some bearing on their strong sense of belonging to Scotland or Britain. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, all three respondents had some sense of belonging to Scottish or British identity as part of their multiple or hybrid identities on the basis of residential markers. Such positive attitudes and interpretation of Islamophobic incidents were also evident in the third category from Scottish major cities, where such incidents were interpreted as casual or unusual and associated with drunks. This positive attitude and interpretation was also evident in the next example. Hareb, who was from Stirling - which is a city\(^1\) in Central Scotland - has lived in Stirling for 22 years and was a first generation Muslim man. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard. He was self-employed and worked in a take away restaurant. He stated that his experience of Islamophobia has been limited to rare experiences of verbal abuse:

> It happened a couple of times in the shop; they were drunk and they were swearing at us but police helped. In 15 years only two incidents happened. … There are more problems in areas where too many Muslims are living. Where I am living, I am the only Muslim and the rest are white people but I do not have any problem. We are working very hard and everybody here is busy; working, studying, and taking care of their family. So, there is no problem…

[Stirling, 45 years old]

In this quote, Hareb talks about a couple of incidents in his shop that were caused by some drunks. In line with the examples of Ehsan and Tariq, he points to the importance of specific self-employed jobs (namely in a low level occupation and in daily contact with many people) in experiences of Islamophobia. However, the example of Hareb suggests that such employment does not always result in frequent experiences of Islamophobia. Hareb’s rare experience of Islamophobia, rather, might be associated with the specific situation of Stirling, where other participants (Nadim and Hashim) also reported rare or no experience of Islamophobia. Consistent with

\(^{1}\) As the numbers of Muslims living in all other cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen) were at least more than one percent of the local population, the city of Stirling, with 0.6 percent, is studied along with other Scottish towns that all constitute less than one percent of the local population.
the main theme in the third category from Scottish major cities, this quote also links Islamophobia to drunkenness. Hareb also stated that he felt that Islamophobia exists in larger cities with more Muslims rather than smaller cities with a smaller number of Muslims. However it is important to note that this perception of more Islamophobia in larger cities runs counter to the perceptions of Ehsan and Adil, who earlier stated that they feel that larger cities with greater diversity are in general more tolerant. As noted in the last chapter, my qualitative data suggests that the importance of socio-economic factors may be more significant than the density of the Muslim population in experiencing Islamophobia.

The next example is Nadim, who has lived in Stirling for 20 years and, like Hareb, had rare experiences of Islamophobia. He was a first generation Muslim man and of Pakistani background. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard. He was a retired self-employed restaurant owner, who pointed to a change in people’s attitudes and behaviour since the Race Relation Acts:

Some people did have problem with us; they sometimes call us Paki or said ‘go back home’… but here police control everything. In the past people did have problem; parliament passed a law, for example in 1990s we had a doctor, doctor Ahmed from Karachi, he was working for 15 years in Stirling hospital and applied to buy a house here but they refused his application because he was not white. These things went to the Parliament and they passed a law; now everybody is equal here. There is no racism here; if anybody is racist to you, you can call the police right away.

[Stirling, 73 years old]

Nadim here highlights the importance of equality Acts and police protection in Stirling. In parallel to the example of Hareb, Nadim was also self-employed in a low level occupation and in daily contact with many people. Both respondents had rare experiences of Islamophobia, while other respondents with the same socio-economic status in Scottish major cities had daily experiences of Islamophobia. However it is important to note that these two respondents were restaurant owners who probably have a different clientele to those who run small shops. It can be argued that most people who go to these restaurants may already be tolerant or familiar with other cultures as they intend to eat the food that these respondents would serve. This is in
contrast to other self-employed jobs such as running a grocery shop or being a taxi driver that serve a far greater range of people. This implies that in the former, some degree of toleration and respect is expected, however in the latter, all kinds of attitudes and behaviour can be expected. This also implies that the category of low level self-employment with daily contact with many people can be diverse.

As I mentioned above, Hareb’s and Nadim’s rare experiences of Islamophobia may also reflect the particular situation in Stirling. One of the issues that might make the example of Stirling stand out is the adequate police protection in Stirling because once an incident happened; both respondents highlighted their satisfaction with the police service. By contrast, in other towns such as Falkirk and Dunfermline, there was less or no satisfaction with police services (this is discussed later in this chapter in the section about ‘Institutional Islamophobia’). The next example is Saleh, who has lived in East Kilbride for 28 years. Saleh was a first generation Muslim man and was of Egyptian background. He was a practicing Muslim with a beard and was a retired university lecturer. He said:

It happens occasionally, sometimes you can prove it, sometimes you cannot prove it, sometimes you ignore it and sometimes you respond to it…

[East Kilbride, 65 years old]

One important point in this example is the fact that even though Saleh was living in a small town where there was a small number of Muslims to such an extent that there was not even one mosque or an Islamic centre, Saleh had similar experiences to those who were living in towns like Falkirk and Dunfermline with longer established Muslim communities. This example again questions the significance of population density for the occurrence of Islamophobic experiences. Findings from the other categories support this argument. For example, the Stirling council area, which has the lowest number of Muslims - 578 people constituting 0.6 per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 2013) - was reported (by Hareb, Nadim and Hashim) to be less Islamophobic. However the Falkirk council area, which has the largest number of Muslims - 1,415 people constituting 0.9 per cent of the local population (National Record of Scotland 2013) - was reported in contrast (by Ehsan, Tariq and Adil) to be more Islamophobic. One significant factor highlighted in these
towns and cities was police protection; respondents from Stirling had more satisfaction with the police forces whereas respondents from Falkirk and Dunfermline had lower satisfaction with the police forces, especially with the local officers. However, given the small sample size, making any solid association requires further research.

The last example is Hashim, who had no experience of Islamophobia at all and thus had a perception that there is no Islamophobia in his local area. Hashim was a second generation Muslim man and was born and brought up in Stirling. He was 17 years old, a student, and also employed. He stated that he is treated the same as others and that there is no Islamophobia in Stirling:

I did not have any experience of racism or discrimination in Stirling. People here just treat me as well as everyone else; I have some quite good friends here, they are all British people… [but] I think in bigger areas where a large Muslim community lives situation would be different… for example, Muslims probably in Glasgow or maybe in Dundee may face more discrimination and racism. So it might be different just in large areas but Stirling is a quite small city so it is all right.

[Stirling, 17 year-old]

This example lends support to the previous finding that the small size of a Muslim community in itself cannot be a significant factor. Consistent with other examples in the third category, Hashim’s generalisation of no Islamophobia was limited to his local area rather than to the whole of Scotland. Unlike the fourth category from Scottish major cities in which participants perceived themselves to be exceptions to the majority of Muslims due to their invisibility or integration, Hashim and other examples from the third category associated either no or less Islamophobia to their local areas. Thus, they had this perception that all other Muslims living in those towns have the same experience of less Islamophobia. Interestingly, they all felt that Islamophobia would be higher in areas with a large number of Muslims such as Glasgow, Edinburgh, or Dundee. This was despite the perception of those in the first and second categories of Scottish small towns (such as Ehsan, Tariq and Adil), who tended to think that there is less Islamophobia in such areas. My research thus suggests that merely the size of a Muslim community is not a significant factor in the
rate of Islamophobia because different range of experiences was reported in both cities and towns.

Different Range of Islamophobia: Verbal and Physical Abuse

In parallel with Scottish major cities, respondents in Scottish towns and small cities reported two types of Islamophobia: individual and institutional Islamophobia. As I presented above, verbal abuse, such as being called Paki, was the most common form of individual Islamophobia in Scottish towns. This finding supports previous studies by de Lima (2001) and Plastow (2010), which showed that verbal abuse was the most common form of reported racism in Scottish rural areas. Verbal abuse took place in different locations, such as on the street and at business premises. The streets were considered to be the most common place where verbal abuse was directed against Muslims. However while the importance of deprived areas was highlighted in Scottish major cities, the significance of drinking establishments was also emphasised in Scottish towns. The next common location where verbal abuse was experienced was at business premises such as local shops and take-away restaurants. This was evident in the examples of Ehsan, Tariq, Hareb, and Nazir. This finding supports previous research by Plastow (2010: 202), which revealed that business premises, with 67% of all police recorded incidents in 2007, were the most common location for racist incidents directed against visible ethnic minority group members in rural areas.

Unlike Scottish major cities where no physical abuse was reported (except a report of a graffiti on the door in the case of Kathryn which was caused by some children), experiences of physical attack and damage to property was reported in Scottish towns. This was mainly reported in Falkirk and Dunfermline; for example Ehsan, who was a shop keeper in Falkirk, had some experiences of physical attack. In another example, Asif, who was a nurse in Dunfermline, stated that his car was smashed two times and that his tenant once damaged his property. These examples support findings from previous research (Plastow 2010: 199), which revealed violence and damage to property to be the second and the third most common forms of reported racism (19.48% former and 10.38% latter) against visible ethnic
minorities in Scottish rural areas. It also supports findings that ‘relatively isolated and small Muslim communities are often at increased risk of anti-Muslim violence and abuse’ (Lambert and Githens 2010: 35). One possible explanation for such physical attacks in Scottish towns rather than Scottish major cities could be inadequate police protection in such areas. This was explicitly mentioned in the examples of Ehsan, Samad, and Arif, who all asserted their dissatisfaction with police services at the local level (this is illustrated later in this chapter in ‘Institutional Islamophobia’).

Physical abuse and violence can have serious implications for victims’ lives such as the perception of ‘loss of security and safety’ that can affect their integration (Kelly 1989: 195). This was particularly highlighted in the examples of Ehsan, Tariq, and Samad, who explicitly mentioned that they did not go out at night and especially not near to drinking establishments (Muslims’ integration is particularly discussed in the next chapter). Further to Individual Islamophobia, there was a perception of employment discrimination and police racism, which can be categorised under institutional Islamophobia in Scottish towns. It is to this that I now turn.

Institutional Islamophobia; Employment and Police Discrimination

As noted earlier, this is not a systematic study of institutional Islamophobia, but it does present respondents’ perception of such Islamophobia in Scottish towns. The data suggests that there were some perceptions of employment discrimination in Scottish towns. Some participants particularly highlighted their feelings of covert and implicit discrimination in job application and promotion processes. Asif’s account highlights these issues:

Sometimes there is problem in employment section because if the local [indigenous] people are available, they get the job even though they are less experienced. Sometimes they were preferred only because they are Scottish. Recently I experienced this; there was a post and I applied for that but I did not get it and it was disappointing because I was more capable to do that job than the other person who got the job eventually. I do not know what the bottom line reason for refusing me was but it made me really angry that time … it is against the law but in practice the first priority is for the local people.
This quote highlights the perception of racial prioritisation in the job market, which was also reported in Scottish major cities. In another example, Adil, who used to work in a bank branch in Falkirk, felt that there was indirect discrimination in his everyday interaction with his colleagues:

Generally, when you go to your office and interact with different people and do your business and everything discrimination is there. You know it is there but you cannot do anything about it. … [For example in my workplace] They would talk to me but again having beard; this makes difference as well, because they do not want to know you if you got beard because they think you are backdated and stuff like that.

As I discussed earlier, Adil had a perception of everyday Islamophobia that affected all aspects of his life. In this quote, he particularly highlights the social aspect of discrimination in his workplace. He felt that his colleagues avoid socialising with him due to his Muslim identity and appearance. This can have important implication for his integration (which is discussed in the next chapters). The next example is Saleh, who has lived in East Kilbride and had rare experiences of Islamophobia. Saleh asserted that there is institutional racism in Scotland which discriminates against people of certain skin colour and faith by pointing to employment discrimination:

You should make a distinction between abuse and insult in the street and institutional racism. We normally ignore the first one because it is not based on any fact or any real identification, but when you feel that there is discrimination in an institution or organisation this hurts and you feel that it is very bad… That exists because we feel that and there are some people from certain colour and certain faith who are not treated as the same as others. … Institutional racism or discrimination affects your whole life and your family's life as well. For example, it could affect your application for a job or your promotion process. But if anyone discriminates against you in street you can defend yourself as long as it does not lead to violence and if it leads to violence you can take your case to the court and law will support you. … The institutional racism not only affects people’s life but also it affects the whole country
as well, because maybe some institutions due to racism employ less qualified people instead of well qualified.

[East Kilbride, 65 years old]

In this quote, Saleh particularly highlights the importance of institutional racism over individual racism. As Saleh was a representative of a social and political Muslim organisation in Scotland, his perception of institutional racism and Islamophobia draws on his contact with other Muslims rather than his personal experiences. However, other respondents also pointed to the importance of institutional Islamophobia in Scottish towns. Even though this study presents and highlights Muslims’ feelings and perceptions rather than doing a systematic examination of their experiences, these perceptions map onto de Lima’s (2001) work, which suggests the existence of a wide range of employment discrimination (such as difficulties accessing work despite having relevant qualifications, racial victimisation in the workplace, being ignored for promotion prospects, difficulties finding jobs outside the ethnic minority sector etc.) against ethnic minority people in Scottish rural areas. Perception of employment discrimination in Scottish towns was consistent with the findings in Scottish major cities that highlighted Muslims’ concerns over employment discrimination.

Some participants in Scottish towns reported less satisfaction with police services. The data suggests that there was some dissatisfaction with local police attitudes and services in some particular towns such as Falkirk and Dunfermline. There was a perception of police discrimination in these towns. Such dissatisfaction was especially attributed to the local police officers who were in direct contact with people. For example, Ehsan, who has lived in Falkirk and has had daily experiences of Islamophobia, expressed that his call for help was ignored in two incidents by local police officers:

Here in two incidents I called police; once for attempted break in [burglary] to the shop and once for breaking my shop’s windows. They did not come for any of these calls … higher level police officers are okay but when you are dealing with lower level officers there are some problem … my wife used to work for the police and she
was part of the police; she told me that the high ranking officers, who are not coming
to the street, do not know what is really happening in the street.

[Falkirk, 42 years old]

In this quote, Ehsan particularly highlights discrimination by local police officers. He felt that the local police’s lack of response to his calls was a form of discrimination. This may imply that at the higher levels of policy making, there can be supportive Acts, but that there is a problem with implementing these laws and policies in practice, especially at the local levels. In another example, Samad, who has lived in Dunfermline and has had rare experiences of Islamophobia, pointed to this dichotomy between policies and practices at the local level:

The government itself is very supportive; after 9/11 they with some police officers came to the mosque and they said if you have any problem, we are here to help you. We want you to live in peace; we do not want you to be attacked. So, the government is very good … but there are some racist police forces especially in local and frontline levels who many not believe in such policies.

[Dunfermline, 51 years old]

As I mentioned, Samad had no experience of police discrimination, however he had a perception that there are some police officers who might be Islamophobic or racist. This perception might draw on his knowledge of others’ experiences such as his friend Asif’s¹. Asif had two experiences of dealing with police officers and was dissatisfied with their services. For example, he explained that in one incident where his car window was smashed, police officers told him that it was done by some teenagers who were under age and nothing can be done except ‘keeping an eye on them.’ In his second experience, in which a retired army soldier who was his tenant damaged some of his property, after arresting the tenant and interviewing him, he was released without any charge because in a strange and doubtful way, police did not inform him about his right to consult with a lawyer before interviewing him:

¹ Both participants were from one mosque and they knew each other.
Police arrest him but a month later I received a latter which said sorry to disappoint you but he had a legal right to consult with a lawyer before we interview him which he did not have because we interviewed him first so we cannot do not anything about it; so that was a waste of time. It was very surprising and strange that when police called him, they have provided everything there like a studio with lights and recorders and everything but they did not know that he has right to consult a lawyer before police interviewing.

[Dunfermline, 39 years old]

These quotes imply dissatisfaction with police services in Falkirk and Dunfermline amongst some Muslims. It is, however, important to note that in all the above incidents, the police was active (for example in locating the culprits, cautioning the youngsters and questioning the tenant) but they were perceived by Asif as inadequate and discriminatory. These actions, however, may be regarded by some others as taking the necessary steps and thus not not discriminatory at all. Therefore, associating these perceptions with police discrimination requires further research. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with police services also plays an important part in the perception of Islamophobia. Those respondents who were dissatisfied with the police had stronger feelings about Islamophobia (such as Ehsan and Asif), whereas those who were more satisfied with the police services (such as Hareb, Nadim and Hashim) felt that Islamophobia was not a problem in their local areas. The importance of police protection was explicitly emphasised in the examples of Hareb and Nadim, who highlighted the key role of the ‘police’s help’ in their rare experience of Islamophobia. This can imply the importance of police protection in the experience and perception of Islamophobia, but given the size of my sample, more research on this is needed.

**Conclusion**

In discussing and comparing the result of the findings in both Scottish cities and towns, the data suggests that the size of a Muslim community was not a key factor in the experience of Islamophobia because in both cities and towns, a different range of experiences were reported in both high and low density Muslim areas. Thus it can be
concluded that size is not necessarily correlated to Islamophobia. In contrast to the claimed importance of Muslim population density, the data suggests the importance of socio-economic factors in the experience of Islamophobia. Social and economic factors such as living in deprived areas, drunken people, and self-employment in low level occupations with daily contact with many people were identified, but it is important to note that the data also suggested that self-employment is not a homogenous category. Further to the importance of these factors, the importance of drinking establishment areas was specifically highlighted in Scottish towns and small cities. Even though in Scottish cities, the issue of drunks was highlighted, there was no mention of the areas near to pubs and bars. In Scottish towns by contrast, there was a common fear of being present in such areas because it would result in verbal abuse. The importance of drinking establishments and some reports of physical abuse in Scottish towns can be explained by less police protection in these areas, which led to the next difference between cities and towns. While there was more satisfaction with police forces in Scottish major cities, there was less satisfaction with these services in some Scottish towns. For example in Falkirk and Dunfermline, there was a perception that the local police officers can be Islamophobic or racist towards Muslims. This may imply an association between police protection and the experience of physical abuse, especially in drinking establishment areas in Scottish towns. This supports previous research that suggested that inadequate police protection in Scottish rural areas may put the life and security of Muslims at risk (Lambert and Githens 2010; De Lima 2001; Plastow 2010). The confirmation of this association, however, requires further research to study police racism and police Islamophobia in Scottish towns and small cities. The final point that needs to be made is that even though the experience of Islamophobia was not pervasive in Scottish cities and towns, those who experienced high rates of Islamophobia may affect their integration in Scotland. This is what I will discuss and illustrate in the next chapter.
Chapter 8: ‘The cup of kindness’? Dominant Norms and Social Integration

Introduction

Since the 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London Muslims’ integration in the UK has been under intense scrutiny. Muslim integration, however, has long been a matter of debate in Britain (Modood 2005, 2007; Parekh 2008; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Hopkins 2011) which revolved around the maintenance of Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice. Recently, for instance, David Cameron (British Government 2011), Britain’s Prime Minister, announced at the Munich Security Conference that ‘state multiculturalism’ has encouraged ‘different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream.’ In criticizing multiculturalism, most critics mainly refer to Muslims as being less integrated into the wider society than people from other minority groups and Muslims are shown to be disloyal (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Muslims’ distinctive identity and practice has sometimes even been perceived as a national identity threat (Goodhart 2004; Chakraborti and Garland 2009: 45) or has been seen as potential enemies within (see Ahmad 2003). It is however important to note that Muslims’ practices and integration are complex and complicated and varied in relation to different factors (such as ethnicity, religion and nationality). For instance, as noted in previous chapters, Muslims’ identity and experience of Islamophobia could affect their integration. In this chapter, I discuss different barriers and pathways to Muslims’ integration.

Integration of ethnic minority people, particularly Muslims, has been studied from different perspectives and aspects. Much of what has been discussed about integration starts from the majority vantage point and little attention is paid to the views of minorities’ (Fekete 2008). Muslims’ integration, especially social integration, in Scotland has been even less studied. Most studies have paid less attention to this aspect of integration by focusing more on economic or educational integration (Hussain and Miller 2006; British Council Scotland Survey 2010; Kidd
As my data emphasised the importance and problematic nature of social integration for Muslims in the Scottish context, this chapter focuses on that specific aspect of Muslims’ integration.

The importance of integration lies in the fact that some minority groups, including Muslims, often sought to maintain their own ways of life and also to teach such ways of life to their children, while the host country sought to maintain a sense of common national identity and cultural continuity. The problem was seen as a matter of finding a way for a society to incorporate its minorities so that it could both satisfy their aspirations to maintain cherished ways of life and at the same time to maintain itself as a (historical) community of common belonging. Therefore, incorporation of these new members into society is a question of growing importance. Different scholars’ responses to this question have mainly revolved around the concepts of assimilation and integration. Assimilation refers to a process in which the newcomers become similar to their host society (Brubaker 2001) whereas the term integration, mainly proposed by multiculturalists, refers to a state of ‘recognition and respect’ (Kymlicka 1995; Hall 2000; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007).

Multiculturalism in Britain was officially sanctioned by the New Labour Government in 1997, but prior to that time, this ideology emerged on 29 May 1966 (Joppke 1999), when the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, distinguished sharply between integration and assimilation. Jenkins favored ‘integration’ but insisted that it should not mean ‘the loss, by immigrants of their own national characteristics and culture’ (Joppke 1999: 225). He defined integration ‘not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity...cultural diversity...mutual tolerance’ (Banton 1985: 71 quoted in Hussain and Miller 2006: 50). At the more social level, multiculturalism and integration became a politically and ideologically significant movement in the 1960s when South Asians and Afro-Caribbeans refused to assimilate into the wider society (Parekh 2006:5).

The term integration, however, is contested and there is no single definition or theory of immigrant integration (Castles et. al. 2002; Phillimore and Goodson 2008). One common theoretical approach to integration was through distinguishing integration from assimilation (Kymlicka 2001; Parekh 2006; Modood 2007; Pfeffer
Distinguishing assimilation from integration, Pfeffer (2014) proposes three main distinctions; first, ‘there is a fundamental normative difference between a host society that invokes laws to incorporate its immigrants in a way that is respectful of, and is willing to celebrate their diverse practices (which is indicative of integration) and a host society that seeks to attenuate differences between minorities and the host society’. Second, ‘assimilation is often a unidirectional process insofar as it places most of the expectations on immigrants. … Conversely; integration ought to be viewed as a dialogical process meaning that it should be achieved through the cooperation and deliberation of both actors’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354). Finally, ‘integration can be defined on the basis of participation in, as opposed to degree of similarity with, the host society. … However, just because integration requires convergence on liberal democratic values does not mean that cultural groups need to give up traditional practices’ (Pfeffer 2014: 354).

Immigrants’ integration is also debated and theorized from more practical and functional perspectives, which highlights the interaction between the social and functional dimensions and the influence of the state (Korac 2003). In Britain, Ager and Strang (2008) argue that integration has been considered to be within the discussion of social inclusion/exclusion and race relations. From this perspective, the importance of social and structural barriers to integration was highlighted. The importance of structural barriers to ethnic/faith minority groups was supported by empirical research (Berry 1997; Hale 2000; Hickman et. al. 2008). Different types of discriminatory practices and inequalities such as institutional and individual racism and Islamophobia can also affect Muslims’ integration (Fekete 2008; Trevor Phillips 2011), however, there is a dearth of research on how the perception of discrimination is related to immigrants’ overall adaptation (Berry 1997). Taking the importance of social and structural factors into consideration, Ager and Strang (2004: 9) define an integrated individual or group within a society as ‘when they achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc.’ It is however important to note that Muslims’ integration is not limited to social and structural issues and relational and cultural barriers are also important.
The importance of ‘relationships with the host community, the importance of retaining one’s own cultural connections, shared values and the need to ensure safety and security’ (Phillimore and Goodson 2008: 309) are also important in affecting minorities’ integration strategies. From this perspective, the importance of relational and cultural issues such as religious boundaries and cultural barriers is better highlighted. Religion and religious identity for many Muslims is central to their sense of who they are and how their behaviour in all spheres of life should be (Jacobson 1997b). Similarly, Modood (2005) argues that religion is central to many Muslims and any new ways of living in Britain and becoming a part of British society had to be ultimately justified in terms of compatibility with the Muslim faith and the welfare of Muslims. Joppke (2012) also argues that the religious identity of practicing Muslims creates boundaries for Muslims’ cultural and social integration. Muslims’ identity politics, however, has also been seen as an important trigger for increased civic integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010). As Hussain and Miller (2006) argue, Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a tool of integration rather than separation.

Taking the impact of social and cultural factors on immigrants’ or minorities’ integration into consideration, several diverse forms of integration such as partial, limited, or thin are possible (Parekh 2008) and no single sociological model for a multiethnic or multicultural society is possible (Modood 2007). In sum, no minority group can be a model for all others, so there is no right to insist that some minorities’ lifestyle, behaviour, and manner be the form of integration to which other groups should adapt themselves. ‘So, the ultimate meaning of multi is that specific policies, complexes of policies and multicultural institutional arrangements have to be customized to meet diverse (as well as common) vulnerabilities, needs and priorities’ (Modood 2007:46). This chapter, therefore, examines Muslims’ integrational strategies and discusses the importance of different barriers and pathways to Muslims’ integration in Scotland, including Muslims’ identity and Islamophobia.

This chapter will first detail and discuss the barriers to Muslims’ integration. Issues articulated here are those factors and concerns that were identified by participants as barriers. These mainly fall into structural/social and cultural barriers. The former included Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes, media and Islamophobic
representation of Muslims, language barriers, and Scottish dominant social norms and assimilation. The latter constitutes the discussion around how some Muslim religious practices such as not consuming alcohol and avoiding mixed-sex meetings can function as cultural barriers. Finally, this study discusses how issues of cultural understanding and respect, expressed as the main pathway to integration, could aid Muslims’ integration. In the next chapter, I discuss how Muslims manage these structural and cultural barriers to develop a form of *Halal* integration through alternative ways of social interaction.

*Structural/Social Barriers*

Structural barriers were mainly the concerns that related to Muslims’ social integration rather than their economic or educational integration. These concerns were; Islamophobia and social avoidance, media, language, and dominant social norms.

*Islamophobia and Unwelcoming Attitudes*

Unwelcoming attitudes were one of the main barriers to Muslims’ social integration, which was acknowledged by some participants. The data suggests that there was a perception among Muslim interviewees that some Scots have no interest in integrating and interacting with Muslims. For example, Adil was one of 4 participants who asserted this view. He was a practicing Muslim man and was living in Falkirk. Adil had an undergraduate degree and was working in a bank in Falkirk. He said that his neighbours and his colleagues did not show any interest in interact and socialise with him:

*I do not consider myself fully integrated … because my neighbours are racists and do not wish to interact with me so we have very limited relationship. Even in my workplace they would not talk to me but again having beard this makes difference as well, because they do not want to know you and thus they do not talk to you. If you have got beard, they will think that you are backward and backdated and stuff like that…*

[24 year-old, Falkirk]
Adil was economically and educationally integrated to Scottish society, however in this quote, he highlights that an unwelcoming approach in his neighbourhood and workplace against Muslims was the main explanation for his limited social integration. Later in the interview, he asserted that he knew that Islam encourages Muslims to interact with others especially one’s neighbours but that others’ unwelcoming approach stopped him from achieving greater integration. This can imply that there might even be some religious aspirations for greater social integration; however, the experience or perception of social avoidance can hinder such integration. This supports Modood’s (2007:48) argument that integration occurs ‘where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing (or not trying) to integrate.’ Adil felt that his colleagues’ unwelcoming approach was associated with their stereotypical perception that Muslims are ‘backdated.’ Associating Muslims with backwardness or seeing them as ‘backdated’ can arise from having Islamophobic views about Muslims. This can be explained by the argument of the Runnymede Trust (1997: 6), which describes one facet of Islamophobia as seeing Islam or Muslims, as ‘them,’ inferior to non-Muslims or ‘us.’ Seeing Muslims as ‘backdated’ and different can affect people’s social relationship with Muslims. Having such views about Muslims can make them less-favoured in the society. This argument is supported by quantitative research that suggests that Muslims are the least favoured religious minority in Scotland (British Council Scotland Survey 2010). The analysis of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010) also showed that ‘Muslims attracted the most discriminatory response, with 23% saying they would be unhappy if a Muslim formed a relationship with a family member, falling to 18% for a Hindu, 9% for someone who is Jewish and just 2% for a Christian’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 22).

As Adil was living and working in a small town, Falkirk, with a small number of Muslims and a small ethnic minority population, this may suggest an association between small towns and Islamophobia, and thus more social avoidance in small towns rather than in larger cities. However, as I discussed in the previous chapter,
Islamophobia was evident in both small towns and larger cities, thus the role of geographical differences on having Islamophobic and unwelcoming attitudes towards Muslims is challenged by my data. Furthermore, other examples in this section suggest that some participants from larger cities such as Edinburgh also reported such unwelcoming approaches in their social integration with the majority Scots. For example, Kasim, who, like Adil, was a practicing Muslim man with an undergraduate degree and was working in a bank branch in Edinburgh, had the same perception of being socially avoided. In this example, Kasim especially highlights the importance of identity non-recognition as another reason for having an unwelcoming approach towards Muslims. Kasim stated that interaction with the majority Scottish people was so difficult because they did not accept him as being Scottish and as being one of themselves and, thus, do not wish to interact with him. He said that interaction with people from other ethnic/faith minority groups was much easier than with the indigenous people:

You may want to integrate into the society but the society may not want to integrate with you because of your religion or your religious identity. … For example, I am friends with many people from different background but making friendship with the indigenous Scottish people is so difficult because they do not accept you as a Scottish person. I want to integrate and interact with them but their barrier stop me from integration. So those who are from other background or other faiths are easier to integrate with but the indigenous Scottish people keep to themselves. So, it is very difficult to integrate with them because they do want to accept you as one of themselves; only a few of them accept you.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote implies an association between unwelcoming approaches in social relationships towards Muslims and the non-recognition of Muslims’ national identity as fellow Scottish at the grassroots level. This supports Bond’s (2006) argument that ‘even those who enjoy full formal citizenship may still, in the eyes of the majority, be excluded from belonging to the nation in which they reside.’ This can imply that Muslims can be seen as Others or outsiders at the grassroots level and thus be less favoured for socially integration or interaction. This supports my finding in the previous chapters, which suggested that the majority of participants, even the second
generation Muslims, felt that their Scottish or British identity claims were not accepted at the grassroots level and that they are often seen as outsiders or foreigners. Considering Adil’s and Kasim’s social status, as having been educated in Scottish universities and employed at public institutions, it can be suggested that even those Muslims with higher social status can be regarded as less favoured by some of the \textit{majority} on the grounds of Islamophobic attitudes or identity non-recognition.

The examples of Adil and Kasim also imply that such unwelcoming approaches to greater social interaction can hinder Muslims’ social integration with \textit{majority} Scots. As was evident in both quotes, Adil was not socialising with his neighbours and colleagues, and Kasim tended to interact with other minority people. Considering Kasim’s example, this implies that he finds socialising and interacting with the \textit{majority} group members difficult, Muslims interact with other minority people who were found to be more welcoming than the \textit{majority}. Such drifting away from the \textit{majority} and leaning towards other minorities was also evident in other examples. For instance, Sanaz found other minorities to be more welcoming than \textit{majority} Scots. She was a practicing Muslim woman with hijab and was a housewife, but was also working in some voluntary groups. Like Adil and Kasim, she was integrated into the Scottish educational system and had an undergraduate degree. She stated that she felt that she was avoided by Scottish majority group members in her children’s schools, while she found people from other minority ethnic groups to be more welcoming:

To be honest I have never really found it quite easy to break to Scottish white people... In my daughter’s class all students and teachers are white Scottish people. Children’s mothers are usually stuck to their little groups and did not want to interact with others that much, whereas in my son’s class mothers are much more friendly, they are from different background therefore it is much easier to relate to them. ... Now that I am wearing Hijab, I think that might be a problem too... but for integration there are little things I can do; if they do not like you because you are coloured, there is not really so much you can do... I think it is up to other people as well to accept you and wish to integrate with you. I think they do not want to have us here, they do not feel comfortable having us here.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]
This quote, in parallel to the example of Adil, highlights the importance of Islamophobia in forming unwelcoming approaches towards Muslims. Sanaz particularly highlights her perception that people from the majority group may dislike Muslims on the ground of their racial or religious characteristics. This can imply that having such views about Muslims can make the majority unwilling to integrate and interact. After experiencing unwelcoming approaches, like Kasim, Sanaz found people from other minority groups more welcoming and thus tended to interact with them rather than with the majority. Another possible implication of feeling unwelcome, even though not widespread, can be inter-community isolation. This was evident in two examples, Ghader and Ehsan. Ghader, who was an ex-self-employed practicing Muslim man from Pakistan, by highlighting the negative impact of discrimination on his sense of belonging to Scotland, stated that he felt more at home when he is in the Punjabi community:

If people here discriminate against you, you would not feel at home there, you cannot have any sense of belonging. But there are some people who are not that severe; they do not say anything but they do not encourage you either. … We have our big community here; Punjabis. So, we feel quite at home among our community because we have our Punjabi community here; we have our shops and our business but we interact with other people too.

[63 year-old, Glasgow]

This quote shows how Islamophobia and an unwelcoming approach can lead some Muslims towards inter-community isolation and having parallel lives. In another example, Ehsan, who was also a self-employed shopkeeper, pointed out that he is more comfortable either in the Pakistani community or in Pakistan:

Wherever Asians are gathering some where, we feel safer and better with them. They are saying that we are not mixing but there is no mixing from that side; for example if you go to the pub no one come to you or nobody shakes your hand, nobody joins you; even when you do that because I do not drink but even if you start drinking they would not come to you because you are different. They are saying that we are not mixing but I do not know how we can mix. … Even I feel more comfortable whenever I go to Pakistan. I go every year or every two years to Pakistan and over there you feel that you can do whatever you want, go wherever you want. I feel safer and more
comfortable over there than here. Here even when I walk outside and there is a drunk person, he will feel safe to say whatever they like to me.

[42 year-old, Falkirk]

In this quote, Ehsan highlights his feeling that he did not feel safe and comfortable in gatherings of Scots. This is similar to de Lima’s (2004) finding that social exclusion could lead to social isolation and maintaining the cultural identities of ethnic minority groups in Scottish rural areas. However, it is important to note that the trend of having parallel lives was absent in the Scottish context (Hussain and Miller 2006). Furthermore, the comparison between the examples of Ghader and Ehsan with other participants suggests the specificity of their examples and thus cannot be generalised. For instance, the examples of Adil, Kasim, and Sanaz who also reported social avoidance, show that none of these participants tended to have separated or parallel lives. These participants were all integrated into the Scottish educational system and two of them (Adil and Kasim) were economically integrated. Social avoidance, thus, limited these participants’ social integration rather than leading them towards having separate lives. The actual integration of other participants in different aspects of Scottish society that is discussed in the next chapter, even though it points to limited integration in most cases, supports the absence of Muslims having parallel lives in Scotland. It is also discussed in the next chapter that even though Muslims’ social integration has been challenged by different barriers, Muslims in Scotland have tried to fit into the society by choosing alternative ways of socializing.

As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, Ghader and Ehsan had daily experiences of Islamophobia. Their limited integration may be associated with their high rate of experiencing Islamophobia. As I discussed earlier, Islamophobic attitudes such as seeing Muslims as inferior or being unhappy to have a social relationship with Muslims could lead to the isolation of Muslims from the majority Scots. Further to their daily experience of Islamophobia, Ghader and Ehsan’s social status was poor, which could have also affected their social integration. They were both first generation self-employed with English language difficulties and no Scottish education. I discuss in the next chapter that poor education and English language
difficulties were factors that some first generation Muslims acknowledged as important factors that led them to self-employment. It will also be discussed here that English language difficulties could also affect their social integration by prompting them to only socialise within their Punjabi community that uses the same language.

Investigating the importance of daily experience of Islamophobia and low-level self-employment in limiting Muslims’ social integration, the data suggests that other examples with the same social status such as Hamid and Tariq had a more mixed life. The comparison between the example of Hamid/Tariq and Ghader/Ehsan shows that the former examples had some Scottish education. Hamid for example, had an undergraduate degree and Tariq had a college degree, while the latter examples had only a primary education from Pakistan. Another difference was English language: Hamid and Tariq were fluent while Ghader and Ehsan had some English language difficulties. This may imply that even though the examples of Ghader and Ehsan were peculiar and could not be generalised to other Muslims, their examples may suggest the importance of low or no education and language difficulties alongside experiencing Islamophobia in leading to social exclusion. This could also imply the importance of generational differences. The second generation Muslim usually acquires the English language and enters into the Scottish educational system, while most first generation Muslims have no Scottish education and still struggle with English language difficulties. The different implications of generational differences are discussed later in the section on language barriers.

Some participants pointed to some of the Scottish Government’s policies or programmes that could also encourage Islamophobia and thus lead to the increased social isolation of Muslims. For example, Azadeh, who was a practicing Muslim woman, asserted that commemorating the 9/11 attack anniversaries can indirectly spread Islamophobia and lead to the dislike of Muslims. By referring to her experience, she explained how associating the 9/11 bombing with Muslims at school singled out her nephew and all students looked at him differently as a result:

Last week it was the 10th anniversary of 9/11 and on Monday my nephew went to school and his teacher spoke to the class about 9/11 and she went to say that some Muslims do that, my nephew is only 9 years old and he felt that he was dying in that point because everybody in whole class turned around and looked at him, what kind of
integration is this, how is he going to feel? … They keep reminding kids that Muslims did that and kids would look differently at my nephew now. This would only help isolation than integration.

[42 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote highlights the important role of public institutions such as schools and the government in spreading or fighting Islamophobia. Pointing to commemorating 9/11 anniversaries and associating Muslims with terrorism, this quote supports my previous argument that considered Islamophobia to be one of the main reasons for social avoidance. In another example, by supporting some of Scottish Government policies such as the ‘One Scotland’ campaign, Samad, who was a practicing Muslim man, stated that the government tries to promote diversity and equality through different programmes, but that the media’s Islamophobic representation of Islam and Muslims halts that process:

If you watch the news on the media, you will see that there are many Scottish people who do not like Islam ... The government like to promote diversity and it is a nice idea but I do not think everybody is happy with Islam; a lot of people fear Islam because of ignorance or because of media. The issue of suicide bombers and terrorist attacks has affected Muslims’ image in the media; the propaganda was against Islam.

[51 year-old, Dunfermline]

The last two quotes raise important questions about the effectiveness of some anti-racist programmes such as the ‘One Scotland’ campaign because on the one hand, the government tries to promote diversity and integration, but on the other hand, other programmes can spread Islamophobia and hatred against Muslims. The important role of the media in hindering integration by spreading Islamophobia is the focus of the next section.

Media: Islamophobic Representation of Muslims

In presenting an Islamophobic image of Muslims, the media was also identified by almost all interviewees as one of the main barriers to integration. It is important to note that most participants did not mention any specific form of media and mainly
referred to it in general, which could include different TV news channels, TV programmes, and newspapers. There were only one explicit mention of the Sun newspaper (in the case of Samad) and some general references such as British media, mainstream news, newspapers, and TV. They had the widespread perception that as a result of the media’s Islamophobic representation, many Scottish majority group members associate Muslims with terrorism, which makes them reluctant to interact with Muslims. For example, Akram, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, stated that many Scottish people consider all Muslims to be the same based on media representations:

The way that Islam is portrayed in the media is a big barrier. I find out that a lot of people judge all the Muslims as they are all the same. They do not understand the difference between what Islam is really and what some people do in the name of Islam.

[43 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote referred to terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 bombings in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London, which were associated with Muslims and Islam by some mainstream media. This quote points to the first feature of Islamophobia itemised by Runnymede Trust (1997: 5), which is seeing Islam or Muslims as ‘undifferentiated, static and monolithic and as intolerant of internal pluralism and deliberation.’ Akram highlights that spreading or having such views about Muslims cannot improve integration. It is important to note that all broadsheets or broadcast agencies do not present an Islamophobic image of Muslims, but nonetheless, the general term ‘media’ was used by respondents to refer to those who spear-headed Islamophobia that could result in hatred against Muslims. Further research, thus, is required to show which media spread Islamophobia and in what ways they do so. This study only concentrates on the implications of Islamophobic attitudes on Muslims’ integration. In another example, Nader, who was a practicing Muslim man, also mentioned that the media only represents the image of extremist and fanatic Muslims, which has distorted the image of Muslims and has caused many problems for them, especially after the 9/11 bombings:
The media keep showing only the extremist and fanatic Muslims who represent only very small percentage of Muslims. Majority Muslims’ life is very hard and they are trying to make a good life peacefully and try to be respected and also respect other people. Before September 11, there was very low level focus on Muslims and everyone was just getting on with that but then after 9/11 certainly Muslims were victimized and picked on which causes many problems even for their social life.

[38 year-old, Edinburgh]

These quotes support previous research that suggests the significant role of media in reinforcing Islamophobia by presenting a distorted and negative image of Islam and Muslims (Runnymede Trust 1997; Masud 2005; El-Nakla et. al. 2007; Instead Consultancy 2007; Meer et. al. 2010). By distinguishing between majority of Muslims as hardworking, peaceful and respected people from the extremists who caused 9/11, this quote particularly highlights that the Islamophobic presentation of all Muslims affects Muslim social life and social integration. Giving an example of such social problems, Fatima, who was a practicing Muslim woman, expressed that as result of the media’s Islamophobic representation, some Scottish majority group members are afraid to integrate and interact with Muslims:

The way that media portray Muslims in this country is a barrier to integration. I think such representation isolated Muslims more; because of the way media portrays Muslims the indigenous people are afraid to integrate with Muslims.

[32 year-old, Glasgow]

All the quotes in this section suggest that the media spreads fear and phobia against Muslims, making it harder for the community to integrate with others. This finding suggests the need for positive alternatives to the existing presentation of Muslims that celebrate diversity and particularly Muslims. This was the main goal of the ‘One Scotland, Many Cultures’ initiative that was launched in September 2002 (Scottish Government 2005a; Penrose and Howard 2008). However, government evaluations of the ‘One Scotland’ campaign (TNS System 3 2005; 2006) suggest that there was a limited success in changing attitudes. Indeed, ethnic minorities in Scotland continue to report high levels of racially motivated crime, whether this is in self-report surveys
or police recorded statistics, and the analysis of the Scottish Attitudes Survey (2010) also suggests ‘no significant change in discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims since 2006, which thus remain somewhat more prevalent than they were in 2003’ (Ormston et. al. 2011: 72).

Language: Old Barrier and New Identity Marker

Language had previously been identified as one of the main barriers to integration (Change Institute 2009), but this research suggests that language is no longer a barrier for all Muslims. My study shows that language used to be a barrier only for the first generation Muslim immigrants who could not speak English at the time of their arrival. It was acknowledged by some of my participants that language was an issue, for instance in economic integration, but this was in relation to the first generation Muslims. Four participants, out of 43, mentioned that language was a barrier for new arrivals who could not speak English when they came to Scotland. To illustrate, Rafiqah, who was a second generation Muslim woman, stated that language used to be a barrier for her parents and new arrivals:

Language was always a big problem for those who came here a generation ago, like our parents, and could not speak English. It can also be a barrier for those who come, even now, to this country but do not know how to speak English. Our generation has no language barrier though.

[36 year-old, Edinburgh]

Likewise, Zainab, who was a second generation Muslim woman, stated that language can be the biggest barrier for new arrivals, especially in the time of financial crisis and government budget cuts:

I think the biggest barrier for those who come here as an adult is language; not knowing how to speak English. There was a time that English class was free and easily accessible, but now because of the state of the economy those classes have been cut.

[44 year-old, Edinburgh]
These quotes imply that the issue of language was only a barrier for the first generation Muslims who could not speak English at the time of their arrival. However, some respondents still struggled with English language despite living in Scotland for a long time. As I discussed earlier, Ghader and Ehsan were two examples who - in spite of having lived in Scotland for 50 and 20 years - still had English language difficulties. These two examples were self-employed and had no Scottish education. They only had a primary education from Pakistan. As discussed above, the language barrier could affect these participants’ social integration, and it is discussed in the next chapter that the language barrier - alongside other factors such as having no Scottish education - plays a part in driving first generation Muslims towards self-employment. This implies the importance of language barriers for those who still cannot speak the language properly, and highlights the importance of free English classes for first generation migrants to improve their economic and social integration.

In relation to second generation Muslims’ integration, however, the English language or Scottish accent was not only considered not to be an issue, but was also utilised by some participants as a Scottish identity marker. Thus it functioned as a pathway rather than a barrier. For example Rafiqah, Adil, and Ahad, who were all second generation Muslims, used the English language and the Scottish accent in particular as an identity marker to support their Scottishness [this was illustrated in more detail in Chapter 5]. Even some of the first generation Muslims, who have lived in Scotland for a long time and were able to adopt the Scottish accent, used the language as an identity marker. For example, Tariq, who was a first generation Muslim and has lived in Scotland for 7 years, stated that his Scottish accent made him feel Scottish:

I feel of myself Scottish … if they hear my language and my accent, they will understand I am from here [Scotland].

[28 year-old, Falkirk]

These findings suggest that the language issue need not be a barrier for the second generation and for those first generation Muslims who have lived in Scotland for a long time and have entered Scottish educational system or learnt the English
However even well integrated and Scottish sounding individuals struggled to integrate socially and so I turn now to one of the principle barriers encountered in the previous research.

Dominant Social Norms and Assimilation

The data suggests that the prevalence of the dominant culture of alcohol consumption in Scotland’s social life (Bromley et al. 2005; Scottish Government 2008) served as the most important barrier to Muslims’ social integration. As alcohol consumption, sale, and purchase is prohibited in Islam (Esposito 2011), almost all participants identified the dominant practice of drinking culture as an important hindrance to Muslims’ greater integration into Scottish social life. Further to its communality, the significance of this issue was due to the fact that many participants perceived social norms around drinking as exhibiting an ‘assimilatory attitude and approach’ towards Muslims’ social integration. For example, Kasim, who was a practicing Muslim man, had a perception that integration for many Scottish majority people means assimilation into Scottish mainstream culture. He stated that if he did not integrate into that culture, he would not be considered ‘Scottish and as one of them.’ He expressed that such restricted views on integration that require Muslims to give up their religion and moral practices is a big barrier for further social integration:

They see integration as being very much like them; for example going out for drink, going out for smoking; womanising, that is what they class as integration… If you are not like them, you are not one of them… the mainstream society as a whole view integration as that; if you are not at the office party, you are not one of them. If you do not take part in their group sessions, you are not part of them. If you do not go down to the pub, you are not part of them. So, this is the very restricted culture where you can only integrate if you break your own moral or religious views or conditions… We should give up what is our religion and culture for mainstream, to give up whatever our identity is and become what they are.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote highlights the contradiction between the dominant practice of some social norms and Muslims’ religious identity and beliefs. Social integration, in that
sense, requires Muslims to give up their religious and moral beliefs. This quote also suggests that the dominant practice of alcohol consumption was perceived as an assimilatory approach to integration rather than what Muslims expected integration to be. As the most common views of integration amongst participants entailed the respect and recognition of Muslims’ identity, culture, and religion, such perception of assimilatory attitudes and practices could hinder Muslims’ integration. In another example, Ali, who was also a practicing Muslim man, said that being asked to take part in the dominant culture of alcohol consumption for Muslims means a total change in their identity and is a clear assimilatory demand. He also felt that some of the Scottish majority group members consider alcohol consumption to be a yardstick of integration:

> Asking to participate in drinking or not wearing Hijab in women case is forcing your views to somebody and asking them to completely change what they are. This is assimilation to whatever they want. Then you have to follow their culture, their way of life. The biggest obstacle, the biggest difference between us and Britishness is alcohol. We do not drink alcohol they drink alcohol and this is something that I think is sometimes used as a meter to measure somebody, to see how integrated they are. Do they drink alcohol with us? If yes, they are okay, if no, so something is wrong with them.

[38 year-old, Edinburgh]

These two quotes, as was also evident in other examples, can imply the importance of alcohol in Scottish culture and social events. This supports previous research by Hopkins (2004), which suggested the importance of alcohol and pub and club culture in Scottish culture in which Muslims could not take part. This finding is supported by the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2004), which shows that ‘alcohol is seen as a central part of Scottish culture, with 64% agreeing with drinking is a major part of Scottish way of life’ (Bromley et. al. 2005: 1). This survey also showed that around half of men (47%) view alcohol as a social lubricant, agreeing that ‘it is easier to enjoy a social event if you’ve had a drink’ (Bromley et. al. 2005: 1). It has also been argued that offering alcohol for some Scots can represent generosity (The Social Issues Research Centre 1998: 23) and it might be for this reason that alcohol is served at many social events, and so all guests are invited to participate in drinking
'the cup of kindness.’ However, it is important to note that such dominant cultural and social practices are perceived as an assimilatory demand for some Muslims. Thus, objections to alcohol at social events can have a negative effect on Muslims’ integration, such as avoiding being present at any event where alcohol is involved. This is more evident in the next example. Zahra, who was a practicing Muslim woman, explained how assimilatory expectations, particularly of Muslim women in the workplace, make integration too difficult for them:

One very simple thing that people do not understand is that Muslims do not drink alcohol, so if you do not drink alcohol, you do not go to places where they serve alcohol. In work environment there is a big pressure to socialise and especially socialise with your boss so if you are not going to go for drink after work then you are not going to go ahead in your job. And it is in every level, for example if you are working in a supermarket check out, you see that all the girls go together for drink, if you do not go you might get comment such as ‘you are not integrating’ or ‘you do not hang out with us’ or ‘why you do not do this or that’. So, there are some limitations because of our morals and ethics but it does not annoy us to socialise and also because of our commitment to the family.

[45 year-old, Edinburgh]

Zahra stated in this quote that because she does not consume alcohol, she would not go to places where alcohol is served. This refers to another Islamic code that prohibits being present or working in places where alcohol is served; even though this prohibition is a matter of religious and cultural debate amongst Muslims living in western countries (Esposito 2011), many Muslims such as Zahra, Kasim, Ali, and other participants practice it. The above quote could also highlight the fact that the majority’s lack of knowledge about these norms could function as a big barrier to integration. Inviting Muslims to parties and social events that mainly involve alcohol consumption, might be intended to show respect and kindness, but was considered to be an assimilatory attitude by some respondents. The perception of the majority’s assimilatory approach to integration may make Muslims think that they want to change Muslims’ religion and culture. This may result in taking a more defensive position on the issue of attending any event where alcohol is served. It can also make them think that Scots want Muslim to change their religious identity, which was the
most important identity for some respondents (as I discussed in Chapter 5). This can make them think that social integration may end up changing Muslims’ identity. Raising awareness about the limits of social integration for Muslims can reduce misunderstandings and help increase integration. This was particularly mentioned by some participants. For example, Sanaz, who was a practicing Muslim woman, stated that lack of knowledge about Muslim culture makes social integration harder:

When I was studying at university in my final year there was a Christmas party and all students were in laboratory. My classmates were going for a drink afterwards. I said to my teacher that I would be busy and I would not be able to make it, but I knew that he did not like it. My friends also did not like it and they did perceive me as being outside of the group and influenced their further relations with me... They did not really understand that I could not do it. For that reason social interaction is so difficult. Even now in the primary school they have events such as wine tasting day. I think they should not have wine or at least should say for example wine and non-alcoholic drinks. Then that would include us as well. When they say wine and cheese only, so obviously it is not going to be for Muslims, is it? So, there are lots of things in the society which is still western cultural perception of who they want to bring along and maybe it is us as British Muslims, maybe we should be at the top of the parents evening as well saying all these and organise this and organise that, we do not tend to kind of help make that influence here.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Sanaz suggested that by becoming more engaged and involved in such shared events, Muslims can raise awareness about Muslims’ limits and thus promote their social integration. To sum up, this section suggests that some Muslim participants saw the ‘drink[ing] and going out’ culture as effectively demanding assimilation. These findings support previous research in Scotland and England that suggested that there was a feeling amongst longer established Muslim communities that they still are not accepted or valued in society, and that the rhetoric of integration is often underpinned by an expectation for minority communities to assimilate (Fekete 2008; Change Institute 2009; British Council Scotland Survey 2010). It was also evident from discussions carried out by Masud (2005) with Scottish Muslim women that they felt that they were being forced to change their
behaviour as a consequence of the London bombings to avoid being labelled as ‘terrorists’ (Masud 2005). Previous research by the British Council Scotland Survey (2010:30) showed that such perceptions amongst Muslims were not unfounded because there was a view among non-Muslim Scots - particularly those who were older and from a lower socio-economic status - that Muslims should completely adopt Scottish customs. My study, however, suggests that this perception of the majority’s assimilatory attitude was not common amongst all participants. Some participants saw offering alcohol as an assimilatory attitude whereas some others saw it as a lack of knowledge. For instance, Kasim and Ali, who also reported daily experiences of Islamophobia, felt that asking Muslims to participate in drinking culture was an assimilatory demand. It can also be argued that these participants’ experiences and perceptions of the prevalence of Islamophobia could affect their perception of the majority’s assimilatory attitudes. In contrast, Sanaz and Zahra, with rare or no experience of Islamophobia, associated ‘being asked for participating in drinking culture’ with a lack of knowledge about Muslims’ moral and religious codes of practice rather than assimilatory attitudes. These participants, therefore, felt that if the majority’s knowledge increases, they would respect and accommodate Muslims’ religious needs. In other words, my research suggests that the expectation of assimilation could sometimes be unwitting and arise from well-intended efforts to show respect and kindness; so the lack of knowledge from both sides can cause misunderstanding. Raising awareness about Muslims’ limits and the majority’s actual intentions could promote interaction [this is discussed latter in this chapter in ‘pathways to integration’]. Muslims’ objections to Scottish dominant social norms, such as taking part in ‘drink[ing] and going out culture’, lead us to the second type of barriers, which relate to Muslims’ moral and cultural practices.

Cultural Barriers

Cultural and Religious Codes of Practice

Cultural barriers, by and large, were related to some moral and religious practices which Muslims tended to preserve when socially integrating into society. Based upon Muslims’ religious identity and commitment to their religion, any social interaction had to be within the framework of Islamic rules and laws in order to be considered as
permissible - *Halal* - integration. Practicing some of these rules - such as wearing Hijab, avoiding mixed-sex meetings, and alcohol consumption - are the most common factors that limit Muslims’ social integration in the Scottish context, where the contrary was the social norm. As mentioned in the last section, the lack of alcohol consumption by far was the most important issue that was raised by the participants. Illustrating the importance of this issue, the data showed that almost all of the participants stated that they avoided alcohol consumption. The lack of alcohol consumption can limit Muslims’ social integration because many social events in Scotland revolve around drink. However, the more important issue here was being present in places where alcohol was served, which can have a greater impact on Muslims social integration. Believing the former may result in attending and participating in social events but not drinking alcohol, but however, believing the latter would mean not attending any social events or parties where alcohol is served.

Despite the common opinion on the avoidance of alcohol consumption among practicing and less practicing participants, there was some division on the issue of being present in places were alcohol was served. My data suggested that practicing Muslims tended to avoid such places, but some less-practicing Muslims did not mind attending events where alcohol was served. Considering the debate on the prohibition of being present in places where alcohol is served (Esposito 2011), such a difference could be related to the interpretation of those Muslims who also include its serving areas (bars) inside the prohibition of alcohol consumption. In the context of the Scottish culture in which alcohol consumption is a dominant social norm, commitment to this belief can greatly limit Muslims’ socialisation and social integration. Illustrating the position of practicing Muslims on attending social events where alcohol was served, Jafar, who was a practicing Muslim man, said that he avoided places where alcohol was served. He said that despite the dominance of alcohol consumption in Scottish mainstream social culture, being a Muslim meant he could not participate in such culture:

> Majority of Scottish and British people go out and have drink in certain days. … But that really discourages me to integrate in such culture and events because alcohol is my restriction. I am a Muslim and I cannot drink or go to the pub.

[20 year-old, Glasgow]
In this quote, Jafar relates the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving areas to his religious identity as a Muslim. Jafar also highlights that despite the dominance of this practice in the Scottish context, he would not attend such places as a Muslim. In another example, Hakim voiced similar sentiments:

I guess integration in Islam always has some certain stops. You cannot just have a Muslim who drinks and goes to club. For example, as a Muslim I cannot say ‘yes I am Scottish, so I go to club or I am Irish all I do is go to club’.

[20 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote also highlights the importance of Muslims’ religious identity in avoiding places where alcohol is served. In this quote, Hakim also highlights that his Scottish identity does not override his religious beliefs. These last two quotes particularly imply that Muslims’ religious identity has a more important role than their civic or territorial identities in shaping and forming their social integration. Avoiding places where alcohol is served was not only limited to drinking establishments such as pubs and bars, but it can also include work and school parties or events. This implies that this is the greater limit to Muslims’ social integration, thus making it more difficult for those who really want to integrate and want to maintain their religious and moral beliefs at the same time. An example illustrating this was Batool. She was a practicing Muslim woman, who highlighted the importance of alcohol in work parties and its impact on her integration:

I do find integration sometimes difficult for example in my work; when there is a drink party or a night out because I am a Muslim obviously I cannot attend such events where alcohol is involved …

[28 year-old, Glasgow]

In parallel with the examples of Jafar and Hakim, Batool also stated that her religious identity as a Muslim makes her avoid such events that can make social integration in her workplace difficult. The example of Sanaz, who was a practicing Muslim woman and referred to her student days in a lab environment and to her experience as a parent, was quoted above and she similarly highlights the avoidance
of social events and places where alcohol is served. In another example, Fatima, who was a practicing Muslim woman, expressed her willingness for full integration but asserted that alcohol consumption was the main challenge:

As a Muslim I do integrate and I really try to integrate but there are some challenges. Sometimes even cultural challenges, for example one of the challenges is drink. As a Muslim I do not drink and go to places alcohol is served but drinking is like a social thing in this country.

[32 year-old, Glasgow]

All these quotes suggest that Muslims’ religious identity, their commitment to their religion, and the dominance of drinking culture in different aspects of Scottish society can all limit practicing Muslims’ social integration to a great extent and make it too difficult for those who really want to integrate into Scottish society. Turning to the views of less-practicing Muslims on the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving places, the data suggests that despite their lack of alcohol consumption, they were less likely to avoid places where alcohol was served. As discussed above, the main intention behind the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving places amongst practicing Muslims is religious identity and commitment to their religion. Even though some less-practicing participants such as Shakila and Zainab also avoided alcohol consumption, there were two less-practicing participants, Hamid and Kathryn, who mentioned different reasons for their lack of alcohol consumption. For example, Hamid, who was a first generation less-practicing Muslim man, expressed that abstinence was mainly a matter of choice rather than a religious obligation:

I do not choose to drink alcohol; even if I was not a Muslim probably I still would not do these things... I do not choose to do things like; drinking, gambling, going out and doing all those stuffs.

[28 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Hamid highlights that his lack of alcohol consumption and other prohibited actions such as gambling were for him a matter of choice and related to other reasons, e.g. perhaps seeing them as anti-social behaviour, rather than
religiosity. It is however important to note that it is likely that Hamid’s view was shaped or affected by socialisation with his family and community, who were all Muslims. In another example, Kathryn, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, also asserted that lack of alcohol consumption was for her just a matter of choice:

I do not do things which I believe are wrong … I could do it, but it is just like something that we feel we do not need to do; like drinking alcohol.

[27 year-old, Edinburgh]

These two quotes might be associated with both the stronger religious identity amongst practicing Muslims and the weaker religious identity amongst these two less-practicing Muslims, Hamid and Kathryn. As I discussed in Chapter 5, these two respondents reported more affiliation with their ethnic (Pakistani) and national identities (British) than their religious identity as Muslims. Such commitment to abstinence amongst these less-practicing participants might be due to family and/or community pressure. Apart from seeing alcohol consumption to be wrong, a fear of being isolated from the family or the community can be another possible explanation for such commitment. These examples support previous research (Runnymede Trust 1997; Murji 2011), which suggested the importance of the family and community in affecting Muslims’ - especially young and second generation Muslims’ - integration and identity in the UK. The association between being a less-practicing Muslim and having a weaker religious identity, however, is problematised by the example of Shakila and Zainab. These two participants were both less-practicing Muslim women, but they also had a strong religious identity. The lack of alcohol consumption by these participants was associated more with following the religion of Islam rather than with any other intentions. These examples may thus imply that even though religiosity and religious identity is significant on the whole in the lack of alcohol consumption amongst practicing Muslims, other factors such as family and community pressure can also play a part, especially amongst less-practicing Muslims.

Turning to the issue of avoiding places where alcohol was served, the data suggests that even though some less-practicing Muslims reported abstinence, they did not avoid being present in its serving areas and consequently did not mention alcohol
consumption as being a barrier to their social integration. These participants did not mind attending places where alcohol was served and they used to attend drinking establishments such as pubs and bars. Ehsan and Hamid, for example, reported that they used to attend pubs, bars, and night clubs. For example in one quote in which he highlighted the importance of Islamophobia and racism, Hamid also stated that he used to go to pubs and bars. This was despite the fact that he already mentioned that he did not consume alcohol:

I used to go to the pub but it does not matter what we do, we could be drinking with them in the pub, we could go out with them and having fun and everything, but we are still [a foreigner/Paki], for example if we have a fight, the first thing they would say is "you are a Paki".

[28 year-old, Edinburgh]

Although some less-practicing Muslims attend drinking establishments, the above quotes show their ambiguity about this subject. The example of Ehsan, a less-practicing Muslim man, was quoted above when he referred to the times that he used to go to pubs and bars and thus similarly highlighted drinking establishments. The examples of Ehsan and Hamid highlight the fact that despite the lack of alcohol consumption, these participants went to drinking establishment areas to gain a greater social integration. This supports previous research by Hopkins (2004) that showed that some of his respondents tended to go clubbing together in their spare time or at the weekend but did not drink alcohol. These participants have a specific interpretation of prohibition of alcohol consumption; believing that even though consumption is prohibited, being present in places where alcohol is served is not prohibited (Esposito 2011) or is at least not considered to be as important. Thus, the lack of alcohol consumption did not stop these participants from socialising and taking part in events where alcohol was served. As I illustrated in previous chapters, however, several respondents stopped going to such places due to the fear of Islamophobic or racist attacks. In contrast to other practicing and less-practicing Muslims (such as Shakila and Zainab) whose religious identity was the main reason for the lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding its serving places, for Ehsan and Hamid (who had no strong Muslim identity), it was Islamophobia and racism that
stopped them from socialising in this way. This can imply that while Muslim identity - commitment to the religion - was a barrier to social integration, for those who had no such strong religious identity, other issues such as Islamophobia and racism had a larger role to play than religiosity in hindering their social integration.

Mixed Sex Interactions: Another Cultural Barrier

The next cultural limit for Muslims’ social integration was mixed-sex interactions and meetings. Some interviewees mentioned that based on their Islamic rules, free mixing with opposite sexes is not permitted for Muslims. This can be traced to an interpretation of Islam that posits that after puberty, boys and girls should be separated (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 2011). However, there are different practices and interpretations of this separation. In some cases, interaction between men and women was practiced but only to a limited extent. For example, Shadi, who was a practicing Muslim woman and a full-time undergraduate student, stated that despite feeling Scottish or British, she would not have ‘too much one-to-one conversation with a man’ due to her religious identity:

I put my religion first … for example if there is too much one to one interaction and conversation with a man, I would refuse that because whoever you are Scottish or British normally Islam comes first, even before your nationality but other than that any kind of integration like going to university, going out with your friends as long as they are good friends, working with charities and volunteering I think all these are okay.

[25 year-old, Aberdeen]

For Shadi, ‘too much one-to-one interaction and conversation’ with opposite sex was considered to be unacceptable behaviour. Whilst this allows for everyday interaction in the university and workplace, however, what could limit her social interaction is the judgement of what is perceived as ‘too much.’ ‘Too much’ engagement here could mean a long one-to-one conversation with the opposite sex, which could make interactions with course lecturers difficult. What the quote underscores is that some practicing Muslims do initiate or engage in a conversation with the opposite sex, but however, such conversation and interaction would be limited to a certain extent in order for it not to be considered as ‘too much’ or in
other words, inappropriate behaviour. Even though the boundaries of the separation or avoiding of free mixing with the opposite sex were not clear, some respondents clarified a little more on the boundaries of such interaction. In some examples, the term ‘inappropriate manner’ was used by participants to explain the extent to which a mixed sex meeting or interaction could be identified as being prohibited. For example, Fazel, who was a practicing Muslim man, stated that he avoided conversation with the opposite sex in his workplace when there is an inappropriate subject such as sexual joking:

Especially at work when some girls try to joke or speak about something which is not appropriate, such as sexual jokes and issues, for a Muslim to engage I avoid conversation with them or I just change the subject. So this is just an example of limits which a Muslim might have regarding his social integration.

[23 year-old, Glasgow]

This quote implies that conversations with the opposite sex involving sexual content can be considered as an ‘inappropriate’ manner by some Muslims. These two quotes could also imply that some practicing Muslims initially take part in events or places where the opposite sex are present and they may engage in a conversation with them, but the ‘inappropriate’ extent or content of a conversation or interaction is what can result in the ending of such an interaction. In another example, it was highlighted that if the extent and content of a social event is thought to be inappropriate, some practicing Muslims may not attend such events from the outset. Illustrating this, Samad, who was also a practicing Muslim man, expressed that he would not feel comfortable as a Muslim in attending certain social events:

As being Muslim, there are some limits for social integration and interaction. For example, if there is a social evening or a dance evening and people get drunk and women dance with inappropriate dress, such as half naked dressing, then I would not feel comfortable attending such events.

[30 year-old, Dunfermline]

Samad’s quote highlights how avoiding inappropriate interactions and inappropriate meetings with the opposite sex can limit practicing Muslims’ social
integration in the Scottish context, wherein many social events and activities are held in a mixed way and with alcohol consumption. This echoes Hopkins’ (2004) research, which suggested the importance of behaving and dressing modestly for both Muslim men and women, and highlighted that ‘the lack of modesty present in Scottish society works to exclude young Muslim men and women.’ Further to social integration, this can have some bearing on other aspects of Muslims’ integration in Scotland. For example, it can be discussed that the low employment rate or higher educational attainment for Muslim women might be associated with the practice of this rule [this was discussed in more detail in the previous chapter]. These quotes can also suggest that the definition of ‘inappropriate manner’ even amongst practicing Muslim participants was not concrete enough to provide the same boundaries for everyone, and thus could change from person to person. As was illustrated above, the term ‘inappropriate manner’ could include too much conversation, sexual joking, dancing, and drinking with the opposite sex. Even though these last three quotes suggest the importance of religious identity as a driving force in directing Muslims’ social integration, they also highlight that Muslims’ approaches to mixed-sex meetings is a matter of difference that is based on their religiosity and their interpretation of separation between men and women. This implies that less-practicing Muslims or non-practicing Muslims would have different attitudes in meetings and interactions with the opposite sex. For example, none of the less-practicing Muslims pointed to mixed-sex meetings as a barrier to integration. This finding is consistent with the finding of the previous discussion of being present in alcohol serving areas that suggested that some less-practicing Muslims did not mind going to such places. Despite structural/social and cultural barriers, Muslims made efforts to integrate into Scottish society through alternative means. These alternative methods of social integration are discussed in the next chapter. In contrast to the cultural and social barriers, participants identified some other issues such as cultural understanding and respect as pathways towards integration that could help them to develop their social integration. It is to this that we will now turn.
Pathways to Integration

Cultural Understanding and Respect

For most participants, cultural understanding and respect were the main pathways to Muslims’ integration. It was highlighted that an increased understanding of Muslim culture and religion by the majority group members could facilitate Muslims’ religious considerations and their special needs for social interaction. Participants felt that familiarity with Muslims’ cultural and religious limits could help the majority group members to facilitate their intended social interaction by accommodating Muslims’ religious needs; e.g. providing Halal foods and drinks or holding events in non-alcoholic places such as cafés. Interviewees particularly articulated the fact that if their moral and religious limits were acknowledged and respected, they would feel more comfortable in developing a committed and close friendship with majority group members. Sanaz, for instance, who was a practicing Muslim woman, felt that if the majority group members received enough knowledge about Muslims’ social integration limits, they would make an effort to facilitate such considerations:

Pathway, maybe making people more aware of point; like I do not drink, you can go somewhere like coffee place, you integrate differently or eating vegetarian or something, just making people more aware of that; this is something that you do not do and this is the way around it. If they are accommodating enough, understanding enough then they would do that for you and there would not be any problem for further social integration.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

This implies that some Muslims had a hope that if the majority Scots had more knowledge about Muslims, they would try to accommodate such needs in everyday interactions with Muslim fellow citizens or friends. This perception that familiarity with Muslims’ religious needs could lead to increased accommodation of such needs differs from the perception of some participants such as Kasim and Ali, who felt that the majority Scots have an assimilatory approach to Muslims’ integration (this was discussed in the barrier section). They had a perception that the majority Scots expect Muslims to abandon their moral codes of practice and adopt to the Scottish dominant
culture of ‘drink[ing] and going out.’ This and other quotes in this section, however, suggest that some other Muslims felt that more knowledge about Muslims could lead to increased accommodation of Muslims’ religious needs. The hope and perception that the majority would accommodate Muslims’ religious needs by in everyday social interaction may have been created and affected by these participants’ experience of such respect and accommodative practices. Further to the example of Sanaz who suggested that Muslims should make more of an effort to take part in various public events and raise the awareness of the majority about Muslims’ limits, Sadiq pointed to his own experience of organising a university conference in a non-alcoholic restaurant. Sadiq, who was a practicing Muslim who was studying at Glasgow University, highlighted the importance of raising the awareness of people and asserted that if Muslims speak about their condition, then the majority would accommodate Muslims’ conditions:

If we speak about our needs they will accommodate that. I will give you an example, I organised a conference four years ago in my university in Glasgow. 150 people from all over the world; India, South Africa, Russia, Canada all these people were invited to come and speak. One of the things which I raised in the committee was the issue of meal and restaurant. They already assumed that they are going to go to a bar-restaurant or something like that but as I was in the committee I said and insisted that if we have our event in a bar-restaurant, this may exclude 5% of the guests who are Muslims. This will turn them off because they do not drink alcohol and probably would not sit in a table where alcohol is served. Instead, I suggested that it is better to book a place where it serves Halal food and a place where have not alcohol in certain tables and so on. Only because I was there and raised the issue they understand the issue and agreed to arrange a restaurant with Halal food. If I was not there or did not raise the issue, they would never think of that and arrange such place. So, again it is up to us to show and speak our conditions. In that case I think they will accommodate our conditions as much as they can.

[25 year-old, Glasgow]

These quotes reinforce the point made above about the unintentional nature of assimilatory behaviour. This was also highlighted in the next example, where Wahed stated that awareness about Muslims’ limits for social integration can result in respecting such limits and thus not pushing Muslims to do what is prohibited for
them. Wahed, who was a practicing Muslim man and was studying at Glasgow University like Sadiq, highlighted that his university friends who were familiar with Muslims’ religious limits for social integration never pushed him to do prohibited things:

I am studying in Glasgow University. I think my friends in Glasgow University know Muslims, so they understand what I can do and what I am not allowed to do. So I have never been pressured to drink or go to the pub. I think now in some ways educated indigenous Scottish people know how much Muslims can be integrated, they also know how much they [Muslims] cannot do these things and stuff.

[20 year-old, Edinburgh]

Further to highlighting the importance of familiarity with Muslims’ religious needs for the possibility social integration, the example of Sadiq and Wahed also highlighted the importance of the academic environment and education. These quotes suggest that educated people who have more knowledge about Muslims or become familiar with Muslims’ religious needs can be more accommodative towards Muslims. It also emphasises the importance of education in respecting and accommodating Muslims’ religious needs and thus in developing their social integration. Such accommodation and respect may result in the greater integration of Muslims in Scotland. The next chapter, thus, focuses on how Muslims, especially the new generation, try to fit into Scottish society by taking alternative ways of socialising such as meeting in cafés and doing voluntary work.

Further to the practical aspect of raising awareness about Muslims’ religious needs and conditions for social integration, the psychological aspect of raising awareness about Muslims’ religion was also highlighted by one of the participants. Raising awareness about Muslims’ religion, it was suggested, could result in more confidence and thus in more comfort to develop social integration for Muslims. For example, Nader, who was a practicing Muslim man, stated that familiarity with Muslims’ culture could make both sides - the majority and minority groups - feel more comfortable and thus more easily able to integrate. Nader himself was trying to promote people’s understanding about Muslims and Islam through some voluntary activities:
What we try to do is telling people why we do pray and how many times we do that. This would help them to understand us better and if they understand then they would be comfortable with it and then it would be easier for us to practice our religion and integrate with others... integration will only happen when people respect our belief and culture. If they are not going to accept that, we will not change our religion only because somebody wants us to integrate. I think I will probably get on a lot better with people who respect my culture and religion.

[38 year-old, Glasgow]

In this quote, Nader highlights the importance of respect and recognition of Muslims’ religion and culture by the *majority*. This is exactly the opposite of Islamophobia, which could eventually make Muslims the most unfavoured minority group. As I discussed in the above section, Islamophobia can lead to less socialising and interaction on both sides by making Muslims an unfavoured group. Another implication for such familiarity with Muslims’ culture could be decreasing Islamophobic views amongst the majority group members. This can also help Muslims’ integration by removing such barriers and may result in more welcoming approaches from majority group members towards Muslims. For example, Hassan and Hamid pointed to the possibility of decreasing Islamophobia through increasing awareness about Muslims’ culture and religion in speaking about pathways to greater social integration. Hassan, who was a practicing Muslim man, had a perception that people gaining more knowledge about Muslims’ culture and religion, especially through interfaith dialogue, could result in the elimination of distorted images of Muslims and thus make their integration easier:

The best way to promote integration is to have more understanding, to share and have a dialogue; interfaith and inter-cultural dialogue. Best thing from Muslims and people from other nationalities is inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogue because they can understand you, they can understand your culture and they can understand Islam. In the past there used to be bad and negative things about our culture so when they understand they realise that a lot of it was distorted about Islam or about other culture, a lot of these propaganda. If they understand Muslims then Muslims can have at least easier life from their fathers who came here long times ago.

[37 year-old, Dundee]
Hassan asserts that raising awareness about Muslims can decrease Islamophobia and lead to an easier life and to interaction with others. In another example, Hamid, who was also a less-practicing Muslim man, had a perception that having knowledge about Muslims or any other minority groups through education - especially from an early age - could lead people to have increased respect for their cultural and religious practices:

Racism and Islamophobia are very important. If there was not any racism, integration would be much easier. For example, if people become more educated about Muslims and their culture and religion it may make to have less racial and Islamophobic views about them. If kids in this country are taught about other religions and other cultures from the beginning I think there might be a difference because they will know what they are growing up with, if they get taught about other religions and other cultures they would respect it.

[28 year-old, Edinburgh]

In parallel to the examples of Nader and Hassan, Hamid highlights the importance of education in giving more knowledge about Muslims, which can lead to more respect for Muslims, and thus more toleration of Muslims. As illustrated so far, familiarity with Muslims’ culture and religion can be achieved through inter-faith dialogue and education. In the next example, the importance of mixing with the majority as another way of becoming more familiar with Muslims’ culture and religion was highlighted. Zainab, who was also a less-practicing Muslim, asserted that familiarity with Muslims could be gained through working and mixing with the majority group members:

Those Muslims who are working in state sector or private sector could help integration process because they are mixing with others and that is one way to bring down barriers by working together, talking together, sitting together … that would bring down the barriers... once we start working as equals, sitting down and building friendship, getting to know each other the barriers will come down.

[44 year-old, Edinburgh]
To sum up, all quotes in this section imply the importance of familiarity in recently decline of Islamophobia. These quotes also highlight the importance of the lack of Islamophobia in normalising Muslims’ interaction with others. As I discussed in the barriers section, barriers to Muslims’ integration were both cultural and social. This can suggest that key barriers that revolved around assimilatory practices could be removed by making people more familiar with Muslims’ culture and religion. These findings support previous research by Hussain and Miller (2006: 59), which showed that those Scottish people who said they know at least ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims were 25 per cent less Islamophobic compared to those who said they ‘know nothing at all.’ It also supports the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), which considered the importance of familiarity with Muslims in the context of personal relationships and showed that the percentage of people who would be unhappy with a Muslim forming a long-term relationship with a close relative (29%) dropped almost by half (16%) just because they knew a Muslim person (Ormston et. al. 2011: 27).

Conclusion

Discussing the importance of Muslims’ identity and experience of Islamophobia and also that of other factors such as media and language, the data suggests that one significant barrier to integration was the majority’s unwelcoming attitudes towards Muslims as the most unfavoured minority, which were attributed to Islamophobia. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, Islamophobia was not a big issue in Scotland and was, therefore, a less significant factor in hindering Muslims’ integration. Scottish social norms such as drinking alcohol and mixed-sex meetings were by far the most significant issues raised by respondents, in particular the fact that so much of Scottish social life revolved around alcohol. The significance of this issue was due to the dominant practice of alcohol consumption in Scottish social life and its prohibition in Islam. Thus, it can be argued that the most important issue that limited Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious identity and the dominance of alcohol. Even the Scottish identity could not build a bridge between these two issues due to the importance of religion amongst the
practicing Muslims. Less-practicing Muslims, however, due to their lesser commitment to their religion, had a more flexible approach on this issue. For example, some less-practicing Muslims used to drink alcohol and/or, crucially, did not mind attending drinking establishments, whereas practicing Muslims never drink alcohol and usually do not tend to go to any place where alcohol is served. In other words, religious identity was the most important consideration for practicing Muslims for managing their social integration, while for the less-practicing Muslims, the issue of Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes was more important. This may imply interestingly that non-practicing Muslims would have different strategies for their social integration, but this requires further research.

The recognition and respect of Muslims’ religious needs was identified as the main pathway to social integration. The demonstrated importance of the familiarity with Muslim culture in Muslims’ views could reflect that the majority’s inclusionary attitudes and practices towards Muslims are central to Muslims’ social integration and that on the contrary, exclusionary attitudes and practices can cause social isolation. This leads to the next chapter, where I discuss how Muslims integrate into Scottish economic, education, and society by managing these barriers.
Chapter 9: Muslims’ Integration in Scotland: Halal Integration

Introduction

In the last chapter, I discussed how Muslims’ religious identity, experience of Islamophobia, and social norms such as drinking alcohol can limit their social integration in Scotland. In this chapter, I discuss Muslims’ main strategy to overcome such barriers, namely Halal integration, in order to socialise and interact with the mainstream society while maintaining their religious identity. Other aspects of Muslims’ integration - economic and educational integration - are also discussed in this chapter.

As mentioned in the last chapter, religion plays a central role in Muslims’ identity (Modood 2005; Esposito 2011) and how their behaviour in all spheres of life should be (Jacobson 1997b). The significance of Islam in practicing Muslims’ life is related to the crucial emphasis of teachings of Islam upon right and correct action (Jacobson 1997b; Esposito 2011). Islamic law, which constitutes ‘the ideal social blueprint for the believer who asks, what should I do?’, has remained important to Muslims’ identity and practice (Esposito 2011: 158). These teachings include ‘regulations ranging from religious rituals to marriage, divorce and inheritance to setting standards for penal and international law’ (Esposito 2011: 158). These pervasive religious boundaries can affect Muslims’ social integration because it affects their wider social relation with non-Muslims - the majority - and their daily life (Jacobson 1997b; Joppke 2012). The practice of some Islamic rituals such as reading daily prayers and avoiding alcohol consumption, especially by devoted Muslims, can make Islam a significant element of Muslims’ daily life and thus directly impinge upon their relationships with non-Muslims (Jacobson 1997b). The necessity of eating a Halal diet and abstinence from alcohol are the religious prescriptions that inevitably have an effect upon a large number of Muslims in Britain (Jacobson 1997b). Illustrating this, Jacobson (1997b) highlights the differences in socialising patterns between Muslims and non-Muslims, and suggests that the dominance of drinking alcohol in the social lives of most young Britons can result in the isolation of Muslims (Jacobson 1997b). Therefore, Muslims’ religious identity and practices can
function as a cultural boundary (Joppke 2012), a trigger for increased civic integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010), or a tool of integration (Hussain and Miller 2006). As I discussed in Chapter 5, the strength of Muslims’ affiliation with religious identity can vary on the basis of their commitment to their religion. Thus, this chapter discusses the importance of religious identity for integration amongst practicing and less-practicing Muslims.

It has also been argued that integration, or acculturation, can differ ‘among generations, as indicated by the differences that can be observed between immigrants and their children and grandchildren’ (Phinney 2003). Jacobson (1997b) also points to the complex ways in which young Muslims negotiate their identities in different contexts. The differing values that are associated with the private and public spheres may require the second generation Muslims to develop different identity strategies and to switch cultural ‘codes’ (Ballard 1994: 33). Studying migrants’ integration by analysing political trust and satisfaction in 24 European countries, Maxwell (2010) also found that first generation immigrants have the most positive attitudes while second generations have a similar level of political trust and satisfaction to the native-origin individuals. These findings may suggest that as the second generations adopt linguistic, educational, and social aptitudes over time, the process of integration would only concern the first generations. However, others by highlighting the long-term and intergenerational nature of integration argue that in some areas integration of second generations still remains problematic (Modood 2007; Pfeffer 2014). The result of McVie and Wiltshire’s (2010) survey - on Muslim and non-Muslim youths’ experiences of racism, discrimination, and social marginalisation in England and Scotland - showed that generational dynamics can lead to intergenerational conflicts. For example, the significance of the birthplace marker to everyday understandings of Scottishness may make second generation respondents more likely to claim a Scottish identity. However, other factors that are relevant to both the first and second generations, such as one’s length of residence and commitment to place, have also been identified as leading people towards feeling Scottish (Bond 2006, McCrone and Bechhofer 2008). By taking generational dynamics into consideration, I will discuss the importance of generational difference in Muslims’ integration.
Previous research pointed to a gendered process of exclusion in observing that Muslim women are less likely to be employed or to have higher educational qualifications (Scottish Government report 2005). A more recent report (Poverty by Ethnicity and Country 1999-2008) by Netto et al. (2011) also found that employment rates are particularly low among Pakistani and Bangladeshi women who are predominantly Muslim. Both structural factors (such as discrimination and racism) and cultural pressures (Qureshi and Moores 1999; Masud 2005; Cassidy et al. 2006; El-Nakla et al. 2007; Lewis 2007) affect Muslim women’s economic and social integration. In terms of external pressure, previous research that reported the voices of Scottish Muslim women (Masud 2005; El-Nakla et al. 2007) showed that Muslim women have experienced an increase in Islamophobia since 9/11, the Iraq war, and the London bombings. El-Nakla et al. (2007) found that many Muslim women experienced discrimination as a factor that affected their employability. These women felt that their Muslim identity and appearance played a part in being discriminated against in both employment and education (El-Nakla et al. 2007). Concerning cultural pressures, Lewis (2007), for example, suggests that young Muslims - particularly young women - are often overprotected by their anxious families. More specifically, Lewis reports that a recurring feeling expressed by young Muslims was the ‘suffocating impact of community pressure exercised by the extended family embedded in clans’ (Lewis 2007: 41). Qureshi and Moores (1999) also suggested that young British Asians live between two sets of cultural values: on the one hand, the social world of family, community, and religion; and on the other, the western world as experienced through education and media. They suggest that ‘the Islamic tradition make[s] any translation between those value systems especially difficult for second generation girls’ (Qureshi and Moores 1999: 318). Lewis (2007) argues that cultural and religious practices play a part in educational underachievement among Muslims women. This chapter reflects on these gendered processes and highlighted the importance of gender dynamics in Muslims’ socio-economic integration in Scotland by addressing the experiences of both men and women.

This chapter begins by exploring participants’ economic and employment integration in Scotland. Due to the high rate of first generation Muslims’ self-
employment and the lesser participation of Muslim women in paid work, the importance of generational and gendered processes are discussed here. Second, this chapter details participants’ educational achievements. In this section, the importance of second generation Muslim women’s religious identity in challenging cultural barriers to achieving greater educational integration is highlighted. Finally, participants’ social integration through friendship and shared and sporting activities is outlined. In this section, the importance of religious practice for participants’ strategy of Halal integration is discussed.

**Economic Integration**

The first point to note is that there was considerable economic and employment integration amongst participants: more than a third [16 out 43] were employed, more than a third [15 out 43] were self-employed, and less than a third [12] were either students or working as volunteers or looking for a job. Taking gender differences into consideration, however, the data suggested considerable female participation in employment. Amongst Muslim men - who were the majority of the interviewees - 25 out of 31 participants were working either as employed [12] or self-employed [13], 5 participants were full time students, and one remaining participant was looking for a job. This was slightly different amongst Muslim women because about half of them were working; 4 [out 12] were employed, 2 were self-employed, and one was a full time student. Given the small sample size, this numerical distribution together cannot fully represent the diversity of Muslim experiences. However it can firstly suggest a high tendency towards self-employment and secondly suggest the participation of Muslim women in paid employment. In the following sections, I discuss different explanations for these two findings with regards to participants’ experiences and views.

**Self-Employment; The First Generation Issue**

Starting with the former finding, the data suggests a significant tendency towards self-employment; consisting of more than a third of male participants [13 out 31] and 2 female participants [2 of 12]. This rate is consistent with the national trend of
Muslims’ involvement in self-employment in the country, which the highest rate of self-employment after Sikhs (29%) (Scottish Government 2005). The analysis of self-employed interviewees’ experiences and accounts suggests that some structural barriers contributed significantly to this trend. The following factors were cited by participants as the main reasons for self-employment: 1) discrimination; 2) financial rewards; 3) insufficient qualifications; 4) language barriers; and 5) lack of familiarity with the job application process. It is, however, important to note that reason 2 - financial rewards - was not a barrier and functioned rather as an encouraging factor to self-employment. The data also suggested that it was mainly the first generation Muslims who tended to build up self-employment jobs such as small businesses and shops in Scotland for these reasons. I will now discuss and illustrate the importance of these issues alongside generational differences.

The first example is Ehsan, who was a first-generation Muslim man, was self-employed, and has lived in Falkirk for 20 years. Ehsan had no Scottish academic qualifications and had only a primary education certificate from Pakistan. He had owned a grocery shop in Falkirk for 10 years. In an interesting comparison, he compared his previous job as an employed labourer for a Scottish company with his current self-employed job as a shop keeper. He stated that due to the push of discriminatory behaviour and the pull of financial rewards and a more convenient situation, he had decided to start up a self-employed job:

When I came here I used to work for a Scottish company and they expected me to do everything and I always did whatever they said because I was not confident enough and could not do anything against that. I feared that they would fire me if I made any complaint against that. So, I just tried to save money to buy this shop. Now I am more confident in my new self-employed job. Now I know that there are many things you can do and money wise it is better as well because people from Asia can work longer hours and they need more money to build house and fulfil their other basic needs…. we think that you will be more respectful if you earn your life yourself that is why we go for our own business. At the end of the day if you are working for somebody you should be responsible to him but if I am working for myself I am happier and I have no boss.

[42 year-old, Falkirk]
This quote highlights how the perception of discrimination and lack of information about employment and labour rights led Ehsan towards a self-employed job. It also highlights his fear of losing his job were he to complain against the unjust situation. In addition to those negative factors, two positive factors were also highlighted. Having no boss and making more profits - due to longer working hours - were also identified as reasons for self-employment in this case. He insists that Asian people work longer hours than the majority, a point that is supported by survey research (Scottish Government 2005). This could mean that the Asian minority group would be more effective in terms of greater economic integration, albeit at the expense of working longer hours. Another issue about this quote was the fact that Ehsan was living in a small town, where the experience of racial and religious discrimination has been said to be more likely than in the larger cities (de Lima 2001). De Lima (2001) suggested that there is a wide range of employment discrimination in Scottish rural areas that made self-employment the main form of employment. Self-employment amongst Muslims, however, was not limited to the smaller towns. This is consistent with my findings in the previous chapter that suggested a significant perception of employment discrimination in both Scottish large cities and small towns. To compare the example of Ehsan with one from the larger cities, I turn to Emran. Emran was a first generation Muslim man, who was self-employed in buying and selling cars in Glasgow. He has lived in Glasgow for 10 years. Emran also used to have an employed job which, like Ehsan, he later left due to perceived discrimination. By making a comparison between his last and current job, he stated that his experience of indirect discrimination was the main reason why he quit his employed position and became self-employed:

I used to work for a company. Its manager was discriminating against me. They never do that directly because it is against the law but they do it indirectly. So you cannot prove it. For example, if someone like your supervisor does not like you, for any reason, no matter how hard and nice you work, he would always criticize you and would try to find something wrong with your work. That would make other team members to do the same thing to you in order to support the supervisor’s view. That made me frustrated and depressed which was affecting my family too. So, I left the job and became self-employed. Now I have been in this job for a while and deal with my customers who are often white people and they talk to me nicely too. … Being self-
employed is an advantage because you are your own boss. You have got your own business and you do not answer to anyone, you work your own hours.

[39 year-old, Glasgow]

This quote highlights the indirect and hidden nature of discrimination that could affect Muslims’ employment choices. The importance of this kind of discrimination is in its hidden nature, which means that Muslims are unable to deal with it legally because it is impossible or hard to prove. This is certainly one factor that explains why some first generation Muslims, such as Ehsan and Emran, tended to decide to open up a small business and become self-employed. Another advantage of self-employed jobs as recognized by these two interviewees was having no boss who might discriminate against them. As seen in the case of Emran, having a discriminatory supervisor or boss can cause distress and trouble in someone’s economic and even family life. Although self-employment could reduce experiences of discrimination and racism from a boss or from any other managerial position, it was not necessarily effective in reducing experiences of racism or any other form of abuse from customers. As highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7, some self-employed participants reported experiences of racism and Islamophobia. The previous research by Ameli et. al.(2004: 31) revealed that the difference in reported discrimination between employed (85%) and self-employed (82.2%) Muslims was insignificant. It is important to note that discrimination by an employer can mean not getting a job or promotion, but discrimination or racism by customers can mean verbal or physical abuse or them not buying goods. The former may imply an effect on people’s economic and financial wellbeing, whereas the latter may affect people’s mental and social wellbeing. For those first generation Muslims who were struggling with financial difficulties, the financial loss was more important than the psychological effects. The example of Saleh, who was another first generation Muslim man who referred to his experiences of street and individual racism (as quoted in Chapter 7) highlighted the more severe implications of employment discrimination that can also affect their family. He stated that Muslims usually take employment discrimination seriously, for example by taking their cases to court, while they usually ignore verbal abuse. The examples of Ehsan, Emran and Saleh imply that for the first generation
Muslims, the discrimination received from employers was more important than the discrimination that might be received from customers. The example of Ehsan and Emran can also imply the significance of a cultural mentality that prefers a man to be ‘his own boss’ amongst some first generation Muslims.

Insufficient qualifications, language barriers, and lack of familiarity with job application processes were other factors that were acknowledged to affect first generation Muslims’ tendency towards self-employment. For example, Tariq mentioned that finding a job in which to be employed was difficult for him. Tariq was a first-generation Muslim man of Pakistani background who was born in the Netherlands. He has lived in Scotland for 7 years and has worked in a shop in Falkirk for 3 years. Tariq’s knowledge of the English language was at an intermediate level and was good enough to communicate with his customers. He stated that the easier process of setting up a self-employed job was the main reason that he chose to be self-employed:

We always try to work hard to get to the stage. Self-employment is easier than looking for a job; you do not have to give your CV to someone; you can build on your own skills. If I wanted to have job, to be honest first I would go to my Asian friends because that is an easier option for me. If I do not get accepted there, I will go to a job centre and through them take the procedure. But the first thing I do is ask a friend.

[28 year-old, Falkirk]

This quote reflects that the lack of information and unfamiliarity with the job application process made setting up a self-employed job easier for some Muslims. This was in addition to the fact that, on arrival to Scotland or Britain as a whole, many first generation Muslims lacked sufficient qualifications and English language capability. These findings support the previous research by the Change Institute (2009), which suggested that the language barrier was a key barrier to accessing the job market and that it could lead those without fluency towards jobs that have unsociable hours, such as taxi services. The importance of the language barrier and insufficient qualifications is also highlighted in the next example. Ghader was a first generation Muslim man who has lived in Glasgow for 49 years. He was self-employed and owned a grocery shop. He highlighted the importance of language
difficulties and insufficient qualifications in rendering him an unsuccessful employee. By contrast, in becoming self-employed, he could himself become an employer:

Basically we were not very skilled for example in my case; I came here when I was 15; I could not speak the language; I did not have any professional skill, so what could I do? I was a manual labourer, so that was what I had done then I realised if I am going to staying in this country I have to learn the language then I taught myself to read and write English by myself. … So, I have been in this business for long time now and I have become an employer myself, I have employed non-Muslims in my shop but I treated them and interact with them as the same as what I do with Muslims.

[63 year-old, Glasgow]

This quote shows how setting up a self-employed business could bring more success for first generation Muslims who lack other opportunities. It was seen in all of the above examples that these participants were happy with their self-employed business. This could be associated with their preference to be ‘their own boss,’ and also the increased level of financial success that they could gain from self-employment. This is also highlighted in the person in the next example, who owned two shops in Stirling. Hareb, like other examples in this section, was a first generation Muslim man, was of Pakistani background, and has lived in Stirling for 22 years. Hareb considered himself to be a successful self-employed person who owned two shops. He had no Scottish academic qualification and his English spoken language was of an intermediate level. He expressed that he is happy and successful with his job while having no Scottish qualifications:

One main reason was my education. See most of people from my class came here and immediately started opening up a business. Some who had good qualification and education went for good jobs but we had not good qualification so we went for business and I am happy with that. I have one grocery shop and one cash and carry shop, so they do not require any qualification and it was easy to run those businesses.

[45 year-old, Stirling]

This may imply that setting up a self-employed business was further seen as an easy start that could also bring more prosperity for first generation Muslims. To reflect on
the importance of sociological factors in the tendency to choose self-employment, the data suggests the importance of generational differences. Of the 15 self-employed participants, only 4 were second generation and the rest were first generation. As well as to the greater number of self-employed first generation Muslims, a recurring theme in all of the interviews was the existence of a generational dynamic as expressed by the high rate of Muslim self-employment. In particular, the significant role of structural barriers - such as experience of discrimination, lack of information about labour rights, insufficient qualifications, and language barriers - were highlighted as being factors that drive first generation participants to self-employment. The absence of such barriers amongst the second generation Muslims could mean that they have no interest in self-employment. Analysis of the first generation participants’ accounts of their children’s (the second generation’s) employment priorities and of the second generation Muslims’ actual employment preferences supports this argument.

Looking at the employment status of the second generation, only 4 out of 27 second generation participants were self-employed. Of the 17 employed participants, 12 were from the second generation and only 5 were from the first generation. This numerical distribution indicates that the first generation participants had more tendencies towards self-employment than the second generation participants, and also suggests that second generation Muslims are better integrated into Scotland than their parents. In order to seek a deeper explanation for such a generational shift in Muslims’ employment preferences, the first generation participants were asked to comment on their children’s employment preferences and explain their actual reasons for taking self-employed jobs. They indicated that the second generation Muslims had no significant interest in self-employment due to the absence of structural barriers. For example, the second generation Muslims had more successful educational integration than the first generation participants, and in many cases, their first generation parents had a strong intention to educate their children up to higher degrees in order to be able to get a professional job. For example, Ehsan, who was living with his Scottish born son and daughter in Falkirk, stated that his children are currently studying. He had decided to send his son to a private secondary school to receive a better education in order to increase his chances of entering a prestigious
university such as Oxford or Cambridge. Despite his own employment status as a self-employed businessman, Ehsan had helped his children to study to increase their chances to gain better job opportunities:

> My son and my daughter were born here and they are studying hard and I have sent my son to a private school to get a better education. I think the second generation can find better jobs and there are more options for them than what has been for us because they are more educated. Most people who are working like me as a self-employed businessman do not have any qualification.

[42 year-old, Falkirk]

This quote highlights the relationship between having good and sufficient qualifications and the increased chance of getting a better job. Education had a significant status among Muslims. For example, Muslims in Scotland were more likely than others to be university graduated (Scottish Government 2005); but this focus on higher education could be only connected to the second generation Muslims because Muslims were also more likely than others to have no educational qualification at all. One reason for the desire to receive better education can be explained by the fact that better education could help Muslims and especially their children to find better jobs (Change Institute 2009). In another example, Hareb, who was another self-employed first-generation businessman, stated that being given the choice to choose between studying or working for their father, his children chose studying:

> I want them to study too. So I send my son and daughters to study and my daughter now is studying at Edinburgh University for her undergraduate degree. So, they will go to the jobs and they are studying very well. Actually it was up to them, working with me or studying, but they went for education.

[45 year-old, Stirling]

These two last quotes imply that the second generation children did not have a significant interest in self-employed jobs even though such opportunities were ready for them. It can also suggest that their decision to continue studying in order to get more professional jobs was supported by their parents. It can be asserted that having
sufficient qualifications, knowing the language, and being familiar with the job application processes meant less interest amongst second generation Muslims to do self-employed jobs, even though such jobs are more available and accessible for them. This is further highlighted in the next example. Arezo, who was herself a self-employed second generation Muslim woman, was working in her parents’ shop. She identified the availability and accessibility of her current job as the main reason to be self-employed. However, she stated that her other siblings and her own children had no interest in such work:

What is happening now is that some of my siblings and my own children do not want to go to the businesses that their fathers started because they are more educated and they do not want to have a job that they are stuck to and take the bill home. They just want to go to a job, do the job, go home, and have nothing about job to think about; so that is changing now. I suppose society is a little bit more open now [less discrimination in employment] and more people can get the job they want, they struggle but eventually they manage to get a job.

[50 year-old, Edinburgh]

Arezo suggests that working for longer hours and thus making more profit, which was identified mainly as a positive factor and an advantage for first generation Muslims, could be seen as a disadvantage by the second generation Muslims. As already mentioned in earlier quotes, most first generation Muslims were newly arrived and unskilled workers who were also main providers of a usually extended family. Thus they were in a difficult situation because they had to work very hard and even took on two shifts in some cases to make a acceptable life for themselves and their families. The second generation Muslims who mainly had educational qualifications, English fluency, and parental support did not feel the necessity for such hard work that was more a part of self-employment. In another example, Wahed highlighted the lack of familiarity with the job application process that was identified by some first generation Muslims as an issue that led them to self-employment. Wahed, who was a full-time student and a young second generation Muslim man, mentioned that the familiarity of second generation Muslims with institutional processes makes it no problem for them to enter the process and apply for any job:
We as new generation have no problem go to the workplaces and finding job and handing over our applications… I think the older generation because of language barrier, because they came from country which this system of applying for job did not exist, they tend to open up a business.

[20 year-old, Edinburgh]

It can be argued that familiarity with job application processes among the second generation Muslims is due to their successful educational integration and English language fluency. This can imply that being familiar with the process and having sufficient qualifications can make the second generation Muslims feel confident enough to enter and complete such a process. Another possible factor in leading the second generation Muslims towards employed jobs is having less experience and perceptions of job discrimination. This was highlighted by the next example. Hakim, who was a full-time student and a second generation Muslim man, stated that the absence of fear of employment discrimination meant that new generation Muslims had no fear when applying for any job, particularly in big companies:

We as younger generations are pretty fine for applying for any job particularly in big companies, like Asda or any other big company. If they discriminate against us then the Scottish law will go higher than them, they won’t give way against discrimination. None of us have any fear of being discriminated against in those jobs.

[Male, second generation, Edinburgh, 20 year-old]

In this quote, Hakim explicitly states that the law would protect them against any employment discrimination, thus second generation Muslims have no fear of such discrimination. This could also imply the second generation’s awareness of employment and labour law as well as their confidence in its protection of Muslims against any discrimination. As discussed above in the examples of Ehsan and Emran, there were some first generation Muslims who had insufficient confidence and information about labour rights to legally deal with employment discrimination, thus they preferred to quit their employed jobs and to instead set up self-employed businesses. In contrast, the better integrated and networked second generation have no fear of such discrimination. Despite this, the emphasis on the ‘big firms’ suggests
that Hakim is less confident about the absence of racism in smaller firms. To sum up about the first key finding about interviewees’ economic integration, it can be concluded that the high rate of self-employment amongst the first generation Muslims was mainly due to structural barriers. The absence of such barriers among the second generation Muslims, therefore, helps to explain why there was no significant trend towards self-employment amongst them.

Female Employment: Challenging Cultural Barriers

Turning to the second finding and taking the gender difference into consideration, the data suggests that there was considerable female participation in paid employment. Previously, analysis of religion in the 2001 Census showed that economic activity was particularly low amongst Muslim women (Scottish Government 2005b), and previous research also suggested that female Muslims are nine times as likely as other females to have never worked (in paid employment) or to be unemployed (Hussain and Miller 2006). It has been said that Scotland’s Muslim women’s reduced participation in the labour market was due to various barriers that included limited appropriate childcare, a lack of understanding of Islamic requirements by employers, poor English language skills, and their lack of confidence (El-Nakla et. al. 2007; see also Netto et. al. 2011). However, by highlighting the diversity of economic participation amongst female Muslims, the results of my research also suggest that such structural (such as low qualification and language issues) and cultural issues (such as patriarchal practices) have been challenged by some second generation Muslim women. Looking again at the numerical distribution of the participants, it suggests that amongst Muslim men who were the majority of the interviewees, 25 out of 31 were working either as employed or self-employed, 5 participants were full-time students, and one man was looking for a job. In contrast amongst Muslim women; a third of them were employed [4 out 12], a sixth was self-employed [2], more than a third of them were volunteers [5], and one interviewee was a full-time student. The first point that needs to be made here is the importance of the second generation; almost all of the female interviewees [6] who were participating in the economic aspects of society as employed or self-employed, were part of the second generation who were educated and brought up in
Scotland. There was only one interviewee who was from the first generation and she was a full-time student. This may imply the considerable participation of second generation Muslim women in the economic aspects of society. As this research could only access one first generation female participant, any conclusions concerning change amongst first generation Muslim women requires further research. In the next section, I discuss how Muslim women challenge and deal with structural and cultural barriers to their economic integration.

The data suggests that the ability of some second generation female Muslims to achieve greater economic integration points to the absence or decline of structural barriers (such as low qualifications, the language barrier, and discrimination) and their increasing ability to challenge cultural barriers. For example, Azadeh was one of those 5 participants who were engaged in voluntary work almost every day. She was a second generation Muslim woman and she used to work in a health educational centre for 7 years. She expressed how she pushed her family to let her go to work:

As I grew up, it was very hard to have a job. For example, when I wanted to apply for a job, my dad [a first generation Muslim] was not very keen on it and I said to my mum ‘you speak to dad’, as mums always do, so she said to my dad if she (me) wants to work let her to do. Then I worked for 7 years in health education and then I decided to settle down and start a family. I have not worked since then but I have been busy with certain voluntary work which is like a full time work.

[42 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Azadeh highlights that she was able to challenge the cultural barrier that was put forward by her father and was thus able to secure paid work. This implies that the second generation Muslim women were becoming more able to challenge cultural barriers and enter paid or voluntary work. It can also be argued that structural barriers such as low qualification and language barriers faded as the second generation become more integrated into the Scottish educational system [this is discussed more in the next section]. This finding supports previous research that showed that different Muslim women, especially young women, were willing to work (El-Nakla et. al. 2007) and were becoming more integrated into the economic
life of society by challenging cultural and structural barriers (Ansari 2002; Change Institute 2009). The last part of Azadeh’s quote, when she highlights that she had quit her paid work and shifted to voluntary work after starting a family, could imply the importance of family issues such as childcare in the employment choices of Muslim women. Azadeh highlights that shifting from paid work to voluntary work was her own decision and was mainly due to entering marriage and starting a family. This may imply the persistence of patriarchal identities amongst some Muslim families. It is however important to note that the tendency to take up voluntary work, especially at those places that were run by Muslims, can also be influenced by some religious considerations, such as lack of alcohol consumption or the avoidance of mixed-sex meetings (which was discussed in the last chapter). The example of Azadeh supports previous research by Hopkins (2009) that suggested the persistence of patriarchal identities amongst some young Muslims in Scotland. This research also suggested that amongst some other young Muslims, there were Muslim families who were ‘being more open to equal, accepting and less dominant forms of gendered identities’ (Hopkins 2009: 309). This heterogeneity is highlighted in the next example. Sanaz, who was a second generation Muslim woman who was also active in voluntary work, explained how her mother’s attitude towards female integration was different from her first generation husband, who was from Pakistan:

My husband is from Pakistan; he was brought up there and he has got some values from there but we have got slightly different values. For example, my mother was working outside the house in a shop and had no objection to my work if I wanted to work. So, our perception of woman’s role is different from his perception of woman’s role.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Sanaz highlights two different attitudes regarding Muslim women’s employment: her own mother who was working outside the house and her husband who was against her working outside. Even though they were all from a Pakistani background, Sanaz differentiates between her mother’s attitude that has come from living in Scotland for more than 40 years, and that of her husband who has just came to Scotland from Pakistan recently. This firstly implies the diversity and
heterogeneity of Muslim women and families, and secondly, the impact of Scottish or British culture in challenging patriarchal ideology.

Another example of the economic participation of Muslim women in Scotland was participation in family businesses. This type of participation was mainly related to the economic activity of Muslim women in small businesses (such as shops, pharmacies and post offices) that the first generation Muslims set up. Different members of a family, including mothers and daughters, were participating in such activities either as a part time activity or in a shift rota. As family support was a key issue in such businesses, the barriers which limited the first generation Muslim women’s economic participation in other sectors was absent or less important in family businesses. As mentioned above, the language issue and inadequate qualifications were some of the most important barriers to first generation Muslims’ employment. The data suggests that the participation of Muslim women in family businesses helped to overcome these barriers. For example, Zahir was one of the six participants who pointed to such family businesses. He was a second generation Muslim man and used to work in a family shop alongside his parents. He stated that his mother was working everyday in their family shop, where they sold western clothing:

> When the first generation Muslims came here; they bought shops and they were quite happy working in like in grocery shops and nothing was wrong with that. For example, we had a family shop where we sold western clothes in Dundee. My mother was working in that shop beside my father and for working there she did not need any academic qualification or a CV. There was only language problem. As we were selling western clothes different customers, including white Scottish people, used to come to our shop. At the beginning my mother had some language difficulties but working there and my father’s help could help her to improve her English language soon.

[39 year-old, Glasgow]

This highlights how language barriers faded in such participation because the family helped each other. This can also imply that economic integration can lead to greater social integration. Even in another example, Hashim, who was a second generation Muslim man from Stirling, asserted that the white Scottish people from
the neighbourhood used to help his mother, who was working in their family shop to improve her English language:

My parents came over and my mum did not know how to speak English but she was working in our family shop. So, she was always talking to customers. Then, they just help her along because they understood that she was not able to speak the language and my Dad helped her as well. My Dad already knew people from here before he come form Pakistan.

[17 year-old, Stirling]

These two quotes can imply that in the context of family business, language and inadequate qualifications were not a big problem for Muslim women’s participation. Considering the cultural barrier and the persistence of patriarchal ideology that saw housework and childcare as the main role of women (Brah 1996), these quotes can also suggest that Muslim women’s participation in family business was another example of Muslim women’s economic integration. It is, however, important to note that these women did not get paid for such work and thus it can be argued that family businesses perhaps acted as an extension of housework and their contribution to the family. Muslim women’s participation in paid work and family businesses implies a challenge to the persistence of patriarchal identities amongst some Muslims families, which led to them keeping women at home. This can suggest the greater economic integration of Muslim women, - especially those of the second generation - in the future. These examples can also imply by highlighting the heterogeneity of Muslim women that the economic participation of female Muslims in Scotland was diverse, and that we can no longer speak about the small or no participation of Muslim women in the Scottish economy. As I discussed above, one important difference was generational. This research suggests that the second generation Muslims were more likely to participate either in paid or voluntary work because they lacked structural barriers and also challenged cultural barriers. The second generation Muslim men’s and women’s involvement in paid or voluntary work owed much to their higher levels of education. It is to education that we now turn.
Educational Integration; Growing Achievements

The second aspect of participants’ integration into Scotland was integrating into Scottish education. Interviewees’ educational status showed that a majority of the participants [36 out 43] had integrated into the Scottish educational system by completing either Standard Grade [14] or higher education degrees [22] in Scotland. In parallel to employment integration, educational achievement was more significant amongst the second generation; all 27 second generation participants had studied in Scotland or elsewhere in Britain; out of these, 16 participants had higher education degrees and 11 had a Standard Grade or a College diploma. Even though numerical distribution is not the focus of this study, these figures illustrate the educational achievements of second generation Muslims in Scotland. This is despite the fact that more than a decade ago, Muslims were the most likely to have no qualifications between the ages of 16 and 29 out of all of the religious groups (Scottish Government 2005). At the same time, Asian Pakistanis - predominantly Muslims - had the second highest number of full time students amongst the ethnic/faith minority groups in the Pupil Census in 2012 (Scottish Government 2013b). It can be suggested that this has resulted in second generation Muslims’ increased educational achievements. This study can make no definitive claims given the qualitative form of this research and its limited sample size, but it does suggest a greater interest by them in Scottish education. One possible explanation for the growing interest in attaining an educational is related to maximising the chance of getting more professional jobs. As was illustrated earlier with employment integration, the first generation Muslims had a significant intention to help their children achieve a better educational qualification in order for them to be able to gain a more professional job. For example, as quoted earlier by Ehsan, who was a first generation Muslim, he sent his son to a private secondary school despite his financial difficulties in order for him to receive a better education and thus to be able to enter Oxford or Cambridge University. In this example, Ehsan highlights the first generation Muslims’ intention to support their children’s higher education achievements in the hopes of improving their employment prospects. As this argument was discussed with employment integration, I do not discuss it here again. Ehsan’s example also raises the issue of the education attainment amongst Muslims in separated schools such as faith schools.
The high trend of Muslims attending state-funded faith schools or private Muslim schools was an issue in England (Meer 2010), but was absent in the Scottish context. Although there were more than 370 state-funded faith schools in Scotland, Muslims did not run any themselves (Scottish Government 2013a) because most Scottish Muslims supported the teaching of all major religions in state schools (Hussain and Miller 2006). It was reported, however, that there were some private Muslims schools in Glasgow and Dundee that provided primary education for Muslim children (Scottish Government 2010). These schools and the idea of separate schools were generally not so popular amongst Scotland’s Muslims because there was not enough support for establishing a stated-funded school. (MacLeod 2008) and an attempt to set up a secondary private Muslim school failed (Cowing 2013). By supporting such trends, the findings of this research showed that all participants, except two, studied or sent their children to public schools. These two exceptions were related to a shift from public schools to a private and to a Catholic school. The change from public schools to those schools was related more to the quality of education and class/behaviour rather than parents preferring a separate or segregated educational setting for their children. For example, Ehsan stated that reduced anti-social behaviour was the main reason to send his son to a private school:

When my son was 14 years old [now is 18 years old] I sent him to private school because in that age people here start smoking and his friends in school were saying to him that you should join us but he was not smoking or drinking and they were always frightening him because he does not join them. Whenever they go out for break time no body hanged out with my son and they just frightened him. He was scared and he could not concentrate on his studies. I told him if you want, I can send you to a private school and he said ‘yes and I would do my best’ and he went and he did well. We are happy with that even though we are spending much more money but now he applied for Oxford University and next month he is going for an interview. We just felt that parents in the private school look after their children better … they never teach them bad things and they accept us and our children … but [in public schools] even with under age children, more parents do not care what their children do. Parents in private school are more educated and they are very nice; they never say anything bad to us and to our children.

[42 year-old, Falkirk]
In this quote, Ehsan highlights that the shift from a public school to a private school was done to receive better education and treatment rather than to segregate from the mainstream society. Furthermore, studying in private schools cannot be regarded as segregation because what is taught in these schools complies with the national curriculum, and those who are studying in these schools are mainly from majority Scot families. The next example is about shifting from a public school to a Catholic school. Tariq’s example, however, suggests that this change was also not on the grounds of separation. Tariq, who was also living in Falkirk, highlighted the better quality of education and the more inclusive environment -especially amongst the parents and pupils - as the reason for changing his children’s school to a Catholic school:

My children used to go to normal nurseries … but honestly, people who go to these ordinary schools do not like us. In Catholic school they put extra pressure and effort to prevent any discrimination against people but in the ordinary schools, I am not saying that schools have problem but the parents are very bad with us. They do not want to integrate with you. … I do not want to put my children in a place that they end up hating other children … I do not even see that as a Catholic school; I just see it as a better school. Catholic or Muslim or any other it does not really matter; the education they are receiving is the main concern for me. For example, if you go to Islamic schools which are good but you only get Islamic education. My children insha-Allah [God willing] will always know that they are Muslims but they need to know who other people are and how they think because they will live with them. The Catholic schools are good, other children who are going there are good people; the parents are good; I have seen them. The programmes they have in school are good … You always want the best for your children and in my opinion these schools are better than the public school they used to go.

[28 year-old, Falkirk]

Both quotes indicated that the main intention for shifting away from public schools had no relationship to isolation from mainstream educational settings, but was rather to gain a better education and thus being able to achieve greater integration by being able to enter universities and high professional jobs. These two examples also suggested the importance of geographical differences in Muslims’ school choices. Both of the above cases were from Falkirk, which was a small town with a small
number of Muslim residents. As I discussed in a previous chapter, these two participants particularly had daily experiences of Islamophobia and Ehsan even had an experience of physical attack. Both respondents were dissatisfied with the police services and even had a perception that some local police officers were racist. Alongside acknowledged explanations, another possible explanation for the change from a public school to a private or Catholic school could be the lack of other choices. As Falkirk was a small town, the number of primary schools (in the case of Tariq) and secondary schools (in the case of Ehsan) was limited and thus they did not have any other choice except to apply for private or Catholic schools.

Detailing Muslim women’s educational integration, participants’ educational status showed that all of the female participants [12 participants] had some education in Scotland; out of whom 5 participants had higher education degrees and 7 had a Standard Grade or a College diploma. It is important to note that all of these participants, except one, were second generation Muslims. This may suggest changes in second generation Muslim women’s educational attainment that had previously been constrained by structural and cultural barriers (Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 2007). As was also evident from some second generation Muslim women’s economic integration, the second generation Muslims overcome the major structural barrier for further education, such as the language barrier, and were better able to challenge cultural barriers to their educational attainment. In what follows, I discuss these barriers and how they were changing.

As school attendance up until the standard grade is mandatory in Scotland and elsewhere in the UK, there was no problem in terms of attending school. Problems arise when it comes to Muslim girls attending universities. Based on patriarchal ideology, the modesty and sanctity of Muslim women can be best preserved if they stay at home. This is highlighted in the example of Azadeh, who mentioned these barriers and explained how such attitudes are changing. Azadeh asserted as a second generation Muslim woman that her children are free to study for higher education degrees;

> Education is so important … there was a time, when I was younger and I was at school, Muslim girls were supposed to educate to certain level and that is it. But now that attitude is changing, education whether university level or whatever is so
important. So, my children, no matter boys or girls, are free to study up to the level they want. Our parents used religion [Islam] to stop our further education but those who knew Islam never stopped people from education. … My parents came from completely different environment; but I have grown up completely in a different environment; when it comes to my children’s education, I want them to try the best of what they possibly can.

[42 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Azadeh highlights the importance of Scotland as a different environment that she was brought up in compared to the one in which her parents grew up. In this new environment, education was valued to a great extent and gender equality was practiced in many aspects of social life. This was the opposite of the context where many first generation Muslims had come from - i.e. countries such as Pakistan - where the dominant culture encouraged female Muslims to stay at home even though this culture has also been changing in those countries. It is important to note that mandatory education, which all second generation Muslims have benefited from, could have a significant part in forming this new attitude of appreciation for education amongst some second generation Muslim women. The example of Azadeh can imply the importance of up-bringing in a different environment because it is an important factor in challenging patriarchal ideology and changing second generation Muslim women’s attitudes towards higher education.

In this quote, Azadeh also implicitly highlights the role of Islam in challenging the ideology of ‘keeping women at home’ when she asserted that the real and true interpretation of Islam never stops people from education. The important role of religion is highlighted more in the next example. Rafiqah, who was also a second generation Muslim woman, expressed by referring to the cultural barriers she encountered in the past that her children are even encouraged to do higher education degrees:

There were some cultural barriers in the past … for example our mum did not push us to do university education; she did not put pressure on us to go to university and get degree. But now I feel that Islam really encourages us to go out and get education. Now I am putting a lot of pressure on my daughter to do university degrees. She is
doing a lot of Islamic courses here and I want also send her to a secular education too.

I tell her go out and get your degrees and I am pushing her into that.

[36 year-old, Edinburgh]

Rafiqah highlights that Islam encourages education and that it is not limited only to boys, thus she encouraged her children to gain more knowledge and education; both secular and Islamic. This can suggest an emerging shift in second generation Muslims’ attitudes towards educational attainment, which was precisely against the previous culture that used religion to keep women at home. These last two quotes implies that the second generation Muslims who were affected by Scottish culture used a new interpretation of Islamic teachings to challenge the idea of ‘keeping women at home’ and moved one step further towards greater educational integration in Scotland. This finding supports a previous study by Lewis (2007) that revealed a growing number of young Muslims who are challenging their parents’ cultural tradition by appealing to the teachings of Islam. The second generation female Muslims’ ability to challenge cultural barriers can be explained by Ballard’s (1994: 30-33) description of ‘cultural navigators.’ He argues using this description that as the second generation, for example South Asian migrants, are exposed to both their family traditions and the British educational system, they should be thought of as ‘cultural navigators’ who are able to contextually switch between several ‘cultural codes.’

The emergence of such change in second generation Muslims’ attitudes can imply further female educational attainments. These can support previous research that showed growing numbers of young Muslim women going into higher education and thus into professional jobs (Change Institute 2009). The data suggests that such change in attitudes was not only limited to the second generation Muslims, but that there were also some first generation Muslims who supported their female children’s higher education. As mentioned above, the main inspiration for sending children to universities amongst the first generation Muslims was increasing their chances of getting a more professional job. For example as quoted earlier, Hareb, who was a first generation Muslim man of Pakistani background, not only did not object to his daughter’s study at a higher educational level, but also sent her to another city to
complete her higher education degree at Edinburgh University. He had a perception that such achievement could help her to find a more professional job. This implies parental support for greater educational integration of females amongst some Muslim families. This can suggest that not only attitudes about Muslim women’s higher education were changing, but via change in patriarchal ideology, attitudes about their employment integration could also be changing. Some of these emerging changes were discussed above. Second generation Muslims’ educational integration - both male and female - can suggest that although many Scottish Muslims seek to maintain their religion, they preferred a mixed educational setting rather than separate schools as seen in England and Wales. This can imply the importance of mixing with the majority in Muslims’ integration strategy in the Scottish context, and it is to this that I now turn.

Social Integration: Fitting in; Alternative Ways of Socialising

The third aspect of participants’ integration was social integration. As discussed in the last chapter, there were different social and cultural barriers such as the dominant culture of alcohol consumption and mixed-sex meetings that impeded Muslims’ social integration. I also discuss how participants, especially the practicing Muslims, had a significant concern that their social integration should be within the boundaries of their religious codes of practice. For example, the data suggested that both practicing and less practicing Muslim participants did not drink alcohol. It also suggested that some less-practicing interviewees did not mind being present in places that serve alcohol, while the practicing and other less-practicing interviewees tended to avoid being present in such areas. I discussed that this religious observation can significantly limit Muslims’ social integration in the Scottish context where drinking alcohol is a dominant social norm (Bromley et al. 2005; Scottish Government 2008). In this section, I discuss how Muslims integrate into Scottish society by dealing with these barriers.

Analysis of interviewees’ experiences suggests that participants tried to fit into the society by adopting alternative ways of socialising that could also fit with their religious code of practice. These included friendships with majority group members
and taking part in shared activities such as charity, interfaith, and voluntary work and sport. Participants were most explicit that effective social integration depends on making social relationships with different people in society, particularly with the majority group members, thus mixing and socialising with the majority was crucial to their social integration. In all of the above activities, they tried to show that they made a great deal of effort to mix with the majority. At the same time, they showed a widespread concern that such social connections and engagement with the majority group members should occur within the boundaries of Muslims’ religious codes of practice.

Social Friendship: Daytime and Non-Alcoholic Environment

The first aspect of Muslims’ social integration was making friends and socialising with majority group members (white Scottish non-Muslim people). Some participants stated that they had white Scottish non-Muslim friends as well as Muslim friends. Educational settings such as school and university were the most common places in which participants set up or developed friendships and social relationships with majority group members. For example, Akram was one of 10 participants who mentioned the importance of school in the development of their first social relationships with the majority. Akram, who was a less-practicing second generation Muslim woman and was born and brought up in Dundee, stated that she had a good relationship with English and Scottish people and that this started in school:

I have English and Scottish friends as well as Muslim friends and most of my clients are white Scottish people. Actually, this was started from school. Throughout my education there was a lot of integration with the Scottish people and I did not have any problem with them and they did not have problem with me either.

[43 year-old, Dundee]

This can imply the importance of public schools in developing some Muslim children’s social friendships with the majority. In another example, Batool, who was a young second generation Muslim woman, expressed that in her school time she intentionally tried to make close relationships with Scottish girls even though there
were also some Asian girls in her class:

In primary school there were a few Asian girls in my school but I did try not to hang out only with them. So, I did try to make friendship with Scottish girls. I started up my social relationships with a Scottish girl but after a while my friends were from both Scottish and Asian girls.

[28 year-old, Glasgow]

These two quotes highlight that these participants’ first contact with white Scottish people - the majority - started from their time in public school. This shows the importance of schools and childhood in the development of Muslims’ social integration with the majority. The possibility of developing friendships with the majority in school results from the absence of barriers, e.g. Islamophobia and prohibited actions such as including drinking alcohol and mixed-sex meetings. It is important to note that these two participants had no experience of Islamophobia at all, thus such an experience could also affect their social integration. All of the other 8 participants who also reported school to be the first and most important place in starting close friendships with the majority had no or very rare experience of Islamophobia in their schools. However, such easy association between children and the lack of Islamophobia/any other prejudice was challenged by the findings of Chapter 6, in which some participants highlighted their experiences of Islamophobia in their schools or reported receiving verbal abuse from children. It was discussed that the assertion and display of such attitudes amongst children can be associated with the fact that children can be more vocal about the prejudiced and Islamophobic attitudes that they may have. Therefore, this can suggest that those Muslims with no experience of Islamophobia were more likely to start and develop their social relationship with the majority children from their schools during their childhood.

Another important issue about school is that the higher possibility of gaining familiarity with Muslims can affect white Scottish pupils’ welcoming attitudes and, thus, facilitate Muslims’ friendship with the majority. It can be argued that if children at school are in close contact with Muslim pupils, they can become more familiar with them and thus remove prejudice and develop social friendships. As was illustrated in the last chapter, familiarity with Muslims could decrease Islamophobia
and prejudiced attitudes. This supports previous research that found that more contact with Muslims and knowledge about Muslims plays an important part in decreasing Islamophobia (Hussain and Miller 2006; Ormston et. al. 2011). Decreasing Islamophobia and being in daily contact with Muslim pupils can therefore make the process of setting up a social friendship much easier for both Muslim pupils and the majority children.

The next issue regarding the importance of schools was the absence of cultural barriers in the development of friendship with the majority. It can be argued that because there is not much alcohol consumption (except at special events such as school wine tasting events) and Muslim pupils are not old enough for the practice of prohibiting mixed-sex meetings, social relationships and friendships can be easily started and developed. This was evident in the examples of both Akram and Batool, who asserted that there was no problem in starting social friendships with the white Scottish pupils. However, the data suggests that when these social relationships were developing in later ages, more cultural and social barriers came into play. For example, if these relationships were to also develop outside of school and in each others’ houses, they would face certain limits. For instance Wahed, who was a second generation Muslim man studying at Glasgow University, stated that he tended to interact with his Pakistani friends most of the time, even though he had some white Scottish friends:

In the university, right now, we are in our group; we are eight Pakistanis. We are all actually Scottish but we hang out only to each other. We have no problem to talk to other Scottish white friends, colleges or students; we are very friendly but we keep together. I think the reason is religion; I mean, for example, you can talk to them for half an hour but eventually they are going to talk about going out, partying and drink but you cannot really relate to that.

[20 year-old, Edinburgh]

Wahed highlights that the issue of drinking and going out is so dominant in Scotland and is usually the subject and content that normal conversations revolve around. Even though he self-identified as being Scottish, he could not relate to such issues because he did not drink alcohol, thus he preferred to interact with Muslims
with whom he had much more in common culturally and religiously. This can suggest that in social relationships in which alcohol becomes central and friendly events often take place in pubs and bars, Muslims limit their social relationships to a certain extent. One of these limits was avoiding places where alcohol was served. It was for this reason that some practicing and less practicing Muslims tried to have their social meetings in places such as cafés and coffee shops. The first example is Akram, who was a less-practicing second generation Muslim woman. As mentioned earlier, she was born and brought up in Dundee and was a skilled self-employed worker with a college degree. Akram expressed that she managed to have her meetings with her Scottish friends in places such as coffee shops, where alcohol was not involved:

I have got some Scottish girls as well ... We meet out for a coffee; sometimes I go to my friends’ houses but they are Muslims too. But for meeting up with white Scottish girls in the towns we usually go to places such as cafés.

[43 year-old, Dundee]

This quote highlights how even skilled second generation Muslims are limiting their social integration due to religious observations. This quote could also imply that firstly, Akram’s social friendships with white Scottish people was limited to girls, and that secondly, her social meetings with Scottish girls was limited to outside of the house, and thirdly, meeting outside was also limited to non-alcoholic environments such as cafés. This quote illustrates how avoiding alcohol consumption and mixed-sex meetings can affect Muslim women’s social integration. Akram was a less practicing Muslim; however she highlighted that she did not prefer to arrange her social meeting in places where alcohol is served. This statement can imply that even some less practicing Muslims do not prefer going to places where alcohol was served. Considering that my finding in the last chapter pointed to some less-practicing participants such as Ehsan and Hamid who did not mind such places, it can be argued that being present in places where alcohol is served is a matter of difference, even amongst less-practicing Muslims.

The next example is Azadeh, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman with a college degree. As mentioned earlier, she was a housewife but was
also very active in many Muslim and non-Muslim groups. She also stated that she does not drink alcohol and prefers not to go to places where it is served. However she also asserted that she managed her social integration by leaving events only when the alcohol is about to be served:

When I was working we used to go to office parties where alcohol was but I went and had the dinner and socialise and them came out because I knew that afterwards they are going to drink. If you explain to people let them know the reason it makes difference. … whenever we meet anybody we say to brothers that sorry I am a Muslim and we do not shake hand with opposite sex and it is the same for the men.

[42 year-old, Edinburgh]

In this quote, Azadeh highlights that although practicing her religion has limited her to some extent, such as having to leave parties at drinking time, it did not lead her towards isolation or lack of socialisation. It is, however, important to note that alcohol is served from the outset at some social events, thus there would be nonattendance at such events rather than deciding to leave earlier. The decision to leave events in drinking time was also evident in the example of Sanaz, who was another second generation Muslim woman with a bachelor degree. As quoted in the previous chapter, she asserted that she attended a Christmas party in her school but did not go for drinks afterwards. This can imply that approaches to how to avoid being present in alcohol serving places can be different even amongst practicing and less-practicing Muslims. Some do not attend from the outset and some attend but leave the event at the time of drinking alcohol. Taking different strategies to avoid being present in alcohol serving places can be context dependent. For example, none of the practicing Muslims or even some less-practicing Muslims (such as Akram and Zainab) would attend pubs and bars, however they may attend some academic or work parties where there would be alcohol consumption either during the event or at the end. In the former situation, it was discussed in the last chapter that a majority of the respondents (except Hamid and Ehsan who used to attend) did not attend any pub or bar. However, it was in the latter form that the matter of difference was most evident. Some, such as Batool, Fatima, and Fazel (quoted in the last chapter), avoid such events from the outset whilst some such as Akram, Sanaz and Sadiq just leave
the event at the time of drinking or going out for a drink. This can imply greater integration for those with more a open interpretation of avoiding being present in alcohol serving places than those with restricted interpretation.

In other contexts such as community or family events, where Muslims are the main organisers or are in the decision making committee, they make sure those events are held in places where alcohol is not involved, thus removing a barrier for the greater social integration of Muslims. Running voluntary and charitable groups could enable Muslims to keep religious considerations in mind whilst increasing their social integration. For example, there was no alcohol consumption or mixed-sex meetings at events run by these groups. The collective effort of some female Muslims to arrange such *Halal* social meetings is highlighted in the next example. Arezo, who was also a second generation Muslim woman and was involved in arranging many events for Muslim women at Edinburgh Central Mosque, stated that they arranged their events with non-Muslims at the mosque or any other place where alcohol is not involved:

> We have had get together with non-Muslims at gatherings we have arranged ourselves; we cannot go to their gathering because of the drinking culture etc. When they come to our gathering which we have had at the mosque or at various venues such as schools and churches, we always have it as a family event, so it would not be right to have drink there. Most people understand our issue with alcohol and those who do not understand we explain it to them. Actually we have found that many non-Muslims with families don't like to drink much anyway.  

[50 year-old, Edinburgh]

Arezo highlights that due to Scottish drinking culture, Muslims cannot attend *majority* social events and therefore sought to organise their own. As quoted already in the last chapter, another example of such efforts to reserve special spaces as non-alcoholic places was Sadiq, who tried to arrange his university conference to be in a restaurant where *Halal* food was served and alcohol was not served. These examples imply the importance of space in the development of practicing and some less-practicing Muslims’ social integration. They can also suggest that efforts for *Halal* integration were not only limited to Muslim individuals, but also involved some
Muslim groups or Muslims in some public institutions, who suggested or negotiated for alternative spaces in order to facilitate their greater social integration.

Muslims’ alternative path to integration was not limited to spatial changes; the data suggests that it was also concerned with the issue of timing. Particularly, 6 participants (Jafar, Fazel, Sadiq, Hareb, Azim and Zahra) reported their concerns about night time socialising. For example Azim, who was another second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that he does not take part in Scottish night life culture:

Obviously we cannot take part in drinking and night clubbing culture. These things are not allowed in Islam. So, I do not go out night times. So those times I come to the mosque and I prefer to spend my time with my Muslims friends or with my family. Because Scottish people those times, especially at weekends, definitely go out for drink and if you are with your non-Muslim friends they might be drinking and clubbing and they might push you to do what they do.

[24 year-old, Dundee]

In this quote, Azim highlights that the main reason for avoiding Scottish ‘night life’ was the dominance of alcohol consumption and the possibility of being pushed by friends to take part in such culture. Similarly in another example, Sadiq, who was a second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that he did not take part in the ‘night life’ of Scottish dominant social culture:

My social integration is limited. I try to integrate academically and outside of the university and on social level it is limited too. For example, I manage my social meetings in a coffee shop, so it is limited. Night time and socialising in pubs and bars is zero percent; it is out of the question.

[25 year-old, Glasgow]

The examples of Azim and Sadiq highlight that the dominant form of socialising at night times is involved with alcohol consumption, and thus they as Muslims could not participate in the night life. This implies that for some Muslims, social integration with the majority can be limited only to the daytime and mostly in non-alcoholic environments as was earlier discussed. Socialising at night time might be more difficult for Muslim women due to the practice of patriarchal ideology or the
moral values of the family. For example, Hareb - who was a first generation practicing Muslim - allowed his son to stay in his Scottish friends’ house for a night but did not let his daughters socialise in the same way:

My younger children have many white Scottish friends. For example my son plays football and he had some Scottish friends from there. Sometime his friends come to our house and sometimes they stay in our house at weekends. Sometimes he goes to their house and stay with them... they study or play together. Whenever he goes to their house he only eats Halal meat and when they come to our house they eat our food and they do not say we want another food and actually they like our food. So, he keeps his religion and there is no alcohol issue as well. So, there is no problem in socialising with them. My daughters have also some Scottish girl friends and they come to our house and sometimes my daughters go to their house but they never stay for night times. I do not allow them to stay nights but their friends come to our home during the day and they just stay together.

[45 year-old, Stirling]

This quote suggests that boys in Scotland have a full and active social life because concerns about alcohol and mixed sex interaction do not arise at this age. However, such participation was not allowed for girls and so their socialising was limited to day time meetings. The more parental control over Muslim women as compared to Muslim men was also highlighted in the example of Akram:

The social integration is more difficult for female Muslims. It has a lot to do with the peer pressure and the parents as well and how they see things. A lot of first generation Muslims like my parents were not happy with their children’s integration with the Scottish people. Such objection was more about female because they tended to self control female Muslims a lot more than men. For example, they wanted to know what female Muslims were up to rather than what male Muslims were up to.

[43 year-old, Dundee]

The examples of Akram and Hareb’s girls can suggest that some Muslim women can be under parental or peer pressure to manage their social integration in certain ways, such as interacting only with girls and in the daytime. The parental control on female Muslims may be associated with controlling female Muslims’ sexuality (Brah
Muslim women’s lack of participation in ‘night life culture’ can also be associated with the observation of patriarchal family values in which females are considered to be ‘culture-bearers’ (Esposito 2011: 98). The latter was highlighted more in the example of Zahra, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman. She stated that some Muslim women would not participate in ‘night life’ culture for a range of reasons:

For example, if you are working in a supermarket checkout, you see that after work and in night time all the girls go together for drink, but we cannot go with them because we would not drink, we actually do not want to be in a environment where people are drinking either. You also do not want to be out alone at nights. So, there are some limitations because of our morals and ethics because of our commitment and love to the family. For example, we may need to go back home after work and be with the kids and with the family. Other people may not have such commitment or such family. But these limitations do not stop us from socialising. For example instead of going out for drink and night life, we take part in voluntary works and family events.

[45 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote can highlight that even those Muslim women who work, which is already a challenge to the practice of patriarchal ideology, still observe other values such as devotion to the family. It is, however, important to note that if it was only the women who were expected to be so devoted, such practice could be seen as patriarchal. It is also important to note that those women who participate in dominant socialising culture can also be devoted to their families with time management; in other words, it is a question of priorities. This example, however, can imply that staying with family and taking care of children can limit some Muslim women’s socialising at ‘night.’ This quote also highlights that instead of taking part in such culture, Zahra prefers to participate in voluntary works and family events. It can be argued that as the former is usually done at daytime with either little or no involvement of alcohol and the latter is done with the involvement of children and family members, there would not be any barrier for Zahra and Muslim females like her to participate in voluntary works and family events (this form of integration is discussed in this chapter in the next section).
Social friendships with the *majority* can be even more limited than daytime meetings in cafés for some other Muslims. For example, Wahed and Azim (as quoted earlier this section) preferred to socialise with their Muslim friends rather than with their white Scottish friends. This was also highlighted in the example of Jafar, who was a second generation practicing Muslim man. He stated that while his white Scottish friends are clubbing or going for drink, he attends his community programmes:

> Because the majority of Scottish people have the culture of going out for drink this make us really discouraged to integrate with them in such issues. This in itself has a restriction on me because I am a Muslim. However we do other Halal things together such as charity works or university tasks. So, the time my white Scottish friends do their socialising and clubbing, I would be with Iraqis or Lebanese who do the same things I will do. For example, we go to our Mosque and read some supplications or read some prayers. In Ramadan we have programmes every single night. In some other occasions we have programme every single night, so at the time white Scottish people have their programmes like going for drink or clubbing and whatever they find interesting but would have some restriction on me, I would be with Muslim friends in that time.

[20 year-old, Glasgow]

In this quote, Jafar highlights that issues such as drinking and clubbing restricted his social relationships with his white Scottish friends to doing charity and academic work. He also highlights that sharing more commonalities with other Muslims in his community leads him to communicate with his Muslim friends at night times when his Scottish friends are out drinking. Such time management in socialising with Muslim and non-Muslim friends was also evident in the example of Wahed and Akram, who asserted that due to the dominance of drinking in Scottish social culture, they limited their social friendships with white Scottish people to a certain extent. All these quotes can suggest that some Muslims’ social friendship with white Scottish people is often limited by religious or cultural considerations as well as Muslim identity. This could imply that such restrictions would apply less to less-practicing Muslims, but the example of Akram, who was a less-practicing Muslim woman, suggests that even some less-practicing Muslims may commit to such restrictions. This is consistent with my finding in the last chapter that suggested that some less-
practicing Muslims prefer not to attend such places (such as Akram and Zainab), but some others did not mind attending drinking establishments (such as Ehsan and Hamid). In other words, even the category of ‘less-practicing Muslims’\(^1\), which was added to the dichotomy of ‘practicing’ and ‘non-practicing’ Muslims, does not represent a homogenous category. For example, Hamid, who was a first generation and a less-practicing Muslim man, stated that he has some white Scottish friends with whom he has developed a mutual close social relationship:

> I have got some white friends, I play cricket with white folks, they are very good friends. They come to my house and we go to their house and we have got a very good interaction between each other.

[28 year-old, Edinburgh]

Hamid is unusual amongst my participants since none of the others reported such close personal relationships with their white Scottish friends; this was mainly related to the dominance of alcohol consumption in such relationships. There was only one example, Hareb’s son, in which it was mentioned that alcohol was not served when he was in his Scottish friends’ house. In contrast, in the example of Hamid, alcohol was served when he was in his Scottish friends’ house but it was not considered to be a barrier by Hamid. As I mentioned in the last chapter, Hamid used to go to pubs and bars and was one of those less-practicing Muslims who did not mind being present in places that serve alcohol. It might be for this reason that he could develop such close relationships with some of his white Scottish friends. The example of Hamid can suggest the importance of flexibility about being present in alcohol serving places in improving some less-practicing Muslims’ social integration. It may also imply that those who have no commitment to the religion at all, such as non-practicing Muslims, will not have such cultural barriers in developing their social friendships with white Scottish people. However it can be argued that other barriers such as racism and Islamophobia can affect their social integration. Given the importance of commitment to the religion, further research on non-Muslims’ attitudes towards social integration would be welcome.

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\(^{1}\) As mentioned in the methodology chapter, participants in this chapter in terms of commitment to their religion are categorised as practicing, less-practicing, and non-practicing Muslims.
Social and Shared Activities

Another form of social integration preferred by Muslims was participation in, or organising, shared and social activities such as voluntary activities, and interfaith and charity events. As already mentioned in the examples of Arezo, Sadiq, Zahra, and Jafar, some Muslims preferred to develop or maintain their social relationships with majority Scots through voluntary work. As discussed before, the importance of this form of social integration stemmed from Muslims’ active role in organising and running such activities, which can also imply their civil integration. The popularity of these activities, especially amongst the second generation Muslims, can be explained by the absence of alcohol and accommodation of Muslims religious needs. Running voluntary and charitable groups could enable Muslims to observe their religious considerations because in events run by these groups, there was no alcohol consumption or mixed-sex meetings. For example, Jafar, who was one of 13 participants who were active in social and charitable organisations, highlighted his involvement in charitable works as a good example of Halal integration:

I do a lot of charities… and this is the way we integrate with different Scottish people. We talk to them and we tell them what this charity is about and what events would take place in the future. I do not just target Muslims to come; we target all types of religious people and even atheists. This is a very good way of integration because we integrate with different white Scottish people and there is no issue of alcohol. I am very successful in this form of socialising if I am not that successful in some other aspect of integration such as drinking and clubbing.

[20 year-old, Glasgow]

This quote demonstrates how respondents were keen to integrate and sought innovative and acceptable means of doing so. Jafar was a second generation practicing Muslim man and a full-time student at Glasgow University; this may imply that those Muslims with a Scottish education could be more active in such activities. This is supported by the educational background of other examples in this section. The data suggests that all 13 participants who were active in social and charitable works had at least obtained Scottish standard grades or a British General
Certificate of Secondary Education. This can imply the importance of education in Muslims’ social integration. Although *Halal* integration remained important for these individuals, mixing and interacting with the Scottish *majority* group members was crucial in these activities. Many participants asserted that their activities were in cooperation with Scottish *majority* group members as well as Muslims and were thus beneficial for both. For example Arezo, who was self-employed and a second generation Muslim woman, said that her current voluntary work was in relation to Scottish children included non-Muslims:

I used to volunteer a lot, I started to volunteer with Muslim groups and then I just thought why I am volunteering only with Muslim groups; it is not just the Muslim groups need help, everybody needs help, then I started volunteering with a group that teaches English to people with learning disabilities and they are all Scottish people.

[50 year-old, Edinburgh]

This quote shows how skilled people within the community could have a wider impact in the society. However, educated Muslims’ voluntary work and civil participation was not limited to social and charitable work, since such work required them to be in contact with public institutions such as councils or police in order to facilitate or license their activities in the public sphere. Muslims’ participation in public institutions was not limited to such civil integration, and there were some indications of their political integration in Scotland. There were particularly three participants who reported their political participation in Scotland. For example, Zahra, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman with a college degree, stated that she was active in some groups that strove for racial equality and justice in Scotland:

Question of integration for me as a second generation Muslim is quite irrelevant because I am already and in fact naturally integrated into the society where I live. For example, I work with two Muslim groups (@Radio Ramadan Edinburgh and Edinburgh Muslim Women Association) but I work with non-Muslims as well because I arrange some shared events with them. For example, I work with *Scotland Against Criminalising Communities*, I work with *Scottish Palestinian Solidarity Campaign*, I work with *United Against Fascism*, I work with Edinburgh Interfaith Group, I also work with libraries and schools which are all non-Muslim. So, although the main
committees in our group are Muslim people, we work outside with non-Muslim people all the time. Whenever we have an event, we invite non-Muslims as well.

[45 year-old, Edinburgh]

Later in the interview, she also stated that Muslims in cooperation with other groups such as United Against Fascism, organise a big demonstration every year in response to the EDL (English Defence League) and its new branch, the SDL (Scottish Defence League). This suggests the political integration of some Muslims, especially the more educated Muslims. The second participant who was active in political issues was Saleh. He was a first generation practicing Muslim man who was politically active in many Muslim and non-Muslim groups such as the Muslim Council of Scotland. He was a retired professor and has lived for 28 years in East Kilbride. Saleh stated that he was working with the Scottish parliament to improve racial equality in Scotland:

I participate in different activities here which are not related to Muslims only. I was a member of different groups which were not related to any specific nationality, religion or ethnicity such as Scotland Interfaith. I am also cooperating with the Scottish Parliament in a wide variety of issues regarding all minority group members in Scotland. For example one of the issues we cooperate with the Scottish Parliament is how to improve racial and religious equality in Scotland.

[65 year-old, East Kilbride East]

The last example in this section is Samad, who was a first generation practicing Muslim man with an undergraduate degree from Bristol University. He was working with some local and national organisations such as Fife Council to improve community services for ethnic minorities:

I was the chair of the a task group in Fife where the National Health Service, the police, the council all these bodies were looking at 4 or 5 ethnic minority organizations to look after them and accommodate their needs. All these bodies were working together on how to build the capacity of the organizations and how to make sure that they are were giving ethnic minorities’ rights to them, how they are communicating with them, how they are dealing with them. I was active in this group
and also encouraged my Muslim friends to take part in these programmes and other community programmes which are run by them.

[51 year-old, Dunfermline]

In parallel with the examples of Zahra and Saleh, this quote demonstrates some Muslims’ civil and political participation in Scotland. Considering the socio-economic status of the participants in this section, the data suggests that many of the participants - 11 out of 13 - were second generation. This can suggest the importance of generational dynamics in Muslims’ social and political participation, however, the examples of Saleh and Samad, as two first generation Muslims, challenge such association. These two examples can suggest that first generation Muslims can also be active in such civil and political participation. It is important to note that both Saleh and Samad had British higher education degrees. The fact that all 13 participants in this section had some British education suggests the importance of having British education in Muslims’ social and political participation. The issue of class could also be a factor here, but making any association to this issue requires further research. It can be argued that the importance of having British education can be attributed to some of its implications, such as being more familiar with Scottish cultural, social, and political systems – this could make the educated Muslims more confident and more capable in taking part in social and political activities. This was also highlighted in the examples of Zahra and Nader (this example is illustrated below), who asserted that the second generation Muslims naturally integrate into society. The lesser participation of the first generation participants in such activities can also be explained by this argument, suggesting that most of the first generation participants had no British education and struggled with language barriers that diminished their participation in civil and political issues. This is consistent with my finding in previous sections, which suggested greater integration of the second generation participants in economic and educational aspects compared to the first generation participants. As well as the significance of education and language, it is important to note that other issues such as the poor economic status of most of the first generation participants could also limit the participation of first generation Muslims in social integration. For example, as I discussed earlier about economic
integration, many of the first generation Muslims were unskilled workers and the main providers for a usually extended family, thus they had to work very hard, and in some cases, took on two shifts to make an acceptable life for themselves and their families. Therefore, they lacked time to take part in voluntary activities. In contrast, the second generation Muslims, as discussed in the self-employment section, were not interested in two shifts and having long hours of work. They also had their parents’ financial support for attaining higher education. This therefore suggests the importance of second generation Muslims’ increased capability, education, language fluency, and having time (the most important), in facilitating their further integration in social and political activities.

Sporting Activities

Participating in sporting activities was another form of Muslim social integration in Scotland. Consistent with earlier forms of social integration, interacting and mixing with white Scottish people was also highlighted in sporting activities. Playing football with white Scottish people was one of these sporting activities. For example Nader, who was a second generation Muslim man, stated that he participated in a football team in which he was the only Asian:

I used to play a lot of sport and all that kind of stuff and I played football in a predominantly white team and I was the only Asian or Muslim and that is a kind of integration as well. So if you born here it just naturally happens [integration] in anyway.

[38 year-old, Edinburgh]

Nader highlights here that for him, as a second generation Scottish Muslim, integration is inevitable. This supports my earlier argument, which suggested that social integration for the second generation Muslims was normal due to the similarity of their educational, cultural, and linguistic characteristics with the majority Scots. However, as I discussed in the last chapter, the dominance of alcohol consumption and the prohibition of it in Muslim religion was the main barrier for second generation Muslims’ greater social integration. Muslims’ participation in sporting activities points to the absence of such barriers in sport. This was highlighted in the
example of Fazel. He was a second generation practicing Muslim man and stated that even though he could not take part in the going out and drinking culture; he could play football with white Scottish people:

> My social integration is limited because if a Scottish person generally wants to go out for a drink, I don’t go with them because I do not want to be in that environment. However, if there is football game I will go. Sometimes we play football with some white Scottish people and that is fine. So, you can call that social integration if you wish. But if certain people at your work, say, want to smoke drugs, I would not go with them because it is against my morals; it is the same about other things too.

[23 year-old, Glasgow]

Fazel highlights that due to the absence - or lesser - involvement of alcohol in football matches, he could enjoy such activities. In another example, Azim, who was another second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that instead of taking part in drinking and night clubbing, he plays football with white Scottish people:

> Obviously drink and night clubs and stuff like that which are not allowed in Islam are barriers to integration. For example, if I make a friend with a non-Muslim, they might be drinking, and clubbing and they might push me to do what they do. But I cannot do such things. What I can do is doing sport, going out and playing football with my Scottish friends.

[17 year-old, Stirling]

The examples of Nader, Fazel, and Azim emphasise playing football versus drinking or clubbing, which may imply the absence of alcohol in football games. It is, however, important to note that many football teams have a culture of going out for a drink afterwards, which would limit the extent to which Muslims can take part in this. Participants’ participation in sporting activities was not limited to football. Zahir, for example, who was a second generation practicing Muslim man, stated that he used to do many sporting activities such as hockey and rugby with white Scottish people:

> I do not take part in drinking and clubbing culture … but I remember I used to do sport, so if I have played hockey or if I have played rugby or if I have played any of these things majority of people were non-Muslims. So, I build a relationship with a lot
of people through sport. We also send our kids to some classes for sport. My son does athletics with non-Muslims; he was doing Judo for a few years with non-Muslims as well. My daughter is doing swimming. All of those activities are in mixing with non-Muslims and are outside of school.

[39 year-old, Glasgow]

All the above examples (Nader, Fazel, Azim and Zahir) can suggest the importance of the absence of alcohol in the development of second generation Muslims’ social integration in sporting activities. However, there were two first generation participants (Hamid and Samad) who highlighted different issues, rather than alcohol, in their social integration. It is also important to note that engagement in sporting activities can extend beyond the pitch. Hamid, for example – as we saw above - socialises with friends with whom he plays cricket. Unlike other participants who highlighted the absence of alcohol consumption in sporting activities, Hamid highlighted that through sport, he has developed closer friendships (e.g. going to each others’ houses) with some white Scottish people. He also highlighted that if such close relationships lead to alcohol involvement or going to places where it is served, he could accompany them but just avoid drinking alcohol. It is important to note that this approach was very rare amongst participants. As I mentioned in the last chapter, Hamid used to go to pubs and bars and so did not mind being present in alcohol serving areas. Therefore this may have helped him to develop such close relationships with some of his white Scottish friends. The next example is Samad, who was a first generation practicing Muslim man. He explained how he and his Muslim friends in a Scottish cricket club split from a white majority Scottish team and made a Muslim majority team:

About 25 years ago I and some of my Muslim friends joined to a cricket club here. We used to play in a Scottish club but we end up to make our own cricket team; a Muslim team. … Why we did that; we did not feel 100% comfortable or because you have the batting order and they used to choose a specific person because he was white rather than being selected because he is better. So, there were a lot issues and I am not quite sure what was the exact issue to do that but I know that we did not feel 100% happy in that situation and once we got the chance and there were enough Pakistanis or Muslims we made our own team. The other reason might be because most people in our team did know each other and they spoke Punjabi. Now we have two teams; one
plays in higher league and one plays in lower league. So, there was something which was not quite as it should be or we might felt that we are more comfortable with Muslims players so we made our own team; but our team plays with all other white teams. I think it was more because of cultural things because you are more comfortable doing things that you do together for example you can speak your own language or have your foods and your jokes afterwards. Whatever the reason we just felt that that we are more comfortable together.

[51 year-old, Dunfermline]

In this quote, Samad highlighted that issues such as the language barrier and cultural issues (such as feeling more comfortable with other Muslims) led them to make a Muslim team in a Scottish club. This can imply the importance of ethnic and religious homophily and suggests that it can limit some Muslims’ social integration to people from a different ethnic and religious background (c.f. Wimmer and Lewis 2010; Platt 2012). Unlike those who stressed the barrier of alcohol, especially at night time, Samad suggests that the main reason for their split was the perception of racism as well as cultural and language issues. Given the strong association between sporting teams and alcohol, this may also have played a role. Considering the second generation Muslims’ socio-economic status as being advantaged by having a Scottish education, knowing the English language, and being better linked to Scottish culture, it can be argued that their attitudes and perspectives to social integration or social isolation would be different from that of first generation Muslims who mostly lacked such characteristics. Considering the importance of sociological variables in the participants’ participation in sporting activities, the data suggests that a majority of those who reported their participation in sporting activities were second generation Muslims [16 out of 18]. This may imply the importance of a generational dynamic in Muslims’ participation in sporting activities. However, the examples of two first generation Muslims, Hamid and Samad, challenge this.

Participants’ involvement in sporting activities was not limited to male interviewees. There were 5 female interviewees who reported that they take part in sporting activities. Muslim women’s participation in sporting activities, however, was confronted by different barriers to those that Muslim men reported. Muslim women’s participation was more interlinked with their religious concerns; more
specifically the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings. The data suggests that all 5 Muslim women took part only in single-sex or women-only-sessions. Muslim women’s tendency to go to women-only-sessions was mainly due to an Islamic code of practice which prohibits the free mixing of genders (Hashmi 2002; Esposito 2011). It is important to note that observing this code, like any other code such as being present in alcohol serving places, was a matter of difference and debate. However, it was evident that all practicing female participants in this research tended to respect some gender segregation in sporting activities. For example, Sanaz, who was also a second generation Muslim woman, stated that she preferred women-only-sessions:

> Previously I attended fitness classes for women-only as well as playing badminton. …
> I always attend ladies-only classes; firstly, because of hijab reasons and secondly, I found it to be more comfortable.

[41 year-old, Edinburgh]

In another example, Shakila, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman, stated that MWAE (Muslim Women Association of Edinburgh) organised several women-only-session sporting activities for teenage girls for religious reasons and because they feel more comfortable:

> MWAE run a teenage girls group where the girls can enjoy a female-only-environment to do badminton, aerobics, yoga, football, and mountain biking and now we will start swimming classes … because of the Muslim culture and our religion it would not be right for girls to be doing physical fitness activities with males. They would not feel comfortable or enjoy themselves.

[30 year-old, Glasgow]

These two quotes imply the importance of the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings, hijab, and Muslims’ preference for attending women-only-session sporting activities. Participation in women-only-sessions was not only limited to practicing Muslim women. There were three less-practicing Muslim women (Kathryn, Zainab and Akram) who also only attended women-only-sessions. For example, Kathryn who
was a second generation less-practicing Muslim woman, stated that she did not like or feel comfortable attending mixed-sex-sessions because it is prohibited in Islam:

There are many mixed-sex sessions in Edinburgh but I do not like to attend any of those because it is inappropriate for us as Muslims. I do not feel comfortable in such environment plus it is not allowed in Islam. There are some women-only-sessions in Edinburgh which are more appropriate and comfortable for us to attend. For example, I often go to Leith Victoria Swim Centre on Saturdays, and Portobello Swim Centre or Jack Kane Sport Centre on weekdays. It is more comfortable in these sessions and it is more Islamic.

[27 year-old, Edinburgh]

Even though Kathryn was a less-practicing Muslim woman, she along with the examples of Sanaz and Shakila emphasises that religious concerns and feeling more comfortable were the main reasons for attending women-only-sessions. Other less-practicing Muslim women also attended women-only-sessions. This can imply that observing the prohibition of mixed-sex meetings could be common amongst some less-practicing and practicing Muslim women. As I discussed in the last chapter, such communality was also evident on the issue of no alcohol consumption because all the above less-practicing Muslim women did not drink alcohol. This can imply that even though some less-practicing Muslim women may not observe hijab, daily prayer, or Ramadan fasting, they may observe the prohibition of alcohol and mixed-sex meetings in sport activities. As the majority of sport centres in Scotland held mixed-sex-sessions, arranging women-only-sessions required Muslim women’s civic integration. To arrange women-only-sessions, Muslim women or any group associated with Muslims had to take many measures and get into touch with the local authorities to arrange any women-only-sessional sporting activities. Such civic involvement was again highlighted by Arezo, who was a second generation Muslim woman and was involved in arranging many sporting activities for Muslim women. She stated that booking any women-only-session requires a greater engagement of Muslim women with public institutions:

It is a long process of applying for funding, looking for suitable female tutors (there are many more male tutors in the sports and exercise field than female), finding suitable venues, advertising to get a suitable number of girls attending, getting
disclosures for all the tutors and helpers and also the insurance. The local authorities help whenever they can but usually there is a lack of venues which are suitable, i.e. the swimming has taken a long time. The Leith swimming center is so busy there is no chance of actually learning any survival skills so we have had to find somewhere else along with a female life guard, which are difficult to find and a female tutor to teach lifesaving.

[50 year-old, Edinburgh]

The examples of Shakila and Arezo, who were active in arranging women-only-session sporting activities for Muslim women, can imply the civic integration of some Muslim women in Scotland. These examples can also suggest that there was such a high demand for women-only-sessions amongst Muslim women that some Muslim women organisations’ civic engagement to accommodate such demand was fulfilled by the local authorities. It is, however, important to note that these sessions were inclusive to all women regardless of their ethnic and religious background and thus white Scottish women could also take part in these sessions. This was pointed out in the next example. Rafiqah, who was a second generation practicing Muslim woman, stated that women-only-sessions were highly welcomed and well attended by Muslim and some non-Muslim women and therefore they became a permanent feature of Muslim female’s social life in Scotland:

I was just a participant in the women only sessions. Even non-Muslims and some white Scottish girls take part in these sessions....all the activities they gave us were well attended each week....instead of keeping up with demand they have made sessions shorter and split the time....I do believe that a colleague of mine who works with council started this off and it was supposed to be a trial but now is a permanent feature.

[27 year-old, Edinburgh]

These quotes suggest that reservation of such venues in response to Muslim women’s demand was a form of civic integration that Muslim women engaged in, which has led to greater engagement in civic participation. This finding supports previous research that suggested that Muslim’s identity politics can be an important trigger for greater civic integration (Choudhury 2007; Meer 2010). To conclude this section, sport can offer a safe arena for both Muslim men and Muslim women to
interact separately because it does not involve alcohol. Muslim women’s engagement, can however be more constrained, but the search for gender segregated sessions had led to increased civic participation. This leads to the conclusion of this chapter.

Conclusion

This research suggests that even though Muslims in Scotland deal with different social (discrimination and Islamophobia) and cultural barriers (such as dominance of alcohol consumption and its prohibition in Islam); they try to fit into different aspects of society. The most common strategy was Halal integration, which means fitting into the society while maintaining their religious identity. Even though the adoption of this strategy implies the importance of Muslims’ religious identity, the strategy of fitting in and integration can be varied based upon Muslims’ gender differences, generational dynamics, and religious practice. Considering the importance of generational dynamics, the data suggests that the integration of second generation Muslims in all economic, educational, and social aspects can be greater than the first generation Muslims. The second generation Muslims’ greater integration seems to flow from them having British education and knowing the English language, thus being more confident in applying for jobs or socialising and communicating with the white Scottish people. Such greater integration was evident in their interest in employment rather than self-employment, in higher education achievements, and increased engagement in social and civil participation. This may imply an increasing interest in integration into Scottish society and can also suggest that the third generation Muslims’ economic, educational, and social integration could be even greater than what is happening now. Confirming this association, however, requires further research on third generation Muslims. I also found none of the segregation and separation that was said to characterise Muslim and non-Muslim groups in northern England.

Consistent with other research (Scottish Government report 2005; Qureshi and Moores 1999; Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 2007), this research also suggests the importance of gendered processes in Muslims’ integration. However, it also suggests
that the second generation Muslim women challenged both social and cultural barriers. It was highlighted that the second generation Muslim women’s religious identity played an important role in challenging cultural barriers such as the practice of patriarchal ideology in some Muslim families. The capability to challenge cultural barriers is evident in the considerable interest of some second generation Muslim women in voluntary work and in gaining higher education qualifications to benefit their children. This could also suggest a growing trend of Muslim women’s social, educational, and economic integration in the future.

Another important issue that can affect Muslims’ integration is religious practice and moral observation. The importance of religious observation (such as lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding being present in places where it is served) can be highlighted by Muslims’ social integration than by economic or educational integration. For example, it was suggested that some less-practicing Muslims who do not mind being present in places where alcohol is served may be able to develop closer social relationships with the mainstream white Scottish people. In contrast, the practicing Muslims’ social integration is limited to daytime and non-alcoholic environments. This can imply that the social integration of non-practicing Muslims is different, and perhaps more developed, from practicing or less-practicing Muslims’ integration.

Putting these findings together adds to the general argument that even though Muslims’ religious identity and some cultural practices have limited their integration, there is the possibility of increased participation by second generation Muslims, who use new interpretations of religious codes to seek further integration into society. It is important to note that new interpretations can also be used to put more limits on Muslims’ integration. However, the interpretations that were used by respondents in this study acted more to facilitate their fitting and integration process. This can imply Muslims’ intention for greater integration in Scotland. For example, socialising in alternative ways such as meeting at cafés, running family and social events in non-alcoholic environments, and taking part in voluntary and charitable work are some of their strategies for greater integration.
Chapter 10: Conclusion; *Halal* Scots and *Halal* Integration

This research in Chapter Five discussed the importance, meaning, and strength of nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity negotiation and argued that religion and nationality (mainly their country of residence) appears to be more significant amongst second generation Muslims than other factors like ethnicity. In contrast, it was argued that ethnic background (mainly their country of origin) was more important amongst the first generation Muslims than other factors. Chapters Six and Seven studied Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia in Scottish major cities and compared them with those in towns and small cities; this comparison suggested that those living in less-segregated areas (with the highest number of Muslim residents) felt that there might be more Islamophobia in the more-segregated areas, and those living in the more-segregated areas (with fewer number of Muslim residents) felt that there might be more Islamophobia in places with a higher density of Muslim residents. However, the findings of these two chapters suggested that the density of Muslims is not necessarily correlated to Islamophobia, and that social and economic factors such as living in deprived areas, drunks, and self-employment in low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people are more important than numbers per se. Chapter Eight argued that the most important issue in limiting Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious identity and the dominance of alcohol consumption in Scottish social life. The prohibition on attending places where alcohol is *served* in Islam, limits the number and type of events that strictly-practicing Muslims can attend. This chapter also discussed the importance of cultural understandings and respect as the main pathway to Muslims’ integration. Finally, I discussed in Chapter Nine how Muslims adopt the strategy of *Halal* integration in order to socialise and interact with mainstream society while maintaining their religious identity.

**Research Aims**

The main aim of this research was to explore and explain the importance of different factors - with a focus on religion - in Muslims’ identity negotiation, experiences of Islamophobia, and integration. Considering the first part of this
objective, this thesis aimed to explore the importance of different factors such as nationality, ethnicity, and religion in Muslims’ social identity construction. It examined how the above factors affected Muslims’ social exclusion or inclusion into Scottish society. To meet this aim, participants’ sense of belonging was firstly examined by asking them to describe their identity as they wished to be identified. Then, they were asked to clarify what made them choose those identities in order to explore the identity markers that they used to support their social identities. Second, to explore different meanings and the strength of Muslims’ different social self-identifications, participants were asked to comment on the importance of their religion, ethnicity, and nationality in their identity and how these elements could relate to or co-exist with each other. This was an attempt to understand the strength of one particular identity marker over the others.

This study also aimed to explore Muslims’ experiences of Islamophobia or racism in Scotland and to explain the importance of different factors in these experiences. This aim was met by asking an open ended question to see whether participants had any experience of racism or Islamophobia in Scotland. After that, they were probed for deeper explanations with questions like what, where, when, and why to elaborate the underlying foundations of their experiences of racism and/or Islamophobia. It is important to note that the analysis of participants’ responses showed that they had experienced both racism and Islamophobia, thus both of them were studied.

To deal with the final research aim, this study explored respondents’ development of integration and explained the importance of different barriers and path-ways to their socio-economic participation in Scottish society. To meet this aim, respondents, were firstly asked to clarify/offe their views on the term ‘integration.’ This was mainly to find a common ground on which to discuss Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Then, they were asked to comment on the path-ways and barriers to Muslims’ integration in Scotland. Given the importance of Muslims’ religious identity (especially amongst practicing Muslims) in their social life, they were probed further on how they, as Muslims, might integrate and interact with majority Scots. Finally, with regards to their actual socio-economic integration, they were asked to comment on challenging issues such as unemployment and self-employment, women’s employment, and higher education.
Main Arguments and Contributions

This thesis - as a piece of qualitative research - was able to highlight the diversity of Muslims and the complexity of their social identity construction and integration in Scotland. This research could particularly highlight the importance of religion and religiosity on Muslims’ identity and practice. It also highlighted the important role of other sociological factors such as gender and generation. This thesis also accessed some Muslim participants (16 out of 43) outside of Edinburgh and Glasgow, who offer valuable insights into the understanding of those who live in smaller parts of Scotland. This thesis particularly offers more insight into Muslims’ social integration in Scotland, which has been less often studied. By examining barriers and path-ways to their integration, this research explained the importance of some untypical issues such as alcohol consumption and gender segregation, which can shed more light on the development of Muslims’ social integration in Scotland. Overall, these findings offer some new and deep accounts on different aspects of Muslims’ lived experiences in Scotland.

This research, which drew on different Muslim participants’ identity negotiation processes, suggests that religion plays a central role in practicing Muslims’ identity and integration. It also highlights that practicing Muslims’ identification with religious identity can be stronger than their identification with nationality or ethnicity. The significance of religion was previously associated with the public devaluation of Islam, Islamophobia, (Saeed et. al. 1999; Modood 2005; Modood 2007) or particular social functions of Islamic law as complete, and of course distinctive, ways of life (Jacobson 1997b; see also Ysseldyke et. al. 2010; Park 2007). This research suggests that both of the proposed explanations can contribute to strong identification with Islam. Further to these proposed explanations, this research particularly suggests that strong identification with religion, especially in the case of practicing second generation Muslims, is reinforced as they have no connection to their parents’ country of origin and find their full belonging to Scottishness denied at the grassroots. Religion could become the most important source of identity in this case. This particularly highlights the importance of disassociation with ethnic identities and the significance of identity non-recognition. It is, however, important
to note that such strong identification with religion contributed to the distinctive identity and integration of practicing Muslims, but did not lead to their isolation from mainstream society. It is for this reason that this research suggests the term ‘Halal Scots’ or ‘Halal integration’ to explain the position of many Scottish Muslims who have integrated into many aspects of Scottish society while maintaining their distinctive religious identity and practice. This was heavily highlighted in their sense of belonging to Scotland and their attempt to fit into society through permitted/Halal ways of integration. I start with the former.

As Hussain and Miller (2006) argue, Muslims’ Scottish identity was adopted as a tool of integration rather than of separation. The hyphenated or multiple identities of Scottish-Muslims are a good example of such integration. This thesis also suggests that Muslims’ social self-identification is not only affected by religion because nationality also plays an important part. The importance of nationality - mainly their country of residence in this research - was based on residential and citizenship markers, particularly amongst the first generation. Amongst the second generation Muslims, this was based on a range of markers such as birthplace, education, English language, and Scottish accent and culture. It is, however, important to note that the ‘continuing salience of race’ (Hopkins 2007; Jacobson 1997a; 1997b) and persistence of cultural boundaries (Jacobson 1997a; 1997b; Virdee et. al. 2006) means that the experience of national identity non-recognition played an important part in weakening these participants’ sense of belonging to Scotland or Britain. For example, this meant that in the case of first generation Muslims, some wanted to keep open an option of return. This leads to the importance of ethnicity, which was mainly based on maintaining social/cultural ties with their country of origin in the case of the first generation\(^1\), and their parents’ country of origin in the case of the second generation. Social imposition and labelling behaviour also played an important part in associations with ethnic background.

\(^1\) As mentioned in Chapter 5, in this research respondents’ identification with their country of origin has been regarded as ethnic identity rather than national identity because respondents distinguished between their national identity which was based on their country of residence and their ethnic identity which was based on their country of origin.
Turning to the second body of evidence that relates to Muslim’s Halal integration into Scottish society, this study suggests that religion and religious identity also play an important role in Muslims’ integration. The importance of religion and religious identity for Muslims lay in its function as a complete way of life, with which everything else should be in line. The most important issue in limiting Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious identity and the dominance of some Scottish social norms such as drinking alcohol and mixed-sex meetings that are prohibited in Islam. To fit into Scottish society and circumvent these limits, Muslims have adopted alternative ways of socialising such as meeting in cafés, running family and social events in non-alcoholic environments, and taking part in voluntary and charitable works to try to fit into the society. Considering the importance of some cultural barriers such as patriarchal ideas in the lack of economic and educational integration of Muslim women, this research also suggests that there is a possibility of the increasing participation of second generation Muslims who, by using new interpretations of religious codes, seek further integration into the society.

This research also suggests that Muslims’ religious identity, symbolised by growing a beard in the case of men and wearing a hijab in the case of women, was crucial to their experiences of Islamophobia. Whilst the prominent use of the term ‘Paki’ in verbal abuse might suggest that many respondents experienced racism rather than necessarily Islamophobia, it is important to note that such abuse was directed at those displaying markers of Muslim identity including white British/Scottish converts. This can be explained by the racialisation process at the heart of Islamophobic discourse that marks all Muslims with an ‘inherent difference that leaves them vulnerable to being targeted with a specific prejudice’ (Moosavi 2014: 3). The terms of abuse do, however, point to the continuing importance of ‘race’, especially in the case of less-practicing Muslims, in which their racial signifier (mainly skin colour) was highlighted during their experiences of racism. This can be explained by the persistence of racial markers. Further to the importance of Muslims’ identity and visibility (either racial or religious), some social and economic factors were particularly important in the daily experience of Islamophobia. These factors included living in deprived areas and self-employment in low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people. The
importance of these factors can be explained by the results of the Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (2010), which showed that those living in more deprived areas of Scotland and those with lower levels of educational attainment were more likely to have discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Ormston et. al. 2011).

The research also highlighted the importance of the fact that the category of ‘Muslim’ is as internally diverse as any other category (Modood 2003; Meer 2012). This was evident in different Muslims’ varying attitudes and approaches to identity, Islamophobia, and integration. In that sense, this research suggested that key differences were based on different Muslims’ level of religiosity and degree of commitment to religion. This research also highlighted the importance of some sociological factors; particularly generational differences, gender dynamics, and geographical differences in varying Muslims’ attitudes and experiences. In the next section, I summarise the main findings on the importance of these issues in turn.

**Commitment to Religion**

This research suggests that different levels of religiosity and observation affect the impact of practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ attitudes to identity and integration. For practicing Muslims, religion can be the most important identity marker. For these Muslims, identification with religion can be stronger than identifying with ethnicity and nationality. For less-practicing Muslims on the other hand, identifying with national or ethnic identities can be stronger, with religious identity not even reported as being a part of their multiple or hybrid identities. Such variation can also have some bearing on practicing and less-practicing Muslims’ integration. For practicing Muslims, religion can be a complete way of life that everything else should be in line with, while less-practicing Muslims do not have such commitment. The importance of religious observation (such as lack of alcohol consumption and avoiding being present in its serving places) can be again highlighted in Muslims’ social integration. The most important issue that limited practicing Muslims’ social integration was the interplay between their religious identity and the dominance of alcohol in Scotland. Even the Scottish identity could not create a bridge between these two issues due to the importance of religion.
amongst practicing Muslims. Less-practicing Muslims, however, due to their lesser commitment to their religion had a more flexible approach on this issue. For example, some less-practicing Muslims used to drink alcohol and/or, crucially, did not mind attending drinking establishments, while practicing Muslims never drank alcohol and usually did not attend any place where alcohol is served. In other words, religious identity was the most important consideration for practicing Muslims in managing their social integration, while for less-practicing Muslims, the issue of Islamophobia and unwelcoming attitudes was more important. This may imply that non-practicing Muslims would have different strategies for their social integration, but this implication requires further research. The level of religiosity, however, was not the only factor that varied in Muslims’ identities and integration. Generational differences also played an important part in differentiating first and second generation Muslims’ identity negotiation and integration.

**Generational Dynamics**

The importance of generational differences was highlighted more in participants’ different senses of belonging to Scotland and identification with their ethnic backgrounds. The importance of generational dynamics was evident in most second generation Muslims’ stronger ties with their country of residence than their parents’ country of origin. First generation participants’ identification with Scotland was mainly based on residential and citizenship markers, and identification with their country of origin was mainly based on the salience of birthplace and maintaining social and financial ties with their country of origin. However, the strength of identification with national (e.g. Scottish) and ethnic identities (e.g. Pakistani) varied based on the idea or myth of return. Those participants who set up their new home and life in Scotland and did not consider going back to their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their national identities than their ethnic identities. On the other hand, those who kept the possibility of return open and maintained strong cultural and financial ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic identities than their national identities. In contrast, the importance of ethnicity and ethnic identity amongst the second generation was mainly related to social imposition (labelling behaviour) or family education. The strength and
meaning of their identification with national and ethnic identities varied based on family education and ethnic culture. Those respondents who maintained strong cultural ties with their country of origin had a stronger affiliation with their ethnic identities than their national identities. In contrast, those respondents who had closer bonds with Scottish culture had a stronger affiliation with their national identities than their ethnic identities.

The importance of generational dynamics was also highlighted in participants’ intergenerational strategies. Second generation Muslims, significantly, had more structural and social abilities for integration. For example, the data suggests that the integration of second generation Muslims in all economic, educational, and social aspects can be greater than the first generation Muslims. The second generation Muslims’ greater integration seems to flow from having British education and knowing the English language, thus being more confident in applying for jobs or socialising and communicating with majority Scots. Such greater integration was evident in their interest in employment rather than self-employment, more interest in higher education achievements, and greater engagement in social and civil activities. This may imply an increasing interest in integration into Scottish society and can also suggest that the third generation Muslims’ economic, educational, and social integration could be even greater than what is happening now. Confirming this association, however, requires further research about third generation Muslims.

**Gender Differences**

The importance of gendered processes was particularly highlighted in Muslims’ integration. Consistent with other research (Scottish Government report 2005; Qureshi and Moores 1999; Cassidy et. al. 2006; Lewis 2007), this research suggested the importance of a gendered process that underlies the participation of Muslim women in economic, educational, and social integration. However, it also suggests the importance of religion and generation in some second generation Muslim women’s challenges to both social and cultural barriers for greater integration. For example, it was highlighted that some second generation Muslim women’s religious identities played an important role in challenging cultural barriers such as the
practice of patriarchal ideology in some Muslims families. The importance of such capability to challenge cultural barriers is evident in the interest of some second generation Muslim women to engage in voluntary work and to seek higher education for the benefit of their children. This could also suggest a growing trend of Muslim women’s social, educational, and economic integration increasing in the future. Factors which made second generation Muslim women’s integration greater than the first generation were having Scottish/British education, being familiar with the Scottish culture, and speaking the language.

Location

Finally this thesis departed from most of the research on Muslims in Scotland, by interviewing people living outside the metropolitan centres of Glasgow and Edinburgh. In so doing, this thesis suggested that the number of Muslim residents in a place is not necessary correlated to Islamophobia. This research suggests that a different range of experiences of Islamophobia took place both in major cities such as Edinburgh and Glasgow – which have the highest number of Muslim residents - and small cities/towns such as Dunfermline or Falkirk. For instance, participant’s accounts of experiencing less or no Islamophobia in cities such as Dundee and Aberdeen as compared to cities like Edinburgh and Glasgow can challenge the importance of the high density of Muslim populations in the high rate of Islamophobia. The data highlighted instead the importance of other socio-economic factors such as deprivation. For example, the data suggests that in daily experiences of Islamophobia living in deprived areas, drunks, and self-employment in low level occupations that involve daily contact with many people are important. Interviewees emphasised the importance of police protection in small towns and suggested that inadequate police protection in such areas due to the smaller number of ethnic minority residents may affect the role and impact of Islamophobia. However given the small sample size, confirming this association requires further research.
In reaching out beyond urban centres and interviewing men and women the thesis not only offering insights into Muslim experiences but also highlighted numerous avenues in which further research is required. Firstly, future studies can build on this research which highlights the importance of young Muslim women’s integration in Scotland. My data highlighted a change in some second generation Muslim women’s participation in the society, so more concentration on the first and second generation Muslim women’s integration would be helpful in verifying an emerging shift in the second generation Muslim women’s integration. The next area that this research suggests for further study is non-practicing Muslims’ integration and identity negotiation. The findings of this research suggested that less-practicing Muslims can have different strategies of integration as compared to practicing Muslims. This can be the case between non-practicing Muslims as well due to their varying commitment to any Islamic rules or guidelines. Further research about these people can make a significant contribution to understanding the importance of religion in Muslims’ identity and practice.

One of the other areas that could contribute to the study of Muslims is the examination of the second and third generation Muslims’ identity negotiation and integration. By studying the first and second generation Muslims’ integration strategies, this research suggested that in some aspects such as employment and educational achievement, generational dynamics were important. Examining the integration of later generations can confirm the greater integration of new generation Muslims in some specific aspect of society. Further studies about younger generations can also examine whether the religion of Islam is still central to the third generation Muslims’ identity and practice or whether the importance of religion is fading as they integrate more into the society. Last but not least is arranged marriage or intercommunity marriage. It was highlighted by some participants in this research that second generation Muslims are not interested in arranged marriages, especially in marrying someone who is not born inside the UK. For example, there were a couple of second generation respondents who married someone outside of their ethnic community. This may suggest a change in younger generations’ marriage
preferences, which further research about generational dynamics and marriage preferences can verify.

The final point that needs to be made is that, as mentioned earlier, the importance of ‘race’ (mainly with reference to skin colour) was also highlighted by some first and second generation participants, which could imply the persistence of ‘race’ as a marker of social difference. Muslims’ sense of being part of Scottish/British society or of being outside that society is not only a Muslim issue, but is also related to their perceptions and experiences of how others see them. This is where Muslims learn whether their claims to Scottishness are accepted or refused. Interestingly, despite having a widespread experience of identity non-recognition at the grassroots level, both first and second generation Muslims still had some sense of belonging to Scottish/British identity. This can be associated with the Scottish elite nationalism that is still promoting and propagating a civic sense of Scottish identity (Hussain and Miller 2006; Hopkins 2008), or it can be associated with the relative lack of racism and Islamophobia in Scotland (Hussain and Miller 2006). This research suggests that even though Muslims in Scotland deal with different social (discrimination and Islamophobia) and cultural barriers (such as the dominance of alcohol consumption and its prohibition in Islam); they still try to fit into different aspects of that society. The most commonly adopted strategy of practicing Muslims is what I have termed *Halal* integration, which suggests fitting into society while maintaining religious identity. The final implication of this chapter is a practical recommendation for those policy makers who work towards the greater integration and participation of Muslims in Scotland. Due to the importance of alcohol consumption in hindering Muslims’ integration, it is suggested that, as one of my participants pointed out, in public events where Muslims’ participation is expected, non-alcoholic places and *Halal* food should be considered. Alternatively, if non-alcoholic places are unavailable, then some tables with *Halal* drink and food should be reserved for Muslims. Such simple steps would send out a strong symbolic message that majority Scots are keen to interact and engage with Muslims and that integration is not a one-way street. In so doing, they could reinforce the sense of belonging to Scotland that many of my respondents already possess.
Appendices

Appendix 01: Invitation Letter for Interview Participation

Dear Brother/Sister ….,

Hi/ Asalaam Alikoum,

I am a postgraduate student at the University of Edinburgh. I am doing a study on ‘Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Social Identity Negotiation and Integration in Scotland’. As you may know, Muslims are portrayed as being a non-integrated and disloyal group in Britain. However, there has been little research on this issue, especially from the perspective of Muslims in Scotland. Accordingly, this research will examine how Muslims, as an ethnic/faith group who have experienced a degree of stigmatisation, negotiate their national belonging and integrate into a multicultural society.

I need to do some interviews with Scotland’s Muslims (specifically those who were born in Scotland or have live in Scotland for more than 10 years). I’d be immensely grateful if you or any of your members/friends could take part in this study. I should also mention that in interviews with Muslim women, my wife who is also a Muslim woman too will accompany us. The interviews will usually take around 30-40 minutes and it can take place at wherever best suits respondents (e.g. Mosque, University meeting rooms, library meeting room etc.).

Should any further information be required, I would be happy to discuss it with you. I look forward to hearing from you. Many thanks in advance for your help.

Kind Regards,
Appendix 02: Interview Schedule

Personal Question
Name, age, origin, birthplace, location, length of residence, employment status, gender, education

Research Question
Identification and Social Identity Negotiation
1. How do you describe yourself (in terms of national identity)?
2. Would this change in different settings?
3. What do you think it means to be Scottish/British?
4. Do you feel that your self-categorisation is widely accepted?
5. How do you find indigenous Scots’ attitudes towards yourself/Muslims?
6. What do indigenous Scots consider a Muslim in Scotland to be?
7. How important are the attitudes of others to your national self-definition?
8. Has your self-identification changed over time?
9. How important is your religion to how you see yourself? How easy is it for your religious and national identities to co-exist?
10. How important is your family origin/ethnicity to how you see yourself? How easy is it for your ethnic and national identities to co-exist?
11. If you had children, do you think that they would be S/B or they would feel that they belong to another nationality? How would you prefer to bring them up?

Racism and Discrimination
1. Do you think that there is much religious and/or racial prejudice in Scotland? Has this changed over time? Have you personally ever experienced religious or racial discrimination?
2. How important do you think your geographical location/gender/generation is in your experience of social inclusion or exclusion?
3. Do you think that the way you think about your national identity is affected by perceptions or experiences of discrimination, or are these two issues quite separate for you?

Integration and Social Interaction
1. Do you feel that you are integrated into wider society? In what ways?
2. In terms of primary social relationships, would you consider/be happy to marry a British/Scottish person? Social cliques, child playgroups? Why/why not?
3. Do you have any non-Muslim close friends whom you invite to your home often? Why/why not?
4. Are you a member of/ a participant in any non-Muslims/denominational interest organization, voluntary groups, or public centre? Why/why not?
5. Do you feel comfortable referring to any public institutions for the purpose of gaining any social services? (Overcoming language barriers, complaining about discriminatory reception etc.) - Social in/exclusion - Do you have any problems in terms of gaining social services?

6. Do you think that you can apply for any job and be successful?

7. 28% of Muslims are self-employed, why do you think this is?

8. What are the pathways and obstacles to integration/socialization? Why?
Appendix 03: Consent Form

I understand that (please initial the appropriate boxes):
My participation is entirely voluntary □
I am free to refuse to answer any question asked □
I can choose to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice with the knowledge that the provided data will be destroyed accordingly □

And I confirm that:
I have read and understood the research participant information sheet □
I fully understand that any information disclosed during the research interview will be treated as confidential and that my anonymity will be respected at all times unless I give consent in this form for my name to be used □

I agree □ /object □ to give consent for my real name to be used in this thesis, research reports, subsequent conference papers, and academic articles.

I consent to be interviewed □
I consent for the interview to be recorded □

Signed ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Printed signature ………………………………………………………………………………………
Date ………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Appendix 04: Participant Information Sheet

Before deciding to take part in this research study (a PhD research in Sociology), which is titled: ‘Multiculturalism and Muslims’ Social Identity Negotiation and Integration in Scotland’, please read the following sections carefully because it is important for you to understand why this study is being conducted and what your participation will involve.

Purposes and Aims of the Study

Most of the time, Muslims are portrayed to be a less loyal and less integrated community in multicultural societies. However, the important fact that minority groups’ national belonging and integration is highly affected by and through interactions between different factors and actors (e.g. government, media, majority and minorities themselves) is often forgotten. Accordingly, this research is set to examine how Muslims as a stigmatised ethnic/faith minority group negotiate their national belonging and integration in Scotland. It is designed to look at identity construction and the integration process from the perspective of Muslims and to explore the barriers and pathways that they face in this process.

Reasons for being invited to participate in the research interview

You have been asked to participate because your views, perceptions, and attitudes on Muslims’ identification are the focus of this study (rather than exploring how the majority people view Muslims’ national identity in Scotland). The research interview that you are considering participating in forms a part of a larger doctoral research study.

Your decision about participation

It is entirely up to you whether you participate. If you do decide to participate, the interview will be recorded; however, any information disclosed during the research interview will be treated as confidential, and your privacy and anonymity will be respected at all times. All data drawn upon in my study or for other academic articles and conference papers will also abide by strict confidentiality. Pseudonyms will be used for all participants and it is proposed that any other names or places of reference that would jeopardise the anonymity of the participant will also be changed or removed. You can also withdraw from participation at any time you like. The data will be only accessed by me, the researcher, and the two academic supervisors identified at the bottom of the page. This procedure is in line with the ethical guidelines of the University of Edinburgh and the British Sociological Association.

If you have any further queries please contact:

Reza Bagheri (researcher), University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.13) 15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: r.bagheri@sms.ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)753 342 8008.

Or alternatively:

Dr. Hugo Gorringe (supervisor), University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.30) 15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: h.gorringe@ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)131 650 3940.

Dr. James Kennedy (supervisor), University of Edinburgh, Social and Political School, Sociology Department, Chrystal Macmillan Building (Room 6.28) 15A George Square Edinburgh EH8 9LD, email: j.kennedy@ed.ac.uk or tel: +44 (0)131 650 4250.
Appendix 05: Coding Framework (A Sample of Codes and Categories)

Category 01: Social Identity Negotiation (First Generation Participants)
Sub-category 01: Type of Identity
   Code: National and ethnic: ‘British-Pakistani’;
   Code: Sub-National and Ethnic: ‘Scottish-Asian/Kenyan’;
   Code: British and Scottish together;
   Code: Mixed of national, ethnic and religious

Sub-category 02: Identity markers
   Code: Citizenship and passport;
   Code: Residence

Sub-category 03: Experience of Islamophobia or racism
   Code: rarely: ‘Sometimes’;
   Code: many time: ‘Quite a lot’;
   Code: never: No experience at all;
   Code: Self-employment: ‘Self-employed Muslims get more’

Category 02: Experience of Islamophobia or Racism (First Generation Participants)
Sub-category 01: Different type of discrimination
   Code: Street-racism;
   Code: Islamophobia;
   Code: Verbal abuse;
   Code: Institutional racism

Sub-category 02: Implication of Identity Mis-recognition
   Code: Isolation: ‘Stick to your own identity’

Sub-category 03: Why is there discrimination?
   Code: Skin colour;
   Code: Economic Resentment;
   Code: Media and Islamophobia;
   Code: Lack of education

Category 03: Social Identity Negotiation (Second Generation Participants)
Sub-category 01: Type of Identity
   Code: Multiple: Scottish Pakistani (sub-National-ethnic);
Code: Multiple: Scottish Muslim (sub-National-religious);
Code: Multiple: British Pakistani (National-ethnic);
Code: Multiple: British Muslim (National-religious);
Code: Only Scottish (only sub-National);
Code: Only Muslim (only religious);
Code: Only British (only National);
Code: Only Iraqi/Lebanese (only ethnic);
Code: British and Scottish together;
Code: Not ethnic: ‘I do not see myself Pakistani’;
Code: Mixed identities: British-Muslim-Pakistani

Sub-category 02: Identity markers
   Code: Birthplace and Residence: Born and bred, live and love the country;
   Code: Adopting Scottish and British culture: characteristics and values;
   Code: Scottish/British Education;
   Code: English Language;
   Code: Scottish accent;
   Code: Citizenship, living, passport, here is home

Sub-category 03: Cultural Identity
   Code: Culturally Scottish: ‘I am culturally Scottish’;
   Code: Not Pakistani: ‘I can not live in Pakistan’;
   Code: Being selective: ‘I take the best from both cultures’

Sub-category 04: Identity acceptance
   Code: They Accept;
   Code: They do not accept;
   Code: ‘not at first look but after knowing you’
   Code: ‘they should accept’

Sub-category 05: Majority’s perception about Muslims’ identity
   Code: Outsider;
   Code: Foreigner;

Sub-category 06: ‘Truly’ Scottish/British
   Code: Assimilation: ‘Certain way of thinking’;
   Code: Whiteness: ‘skin colour’, ‘appearance’;
   Code: Ancestry: ‘Should have Scottish parents’
Appendix 06: Summary of 43 Interviewees

1. Kasim: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Brought up in Scotland, 41 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Interviewed on 02/11/2010

2. Bohlol: Edinburgh; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani Origin, 20 Year-old, Sunni, Standard Grade, Interviewed on 04/07/2011


6. Shakila: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Scottish Mother and Iranian Father, Scottish Born, 30 year-old, Sunni, Standard Grade, Employed, Interviewed on 26/07/2011


8. Wahed: Edinburgh; Male, Second generation, Scottish born, Pakistani origin, 20 year-old, Sunni, Bachelor, [doing voluntary activities], Interviewed on 27/07/2011

9. Arezo: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, Kenyan Born (Living in Scotland for 30y), 50 Year-old, Sunni, Self-employed, College, Interviewed on 03/08/2011


11. Sanaz: Edinburgh; Female, Second Generation, Scottish Born, Pakistani Origin, 41 Year-old, Sunni, Housewife, Doing Voluntary Activities, Interviewed on 10/08/2011
15. Asghar: Edinburgh; Male, First Generation, Kenyan Born, 56 Year-old, Shia, Self-employed, Interviewed on 29/08/2011
21. Zahir: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Scottish born, Pakistani parents, Brought up in Dundee (lived there for 18 yrs), 39 Year-old, Sunni, Employed, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 08/10/2011
22. Nader: Glasgow; Male, Second Generation, Scottish born, Pakistani origin, Sunni, 38 Year-old, PhD, Employed, Interviewed on 21/09/2011
23. Fatima: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Brought up in Glasgow, Iraqi Origin, 32 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Master Degree, Interviewed on 09/10/2011

24. Batool: Glasgow; Female, Second Generation, Brought up in Glasgow, Iraqi Origin, 28 Year-old, Shia, Employed, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 09/10/2011


29. Amir: Dundee; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Dundee), Pakistani origin, 21 Year-old, Sunni, Student, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 10/11/2011

30. Azim: Dundee; Male, Second Generation, English Born (Living in Dundee for 20y), Malawi origin (Africa), 24 Year-old, Sunni, Employed, College, Interviewed on 10/11/2011


32. Akram: Dundee; Female, Second Generation, Born in Dundee, Pakistani origin, 43year-old, Self-employed, College, Sunni, Interviewed on 04/12/2011
33. Hashim: Stirling; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Stirling), Pakistani Origin, 17 Year-old, Sunni, College, Student (and part time employed), Interviewed on 11/11/2011

34. Hareb: Stirling; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born (Living in Stirling for 22y), 45 Year-old, Self-employed, Sunni, Bachelor, Interviewed on 11/11/2011

35. Nadim: Stirling; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born (living in Stirling for 20y), 73 Year-old, Retired, Sunni, Primary Education, Interviewed on 27/12/2011


37. Shadi: Aberdeen; Female, First Generation, Kenyan Born, Brought up in UK, Living in Scotland for 4 Years, Marring a white Scottish Muslim), 25 Year-old, Under graduate, Sunni, Interviewed on 23/11/2011


40. Adil: Falkirk; Male, Second Generation, Scottish Born (Falkirk), Pakistani Origin, 24 Year-old, Employed, Sunni, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 17/11/2011


42. Samad: Dunfermline; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, Living in Scotland for 30y, 51 Year-old, Sunni, Retired, Undergraduate, Interviewed on 18/11/2011
43. Asif: Dunfermline; Male, First Generation, Pakistani Born, Living in Dunfermline for 12y, 39 Year-old, Sunni, Employed, Bachelor, Interviewed on 18/11/2011
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