THE LOGICAL STATUS

OF THE

FREUDIAN UNCONSCIOUS

A thesis on the logical relationship between the Freudian unconscious, considered as a scientific model, and the technique of psychoanalysis

by

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INTRODUCTION.
This brief introduction is intended partly to provide a background against which a discussion in detail of Freud's unconscious can be seen in proportion and partly to explain why such a discussion has not been rendered a waste of time by the advances in psychology which have made obsolete so many of Freud's notions. This introduction does not try to justify its statements, but merely to make them as plain as possible: and this must be my excuse if some of them are less precise than they might be.

(1) From the practical point of view, Freud was the man who worked out a technique for alleviating certain disorders by talking to his patients and by getting them to talk to him. Some of these disorders were physical (hysterical paralyses or tics, for instance) and some were emotional (such as anxieties about illness or abnormal affections). There was a striking difference between this technique and the physical measures which had hitherto been applied to all disorders and which continued to be applied by other practitioners to the disorders which Freud's method alleviated: and this difference was identified by Freud with the distinction between the mental and the physical. His patients' talk /
talk was an expression of things of the mind - memories, phantasies or emotions - while the medicines and neurosurgery of his colleagues were directed at the body. His patients' disorders were alleviated when their talk led them to recall experiences which they had forgotten - to regurgitate, as it were, memories instead of foreign bodies. The more difficult it was to regurgitate the memory, the greater the relief when it was out.

(2) Like so many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century psychologists, Freud thought of memories, phantasies and so forth as consisting of ideas which were the contents of the mind in much the same way as food can be the contents of the stomach. Instead of being regarded as actions which were sometimes being performed and sometimes not, ideas were thought of as things which existed, and which could not be created out of nothing or vanish into nothing. When this habit of thought encountered the fact that some disorders were alleviated when certain memories were with difficulty regurgitated, it seemed clear, at least to Freud, that these memories had been there all the time, like "matter in the wrong place". The wrong place must be a part of the mind, since memories were things of the mind; but this could not /
not be a part of the mind that was known to us (bewusste). Everyone knew, of course, that there was a part of the mind where memories went when they were not being recalled, and where certain processes, such as counting or reasoning, could be carried out without our realising it, although they were easily recognised as taking place when attention was drawn to them. But this was only a sort of ante-chamber to the known mind: it could be called the "vorbewusste", or "preconscious". The interesting and important thing was that there seemed to be other thoughts that differed from those in the preconscious in that they could not be brought into the conscious part of the mind at will, but only by special methods and with difficulty. This must be a completely unknown part of the mind, the "unbewusste", the unconscious.

(3) The things in the unconscious were the cause of disorders because they were trying to escape into consciousness, but were prevented by a force, called repression by Freud, exercised upon them by the conscious self, the ego. The ego behaved in this way because it was under constant surveillance by the super-ego, a structure which had been created out of the ego by parental admonition, and
and which subjected the ego to feelings of guilt if the things in the unconscious were entertained by it. The efforts of these things to escape from the unconscious took two forms: the first was their appearance in dreams under elaborate disguises: the second was mental or physical disorder, such as the detachment of an emotion from its proper but repressed idea and its mésalliance with a conscious but inappropriate idea, or again the appearance of the physical concomitants of a violent emotion without the emotion itself.

(4) In this and other ways the things of the unconscious did not behave quite like those of consciousness. There was this protean fluidity which sought escape in all sorts of disguises. There was the coexistence of quite contradictory ideas about, or emotions toward, the same object. There was a sort of "timelessness" or absence of change. There was the absence of negation: all unconscious things were positive, and negation or prohibition was a function of the conscious ego. There was an independence of reality: unconscious desires took no account of whether their objects were attainable, or whether, if attainable, they might not harm or destroy the possessor of these desires: what determined whether /
whether thoughts should be repressed or admitted to consciousness was the pain or pleasure they would give to the ego if it entertained them, not their practical consequences if they gave rise to action.

(5) It would of course take too long to refer here to all the new notions that Freud introduced at various points of this psychological framework. Some of them, such as symbolism, will be dealt with in the detailed discussion which is to come. There are other innovations, such as the classification of instincts into the sexual and destructive groups, and the much criticised inclusion of many apparently "innocent" ones in the sexual group, which are very largely independent of the psychological framework, and with which we shall therefore be very little concerned.¹

(6) But no account can afford to leave out Freud's "metapsychology", although almost all expositors try to. Freud thought that a complete description of a mental process must deal with three aspects of it. It must say which system it belonged to (for example, to the preconscious system): this was the "topographical aspect." /

¹Although these other innovations of Freud's are also of great interest to the logician.
aspect". It must also say what the process did (that is, whether it was a memory, an emotion or some other kind of process): this was the "dynamic aspect". These two aspects together were sufficient for a "psychological" account. But a metapsychological account must also include a third aspect. This was the distribution of energy which was involved in the process: the "economic aspect". All mental processes involved the same kind of energy, which Freud visualised as electrical: but the energy could exist in two states, "cathected" and "discharging", which corresponded roughly to "potential" and "kinetic" with the additional difference that in the cathected form a certain amount of energy was linked with a particular process, such as an individual memory. It was this cathected energy, striving for discharge, which was responsible for the efforts of unconscious mental processes to escape into consciousness. One of the important differences, in Freud's view, between conscious and unconscious processes was that cathected energy, which in the former is linked to one particular process, can transfer itself in the unconscious from one process to another in its search for a means of discharge: I have already given a "psychological" description, in paragraph 3, of this phenomenon, which Freud described metapsychologically /
metapsychologically as "motility of cathexis".

(7) Freud's metapsychology, to which I shall return when considering his views on the mind-body relationship, is in one way an attempt at a reconciliation between his technique and his scientific beliefs. He must have felt that the success of his technique was closely connected with the fact that it dealt with things of the mind, such as ideas and emotions, instead of things of the body, such as lesions of the brain. But his scientific materialism, which regarded all these mental phenomena as the result of the process of evolution, made it necessary for him to show that the things he described psychologically were physical phenomena. His metapsychology provided this demonstration. At the same time it provided him with a defence against attacks from two quarters - from academic psychologist-philosophers who argued that only the conscious was mental, and from practising psychiatrists who objected to his neglect of physiology.

(8) I shall have more to say about metapsychology very soon. But I want to explain why the Freudian unconscious seems to me to deserve study at this late stage. To begin /
begin with, it has been adopted in one form or another by practically all exponents of a very important group of psychotherapeutic techniques. I shall be devoting a chapter to the exact relationship between it and the technique of psychoanalysis, and a rough statement must suffice at this stage.

(9) The psychotherapeutic techniques can be divided first of all into two main divisions, the "physiological" and the "semantic". The former rely chiefly on the administration of drugs, electric shocks, and surgery: the latter on the exchange of signs between technician and patient. (I say "signs" rather than "words" because of the use of pictures, models and toys, which is not entirely confined to the treatment of children). The semantic techniques can be divided in their turn into the "environmental", which seek to remedy the patient's disorder by inducing him to change part of his environment — for example, his job or his wife: (some of the "counselling" techniques that are practised in the United States of America seem to rely largely on this): and the "personal", which seek to produce a change in the patient himself. Personal techniques can be arranged in a scale according to the extent to which they are /
are "mandatory" or "maieutic": the former seek to change the patient's constitution by persuasion, instruction, threats or hypnosis, while the latter seek to guide the patient's own mental processes so that he rearranges himself, as it were. No technique, of course, is wholly mandatory or maieutic: even psychoanalysis, which is probably the most maieutic, has comparatively mandatory exponents such as Ferenczi.

(10) It is this group of semantic personal techniques which are usually labelled "psychotherapy". There are perhaps a few at the extreme mandatory end of the scale which do not make use of the concept of the unconscious: there is, for example, the general practitioner whose advice in cases of anxiety neurosis is to "pull yourself together" or to "think of something else" (this technique is becoming rarer). But I cannot think of any school, outside the churches, which does not use the concept. It is true that it assumes different forms in different hands - an obvious example is the comparatively shallow individual unconscious of Jung, supplemented by the comparatively bottomless collective unconscious. In these non-Freudian hands the /

2Hypnosis can of course be used, as Freud himself used it at first, to assist a maieutic technique.
the concept is to be found without the rest of the
Freudian apparatus - without the superego, the libido,
the metapsychology. It is true that some of his other
concepts, notably the superego, have proved of such
value that, under one name or another, they appear in
many other psychologies. But they have achieved this
on their own merits. They are not logically involved
in the employment of the concept of the unconscious.
Indeed, as we shall see, there is probably only one other
Freudian concept which is logically implicated with that
of the unconscious in such a way that it is impossible
to employ one without the other, and that is "repression".

(11) So much for the importance of the notion. But is
there any need for yet another discussion of its nature?
My excuse must be that there is still a good deal of
misunderstanding on two points. The first of these is
its nature as it is described by Freud. I hope to show,
for example, that the so-called dynamism of the Freudian
unconscious has been exaggerated. It has been thought
of as something that was in a continual state of change -
a place where action went on unobserved, or even as a
crude kind of alter ego which could scheme against a
man's conscious well-being. But when we come to examine
the /
the sort of behaviour that Freud actually attributed to it, we shall find it to be something much less exciting - much more like a simple machine than a manikin. I do not mean that the view which I intend to put forward would have been accepted by Freud: but it is the view that emerges when all his considered statements are put together, when his thoughtless obiter dicta are discarded and when a consistent scheme is thus drawn up.

(12) The other misunderstanding concerns its logical status. A lot of controversy has raged round the question "Is there really such a thing as the unconscious?" Some people (including Freud) have produced arguments from observed phenomena to show that there is such a thing. Others have attacked these arguments, or have produced evidence that there is no such thing. Others again have treated the matter as a dispute over words. I hope to show that the Freudian notion of unconsciousness belongs in fact to a fairly small class of things which we find in the explanatory sciences, and whose true nature has only recently been appreciated. I shall not attempt to make an assessment of its value, either to psychotherapy or to academic psychology, since I am not /
not qualified to do so. What I shall attempt to do is to suggest a certain view as to its logical nature, and show how this affects its logical relationship to the technique of psychoanalysis; and both of these subjects have a bearing on the question of its practical value.

(13) In the remainder of this Introduction I shall deal very briefly with the origins of some of Freud's notions, the traps to be avoided in interpreting him and his views on the relationship between mind and body -

In Chapter 1 I shall discuss Freud's way of distinguishing between conscious, preconscious and unconscious entities, and will give a short account of the things which in his view were never unconscious.

In Chapter 2 I shall discuss "repression" and the way in which different accounts of repression support the suggestion that the unconscious is a "scientific model".

In Chapter 3 I shall discuss the various things that in Freud's view could be genuinely unconscious, and the kind of scientific model to which such things probably belong.
In Chapter 4 I shall discuss Freud's four arguments for the unconscious in the light of these conclusions, and suggest that only one of them is of any value, and this only if it is modified.

In Chapter 5 I shall suggest that unconsciousness belongs to the class of things that have been called "principles of inference".

In Chapter 6 I shall discuss its relationship to psychoanalysis in the light of the recognition that this is a technique and not a science, pure or applied.

THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S NOTIONS.

(14) To identify all the sources from which Freud drew the concepts and theories which are now regarded as his system, is a task in itself, and I intend to include in this brief introduction only a few salient facts to serve as a background for my logical discussions, which will not deal with historical questions. At least two writers in English, Allers (SE. 1941) and Ernest Jones (SEMW. 1953) have reviewed what is known about Freud's intellectual ancestry. Ernest Jones with industry and Allers with insight. Ernest Jones' statements, however, (especially in his chapter on "Freud's Theory of the Mind") suffer from at least one important defect: they do not make it clear /
clear whether they are dealing with Freud's mature views or whether they are dealing with his views as they were during the last decade of the nineteenth century, that is, at the end of the period with which Ernest Jones' first volume is concerned. Perhaps the second volume, when it appears, will make this clearer.

(15) Neither Freud nor his followers owed anything to the experimental psychologists of their generation in Germany, nor even perhaps of the previous generation. Freud's only public mention of the great Helmholtz, although he much admired him, is when he cites him as a case in which epilepsy did not "interfere with the highest intellectual achievement". (DP, 1928, CP V, p.226). Until Freud went to Paris, his subject was cerebral neurology, and when his interest was aroused there in non-physical methods of treating disorders of behaviour, it was of course from the French psychologists that he learnt his technical approach to them. He always denied, of course, his debt to Janet, for reasons of prestige, but was less ungracious to Charcot: and there is an obvious resemblance between his "unconscious" and Binet's "double consciousness", although Freud stresses the differences (UCS, 1915, CP IV, p.103). The hypnotic technique which he at first employed /
employed was borrowed from the Frenchman Bernheim, and traces of it still remain in present-day psychoanalysis: the patient's couch is the altar to the forgotten god.

(16) His most striking debt is of course to Herbart, from whom he inherited his notion of "ideas" as the material objects of the mind (see Chapter 3) and his "censorship", and perhaps other concepts such as the libido. No-one, however, seems to have offered a very satisfactory explanation of the way in which Freud came by his Herbartian notions, until Ernest Jones made a suggestion in SFLW (1955, p.410). Allers had suggested that Breuer (who according to Aller's "personal information" was acquainted with the works of Herbart, and who had certainly a great influence on Freud) was the source. Ernest Jones has learned, however, from a Dr. and Mrs. Bernfeld that in Freud's last year at the Gymnasium a text-book was in use which was in effect a compendium of the Herbartian psychology: this does not contradict Aller's suggestion, but it is far more likely to explain Freud's Herbartianism. I myself suspect, however, that Herbart's system was well-known to the French psychiatrists. I find Janet, for example, asking this question in AP (p.479) which was published in 1889 (three years after Freud's /
Freud's visit to Paris):

"... les théories plus modernes sur la persistance des idées dans la mémoire et sur le caractère indestructible de la pensée, ne se rattachent-elles pas d'une manière bien étroite à nos expériences sur la catalepsie, la suggestion thérapeutique et les actes subconscients?"

Quite apart from the question whether Freud owed his notion of the unconscious to Janet, this passage suggests that Herbartian notions were at least being talked about in the France of the eighteen-eighties.

(17) I shall be dealing later with the complete logical independence of Freud's psychology from his metapsychology. The latter was the legacy of his physiological training under Brücke. Ernest Jones (loc. cit.,) and Boring (HEP, 1950, p. 708) have dealt with the efforts of Brücke and others of Helmholtz' school to explain all the behaviour of the organism in terms of chemistry, electricity and physics; and Ernest Jones has given us a synopsis of Freud's unpublished Project, in which Freud thought he had achieved this for the behaviour of the brain. Freud wrote this in 1895, but seems to have lost interest in it very quickly: as the last section has never been seen by anyone it is not even certain that he finished it.

Ernest Jones is probably near the truth when he says "We /

\textsuperscript{3}I.e. plus modernes que "les spéculations des anciens auteurs hylozoistes" of whom Janet has just spoken.
"We may regard the feverish writing of the Project as a last desperate effort to cling to the safety of cerebral anatomy" (SFLW, 1953, p.421). Freud's discoveries were made in the consulting-room, not the dissecting-room or laboratory, and consequently he thought of, and gave them their first expression, in psychological language. But he never ceased to offer, as a sort of by-product of his work, the metapsychological account which derived from the physiology of Brücke.

(13) At the risk of oversimplifying, I should like to conclude this very brief section by emphasising that in Freud we find three quite distinct things combined, and that they came from three quite distinct sources. First, there was his psychotherapeutic technique, which was developed out of the hypnotic methods of the French school. Second, there was his psychology, which was Herbartian. Third, there was his metapsychology, which attempted to reconcile his discoveries in the other two fields with the cerebral anatomy which had been his first love. His notion of the unconscious belongs to his Herbartian psychology, but he was led to it by his discoveries in the consulting-room. We shall find in Chapter 4 that when he produces arguments of the laboratory type in support of it, they are not worth much, and that the only one /
one of importance is the one taken from the consulting-room. We shall see, too, that he did not realise that the notion of the unconscious was foreign to his metapsychology.

**INTERPRETING FREUD**

(19) To extract from Freud a full and precise description of the unconscious is an undertaking in itself. The trouble is not the sparsity of his statements but their abundance. Any consistent and comprehensive interpretation could be refuted many times over by quotations alone. The inconsistencies are most numerous in his passages on the nature of the psychic apparatus. The same phenomena are described on different occasions in quite different terms. The most general pronouncements are delivered without a hint of the important reservations that are made elsewhere.

(20) It is true of course that Freud was not trying to state a metaphysical theory (as he is at pains to point out) but to secure acceptance for a technique and an attitude. As a result his arguments are often selected with an eye to effect rather than consistency. But this explanation does not make it any easier to decide what his /
his considered answer would have been on many points. No doubt he would simply have dismissed many of the distinctions which philosophers feel bound to draw. 4

(21) It is also possible to draw a distinction between his popular and his esoteric works. Apart from writings on applied psychoanalysis (such as "Moses and Monotheism"), the popular ones are the "Introductory Lectures" ("Old" and "New"), "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life", the "Autobiographical Study" and perhaps "An Outline of Psychoanalysis". But I doubt whether many difficulties can be resolved by discarding the popular expositions. They may contain a higher proportion of loose statements: but they also contain the concrete illustrations which are lacking elsewhere 5. (Apart from "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety", the theory is seldom illustrated in the esoteric papers).

(22) One fact, however, which must be allowed for is the important development which took place in Freud's views after the first World War. Unfortunately, it also took place after he had written his two papers on the unconscious (1912 and 1915: CP IV), which would otherwise /

4 He regarded precision in new scientific concepts as a disadvantage, since it prevented them from being modified as a result of investigation (TIV, 1915, CP IV).

5 For example NIL, 1933, p. 93 et seq. gives a clearer statement of the distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious than any passage in the esoteric papers.
otherwise be the loci classici on the subject. These and other "metapsychological" essays which were published before 1919 can thus be quoted only with a certain amount of caution. The same caution must also be used in accepting expositions by other writers, unless they give full weight to this development.

(23) I shall try to outline the nature of this development without anticipating too many of the conclusions about Freud's later view which require to be substantiated in detail. The 1915 essay treats the unconscious as a "system" (Freud uses the same word in the German): it is one of the "regions of the mental apparatus" and the conscious and preconscious are another. To Freud at this time it was conceivable that "an idea may exist simultaneously in two parts of the mental apparatus", and may "regularly advance from the one position to the other, possibly without the first location or position being abandoned". At the same time, he was aware that he was using the term in two senses - to refer to a system, which he regarded as the proper sense, and to refer to a quality which some mental acts possess, which he called the descriptive sense.

(24) /

6Anna Freud (EMD p. 4) speaks of the new phase as beginning with the books GPAE (1921) and BPF (1920). It is of course true that the term ego (or rather, ich) was used much earlier, for example in the metapsychological essays of 1915 and in the essay on Charcot of 1893 (CP I, p. 20): but see paragraph 165 for the difference between the early Freudian "ego" and the later conception.
By 1923, however, he had conceived, or borrowed from Groddeck\(^7\), the distinction between the ego and the id. Henceforward the id takes the place of the unconscious as a system. This was not entirely a verbal matter, since the id did not include all that the unconscious had included, such as the unconscious parts of the ego. In much the same way the ego replaced the "system CS", although here again the correspondence was not exact. (EI, 1923, part II). Thus it is no longer the consciousness or unconsciousness of a mental process that is held responsible for a pathological condition, but the relationship of the process to the ego. Consciousness is a by-product of the acceptance of the process by the ego.

Another source of confusion is Freud's use of what are really two separate languages - the psychological and the metapsychological. A good example of this confusion is Dr. Brierley's statement, while she is sketching the development of Freud's thought, that

"With the formation of the libido theory and the conception of conflict as conflict between ego and sexual instincts, the ideo-motor terminology lapsed into disuse. Today the language of instinct holds the field in theory. Thus, we speak of cathexes of objects rather than of the emotional ."

\(^7\)Freud acknowledges this debt in EI (1923, p.27)
emotional charges of ideas, and tend, in practice, to regard these two expressions as synonymous . . ."

Her remark may well be true of the linguistic history of psychoanalytic literature: certainly she knows more about this than I do. But I am afraid that she means that this change took place in Freud's own thinking, and that it was more than a linguistic change. I shall try to make her mistake clear in the course of my brief section on Freud's views on the mind-body relationship. But I ought in fairness to say that Freud himself provides every excuse for those who confuse his two languages, since he makes no effort to keep them separate. I shall shortly, for example, quote a passage where he talks about "cathecting an idea". One reason for this sort of trouble is that there were a number of notions - for example, the ego - that had to be used both in his metapsychology and in his psychology: so that Freud sometimes slipped from one language into the other without realising it, like a Frenchman talking in English who has to use a French phrase - such as "esprit de corps" - which is common usage in both languages, and as a result inadvertently goes on talking French.
FREUD'S VIEWS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND BODY.

(26) A good example of the difficulty of interpreting Freud is the task involved in extracting from his works a clear account of the relationship between the mental and the physical. The need to attempt this is obvious. Interpretations of Freud's statements about the unconscious will vary greatly if one interpreter imputes to him a Cartesian dualism while another believes him a follower of Leibniz.

(27) These are of course views which Freud was not at all likely to share, as his background makes plain. His own autobiography tells us how much he was influenced in his student days by Darwin. In his revised edition of ID (1911, p.2) he shows that he was acquainted with the works of Herbert Spencer. In the early part of his medical career his subject was cerebral anatomy and the location/organic lesions in the brain which were responsible for disorders of speech or of other kinds of behaviour. It is also true that he had read Kant: but all that he seems to have got from this is a conviction that scientific descriptions, however conscientious, can be /

Ernest Jones points out (SFLW, 1953, p.331) that Freud was strictly speaking a Lamarckian, since he believed that experiences of one generation could be inherited by later generations as racial memories.
be no more than approximations to a reality which is unknowable.

(23) Against this background, we should expect Freud to derive his notions of the nature of the mental not from the dualism of the Cartesians or the idealism of Leibniz, but from the scientific materialism which was fashionable in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, and which Karl Pearson had popularised in Germany (and also, no doubt, in Austria). And this is, I think, what we find in most of the relatively scarce passages in which Freud hints at his views. Both in comparatively early essays (such as FTP, 1911) and in his last work (OP, 1940, p.15) he explains that the ego is apart of the id which has undergone modification as a result of its proximity to the outer world: it "serves the purpose of receiving stimuli and protecting the organism from them, like the cortical layer with which a particle of living substance surrounds itself" (NIL, 1933, p.100). He believed that the conscious system developed out of "unconscious mental processes ... the older primary processes, the residue of a phase of development in which they were the only kind of mental processes". Consciousness, he thought, appeared only with the ability to think in words: for thinking in pictures is
a "very incomplete form of becoming conscious, which approximates more closely to unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and is unquestionably older than the latter, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically". In OP, however, he says that the "higher animals" must be assumed to have an ego, and even a superego. Possibly, therefore, he thought that the evolutionary order was - ego, preconscious thought of the "picture" kind, followed perhaps by the formation of a superego, and lastly fully conscious thinking in words.

(29) This sequence does not of course account for all the kinds of mental processes in which Freud believed. There are still the primary processes, the processes of the id, to be accounted for. Their evolution is not described by Freud. But from his account of the emergence of the other processes we can without any reasonable doubt infer that in Freud's view animals began to have an id as soon as they began to have a brain - perhaps even as soon as they began to have a central nervous system.

(30) For Freud, this ascending scale of processes overcame the difficulties of dualism. One of his arguments /
arguments against "the conventional identification of the mental with the conscious" is that this "plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psychophysical parallelism". (UCS.1915.p.100)⁹. He goes on to say -

"At any rate it is clear that the question - whether the latent states of mental life . . . are to be conceived of as unconscious mental states or physical ones - threatens to resolve itself into a war of words . . . Now as far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: no physiological conception nor chemical process can give us any notion of their nature".

(31) His argument seems to be this. "If you hold that all mental states are conscious, you cannot give a satisfactory description of any causal connection between mental and physical states, and are thus driven into the arms of Malebranche. But the evidence points to intermediate states, and it is largely a matter of definition whether they are called physical or mental. But the latter is better, because they cannot be fully described in physical terms (although they have some characteristics which can be): they require psychological terms to complete the description".

(32) Compare this with a later passage (BPP.1920,St.VI) where /

⁹Ernest Jones quotes a passage from Freud's "Aphasia" to show that in 1891 Freud did in fact believe in psychophysical parallelism. His failure to draw attention to this later passage is a good example of the difficulty of knowing when he is describing Freud's views at the end of the nineteenth century and when he is dealing with Freud's views once and for all.
where Freud is dissatisfied with the lack of precision in his speculative concept of the death-instinct, and says -

"This comes only from our being obliged to operate with scientific terms, i.e. with the metaphorical expressions peculiar to psychology (or, more correctly, the psychology of the deeper layers). Otherwise, we should not be able to describe the corresponding processes at all, nor in fact even to have remarked them. The shortcomings of our description would probably disappear if for the psychological terms we could substitute physiological or chemical ones. These too only constitute a metaphorical language, but one familiar to us for a much longer time and perhaps also simpler".

(33) Freud is regretting that his concepts are not such as can be discussed in physiological or chemical terms - not that these are completely adequate even for the phenomena to which they are applied, but having been longer in use they approximate more closely to the reality. As I have said, Freud knew enough about Kant to believe that reality contained something quite unknowable.

(34) There is, however, at least one passage which suggests a "two-sided interaction" theory\(^\text{10}\) :

"For the telepathic process is supposed to consist in a mental act of one person giving rise to the same mental act in another. What lies between the mental acts may very well be a physical process into which the mental process transforms itself at one end and which is transformed back into /

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\(^{10}\) I am using Broad's excellent classification in MPN, 1927, Section A.
into the same physical \( \text{sic translator} \) process at the other. The analogy with other transformations, such as speaking and hearing across the telephone, is an obvious one. And think what it would mean if we could get hold of this physical equivalent of the mental act! I should like to point out that by inserting the unconscious between the physical and what has hitherto been regarded as the mental, psycho-analysis has paved the way for the acceptance of such processes as telepathy." (NLL" 1933,p.75)

(35) It is possible to reconcile this passage with an emergence theory by supposing that a "mental act" is a process most of whose characteristics (but not of course all) are best described in psychological terms, and which gives rise (at least on some occasions) to processes that can be more or less adequately described in physical terms, and so on. There is some support for this kind of interpretation in the following passage from OP (p.34):

"...there is no alternative to assuming that there are physical or somatic processes which accompany the mental ones and which must admittedly be more complete than the mental series, since some of them have conscious processes parallel to them but others have not".

But perhaps it is simpler, and more probable after all is said and done, to explain both these passages as the obiter dicta of a man who was no logician and no philosopher, and did not trouble to reflect whether he was here talking the language of parallelism from which he had long since meant to save psychology.

(36) /
From OP (pp. 34-36) Freud seems to have thought that the metapsychology which he evolved from 1910 onward provided the language which came nearest to describing the essence of mental processes.

"The processes with which (psychology) is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by the other sciences... but it is possible to establish the laws which these processes obey and to follow over long and unbroken stretches their mutual relations and interdependences... This cannot be effected without framing fresh hypotheses and creating fresh concepts: but... we can claim for them the same value as approximations as belong to the intellectual scaffolding found in other natural sciences, and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as more experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instinct, nervous energy etc.) remain for a time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction etc.)."

(0P, 1940, p. 36)

Notice that the "basic concepts and principles of the new science" are quite different in nature from the other set of terms with which Freud is accustomed to work: the latter include such things as ideas, emotions, and are in short introspectible, truly mental entities.

The metapsychology is couched in non-mental terms: its entities are not the sort of things that could conceivably be introspected. They are such things as libido, cathexes, or as Freud says here, instinct and nervous energy.
(37) I have already given a short outline of the nature of this metapsychology; but it will perhaps be clearer if we consider as an example the sort of description it offers of what Freud in his psychological language would have called an "idea" (vorstellung). For the metapsychologist, mental phenomena were processes involving the brain and a kind of energy which Freud seems to have regarded as electrical (to judge by some of his terms). This energy was encountered in two forms, cathexis and discharge (besetzung and abfuehr). Examples of discharge were emotions (gefühlen) and "purposive muscular action" (zweckmassige Muskelaktion), all of which, by the way, involved consciousness or preconsciousness. Ideas, on the other hand, were cathexes, "ultimately of memory-traces" (im Grunde von Erinnerungsspuren) (UCS, 1915, CP IV p.111). I have not found anyone bold enough to attempt a full explanation of the nature of a cathexis (or, a fortiori, of a hypercathexis or anticathexis). It seems, however, to consist of this electrical energy in an undischarged form, in which it corresponds roughly to the potential energy of dynamics, as opposed to the kinetic form, to which the discharge of this energy corresponds. The correspondence is not exact, because a cathexis is sometimes spoken of as a process (vorgang). I think, however, that it is a process which is, as it were,
were, circular and unending, like some forms of perpetual check in chess or, to use an electrical simile, like a current induced in a metal ring. For practical purposes, therefore, the distinction between cathexis and discharge is very close to that between potential and kinetic energy. The point is of importance for an understanding of the real nature of the Freudian unconscious (see Chapter 3).

(33) In the section on the interpretation of Freud, I quoted Dr. Brierley's remark that the ideo-motor terminology lapsed into disuse, and was replaced by the language of cathexis. My own view is that this is true of the history of psychoanalytic literature, but not of the development of Freud's own terminology, and particularly misleading if it is intended to convey that he abandoned his ideo-motor psychology.

(33) First of all, Freud did not confess to any change of this kind. This is not of course conclusive, but he did confess, as we have seen, to the adoption of his ego-id theory. Dr. Brierley ought however to offer an explanation of the many references to ideas in Freud's latest works (for example, ISA, 1926, p.20, NIL, 1933 p.100, 108, OP, 1940, p.23, 42), and particularly OP p.23 where /
where Freud talks of the ego as beginning "to cathect the ideas of objects with libido".\footnote{Strachey translates "die Vorstellung von Objekten" as the "presentation of objects", although he usually renders "Vorstellung" as "idea" (for example, on p. 42 of OP). I cannot see any advantage in this sort of translation.}

(40) It is fairly clear that Dr. Brierley has fallen into the error of mistaking Freud's metapsychology for a rival psychology to his ideo-motor one. I hope that what I have already said shows how wrong this is. I am of course concerned with Freud's ideo-motor psychology rather than with his metapsychology, for it is to the former that the Freudian unconscious belongs. But in view of the sort of confusion of which someone so knowledgeable as Dr. Brierley is capable, I had better say a little more about metapsychology.

(41) This language seems to me to have been constructed by Freud for two reasons. One of the reasons was that he was forced to recognise that in some ways his unconscious mental entities (that is, his unconscious ideas) did not behave in quite the same way as they did when conscious. But the chief reason was that once he had conceived the notion that his unconscious bridged the gap between conscious mental events and physical processes, he saw a chance of linking his psychology with the /
the physiology and physics of his day. His meta-
:psychological language is much more like that of
electrodynamics than that of psychology.

(42) This has some odd results. First, his meta-
:psychological concepts still behave, as I have hinted,
in a way that is reminiscent of the way in which Freud
thought ideas behave. Instead of the exclusion of one
idea from consciousness by another incompatible idea,
you have a cathexis of a memory-trace kept from dis-
:charging itself by an "anticathexis". Second, he fell
into a kind of epiphenomenalism. Psychoanalysis, he
is forced to say "explains the supposedly somatic
processes as being what is essentially mental and dis-
:regards for the moment the quality of consciousness".
For if the most accurate description of mental processes
is one that contains no mental terms, it cannot be the
introspectible qualities of such processes that determine
their courses. These introspectible qualities, in
other words, must be causally irrelevent, like the
colours of the parts of a grandfather clock: if you
shine a light on them, you see that they are brown or
black or golden, but the clock works whether they are
seen or not.
Philosophically speaking, he was thus biting the hand that had fed him. For in his eyes the essence of the discovery he had made was that you could affect people's thoughts and behaviour by means of their introspectible mental entities. Instead of manipulating their bones or muscles you could manipulate their ideas: instead of extracting teeth or gall-stones you cured them by extracting memories. Fortunately, one of the striking things about Freud is the speed with which he drops his metapsychology as soon as he begins to talk about actual examples. Case histories are rarer in his later works than in his early ones, but even in IS, where he is at his most obscure and theoretical, he begins to talk in plain terms (memories, emotions, desires) as soon as he tries to explain what was the matter with Little Hans. This is not only because his metapsychological language is hopelessly cumbrous; it is also because it is lacking in particularity. For you cannot really explain what was wrong with Little Hans in terms of cathexes, anticathexes, ego-syntonic processes and so forth: they just do not begin to be an explanation until you give them meanings by saying "well you see, this cathexis is a memory of an accident to a horse, and this instinct is an aggressive one towards his father; and so on".
(44) I shall be dealing later with the true logical relationship between the two languages, the metapsychological and the ideo-motor. For the present, it is enough to emphasise the point I have just made about the lack of particularity in the metapsychological language. It is impossible to see why one metapsychological process should cause or prevent another unless you have identified the former as, let us say, a dislike of your brother and the latter a memory of a kindness which he did you. And to escape from the difficulty, as Freud and the neo-Freudians sometimes do, by talking of the processes as an object-cathexis of your brother and a cathexis of that memory trace, is merely to translate metapsychological language back into ideo-motor language, but to disguise this fact by retaining some of the words of the former. It is true that some words belong to both languages: "repression" is probably the best example; and this helps to disguise the sleight of hand. But they are none the less separate languages.

(45) We must not of course make the mistake of dismissing Freud's metapsychology as a useless historical curiosity. From the point of view of cerebral physiology that is no doubt what it is. But in psychoanalysis it is not obsolete.
obsolete: it is the origin of the "process theory" which so many present-day psychoanalysts regard as the proper language. These neo-Freudians reserve the ideo-motor language of emotions, memories and so forth for their patients, and converse among themselves in a technical language elaborated out of Freud's meta-psychology. Happily this is not universal: as I shall explain later, the ideo-motor language survives not merely as an exoteric language but also as the technical language of the "object-relations school".

(46) I hope that I have said enough to make it clear why Dr. Brierley is oversimplifying matters when she says that "the ideo-motor terminology lapsed into disuse" "with (Freud's) formulation of the libido theory and the conception of conflict as conflict between ego and sexual instincts". If her remark is a purely philological one, and means no more than that Freud began to use words like "libido" and "cathexis" with great frequency, I cannot quarrel with her. But I suspect that she means that Freud abandoned his ideo-motor way of thinking for a metapsychological way of thinking: certainly this is what she thinks that psychoanalysis has now done (TPA, 1951, p. 43: and see Ch. IV). If so, I think that she is not clear about the relationship between the two languages; and if she is /
is not clear on this subject it may be that other psychoanalysts who think (or think they think) in terms of "process-theory" are not clear either. However this may be, the language which I am going to examine is the one in which Freud first described his discovery and to which he resorted whenever he wanted to make it plain what was wrong with a particular person - the ideo-motor language - although I shall sometimes have occasion to refer to the other.
CHAPTER I

The distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious.
Before plunging into a detailed discussion of the mental phenomena which could, in Freud's view, be unconscious, we must have as clear an idea as possible of the nature of the distinctions which he drew between this and the other categories of mental phenomena. For example, it is important to realise that the classification of these phenomena into conscious, preconscious and unconscious was intended to be exhaustive: if a thing was mental, it fell into one of these groups, and if it did not it was not mental (OP, 1940, p.38). This principle led him into some questionable conclusions about things, such as the superego, which must, he thought, be mental but did not appear to be conscious: he was compelled to conclude that they were preconscious or unconscious. On the other hand there were phenomena, such as instincts, which did not fall readily into any of these categories, and which were clearly dependent in some way on the functioning of bodily organs; they were therefore not mental.

If there could be said to be any one passage in Freud's writings which summed up his views on the distinctions between conscious, preconscious and unconscious, it would be pages 94-96 of NLI (1933). Even this passage has obvious deficiencies. It begins by saying
"What is meant by 'conscious' we need not discuss; it is beyond all doubt" - an optimistic pronouncement to which Freud was prone. This forces us to scrape together references to consciousness in other passages, of which the most important are:—

"Only something which has once been a Cs perception can become conscious, and anything arising from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to transform itself into external perceptions: this can be done by way of memory-traces" (EI, 1923, p.21)

"Sensations and feelings only become conscious through reaching the system Pcept" (ibid. p.25)

"Consciousness is in general a very highly fugitive condition. What is conscious is conscious only for a moment. If our perceptions do not confirm this, the contradiction is merely an apparent one. It is explained by the fact that the stimuli of perception can persist for some time, so that in the course of it the perception of them can be repeated. The whole position can be clearly seen from the conscious perception of our intellective processes: it is true that these may persist, but they may just as easily pass in a flash. Everything unconscious that behaves in this way, that can easily exchange the unconscious condition for the conscious one, is therefore better described as "capable of entering consciousness" or as "preconscious" (OP, 1940 p. 37-38)

(49) The passage in NIL is lengthy, but probably important enough to make it worth quoting almost in extenso. After beginning as I have described, it goes on /

1The "perceptual system", which Freud thought of as an outer layer of the mind, developed to cope with external stimuli. It is sometimes called the Pcept-Cs.
The oldest and best meaning of the word "unconscious" is the descriptive one; we call "unconscious" any mental process the existence of which we are obliged to assume - because, for instance, we infer it in some way from its effects - but of which we are not directly aware. We have the same relation to that mental process as we have to a mental process in another person, except that it belongs to ourselves. If we want to be more accurate, we should modify the statement by saying that we call a process "unconscious" when we have to assume that it was active at a certain time, although at that time we knew nothing about it. This restriction reminds us that most conscious processes are conscious only for a short period; quite soon they become latent, though they can easily become conscious again. We could also say that they had become unconscious, if we were certain that they were still something mental when they were in the latent condition. So far we should have learnt nothing, and not even have earned the right to introduce the notion of the unconscious into psychology. But now we come across a new fact which we can already observe in the case of errors. We find that in order to explain a slip of the tongue, for instance, we are obliged to assume that an intention to say some particular thing had formed itself in the mind of the person who made the slip. We can infer it with certainty from the occurrence of the speech-disturbance, but it was not able to obtain expression; it was, that is to say, unconscious. If we subsequently bring the intention to the speaker's notice, he may recognise it as a familiar one, in which case it was only temporarily unconscious, or he may repudiate it as foreign to him, in which case it was permanently unconscious. Such an observation as this justifies us in also regarding what we have called 'latent' as something 'unconscious'. The consideration of these dynamic relations puts us in a position to distinguish two kinds of unconscious: one which is transformed into conscious material easily and under conditions which frequently arise, and another in the case of which such a transformation is difficult, can only come about with a considerable expenditure of energy or may never occur at all...
all... We call the unconscious which is only latent, and so can easily become conscious, the 'preconscious', and keep the name 'unconscious' for the other. We have now three terms, 'conscious', 'preconscious' and 'unconscious', to serve our purposes in describing mental phenomena. Once again, from a purely descriptive point of view, the 'preconscious' is also unconscious, but we do not give it that name, except when we are speaking loosely, or when we have to defend in general the existence of unconscious processes in mental life". (NII, 1933, pp. 94-96).

(50) These passages suggest that for Freud "consciousness" (bewusstsein) was something very closely connected with "perception" (Wahrnehmung). This "perception" could take the form of awareness of what was going on in the outside world, or in a bodily organ, at the present moment; or it could be a past perception revived, either in the form of a memory or in the form of a new combination of past perceptions ("phantasy" or "imagination"). When Freud talks of the "conscious perception of our intellective processes" (in the OP passage) he seems to be describing "introspection". Even the most complicated and abstract processes of reasoning were made to come under the heading of "perception" by regarding the conscious part of them as consisting of words, which were visual or auditory perceptions revived.

(51) At the same time, Freud's references to the fugitive nature/
nature of conscious processes (both in the NIL and in the OP passages) suggest that bound up with the perceptual nature of consciousness there was an element of introspection. I do not mean that Freud thought of all conscious mental phenomena as being what we should call introspected. But as we shall see Freud did not think clearly about introspection; nowhere does he describe, far less discuss it. And in this case it seems to me very probable that he was trying to describe the state of affairs which Broad (in MPN, 1925, p.381) puts in this way -

"It is evident that in the vast majority of cases of conscious perception, I am not aware of my perception in the sense of introspectively discriminating. Nevertheless, I should certainly refuse to entertain the suggestion that I am not aware, in any sense, of my conscious perceptions while they are taking place. I shall say then that the person in our example was aware of his act of seeing the drawer and most of its contents, in the sense that he had "simultaneous undiscriminating awareness" of this mental event..."

And I think that in describing this state of affairs, Freud did not distinguish between "introspective discrimination" (that is, what we should call introspection proper) and "simultaneous undiscriminating awareness". If, as seems unlikely, he did reflect upon the difference, he may well have thought that it was a difference in degree /
degree only, and that introspection was merely the clearest sort of undiscriminating awareness; certainly when we come, as we are about to do, to the difference between the preconscious and the unconscious we shall find that this too is regarded by Freud as one of degree and not of kind.

(52) The ground is thus prepared for an ambiguity in the definition of the preconscious. This consists of phenomena which, as OP says, "are capable of entering consciousness" or as NIL says are "transformed into conscious material easily and under conditions which frequently arise" but "the existence of which we are obliged to assume . . . but of which we are not directly aware". In view of Freud's ideas on the nature of consciousness it is clear that "entering consciousness" or "being transformed into conscious material" could mean one of two things - either (1) being turned into conscious perceptions or (2) being the object of conscious perceptions, that is, being the object of what Broad calls "introspective discrimination". These two possibilities were not clearly distinguished by Freud, who appears to be thinking sometimes in terms of one and sometimes in terms of the other.
(53) This ambiguity may be responsible for Freud's omission to draw a clear distinction between two rather different things which were both regarded by him as pre-conscious. The most obvious example of this is the way in which both "memory-traces" (erinnerungsspuren) and the act of remembering are spoken of as preconscious without any indication that they are of a different nature. If one does not distinguish between "remembering with simultaneous undiscriminating awareness" and "introspectively discriminating" one's act of remembering, then it is easy to overlook the difference between two other things. These are (1) the "actualisation" of a capacity for remembering something; and (2) the introspection of this capacity. The first of these consists simply of the conscious act of remembering something, whereas the second is not possible.

(54) An example may make it clearer how easy the confusion was for Freud. If I am asked "Do you remember your telephone number?" I may think of the number 45092, introspect this act of remembering, and truthfully reply "Yes". But if I am asked "Do you remember T.S. Eliot's poem 'The Hippopotamus'?" I may reply "Yes" without saying the poem to myself, and yet without being dishonest. For I may have recalled that on the occasions when I have /
have tried to recite this poem I have succeeded, and
that the last occasion was recent enough to make it un-
likely that I am now unable to do so. Now in these
examples Freud would have said that my remembering my
telephone number was conscious and my memory of "The
Hippopotamus" preconscious. But there is a third kind
of phenomenon which we would also have called preconscious.
If I had been absentmindedly repeating to myself the
words of the poem, let us say while I was cleaning my
shoes, he would have said that I was preconsciously
remembering it. If I had been asked "what are you
thinking about?" I might have replied "the words of
'The Hippopotamus'"; and to do so I would have had to
introspect that I was doing preconsciously. But that
would still be very different from the process by which
I concluded that I had the capacity to remember the
poem.

(55) Thus Freud failed to distinguish introspection
proper not only from simultaneous undiscriminating
awareness, but also from something else, which I propose
to call "self-description". As we shall see when we
come to consider concepts such as repression, resistance,
and the super-ego, this failure had important consequences.
For it led Freud to think that all the mental capacities,
tendencies /
tendencies and dispositions which can be attributed to a person in one's "description" of them ought, if all were well, to be introspectible by that person; and consequently he assumed that any such dispositions as the person could not introspect were prevented from being introspected by some abnormal circumstance. Let us suppose that someone whose judgment I respect tells me that I am hypocritical, and that instead of ceasing to respect his judgment I proceed to search myself for this hypocrisy. If I make the mistake of looking for something that is introspectible I shall fail to find it, and may conclude that there is some pathological reason for this. If on the other hand I realise that what I ought to be doing is recollecting my thoughts in certain situations and comparing them with my expressed opinions - in other words, performing an act of self-description and not of introspection - I shall not come to such a disturbing conclusion.

(56) There is another feature of Freud's attitude towards introspection which is interesting when the concept is used to distinguish between the status of different mental phenomena. The use of introspectibility in this way is very like the way in which chemists distinguish /
distinguish between certain pairs of substances. They are able to tell whether a substance is X or Y by attempting to dissolve it in water or some other fluid. If the attempt is successful the substance is X, if not, it is Y. The underlying assumption in this kind of test is that the fluid's capacity for dissolving X does not alter: the chemist is of course able to make this a reasonable assumption by making sure that his fluid is not at an abnormally high or low temperature, and is not already saturated. The same assumption underlies the use of introspection as a touchstone for the status of a mental phenomenon; the capacity for introspection is assumed to be constant. My point here, however, is not that the capacity to introspect varies, not only from person to person, but also from moment according to the distractions to which the person is subject; so much must have been obvious to Freud. What is interesting is that he chose to treat variations in the introspectibility of mental phenomena as entirely due to their accessibility to a constant capacity for introspection, when there were two other courses open to him. These were of course to treat these variations as entirely due to variations in the capacity for introspection, or to treat them as the "resultants" from combined variations both
in the capacity for introspection and in the accessibility of the phenomena.

(57) It may well be that these alternatives did not occur to him: after all we have seen that he did not reflect very deeply on the subject of introspection. But if he had considered them, he might have been able to offer reasons for his own choice. He might have argued as follows:—"I agree that if your only observation is that a mental phenomenon X, which you would expect to be introspectible, is not introspectible, you have no rational grounds for preferring one of these three courses to another, unless perhaps you argue that the assumption that the situation is due to variations in both the capacity to introspect and the accessibility of X is more complicated and therefore that the other two are preferable. But as soon as you couple this observation with the observation that the effects of a non-introspectible X differ from the effects of an introspectible X, then it is clearly simpler to assume that the difference lies in the two Xs, than that it lies in the capacity for introspection and that the two Xs do not differ. So that this last assumption must be ruled out, and you are left with a choice between the other two, of which one involves two variables instead of one, and /
and is therefore only justified if the "assumption of varying accessibility" fails to account for some of your observations. I agree that the capacity must be regarded as something which can vary - for example, in situations where the external distractions are great - and there may therefore be small variations at any time. But I can produce situations in my consulting-room so free from distractions that these variations are negligible, and the capacity to introspect can be regarded for practical purposes as a constant. On the whole I think that this would have been a valid answer.

It depends of course on the truth of the assertion that the effects of an unintrospected X are different from those of an introspected X, with all the assumptions that underlie this. But granted this for the moment we can I think approve Freud's reasons for choosing the "assumption of varying accessibility", if indeed it was consciously chosen. But we shall find the other two raising their heads when we come to the concepts of repression and resistance, and the attempts of Russell and Broad to treat these as "non-recognition".

(58) We are now in a position to consider Freud's distinction between preconscious and unconscious mental phenomena./
phenomena. In the NIL passage we have seen this described as the difference between what is "transformed into conscious material easily and under conditions which frequently arise" and things "in the case of which such a transformation is difficult, can only come about with a considerable expenditure of energy, or may never occur at all". We have already seen the ambiguities which are concealed in the phrase "transformation into conscious material". But there is something else which the NIL passage does not make quite clear. At first sight it gives the impression that there are alternative sources from which material can come into consciousness - first, the preconscious and second the unconscious. Freud makes the conscious mind sound like a room with shelves, some of which (the unconscious ones) are harder to reach than the others (the preconscious ones): we are tempted to conclude that something could be one moment unconscious and the next moment conscious, as an alternative to being one moment preconscious and the next conscious. But he did not mean this. What is unconscious can become conscious only by first becoming preconscious.\(^2\) The preconscious is the only antechamber to consciousness\(^3\) and not merely the more usual of two means of entrance.

\(^{59}\) /

\(^2\) See, for example, the quotation in the next paragraph.

\(^3\) I am, of course, ignoring perception, which was regarded by Freud as another means of entry.
Freud's way of describing the difference, however, allows him to think of it as one of degree: unconscious mental phenomena are merely harder to reach than pre-conscious phenomena. We can see the confusion at work in this passage from OP (1940, p.38): "The division between the three classes of material which have these qualities /consciousness, preconsciousness and unconsciousness/ is neither absolute nor permanent. What is preconscious becomes conscious, as we have seen, without any activity on our part: what is unconscious can, as a result of our efforts, be made conscious, thought: in the process we may have an impression that we are overcoming what are often very strong resistances. . . The amount of effort needed varies in each individual case. For instance, what comes about in an analytic treatment as a result of our efforts can also occur spontaneously: material which is ordinarily unconscious can transform itself into preconscious and then into conscious material - a thing that happens upon a large scale in psychotic states." I think that Freud is thinking of the process of making the unconscious conscious as if it were merely a more laborious form of the process which we should call "proceeding to introspect". When he was being precise (as in the last sentence /
sentence of the OP passage) he describes the former process as one of transformation into preconscious and then into conscious material. But we have seen how he can almost in the same breath describe it loosely as the transformation of unconscious into conscious material.

(60) In fact, of course, the process of introspection (or more precisely of proceeding to introspect) differs in kind and not merely in degree of laboriousness from the process of rendering the unconscious conscious. On Freud's own showing, the latter requires either a clearly abnormal mental state, a psychosis, or else the prolonged employment of various psychoanalytic devices, such as free association. As a corollary, the status of the unconscious differs in kind from that of the preconscious. The former is not merely harder to reach than the latter; it cannot be reached until it is transformed into the latter. The logical error committed by Freud was this, Having recognised that in addition to conscious mental phenomena there were mental phenomena that could be rendered conscious by a simple act of introspection, he found that there was a third class, that could be inferred but not rendered conscious by this simple act. He also found, however, that this third class could by certain means be turned into things in the second class, whereupon /
whereupon they were of course capable of being rendered conscious by the simple act. Therefore instead of continuing to define the third class as what could be inferred but not rendered conscious, he tried to define it as what could be rendered conscious with difficulty. His mistake may have been more natural because the process of turning things of the third class into things of the second was often necessary in order to justify the inference that was part of the original definition.

(61) As a result of all these ambiguities it is logically possible that Freud's unconscious mental phenomena will fall into the following subdivisions:

A. "Actualisations" (e.g. emotions, acts of recall) which are not introspectible.

B. "Potentialities" which are not the subject of "self-description" (i.e., are not recognised by their possessor when he attempts "self-description", either

B.1. because the potentiality is never actualised

or B.2. because its actualisations are not introspected.

or B.3. because it is actualised in the form of introspectible actualisations, but these actualisations are not recognised by the possessor as examples of the potentiality in question.
THINGS THAT WERE NEVER UNCONSCIOUS

(62) In addition to these distinctions, there is the subdivision of mental phenomena according to whether, in Freud's opinion, they were never unconscious, always unconscious or sometimes unconscious and sometimes conscious or preconscious. It is not difficult to find examples of "never-unconscious" phenomena. It seems clear from EI (1923, p.21 seq) that phenomena involving "verbal images" or "thinking in pictures" were assigned by Freud to this category, as were the sense - perceptions of the external world from which these images are derived. (As Dalbiez points out (in PMDF, 1941, p. 47) Freud does not seem to have distinguished perceptions of one's own bodily organs ("proprioceptive sensations") from other perceptions or feelings.) Reasoning was another thing that was probably "never unconscious". There are passages which cast a little doubt on this; for example, in ILP (1917 p. 153) we find that mathematical calculations do not "come into the province of the dream-work; anything of the sort appearing in the manifest dream is generally a mere combination of numbers, a pseudo-calculation, quite absurd as such, and again only a copy of some calculation comprised in the latent thoughts". Here it may be that the "latent thoughts" are unconscious phenomena. /
phenomena. But as we proceed through the middle and
later works it becomes clear that this was not Freud's
considered opinion. There are the repeated assertions
that "the governing laws of logic have no sway in the
unconscious" (OP, 1940, p. 53) and that "there is in this
system no negation, no dubiety, no varying degree of
certainty" (UCS, 1915, p. 119). And finally there is the
passage in OP (1940, p. 110) which says that the ego's
"constructive function" consists in interposing, between
the demand made by an instinct and the action that
satisfies it, an intellective activity which, after
considering the present state of things and weighing up
earlier experiences, endeavours by means of experimental
actions to calculate the consequences of the proposed
line of conduct".

(63) These passages do not of course exclude the pos-
sibility that Freud regarded separate judgments or
beliefs, as distinct from a process of reasoning, as
capable of being unconscious. In ILP (1917, p. 83) a
dreamer is described as really knowing the meaning of
his dream, although consciously he cannot interpret it:
and there is a similar implication of unconscious
knowledge /

4I do not think we need seriously consider the
possibility that this was a function of the unconscious
part of the ego.
knowledge in ID (1911, p.561). But I cannot find any passage that makes it clear whether this was Freud's considered opinion. On the one hand, the two passages I have referred to are *obiter dicta*, not essential to his argument, and there is an obvious metaphorical way in which a dreamer may "know the meaning of his dream"; Freud may have meant no more than that the dreamer has in his unconscious the ideas that the dream represents in a cryptic way. On the other hand, Freud may have considered separate judgments or beliefs as consisting of ideas or groups of ideas, and may therefore have thought that like all ideas they could be repressed. I do not think we can reach any firm conclusion unless a more decisive passage is discovered.

(64) Another phenomenon that is, in normal cases, never unconscious is volition, or, to be more precise, volition that issues in action. "The ego is in control of voluntary movement" (OP, 1940, p.15). Freud arrived at this conclusion at a fairly early stage, for he states it in UCS (1915, pp. 111 and 120). In these early passages he makes two exceptions to this general rule. "Left to itself, the system Ucs would not in normal conditions be able to bring about any purposive muscular acts, with the exception of those already organised as reflexes". /
reflexes". And again "whereas the control of the system Cs over voluntary motility is firmly rooted, regularly withstands the onslaught of neurosis and only breaks down in psychosis. . . ."

(65) The first of these exceptions - reflex actions - fits reasonably well into the theory of mind-body relationship which I have attributed to Freud. An emergence theory can (but does not have to) hold that the emergence of mental characteristics begins very low - even at the lowest point - in the scale of biological processes. Thus, while most of the characteristics of reflex actions can be described in non-mental language, it is possible to hold that a complete description must employ mental language, to however small an extent.

(66) The second exception - psychotic behaviour - is explained by Freud's belief that in psychoses - or at any rate some of them - the normally organised ego is overwhelmed by the unconscious id.

(67) The interesting thing is that Freud does not mention a third class of phenomena as an exception - the "parapraxes". /
"parapraxes". At first sight, he might have been expected to regard slips of the tongue, *lapsus calami* and other errors in "voluntary movement" as unconscious - in fact, as minor invasions of the ego by the id, which differ from psychotic behaviour only in frequency or importance (as indeed is hinted in the last page of PPEL, 1904).

(68) It is also surprising to find no mention of the phenomena which captured the attention of the French psychologists about the turn of the century - the automatic writing and other unconscious actions which they could elicit not only from hysterics but also from normal subjects.

(69) The explanation, I suggest, is this. The parapraxes which Freud described in PPEL (1904) were regarded as faulty parts of an otherwise correct whole - they were looked on not as actions themselves but only as defective sections of actions. Secondly, the error was distinguished from its motive; the latter was unconscious (or, in the case of easily explained errors, preconscious) but the error itself, since it formed part of an action which was consciously willed, was not unconscious.

(70) /
(70) Phenomena such as automatic writing had been used by Binet as evidence for "double consciousness" - a concept which Freud was at pains to reject. In UCS (1915, CP IV p. 103) he explains "known cases of 'double conscience'... as cases of a splitting of the mental activities into two groups, whereby a single consciousness takes up its position alternatively with either the one or the other of these groups." This does not, of course, do full justice to Binet (whom Freud must have had in mind): for Binet had described similar, though less striking, phenomena in normal as well as hysterical persons (DC. pp. 76 et seq.)

(71) Nor are dreams ever unconscious. So-called unconscious phantasies, which I shall discuss in paragraphs 201 to 203, are not unconscious dreams because they are not the result of dream-work. I shall discuss dream-work when I come to deal with so-called unconscious processes. I suppose, however, that Freud would have agreed that a dream, though always preconscious when it occurs, can become unconscious in the sense that the memory of it can be repressed.

(72) Most of my conclusions in this short section on "never-unconscious entities" differ from those of Dalbiez /
Dalbiez (PMDF, 1941 VOL II, p. 46 et seq.). His interest, however, is in deciding whether Freud's views coincide with his own conclusions as to what can, for theoretical reasons, be unconscious, and he does not, in this chapter at least, draw attention to Freud's own distinction between the descriptive sense of "unconscious" (which includes "preconscious" - see NIL, loc. cit.) and the "dynamic" sense (which excludes "preconscious"). As a result, there is complete confusion in this chapter of Dalbiez' between "unconscious" and "preconscious", which, to do him justice, does not weaken his main argument, although it greatly reduces the value of his interpretation of Freud.

**AFFECTS.**

(73) The exclusion from unconsciousness of these concepts is not very surprising, although the Freudian unconscious is often credited with them in superficial expositions. A more interesting exclusion is that of "affects".

(74) "Affekt" in Freud's terminology is used to denote all emotions (gefuhlen) and feelings (empfindungen). Examples of emotions are love, hate, fear, anxiety: pain and pleasure are feelings. Sometimes all three terms, emotions,
emotions, feelings and affects, are used together as if they were species of the same genus; sometimes they are used almost as synonyms (cf. UCS, 1915, p.110).

Ernest Jones quotes a passage which suggests that affect is the metapsychological counterpart of the other two. In the 1915 essay (UCS p. 111) they are said to "correspond with processes of discharge", in contrast to ideas, which consist of energy in cathexis.

(75) UCS (1915, p.111) makes it clear that "there are no unconscious affects in the sense in which there are unconscious ideas". "The unconscious idea continues, after repression, as an actual formation in the system Ucs., whilst to the unconscious affect there corresponds in the same system only a potential disposition which is prevented from developing further". Earlier in the same section, the reason for this conclusion is given: "It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness".

(76) It is obviously necessary to decide whether Freud was still of this view in his later phase. In his later phase, he certainly refers several times to unconscious affects (for example, EI, 1923, p.33). But in EI (p.26) he says "We come then to speak, in a condensed /
condensed and not entirely correct manner, of "unconscious feelings", keeping up an analogy with unconscious ideas which is not entirely justifiable". It is interesting, too, to find that this doctrine continues to be a part of modern psychoanalytic thinking. Brierley (T.P.A., 1943, p.44) quotes Freud on the subject with complete approval.

(77) Freud's own argument in support of this surprising doctrine is not worth very much. At the most, it would show that the introspectible qualities of affects are not unconscious. But by his own showing mental processes have non-introspectible qualities, which, according to his metapsychology, are the essential ones from the point of view of causality. It is true that if affects are processes of discharge and other unconscious processes are not, this would be a strong argument. But this distinction, since it is a metapsychological one, must be reached by reasoning, and not by introspection, and cannot therefore be the starting-point for an argument.

(78) According to Dalbiez (PMDF, 1941, p.49) the doctrine was criticised by Freud's own follower de Saussure. As
I have been unable to find a copy of *La Méthode Psychanalytique*,5 I know no more of de Saussure's argument than is summarised by Dalbiez. He seems to have maintained "that Freud's point of view would end by recognising only possibilities outside the conscious". Dalbiez, who agrees with Freud (p. 34) seeks to refute him, firstly by appealing to Freud's belief in unconscious cognition (an argument which is greatly weakened by Dalbiez' failure to distinguish between the descriptive and the dynamic senses of "unconscious"; and secondly by saying that de Saussure "confuses possibility with potentiality. The former belongs to the purely logical, the latter to the ontological, order. The state of potentiality is more than possibility and less than actuality".

(79) Without access to de Saussure's thesis, it is difficult to tell whether Dalbiez' retort is more effective than it sounds. But, however, this may be, two points are of interest. The first is that, as Dr. McAlpine points out in her paper PSSF (1942), Freud's early papers make no such distinction between the unconscious /

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5It appears to be a thesis published in 1922.
unconscious affect and the unconscious idea (see, for example, DNP, 1894 in CP I p.63). Secondly, when the distinction does come to be drawn, it is inferred not from fresh clinical data, but from Freud's notions of the metapsychological natures of ideas and affects. There is no doubt that, at least in Freud's early papers, the cause of disorders/often "locked-up affect". What then was the reason that led him to decide that what was "locked-up" was not really affect, but ideas? I shall suggest a reason when I come to discuss "ideas".

**INSTINCTS.**

(80) So much for things that are always either conscious or preconscious. But there is another kind of thing that is never unconscious, for a different reason; it is not mental. It is however of great importance to an understanding of the Freudian unconscious - perhaps of more importance than some of the things (such as phantasies) that could be unconscious. This is the Freudian "Trieb".

(81) I have not succeeded in finding a satisfactory discussion of the origins of this notion. Ernest Jones does not mention it in the first volume of SFLW, although
he may repair this omission in the next. Boring is equally reticent in HEP. As happens so often, it is Allers who, though antagonistic to Freudianism, has the deepest insight. In SE (1941, Ch. 3) he attempts to derive this notion of Freud's from Wernicke and Brücke; Freud had criticised the former's account of speech disturbances in his monograph on aphasia, but has clearly been influenced by Wernicke's notion of reflex arcs (see the reference to them at the beginning of ITV (1915, CP IV p. 60). As for Brücke, Freud had worked in his laboratory, and was no doubt acquainted with Exner's experiments with stimuli (ITV also begins with references to those). I cannot help feeling, however, that Allers has accounted for only part of what is contained in the Freudian "Trieb". It is of course possible that the residue is Freud's original contribution, but I should like to be more certain of this. I cannot, for example, find anyone who will either name earlier physiologists or psychologists who used this very word or will state categorically that Freud was the first to use it.

(32) Nor have I found any satisfactory account of all that the word stood for in Freud's writings. Allers again is the best, but is unsupported by references that would prove his points. I shall therefore have to begin with /
with a rather tedious series of quotations.

(83) It has of course been said again and again that "instinct" is not a good translation of "Trieb". It is true that those who say this are usually thinking of "instinct" as the equivalent of what is more precisely called "instinctive behaviour" - that is, the unlearned purposive behaviour of the organism as a whole; whereas if "instinct" is defined as the physiological cause of such behaviour it comes far closer to the meaning of "Trieb" in Freud. It is also true that Freud himself used "instinct" to translate "Trieb" when he wrote his account of psychoanalysis for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is now the accepted English equivalent, although words like "urge" have also been used. I myself think that "motive" is the closest of all, but whether this is accepted depends on whether my account of the Freudian "Trieb" is accepted. I shall follow tradition by talking of "instinct".

(84) It is perhaps worth beginning by pointing out that Freud believed in what is sometimes called the "quiescence" theory of cerebral behaviour:

"The nervous system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing stimuli which reach it, or of reducing excitation to the lowest possible level; an apparatus which would even, if this were
were feasible, maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition" (FIV, 1915, CP IV, p.6).

In colloquial terms, this can be described as the theory that all one really wants is to be left alone; that the organism is organised with one end in view - to get rid of stimuli as soon as possible and return to the unstimulated state. Sometimes this can be achieved comparatively quickly, but sometimes it leads to long and complicated manoeuvres by the organism. All this of course is the basic assumption underlying Freud's theory that dreams were really devices to prevent the dreamer from being wakened up by his own wants, and it also fits in with his notion of a death-instinct (Todestrieb - see for example CP, 1940, p. 20).

(35) In FIV, Freud distinguishes several kinds of stimuli. There are those that act on reflex arcs and do not reach the mind. There are those that do reach the mind, but from the outer world, that is perceptions. And there are those that reach it from "within the organism". These are "stimuli of instinctual origin" (Triebreizen). The examples given by Freud are "when the mucous membrane of the oesophagus becomes parched

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6 The quiescence theory is not by any means dead (see for example J.Z. Young's DCS, 1951, p. 67). It has of course been attacked, notably by Hebb, in OMB, (1949, p.172 et alibi), but I am not sure that it is one of those theories that can be disposed of by scientific argument. It may turn out to be another "principle of inference" - see Chapter 5.
or when a gnawing makes itself felt in the stomach". These stimuli, however, are not exactly what is meant by instincts, which "never act as a momentary impulse but always as a constant force".

(36) A Freudian instinct is not mental. When he is being precise, Freud carefully distinguishes between an instinct and its "mental representative" (psychischer Repräsentat). This distinction is to be found even in his latest works (for example, in NIL, 1933, p. 102 and OP, 1940, 0.19). The mental representative of an instinct in the conscious or preconscious is an idea plus an affect (that is, desire or fear); in the unconscious it is represented by ideas alone, since affects cannot be unconscious.

(87) Freud is not often so precise as this, however. He will frequently give explanations in terms of unconscious wishes or impulses. In OP (1940, p.19) the mental representatives of the instincts are described as "the tensions caused by the needs of the id" (Bedürfnisspannungen des Es). And on p. 36 of OP "instinct" is named, along with nervous energy, as one of the basic concepts of the new science. It is not quite clear here whether Freud is talking of his new psychology /
psychology or his metapsychology (probably the latter) but in any case we must try to decide whether in his later years he thought of instincts as represented in the mind not by ideas and affects, but by a third kind of entity, a need or wish.\textsuperscript{7}

(83) There is a passage in MIL (1933, p.125) which certainly suggests a new definition -

"An instinct differs from a stimulus in that it arises from sources of stimulation within the body, operates as a constant force, and is such that the subject cannot escape from it as he can from an external stimulus. So far this does not differ from the account in \textit{MIL}. An instinct may be described as having a source, an object and an aim. \textit{This catalogue omits "impetus", which heads the list in \textit{MIL}.} The source is a state of excitation within the body, and its aim is to remove that excitation; in the course of its path from its source to the attainment of its aim the instinct becomes operative mentally. The emphasis is mine.\textsuperscript{7} We picture it as a certain sum of energy forcing its way in a certain direction . . . The aim can be attained in the subject's own body, but as a rule an external object is introduced, in which the instinct attains its external aim; its internal aim is always a somatic modification which is experienced as satisfaction."

(89) Although Dalbiez does not quote his evidence, I think he must have had this passage in mind when he attributed /

\textsuperscript{7}I find Anna Freud talking of the "ideational representatives of repressed instincts" as "entering consciousness" (\textit{EMD}, 1936, p.32) But this falls between both stools, and proves very little.
attributed to him two definitions of "instinct" -

"According to Freud, instinct is a constant internal stimulus, which produces specific satisfaction if it obtains sufficient response. He often gives the word "instinct" a wider significance, when it implies the sum total of psychic acts necessary to the fulfilment of a physiological function." (PMDF, 1940, UAI p.129).

This view would certainly explain the passages in Freud's later works where he speaks of instincts as if they were mental phenomena, without making it clear that he is talking of their "mental representatives". But we have already come across a similar looseness of language in the case of "affects", and I do not think that these passages alone make it necessary to assume a change of view.

(90) Even on its own, however, the passage from NIL which I have just quoted seems to support Dalbiez' theory of a "wider significance". And if Dalbiez is merely pointing out that Freud employed "instinct" in a loose as well as in a precise sense, and does not intend to imply that he abandoned the sense in which he used it in ITV, I agree. But I think that a comparison of the passage from NIL with ITV will yield an even more exact picture of the Freudian "instinct" than Dalbiez has sketched out.
I have already, while quoting the NIL passage, drawn attention to the disappearance of "impetus" from the catalogue terms which Freud says can be used in connection with instinct. And yet in IV (CP IV p. 65) he had said -

"By the impetus of an instinct (unter dem Drange eines Triebes) we understand its motor element, the amount of force or the measure of the demand upon energy which it represents. The characteristic of impulsion is common to all instincts, is in fact the very essence of them. If we speak loosely of passive instincts, we can only mean those whose aim is passive".

How is it that something which had been regarded as the "very essence of instincts" in IV had disappeared from the catalogue in NIL? For the very reason, I suggest, that it is of the essence. By the time Freud wrote the later passage, the notion of impetus or impulsion had become so closely bound up with the concept of instinct that it was no longer a notion to be used in connection with instinct, as were "source", "aim" or "object"; it was instinct. In its most precise usage, the Freudian instinct is a force. This is strikingly confirmed in a passage (OP, 1940, p. 19) which may not, because of its late date, have been accessible to Dalbiez -

"The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called "instincts". They represent the somatic demands upon mental life. Though they are the ultimate cause /"
cause of all activity, they are by nature conservative; the state, whatever it may be, which a living thing has reached, gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state as soon as it has been abandoned . . . "

(92) I think that this passage is to be taken very literally. Instincts are the forces that set the psychic mechanism in motion. Like the forces of dynamics, they are exercised by one body (the somatic organ) on another (the idea): they have direction (the "aim"). They can be opposed to one another, giving rise to affects in the conscious mind, to actions or (through the agency of the super-ego) to repression. Their energy can pass from one instinct to another.

(93) This last point of similarity is of some importance. Freud is in the habit of talking of the instincts as "constant forces". If an instinct ceases to make itself felt, his explanation is that it has been "repressed", "sublimated", "reversed into its opposite" or "turned round upon the subject". This list of possibilities (from IV, 1915, CP IV. p. 69) is interesting, for it does not include what, for want of a better word, I shall call "abatement". To make it clear what I mean, I need only refer to the example of hunger which Freud himself gives /
gives at the start of IV. (see paragraph 35). If I cease to feel hunger the first explanation that would occur to me would be that I must have fed, and that this has removed what Freud calls "the stimulus to the mind". It is true that by the time Freud comes to catalogue the "vicissitudes" of instinct, he has expressly confined himself to the sexual instincts. But even here the phenomenon of abatement surely occurs? It is true that the four "vicissitudes" which Freud does mention are much more interesting. But I suspect that through confining himself to cases where "abatement" was not the obvious explanation, Freud came to regard his list as exhaustive. If so, this list amounts to a statement of the principle of the conservation of energy, with the organism regarded as a closed system. For all four "vicissitudes" have this in common, that they explain the disappearance of an instinct by saying that its energy has "gone somewhere else". We shall see that this principle of the conservation of instinctual energy is accompanied, as its counterpart was in nineteenth-century physics, by corollary, the indestructibility of mental matter - namely, ideas.

(94) It is now easy to see why instincts are not regarded by Freud as mental, but have ideas and affects as their
mental representatives. He was like a man looking inside a clock, who sees the springs, the cog-wheels and the levers. To account for their motions he must assume that pressure from the mainspring is being transmitted through the mechanism. But he is careful to exclude this from his definition of a watch: he can see the wheels, levers and springs, but not the force that moves them. It is interesting to compare this attitude of Freud's with Bertrand Russell's elimination of "desires" as a mental phenomenon (AM, 1921, p.63 et seq.)

(95) I cannot find any writer who has considered the extent to which the Freudian concept of instinct succeeds in dispensing with teleological explanation. For this is undoubtedly what it was intended to do. Freud was offering an explanation of the "goal-seeking" behaviour of animals which sought to do two things. First, it tried to make "final causes" unnecessary by providing a sufficient mechanical cause; and second, it left a place in its mechanical system for the idea of the goal which so often appears to be a feature of human goal-seeking behaviour. The sufficient mechanical cause was the stimulus provided by the bodily organ, which, as we have seen, Freud visualised as a force like the forces of dynamics. He was not the only twentieth-century psychologist /
psychologist to visualise matters in this way: McDougall's "hormic" psychology deals in much the same way with the problem of goal-seeking behaviour. The trouble about it is that it can be too successful. If it provides a thoroughly satisfactory mechanism to account for animal behaviour in general, the picturing of the goal, which we know to occur in some human goal-seeking behaviour, is rendered superfluous; the causal chain is supposed to be complete without it. We have already seen that this sort of epiphenomenalism is an accompaniment of the metapsychology which Freud used as an alternative to his ideo-motor language. The latter, however, avoids epiphenomenalism in this way. Instincts are forces that are exerted upon the mind, and not, like mere reflexes, directly upon other bodily organs. Ideas, being the particles of which the mind consists, are impelled by these forces (indeed they have nothing but these to give them motion); if the impulsion is not blocked or diverted, the ideas reach consciousness and there produce "muscular innervation".

(96) My concern is not with the fact that there are other and probably better ways of eliminating final causes without falling into epiphenomenalism of the kind I have described. What I want to consider is whether Freud's /
Freud's method really did eliminate final causes. There is at least one feature of it that makes me doubtful. This is what I call the "selectivity" of the Freudian instinct: by which I mean the way in which, for example, the instinct of hunger "impels" ideas of meals rather than ideas of, let us say, women into consciousness. Why should it select one kind rather than the other? It cannot be that the force exerted by the organs of digestion has some peculiar property that makes it do this, while the force exerted by the organs of reproduction selects another set of ideas. For Freud is at pains to emphasise the homogeneity of the various instincts. The energy that manifests itself in them all is the same. It can reinforce now one instinct, now another. Nor must we forget that an instinct can, in abnormal circumstances, select an inappropriate idea; the destructive instincts, for example, can select ideas of harm to the person to whom they belong. Nor can the ideas themselves be responsible for this phenomenon of "selection"; for they are the passive subjects of forces: the billiard ball does not select its cue.

(97) But in fact Freud does not trouble to keep his instincts free of final causes when he warms to the task of /
of describing them. As we have seen, he talks quite unashamedly in ITV of their aims and objects; they are not, as they should be in his mechanistic system, blind forces that actuate goal-seeking behaviour; they are themselves goal-seeking. Now it seems to be possible to distinguish behaviour that is goal-seeking from behaviour that is not without bringing in final causes; Braithwaite, for example, provides such a distinction in SE (1946, ch. x). And I suppose that anything, from a paramesium to a presbytery, that exhibits this sort of behaviour can be called goal-seeking without any covert reference to final causes. But if what you are trying to explain mechanically is the way in which a future event - such as the eating of a meal - seems to determine present behaviour, are you really doing so if you say that the present behaviour is really due to an invisible force within, which is food-seeking? Is this not rather like showing someone a chess-playing machine, and saying "Yes, it certainly behaves as if it were alive, doesn't it? But its just a machine really, although of course to make it work we've got Capablanca in the cupboard at the back." Both explanations manage to avoid attributing a quality - teleology or life - to the whole only by attributing it to an invisible part. I shall refer to this feature of Freud's instincts again in Chapter 5, under the nickname of "cryptoteleology".
THINGS THAT WERE ALWAYS UNCONSCIOUS.

(93) I should like to be able to say a good deal about the things that in Freud's view were always unconscious. Unfortunately, Freud himself does not say very much about them. He seems to have come to the conclusion, in the course of analysing such phenomena as the Oedipus complex, that there were some unconscious phenomena which did not owe their unconsciousness to expulsion from consciousness and preconsciousness; these were phenomena which must, as it were, have inherited instead of acquiring unconsciousness. See, for example, OF(1940, p.49), where Freud is cataloguing the ways in which the id influences the shape of dreams, and after talking about elements that have become unconscious through repression, goes on to say -

"(d) Beyond this, dreams bring to light material which could not originate either from the dreamer's adult life or from his forgotten childhood. We are obliged to regard it as part of the archaic heritage which a child brings with him into the world, before any experience of his own, as a result of the experiences of his ancestors. We find elements corresponding to this phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends and in surviving customs . . . ."

It was of course this feature which was developed by Jung into so essential a part of his system. For Freud it was certainly a good deal less important: the assumption of phylogenetically unconscious material was perhaps the best way of accounting for a few isolated phenomena, but was not necessary in the case of the great /
great majority.

(99) It is perhaps worth considering briefly the sort of phenomena which seemed to Freud to call for this assumption. At first sight they were of two kinds. First, there were emotions of inappropriate strength; the boy's fear of castration is out of all proportion to the likelihood of this catastrophe, but becomes less unaccountable to Freud if he assumes that the boy has some sort of recollection of a time when the catastrophe was less unlikely. Second, there were the untrue stories produced by his patients in the course of treatment. Some of these were not of course offered as the truth; they were admitted "phantasies"; others were thought by the patient to be true recollections. But in either case Freud believed that a phantasy had to be accounted for by tracing an actual occurrence of which the phantasy was a copy. This actual occurrence could be one in the patient's own experience, of which the phantasy was a much-distorted copy, the distortion being due to the ego's unwillingness to admit a true recollection of the occurrence. But in some cases it seemed more likely that the occurrence had taken place, not in the patient's own experience, but in the experience of his ancestors.
(100) I do not think however that unconscious material of this sort differed in kind from the material that acquired unconsciousness as a result of repression. As we shall see in paragraph 106, Freud thought at one stage that it differed from repressed material in that it assisted the process of repressing this material by exerting an attraction upon it - "dragging it down to its own level" as it were: but he seems to have thought better of this. It is conceivable that Freud thought it differed in another way: that is, that it did not require repression to keep it unconscious, and did not strive for consciousness like repressed material. If so, then it would be impossible for phylogenetically unconscious material ever to be made conscious, even by psychoanalysis, since, in Freud's view, psychoanalysis merely removed repression, and could not provide the force necessary to make something emerge from the unconscious when this repression was removed. But I think this an unlikely view for Freud to have held, both on the grounds that he would have said so more plainly if such an important difference had occurred to him, and on theoretical grounds. The theoretical grounds are that this phylogenetically unconscious material seems to have consisted, like repressed material, of ideas, and that these ideas, unless they differ unaccountably /
unaccountably from repressed ideas, consist of, or at least involve, energy in the form of cathexis - that is, energy seeking discharge. It is true that this discharge is normally achieved by indirect means - such as displacement. But it must also be capable of direct discharge - in the form of a conscious or preconscious expression of the phylogenetically unconscious ideas. The only possibility in the Freudian system which I can think of as preventing this direct discharge (assuming that repression is removed) is the absence of the appropriate "verbal residues" or "visual residues" which are to clothe an idea before it can be conscious or preconscious. In other words, a man might not be able to recollect, consciously or preconsciously, his ancestors' practice of castrating boys because he had never learned the words or experienced the visual images in which such a recollection could be expressed. Obviously in the example I have chosen this is unlikely, and the sort of case in which it might be plausible is very difficult to imagine. But even if it turned out to be true, it would merely /

8 In a way, this argument is like the announcement of Bertrand Russell's correspondent that she was a solipsist and wondered why there were not more of them. The very conditions which would give rise to a situation in which an ancestral memory could not be recollected because suitable words or images could not be found to clothe it would also make it impossible to imagine an example. Fortunately for the validity of my argument, we can assume that different people have different experiences and therefore different verbal and visual vocabularies, so that while I, for example, can not be expected to imagine what sort of ancestral memory I am thus prevented from recollecting, I may very well be able to imagine what someone else might be prevented from recollecting, particularly if their experience is very different.
merely be an accidental reason for the permanent unconsciousness of phylogenetic material, and not a reason founded on its essence.

(101) For these reasons, I am inclined to think that Freud's phylogenetically unconscious material - though different in origin from his ontogenetically unconscious material, does not differ from it in its theoretical capacity for being transformed into introspectible material - that is, into conscious or preconscious phenomena. It is therefore "always unconscious" only in the sense that the circumstances in which it might cease to be unconscious seldom, if ever, arise, and not in the sense that it is by definition incapable of being anything else. I think too that both types of unconscious material are kept in the unconscious state by the same factor - that is, by repression. This does not mean that it is impossible, or even difficult, to describe a class of phenomena that are invariably found in the "always unconscious" form; Freud seems to have had fairly definite ideas as to the sort of thing that was phylogenetically unconscious, although he is not very interested in them, and does not give us a detailed description or catalogue. Nor does it mean that the effects of phylogenetically unconscious phenomena upon conscious /
conscious or preconscious phenomena are necessarily the same as those of repressed material, although here again Freud is not as explicit as we should like.

(102) There is one odd unconscious entity, however, which is difficult to fit with certainty into the division of unconscious phenomena into phylogenetically unconscious and ontogenetically unconscious. This is the unconscious part of the ego (and also the unconscious part of the super-ego if, as I think, this is to be distinguished from the former). The nature of this unconscious entity will be discussed later. All that I need say here is that it is unlikely that this was regarded by Freud as kept in the unconscious state by repression, and thus differs from other unconscious phenomena in an important respect. I doubt however whether Freud thought of it as phylogenetic in the same sense as "racial memories", since the ego is something which appears in the development of the mental organisation of the growing child. On the other hand, it differs from other ontogenetically unconscious material in not being wholly the result of experience; it is difficult to imagine the human being failing to develop an ego of some sort, whatever his experience. Clearly, too, it differs from the ideas which constitute other /
other unconscious material, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic in that it is an organisation and not a substance. The curious thing is however that Freud probably regarded the unconscious part of the ego as being capable of transformation into something conscious, without (as we shall see in paragraphs 171 et seq.) having a clear notion of what the conscious part of the ego was. Here, if anywhere, is something that might have been regarded as incapable, even in theory, of becoming conscious or preconscious; but it seems to have been regarded simply as something which was seldom introspected, but could be rendered introspectible by means of psychoanalysis. I shall therefore discuss it among the things that are "sometimes unconscious".

THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

(103) In case anyone is in doubt as to whether Freud believed like Jung in a collective unconscious, it is perhaps worth a paragraph or two to make it quite plain that he did not. He did, of course, hold two beliefs in common with Jung, namely

(a) that there is enough similarity between the way in which the minds of different individuals work to make it possible to use psychoanalytical explanations to account for the /
the behaviour of groups of people (as Freud used it in GPE, 1921); and

(b) that some of the ideas to be found in the unconscious cannot be accounted for by the individual's own history, but can be accounted for by the history of the race to which he belongs. (Freud also believed of course that the structure of the psychic mechanism and the way in which it worked could be explained as the result of evolution, but I am not sure whether Jung shared this view).

It is possible that Jung's notion of the collective unconscious is merely an elaboration of these two beliefs. Jacobi quotes him as saying that "The collective unconscious is the mighty spiritual inheritance of human development, reborn in every individual . . . constitution". (The emphasis is mine). If so, the difference between Freud and Jung on this point is simply in the importance they attach to the content of ideas which have to be accounted for by racial history: Jung considers them all-important as causes of disorders, Freud considers them negligible.

(104) I am sure, however, that Jung regarded the collective unconscious as more than just a name for the peculiarities of group behaviour and the ideas that could not be explained by an individual's personal history. Let me take two passages quoted by Frieda Fordham in IJP (1953, Introd.) Jung appears to have been /
been much impressed by a mental hospital inmate who in
1906 described visions, images and symbols that closely
resembled descriptions in a Greek papyrus that was not
edited until four years later. Secondly, Jung appears
to have said of the "archetypes" that "not even our
thought can clearly grasp them for it never invented
them". I think that Jung believed two things to which
Freud would never have agreed, namely

(c) that certain ideas resulting from the history
of part of the human race can affect the
behaviour of any member of subsequent
generations, whether or not he has any
genealogical connection with the part of the
race whose history accounts for them, and
whether or not he has encountered them in
his own personal history; and

(d) that such ideas have some sort of existence
that is independent of the minds of the
individuals in whose behaviour they are
manifested, much as Plato's ideas did.

(105) The way is now prepared for an approach to the
mental phenomena that Freud regarded as capable of being
either unconscious or otherwise. As the preliminary
discussion may have indicated, these are not all of the
same nature. There are forces (repression), substances
(ideas), systems (ego and superego) and processes (con-
densation, displacement, symbolism). The concept of
repression is so fundamental to an understanding of Freud
that it has been difficult to postpone a discussion of it
even until this stage, and it must undoubtedly be con-
sidered first of all these concepts.
CHAPTER 2.

Repression and its logical significance.
(106) The _locus classicus_ for the description of repression is Appendix A to _ISA_, 1926. The 1915 essay on Repression must also be used, but with caution because of the subsequent development in Freud's theories. (To give two examples, Freud adopted a new theory of the nature of anxiety in _ISA_: and - what is more important - he abandoned the theory that repression is partly due to the attraction of what is already repressed on what is about to be - see _NIL_, 1933 p. 92)¹. Unless another source is quoted, my statements are based on these two passages.

(107) Repression (Verdrängung) is one of the ego's "defence-mechanisms" against certain ideas, impulses or external perceptions. It can be employed in conjunction with one, or perhaps more, of the other mechanisms. Its "essence lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness". There are two kinds of repression - primal repression, which denies consciousness to something that has not become conscious; and after-expulsion, which expels from consciousness something that has entered it. When he talks of repression, Freud usually refers to the latter, and I shall follow this usage.

¹At first sight, this is contradicted by _ISA_, p. 143, where Freud talks of "the attraction exerted by the unconscious prototypes upon the repressed instinctual process". But he is describing here not the force which is responsible for repression, but the habit (which he calls "repetition-compulsion") that makes it difficult for the ego to "undo the repressions" (ibid). Later in the same passage it becomes clear that this, so far from being part of his original concept of repression, is a new feature.
(108) Repression is not an act "that takes place once for all". It demands "a constant expenditure of energy". But in the next breath Freud says that if this energy ceased to be expended, a fresh act of repression would be needed. Later, he uses the term "resistance" (Widerstand) for the "steady counter-pressure" that is required. Unfortunately this is also used to describe his patients' efforts to avoid the removal of the repression, and I shall therefore use "repression" to refer to the steady counter-pressure, and "act of repression" to refer to the initiation of this counter-pressure.

(109) Repression is also a matter of degree. It can be completely successful, but more often fails to exclude from consciousness "derivatives" of what is repressed. The more successful it is, the less do these derivatives resemble what is repressed.

(110) The difficulties begin when we examine the meta-psychological accounts of repression. Firstly, it involves an "anti-cathexis": this seems to be a charge of energy which resists the tendency of the cathexis (or "potential energy" - see paragraph 6) of whatever is repressed to discharge itself and thus become pre-conscious. But in the UCS (1915, CP IV pp. 114, 134) it /
it is suggested that it also involves "withdrawal of the preconscious cathexis" which seems to be the translation of the repressed "idea or mental act" into words or visual images.

(111) The language of "pressure and counter-pressure" was not intended to be metaphorical. Repression was conceived as a force, exercised by one body, the ego, upon other bodies, usually ideas, in opposition to other forces, the instincts. It is true that there are passages (see the footnote to paragraph 106) where repression seems to be regarded as a habitual behaviour of the ego. This accords better with the nature of most of the other "defence-mechanisms" - regression, for example, is a type of ego-behaviour, and is difficult to describe in terms of force. The distinction is important, not only because behaviour is a concept of a completely different kind from force, but also because it would make it conceivable that the ego was thought of merely as "disregarding" whatever is unconscious, rather than actively preventing it from becoming conscious? To give an analogy, there is a difference between starving a man by simply failing to bring him food, and forcibly opposing his efforts to reach food.

(112) /

?This is the "cognitive" account which I shall be describing in paragraphs 114 et seq.
(112) It is quite impossible, however, to regard the contents of Freud's unconscious as passively allowing themselves to be disregarded. The reason why he sometimes spoke of repression as if it were a habit which the ego has difficulty in "undoing" was that his ego was not really a body of the kind that exercises forces in physics. As I shall make clearer later (paragraph 171) he failed to fit the ego properly into his psychological mechanics, and it retained some of the properties which are ascribed to persons: it is not a puppet but a manikin.

(113) It is interesting to consider what alternatives there are to the Freudian conception of repression. I do not of course mean to ask "What alternatives are there to repression as an explanatory concept?" but rather "Granted for the sake of argument that there is a need for an explanation of certain phenomena in terms of mental phenomena which are normally introspectible but are not introspectible in the cases in question, then is the Freudian description of repression as a force acting upon these phenomena the only possible description, and, if not, what other descriptions are possible?"

(114) I think that there are at least two other ways of describing /
describing repression. The first of these I shall call
the "cognitive" description, since it treats repression
as if it were essentially non-recognition. This non-
recognition can take two forms, either a complete "non-
awareness" or a mistake as to the nature of what is
"repressed". A passage from Broad's MPN (1925, p. 368)
will illustrate the "non-awareness" type of description -

"An aversion of introspective attention, which
begins by being deliberate, will quickly become
habitudal. An analogy will make this plain. If
I have a tender tooth I shall at first deliberately
try to avoid biting on it, and shall sometimes
make mistakes and hurt myself. But very soon I
shall automatically avoid biting on it. Now
emotions and desires tend to recur; and, if I
at first deliberately avert my attention from
some of them, I shall very soon come to do so
habitually. This habit, like any other, may
eventually become so strong that it cannot be
overcome by deliberate volition." (and see also
p. 330, (3)(b) )

Broad does not offer this as a description of all the
phenomena which Freud would have regarded as examples of
repression. He also uses the "mistaken nature" type
of description for certain phenomena, and he may
(though it is hard to be sure) consider that other types
of description are appropriate in some cases. It is not
easy to be sure, because Broad does not regard "wishes
and emotions" as being among the things that can be
"literally unconscious" (though he had different reasons
from Freud's for coming to this conclusion).

(115) /
(115) A much more striking example of the equation of repression and "non-awareness" is provided by Angyal in I'SP (1941, p. 120) -

"There is also considerable truth in the psychoanalytic theory of repression. Repression is a factor which aggravates the split between the psychological self and the rest of the personality. Repression can be defined, as a first approximation, as an inhibition of the symbolization of certain personality factors. The inhibition may be due to the incompatibility of a personality factor with the psychological self. Inhibition of symbolization however also arises as a useful selection between relevant and irrelevant factors (range of attention). The lack of symbolization however is not merely a function of inhibition but a more fundamental incongruity between total organism and the psychological self, because the psychological self represents only a small part of the total organism. Only part of the biological total process is symbolized by man in his present stage of evolution".

(116) Examples of the "mistaken nature" description are provided by Broad and Russell -

"Another (course) is to recognise the existence of the desire, but to pretend to myself and to others that it is for some object which it is considered respectable to desire ..." (MPL, 1925, p. 366: and see the preceding pages for a similar treatment of "misdescribed emotions").

"A /

3"Symbolization" in Angyal's language does not of course have the restricted meaning that Freud gave it. Rather, it recalls Peirce's use of the word "symbol". Angyal uses the word to refer to all mental activities that have a representational character - perception, memory, imagination, reasoning. So that when he says that something is "not symbolized" he is merely trying to say, without using words which are foreign to his terminology, that the thing is not perceived or thought about.
"A desire is called 'conscious' when it is accompanied by a true belief as to the state of affairs that will bring quiescence; otherwise it is called 'unconscious'". (AM, 1921, p. 76; see the preceding pages for the discussion of which this is the summary). Unlike Broad, Russell does not accord the same treatment to emotions; he seems to take the Freudian view that an unconscious emotion is a contradiction in terms, and that the essence of an emotion is that it should be consciously felt).

(117) I think that Angyal is the only one of the three authors quoted who offers a description of the "cognitive" type as a complete equivalent of the Freudian "repression". Even he does not make it clear beyond doubt that he regards repressed memories and ideas as being "unsymbolised" memories or ideas in the same way as repressed desires are unsymbolised "tensions" (to use Angyal's language). However this may be, I think that there are obvious inadequacies in any kind of "cognitive" account of repression.

(118) The chief of these inadequacies is this. If I say that a repressed desire is merely one of which I am unaware or which I misdescribe to myself, I imply that the only difference between it and the same desire in an unrepressed form lies in my recognition of it, and that /

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4It is true that my failure to recognise it might have effects on my behaviour, but on a pure "non-recognition" view there could only be such as could follow logically from non-recognition.}\]
that there is no other difference between the two forms. This makes it difficult to give a satisfactory account of the difference between the effects on my behaviour of the desire in one form and the desire in the other form. For example, let us suppose that I have a brother for whom I have a violent and unrepressed dislike. I shall tend to avoid his company and to be rude to him when I cannot. If, on the other hand, my dislike is repressed, then (according to Freud) I shall behave rather differently; I may seek instead of avoiding his company, and I may feel ill instead of merely rude when I am in it; if I do hurt his feelings, it will be "unintentionally".

(119) The other possible description of the phenomena of repression is of what I shall call the "substituted action" kind. This describes repression in terms of the substitution of some other action for the repressed one. In the example which I have just given, my repressed dislike of my brother would be described simply as replaced by my feeling of illness or anxiety. This does not of course reduce my repressed dislike to the status of something that I merely "don't do": if it did, that would be a fatal objection to this kind of description, since it would provide no means of distinguishing between the status of this dislike and the status of all the other things /
things I don't do when I am unable to avoid my brother's company - such as wish to play chess. The latter are not only innumerable but also of no significance for any attempt to explain my behaviour in my brother's company; whereas we are proceeding on the assumption that my dislike of him is significant.

(120) I do not think however that the "substituted action" type of description need have much difficulty in according a special status to the "replaced" action. This can be singled out from all the other actions that are not performed in one of two ways. It can be described as the action that I was formerly in the habit of performing in the same circumstances; perhaps in my boyhood I did dislike my brother, and was intentionally rude and even violent to him when in his company. There may however be situations in which this method of designating the "replaced" action will not work. Another man who is not my brother may be my rival for the affection of the same woman, and in his company I may exhibit the same symptoms of illness or anxiety. If these symptoms are to be explained by reference to my repressed dislike of my rival, it will be necessary to distinguish this dislike from all the other emotions that I do not feel.
by designating it as the one that I might have been expected to feel - the one, in other words, that I would have felt if I were a normal person. It is of course possible to designate as the normal emotion for a certain situation an emotion which, for all that is known, I have never felt before, either because I have never been in a situation of that kind, or because I had become abnormal before my first encounter with a situation of that kind. It will of course make it more plausible to call an emotion normal if the situation can be likened to past situations in which I have as a matter of fact felt that emotion - for example, if my relationship to my rival can be likened to my relation-

ship to my brother whom I used to dislike - but this is not essential.  

(121) The most striking difference between this sort of description of repression and those of the "force" or "cognitive" type is that it abandons any attempt to treat what is "repressed" as if it had the same sort of reality as /  

5Lest it should be objected that there are cases in which the "substituted action" will fail to replace the "repressed" action completely, and that there will be by-products, such as anxiety, I ought perhaps to make it quite clear that by the "substituted action" I mean the total response which has taken the place of the former (or normal) response, and not just part of the new response.
as the unrepressed - to put it colloquially, as if it were still there. The subject of Freudian repression is rendered unintrospectible and at the same time altered so that its properties are not quite the same as before repression. The subject of Angyal's repression is rendered unintrospectible, and the subject of Russell's repression is mis-described. In none of these cases are the subjects annihilated and given a purely hypothetical or historical status, as they are in the "substituted action" description.

(122) I have been compelled to offer my own outline of the "substituted action" type of description for two reasons: first, because I have not been able to find a clear example of it which could be quoted without a good deal of preliminary discussion: and second, because I do not think that a description of this kind is necessarily bound up with one particular kind of psychological system. But both these reasons must be qualified by admitting that there are psychological systems that lend themselves more obviously than others to this way of describing "repression". These are systems of the behaviourist or "reflexologist" type. Dalbiez, in an interesting chapter of PMDF (1940, Vol.II ch.2) draws attention to the possibility of describing repression /
repression and the concepts connected with it (such as displacement and sublimation) in Pavlovian terms. It is true that Dalbiez's purpose in this chapter is to show that the experiments of the reflexologists are evidence for the hypotheses of Freud: but in attempting this he makes it clear that Pavlov's language can be used to describe phenomena of the kind observed by Freud.

(123) It would take too long to summarise Dalbiez's comparison, and in any case it is probably unnecessary to attempt an account of Pavlov's well-known experiments. I shall merely borrow from Dalbiez one of his well-chosen quotations from Pavlov (LCR, p. 345) -

"One of my collaborators brought to my notice a simple case of war psycho-neurosis. An ex-officer used to relive battle scenes whenever he fell asleep, shouting, running, giving orders, etc. We succeeded in reproducing a similar condition in a dog, in whom Dr. Konradi established several conditioned reflexes in response to the various notes of an instrument, each reflex being maintained by a different absolute reflex. The first note was associated with the oral exhibition of acid, the second with the offer of food, and the third with a strong electric shock in one paw. The current was so strong that it aroused a violent defence-reaction. This violence was further demonstrated by the fact that the two other reflexes were also complicated by a defence-reaction. Later the reflexes attached to the oral exhibition of acid and the electric shock were discarded and only the alimentary reflex used. After some time the defence-reaction became grafted onto the latter, which grew weaker and wholly disappeared after two months. A little later still, we were struck by /"
by the following strange event: whenever the dog fell into a hypnotic condition (the sure indication of which was the appearance of the paradoxical phase), the defence-reactioin was aroused. When the condition passed off, the reaction disappeared. The analogy with the aforementioned clinical case is complete. It is a further confirmation of the usual explanation of such events: the traces of very strong stimuli persist in the sub-cortical centres, and emerge when the inhibitory influence of the surface is weakened.

(124) I think that this passage is a good example of the difference between the Freudian and the "substituted action" account of repression. Freud would have described Pavlov's "defence-reaction" as a memory forced out of consciousness into the unconscious, but constantly striving to return, and succeeding when the ego relaxed its constant pressure. Pavlov, on the other hand, merely talks of the defence-reaction as disappearing and re-appearing: he says nothing about its status in the interim. It is true that he does talk about something that persists in the interim, namely "traces in the sub-cortical centres". But this merely serves to underline the difference between his description and Freud's. In Freud's, what persists in the interim is something like the thing that disappeared and reappeared: in Pavlov's it is something quite different. Moreover, although Pavlov refers to his traces in sub-cortical centres as "the usual explanation of such events", it is
an explanation in theory only. It is like using the atomic theory to explain the action of a lever: it is both more complicated than is necessary and probably cannot be managed in practice. What we are really doing in such a case is to reassure ourselves that atomic physics, which by its nature ought, we think, to be capable of giving an account of all phenomena, is theoretically capable of doing so in the case of the particular group of phenomena with which dynamics deals. In the same way, Pavlov's introduction of a neurological account of the phenomena of inhibition does not add anything useful to his reflexological account: it does not simplify the notation or make it any easier to predict phenomena. It merely serves as a reassurance that the phenomena studied by reflexology are no exception to the assumption that a physiological account can be given (at least in theory) of all the behaviour of living organisms. When this is clearly seen, and when it is realised that the neurological explanation is not an integral part of reflexology, we can see that the reflexologists are attempting a task that involves something very like a substituted action account of repression. The task they have set themselves is no less than the working out of a set of concepts and rules for describing organic behaviour with the least possible reference /
reference to what is not observed. When a reaction to a stimulus is not observed, they formulate a law that describes its non-occurrence: they do not accord a special status to what they do not observe, and endow it with causal properties.

(125) I do not mean to imply that this description would fit all reflexologists, or that reflexologists have consciously set themselves this task. It is only too easy to find examples to the contrary. Bechterev, in GPHR (1925, Ch. LI et seq.) attempts to give an account of the Freudian unconscious in terms of reflexes, and in doing so distinguishes between two kinds of reflex - the "conscious or accountable" and the "unconscious or unaccountable". "Accountability" is a translator's term which seems to stand for "occurrence in accordance with expectation" (cf. loc. cit. p. 104). But we find Bechterev attributing causal properties to "unaccountable" reflexes, and generally talking about them as if they were occurring unobserved.

(126) From our point of view the reflexologists are more "purist" than the behaviourists, who allow themselves a great many more assumptions about the occurrence of the unobserved. A few quotations will illustrate this.
An article by Hull in 1939 describes two kinds of repression. (MBP, 1939). First -

"...animal experiments seem to show that if a severe frustration or emotional shock occurs, the organism may revert to a previously abandoned type of goal. In psychoanalysis this is called "regression". Sometimes, however, the emotional shock may be so profound that its generalised effects extend from the goal in which the trauma occurs to practically all such goals: this is known in psychoanalysis as one form of "repression".

The other kind is described thus -

"When we have no functioning verbal reactions conditioned to a past situation or present intent.... we obviously cannot tell about it. Such events and motivations are said by psychoanalysis to be "unconscious", whereas when we can tell about them they are said to be "conscious". Since children have few words before three or four years of age, it is inevitable that they should not be able to tell about events of that period, yet lasting habits, including toilet training, are found at this time. These events are naturally "unconscious".

(127) The first of these passages is almost pure reflexology, even to the extent of its use of terms such as "generalised". It is the second passage that introduces the account of repression that is typically behaviourist. By itself, of course, it is only a partial account, confined to what Freud would have called "primal repression" (see paragraph 107). But we find this account taken further by Gustav Bergmann (PEP, Mind 1943, pp. 122 et seq.). Bergmann, who claims to be following /
following Hull, gives only one account of repression, and makes no mention of the kind described in my first quotation from Hull. His article is a more philosophical attempt than Hull's to show how the observations of psychoanalysis can be described in the language of the experimental psychology of learning. Among his conclusions is this one:

"The experimental psychology of learning studies the micro-mechanisms of which the so-called personality mechanisms of psychoanalysis are the very complex macro-result. . . . . . Let us in conclusion test the plausibility of this scheme by enquiring what light it sheds upon the metaphorical terminology of the psychoanalysts. Within the limits of a broad structural allocation one finds the Id rather satisfactorily represented by the prime motivators and those response habits which have been partially extinguished by the learning process. Ego and Superego are somewhat cruder conceptions. What they represent, personalised and endowed with some driving power of its own, is apparently the difference between the total pattern of the responses as they would occur before, and as they actually do occur after, the development of the symbolic apparatus during the learning process. Conscious are, by definition, those intermediate states of the organism which contain the actual occurrence of a verbal symbol and/or image . . . . . . . . . . . It seems plausible that the symbolic responses are located relatively near the end of their chains and that the reaction is therefore less easily stopped short of overt expression if the process has once reached the conscious stage. Repression, that is the stopping of an initiated response sequence before it reaches that stage, becomes thus plausible as the result of strongly negative states; it also becomes plausible that anxiety, the general anticipatory response to such states, is aroused whenever strongly inhibited response sequences are about to reach consciousness. It is significant in this context, and has been pointed out by C. L. Hull, that the first training of the libidinal hungers takes place in that period of life-history where the child's symbolic apparatus is /
is still entirely missing or relatively rudimentary". (The emphasis throughout is mine).

(128) Before considering whether this can be called a "pure substituted action" account of repression, we must be clear about the difference between it and Angyal's account, particularly since there is a strong superficial resemblance. Angyal's account is a "cognitive" account because the thing that is or is not "symbolised" is one and the same as the thing that is not, or is, repressed. Bergmann's account is not a "cognitive" one because what is or is not symbolised in his "symbolic responses" is something other than what is not, or is, repressed; his symbolic responses no doubt symbolise stimuli. Put in another way, Angyal's symbols symbolise the rest of the organism's total response (the non-symbolic part of it) whereas Bergmann's symbols symbolise all or part of the stimulus. It is of course possible in Bergmann's account for one response to be symbolised in the symbolic part of another (as in introspection) but not in the symbolic part of the same response.

(129) I do not think, however, that Bergmann's is a pure "substituted action" account. Repression, for him, is not the complete replacement of one response by another /
another, but the disappearance of only part of the "repressed" response - the symbolic part: note, for example, that the "response habits" which he allocates to the id are not wholly but only partially "extinguished by the learning process". The crucial question, of course, is whether the unextinguished residue of the response is supposed by the behaviourists to be observable or not. As Bergmann does not give examples, it is not easy to be sure of his view on this point. Let me therefore take my example, in paragraph 118, of my repressed dislike of my imaginary brother. If I understand Bergmann correctly, my original response to my brother's presence was partly symbolic (a feeling of dislike, perhaps accompanied by imagery "with boiling oil in it" or something of the sort) and partly non-symbolic (perhaps a slightly increased blood-pressure and a certain condition of the gastric mucosa). Let us call these two parts of the response S and NS. According to Bergmann, repression consists of the stopping of this response before it reaches the stage of including S. It is however important to know whether in such cases NS is supposed to occur just as it did when the total response NS plus S took place. Are the rise in blood-pressure and the change in the gastric mucosa /
mucosa supposed to be the same as when S accompanied them? Or are they intensified, or perhaps accompanied or replaced by some new physiological response? Bergmann appears to assume the former. Whether he is correct or not is of course largely a matter for clinical observation, but may well turn out to be also a matter of method. For it seems to me that Bergmann is trying to use NS to supply a causal link between the total response before repression and the total response after it. So that if clinical observation showed that after repression NS was intensified or even complicated by some new physiological phenomenon, he might well call this the original response, minus S but with NS intensified, or minus S but plus Y. For this reason I suspect that NS is an assumption of much the same nature as Pavlov's "traces in the sub-cortical centres". There is of course this difference; I pointed out that Pavlov's interim persistent was quite unlike the two things, namely reflexes, that it was intended to link; whereas Freud's repressed entities resemble the mental phenomena that they are used to link. Bergmann's non-symbolic part of the total response is an attempt to find a common constituent in the responses before and after repression, while recognising the difference that gives rise /
rise to the problem. A common constituent of this kind is desired by the behaviourists because the repetition of responses is one of the assumptions upon which their system is based. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that it does not enter into other systems, such as that of the reflexologists (and even into Freud's, under the title of the "repetition-principle", although he used it only as a last resort). But it is easier for the behaviourists than for Freud to find a common constituent, since he is looking only at what they would call the symbolic response, while they are allowed to look at a total response which includes not only the symbolic response but also a non-symbolic response that they are usually allowed to adduce because it is unobservable.

(130) I think that I have said enough about the behaviourists and the reflexologists to make it plain that the account of human behaviour which they are both attempting to give is of a special kind. It is an account which confines itself to pointing out the relationships between observable occurrences. My abnormal behaviour in my brother's company is related to the punishment or admonition I received in childhood when I reacted antagonistically towards him. This is, according to this sort of account, an instance of a law /
law that children who are trained in a particular way out of their emotional reactions to members of their family later display abnormal reactions to them. This in its turn is subsumed under a more general law, perhaps to the effect that there are certain kinds (or intensities) of emotional reactions that cannot be abolished by training (or perhaps by certain methods of training) without resulting in abnormal reactions to the situations which formerly aroused the emotional reactions. It is impossible to give more than a loose example to illustrate the sort of system that is being aimed at. Between the sort of laws that I have sketched out there would really be a large number of intermediate ones. First there might be laws about members of my own family and the way in which they react to this sort of training: next perhaps would come laws about people of certain constitutional types (or of some other classification): and so on. The phenomena of repression would be described in some of these laws. The general law of repression might be to the effect that there are certain types (or intensities) of reactions that cannot, as a result of training, be replaced by reactions that do not include certain abnormalities: or it might be to the effect that there are certain types of animal of which this is true; or thirdly it might say that there are certain /
certain types of training of which this is true.

(131) At first sight I might appear to have reached the point where I ought to discuss the rival claims of the Freudian and the substituted action account of repression, and to arrive at a decision in favour of one or the other. But it begins to be seen that these two accounts are not in fact rivals in the ordinary way. They are not irreconcilable alternative explanations of the same piece of behaviour. If a reflexologist and a Freudian were both given my life-history and asked why I exhibited my abnormal symptoms in my brother's company, the former might reply -

"Because he is of a certain type and was trained out of an antagonistic reaction of very great intensity by a certain method". (He might not of course find it necessary to refer to my type, or the intensity of the reaction or the method, but I have put these references in to show how complicated his statement might be).

The Freudian's reply might be -

"Because he is repressing a (very strong) dislike of his brother".

The point is that neither the Freudian nor the reflexologist ought to say to the other "No, my explanation is the true one". For it is impossible to find any respect in which one gives the lie to the other.

(132) /
The relationship between the two accounts is interesting in other ways. Not only can the Freudian answer be given to the question "Why do I have these symptoms?": it can also be given to the question "Why is the reflexologist's explanation true?" This not only underlines the fact that it is not incompatible with the reflexological explanation, but also draws our attention to the fact that there are two answers to a "Why" question about my behaviour, or about the truth of a reflexological law: one is a more general form of reflexological law, while the other is a Freudian statement. But the reverse is not the case: it makes no sense to give a reflexological statement in answer to a "Why" question about a Freudian law involving repression.

If this logical relationship between the two kinds of statement were unique, it should make us suspicious and inclined to discredit either one or the other kind, or both. But it is far from unique. It is the relationship which we find in most sciences between the two main kinds of statement which they make. These I shall call "descriptive" statements and "model" statements. The former are statements about occurrences that can be observed, while the latter are essentially
about something that cannot be, and yet assist us in some way to think about statements of the former kind. The former include statements such as Boyle's law, the latter the statements about molecular motion which provide one kind of explanation of Boyle's law (the other kind being of course a more general form of Boyle's law, such as Charles' law).

(134) The distinction is of course one that has been recognised for a long while: Braithwaite (in SE, 1955, p.90) says that it was pointed out by Hertz in the nineteenth century. Braithwaite himself (ibid, ch.IV) has worked out, with the aid of a symbolic calculus, a definition of the logical relationship between what he calls "model" and "theory". Even so, however, it is not always easy to be sure in all cases whether one is dealing with a statement about a model or a descriptive statement, which Braithwaite would say is about the theory proper. For example, the chromosomes of genetics undoubtedly began as models, which were unobservable and whose characteristics were assumed in order to simplify the working out of statements about the observable subject-matter of genetics. Now that chromosomes have been seen under the microscope, it is not entirely easy to say whether our statements about them /
them are "model" statements or "descriptive" ones. There is little or no difficulty in classifying the diagrams of forces which we find in dynamics, or the light-waves which can be used as a model for some but not all optical phenomena. On the other hand it is not easy to recognise as descriptive statements some of the laws of physics which employ such general terms as "mass" or "energy": how far can we tell what is shorthand and what is a diagram? These problems do not however destroy the value of the distinction between the two kinds of statement, or the importance of realising that they are both to be found in the field of psychology.

(135) This realisation helps us to see, for example, that the laws of the reflexologists are almost pure description, but that their references to traces in the sub-cortical centres are model statements which have two incidental features. First, they resemble the statements of genetics about chromosomes in that something corresponding to the entities of the model has been observed under the microscope. Second, they are much less useful than most models: it is difficult to see how in fact they do make it easier for us to work out descriptive statements. We are also enabled to see that

Freud's
Freud's statements about repressed entities are model statements which employ a different kind of entity from the Pavlovian model, but which might very well be a model for a purely descriptive reflexology. (I am assuming, of course, that Freudian and Pavlovians would agree in correlating the same pairs of occurrences, which, though it may not in fact be true, can be assumed in the case of our ideal reflexology). The fact that this is not more widely recognised is largely due to the comparative rarity of descriptive statements in Freud's writings. Most of his statements, even very general ones, are about his model, and are not descriptive laws. The reflexologists and behaviourists, on the other hand, go to the other extreme, and reduce their model statements to a minimum.

(136) If, therefore, the Freudian repressed entities are to be compared with anything, it should be with another model, and not with descriptive statements. Even so, Braithwaite's logical analysis makes it clear that models are not things that are necessarily incompatible with each other. Two models used to facilitate thinking about the laws of the same science can be incompatible (though Braithwaite does not give examples) but need not be so. As instances of two compatible models for the same science, he quotes the very models which we have been /
been discussing - unconscious entities and physico-chemical processes in the brain or body as a whole (p. 343). Indeed, if the two models are used in thinking about two different groups of laws of the same science, even incompatibility does not seem to me to matter until one comes to the point of subsuming the two groups of laws under one unifying law. Let us assume for example, that the wave-model and the quantum-model which are both used in optics are incompatible. Once they are recognised as models, there can be no objection to using the wave-model in thinking about the laws that describe one group of phenomena and the quantum-model in thinking about another group. No difficulty should arise until one formulates a law which is intended to cover the laws of both groups. Even then, the difficulty, as I see it, arises only if a model is required to assist in thinking about this law. If we are content with the formulation of the unifying law, the incompatibility of the two models for the two groups of laws subsumed under it is still nothing to worry us.

What then are the features of a model to be taken into account when we are comparing it with another possible model for the same science? I think they are
these -

(a) The extent to which it does in fact make it easy for us to think about the descriptive statements of the science. More precisely, the extent to which it helps us to remember the statements which we have already worked out, or been taught; and the extent to which it enables us to work out new statements and conditions for testing them;

(b) The number of statements for which it does serve as a model, as opposed to the number for which it does not.

At first sight, these two considerations often lead to opposite conclusions. The higher the percentage of laws for which a model serves, the less easy the model is to handle in practice. The model of nuclear physics, although it is thought of as serving very nearly all the laws governing the behaviour of matter, is of very little use when we are thinking about the great majority of the laws of dynamics or of biology; it is only where we come to the stage of trying to subsume whole groups of laws under very general ones that it becomes useful.

Clearly we must distinguish between the theoretical utility and the practical utility of a model. Theoretical utility is of interest only to the scientist who is trying to formulate unifying laws, or to the metaphysician who is trying to base an argument on the extent to which scientists succeed in doing this. For other purposes, that is for the application of discovered laws to practical ends or for the working out and testing of new laws /
laws that are not of a higher order, practical utility is what matters.

(133) Practical utility depends to a great extent on the resemblance between the entities of the model and the phenomena which we observe in everyday life - that is, on what I shall call the degree of "phenomenomorphism" in the model. The more "phenomenomorphic" the model is, the less the effort of imagination that is required to make use of it. Examples of models that are phenomenomorphic to a high degree are the anthropomorphic deities of some religions, or the "forms" of Plato. The entities of the atomic theory, on the other hand, have grown steadily less phenomenomorphic as they have been adapted to more and more general laws. Among phenomenomorphic models we can distinguish those which resemble the phenomena that they are intended to/("autophenomenomorphic") and those that explain one kind of phenomena in terms of entities of another familiar kind ("allophenomenomorphic"). Anthropomorphic deities used to explain the phenomena of inanimate nature (for instance, Neptune and storms at sea) are allophenomenomorphic, whereas Plato's forms are autophenomenomorphic: a tree is what it is because of the ideal tree. The repressed entities of Freud are for the most part autophenomenomorphic, /
autophenomenomorphic, although they also borrow properties from the less phenomenomorphic models of nineteenth-century physics. Repressed ideas are obviously autophenomenomorphic, but sometimes the way in which they are supposed to operate, by forcing their way into the ego, or attempting to do so, and thereby setting up disturbances, is more reminiscent of the "hard massy atom" than of the conscious ideas on which they were originally modelled.

(139) But there are several other ways in which models ought to be subdivided. We have seen that the entities of the model of genetics began by being imaginary, with properties inferred from the observables of the science, but that with the aid of the microscope it is now possible to observe things that have been identified with these entities. Cloud-chamber photography and other devices seem to have performed the same service for atomic physics. Some people may of course wish to draw distinctions between the way in which we can be said to observe a chromosome or the track of an alpha-particle and the way in which we way we observe the inheritance of pink eyes in rats: such distinctions presumably imply that the microscope or the cloud-chamber are quite different from the naked eye, or even from the naked eye assisted by spectacles.
spectacles. However this may be, such observations are commonly regarded as "verifying" the entities of the model. So that we can at least subdivide models into "verified" and "unverified". But the "unverified" will include at least two other kinds of model. There will be those for which observations which one might expect to disclose entities corresponding to those of the model have in fact disclosed nothing of the sort: let us call these "non-corresponding" models. A non-corresponding model is not necessarily a discarded model: the science of optics uses at least three models (rays, waves and quanta) of which at least two must be non-corresponding. Some models are, and have always been, regarded as non-corresponding; an example is the isobaric and isothermic lines of the meteorologists, or the contour lines of the geographer. And fourthly there are the models that are regarded as not yet tested for correspondence and yet as not so obviously non-corresponding as to make testing unnecessary.

(140) To which class does the Freudian model belong? The answer to this question must await the discussion of the entities that make it up. At this stage all that I can do is to point out the fallacy of drawing any conclusions
from the currency of other models that are held out as explanations of the phenomena that Freud was explaining. For we must keep in mind several possibilities:

(i) such models may be usable in theory only: I cannot imagine how the model of atomic physics will ever be used to explain human behaviour. It may well of course be used, and with profit, to explain certain special behaviour of kinds of living matter: but the sheer complication of the human organism will almost certainly prevent its behaviour from being described and predicted in terms of nuclei, electrons or similar entities.

(ii) even if universal models, such as that of atomic physics, were usable for this purpose, specialised models, such as Freud's, might still be preferable, either because they were simpler to use or because they were more easily accepted by patients. History is taught to young children in terms of stories about personalities, and not in terms of economic forces, not only because personal models are easier to use, but also because children accept them and would reject others. (I shall return to this point in Chapter 6).

(iii) there are several possible logical relationships between a universal and a specialised model. Both might of course be non-corresponding; or one might be corresponding and the other not. But perhaps it is less obvious that both might be corresponding: electrons and chromosomes may be an example of such a situation. Sometimes an inference can be drawn from their compatibility; if the universal and the specialised models were compatible, either or both or neither might be corresponding. But if they were incompatible, it is difficult to imagine how they could both be corresponding.
It is tempting but, I think, fallacious to argue that because Freud's unconscious entities are *ex hypothesi* unintrospectible, he has devised a model that is *ex hypothesi* "unverifiable". For this argument depends on the assumptions (i) that all the characteristics of Freud's unconscious entities are observable by introspection and (ii) that what is observable by introspection is not observable in any other way. Freud would certainly have challenged the first of these: for he believed that all mental events had characteristics that were in theory at least observable by the investigator of cerebral anatomy and functioning. The second assumption is at first sight on safe ground, for it is difficult to imagine how an introspectible characteristic - such as the colour of my memory of a postage-stamp - could be observed by any means but my introspection. But Ehrenwald has suggested (TMP, 1947) that some phenomena are most easily explained on the assumption that some people are telepathically aware of the repressed thoughts of others; and if his explanation gains currency it will be a nice question for the philosophers of the future whether such telepathic awareness of unconscious entities should be regarded as non-introspective observation of some or all of their introspectible characteristics. I think we shall find, however, a simpler way of deciding whether Freud's unconscious entities are "corresponding", as soon as we begin to examine them closely, as we are about to do.
CHAPTER 3.

The entities of the Freudian unconscious.
In this chapter I shall describe and discuss the things that Freud talked of as "unconscious", principally with a view to determining what sort of a model his unconscious is. These things are -

**Ideas**
The unconscious parts of ego
and superego
Unconscious processes.

**IDEAS**

The notion of "ideas" (vorstellungen) was one of the things that Freud owed to Herbart. The latter's system has been summed up as follows:

"Herbart dealt with a dynamics of the soul. Its ideas are all struggling for realisation in consciousness, kept down in a state of tendency below the limen of consciousness because there is not enough room for all in consciousness. The ideas thus come into conflict and inhibit one another ...

(Boring, HEP, 1950 p. 702)

The resemblance is most striking. If we regard Freud's system purely as a "dynamics of the soul", and disregard his views on the nature of the forces that provide these dynamics, we might say that his contribution to the Herbartian system was to suggest why it was that one kind of idea rather than another succeeded in establishing itself in consciousness. But this is by the way.

The metapsychological nature of ideas has already been discussed in paragraphs 37 et seq. They are cathexes/
cathexes, parcels of energy in potential form. Occasionally they are referred to as mental acts (see, for example, UCS, 1915, CP IV p. 106). But for practical purposes they are treated as things, or substances, which are acted upon by impulses and repression as physical bodies are acted upon by gravity or magnetic attraction. Affects are the qualities exhibited by some of these substances when they enter consciousness.

(145) But EI, 1920, p.21 et seq. makes it clear that there is an important difference between an unconscious and preconscious idea: "the former is worked out upon some sort of material which remains unrecognised, whereas the latter (the Ps) has been brought into connection with verbal images . . . These verbal images are memory-residues; they were at one time perceptions, and like all memory-residues they can become conscious again . . . It dawns upon us like a new discovery that only something which has once been a Cs perception can become conscious and that anything arising from within (apart from feelings) that seeks to become conscious must try to transform itself into external perceptions; this can be done by way of memory-traces." And so on1. Freud soon sees that it is not always verbal /

1In UCS, 1915, CP IV p. 134, he says that a conscious idea is a "Wortvorstellung" plus a "Sachvorstellung", while an unconscious idea consists of the latter only.
verbal images that are used to express ideas, and brings in other memories of external perceptions, for example "thinking in pictures" which "in some ways approximates more closely to unconscious processes than does thinking in words..."\(^2\)

(146) The verbal or visual images in which ideas are expressed are thus not part of their essence. What their essence is, is not so clear. Freud is in one of his Kantian moods, and is reflecting that since he has stripped his ideas of all perceptible qualities, what is left must be unknowable. This has the advantage of explaining why the unconscious idea is unintrospectible: indeed it makes it impossible that it should be introspectible. I am not at all sure that Freud need have adopted this curious position, and still less am I sure that he remembered on all suitable occasions that he had done so.

(147) /

\(^2\)There is a passage in NIL (1933, p. 100) that is, I think, unique. Freud says that the energy of instinctual impulses must, in the id, "be far more fluid and capable of being discharged, for otherwise we should not have those displacements which are so characteristic of the id and which are so completely independent of the qualities of what is connected. (In the ego we should call it an idea)". This hint of a complete difference between conscious ideas and their unconscious counterparts is nowhere amplified, and should not perhaps be taken too seriously. It may mean no more than the difference described in this paragraph.
However that may be, we must consider its effect upon the logical status of the Freudian "idea". When we see it stripped of all that makes it observable, we are bound to wonder whether the unconscious idea is really the sort of thing that could conceivably be observed under any circumstances. In the last chapter (paragraph 141) I pointed out that just because Freud's unconscious entities were ex hypothesi unintrospectible we could not argue that his model was "unverifiable". But it may very well be that his description of his unconscious ideas may be such that they cannot possibly correspond to anything observable. We saw that there are entities like this in some models; the isobars and isotherms of meteorology are not observable. It is true that an isotherm is visualised as occupying a certain position because certain observations have been made with thermometers; but it is more than all these observations - it represents all the observations that could be made at all the points through which it passes. You cannot see, feel, smell or hear an isotherm; in fact you cannot even take its temperature. It represents a potentiality.

Freud's "ideas" are beginning to look rather like isotherms. All that one can say of them is that they are/
are things that in certain circumstances could turn into something introspectible. It was John Stuart Mill who once described a material object as "a permanent possibility of sensation". Freud's ideas are the material objects of the mind, and might almost be described as "permanent possibilities of introspection".

(149) An important feature of Freud's notion of ideas is their complexity. He does not deal in such comparatively simple ideas such as that of "my father"; it is always "my father dying" or "my father punishing me". He thus avoided a difficulty which would have arisen as soon as he gave examples of unconscious ideas. For an idea such as that of "my father" cannot be unconscious, or I should never think of him consciously or preconsciously. But it is not illogical to talk of my idea of my father punishing me as unconscious, and at the same time to say that I have a number of other conscious or preconscious ideas involving him.

(150). But Freud's notion of symbolism is not altogether consistent with this. Without anticipating my later remarks on symbolism, I can point out that most of the symbols he describes stand for comparatively simple ideas which/
which are supposed to be unconscious. What is more, the symbolised ideas are usually preconscious. To give an example, it is inconsistent of Freud to say that in a dream a staircase is a symbol of coitus (NLF, 1933, p.36) if the dreamer is ordinarily capable of entertaining the idea of coitus consciously. Nor does he escape the inconsistency by saying that what is unconscious is the idea of coitus with so-and-so, unless he also makes it clear that the symbol is a symbol not of coitus simply, but of coitus with so-and-so: and to do this he must surely point to some element in the symbol that represents so-and-so. In fact, some of Freud's examples can be explained in this way (for example, Hans' dream of smashing the railway-carriage window - CP III, p.264).

(151) We have seen that, like most philosophers and nineteenth-century psychologists, Freud distinguished mental phenomena into ideas, affects and desires, but that he regarded the third of these categories as reducible to combinations of the first two. This left him with two distinct kinds of mental phenomena, ideas and affects. And we have seen that he regarded the former/

3 I am of course leaving out of account the ego and superego, which are not introspectible phenomena like ideas, affects and desires. As we shall see very soon, Freud did not clearly appreciate this, and in consequence came to curious conclusions about the unconsciousness of parts of the ego and superego.
former as the only kind that were capable of being unconscious in the strict sense of the word: the latter were merely properties that were manifested by the former on entering consciousness. When I discussed this doctrine that the essence of affects was to be consciously experienced, I promised to suggest a reason for this distinction between them and ideas.

(152) The essential difference between an idea and an affect is the content which the former possesses and the other lacks. What distinguishes one idea from another is the difference in the things of which each is the idea: but what distinguishes one affect from another is its quality (that is, the difference between fear, pity and horror) or its intensity. If it is objected that fear (or some other emotion) is directed towards an object, that fear is fear of something and that a man's fear of water is thus to be distinguished from his fear of snakes, the answer is presumably that the relationship between affect and object differs from that between idea and content, and that the former is not essential, since the occasional instances of fear without an object ("nameless dread") do/
do not mean that fear is not an affect. Freud would, I think, go even further than this, and would say that when, as in most cases, the fear appears to have an object, it is in reality an idea of the object, together with the attached affect of fear.

(153) However this may be, I cannot find in Freud (and I have not so far found in the Freudians) any appreciation of the real nature of the content of an idea. They fail to distinguish it on the one hand from the object (the real water or the real snake) and also from the act of ideation, of entertaining the idea (the act of thinking of the snake or of the water). As a result, the indestructibility that usually belongs to the content of an idea is mistakenly attributed to the act of ideation. The content of my idea of a snake, unlike both the real snake and my thinking of it, cannot be done away with, although it may, I suppose, be altered in a sense. But if I fail to distinguish my thinking about the snake from the content of this thinking, I shall come to regard this thinking as something indestructible, and when I cannot find it in the normal place, I shall begin to look for it in odd places. It is this confusion that leads people to think
think of memories as "stored in the mind", and to conclude that "one never really forgets anything". And it seems very likely that the same confusion led Freud to distinguish between ideas as things that are indestructible and affects as things that make no pretence to be. As a result, it was only a small step to the conclusion that when an idea ceased to be consciously thought of, it must continue to exist in the unconscious, whereas when an affect ceased to be felt it merely ceased to be felt.

(154) But most Freudians have ceased to think in terms of the ideo-motor theory. No doubt this is partly because it has been discredited experimentally; but it may also be due to the recognition of a clinical fact. In psychoanalytic language, this is the fact that symptoms are not relieved solely by the derepression of ideas: the ego must also experience the appropriate affect. In layman's language, it will do me no good simply to remember my encounter with a large dog in a passage-way: nor even to remember that I was frightened at the time. I must both remember the encounter and experience the fear.

(155) /
We therefore find the neo-Freudians talking of unconscious entities of other kinds. First there is the unconscious process. We shall see that for Freud the so-called unconscious processes were of a special kind, although he sometimes used the word "vorgang" to refer to ideas or thoughts. It is this more general sense which the neo-Freudians seem to have developed, until they use the word as an umbrella for everything that happens in the mind. Brierley, for example, says -

"The full psychological reality at any moment is the totality of activated processes, conscious and unconscious." (TPA,1951,p.165).

"In metapsychology it is assumed that the mental process is the hypothetical unit of psychic life" (ibid.p.105).

"The hypothetical unit of experience corresponding to the hypothetical unit-process is not an atomic impulse, affect or presentation, but a relationship of impulse, affect and presentation ... Hypothetical units are convenient figments to illustrate the parallelism between subjective reaction and objective wave of activity, but in fact the simplest conscious experience is probably the equivalent of a whole series of processes .... whether viewed subjectively as experience or objectively as process-activation, mental life is a sequence of adaptive responses." (ibid.p.108)

A mental process seems, from these and other passages, to be something very like the combination of stimulus and response in which the behaviourists deal. What is quite/
quite clear, particularly from the last of these quotations, is that the process itself is not the kind of thing that could conceivably be introspected. Introspectibility is reserved for something that appears to be completely epiphenomenal, although of course it is still of major importance whether a process is "conscious" or "unconscious" - that is, whether it belongs to the ego-organisation or not. (See the passage from which the last quotation is taken).

(156) The other concept which some neo-Freudians have substituted for ideas is that of "object-relations". This has enabled Melanie Klein and Fairbairn to devise elaborate models. Without attempting to expound their systems (which I am not indeed qualified to do) I can illustrate the nature, and the difficulties, of the concept by the following passage from a lecture by Fairbairn. After describing the superego as an "internal object", he goes on -

"Freud's theory of the mental constitution is thus seen to imply that object-relationships exist within the personality itself as well as between the personality and external objects ... Melanie Klein, while accepting Freud's concept of the superego together with his whole theory of the mental constitution, has been led to envisage the presence of a multiplicity of internalised objects/
objects in addition to the superego. These ... are considered to represent various aspects of parental figures as interpreted, not only in terms of actual experience in childhood, but also in terms of the child’s own instinctive tendencies and emotional reactions. On the basis of the resulting concept of internal objects there has been developed the concept of a world of inner reality involving situations and relationships in which the ego participates together with its internal objects. These situations and relationships are comparable with those in which the personality as a whole participates in the world of outer reality: but the form which they assume remains that conferred on them by the child’s experience .... The world of inner reality is conceived as essentially unconscious: but this does not preclude its manifesting itself in consciousness in the form of dreams and phantasies ...... Freud’s original distinction between the conscious and unconscious now becomes less important than the distinction between the two worlds of outer reality and inner reality."

(TEAP, 1952, p.126)

(157) Here again, the concept which has been substituted for the "idea" is something that could not itself be introspected under any circumstances. But while an "object-relation" cannot be introspected, it can be the object of self-description, and has thus a different status from that of the "process". What is more, an object-relation seems to me to consist very largely of components that could conceivably be introspected/ 

4There is, of course, a fuller exposition in PSP(1952)
introspected, although the relation itself could not. For it seems to me that an object-relation is really a collection of emotions and beliefs which have been grouped together because they "are about" the same object. Indeed, when we consider the doctrine of "internalised objects", it is difficult to see how these differ from the Freudian "ideas". We must not of course make the mistake of thinking that the object-relation is completely described when we have listed its components: there is still the element of relationship, the fact that, for example, I cannot think about my brother (or as Freud might say, entertain the idea of him) without feeling hate and believing him to be ill-intentioned toward me. Thus most of the components of an object-relation are the introspectible entities of Freud, but the relationship is non-introspectible and at most the object of self-description.

(158) The difference between the concepts of "process" and of "object-relation" is of real importance for an understanding of Freud's own logical position. For each of these concepts is the development of a different side of Freud's doctrine.
On the one hand, there is the doctrine of mental entities that are introspectible in nature but are sometimes found existing in an unintrospectible position. The concept of object-relation is the direct descendant of this doctrine. On the other hand, there is the doctrine of entities that are by nature unintrospectible - energy, cathexis, anticathexis, memory-traces - and it is to this family that "process" belongs. In the previous chapter we saw how the former of these doctrines - the doctrine of repressed entities - was in reality an attempt to provide an autophenomenomorphic model for the explanation of human behaviour, and that this model, though specialised, is not for this reason necessarily incompatible with the universal model which is offered by physics, and is not necessarily non-corresponding. But in Freud's metapsychology we seem to be presented with an alternative model, which differs in important respects from the model composed of repressed entities. First, it seems to be an attempt to link the explanation of human behaviour (including introspectible mental events) to the universal explanation of phenomena offered by physics: if so, it is not a specialised model. Secondly, it is allophenomenomorphic; its working parts do not in any way resemble the things they are designed to explain.
If Freud's concepts are recognised as belonging to two quite distinct models, which are of different logical status, it will be found much easier not only to unravel many of his obscurer passages, in which he turns from one model to the other without realising what he is doing, but to understand why neo-Freudian doctrine should have divided into these two main terminologies, and why their users are so puzzled at the division and anxious to prove both their own and the other's orthodoxy, like two monasteries each of which possesses the miracle-working body of the same saint. Indeed it is paradoxical but true that although the object-relation model is the legitimate descendant of Freud's autophenomenomorphomorph model, and as such more orthodox than the descendant of his metapsychology (which was after all a by-product of his discoveries), the original propounders of the concept of object-relations were under grave suspicion of heresy.

But quite apart from its historical interest, the object-relations model throws an interesting light on the "idea-plus-affect" model if we recognise the
former as a more refined form of the latter. For an object-relation is a very thinly disguised description of a potentiality. It is, as I have suggested, a name for the somewhat complex fact that I cannot, for example, think of my brother without certain emotions and beliefs. It is more than a name for a particular occasion on which I think of him in this way, and it is more even than a name for all the occasions on which I have ever or will ever think of him. It includes, besides these occasions, other hypothetical occasions of the same kind which did not occur or will not occur. What is more, this particular object-relation includes all the differing degrees or qualities of emotion which I have felt, or will or would feel, towards my brother in various different circumstances. All this suggests that the "idea-plus-affect" model may really be a cruder kind of potentiality model. We have seen that the permanent existence which Freud attributed to ideas was probably due to the confusion between the act of ideation, the content and the object. This helped to disguise the difference in logical status between an act of ideation and the ability or tendency to perform that act. We have seen too that the affective/
affective part of the object-relation was regarded as nothing but the effect of the entry of the idea into consciousness. Thus my tendency to think of my brother with hate and suspicion, which Klein and Fairbairn would call my object-relation toward my brother, is broken down by Freud into an indestructible idea of my brother and its property of giving rise to the affects of hate and suspicion when it enters consciousness.

(161) In the last chapter I pointed out that models could be divided into "corresponding" and non-corresponding. There is no doubt that Freud would have called his model "corresponding" if the issue had been put to him. And I also suggested in the last chapter that we cannot argue from the unintrospectible nature of Freud's unconscious entities to the impossibility of testing them for "correspondence", that is, of "verifying" them. But we have seen in the present chapter that his model has been replaced in psychoanalytic practice (as well as in academic psychology) by other models, and that its most direct descendant is a potentiality model. This fits the conclusion which we reached at the end of Chapter 1, namely that Freud's distinctions between consciousness, pre-consciousness and unconsciousness were such that it was logically possible that his unconscious entities consisted /
consisted of potentialities which are not the subject of self-description, and that there could be three reasons why they were not the subject of self-description.

(162) I do not think that we can regard potentiality models as "corresponding". When the entities of models are things like viruses or chromosomes we can look through microscopes and say "That must be a virus - so that's what it looks like". But when the entity is a potentiality, no observation like this can be regarded as an observation of the entity. A potentiality is unobservable because it is a name for a very large number of events, some of which actually occur, but some of which are merely possibilities. An isobar is not observable because it is more than the measurement of the barometric pressure at a particular place, and more even than all the similar measurements that led to its being traced on the map: it is a name for all the measurements that might be made and might result in the same barometric reading at that particular time. For the same reason you cannot observe an object-relation, whether it is conscious, preconscious or unconscious.
So that, while Freud's autophenomenomorphemic model was intended by him to be "corresponding", and while verification of its correspondence is not logically inconceivable, its chief entities have been replaced in psychoanalytic practice by two models, of which one is not autophenomenomorphemic (the "process theory") while the one that is seems to be non-corresponding.

THE UNCONSCIOUSNESS OF PARTS OF EGO AND SUPEREGO

The nature and properties of the Freudian ego are in themselves a subject fully as complex and as difficult as those of the unconscious. I must, however, say something on this subject before going on to discuss Freud's theory that part of the ego was unconscious. Fortunately, the examination of other Freudian concepts has to some extent prepared us for the sort of obscurities that are to be expected in this concept.

As we have seen, the concept of the ego was a comparatively late development in Freud's thought. He used the term as early as 1893, if not earlier (see the essay on Charcot of that year, CP I, p.20) but it
is not until 1923 that we find him describing the
distinction between the ego and the id as a new addition
to his theory (EI, 1923, ch. 2). Until then, the
term "ego" tends to be used without definition and
vaguely: in the essay on Charcot it is simply the
equivalent of "the other mental processes" when he
is describing their relationship to a repressed
memory. In EI, however, he tries to define it, and
to arrive at an idea of its relation to unconscious
mental entities. Thereafter, the ego is of increasing
importance to Freud and to his followers, and they
concentrate more and more on dissecting it and studying
its behaviour. I think that this development took
place for this reason. The "discovery" of unconscious
mental entities provided a picture of a mental
machinery that looked at first like accounting satis-
factorily for all the abnormalities of human
behaviour: to understand human behaviour it now appeared:
 to be sufficient to study these unconscious
entities. The concept of the ego was necessary only
as the thing that on the one hand exercised the force
called "repression" and on the other hand was sub-
jected to the forces of the instincts, either in
straightforward shape or in the distorted form resulting
from /
from repression. It was simply needed as the subject of the verb "to repress" and as the object of the verb "to motivate". Eventually, however, it became clear that the study of the unconscious alone was not enough to account for all behaviour. Instead of being a simple, uncomplicated pronoun the ego betrayed idiosyncrasies. It turned out that it did other things as well as "repress"; it could be the subject of the verbs "regress", "project", "introject" and so forth. A fully satisfactory account of behaviour therefore called for an account of the behaviour of the ego. It was as if Freud had tried to construct an automaton that would behave like a person, and had at first thought that a system of springs and cog-wheels would serve; and as if he then found that to make it work he had to substitute a manikin for his main cog-wheel.

(166) As we shall see, the development of the concept of the superego is partly an attempt to restore to the ego the status of a mere cog-wheel. It is an attempt to provide the mainspring of the ego's behaviour towards the rest of the psychic machine. In this way it is an effort to escape from the infinite regress which /
which appeared to be on the point of commencing as soon as the complexity of ego-behaviour had to be acknowledged. The superego is a sort of ego within the ego: but not every superego behaves in the same way — some, for example, allow the ego to entertain impulses and ideas which are banned by other superegos — and the infinite regress appears to be about to begin. Probably unwittingly, Freud makes an adroit escape from the eventual necessity of assuming a sort of ego within the superego by ascribing the behaviour of the superego to the influence of parental training, and thus in effect making it a specialised part of the id, due not to inherited constitution but to environment.

(167) When Freud first attempts to describe the ego, his description is confused by a good deal of cerebral anatomy, which the charitable might try to explain away as metaphor, but which is probably due to Freud's belief that a fairly close correspondence could be traced between his concepts and the functions of parts of the brain.

"We shall now look upon the mind of an individual as an unknown and unconscious id, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the P upt. - system." (EI, p.23)
and a couple of pages later -

"The ego is first and foremost a body-ego: it is not merely a surface entity but is in itself the projection of a surface"

to which the "authorised note by the Translator" is as follows -

"i.e. the ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus" (ibid. p. 31).

Freud goes on -

"If we wish to find an anatomical analogy for it we can easily identify it with the "cortical homunculus" of the anatomists, which stands on its head in the cortex, sticks its heels into the air, faces backwards and, as we know, has its speech area on the left-hand side.""}

(168) In later works, Freud is less obsessed by anatomy.

"The ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially differentiated part of it. If we regard this part by itself in contradistinction to the whole, or if a real split has occurred between the two, the weakness of the ego becomes apparent. But if the ego remains bound up with the id and indistinguishable from it, then it displays its power. The same is true of the relation between the ego and the superego. In many situations the two are merged: and as a rule /

5On p. 29 Freud has just said "the ego wears an auditory lobe - on one side only, as we learn from cerebral anatomy".
rule we can only distinguish one from the other when there is a tension or conflict between them. In repression the decisive fact is that the ego is an organisation and the id is not. The ego is indeed the organized portion of the id... The ego is an organisation. It is based upon the maintenance of free intercourse and of the possibility of reciprocal influence between all its parts. Its desexualized energy still shows traces of its origin in its tendency to bind together and unify, and this necessity to synthesize grows stronger in proportion as the strength of the ego increases." (ISA, 1926, pp. 31-34).

Again

"A special organization has arisen which hence forward acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. This region of our mental life has been given the name of ego. The principal characteristics of the ego are these... The ego is in control of voluntary movement. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of the stimuli from without, by storing up experiences of them (in the memory), by avoiding excessive stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation), and finally by learning to bring about appropriate modifications in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of instincts, by deciding whether they shall be allowed to obtain satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favourable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations completely. Its activities are governed by consideration of the tensions produced by stimuli present within it or introduced into it... It may be inferred from the state of sleep that its organization consists in a particular distribution of mental energy." (OP. 1940, pp. 15, 16).

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6 The word is the same in the German.
From these descriptions we can draw one or two conclusions about the Freudian ego. First, it is made up of the same constituents as the id - ideas, subject to the impulsion of the instinctual forces. It is true that affects are confined to ideas that have entered into consciousness, and therefore into the ego: but affects are merely, for Freud, properties of ideas that belong to them at all times and are merely actualised in consciousness. The ego is not therefore another kind of substance. Secondly, it has no motive power of its own. For this power it has to depend on the same instinctual forces as the id. Even the force of repression is probably the resultant of the instinctual forces (albeit distorted by training) that impel the conscious ideas which are incompatible with the repressed ideas. Thirdly and consequently, it is distinguishable from the id solely by possessing the quality of "organisation".

What sort of a quality is organisation? For Freud, it seems to consist in "the maintenance of free intercourse and of the possibility of reciprocal influence between all its parts". It is thus a quality that shows itself in the behaviour of the ego's constituents. This distinguishes it from qualities.
(such as affects) that show themselves "on immediate inspection", as it were. An analogy will make the difference clearer. If I look at a game of chess which has reached, let us imagine, the middle game, I can tell by "immediate inspection" that some of the pieces are black and the rest white. But not until I observe or imagine the behaviour of the pieces can I tell that White is organised into a defence against an attack by Black's knights and King's rook. I say "observe or imagine" because it may be objected that if I am a sufficiently good chess player or critic I can tell at a glance that White and not Black is organised into a defence and so forth: to which the answer is of course that in order to do so I must imagine the behaviour of the pieces and that if I could not do this I could not detect any kind of organisation in a game of chess. I am not of course denying that there may be types of organisation that are detectable by "immediate inspection": the philosopher of aesthetics might, I suppose, point to the organisation of the parts of a painting to show that there is at least one such type. Whether this is organisation in the same literal sense as the causal type that I have been describing, or whether
it depends on the behaviour of my visual apparatus are questions that I cannot discuss: but I think it is plain that the organisation of the constituents of Freud's ego is not of this kind. The point is of importance when we come to consider the alleged unconsciousness of part of the ego.

(171) For the moment, however, I want to draw attention to the difficulty of reconciling the ideo-motor model with the fact that the ego is defined in terms of an organisation that in its turn is defined in terms of behaviour. For the ideas of the ideo-motor model are not bits of behaviour: they are things, substances, mental atoms. They may, like comets, enter and leave the system that is called the ego, and they may exert forces upon one another: but they themselves are not actions. It is true that they are sometimes spoken of as processes, or as having processes that correspond to them: but such processes belong, as I have pointed out, to the metapsychological model, and not to the ideo-motor one. As soon as you appreciate this, you begin to suspect that the ego defined in terms of organisation - what I shall call the "organisation-ego" belongs to the metapsychological model and not to the ideo-motor /
ideo-motor model. The ego that belongs to the ideo-motor model must be one of two other things, both of which can be detected occasionally in Freud's writings. Either it resembles the ideas in being a sort of mental molecule whose constituents are mental atoms, and in being able to exert forces - such as repression - upon them: or it is a mere location which ideas enter or leave under the compulsion of forces, a sort of mental billiard-table round which mental billiard-balls ricochet and disappear into pockets. But we have seen that Freud did not clearly distinguish between his two models, and it is not surprising therefore that he did not realise that each of them required a different sort of ego. It is of course with the ego as part of the ideo-motor/that we are concerned when we come, as we are about to do, to the doctrine of the unconsciousness of part of the ego.

(172) The view that parts of the ego and super-ego are unconscious seems to have been a comparatively late elaboration of Freud's theory. The first clear statement of it that I can find is in NIL (1933, pp. 93 et seq.). Later still, in OP (1940, p.45), he says something which casts a certain amount of doubt on the interpretation of the passage in NIL. "Large portions /
portions of the ego, and in particular of the super-ego, which cannot be denied the characteristic of being preconscious, none the less remain for the most part unconscious in the phenomenological sense of the word". (OP, p. 43). But the passage in NIL is quite unambiguous. Immediately after a clear statement of the difference between the "dynamic" or proper sense of the word "unconscious" and the "descriptive" sense, more properly named "preconscious" (see paragraph 49) he goes on to speak of the "discovery, inconvenient at first sight, that parts of the ego and super-ego, too, are unconscious in the dynamic sense. . ." (NIL, p.96).

The explanation of the OP passage may be that Freud is talking of the very parts of the ego and super-ego which are not "dynamically unconscious" - and that the two passages between them cover the whole of the ego and super-ego. Or the OP passage, in which Freud is trying to establish a new point about the pre-conscious, may be merely argument of an opportunist, which Freud sometimes was. The third possibility, that the NIL passage was superseded by the OP one, will not be taken seriously by anyone who compares the two.
(174) The second question is what the distinction was between the unconscious part of the ego and the unconscious part of the super-ego. I am inclined to think (though not with any confidence) that the answer is in NIL p. 92. After drawing attention to the unconscious resistance of patients, Freud says -

"The resistance can only be a manifestation of the ego ... Now that we have posited a special function within the ego to represent the demand for restriction and rejection, i.e. the super-ego, we can say that repression is the work of the super-ego - either that it does its work on its own account or else that the ego does it in obedience to its orders. If now we are faced with the case where the patient under analysis is not conscious of his resistance, then it must be either that the super-ego and the ego can operate unconsciously in quite important situations, or, which would be far more significant, that parts of both ego and super-ego are themselves unconscious ..." (Later he makes it clear that he accepts the latter view).

(175) This passage suggests that the evidence for both the unconscious part of the ego and the unconscious part of the super-ego is the phenomenon of resistance, and that the only difference between the two is that the former does the repressing under the influence of the latter. The argument seems to be this:

I. a) My patient is "resisting"
b) From what he says (and I accept it) he cannot introspect his resistance.
c) What "resists" is the ego.
d) Therefore the ego is doing something which is not introspectible.
e) Therefore part of the ego is not introspectible.

II. /
II. f) The reason for the resistance is the influence of the super-ego (whose origins and functions have been demonstrated elsewhere').

g) Introspection does not detect this influence at work.

h) Therefore it is the influence of a part of the super-ego which is not introspectible.

(176) It is sometimes suggested that Freud's psychic entities, such as the super-ego, were very largely metaphors, designed to enable his patients and readers to visualise the way in which their minds functioned. I find this very difficult to reconcile with passages like the one just quoted, where the whole argument is based on a conception of ego, super-ego, and repressed material as bodies which interact according to laws that closely resemble physical laws. The ego exercises a force upon certain ideas because it in turn is acted upon by a force exercised by the super-ego: and because we cannot see the portions of them which are involved in this psychic leverage, we must conclude that they have invisible portions.

(177) The whole argument turns upon the assumption that /
that repression and the ego belong to the sort of things that could conceivably be introspected. There is of course no absurdity in the assumption that the ego is introspectible if all that is meant is that all its constituents are introspectible: for, as we have seen, its constituents are ideas and affects, which Freud certainly regarded as introspectible. But I suspect that Freud meant something more than this, although he does not seem to have a very precise notion of what that something was. He cannot very well have thought that one could simultaneously introspect all the constituents of the ego. He may have thought that one can introspect several of its constituents simultaneously, together with the relationship between them that he describes as "organisation". In fact, as we have seen, the organisation of the ego's constituents is not something that could present itself to immediate inspection: it is something that can be apprehended only by watching the interaction of these constituents (or, as Freud calls it, the "maintenance of free intercourse and of the possibility of reciprocal influence" between them) over an appreciable period. This sounds much more like "self-description" than introspection.
(178) Nor is it easy to imagine the nature of the constituent or constituents of the unconscious part of the ego, which must, on Freud's showing, be an idea or ideas which are in theory introspectible but in practice unintrospectible. These ideas are thus in exactly the same position as repressed ideas, with the sole difference that their unconsciousness cannot be the effect of repression, since this would involve an infinite regress. This is not an insuperable objection, since we have seen (in paragraph 100) that Freud may have believed in material which was naturally unconscious. But what are we to think of as the content of these ideas that make up the unconscious part of the ego? I can think of no plausible answer, and Freud does not help.

(179) Freud certainly believed that repression could, as a result of psychoanalysis, be introspected (NIL, loc. cit.). But I think that this was the result of a failure to make two distinctions. The first is between the "act of repression" and "resistance" (see paragraph 108). As Freud himself pointed out at the beginning of his essay on Repression (1915, CP IV p,84) the former resembles conscious condemnation which he defines as "rejection based on judgment". It can quite plausibly be asserted that condemnation is an occurrence /
occurrence which we can and do introspect (and as I am concerned only to show the grounds of Freud's belief, it does not matter whether a sophisticated view of introspection would deny this). This being so, the act of repression, being of the same nature, is in theory introspectible. What is more, it may well be the case that psychoanalysis can enable the patient to introspect not only what he formerly repressed, but also a process similar to that which occurred when he first began to repress it -/that is, to the original act of repression. But even if we grant that an act of repression can be made introspectible (or at least replaced by something that is introspectible), it does not follow that repression, in the sense of constant resistance, is introspectible. I may decide to concentrate on something, and this decision may be introspected: but it does not follow that my concentration is introspectible.  

If it is maintained that concentration (or resistance) is sometimes introspected, this is probably due to the failure to draw the second of the distinctions. I have referred to this in paragraphs 54 and 55 as the distinction between introspection and self-description. In other words, I suggest that the process by which I become aware of my concentration, though it may include a certain amount of introspection, also includes comparison and generalisation. It consists of noting (by introspection if you like) what I am thinking about, remembering that I have been thinking about the same thing for some time past, noting that I cannot remember having thought about anything else recently, comparing this with my usual behaviour, deciding that it is sufficiently abnormal to be given a name, and calling it "concentration."
So far, I have been discussing the unconscious part of the ego, and have only referred in passing to the unconscious part of the super-ego. It is not always easy, however, to tell whether a reference by Freud to the unconscious part of the ego includes or excludes the super-ego: and I think the passage quoted in paragraph 174 shows the difficulty which he had in distinguishing them.

I must attempt a summary of those of Freud's statements which throw light on the nature of this concept, since it seems to me one of the most difficult to understand. I need not of course do more than summarise Freud's well-known theory of the genesis of the super-ego, or of the role which it plays in mental life.

It is a "genuine structural entity" and not merely the personification of an abstraction (NII, 1953, p. 88). It is a "modification of the ego" as a result of an "identification" with the parents (EI, 1923, p. 44). "In many situations the two ego and super-ego are merged; and as a rule we can only distinguish one from the other when there is a tension or conflict between them." to this extent /
extent their relationship resembles that between the ego and id, the former being the organised portion of the latter. (ISA, 1926 p. 31): (see also p. 46 of OP, 1940). "It is the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself ... and whose demands for ever-increasing perfection it is always striving to fulfil ... This ego-ideal is a precipitation of the old idea of the parents, an expression of the admiration which the child felt for ... them" (NIL, 1933, p. 88) "By setting up this ego-ideal the ego masters its Oedipus complex and at the same time places itself in subjection to the id. Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id. Conflicts between the ego and the ideal will, as we are now prepared to find, ultimately reflect the contrast between what is real and what is mental ... Through the forming of the ideal, all the traces left behind in the id by biological developments and by the vicissitudes gone through by the human race are taken over by the ego and lived through again by it in each individual." (EI, 1923, p. 48)
(183) The conscious manifestations of the super-ego appear to be feelings of guilt, inferiority, depression, occasionally self-approbation (M.L., 1933, p. 33, 34) and the sense of compulsion to do or refrain from certain actions (or thoughts). There is also the statement (in EI, 1923, p. 33-45) that another manifestation may be "an unconscious sense of guilt", which Freud makes in the full knowledge that it is inconsistent with his belief that there are no unconscious affects. These manifestations must not however be regarded as constituting the super-ego, or indeed as anything more than its effects upon the ego, which it produces by means of what is described as "punishment" or "criticism", or, less metaphorically, as "tension".

(184) What is it then that produces these effects? It cannot be merely a special subdivision of the "organised processes" that constitute the ego, for that would require us to suppose that such processes either are these manifestations (guilt, depression and so on) or are related to them in some epiphenomenal way: whereas it seems quite certain that their relationship is a causal one.

(185) It is possible that the answer lies in the ego-ideal (Idealich - see N, 1914, CP IV, p. 51).
Freud may have regarded this as a complex of ideas, and, as we have seen, ideas were the substances of the mental world which Freud pictured: they were just the sort of thing to produce effects on the ego of this kind. I cannot put this suggestion forward with complete confidence, but it seems to me to explain two facts which take some explaining. The first is the importance of the ego-ideal to the concept of the super-ego, an importance quite out of proportion to the comparatively infrequent instances in which the ordinary human being is consciously influenced by anything resembling an ego-ideal. The second is that in at least two passages (EI, p. 51 and OP p. 123) Freud speaks as if the super-ego is of the same nature as the id and as if the essential difference between them were that the id represents "the organic past" (i.e. the influence of the evolution of the species) while the super-ego represents the early experience of the individual.

(186) The more closely the super-ego is examined, the more closely it is seen to resemble the id in its nature and operation. Both (if I am right) consist of ideas producing effects upon the ego: in both cases the effects consist either of behaviour or of affects /
affects or both. There are only two important differences between the two concepts. The first is their origins: the second is that the id is regarded as being "external" to the ego, while the super-ego is "internal" to it - in some passages, a part of it.

(187) The need for a super-ego seems to arise from the way in which Freud tried to anatomise the mind into two main systems - the id, and the mediator between the id and the external world, the ego. The behaviour of the latter was intended to be explicable by reference to the forces exercised upon it by the id and the external world. In certain circumstances, however, the ego behaved in a way which could not be explained as the mechanical result of these forces: it was still, one might say, a personality, whose behaviour was to some extent determined by its history.

(188) Freud might have explained this as the result of modifications in the constituents of either the id or the ego (or indeed of both) which had been produced by the history of the individual. That he did not adopt these solutions was probably due to his assumption that the constituents of these two systems could not be modified, but could only be made more or less /
less conscious, or be cathexed with more or less energy.  

(189) It is true that Freud does describe the super-ego in at least one passage as a "modification of the ego" (see paragraph 182). But it is clear from the context of this as well as the other passages that it was, as Freud said, to be regarded as a "genuine structural entity", which could, on occasion at least, operate quite independently of the ego, and which could, as we have seen, produce effects on the ego while remaining "unconscious" itself.

(190) What then is the distinction between the conscious and unconscious parts of the super-ego? The difficulty appears to be to identify something that can plausibly be called the conscious part. Once we have realised that guilt, depression and so on are effects and not constituents of the super-ego, there is little left that is conscious. The simplest way out of the difficulty would be to suppose that Freud was not troubling to distinguish effects from constituents when he thought of a conscious super-ego.

Freud's actual reasoning was no doubt less logical. For instance, he uses the "delusions of observation" found in some psychotics as an argument for regarding the super-ego as a separate internal system (NIII, 1933, p. 81).
(191) This may well have been the explanation. Certainly, the distinction between effects and constituents is not made by Ernest Jones, even where he has made a special attempt to describe the difference between conscious and unconscious super-ego, (DCS, 1927). He suggests that the conscious part corresponds very closely to what is commonly called conscience: "considerations of reality, with knowledge of actual life, have been allowed for in its formation". The unconscious part, on the other hand, is irrational, unrelated to reality, derived from few sources (chiefly of course the parents) and is infantile in attitude. What he appears to be distinguishing here are two different sorts of behaviour on the part of the ego: he may not mean that this behaviour constitutes the super-ego, but if he regards the super-ego as something more, he has distinguished its parts only by means of their effects on the ego.

(192) On the theory that the super-ego is essentially a complex of ideas, it would obviously be possible to distinguish those that are conscious or preconscious from those that are unconscious. An idea which could be introspected in order to explain certain sorts of behaviour
behaviour would be a constituent of the preconscious super-ego, and an idea which, though regarded as causally responsible for certain sorts of behaviour, was not introspectible would be part of the unconscious super-ego.

(193) So that in so far as Freud distinguishes the unconscious super-ego from the unconscious ego (and of course he does not always do so) it is a miniature and specialised id. Its effects upon the ego, like those of the id, consist either of actions or affects. If my earlier suggestion is accepted, it consists like the id of a complex of ideas. Freud was aware of this resemblance (see, for example, OP, 1940, p. 122-3). For him, however, the difference in origin involved a difference in metapsychological status. The impulses of the id are forces exerted by the bodily organs of digestion, reproduction and so on – that is, by the inherited structure of the organism. But some (if not all) behaviour can be fully explained only by referring to the early history of the particular organism.

10 "Behaviour" in this context of course includes having feelings of guilt and so forth, as well as performing the actions which would have avoided such feelings, and the vague phrase "certain sorts of behaviour" could be defined by reference to the feelings of guilt, self-approval and the like which accompany, or are the alternatives to, a wide class of actions.
organism. In effect Freud said that this must be because the forces exerted by its inherited structure were opposed by forces exerted by something created or implanted in the organism.

(194) There are two interesting features of the super-ego, which can be seen more clearly when it is described in this crude way. The first is apparently a criticism of my simplified description. For my description would include all the effects of an organism's history on its behaviour. But the Freudian super-ego does not include all this. Yet it is very difficult to define the difference between the effects which Freud would and those which he would not have attributed to the super-ego. He would no doubt have tried to base his distinction on the source of the acquired behaviour: if this source was the parents - or people in a parent-like relation to the child - then the behaviour would be attributable to the super-ego. But this would include all sorts of behaviour, such as speech or the way in which a man brushes his teeth. And if the source of "super-ego behaviour" (as I should like to call it for the sake of brevity) is not limited to the parents (for orphans have super-egos) it is difficult to see exactly what sources should be included /
included and excluded. Eventually, perhaps, we should be faced with the necessity of allowing all behaviour acquired by imitating other persons to be "super-ego behaviour".

(195) All I am trying to do here is to establish the difficulty of drawing a satisfactory distinction in kind between "super-ego behaviour" and other learned behaviour. Yet Freud must have thought it possible, for a great deal of learned behaviour was clearly regarded by him as not being "super-ego behaviour". Nor is it easy to understand where these other kinds of learned behaviour fitted into his system. Some of them were certainly attributed to dynamically unconscious ideas, others again to a preconscious source (such as the "verbal residues").

(196) The other striking feature of the Freudian concept of the super-ego is the extent to which it is a reification, and even a personification, of the phenomena of habit.11 The process which resulted in this /

11 It is interesting to note that there are only two phenomena that Freud describes in terms of habit. One is the tendency to recall or even re-enact unpleasant experiences, the other is the tendency to repress against what has been "de-repressed" in the course of treatment. To explain these, Freud makes use of the concept of the "repetition-compulsion". This is a last resort, and a confession of the failure of other concepts to explain the phenomenon. I believe that Freudians now explain the recall or re-enactment of the unpleasant by the concept of masochism.
this reification seems to have consisted of the following steps -

1. the observation that certain actions and affects cannot be explained entirely in terms of ego and id.

2. the observation that the more striking of these resemble actions and affects produced in the child by its parents.

3. the observation that some of the actions and affects are accompanied by thoughts of a parent or parent-like person.

4. the conclusion that this concomitance betokens a cause-effect relationship.

5. the assumption that the affects and actions which are not accompanied by such thoughts in an introspectible form are nevertheless caused by them in exactly the same way as those that are.

6. the conclusion that there exists in a non-introspectible form a complex of ideas of one's parents (and of other parent-like persons) operating upon the ego to produce certain actions and affects.

(197) The point upon which I want to make in passing is that the first of these steps rests on the notion of the ego (and for that matter the id) as something which is not susceptible of alteration. Any change in its behaviour therefore calls for an explanation in terms of a force acting upon it. To say that the ego acquired the habit of feeling guilty when it lost its temper.
temper would not, for Freud, have been an explanation of its feeling of guilt. For him, the feeling must be the effect of something acting upon the ego, and this something must be the idea of the persons who first produced these effects upon the ego.

**UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES.**

(198) Freud constantly refers to "unconscious processes". "Process" is used by his translators as the equivalent of both "vorgang" and "akt". The former, however, is the more frequent, and I understand that like "process" it connotes a succession of events or states, involving the notion of change.

(199) What these unconscious processes were is a very important question for the understanding of the true nature of the Freudian unconscious. I think that he sometimes used "vorgang" or "akt" to mean simply "idea", or more precisely its metapsychological equivalent. (See, for example, NIL, 1933, p.75). We have seen, of course, that in the autophenomenomorphic model ideas played the part of unchanging substances, but I have already suggested in the introduction that the
cathexis which is the essence of the metapsychological equivalent of an idea may be like an electric current in a metal ring. This would explain how Freud could call it a process; it is an endless process, which does not result in change, rather like perpetual check in chess.

(200) We must consider, however, the possibility that in some contexts Freud is thinking of sequences of ideas as "unconscious mental processes". I have pointed out that intellectual operations, such as reasoning and calculating, were not regarded as unconscious. But a great part of our conscious mental life consists of sequences which are not of these kinds - trains of thought about subjects with only remote connections, or even phantasies (daydreams). Can some of Freud's unconscious processes be of this nature?

(201) Certainly he sometimes talked about unconscious phantasies. Most of these references are in a fairly early essay (HPB, 1908, passim) and later ones (for example in R, 1915, CP IV, p. 87) are not so clearly references /

\[12\] Vorstellungsläufe (OP, 1940, p. 42) is translated by Strachey as "sequences of ideas".
references to unconscious phantasies\textsuperscript{13}. It is often difficult to be sure whether Freud is talking about the unconscious proper or about the preconscious (see Chapter 2).

(202) I should very much like to know for certain whether Freud believed in unconscious phantasies in his later years, or whether he abandoned this belief as he abandoned the notion of unconscious calculation (see paragraph 62). For there are two ways in which he would have had difficulty in reconciling it with his other beliefs. We have seen that phenomena involving "verbal images" or "thinking in pictures" are not unconscious but preconscious or conscious, although of course the verbal or pictorial images may clothe something that has hitherto been unconscious (paragraph 145). To be consistent with this belief an unconscious phantasy would have been something very different from a conscious or preconscious one.

(203) The other belief with which Freud would have had to reconcile this notion is the permanence of ideas. /\
\textsuperscript{13}Varendonck, however, in his book PD, (finished in 1921, with a foreword by Freud) seems in no doubt that Freud believed in unconscious as distinct from preconscious phantasies (see p. 19).
ideas. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Freudian ideas are not things that occur and then cease to be; they are indestructible substances. Yet if they do not occur, but exist, what sort of a thing is a sequence of ideas? A conscious or preconscious sequence is not too difficult to visualise; it is the order in which the ideas emerge, are clothed in verbal or visual images and are the subject of attention (although there are difficulties here too, particularly in "preconscious ideas"). But this cannot be the nature of an unconscious sequence, for in the unconscious the ideas are not clothed in images, nor are they the subject of attention. All that an unconscious phantasy can be is the collection of ideas that would form a conscious sequence of the kind called a "phantasy" plus whatever it is that links them together in this way; it cannot be a literally unconscious sequence.

(204) There is no doubt that one of the things that Freud thought of as an unconscious process was repression. But, as we have seen, repression, in the sense in which it is a conscious phenomenon, is not a process at all, but a force. It is true that what I have /
have called the "act of repression", that is the expulsion of an idea from consciousness and pre-consciousness, might be regarded as a process. Certainly it involves change. But is it unconscious? Freud may have thought so, for he did not clearly distinguish it from repression as a constant force, and as we have seen he thought that this force was exercised by an unconscious part of the ego. I do not think however that he was really thinking of this when he referred to unconscious processes.

(205) I am quite sure that in the great majority of cases he was thinking of the processes involved in what he called the "dream-work" (see, for example, NL, 1933, p. 28-9, or OF, 1940, p. 50-1). These are, of course, symbolism, condensation, displacement, dramatisation. I have not included "secondary elaboration" as there is no doubt that Freud regarded it as preconscious, not unconscious.

(206) "Dramatisation" (darstellung) can also, I think, be disregarded. It is mentioned as one of the processes of the dream-work in ID (1900, p. 315 et seq.), but not in OPA (1940) or the other late works, although
Ernest Jones (PPA, Ch. XI) and Healy, Bronner and Bowers (SMP, 1930 p. 258) include it in their list. I think that its omission from Freud's later works is significant, for it implies two things which do not accord very well with his other views. In essence it appears to be the representation of abstract or complex relationships (such as time, causal connection, repetition) by simple concrete or pictorial relationships between elements of the dream. Thus a causal relationship between A and B is expressed by dreaming first of A and then of B (or of course of A and B in disguised forms); while repetition of an incident involving a person can be represented by seeing two or more images of the person simultaneously. This implies first that the unconscious is trying in dreams to make statements and convey propositions, and second that the preconscious is forced to express these statements in an exceedingly crude form. This is an almost complete reversal of the sort of activity that Freud elsewhere attributes to the two systems, and he nowhere attempts to justify it. I therefore suggest that it can be safely assumed that Freud discarded "dramatisation" as one of his "unconscious processes".
(207) This leaves three "unconscious processes" to be considered - symbolisation, condensation, and displacement. Symbolisation (symbolisierung) is not, so far as I can discover, discussed by Freud from the metapsychological point of view. It is, of course, fairly clear that he thought a symbol was. It is an idea which (or sometimes an object the idea of which) appears in conscious or preconscious mental processes in place of another idea which is prevented from appearing in them by repression. (Ernest Jones would, I think add that the prevention might be the result not always of repression but sometimes merely of the mind's incapacity - PPA, ch. VI). But what the process of symbolisation consists of is not so clear.

(208) It is not, of course, merely the act of thinking of the symbolic idea, for this is a conscious process. It must be something which helps to account for the occurrence of the conscious idea. It cannot be a process of transformation of the repressed idea into the symbolic idea, for the repressed idea continues to exist and to give rise to symbolic ideas on later occasions. To put this argument in another form, symbolisation cannot be regarded as a series of events/
events in which the symbolised idea is the first event and the symbolic idea the last, since the symbolised idea is not an event at all, but an existent. Indeed, I have little doubt that Freud also thought of the symbolic idea as an existent, which differed from the symbolised idea in being conscious or preconscious while the other was unconscious. If so, of course, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a process which could link them in the way in which Freud thought of them as being linked. I am inclined to think that what Freud was describing as a process was really a relation of some kind. To give a crude example, if I deputise for someone at a meeting, there is no process of deputising which is distinct from my attending the meeting, and which goes on outside the committee-room either before or during the meeting. "Deputising" is a relation between me and my principal — or, more precisely, it is my attendance at the meeting described in the light of my relation to my principal.

(209) However this may be, one or two things seem certain. If symbolisation is a process, then an essential part of it, the symbolic idea, is conscious or preconscious. Secondly, it does not seem to involve /
involve any change in the symbolised idea. Moreover, whether it is to be regarded as a process or relation, it is very much more complex than the psychoanalytic description of it would lead us to believe. I have already pointed out (in paragraph 150 on "ideas") that it is not plausible to talk as if what is symbolised is something comparatively simple, like the idea of coitus: for the idea of coitus can quite easily be consciously entertained. There is no good reason why I should use a symbol, such as going up stairs, for an idea which is conscious or preconscious. The theory of symbolism becomes plausible only when the symbolised and the symbolic are comparatively complex: for example, when coitus with a parent is symbolised by going up the stairs in the parent's house. I think, however, that we must go further than this. To be complete, the description of the symbolic and the symbolised must include whatever affect is attached to the ideas. In my example, it is a repressed desire for coitus with a parent that is symbolised by a pleasurable idea of going up stairs in my parent's house (not that the affects are always as similar in the symbolised and the symbolic). I should like to make the suggestion, in passing, that the apparent multiplicity of symbols for the same thing is explained /
explained by the complexity of the symbolised: for example, that dreams of flying and dreams of going upstairs do not really symbolise the same thing, coitus, but that each symbolises a different aspect of it (or, more precisely, a different attitude towards it). Synonyms, in fact, do not exist in symbolism any more than in ordinary language.

(210) So that when the Freudians regard symbolism as a universal language, for which it is possible to compile a dictionary, they are over-simplifying. I am not denying that it may be helpful, and in a limited sense true, to say that going upstairs symbolises coitus. But we must not be misled by this into the notion of symbolisation as a process or relation which connects simple ideas such as these.

(211) If the two remaining processes\(^{14}\) of the dream-work - condensation and displacement - are examined in the light of these remarks, it will be found that my generalisations apply to them also. First, it is just as /

\(^{14}\) In case anyone should ask whether Freud's "primary process" (primärvorgang) is not another candidate for the title of "unconscious process", it is perhaps worth a footnote to explain that this is his name for the combination of condensation and displacement. This is clear from UGS, 1915, CP IV, p. 119 and OP, 1940, p. 52.
as difficult to visualise in what the "process" consists: that is, there are the same grounds for suspecting that Freud was really trying to describe a relation. Secondly, both "processes" terminate in a conscious (or preconscious) phenomenon. Thirdly, they do not seem to involve any change in the unconscious elements in the "process". Fourthly, whether they are processes or relations, the elements which they connect are complex, and cannot be adequately described in terms of ideas alone (or, in the case of displacement, of affects alone). It is less surprising, of course, that these generalisations apply when we see how closely condensation and displacement resemble symbolism: indeed, I think that condensation can fairly be regarded as a special kind of symbolism, differing from normal examples in matters of degree: if I use A in a dream to represent X, Y and Z, the connection is simply more complex and less likely to recur in a recognisably similar form, than if I use A to represent X alone.

The Timelessness of the Unconscious

(212) At the beginning of my Introduction I referred briefly to the ways in which the entities of Freud's unconscious differed from the same entities in their conscious /
conscious form. According to Freud there are four main characteristics which distinguish the unconscious from the preconscious and the conscious. These are —

(a) **exemption from mutual contradiction and absence of negation.** Two incompatible ideas or impulses do not cancel each other out, but exist side by side and if they manifest themselves do so by means of a compromise, which is as it were a resultant of the two forces:

(b) **mobility of cathexis.** The cathexis, or "charge" of one idea can be transferred to another, particularly if the former is repressed, and an idea may thus have behind it the "force" as it were that but for repression would be distributed among several ideas:

(c) **substitution of psychic for external reality.** The impossibility of attaining an end, or the fact that to do so would have harmful consequences for the individual, persuades the conscious mind not to desire it, but it will not affect an unconscious desire.

(d) **timelessness.** As this is by far the most interesting of the four, I shall quote Freud's own words: "The processes of the system Ucs are timeless (zeitlos); i.e. they are not ordered temporally (zeitlich geordnet), are not altered by the passage of time, in fact bear no relation to time at all. The time-relation also is bound up with the work of the system Cs."

(UGS, 1915, CP IV, p. 119).

(213) I have not been able to find any writer who has attempted to explain the fourth of these characteristics. The other three are easy enough to understand when one grasps /
grasps that the model is based on ordinary dynamics, with ideas being impelled by forces as billiard-balls are impelled by a cue and their momentum. But what does Freud mean by his "timelessness"? I think that the clue lies in the subject we have just been discussing, the nature of the so-called "unconscious processes". We have seen that they are not really processes at all, but relations between unconscious and conscious ideas. We have also seen that another thing that Freud sometimes talked of as a process, namely repression, is really conceived of in his model as a force. I have also suggested that if by unconscious processes Freud occasionally means nothing more than the ideas themselves, these are processes only of a very special kind, since they do not change; they are like a mouse in a treadmill or an electric current induced in a metal ring. So that in the Freudian unconscious nothing progresses. There is no real change in its inhabitants: all that happens is that they leave it or enter it, and while they are in it they are immobile. There are no "goings-on" (vorgangen) in the unconscious. I think that Freud had an inkling of the real nature of the model he was describing. I do not mean that he regarded it as a model, with all the /
the possibilities of correspondence or non-correspondence and so on that this implies; but I think that he realised that the sort of world he was trying to describe when he drew his picture of the unconscious was really a frozen, lifeless world, in which there was no change and therefore no time.
CHAPTER 4.

Freud's arguments for unconscious entities.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE UNCONSCIOUS.

(214) Freud used several arguments to support his belief in unconscious mental entities. But he did not collect them into a single systematic statement: he uses one argument here, another there. As a result it has been left to others to sort them out and distinguish them.

(215) Healy, Bronner and Bowers (SMP, 1930, p. 22) distinguish seven "main" arguments. Levine (TU, 1923, p. 92 et seq.) gives five, but one of them is really concerned not with the existence but with the status of the unconscious - with the question whether it is "mental". I shall show, in the course of my discussion of Levine's other four arguments, how Healy, Bronner and Bowers' list fits into his classification.

(216) I shall nickname his four arguments -

a) the argument from other minds
b) the argument from discovered causes
c) the argument from continuity
d) the argument from results.

Their statements correspond fairly closely in wording to Freud's, but comparison with Freud is difficult because they omit any reference to their sources. This is a stupid omission, which arouses one's suspicions; but they are on the whole to be trusted.
I shall try to state them in a more rigorous way than Levine, who tries to follow Freud's own dictum far too closely. I am of course concerned with the arguments themselves and what they prove or render probable. I am not qualified to criticise the evidence on which they are based, except where the evidence is supposed to be obtained from introspection. I shall not for example challenge the claims made for post-hypnotic suggestion, at least in so far as they relate to observable facts.

THE ARGUMENT FROM OTHER MINDS.

(217) It is not easy to state this argument precisely without making the fallacy too plain. Levine puts it in this form:

"Strictly speaking, each one of us has knowledge only of his own mental processes. Those of other persons are known by inference. Psychoanalysis only requires us to follow a similar line of inference in the case of our own self. In other words, when we meet with behaviour which has all the appearance of expressing psychic activity, we are entitled to infer a psychic source in our own being for that behaviour, that is, the Unconscious. It is then as valid an inference as that of the consciousness of other persons." (Levine goes on to explain why Freud denied that this argument demonstrated the existence of a second consciousness).

(218) The weakness of this argument appears as soon as we /

2 The argument is not in SMP
we ask what the evidence is on which the inference to other minds is based. It is of course the similarity of certain actions of other bodies to our own. From introspection we know that these actions are for the most part accompanied by mental events (for the present purpose the temporal or causal relationship between the two is immaterial). We therefore conclude that when we observe similar actions in other bodies they are accompanied by similar mental events. But what we are trying to account for are of course those actions of our own which introspection does not show to be accompanied by mental events.

(219) The argument is thus of this form: "most of my actions of a certain kind have mental accompaniments. Other people's actions of a certain kind therefore have mental accompaniments. Those of my actions of this kind, therefore, which are not known to have mental accompaniments probably have them". The second step ought of course to be "Some actions of this kind by other people probably have mental accompaniments". In fact, the introduction of other minds into the argument contributes nothing but confusion. If they are left out, it is reduced to this: "I know by introspection that most of my actions of a certain kind have /
have mental accompaniments: therefore the rest probably have”.

(220) In this form, the argument cannot be dismissed so lightly, for it is of a kind used in other scientific inquiries. If infection with the smallpox bacillus is accompanied by fever and a rash in some cases but not in all, we are able to draw a conclusion: but not of the kind which Freud has drawn. We conclude either that we are deceived, and that the remaining cases really have fever and a rash, or (if we trust our observations) that there is some difference between the cases which showed these symptoms and those that did not. This pair of alternatives is of use to us, of course: it is merely a stepping-stone from which we pass to some experiment which will point to one or other of the alternatives as the explanation. We are not satisfied until either a delay has allowed the usual symptoms to manifest themselves, or we have concluded that the immune cases have an organism in their blood which destroys the smallpox bacillus.

(221) In other words, the observation that "most Xs are Ys" neither proves nor makes probable the conclusion that "the other Xs are Ys, too" unless a thorough /
thorough investigation fails to suggest a relevant difference between those Xs that are seen to be Ys and those that do not seem to be. For we are not dealing with a situation in which all the observed Xs are Ys and we know that the observed Xs are most of the Xs: on the contrary, some of the observed Xs have been observed not to be Ys.

(222) It is now clear that there is an important assumption underlying this argument of Freud's, namely that similar effects have similar causes. If action X is usually the effect of mental event Y, then, whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary, it must be so in the remaining cases. Therefore, Freud argues, mental event Y, though not observable in the remaining cases, must have occurred just the same, the only difference being that it was not observable.

(223) If this simplification of the argument is a fair one, then it is a fair criticism to point out that it leads to a conclusion rather different from Freud's: that is, to the conclusion that in the cases in which mental event Y is not observable it does /
does not differ in any relevant respect from mental event X in the cases in which that event is observable. In other words, that there is no relevant difference between conscious and unconscious mental events.

(224) It is necessary to qualify this conclusion by using the phrase "relevant difference", since the process of classification which enables any two events to be regarded as similar must always involve disregarding some features of both as irrelevant. So that although we have seen in earlier chapters what important distinctions Freud drew between conscious and unconscious mental events, we must still consider whether he would have considered them relevant.

(225) It is perhaps hardly fair to quote against Freud at this point his statements that the unconscious could not "in normal conditions bring about any purposive muscular acts, with the exception of those already organised as reflexes." (See paragraph 64): or his remarks about the "timelessness" of unconscious processes, which might be expected to prevent them from preceding or accompanying actions in quite the same /
same way as conscious processes. And it must be remembered in Freud's favour that he seems to have regarded the consciousness of mental events as strictly epiphenomenal. (See paragraph 42).

(226) This last observation is in all probability the key to the problem. "Consciousness" for Freud was an epiphenomenal quality which distinguished conscious from preconscious processes. Causally, the two were indistinguishable. When Freud used his "argument from other minds" he was, in all probability, failing to distinguish between preconscious and "dynamically unconscious" mental entities (see paragraph 49). His argument is evidence for the former (though even so its value is doubtful) but if it is carelessly used as evidence for the latter, it leads to the unfortunate conclusion that they are causally indistinguishable from preconscious or conscious events.

(227) The existence of this confusion is confirmed if we consider whether Freud does ever in fact give an example of two similar actions of which one is caused by a conscious (or of course preconscious) process and the other by an unconscious one. Perhaps the examples which are most nearly of this kind are some of the mistakes /

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3 But this does get him into real difficulties over the argument from discovered causes: see paragraph 239 et seq.
mistakes in speech or action which are described in 
PPEL. In most of those the mistaken action or locution 
which is attributed to an unconscious thought or 
intention is very different from the sort of thing 
which we should expect to result from a conscious one. 
But there is at least one example in which, at first 
sight at least, this is not so. On pp. 62-3 of PPEL, 
Freud tells the story of the lady who said "Yes, a 
woman must be pretty if she is to please the men. A 
man is much better off. As long as he has five 
straight limbs, he needs no more." Of this, Freud 
says "The woman's saying, following its wording, 
could just as well be an excellent witticism as a 
jocose speech-blunder. It is simply a question 
whether she uttered these words with conscious or 
unconscious intention . . . . . ." Even here, however, 
the real point is not that she could conceivably have 
said "five" as the result of a conscious thought, 
but that if her unconscious thought had been conscious 
instead, she would no doubt have said "four". In 
other words, the conscious thought that might have 
caused her to say "five" would have been a different 
one from the thought that, being unconscious, caused 
her to say it in this instance.
(228) Apparent exceptions such as this underline the fact that what Freud was seeking to explain was not the similarity of one group of actions to another, but the dissimilarity of a small group from all the rest. This group consisted of such things as unjustified fears, unreasonable actions, apparently causeless mistakes, physical symptoms without detectable physical origins, and so forth. The nature of Freud's explanation is discussed in other chapters. My present purpose is merely to show that his "argument from other minds" was neither based on the evidence which it requires nor leads to the conclusions which Freud requires.

(229) It is interesting to compare Freud's argument with Professor Macmurray's "account of the theoretical origin of the notion of the unconscious in psychoanalytic theory" (BS, 1939, pp. 169-172). Professor Macmurray concludes -

"What I call the consciousness of another person is simply the thoughts, impulses, desires and intentions which I must assume to be operative behind the behaviour that I observe. No doubt I am convinced that he is aware of them, but I am not, and in the nature of things can never be. The "unconscious" of the psychoanalyst involves the hypothesis that what is always true of my consciousness of another person's /
person's consciousness is true also in respect of a part of my own consciousness. It merely insists that I can observe in my own behaviour as well as that of other people elements of activity which can only be accounted for on the assumption that they have a motive and to which I can assign no motive. If this is so, then I must have motives which I am not aware of. A motive of mine which I am not aware of is quite properly described as an unconscious motive, and the collection or system of such motives in myself is not too badly described by the phrase "my unconscious".

The argument is almost identical with Freud's, but with one important difference. In Professor Macmurray's hands it is a psychological explanation of the origin of the theory of the unconscious, and not an attempt at a logical justification of it. It therefore contains no logical fallacy, and is merely true or untrue, probably the former.

THE ARGUMENT FROM DISCOVERED CAUSES.

Levine's statement of this argument is so brief that it can be quoted in extenso:

"If it be still maintained that the conception of unconscious mental processes is invalid, what can be made of the mass of facts which it has been the special task of Psycho-analysis to bring to light? Is pathology a myth? Are errors and mistakes just an "accident"? Are dreams mere meaningless froth or rubbish? And what of the facts of post-hypnotic suggestion, which even before the time of Psycho-analysis seemed to demonstrate the reality of unconscious mental activity?".
This seems to correspond to items (a), (b), (c) and (f) in SMP:

"(a) the post-hypnotic carrying out of suggestions held in the unconscious;
(b) the evidence found through discovering the latent meaning of dreams;
(c) the discoverable bases for common slips or errors of speech, memory, action;
(f) the fact that through psychoanalytic technique various mental and physical symptoms are found to have their foundations in hidden mental life, and in general, that "analytic investigation reveals some of these latent processes as having characteristics and peculiarities that seem alien to us, or even incredible, and running directly counter to the well-known attributes of consciousness".

It is not easy to see exactly what the argument is. It seems however to consist of a claim to have discovered certain things ("meaning" of dreams, "bases" of errors, or "foundations" of symptoms) that account for certain otherwise unaccountable phenomena. Hence the nickname I have given to the argument.

The first question to be considered is "What does the process of discovery consist of?" Undoubtedly, in many of the examples that Freud gives, the meaning
of a dream or the basis of a slip of the tongue is an assumption, and it is this that gives the argument its appearance of begging the question which has irritated critics such as Wohlgemuth (CEP, 1923, pp. 54-8 et alibi). These, however, are merely applications of the theory, whose plausibility or far-fetchedness certainly contribute to its acceptance or rejection, but are not strictly relevant to the argument we are considering.

(234) To be fair, I do not think that Freud would have regarded the meaning of a dream or the cause of a parapraxis as "discovered" unless it had been made conscious. It is true, of course, that he did not always distinguish clearly between his patient's consciousness of something and his own perception of that something as being present in his patient: we have seen a similar confusion between introspection and self-description (see paragraphs 53 et seq.), and there is undoubtedly a close connection between the two, although they can of course occur independently. A good example of what I shall call the confusion between the conscious and the diagnosed is Freud's claim to be able to make "resistance"

(235) /
But if we leave cases of "diagnosis" out of account, it becomes painfully obvious that "discovery" by "making conscious" is suspect. Not only is a "conscious idea" very different from an unconscious one on Freud's own theory - as is clear, for example, from their different effects - but the process by which the unconscious is made conscious is not what would ordinarily be called discovery. It is of course often stigmatised as being the effect of suggestion by the analyst: and some analysts, such as Ferenczi and Schmideberg, support this, although most would prefer to see it called "interpretation" (which is what Stephen Potter would call an "O.K. word" while "suggestion" is not). Even if true, however, this criticism does not explain why it is possible to induce a patient to admit to one unconscious desire and not to another; and it does not prove that there is not something there to be discovered: the most that it could show is that the process of psychoanalysing someone is not the discovery.

What can be said with certainty is that it is much more plausible to give the name "discovery" to the /
the process of making conscious what is preconscious than to the making conscious of what is "dynamically unconscious". It is interesting to see how many of the examples of unconscious ideas or desires given in Freud's early works are really preconscious. Very few, for example, of the causes of parapraxes and so forth which he gives in PPEL (1904) would have been regarded by him in later life as anything but pre-conscious.

(237) This is a very relevant consideration when the value of cases of post-hypnotic suggestion as evidence is in question. I have not found any account of experiments designed to show whether the subject of post-hypnotic suggestion is preconsciously aware of his instructions.

(238) The next question is the way in which the "discovered" ideas, desires or emotions "account" for the phenomena which Freud uses them to account for. Let us accept for the moment the assumption that they have been discovered in a way which does not alter their nature. The argument implies, I think, that they account for certain effects in the same way as normally /
normally conscious ideas, desires or emotions account for certain effects. These effects may be either other ideas, desires etc., or bodily actions. In either case, the unsophisticated man regards the relationship of "accounting for" as the relationship between a cause and an effect both of which are events. A fit of anger is regarded as the event that causes both the sudden flush and the murderous thought. The cause is regarded as occurring before the effect, although it may of course overlap with it temporally. (I am not of course discussing the way in which an idea or emotion is sometimes regarded as a "slice" out of a longer series: that belongs to the "argument from continuity"). The cause may last longer than its effect, or, more usually, vice versa.

(239) But this cannot be the relationship between an unconscious idea, emotion or desire and its effect. For they are "timeless" (zeitlos): they do not "occur", but are "there" all the time. Their effects, on the other hand, are transient, whether they are bodily actions or thoughts. This is fairly obvious in the cases of bodily actions, but tends to be obscured in the case of mental effects by Freud's habit of treating them as substances.
(240) This does not of course mean that there can be no causal relationship between Freud's unconscious entities and what he regarded as their effects. People frequently account for an event by adducing as "cause" something that is not an event. If I ask why a jack-in-the-box springs out when I unfasten the catch, I may be told that the cause is the compressed state of the spring within.

(241) We must of course consider the possibility that this relationship (which, for want of a better name, I shall call that of "subsistent cause" to its effect) was regarded by Freud as the relationship which connected not only unconscious but also conscious mental entities to their effects: in other words, that conscious mental entities were "subsistent causes" and not "occasions".

(242) This possibility is not disposed of by the apparently transitory nature of conscious mental states. For one thing, we shall see, when we come to examine the "argument from continuity", that these were regarded by Freud as merely the conscious sections of permanent

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4This distinction between "subsistent causes" and "occasions" is not quite the same as the Thomists' distinction between "material" and "efficient" causes.
permanent (or comparatively permanent) entities. But even if this were not so, it is possible for a comparatively transitory state to be regarded as a "subsistent cause". In the case of an explosion in the cylinder of an internal combustion engine, the electric spark is regarded as the "occasion" and the presence of a certain mixture of oxygen and petrol vapour as the "subsistent cause": both, however, are transitory, and it may be that we merely regard the more transitory as the "occasion", and the less transitory as the "subsistent cause".

(243) There is of course no explicit statement by Freud of such a view of conscious or preconscious mental processes. At times, when he is being Pavlovian and describes the ego as something which merely reacts to stimuli, it is possible to read this view into his words (see, for example, OP, 1940, pp. 15-16): in such passages, "stimulus" corresponds to "occasion", and the subsistent cause is the state of the ego, though it is precisely this aspect of psychic causation that is left vague.

(244) But even in these passages, we find that the
stimuli which act upon the ego come from within as well as from without. There are thus mental as well as physical "occasions". And whatever the relationship between the ego and conscious mental events it would be very difficult for Freud to maintain that the latter were never "occasions". He would, for example, have had great difficulty in explaining why a man, sitting quietly in a room and subject to no external stimuli which would explain his action will go to a bookcase and look up a page in a book, or will wind the clock, or suddenly begin to write a letter. To us, conscious mental events seem more like occasions than subsistent causes.

(245) The argument from "discovered causes" thus seems to me to require us to overlook two important things. The first is that the process of psychoanalysing someone is not what we should normally call "discovery", and the second is that if anything is "discovered" it does not belong to the kind of "cause" to which we should normally assign conscious mental entities.

THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTINUITY.

(246) Levine states this argument as follows:

"It is found by experience that the data of consciousness are "very incomplete". Both among normal people and abnormal, psychic activities occur which do not contain their own explanation. They presuppose other psychic /
psychic activity, of which consciousness, however, reveals nothing.

"What is meant is not simply the activity in dreams, errors, obsessions. In everyday experience we meet with 'ideas whose origin we do not know, and thought products the elaboration of which remains a mystery to us'. The significant fact is that, as Freud writes, 'all these conscious activities remain disconnected and unintelligible, if we persist in the claim that everything psychic in us must be consciously experienced; whereas they fit into a demonstrable, coherent system, if we introduce the unconscious activities that are revealed behind.'"

(247) This corresponds, I think, to arguments (d) and (e) in SMP:

"(d) the fact that ideas suddenly appear in the mind from somewhere outside consciousness or even that problems are solved without awareness;

(e) the small amount in consciousness at any one time in comparison to the latent content of the mind."

(248) Both these statements are open to the criticism that they do not clearly distinguish between the "argument from discovered causes" and the argument they are trying to state. But both Levine and the authors of SMP are right in attributing to Freud an argument that is quite distinct from the one I have just discussed. One of Freud's clearest uses of this third argument is in a passage which had not been written /
written at the date of SMP or Levine's book:—

"Every science is based upon observations . . . We make our observations . . . precisely by the help of the breaks in the series of conscious mental events, since we fill in the omissions by plausible inferences and translate them into conscious material. In this way we construct as it were a series of conscious events complementary to the unconscious mental processes". (OP, 1940, pp. 36-7)

(249) As always, the first thing is to make sure whether Freud is really thinking of the unconscious or only of the preconscious when he uses this argument. SMP's reference to "the fact . . . that problems are solved without awareness" is an excellent example of the failure to ask this question, since Freud had long since abandoned the notion that the unconscious proper could do anything of the sort.

(250) The very passage I have quoted from OP makes it doubtful whether Freud was really thinking of the unconscious proper. The paragraph which follows my quotation, and which is unfortunately too long to reproduce here, goes on to explain the difference between the preconscious and the unconscious proper, treating /

5 Inserted by translator.
treating it (as we have found Freud doing before—see paragraphs 58 and 59) as a matter of degree, and not of kind. As I have already suggested, Freud may have been guilty of using an argument that proves (or purports to prove) only the occurrence of preconscious processes and extending it to unconscious ones by later describing the latter as if they were merely preconscious processes that are particularly hard to introspect. 6

(251) The argument from continuity is probably the best illustration of the way in which Freud treats mental phenomena as if they were material things. For the argument amounts really to this:—

a) from 2 p.m. until 2.01 p.m. I thought about the frosty Caucasus.

b) from 2.01 p.m. until 2.03 p.m. I thought about my dinner.

c) from 2.03 p.m. until 2.04 p.m. I thought about the frosty Caucasus.

d) what happened to my thought about the frosty Caucasus during the two minutes for which I thought about my dinner?

e) /

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6His use of words in the passage in OP tends to support this suggestion. What the translator renders as "unconscious mental processes" at the end of my quotation from OP is merely "unbewusste Psychischen" in the original. Then, after describing the readily introspectible preconscious "Vorgang" he turns to "andere psychische Vorgänge, Inhalte . . . Für diese reservieren wir den Namen des eigentlichen Unbewussten." It is tempting to translate this as "other mental processes or rather contents . . .": for as I have pointed out (in Chapter 3) Freud did not really believe in dynamically unconscious mental processes, and in the present passage it looks very much as if he was correcting himself.
e) it was there all the time, but it was unconscious.

This is strikingly similar to the commonsense answer to the question "Where is the dining-room table when I am not looking at it?". "Still there; it is invisible because you are in another room".

(252) If you could find a person sufficiently intelligent and articulate to give you a very general description of his experience of the outer world, but at the same time, by a happy accident, ignorant of physics and philosophy, he might well tell you that this experience consisted of "things and their actions". If you asked him where the things are when he is not experiencing them, you would be told "either still there, or somewhere else". But if you asked where their actions were when he was not experiencing them, you would be told "either still going on, or stopped". Like all conversations on such subjects, this has a rather unlikely air. But it shows the importance of deciding whether you are talking about a thing or an action.

(253) If Freud had regarded mental phenomena as actions he could not have used the argument from continuity.
continuity. To do so would have been like asking "What has happened to the typing of Chapter 1 when my typewriter is typing Chapter 2?" In the case of a typewriter the answer is simple - it just is not doing anything but typing Chapter 2. In the case of mental phenomena Freud was of course dealing with something far more complicated than a typewriter. The fact that I am thinking about my dinner does not exclude the possibility that I am also continuing to think about the frosty Caucasus, any more than the fact that a printing press is printing a page of type excludes the possibility that it is also folding another page at the same time. But if it does not exclude it, no more does it prove it. To prove it you must show that what was an unfolded Page One in the machine when it started to print Page Two has somehow got folded while the machine was known to be printing Page Two. This sort of thing does occur, in Freud's view, with preconscious processes: they can develop while other processes are going on in consciousness. But it is exactly what does not happen with unconscious mental entities. They are timeless, changeless; next time you look at them (if you can manage to get a look at them) they are just the same as the last time.
We have now examined three out of Freud's four arguments - the ones from other minds, from discovered causes and from continuity - and found them inconclusive. Before I go on to the fourth, the argument from results, I want to point out one way in which these three differ from the remaining one. They are all what I might call "laboratory arguments". It is true that as Freud states them they are based on evidence which he has observed in everyday life or in the consulting-room, and not on laboratory experiments. It might therefore be more accurate to label them "arm-chair arguments". But this is a side-issue: my point is that they ought properly to have been based on laboratory experiments. This point is quite independent of the question whether the arguments themselves are conclusive. The argument from results, on the other hand, is not of this nature. It appeals to the consulting-room instead of to the laboratory. It is true that neither Freud nor his critics have seen it in this light. Freud uses the argument, as we shall see, as if he were a scientist who is claiming that a crucial experiment has verified an hypothesis, and not un- naturally his critics have complained that consulting-
room results are not the same as the results of scientifically controlled experiments. But I hope to show that Freud was mistakenly putting in "laboratory language" an argument which could be more cogently put in another, less ambitious, way.

(255) This logical difference between the argument from results and the others is interesting because of the mixed parentage of Freud's notion of the unconscious. In my Introduction I pointed out that while his psychological notions were those of Herbart, his technique developed out of that of the French hypnotists, and it was of course the results achieved by the technique that led him to look for and find psychological notions, in particular that of the unconscious, to fit these results. We find this origin reflected in Freud's arguments for the unconscious. Three of them are those of the academic psychologist (although not of course based on evidence or stated in ways that would satisfy the academic psychologists), while the fourth is really a technician's argument. I hope that the nature of the difference will become clearer as I go on.
THE ARGUMENT FROM RESULTS.

(256) Levine states this argument very briefly, and does not discuss it at all:

"It may be pointed out that successful treatment has been achieved upon the basis of a hypothetical Unconscious. The course of conscious processes is thereby affected. This seems, therefore, to prove that the hypothesis of an Unconscious has real justification. [The italics are Levine's]

(257) SMP merely quotes (but without any reference) from UCS (1915, CP IV p. 99) -

"When it appears that the assumption of the unconscious helps us to construct a highly successful practical method, by which we are enabled to exert a useful influence upon the course of conscious processes, this success will have won us an incontrovertible proof of the existence of that which we assumed."

(258) Freud himself seems to have regarded this argument as no more than a reinforcement of his other proofs. In the passage just quoted it is a sort of postscript to his main proof (in this case a mixture of the arguments from continuity and from discovered causes). What is more, I cannot find any later passage in which this argument is used.

(259) /
(259) I think that the argument from results, as Freud uses it, is overstated in several respects, but that at the same time it is the only one of his arguments that has any force when his unconscious is recognised as a scientific model. I shall therefore try to remove the overstatements.

(260) Let us first examine the conclusion, which Freud describes as "an incontrovertible proof of the existence of that which we assumed". In the language of scientific models which I have improvised in earlier chapters, he is saying "This proves it is a corresponding model". But there is really only one way to do this. First, you must show that the entities of your model are the sort of things that could conceivably correspond to something observable. When we considered Freud's ido-motor model, we found that while he intended its entities to be of this nature, they have since been refined into the form of "object-relations" which could not conceivably be corresponding. Second, you must then discover by observation something that corresponds to your entities. And while the entities of the Freudian model are not ex hypothesi unobservable, there is no means at present that would be recognised
as observation in the way in which microscopic examination is recognised to be observation in sciences such as genetics.

(261) Freud must therefore give up the attempt to prove by this means that his model is corresponding. But as soon as he does so, his argument becomes one which merely seeks to show that of all possible models his is to be preferred. For if you can establish that your model is a corresponding one, then it does acquire a status that distinguishes it from other models that have been devised to explain the same phenomena; but if not, the most you can hope to show is that yours is the best.

(262) At this point you must decide whether "best" is to mean "best for all purposes" or merely "best for your purpose". I do not think that any scientist or philosopher since the middle ages has claimed for any one model that it is the best for all purposes; even those that offer the model of modern physics as a universal model would not deny that there are fields in which it is only theoretically usable and in which a cruder model is of greater practical utility. A dietician would be handicapped and not helped if he were /
were forced to scrap the calory-vitamin model for the model of nuclear physics. Nor, I think, would even the most fanatical Freudian claim that his model would be of use in neuro-surgery. Indeed, as I have pointed out in the Introduction, there are types of psychotherapy that seem to be able to do without the concept of the unconscious. The most that Freud could safely claim is that his model is the best for the purpose of a certain kind of psychotherapy.

(263) Working backwards from Freud's conclusion, the next claim that we have to consider is that his "practical method" is "highly successful". I am, as I have said before, not qualified to discuss evidence for or against psychoanalysis which is offered by the laboratory or the clinic. But I hope that I am not disqualified altogether from commenting on this controversy. It seems to me that in most of the countries of Western civilisation this dispute has now progressed beyond the stage in which the opponents of psychoanalysis denied that it had any remedial effect. (The exceptions appear to be the Roman Catholic countries and Scotland). Most of its opponents now argue that it has some effect, but that there are other methods that are to be preferred, either because they are quicker, or because they produce more lasting or more marked improvements. A more extreme position, however /
however, is taken by Eysenck, who maintains that such evidence as can be collected about the recovery rates of neurotics who are treated by psychoanalysis or eclectic psychotherapy, and of those who receive no treatment whatsoever, suggests that in both cases about two in every three recover. He is careful to point out, however, that a properly controlled experiment has yet to be conducted. (UAP, 1953, Ch.10).

(264) Even if these were the results of a controlled experiment, however, they are not sufficiently precise to tell us what we want to know. Guntrip has pointed out (TFP, 1953, p. 116) -

(i) that the argument assumes that the state of the neurotic after natural recovery and after psychotherapeutic recovery is the same;

(ii) that we should want to know the relapse rates after both kinds of recovery;

(iii) "a statistical summary ... takes no account of the motives patients may have for recovery or non-recovery ... Some types of patient ... find extreme difficulty in accepting psychotherapeutic treatment at all".

The force of the third of these arguments is not at all clear to me; in so far as I think I understand it, it seems to me to beg the question by assuming that if
this type of patient did co-operate the treatment would do him good. But the first two points seem to me to be legitimate criticisms.

(265) In the same article, Guntrip also makes an interesting assertion which suggests that Freud himself might have been willing, towards the end of his long life, to modify his claim that he had constructed a "highly successful practical method". Guntrip says -

"It is well known that as Freud grew older he grew more cautious in his estimate of the therapeutic value of psycho-analysis, though he retained an undiminished regard for it as an instrument of scientific research on mental life".

I gather from Guntrip that he is founding here on ATI (1937, CP, Vol V), and that he regards that essay as an admission by Freud that psychoanalysis, being unable to abolish or diminish the real source of neurotic disorders - namely the instincts - is unable to achieve permanent cures. It is obviously important to know whether this is a correct interpretation, since it is only a matter of time before it becomes an argument in the hands of the opponents of psychoanalysis.

(266) /  

By what psychological writers usually call "a personal communication". I had a talk with him.
(266) I think myself that Guntrip has oversimplified what Freud is saying in ATI. I do not think it will be a waste of time to attempt a summary of this very important essay. It starts by referring to the problem of the patient who, having made a certain amount of progress, is "becalmed" without having been fully cured. Freud discusses certain methods of speeding-up the analysis and bringing it to an end. This suggests to him the interesting question whether, in the theoretical sense, there is ever really an end to an analysis. At this point Freud makes it clear that in practice, of course, most analyses do have an end:

"Every analyst will have treated cases with this gratifying outcome. He has succeeded in clearing up the patient's neurosis, there has been no relapse and no other nervous disturbance has succeeded it." (CP, Vol. V, p. 320)

He then goes on to discuss the exceptions - the analyses that drag on without coming to a satisfactory end, or that have to be renewed some years later because the patient has relapsed. He starts this discussion by saying that of late years he has confined himself to training - analyses (of prospective psychoanalysts) and to the treatment of a relatively small number of severe cases of neurosis, in neither
of which types is there any question of shortening the analysis. Broadly speaking, he then comes to these conclusions. First, the number of "interminable analyses" can be reduced if the analyst himself keeps himself in good shape, as it were, by undergoing periodic analyses himself. Second, the irreducible number of cases which he cannot then deal with will be due either to his own irremediable shortcomings, or to two kinds of defects in the patient. One of these is the way in which some patients cannot get out of the habit of using certain defence-mechanisms (such as repression or regression) to deal with their conflicts, even when these mechanisms are recognised by them during analysis to be harmful. The other is the fact that instincts are sometimes too strong to be subdued by any method; Freud ends by giving two particularly intractable instances.

(267) I do not think that this shows any lessening of confidence in psychoanalysis as a technique for dealing with the majority of cases of neurosis. It is of course always possible to find passages that will support extreme interpretations: Freud is a writer who thinks aloud, even when he is thinking of ways of presenting the case against himself. I think that
Freud summed up his own views on this subject in an even later work (CP, 1940, p. 78) when he said -

"It is true that we do not always succeed in winning, but at least we can usually see why it is that we have not won. Those of us who have been following our discussion only out of therapeutic interest will perhaps turn away after this admission . . . But for the moment we have nothing better at our disposal than the technique of psychoanalysis, and for that reason, in spite of its limitations, it is not to be despised".

(268) If Freud had been concerned, however, to construct as cast-iron an argument as possible, rather than to state what he believed, he might have put forward a more modest claim for his method. He might have been content with maintaining that his method enables the user "to exert an influence upon the course of conscious processes". Notice how close this is to the words he himself used - all that has been omitted is the assertion that the method is "highly successful" and that the influence is "useful". In other words, he might reduce his claim to the assertion that he can by his method produce in his patient such emotions as fear, pity or horror, or recollections of events which the patient denied being able to recollect, whether or not the productions of these /
those emotions or recollections have any beneficial effect. This watered-down claim might not be to the taste of Freud or his followers, but it would greatly strengthen the argument from results.

(269) The next part of the argument to be examined is Freud's claim that the assumption "helps us to construct a... practical method". Again this claim seems slightly overstated. First, as a matter of historical fact, the method appears to have been constructed more by trial and error, the error being hypnotism and the method of "free association" and "interpretation" being the more successful and less disreputable alternative. Certainly the fact that the entities of the model were mental and not physiological (that is, the model's autophenomenomorphism) may have suggested that an alternative to hypnotism should be sought among "mental", that is, semantic methods: but the model itself was suggested to Freud by his experiments with the semantic technique of hypnotism. But I pointed out in the Introduction that there is more than one kind of semantic technique, and there is nothing in the model itself to suggest which of them is most likely to be successful. It would be truer to assert /
assert that the model helps the psychoanalyst not in the construction but in the application of his technique.

(270) For I think that Freud was confusing two things. One of these is the way in which a scientific hypothesis suggests an experiment that will confirm or refute it; the other is the way in which a model is used to help the scientist or technician in thinking about his subject. An example may make this clearer. It was observed that in certain parts of the world large numbers of people developed the symptoms called yellow fever. As we know, the general statement that explains this is that a person bitten by a Stegomyia Calopus mosquito which has bitten a sufferer from the fever will in most cases also fall a victim. So much could be established purely by observation, if we could think of the right observations to make. But we are less likely to think of them if we are not accustomed to think in terms of the microbe model. This in fact led first to the idea that the fever was contagious, and to the experiments that disproved this (such as dressing healthy volunteers in the clothes of sufferers) and next to the idea of an insect vector, which suggested the famous experiment in which Lazear proved by his death that Stegomyia Calopus was the vector.

(271) /
What is important to note here is this. First, the experiment proved nothing about the model. Nothing but direct observation could do that; and it has in fact shown that it is not a microbe but a filter-passing virus that is involved. Second, that thinking in terms of the model was not the only way in which the experiment might have been thought of, although such thinking undoubtedly made it far more probable that the association between the mosquito and yellow fever would be noticed.

The third thing to note is that experiments that verify or refute general statements belong to sciences and not to techniques, and that what Freud described as his "highly successful practical method" is a technique and not a science, though it may be based upon a science. In the next two chapters I shall try to separate the science from the technique, and to show the roles which the notion of the unconscious plays in each.

I shall conclude this chapter by restating, without Freud's overstatements, the only one of his four arguments which appears to me to have any force.
In its new form it might be put as follows: -

"The model of the unconscious is of more help than any other in the application of a technique that enables us to produce in patients certain emotions, recollections and other mental phenomena."

In this form, it seems to me that it is a good deal harder to refute. To do this, one would have to show either that the model is of no help at all, or else that there are better models for the purpose. Please note that it would not be sufficient to show that one could manage without a model. It is, I suppose, possible to remember all the laws of genetics, and to be a successful horse-breeder, without thinking in terms of chromosomes, or even hearing of them; but this does not discredit the model, which provides a much easier way of working out and remembering what will happen if you mate two animals with certain characteristics.
CHAPTER 5.

Unconsciousness as a scientific principle of inference.
In the chapter on Freud's unconscious entities I discussed the sort of a model that these constituted, but I did not discuss the way in which this model is meant to be used to facilitate thinking about human behaviour. I have therefore said a good deal about the nature of unconscious entities while saying very little about the place of the notion of unconsciousness itself. In order to understand this fully, we have to appreciate several things. These are—

a. The nature of the science on which psychoanalysis is based:

b. The nature of the laws of this science when they are stated in their proper form:

c. The role played by the notion of unconsciousness in the formulation of these laws:

d. The fact that, though based largely on one science, psychoanalysis is neither a pure nor applied science, but a technique:

e. The fact that the way in which this technique uses the notion of unconsciousness is not unique, though it may be rare.

In his "Philosophy of Science" (1952) Toulmin gives an account of scientific explanation which is very relevant for my purpose. In his chapter on
"Laws of Nature" (p. 90) he discusses various views which have been held about the logical status of such laws, and shows how the different views result from the kinds of scientific statement which are selected as examples. For in Toulmin's view there are four different kinds of scientific statement, and each one can be used to prove a different theory.

(276) His illustration is taken from geometrical optics, which, because of its comparative simplicity and its use of concepts which are easily grasped by the layman, he employs to illustrate most of his arguments throughout his book. His four classes of scientific statement are -

(i) abstract, formal statements of a law or principle - e.g. Snell's Law, in the form quoted above:

(ii) historical reports about the discovered scope of a law or principle - e.g. the statement that Snell's Law has been found to apply to most non-crystalline substances at normal temperatures:

(iii) applications of a principle to particular cases - e.g. the statement that, in a particular prism now under examination, the directions of the incident and refracted beams vary in accordance with Snell's Law; or the statement that the sunlight getting over a certain wall is travelling to the ground behind the wall in a straight line:

(iv) /

\footnote{For Snell's Law, see paragraph 286.}
(iv) conclusions of inferences drawn in accordance with a law or principle - e.g. the conclusion that, the angle of incidence and refractive index being what they are, the angle of refraction must be 36°; or the conclusion that, with the sun at 30°, the shadow of a 6ft. high wall must be 10ft. 6ins. deep.

(277) In considering how the statements of psychoanalysis fit into this classification, it is possible to be misled in several ways. First, by trying to fit in statements that do not belong to it; and second, by failure to find satisfactory examples of ones that do belong. Toulmin's classification describes the statements of a completed science, and not the statements that were made in the construction of the science, nor again those that tell us how to manipulate the laboratory apparatus. But it is just this sort of statement that constitutes most of psychoanalytic literature. Another misleading feature is the complexity of most psychoanalytic descriptions, compared with the relative simplicity of those of geometric optics. This is no doubt partly because organic behaviour is more complex than inorganic behaviour. But it may also be due to the fact that psychoanalytic observables are not yet numerically measurable, and descriptions of them are thus deprived of /
of the compact notation which most of the sciences enjoy (but see paragraph 286).

(278) The pure science of psychoanalysis is thus something which is implicit, not explicit, in the literature, partly because this is the literature of a science under construction, partly because the writers are in any case concerned more with application and technique than with the formulations of laws, and partly because these laws would in fact be extremely difficult things to formulate satisfactorily.

(279) Before I try to formulate a not too unsatisfactory example of a psychoanalytic law, there is one more precaution to be taken. As Toulmin points out (p. 44) there are two kinds of science - the "explanatory", such as physics, and the "descriptive", such as natural history. The latter "hunt out regularities in phenomena" while the former "investigate the form of regularities whose existence is already recognised".

(280) We have already come across this distinction in Chapter 2, where I pointed out the difference between
the Freudian account of repression and the "substituted action" account that is offered by the pure reflexologist, and where I argued that the logical relationship between the Freudian and the reflexological explanation of behaviour is the logical relationship that is found between scientific statements about models and scientific statements of the purely descriptive kind. And in subsequent chapters we found that by regarding Freud's unconscious entities as belonging to a scientific model we were able to make a good deal of progress with the task of sorting out their relationships to one another and to his metapsychological entities, and were able to estimate the comparative worth of his four arguments for the unconscious.

(281) I must deal here, however, with two attacks that may be made on my assumption that psychoanalysis is based upon an explanatory science. First, it may be said that no science is wholly descriptive or wholly explanatory. It may be pointed out, for example, that even natural history, which Toulmin uses as the example, par excellence, of a descriptive science, sometimes offers explanations that are not just more general statements. The cat's possession of incisor teeth, for example, is not dismissed with the explanation that
"all carnivores have incisor teeth"; natural history goes on to explain that incisors are useful in masticating uncooked meat and that the process of natural selection therefore results in the survival of carnivores with well-developed incisors, and in the gradual disappearance of their less fortunate brethren; this explanation in its turn can be expanded by references to genes and chromosomes. Likewise, it may be argued, the so-called explanatory sciences cannot be purely explanatory; they must have something to explain, and therefore must include some descriptive statements; physics, which is Toulmin's example of a purely explanatory science, must be about something, or it would be nothing but pure mathematics.

(232) I think that there are two mistakes in this argument. One is the assumption that when natural historians offer explanations of the regularities they observe, these explanations are also part of the science of natural history. In fact, scientists themselves distinguish such explanations from natural history proper, by calling the former biology, or, more often, by assigning them to some subdivision of biology such as genetics. The converse of this mistake is to regard the regularities which are admittedly the subject of
of the explanatory sciences as being "collected" by such sciences in the same way as specimens are collected by the botanist. In fact they are seldom collected in this way, but usually have to be "manufactured". I am not trying to suggest that the behaviour in the laboratory of some synthetic substance such as polythene is in any way less "real" than the behaviour of migrating geese. But the fact that a substance that would not be encountered if it had not been produced by the chemist himself is nevertheless of interest to chemistry illustrates the difference between this science and natural history which the argument we are considering tries to obscure. Natural history is not interested in phenomena that are deliberately produced in the laboratory. For the second mistake of the argument is to ignore the differences in the objects of the two kinds of sciences. The object, and the value, of sciences such as natural history, history proper, or geography is the information they give about what Toulmin calls "regularities in phenomena"; but the point of physics is not the information it provides about phenomena that we shall not encounter unless we deliberately produce them ourselves; it is the explanations that its experiments enable it to offer. At this stage the objection may be raised that all sciences ultimately have a practical aim; they all /
all assist us, though sometimes very indirectly, to do something that we want to do - whether it is to make life longer or shorter, more bearable or less so. Even if this is accepted, however, - and it need not be - there is still a valid distinction between the sciences that serve their practical end through the information they provide about phenomena that occur naturally (by which I mean of course "outside the laboratory") and the sciences that do so by providing explanations that make it easier to predict or produce phenomena.

(233) The second attack that we must meet is the argument that even if Toulmin is right in distinguishing between explanatory and descriptive sciences, I am wrong in suggesting that psychoanalysis is based upon an explanatory science. It is possible to argue with some force that the real value of psychoanalysis lies in its observations of natural phenomena. Perhaps the best illustrations of this would be the many resemblances pointed out by Freud between infantile attitudes towards parents and adult disorders of behaviour and emotion. Strictly speaking, it would be sufficient for my present purpose to point out that
Freud clearly thought he was dealing with an explanatory science, and that this thesis is concerned with the logical status of one of its concepts, and not with the question whether Freud was right in his assumption. But the argument we are considering here is so interesting, and crops up in so many forms in anti-psychoanalytic literature, that it deserves a little more consideration.

(234) I do not think that anyone who admits the distinction between explanatory and descriptive sciences would maintain that there can be no such thing as an explanatory science concerned with human behaviour. Nor could they deny that psychoanalysis offers what purports to be a scientific explanation. But I think that some of its opponents, who call it "unscientific", must mean that it differs in some important respect from a genuine scientific explanation. If we think of this assertion in terms of "models", as I have suggested we should do, we see that this can only mean one of three things. It may mean that the model used by psychoanalysis is not known, or is known not, to be corresponding; but this could be said of the ray model of light, which nobody calls "unscientific". It may mean that there is a better model for the purposes /
purposes of psychoanalysis; but nobody calls a scientific model "unscientific" because it is improved upon. Or it may mean something less naive. It may be intended to suggest that there is something peculiar about the way in which the model is used by the psychoanalyst. This last possibility is one that cannot be properly considered until we have gone a little further into the nature of psychoanalytic laws, but I shall return to it in the next chapter, when I discuss the implications of recognizing psychoanalysis as a technique and not as an applied science.

(285) I hope it will now be granted that an example of a psychoanalytic law should not be formulated in a purely descriptive form. It should not be of the form -

"A man's attitude to men in a position of authority over him usually resembles his attitude to his father in his fifth or sixth year."

It is true that most text-books of psychology abound in statements of this kind - particularly if they are trying to state the discoveries of Freud in non-Freudian language. But such statements belong to the natural history of human behaviour, and are not explanatory. I am not of course suggesting that psychoanalytic laws are /
are the only kind of psychological laws that is explanatory, or even that they are preferable to other kinds of explanatory psychological laws. All I am pointing out at present is that we must not mistake a "natural history" statement for an explanatory law.

(286) At the same time I do not want to confuse issues or complicate my example any more than is absolutely necessary, as I should do if I were to attempt to give the full-blown psychoanalytic counter-part of the descriptive example in my last paragraph. I am not even sure that I could do so if it were necessary. I expect that the concept of "projection" and of "father-image" would be used. But I do not think I need attempt quite as much as this to show how the psychoanalytic law is explanatory where the other is merely descriptive. All I need do is to cast it into the form -

"A man unconsciously regards men in a position of authority over him in the same way as he regarded his father in his fifth or sixth year".

(I realise that the word "regards" is not altogether satisfactory: it really embraces all sorts of reactions, which /
which ought to be set out in a technical definition. But Snell's Law, which Toulmin uses as an example, is open to much the same objection. When it says that the ratio of the sine of the angle of incidence to the sine of the angle of refraction is a constant, its compactness and precision are deceptive, for we need sine-tables to make use of it).

(287) With all its shortcomings, this law has two advantages over the descriptive form. First, it offers a causal explanation of men's behaviour towards their superiors. The descriptive form did not, because we do not regard events which are separated by an appreciable period of time as being causally connected, unless we can show something which persists during this period to mediate between them. But the psychoanalytic form gives us a contemporary cause, which is intended to stand in the same relationship to men's observable behaviour towards their superiors as would, for example, a conscious belief that one's superior was one's father.

(288) For much the same reason it is technically more useful than the descriptive form. For the latter offers /
offers no hint of how a man's attitude to his superiors, if abnormal and inconvenient, can be improved: you cannot adjust something that was happening twenty or thirty years ago. But if you are given a contemporary cause, you can at least speculate as to what might alter it.

(239) This law fits without much difficulty into Toulmin's four classes. Let us take them in reverse order, so as to leave the more interesting to the last. It is easy to imagine "inferences drawn in accordance with this law". If asked to say what Mr. Jones' attitude to his employer might be expected to be, the psychoanalyst would ask to be told about his childhood relationship with his father (just as the optician, asked for the angle of refraction, would ask for the angle of incidence). In fact, of course, the psychoanalyst would probably want to know something about the employer's character as well: but this would be in order to make a statement of type (iii) - that is, that the case in question was governed by his law, and was not merely a case in which the employer was so intolerable that any man, whatever his childhood story, would get on badly with him.
(290) From the point of view of psychoanalysis, Toulmin's type (iii) is quite interesting. For a great deal of the technique of psychoanalysis, and many of the resulting statements, are concerned to establish what law it is that governs the particular symptom that a patient is presenting at the moment. To identify the law it may well be necessary to make use of other laws - for example, the patient might complain of attacks of ulcerative colitis whenever he had to stay with his employer. The analyst might make use of a law that men who do not experience feelings of anger when this would be a normal reaction are subject to symptoms such as ulcerative colitis, and might thus guess that he had to deal with a case of our law. He might then go on to confirm this by indirect enquiries into the patient's childhood attitude to his father, and might discover that this had been mainly one of dislike.

(291) But he would also have to rely on statements of type (ii) - that is, about the scope of the law which was suspected to govern this aspect of his patient's behaviour. In our example, these might say that the law had been found to apply to cases in which -

a) the employer's behaviour was normal,

b) /
b) the man was past adolescence and in normal health, and

c) he had been a normally constituted child.

These provisos might be criticised for their vague references to "normality", which might even be said to amount to the proviso "unless the law doesn't apply". But Toulmin points out that this is inevitable if one tries to produce a complete statement about the scope of a law (p. 63).

(292) When we come to Toulmin's first group, we find that it really consists of two different kinds of statement - "abstract formal statements of a law or principle - e.g. Snell's Law . . ." For his immediate purpose (namely, considering whether laws of nature are necessary or contingent) the distinction between a law and a principle of inference does not matter. But elsewhere he makes the difference plain. He takes as his example of a principle, the Rectilinear Propagation of Light, and explains -

"The distinction turns upon something we noticed earlier: namely, the role of the principle as the keystone of geometrical optics. One can well imagine a geometrical optics in which the law of refraction was different. The adoption of a different law in place of Snell's Law would /
would of course mean considerable changes - our present notion of refractive index would be one casualty. But geometrical optics could still exist as a subject, and designers of optical instruments, having learnt the new rules for tracing the passage of rays through their assemblies of lenses, would soon accommodate themselves to the change. By comparison, the principle that light travels in straight lines seems to be almost indefeasible: certainly it is hard to imagine physicists abandoning completely the idea of light as something travelling in straight lines, for to give up this principle would involve abandoning geometrical optics as we know it. If we question the principle of rectilinear propagation, the whole subject is at stake: that is why the principle is not open to falsification in any straightforward way." (p. 63)

From this and other passages it seems that the points of difference are -

a) laws are dependent in some way upon principles, but not vice versa.

b) laws can be falsified by appeals to observation in a way in which principles cannot.

c) principles of inference are not merely more generalised forms which combine two or more laws.

But the question whether a particular statement is a law or a principle is not always easy to answer (Toulmin instances the principles of thermodynamics).

A principle of inference appears to be (if I may step in where Toulmin omits to tread) a general, non-empirical statement of a rule (or convention) which enables some non-syllogistic method of inference to be applied to a group of phenomena.
phenomena. Thus the principle of the rectilinear propagation of light enables the method of inference of plane geometry to be applied to the phenomena of optics.

(293) So far, I have not mentioned the "principles" of psychoanalysis. They may well prove as hard to identify as it proved hard to formulate a satisfactory law. Something of this sort is attempted by Allers in his chapter "The Axioms of psychoanalysis" in his book "The Successful Error" (1941). By axioms Allers seems to mean something like Toulmin's principles, though he has none of Toulmin's insight into their logical status or relationships to the other statements of psychoanalysis. In what is intended to be an exhaustive list, Allers gives six "axioms" -

a) All mental processes develop according to the pattern of the reflex mechanism.

b) All mental processes are of an energetic nature.

c) All mental processes are strictly determined by the law of causality.

d) Every mental phenomenon derives ultimately from an instinct. Instincts are the primary material of mental states.

e) The principle of evolution, as stated in the phyletic evolution of organisms, applies to the development of the human mind in history.

(294) f) The chain of free association leads back to the real cause of mental phenomena.
(294) It is tempting to discuss each of these axioms in detail. Such a discussion would certainly arrive at a clearer and more precise wording of them. It would also determine whether each is logically on all fours with the rest: axiom f., for example, looks more like a piece of technical advice, of much the same status as a physicist's advice about the best way to discover the source of an unexpected distortion of light-rays (Allers himself has doubts about this axiom, although for different reasons). Again, it would be interesting to consider whether there is not an overlap between what Allers is trying to say in axioms a) and b), and what he is trying to say in c) and d). Axiom e), though it would probably be true if it were phrased properly, is not really of much importance for psychoanalysis, and might in fact turn out to be really a piece of disguised natural history. Another interesting question is whether Allers' list is exhaustive: it makes no mention, for example, of the indestructibility of ideas, which we have seen to be such an important assumption of Freud's.

(295) In spite of all its shortcomings, however, I intend to use Allers' list, in preference to one drawn up /
up by myself, in my attempt to illustrate the function-
ing of a true principle of inference in psychoanalysis. If I drew up a list of my own I might be suspected of formulating it so as to fit my own interpretation of Freud and my own notions as to his principle of inference. I shall imitate the conjurer, who does not use his own watch but borrows one from someone else. What is more, Allers' axioms, although perhaps not as precise or exhaustive as he imagines them, are by no means lacking in insight; I have not found anyone else who has come as close to identifying the historical and logical mainsprings of Freud's system.

(296) There is one very striking feature about his list. It makes no mention of unconscious mental phenomena. The omission is quite deliberate. Not only does Allers regard the list as exhaustive; he also declares openly in an earlier chapter (p. 31-2) that he intends "to disregard this notion". His justification is worth quoting -

"The idea of an unconscious mind is not a peculiarity of psychoanalysis. Many authors have made use of it, before and after Freud. It is doubtless true that the 'unconscious' as conceived by psychoanalysis is different from the conception bearing the same name in other systems. The characteristic features, however, that the unconscious is given in psychoanalysis result from the ideas /
ideas on the nature and the role of the instincts and from the general conception of mental dynamism. Of these things enough has been said to supply a basis for critique. A study of the notion of the unconscious would not reveal more of the fundamental attitudes of psychoanalysis than does the study of the notions of instincts, of mental energy, of causality, etc., all of which will be examined in the following chapters. The notion of the unconscious is secondary to the notion of instinct, of dynamism, etc. Being an important link in the chain of Freudian conceptions, it implies, of course, all the fundamental suppositions of psychoanalysis. But it does not imply more or others than do those notions which will be studied presently. To indulge in an inevitably lengthy analysis of the notion of the unconscious would necessitate useless repetition.

(297) Allers obviously recognises that the notion of the unconscious stands in some peculiar logical relationship to the concepts which he does propose to discuss, and which ultimately appear in his "axioms". But he has not troubled to be clear about this relationship. He uses phrases like "is secondary to" and then "implies", which are not, on the face of it, consistent with each other, and certainly do not leave us satisfied. The real relationship may become plainer if we examine one or two of his axioms more closely.

(298) Let us take the first axiom. "All mental processes develop according to the pattern of the reflex mechanism."
mechanism". In his discussion of this axiom Allers shows how Freud was influenced by Wernicke, who "conceived of mental reactions or of responses due to mental operations as being identical with reflexes". We have already seen, when we glanced at Freud's concept of instinct, that it was in a sense a name for an internal stimulus which was needed to provide the mind with its motive power. This is, Freud says, "a stimulus of instinctual origin", and he gives as an example "when the membrane of the oesophagus becomes parched or when a gnawing makes itself felt in the stomach". What Allers seems to be pointing out (with a great deal of insight) is that Freud sought to apply the stimulus-response interpretation which had been evolved from the study of simple organisms (or easily isolated types of behaviour, such as salivation, in animals of a higher order) to more complex kinds of behaviour which we find in human beings outside the laboratory. The essence of this sort of interpretation seems to me to consist of observing that the organism is in a situation which can be called a stimulus, and then of looking for the response to this stimulus, in the belief that the same sort of stimulus always produces the same sort of response.
(299) Let us, however, do what Allers ought to have done, and take an example: let us take in fact the one offered by Freud. Imagine a situation in which a person has been without food for twenty-four hours. The response that corresponds to this stimulus is "hunger" or "hungry behaviour". Freud is more careful than this; he eliminates cases in which the digestive system is not working normally by saying that the stimulus is the "gnawing in the stomach". Given the stimulus, we look for the response. Usually we find it: Freud, who was concerned with mental phenomena, would have said that we found it in feelings of hunger (the idea of food plus an affect). But in cases of anorexia nervosa we cannot find the response (or, if you prefer it, we find an unexpected response). At this point Freud would not forsake the axiom which Allers has put into words: he would get round the difficulty by saying that the expected response may not be observed, but that this is only because it occurs in an unobservable form: the feeling of hunger is there after all, but it is unconscious.² Allers has thus correctly formulated one of the "axioms" with which Freud worked, but has failed to see that the notion /

²We also do the converse: when given what we recognise as a "response", we look for the "stimulus", and if we can't find it we say it is unconscious.
notion of unconsciousness is indispensable to the universal application of this axiom. We shall find that the same is true of Allers' other axioms.⁴

(300) "All mental processes are of an energetic nature". What Allers seems to have in mind here are the forces which are exerted upon the Freudian "ideas" and either propel them into consciousness, repel them from it, or expel them if they have gained an entrance; he may also be thinking of the cathexis which discharges itself into the conscious mind in the form of affect. But we have seen that if we are to think of the ego as exerting the constant force of repression upon certain ideas, it is necessary to think of these ideas as "substances" - that is, as "being there" when they are not observable. Or again, if we are to think of an affect, such as fear, as the discharge of the energy attached to an idea (such as the idea of castration) what are we to do when we come across this fear without being able to find the idea which is "discharging" it, or when the only idea associated with it (such as a pair of scissors) seems insufficient to account for it? We can obey the axiom only by assuming that an idea is "there". /

⁴Always excepting the sixth, about which, as I have said, Allers himself was doubtful.
"there". It will not satisfy the axiom to point to an idea of castration that was conscious at some time in the past, for we are being instructed by the axiom to apply the laws of dynamics, and this science does not allow phenomena which are "over and done with" to be regarded as the causes of present effects. We must presume that what was past is present, or that what was never observed is there just the same.

(301) I hope that these discussions of the place of unconsciousness in the application of Allers' first and second axioms has made it unnecessary for me to devote time to a similar discussion of the other four. I have already pointed out that axiom f) is more like a piece of technical advice than an "axiom". Again, I do not think that axiom e) (namely, that "the principle of evolution, as stated in the phyletic evolution of organisms, applies to the development of the human mind in history") is really of much importance to psychoanalysis; Allers himself does not devote much time to it. Axioms c) and d) ("All mental processes are strictly determined by the law of causality"; and "Every mental phenomenon derives ultimately from an instinct . . .") are so closely bound up with the first two axioms and with Freud's argument from discovered causes/
causes that anyone who has followed my discussion of these in this and the previous chapter could work out for himself in a few seconds the way in which they make use of the notion of unconsciousness.

(302) What I must now try to do is to describe in more precise logical terms the part played by the notion of unconsciousness. Clearly, I must first be sure of the exact status of Allers' so-called axioms. Allers himself does not regard them as laws, for he says -

"They do not follow from the empirical statements - which, as we know already, are indeed not purely empirical, not the result of experience, but very much dependent on theoretical preconceived ideas. On the contrary they precede them and they determine the way these statements are used for building up the theory".

This tells us more about what they are not than about what they are. But when we come to read what Allers has to say about individual axioms, he is more helpful. The first axiom, he says "implies ... that there is no essential difference between nervous and mental processes". The second "implies that mental processes are governed by the same laws as those assumed by physics". Discussing the third, he says that "the causality" which, according to the axiom, determines mental processes "is conceived according to the pattern of /
of causality in physics. The first three axioms then are, roughly speaking, statements that you can make sense of mental phenomena by treating them as if they obeyed the laws that describe the phenomena of other sciences. And if we look closely at the fifth axiom we find that it is an almost explicit injunction to apply the laws formulated by Darwin. The fourth axiom is less obviously of this nature, until we remember that "instinct" is for Freud a physiological and not a psychological concept.

(303) It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that Allers' "axioms" are therefore what Toulmin calls "principles of inference". One might argue that just as the principle of the rectilinear propagation of light enables geometrical methods of inference to be used for inferences from one optical phenomenon to another, so Allers' first axiom enables inferences of the Pavlovian kind to be used in interpreting the more complex kinds of human behaviour; and that similarly his second axiom allows the inferential methods of physics to be used also in this field. But closer thinking shows that the two things are not on all fours. Allers' axioms do no more than state that certain methods of inference can (or, if you prefer it, should) be used
in interpreting certain human behaviour. They do nothing to show how this is to be done, and as we have seen a certain sleight of hand is needed if we are to obey them. The Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of Light, on the other hand, is something that helps us to apply the inferential methods of geometry to the interpretation of optical phenomena. What corresponds in geometrical optics to one of Allers' axioms is the statement that the inferential methods of geometry can or should be used. If the person to whom you make this statement turns round and says "But you might tell me how to apply these methods" you can reply "By representing light as consisting of straight lines on a plane surface". This enables the phenomena of refraction, for example, to be treated as problems in geometry and trigonometry.

(304) I have already shown, I think, that if you want to put into practice the advice contained in one of Allers' axioms, there is one expedient that you must be prepared to employ in each case; you must be prepared to regard certain expected phenomena as being present even when they are not observed - that is, as being present in an unconscious form. It is thus the notion of unconsciousness that corresponds to such expedients /
expedients as the presumption of the Rectilinear Propagation of Light. The notion of unconsciousness, as Freud uses it, is a true principle of inference. Just as the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of Light enables us to interpret some optical phenomena by drawing or thinking of geometrical diagrams, so the notion of unconsciousness enables us to interpret certain human behaviour by describing it as if it exemplified the laws of other sciences, principally dynamics.

(305) One question is bound, however, to have occurred to anyone who has read the last few pages. Is the notion of unconsciousness indispensable only if you are trying to apply the inferential methods of other sciences to the interpretation of mental phenomena? Suppose that Allers were wrong, and that psychoanalytic laws need not be formulated in terms of concepts borrowed from physics or physiology? The question is not an academic one, because I think that Allers' view is at most a half-truth. Freud had created an autophenomenomorphic model - one whose parts were meant to resemble the phenomena they were designed to explain. But, as we have seen, the parts could not be regarded as behaving in exactly the same way as their conscious counterparts. There were three choices -

(1) /
(i) to borrow laws from other sciences;
(ii) to invent a new set;
(iii) to mix new laws with borrowed ones.

Allers implies that Freud chose the first of these. In fact he took the third. Some of his laws are not borrowed - for example, the "repetition-principle" which says that the unconscious tries to repeat experiences that have made a strong impression on the person, whether they were pleasant or the reverse. (BPP, 1921, Ch. III). Another instance is perhaps the way in which mutually contradictory ideas and impulses were supposed to co-exist in the unconscious (UCS, CP. IV, 1915, p. 119). The example of a psychoanalytic law which I offered earlier in this chapter is intended to avoid borrowing from other sciences.

(506) I think that the question I put at the beginning of the last paragraph boils down to the question whether an autophenomenomorphic model is indispensable to a psychological inferential system. This is clearly a question which could be properly answered only after a thorough review of modern psychological systems, more or less in the way that F.V. Smith has reviewed /
reviewed one or two systems in EMB (1951). If I may offer a view that is based on a priori reasoning, it is that a model of some sort is indispensable if the inferential system is to be that of an explanatory science: one without a model would consist merely of generalisations of the "natural history" kind: and as I shall suggest in the next chapter an explanatory science is of more use to a technique. I shall also suggest that there are reasons why an autophenomenomorphic model is of more use than an allophenomenomorphic one to techniques such as psychoanalysis. But for the present argument it is important to recall that Freud at times made use of an allophenomenomorphic model, whose parts bore no resemblance to the phenomena they were designed to explain. These parts, therefore, were not the sort of thing that could conceivably be observable - that is, conscious. The notion of unconsciousness is therefore not only not indispensable but in fact inappropriate in the employment of allophenomenomorphic psychological models. It is significant that in modern psychoanalytical language, in which the allophenomenomorphic metapsychological model is fashionable, references to unconsciousness are now less frequent; processes now tend to be "ego-dystonic" - i.e. incompatible with the ego's organisation - rather than "unconscious".
(307) So far, however, I have not attempted to put the Freudian principle of inference into words in the way in which the principle of geometrical optics can be put into words by saying "Light moves in straight lines". It is true, as Toulmin points out, that as soon as you put a principle into words in this way, you are at once beset by the need for so many exceptions that you end up by saying "except when it doesn't". (loc. cit., p. 30). But it seems to me that this difficulty is largely avoided by phrasing the principle not as if it were a statement of verifiable fact but as what it is - advice on a good method for drawing inferences when dealing with certain phenomena: by saying, in fact, "There are a good many optical phenomena that can be made the subject of geometrical methods of inference if you pretend that light consists of straight lines on a plane surface". It is, I think, a statement of this kind that we should attempt to formulate if we want to see Freud's principle of inference put into words.

(308) As soon as this is recognised, the task is easy. One of the presumptions of modern science is that in order to account for any state of affairs at any point of time you need not go further back into history than the immediately preceding state of affairs: that /
that state of affairs plus your laws should be sufficient explanation. This is the temporal counterpart of the principle of "no action at a distance". This presumption becomes strained, of course, as soon as you begin to be concerned with the behaviour of living organisms; it forces you to assume structural changes in the nervous system of the organism in order to provide "an immediately preceding state of affairs". When you come to deal with the more complex kinds of human behaviour, the utility of this sort of model is so obviously nothing but theoretical that you look around for a better one. Psychoanalysis provides this by saying "your difficulty arises from your refusal to refer in your explanations to any past states other than the immediately preceding one. You would get on much better if you would allow yourself to refer to any previous mental states in the history of the organism (and in some cases perhaps the history of its tribe). If you still insist on preserving the principle of "no action at a distance in time" you can manage both by treating past mental states as if they were present". It is this presumption that past mental states are present that creates the Freudian unconscious.
(309) It may not be quite accurate, however, to regard
the Freudian unconscious as consisting entirely of past
phenomena: I think it is possible to detect in it more
than a trace of something different. I have already
referred in Chapter I to the "cryptoteleology" of the
Freudian models, that is, to the way in which, by using
instincts as a kind of final cause, Freud was able to
make his models appear to be actuated entirely by
antecedent causes. The unconscious mental representatives
of these instincts are thus the way in which the Freudian
model represents future, or more precisely hypothetical
future, events. I do not want to make too much of
this point and I certainly do not want to suggest that
this is an essential element of the notion of an
unconscious. It is largely a model for the representa-
tion of past occurrences in the life of the
individual or his race. But in Freud's hands it
contains, probably unrecognised by him, this admixture
of futurity.

(310) It is this reflection of past and future that
accounts, I think, for that rather surprising feature
in Freud's unconscious which I pointed out in Chapter 5 -
its changeless, timeless nature. If the entities of
his /
his phenomenomorphic model are really past or future phenomena, they cannot very well be otherwise than changeless, and if they are taken out of their correct place in time and made to serve as present causes, "timeless" is a fairly appropriate description to apply to them.

(311) If we recognise that the Freudian unconscious is essentially a piece of advice for the would-be explanatory psychologist, we are, I think, in a position to give a short and simple answer to the question which is so often asked in different forms - "What sort of things can properly be called unconscious? Is it proper to talk of unconscious emotions, wishes, thoughts, attitudes, purposes and so on?" The answer to this is "If you are constructing an inferential system in which any of these - or any other conception denoting introspectible mental phenomena - is treated as a cause, then it is legitimate to talk about unconscious as well as conscious forms of these conceptions. Whatever conscious phenomenon is regarded as part of your causal system can be talked of as unconscious. It may not be necessary to talk of all of them in this way; as we have seen, Freud soon gave up talking about unconscious /
unconscious reasoning or calculating; but it is not logically improper.\(^4\)

(312) Toulmin makes use of an excellent analogy between theories and maps, which will help to illustrate the place of the unconscious in the pure science of psycho-analysis. (PS, Ch. IV). He refutes Mach's view that a scientific theory is a sort of summary of the observations on which it is founded: Toulmin points out that the relationship would then be a deductive one, which it is not. The relationship is very like that between a map and the geographical statements that can be "read off it". He goes on to point out that —

"though the map and the geographical statements are not deductively related, one need not conclude that the map goes beyond the surveyor's readings; since it does not present us with additional information of a novel kind, but represents the same information in a different manner . . . The logical relationship between, for instance, ray-diagrams in geometrical optics and the phenomena they can be used to represent is a similar one. Here, too, neither can be spoken of as being deduced from the other: yet a ray-diagram need not be thought of as containing more than the phenomena. It is rather that the diagrams present all that is contained in the set of observational statements, but do so in a logically novel manner: the aggregate of discrete /

\(^4\)It may of course be that for practical reasons it is better to talk, for example, of "unconscious object-relations" rather than "unconscious ideas" (see para 352): but I am concerned here merely with logical considerations.
discrete observations is transformed into a simple and connected picture, much as the collection of readings in a surveyor's notebook is transformed into a clear and orderly map."

(313) The role of unconscious mental phenomena might well be represented in this cartographical analogy by comparing them to the maps on transparent paper which are intended to be superimposed on other maps in order to show features of the area which are not represented on the other because these features are things of the past.5 The one-inch-to-the-mile Ordnance Survey map of an area will serve most normal purposes, but if you want to understand why flint arrowheads are discovered here and not there, and if you want to make such discoveries yourself, a transparent "overlay" showing the pattern of neolithic settlements in the area is useful.6

(314) Just as the Principle of the Rectilinear Propagation of light is essentially a recognition that you can profitably represent light as consisting of straight lines, so the concept of the unconscious is essentially a recognition that you can profitably represent past mental phenomena as contemporary mental phenomena. In terms /

5 Or of the future - as with town development plans.

6 Freud himself compared psychoanalytic reasoning with archaeology (Ernest Jones, SFL, 1955, p. 363).
terms of the cartographical analogy, it is the recognition that there is a way of representing bygone features of an area without confusing them with contemporary features.
CHAPTER 6.

The use of the unconscious in the technique of psychoanalysis.
In the last chapter I discussed the principles of the explanatory science on which psychoanalysis is based. In this chapter I want to consider the implications of recognising that psychoanalysis proper is not a science but a technique, for it is only by doing so that we shall understand fully the way in which it makes use of the notion of unconsciousness. I do not mean to suggest that there is anything new or original in calling psychoanalysis a technique: but I think that this is often done without a clear idea of the relationship between techniques and sciences. This is not surprising, because I have been unable to find any book in which this relationship is discussed.

The statements of the sciences, as we have seen, are either, as Toulmin says, descriptions of "regularities" in phenomena (in more or less general form) or statements about explanatory models and their uses. Techniques are systems of rules for achieving certain classes of ends. It is necessary to say "classes of ends" in order to distinguish between a technique and the description of the application of it in a particular instance. "Operation Overlord" had an individual end - the establishment of a beachhead on the Normandy coast - and was therefore not /
not itself a technique but the application of one which consisted of rules for achieving the class of ends described as "opposed landings". So far there does not seem much possibility of confusion between a science and a technique. It is true that there have been attempts to describe sciences as if they were techniques of a high order, consisting of very generalised rules for attaining very broad classes of ends. These attempts confuse the motives and purposes for which individual scientists evolved their sciences (assuming that they did have practical aims, which in many cases is very doubtful) with the nature of the system which was the result. A science does not, like a technique, say "In order to achieve X you must do Y and Z".  

(317) It is when we come to applied sciences that the possibility of confusion increases. An applied science /
science consists of statements selected from those of
the pure science and set out in a way which will be
useful in achieving a class of ends. But what must
be noticed is that its statements are still not of the
form "If you want to achieve X, do Y and Z". Let me
illustrate the difference from the science of optics,
which Toulmin chooses as his example because of its
comparative simplicity. What we must distinguish
are -

(i) Statements of the pure science, such as
Snell's Law ("whenever any ray of light
is incident at the surface which separates
two media, it is bent in such a way that
the ratio of the sine of the angle of
incidence to the sine of the angle of
refraction is always a constant quantity
for these two media");

(ii) Statements of the applied science, such as
tables of refractive indices of solids
(for example, different kinds of glass)
likely to be used in optical instruments.
Such tables are a by-product so far as
the pure science is concerned; they are
of interest to it only when they reveal
some irregularity, such as anomalous
refraction, which may require a modification
of the statements of the pure science;

(iii) Rules of the technique, such as instructions
for making a telescope, which might be of
the following form "Find from the tables the
refractive index of the kind of glass you
propose to use for your lenses. From this
calculate the correct curvature and relative
position for the lenses . . ."
(318) There are two important points of linguistic usage in the case of techniques. My definition of a technique as a system of rules for achieving a class of ends is not intended as a reflection of ordinary language. At one moment we may speak of poultry-keeping as a technique, and at another we may apply the term technique to two other things, such as poultry-keeping by the battery system (as opposed, for example, to poultry-keeping by the deep-litter system) or on the other hand the sexing of chicks. In the first case we are applying the term to one method of practising the technique, while in the other we are applying it to something which is certainly defined by its end, but whose end is nevertheless subordinate to the main end of poultry-keeping. To avoid confusion we should, I think, call the former a "sub-technique", and the latter an "intermediate technique". This is of course an arbitrary usage, but it will help to avoid confusion later.

(319) Explanatory sciences seem to be of more use to techniques than do descriptive ones. A couple of generations of genetics has done more for agriculture than all the botany and zoology since Linnaeus. The reason must be, I think, that a descriptive science is
less likely to suggest new ways of achieving ends. Zoology merely reports that one breed of cattle survives severe winters but yield poor meat, while another yields good meat but has little resistance to bad weather: all that this suggests to the farmer is that he should choose the latter breed and winter them indoors. Genetics, on the other hand, suggests the possibility of breeding a "cross" that combines hardiness with good meat. It is true that a series of lucky chances might allow a zoologist to make observations that suggested this possibility; but a geneticist would come to this conclusion by using his explanatory model, which would enable him, for example, to apply lessons learnt from breeding albino rats to the breeding of the required type of cattle.

(320) This does not necessarily mean, however, that any particular explanatory model is logically indispensable to any particular technique, although some models may be indispensable in practice. Let us once more take Toulmin's example of the light-ray model, and let us assume for the sake of argument that it and it alone meets the needs of the technique of telescope-making. This would make it indispensable in practice.  

2 This must at one time have been the case.
practice to that technique. But the technique would not cease to be that technique if one day the light-ray model were found to be inferior for this purpose to another - such as the light-wave model. Each technique consists of a series of operations, and it is possible to point to the operation or operations that involve the use of a particular model. In the case of telescope-making it is the operations of determining the correct positions and curvature of the lenses that involve the use of the light-ray model. But let us suppose that all possible combinations of curvature and position were determined experimentally and set out in tables; these operations would then be possible without the use of the explanatory model. My point is that I do not believe it possible to imagine any operation in a technique which could not, in strict theory, be carried out even if the explanatory model normally involved in it had never been thought of.

(321) This brings us to another important point about the relationship between techniques and sciences. The divisions between the former do not correspond to the divisions between the latter. This is not simply because there are far more techniques than sciences. The reason is partly that sciences and techniques are classified /
classified in totally different ways, so that any correspondence between the divisions would be a coincidence, and partly that it is not in the nature of a technique to make exclusive use of any one science.

(322) Consider first the classification of sciences. The traditional classification is by subject-matter: botany, says the Penguin Dictionary of Science, is "the scientific study of plants", while zoology is "the scientific study of animals". This serves very well for descriptive sciences like these two examples. But with explanatory ones it tends to raise awkward questions. If optics is the study of optical phenomena and electrodynamics the study of electrical phenomena, how do you tell what are optical and what electrical phenomena? Which is the Aurora Borealis? The only satisfactory way of classifying explanatory sciences is by means of their explanatory models. The Aurora is an electrical phenomenon not because we can tell the difference between electrical and optical phenomena as we tell the difference between plants and animals, but simply because it is explained by the science of electrodynamics, that is, by reference to an electrical model. You can see that this is to some extent recognised if you consider the names of sciences /
sciences such as "atomic physics" "quantum theory" or our old friend "geometrical optics".

(323) Techniques, on the other hand, must be defined and distinguished by their ends, and these are of all kinds. A few, like carpentry or bee-keeping, could perhaps be defined according to the material with which they are concerned, and might thus be distinguished in the same way as the descriptive sciences: but this is accidental. There are techniques - such as clock-making - in which alternative materials - wood or metal - may be used, and there are techniques - such as navigation - in which the material is difficult to describe plausibly.

(324) The true position is not altogether easy to visualise, and I think it can best be described by having recourse once more to Toulmin's cartographical analogy, although what follows is an elaboration of it for which he is not responsible. He compares an explanatory science with a map. But a map is a map of a particular area, not of any part of the surface of the earth. Even a map drawn for special purposes - such as a map of surface geology - is a map not of any surface geology, but of the surface geology of a particular /
particular area. But the phenomena that are linked up by a scientific theory are - or should be - all the phenomena of the kind covered by the theory - for example, all optical phenomena. It is true that the observations from which the theory was built up, like the observations from which the map was drawn, were particular observations. But if the theory is properly constructed there should be no phenomena of this kind that do not, as it were, have a place on it. If therefore we are to compare a theory with a map, it must be with a map that covers all the ground there is. I am not concerned here with Toulmin's distinction between "maps" of different scales. It is true that an optical theory using the concept of light-rays covers less phenomena than one based on the concept of light-waves. My distinction, however, is not between different degrees of generality, but between generality and particularity.

(325) Even so, however, it is easy to overlook the fact that in techniques two kinds of "map" are used. One is the general maps which are the analogues of the explanatory sciences concerned. The other is what, for want of a better term, I must call an "individual map". /
map". This is a "map" of the way in which the laws of the sciences are working in the particular system with which the technique is concerned each time it is applied.

(326) An illustration from medicine may make this clearer. A physician's "general map" may tell him that the administration of diphtheria antitoxin to a person who has begun to show the symptoms of diphtheria will have a beneficial effect. What it will not tell him is that if he administers the antitoxin to Miss Jones, he will cause her "pain, swelling, eruption, feverishness and general prostration" (Black's Medical Dictionary, 1928, under "anaphylaxis"). Only experience of previously administering the antitoxin to Miss Jones, or detailed knowledge of Miss Jones' history, or, in terms of our metaphor, only an "individual map" of Miss Jones - will warn him of this.

(327) It may be argued that this is merely because the physician's general map is too crude, and because I have framed his rule of thumb about diphtheria in too simple a form. It may be pointed out that the well-known forms of many laws have to be modified in special circumstances /
circumstances - that Boyle's law, for example, has to be modified for high pressures and temperatures. Moreover, this argument would continue) it is possible to formulate general laws about the circumstances in which anaphylactic reactions of this kind occur; to say, for example, that it occurs only in people who have had a previous dose of the antitoxin (if this is true) and so forth.

(328) But none of this gets over the fact that, in order to predict (and of course cope with) Miss Jones' reactions, it is not sufficient to know all these laws: the physician must know something about Miss Jones. He must either have observed this anaphylactic reaction in her on a previous occasion, or he must know certain facts about her which lead him to expect it on this one. There is an obvious logical difference between knowing all the laws which are exemplified in the case of a certain individual, and knowing that they will be exemplified, and in what proportion. There are individuals who would exemplify the laws of anaphylaxis violently, and others who would exemplify them so slightly that the physician could afford to ignore these laws in their case.

(329) /
(329) We must not make the mistake of overlooking the difference between a patient and a laboratory subject, which is both a practical and a logical difference. To establish the laws connecting anaphylactic reactions to diphtheria antitoxin with other things such as previous doses of the antitoxin would require experiments under conditions which excluded the possibility of some other connection (for example, the possibility that everyone who has had measles will exhibit this reaction). The difference between a patient and a laboratory subject is that the latter is selected (or treated) with the object of making it an exemplification of one particular connection; if this object is not achieved the experiment is vitiated before it is begun. A patient, on the other hand, exemplifies an enormous complexity of laws—physical, chemical, psychological and so on. This distinction is not removed by the fact that patients can be made the subjects of experiments by certain expedients—for example, by using a sufficiently large number of them to make it highly improbably that they all share some unguessed factor which will vitiate the experiment. This statistical expedient is necessary even in the laboratory. 

3Or, of course, of the absence of such a connection.
laboratory because of the extreme difficulty of ensuring that one individual is in perfect experimental condition - that is, is not exemplifying some unwanted law, as it were. Its use with actual patients is a recognition of the fact that you cannot make human beings into laboratory subjects as you can guinea-pigs; and it gets over this by giving up the idea of making the individual into a subject, and instead selecting enough individuals in such a way that, together, they are a laboratory subject.

(330) I shall call this fact about individuals the "differential exemplification of laws". I should like to make it very plain that I do not regard it as something which is confined to living organisms. It is this same fact which compels a man who is trying to mend a clock to make for himself an "individual map" of the causal connections which operate in this particular clock. He will, for example, move different cog-wheels one by one, observing which other wheels move at the same time and which do not. By moving the hands he will be able to distinguish the train of wheels that moves them from the train that makes the clock strike, and so on. Finally, he may discover /
discover a worn or missing cog on one of the wheels.

(331) Two objections may be made to this example. First, that there are in all probability other clocks made to exactly the same pattern, and that therefore, if the man who is trying to construct a "map" succeeds in doing so, it will really be a map that applies to all these clocks, and not an individual map at all. But I think that this is the same as saying that a literal map of the Isle of Wight is not really a map of the Isle of Wight but a map of all islands of this type, on the grounds that there could conceivably be another island whose natural features were exactly the same. A man who had no idea that there were any other clocks of this pattern would not for that reason hesitate over the construction of his "map" and say to himself "Of course, I must first look for any other clocks of the same pattern to make sure that I am right".

(332) It might be objected that the example is badly chosen for another reason; that it does not really illustrate "differential exemplification" in inorganic objects because mechanism like clocks owe their existence to living organisms and would not exhibit this /
this differentiation if they had not been constructed with a purpose. But it is really only a matter of degree. Differential exemplification is undoubtedly easier to observe in systems which are comparatively independent of their environment - that is, which tend to do whatever they usually do in spite of comparatively marked differences in what is going on around them. That is why human beings or clocks illustrate this differentiation more clearly than something which is neither organic nor designed by an organism. Even in the example of the clock, we have lost some (but not all) of the variety of kinds of law which are exemplified in human beings. Most of the laws which are exemplified in the clock are laws of dynamics; chemical laws or electro-chemical laws are in the background, although they are occasionally exemplified in corrosion or in the magnetisation of certain parts.

(333) So that the comparative lack of isolation and independence which is characteristic of inorganic nature makes it hard to give a convincing example without a very laboured exposition. Perhaps we might take the pot-holes of Yorkshire, where the rise and fall of water levels is governed, for the most part, by hydraulic laws and to a much smaller extent by the chemical /
chemical laws exemplified in the breaking down of limestone. The behaviour of the different chains of pot-holes has to be "mapped" (not in the literal sense) by the "pot-holers" who explore them, and the result is a number of individual maps.

(334) But the chief lesson of all these examples is, I think, that the need for an individual map arises only when you are trying to do something to, or with, the system in question; in other words when it is the subject of the instrument of a technique. The pure science must find some way of eliminating or, if it cannot eliminate, of ignoring the way in which the objects it studies exemplify laws with which it is not concerned; for it is interested only in the general form of its own laws. The technique, on the other hand, must recognise, accept and make use of the variety of laws exemplified in its subject, and not only of this variety but also of the individual "blend" of laws that is found in each subject.

(335) Differential exemplification is of course extremely marked in the case of laws governing human behaviour, and to some readers the last few paragraphs will recall William Stern's Differential Psychology.

This /
This was, in Stern's own words, "a science of the essential differences of the functions and qualities of mind, and hence a bridge between general psychology and psychological comprehension of individuality" (G.P., 1937, p. 29). But in so far as it was a science it was really a study of two hitherto unrecognised ways of generalising about certain human behaviour; it was not really a science of individuals, for that would be a contradiction in terms. Stern says "One feature is common to all these researches in differential psychology; the issuance of a single mental function. Individual differences in every such function are either formulated as certain basic forms called "types" (perceptual types, attentional types, etc.) or arranged quantitatively; the most familiar example of the latter procedure is ranking in intelligence ..." (ibid.) In other words, his science enabled him to assign individuals to groups according to the sort of laws that were most often exemplified in their behaviour, or to arrange them in an order according to the extent to which they exhibited a certain property. It would thus be a most useful basis for the techniques of teaching individuals, assigning them to jobs, and so on. But note that it is still concerned with some kind of law
or property that has to be isolated from the rest of
the individual's "map" before it can be studied. It
is true that it can, in theory at least, go through
the whole catalogue of laws and properties relevant
to the behaviour of human beings, assigning each of a
group of individuals to sub-groups according to his
"type" and giving him a place in the order of
intelligence, memory, emotional stability, and so on.
But the technique of teaching Mr. Smith, or of
choosing a job for him, or of managing him, depends
on building up a "map" of him out of his "types" and
his places in all these lists. This is where the
science ends and the technique begins.

(336) We have learned to distinguish a technique from
a pure science, but we must also learn to distinguish
it from an applied science. In practice this is fairly
easy. For a technique will always have to make use
of more than one science. Medicine, for example,
makes use chiefly of chemistry, biology and dynamics.
An artificial pneumothorax deprives the tubercle
bacillus of oxygen (which biology suggests should kill
it) by allowing air to enter the cavity between lungs
and ribs and thus preventing the inflation of the
lung - a method obviously suggested by dynamics. The
multiplicity /
multiplicity of sciences is not always so easy to demonstrate. You might at first say that a clockmaker uses none but dynamics: but he chooses brass instead of iron for his wheels because chemistry (his crude knowledge of it) tells him that brass will not corrode as soon. And there are of course instances in which the technique is so simple and the scientific knowledge on which it is based so crude that the technique may appear to have no scientific basis at all. But there is still a simple logical rule for distinguishing the technique from the science, pure or applied. The science consists of statements (such as "iron rusts more than brass") while the technique consists of rules or instructions ("never use iron for this if you can get brass").

I hope these illustrations show that a technique will not necessarily have its own peculiar pure or applied science. Clock-making or clock-mending, for example, are not based on any science that is not part of the basis of other techniques. Some techniques, of course, make use of a particular science to a marked extent, and of others to a minor extent. Clock-mending is largely a matter of dynamics. There is even a close historical association /
association between some sciences and techniques - for instance between geometry and surveying, as the name of the former shows.

(338) My object in this general discussion of the distinctions and relationships between techniques and sciences has been two-fold. First, it will I think help us to sort out the role of Freud's autopheno-:menomorphic model in his technique, and secondly it will help us to decide whether there is anything at all unique or unusual in this role.

(339) First of all, I think it is clear that if we are adopting the usage I advocated earlier in this chapter we must call psychoanalysis not a technique but a sub-technique. It is a sub-technique of the technique of psychotherapy. Like other techniques proper, this can be defined solely by its end, which is the remedying of psychological disorders. As I pointed out in the Introduction, there are two main divisions of sub-techniques, the physiological and the semantic, which are classified according to the means they employ. It is of course the semantic techniques in which we are interested. They can be sub-divided /
sub-divided into the environmental (which seek to alter not the patient but his environment) and the personal (which seek to produce a change in the dispositions of the patient himself. It is the personal in which we are interested. They can be arranged in a scale according to the extent to which they are mandatory (that is, seek to produce the change by persuasion, instruction, hypnosis, suggestion and so forth) or maieutic (that is, seek to assist the natural development in the patient of beneficial processes).

This last classification is a range rather than a sub-division, since no sub-technique is wholly mandatory or wholly maieutic. Psychoanalysis is probably the most maieutic, but even so it has its mandatory exponents like Ferenczi.

Carl Rogers distinguishes these under the names "environmental" and "client-centered". He describes forms of "counseling" which employ only "environmental" sub-techniques, but himself favours the latter for genuine disorders of personality. Another example of "environmental" technique is the improvement of the morale of industrial workers by attention to their amenities.

Hypnosis can of course be used to assist a maieutic sub-technique.

I have deliberately chosen "maieutic", which is reminiscent of the Socratic method, because such sub-techniques seem to me to rest on the quasi-Socratic assumption that the patient has in himself the forces needed for his own cure, an assumption which is the psychiatric counterpart of the Hippocratic vis medicatrix naturae. The term "cathartic" is sometimes used, but is unsuitable for my purpose, partly because some "maieutic" sub-techniques are not "cathartic", partly because this term implies too much as to the nature of the cure; it is almost a "definition by model".
I spoke in the last chapter of the science on which the technique of psychoanalysis was based. Though it was a loose manner of speech, it did not mislead at that stage. But we must now consider -

(i) whether the sub-technique uses the model of this science and of no other;

(ii) conversely, whether this model can be used by psychoanalysis and by no other technique or sub-technique.

I think that the answer to the first of these questions is an indubitable "No". The sub-technique uses at least one other model or set of models, which is that on which the technique of medicine is based. One of a psychoanalyst's tasks is to decide, both before and during treatment, whether his patients' somatic symptoms are of the sort that are best treated by his sub-technique or by medicine: this is the chief reason why the Institute of Psychoanalysis insist that a psychoanalyst should either be a medical practitioner or should work under the supervision of one.

The second question is not quite so easily answered. Academic psychologists are making increasing use of Freudian concepts, among them his autophenomenomorphic model (see for example Knight's MIP, 1948, Ch. XVI/
Ch. XVI et seq., and other Introductions to Psychology); and their science of psychology is used in techniques other than psychotherapy — for example, aptitude-testing and industrial relations. But my impression is that the use of the Freudian model in these techniques is the exception rather than the rule. Nor does the use of the model in anthropology prove anything; for one thing, it is now less fashionable to make this use of it; but, more important still, anthropology is a science and not a technique. What is more to the point is the way in which the Freudian model has been used in literature, drama and dramatic and literary criticism: although even here some people might deny that we are dealing with techniques. Again, its use in techniques such as the education and upbringing of children (which must surely be regarded as separate from any therapeutic technique) is advocated and demonstrated by Pfister. It is true that there are other techniques concerned with the behaviour of human beings that do not seem to find much use for it — politics, for example. But the people who would deny that it has any utility at all outside psychotherapy are probably those who would deny its utility for psychotherapy. Finally, I cannot see any a priori /
a priori reason for regarding the model as unsuitable for use in other techniques; there is nothing about the model itself which suggests that it is a "one-technique" model.

(342) What about the position within the technique of psychotherapy? Is the model used by other sub-techniques? It is tempting to suggest that it might be the use of this model that distinguishes psychoanalysis from the other psychotherapeutic sub-techniques; this would enable me to define psychoanalysis neatly, as "the psychotherapeutic sub-technique that uses the autophenomenomorphie model". But I distrust this for two reasons. First I should expect to find the distinction between sub-techniques in a difference of practical method, as in the examples I gave in paragraph 318. I should be surprised to find that the only difference between two sub-techniques lay in their explanatory models; if I did, I should be strongly inclined to doubt whether there was any real difference between the models - that is, whether they did not consist of the same parts, or concepts, under other names. For if the models really differed in important respects, I should expect to find differences in the practical methods of the two sub-techniques, and
I should prefer in that case to distinguish them, as we normally do with sub-techniques, by those practical methods rather than by their models. Secondly, I think that what we actually find when we look at the facts supports this argument. Other sub-techniques—for example, those of Jung and Adler—make use of autophenomenomorphic models. They differ from the Freudian unconscious in the entities they contain: Jung’s animus and anima have no counterpart among the entities we studied in Chapter 3. But the differences between the practical methods of the sub-techniques is more marked; the Jungian one makes very little use of the revival of memories, and past emotions, and more use of attempts, sometimes less maieutic than mandatory, to alter the patient’s way of reacting to his present environment. There is no need to resort to

differences/7

7Although there are counterparts of a sort in the internalised good and bad objects of the object-relations theory of Fairbairn.

8Jungians are not given to precise descriptions of their therapeutic methods. But a little can be gleaned from Ch. 5 of Frieda Fordham’s IJP, 1953, where she says, for example “To work only backwards and downwards—i.e., looking for traumas in infancy—can have a destructive rather than a healing effect...” Again, Jacobi, in a very unsatisfactory chapter on “The practical application of Jung’s theory”, says “Freud employs a reductive method, Jung a prospective one. Freud treats the material analytically, resolving the present into the past, Jung synthetically, building up out of the actual situation toward the future” (FOCG, 1942, p. 67).
differences between models to distinguish psychoanalysis from other sub-techniques.

(343) One more way may be suggested in which the relationship between the concepts and the technique of psychoanalysis may be unusual or even unique. Roughly speaking, it is this: in the exercise of the technique it is necessary that the subject of it (i.e. the "analysand") as well as the practitioner (i.e. the analyst) should think in terms of the concepts. If this is so, it seems, at first sight at least, to distinguish this technique very sharply from techniques practised on inanimate objects (shoes need not share the cobbler's notions of how to repair them) and even from remedial techniques practised on animate objects. A veterinary surgeon does not trouble his subjects with theory. Even in physical medicine the same is broadly true; the fact that sufferers from some ailments recover more frequently or more rapidly if they share the doctor's belief (or what they take to be his belief) in the efficacy of his methods is a different point.

(344) Having demonstrated my familiarity with this curious word, I do not propose to use it again. It is illegitimate, being a Latin gerundive of a Greek verb. If anything, it should be "analyomenos".
I think that Professor Macmurray was the first to draw attention to this feature of psychoanalysis, in his chapter on "The theory and practice of psychotherapy" in "The Boundaries of Science" (pp. 172-3). He is not of course concerned, here or elsewhere in his book, with the relationship between techniques and their concepts. He is, I think, making the point that there is a practical as well as a theoretical justification for making use of the concept of the unconscious. He says -

"The proper distinction seems to be, originally, that between acting consciously and acting unconsciously, rather than between a consciousness and an unconscious. There is, however, a practical motive underlying the adoption of the hypothesis of the unconscious which concerns our purpose more nearly. The practice of psychotherapy involves a relation between doctor and patient in which the doctor has to diagnose a disease which has its seat in the subjective processes which lie behind the behaviour of the patient. The problem for doctor and patient alike is to understand why the patient behaves in a way which is unsatisfactory to himself. In other words, both doctor and patient are under the practical necessity of trying to understand the motivation of the patient's behaviour. Now if the doctor is to help the patient to discover the motivation of his behaviour it is necessary that the patient should adopt the same attitude to his behaviour as the doctor does. The doctor... is compelled to adopt an objective attitude and to arrive at his conclusions by inference from what he can observe and what the patient can tell him. The patient therefore must adopt the same attitude to his own behaviour. He must consider it as if it were the behaviour of another person, as it is, in fact, for the doctor".
It makes no difference, of course, for Professor Macmurray's purpose whether a relationship of this kind makes psychotherapy unusual or perhaps unique among techniques. But this question is suggested by the passage I have quoted, and is an interesting one for my purpose.

(345) We shall not get much further without identifying fairly precisely the part of the sub-technique of psychoanalysis at which it is necessary that both analyst and patient should think in terms of the unconscious. Let us start with the naive question "Must the patient be thinking in terms of the unconscious whenever his analyst is"? Obviously not. We saw when we were considering what distinguished psychoanalysis from sub-techniques such as the Jungian that the former relied very largely on the method of inducing the patient to revive memories and other past reactions, principally emotions. Until they are revived, they are not phenomena, either for the patient or for the technician; they are entities of an autophenomenomorphic model. As it is the technician's aim to bring about their revival, he must think in terms of them. He may not know what the memories and emotions are when the analysis begins, although he may /
may have an idea of their nature from the nature of the patient's disorder, and he probably begins to have a fairly clear idea of the sort of thing that is about to be revived some time before the patient does. But the patient does not need to think in terms of the sub-technique at this point, and the analyst tells him, and obey the analyst's instructions not to restrain or conceal any beliefs, emotions, or other experiences. Indeed, some analysts maintain that a patient with too much knowledge of Freudian theory is actually handicapped.

(paragraph 342) At what point, then, in the sub-technique is the patient required to think in terms of the model? It seems to me that this point is to be found in an intermediate technique within the sub-technique. When we were manufacturing a language in which to discuss techniques (paragraph 318) we saw that within some techniques there were others, which like techniques or sub-techniques were definable by their ends, but whose ends were means toward the end of a technique or sub-technique. An example might be the technique of telescope-making, which includes intermediate techniques such as those of making lens-caps or calculating their curvature.
curvature and position. The latter of these inter-
mediate techniques involves the use of the model of
geometrical optics. In the same way there are inter-
mediate techniques in psychoanalysis. One of these
is "interpretation". Another is what is called
"control of the transference". It is the former that
involves the use of the model both by patient and
analyst.

(347) "Interpretation" is the technical term for
telling the patient what unconscious thoughts etc. he
must revive in order to be well. In dream-interpretation
it consists of explaining to the patient - almost
always after the latter has attempted free-association -
what unconscious thoughts caused his dream. It can
however take the form of interpretation of the unconscious
entities underlying the waking emotions and other
reactions to waking experience, which the patient
relates to the analyst. It seems to be used, broadly
speaking, in two kinds of situation. The first seems
to be when the analyst judges that the patient is so
nearly able to "derepress" a memory or emotion etc.
that if the analyst describes it to him this will help
to release it. It is, apparently, necessary to time
this sort of explanation carefully, since if it is
premature /
premature it will merely strengthen the patient's "resistance" to the revival of whatever it is. The other sort of situation is that in which the patient produces in the process of analysis emotions etc. (such as excessive dislike or affection for the analyst) which the analyst considers are analogous to those which, in unconscious form, are responsible for abnormal behaviour or emotions outside the consulting-room (such as excessive nervousness or anxiety in the patient's relations with his employer or superior).

(345) It is possible to argue that the model is also used in "free association", but I think that this is only plausible through a confusion. Free association (when it works) produces in the patient a series of conscious thoughts. During the process it is not necessary for the analyst - and it would probably impede the patient - to think of these thoughts (or their causes) as being unconscious. It is after the process of free association has been brought to a successful conclusion that the analyst explains to the patient that the later thoughts in the series either are or are closely akin to thoughts that have hitherto been repressed. But this explanation is of course not free association but interpretation.

(349) /
(349) How does the use of the model, as a result of interpretation, help the patient? Here I must once again issue a warning against the "recognition" fallacy which I described in Chapter 2. Recognition is not derepression. The patient who recognises the emotion that he ought to revive is not thereby reviving it, although a properly timed recognition, according to the psychoanalysts, helps him to revive it. How does it do so? The simplest answer is that it tells the patient what to look for, as it were; if he recognises that the emotion he is trying to make conscious is fear, he will look out for the first traces of this emotion and when he encounters them will encourage them, instead of disregarding or repressing them. If this were the whole answer, the patient would be using the model in much the same way as the analyst - that is in what I shall call the "diagnostic" way. When used diagnostically, it tells both analyst and patient what to look for, and what to encourage and dwell on when they find it, just as a tentative diagnosis of cancer from a patient's account of his symptoms tells a doctor what to look for. If this were the whole truth, there is clearly nothing essential, from the patient's point of view, in the role of the model; for why need the analyst represent to /
to the patient that what must be revived is there "in the unconscious"? Why should he not merely tell the patient what to look out for, and leave words like "unconscious" alone?

(350) But I should like to suggest that it is not quite so simple as this. For the explanation I have given - although I think it is the one that the orthodox Freudian might approve - does not explain how recognition helps to overcome resistance. In other words, before recognition can work in the way I have suggested, the force of repression must have been sufficiently overcome to allow the patient at least occasional faint glimpses of the emotion or memory that he must revive. If this diagnostic way were the only way in which the model helped the patient to revive what he must revive, interpretation must be a very unimportant and far from essential intermediate technique.

(351) What do the Freudians themselves say about its importance? Glover considers it important enough to be the subject of four out of the eleven chapters of TTPA. But his summing-up is this -

"Discussion /"
Discussion emphasized this difference in estimation of the value of the patient's intellectual co-operation between the experts of those who considered it essential and those who regarded it as either negligible or ineffective. There appeared also a moderate section. These maintained that in general the patient's co-operation must vary with the patient's degree of insight, but that refusal of co-operation might easily mean undesirable frustration. (ITPA, 1940, p. 17)

We must not make the mistake of assuming that the psychoanalysts whose views are summarized by Glover have reasoned as I have been reasoning in this chapter. But this passage suggests to me that if some of them - those who considered interpretation "negligible or ineffective" - were asked whether the model played nothing but a diagnostic role in its use by both analyst and patient, they would say "Yes"; while others - those who consider it "essential" - would maintain that, at least in its use by the patient, it must have another role. For if they consider interpretation essential, it might be because it is of help before the process of derepression has begun, since by then the battle is half-won.

I myself think that they are probably right, and that it plays more than a diagnostic part in the patient's thinking. But I am not so sure that they would.
would agree with my idea of the other way in which it works. Let us take the case of a patient who knows that what he must revive is his childhood hatred of his brother, but who has not yet reached the stage at which this emotion is dimly and very occasionally felt. Recognition is therefore of no use to him. But he is, I think, helped in his efforts by thinking of the emotion as present in himself unconsciously, in a way in which he would not be helped if he merely thought of it as an emotion which he had once felt and which it would do him good to feel again. An analogy may make clearer what I mean. If a man is made to stand with his eyes shut, and someone else says to him firmly and convincingly "You are falling now", his body will begin to sway. This is the "body-\sway" test of suggestibility. The analogy lies in this, that the subject is told that he \textit{is} falling now, and not merely that he \textit{could} fall or that he \textit{used to} fall as a child or that he \textit{ought to} fall. (I should think that the effect of such information would be nil). In the same way the analyst's patient is encouraged to revive what he must revive by having it described to him as something \textit{already} present, and not as something from his past. I call this the "suggestive" function of the model. I do not see any reason why the model should /
should not have both the diagnostic and the suggestive function for the same patient, at different stages in the revival of the same thing. Indeed, it may well be that the model has both functions for some analysts: in its suggestive function it may well be what gives them the confidence that what must be revived can be revived. However this may be, I think that for the analyst the main function is the diagnostic one, while for the patient it is the suggestive one.

(353) The recognition of the "suggestive" role of the model of the unconscious helps us to understand why, for psychoanalytic purposes, an autophenomenomorphic model is preferable to an allophenomenomorphic one. A model that consists of entities, such as ideas or emotions, with which the patient is familiar from everyday introspection is much more likely to have the suggestive effect I have described than one that consists of libido, cathexes, ego-dystonic processes and the other entities of the Freudian metapsychology — or, for that matter, than the allophenomenomorphic models of neurologists or other psychologies. I am not however maintaining that the Freudian autophenomenomorphic model is the only suitable one for
psychoanalytic purposes, or even the most suitable; I have already mentioned the Klein-Fairbairn "object-relation model" as a formidable rival.¹⁰

(354) I have not yet dealt with an obvious question. Put into ordinary language, this is "Need the analyst believe in the unconscious as well as the patient?" It is this sort of question which I can, I think, answer more easily as a result of my discussions of models and techniques. For the question can now be put more precisely in this way:-

"Must a psychoanalyst who induces his patient to revive what must be revived by means of the Freudian model be either -

(a) one who believes that the model is a corresponding one; or

(b) one who does not believe this, but believes it to be the best one that both he and the patient could use; or

(c) one who believes neither of these things, but considers it the best model for the patient to use, but inferior to some other for his own use?"

(355) I think it is clear that to stand any change of /

¹⁰ This is the practical aspect of the logical question "What sort of thing can properly be called unconscious?", to which I suggested a purely a priori answer in paragraph 311.
of success by employing the Freudian model the analyst must hold something like one of these beliefs (please note that I am not saying that he must use the Freudian model if he is to stand any chance of success). For an analyst who held that the model was non-corresponding and inferior to some other for use by both patient and analyst, and who nevertheless persisted in using it, is surely a possibility that we need not consider. An even more academic possibility is one who holds that it is corresponding but inferior to some other: So that if the question means "Must an analyst, to succeed, belong to one of the categories (a), (b), or (c), the answer is surely "Yes". But if it means "Must he belong to category (a)"? then I think the answer is probably "No". For I believe that to-day a good many analysts, who claim success by the use of the Freudian model, belong to category (c). Anyone who reads Dr. Brierley's TP cannot fail to receive the impression that neo-Freudian analysts tend to think in terms of the metapsychological model to which I have briefly referred in earlier chapters, but at the same time to use the autophenomenomorphic model when they are talking to their patients (I am excluding here the Klein-Fairbairn school, whose model I have already described in Chapter 3 as the descendant /
descendant of Freud's autophenomenomorphomic one). I get the same impression from Glover's ITPA. This does not prove that a belief of type (c) is more effective than a belief of type (a); but it shows that (c) has a certain survival value, and thus that it is not essential to belong to type (a). And if it is possible for one who believes (c) to be a psychoanalyst, it follows a fortiori that a believer in (d) can be.

(356) All that this proves, however, is that if the Freudian model of the unconscious is used in psychoanalysis, it is the patient who must use it, mainly because of its suggestive function, although possibly also for its diagnostic function. But is it essential that it should be used in psychoanalysis? Obviously this is the sort of question that cannot be finally answered on a priori grounds, but requires clinical experience and might even be the subject of experiment. All I can do here is to suggest that if the arguments I have put forward in this chapter come anywhere near the truth, there is no logical reason why the use of the model should be essential. If I am right in describing its functions in interpretation
as diagnostic and suggestive, then I do not see why it should not be possible for analysis to be carried on without it. For I do not see why it should not be possible to induce a patient to revive what must be revived without assistance either from the suggestion or from the diagnosis it provides. I realise that the practical difficulties may be great, although not insuperable, if we can judge by the number of analysts who told Glover than interpretation was negligible or ineffective. But I think it is most important to recognise that the role of the unconscious in analysis is a facilitating role and not a logically essential one; it is, as it were, not the conjurer himself, but the conjurer's assistant.

(357) So far in this chapter I have treated psycho-analysis as a remedial technique. As I pointed out, however, at the end of Chapter IV, its opponents have challenged its efficacy as a remedy for neurosis: and though the statistical argument used by Eysenck is defective because of its unsatisfactory and incomplete data, the challenge cannot be ignored. In that chapter, I suggested that Freud would have done well to base his argument from results upon the more modest claim that psychoanalysis is a technique that can /
can produce in its subjects certain recollections and emotions. What I want to point out here is that in the present chapter I have been suggesting a view of the part played by the concept of the unconscious in this technique, and that this view can be held whether you believe that the technique is a remedial one or merely that it is one capable of fulfilling this more modest claim.

(358) Another point which is worth making is that even if you believe in psychoanalysis as a remedial technique, it is still possible to hold a number of different views on the question of how it achieves its beneficial effects. You may believe, for example, that it does so by temporarily turning certain rather complicated habits or automatic responses into deliberate, attentive responses, which can thus be replaced by other deliberately learned responses that have been selected, either by patient or analyst, as more desirable; Macmurray has suggested a view of this kind in BS (1939, Ch. 5). Or you may believe that the true remedy lies in the establishment of a satisfactory relationship between patient and analyst, which corrects the effects of an unsatisfactory child-parent relationship.
relationship. Guntrip has suggested this view in TFP (1953), and it may, for all I know, be the orthodox view of the "object-relation" school, to which he belongs. Glover, on the other hand, seems to regard all repressed "processes" as constituting one or more subsidiary egos (he calls them "ego-nuclei") which interfere with the organisation and control of the ego proper until they are brought within its organisation by analysis (see Brierley, TP, 1951, p. 39, 49-52); this may very well amount to Macmurray's explanation in different words. And there are no doubt other accounts. The point I want to make is that my view of the role of the unconscious in the technique does not commit the holder of it to any particular explanation of how the technique has a beneficial effect. It is true that it would rule out explanations that made explorations of the patient's memories, emotions and desires superfluous; indeed it seems to me that Guntrip does not make it sufficiently clear why, on his view, these should be helpful. But so far as other explanations are concerned, the view I have suggested does not favour one or the other.

(359) It remains to decide whether this "diagnostic-suggestive" function that I have ascribed to the notion of /
of the unconscious in the intermediate technique of psychoanalytic interpretation is unique, or whether it has parallels in other techniques. I think that this is worth considering not because of any strictly logical conclusions that could be drawn if we decided that the function is unique, but simply because of the suspicion or prestige that is apt to attach itself to the unique. It is perhaps worth pointing out that if we fail to find a satisfying analogy elsewhere, this will be quite consistent with my view that the concept is not essential to the sub-technique of psychoanalysis. For in that case it is quite conceivable that there are techniques which are comparable to psychoanalysis but which, for one reason or another, do not find it necessary to employ a concept in the diagnostic-suggestive role. In other words, what is inessential in theory but may be essential in practice to psychoanalysis may well be inessential to another technique both in theory and in practice. I issue this warning in case the only analogies I can offer are considered too thin.

(360) In my search for an analogy I must of course mention Wisdom's "Philosophy and Psychoanalysis", in
which he points to a similarity between these two
techniques (I think he would call them both techniques).
If I understand him, he thinks that there are similarities between both their ends and their means. Both appear at first sight to be intended to answer questions of fact ("What is colour?" or "What did you see in the wood-shed at the age of five?") but in both cases this is illusory, since they are really intended to alter people's reactions. The reactions that concern philosophers are verbal usages, while the psychoanalysts are interested in producing different or less intense emotional reactions. I think, too, though I am not certain, that Wisdom would also point to analogies between the methods used by the two techniques. Both are of course semantic; both require the "patient" to think of himself as in certain situations and to report on his reactions, linguistic in one case, emotional in the other.

(361) It may well be that Wisdom's analogy, fully worked out, would show that there is a concept, or concepts, in philosophy that play a similar part to that of the unconscious in psychoanalysis. But he does not work it out, and as he does not - except by occasional implication - let us know how he thinks that
that psychoanalysis works, I cannot tell whether he would agree with the "diagnostic-suggestive" part that I have assigned to the unconscious. Nor can I imagine what sort of concepts the philosophical analogies would be. And in any case, the real nature of the ends and the means of philosophy is itself a subject just as controversial as that of psychoanalysis; so that even if Wisdom or I succeeded in producing an analogy, it would convince only those who held the same views on both techniques.

(362) There are of course plenty of examples of non-corresponding models used by techniques in diagnostic roles - one is an engineer's diagram of the stresses in a structure such as a bridge. There are also examples of non-corresponding models used in suggestive roles; there is the geometry-teacher's trick of proving the impossibility of something - such as the meeting of parallel lines of finite length - by asking the pupil to suppose that the impossible is the case and then to work out the logical consequence, "which", as the proof concludes, "is absurd". The difficulty is not to find such examples, but to find ones that combine the diagnostic and the suggestive roles of a non-corresponding.
non-corresponding model. The trouble is that, like Wisdom’s philosophical analogy, the nature of important techniques is usually controversial. Take for example the case of the Sunday-school teacher who has among her charges a child who lies and steals. She may diagnose his trouble as a failure to recognise the rightness and wrongness of actions, and she may regard these qualities as being capable of recognition in the same way as red or green are recognisable. She may succeed in improving the child’s behaviour by inducing him to share this view of ethical qualities, although it may in fact be a non-corresponding model. The trouble about this example is that there are people who would not agree that the model is non-corresponding.

(363) It is easy, however, to find non-controversial parallels among trivial techniques. There is the share-pusher, for example, who wants to create a demand for his shares in order that the price shall go up. He knows very well that there is no demand at the moment, and he reasons that if he can create the belief that there is a demand, people will hasten to buy them. He therefore spreads a rumour that people are buying his shares, and before long this mistaken belief /
belief has brought about a state of affairs corresponding to the rumour. Or again there is the journalist or politician who wishes to start a campaign that will provide him with news or prestige. He selects some not too far-fetched measure - such as the construction of a large and imposing public work - and he begins to talk about the "widespread and almost universal demand for it". Before long the belief that other people are demanding this measure induces some people to desire it, either because they fear to be in a minority or because they believe that what a lot of people want is a good thing to have.

(364) It would be easy to multiply trivial examples like these. The difficulty of finding a non-controversial example of an important and widely used technique to which the diagnostic-suggestive use of a non-corresponding model is a practical necessity is no coincidence. For to be effective in a suggestive role a model must not be widely recognised as non-corresponding, or it will cease to have the intended effect upon the subject of the technique.
I have gone, I think, as far into the relationship between this particular principle of scientific inference and this particular sub-technique as I can go without involving myself in questions that are not only extremely controversial but also call for experiment rather than philosophical discussion. "Ex cathedra" does not mean "from the armchair".
SUMMARY
I am now, I think, in a position to review very briefly the results of this examination of Freud's unconscious. In the interests of brevity I shall omit arguments and minor conclusions, and state the main conclusions dogmatically, without any of the reservations that accompany them in the preceding chapters.

**INTRODUCTION.**

Freud's work consisted of three separate things, each of which came from different sources. His technique — so far as it was not his own discovery — came from the French psychiatrists; his metapsychology, which was to become the language of the main neo-Freudian school, from the laboratory of Brücke; and his psychology from Herbart. The Freudian notion of the unconscious really belongs to his psychology, but he was led to adopt it by the results achieved with his technique.

Freud's theory of the relationship between mind and body was a type of emergence theory. He regarded his unconscious as helping to bridge the apparent /
apparent gap between physiological processes and the phenomena of consciousness. He thought, however, that his metapsychology came nearer than either physiological or psychological language to describing the real nature of mental processes. This really implied that consciousness was epiphenomenal, which is an odd thing for Freud to hold, but not inconsistent with an emergence view of mental processes.

CHAPTER I.

(369) Freud equated "consciousness" with "introspectibility". But because he did not properly distinguish between introspection and things such as simultaneous undiscriminating awareness or self-description, he did not realise that his unconscious could be either:

A. unintrospectible actualisations;

or

B. potentialities not the subject of self-description.

He also mistook the difference between preconsciousness and unconsciousness as one of degree, instead of kind.

(370) /
The following things, according to Freud, were never unconscious, for the reasons shown:

**Reasoning and calculation:** because the unconscious is not logical.

**Affects (feelings and emotions):** because they are discharges of energy, and so conscious.

**Instincts:** because they are not mental entities, but physiological forces, represented in the unconscious by ideas and in the rest of the mind by ideas plus affects. They are cryptoteleological.

Freud thought that there were things that were always unconscious, but did not think they differed in kind from those that were sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious. They consisted of "racial memories." These were of much less importance to Freud than to Jung. Freud did not believe in the collective unconscious in the full Jungian sense, which involves four tenets; Freud believed in only two of these.
(372) Repression (apart from the act of repression, which was probably introspectible) was conceived by Freud as a force exercised upon unconscious ideas to keep them out of consciousness, in opposition to the instincts, which were also forces and were trying to push them into consciousness. If we consider the alternatives to the notion of repression, which I call "non-recognition" and "substituted action", we see that the former does not let us give a satisfactory account of the effects of the "repressed". The latter, on the other hand, turns out to be, not an alternative to the Freudian "repression", but something of a different logical status. The Freudian explanation and the substituted action explanation are related to each other in the same way as scientific models are related to purely descriptive laws.

(373) Scientific models can be classified according to their "phenomenomorphism". Highly phenomenomorphic models are either "autophenomenomorph" (like the Freudian unconscious) or "allophenomenomorph" (like the Freudian metapsychology). They can also be classified according to whether they are "corresponding", "non-corresponding" or "unverified". The fact that the Freudian /
Freudian unconscious entities are ex hypothesi unintrospectible does not mean that the model is therefore unverifiable.

CHAPTER 3.

(374) The chief entity of the Freudian model of the unconscious is the "idea". When they are driven out of consciousness and preconsciousness, ideas are stripped of the visual or verbal images in which they were clothed; hence their unintrospectibility. At the same time, they are indestructible, like the matter of nineteenth-century physics. They might be described as "permanent possibilities of introspection", and are thus more like potentialities than observable entities, that is, more like such model-entities as isotherms than chromosomes. Freud's belief in their permanence, however, was due to a confusion between the act and the content of ideation. This explains why he believed that ideas, which have content, can be unconscious, while affects, which have none, cannot.

(375) In neo-Freudianism, ideas have been replaced by two alternative notions. The "process school" have
really taken the "process" of Freud's metapsychology and made this into the entity of their model, to which the term "unconscious" is quite inappropriate. The Klein-Fairbairn school, on the other hand, have refined the "idea-plus-affect" into the "object-relation", which is, even more clearly than the "idea", the entity of a "potentiality-model", and cannot be regarded as "corresponding", although Freud would have maintained that his model was.

(376) Freud maintained that part of the ego - the part that exerted repression - was unconscious. His notion of the ego began by being a simple, uncomplicated entity, with the sole function of repressing and being motivated by ideas under the impulsion of the instincts. It soon became necessary, however, to attribute to it other kinds of behaviour, and it eventually ceased to be a cog-wheel and turned into a manikin. Freud distinguished it from the id by saying that it consisted of the same sort of constituents, but in an organised form. But the "organisation-ego" really belongs to Freud's metapsychological process-model: a different kind of entity is needed (and is sometimes found in occasional remarks of his) to act as a recipient for the ideas of the autophenomenomorphological model. The unconsciousness /
unconsciousness of part of the ego is inferred from the mistaken assumption that repression (as distinct from the act of repression) and the organisation of the ego are the sort of things that could conceivably be introspected.

(377) It is difficult to determine the relationship between the so-called unconscious parts of the ego and the super-ego. They may have been one and the same, or the former may have been visualised as acting under the pressure of the latter. If, as seems likely, the two were separate, the unconscious superego may be a complex of ideas (sometimes called the "ego-ideal") which acts upon the ego just as other unconscious ideas, and is in fact (thought Freud would not have admitted it) a miniature and very specialised id. The superego is really an attempt to describe certain kinds of learning-phenomena.

(378) Freud talks of "unconscious processes", and it is important to know whether this means that his unconscious was the sort of place in which change and action went on. But his ideas were processes only in the metapsychological sense, and while he spoke of "unconscious phantasies" these may only have been groups of
of ideas which could produce a phantasy if made conscious. When he talks of unconscious processes he usually means the dream-work. But the four so-called unconscious processes of the dream-work turn out to be relations between unconscious and conscious (or preconscious) mental entities, and not something involving change or development in the unconscious itself. The conscious (and preconscious) mind is like the action of a play, but the unconscious is a tableau, whose characters resemble those of the play, and are sometimes removed to take part in it or added to by players expelled from it, but otherwise stand for ever in frozen immobility.

CHAPTER 4.

(379) Of Freud's four arguments for the unconscious, three are logically unsound - the arguments from other minds, from discovered causes and from continuity. These three are "laboratory arguments", whereas the fourth, the argument from results, is a "consulting-room argument". Only the fourth has any force. But it was overstated by Freud, who claimed that his assumption helped him to construct a successful therapeutic method. It would have been more prudent to /
to claim only that -

"The model of the unconscious is of more help than any other in the application of a technique that enables us to produce in patients certain emotions, recollections and other mental phenomena."

CHAPTER 5.

(380) The pure science of psychoanalysis is explanatory, not descriptive, although it is responsible for many acute observations about human behaviour. It is possible to formulate psychoanalytic laws so that they, and statements about them, fit into Toulmin's classification of scientific law-like statements. But Toulmin also points out that in addition to laws explanatory sciences use "principles of inference". Allers' "axioms of psychoanalysis" are not principles of inference, but are statements that you can make sense of mental phenomena by treating them as if they obeyed the laws of other sciences, such as physics. But in order to adopt this advice it is necessary to regard certain expected phenomena as present when they are not observable — that is, as being in the unconscious. Unconsciousness is thus a scientific principle of inference. It is an expedient which is needed /
needed to apply to the explanation of complex kinds of human behaviour the principle of "no action at a distance in time", and it does this by treating past states as if they were present. If we also take account of the Freudian instincts and their cryptoteleology, the unconscious also to a certain extent represents hypothetical future events as present. This explains its "timelessness".

CHAPTER 6.

(381) The role of the unconscious in psychoanalysis will be fully understood only by recognising that the latter is a technique and by clearing up the nature of the relationship between techniques and sciences. Techniques are systems of rules for achieving classes of ends. Sciences are either descriptions of regularities in phenomena or these plus statements about explanatory models and their uses. Techniques can have "sub-techniques", which make use of alternative ways of achieving the object of the technique, and also "intermediate techniques", which achieve ends that are means toward the main end. Explanatory sciences, which almost always make use of models, are of more use to techniques than are descriptive sciences,
and explanatory sciences are sometimes distinguished or sub-divided according to the model they use. But no technique, sub-technique or intermediate technique need be defined in this way (with the possible exception of statements about models, which may prove to be a highly specialised kind of technique). The subject-matters of techniques do not divide up along the same lines of division as the subject-matters of sciences. Each technique makes use of more than one science, and this is one of the ways in which techniques can be distinguished from applied sciences. Techniques do not have their own peculiar sciences.

(382) It is not difficult to fit psychoanalysis into this pattern. It is a sub-technique of the technique of psychotherapy. This has as its end the remedying of psychological disorders. Its sub-techniques can be classified first into the physiological and the semantic. The latter can be divided into the environmental and the personal. The latter can be arranged in a scale according to the extent to which they are mandatory or maieutic. Psychoanalysis is probably the most maieutic. Like other techniques it is based on more than one explanatory science, and therefore uses more than one model. It is distinguished from /
from other sub-techniques not by its use of the Freudian autophenomenomorphemic model, but by its practical method, which lays emphasis on the revival of past memories and emotions. There is no logical reason why the use of the Freudian model should be confined to this technique, and it can in fact be argued that other techniques can or do use it.

(333) So far the relationship between psychoanalysis and the model follows the normal pattern. But it is not every technique in which it is considered necessary for the subject as well as the technician to think in terms of the model. This takes place not in the sub-technique of psychoanalysis as a whole but in the intermediate technique called "interpretation". This is the technical term for telling the patient what memories, emotions etc. he must revive in order to be well. In the "interpreter's" thinking the model plays a "diagnostic" role. In the patient's thinking it can play a diagnostic role, but this would not justify the great importance which some analysts attach to this sub-technique, and I suggest that its most important role is a "suggestive" one. This explains why an autophenomenomorphemic model is preferable for

psychoanalytic /
psychoanalytic purposes to other kinds. It is not essential for the psychoanalyst to believe that it is a corresponding model; he need only believe that it is the best model for the patient to regard as corresponding. It may in practice be difficult to do without a model of this sort for psychoanalytic purposes, but there is no logical reason why interpretation should not be carried out without it, and some analysts do not even consider interpretation a very important intermediate technique. This view of the role of the unconscious is consistent with the modified form which I have suggested for Freud's argument from results, and also with different theories as to how psychoanalysis achieves its beneficial results (if it is held that it has beneficial results). It is also possible to find other non-corresponding models that play analogous roles in other techniques although these analogies are either controversial or trivial, for the very good reason that, if the technique were an important one, the model could not be generally accepted as non-corresponding without losing its suggestive effect.
POSTSCRIPT.

(384) The Freudian unconscious has suffered from an excess of both scepticism and mysticism. The sceptics have accused it of being unscientific and of corresponding to nothing in reality. The mystics have exalted it into something which is not merely as real as the things of the familiar mind but even represents the true reality, of which the mental things we know are only shadows. Both attitudes arise from the same failure to appreciate its logical status. If this is seen to be the same as the status of some of the conceptions used in other sciences, the question at issue ceases to be "Is there any such thing?" and is replaced by two new questions. The first is -

"Does it help the psychoanalyst more than any other conception to visualise the remedy for the disorder which he is trying to alleviate?"

and the second is -

"Does it help the patient more than any other conception to experience the experiences that will alleviate his disorder?"

These are questions which I have not tried to answer, since it is only in the consulting-room that they can be answered. I have in passing suggested reasons, historical and logical, why the conception took this particular /
particular form. I have also pointed to some respects in which it has been improved, or might have been; no doubt there are many more. An important question to which I have only made brief references is -

"From the technical - that is, the therapeutic - point of view, what are the entities which it is most effective to refer to as "unconscious" - should they be emotions, purposes, object-relations or what?"

This too is the sort of question that is better answered from the consulting-room. From the armchair, all that I can do is to point out what sort of a thing it is that the sceptic is trying to put into a pillory and the mystic is trying to put into a temple.
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TEAP Theoretical and Experimental Aspects of Psychoanalysis (British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol. XXV, Part 2 & 3 pp. 122-127) 1952

FORDHAM, Frieda

IJP An Introduction to Jung’s Psychology (Penguin Books) 1953

FREUD, Anna

EMD The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (Hogarth Press) 1936

FREUD, Sigmund

(CP = the Hogarth Press edition of the translation of the Collected Papers, in five volumes. Only the first two volumes of the Standard Edition were available by the end of 1953, and no references to it will be found)

DNP The Defence neuro-psychoses (CP I) 1894

ID The Interpretation of Dreams (Allen & Unwin, 1933) 1900

PPEL The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Pelican Books) 1904

HP Hysterical Phantasies and their relation to bisexuality (CP II) 1908

APFB /
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<td>OP</td>
<td>An Outline of Psychoanalysis (W.W. Norton &amp; Co.)</td>
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<td>GLOVER, Edward</td>
<td>The Technique of Psychoanalysis (The Institute of Psychoanalysis)</td>
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HEALY, BRONNER & BOWERS,

**SHP**  The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis  
(Alfred A. Knopf, New York)  
1930

HERB, D.O.

**OHR**  The Organisation of Human Behaviour  
(Chapman & Hall)  
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**MHP**  Modern Behaviour and Psychoanalysis  
(Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1939, Ser. II Vol. I)  
1939

JACOBI,

**PCGJ**  The Psychology of C. G. Jung  
(Kegan Paul)  
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**PPA**  Papers on Psychoanalysis  
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**DCS**  Development of the Concept of the Superego  
(J. Ab. Soc. Vol. XXIII, p. 276)  
1927

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**MIP**  A Modern Introduction to Psychology  
(London University Tutorial Press)  
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LEVINE /
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<th>Author</th>
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<td>LEVINE, Israel</td>
<td>The Unconscious (Leonard Parsons)</td>
<td>1923</td>
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<td>McALPINE, Ida,</td>
<td>Psycho-somatic Symptom Formation (Lancet for 11th February, 1942)</td>
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<td>MACMURRAY, John</td>
<td>The Boundaries of Science (Faber and Faber)</td>
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<td>ROGERS, Carl</td>
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<td>RUSSELL, Bertrand</td>
<td>The Analysis of Mind (Allen &amp; Unwin)</td>
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<td>SEARS, R. Ronald</td>
<td>Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytical Concepts (Social Science Research Council, New York, Bulletin 51)</td>
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GP General Psychology
(Macmillan, New York) 1937

TOULMIN, Stephen

PS The Philosophy of Science
(Hutchison's University Library) 1953

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PD The Psychology of Day-Dreams
(Allen & Unwin) 1921

WOHLGEMUTH, A.

GEP A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis
(Allen and Unwin) 1923

YOUNG, J.Z.

DCS Doubt and Certainty in Science
(Clarendon Press) 1951

Freudian /
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