DISCOURSE, NOMINALITY AND REFERENCE:
A STUDY IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Hugh R.N. Trappes-Lowax

Ph.D.
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
1983
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgments</th>
<th>viii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APPLIED LINGUISTICS AND PRACTICAL PRAGMATICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: Theories and positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Between theory and practice</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Linguistics and discourse analysis</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Linguistic facts</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Aspects of discourse</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 'In' and 'out' in language teaching</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Origin of new positions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. A change in direction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse, text and context</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Discourse</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Text</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Context</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse competence: What native speakers know</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Aspects of competence: form, meaning and use</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fixed meanings (knowledge pertaining to text)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Facts and praxis (knowledge pertaining to context)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'Rules' of use (knowledge pertaining to discourse)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Indirectness</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Competence for discourse: recapitulation</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse performance: what native speakers do</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Performance in relation to competence</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The unit of discourse activity</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Nominals: external relationships 158
4.1 Ascriptive complements and adjuncts 160
4.2 Equative complements and adjuncts 162
4.3 Existentials 164

Chapter 6 Reference 169
1 Review 170
1.1 Sources 170
1.2 Referrers 173
1.3 Referents 176
1.4 Referential acts 184
1.4.1 What kind of speech act? 184
1.4.2 What kind of utterance? 189
1.4.3 What kind of conditions? 191
1.4.3.1 Conditions for 'definite' reference 192
1.4.3.2 Conditions for 'indefinite' reference 196
1.4.3.3 Conditions for generic reference 201
2 Three dimensions of reference 203
2.1 Primary - Secondary 204
2.2 Specific - Non-specific 205
2.3 Known - Not-known 207
3 Six referential functions 208
3.1 The three specific functions 209
3.1.1 Referring 210
3.1.2 Relating 214
3.1.3 Identifying 218
3.2 The three non-specific functions 223
3.2.1  Evoking  224
  3.2.1.1  Indicating  229
3.2.2  Establishing  232
3.2.3  Attributing  234
3.3  Retrospect and prospect  236

Chapter 7  Nominal-referential analysis: A guide  239
  1  Introduction  239
  2  Field Guide to Nominal-Referential Analysis  245
    2.1  Nominal Expressions  245
    2.2  Referential functions  248
    2.3  Nominal-referential: some expected regularities of use  249
      2.3.1  Notes on the use of nominal expressions  249
      2.3.2  Notes on regularities in the realisation of referential functions  255
    2.4  Interactivity  262
      2.4.1  Co-reference  262
      2.4.2  Cross-reference  264
      2.4.3  Referential routines  265
      2.4.4  Reference and predication  265
      2.4.5  Reference and performative force  266
      2.4.6  Reference and interactive acts  266

PART THREE  APPLICATION  268

Chapter 8  Discourse performance: An essay in nominal-referential analysis  268
  1  Introduction  268
  2  Functions and patterns  270
    2.0  Sample of data  270
2.1  'Not-known'

2.2  The indicating function

2.2.1  Standard form

2.2.2  Variations

2.2.3  Indicating nominals: form

2.2.4  Comparison with establishing expressions

2.3  The attributing function and some attributing routines

2.3.1  Choice: attributing or indicating?

2.3.2  Pre-primary attribution

2.3.3  Interactivity of post-primary attributions

2.3.4  Attributing expressions: form

2.3.5  The (Ind - P) + (A - P - A) routine

3  Analysis of two passages

3.1  Passage A: the analysis

3.2  Passage A: discussion of functions and forms

3.3  Passage A: interactivity

3.3.1  Riers and patterns

3.3.2  Co-reference and cross-reference

3.4  Passage B: the analysis

3.5  Passage B: discussion of functions and forms

3.6  Passage B: interactivity

3.6.1  Riers and patterns

3.6.2  Co-reference and cross-reference

4  Summary

Chapter 9  Utility

1  A 'relevant model'?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reference and the communicative approach</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>For example</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>'What to teach'</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>'How to teach it'</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**APPENDIX A**

NOTES 356

**APPENDIX B**

SOURCES OF DATA 382

REFERENCES 383
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

and thanks - to Professor Corder and his colleagues, who made Edinburgh in the early 1970s a most inspiring place to learn about applied linguistics; in particular to my first supervisor, Professor Henry Widdowson, whose influence is, I hope, frequently apparent (at least in those parts of my thesis with which he would not too strongly disagree) and without whose guidance and friendly encouragement I would never have got started; to my present supervisors, Dr Gillian Brown and Dr Alan Davies, who have sustained my enthusiasm and guided me with always illuminating criticism; to my colleagues in the Department of Foreign Languages and Linguistics, University of Dar es Salaam, especially Dr Jennifer Higham and Mrs Saida Yahya-Othman, who have read or listened to many of my ideas and given me invaluable comments and suggestions, and Professor Herman Batibo, for his support and understanding while I have been, for far too long, bringing this work to a conclusion.

I am also indebted to Daphne Beaton and Malcolm Norris, who courageously undertook to produce a typescript of much of the thesis from my handwriting; and to Nd. Mathias M. Maura, who, assisted by Nd. G. Kihiyo, typed the final version.
ABSTRACT

The thesis is in three parts. In Part I a distinction is drawn between linguistic theories and applied linguistic 'positions', the latter being evaluated partly (and principally) in terms of criteria of 'applicability': their efficacy in analysis of data, and the utility for language teaching purposes of the output of any such analysis. Some observations are made on the origin and development of the 'communicative approach' as being one particularly influential position in current applied linguistic work (chapter 1).

A very general position on discourse and its analysis is then outlined. In chapter 2 the terms 'discourse', 'text' and 'context' are given broad definition. In chapter 3 the principal constituents of competence for discourse are described, some emphasis being given to the native speaker's knowledge of 'fixed' lexico-grammatical meanings (in contrast with the 'occasional' meanings which are experienced in actual instances of use). Some observations are made on the nature of 'rules of use' - the interaction between a speaker's grammatical and 'practical' competences - and on types of indirectness. In chapter 4, first, the main kinds of act which characterise discourse performance - locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary - are described and it is argued that not only 'performative' acts, such as requesting and promising, but also propositional acts, specifically acts of reference, are properly regarded as illocutionary; and, second, the process of discourse - the interaction between participants - is shown to be distinct from but connected to the
structure of discourse - the interactivity of discourse acts. 'Inter¬
active acts' are defined. Coherence and cohesion are then explained
in terms of discourse interactivity.

In Part II the idea that reference is an act - or a class of
acts - performed in saying something is developed in detail. In
chapter 5 an account is given of English nominal expressions as being
those expressions generated by the grammar of the language whose use
is essentially referential - i.e. expressions which people use when
their intention is to refer. The account given - in terms of 'denota¬
tive' and 'determinative' functions - is intended to show how it is
that nominals fulfil this referential role. In chapter 6, after a
select review of the extensive literature on reference, three main
'dimensions' of reference are described and a taxonomy of referential
functions is proposed. Chapter 7 provides a checklist of nominal
and referential categories, of their inter-relation in use, and of
aspects of referential interactivity: a 'field guide' for the prospect¬
ive analyst.

In Part III, by way of exemplification and in order to test the
'efficacy' of the position constructed in Parts I and II, a detailed
analysis is given - chapter 8 - of an 'academic' text. In the final
chapter it is shown that reference has received little attention from
applied linguists, despite its considerable importance in linguistic
communication, but that the output of a nominal-referential analysis
such as that undertaken in chapter 8 is straightforwardly accommodated
within the current framework of communicative syllabus design and
methodology: it has, it is claimed, 'utility'.
1 Between theory and practice

The Practical Study of Languages was completed in its first
draft by Henry Sweet in 1877 but was not published until 1899.
In the intervening two decades, during which the Reform Movement
grew to strength, we may plausibly discern the beginnings of a
'modern era' in the history of language teaching. Sweet dis-
tinguished between

the practical and the theoretical study
of languages - between learning to
understand, read, speak, write a language
on the one hand, and studying its history
and etymology on the other hand.
(Sweet, 1899/1964:1)

He also wrote:

But it is important to realise at the
same time that the practical study of
languages is not in any way less scientific
than the theoretical.
(Ibid.)

Thus he breathed life into the future discipline of applied
linguistics - one separate from that of scientific linguistics
but still, at least in part, linguistic, and still, at least
in aspiration, 'scientific'.

Though Sweet perceived the practical study of language as separate in principle from the theoretical, the separation is not clearly visible in Sweet himself as a linguistic scholar, nor in other major figures of the Reform Movement and its immediate aftermath, notably Jespersen and H.E. Palmer. Not, as the quotation from Sweet shows, that they did not see the difference; and not, as reference to their work immediately reveals, that they confused description and prescription. But their interests and their capacities were large, and they easily embraced both disciplines where their successors (with some notable exceptions such as Halliday and Fries) are normally regarded as being practitioners of only one.

Today, for the most part, not only are linguists not language teachers and language teachers not linguists but the concerns of the two groups and their approaches to language have become plainly divergent. There is a gulf between them. The growth of applied linguistics as a separate discipline is a response to this divergence. It is, or ought to be, the bridge across the gulf. The practitioners of this discipline must, therefore, not only, and primarily, be familiar with the practical concerns of teachers and course designers, inspectors and language planners, on the 'near' side of the bridge; they must also know and understand the theoretical and descriptive activities of linguists (including the hyphenated ones) and of others concerned speculatively or empirically with various aspects of language and its use (e.g., philosophers, anthropologists and social psychologists), on the 'far' side. Those immediately
engaged in language teaching are properly viewed as on the 'near' side because it is with them that applied linguistics starts, from them, very largely, that it derives its aims. It is not that, normally, linguists decide to ask, 'How can our theories and descriptions be applied, how can we be practical?'; rather it is that teachers and others concerned with practical aspects of language ask, 'How can we solve our problems in a reliable and systematic way, how can linguistic theory and description help us?' 3

The problems (ignoring the essentially political and administrative problems of language planning at Corder's 'Level 1' (Corder, 1973:13)) are of two main sorts: What to teach? and How to teach it? The solutions emerge from two sorts of consideration: practical and theoretical. The former are to do with the inescapable facts of the case: (a) what the learners need the target language for (purposes general or specific; if specific, the situations, activities, functions, etc involved), and (b) who the learners are (in terms of age, aptitude, past learning experience, etc). The latter are to do with more or less general hypotheses related to (a) the nature of language and (b) the nature of learning. A particular set of answers to the (a) questions yields what I shall call an Approach; a particular set of answers to the (b) questions yields a Methodology. This view is summarised in the following diagram:
Problems: To find solutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRACTICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORETICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATIONS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHAT? Analyse the learners' needs: reflect on the nature of language. **APPROACH**

HOW? Analyse the learners' capacities: reflect on the nature of learning. **METHODOLOGY**

Fig. 1.1 Approaches and Methodologies

Of course, reality is not in fact contained in boxes: considerations of **WHAT** influence considerations of **HOW**; and the way in which we analyse learners' needs and capacities is influenced by the nature of our views on language and learning. The distinction between **APPROACH** and **METHODOLOGY** is therefore fluid. It is nevertheless a real and important distinction. In devising language teaching programmes, decisions on methodology (*behaviourist*? *cognitivist*?) are to a significant extent independent of decisions on approach (*structural*? *communicative*?).

Such, broadly, are the concerns of **APPLIED LINGUISTICS** in its connection with language teaching. Now what of its ethos? Is it concerned with the Truth, or is it simply concerned with the Tried and Tested? Is it, or is it not, a theoretical discipline?
It has recently begun to be said that applied linguistics has reached the stage at which a theory is what it stands in need of. Crystal (1981) aims 'to motivate a direction for a theory of applied linguistics'; Kaplan (1980) is a collection of papers that 'may constitute a first step in the direction of the definition of a theory of applied linguistics'. If we take these statements as something more than rhetorical flourishes we shall need to consider what sort of a theory a theory of applied linguistics might be. To do this, let us distinguish broadly and briefly between three types: a theory of how the world is (a scientific theory); a theory of how we may find out about the world (an epistemological theory); and a theory of how things may best be done in the world (a pragmatic theory). A theory of language or of language acquisition is a theory of the first type; a theory about the nature of linguistic inquiry — whether for example it is or can be 'scientific' — is a theory of the second type; a theory about how to teach a foreign language is a theory of the third type.

A 'theory of applied linguistics' — as opposed to an 'applied linguistic theory' — would be a theory of the second type: a theory about a discipline, about how it sets about the business of reducing a certain sort of ignorance. An applied linguistic theory, by contrast, might be a theory of either the first or third types: it might, for example, on the one hand, be about the nature of discourse or the stages of second language acquisition; or, on the other hand, it might be about the most
effective way of achieving some pedagogic objective - it might claim that a certain approach or a certain methodology will, in certain circumstances, be the most effective. Perhaps it is the case that applied linguists are beginning to see how a theory of applied linguistics might be stated. It is not my purpose to pursue this issue in general. I want, however, to make one particular proposal. It is that part of any such theory should be that applied linguistics is not really in the business of producing applied linguistic theories. It is, indeed, concerned to make statements about how things may be understood and about how things may be done; but these statements are not, I want to suggest, properly regarded as theoretical - they have a rather different character, which is compatible with the 'applied' nature of the applied linguistic discipline. I shall call such statements 'positions'.

A position is not a statement of what is so much as a statement of what works: it provides a set of assumptions, of operational definitions, about the nature, e.g., of language learning (and how it differs from acquisition), of linguistic meaning (and how it differs from discourse interpretation), or of variability in the code (and how it differs from variability in use), on the basis of which the collection and analysis of data and the production and evaluation of materials can proceed. The criteria for a good position will clearly differ, in content and emphasis, from the criteria for a good theory (for example Chomsky's 'adequacy' criteria for a generative grammar). They may be stated as follows:
(1) 'Validity': the position-statement does not contradict the apparent facts (as attested in data or enshrined in a native speaker's intuitions) or at least not too many of them, and not too seriously;

(2) 'Congruity': the position-statement is not anti-linguistic; it fits within the state of the art (or some reasonable conception of it), draws on recognisably linguistic (broadly speaking) theory and description, does not stand up only if some 'issue on which linguists can agree' (Hudson, 1981) is allowed to fall;

(3) 'Efficacy': the position-statement is an effective tool in analysing data, in dealing with the 'facts'; it is comprehensible (and not only to its author), reliable (a clear and unambiguous statement: not all things to all analysts), manageable (not extravagantly complex) and it produces results;

(4) 'Utility': the results it produces are useful; when they are applied to language teaching problems, they solve them - or at least they help.

It will be noted that the first two of these criteria are more oriented to the theoretical-descriptive end of the applied linguistic bridge, while the second two, which we may sum up in one macro-criterion of 'applicability', are more oriented to the practical end.

It is not difficult to point to applied linguistic ideas which, though open to various theoretical objections, are of proven vigour as positions, i.e. have proved useful. One could
cite as an obvious case Widdowson's (1973a) set of dichotomies which underpin his view of discourse and his approach to the problems of teaching 'use': text/discourse, usage/use, cohesion/coherence, signification/value. More generally, almost all British work on discourse analysis is best seen as essentially position-based, and should properly be evaluated as such. In this it contrasts with continental work on 'text-linguistics', which presents itself as an extension of linguistic theory-building.4

Applied linguistic positions are of no obvious interest to the theoretical or descriptive linguist, and it is for this reason that the connection between linguistics and applied linguistics is demonstrably less of a 'two-way channel' than is sometimes piously supposed.5 Little, at any rate, has been written (so far as I am aware) to make explicit the process by which, and the extent to which, the pure is enriched by the applied. By contrast, numerous authors - Corder, Widdowson, Roulet, Spolsky and Wilkins among them - have discussed the nature of the 'application' that makes applied linguistics what it is. I shall not review this literature here, except to note the general agreement that one finds on the origins of applied linguistic activity (in language teaching, not in linguistics) and on the varied and usually indirect nature of the connections between linguistic theory and description and pedagogic practice. In particular, the distinction that is often drawn between 'implications' (Spolsky, Roulet) or 'insights' (Wilkins, Widdowson),
on the one hand, and 'applications', on the other, is of relevance to the present discussion. Both contribute to the construction of positions. But it is implications (deriving largely from advances in linguistic, psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic theory) that make the big impact; applications (deriving from descriptions) contributing more particularly to the detail of, e.g., materials design and pedagogic grammars. It is on implications rather than applications that the applied linguistic bridge is built (witness the connection between the development of speech act theory and that of the communicative approach) and it is implications rather than applications that have provided the foundations for the present work.

2 Linguistics and discourse analysis

2.1 Linguistic facts

Language, unlike speaking, is something that we can study separately. Although dead languages are no longer spoken, we can easily assimilate their linguistic organisms. We can dispense with the other elements of speech; indeed the science of language is possible only if the other elements are excluded.

(Saussure, 1916/1959)

All art which lives by knowledge and not by inspiration must finally resolve itself into scientific study, and there is no doubt that from all points of approach we are driven towards a scientific theory of language. Indeed, for some time already, we have had, side by side with the Arts of Language, attempts at posing and solving various purely theoretical problems of linguistic form and
meaning, approached mainly from the psychological point of view. The other modern Humanistic Sciences, in the first place Sociology and Anthropology, by giving us a deeper understanding of human nature and culture, bring their share to the common problem. (Malinowski, 1930)

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community. (Chomsky, 1965)

Linguistics, as Hymes reminds us, is the least independent of disciplines. The declaration of independence of linguists a generation ago was a prelude to significant advances; its aims were achieved, and times are different. (Halliday, 1967)

An approximation is always made possible by leaving some things out of account, and I believe the things left out of account to achieve an approximation of this particular sort are just the most important properties of human language in that they are the source of its open-ness. (Hockett, 1968)

The answer to complexity is not to give up on the whole thing but to find generalisations and simplifying assumptions that put their finger on the essential facts behind the complexity. (Grimes, 1975)

The history of linguistics reveals a constant tension between the impulse of central linguistics - the core of the discipline - to define itself and to defend its independence and the impulse of greater linguistics to continue growing. The conflict may be presented in this way, as a conflict over 'facts': where to draw the boundary between linguistic facts (and linguistic non-facts) and non-linguistic facts.

It has been said that 'there are no facts in Linguistics until the linguist has made them.' This is true, provided
we recognise that 'facts' is being used in a way which rather begs the question. We need to distinguish 'facts-as-observables', i.e. phenomena or potential phenomena (the 'tree that continues to be when there's no-one about'), from 'facts-as-observations', i.e. human responses to phenomena in the way of conceptualisations, descriptions, explanations, etc. (the tree diagram, for example!). It is of course the latter that there are none of until the linguist has made them. But the latter presuppose the former.

The relationship between facts-as-observables and facts-as-observations is mediated by theory. Theory acts both as a constraint on data and as a constraint on modes of description and explanation. That is to say, it both selects the facts-as-observables that are to be treated and it selects the method of treatment.

Theory and the development of theory have been and properly remain the central preoccupation of linguistics. The relationship between theory and data, on the one hand, and between theory and linguistic description, on the other hand, may be represented in the following way:

---

**Fig. 1.2** Facts and theory
From the world of observables theory selects data. In accordance with theory, data are analysed into observations (descriptions and explanations). Observation, in turn, reacts on theory, both in its selection component and in its analysis component. The impact of observation on each of these components does not appear to be equal, though they are necessarily inter-dependent and mutually informing. In general, it is on the basis of the selection component that disciplines establish their identity; for this reason, selection is normally more firmly constrained than are modes of analysis. It is easier, within the constraints, to devise new ways of dealing with the same data (for example by attaching an index of co-reference to nouns, or introducing a performative verb into the deep structure of declarative sentences) than it is to admit new data (contextual data for example) which, though it might throw light on problems encountered in analysing the old, would appear to challenge the definition that the discipline has provided for itself. If the constraints are weakened, and new sorts of data are admitted, then this will normally be rationalised by the invention of a cross-discipline specialism - such as psycho-, socio-, neuro- or text-linguistics - whose function is to preserve the centrally linguistic character of the home base (and to emphasise the primary interest in language rather than in, for example, neurology or social structure or literary criticism) while facilitating excursions for data collection into surrounding academic territory.
From an applied linguistic perspective, it is, I think, convenient to describe the movements out from the central to the greater discipline - from micro to macro - in terms of four principle dimensions, each associated with a number of concepts which have proved of fundamental importance in the growth of the study of language:

(1) WORDS - SENTENCES - TEXTS

The movement - from Saussure through Bloomfield and Chomsky to some of the work of Harris, Pike, Halliday, Grimes, vanDijk and many others - has been, on the whole, from the smaller to the larger units of analysis: from morphology through syntax to text-analysis.8

(2) FORMS - MEANINGS - FUNCTIONS

Within the history of American Structuralism, the movement has been from a concern with form to the exclusion of meaning, to an interest in the semantics of lexemes and sentences, to the attempt to bring illocutionary function into the description of sentences.9

(3) CODES - SPEAKERS - COMMUNITIES AND SITUATIONS

The view of linguistics as concerned with the description of arbitrary systems of signs abstracted from speakers and communities has been enlarged to include psycholinguistic concern with processes of language acquisition, speech production, comprehension,
etc., and sociolinguistic concern with the 'situated-ness' of meanings and, more generally, with the variability of systems in relation to demographic and contextual factors.  

(4) COMPETENCE – SKILL – PERFORMANCE

From Chomsky's interest in describing the native speaker's intuitive knowledge of the rules of his language, there has developed an interest in the performance skills by means of which speakers exploit this knowledge in actual communication and in the structure and process of the particular speech events - the actual instances of performance - which speakers have, on particular occasions, been observed to engage in.

2.2 Aspects of discourse

All points on all dimensions can be demonstrated to have supplied 'implications' for applied linguistics. In relation, specifically, to applied linguistic studies in discourse analysis, work on the nature of texts, of functions, of speech communities and situations, and of performance has been of particular significance, but the distinction between these different aspects of discourse - discourse as 'inter-sentential', discourse as 'communicative', discourse as 'social', discourse as actual performance - has not always been made clear, and the underlying significance of the related concepts on each of the dimensions has not always been appreciated: for example, that texts consist of sentences, that
functions are necessarily realised in forms with meanings, that speech communities (and indeed speech situations) are aggregates of individuals with particular roles and purposes, and that performance presupposes both competence and 'skill'.

In all this, the socio-linguistic has often been given undue prominence. This is partly because micro-linguistic and psycholinguistic aspects of discourse have, for various position-building reasons, attracted less attention than the socio; and partly because the term 'sociolinguistics' has been used with excessive liberality, to include, for example, any concern with speech events, or 'meaning potential', or illocutionary force, or functions of speaking, or - in general - any concern with language 'in use'; as if performance were a more sociolinguistic matter than competence, and pragmatics than syntax. This has been unfortunate. One effect has been that discourse analysis and the socio-linguistic analysis of texts have been presented as if virtually indistinguishable. But they should be distinguishable, because the study of discourse ultimately makes demands on all dimensions of linguistic inquiry (at least all those I have mentioned above), not just on the sociolinguistic end of dimension 3.

If we ask what part of the business of discourse analysis is properly sociolinguistic, the answer is that part, especially, where 'rules' - whether of grammar or of use - are found to make contact with social variables; 'such as where alternative ways of expressing the same thing are chosen by different social
groups' (Hudson, 1980:3). The mere fact that the notion 'speech acts' implies the social framework in which speech acts occur does not make the study of speech acts necessarily sociolinguistic. The illocutionary distinction ORDER-REQUEST is neither more nor less 'socio' intrinsically than the lexical distinction order-request. Both are social products; and the performance of the one and the utterance of the other in discourse are equally social acts. Thus we come to an important conclusion: the essence of the sociolinguistic study of language is not the study of speech events specifically but the study of variability - the correlation of phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic variation with independent social facts - generally;12 whereas discourse analysis is the study of speech events - of actual instances of performance - undertaken in order to discover the linguistic and communicative regularities, as well as the individual competence and skill, which underlie them.13

3 'In' and 'Out' in language teaching

3.1 Origin of new positions

All disciplines change, but not all disciplines change in the same way. One very general difference follows from the discussion above: disciplines of the unapplied sciences change through theoretical upheavals; disciplines of the applied sciences change through reconstruction of positions. Positions, as we have seen,
are the product of practical problems and theoretical implications. Changes in applied linguistic positions thus result from changes either in practical problems (the applied linguist's perception of the nature of the task that needs to be tackled) or in implications (the applied linguist's grasp of the import of linguistic theory) or, very commonly, in both of these.

It is necessary to stress 'perception of', 'grasp of'. Evidently, not all changes in the situation or needs of learners are noticed by applied linguists, and, of those which are, not all appear to call for special treatment. Evidently, also, not all developments in linguistic theory and description are noticed and followed up by applied linguists, and, of those that are, not all will be capable of yielding implications, still less applications.

It is also necessary to stress the frequency with which changes in both departments lead to new developments in position building. Very often, what is perceived as a problem in language teaching is so perceived because of what has previously been grasped as an implication. Likewise what has been grasped as an implication may be so grasped because of what has previously been perceived as a new language teaching problem. Over the years - since Sweet - the practical and the theoretical ends of the applied linguistic bridge have, indeed, shown a remarkable tendency to be mutually supporting.

It is not easy (for lack of historical information) to point to examples of changes in the perception of language teaching problems not leading to the development of some special
treatment. It is, however, possible to point to some developments in language study disciplines which, though they may have been 'noticed' by applied linguists, have not (yet) led to implications with positive practical effect and (or) on the whole do not appear likely to do so. In general, the following constraints appear to operate.

(1) At the theoretical end of the applied linguistic bridge, the most obvious constraint is the sheer instability of much linguistic theory:

The application of physics to engineering may not be seriously affected by even the most deep-seated revolution in the foundations of physics but the applications of psychology or linguistics to language teaching, such as they are, may be gravely affected by changing conceptions in these fields, since the body of theory which resists substantial modification is fairly small.

(Chomsky, 1971a:153)

Theory building in the social sciences thrives on demolition. Not so position building. Fads and fashions in applied linguistics are a waste of time (and of other, more material, resources). A position needs to have endurance potential and for this it needs firm foundations, theoretical as well as practical.

(2) At the practical end of the bridge, applicability is quite firmly constrained (a) by what needs to be, (b) by what can be, done, either in general or in relation to particular cases, at the level of actual classroom practice. It is also, more weakly,
constrained by what it is useful for the teacher, materials writer or syllabus designer to know about the nature of language in general and of the L1 and target language of certain groups of learners in particular.

For example, it seems to me not necessary to teach the 'rules' of turn-taking (assuming someone knows what they are) even if it is possible, except perhaps in so far as discourse analysis reveals regularities of use which relate particular aspects of turn-taking (e.g. interrupting) to a certain range of lexicogrammatical choice. Certainly, the paralinguistics of turn-taking (control of pitch, tempo) would not normally be regarded as a necessary part of the process of teaching an L2. However, some knowledge of patterns of turn-taking may conceivably help a materials writer to produce realistic, lively and relevant materials.¹⁴

As an example of a different sort, it seems to me not possible to teach linguistic creativity in the sense propounded by Sampson (1980), whether or not it is necessary for the learner to possess this linguistic faculty, since such creativity is defined to be 'ex nihilo', which presumably rules out the teacher as a source! (Chomsky's version of creativity, by contrast, if it is assumed to represent the reality of language knowing and using, is unquestionably applicable, i.e. there is an implication to be derived from it. Such creativity¹⁵ - the knowledge of a generative grammar - is just what needs to be learnt and, if language teaching is assumed to make any difference, must be presumed to be
teachable.) It is, nevertheless, conceivable that reflecting on and reaching conclusions about the real nature of linguistic creativity could influence the language teacher's view of his task, particularly where the language of study is the L1.

(3) In the middle (i.e. where the bridge bridges, so to speak) we encounter what may be called the applied linguistic conflict of 'interest'.

Certain things are interesting in themselves - for example, human action. When a novelist deals with human actions, that's interesting; the flight of a bird, a flower, that's interesting. In this sense, natural history and descriptive sociology are interesting, just like a novel...

But there is another meaning of the word interesting, in physics, for example. A phenomenon in itself does not have interest for a physicist ... What happens under the conditions of a scientific experiment is of no importance in itself. Its interest lies in its relation to whatever theoretical principles are at stake. Natural science, as distinct from natural history, is not concerned with the phenomena in themselves, but with the principles and the explanations that they have some bearing on. (Chomsky 1979:58-59)

Chomsky's examples in the domain of language are:— human interest: irregular verbs; theoretical interest: specified subject condition.

What, then, of the applied linguist? Is he concerned with what is interesting (everyday sense) or with what is 'interesting'? The latter is identified with general principles, with universals of grammar and communication; the former with what is peculiar to certain languages and speech communities. Though Chomsky (1980:133) remarks that
ordinary grammar books, quite properly for their purposes, tacitly assume a principled grammar (generally without awareness) and deal with idiosyncracies ...

and suggests that no grammar book devised, say, for teaching English, would, or should, deal with the simple properties of questions ...

it is precisely through taking an interest in the 'interesting' - for example the communicative conditions for questioning and the one-to-many relationship between the illocutionary force QUESTION and grammatical form - that applied linguistics has in the recent past achieved, through the development of the communicative approach, its most substantial impact on the actual practice of language teaching. How has this come about?

3.2 A change in direction

The communicative approach cannot be defined as the approach which aims to teach language for communicative purposes, nor even as the approach which aims to teach language for specific communicative purposes. Such purposes have been acknowledged explicitly or implicitly since the very beginning of our 'modern era' and can, indeed, never have been wholly absent from the business of language teaching. Even 'structural' courses teach 'skills'.

What, essentially, characterises the communicative approach is the analysis of the content of a course primarily in terms of non-grammatical - or at least non-morpho-syntactic - categories. These categories include: situation types, roles and topics;
language activity types (reading, conversing, etc.); concepts and illocutionary functions; and recurrent discourse patterns, or 'routines'. These communicative categories, which are in principle determined, in a given syllabus, by the needs and capacities of the learners, in turn are supposed to determine the syllabus's linguistic - phonological, lexical and morpho-syntactic - content. Since it is the 'concepts' and 'functions' which make the most immediate links with particular items in grammar or lexis, it is these which have received most of the attention in the development of the communicative approach: 'communicative' and 'notional-functional' are, indeed, frequently used in free variation.

It is not the case that the idea of a communicative approach to language teaching (thus understood) is a new one. Such an idea can be clearly traced in Jespersen's *Philosophy of Grammar* (1924):

(i) Jespersen describes two approaches to the linguistic description of the grammar of a language:

...we may start either from without or from within; in the first part (0 → I) we take a form as given and then enquire into its meaning or function; in the second part (I → 0) we invert the process and take the meaning or function and ask how that is expressed in form (p. 39-40).

According to Jespersen, these differences of approach, of direction, are the defining differences between morphology and syntax.

(ii) He describes the psychological (language-as-process) implications of the difference in direction:
In a duologue the hearer encounters certain sounds and forms, and has to find out their meaning - he moves from without to within (0 → 1). The speaker, on the other hand, starts from certain ideas which he tries to communicate; to him the meaning is the given thing, and he has to find out how to express it: he moves from within to without. (I → 0) (p. 45)

(iii) His discussion of the universality of syntactic categories (p. 46ff) leads to the tentative conclusion that in so far as there is or may be a universal logical basis for languages this is largely external to grammar itself:

NOTIONAL CATEGORIES

We are thus led to recognise that beside, or above, or behind, the syntactic categories which depend on the structure of each language as it is actually found, there are some extralingual categories which are independent of the more or less accidental facts of existing languages; they are universal in so far as they are applicable to all languages, though rarely expressed in them in a clear and unmistakable way. Some of them relate to such facts of the world without as sex, others to mental states or to logic, but for want of a better common name for these extra-lingual categories I shall use the adjective notional and the substantive notion. It will be the grammarian's task in each case to investigate the relation between the notional and the syntactic categories (p. 55).

(iv) He incorporates notional categories into his account of language as process:

In speaking (or writing) we start from the right side (C) ((of the scheme:

\[
\text{A. FORM} \quad \text{B. FUNCTION} \quad \text{C. NOTION}
\]

(= syntactic function)

which he has previously outlined)) and move through syntax (B) to the formal expression (A);
in hearing (or reading) the movement is in the opposite direction, from A through B to C (p. 57).

(v) In a footnote he refers to the then recently published work of Ferdinand Brunot *La Pensée et la Langue*, hailing Brunot as a powerful ally, but observing (as a point of disagreement with Brunot's view that the teaching of French grammar should be revolutionised by starting from 'within'):

What he advocates as the proper method (starting from within, from 'la pensee') should according to my view be one of two ways of approaching the facts of language, one from without to within, and another from within to without (57fn.).

Thus, the idea of 'within' is extended beyond grammatical function to extra-grammatical 'notion', and the communicative approach to language teaching is encapsulated: it is the approach which moves in the direction from inner to outer, from notions through 'syntactic functions' to forms. It is in contrast with the structural approach in that the latter moves in precisely the opposite direction: from forms to notions. 19

The history of language teaching in the modern era is, in broad outline, the history of a fundamental change in direction:

Stage 1: Reform Movement: 0 \(\rightarrow\) I, where 0 is the phonetic basis and I is the meaning content of texts. 20

Stage 2: Structural Approach: 0 \(\rightarrow\) I, where 0 is morpho-syntactic and lexical form ('expression') and I is semantico-cultural meaning ('content'). 21
Stage 3: Communicative Approach: $I \rightarrow O$, where $I$ is notions and communicative functions (with socio-culturally defined situations lying behind these) and $O$ is grammatical meaning-and-form, with its ultimate realisation in phonetic or graphetic substance.

Expressed in this way, the change is seen as a true revolution: a total upheaval, a reversal. What matters is not that it can be demonstrated that for the past 100 years language teaching has had communicative purposes; nor that language teachers have always been concerned with forming associations between grammatical expression and communicative function. What matters is that the approach to language has changed direction. This is the crucial difference. The most firmly rooted and the most widely accepted position in today's applied linguistics is that, for many if not all language teaching situations, the movement from inner to outer is to be preferred.

The theoretical and practical origins of this position (broadly, speech act theory and ethnographic functionalism, on the one hand; language learning for specific occupational and academic purposes, on the other) are well known. The two fundamental assumptions underlying it are: (i) that language teaching syllabuses should, where possible, be based on a careful analysis of learners' needs, and (ii) that the analysed needs can better be answered in $(I \rightarrow O)$ syllabuses than in $(O \rightarrow I)$ syllabuses.

I do not intend to challenge these assumptions. I shall, however, conclude this chapter by making two criticisms of the communicative approach, both of which lead directly to the aspect of
communication with which I am mainly concerned, namely the communication of reference.

The first I shall dispose of briefly. It is that Jespersen appears to have been proved right. A language teaching approach which depends entirely on a movement from 1 to 0 is defective. The best answer is an approach which operates in both directions, from grammar to notions as well as from notions to grammar. A growing murmur of cautionary voices in recent books and periodicals gives support to this view. A syllabus organised around notions will inevitably be more or less disorganised in respect of grammar; one organised around structure, more or less disorganised in respect of categories of communication. Grammatical organisation is desirable (if not in all cases essential) because it imposes order and control on the teaching of the components of the language system in relation to each other. It ensures that these components are learned in the most effective order (in so far as this is determinable), in a grammatically connected way, over a suitable period of time, and that nothing that matters is overlooked. Communicative organisation is desirable because it imposes order and control on the teaching of the components of the language system in relation to communicative needs: the situations, activities, functions and notions which match the objectives set. It organises the communicative side, making sure nothing of communicative importance is left out and that nothing irrelevant is put in. It also, probably, maximises motivation and interest, both for the learners and for their teachers. The most persuasive answer to the question, Which direction? is, therefore, both directions; to the question, What kind of a syllabus? - a dual syllabus, one in which the content of the course is expressed both
lexico-grammatically and notionally/functionally and the movement in both directions (not just from I to O) is made explicit.\textsuperscript{24} The crucial problem in materials design then becomes: how to integrate the two directions.

My second criticism relates to a certain tendency, or emphasis, in the proposals for communicative syllabuses, and in actual materials, which have emerged so far. There has been an assumption that, whereas the relation between grammar and illocutionary force is complex and more or less indirect, the relationship between grammar and propositional meaning is neither of these, as if propositional content and propositions (cf. Lyons, 1981:111) were more or less equivalent. The result has been that relatively little applied linguistic attention has been given to the question of form-function relationships other than those involving illocutionary force. It is possible, it is true, to point to communicative materials that take some account of problems of reference and predication - the interpretation of referential and predicative expressions, the discovery of referential and predicative patterns in discourse. (There is a survey of such materials in chapter 9.) But the position-building needed to give support to these excursions has largely been lacking.

In consequence there is almost unbounded scope for research in a broad field which is of major applied linguistic significance. The present work is a contribution to this research. My fundamental assumption is that reference - the business of referring to people, things, events, states of affairs, concepts, etc. - is a type of communicative function. I shall later argue that it is, moreover, a type of illocutionary function, and one that is familiar to speakers of all languages. Reference, therefore, and the linguistic
means of reference - the grammar of nominal expressions - may, and should, be taken account of in the production of communicative syllabuses and materials, as part of the general movement from I to O. To achieve an applied linguistic understanding of the problems involved, to establish a satisfactory position on nominality and reference, is my task.

Chomsky's notion that the practical study of languages concerns itself with idiosyncrasies, not general principles of language, is seen, I suggest, from the foregoing discussion to be outdated. It would be at least partly true of an applied linguistics whose interest was only in the exterior aspect of language in an approach which led from O to I. But in the I to O era it won't do. Concern with the presumed concepts and functions which underlie the variety of different languages has become a fundamental aspect of the applied linguist's conception of his task. Communicative universals, and a proper understanding of them, form the bedrock on which the new teaching of grammatical particulars is based. This is, of course, a matter of position, not necessarily of theory. Such hypothesised universals, including those of reference, may or may not survive the scrutiny of empirical research; but it would seem difficult to argue that they are not practically essential to the applied linguistic enterprise as at present we conceive it.
This and the following two chapters constitute an exercise in position building. I want to present a form of practical pragmatics which can help in analysing discourse; and an approach to discourse analysis which can yield results of value in improving pedagogical materials. In chapter 3 I shall consider the question: What is it that a person needs to know in order to produce text which will be interpreted as the discourse he intends and in order to interpret as discourse the text that another has produced? In chapter 4 I shall ask: What does a person do in making use of this knowledge in the activity of linguistic communication? It is obvious that not only the answers to these questions but the questions themselves are tied up with a certain way of understanding the term 'discourse' itself. In order to make this explicit, I shall devote the present chapter to an introduction, in the form of a series of 'propositions', of the position I wish to adopt on the general nature of discourse and on the relation of the concept of discourse to the concepts of text and context. I shall not argue for the position that I shall present and I shall not explore its implications in detail. It is my intention here only to make the presuppositions of later discussion plain and to establish an identifiable point of departure for subsequent excursions.
1 Discourse

We are concerned with discourse, not with discourses. The former is to the latter as music to songs, or as magic to spells and incantations. It is the abstract mass noun which is the focus of our attention, how to describe, in a useful way, what it denotes.

PROPOSITION D1: A DEFINITION

Discourse is a means by which people mentally organise and in most cases physically express through speech or writing, normally in order to communicate with other people, their thoughts and their intentions.

Mental organisation, whether or not it is done consciously, is presupposed by expression; expression is presupposed by communication. 'Thoughts' is used here as an undefined label for how a person responds mentally to experience and circumstance; 'intentions' is a label for a person's motives in giving expression to his 'thoughts'. Though, by this definition, not all mental discourse finds expression and not all expressed discourse is intended for communication, nevertheless, from an applied linguistic point of view, it seems reasonable and convenient to assume that discourse is both expressed and communicative. It is in this sense that the term will be used from now on.

PROPOSITION D2: ON THE DISCOURSE PROCESS

The process of discourse is interactional, i.e. it involves action
on the part of one person which produces reaction on the part of another (or others).

Reaction is perceived - or at least perceptible - in the case of conversational interaction; imagined - or at least imaginable - in the case of written discourse. Reaction itself is reacted upon, i.e. it influences subsequent discourse.

PROPOSITION D3: ON DISCOURSE STRUCTURE

Discourse has structure. This structure is a patterning of discourse acts in linear and hierarchical relationship.

The process of discourse, conceived in terms of the actions and reactions of discourse participants, needs to be clearly distinguished from the structure of discourse, conceived in terms of the regular connections between the linguistic acts of various types which speakers and writers perform. These discourse structure relationships will later be referred to as relationships of interactivity. ²

PROPOSITION D4: ON THE DISCOURSE SIGNAL

Discourse involves a speaker or writer encoding certain codifiable meanings in certain conventionally recognised systems of codification (codes) and transmitting these encoded meanings as a signal.

'Conventionally recognised' codes include, essentially, grammatical and prosodic systems and, less essentially, non-prosodic paralinguistic systems such as gesture. Any linguistic utterance is prima
facie a discourse signal. A gesture, e.g. a nod, may be treated as a discourse signal, e.g. if it functions as a reply to a question. However, the opening of a window in response to a request to open a window is not treated as part of the discourse. The opening of the window (or a failure to open it) is, nevertheless, plainly part of the interaction more broadly defined, and it may well become part of the context of situation in relation to which any subsequent linguistic or paralinguistic signal is interpreted.

PROPOSITION D5: ON THE DISCOURSE MESSAGE

Motivating any discourse signal are certain communicative intentions of a speaker or writer, more complex and generally more specific than the meaning content of the signal itself, and the interpretive task of the recipient of the signal is to discover these communicative intentions. The discovered communicative intentions of the sender of the signal constitute the message received.

There is more to the message than there is to the signal. From this point I shall refer to the linguistic part of the signal as text; I shall refer to whatever is immediately needed by the recipient of the signal — apart from the signal itself — to discover the message as context; and I shall use the term discourse to refer to the activity whereby text signals are sent and are interpreted as messages in the light of context. In the next two sections I shall add a modicum of detail to this general position on the nature of text and context.
In the previous section I addressed myself to the question What is discourse? rather than the question What is a discourse? In the same way now I shall consider the nature of text, not what constitutes 'a text'.

PROPOSITION D6: A DEFINITION

Text equals discourse minus context-dependent interpretation.

A random series of sentences generated and printed out by a computer programme would not constitute text. Text is discourse reduced. Text 'has been' discourse, i.e. being discourse is presupposed by being text or, in Firth's terms, 'text has the implication of utterance'. If we ask what text minus context-dependent interpretation consists of, the answer is grammatical units: words, phrases, clauses, sentences. Intra-sententially, these units are formally connected by syntactic structures; inter-sententially, by temporal (spoken) or spatial (written) proximity.

PROPOSITION D7: ON THE CONTENT OF TEXT

In text is propositional content, not propositions. In text is modal content, not illocutions.

This follows from Proposition D6. (Apology to the reader: there is a temporary clash of uses here.) Propositions make contact with the real world; they have truth values; they depend on
reference. The recognition of a proposition is a matter of interpretation, is dependent on context. Propositional content, on the other hand, merely has truth conditions, is context-free. Likewise, modal content is context-free, but the recognition of illocutionary force is a matter of context-dependent interpretation. Propositional content and modal content are complementary aspects of the lexico-grammatical meaning of texts. Such meaning is, strictly speaking, all the meaning that texts contain. It is necessary to say 'strictly speaking' because it is extremely difficult to read any text as if it were not discourse, as if it contained only lexico-grammatical meaning. A reader is a natural interpreter, a context-creating device.

PROPOSITION D9: ON COHESION

Text is not cohesive (strictly speaking).

Co-reference, substitution, logical connection, etc. are not necessarily determined by linguistic expression (pronouns, prop-words, conjunctions, etc.) alone, but by linguistic expression in relation to context; i.e. normally interpretation is required for a reader or hearer to perceive - for certain - a particular cohesive tie. We may say that discourse is cohesive to the extent that the inter-relatedness (mutual relevance) of its parts is given formal grammatical expression in the text-sentences and sentence-fragments in which the parts are linguistically encoded. However, certain devices of cohesion are forceful prima facie
indicators of specific cohesive ties. Adapting Firth, we may say that text has the implication of cohesion.

PROPOSITION D9: ON ACCESSIBILITY

Not all text is accessible. Only accessible text can be analysed. Accessible text is text that is open to analysis in respect of its propositional content (and any other non-context-dependent meaning). Illegible text is inaccessible, for obvious reasons, likewise text in cypher (except to the initiated) or in an unknown alphabet or language. More important for our purposes, text is inaccessible unless it is on paper (or some other form of visual display). Speech involves text. But only the processes of recording and transcribing will make such text accessible to systematic investigation.

PROPOSITION D10: ON TEXT AS RECORD

Accessible text is the means of recording discourse; or, text is discourse recorded. This is the linguist’s view of text as data, text as the ‘corpus inscriptionum’. Text contains the record of discourse, but the record is necessarily an incomplete one for it does not contain context-dependent interpretation, nor does it contain whatever of context is derived from evidence external to the text itself. Nevertheless, though text does not contain all the evidence for
discourse, it contains essential evidence for discourse. Because much discourse analysis has tended to ignore the textual element, or at best to take it for granted, concentrating on the message to the exclusion of the signal, it seems necessary to stress the inescapable significance of text in the analysis of discourse. I shall therefore give this idea the status of a separate proposition.

PROPOSITION D11: ON TEXT AS DATA

Text is part of the evidence for discourse.

We cannot effectively analyse discourse without also analysing sentences.

3 Context

In the spirit of the ethnography of communication we may usefully compare discourse with some other form of cultural expression, for example pottery.

To produce a text is an act - or rather an indeterminate number of acts - as to produce a pot is an act. Accessible text is the residue of people engaging in discourse, as pots are the residue of people engaging in pottery. A text, like a pot, is a social artefact, the product of general social conditions (the context of culture) and of the more immediate circumstances of production (the context of situation). We may analyse a text for its lexico-grammatical content and we may describe a pot in respect of its material substance, size, shape, colour, etc. We may interpret
a text by relating its lexico-grammatical content to its context, and we may interpret a pot by relating its attributes of substance and form to the material and social conditions in which it was produced. Where these two types of artefact differ is that the meanings of texts are, and those of pots are not, encoded in a grammar. To understand a text as discourse involves, therefore, being able to decode its lexico-grammatical meaning, to apprehend its context, and to interpret the one in the light of the other. The question now to be considered is: Of the set of all things not part of the immediate text - the sentence being uttered - which are present in thought or perception to the participants, which subset constitutes the context?

PROPOSITION D12: A DEFINITION

Context is whatever is intended by the utterer (U), and understood as such by the interpreter (I), to be taken as relevant, whether in the more immediate or more remote circumstances of utterance, to the interpretation of text. There is no objective context. Context is part of the subjectivity of discourse. Just as not everything in the audible output of a speaker is textual - hiccups, for example - so not everything in the situation of utterance is contextual, though anything may be. To be so, it must be recognised as such, normally by both, but at least by one, of the participants.
PROPOSITION D13: ON CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

There is a determinate set of factors that 'I' must take account of in looking for what is contextually relevant.

These have been variously analysed by, e.g., Firth, Halliday, Enkvist, Gregory, Jakobson and Hymes, and broadly include PARTICIPANTS (speaker, hearer), SETTINGS (time, place) and TOPICS (concepts, percepts). At the level of 'culture' these factors contribute WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN THIS COMMUNITY. At the level of 'situation' they contribute WHAT IS LIKELY IN THESE IMMEDIATE CIRCUMSTANCES (the circumstances including previous interpreted text). At a yet more particular level we must include WHAT 'U' MAY EXPECT OF 'I' AND 'I' OF 'U' GRANTED MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE. This may be called the 'context of personal experience'.

PROPOSITION D14: ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONTEXT TO MEANING

Context makes multiple contributions to meaning. It supplies what is needed by 'I' in order for him to recognise the intentions of 'U' in respect of at least five different aspects of meaning.

These are:

1. GRAMMATICAL MEANING - What sentence is this?
   Context may clarify unclear signals (illegible, inaudible);
   disambiguate ambiguous sentences; supply ellipted portions
of sentences, clauses, phrases and words. Context does not add grammatical meaning; but it helps to determine it through reducing the range of choice.16

(ii) PROPOSITIONAL MEANING - What proposition is this?
Context helps to make clear the referents of expressions occurring in utterances, thus identifying the states of affairs etc. of which a particular proposition is asserted etc. to be true.17 Context also may indicate (i.e. provide evidence for deciding) whether an utterance or any of its parts is to be taken literally or figuratively.

(iii) PERFORMATIVE MEANING - What is the intended illocutionary force of the speech act?
Context helps to make clear whether 'U' is promising or threatening, requesting or ordering, asserting or questioning, etc.18

(iv) ATTITUDES MEANING - How committed is 'U' to the truth of the proposition, the desirability of the state of affairs described, the force of the act that he appears to perform?
In so far as this one is separable from the others, context helps to make clear the subjectivity of the utterance: how strongly 'U' believes or disbelieves; how strongly he approves or disapproves; how firmly he intends, how tentatively he asserts.
(v) **PERLOCUTIONARY MEANING** - What are the intended effects of this utterance?

Context helps to make clear the intended interactional significance of each speech act: the question intended to *elicit* a reply, the statement intended to *explain* a refusal, the promise intended to *quieten* an agitated interlocutor.

**PROPOSITION D15: ON CONTEXT DYNAMICS**

Context is incremental. It develops with the discourse. It may also change radically in the course of an interaction through some imposed redefinition of the situation of utterance.

As discourse proceeds, experience is added to; the situation of utterance is further defined; even the most basic assumptions of the community culture may also be dismissed or subtly modified. What was not known becomes known; what was known becomes 'not known', or at least irrelevant. The presuppositions of the discourse are gradually modified. All of this may be thought of as context increment. We may talk of context change when there is some palpable alteration in the setting or scene, in the roles the participants are fulfilling, or the topic. A new participant may arrive; a meeting may be called to order. Such events may precipitate a context change.19

**PROPOSITION D16: ON CO-TEXT**

What is sometimes called co-text is not of itself a part of context.
Rather, it is the interpretation of co-text in the discourse process which creates a context increment. The distinction often made between intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic context is not easy to sustain. 20 It is preferable to say that all context is text-external since context is no more than what is recognised as relevant to text interpretation. I shall therefore use 'co-text' to mean merely 'other bits of text'; and context to mean 'what is perceived to be relevant, including parts of co-text, to text interpretation'.

PROPOSITION D17: ON CONTEXT OF WRITING

The interpretation of written text is, in a way not fundamentally different from that of spoken text, dependent on context. What a reader recognises as contextual, i.e. relevant to text interpretation, will derive partly from co-text and partly from extra-textual factors of situation and culture. Co-text will carry greater contextual significance than may typically be the case in conversation but extra-textual factors - role of writer, role of generalised addressee, 'setting' of the text, i.e. whether in a book, magazine, comic, etc. - cannot be overlooked. 21

4 Summary

Text and context are complementary components of discourse, each, as Lyons (1977) says, presupposing the other. They are, without doubt, analytically distinguishable; but in fact there is no text without context just as there is no context - no discourse context
- without text. Both are essential to discourse which, so as to encapsulate the overall position, we may now describe as follows:

PROPOSITION D18: ON TEXT, CONTEXT AND DISCOURSE

In the intentional-interpretive process of discourse, the meanings expressed by the speaker or writer in text are interpreted by the hearer or reader in the light of what both participants recognise as context, with the effect that, by virtue of a particular signal being transmitted, a particular message is received.
Chapter 3 DISCOURSE COMPETENCE: WHAT NATIVE SPEAKERS KNOW

1 Aspects of competence: Form, meaning and use

My fundamental assumption - the essential feature of the position which I wish to construct on discourse pragmatics - is that it is possible to draw a distinction between two kinds of meaning which are present in all linguistic communication: fixed meanings and occasional meanings. Fixed meanings (i) are fixed for all occasions, i.e. they do not change under the influence of context, and (ii) are relatively (though not of course entirely) impervious to change over time.¹ Occasional meanings are the product of the interaction of fixed meanings and particular contexts in which fixed meanings are expressed. Fixed meanings are encoded, as part of a person's overall linguistic competence, in the grammar and lexicon of a given language, and native speakers 'know' them though not, of course, consciously and not very precisely - they are very abstract, more or less indeterminate, and not easily expressible.² Knowledge of such meanings and of the morpho-syntactical and lexical forms with which they are paired is grammatical competence. Occasional meanings arise through recognition of general and particular features of contexts and through the interpretation of text in the light of these features. A person's competence-for-discourse must therefore include, in addition to the grammatical competence by means of which he encodes and decodes units of text, both competence for recognising what is contextually relevant and competence for relating
text to context. The former, which broadly includes knowledge of what is in the world (facts) and of what people do in the world (praxis), I shall call factual and practical competence - F-P competence for short; the latter, which includes knowledge of how sentences and parts of sentences are used to refer to and do the things that are in and are done in the world, I shall call applicational competence. How we may best, from an applied discourse analysis point of view, understand and articulate the relationship between these three aspects of competence is the topic of this chapter.

In the past ten years or so there has been an increasing interest among linguists in the questions how and where - and indeed whether - to draw a line between grammar and pragmatics, and a large number of articles and books have been devoted to this topic, or else have made extensive reference to it in their treatment of particular theoretical and descriptive problems. Two main issues seem to be of especial importance both to theoretical and applied linguistics. The first is whether the line between grammar and pragmatics is a fairly sharp one, so that one would expect to discover more or less autonomous but interacting separate systems, or whether the line is a very fuzzy one, if indeed discernable at all, so that one would expect some kind of continuum from structure-dependence to context-dependence with no clear point of separation between them. The second issue is whether, assuming that the two are to be regarded as complementary aspects of language and of our study of language, pragmatics is to be enlarged at the expense of grammar, or vice versa.
Morgan (1975) starts from the following supposition:

... that among those factors that make up competence at language one can isolate two distinct sub-systems: a syntactico-semantic component, as in the work of Chomsky and others, and a pragmatic component of the sort discussed by Grice ... Then we might say that the former has to do with the relation between meaning and (syntactic) form of sentences, and the latter with how to use a language - how to get things done by verbal means.

Chomsky himself has recently expressed an identical view:

Furthermore, the person who knows a language knows the conditions under which it is appropriate to use a sentence ... we may proceed to distinguish 'grammatical competence' from 'pragmatic competence' restricting the first to the knowledge of form and meaning and the second to conditions and manner for appropriate use. (Chomsky, 1980:224)

Elsewhere (1979:147), he speaks of 'the interaction of cognitive systems. And grammar is only one of them.'

The attraction of this view is both methodological and theoretical. If we are dealing with (i) distinct systems and (ii) the interaction between them, we are presented with more less separable fields of enquiry: in consequence the data become more manageable. From a theoretical point of view, the assumption of interacting autonomous systems provides us with a powerful explanation both for 'creativity' and for indirect and figurative uses of language, as I will show below.

But is this a plausible view of how language really is?

Chomsky (1972), somewhat in contrast with the passage quoted above, states:
It is not at all clear that it is possible to distinguish sharply between the contribution of grammar to the determination of meaning and the contribution of so-called 'pragmatic considerations', questions of fact and belief and context of utterance.

And the point of Morgan's paper is, indeed, to demonstrate, by evidence that links certain derivational constraints directly with pragmatic interpretation, that the neat separation between semantico-syntactic and the world is not as clear as it might at first seem. 'Optional rules turn out to have pragmatic consequences in quite unexpected ways.'

I am inclined to accept the spirit of such cautionary voices, while at the same time denying their significance from a practical point of view.

A useful analogy may be found in the physical facts of light and colour and the psychological facts of our responses to them. Our experience of colour (leaving aside matters of neuro-physiology and socialisation) appears to be a function (a) of the properties of surfaces on which light falls (capacity for reflection and absorption of different wave frequencies) and (b) of the quality of light falling on these surfaces (dull-bright, reflected-direct, full spectrum or part spectrum, etc.). Surface properties are relatively fixed (i.e. (i) they do not change in response to different light sources and (ii) they are relatively impervious to change over time); light quality, by contrast, is infinitely variable and may easily change, either gradually or instantaneously. Since (outside, presumably, the physics laboratory) we can never directly apprehend the light reflecting/absorbing properties of surfaces (i.e. independently
of some particular light shining on them) it follows that our experience of colour is only of 'occasional' colour, i.e. the interaction of light quality and surface quality, not of the element which is fixed. However, the fact that we cannot in practice easily distinguish the two factors does not lead to either of the following conclusions:

(1) the two factors are not really separate;

(2) we do not perceive a distinction which is functional in everyday life. For indeed the two factors are separate (physics proves it); and indeed we do perceive a distinction, for we can conceptualise a 'normal' colour for some object - for example a shirt we are deciding to buy - which is the colour we perceive it as having in 'normal' light (outside the shop at midday) and this is the colour we call it when we're not looking at it, while nevertheless being aware that the colour we perceive the object as having changes in different 'contexts'.

Thus, if we were to say 'the colour of an object is just what we perceive it to be on particular occasions', this would be valid in one respect and invalid in another. And likewise, if we say 'the meaning of a word (or phrase or sentence etc.) is its use', this is valid as a representation of one aspect of our experience of words and invalid as a representation of another.

There is a certain tendency of thought which seems characteristically disposed to a more uncompromising 'meaning is use' conclusion. It is the belief that the form of language is shaped by the functions of communication. It is a belief founded on what would seem a
reasonable supposition. And it is at odds with such notions as 'dictionary meanings', 'literal meanings', 'autonomous syntax', etc. However, as Chomsky (1976:55ff.) and others have recently argued, it is by no means obvious that communication is the sole or even the principle function of language. Language has clearly played as important a part in the development of the intellectual and imaginative life of our species as in its co-operative and social life. And even if we concede, as we probably must, some kind of connection between human communicative development and the evolution of grammar, there is no reason on these grounds alone to suppose that the development of communication and the development of grammar in the lifetime - particularly the childhood - of the individual are causally and inextricably connected. Evidently, from an applied linguistic point of view, this last point matters a great deal. If we agree with the communicationists, we may conclude that to teach grammar and vocabulary we merely have to teach 'communication'. If we agree with the view expressed by Chomsky, we will conclude that we have two distinguishable tasks: to impart to our learners grammatical competence; and to impart to them knowledge of 'the conditions and manner for appropriate use'.

Let us pursue our colour analogy a little further in order to see where it breaks down. An object with a particular surface quality, on which no light is falling, has no perceptible colour. We may say that it has a definable colour potential, i.e. a range of colour that it can present given certain light conditions, but we cannot say that it has colour (except in the everyday sense, discussed above,
of 'the colour it normally has'). It merely has certain surface properties. There is, we may say, no null context in which a surface appears to be coloured.

In the case of language, by contrast, forms do not, in the null context, just have meaning potential (implying that they do not have meaning); they have meaning. (It is by virtue of this meaning that they have communicative potential, i.e. the capacity to be used appropriately in various contexts and for various functions.) The meaning that forms have may not be very clear or precisely statable, but it is no more possible to detach them from some meaning than to detach them from some substance. I want now to give some consideration to the nature of these fixed meanings and their relationship to forms, and in doing so will say something about the second main issue in the semantics-pragmatics debate which I mentioned earlier, namely which is to be enlarged at the expense of the other.

2 Fixed meanings (knowledge pertaining to text)

Not all linguists believe that forms have meanings in the null context. In this section I am only concerned with the views of those that do. The classical Chomskyan statement is to the effect that

the grammar of a language is a system of rules that assign sound and meaning in a definite way for an infinite number of sentences.

(Chomsky, 1972)

The necessary abstraction from contexts of use is here only implied, but it is explicit in the following statement from Leech, a statement that could be paralleled in numerous works by a variety of writers:
The semantic structure of a sentence specifies what that sentence means as a structure in a given language, in abstraction from speaker and addressee ... (Leech, 1980:80)

What does a sentence mean? I assume that the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meanings of its constituent parts (and the meanings of those constituent parts are a function of the meanings of their constituent parts) together with the meanings that derive from the nature of the syntactic relationships between them. Since this needs putting into a more practically manageable form, I shall follow Lyons (1968:435) in discerning three kinds of grammatical meaning:

(1) meaning of grammatical items (e.g. minor parts of speech and secondary grammatical categories);

(2) meaning of grammatical functions such as 'subject of', 'modifier of';

(3) meaning associated with such notions as declarative etc. in the classification of sentence types.

To this list we must add (since we include the lexicon within our broad definition of grammar):

(4) meanings of lexical items.

In accordance with the position that I am attempting to construct, we may say that the task of syntactico-semantic and lexico-semantic analysis is to discover fixed meanings. How is this to be done?

Since discourse consists of occasional meanings which are the product of fixed meanings in interaction with context, it should be clear that the analysis of grammatical meaning is presupposed by discourse analysis, or, as Leech (op.cit.) puts it, 'semantics is logically
prior to pragmatics'. Once we adopt the position that forms have meanings, for members of a speech community, in the null context (i.e. that it is part of a native speaker's competence to know the meaning of forms), there ought to be no objection in principle to use-independent semantic analysis, based presumably on investigation of native-speaker intuitions, whether by introspection or by some form of elicitation procedure. However, there is good reason for not adopting Leech's dictum too rigidly. Fixed meanings are themselves abstractions from occasional meanings, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. (Indirect uses are an important partial exception to this statement, as will be seen below.) Intuition alone is probably not a reliable guide to fixed meanings. It must be supported and corrected by confrontation with actual instances of use. However, investigations of use will provide only indirect evidence for semantic analysis; for the range of occasional meanings of an item is in principle indeterminate; yet the fixed meaning of an item, if not easily determinable, is in principle determinate.

One of the most striking characteristics of the monumental 'traditional' grammars such as those of Jespersen and Poutsma is that treating, so to speak, system and use in the same breath, they tended to multiply the 'meanings' of grammatical items (such as will or the) just to the extent that the corpus of texts on which they based their description yielded distinguishable interpretations. Since then, the formalisation of the relationship between form and meaning within the framework of generative grammar has had a dramatic effect. The numbers of meanings have noticeably declined, to the
extent that the following theoretical question now confronts grammarians with growing insistency: Is it, as Bolinger is well known for arguing, 'the natural condition for language to preserve one form for one meaning and one meaning for one form'? Or, to put the question slightly differently, shall one or both or neither of the following be accepted as axioms?

A. For each form a separate meaning.

B. For each form a single meaning.

According to Lyons (1968:134) the proposal in formal grammar to make the practice of grammar independent of questions of meaning is motivated by the fact that the grammatical structure of a language and the semantic structure of a language tend to be 'highly but not totally congruent with one another'. The term 'congruence' should certainly imply that if we accept axiom A we should also accept axiom B, but 'not totally' may well be intended to apply more to B than to A, a view given support by Bolinger's (1977) remark that cases of more than one meaning attached to a single form far outnumber cases of more than one form attached to a single meaning (if indeed the latter exist at all) for the simple reason that the mind is freer than the tongue.

Bolinger himself investigates both these aspects of form-meaning correspondence, but the more interesting theoretical issues seem to arise in connection with axiom B and it is with this that I shall briefly deal. Let us follow Bolinger's presentation at one point in his book. Discussing Postal on *remind* ('there are really several verbs in English whose phonological shape is "remind"'), he proposes that we can approach the question in two ways:
(1) the form of a word is a more or less empty shell, with a potentially indefinite number of meanings ... therefore the word is really as many words as there are meanings ...

(2) the form of the word is an indication that all of the senses may be related, and this possibility should yield only to the strongest proofs to the contrary.

Taking the case in question, Bolinger suggests that, if we assign

remark the meaning 'A causes B to think of C, where C has some

connection to A', the various senses

are pulled together and the differences are

relegated to another level, that of inference

... We find a single overarching meaning

which performance-variables imbue with

local tinges which pass for distinct senses.

Bolinger thus simplifies the grammatical account and complicates

the pragmatic, a tendency easily discerned in many and various

recent linguistic works. It is the tendency which Posner (1980)

aptly terms 'meaning-minimalist'. Some examples:

(1) Morpho-syntactic meaning

It is a nominal with the greatest possible

generality of meaning ... all the uses of

it stem from a common semantic base.

(Bolinger 1973)

More generally, I felt that too many

distinctions were made in relation to some

and any, and there was too little discussion

of the possibility that some of the differences

referred to might be due to differences in

context rather than in some and any.

(Hudson, 1982, review of Sahlin, 1979)

I would argue that a sentence like You will
go home is semantically only the predication

of a future act of a subject which could be

the hearer ... (such sentences) are

semantically unambiguous, but can be inter-

preted as either commands or predictions

following conversational rules.

(Downes, 1977)
(1) I will be here at 9.15 tomorrow
(2) You will be here at 9.15 tomorrow
(3) He will be here at 9.15 tomorrow
(4) They will be here at 9.15 tomorrow

As far as abstract, logical meaning is concerned, sentences (1) - (4) can all be understood in the same way apart from a change of personal pronoun ... Pragmatics enters into the picture, however, when we ask how such sentences be likely to be practically interpreted in a conversational context.

(Leech, 1980:81)

(2) Lexical meaning:

(In discussing whether an animal noun, uncount, refers to meat, skin, or the animal itself) It is the pragmatic conditions of context, situation and customary reference that control the lexical spelling out of the proper interpretation; semantic composition is only relevant to identify the source animal.

(Allan, 1981)

(In discussing words like newspaper which can be used to refer to the item bought in a newsagents or the company which publishes it) One conventional use, with other normal uses generated pragmatically ... by an independent pragmatic account of extended reference.

(Nunberg, 1979)

The point of these quotations is to show (i) the tendency to give more work to the pragmatic component, (ii) the tendency to assume, or argue for, or be tempted by, the proposed axiom B, and (iii) the connection between these.

The principle theoretical difficulty in accepting axiom B lies in the problem of underpinning, in lexis, the distinction between 'polysemy' and homonymy, roughly paralleled in syntax by arguments over deep and surface contributions to sentence meaning.
The principle practical difficulty lies in the problem of giving informal expression to a single fixed meaning of an item with multiple uses, assuming that such a meaning can be intuitively known. I think there are two main possible solutions to this problem:

(1) by paraphrase; e.g. express the meaning of remind as a type of proposition (see above) or of will as an abstract noun (see below);

(2) by stating the 'characteristic use' (Lyons, 1961) or 'locutionary force' (Leech, 1980) of a sentence type, or the 'customary reference' (Allan, 1981b) or 'conventional use' (Nunberg, 1979) of a lexeme.

Neither of these devices does much, it must be admitted, to advance the cause of theoretical semantics. Our own cause, however, is not theoretical but practical. If we can show that axiom B has a useful contribution to make to our research into use, and if we can make it function in practice by giving paraphrases or characteristic uses which carry conviction as informal representations of what a native speaker 'knows', that is all that is needed. We do not need to prove that it is true; merely to show that to assume that it is true is applied linguistically fruitful.

The 'position' so far is as follows.

The grammar of a language is a device which pairs forms and meanings; every form has - probably - a separate meaning; every form has - more or less - a single meaning; knowledge of the grammar of a language is knowledge of possible forms and of the meanings with which they are 'very largely' congruent.
These inherent meanings are to the forms in text as 'colour-potential' is to the surface properties of objects: fixed. To discover how speakers perceive not these fixed meanings but the occasional meanings of discourse, we must turn our attention away from text to context, away from grammar to 'the world', and ask: What must native speakers know about the world in order to analyse context?

3 Facts and praxis (knowledge pertaining to context)

In opposition to grammatical competence I have posited 'factual and practical competence', which I have glossed as knowledge of what is in the world - factual knowledge - and knowledge of what people do in the world - practical knowledge, or knowledge of praxis. I should make clear, at this point, that this factual-practical knowledge, which I shall now briefly describe, is part of, but not equivalent to, 'pragmatic competence'. The latter also includes the applicational competence by which lexico-grammatical form is related to context in the intentional-interpretive process of discourse.

F-P competence, unlike applicational competence, is, though not independent of language (since our knowledge of language and our knowledge of, and ability to do things in, the world grow together), independent of languages, i.e. of particular codes. The child learning his mother tongue is simultaneously acquiring grammatical, practical and applicational competence. For the child learning a foreign language, only one of these competences is very largely
transferable: the practical. He has to acquire a more or less different grammar, and this means new rules for using this particular grammar for communication. But the world that the grammar will be used to refer to is very largely the same world, and the actions that the grammar will be used to perform in the world are very largely the same actions. (Whorfianism - strong or weak - is an unprovable hypothesis. In applied linguistics there is no reason to take account of it and every reason to disregard it.) In language teaching we do not start from scratch; we build on what is known. Part of what is 'known' is what any language is likely to be like: this will produce a lot of surprises along with some reassurance. Most of what is known will not produce any surprises at all: everyone 'knows' TIME and DISTANCE and QUANTITY; everyone knows the difference between performing a REQUEST and performing an ORDER, between a WARNING and a PROMISE. As Searle (1979:2) puts it:

'Illocutions are part of language as opposed to particular languages,' and there would seem to be at least as much reason to assume the existence of universals of this 'practical' sort as to assume the existence of grammatical universals. Of course, not all concepts and acts are universal. Most people in Britain, for example, have no concept of 'living ancestors'; most people in Tanzania have no concept of 'knight of the garter'. Most people in Britain have no knowledge of the act of declaring oneself debarred from a specific action in the future; most people in Tanzania have no knowledge of the act of dubbing someone a knight. (Such ignorance is not the result of not having words for these things; indeed, the reverse
true.) Part of learning a new language, undoubtedly, is learning certain concepts and acts specific to the culture in which the language is used, as also, perhaps, certain differences in the social significance attached to otherwise familiar behaviour; but a small part. By far the greater part involves no extension or modification of factual and practical knowledge at all. What it does involve is learning to do and refer to the same things but with unfamiliar linguistic resources. The fallacy of Whorfianism is to assume that conventional meanings (those which are highly but not totally congruent with linguistic forms) are the same as concepts. On the contrary, the view which I am putting forward is that forms, by virtue of their conventional meanings, can be used to refer to concepts; but the meaning of, e.g., a noun is not the same as the concepts it is used to refer to, any more than the meaning of an illocutionary verb is the same as the act that the verb is used to describe. Grammatical meanings, it goes without saying, are language specific; and if a language is exclusive to a group (like Hopi) they are culture specific. But what kind of linguistic evidence could be used to prove or disprove the thesis that the concepts and acts which the grammar is used to refer to and perform are not, far from being 'relative', in fact universal?

Frege (quoted in Atlas, 1980) warned against the error which confuses denial with negation, a speech act function with a lexical form. And Searle (op.cit.) observes:

We must not confuse an analysis of illocutionary verbs with an analysis of illocutionary acts ... illocutionary acts are, so to speak, natural conceptual kinds.
Among 'traditional' grammarians, both Sweet and Jespersen made an explicit distinction between grammatical and 'logical' (Sweet) or 'notional' (Jespersen) categories. Jespersen defined his notional categories (such as time and sex as opposed to tense and gender) as

extra-lingual categories which are independent of the more or less accidental facts of existing languages. They are universal insofar as they are applicable to all languages.

(Jespersen, 1924:55)

Modern 'notional' syllabuses are based on strong assumptions about the language independence of various concepts (TIME, DISTANCE, etc.) and 'functions' (REQUEST, PROMISE, etc.). The Council of Europe 'Threshold' syllabus (van Ek, 1976), for example, assumes, necessarily, that these are the same for speakers of all European languages. What is not generally made clear in notional syllabuses, or in discussions of them in the applied linguistic literature, is the relationship between the cross-cultural categories which are listed and the code-specific - conventional - meanings of the forms which must be learnt in order that the desired notions and functions may be appropriately realised in actual communication.¹⁵

Factual and practical knowledge has the same relation to contexts as grammatical knowledge has to texts: that of abstract and general to concrete and particular. It provides the framework in relation to which speakers and hearers are able to determine, relative to any particular occasion of utterance, what is being implicated, what is going on. The sociological and psychological aspects of this link between general knowledge and immediate experience in the 'on-
going' analysis of context which participants almost effortlessly and unconsciously perform are outside the scope of this chapter. What I want now to consider is the nature of the connection between the two aspects of competence we have so far considered, the grammatical and the factual-practical. It is this which is the crucial issue in the description of competence for discourse.

4 'Rules' of use (knowledge pertaining to discourse)

Knowledge of grammar and lexis and knowledge of facts and praxis are necessary for engaging in discourse. Necessary but not sufficient: what has been called the 'working power' of language comes from the interaction between them, Chomsky's 'interaction of cognitive systems'. This sort of knowledge, knowledge of the 'rules' in accordance with which grammar is put to communicative use, knowledge of the 'use of meanings' (Posner, 1980), I am calling applicational competence, intending this, as I have said earlier, as a distinguishable part of pragmatic competence viewed more generally. It is this competence which enables a speaker to encode his message (a complex of communicative intentions in relation to a given context) as a signal (a sentence or sequence of sentences which he utters) and which enables a hearer to interpret the signal as a message in relation to the same (or approximately the same, bearing in mind that now it is analysed from the hearer's point of view) context.

A clear statement of this particular view is given by Atlas (1979):

To syntax, phonetics and semantics are added principles of pragmatics, whose function is
to explain the relation between ways of understanding sentences and the contexts in which they are uttered. These principles take as input the context and the logical form produced by the semantics. They yield as output a new logical form that renders the contextually determined meaning of the utterance ...

One might wish to quarrel with the philosopher's prejudice that the output of the 'principles' is a 'logical form' but the general picture presented is closely equivalent to the position that I am attempting to construct. What is more, Atlas elaborates his account in a way which parallels exactly a line of argument which I have already developed:

Understanding a speaker's utterance is not simply knowing a logical form that the context selects from the 'meanings' of an ambiguous sentence.... On my view understanding the speaker's utterance is knowing a proposition that the context 'constructs' from the 'meaning' of a univocal semantically non-specific sentence. ... The non-specific meaning of the sentence is made specific in the understanding of the utterance.

The pragmatic principles which a speaker knows in order to encode his message in a sentence appropriate to a given context, and which a hearer knows in order to interpret what is said, include what I shall call, following Hymes (1972a) and in recognition of (i) the widespread locution that pragmatics is to do with the 'use' of language and (ii) the regularity of the phenomena in question, rules of use. Before giving examples of what these are, I shall say something about what, in my proposed use of the term, they are not.

1) They are not the same as what Hymes elsewhere (Hymes, 1972b) calls 'rules of speaking', i.e. 'ways in which speakers
associate particular modes of speaking, topics, or message forms with particular settings or activities'. Rules of this sort are to do, in a more large-scale way, with the place in a community of particular genres and registers; e.g. that sermons belong in churches not lecture halls, and that formal religious language belongs to sermons not lectures.

2) They are not the same as 'rules of use' as commonly expounded in British applied linguistic literature. For example, Criper and Widdowson (1975:203) give as examples of rules of use 'invariant rules' such as Labov's 'If A makes a statement about a B event it will be heard as a request for confirmation'. The point here is that such rules are independent of any particular code. They are rules for the use of illocutionary acts (i.e. acts having particular types of illocutionary force) rather than rules for the use of sentences of a particular language to perform illocutionary acts. (They may perhaps better be called perlocutionary conventions - a point discussed below in chapter 4.)

3) They are not the same as Grice's 'maxims' (Grice, 1975) - on the same grounds as those just given.

4) They are not rules in the 'regulative' sense. They are regularities, indeed, but regularities which determine effects of behaviour rather than behaviour as such; i.e. they do not determine what will be done but merely the consequences of such acts as are done. They do not constrain the possible (as do rules of grammar) but give meaning (interpretation) to the actual. We might usefully think of the totality of rules of use of a language as its 'grammar of consequences'. 17
5) There is, in much of the applied linguistic literature, one further misconception about rules of use, indeed about pragmatics in general. This is that, whereas pragmatic principles are required to explain the interpretation of sentences in context as illocutionary acts (i.e. as acts having a certain illocutionary force), no such work of interpretation is required in the case of propositional meaning. The fact is, however, that all aspects of sentence meaning, ideational and textual as well as interpersonal (i.e. all components of the signal), need contextual interpretation if utterance meaning - the message - is to be grasped. The fixed meanings of lexical items, grammatical items, grammatical functions and sentence types must equally find their proper interpretation if a speaker is successfully to convey his intended message as opposed to that meaning merely which the grammar of his language permits him to encode as a signal. Modal content plus context yields attitudinal and performative meaning. Likewise propositional content (the content of truth conditions) plus context yields propositions (truth values). There follow, for illustration, examples of 'rules' (regularities) of use for each of the four types of grammatical meaning. The examples are much simplified and make use only of a very limited range of imagined contexts.

Example 1

**Lexical item: crocodile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIXED MEANING</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>INTERPRETATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'kind of large animal that lives on land and in lakes and rivers in the hot wet parts of the world and has a long hard-skinned body and a long mouth with many strong teeth'</td>
<td>(a) topic = game-viewing</td>
<td>WHOLE ANIMAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) topic = food</td>
<td>MEAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) topic = clothing</td>
<td>SKIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Example 2

**Grammatical item: will**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIXED MEANING</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>INTERPRETATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'anticipation'</td>
<td>speaker in control of events, 1st person subject</td>
<td>INTENTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speaker in control of events, 2nd person subject</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speaker not in control of events</td>
<td>PREDICTION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example 3

**Grammatical function: subject**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIXED MEANING</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>INTERPRETATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'predicatee'</td>
<td>predicate describes intentional event</td>
<td>ACTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>predicate describes non-intentional effect attributable to predicatee</td>
<td>SOURCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Example 4

**Sentence type: imperative**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIXED MEANING</th>
<th>CONTEXT</th>
<th>INTERPRETATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'!! (= 'make it the case that!')'</td>
<td>speaker has, and is understood to be exercising, the right to get the hearer to 'make it the case that'</td>
<td>COMMAND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>characteristic use = 'get addressee to actively respond'</td>
<td>no such right exercised: positive response in speaker's interest</td>
<td>REQUEST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>positive response assumed to be in hearer's interest</td>
<td>OFFER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It will be noted: (i) the fixed meanings are single; (ii) the contexts are multiple and represent types, tokens of which participants succeed in recognising by virtue of their factual and practical competence; (iii) the interpretations are as many as the context types.

Form-to-meaning correspondence in grammar is, we have hypothesised, more or less one to one. However, meaning-to-interpretation correspondence is one to many and (though this is not illustrated in the examples given) evidently one to many in both directions; i.e. a desired interpretation (= speaker intention) may be expressed through a variety of grammatical means.

'Rules of use' is a name for 'known' regularities of interaction between grammar and praxis, as a result of which text becomes interpreted in the light of context. The examples given above are not expressed as 'rules' but they could be, e.g.

If a speaker selects \( \text{Form: will} \) \( \text{Meaning: 'anticipation'} \) in a context where the speaker is perceived to be in control of events and where the particular event is understood to be an action of the speaker, THEN the interpretation which the hearer will construct will be that the speaker is expressing an intention.

It will be seen that this is a pragmatic, 'applicational', rule of consequence, operating in the direction from grammar to praxis. There can be no rule of equivalent status operating in the opposite direction. If a speaker, in a certain context, wishes to give expression to a particular intention, there is no rule of consequence
which can account for the form which he selects, except in so far as his knowing the consequence will motivate him to select a particular form. To achieve a certain consequence he must operate within the grammar of possibilities, i.e. he must know the code which he wishes to put to use, and then he must know the consequence of making a certain selection in that code. Together, these sets of rules, along with his knowledge of the world, add up to his pragmatic competence, his competence for discourse.

4.1 Indirectness

In all the examples of rules of use just given there is a difference between the fixed grammatical meaning of the linguistic item and the various interpreted meanings that the item can get in context. We may assume that this lack of exact correspondence between grammatical meaning and utterance meaning is general, and that

    listeners go beyond virtually every word
    they hear in search of what is really meant.

(Clark & Clark, 1977:131)

From this position some go on to argue (Leech, 1980; Candlin, 1976) that the notion of 'indirect uses of language' is empty since all uses of language are, more or less, indirect. This is true, in a sense, but trivially so. It is true simply because sentence meaning and utterance meaning are, by their very nature, different. However, as between sentence meaning and utterance meaning there are differences and differences. Not all of these, I shall argue, represent true indirectness.
The fact that code meaning and utterance meaning are necessarily different arises from the greater abstractness of the former. Code meanings are general, non-specific, because they have evolved to cover all the varied particularities of utterance meaning. But in the normal case - or let me beg the question and say the non-indirect case - there is a natural fit between the two; one, we may say, is directly suited to the other. 'Anticipation' (as the fixed grammatical meaning of will) and PREDICTION (as an illocutionary force) are not the same, but the movement from one to the other - the interpretation of the one as the other in a certain context - is non-indirect because the meaning 'anticipation' which is used is fully compatible with the use, PREDICTION, to which it is put. Likewise the meaning 'large animal that lives on land and in lakes and rivers etc.' is fully compatible with the concept CROCODILE SKIN, the meaning 'make it the case that' is compatible with the act of COMMAND and the meaning 'predicatee' is compatible with the participant role of ACTOR. There are, however, cases where there is no such complete compatibility between the fixed conventional meaning of a form and a particular referent or a particular illocutionary force, for example between the conventional meaning of crocodile and a referent that is human, or between the conventional meaning of will and the act of asserting a proposition describing a present state of affairs:

1. If Jim is a snake then George is an absolute crocodile

2. If it's Wednesday this'll be Moscow.

'Large animal ...' does not fit with HUMAN; 'anticipation' does not fit with 'NOW'. These are genuine cases of indirectness, one a
metaphor, the other what we may call a morphological trope. If all language use is 'indirect' we must certainly recognise that cases such as these are more indirect than many others. What is more, these cases of enhanced indirectness are distinguishable from the others in functional terms. Whereas general 'indirectness' is unavoidable, following from the very nature of language and communication, enhanced or true indirectness is motivated. It is used to convey such 'implicatures' (Grice, 1975) as:

- irony and sarcasm
- politeness
- striking and unfamiliar attributions and allusions
- innovative style
- unstated implications.

Example (1) above can be explained in terms of the third of these motivations; example (2) by the fifth. (It may be a very conventional trope; but it has not lost its unstated implication that what the speaker assumes to be at present the case will subsequently prove in fact to be so.)

There is an extensive and rapidly growing literature on all aspects of indirectness, some focussing on these different motivations, some on the mechanisms by means of which indirectness is recognised and interpreted, some on the implications of indirectness for the causality between synchronic and diachronic states of languages. Without referring to this literature in detail, I shall conclude this section by saying something briefly about one issue that seems to me to have an important bearing on how we should analyse discourse; together with some final remarks on one or two more general issues.
Earlier I drew a distinction between rules of use which (as I wish to use the term) relate sentence meaning to types of context so as to yield a particular interpretation, and rules of use which (as others have used the term) describe how one kind of speech act can be used to perform another. There is, in the literature on indirectness, an equivocation in the use of the term 'indirect' which closely parallels this distinction; and in the much discussed case of 'Can you pass the salt' conflicting analyses have treated the utterance type both ways: as a sentence-to-act indirectness (S/A) and also as an act-to-act indirectness (A/A). What is lacking in most accounts is a clear recognition that the types are distinct. For it is not just a question of conflicting analyses for a single (type of) datum; but of different phenomena that require distinct analyses.

Searle's analysis of indirect speech acts (Searle:1979, chapter 2) is the A/A analysis: the act of REQUESTING the addressee to pass the salt is done by means of the act of ASKING the addressee whether it is the case that he can do so (i.e. by asking whether one of the conditions for the felicitous performance of the act of REQUESTING is satisfied). One weakness of this analysis, as has been pointed out by others (for example Edmondson (1981:28)), is that the supposed act of ASKING A QUESTION cannot have been done, because one of the conditions for the performance of such an act (namely the sincerity condition, that the speaker genuinely wants to know the answer) will not have been fulfilled. This is notwithstanding the fact that the addressee could 'answer' the 'question' if he chose - the literal
meaning, after all, is there to be played with or even, as the need arises, replied to with all seriousness. Leech (1980) proposes an alternative analysis, in which the indirectness is as between the 'locutionary force' of the sentence ( = '?' ) and the illocutionary force of the utterance. This analysis is certainly to be preferred in this case. Such an analysis would, moreover, bring indirect speech acts of this type into line with Searle's own account of metaphor, which is that metaphors involve an indirectness between sentence meaning and utterance meaning.

There are, however, cases where the S/A analysis will not work. Another example common in the literature is 'It's cold in here', uttered with the intention of getting someone to close the window. One obvious difference between this case and the 'salt' case is that in the latter there is propositional similarity between the two supposed acts and in the former there is not. Moreover, in the 'cold' case, it is entirely reasonable to assume that the speaker sincerely intends to convey the information that he is cold. It is on the basis of this information that the hearer will work out, following Gricean principles, what, if anything, is required of him.

Patterns of A/A indirectness may well be universal, for example in the area of politeness phenomena. S/A indirectness, on the other hand, since sentences are language specific, is necessarily language specific, but even here it has been found that certain modes of indirectness, such as types of metaphor and of morpho-syntactic trope, are common in many languages (Brown and Levinson, 1978).

Evidently, discourse analysis should properly take account of both forms of indirectness. How it should do so is a problem which
connects primarily with the understanding that we have of discourse as performance; also with the practical question of what we are analysing discourse for. These are topics for the next and subsequent chapters. For the moment, I want to consider briefly certain theoretical grounds for regarding the question of indirectness as fundamental to any understanding of how language (I do not mean just grammar) works.

1) S/A indirectness is the strongest possible evidence for the fixed/occasional meanings analysis, for without assuming the latter we cannot account for the former. The traditional word for indirectness is 'trope', and this is a better term in one respect for a trope is a 'turn'. Utterance meaning can reasonably be said to 'turn' in relation to sentence meaning only if sentence meaning is presumed to hold steady in all contexts:

It is often said that in metaphorical utterances there is a change in meaning of at least one expression. I wish to say that on the contrary, strictly speaking, in metaphor there is never a change of meaning; diachronically speaking, metaphors do indeed initiate semantic changes, but to the extent that there has been a genuine change in meaning, so that a word or expression no longer means what it previously did, to precisely that extent the locution is no longer metaphorical. We are all familiar with the processes whereby an expression becomes a dead metaphor, and then finally becomes an idiom or acquires a new meaning different from the original meaning. But in a genuine metaphorical utterance, it is only because the expressions have not changed their meaning that there is a metaphorical utterance at all.

(Searle, 1979:86-87; my emphasis)
This passage is worth quoting at some length because the fundamental idea it contains is applicable not only to metaphor but also to irony (including understatement), morpho-syntactic tropes, and true S/A indirectness of all kinds. Furthermore, it expresses the essence of my second point:

2) 'Metaphors do indeed initiate semantic changes.'

The fixed/occasional analysis does not imply a static view of language. On the contrary, coupled with a theory of S/A indirectness, it provides at least a partial explanation, on the following lines, of how lexico-grammatical meanings change: the use in some stereotyped context of a form with a non-compatible meaning becomes increasingly common practice; there is a gradual shift in the meaning of the form in the direction of compatibility; the new meaning becomes conventionalised and the indirectness, except under conditions of exceptional attention to language, fades away. 'Enfin c'est la parole qui fait evoluer la langue.' From the point of view of discourse analysis, it follows that any assessment of the force of an indirectness may involve diachronic as well as synchronic considerations.

3) This view of language also offers a way of understanding 'linguistic creativity' which is richer than Chomsky's generative 'productivity' and yet less creationist than Sampson's (1980) 'creativity ex nihilo'. The former may be criticised as two constraining; the latter as non-explanatory because wholly unconstrained. Both views are, in their different ways, 'monistic' - one offering a 'monism of meaning', the other a 'monism of use' (Posner, 1980). The dualistic, meaning-and-use, account, on which I wish to propose we may profitably
base our approach to the analysis of discourse, accounts for creativity in terms of (i) the unlimited possibilities for direct (i.e. more or less literal) utterance meaning which follow from the interaction of separate systems (of grammar and praxis) in an unlimited set of contexts; and (ii) the capacity of speakers to further multiply the range of meanings available in discourse by intentionally 'turning' one set of meanings (those inherent in linguistic form) in relation to another (those implicit in context). Such an account has the advantage of accommodating both the 'creativity' of a generative grammar and the 'open-ness' (Hockett) of human use of language. It also provides a principled 'position' for investigating 'the use of meanings' in discourse.

5 Competence for discourse: recapitulation

Chomsky observes (1979:49) that it would be unreasonable to approach the study of performance without first investigating the underlying system of rules (he has in mind the rules of grammar) which make performance possible. But, as he remarks elsewhere (1980:82),

a fuller account of knowledge of language will consider the interaction of grammar and other systems (my emphasis), specifically the system of conceptual structures and pragmatic competence, and perhaps others, for example, systems of knowledge and belief that enter into what we might call 'common sense understanding' of the world.

The various competences discussed in this chapter are represented in the following diagram:
Linguistic competence is here distinguished from grammatical as being knowledge of a language including knowledge of its rules of use. The distinction between linguistic and pragmatic competence may be seen in two ways: (1) as a difference of inclusion, pragmatic competence including linguistic, but linguistic competence excluding factual-practical, since practical knowledge is general while applicational knowledge is language specific; (ii) as a difference in emphasis, linguistic competence being the view from 'how a language is organised to do things', pragmatic competence being the view from 'the things that language is organised to do'. Either way, it is clear that the point of convergence of the disciplines of linguistics and pragmatics is in the study of 'applicational competence', of knowledge of rules of use.
One important dimension needs to be added to this picture, though I have not discussed it in this chapter. It is knowledge of variability of rules, i.e. socio-linguistic competence, knowledge of sensitivity of rules to speakers and situations. This variability is a feature of all types of rules. It is not only grammatical rules that vary according to speakers and topics and styles, etc., but also rules of use (so that, for instance, modes and degrees of mitigation and politeness vary with social class of speakers and formality of situation). Factual and practical knowledge itself varies, even within individuals, depending on settings and roles (so that, for instance, in the parent-child relationship a whale may be 'a great big fish', but in the teacher-student relationship a whale, for the same individual, is a mammal).

We may add this aspect of competence to the others and label the whole package 'communicative competence'.

This account of competence includes a large part of what some would label performance. I wish, however, to restrict the term 'performance' to denote ALL, OR A SUBSET OF, ATTESTED PERFORMANCES; as we might say 'that sermon was a fine performance' or 'his performance as a preacher leaves a lot to be desired'. Communicative competence is (in principle) all the knowledge that is pre-requisite for performance. Performance is the show itself, and the skill with which it is produced.
1 Performance in relation to competence

I have presented in the previous chapter a position on communicative competence which assumes that the native speaker's competence for discourse is essentially tripartite. In chapter 2 I sketched a position on the nature of discourse which, likewise, assumes a tripartite analysis of performance:

- the performance of producing (speaker) or recognising (hearer) a text;
- the performance of determining (speaker) or recognising (hearer) a context;
- the performance of intending (speaker) that a certain interpretation be given to text-as-produced in the light of context-as-determined or interpreting (hearer) the text-as-recognised in the light of the recognised context.

The position which I have been working towards in the previous chapters is that there is a close relation between each of the three aspects of competence and each of the three aspects of performance, as follows:
Applicational competence is not really separate from the other two (which are clearly separate from one another). It exists only as the interaction of the other two in a human intelligence, and as the product of that interaction. Likewise, the intentional-interpretive performance is not really separate from the other two (which are, not quite so clearly, separate from one another). It occurs only as the interaction of the other two in a human intelligence, and as the product of that interaction: namely discourse.
The potentiality of grammatical competence underlies the actuality of text performance; that of factual-practical competence underlies the actuality of context; that of applicational competence underlies the actuality of intention and interpretation. To analyse performance is to analyse past activity; to analyse potential activity is simply to analyse competence. Any adequate position on discourse analysis will take account of both: what is potential (generally); and what was done (specifically).

In order to analyse what 'was done' we need a model of different sorts of acts and of different sorts of relationships between them; also of different sorts of people who perform such acts in different sorts of circumstances and of different sorts of relationship between them. I shall say something about each of these aspects of the description of performance in the present chapter. I shall then briefly address the question whether competence, as defined, is a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for producing an effective performance.

2 The unit of discourse activity

One can not easily overstate the importance of speech act theory as a source of applied linguistic implications for communicative language teaching. The work of Austin and Searle has been accepted, more or less uncritically, as providing a secure basis for understanding and investigating the nature of linguistic communication, and much of their terminology - speech act, illocutionary act, propositional content, etc, etc. - has become part of the everyday vocabulary of applied linguistic research and university teaching. While speech
act theorists have continued to wrestle with basic difficulties such as the validity of the locutionary/illocutionary distinction (Cohen, 1964; Searle, 1968), the nature of propositional acts (Searle, 1969; Cohen, 1974) and the status of illocutionary acts in relation to linguistics and pragmatics (Kempson, 1975; Bierwisch, 1980), applied linguists have held fast to the fundamental idea that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating ... speech acts ... are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication. (Searle, 1969:16)

and have made it into an applied linguistic position both enduring and widely influential.

The ramifications of the theory have not, however, all been incorporated into applied linguistic thinking with equal enthusiasm. Illocutionary forces, classification of illocutionary forces, conditions for the performance of different types of illocutionary act, and indirect speech acts have received much attention; locutionary acts, including acts of reference, and the place of perlocutionary acts in the structure and process of discourse, less so. My object in this section is to give an overall view of 'the speech act' along with its various components in the hope of clarifying the contribution of different parts of speech act theory to our practical understanding of discourse. Since the term 'speech act' has been used in numerous ways, and since what I am trying to describe does not quite correspond with any of these, I shall label the complex entity in question 'unit of discourse activity', or UDA.
Austin (1962) distinguished, as is well known, the act of saying something (the locutionary act), the act performed in saying something (the illocutionary act) and the act performed by saying something (the perlocutionary act). For example, if it is reported

1. Arthur persuaded Mary to help him by promising that he would take her out afterwards,

all three types of act are described: what Arthur said - 'I shall take you out afterwards'; what he did - he promised; and what he achieved - Mary agreed to help. The intuitive correctness of this analysis, and its obvious relevance to different aspects of the language teaching process, no doubt accounts for its attractiveness as a position.

The locutionary/illocutionary distinction has been criticised by speech act theorists on various grounds, notable among which is the difficulty of determining the difference between the 'meaning' of an utterance containing an explicit performative formula, for example

2. I promise to take you out afterwards,

and its force. Searle's solution to this problem is to propose a new distinction, within the 'full-blown illocutionary act', between the force of the utterance and the proposition expressed.¹ The latter is determined by propositional acts of reference and predication. What is left of Austin's locutionary act - its 'phonetic' and 'phatic' elements - is then relegated to what Searle calls the 'utterance act'.²

One effect of this manoeuvre is to raise the question whether the illocutionary/propositional distinction is any more well-founded
than the one it is designed to replace. Bierwisch (1980) presents
the difference in the following way:

It is by now commonplace that an utterance
of (3) can be taken under appropriate
conditions e.g., as a promise, a prediction,
a warning, or a remark on the speaker’s and
the addressee’s dispositions.

(3) I’ll be there before you.

According to current terminology, in each
of these cases a different speech act has
been performed. What these speech acts have
in common is called their propositional
content, what they differ in is called their
illocutionary force.

He then raises the question

how these two components or aspects of a
speech act are related to the linguistic,
or more specifically to the semantic structure
of the linguistic utterance used to perform it,

and proposes the following:

In cases like (3) ... the propositional content
of the various speech acts is more or less
directly determined by the complete linguistic
structure of (3), while their different
illocutionary forces have practically no
connection with it.

This stark contrast results, I believe, from the fact that Bierwisch
is not comparing like with like. Against context-dependent illo-
cutionary force he opposes context-independent propositional content.
But once this latter notion is replaced by that of an actual propo-
sition, in which certain expressions are used in such a way as to make
contact with particular states of affairs in the extra-linguistic
world, Bierwisch’s conclusion ceases to be correct. Not only can an
utterance of (3) be taken, under appropriate conditions, as fulfilling
various different illocutionary acts, it can also, under appropriate
conditions be taken as making innumerable different propositions.


We gather what things or people an utterance refers to, in a given context, primarily by attending to its demonstratives, proper names, personal pronouns, definite descriptions, etc. We gather what force the utterance has by attending, in the same context, primarily to its connecting particles, adverbs, verb-mood, explicitly performative verb-use, word-order, etc. But whereas the reference of many sentences, like 'He met her there yesterday,' changes on almost every occasion of its utterance, the range of forces a sentence may have is much more stable. A sentence keeps on having one or other of the same range of forces again and again, whereas many of its references never recur, especially if it includes some such word as 'now' or 'yesterday.' And in this respect 'force' is much more like 'sense' than 'reference' is ...

In contrast, then, with Searle's view that

the expression of a proposition is a propositional act not an illocutionary act
(Searle, 1969:29),

Cohen, in a later paper (Cohen, 1974:189), argues that there is plainly a case for regarding reference acts as 'illocutionary', even though not equivalent to such acts as PROMISE, WARN, REQUEST, etc.

This is because

to describe what a man referred to involves describing something of what he achieved with his utterance ... a generic feature of all descriptions of illocutionary acts.

Some of the broader implications of this view will be considered shortly. Meanwhile, I want briefly to consider the other boundary of Austin's illocutionary acts, that with perlocutions.

This boundary is no less problematic. Part of the difficulty arises from various proposals - notably in Searle (1975) - which treat implicatures of illocutionary acts as themselves illocutionary
acts, for example the utterance of (3) might, in appropriate circumstances, be used to convey not only a piece of information but also, as an implicature of that piece of information and the fact that it has been conveyed, a warning, a reminder of some past event, and a threat. Not only the INFORM but all the other acts as well would, on this view, be illocutionary. Such an analysis seems to me to be mistaken. Whereas the INFORM is performed in the utterance of the relevant locution, the other acts are effects achieved by the performance of the illocution. In short they are perlocutionary. I shall assume that this account is generally applicable to all such cases of apparent multiple illocutionary forces and shall adopt the following position: For each UDA, one, and only one, illocutionary force. I shall call this the 'single-force' principle.

Adopting this position has the effect of considerably enhancing the importance of the perlocutionary aspect of discourse, and it is therefore necessary to consider, at least in broad outline, in what different ways intentions and effects may be said to be perlocutionary.

1) I shall follow Austin (1962) in recognising that perlocutionary effects may be intentional or unintentional.
2) I shall follow Eemeren (1982) in positing one invariable intentional perlocutionary effect (IPE), which is that the recipient should recognise the single force that the speaker or writer intends, i.e. that there should be 'uptake'.
3) I shall follow Cohen (1973) and Davis (1979) in recognising that some IPEs - beyond uptake - are more closely (conventionally) associated with their causal illocutionary acts than others. For example, a husband asking his wife if she knows where Johnny is has
performed an act with the illocutionary force of QUESTION, which is conventionally tied to the IPE of eliciting a response. If the husband’s question makes the wife doubt if she does indeed know where Johnny is and so start becoming alarmed, this is a perlocutionary effect which may or may not have been intended but is not conventionally associated with the causal illocution. (Conventional IPEs, it is perhaps worth noting, may not be invariable but may be relative to certain situation types.)

4) I shall assume that non-conventional IPEs are accountable for in terms of Gricean principles, i.e. they are conversational implicatures. To take an example of Grice's, if A finds B stopped at the side of the road and out of petrol, A's informing B (illocutionary force) that a garage is just round the corner (proposition) implicates that A has reason to believe that the garage in question is open and has the further IPE that B recognises that A's utterance has given him the help he is in need of.\(^5\)

2.2 Performative and propositional

Following on from the argument that propositional acts, or at least their referential sub-acts, are, in their variability and context-dependence, similar to illocutionary acts, we may reasonably ask whether the 'of-in-by' distinctions are equally applicable to them. Consider the following example:

4. Charged with speeding, Miss Hilary Profitt, an artist, asked for the Miniquip Gun which had recorded her alleged offence to be pointed at the magistrate, Mr James Tinker. The gun showed that he was travelling at 122 mph. A spokesman for the police said that the Miniquip Gun was often affected by central heating. (JSN)\(^6\)
Analysis:

(i) In the utterance of the nominal expression 'Miss Hilary Profitt' the writer makes a specific reference to a particular individual hitherto not known to the reader, and by so doing intends to get the reader to recognise (uptake IPE) that such an entity existed and has been referred to.

(ii) In the utterance of the nominal expression 'an artist' the writer ascribes an attribute of class-membership to the referent of the nominal expression with which 'an artist' is in apposition, and by so doing intends to get the reader to recognise that such an attribution has been made and perhaps also (non-conventional IPE) to recognise the possibility of a following predicate describing artist-predictable (e.g. eccentric) behaviour.

(iii) In the utterance of the nominal expression 'the Muniquip Gun which had recorded her alleged offence' the writer makes a specific reference to a particular gun of a certain type and which had been involved in an incident connected with the referent in (i); and by so doing intends to get the reader to recognise that such a gun was used and that the gun used was the one referred to in the utterance of this particular expression.

(iv) In the utterance of the nominal expression 'the Muniquip Gun' the writer makes a generic reference to a particular type of gun; and by so doing intends to get the reader to recognise that the type referred to has as one of its tokens the particular gun referred to in (iii) and subsequently by the co-referential expression 'the gun'. This contrast, specific-generic, is paralleled by the contrast between the specific event described in the predicate 'showed that
he was travelling at 122 mph' and the general attribute described in the predicate 'was often affected by central heating'; the recognition of this relationship is also an IPE of the use of these various expressions in their contexts.

I think we may conclude that referential acts (at least) may be considered under not only an illocutionary but also a locutionary and a perlocutionary aspect.

Where does this leave the original notion of illocutionary act understood as including such acts as PROMISE, REQUEST, WARN, etc.? It leaves it intact, except in so far as we are now required to differentiate such acts from propositions not in terms of their illocutionary-ness but in terms of what is special to them, namely their performative-ness. We thus re-employ Austin's original term, but now as denoting not non-truth-conditional speech acts (in contrast with truth-conditional 'constatives') but as denoting the non-truth-conditional part of any speech act (in contrast with the truth-conditional propositions). The performative act, like the propositional act, yields to the 'of-in-by' analysis. Under the locutionary aspect we consider what may loosely be called the 'modal content' of sentences, i.e. 'illocutionary force indicating devices' (Searle, 1969; Bierwisch, 1980) such as sentence type and explicit performative formulas and others noted by Cohen (above). Under the illocutionary aspect we may consider, in accordance with some principled means of classification (e.g. that of Searle, 1975), the type of performative act - we may still use the term illocutionary force - which is performed. Under the perlocutionary aspect we may
consider 'uptake', some 'indirect speech acts' (those of the A/A type described in chapter 3) and other conventional and non conventional IPEs.

The foregoing conclusions may be summarised in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCUTIONARY ASPECT</th>
<th>ILOCUTIONARY ASPECT</th>
<th>PERLOCUTIONARY ASPECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'What is said'</td>
<td>'What is done'</td>
<td>'What is effected'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| PERFORMATIVE MEANINGS | illocutionary force indicat- | uptake, indirect speech acts (A/A), other IPEs |
|----------------------| force indicating devices;    |                                        |

| PROPOSITIONAL MEANINGS | Propositional content acts of reference and predication: propositions uptake, implicatures |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|

Fig. 4.2 Components of a unit of discourse activity

These are the components of any 'full-blown' unit of discourse activity: a guide, therefore, to what may be taken account of in any systematic analysis of discourse that is concerned with linguistic form and meaning no less than with illocutions and their pragmatic effects, and with propositional no less than with performative meanings. Since the illocutionary aspect is central, linking the more purely linguistic with the more purely communicational, the classification of illocutionary types is clearly of fundamental importance. There has been substantial work in this area in applied linguistics, based on the work of Austin and Searle, in relation to performative functions. In relation to referential functions, there
has been little or none. It will be my principle object in Part II to see how this may be done.

3 The process of discourse: Interaction of actors

The interactional aspect of discourse - what goes on between participants - has attracted, understandably, more attention from sociologists (particularly ethnomethodologists) and social psychologists than it has from linguists. The relative lack of interest of linguists may be due to the fact that the connection between linguistic conventions and interactional processes is relatively remote, and also to the fact that any study of interaction necessarily draws substantially on the work of non-linguists. There has, however, been some considerable applied linguistic interest in interaction.

My own belief is that this has been largely misplaced. This is because I believe that an applied linguistically motivated study of discourse process is not only less feasible but also less usable than a corresponding study of discourse structure. That said, it must be admitted that the latter may in some degree be illuminated by the former. I shall therefore say as much about the process of discourse as interaction as seems needed to differentiate it from the structure of discourse as interactivity and to give adequate foundations for the description and explanation of the latter.

To view discourse as interaction is to take a broad view indeed. Interactions are the content of human relationships or, as Hinde would have it, a relationship is a series of interactions in time. The latest in a series of interactions between two people
is only interpretable (by them, or some analyst) fully by reference
to the series of previous interactions of which the relationship
consists.

To view discourse as interaction is to view it as cooperation,
competition, problem-solving, exchange; a process of action and
reaction in which there are many layers of meaning, often contradictory,
and through which participants negotiate an uncertain path towards
a more or less indeterminate destination. It is to view discourse
as part of a larger pattern of events in which non-linguistic acts
are no less significant, no less socially meaningful, than linguistic
ones. It is to take account of all perlocutionary effects, not just
conventional ones, not just intentional ones, as well as some effects
which are not 'locutionary' in any aspect at all, since they are
neither caused by nor result in linguistic action of any sort.10

From this mass of observables, what shall the discourse
analyst select for his data? For my own purpose I shall wish to
select whatever will contribute to a more valid account of what
I take to be the structure of discourse, and I shall now suggest
that this contribution is essentially a dual one. First, under-
standing the process of interaction helps to explain the fact of
differences of overall type in discourse structure. Second, in a
more detailed way, understanding perlocutions may provide the best
or only way of accounting for coherent sequences of illocutions.
Austin himself was aware of their interactional significance,
writing that

the way in which perlocutionary effects
are produced is a matter of the
influence of one person upon another.
(Austin, 1962 - my emphasis)
Perlocutions thus provide the link between our view of discourse as a structure of inter-related illocutions and our view of discourse as a process of interaction. Taking the latter view, we perceive, for example, that a reply is a response to a person. Taking the former view, we perceive that a reply is a connection between a question and a statement. To establish and explain this connection, we only need as data (culled from the multitudinous observables of the total interaction) the relevant passage of text and what is contextual (including perhaps some co-text) for the interpretation of that passage. I shall develop this idea in the next section.

I shall conclude this section by expanding briefly and selectively on the other main contribution from interaction studies to discourse structure studies, namely that relating to large scale differences of discourse type.

The process of an interaction depends on a large number of factors: situation type, speech event type, topic, time available, external events, participants' experience of previous interactions, their personal motivations, etc. There is, however, one complex of factors that has an especially important bearing on the relationship between interaction and interactivity. This complex may be called 'participant involvement' and the principle factors involved are:

- PRESENCE, i.e. whether the participants are physically (in sound or vision or both) present to one another;
- BALANCE, i.e. whether, in terms of quantity of speaking, the participants contribute to the interaction more or less equally;
- DOMINANCE, i.e. whether the participants are fulfilling roles which imply non-equal control
over the development of the interaction. Balance is dependent on, but not guaranteed by, presence - in a lecture, for example, there is physical co-presence but unequal contribution. Dominance is distinct from balance because the one who does most of the talking (the witness, the interviewee, the patient) may not be the one who has the initiative in an interaction (the barrister, the interviewer, the doctor).

The purpose of isolating these factors is to draw attention to certain similarities and differences between spoken and written discourse which are not directly or simply related to differences in medium.

In spoken dialogue, necessarily characterised by co-presence of participants and distinguished from monologue (where there may or may not be co-presence) by the factor of balance, the participants react constantly to one another's actions, both vocal and non-vocal.

However, in dialogue which is marked by dominance of one participant, the process of action and reaction is to a greater or lesser extent a contrivance of the dominant party. This participant, in so far as he succeeds in controlling the discourse process, becomes responsible for the developing structure of inter-related discourse acts. Dialogue-with-dominance thus closely resembles written monologue. Here the writer is entirely 'responsible' but this fact does not follow from the total absence of interaction (the reader not being 'present') but from the total control that the writer has over an imagined interaction between himself and his reader. Whether what is written has for its main purpose information or argument or
description, the writer will not achieve his purpose without the co-operation of his reader. What he contrives, his reader must react to. How he expects his reader to react will partly determine the form of his next contrivance. Thus, the perlocutionary effects which he produces (i.e., which he imagines he produces) are ultimately effects on himself as much as on his reader. He must react to these, and incorporate his reaction into the next, or some later, passage of discourse. He may indicate this process of action and reaction either explicitly or implicitly; the techniques of explicitness ranging from the regular use of metacommunicative markers (for example, on the other hand, that is to say, in conclusion,...) to the full apparatus of pseudo-interaction found in dramatised propaganda or 'Socratic dialogue'; the techniques of implicitness consisting just in the juxtaposition and sequencing of illocutionary acts imbued with certain forces and expressing, through their acts of reference and predication, certain more or less related propositions.

All discourse, therefore, is interactional, if we are prepared to give this term a fairly broad interpretation. It seems, furthermore, reasonable to suppose that the explanation for this pervasive interactionality is that dialogue, in the life both of the individual and of society at large, is the source of monologue, whether spoken or written. In analysing spoken dialogue, our description of the patterning of discourse acts - i.e., our account of the structure of the discourse - will reflect, in a quite immediate way, our observation of the process of interaction between the participants. (That B responds in a certain way to A is the - pragmatic - connection between B's act and A's act.) In analysing any form of monologue, (whether spoken or written, and, if spoken, whether written to be
spoken or spontaneous), our description of the discourse structure will reflect our intuitions about an imagined but nonetheless effective interaction - what we may call the hypothetical dialogue. Such intuitions spring both from our general understanding of the nature of interaction and its role in the generation and maintenance of interpersonal relationships; and also from our understanding of the supposed particular (however impersonal) relationship (of experience, of expertise, of role, of status) that exists between the author of the monologue and his addressee.

A genre is a discourse type. We expect not only a certain style (some occupational dialect) but, within broader or narrower limits, a certain structure as well. The structure is not the same as the supposed underlying process of interaction, but it is, in part at least, the product of it. Since interactions, as we have seen, are both the product and the content of relationships, and since relationships are both the product and the content of social structure, we have a connection between structure in discourse and structure in society. We may recoil from the proposition that discourse structure is social structure, as being excessively far-fetched; but we cannot deny, and we certainly should not ignore, the dynamic link between the two.

4 The structure of discourse: Interactivity of acts

Interactivity may conveniently be understood as the corollary in discourse structure of the syntagmatic dimension in sentence structure.
The syntagmatic relations which a unit contracts are those which it contracts by virtue of its combination (in a syntagm or construction) with other units of the same level.
(Lyons, 1977:140)

I assume that for discourse the units in combination are UDAs and their constituents, i.e. performative and propositional acts, and that the syntagmatic relations discovered in actual instances of discourse are tokens of interactivity tupes, i.e. 'routine' connections between particular categories of act. Thus, the paradigmatic dimension is also important:

The paradigmatic relations contracted by units are those which hold between a particular unit in a given syntagm and other units which are substitutable for it in the syntagm (ibid.).

Just as there can be no effective analysis of sentence structure which ignores the paradigmatic dimension, so there can be no effective analysis of interactivity which ignores performative acts and propositions. Our sights may be set on the inter-relationships of acts; but our analysis must begin with the classes of acts between which we expect to discover some sort of relationship.

This view, or close approximations to it, is to be found in the work of many and various writers, notably Hymes, Ervin-Tripp, Labov and Widdowson. The latest and perhaps fullest exploration of its implications is found in Edmundson (1981).¹⁴

(The analogy with sentence structure should not be taken too far. First, discourse paradigms seem disconcertingly more open-ended than their syntactic equivalents; second, it is by no means clear what sort of criteria in discourse will convincingly indentify those units which are, and those units which are not, 'units of the same level'.)
The assumption that interactivity functions both between and within UMDs yields at least the following possibilities for the investigation of relationships between different types of act:

(1) Within any UDA, investigate the relationship between the performative act (single force), the reference act (or acts) and the predicate act (or acts);

(2) Between one UDA and another, investigate
   (i) interactivity of performative acts
   (ii) interactivity of reference acts
   (iii) interactivity of predicate acts

(3) Investigate the prospective function of UDA₁ (as a unit) in relation to UDA₂, and the retrospective function of UDA₂ (as a unit) in relation to UDA₁.

The various relationships may be represented as follows:

Perf = performative act (illocutionary force)
Ref = reference act
Pred = predicate act
- - = internal relations (1)
----- = external relations (2)
UDA₁, UDA₂ = UMDs in sequence (3)

Fig. 4.4 Some relations of interactivity
I shall not enlarge on (1) and (2) at this point. (Chapter 8 includes an attempt at an empirical investigation of some of these hypothetical relationships.) For the present, I shall restrict my attention to (3), saying something about what I propose to call 'interactive acts', and then indicating how the more well-established notions of cohesion and coherence fit in with this concept.

Just as an interpersonal action, such as a greeting or an insult, or a scowl or a kiss, becomes part of the relationship between two individuals, so an interactive act establishes, in discourse, the relationship between two units of discourse activity.

We may reverse this. Just as certain characteristics - roles, statuses, personalities - of two individuals in a relationship constrain the interpersonal actions that can or are likely to occur between them (the secretary can only request not order her boss to make some coffee, unless they temporarily step out of that particular relationship), so certain characteristics - of force, reference, predication - of two units of discourse activity constrain the set of interactive acts that can be performed to establish the relationship between them.

To illustrate this, let us take as an example the interactive act of CONTRAST. Consider the following:

5. Sharks are fish. Whales are mammals.
6. Whales have fins. Whales are mammals.
7. Sharks have fins. Whales have fins too.
8. Sharks have fins. Sharks have fins.
9. Sharks have fins. Do whales?
10. Do whales have fins? Sharks have.
I start from the assumption that making a CONTRAST is something a speaker does. Similarities and differences may be implicit or explicit in the propositional content of an utterance, and these may be necessary conditions for contrast. But they are not sufficient conditions, for there is no contrast unless the speaker intends one and ensures - by invoking the force of context and by the use, where he finds it necessary, of explicit CONTRAST markers - that the hearer perceives his intention. Even where these broad conditions are satisfied, there will be no CONTRAST, or no easily or naturally recognised CONTRAST, unless the configuration of similarities and differences between the two UDAs permits one.

I have constructed examples (5 - 10) so as to take care of the condition (if there is such a condition) of sufficient similarity. The differences between them are all of difference. They are summarised (for examples 5 - 8) in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Same predicate?</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\text{Fig. 4.5 Patterns of propositional difference.}$

Case (5) provides the firmest foundation for CONTRAST. No difficulty of interpretation is presented by:
5a. Sharks are fish. Whales, however, are mammals. Case (6) is not quite so simple:

6a. Whales have fins. However, whales are mammals. Here, as in 5a, the CONTRAST interactive act is unequivocally signalled by however. For the reader to get the point, however, he has to have made the assumption that having fins is un-mammal-like. To do this he has to do some 'bridging' (Clark and Clark, 1977), for such an assumption is not aroused directly by the first UDA but by the first reviewed in the light of the second.

The work of bridging is increased in (7) where the referents are different but the predicates are the same:

7a. Sharks have fins. Whales, however, have fins too. Interactivity of the two UDAs arouses the implicature that sharks having fins is a ground of differentiation between sharks and whales. The second UDA contradicts this implicature. This seems to me to be a longer bridge than that required in (6a) because it is constructed on assumptions about the writer's overall discourse intentions rather than simply about taxonomic facts. My intuition is that, whereas (5) stands up as a potential CONTRAST as it is - i.e. without the addition of however - and (6) might just be interpretable as such, (7), in the absence of some wider-context, positively requires however (or some similar adverbial) if it is to be interpretable as a CONTRAST (rather, for instance, than simply an ADDITION).

(8) will not stand up as a CONTRAST with or without the insert of however:

??? 8a. Sharks have fins. Sharks, however, have fins.
(9) and (10) belong with (7) in having same predicate, different referent. The difference between (9/10) and (5/6/7/8) is in performative patterning, (9) as STATEMENT - QUESTION, (10) as QUESTION - STATEMENT, where (5 - 8) are all STATEMENT - STATEMENT. (9) is quite readily interpretable as expressing a CONTRAST (that between the certainty of the first proposition and the uncertainty of the second) and readily accepts a CONTRAST marker:

9a. Sharks have fins. But do whales?

The reverse performative pattern seems considerably more dubious:

??10a. Do whales have fins? But sharks have.

In the light of these examples and of the discussion up to this point, I want to make the following proposals concerning interactive acts:

1) An interactive act is not simply a function of the illocutionary aspect of two UDAs in close association. It is a separate intention of a speaker or writer that such UDAs be taken as in a certain relation to one another. As such, interactive acts are part of the broad phenomenon of interactivity, but a distinct part, constituting a finite class of conventionally recognised types of intended overall relationship between one UDA and another.16

2) An interactive act is not an additional illocutionary force (cf. single-force principle). It is, rather, an intended perlocutionary effect of some UDA that UDA should be given a certain interpretation in relation to another. We may say that this effect is 'conventional' since this class of IPEs is a limited one (not only finite but quite small in number, for example in comparison with
the number of recognisably distinct performative forces) and also because the means for signalling them are not only contextual but also grammatical (and, in the spoken language, intonational).

3) Some interactive acts are retrospective (REPLY, EXEMPLIFY, AMPLIFY, SPECIFY, REITERATE, CONCLUDE, ...), some prospective (ELICIT, PROMPT, FOCUS, ...). Some (e.g. ELICIT/REPLY) come in easily recognised pairs.17

4.1 Coherence and cohesion

The account I have given of interactivity (in general) and interactive acts (in particular) provides a secure basis on which to define two terms which have long been central to applied linguistic discussions of discourse.

(i) Coherence.

Coherence is not an attribute of a text. It is an experience of a person - a response, principally of a hearer or reader but also of a speaker or writer to his own utterance. It follows that the discourse analyst should say, not 'this discourse is coherent (or incoherent)', but rather 'this discourse seems (or seemed) coherent (or incoherent) to me', or 'in an experiment n% of respondents reported that they found the discourse coherent', or 'I would guess that most native speakers would find this incoherent'.

What are the grounds for this type of response? It is not sufficient to say that coherence is some relationship that can be understood as existing between two speech acts (UDAs). It is well known that, if we work hard enough at constructing a suitable context,
almost any two utterances can be found to be related in some more or less reasonable way. Coherence, thus understood, is merely a correlate of interpretive expectation and ingenuity. No discourse will necessarily seem, to a rational but imaginative native speaker, entirely incoherent.

Such a conception of coherence is obviously vacuous. To get rid of the vacuity, one added ingredient is needed, and that is the interactive act. The interactive act, as we have seen, is the speaker’s intention that the relationship between two UDAs should be such-and-such. (Recognition of this intention will be guided by contextual factors, the sequence of the two UDAs, intonation and, optionally, the presence of one or more metacommunicative signals.) Coherence is the response that the relationship recognised as intended is feasible, taking account of both performative and propositional characteristics of the thus-to-be-related UDAs. Incoherence is the response that it is not feasible. Recall the example:

5a. Sharks are fish. Whales, however, are mammals.

It is plainly signalled that an interactive act of CONTRAST is intended. As we have seen, both the referents and the predicates of the two UDAs are sufficiently similar and sufficiently different for the intended relating act to be entirely feasible. (If we remove ‘however’, the range of interactive act possibilities increases—though it might not actually do so in a wider context—but once some interactive interpretation has been given then the feasibility test applies.) Compare:

5b. Sharks are fish. Whales, for example, are mammals.
The attributes predicated of the distinct referents are in a relationship not of hyponymy but of incompatibility. As a result, the signalled interactive act of EXEMPLIFICATION does not seem feasible.

It may be in the subject rather than the predicate parts of two UDAs that we find the characteristics which undermine the feasibility of a signalled interactive act. Compare:

11. Sharks have fins. However, some don't.
in which the signalled CONTRAST seems not to be feasible, with

11a. Most sharks have fins. However, some don't.
where the interactive act of CONTRAST seems entirely feasible.

Lastly, it may be the performative elements of two UDAs which are the source of an impression of incoherence, as is shown by our earlier example:

?? 10a. Do whales have fins? But sharks have.
which I find difficult (though not perhaps impossible) to interpret as a CONTRAST and to which my first response is therefore that it is incoherent.

(ii) Cohesion. In chapter 2, I adopted the position that, though text typically contains grammatical and lexical devices that we may call devices of cohesion, it is only when text is given contextual interpretation as discourse that the full signification of these cohesive signals is apparent. We can now be rather more precise about the nature of this full signification, for cohesion, like coherence, may conveniently be defined in terms of interactivity. Coherence, I have argued, is a response, principally of the hearer or reader, to interactivity. Cohesion is a means at the disposal of
the speaker or writer for signalling interactivity. Cohesive devices help to make clear not only the interactive act that links two UMs but also the multiple relationships intended to be estab-
ished between two UMs in their illocutionary aspects. Adverbial conjoiners (however, for example) may signal interactive acts; pronouns, determiners and lexical substitutes may signal various kinds and degrees of co-referentiality or difference of reference; tense sequence, structural parallelism, substitution devices, ellipsis, may signal relations between predicates. Cohesive devices thus both contribute to interpretation and require interpretation. They are both context sensitive and context creating. They are intimately tied up with the interactivity of discourse, affecting and affected by the response of coherence.

Two earlier proposals on coherence and cohesion are drawn on but somewhat modified in the position which I have just described. 

The first linked cohesion with text, coherence with discourse. The second linked cohesion with propositional development, coherence with illocutionary (= performative) development in discourse. 18

I have tried to show that cohesion overlaps the text/discourse distinction (as I have drawn it in chapter 2) and that coherence overlaps the propositional/illocutionary distinction (as others normally make it).

Instead of arguing a preference for one or other of these earlier proposals, I have adopted a rather different view:

- that both coherence and cohesion are aspects of interactivity and definable by reference to it;
- that interactivity is the set of relationships that a speaker establishes between two (or more) units of discourse activity;
- that paramount in this set of relationships is the interactive act, by means of which the speaker intends to establish the relationship overall between one UDA and another;
- that cohesion is the grammatical means by which a speaker gives expression to intended relations of interactivity;
- that coherence is a response of discourse participants, especially the hearer, to perceived interactive relationships in all cases where the apparently intended interactive act is found to be feasible in the light of performative and propositional aspects of the connected UDAs; and incoherence is a response aroused in cases where the apparently intended interactive act is found not, in the prevailing context, to be feasible.

5 Performance, competence, accomplishment.

The central issue in discourse analysis relates to the old problem of what people know and what people do. (Widdowson, 1979)

At the end of chapter 3, I argued that we should include in our notion of competence all the knowledge that is prerequisite for performance. I concluded: Performance is the show itself and the skill with which it is performed.

What people do in discourse is, by virtue of the communicative competence that they have, to perform locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Any limitation on some aspect of a speaker's
communicative competence will limit his repertoire of acts of one or more of these three types. A child acquiring his L1 has a limited knowledge of the world and what people do in it; it is possible that at certain stages of his development his grammatical competence (by virtue of which he produces locutions) will outstrip the capacity he has to put his repertoire of potential locutions to good use. For the adult L2 learner, the reverse may be the case. He may know in principle what can be referred to and what can be done; but he may lack the competence in grammar and in rules of use to refer to his intended referents and to perform his intended acts. (For some L2 learners, their situation is not unlike that of the child. I have in mind those who, while developing their linguistic competence, are simultaneously using that developing competence to acquire new factual and practical knowledge, for example where the L2 is the medium of instruction or of library study in a university course. One of the major problems in assessing the work of such students is to discover, in the absence of any independent variables, what kinds of deficiencies in competence are the explanation for any observable defects in performance.)

According to the position developed in these chapters, grammatical, practical and applicational competence are necessary conditions for discourse performance. But are they sufficient conditions? In one way, obviously not. There are, as well, various physical (input-output) conditions: suitable channel, absence of excessive 'noise', physical fitness of participants, etc. These need not concern us. Of far more interest from a language teaching point of view, it is plain that,
as between one discourse participant and another, there may be wide variations in the quality of performance, and these do not always seem to be attributable to variations in competence (as so far described). Competence is sufficient for producing some sort of performance, but it will not guarantee a good or even an adequate performance. Some perform with fluency, with clarity, with style; others with hesitancy, obscurity, prolixity. To make a well-known analogy, knowing the rules of chess or tennis will enable one person to play a game with another but it will not of itself enable him to win. To perform well, or even tolerably, an engager in discourse needs skill. This seems partly to be a matter of practice (i.e. previous performance), partly of some level of 'knowledge' that is intermediate between competence and performance. We may suitably call this skill-knowledge 'strategic' or 'procedural'. It makes the difference between just directing a message at someone, and persuading him, reassuring him, informing him, amusing him; between just writing, and writing well. Or, for the recipient, it makes the difference between just comprehending and truly understanding. In short, it makes the difference between performance and 'accomplishment'.

6 Review: Analysing discourse

In one of Hans Anderson's stories, the Emperor of China befriends a nightingale and is nightly entertained by its song. Later he is presented with a toy nightingale 'in which everything is fixed, definite. You can take it to pieces and see how it works - where
the wheels lie, how they move and how one thing follows from another.' Fascinated by this ingenious artefact, he ignores the real bird, which slips from its cage and flies away.

All discourse analysis is reductionistic, and most of it is mechanistic. If it were not so, it could not be done. The question for analysts is how far to go in this direction: the profit to be got is preciseness; the loss is that part of discourse corresponding to 'the real bird's unpredictable variety and richness and complexity of song'.

Discourse analysts certainly vary in this respect. Some are mechanics; some are, at least by inclination, intuitive observers of the wonders of nature. This important point of differentiation is partly independent of and partly tied up with some others which are perhaps worth noticing:

1) whether the analyst is interested mainly in form - 'how language is organised to do things' - or in function - 'the things that language is organised to do';

2) whether the analyst is interested more in the manifestations of performance or more in the underlying competence;

3) whether the analyst is motivated in his researches mainly by practical or mainly by theoretical concerns.  

In this and the preceding chapters I have prepared the ground for Part II (in which I shall investigate one part of competence - that relating to reference - in detail) and for Part III (in which I shall analyse some actual data of performance and consider the utility of such an analysis for language teaching) in the following way:
1) I have drawn a distinction between theories and positions, arguing that applied linguistics is not a theoretical discipline but one which studies and incorporates the theoretical work of linguistics and other unapplied disciplines in order to construct positions. Positions are evaluated by criteria distinct from those normally applied to theories, and of these the most important are the two criteria of applicability: whether the position does what is expected of it, and whether what it does is useful.

2) I have sketched a picture of discourse in general which is supposed to have such efficacy and utility. To do this, I have insisted on a number of rather sharp distinctions, sometimes opposing in black and white what in 'reality' perhaps more properly seen as a darker shade of pale or a lighter shade of grey. I have attempted to identify and describe some of what seem to me the major 'wheels' or motive forces of discourse, thus adopting an undeniably 'mechanical' approach. This I believe to be the right one for applied linguistics, but I do not deny the validity, in other domains, of the naturalistic point of view.

3) I have sharply distinguished in particular:

(i) competence and performance (admitting, at the end, the importance of some concept of rhetorical skill, not obviously competence but not quite performance);

(ii) text and context meeting in discourse;

(iii) grammatical knowledge and factual-practical knowledge meeting in knowledge of rules of use;
(iv) **fixed grammatical meanings** (which I have proposed we should assume, until confronted with adequate evidence to the contrary, are in one-to-one correspondence with grammatical forms) and occasional discourse meanings;

(v) **direct and indirect** uses of language;

(vi) **performative and propositional** constituents of the unit of discourse activity, each analysable under locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects;

(vii) **interaction**, as a focal concept in understanding the interpersonal action of discourse participants, and **interactivity**, as a focal concept in understanding the structure of discourse;

(viii) **interactivity in general**, i.e. plural relationships between components of UDAs, and interactive acts, as acts whose function is to establish the relationship between two UDAs overall;

(ix) **cohesion**, as a resource of a speaker or writer for signalling interactive links, and **coherence**, as a response of the hearer or reader to the appearance of interactivity.

What I have not done is to indicate in a general way which aspects of this position on the nature of the discourse 'machine' need to be more attended to in actual analysis. I have, however, suggested at various points that (i) grammatical analysis - analysis of the constituents of text - and (ii) propositional analysis - analysis of the referential acts whereby propositional content makes contact with the extra-linguistic world - have tended to be under-
estimated in recent work. In what follows, I shall be giving prominence, in my analysis, to both these aspects of discourse.
PART II

NOMINALITY AND REFERENCE: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

Chapter 5

NOMINAL EXPRESSIONS

1 Reference and nominality

The fundamental problem for the linguist, as far as reference is concerned, is to elucidate and to describe the way in which we use language to draw attention to what we are talking about.

(Lyons, 1977:184).

It is my object now in Part II to contribute to this work of elucidation and description, but to do so in an applied linguistic way, i.e. according to the criteria which I have proposed for the construction of a good position. I shall describe reference as part of any native speaker's competence for discourse: part of his practical competence, for I assume that in order to refer a speaker must 'know' the functions of referring; part of his grammatical competence, for I assume that in order to refer a speaker must 'know' the rules for the production of well-formed noun phrases; and part of his applicational competence, for I assume that in order to refer with precise communicative effect a speaker must 'know' which of the innumerable noun phrases he is capable of producing is the one best suited to his immediate referential intentions. It is around these three aspects of referential competence that I shall organise my
discussion. In chapter 6 I shall propose a taxonomy of referential functions (reference as praxis) linking my own account to a review of the relevant literature in semantics (or pragmatics) and philosophy. In chapter 7 I shall outline, in a summary way and with minimal further discussion, a practical guide to the investigation and description of regularities in the use of grammar for performing these referential functions, including notes on indirectness and on referential interactivity. In the present chapter I focus on the grammar itself, attempting to identify and describe in broad outline, through a select review of the writings of grammarians, those bits of grammar which are functional for reference, and also proposing, at various points in the discussion, certain simplifying generalisations (as in Chapter 2 I shall call them propositions) about the facts in question.

But what are the facts in question? How in principle can we decide which bits of grammar are relevant — which parts of sentences are characteristically used to refer? For Lyons (1977:174) reference, in the most general sense of the term, has to do with

the relationship which holds between an expression and what that expression stands for on particular occasions of its utterance.

If we accept this without qualification, then we may say that in,

1. Peter has passed the driving test
not only is 'Peter' used to refer to Peter but 'has passed the driving test' is used to refer to (= stand for on this particular occasion) what Peter has done. This would seem a reasonable view
since, by nominalisation, we can give this event the same grammatical status as 'Peter' in (1):

2. Passing the driving test has helped Peter in his job.

If we accept that the subject expression in (2) 'stands for' the action which Peter did, should we not also say that the predicate expression in (1) does the same?

If the answer to this question is Yes, however much qualified, it will follow that almost all bits of grammar are relevant to reference, and we shall have no clear bounds to our discussion.

Since the notion 'stands for' is too general for our purposes, we must restrict it, and we may do this either by limiting the type of thing that may be stood for by an expression or by limiting the kind of expression that may stand for a thing; or both. For example:

It is through nouns and noun phrases that grammar organises the way we refer to objects.

(Leech & Svartvik, 1975:43).

If by 'objects' is meant any object (including persons etc) with spatio-temporal identity, and if 'noun phrase' is taken to include independent relative clauses, then this statement is probably true. But it is obviously not the whole truth. For noun phrases can be used to refer not only to objects but also to events, states, ideas, qualities, etc. If all these other types of referent are added, then it is not just noun phrases (in the sense of noun-headed constructions) which can refer to them.

Nevertheless, this narrower view of reference suggests a viable approach: one in which we treat 'objects' as the typical referents of referential expressions; and noun phrases as the
are used to
typical expressions which/refer. According to this way of thinking,
the key to the connection between grammar and reference is the concept
of noun-ness, or nominality. This itself, of course, is not a simple
notion. To explicate it we need to consider at least: (i) the nature
of nouns; (ii) the nature of the constructions that nouns immediately
enter into (i.e. noun phrases); and (iii) the nature of the functions
that noun phrases fulfil in the grammar of sentences (i.e. such
functions as subject, object and complement). These three topics
will therefore constitute the subject matter of the following three
sections.

My approach to the description of these areas of grammar is
broadly semantic. That is, I am more concerned with the meaning of
grammatical forms than with their morphology and syntax, since I assume
that it is by virtue of their meanings that forms in grammar —
including lexis — are put to the communicative uses to which they
are put. Semantics in this sense is a bridge between linguistic
forms and communicative functions, and the present chapter is an
exercise in position-building based largely on this assumption.

2 Nouns

2.1 'Noun-ness'

No-one believes any more that a noun is the name of a person, place
or thing, but it is undeniable that entities, including (notably)
persons, places and things, are typically referred to in discourse
by expressions which are or which contain nouns, and this leads us,
as it led Dionysius Thrax and a great many grammarians since, to
calculate what may be common to all nouns that makes them suited
to this function.

The definition of noun has been approached, in the long
history of linguistic theory and description, from various points
of view: morphological (which led the Greeks to assimilate nouns
to adjectives), 'logical' or functional (which led the mediaeval
speculative grammarians to separate them again), notional (which
gave the traditional grammarians of the 18th and 19th centuries
no firm grounds for deciding the issue one way or the other) and
distributional. It is the notional approach that has attracted
the most vigorous criticism from modern linguistics; nevertheless,
it is on this approach, as offering, in principle at least, some
insight into the connection between reference and nominality, that
I want briefly to comment.

Huddleston (1976:22ff), in order 'to illustrate the independence
of syntax from semantics' restates the well-known circularity case
against notional definitions of noun (a noun is the name of a thing;
a thing is what is named by a noun) and concludes:

There is no semantic property common to all
nouns and no non-nouns: noun is not a semantic
category.

This view is not contradicted by Lyons' 'notional theory'
(Lyons, 1968:318), which assumes the semantic heterogeneity of
whatever distributionally defined class (in a given language) is
labelled the class of nouns, and in which the 'notional' contri-
bution is to the naming of the class, not to the definition of its
members. The name is held to be appropriate to a subset of typical members - proper nouns and concrete common nouns (i.e. those which are names of persons, etc.) - and the rest of the members of the class (e.g. whiteness, arrival, intelligence) are called nouns by virtue of their membership of the same distribution class.

This basic division in the class of nouns - as between these denoting what Lyons (1977:442ff; 1979) calls first-order entities and all the rest - was apparent to the earliest 'traditional' grammarians of English, as is seen from the following:

A thing is any substance or imagination. A noun is the name of a thing.
(Jones 1724:22)

By the word "object" is meant, in the following treatise, not only whatsoever produces an image to the eye, whence the conception thereof is conveyed to the mind; but likewise whatsoever produces any sensation, or gives occasion to any internal conception such as that the mind can employ its discursive powers upon that conception only.

Nouns are the names of objects.
(Ward, 1765:12)

While appreciating the obvious diversity of the 'things' which are named by nouns, these early grammarians were persistent in their determination to establish some common characteristic of noun-ness - or rather, since the term noun was normally used as a superordinate for 'noun-substantive' and 'noun-adjective', some common characteristic of substantiveness: whatever essential element of meaning is involved in a word being a substantive.

There are two main inter-related themes in this tradition:
(i) that substantives denote 'substances', or whatever may be conceived as 'subsisting in itself'; (ii) that substantives denote whatever
may be made the 'subject of discourse'. I shall comment briefly on each of these ideas.

(i) Assuming, as Jespersen (1924:74) does (in common with most of his predecessors), that there is some 'intrinsic reason, some logical or psychological foundation' to the distinction between substantives (his argument relates only to concrete nouns) and adjectives, where shall this be found?

An answer very often given is that substantives denote substances (persons and things) and adjectives qualities found in those things.

But, as Jesperson points out, the names of many substances are so patently derived from one quality that the two ideas cannot possibly be separated (ibid.).

(His examples are: the blacks, eatables, desert, a plain.)

His conclusion is that the difference is one of degree, of specialisation; substantives having a more special, adjectives a more general signification,

because the former connote the possession of a complexity of qualities, and the latter the possession of one single quality (op.cit. p 81).

The most uncompromising attempt at an all-inclusive 'notional' account of nouns since Jespersen - Hewson (1972) - demonstrates that this particular theme is a continuing one. Accepting that not all nouns denote substances, Hewson argues that this does not undermine the notion that nouns are substance words because - he quotes from Gallup (1962) -

grammar does not define with reference to external reality; it must define, rather, how reality is represented or signified (p 46 fn).
(This accords with the position adopted in chapter 3: that lexico-grammatical meanings and concepts are distinct.) He thus proposes:

A noun is a sign used to refer to entities as if they were substances, i.e. as if they had dimensions within the space-time continuum ... the linguistic means whereby elements of the universe are represented as substantial (ibid.).

'As if' is a subtle but significant advance on the earlier substance theory, marking a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of the relationship between language and 'the world'. Jespersen (op.cit. p. 134) wonders whether the same manoeuvre will save the 'subsistence' theory in face of the evidence of abstract nouns. He quotes a consensus of views to the effect that abstract nouns can be included in the notional definition of noun providing a noun is considered not as 'the name of a thing really subsisting by itself, but a thing considered as subsisting by itself', but concludes:

I must confess that when I speak of a young girl's beauty or an old man's wisdom I do not think of these qualities as 'things' or 'real objects': these are to me only other ways of expressing the thought that she is beautiful and he is wise (p. 134).

He proposes that

in such substantives the adjectival element enters as a predicative.

He calls them predicative-substantives. The ultimate development of this view is to be found in Bach (1968), that not only abstract nouns but all nouns derive from predicates in underlying propositions and form part of a larger class of predicate words (contentives) which includes verbs and adjectives.
Lyons notes that Plato's definition of 'nouns' and 'verbs' was made on logical grounds: i.e. as constituents of a proposition (1968:11). Nouns were terms 'that could function in sentences as the subject of a predication ... the thing about which something is said'. In very similar vein, from an English traditional grammarian, we find:

You may know a word to be a substantive when you can make it the subject of discourse; as I speak of virtue, of the sun, of a man.

(Ussher, 1785:5)

One cannot, in English, 'make the subject of discourse' - in this sense - 'intelligent' or 'depart' or 'there are lions in Africa'; but one may speak of 'intelligence', 'departure' and 'the fact that there are lions/the existence of lions in Africa'. The necessity of speaking not only of persons and concrete objects but also of events and states and propositions accounts for the facts of nominalisation; while the facts of nominalisation point to one fundamental characteristic of noun-ness: that noun-ness is the standard lexical packaging for any entity, of any order, to whatever degree 'substantial' or 'subsisting in itself', to be spoken of. Noun-ness is thus a generally necessary condition for reference. It is, however, generally not a sufficient one.

2.2 Classes of noun.

In English, it is through noun phrases that speakers refer, not through bare nouns. In noun phrases, nouns are typically found in construction with determiners and modifiers (Section 3). The
semantics of noun classes is closely involved in the grammar of noun phrases, and thus, indirectly, in the pragmatics of reference.

Quirk et al. (1972:129) present the following classification:

```
common
  count concrete (bun, toy)
  abstract (difficulty, worry)

mass
  concrete (jar, butter)
  abstract (music, homework)
```

All modern traditional grammars make use of, even where they do not explicitly present, similar classifications, mainly in connection with discussions of 'the article' and 'number'. Transformational accounts employ similar or identical labels as well as 'human', 'animate' etc. as lexical features which form the basis of their analysis of selection restrictions.

2.2.1 Common nouns and proper nouns.

We call the names of single ideas proper names, as the name of Plato, which agrees to one particular philosopher, so London to one city; and those names which signify common ideas general or appellative names, as the word man, which agrees with all mankind.

(Gildon and Brightland, 1711:75fn)

Common nouns, as 'signs of general ideas' have an inherent tendency to the generic; i.e. used unmodified by any determiner their referents will normally be understood (at least in a language with an article system) as generic. Proper names as 'signs of particulars' have the opposite tendency - to the specific.
Both Sweet and Jespersen point out that the two types are not absolutely different in the matter of the number of individuals to whom or which they may apply. (Are there more thatchers in England than Thatchers?) Further, both argue that it is not the absence of meaning that distinguishes one type from the other.

Proper names have more meaning than common words through being more highly specialised (Sweet, 1892:59).

But Jespersen points out that it is only in use - when reference is secured - that, as he puts it, 'names connote many attributes' (Jespersen, 1924:66). Names in a lexicon are strictly meaningless.

It is in fact primarily as a difference in use - of 'the way in which names are actually employed by speakers and understood by hearers' (ibid.) - that Jespersen sees the distinction between the two types. This conclusion seems reasonable in view of the fact that their respective tendencies can be reversed in use by determiner modification: common nouns with determiners acquiring the capability of functioning like names, proper nouns with determiners acquiring the capability of functioning like descriptions (or, as Allan (1980) puts it, echoing the 18th century usage, 'appellatives').

It is sometimes said that proper names are 'definite'. If so, this would constitute a grammatical difference between the class of proper names and that of common names. However, it is more usual and seems preferable to regard definiteness as a feature of NPs rather than of nouns, pronouns etc. We may say that any NP of which a proper name is sole constituent is definite; any NP of
which a common noun is sole constituent is indefinite. This grammatical difference reflects the opposite referential tendencies of the two types. I shall return to it in my discussion of NPs.

2.2.2 Count nouns and mass nouns.

A similar account may be given of the distinction between count nouns and mass nouns. Traditionally, these terms have been used to distinguish those nouns which denote things 'possessing a certain shape and precise limits' (Jespersen, 1935:206) and which can therefore be counted, and those which do not.

This 'notional' distinction - as between 'individuated' and 'non-individuated' referents - is marked syntactically (in restrictions of co-occurrence with certain determiners and plural number) not overtly in the form of the noun. It has been invariably noticed that some nouns (such as lamb, cake) are both count and mass; and that others which are normally mass may be used as if (or 'reclassified as' (Quirk et al., 1972)) count, normally with the effect that the referent is understood as a type - or more precisely as a sub-species of the species which the noun as a mass noun denotes (bread → a bread = type of bread). However, as Allan (1980) points out, there is no common noun that cannot be used as a non-count, i.e. in the singular and without article, and most nouns can be used either countably or non-countably. He concludes that, though nouns can be shown to have 'countability preferences', the binary opposition + count is a characteristic not of nouns but of NPs. He also concludes that

all the evidence points to nouns being basically uncountable....
If this is so then common nouns are not only in their potential reference inherently generic but also inherently unindividuated, a view which gains support from Hewson's (1972:106) characterisation of the effect of the zero article on the singular common noun:

the significate represents a formless, non-numerical continuant - there is no view of an exterior limit.

2.2.3 Abstract nouns and concrete nouns.

Abstract nouns are like mass nouns in denoting entities not 'possessing a certain shape and precise limits', unlike them in that the entities denoted are not concrete. They are lexically and transformationally related to the verbs or adjectives of which they are nominalisations. This latter aspect will be touched on at a later point. Their particular interest, as Jespersen points out, is their use; especially

the power they afford of avoiding many clumsy expressions, because subordinate clauses would otherwise be necessary to render the same idea,

(1929:136)

a power which is fully exploited in what has sometimes been described (Jespersen, op.cit; Halliday, 1967) as a 'nominal style'.

3 Nominals: form and meaning

3.1 Noun and nominal

Traditional grammars of the early period had little or nothing to say about phrases. Sentences were made up of words. Subjects of
sentences were nouns. The nearest approach to the notion of phrase is the recognition that

the subject of every sentence is either one single substantive or a series of words considered as one substantive
(Ward, 1765:269).

In early modern traditional grammars (e.g. those of Sweet, Jespersen, Poutsma, Kruisinga), a phrase - or more commonly 'group' - was any kind of grammatical unit consisting of more than one word (and often held to be 'equivalent' to one word) but not of itself constituting a sentence. Such grammars have sections on subjects, objects, etc., and sections on articles, modifiers, etc., but no systematic treatment of 'noun phrases'. Noun phrases (or nominal groups) became recognised objects of linguistic description when linguistic theory developed some or other means for their definition. Thus systemic grammar provides the necessary means in terms of rank and structure; tagmemics in terms of form and function; TG in terms of constituency. Fundamental to all these formulations was the realisation that what makes a noun phrase a phrase is not its size (more than one word in contrast with the single word noun) but its internal structure (its grammatical form) and its external relations (its grammatical function). Closely connected with both these types of considerations, but more especially the first, is the fundamental difference between noun and noun phrase in terms of their capacity for reference. This is expressed by Lyons (1977:425) in the following way:

As far as the distinction between noun and nominals is concerned, whereas nouns have denotation, nominals (i.e. noun phrases,
as they are usually called in current versions of generative grammar) have, or may have, reference: the denotation of a noun like 'man' being quite different from the utterance bound reference of a nominal like 'that man', 'he' or 'John'.

Lyons' examples illustrate three traditionally recognised types of nominal: the common-noun phrase, the pronoun and the proper noun. There is a fourth: the nominal clause. In the present section I shall adopt an internal perspective on nominals i.e. one in which the focus will be on the function of their constituents. I shall concentrate my discussion on the common-noun type, but shall note also some significant features of the others.

3.2 Common-noun phrases

Within the common-noun phrase (henceforth cNP) we may usefully make two sets of distinctions:

(i) we may distinguish constituents which are members of open classes of lexemes (or expressions) from constituents which are members of closed classes of grammatical morphemes;

(ii) we may distinguish constituents whose characteristic semantic function is to describe and delimit the class of entity denoted from constituents whose semantic function is to indicate the individuality, quantity, identity, etc. of the entity referred to. The latter entity is what is actually spoken about; and it is a subset of the former.

PROPOSITION N1: ON NOMINAL CONSTITUENTS

The denoting constituents of a cNP are its head and its modifiers, and these consist typically of open-class lexemes; the reference-
enabling constituents of a dNP are its determiners, and these consist typically of closed-class grammatical morphemes. Two points concerning this Proposition call for immediate comment. First, certain non-lexical categories, especially number and the relational category marked by of and genitive s, are not obviously specialised either for the determinative or for the denotative function of nominals. (But I will suggest below that there are good grounds for treating number as a kind of bound determiner.) Second, the distinction between denotation and reference is crucial. This distinction is discussed at length in Lyons (1977). I follow Lyons in recognising that not only lexemes but also expressions may have denotation; also in recognising that in definite descriptive NPs it is the 'predicative' part of the NP - '(be) a man drinking a martini' in the NP 'a man drinking a martini' - which has denotation, not the nominal expression as a whole. I shall diverge from Lyons' account, however, in using the term denotation not only for the context-independent relationship

that holds between a lexeme and persons, things, places, properties, processes and activities external to the language system

but also for the relationship between lexemes (or expressions) and things etc. where context does enter as a factor. This is not to confuse denotation with reference, which is strictly understood as an utterance-bound intention of a speaker to pick out some subset of tokens of a denoted type. But it is to recognise that the denotational range of a given expression may include a variety of inter-related and overlapping types of entity only one of which,
in a given context, may be that from which the speaker picks out the subset of tokens to which he intends to refer. In contrast with denotation, sense - the meaning that a lexeme has by virtue of its relations of similarity and difference with other lexemes in the same lexical field - is, in accordance with the position outlined in chapter 3, constant in all contexts and all uses. For example,

3a. John's family has lived in this village for hundreds of years.
3b. A family of six live in that cottage.
3c. The couple in the next flat have no family: they say they can't afford one.

In each case the underlined constituent denotes the class of entity intended by the speaker. We may speculate that the single common (or central) meaning - i.e. 'sense' - of family is something like 'group related by procreative ties'. The context indicates that the group denoted in (3a) extends over generations; in (3b) consists of parents and offspring (or other close relatives) to a - here the modification - total of six; in (3c) consists of offspring. In each case the determiner gives the intended subset of the denoted set: of the type 'family': John's; of the type 'family of six': a single unspecified one; of the type 'family': none.

The part of a cNP which is modified is its head. The part of a cNP which is determined is the head plus any modification. According to this view, in the NPs

4a. the second-hand linguistics books in that shop
5a. any intelligent student who wants to do well
the immediate constituents are

4b. (the) (second hand linguistics books in that shop)
5b. (any) (intelligent student who wants to do well).

Such an analysis is not universally accepted by grammarians and presents difficulties for some transformational accounts. However, it is intuitively appealing and has advantages in any account of NP structure which is motivated by a desire to explicate the connection between grammar and reference. 11

3.2.1 The denotative function

Heads and modifiers give the denotation of a noun phrase.

Syntactically, the head of a syntagm is defined in terms of endocentricity and dependency. Neither of these criteria makes it particularly easy to identify the head of a noun phrase. 12 While recognising the syntactic importance of headedness, it suits my present purpose to make semantic considerations the basis for identifying the head of a noun phrase:

PROPOSITION N2: ON NOMINAL HEADS

The head of a cNP is the noun (or compound noun, or substantivised adjective) which denotes the general class of entity which it is the function of any modifier to restrict in some way.

The classification of a head noun (as proper/common, mass/count, abstract/concrete) restricts the range of normally available determiners and influences (though it never absolutely constrains) the referential interpretation (as generic, individuated, etc.) that
will be favoured when a particular NP is used in some particular context. 13

Modifiers function to restrict the general class of entity denoted by the NP head. This restriction may be simple:

\[
\begin{align*}
M & \quad H \\
6 & \quad (\text{agricultural}) \quad (\text{land}) \\
H & \quad M \\
7 & \quad (\text{land}) \quad (\text{suitable for mixed farming})
\end{align*}
\]

compound:

\[
\begin{align*}
M & \quad M & \quad H \\
8 & \quad (\text{fertile but unexploited}) \quad (\text{land}) \\
M & \quad H & \quad M \\
9 & \quad (\text{fertile}) \quad (\text{land}) \quad (\text{suitable for mixed farming})
\end{align*}
\]

or complex:

\[
\begin{align*}
M & \quad M & \quad H \\
10 & \quad (\text{exhausted}) \quad (\text{(agricultural) \quad (land)}) \\
M & \quad H & \quad M \\
11 & \quad ((\text{agricultural}) \quad (\text{land})) \quad (\text{exhausted by over-use})
\end{align*}
\]

Modifiers may themselves contain nominal elements with their own determination (and with a separate - embedded - reference):

12 land of our fathers

13 land lost in the war.

In these cases the entity defined by the head ('land') is given a more specific restriction than is the case in:

12a ancestral land

13a land lost in a war

13b land lost in war,

but we shall allow the concept of denotation to include all forms of restriction on class of entity, not just obviously generic restriction.
However, not all items which we might at first sight take to be modifiers have a restricting function. These are the constituents of NPs which are 'non-restrictive', and which therefore do not assist in identifying what type of entity includes the particular subset of tokens which the speaker intends to make reference to. Whereas restrictive elements 'give a necessary determination to the antecedent', non-restrictives 'might be discarded without serious injury to the precise understanding of the sentence as a whole' (Jespersen, 1927:82). Huddleston (1971:216) gives three reasons for not regarding non-restrictive relative clauses as constituents of the cNP in which the antecedent of the relative pronoun is found:

(a) phonologically the relative clause reads like some kind of interpolation;
(b) the antecedent of a non-restrictive relative clause may be a sentence;
(c) the single constituent analysis is strongly counter-intuitive in the case of what Jespersen (1927:82) calls continuative relatives.

To this list one might add the obvious similarity of many non-restrictive relative clauses to 'supplementive' adverbial clauses and to co-ordination. 14

Huddleston concludes:

It seems best then - in spite of the fact that non-restrictives tend to immediately follow their antecedents - to analyse them as immediate constituents of sentences rather than of NPs (p.217).

With this conclusion I concur. From the point of view of referential analysis it has one very strong attraction: that the cNP without its
non-restrictive relative clause is, from a lexico-grammatical point
of view, referentially complete: it may be analysed as a unit; the
non-restrictive relative clause may then be treated separately, as
having a distinct and independent communicative function.\(^{15}\)

There is, however, a problem. As Jespersen (ibid.) remarks:

The distinction between restrictive relative clauses and non-restrictive relative clauses
is the same as that found with other adjuncts: 'beautiful' is restrictive in 'a beautiful
view', but not in Browning's 'Beautiful Evelyn Hopè is dead'.....

It has been argued (e.g. by Lucas, 1978) that since there is
no obvious way in which pre-Head non-restrictive adjuncts can be
detached from their NPs then there is no alternative but to regard,
on the grounds of consistency, post-head non-restrictive adjuncts as
NP constituents as well. However, this is to confuse functional
with formal criteria. We may accept that non-restrictive pre-head
adjuncts function like non-restrictive relative clauses in giving
additional information about the object referred to without narrowing
the denotation of the NP head. We may also accept, without inconsis-
tency, that the pre-head non-restrictive adjunct achieves this effect
while syntactically part of the NP, whereas the non-restrictive
relative clause achieves the same effect while syntactically not part
of, but nevertheless loosely connected to, the NP in question.\(^{16}\)

Some of the arguments used to justify exclusion of non-restrictive
relative clauses from cNP constituency apply also to noun
complementation (close and loose appositions). Examples of close
apposition are:

14a. the University of Dar-es-Salaam

15a. the rumour that war had broken out
and of loose apposition:

14b. the university, a fairly recent establishment, ...

15b. the rumour, that war had broken out, ...

Where the apposition is loose, the detachment of the second phrase from the first may be marked phonologically by a new intonation unit; where it is close there is normally a single contour. Where the apposition is loose, reference is secured by (context plus) the first element alone; where it is close, reference is secured only by (context plus) both elements in conjunction. 17 I shall therefore treat non-restrictive appositives as extra-NP constituents. (I shall return to them, along with non-restrictive relative clauses, in section 4 of this chapter.)

We have reached this point:

PROPOSITION N3: ON MODIFIERS

The function of modifiers is to delimit the general class of entity denoted by the NP head. Not all nominal adjuncts are modifiers. Non-restrictive pre-head adjuncts (which are part of the NP) and non-restrictive post-head adjuncts (which are not part of the NP) do not have a delimiting function and, if they can be said to 'modify' anything at all, it is not the head of the NP but the NP taken as a whole.

The restrictive/non-restrictive distinction is thus crucial in separating modifiers from other adnominal adjuncts. It is a distinction marked by rather insecure formal criteria but the semantic distinction is easily stateable, if not always easily applicable in particular cases. 18 Restrictive adjuncts, i.e. modifiers, function,
according to Proposition N3, to restrict the class of objects to some subset of which a speaker intends to make reference. Non-restrictive adjuncts, by contrast, function to ascribe to the intended subset some properties or qualities. They add detail, give background information, express attitudes, imply explanations (often, thereby, taking on a 'semi-adverbial' function within the clause). Their function in relation to the NP of which they are adjuncts is thus similar to that of the complement part of nominal predicate constructions in relation to their subject: both are predicative, i.e. they are the grammatical means whereby attributes, properties, etc., are ascribed to some independently identifiable referent.

3.2.2 The determinative function

We have seen so far that, according to the semantically oriented position on noun phrases that I am attempting to construct, the function of a dNP head is to denote, and the function of its modifiers is to restrict, the class of entity - henceforth in this chapter 'D' for 'what is denoted' - to some subset of which - henceforth 'R' for 'what is referred to' - it is the intention of the speaker to make reference. The function of determiners (which, with the exception of non-restrictive pre-head adjuncts, are all the remaining constituents of any dNP) is, in various ways, to contribute to the identification of this subset.

In accordance with his notional theory, Lyons (1977:454) defines the central class of determiners as
any element whose function it is to enter into the structure of referring expressions and to determine their reference as definite rather than indefinite.

By the additional criterion of substitutability,

```
anything that is substitutable for a determiner (within a noun phrase and without changing the syntactic properties of the noun phrase) is also a determiner.
```

These criteria bring within the class of determiners such traditionally recognised categories as articles, demonstratives, quantifiers, and cardinal and ordinal numerals. They exclude the category number but, as I suggested earlier, there are good grounds for including number in any analysis of the determinative function of nominals.

These are:

(i) choice in number is partly independent of choices in the system of free determiners; nevertheless

(ii) restrictions on number that derive from the class of the head noun are clearly related to restrictions on determiner choice deriving from the same source; and

(iii) number interacts with choice of determiner to constrain the referential interpretation of cNPs, e.g. as generic, specific;

(iv) the choice of plural gives a necessarily 'individuated' meaning to a cNP in a way which is comparable to that of certain free determiners, e.g. a, each, every;

(v) the choice between non-determined singular book and non-determined plural books does not affect the noun's denotation (though it is arguable that the singular is more suggestive of the intension of the word - i.e. 'bookness' - and the plural its extension - 'the class of all books' (cf. Lyons, 1977:207ff).
The most notable feature that distinguishes PLURAL from the other determiners is that it is a bound morpheme tied to the head of a cNP, not a free morpheme preceding it. This morpho-syntactic difference does not in itself seem to carry any semantic significance. As Quine (1960:90) puts it:

The 's' of 'apples' is to be reckoned thus merely as an outlying particle comparable to the 'an' of 'an apple'.

I shall now look at the class of English determiners in a certain amount of detail – sufficient to the discourse analysis needs which I have in view.

3.2.2.1 Determiner functions: a classification

The overall function of determiners is to contribute bits of meaning to a cNP in such a way that the utterance of the NP, taken in context, will achieve the referential intention of the speaker. According to the nature of the contribution that they make to this end, determiners may be entered into a functional classification. It may be that there is a universal set of determiner functions from which languages select. This is not my present proposal. My proposal is that there is a definable set of determiner functions which are realised in the grammar of English. I assume that there is a causal connection between the functions that groups of determiners fulfil and the grammatical meanings that particular determiners have. However, I have not attempted a thorough semantic analysis. In a later section I look at particular determiner meanings, but briefly and selectively.
PROPOSITION N4: ON CATEGORIES OF DETERMINER FUNCTION

We may usefully recognise nine categories of determiner functions realised in the grammar of English. They are grouped as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOUNDING</td>
<td>'defining functions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUATING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFINITISING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANTIFYING</td>
<td>'enumerating functions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDERING</td>
<td>'itemising functions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPARING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE-SELECTING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5.1 Determiner functions

Determiners realising the 'defining' functions indicate:
- whether R is to be taken as having, in however vague a manner, quantitative or spatio-temporal limits; for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOUNDING</th>
<th>NON-BOUNDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a paper</td>
<td>paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some papers</td>
<td>papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>some paper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this paper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- whether R is to be taken as 'in mass' or as consisting of one or more separate entities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUATING</th>
<th>NON-INDIVIDUATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a paper</td>
<td>paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>each paper</td>
<td>any paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>every paper</td>
<td>some paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>papers</td>
<td>the paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- whether R is to be taken as having a determinate 'location' (see PROP. N10.4 and discussion below) defined in relation to some independent point or points of reference:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFINITISING</th>
<th>NON-DEFINITISING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the paper</td>
<td>a paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>that paper</td>
<td>all paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>your papers</td>
<td>some paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John's paper</td>
<td>such paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DEFINING functions are so-called because the determiners which realise them give (varying degrees of) 'definition' to the referent sub-set: its external distinctness (clear bounds or not), its internal consistency (individuated or not), its locatedness (determinate or not).

Determiners realising the ENUMERATING functions indicate:
- whether the R set is empty and, if not, the size (exact or approximate) of its membership:
19. QUANTIFYING\textsuperscript{21} & NON-QUANTIFYING \\
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
a paper & the papers \\
more paper & all papers \\
many papers & either paper \\
three papers & neither paper \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

- whether \( R \) is to be taken as selected from \( D \) in one of the following ways: \( R \) contains all the members of \( D \); \( R \) contains none of the members of \( D \); \( R \) contains neither all nor none of the members of \( D \):

20. SELECTING & NON-SELECTING \\
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
all papers & many papers \\
certain papers & three papers \\
y any paper & little paper \\
each paper & a paper \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The difference between the 'enumerating' and the 'defining' functions is, very broadly, that the former relate to the membership of \( R \) - its size relative to \( D \) (SELECTING function) or to some independent set of norms (QUANTIFYING function) - while the latter relate to the condition and situation of \( R \) - the finiteness, separateness and determinateness of the membership of the set. This distinction roughly, but not exactly (see below), corresponds with those of Lyons (1977:452ff) - between 'quantifiers' and 'determiners' - and Thrane (1980:155) - between 'enumeration' and 'identification'. It is not exhaustive; in addition, there is the set of 'itemising' functions.
Determiners realising these functions indicate:

- that \( R \) is one of a series:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDERING</th>
<th>the first/next/last paper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- that \( R \) is additional to some related (implied or previously mentioned) \( R \):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADDING</th>
<th>other/more/further papers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- that \( R \) is (or is not) similar or identical to some other (implied or previously mentioned) \( R \):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPARING</th>
<th>such a paper/different papers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Finally, the PRE-SELECTING function does not operate independently of the other three main categories. Determiners realising a PRE-SELECTING function indicate:

- that \( R \) is to be taken as a subset of another \( R \) that is a subset of \( D \):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRE-SELECTING</th>
<th>NON-PRE-SELECTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one of the papers</td>
<td>a paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all (of) the papers</td>
<td>all papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>another of the papers</td>
<td>another paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which of the papers</td>
<td>which paper</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is perhaps necessary to point out at this stage that no mention has been made in the classification of the functions 'generic' and 'specific'. This is not because these categories are
irrelevant to reference (they are of course of fundamental importance in any analysis of referential functions) but because they are not determiner functions in English.

There are, it is true, certain significant regularities to be observed in the use of various determiners to express these functions in English (for example, such and any are normally used for non-specific reference, certain very often—but by no means invariably—for specific reference). But the meanings 'specific'/ 'non-specific', 'generic'/ 'non-generic' are not directly encoded in the grammar of the language.22

3.2.2.2 Determiner forms: correlation with functions

If it were possible to provide separate and non-overlapping lists of forms specialised for each of the determiner functions, this section would be redundant. Since this is not possible, we must find an approach which yields as orderly account—in accordance with our position-building criteria—as the indubitably complex facts will allow. Following Lyons (1977), Thrane (1980), we might attempt to classify on distributional grounds, name on notional grounds and then see what kind of correlation we can get between the formal and functional taxonomies. However, this procedure produces some rather perplexing results. For example, Thrane's class of 'quantifiers' (central notion: 'enumeration') includes each but not every; and his class of 'determiners' (central notion: 'identification') includes every but not each (p. 127). This is
certainly counter-intuitive. For present purposes we need a classification which carries conviction primarily when considered in a notional-functional perspective; we shall not disregard distributional facts, but shall assign them a secondary significance.

The form-function correlations are given in the table below. Each of the categories is then briefly discussed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Forms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOUNDING</strong></td>
<td>(any determiner except PLURAL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDIVIDUATING</strong></td>
<td>a, one PLURAL each, every, either, neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEFINITISING</strong></td>
<td>the this/these, that/those my, your, ..., John's, ... which, whose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>QUANTIFYING</strong></td>
<td>a, some, any, no one, two, three, ... many/much, more, most, several (a) few/little, fewer/less, fewest/least a lot of, a great deal of, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SELECTING</strong></td>
<td>some, certain, most any/either, no/neither all/both, every, each whichever, whatever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ORDERING</strong></td>
<td>first, second, third, ..., next, last, former, latter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ADDITION</strong></td>
<td>other, more, further</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMPARING</strong></td>
<td>such, same, different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRE-SELECTING</strong></td>
<td>(any quantifying determiner except a, no, unstressed some) (any selecting determiner except every, no) every one, none those, which, the + ordinal other, more, such</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5.2 Determiner functions and forms
PROPOSITION N5: ON DEFINITISERS

Definitisers are all those determiners which fulfil a DEFINITISING function. Notionally, they are all those items which have traditionally been recognised as conveying the meaning 'definite', or of making definite the cNP of which they are part. Distributionally, definitisers are all those items which can occur, and must obligatorily be chosen from, in the position immediately to the right of of in a cNP with a PRE-SELECTING determiner.

This definition gives a narrower class of items than that which Thrane (1980:127) labels 'determiners' - defined by him as those which can occur in place of x in (a) but not in (b):

25. (a) x noun
    (b) x of [these] noun

and which therefore includes a, every, no. It also gives a narrower class than Lyons' notionally defined 'determiner' (as contrasted with 'quantifier'):

modifiers which combine with nouns to produce expressions whose reference is thereby determined in terms of the identity of the referent (1977:455),

... in short, expressions that answer the question 'which?'. This definition includes, for example, some when used in a cNP intended to have specific reference:

If the phrase 'some students' is in implicit or explicit contrast with 'other students', 'some' is a determiner; if 'some students' is in contrast, whether implicit or explicit, with 'all (the) students', 'some' is a quantifier (ibid.).

(Lyons gives Russian as an example of a language in which the distinction is grammaticalised.)
In the classification which I have proposed, *some* is seen to be bi-functional (SELECTING/QUANTIFYING). But it is not in the same functional category as *\textit{the}.*

All definitisers are mutually exclusive. They also may not combine with selecters, with the quantifying articles (*a, some, any, no*) and with certain itemisers.

**PROPOSITION N6: ON SELECTERS**

Selecters are all those determiners which fulfill a SELECTING function. Notionally, they are 'which?-answering' but they do not convey the meaning 'definite': 'which' is to be understood more in the sense of 'what proportion of?' than in the sense 'which particular ones?'

Distributionally, they cannot occur post-of in a dNP with PRE-SELECTING determiner; but they can, with the exception of *no* and *every,* occur at \textit{x} in Thrane's environment (b), i.e. they can themselves be pre-selecting.

Selecters are mutually exclusive, except that there are two pairs whose members can appear in conjunction: 'any and all', 'each and every'.\textsuperscript{23} They do not combine with definitisers or with the quantifying articles. There are numerous restrictions on their combination with the other quantifiers and with itemisers.

**PROPOSITION N7: ON QUANTIFIERS**

Quantifiers are those determiners which fulfill a QUANTIFYING function. Notionally, they are 'how many?-answering'. Distributionally, they can, with the exception of *a, no* and unstressed *some,* occur at \textit{x} in
Thrane's environment (b).
The quantifiers are mutually exclusive. They combine, with various restrictions, with members of all other classes.

Taken together, the selecters and quantifiers are equivalent to Thrane's class of 'quantifiers', enlarged, however, by the addition of a, every, and no. The functional distinction between the two classes is, perhaps, the least clear in the taxonomy. One result is that there is a certain overlap in their membership. Some and most appear in both. Perhaps others should. Lyons (op. cit.) points out that all may answer both questions, 'which?' and 'how many?'

In the latter case, however, all seems to me to provide a substitute for the information actually requested: either the number of 'all' is known to the hearer, in which case to answer 'all' is equivalent to answering 'n'; or 'n' is not known to the speaker, and 'all' is the most informative he can be. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the distinction between a proportional quantity (SELECTING) and a norm-referenced quantity (QUANTIFYING) is a rather subtle one, even though communicatively significant in very many occasions of use.

PROPOSITION N8: ON ITEMISERS

Itemisers are all those determiners which fulfil one or other of the 'itemising' functions. In various ways, they express a 'relational' meaning. Typically an itemiser combines with another determiner, which (except in the case of such) it follows.

Itemisers are mutually exclusive within the subclasses and also between the subclasses, except that the ADDING itemisers may combine
with such. They combine, with various restrictions, with members of all other classes.

Their 'relational' meaning is apparent in the implied reference that their use indicates to some other R: 'the second' implies 'the first', 'the first' implies 'the following', 'some others' implies 'some', 'a different one' implies 'one'.

The definitisers, selecters, quantifiers and itemisers between them include, with the exception of PLURAL, all the determiner forms of English. There is only very limited overlap between them. DEFINITISING, SELECTING, QUANTIFYING and ITEMISING may thus conveniently be regarded as the defining functions of these sets of forms. The remaining functions may therefore be regarded, in relation to these forms, as secondary or accidental. The following proposition summarises the relation between the forms and the secondary functions.

PROPOSITION N9: ON DETERMINER FORMS AND THE SECONDARY FUNCTIONS

9.1 The BOUNDING function is realised by any determiner other than zero and PLURAL. (On the meaning of the zero determiner, see PROP. 10.1 below.)

9.2 The INDIVIDUATING function is realised by any determiner which unequivocally gives a cNP the meaning 'count' rather than 'mass'. (The INDIVIDUATING determiners thus include PLURAL, on the meaning of which see PROP. 10.2 below.)

9.3 The PRE-SELECTING function is realised by determiners of all the main classes, but only those which can stand alone as pronouns and only a very restricted subset of definitisers.
3.2.3 Some determiner meanings

In the classification which I have proposed, I have attempted to make some organised generalisations about the meanings of the determiners in each class. In this section I shall look a little more closely at the meanings of certain individual determiners, with the object of encapsulating these meanings in a series of 'propositions'.

(i) 'zero'

'Zero' is the absence of any determiner, not just of the articles. It follows from the proposal on the BOUNDING function that the meaning of 'zero' is 'unbounded'. This is not a new idea:

As both the articles imply that the speaker intends to use the appellative substantive to which they are prefixed with some degree of limitation: whenssoever such substantive is used in its most extensive signification it is usually applied without any article (Ward, 1765:103).

This idea is refined by Hewson (1972:76) as follows:

In English, the noun without article does not represent a mere idea, a total abstraction. It may represent a concrete reality, but a reality without clarifying exterior form ...

which Hewson illustrates with the example:

26. Letter was the only means of communication he had.

PROPOSITION N10.1: ON THE MEANING OF 'ZERO'

'unbounded', 'unlimited', 'without "clarifying exterior form"'
(ii) **PLURAL**

The meaning conveyed by the plural morpheme is generally assumed to be 'more than one'. This accounts for the difference in meaning between (25) and

27. Some letters arrived this morning

but does not throw much light on the difference between (26) and

28. Letters were the only means of communication he had.

Thrane (op. cit. p. 79) quotes Hjelmslev as suggesting that PLURAL conveys the notion 'discrete' (glossed by Thrane as 'clearly a collection of individuals regarded en bloc') in contrast with singular 'compact'. Since this characterisation accounts for the difference in meaning in both pairs of sentences (26/27 and 26/28), it is to be preferred, as more general, to 'more than one', which accounts only for the difference in meaning of the first pair. It also accounts neatly for pluralia tantum nouns such as scissors, glasses, whose component parts are perceived as discrete (or we might better say 'separated') though the entity referred to may be single. It is clearly compatible with our INDIVIDUATING determiner function.

PROPOSITION N10.2: ON THE MEANING OF PLURAL

'discrete', 'separated' (normally of a non-single entity).

(iii) **a**

Reference to traditional grammars of the modern period yields an impressive list of 'functions' and 'uses' of the indefinite article:

individuating, particularising, singling out, classifying, predicative, introductory, not yet
mentioned, specific, generic, all-representative, vague reference, 'any', absolute, distributive.

More recent writers have attempted to identify a single overall function of the indefinite article. They have seen this as an underlying 'source' in a generative grammar (one proposal being that this source is some existential sentence) or as some pragmatic purpose (one proposal being that this purpose is to indicate 'exclusive' reference, i.e. the implication that the entity referred to is not the only one in existence). Both proposed accounts are open to various objections. The dualist position on grammar and communication which I outlined in chapter 3 inclines one to be skeptical of any attempt to reduce the meaning of a morpheme to some all-inclusive communicative function; and reluctant to accept a multiplication of grammatical meanings as an alternative. In this case I think it is possible to discern a single fixed meaning of which is compatible with all its (non-indirect) uses:

PROPOSITION NO. 3: ON THE MEANING OF A
'single'.

There are two parts to this meaning: (i) 'individuated' (ii) 'one'. These correspond to the INDIVIDUATING and QUANTIFYING determiner functions in which a is used.

The diachronic relation between a and one is well established. Arguments have also been put forward for a synchronic relation, deriving a from a deep structure one. 27 To see a in this light is to see it as categorically different from (not in simple semantic contrast with) the. It is a quantifier, albeit of minimal force (except when stressed).
Hewson neatly sums up the various functions of *a* as follows: to refer to 'one and only one', 'one and any one', 'every one'. He claims that

in general, the indefinite article functions in any usage that requires a representation of a single entity, individual or generic (my emphasis) (p. 87).

(iv) **the**

Like *a*, **the** has acquired a long list of traditionally recognised referential functions:

- identifying, defining, definite, determinate, expressing what is familiar, known, specifying, particularising, generic, classifying, generalising, defining absolutely, unique, referring back, resumptive, recalling, deictic, situationally determined, referring forward, preparatory, introducing.

Since several of these come in apparently contradictory pairs - e.g. 'introducing' - 'recalling', 'particularising' - 'generalising' - it is easy to see the degree of difficulty involved in attempting to describe some predominant or general and all-embracing function.

Hawkins' (1974:238) solution is as follows:

- The always refers to the totality of objects in the relevant shared speaker-hearer set. When a singular count noun is used, this is simply because the totality in question amounts to no more than one object in this case. If it exceeds one, then the plural must be used.

Though this seems to me to be true so far as it goes, there is an obvious difficulty. This is that **the** is not the only item that has this effect: *all, each, both, either* and *every* do so too. So what is special about **the**?

The short answer is that **the** is definite and the other totality determiners are not. But then we need to know the meaning of definite, or, to put it in transformational terms, the source of
definiteness. According to the summary of the literature given in Stockwell et al. (1973:73), three main sources have been posited:

(1) anaphoric
(2) definite description with relative clause
(3) non-linguistically anaphoric.

As Stockwell, Schachter & Partee point out, (1) may be considered a special case of (3). This leads to the assumption of a very general 'deictic' meaning for the, i.e. such that

the definite article ... is to be understood as instructing, or inviting, the addressee to find the referent in the environment, without however directing his attention to any particular region of it (Lyons, 1977:656);

the definite article acts as a form of instruction to the hearer to locate the referent in the situation of utterance (Hawkins, 1974:162).

Thus, the 'definiteness' of meaning of a cNP with the as determiner is that the referent of the NP is to be understood as 'located' somewhere or other where the hearer can find it. The question is whether this notion applies only in 'situation of utterance' cases, or generally. An alternative view, which sees (1) and (3) as special cases of (2), is that

'the' is always a sign of a restrictive relative clause, present or deleted (Vendler, 1968:15).

Such an analysis has the merit of providing a consistent treatment of both specific and generic 'the + N' nominals: 'the bicycle' (specific referent intended) implying a deleted relative clause such as 'which I normally ride to work' and 'the bicycle' (generic referent
intended) implying some underlying NP in which the nominal head gives the genus and the relative clause gives the species, as 'the vehicle which is a bicycle'. But there is a good case also for seeing (2) as a special case of (3). In (1) the location of the referent is given anaphorically in (3) by the extra-linguistic context; in (2) by the restrictive relative clause, which defines it either specifically, i.e. in relation to speaker-hearer-shared knowledge of certain spatio-temporally located particulars, or generically, i.e. in relation to some/other category or categories (explicit or implicit) in some system or taxonomy. This line of argument suggests, therefore, a single meaning for the:

PROPOSITION N10.4: ON THE MEANING OF THE

'located'

The location of the referent is given either by the extra-linguistic context or by previous mention in the discourse or by the descriptive content of a restrictive relative clause.

All other definitisers have this basic meaning 'located'; e.g. this means 'located' + 'here', that means 'located' + 'there', my means 'located' + 'I'. Whatever is not determined by a definitiser is not 'located' in this sense.

(v) some

Some is both selector and quantifier. In both functions it conveys a characteristic vagueness, which may be expressed as:
PROPOSITION N10.5: ON THE MEANING OF SOME
'more than none and less than all'

Some is even vaguer than a, but not quite so vague as any. It does not express the meaning 'individuated' and is therefore applicable both to masses and to sets of discrete entities, being selected for non-count nouns where a is selected for count; and it does not express the meaning 'one' and is thus selected for plural noun heads where a is selected for singular. Like a it may be stressed so as to put it in contrast with quantifiers expressing greater quantity: 'a man' (not several); 'some men' (not many). As a selector it is in particular contrast with all and no. It stands in contrast with the (with which it has in common, unlike a, the ability to join with any common noun, whether singular or plural, count or non-count) because of its lack of definiteness: it signals no particular location for the entity referred to.

(vi) any

Any parallels some in being both quantifier and selector. As a quantifier it is normally unstressed and is chosen in preference to some in various modal environments, notably interrogative, negative and conditional. As a selector it is somewhat stressed and its choice in preference to other selectors also seems to be dependent on modal factors, especially conditionality. For Vendler (1967) 'an any proposition is an open hypothetical, a lawlike assertion,' and he notes:

29. Any doctor will tell you ....
30. *I asked any doctor ...
the latter example contradicting that element of the meaning of any which he calls 'freedom of choice', or which one might simply call the requirement of maximum vagueness, the modal aspect. Any is to some as maybe is to is. Hence:

PROPOSITION N10.6: ON THE MEANING OF ANY

'modal (vague, hypothetical, negative, questionable) some'

(vii) all, each and every

What may be called the selectors of totality present particular problems of description, and I shall not attempt to include them in this series of simplifying Propositions on determiner meanings; but shall merely note Vendler's comment (op. cit.) that they are not stylistic variants of the same logical structure;

and that, for example, the singular concord required by each and every in contrast with the plural demanded by all is not just a caprice of grammar but indicative of a difference in the very meaning of the words.

The position outlined in Part I included the idea that the meaning of a grammatical item, if it can be stated correctly, will necessarily be consistent with all the communicative uses to which the item may be put; except in cases of indirectness, where the conflict between the 'known' meaning and the apparent intention will yield some particular stylistic or attitudinal or other communicative effect. Only the process of analysing performance, to which we shall come in Part III, can confirm or disconfirm the validity of the mean-
ings proposed and can show whether, by the criteria of efficacy and utility, such Propositions succeed.

3.3 Proper-noun phrases and pro-noun phrases

The essential feature of the account I have given of cNPs is that they express two types of meaning: denotative meaning, which gives the class of entity referred to; and determinative meaning, which 'defines', 'enumerates' and 'itemises' the subset (of the denoted class) to which the speaker intends to make reference.

We may now conveniently characterise pronoun NPs (henceforth proNP) as NPs typically having determination without denotation; and proper-noun NPs (henceforth pNP) as NPs typically having denotation without determination.

3.3.1 pNP

It is somewhat unusual to regard proper nouns as having denotation (since the commonly accepted view is that they have no meaning at all). But if we may say that apple denotes any fruit to which we give the name apple, then we may reasonably say that William denotes any person to whom we give the name William. What proper nouns lack - it is widely but not universally agreed - is sense.31

The utterance, in some suitable context, of a pNP consisting just of a proper noun is normally sufficient to achieve an intended uptake of reference to some single, specific, known individual. From this follows the fact that pNPs are normally regarded as inherently
definite. It also follows that any additional constituent of a pNP will be a non-restrictive adjunct and not a modifier. An expression such as *Sweet William* is typically used to refer to William, while reminding the hearer of William's sweetness.

The various usages in which we find proper nouns accompanied by determiners and/or modifiers:

31a. The Smiths are coming to dinner.
32a. The Smiths from across the road?
33a. A Mr Smith is on the phone.
34a. He's a typical William.

may conveniently (though it is not the only solution) be treated as cNPs involving some deleted element (which if not deleted would be head):

31b. The family called Smith
33b. A man called Mr Smith
34b. A person typical of people called William.32

3.3.2 PronP

Pronouns, as Lyons (1979) points out, would better be called, in almost all instances, pro-nominals. PronP convey little denotative meaning (none if we exclude sex and human-ness) but convey the full range of determinative meaning: INDIVIDUATING (e.g. *they*), QUANTIFYING (*many*), SELECTING (*everyone*), DEFINITISING (*he* and all other personal pronouns and their possessives), ORDERING (*the first*), ADDING (*others*), COMPARING (*the same*) and PRE-SELECTING (*some of us*). We may reasonably assume (as do most transformational accounts) an identical 'source' for pronouns and determiners.
Nominalisation is the set of syntactic processes by means of which a sentence may be given nominal function. Vendler (1968:35) proposes that nominalisations may be distinguished from one another in a general way according to how close the derived nominal is in form to the source sentence. He compares:

35. that John has arrived,
which he calls 'the least distorted nominal' with

36. life in China,
the 'matrix' sentence of which 'clearly underwent some radical changes'.

What is nominal about the first of these is merely that it can be a subject, object etc., i.e. it describes a fact which can be referred to and commented on within the framework of the clause. What is nominal about the second is also that it has a noun as its head, with a restrictive post-modifier, and is open to the full range of determinative functions, e.g.:

37. John's life in China
38. some of his life in China.

Nominals of this type thus represent a fusion of subject-predicate meaning (the underlying sentence) with denotative-determinative meaning, a fact which accounts for the particular complexity of their syntax.33

Certain nominalisations have been observed to have certain special semantic implications: e.g. to + infinitive nominal expresses 'putative' meaning; that clauses may be 'factual' as well as putative
or 'hypothetical'; there is a 'factive'/'manner' ambiguity in a nominal like

39. John's death,

which, according to the intuitions of some, parallels the difference in meaning between

40a. John's riding of the bicycle,

i.e. 'his manner of riding', and

40b. John's riding the bicycle,

i.e. 'the fact that he rode it'. The presence of for with certain predicates indicates an 'emotive' meaning:

41. It is important for John to ride his bicycle.34

I shall not develop these topics here, but shall merely note that there is enough in the linguistic literature to suggest the importance, for any comprehensive referential analysis of nominals in discourse, of being alert to the specialised semantics of nominalisation.

4. Nominals: external relationships

Thrane (1980:61ff) describes NP as a category capable of performing certain grammatical functions (subject, object, etc), certain semantic functions (agentive, instrumental, etc), and certain rhetorical functions (topic, theme, etc) in addition to certain referential functions. Though there are some noticeable connections between the referential functions and the semantic and rhetorical functions these are weak in comparison with the significance for reference of the grammatical functions.
Thrane limits his account of referential functions to NPs functioning as subjects, objects and complements of prepositions. He thus sidesteps the fundamental problem of the referential status of NPs which are not used to fulfill these particular grammatical functions. By contrast, I start from the assumption that all nominals in discourse are used to fulfill some referential function, or, to put it slightly differently, that there is an overall nominal function that all nominals are used to fulfill and that this function is, broadly speaking, referential.

By 'nominal' I mean any clause constituent which either is a common-noun phrase or could be substituted by a common-noun phrase without otherwise disturbing the syntax of the sentence. Such constituents, apart from functioning as subjects, objects and preposition complements, function as ascriptive, equative and existential complements (nuclear elements within their clauses) and also as 'adnominal' adjuncts (extra-nuclear or 'peripheral' elements linked syntactically and semantically to another nominal). I shall argue in the next chapter that there is a broad difference in referential function that correlates approximately with the division between subjects, objects, preposition complements and existential complements, on the one hand, and ascriptive and equative complements and adjuncts, on the other. Since it is the latter group whose referential status is more obviously in doubt, I shall now briefly consider them from a grammatical, and especially a semantic, point of view. Then, because of the importance of 'existence' for reference, I shall look at the grammar of existential sentences.
4.1 Ascriptive complements and adjuncts

In a sentence like

42. Mary is a typist

it has been suggested that the expression 'a typist' is not part of the predicate but in fact is the predicate, is what is predicated of Mary. The verb BE is held to be a semantically empty carrier of tense and aspect (and not generated by the IS rules in a TG account). Furthermore, it is observed that 'a typist' does not identify any separate entity but defines an attribute which is said to be an attribute of Mary. It is thus similar in function to a predicative adjective, as in

43. Mary is cheerful.

Lyons calls sentences of this sort 'ascriptive'. He argues that an expression such as 'a typist' in the example given is neither referential nor even nominal, i.e. is not an NP, but is merely a noun which is necessarily (in English) preceded by the definite article:

The occurrence of the indefinite article form a is a purely automatic consequence of the fact that the subject NP is singular and (the noun) is a countable noun (1977:472).

This account does not seem to me to be entirely persuasive. First, in language (if not in logic) the difference between reference and predication seems not to be absolutely clear cut, and I am inclined to see an element of referentiality in ascriptive complements as others have seen an element of predication in referring noun phrases. Second, it is clearly the case that ascriptive complement expressions may consist not just of a singular count noun with its 'obligatory' indefinite article but may display the full complexity
of structure, and the full range of choices at each point in structure, that we find in NPs in subject and object functions. In, for example,

44. Mary was one of the fastest typists in the office

what shall we call the ascriptive complement if not an NP?

In terms of referential function (or the lack of it) there is, furthermore, no fundamental difference between predicate NP and predicate adjective (or, within the predicate NP, between adjective and noun). Both may denote attributes which are equally descriptive of the referent of the subject NP. There are good grounds, both traditional and transformational, for treating all such elements as nominal. What sets them apart from other nominals (subject, object, etc.) is their additional adnominal status.

Ascriptive adnominal complements may be converted into ascriptive adnominal adjuncts in three main ways:

(i) by apposition:

45. Mary is {a typist always cheerful} and is happy in her work.

45a. Mary, {a typist always cheerful}, is happy in her work.

45b. {A typist Always cheerful}, Mary is happy in her work.

(ii) by relativisation:

45c. Mary, who is {a typist always cheerful}, ...

(iii) by premodification:

45d. {Typist Mary Cheerful Mary} is happy in her work.
I shall not concern myself with the syntactic definition of these various types. What is relevant to my discussion is that in all their transformations the expressions in question retain their adnominal function; they are all non-restrictive; and the 'ascriptive' function is constant throughout. The differences are all rhetorical: what is presented later rather than sooner; what is presented as assumed rather than asserted; what is presented as a casual elaboration rather than as a matter for particular emphasis.

4.2 Equative complements and adjuncts.

The semantic distinction between equative and ascriptive structures is that the former are used, characteristically, to identify the referent of one expression with the referent of another and the latter to ascribe to the referent of the subject expression a certain property. (Lyons, 1977:472)

Equative predicates answer the question 'who?' (or 'which?'), ascriptive predicates answer the questions 'what?' or 'what ... like?'.

In some languages this distinction is morphologically marked. In English, (i) there are some restrictions on what nominal expressions may be equative complements, and (ii) subject and complement expressions in equative sentences are more readily reversible. I shall discuss the pragmatic effects of reversal in the next chapter, and indicate norms for determiner choice in chapter 7. For the present it is sufficient to note that, whereas proper names and personal pronouns are not normally found as ascriptive complements, adjectives and indefinite NPs are not normally found as equative complements.

The majority of nominal expressions, however, may be used both
ascriptively and equatively: interpretation is highly dependent on context (and it is arguable that the distinction is a pragmatic one and not, in English, a grammatical one at all).

Equative complements may be converted into equative adnominal adjuncts but not with such freedom of syntactic choice as in the case of ascriptives. The most usual device is apposition:

46. Mary is our typist
46a. Mary, our typist, ...
47. Our typist is Mary
47a. Our typist, Mary, ...
48. One of our typists is Mary
48a. One of our typists, Mary, ...

There is no 'preposed' equative apposition to correspond with the ascriptive type exemplified in (45b). Relativisation is less straightforward than is the case with ascriptives. Relativisation of (46)

46b. Mary, who is our typist, ...

has the effect of making an ascriptive rather than an equative interpretation more likely. Relativised versions of (47) and (48) produce sentences not easy to contextualise:

47b. ?Our typist, who is Mary, ...
48b. ??One of our typists, who is Mary, ...

However, relative clause equative adjuncts are quite natural in the case of deictic descriptions such as:

49. Our typist, who is that girl over there, ...

Pre-head does not seem to be a possible location for an equative adjunct. 42
The complement in pseudo-cleft sentences - which are closely comparable to equatives - may likewise become an adjunct both by apposition and relativisation:

50. What Mary wants is a really nice cup of tea
50a. What Mary wants - a really nice cup of tea -
50b. What Mary wants - which is a really nice cup of tea -.

As with ascriptives we may note that, in the transformation from complement to adjunct, the adnominal relationship, the non-restrictive relationship and - in most cases - the equative relationship remain constant. The difference is thematic - or rhetorical; a difference of presentation.

4.3 Existentials

The syntax of typical existential sentences in English is:

\[
\text{THERE} + \text{BE} + \text{INDEF-NP} + \text{LOCATIVE COMPLEMENT.}
\]

51. There / is / a suspicious looking man / at the door
52. There / are / two alternative solutions to be considered / at this point.

The principal uses of existential sentences are normally understood as being (i) to assert the existence of some entity and (ii) to introduce an entity into the discourse (Ziv, 1982a). As Ziv points out, much of the difficulty in discussion of existentials arises from disagreement on whether they should be defined morpho-syntactically (as above) or semantico-pragmatically (as here).

The logic of existential syntax has been the focus of considerable attention. According to Allan (1971)
the assertion of the existence of an object
is the assertion of a spatio-temporal
location for it.

Thus there (spatio) and BE (temporal) together function as a sort of
natural language existential operator. The locative complement
or complements give explicit content to these minimal forms. The
indefiniteness of the NP is accounted for by the absurdity of asserting
the existence of an entity presupposed by the to exist or of
introducing into the discourse an entity marked by the as already introduced (Ziv, op.cit.). Or we may say, in accordance with the
position on the definite article proposed above, that the is ruled
out in existentials by the awkwardness of simultaneously indicating
that an entity is 'located' for the hearer and informing the hearer
that the same entity 'is somewhere', has a location, exists - i.e.
making the entity 'located' for the hearer.

We find a number of variations on the basic existential syntax
noted above. Existentials (assuming a semantico-pragmatic rather
than a strict morpho-syntactic understanding of the term) occur
without there:

52. A suspicious looking man is at the door;

without BE:

53. There arrived at that moment a most welcome
newcomer;

and without both there and BE:

54. The porter had a taxi ready (Quirk et al.)

55. A man here wants to know if we sell pawpaws (Allan).

Of particular interest, because of the general expectation that the
existential complement should be indefinite, are sentences which are
morpho-syntactically existential in all respects except that the complement NP is definite. Various types of definite existentials have been recognised, and various explanations given:

(a) 'Underlying indefinite'

Jespersen (1949) notes examples like:

56. There came the cry of a man at the point of death, in which the definite article is obligatory, and also cases where 'the writer might nearly as well have written a as the':

57. There had begun to form in his mind the conviction that all was not quite well with his work.

He also notes the use of the in superlatives:

58. There followed the strangest silence.

Such cases are noted in Ziv (1982b), who observes that they have 'usually been reduced to semantic indefiniteness'. Underlying indefiniteness is also used to explain:

(b) 'List existentials'

It is argued that in cases like

59. Where can I get something to eat at this time of night? - Well, there's the Chinese take-away or that kebab place and there's a new fish-and-chip shop round the corner (my example)

assertion of existence is made of the list (which is therefore conceived of as indefinite) and not of the entities (definite or indefinite) comprising it (Ziv, 1982b).

However, such an explanation will not account for

(c) 'Non-list existentials', such as

60. Where can I get this cloth? - There's that cloth exactly on the first floor of Harrods (ibid.)
Ziv suspects a different (non-existential) communicative function for the comparable examples (from Hebrew) that he discusses. One might reasonably suggest that the function is to assert the availability, in the location referred to, of a token or tokens of the type described. One might then say that what is definite is the cNP describing the type and what is indefinite (or would be, if it were expressed) is the NP describing the tokens.

All these examples are clearly relevant to my own position on fixed meanings, in general, and the fixed meaning of the in particular; also to my position on the relation between fixed grammatical meanings and the occasional meanings which occur in communicative use. Are definiteness and indefiniteness matters of pragmatic interpretation? Or are they meanings which either are plainly signalled in the grammar of sentences or else not present at all? I have proposed that a cNP is definite in the presence of a definitiser (conveying the meaning 'located') and otherwise is indefinite. According to this position, the relevant cNPs in (56-58) are all definite and the meaning 'located' is expressed. What needs to be explained is how that meaning relates to the apparent communicative function of the nominals within their context. In (59) two of the cNPs are definite and one is indefinite, but the list itself is not indefinite, just because it is a list and is not a cNP. Nevertheless the list does either 'establish or recall' (Allan, op.cit.) - or rather the NPs in it are used to establish or recall - certain entities unknown or known to the hearer. The sentence is communicatively existential, i.e. is used to inform or remind the hearer of the existence of certain things, but, if an existential sentence is defined to be indefinite, grammatically not so.
Cases such as these strengthen the conviction – on which the present account of nominality and reference is based – that the analysis of communicative function is best undertaken, as far as possible, independently of considerations of grammatical form. The correlation of form and function – the description of 'rules of use' or 'applicative competence' – then becomes a separate, and more readily empirical, investigation.
Nominality is part of how form and meaning in language is organised. Reference is what nominals are organised to do. Reference is a class of speech acts. To understand it we must try to see what all the members of the class have in common, and we must try to see what separates them one from the other. Consider the following example:

Scene: Mr and Mrs Capp in pub

Flo: Mother looks good, doesn't she? The other day a woman told her she had the skin of a twenty-year-old.

Andy: (looking round at mother)
Really? Well, she'd better give it back - she's gettin' it all wrinkled.

The joke does not depend on a constructional ambiguity in the expression 'the skin of a twenty-year-old'. According to the position outlined in chapter 3, this has a single fixed grammatical meaning sufficiently abstract to make the expression appropriate as the realisation of more than one communicative function. The illocutionary act that Flo intends to perform is the act of referring to a type. The illocutionary act that Andy pretends to have understood her as intending to perform is the act of referring to a specific token of a type. Any analysis of referential acts in discourse calls for a taxonomy which describes and differentiates these two acts as well as all other referential acts that nominal expressions can be used to perform. No such taxonomy exists, at least none which satisfies the criteria
for an adequate applied linguistic position. It is therefore my
object in this chapter to propose one.

I have proceeded as follows. I have reviewed the literature.
Since this is vast, various, contentious and, in some areas, presents
difficulties for a non-specialist, my review (section 1) has been
necessarily selective. In the light of this review and of some
preliminary analysis of data of the sort which is presented in Part
III (see Appendix B) I have recognised three principal 'dimensions
of reference' (section 2). These have been made the basis of the
taxonomy of referential functions which I have then (section 3)
described in some detail.

1 Review

1.1 Sources

There is almost no applied linguistic literature on reference.
(Such as there is is reviewed in chapter 9.) There are occasional
discussions of reference in works on linguistic stylistics
but these tend to take for granted the validity and utility of
traditionally recognised categories such as 'definite' and 'known'.

The sociolinguistic interest in the topic has largely been restricted
to 'rules of address' relating to norms for the use of names and
titles and social and attitudinal implication of T/V alternation;
the ethnomethodologists have shown interest in the 'formulation' of
certain aspects of reference, for example 'membershhipping'.

There is a growing literature on the acquisition of reference within the
domain of developmental psycholinguistics, a literature to which both linguists and philosophers have directly contributed. But it is within theoretical linguistics and philosophy, on their own account, that the major sources for the study of reference are to be found.

In the case of linguistics, the relevance of reference - the propriety of including it within the linguistic domain - has been only recently recognised. Even a school such as the Firthian, which appreciated (as Bloomfieldian structuralism did not) the importance of developing a theory of meaning and techniques for dealing with meaning, had little to contribute on the subject of reference. Within Chomskyan theory, the central importance of meaning was accepted in principle from the beginning but did not attract serious attention until, via problems in the definition of grammaticality, the attempt to formalise rules for pronominalisation, and the semantic theory of Katz, it surfaced in Aspects. The Aspects model had, however, a 'limitation in scope' in that the grammar will describe the meanings of sentences in isolation from their use in any particular situation. One aspect of this limitation involves the distinction between meaning and reference (Huddleston, 1976:4).

Despite this limitation, the Aspects model included a feature which opened the way to a generative-linguistic interest in reference. This was the proposal for attaching an index to the head noun of any noun phrase. This device was introduced as a means, not for indicating reference, but for notating co-reference (Chomsky, 1971:191fn.), a notation which could be exploited in the operation of rules governing complementation, relativisation and pronominalisation.
The study of reference entered generative grammar through linguists—particularly those whose names have since been associated with the development of generative semantics—raising the question 'how and if such markers could be used in semantics' (Karttunen, 1968). The process of answering this question helped to clarify the distinction between the referential and the descriptive content of noun phrases, to focus attention on the difficult problem of what it is that gives an entity the status of a referent, and to show how some problems can be tackled by distinguishing indices as variables from indices as constants (Bach, 1968; McCawley, 1968; Karttunen, 1968). In the theory associated with the name of Montague (see Lyons, 1981, for a comprehensible account) an index is a pointer to a 'possible world', or set of co-ordinates which fully specifies all contextual information relevant to the determination of the truth value of sentences (and the distinction between sentence and utterance is thus in large part obliterated). Work in generative and Montague semantics, along with other attempts in recent years to bring reference, or some aspects of reference, within linguistic description (e.g. Thrane (1980)), appears to offer some remedy to

a really extraordinary state of affairs.
What seemed at first to be the essential aspect of meaning, the relation between language and the world, is to be ignored or given second place.
(Palmer, 1976:33)

This is, of course, not an accusation that could be made against philosophers, for whom the relation between language and the world has been a— or perhaps even the— major issue since the time of Plato. The study of acts of reference (as opposed, for example, to
speculation on the naturalness of names, the origin of general terms and the nature of universals) began with Mill, and, interwoven with such major related themes as truth and truth conditions, entailment and presupposition, existence, entities and properties, subject and predicate, intension and extension, opacity and the attributable use of expressions, propositions and illocutions, pragmatic assumptions and conditions for speech acts, has continued up to the present.

Rather than attempt a general review of this linguistic and philosophical literature on reference, I shall organise my discussion around three topics which appear to me to be fundamental to my present position-building task: referrers, referents, and referential acts.

1.2 Referrers

Consider (1) - (3):

1. The meaning of a word is what it stands for in the real world; what a word stands for is its meaning.

2. What (if anything) a word stands for in the world is not equivalent to the meaning of the word but is in virtue of its meaning.

3. What a word stands for in the world in virtue of its meaning alone cannot be any particular object but only a category (a class to which things belong, or a property which things have). To know what it is that a word (or more typically in English a word in construction with other words) refers to, it is necessary that someone should utter it, or them, and, at least partly in virtue of their meaning, intend to refer to something.
(1) briefly states what is usually called the referential theory of meaning, demolishing which is a task which normally occupies an early page or two of any good textbook on semantics. (It is of interest that such a weak theory should go on refusing to die, and thereby become a mere historical curiosity worthy at the most of a footnote. Its resilience is almost certainly due to the fact that most people go on thinking that words do stand for things.)

(2) accepts that words (at least some words) stand for things, but distinguishes between what they stand for and their meaning. The distinction which Ogden and Richards (1923) draw between 'thought' and 'referent', and that drawn by Lyons between 'sense' and 'denotation', are both examples of this view. However, where Ogden and Richards' 'thought' is to be taken as some kind of psychological response (either to an utterance or some non-linguistic event), Lyons' 'sense', as we saw earlier, is defined in terms of systematic lexical relationships internal to a particular language; and whereas the denotation of a lexeme or expression is known (in Lyons' account) independently of any contextual considerations, it is not clear whether Ogden and Richards' 'referent' is (cf. Lyons 1977:99):

- something referred to on a particular occasion;
- the totality of things that might be referred to by uttering the sign;
- some typical or ideal representative of this class.

(3) clarifies the distinction between reference in abstraction from utterance (i.e. denotation, as Lyons defines the term) and reference in utterance. The essential feature of reference-in-utterance...
is a speaker (or more generally, in Lyons' term, a 'locutionary agent') who, in his utterance of certain types of expression in a certain context and with a certain communicative intention 

invests the expression with reference by the act of referring.7 (Lyons: 1977:177)

We may call (3), in contrast with (1), a 'meaning-based theory of reference', for, though intention in context is a necessary pre-condition for reference in utterance, it is not sufficient: the appropriateness of the meaning of the expression used is also, generally, a necessary condition - 'sense', as Frege put it, being 'the mode of presentation of the object'.8 I shall have more to say on these and other conditions shortly.

The importance of the referrer, according to (3), is apparent in two ways: first, there is no reference without him, i.e. he is an essential factor in reference thus defined; second, knowing the referrer - his past experience, his present 'place' (physical and social), his personality, his present attitude - may be necessary for identifying the referent that he intends. There are both deictic and cognitive elements involved here, deixis being the 'pointing' and cognition the 'knowing' element in reference. The speaker himself is the origin or 'reference point' for deixis. He must therefore take account of where - from various points of view - he is if he is to select an expression which will, for a given hearer in a given context, pick out his intended referent.9 As to the cognitive element, both speaker and hearer must know, in so far as this knowledge is relevant to the discourse they are for the time being engaged in, what one another know:
We do constantly presume knowledge as well as ignorance on the part of those who are the audience of our assertive utterances, and the first kind of presumption, as well as the second, bears importantly on our choice of what we say.

(Shawson, 1964/1971:87)

1.3 Referents

'Whatever can be meant can be said' (Searle, 1969:19) entails that whatever can be perceived or thought of can be made a referent in some discourse. In this section I shall focus, not on the kinds of acts by means of which entities become referents, but on the different kinds of entities that may be the object of a speaker's referential intentions.

My starting point is the distinction drawn by philosophers between particulars, or individuals, on the one hand, and universals, or non-particulars, on the other hand. Various distinctions have been drawn between particulars and individuals but the terms are often used interchangeably and this practice I shall, by and large, follow myself, though favouring one term rather than the other in certain contexts. Also, I shall not distinguish between universals and non-particulars which are not universals.

Particulars are instances of universals. This rectangular piece of white paper, indeed any rectangular piece of white paper, is a particular instance of the universals RECTANGULARITY, WHITENESS and PAPER. Universals are characteristically associated with the predicate function in propositions (Lyons, 1977:110). I may, for example, say of the object on which I am writing:
4. It is white; it is rectangular; it is paper.

Universals may also be the subject of propositions:

5. Whiteness and rectangularity are normal properties of paper

but such uses are clearly derivative. 'Whiteness' derives from '
... is white' and it is difficult to conceive of a language possess-
ing expressions of the former type but not the latter (cf. Searle, 1969:119). Universals have been broadly distinguished into two
groups: sortal universals, by which particulars are classified into
types, species, categories, sorts, etc; and characterising universals,
by which particulars are ascribed properties, qualities, relations,
states, actions, processes, etc. (Lyons, 1968:338; Strawson, 1959:168).

If universals exist (e.g. as concepts), their existence is
evidently not in space-time. Herein lies the most crucial point
of contrast between universals and particulars, at least - or most
clearly - those particulars which Strawson calls 'basic'. Basic
particulars (cf. Lyons' first-order entities) are material objects
and persons - discrete (and therefore identifiable), continuing
(and therefore re-identifiable) 'public existents' (Strawson) charac-
terised by a set of 'perceptible or otherwise intelligible properties'
(Lyons, 1977:110). Over time, some of the properties of such part-
iculars (one might alternatively and perhaps helpfully say some of
the particular properties of such individuals) may change. But the
individual remains (or at least does not necessarily cease to be) the
same individual.

Discreteness is unproblematic in the case of such entities as
pens, dogs, houses, pieces of paper, etc, but we may have doubts
about the discreteness of a quantity of water, coal or seaweed, of
geographical features such as steppes, rifts, promontories, etc,
and of places in general. Nevertheless, in contrast with such
entities as events, processes, states etc (Lyons' second-order
entities) these may all be regarded as basic. Second-order entities
are non-material, or at least we may say they are relatively abstract,
but they are spatio-temporally located by virtue of the necessary
involvement in them of basic particulars such as people and things.

Human institutions, e.g. laws, universities, political parties,
though not exactly processes or states of affairs, are, in their
relative abstractness, more like second than first-order entities.

Beliefs, facts, thoughts, ideas, propositions, etc. (Lyons'
third-order entities) 'are unobservable and cannot be said to be
located in space or time' (Lyons, 1977:445). On these grounds they
are not particulars. However, there is a general process by which
non-particulars, including third-order entities, may be particularised,
and this is by being presented as particular attributes (properties,
etc.) of individuals. As Strawson (1959:168) puts it:

In general, whenever a particular is
bound to a universal by the characterising
tie, we can frame the idea of another
particular bound to the first by the
attributive tie; so to the characterising
tie between Socrates and the universal,
_dying_, there corresponds the attributive
tie between Socrates and the particular,
his death.

We may thus refer, as particulars, not only to

6. _THAT GRASS OVER THERE*_

7. _JOHN_

*Capital letters indicate that what is exemplified is a type of
referent, not a type of expression.*
but also to

8. THE GREENNESS OF THAT GRASS OVER THERE
9. THE EXTENT OF THAT GRASS OVER THERE
10. JOHN'S NOTORIOUS BAD TEMPER
11. JOHN'S IDEA THAT ANIMALS HAVE SOULS
12. THE FACT THAT JOHN DIED

even though GREENNESS, EXTENT, BAD TEMPER, THE IDEA THAT ANIMALS HAVE SOULS and THE FACT THAT PEOPLE DIE are themselves non-particulars.  

When in doubt as to whether a referent is to be understood as a particular, it is helpful to consider whether a speaker appears to have in mind a type or one of its tokens. Consider

13. The same person was here again today
14. The same thing happened again today.

(These examples are discussed in Lyons, 1977:444.) The referent of 'the same person' (first-order entity) is a particular. The referent of 'the same thing' (second-order entity) may not be. It may be understood as

15. THE SAME TYPE OF THING

(non-particular) or

16. A SEPARATE OCCURRENCE OF THE SAME TYPE

(particular). Lyons' conclusion that, in such cases, there is no sharp distinction to be drawn between an individual situation and a generic situation (ib.) may be applied to attributes as well. Though (8) is intended as an example of a referent that is a particular attribute, in the utterance of a sentence such as
17. The greenness of that grass is the same as the greenness of this grass

one would be inclined to understand the referent of the subject expression as

18. THIS QUALITY OF GREENNESS,

and, likewise, though (6) is intended as an example of a referent that is a particular, in the utterance of a sentence such as

19. That grass over there is the same as the grass in our garden

one would be inclined to understand the referent of the subject expression as

20. THAT TYPE OF GRASS.

I began this discussion of particulars by noting that, in contrast with universals, they exist in space-time. There are two important further points to be made about this matter of 'existence'.

(i) Actuality

Not all particulars actually exist. Some are merely hypothetical or putative or optative particulars, and such particulars merely exist hypothetically or putatively or optatively. If I ask you to consider, for the sake of some argument, the case where

21. A man crawls onto the roof of a building and threatens to jump ...

then the entity I invite you to have in mind is certainly not a universal but is in all significant respects a particular: if such an event occurred, the participant would be a person, a discrete object, identifiable, re-identifiable, endowed with a complex of properties, etc. Likewise, if
22. John wants to marry a Norwegian

there may be no actual Norwegian that he wants to marry but, on
the other hand, it is definitely not part of his intention to find
himself eventually married to a non-particular. 15

(ii) Reality

Not all actual particulars really exist, i.e. in the real world
of concrete experience. Some exist only in legend, in fiction, in
dreams, in fantasies and visions etc. Though Russell (1905, 1919)
denied the existence of the golden mountain even as an 'unreal object'
and of unicorns even in heraldry, it is now generally accepted that
such forms of existence can be accommodated within some theory
of 'possible worlds' or 'alternative states of affairs' or 'universes
of discourse' (Searle, 1969; Lyons, 1977, 1981). There is, at the
same time, a somewhat contradictory tendency to resist the opening
up of too wide a gap between the real and the unreal. Thus McMichael
and Zalta (1980) observe that

it is evident that we do have intentional
attitudes towards non-existent objects.
For example, Conan Doyle created Sherlock
Holmes. Some Greeks imagined Pegasus.
Children dream about Rumplestiltskin.
Sentences expressing these attitudes are
true of this world.

Moreover, it is absurdly cumbersome to suppose that someone who,
in the course of speaking, makes a quotation which he attributes
to Hamlet 'suddenly slipped into a fictional play-acting let's
pretend mode of discourse' (Ziff, 1979:207) and then, presumably,
got himself out again in order to start referring once more to what
is real. And, as Vendler (1967:68) points out, even in a dream
world reality may intrude, since one may dream as well about an object existing in the real world as about one which is imaginary:

23. I dreamed about the house where I was born. In which world shall THE HOUSE WHERE I WAS BORN be held to exist? - a question made more difficult to answer if the house of the dream differs in various respects from the real house which it 'purports to represent' (cf. Jackendoff, 1975).

It is, of course, perfectly possible that there be in fact no referent existing in any 'world' despite an apparent reference to an individual. This may result from a deception (cf. Ziff, op.cit., p. 308) or a mistake (Linsky, 1963:86).

One final point about particulars. We have seen that they are endowed with a complex of properties. A question arises whether, in referring to particulars, we refer indivisibly to all these properties, or perhaps (on occasion) to some subset of them, or to some rather than others; whether, as Coppieters (1982) puts it, 'individuals are the primitives about which we talk'.

Coppieters argues that individuals are not 'primitive concepts' but 'are themselves indowed with some internal structure'. He discerns, for example, a difference between

24. Napoleon is sad and would like to go home

and

25. Napoleon was a great Emperor.

He comments:

The Napoleon who is sad is grasped as a transient living consciousness, apprehended in its most immediate form as a man who is unhappy here and now. (In the other case) the speaker is referring, in a more abstract
way, to his concept of Napoleon, which is necessarily linked to his knowledge of Napoleon's actions and the series of events which are evoked by his name.

These two 'attitudes' he calls 'being-as-subject' and 'being-as-concept'. Reference to a person 'as-subject' implies some privileged access to that person's thoughts. A close colleague may say of the Prime Minister (speaking metaphorically)

26. She is spitting blood,

but a member of the public may do so only in a modal context

27. She must be spitting blood.

A person has identity not only as a being with a name and a personality but also as a set of private and public roles which he or she fulfills. At one level of generality we may say 'Mrs Thatcher' and 'the Prime Minister' (uttered in 1983) and 'my wife' (uttered by her husband) may have the same intended referent; at another level, the intended referents may be perceived as rather different. What is at issue here is the congruence of a set of single-time (synchronic) identities. There is a diachronic issue as well: the continuity of individuality, but not of all attributes, through changing roles and stages of life. Bach's (1968) analysis effectively brings out this aspect:

28. I first met my wife when she was only three, of which 'my wife' is analysed as

29. one who is now my wife.

In relation to places, this problem of continuity was first noted by the grammarians of the Port Royal:
Auguste disait de Rome, qu'il l'avait trouvée de brique et qu'il la laissait de marbre ....
Quelle est donc cette Rome, qui est tantôt de brique, et tantôt de marbre?
(Quoted in Durand, 1977)

Places also have complexities of synchronic identity. It is said that

30. Freud had a life-long obsession with Rome.
Whether his neurosis centred on imperial, papal or Italian Rome is a matter of continuing dispute among Freud's followers.

1.4 Referential acts

For something to be an act someone must do it. Because people, not words or expressions, refer (as we are using the term), reference is an act (Searle, 1969:28). Because, or to the extent that, 'the performance of the act involves the uttering of an utterance' (Ziff, 1960:77), it is a speech act. As a speech act, it is a piece of intentional-conventional behaviour which 'can be performed under certain conditions and not others' (ibid.). I shall consider: what kind of speech act is a referential act? what kind of utterance is uttered? what kind of conditions pertain?

1.4.1 What kind of speech act?

The question is complicated by the fact that we are dealing not with a single clearly defined act but with a not very clearly defined class of not very precisely differentiated acts. Philosophy has largely concerned itself with problems of 'definite' reference
to single individuals. Even this notion 'lacks precise boundaries' as Searle notes. For example, 'in signing one's name to a document, does one refer to oneself?' (Searle, 1969:28). Also, in calling out an individual's name, vocatively or as a warning to others, does one refer to him? And, in the utterance of an equative sentence, is the same individual referred to twice?

The entire class of referential acts, within which 'definite' reference is included, has, in the literature, even more uncertain boundaries, but the following types are commonly mentioned and more or less infrequently discussed: 'definite' and 'indefinite' reference to single individuals; reference to groups of individuals; reference to universals (cf. Searle, 1969:27; Lyons, 1977:173). There is little or no treatment of non-specific non-generic reference (e.g. reference to hypotheticals) within a speech act framework.

A more basic issue is the nature of the speech act that is performed in referring. Austin (1962) sets the scene for later controversy. In his classification of 'illocutionary forces' he places 'refer' in the list of expositives, which includes 'the clarifying of usages and references' (op. cit. p.161). Austin seems to have in mind utterances such as

31. I am referring to Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Of this, Linsky remarks in a deliberate paradox that, in saying it, 'I am not referring to Ludwig Wittgenstein'. In other words, we must distinguish between the performative act of 'announcing what one is referring to' and something else.

The nature of this something else was discussed in a preliminary way in chapter 4, where it was argued that to refer is to perform
an illocutionary act, but one of the propositional, not the performative, sort. However, to say this is immediately to expose the concept of reference to two possibly destructive doubts: whether there is always a clear and categorical difference between the propositional act of reference and the performative act of assertion; and whether there is ever a clear and categorical difference between the propositional act of reference and the propositional act of predication; i.e. whether reference may (at least sometimes) be a kind of assertion, or, alternatively, whether it may be a kind of predication.

The idea that reference is a form of assertion, as first propounded by Russell, is disputed by Strawson (1950), Searle (1969) and many others. Kempson (1975) argues that such of the criticism of Russell is based on misunderstanding of his use of 'assert', and that if 'assert' is taken in Russell's sense of 'a commitment to the truth of certain conditions' then the inference that the use of a definite description involves an assertion by the speaker of the existence of the intended referent is not an incorrect one. It is, however, the sense of 'assert' that, according to Kempson, Russell did not intend that concerns me here, that is the 'assert' which is in pragmatic contrast with 'presuppose'. Assertion, in this performative rather than logical sense, involves presenting to a hearer what is assumed not to be part of his knowledge and belief. Presupposition involves presenting what is assumed to be known.

Compare

32. Some students have moved in next door,
in the normal utterance of which we would take it that the existence of the students is part of what is being asserted, and

33. The students next door have left,

in the normal utterance of which we would take it that the hearer's knowledge of the existence of the students is presupposed. In neither case can we say that the act of reference performed in the utterance of the subject nominal is a type of assertion, because in (32) it is the sentence as a whole which is used to assert and in (33) the existence of the referent is not asserted but presupposed. There are, however, quite common cases where apparent presuppositions are disguised assertions, where an act of reference not only is part of an act of assertion but also is, or contains, such an act. Strawson (1954/1971:88) notes cases in which

an audience cannot exactly be credited with knowledge of the existence of a certain item unique in a certain respect, but can be credited with a strong presumption to this effect ... Such presumed presumption can be invoked in the same style as such (identifying) knowledge can be invoked.

Such cases of identification are very close to being assertive. But there is a further possibility: that a speaker may purport to invoke knowledge with which he knows he cannot in fact credit the hearer, even as a 'strong presumption'. The 'style' of identifying reference thus becomes a means of supplying information, of actually asserting.

The distinction - and connection - between reference and predication is more complex and of more fundamental importance. One way to separate them is, as we have seen, in terms of the notion 'stands for', providing we accept the type of argument put forward by Searle that nothing 'stands to a predicate as an object stands to a singular
referring expression'. If we find this sort of argument unconvincing, we may attempt to establish a difference in communicative function: the act of (singular definite) reference serves to 'pick out or identify some object or entity'; the act of predication serves to 'say something about' the entity identified.23 This is, no doubt, basically true, but it is oversimple; for (i) reference enters into predication, for example through some referential intention associated with the object of a verb or through the complement of an equative sentence; and (ii) predication enters into reference.

Predication enters into reference in two ways: the predicative act may itself contain clues as to the referent intended in the utterance of the referring expression; (the sentences discussed by Copper-ters concerning Napoleon are an example of this); and, more importantly, the act of referring may involve predication.7 What is predicated in the act of reference is whatever property or set of properties are considered by the speaker appropriate and sufficient (in context) to identify the referent. What these properties are predicated of is the intended referent. On such a view (elaborated in Bach, 1968; also McCawley, 1968), 'reference is identification by predication'. Thus the difference between reference and predication is one of degree not of absolute kind. Some acts of predication are almost wholly referential:

33. My car is that one by the tree.24

and some acts of reference almost wholly predicative:

34. The idiot called me up yesterday,

where the fact that he called me up yesterday is the reason why I call him idiotic, i.e.

idiot predicates something of the entire proposition 'he called me up yesterday' (Declerck, 1978).
In drawing his distinction between referring and predicating Searle points to the distinction that he makes in his analysis of speech acts (and which is basic to any analysis of speech acts) between content and function. He suggests that this distinction is plainly seen in 'the total illocutionary act' (content = proposition; function = illocutionary force) and in the act of identifying reference (content = description; function = identifying an object) but is not apparent in predication, which provides only content, and the role in which the content is presented ... is determined entirely by the illocutionary force of the utterance (1969:126).

In referential acts other than those of identifying reference, the distinction between content and function is considerably less clear, the descriptive element in most forms of 'indefinite reference' being paramount and 'the role in which the content is presented' being strongly determined by external factors. The distinction between the two types of propositional act is never absolute; but as we get away from the (philosophically) favoured 'definite' variety of referential act we find that it becomes increasingly obscure.

1.4.2 What kind of utterance?

In the previous chapter I argued that the grammatical correlate of reference is nominality and I discussed at some length the various components of nominal expressions and the contribution they make to reference. Within the philosophical literature, the usual approach is to discuss a particular type of reference by way of investigating a particular type of expression which is defined as having the function
of making such reference possible. Thus the function of a 'definite description' is to enable a speaker to pick out some single 'definite' entity; that of an 'indefinite description' to pick out some single 'indefinite' entity. A definite description is but one type of 'singular term'. Other types — having the same function but achieving it in different ways — are personal pronouns, proper names and titles.

In contrast with singular terms are general terms, whose function is to refer to 'universals':

What is characteristic of descriptions (definite or indefinite) is the work done by the descriptive content of the expression in enabling the intended referent to be picked out. What is mysterious about names is the way in which they enable a unique entity to be picked out when descriptive content is just what they lack. The amount of descriptive content of an expression is but one factor in the overall means by which an entity may be picked out. Another is the breadth of applicability of an expression. The relationship between the two may be shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expressions with wide applicability</th>
<th>Expressions with little or no content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expressions with descriptive content</strong></td>
<td><strong>DESCRIPTIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 6.1 Referential expressions: content and applicability

'Quasi-names' is Strawson's term for
'impure' proper names like 'The Round Table' - substantial phrases which have grown capital letters (1950/1963:186).

They are 'impure' by virtue of their descriptive content, by which they are distinguished from proper names in the same way as descriptions are distinguished from pronouns. They are differentiated from descriptions in the same way as proper names from pronouns, in that to know their application is to know an ad hoc convention, not a general one (cf. Strawson, ibid.).

There remains the question of how, in general terms, we may describe

the connection between the act of uttering (an expression etc.) and the performance of certain other speech acts.
(Ziff, 1960:77)

To this we now turn.

1.4.3 What kind of conditions?

The notion 'conditions under which something may be done' has been applied in linguistics and the philosophy of language (a) to the utterance of types of expression, (b) to the performance of types of illocutionary act, (c) to the utterance of some type of expression for the purpose of performing some type of act. An example of type (a) conditions is truth conditions on sentences; of type (b) conditions is Searle's conditions for 'the speech act of singular identifying reference' (1959:94); of type (c) conditions is Searle's conditions for the illocutionary act of promising (op. cit. p.57ff). In relation to (b) and (c) Searle remarks:

Since the analysis is of reference in general and is therefore neutral as between reference using a proper name, a definite description or whatnot, it
has an extremely abstract character which the analysis of promising managed to avoid.

Whether or not the analysis is in fact significantly more abstract, such an approach has, as I noted earlier (chapter 3), practical advantages in constructing a position: it provides a means for defining a type of act without prejudging the issue of what sorts of expression are typically used to perform it. It has not, on the whole, been the approach to reference adopted by philosophers; but it is the approach that is suited to my objectives in this chapter.

1.4.5.1 Conditions for 'definite' reference

There is extensive coverage in the literature of conditions for singular 'definite' - or 'identifying' - reference, in particular by means of the utterance of definite descriptions and proper names. The conditions most commonly discussed are:

1. 'Existence'

We have discussed this topic under 'referents' above. There is a type (a) issue involved, whether definite noun phrases entail or presuppose the actual existence of a referent (Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950; Searle, 1969; Kempson, 1975). And a type (b) issue, which is best resolved in Ziff's (1960:84) formulation:

It is impossible to refer without referring to something, but it is still possible to refer to what does not and never did exist,

(i.e. exist really).

Absence of a referent results in what Strawson calls 'radical reference failure', such occasions arising, as we have seen, out of ignorance on the part of the speaker, or pretence.
According to the 'existence' condition there must be at least one, according to this condition not more than one, individual which is picked out by the utterance of a particular name or description on a particular occasion. For Russell uniqueness was an entailment of the expression in question. For Kempson (1975:174ff) it is a 'normal implication of its use'. The 'existence' and 'uniqueness' conditions are together summarised by Searle (1969:82) as follows:

There must exist one and only one object to which the speaker's utterance of the expression applies.

Both conditions are prerequisites for

Searle's formulation of the identification condition is as follows:

The hearer must be given sufficient means to identify the object from the speaker's utterance of the expression (ibid.).

Whether or not the means adopted on a particular occasion prove 'sufficient' mainly depends on the shared knowledge of which mention was made above in the discussion of 'referrers'. In particular it depends on 'identifying knowledge' (Strawson, 1964) possessed by the hearer. This exists: where a person is able to pick a thing out in his current field of perception; where he knows there is a thing (not in his current field of perception) to which a certain description applies which applies to no other thing; when he knows the name of a thing and is able to recognise it when he encounters it (op.cit.). There is of course considerable scope for variation in what is understood by 'identifying', particularly where the mode of identification
is a proper name. Probably, Strawson's third option is too exacting for many quite ordinary referring acts. One's knowledge of the name of an individual - and of the circumstances in which one has heard it (Harrison, 1982) - may be almost the extent of one's knowledge about him, and yet that individual may be established as a 'definite' referent in some discourse in which one is involved. Or, as Searle (1979:153) points out:

Relative to one set of interests I know who Heidegger is ... the Austrian Slalom specialist ... ; but relative to some other sets of interests I haven't the faintest idea who he is. I couldn't pick him out in a police line-out or tell you any of the salient facts of his life for example.

Identification in an even weaker sense is found in a case such as the following:

A speaker tells a story which he claims to be factual. It begins: 'A man and a boy were standing by a fountain', and it continues: 'The man had a drink'. Shall we say that the hearer knows which or what particular is being referred to by the subject expression in the second sentence? We might say so. For, of a certain range of two particulars, the words 'the man' serve to distinguish the one being referred to, by means of a description which applies only to him.

(Strawson, 1959:18)

Strawson calls this 'relative identification' for it is identification only relative to a range of particulars ... which is itself identified only as the range of particulars being talked about by the speaker (ibid.).

A speaker's assessment of the state of knowledge of his hearer is an important determinant of his choice of name, title, pronoun or description for a referring expression; and, if a description, then
of its content (Lyons, 1977:180; Strawson, 1964). Lyons notes that in some circumstances a relative clause may be needed 'to specify one particular member of a class of individuals'. Vendler (1966) makes this idea completely general: a relative clause is always required, present or by some means recoverable, if any 'the - N' phrase is to count as a singular term.

Searle's account of identification, and indeed almost all accounts, make clear that an exhaustive description is not a requirement for successful reference. By Grice's maxim of quantity we may predict that most references are not, therefore 'fully consummated' (Searle, 1969:82). By Grice's maxim of quality we should expect that a description used in a successful reference should be true of the referent, i.e. the referent should possess the properties ascribed to it by the description. But it has been widely noted that reference may be successful though 'incorrect'. This may result from a 'slip'. (We were talking about lorries; my son said:

36. The lorry we went to Moshi in ...

and the reference was successful though I knew they had gone to Moshi in a bus.) Or it may be the intentional effect of irony, metaphor or facetiousness. Referential failure may result from:
- the hearer not being in possession of 'identifying knowledge';
- the expression used by the speaker failing to invoke the knowledge which the hearer does have (Strawson, 1964).

(4) 'Wider discourse function'
An act of reference is always part of something else: it normally belongs in some proposition, the making of which is associated with
some other illocutionary act or acts, such as making an assertion, asking a question, or giving an order (cf. Searle, 1969:96; Cohen, 1974:189).27

1.4.3.2 Conditions for 'indefinite' reference

Once we move on to consider expressions whose reference (if they are indeed rightly regarded as referring expressions) is in one way or another indefinite, we strike against a host of complexities.


Two important ways in which 'reference' may be 'indefinite' are illustrated in the following:

37. John is looking at a house, but he doesn't expect to buy it.

38. John is looking for a house, but he doesn't expect to find one that he likes.

The referent of 'a house' in (37) is an actually existing individual, as defined above. The 'referent' of 'a house' in (38) is nothing, unless it is taken to be SOME (MORE OR LESS) ARBITRARY (BUT SUITABLE) SPECIMEN OF THE CLASS OF HOUSES. Russell (1919) said of this latter type: 'It is only what we may call the concept that enters into the proposition'. For many writers, this is tantamount to saying that such uses are 'non-referential'.28

Most commonly, the distinction between the two uses of the expression 'a house' in (37) and (38) is presented in terms of 'specific' versus 'non-specific' meaning. For some this is a matter of grammar: (\( ^2 \) spec) as a feature of NPs.29 For others it is a matter of pragmatics: specific vs. non-Specific referents, or specific vs. non-specific uses of noun phrases. Specificity is a highly contentious
area, and a complex one. Part of the difficulty (facing the non-specialist) is that much of the discussion is conducted within a formal framework of quantificational logic. A more important difficulty (facing even the logician, or especially the logician) is that very exact systems do not easily yield simple solutions to problems concerning very vague facts. And

very often, of course, we cannot tell whether a noun phrase is being used with specific reference or not; and the speaker himself might be hard put to decide. (Lyons, 1977:188)

One source of uncertainty is that a referent may be an individual by virtue of being a 'particular one' involved in some actual event or state of affairs; and yet a speaker may not in 'referring' to that individual have it, as a particular individual, 'in mind'. For example, I may say

39. I caught a 27 bus to the station,
and though, evidently, it was a particular 27 bus that took me on that actual journey, it is quite possible, even likely, that I do not have that bus as a particular individual in mind when I refer to it. Have I made a 'specific reference'? If the crucial point is 'having in mind' rather than 'there being a particular individual to potentially have in mind' then plainly we are dealing with a peculiarly insecure type of data. There is the possibility that a speaker may have such a referent, so to speak, 'semi - in mind'.

Or that the specific referent is 'in mind' at one point of the discourse and less so, or not at all, at some other point. How shall 'in - mindness' be determined? The issue is further complicated if we raise the question whose mind it is necessary for the particular
individual to be 'in'. Petersen (1979:330) distinguishes between subject-specificity and speaker-specificity. Thus 'a woman' in

40. John wants to find a woman

may be specific for both speaker and John, or may be specific only for John. In the latter case there is no speaker-implication that a specific woman exists; only that one exists or might exist for John, or exists according to John (who is therefore 'responsible for the description', cf. Heraeus, 1959).

Discussion of conditions for indefinite but specific reference is fragmentary. Strawson (1950) disputes 'the orthodox (Russellian) doctrine' that such sentences as

41. A man told me ....

'are existential, but not uniquely existential.' He accepts that there is an implication (but denies that there is an assertion) of the proposition that 'the class of men is non-empty'. He also sees an implication of uniqueness not basically different from that associated with a 'definite' reference (the man ...). The essential difference in conditions between 'indefinite' and 'definite' specific reference would seem to involve the condition of identification: in 'indefinite' reference, the speaker does not assume 'identifying knowledge' on the part of the hearer, and his use of an expression to make specific reference thus has an informing function: not to inform that 'the class is non-empty'; but to inform that among the members of the class is a particular individual of whom or of which a certain proposition is asserted to be true.31

In the non-specific cases there is no actual individual 'in mind' or elsewhere, and it follows that the conditions of uniqueness
and identification cannot apply. The typical circumstances of 'non-specific reference' have been discussed largely in terms of the notion of 'referentially opaque contexts', i.e. contexts in which a noun phrase falls within the 'scope' of modal or negative operators or of verbs 'of propositional attitude'. In such contexts the 'reference' of an expression may be unambiguously non-specific:

42. Would you like a gin and tonic?
43. He doesn't have a daughter,
or may be open to both specific and non-specific interpretations:
44. He wants his daughter to marry a wealthy businessman.

On the specific interpretation there is room for argument among the parties concerned (speaker, subject, maybe even the daughter and the businessman) as to whether the description is apt – whether the target son-in-law is in fact wealthy and/or in fact a businessman. On the non-specific interpretation the description may not be substituted (except by one that is completely synonymous); for it does not function to pick out some referent from among others (in which case it may succeed even if of disputable accuracy): it absolutely defines the referent (as a type).

The circumstance of an opaque context cannot be regarded as a condition for non-specific use of an expression, for some non-specific uses occur in non-opaque contexts (cf. 39 above). But the analysis of opacity points the way to a statement of the most basic condition for non-specific 'reference', which we may call the 'description condition': that the description is all important, and defines the referent, constituting 'an essential part of the proposition itself' (Karttunen, 1968). The description condition also serves to
separate Donnellan's 'attributive' use of definite NPs from the 'referential' use. Typical examples of definite NPs which may be understood 'attributively' are:

45. Smith's murderer is insane
(i.e. whoever murdered Smith must be insane)

46. The Republican candidate for president in 1968 will be a conservative
(i.e. whoever it turns out to be - utterance being made in 1966)
(these are Donnellan's examples);

47. I want to meet the first woman Prime Minister of Britain
(i.e. where what counts is 'not the actual person that the speaker has in mind, but some concept that fits the descriptive content of the expression' (Lyons, 1981:227)).

According to Donnellan's account:

In the (attributive) case the definite description might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something about whoever or whatever fits that description; but in the referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a person or thing - and in general any other device for doing the same job, another description or name, would do as well. In the attributive use the attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use.
(Donnellan, 1966).

This suggests that the referential/attributive distinction for definite NPs is closely equivalent to the specific/non-specific distinction for indefinite NPs. Both may be explained as a difference in use rather than a difference in grammar.34 In opaque contexts,
the attributive interpretation of a definite NP gives the 'opaque' reading as does the non-specific interpretation of an indefinite NP. In attributive as in non-specific uses the referent is best understood as a type or class rather than an individual. Moreover we find a similar indeterminacy in the referential/attributive contrast as in the specific/non-specific contrast. However, there are differences. One is that in the attributive use of a definite singular NP it is normally (but I do not think invariably) implied that at some point in time and place an individual satisfies (satisfied, will satisfy) the description, i.e. actually exists; another is that there is an implication that whoever-the-individual-is is unique. Neither of these implications arises from the non-specific use of an indefinite NP. We may compare (47) - understood attributively - with

48. I want to meet a woman prime minister (understood non-specifically). In the latter case I wish to meet any individual (if there is one) who answers the description; in the former case, I wish to meet whichever is the one.

This suggests an alternative way of seeing the difference. In the non-specific case (indefinite NP) the intended referent is some arbitrary member of a class (which may be of indeterminate size).

In the attributive case (definite NP) the intended referent is an entire class - which has but one member. If I utter (47) referringly, I intend to draw your attention to the single member; if attributively, I intend to draw your attention to the class.36

1.4.3.3 Conditions for 'generic' reference.

If the preceding argument is sound, then there is a close similarity between the attributive use of a definite NP and a part-
icular type of non-specific use, the generic. In both cases, the referent is some class-as-a-whole rather than all the individuals belonging to it at some point in time. It is of interest that, just as there is a disposition among a number of writers to regard the attributive use as a form of 'reference', so there is a tradition that treats the 'generic' use as 'reference', or at least regards the issue of whether generic NPs 'refer' as a matter for serious enquiry (Bacon, 1973; Kempson, 1975:111fn.; Carlson, 1982). My own intuition is that the non-specificness of generics closely parallels that of attributives. Compare:

49. Smith's murderer is very likely insane.

50. Burchell's zebra is very likely extinct.

This similarity is made more apparent if we consider the relevant conditions for use. Searle says in respect of universals:

In order to satisfy the axiom of identification for particulars, a speaker has to be in possession of a contingent fact as described by the principle of identification. In order to satisfy the analogue of the principle of identification for universals no such factual information is necessary. The axiom of identification for universals requires only that the speaker know the meaning of the general term which underlies the abstract singular term used to refer to the universal (1969:121).

Precisely the same statement may be made about Donnellan's attributives. Knowledge of a contingent fact (who actually is Smith's murderer) is not required (though, as Donnellan points out, it is not excluded). Once again, the identification condition yields to the description condition.
Finally, the 'wider discourse function' condition applies equally to 'indefinite' and to 'definite' reference. It is no doubt in need of a good many qualifications, since, as Sampson (1980:159) points out,

bare noun phrases do occur constantly in speech for purposes such as identifying people or things, drawing attention to things, summoning people, and the like.

I shall not discuss such possibilities here. Nor shall I review the literature on contextual constraints on referential functions which nominals may fulfil: for example constraints on functions of existential complements (they may not normally be used to make 'definite' reference (Searle, 1969)) or on subjects of non-habitual predicates (they may not normally be used to make 'generic' reference (Carlson, 1979)). The connections between referential acts and other acts in discourse - part of the broad phenomena of discourse interactivity - I shall return to at a later stage.

2 Three dimensions of reference

Whatever else we conclude from the foregoing discussion, it is clear that reference is a field in which there are few well established 'facts' and no simple and easily statable ones. In establishing an applied linguistic position on reference it is evident that any approach towards efficacity and utility will involve certain sacrifices in congruity and perhaps validity. My imperfect solution to this difficulty has been to proceed as follows: first (this section) to minimise complexity by reducing the many conceivable dimensions of
differentiation between referential types to three; then, responding
to the requirement of validity, to increase it again in the account
that I give (section 3) of each of the referential types defined
according to the three dimensions.

PROPOSITION R1: ON DIMENSIONS OF REFERENCE

The referential functions of nominal expressions are classified
in terms of three principal dimensions: PRIMARY - SECONDARY;
SPECIFIC - NON-SPECIFIC; and KNOWN - NOT-KNOWN.

2.1 PRIMARY - SECONDARY

We have seen in the preceding discussion (i) that part of the work
of explicating reference is to show how reference differs from
predication; (ii) that any such difference is not easily statable
in absolute terms since reference enters into many forms of predi-
cation and predication enters into many if not all forms of reference;
(iii) that predicate nominals are not obviously non-referential any
more than a subject nominal with non-specific meaning is obviously
referential; and (iv) that, if equative complements are, as many
writers claim, referential, then still we must account for their
difference in communicative function from referential equative subjects.

PROPOSITION R1.1: ON THE PRIMARY-SECONDARY DIMENSION

A nominal expression is used with PRIMARY referential function if it
serves to identify or describe some entity (particular or non-
particular) which, if it is not already established as a discourse
referent, thereby becomes so. It is used with SECONDARY referential function if it serves to classify, characterise, define or further identify some referent already established in the discourse by an act of primary reference.

The terms 'primary' and 'secondary' are borrowed from Jespersen (e.g. 1924:96ff) where they appear along with 'tertiary' in his account of syntactic subordination, and the reason for this is the close association between the referential and the grammatical functions. Subjects, objects and preposition complements are syntactic primaries and also fulfil, through the nominal expressions which realise them, a PRIMARY referential function. Equative and intensive complements, and the corresponding adnominal adjuncts (Ch.5), are syntactic secondaries, and also fulfil, through the nominal expressions which realise them, a SECONDARY referential function.

The correspondence between my referential use of the terms and Jespersen's syntactic use is not, however, exact: (i) I am only concerned with nominals, whereas for Jespersen the three terms were applicable to all phrasal, clausal and sentential constituents; and (ii) restrictive modifiers syntactically are secondaries but have no independent referential function. Thus all nominals with SECONDARY referential function are syntactic secondaries, but it is not the case that all syntactic secondaries have SECONDARY or any referential function. And the same applies to nominals with PRIMARY referential function in their relationship to syntactic primaries.

2.2 SPECIFIC - NON-SPECIFIC

It has been possible to define the PRIMARY - SECONDARY dimension
fairly precisely and to present the referential difference as an absolute one. With the SPECIFIC - NON-SPECIFIC dimension this is more difficult. There are no simple grammatical tests for specific-ness. Intuitions are open to challenge, even by oneself. We are not dealing with an absolute opposition but, more or less, a cline. There are profound logical, psychological and philosophical problems surrounding the whole notion. Nevertheless, our criteria of congruity and validity, at least, demand that specific-ness must have a central place in any analysis of reference.

PROPOSITION R1.2: ON THE SPECIFIC - NON-SPECIFIC DIMENSION

If the intended referent of a nominal expression is some actual individual (or set of individuals) rather than some type (or some hypothetical or arbitrary token of a type); and if it is as such that the speaker has the intended referent, more or less, in mind and intends to present it to his hearer; then the expression is used with SPECIFIC reference; otherwise with NON-SPECIFIC reference.

'Actual individual' must (see above) be taken to include any particular property actually belonging to an individual: specific reference is possible not just to individuals but also to qualities they possess, thoughts they have, events they experience, states of affairs they are in, etc.

A major factor separating SPECIFIC from NON-SPECIFIC reference is the relative importance of the identification condition and the description condition. In NON-SPECIFIC uses the description is all important and defines the referent. In SPECIFIC uses this is not the case.
For Kempson (1981) specificity is 'not a semantic phenomenon at all ... but a verification strategy.' This suggests a possibly useful analogy. Inductive science infers non-verifiable (though falsifiable) generalisations from verifiable particulars. The verifiable particulars are specific 'individuals' - in this case, measurable events. They are verifiable because they have spatio-temporal definition: the truth or falsity of propositions concerning them may be established by some suitable procedure of observation. The inferred generalisations, by contrast, cannot be observed. They may only be described. And the description defines them.

2.3 KNOWN - NOT-KNOWN

Identifying reference depends on the successful invocation, through a speaker's use of some suitable expression in some suitable context, of identifying knowledge on the part of the hearer. We have seen that such knowledge is not easily defined. It ranges from the fullest possible acquaintance that a person may have with some actual individual (in which case there will be a large number of possible expressions which could be used with identifying effect) to knowledge based on some single use (by some speaker in some context) of some single minimal description. The concept of identifying knowledge is introduced by Strawson to explain the process of reference to particulars. We need a similar concept - it might be called 'defining knowledge' - to explain the process of reference to non-particulars.

PROPOSITION R1.3: ON THE KNOWN - NOT-KNOWN DIMENSION

When a speaker uses an expression to make reference to some entity (particular or non-particular), he assumes EITHER that his intended
referent is KNOWN to his hearer OR that it is NOT-KNOWN. Knowing a particular implies, minimally, having a previous awareness, or belief or expectation, that the particular exists (in reality or fiction); knowing a non-particular implies knowing the existence of a class of entities to which a certain expression applies.

The two types of knowledge correspond to the traditional distinction between knowledge de re, of the thing, and knowledge de dicto, of the word for a thing. For both types, the distinction KNOWN - NOT-KNOWN, hinging, as it does, on awareness of 'existence' rather than on such notions as 'having in mind', 'being currently conscious of', etc. is not the same as any thematic distinction such as theme - rheme, given - new, or focus - presupposition. It often happens, of course, that the focus or 'new' part of a clause introduces a referent that is NOT-KNOWN; but it is also possible for a referent which is KNOWN (and known to be KNOWN) to be introduced as new.

3 Six referential functions

The theoretical product of the three dimensions of reference described in the previous section is eight referential functions, as in the diagram below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC</th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNOWN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT-KNOWN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NON-SPECIFIC</th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNOWN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT-KNOWN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 6.1 Dimensions and functions
However, occurrences of types (7) and (8) are rare and not easily distinguishable from occurrences of (3) and (6). In my proposition on referential functions, which follows, I have found it convenient to assimilate the former to the latter.

PROPOSITION R2: ON REFERENTIAL FUNCTIONS

There are six main referential functions which may be fulfilled in the utterance of nominal expressions, and they are defined by the three dimensions of reference as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC</th>
<th>PRIMARY</th>
<th>SECONDARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KNOWN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Referring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT-KNOWN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Relating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-SPECIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNOWN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Evoking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT-KNOWN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Establishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Identifying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attributing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 6.2 Six referential functions

In this section I shall discuss and exemplify each of these functions in turn and I shall describe a number of sub-types.

3.1 The three SPECIFIC functions

These are the functions which philosophers and linguists have, with numerous qualifications, been most willing to describe as 'reference'. My own usage henceforth, will be to use the terms 'reference', 'referential' and 'referent' in relation to all six functions, and to reserve 'refer' and 'referring' for type (1).
3.1.1 Referring

The referring function - or we may say the act of referring - is the same as the philosophers' 'singular definite reference to a particular' except that the qualification 'singular' is removed. The conditions for referring are informally stated in the following proposition:

PROPOSITION R2.1: ON CONDITIONS FOR REFERRING

(i) There exists (in reality or fiction) some actual individual or set of individuals, or some particular property of some actual individual or set of individuals, which the speaker has, more or less, in mind;

(ii) the speaker assumes (or at least acts as if it were reasonable to assume) that his intended referent is KNOWN in some sufficient way to the hearer;

(iii) the speaker uses an expression which is sufficient in context to identify to the hearer the individual etc. which he wishes to pick out by invoking the hearer's identifying knowledge;

(iv) the point\(^{39}\) of the act performed in the utterance of the expression is to pick out the intended individual for the hearer;

(v) the expression is normally uttered as part of a larger propositional act with which is associated some illocutionary force.

An expression which is used with referring function will be called a referring expression.

Referring expressions may be used anaphorically or non anaphorically. A non-anaphoric use is recognised when no previous expression in a discourse has been used to pick out the same intended referent.
If an expression is co-referential with some previous expression in a discourse, its use is anaphoric. 40

51. Hobbes' father was a vicar, who was ill-tempered and uneducated. He lost his job by quarrelling with a neighbouring vicar at the church door. (R) (see Appendix B.)

'Hobbes' father' is the first mention in the discourse of Hobbes' father and is therefore non-anaphoric. 'He' is a subsequent mention and is anaphoric.

Is Hobbes' father, even when first mentioned, assumed to be KNOWN to the reader? Or, rather, does the writer appear to assume, in his use of the expression, that the referent is 'known'? The answer must be yes. Hobbes is 'known', having been previously introduced in the discourse (and 'Hobbes' is therefore anaphoric). This is a particular item of knowledge that the reader has. He also has an item of general knowledge, namely that everyone has a father. From the particular and general together, the requisite identifying knowledge can be inferred.

This is a very general referential process (it is not confined to referring expressions) which has received some attention in the literature. 41 I shall describe the relation between 'Hobbes' and Hobbes as immediate, and that between 'Hobbes' father' and Hobbes' father as mediated: knowledge of the existence of a father is mediated by knowledge of Hobbes himself. Likewise, in the same sentence, reference to the church door is mediated by the class-membership reference 'a vicar' (particular: Hobbes' father was a vicar; general: vicars have churches and churches have doors). 'His job' is also, in this context, a referring expression expressing a mediated reference (particular: Hobbes' father was a vicar; general: being a vicar is a job).
There is a more dubious route to identifying knowledge of the referent of 'his job'. Hobbes' father is a person; people have jobs. But people do not always have jobs. Is there, then, an implied assertion that Hobbes' father had a job? Not in this case, since we have been told that Hobbes' father was a vicar. Even without this added particular, however, we might conclude that 'his job' is referring, on the grounds that the implied assertion is a very weak one and communicatively insignificant; but we must be prepared for cases where the decision between a mediated referring function and a relating function (3.1.2) is not easily made:

52. (Byron's) earliest recollections were of his parents' quarrels. (R)

This is the first mention of the quarrels. If it is the writer's assumption that quarrels are to parents as churches to vicars, then the function is referring (mediated); if not, it is relating: the implied assertion has communicative force. There is no simple and certain way of deciding this issue.

Treating the underlined expression in (52) as referring, let us now consider it from another point of view. The quarrels which Byron recollected were, when they occurred, particular quarrels - 'individuals' in the sense in which I am using the word. If the quarrels were itemised, each reference would be specific. Instead of being itemised, they are here referred to en masse, as a group (or set) - a specific collection of certain unitemised individuals. I shall, following established practice, call any such collective reference general. (By contrast, the reference to Hobbes' father is said to be singular, being to one specific parent. However, to avoid confusion
with grammatical 'singular', I shall describe any such reference as 'unitary'. Some further examples of referring expressions used to make general reference are:

53. As a principle, the Stoics preached universal love. (R)

54. Most of the philosophers of the French Revolution combined science with beliefs associated with Rousseau. (R)

In both cases we have specific reference to a group (not necessarily numerically determinate) of individuals who are not itemised. The predicate gives information concerning what individual members of the collective referent in fact did. (These are not generic statements; but statements about historical events and states of affairs.)

There is a type of referent intermediate between 'general' and 'unitary'. If we now include the pre-selecting determiner 'most of' (in 54), we find that the referent is an imprecise subset (still consisting of actual individuals) of the collective set. What matters in such a case is not that the number of individuals is not precise (it could be made more so: 'One of the philosophers', 'About half of the philosophers') but that no means is supplied for distinguishing the philosophers who did, from the philosophers who did not, combine science with Rousseau. Notwithstanding this fact, the expression is plainly used with a referring function: not to assert the existence of a group but to pick out, albeit with deliberate vagueness, one part of it. I shall use the term 'vague' to describe reference which is neither general nor unitary. 43

In this sub-section I have distinguished; within the referring function:

- anaphoric and non-anaphoric reference;
- immediate and mediated reference;
- general, vague and unitary reference.

Though I have stressed the importance of specific-ness in connection with the referring function, it is evident that the notion has become somewhat weakened in the course of the discussion, especially as it applies to many instances of general and vague reference. Of the two elements in specific-ness - being an actual individual and being in mind - the former seems to me more basic. A reference which is not to an actual individual (or group of individuals) is not a specific reference at all. One which is to an individual that is only very vaguely 'in mind' may appropriately be called a 'weakly specific' reference.

3.1.2 Relating

The relating function is connected with the not much explored philosophers' category 'indefinite reference'. The most important characteristic of relating expressions is that they are used to inform: through them a speaker tells his hearer about certain individuals previously unknown to him.

The conditions for successfully fulfilling the relating function are:

PROPOSITION R2.2 : ON CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF A RELATING EXPRESSION

(i) as for referring;
(ii) the speaker assumes (or acts as if it were reasonable to assume) that his intended referent is not known to the hearer;
(iii) the speaker uses an expression which is sufficient in context, and taking account of the relevant knowledge that the hearer is presumed to have, to describe the intended referent to the hearer;
(iv) the point of the act performed in the utterance of the expression is to inform the hearer of the existence (in reality or fiction) of some actual individual or group of individuals of which he is presumed to be unaware;
(v) as for referring.

Relating expressions may not be used anaphorically. (This follows from (iv).) Any expression which is co-referential with a relating expression is a referring expression.

56. A dog staggering through the streets of Palma with a golden ear-ring in its ear aroused police suspicions. They took it into custody ...(JSN)
The point of the relating expression 'A dog ...' is to make the referent known to the reader. By virtue of it fulfilling this function, the subsequent expression 'it', which is co-referential, is a referring one.44

The referent of a relating expression is invariably an actual individual not a type or some arbitrary or hypothetical token of a type. If the predicate part of (56) were 'would probably arouse police suspicions', the function of the subject nominal expression would be understood not as relating but as 'evoking' (3.2.1).

The notion of mediation applies also to relating expressions.

In

57. The leader of a religious cult on this Mediterranean island has been arrested and accused of rape (JSN)
we have a nominal with complex postmodifcation. The referential
function of the most embedded, nominal ('this Mediterranean island') is referring; that of the nominal in which it is immediately embedded ('a religious cult ...') is relating; that of the nominal as a whole is, since the intention is to introduce the leader as an individual previously NOT-KNOWN, also relating. 'Leader' is mediated by 'cult' in the following way:—particular fact: the island had a cult; general fact: cults have leaders; particular fact: this cult had a leader.

Compare the following examples:

58. An example was given of the doctor from abroad who interpreted the use of colloquialisms by the patient as a sign of confusion and disorientation. (M)

59. Jailers here were today taking special precautions against another escape attempt by the killer who once fled by losing so much weight that he managed to squeeze through an air-vent in his cell. (JSN)

In these there is no mediation. Nevertheless, despite the definite article, the 'indefinite reference' — i.e. the relating function — is evident in both cases. The restrictive relative clause is an obligatory element in nominal expressions with definite article and relating function.45 The only exceptions are found in the context of a distinctive narrative style, e.g.

60. The bride sat at the altar ... in tears.
   The groom sat at home ... in hiding. (JSN)

(Both nominals are non-anaphoric. These are the opening words of the story.) Even a personal pronoun may be used as a relating expression in this style.

Far more common, especially in journalism, is the relating proper-name NP, with or without some restrictive apposition:
61a. **Alfonso** (first mention) wept as he clung desperately to the steeple. *(JSN)*

61b. Suspicious wife **Priscilla** ... *(JSN)*

61c. Blushing policeman **Peter Popham** ... *(JSN)*

(In less restricted style, relating proper names are typically prefixed by *a*/*a certain / one*.)

There is an obvious connection between referentially relating expressions and grammatically existential sentences. This is particularly marked in story-telling:

62. There was once a powerful king whose mad ambition was to rule without the advice of his elders. *(M)*

(In colloquial narrative we frequently hear the demonstrative 'this': 'Well, there was this very powerful king and he ...!')

Most utterances with relating expressions may be reconstructed in the form of an existential sentence:

58a. There was, for example *(the)* doctor from abroad who ...

However, not all nominals introduced by there BE (or other 'existential' types, e.g. with HAVE) have a relating function. These are the 'list' existentials - sometimes called 'enumerating' - which were discussed in chapter 5; for example:

63. Who shall we invite? - There's Arthur, and the vicar, and your friend who knows Russian, ...

The referents in this case are evidently assumed to be **KNOWN**, and the function of the expressions is therefore referring. There is one type of existential utterance, however, in which the referent is assumed to be 'known' and yet we would want to say that the referential function is relating. In this type, the speaker **reminds** the hearer of
something which he may have forgotten or may appear to be forgetting:

64. Do you remember they once had a house in Edinburgh?

65. There's a man under the bed and you accuse me of getting hysterical!

We might say, to get out of this difficulty, that the speaker wishes to treat the referent as 'insufficiently known' in view of his present communicative intention. Thus the function is relating, not referring.

Nominals with a relating function are often notable for their length, syntactic complexity and high information content (cf. 58, 59, 64). They are a convenient narrative or expository or explanatory device in themselves. Hence the aptness of the term 'relating'.

3.1.3 Identifying

Identification is an extremely pervasive function in discourse. In the linguistic and philosophical literature the term is used to cover a wide variety of phenomena and, in accommodating this variety to the taxonomy I have established, it has been necessary to recognise two distinct sets of identification processes. On the one hand there is the type of process in which the message is split, for reasons of emphasis or information blocking, etc., into a part which describes what is to be identified (and which indicates that the identification is more or less immediately forthcoming) and a part which actually provides the identification, i.e. reveals whatever it is that the speaker has in mind. For example:
What she would most like to have is a room of her own.

The writer she would most like to have met is Virginia Woolf.

What is revealed in (66) is (an arbitrary token of) a type; in (67) is an actual individual. The revelatory expressions do not function to say something about a referent already established in the discourse. On the contrary, they function to establish a referent about which, in the introducing expression (typically, as in these cases, the subject of the sentence), something has, in anticipation, been said. They are thus, despite their grammatically secondary status, referential primaries (referring, relating expressions, etc.). The expressions which introduce them are of considerable interest and will be discussed below (3.2.2.1).

Apart from expressions in identification processes of this type, there are expressions which 'identify' and which are clearly secondary in their referential function, i.e. they serve not to pick out a referent about which something will be said but to say something about a referent which has already been picked out. These are the expressions which I shall consider in this section and which I shall call 'identifying expressions'. Such expressions have been much discussed, and their complexities and subtleties are protected by a small minefield of puzzles and paradoxes (Russell, 1905; Strawson, 1950; Linsky, 1963; Ziff, 1960). They appear strongly resistant to any kind of account which, without numerous qualifications, is both comprehensive and consistent. Part of the problem seems to lie in the not always clearly stated distinction between identity, as a relation
of equivalence between two entities (and equation as a means of asserting identity), and identification, as a process of exposition by means of which a referent is made more fully known to the hearer.

What, we need to ask, is the connection between these two?

For Lyons (1977:135) both expressions in an equative sentence

function as referring expressions and the copula asserts an identity between the two referents ... the two expressions are interchangeable (as are the two terms in an equation like \(3^2 = 9\)).

Provided 'referring expressions' is interpreted broadly enough, it is clear that this formula could apply equally to specific and non-specific reference (Cicero is Tully / Salt is sodium chloride).

However, the notion of identification (in the present sense) applies only to expressions with specific reference, so we shall here disregard the non-specific case. There can of course be no kind of identity between a referent which is a particular (an individual) and one which in a non-particular (a type).

The one and only test of an equation is that the referents of the equated expressions should be identical (in some relevant respects).

Equations are reversible because reversability does not affect identity. However, in natural language the communicative function of an equation is identification, and a reversal does affect identification. In the use of an equative sentence, the referent of one expression is 'identified' by means of the utterance of the other expression. The identifying expression, in the unmarked case, is the complement; (if it is the subject, it will normally carry some intonational prominence). If two equative sentences are identical except for
the order of the nominal expressions, and if both are unmarked, then
the utterances make the same equation but they do not make the same
identification:

68a. That man over there is the man you spoke
to at the party last night
identifies the man over there as the man you spoke to;

68b. The man you spoke to at the party last
night is that man over there
identifies the man you spoke to as that man over there.

In the examples just given, the identifying expression provides
a complete means of identification: its referent is unique and known
to the hearer. However, the only absolute requirement for an ident-
ifying expression is that its referent should be some actual individ-
ual. It may not be unique:

68c. The man you spoke to at the party last
night is one of those men over there.
(In this case the identification is vague.) And it may not be known
to the hearer:

68d. That man over there is one of the people
I spoke to at a party I went to last night.
(In this case the expression provides a means of prospective identi-
fication: more will be known about him in case he is encountered or
referred to in the future.)

Notice that in none of these examples does the identifying
expression enable the hearer to identify what he could otherwise
not be able to pick out correctly on the basis of the utterance of
the subject expression. The subject expressions here are referring,
and the principle of identification applies. The function of the
identifying expression is to supply an alternative or additional means of identification: identification of the subject referent under a different aspect.

Some examples. (All involve appositions; but the same points apply to the equivalent subject-complement types.)

69. It probably did not convince the Prime Minister, Macmillan. (I)

'The Prime Minister' has PRIMARY function (referring); 'Macmillan' identifies by naming. This type of identification has been called 'appellation' (Quirk et al., 1972:629). Reversal leaves the referential pattern (R - I) unchanged:

69a. ... Macmillan, the Prime Minister.

This latter type, in which, most commonly, an individual referred to by name is further identified by role, has been called by Quirk et al. 'designating'.

Sometimes the primary expression fulfills a relating rather than a referring function:

70. The leader of a religious cult on this Mediterranean Island, John Smith. ...

Reversal leaves the referential pattern (REL - I) unchanged. Compare the following, in which the primary expression is also relating:

71. 'We are every whit as good as the whiteman and as fit to control our own country,' declared a Chagga teacher, Petro Niau ... (I)

This type is called by Quirk et al. 'identification'. They note that, in contrast with appellation, 'there is no longer unique equivalence'. An important effect of this is that reversal produces a different referential pattern:

71a. ... declared Petro Niau, a Chagga teacher.
The secondary expression here is no longer identifying but 'attributing' (3.2.3), since 'a Chagga teacher' describes a class to which Petro N'jau is said to belong, not an identity.

The main points of this discussion are summarised in the following proposition:

PROPOSITION R2.3: ON CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF AN IDENTIFYING EXPRESSION

(i) As for referring and relating;
(ii) the individual identified has been established in the discourse as the referent of a PRIMARY (relating or referring) expression;
(iii) the speaker uses an expression — a name or designation — the referent of which is asserted to be identical to the referent of the primary expression;
(iv) the point of the act performed in the utterance of the identifying expression is to provide the hearer with an alternative or additional means of identifying the referent of the associated primary expression;
(v) the expression is normally uttered as part of a larger propositional act with which is associated some illocutionary force.

3.2 The three non-specific functions.

These are the functions which philosophers and linguists have been least willing to call referential, or have called non-referential. They are functions in which the descriptive content of the nominal expression is of enhanced significance, and in which the predicative
element is not easily distinguished from the referential. My dis-
cussion will exactly parallel that for the SPECIFIC functions.

3.2.1 Evoking

Evoking expressions parallel referring expressions in that their
referential function is PRIMARY and their referents are assumed by
the speaker to be KNOWN. The difference lies in the distinction
between reference to some actual individual, which is the function
of referring expressions, and reference to a type, or some hypothetical
or arbitrary token of a type, which is the function of evoking ex-
pressions.

Evoking expressions are so-called since their intended effect
is to summon up in the mind of the hearer either some idea or image -
some concept - of some class or property of things or people or events
or states of affairs or facts, which lacks, for the purposes of the
relevant part of the discourse, any specific extension outside the
minds of the participants; or some idea or image of some arbitrary or
hypothetical token of the type. Thus, condition (i) of all the specific
functions does not apply.

PROPOSITION R2.4 : ON CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF AN EVOKING
EXPRESSION

(i) The type (class, property, etc.) evoked, or of which some arbitrary
or hypothetical token is evoked, is assumed to be a type previously
KNOWN to the hearer;
(ii) the speaker uses an expression which describes, with sufficient exactness, the type (or its token) which he wishes to evoke;

(iii) the point of the act performed in the utterance of the evoking expression is to call into the mind of the hearer an image or idea of some type, or some arbitrary or hypothetical token of a type, which corresponds nearly enough to the image or idea in the speaker's mind which prompted him to use the expression;

(iv) the expression is normally uttered as part of some larger propositional act with which is associated some illocutionary force.

I shall interpret KNOW in a fairly wide sense. There are some expressions whose function in their context is plainly to inform the hearer of the existence of some category of which he is assumed to have been previously unaware ('establishing expressions', 3.2.2). The preceding sentence contains an example of the type. Also, there are expressions whose function in their context is to inform the hearer of the existence of some category, not absolutely, but relative to some situation or state of affairs; i.e. to inform him, not that the type of things called N exists, but that the type of things called N exists, or also exists, somewhere. Thus the expression 'lions' in 'there are lions in Africa' is used with an establishing function, though even there is not necessarily any assumption by the speaker that the existence of lions, in a general way, is NOT KNOW to the hearer.

Apart from such cases, I shall make a general assumption that where there is a non-specific reference there is KNOW-ness. Often, as with referring expressions, this will be mediated: from a (hypothetical) country, plus general facts about countries, may be inferred its
possession of a capital, a population, a national anthem, a crime rate, etc.; from the (generic) tribe, plus general facts about social groups, may be inferred tribal cohesion, tribal customs, tribal myths, tribal disintegration, etc. All of these derived categories are 'known', if at all, in the way concepts in general are known – not in the way individuals are known.

There are various types of evoking expression. The main division is between those with and those without generic reference, but this distinction is not easy to apply in all cases. Non-generic evoking expressions are those whose referent is a particular: a token of a type, not the type itself.

72. (Berkeley) formed a scheme for a College in the Bahamas, with a view to which he went to America; but after spending three years in Rhode Island he came home and relinquished the project. (R)

The scheme existed ... until it was abandoned. The College in the Bahamas never did. The relating expression 'a scheme for a College in the Bahamas' includes an evoking expression, with a non-generic referent, 'a College in the Bahamas'. The factive verb 'form' supplies a transparent context; the expression 'a scheme for' supplies an opaque context, within which a non-opaque interpretation of 'a college' does not seem possible. The much discussed ambiguities found in sentences such as 'My friend wants to marry a Norwegian' are thus, according to my analysis, pragmatic ambiguities (i.e. alternative conceivable interpretations in some context) as between the evoking and relating functions. If 'a Norwegian' is intended to be interpreted as an evoking expression there is no actual individual in mind; if as a relating expression then such an individual exists.
73. Great heat, he says, is a pain, and must be in a mind. Therefore heat is mental; and a similar argument applies to cold. This is reinforced by the famous argument about the lukewarm water. When one of your hands is hot and the other cold, you put both into lukewarm water, which feels... (R)

There are a number of non-generic evocations in this passage, as well as some generic ones. (There is only one indubitable referring expression: 'he'.) The non-generic evoking expressions are 'a mind' (referent: any token of the type), 'the lukewarm water' (any specimen of lukewarm water which might be obtained for the purpose of the experiment), and 'one of your hands'... 'both'... 'one hand'... 'the other' (the referent of 'your' is an arbitrary token of the human type; 'hands' are mediated by this referent). Of the generic evoking expressions, 'great heat', 'heat' and 'cold' evoke types of physical phenomena (pace Berkeley), while 'a similar argument' evokes not a token but a sub-type of the type 'argument'. From the context, it is not entirely clear whether 'the famous argument about the lukewarm water' is intended to make reference to the particular argument that Berkeley produced in demonstrating that heat is mental or to a type of argument that may be used by anybody for this purpose. If we conclude (probably correctly) the former, the expression is referring notwithstanding the abstractness of the referent; if the latter, then the expression is evoking (and evokes a type).

Any adequate treatment of generic reference would be a lengthy study in itself, and would need to be accompanied by a study of the various types of generic propositions that generic evoking expressions enter into. I shall here do no more than note a broad correspondence
that exists between types of generic reference and types of specific reference.

(i) We recognised a class of **general** referring expressions: expressions serving to pick out all (or just about all) of a known set of individuals. Parallel to these is the class of 'toto-generic' evoking expressions, which are used to make reference to whatever belongs to the class denoted. Examples are 'heat' in (73) and

74. **Dreams** have at their command memories which are inaccessible in waking life ... (F)

75. The brain, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. (R)

76. A false belief is one which, in suitable circumstances, will cause the person entertaining it to experience surprise. (R)

I shall not go into the referential differences which may be said to correspond to the three grammatical types here illustrated, except to note that the indefinite article singular type (76) excludes, as Lyons points out, the collective interpretation which is possible in (75) and unavoidable in (74), and shades imperceptibly into the class of non-generics exemplified by 'a mind' in (73).

(ii) We recognised a class of **vague** referring expressions, usually marked by pre-selecting determiners (**some** / **most** / **one** of the ...). Parallel to these we find vague ('parti-generic') evoking expressions, marked by the same set of quantifiers (but **normally** non-pre-selecting): 'some dreams', 'many dreams', or even 'one dream' (which could be used to evoke one type of dream).

(iii) We recognised a class of unitary referring expressions, serving to pick out one specific individual. Similar, in some respects, to
these we find evoking expressions which serve to define a class whose membership (in contrast to the open-ended membership of, for example, the class of dreams) is strictly determinate: commonly one. These are, of course, expressions having Donnellan's 'attributive' function, i.e. those whose referent is 'whatever is the one', in contrast with those (i.e. the unitary referring expressions) whose referent is 'the one'. I shall not add to my earlier comments on these, except to describe, in the following sub-section, what appears to be one extremely important sub-class.

3.2.1.1 Indicating expressions

Indicating expressions are characterised (a) by the function which they have of evoking a determinate class; and (b) by the function of pointing forward to a separate expression whose function it is to reveal the individual or the type or some arbitrary token of the type which, according to the speaker, satisfies the earlier description. This form of 'identification' was touched on in 3.1.3 in order to distinguish it from the type of identification brought about by the use of a relating or referring expression followed by an identifying expression. Consider:

77. The height of ambition for schoolboys was Makersere College. (I)

78. The European officer's normal role was to supervise and educate. (I)

79. One example of tribal aggregation so completely illustrates the process that it deserves more extensive treatment: the introduction of direct rule into the region surrounding the lower Pagani. (I)
The pattern in such sentences is 'address, occupant'. The writer does not, in the use of the subject expression, pick out, e.g., a specific known 'height of ambition' which he then goes on to alternatively or additionally identify. Rather, the function of the subject expression is to describe an 'address', which happens to have a single occupant, and the function of the complement expression is to reveal the occupant and thereby establish it as a new referent in the discourse. In (77) the occupant is a specific individual; if it is assumed to be known to the hearer, the expression is referring; otherwise relating. In (78) the referent is a type of activity, the expression evoking. (79) shows that an indicating expression need not be definite; there is an implication that other examples could be given. It also shows that an indicating expression may be separated by other material from the 'occupant' expression.

The effect of reversal on such sentences is that a new referential pattern is produced:

77a. Makerere College was the height of ambition for schoolboys.

There is no indicating expression here; rather, we have an act of referring followed by one of attribution. It appears to be invariably the case that if an indicating expression is transposed in this way it reads as an attributing expression. One might almost define an indicating expression as an attributing expression with PRIMARY referential function.

One way to produce an indicating expression is by means of a descriptive noun phrase as in the examples so far considered. A second way is by means of a pseudo-cleft sentence:
80. But what stands in the forefront of our interest is the question of the significance of dreams ... (p)

81. What was needed in this situation was a new leader.

Note that the occupant described in the complement expression in (81), as is often the case with pseudo-cleft sentences, is non-generic: a token of the type.

A third way is by means of certain minimal formulae, such as the fact, the news, the result, the problem ...

82. The difficulty is that our people are largely illiterate.

83. Its essence was the complete integration of indigenous political systems into the colonial administration. (I)

This type may be distinguished from descriptions and pseudo-clefts in its failure of interchangeability (at least in most cases) even where the occupant expression is not, as it frequently is, a that-clause.

82a. ?? That our people are largely illiterate is the difficulty.

83a. ?? The complete integration ... was its essence.

In the cleft sentence, the pointing-forward function is separated from the evoking function:

84. It was this critical attitude that prevented the subject from reporting any of these ideas. (F)

We might regard it as the most minimal of potential indicating expressions; but more consistently we should deny it this label on the grounds that it lacks all descriptive content.
Establishing expressions parallel relating expressions in that their referential function is PRIMARY and their referents are assumed to be NOT-KNOWN. They differ in that their referents are NON-SPECIFIC (and, indeed, invariably generic).

**Proposition 2.5: On Conditions for the Use of an Establishing Expression**

(i) The type (class, property, etc.) established is one assumed by the speaker to the previously NOT-KNOWN to the hearer, either absolutely or relative to some situation or state of affairs;

(ii) the speaker uses an expression which describes, with sufficient exactness, the characteristics of this type;

(iii) the point of the act performed in the utterance of the establishing expression is to inform the hearer of the existence, unqualified to or relative/some situation or state of affairs, of the type in question;

(iv) the expression is normally uttered as part of some larger propositional act with which is associated some illocutionary force.

Establishing expressions, it may be confidently hypothesised, are most frequently to be found in pedagogic and scientific discourse:

85. (Indirect rule) differed from direct rule (as in Swatt's Tanganyika) where native authorities needed no indigenous status, and from 'a native state' (as broadly in Buganda) where relations between European and African rulers were fixed by treaty. (I)

86. Dreams can be divided into three categories in respect of the relation between their latent and manifest content. In the first
place, we may distinguish those dreams which make sense and are at the same time intelligible, which, that is to say, can be inserted without further difficulty into the context of our mental life. (F)

In both these examples, more or less familiar phenomena (within the discourse context) — Byatt’s Tanganyika, dreams which make sense — are given an unfamiliar classification. (In (86) this is original work of the author; in (85) the author describes a typology known to historians but not, it is assumed, to the reader.) Frequently, however, the phenomena themselves are assumed to be not known:

87. There are some twenty species of armadillo and once there were a lot more, including a monster with a single-piece domed shell as big as a small car. (A)

An establishing expression may, like any PRIMARY, follow an indicating expression:

88. Another motive was a real desire to define oneself and one’s tribe by its origins. (I)

89. The most important of these is the vagus, or tenth nerve, which supplies the heart, ... (M)

As with relating expressions, it is notable that an establishing expression has the potential for being a complex expository device, into which a large amount of content may be packed (e.g. 85, 86).

On the other hand it may consist of no more than the name — preceded by the definite article — of a type of entity new to the hearer (89).

Establishing expressions are not, of course, confined to scientific discourse:

90. There is a tide in the affairs of men which taken at the flood leads on to fortune.

As with Freud’s dreams, familiar material — but a new way of seeing it.
3.2.3 Attributing

Attributing expressions resemble identifying expressions in their SECONDARY referential function but differ in being NON-SPECIFIC. They are thus the least 'referential' of all referential expressions. There is a connection between this fact and the diverse grammatical forms in which the attributing function is realised: not only NPs ("his parents are millionaires") but also adjectives ("his parents are rich") HAVE-predicates ("his parents have lots of money") habitual predicates ("his parents work hard") and pre-head adjuncts ("his rich / millionaire parents") may be attributing. It is certainly stretching our use of 'referential' to the limit to regard the function of, e.g., this NP constituent 'rich' as coming within the scope of referential analysis of discourse, but I hope I have by now established that there is reason in so doing, and that Part III will demonstrate its utility.

Various types of what I am calling attributing expressions have been described (e.g., in Bach, 1967; Lyons, 1977). I shall illustrate three which between them include a large proportion of all instances: characterising, classifying and defining.

A characterising attribution is one in which a property is predicated of some referent:

91. The election of September 1958 was a devastating victory for TANU. (I)

92. He pointed out that the Princess is the sister of the Head of the Church of England. (M)

93. My eighth Mr Right is Mr Wrong ... says Joy, Britain's most married woman ....... Dark-haired Joy Grassick (50) made history only last December when ... (JSW)
It is arguable that (91) **classifies** the election as a victory for TANU and **characterises** it as devastating. (92) is of interest because of the fine line which separates an attributing from an identifying interpretation. However, the context strongly suggests that it is not as the specific sister of the specific Head that the speaker intended to identify the Princess, but as having the attribute SISTER OF HEAD OF CHURCH that he wanted to characterise her. (93) is included as illustrating typical journalistic usage (e.g. the characterising pre-head adjunct in the anaphoric NP 'dark-haired Joy Grassick') as well as three grammatical types: the intensive complement, the appositive adjunct and the pre-head adjunct.

A **classifying** attribution is one in which class membership, class inclusion or class equivalence is predicated of some referent:

94. **A West Indian Creole**, Cameron shared the period’s widespread scepticism of the desirability of assimilating non-Europeans to European culture. (I)

(Cameron is described as belonging in the class of West Indian Creoles.)

95. Dreams are nothing other than **fulfilments of wishes**. (F)

(The class of dreams is described as being included in the class of wish-fulfilments.)

96. Tree-nymphs, or **dryads**, figured often in these myths.

(The class of tree-nymphs is described as being the same as the class of dryads.) **Class equivalence attributions** are the non-specific counterpart of identifying expressions, and typically are complements in equative sentences or appear in an appositive relationship, as here, marked by 'or'. Very often, to assert a **class equivalence** is in
effect to provide a name, or an alternative name, for a type.

Reversal does not affect the identity relation:

97. Beauty is *truth, truth beauty*.

A defining attribution is one in which a combination of classifying and characterising ascriptions are described as giving the definition of some referent:

98. Tribes were seen as *cultural units 'possessing a common language, a single social system, and an established customary law.'* (I)

**PROPOSITION R2.6:** ON CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF AN ATTRIBUTING EXPRESSION

(i) There is some referent (particular or non-particular) previously established in the discourse, in respect of which the attribution is made;

(ii) the speaker uses an expression which describes, with sufficient exactness, the attribute or set of attributes which he wishes to ascribe to the referent;

(iii) the point of the act performed in the utterance of the attributing expression is to ascribe to the referent some characterising, classifying or defining attribute or attributes;

(iv) the expression is normally uttered as part of some larger propositional act with which is associated some illocutionary force.

3.3 Retrospect and prospect

I have described six main referential functions and a number of sub-types. The immediate application of this taxonomy is in the analysis
of discourse; discovering patterns of referential acts and describing their linguistic realisations. The efficacy of the taxonomy depends on various factors: have the correct - the important - distinctions been made? have they been defined with sufficient clarity and exactness for them to be applied with reasonable ease and with tolerable reliability? (If so, the reader may by now have realised that the function intended by Elo, in the example at the beginning of the chapter, was attributing, and that which her husband purported to recognise was relating.) It is obvious that no functional taxonomy (that is to say no taxonomy of communicative functions) can be proof against all doubtful cases. For example, the performative distinction between ordering and requesting might be described in meticulous detail, but whether a particular datum fits one description or the other will always be a matter, not of absolute fact, but of interpretation, interpretation which may waver as different factors are brought into consideration.

In attempting to minimise uncertainty, we may usefully take account not only of the definitions given to different functions in terms of sets of conditions for the use of expressions fulfilling them but also of the more basic of the patterns that expressions enter into. Six such basic patterns, most of which have been noted and exemplified in the discussion, may usefully be recognised:

- **R - I** (referring, identifying)
- **REL - I** (relating, identifying)
- **R - A** (referring, attributing)
- **REL - A** (relating, attributing)
- **E - A** (evoking, attributing)
EST - A (establishing, attributing)

Reversal provides a useful check on intuitions:
- the reversal of \((R - I)\) is \((R - I)\);
- the reversal of \((REL - I)\) is \((REL - I)\) where there is unique equivalence, otherwise \((REL - A)\);
- indicating expressions given secondary function become attributions; hence if an A expression is reversible we may get:
  \[
  \begin{align*}
  (R - A) & \rightarrow (IND - R) \\
  (REL - A) & \rightarrow (IND - REL) \\
  (E - A) & \rightarrow (IND - E) \\
  (EST - A) & \rightarrow (IND - EST)
  \end{align*}
  \]

But it is not always the case that an A expression is reversible.

And an alternative possible reversal for \((REL - A)\), as we have seen, is \((REL - I)\). A more secure hypothesis is:

\[
\begin{align*}
  (IND - R) & \rightarrow (R - A) \\
  (IND - REL) & \rightarrow (REL - A) \\
  (IND - E) & \rightarrow (E - A) \\
  (IND - EST) & \rightarrow (EST - A).
\end{align*}
\]

Other reversals may well be revealed in the analysis of data. We will also expect to find recurring patterns of referential functions other than those involving referential secondaries and indicating expressions. As patterns emerge and become confirmed or modified, the 'definition' of the various functions will be enriched. We shall see them not as types of isolated act but as inter-related acts, acts in regular patterns of interactivity. Thus the analysis of text data will not only test the position I have constructed but, if it does not demolish it, will extend it and strengthen it.
1 Introduction

My object in this chapter is two-fold: to recall certain issues discussed in Part I so as to indicate their bearing on nominal-referential analysis (this section); and to present, as a form of practical assistance to the investigator in undertaking his analysis, a 'field guide' to the study of nominality and reference in actual performance (section 2).

We saw in Part I that text (the linguistic signal), context (relevant features of culture, situation - including co-text - and personal experience) and discourse (the interpretation of the one in the light of the other) are the stuff of performance: particular sentences in a particular sequence actually uttered with particular communicative intentions by a particular person or persons fulfilling particular roles in a particular setting. Text sentences encode propositional and modal content; context features make possible the illocutionary interpretation of propositional content as propositions and modal content as performative force. The vital link between mere content and an actual proposition is reference. Referential acts - the utterance of certain nominal expressions under certain conditions and with certain intentions - bind propositional content to the world, or at least to 'a world', i.e. to a particular state of affairs, actual or hypothetical, real or unreal. Thus, to say that
some understanding of how reference operates
in language behaviour is essential for the
analysis of actual texts
(Lyons, 1977:197)

is, if we may read for 'actual texts' discourse, rather to under-
state the case. Such understanding is not merely essential, it is
of fundamental importance, for without it we cannot see what it is
that makes a text anything more than a text, what it is that gives
utterance significance as purposeful communication.

Also in Part I, I distinguished the process of discourse,
which I described as part of the larger process of action and reaction
which takes place between a speaker or writer and some actual or hypo-
thetical interlocutor, from the structure of discourse, which I
described as the sequential and hierarchical patterning of discourse
acts. The former I labelled 'interaction', the latter 'interactivity'.
I suggested that it is interactivity, not interaction, with which
the (applied-linguistically motivated) discourse analyst should be
principally concerned, and that account should be taken of the
interactional aspect (which is largely within the expertise of the
social psychologist and ethnomethodologist) only so far as it throws
useful light on general or particular problems in the description of
interactivity. The term interactivity was intended to be understood
very broadly: as covering all functional relationships between all
kinds of discourse acts. Part of nominal-referential analysis is
thus to discover how referential acts form part of the interactive
patterning of discourse: how they relate to other referential acts,
to predicative and performative acts, and to the various perlocution-
ary intentions and effects which help to make the link between
discourse structure and discourse process; and how such relations are linguistically expressed through grammatical and lexical devices of cohesion.

The other part of nominal-referential analysis, for which the ground has been prepared in the previous two chapters, involves the discovery of certain regularities ('rules of use') that may be expected to exist (and to be of fundamental importance in the business of language teaching and learning) in the realisation of referential function in lexi-co-grammatical form.

Our Field Guide will therefore need to include the following components:

1. an itemisation of nominal types and nominal constituents;
2. a list of referential functions and sub-functions;
3. some notes on expected direct and indirect associations between (1) and (2);
4. pointers to the discovery of patterns of interactivity and typical devices of cohesion.

Components (1) and (2) in this list will be recapitulations of the positions developed in chapters 5 and 6 respectively on those aspects of grammatical and 'practical' competence which, I have argued, must underlie nominal and referential performance. Component (3) breaks new ground. It sketches some possible or probable features of 'applicational' competence, i.e. knowledge that a native speaker may reasonably be assumed to have of how certain (nominal) expressions are regularly used and of how certain (referential) functions are
appropriately performed. It must be emphasised that this component provides no more than a sketch, a loosely structured list of expectations, not a comprehensive set of fully worked out hypotheses. To produce such hypotheses would not, it need hardly be said, be possible without extensive analysis of data, and the Field Guide is supposed to assist the analysis, not vice versa. But, if the 'expectations' are not based on analysis of textual data, on what are they based? In part, of course, they are the product of my own native-speaker intuitions, and I do not want to underestimate that part. But in part, also, they are extensions of various positions already established, especially those to do with the interaction of grammar and praxis, the two axioms on grammatical form and meaning (chapter 3), the nature of indirectness, the distinction between the denotative and the determinative functions in nominal expressions, the classification of determiner functions, the 'fixed' meaning of various determiner forms, and the nature of the three 'dimensions of reference' which serve to differentiate the principle referential functions.

Let us return to the example discussed at the beginning of the previous chapter. We saw that the expression 'the skin of a twenty-year-old', has, according to the position proposed in chapter 3, a single fixed grammatical meaning sufficiently abstract to make the expression appropriate as the realisation of more than one referential function. The indefinite article (fixed meaning proposed: 'single') may be applied equally to a SPECIFIC or to a NON-SPECIFIC particular. The definite article (fixed meaning proposed: 'located') may indicate the locatedness equally of a type (in relation to other types in
some taxonomy) or of a token (in relation to other tokens: in this case a particularised property token in relation to a possessor token). The correlation between grammatical form and meaning is one-to-one; that between grammatical meaning and referential function is one-to-many. Provided there is no contradiction between a certain grammatical meaning and a certain referential function (and providing that no arbitrary convention of usage forbids or discourages it) then one may freely be used for the realisation of the other. Even if there is a contradiction a use may be possible, but it will be recognised as indirect and interpreted accordingly.

From a datum such as this (whether an attested text or some intuitively recognised one) we may conclude that a rule of use exists which recognises that expressions of the form 'the p of a q' are appropriate realisations both for an attributing and for a relating referential function (cf. Higham, 1974:151ff, on 'relational' the, with 'existence-establishing', 'generic' and 'non-specific' possible interpretations.)

There are two approaches to the description of regularities of use, two distinct biases. One adopts the view from grammar to praxis (in accordance with the representation of types of competence given in fig. 3.1 p. 74 we may call this bias 'left-handed'); the other ('right-handed') adopts the view from praxis to grammar. We may start from nominals and their constituents and attempt to describe their correlation with functions; or we may start from referential functions and attempt to describe the possibilities for their realisation in nominal expressions. We may— and for language teaching purposes we should (as proposed in chapter 1) — do both; the two
accounts should not contradict one another, but they would not have precisely the same efficacy and utility. Applied discourse analysis (in so far as it has attended to grammatical realisations at all) has shown a pronounced right-handedness, and this is largely because the communicative approach to language teaching has rooted itself in a form of syllabus design which gives primacy to functions rather than to the use of forms. It is also because functional analysis is in its infancy and is ripe for development, whereas the description of the communicative uses of grammatical items is as old as traditional grammar. Since, for most communicative language teaching purposes, both biases are needed, I shall, in the Field Guide, adopt both. But the piece of position-building which is intended to be most innovative in the present work, and therefore most in need of proving, is the taxonomy of referential functions, and, mainly for this reason, I shall give more attention to the right hand than to the left in my notes on rules of use, as well as in the subsequent analysis.

Component (4) will consist of notes on how the ideas on interactivity reviewed above and discussed at some length in chapter 4 can be explored in relation to referential acts. Both practical and applicational competence underlie the interactive aspect of discourse performance: practical competence since native speakers appear to 'know' not only certain types of act that people perform but also certain common routines or sequences of acts (for example the two-part patterns of primary and secondary reference described at the end of chapter 6) and they appear able to build on these and interconnect them in the production and recognition of discourse; appli-
cational competence because such interactivity may be, and characteristically is, linguistically marked in text through the devices of cohesion. There is no doubt that we are touching here on that border territory between competence and performance, that skill-in-performance, which in chapter 4 I suggested might be be called 'strategic competence' or rhetorical 'accomplishment'.

The applied linguist who has language teaching utility in mind investigates discourse performance not for its own sake but with a view to understanding the bases of competence and accomplishment. He is not concerned that a particular discourse event should be internalised by some learner so that it may later be reproduced, but that certain forms of knowledge and skill should, with the objective that the learner will eventually be able to produce acceptable, even accomplished, performances of his own, be understood by himself and then transferred. We analyse performance so to be able to teach competence. The Guide (which — though it contains more detail than I have made use of in my own analysis in chapter 8 — is by no means comprehensive and will need revising and extending as more analysis is done) is intended to assist in achieving this end.

2 Field Guide to Nominal-Referential Analysis

2.1 Nominal Expressions

2.1.1 NOMINAL TYPE

Is the nominal:
- a common-noun phrase \( cNP \)
- an adjective phrase \( \text{adjP} \)
2.1.2 Denotative Function

(i) Is the head:
- proper noun; common noun pN; cN
- (if proper) human; other (place, animal, etc) +H; -H
- (if human). + title + first name + last name T; FN; IN (TNP, TNN, ...)
- (if common) count preference Cpref
  non-count preference NCpref
  no preference Øpref
- (if Cpref or NCpref) Is there agreement or conflict between the pref of the head and the countability of the NP? if conflict, is it a case of Cpref head in non-count NP Cpref/NC or of NCpref head in count NP NCpref/C
- (if common) concrete; abstract conc; abs
- (if abstract) verb nominalisation v.nom
  adj. nominalisation adj.nom

(ii) Is the modification:
- simple; compound; complex smp; cpd; cpx
- pre-head; post-head preH; postH
- relative (including derivations from full postmodifying relative clause) rel
  or appositional appos
2.1.3 DETERMINATIVE FUNCTION

(i) Which functions are realised:
- DEFINING: bounding; individuating; definitising
- ENUMERATING: quantifying; selecting
- ITEMISING: adding; ordering; comparing
- PRE-SELECTING

(ii) Which forms realise the functions?
- definitisers: the
  this/these, that/those
  my, your, ... John's, ...
  which, whose
- quantifiers: a, some, any, no
  one, two, ...
  many/much, (a) few/little
  more, most, less/fewer, least/fewest
  several, a lot of, ...
- selecters: any, either, no, neither
  all, both, every, each
  some, certain, most
  whichever, whatever, whoever
- itemisers: other, more, further
  first, second, ... next, last
  former, latter
  such, same, different

2.1.4 EXTERNAL FUNCTION

Does the nominal expression function syntactically as:
- subject
- object (direct, indirect)

S
0 (d, i)
- preposition complement in prep. phrase functioning as adverbial in clause
  
- main clause ascriptive or equative complement (link verb: BE, BECOME, SEEM, etc.)
  
- relative or non-finite or verbless clause complement
  
- appositional adjunct
  
- pre-head adjunct (i.e. non-restrictive)
  
- existential complement (THERE BE ...)
  
- part of postmodification of NP
  
- definitising determiner of NP

2.2 Referential functions

Is the function of the nominal expression:

2.2.1 REFERRING (= primary, specific, known) R
  
  - unitary; vague; general R.u/v/g
  
  - immediate; mediated R.i/m
  
  - first mention; subsequent mention (anaphoric) R; R

2.2.2 RELATING (= primary, specific, not-known) REL
  
  - unitary; vague; general REL.u/v/g
  
  - immediate; mediated REL.i/m

2.2.3 IDENTIFYING (= secondary, specific) I
  
  - unitary; vague; general I.u/v/g
  
  - appellative; designative I.appel/des
2.2.4 EVOKING (= primary, non-specific, known) E or e
- indicating; non-indicating IND; \{E\}
- (if non-indicating) type (= generic) E
token (= non-generic) e
- (if type) toto-generic E.t
  parti-generic E.p
  'attributive' E.att
- immediate; mediated E.i/m
- first mention; subsequent mention \{E\}; \{e\}

2.2.5 ESTABLISHING (= primary, non-specific, not-known) EST
immediate; mediated EST.i/m

2.2.6 ATTRIBUTING (= secondary, non-specific) A
- characterising; classifying; defining A.ch/cl/def
- (if classifying) class-membership cl.m
  class-inclusion cl.i
  class-equivalence cl.e

2.3 Nominal-Referential: some expected regularities of use

2.3.1 Notes on the use of nominal expressions

2.3.1.1 Nominal types
- cNP: expect full range of referential functions (henceforth rf)
- adjP: only attributing rf
- **pNP:** if used as a genuine proper name (not a description, in which case treat it as a cNP with pN head), only the SPEC rf;

- **qNP:** only the SPEC rf;

- **pronP:** full range of rf? but any non-anaphoric use (in written discourse) would constitute a form of indirectness so note any pronP realising REL, EST, R, E;

- **nomCL:** full range of rf? factive nominalisations (his riding the bicycle) more open to SPEC interpretation; nominalisations of manner (his riding of the bicycle), emotion (for him to ride the bicycle) and uncertainty (whether he rides the bicycle) more likely E.

### 2.3.1.2 Denotative function

- NP head with modifiers (by definition restrictive) and constrained by context denotes the type, or class, of entity to some subset of which reference is made;

- expect NON-SPEC rf where the NP head is in one of the following categories:

  - species names: type, sort, kind, class, species, variety (cf Leech & Svartvik, 1975:45);

  - certain nationality names: British, Spanish, Irish, etc (Quirk et al., 1972:151);

  - certain collective nouns: aristocracy, bourgeoisie, proletariat, laity, clergy, etc (op. cit. 190)
adjective heads (plural personal): blind, poor, etc (op.cit.151)

adjective heads (singular, abstract): good, true, etc (ibid.)

- count/non-count heads show no particular rf
  tendency, but expect:
  Cpref/N and NCpref/C: NON-SPEC rf; in particular,
  NCpref/C normally signals (if not a portion, e.g.
  two sugars) a sub-type;
  - 'type' or 'class' (see above) is to be given a broad
  interpretation so as to include the very common case
  where the set denoted is delimited by some SPECIFIC
  event, agency, relationship of possession,
  etc, particularly through the operation of a relative
  clause;
  - the precise role of relative clauses (and other forms
  of modification) in particular referential acts
  (see for example Ebert, 1972) is a matter calling for
  detailed empirical investigation; nominals embedded
  in NP modification may, as a step in this direction,
  themselves be analysed for their referential function.

2.3.1.3 Determinative function

BOUNDING, INDIVIDUATING

- If these functions are not realised, i.e. there is
  zero determiner (meaning = 'unbounded', 'without
clarifying exterior limits') and the NP is singular, expect NON-SPEC rf (E, EST, A);

- the individuating determiners, notably the indef. article (= 'single') and plural (= 'discrete', 'separated') will be associated with reference to any particular (or set of particulars) whether SPEC or NON-SPEC;

- in NON-SPEC uses, the individuating determiner may mark:- toto-generic rf (lions are sleepy animals) including representative-generic rf (a lion is a sleepy animal);
attributing rf (that is a lion/those are lions).

DEFINITISING

- proposed meaning common to all definitisers is 'located';

- expect a strong association between definitising determination and rf KNOWN (of 'familiarity' theory of the definite article, Christophersen, 1939; Jespersen, 1949; nevertheless an incomplete account - cf Hawkins, 1974);

- any anaphoric R or E will have realisation in a nominal with definitising determiner;

- likewise any mediated rf, whether or not KNOWN, provided the reference is not general or vague;

- note certain grammatically determined uses of definite article (same, -est, ordering itemisers) which give a necessary 'locatedness';
- note possibility of definite article in attributing rf, provided the attribute is possession of some institutional identity, role, status, etc (he is (the) president of the country).

QUANTIFYING, SELECTING

- expect these determiner functions only in PRIMARY rf (but cf. 2.3.2.6) (in attributing rf the indefinite article may be regarded as having a purely individuating function);

- if the rf of a quantified nominal is SPEC, it will typically also be NOT-KNOWN, i.e. the function will be relating (I have just seen a lion/some lions);

- if NON-SPEC, expect E.p (parti-generic) (many lions are sleepy animals) and e (non-specific token) (I would like to see a lion) but not E.t (toto-generic);

- where a selecting function is realised (all lions/any lion will attack if provoked), expect NON-SPEC rf.

ITEMISING

Note:

- such: typically evoking;

- same: may be used for SPEC rf if the type denoted is a 'first order entity' (the same lion);

otherwise NON-SPEC (the same thing happened again today);
ordering itemisers: especially in indicating and attributing rf;
- adding: rf typically NOT-KNOW.

PRE-SELECTING
- if there is a pre-selecting determiner it will be a quantifier or selecter or the + itemiser and will indicate a subset of a separately determined subset of the class denoted; the immediate determiner of the NP head will be (or include) a definitiser (most of these lions).

2.3.1.4 External function
- expect nominals which are S, O, or prep.comp to fulfil PRIMARY rf;
- an exception to this may be found in identifying expressions which appear in subject position and, in the spoken language, carry intonational prominence (that man is the one you met);
- existential complements (there BE comp) fulfil any PRIMARY rf, SPEC or NON-SPEC; referents will typically be NOT-KNOW (rf REL, EST) but R, E are possible (e.g. in a list); existential complements in interrogative and negative clauses are typically token-evoking (e) (is there a bus coming/there isn't a bus coming);
- other BE complements (and comp. of BECOME, SEEM, etc.) will fulfil SECONDARY rf except when the clause subject fulfils an indicating function;
- appositional and pre-head adjuncts will fulfil SECONDARY rf; the former may be attributing or identifying; the latter are unlikely to be identifying (but NB examples such as My brother John).

2.3.2 Notes on regularities in the realisation of referential functions

2.3.2.1 REFFERING

- if anaphoric, expect NP definite (i.e. pNP, or cNP with definitising determiner, or personal pronoun);
- if non-anaphoric: if R.u (unitary reference) then NP definite and singular; if R.g (general reference) then NP definite and plural (count) or definite and singular (non-count) or zero-determined and plural (count); if R.v (vague reference) then pre-selecting determiner (quantifier or selecter) and NP plural;
- a vague reference is sometimes realised in a NP with no pre-selecting determiner; such cases can be distinguished from nominals with relating function by testing whether a pre-selecting construction would change the meaning: if no change of meaning, then R.v; if the meaning changes, then REL (someone in the audience got up/one of the people in the audience got up ... suggests R.v; but A man is at the door/?one of the men is at the door ... suggests REL);
- syntactic function of any nominal with referring rf:
  S,0, prep.comp., ex.comp.

2.3.2.2 RELATING

- unless mediated, and except where definite article is grammatically determined, expect NP indefinite (with quantifying determiner);
- zero-determination may be found especially where NP is plural; if zero/determination and NP singular, consider whether a NON-SPEC rf is a more plausible interpretation (the referents are understood as being individuals but not 'in mind');
- if mediated (the leader of a cult on this Mediterranean island) then determiner realisation depends on whether the reference is unitary or general or vague and rules of realisation are as for referring;
- note devices for indicating REL rf of pNPs: a, one, a certain, a\q called P;
- the pronoun one, on its own or with a postmodifier, may realise a relating rf;
- syntactic function of any nominal with relating rf:
  S,0, prep.comp, existential comp.

2.3.2.3 IDENTIFYING

- if appellative, then pNP;
- if designative, then cNP with definitising determiner, unless:
- identification is vague, in which case NP indefinite is possible, particularly with pre-selecting determiner (this is one of the students I was telling you about);
- syntactic function of any nominal with identifying rf: equative complement or appositional adjunct; rarely, subject (and carrying intonational prominence).

2.3.2.4 EVOKING
- since E is a very broad category, including reference to both particulars and non-particulars, the range of grammatical realisations is correspondingly wide;
- if anaphoric, expect NP definite;
- if non-generic (i.e. reference is to some arbitrary or hypothetical token of some type) NP will be erodetermined (especially if plural) or quantified (providing a definite article is not grammatically determined);
- if toto-generic, the possibilities are: zero determination (if non-count or count plural), indefinite or definite article (if count singular);
- if mediated, then NP definite is possible, even where NP is plural (the muscles of the human body);
- if parti-generic, expect quantifier;
- if 'attributive' (as described by Donnellan), then the nominal will have a definitising determiner (and may normally be paraphrased 'who/whichever is the one');
- indicating expressions (anticipatory evoking expressions)
appear to show an unrestricted range of possibilities in determiner realisation; note which of the main types mentioned in chapter 6 is exemplified: descriptions (an interesting consequence of this is ...), minimal formulas (the fact is ...); pseudo-clefts (what is needed is ...);
- syntactic function of any nominal with evoking rf: S, 0, prep.comp; if indicating, typically S, but may be 0 pointing to referent disclosed in following phrase, clause or sentence.

2.3.2.5 ESTABLISHING
- expect zero or quantifying determination;
- in some genres, new species are introduced directly by name in the form the + cN; or by classification name (genus/species/subspecies) without determiner;
- syntactic function of any nominal with establishing rf: S, 0, prep.comp., ex.comp.

2.3.2.6 ATTRIBUTING
- expect adjP or cNP (adjP only if characterising);
- if cNP, zero determination if non-count, otherwise indefinite article or zero/with plural;
- quantifier determination is occasionally found (these are two very attractive children);
- note possibility of definite article if what is attributed is a social role held by a single individual at any one time;
- the definite article may be grammatically determined (John is the tallest boy in his class);
- syntactic function of any nominal with attributing rf: ascriptive complement, appositional adjunct, pre-head adjunct.

2.3.3 Notes on indirectness

2.3.3.1 Denotative indirectness

- Note cases where, in the use of a lexeme or expression as head or modifier, the maxim of quality is apparently violated and an additional effort of interpretation is (except where the metaphor etc has become conventionalised) required of the hearer; i.e. where there is an intentional lack of fit between the sense of a lexeme or expression and the referent of which it is supposed to be a true description. Various types of metaphorical indirectness may be recognised:

(i) 'sortal metaphor' - reference to some one or something by means of a word or expression which denotes a class to which the referent is known not to belong; or attribution of membership in such a class; e.g. 'snake' for person;

(ii) 'characterising metaphor' - attribution to someone or something of a property which is known not to be a property of members of the class to which the referent belongs; e.g. of 'black' to Monday;
(iii) 'part for whole' - e.g. 'hand' for labourer;
(iv) 'property for whole' - e.g. 'brass' for money;
(v) 'one for many' - e.g. 'the man in the street' for ordinary people in general;
(vi) 'person for thing' - e.g. 'man' for a token in a game.

- Apart from metaphor, indirectness in the denotative function of a nominal may convey irony, whimsy etc, through the use of a word or expression which could literally apply to the intended referent but is known to be false, anachronistic, exaggerated, fantastic, understated, etc.

- Also note cases where, in the selection of a word or expression as head or modifier, the maxim of quantity is apparently violated through divergence from 'the inherently neutral level of specificity' (Cruse, 1977), for example in a notice saying 'beware of the golden labrador' or 'beware of the animal'. The additional meanings generated by such violations may be: (i) social indices (marking a relationship or a social situation as such-and-such); (ii) attitudinal markers (expressing positive or negative affect in respect of the referent); (iii) implications of actual fact.

- The use of a word or expression which the speaker himself explicitly, by such devices as 'so-called', 'supposed', 'misnamed', etc., denies the validity of is itself a weak form of indirectness since the direct
route to reference, it would seem reasonable to assume, is always via a description acceptable to both participants.

2.3.3.2 Determinative indirectness

- A definite NP is used indirectly if there is no evident location within which its referent can be placed by the hearer. Two types of definite (and therefore indirect) non-mediated relating expression are worth noting:

(i) expressions containing 'establishing relative clauses' (Hawkins, 1974) as in Hawkins' example: What's the matter with Bill? Oh, the woman he went out with last night was beastly to him. The expression serves to inform the hearer about a woman Bill went out with, and it is noticeable that the indefinite could substitute for the definite article in the original sentence without any apparent change of referential function;

(ii) expressions consisting of a proper name (without determiner) or of a personal pronoun. The additional meaning conveyed by the choice of the rather than a in the 'establishing relative' type is that there is a presupposition that it is not unusual for Bill to go out at night with a woman. That conveyed by the choice of a bare pH or personal pronoun is the implication of immediate familiarity. (In journalism, those readers
who are not familiar with the referent are pampered by the implication that they are; in fiction, the effect of immediateness in a narrative introduced by a definite NP has often been noted.

- An indefinite NP is used indirectly if the referent of the expression is SPECIFIC and KNOWN: the effect is to overlay a referring rf with an attributing one, as for example in 'A big boy like you should know better', in which the referent is the addressee, or in 'It is incredible that a government with such a record has now been re-elected with a greatly increased majority', which plainly refers to the government.

- It is evident in these, as in all, examples of indirectness that, though through indirect uses of language it is possible to achieve certain special effects, the uses themselves are just as 'normal', i.e. just as ordinary and just as dependent on the existence of norms, as non-indirect uses of language. To the discourse analyst they may have a particular significance, illuminating as they do the relationship between different aspects of competence and between competence and performance; but to the participant in discourse they are usually unobservable and unremarkable.

2.4 Interactivity

2.4.1 Co-reference

- Where a nominal expression has a referent which is
the same as that of a previous nominal expression, there is an interactive relationship of co-reference between the two referential acts.

- The descriptive content (or lack of it) of a co-referential expression will be determined by various factors:
  (i) whether pronominalisation is obligatory;
  (ii) whether pronominalisation is possible (e.g. constraints on 'backwards cross-referencing', Langacker, 1969);
  (iii) whether 're-identification' (Bolinger, 1979:308) is pragmatically required to enable the hearer to keep track of the co-reference: 'the majority of re-identifications probably occur after a break of some kind and serve as a justifiable but not always essential reminder' (ibid). One justification may be a high information rate, which 'goes with generally low reliance on anaphoric means of maintaining reference' (Grimes:1975).

- Re-identification may involve
  (i) repetition of the lexical content of the initial nominal expression;
  (ii) repetition of the descriptive content but with some stylistic variation in form;
  (iii) use of a wholly or partially new description;
  (iv) use of a 'pronominal epithet' (the idiot, the bum, of Jackendoff, 1972:110) This may be regarded as borderline between pronominal substitution and 're-identification'.

- If the re-identification is not 'justifiable', then consider the possible motivation for it:
— to give emphasis to some interpersonal/situational index (for example to the status of the referent if it appears to have some bearing on the plausibility of the proposition);
— to convey attitudinal content (positive/negative);
— to supply additional information relevant to the interpretation of the proposition of which the referential expression is part;
— to focus attention on some distinct aspect of the individual originally referred to (role, status, subjectivity, etc). (On some devices and effects of 'lexical cohesion', Halliday & Hasan, 1976, ch.6).

2.4.2 Cross-reference

Where two or more nominal expressions are not coreferential but have referents whose similarities and differences are of significance in the interpretation of discourse, we may speak of an interactive relationship of 'cross-reference'.

The similarities/differences may be marked in the denotative content of the expression, e.g. through sense relations of hyponymy, incompatibility, partial synonymy and various types of antonymy.

These lexical differences, understood in the light of context (and, in the spoken language, intonation), may be indicative of interpersonal/situational, attitudinal, conceptual or connotational differences between the linked referents.
- The similarities/differences may be marked in the determinative part of the nominal expression through the use of itemisers showing relations of comparison (the same -, a different -), ordering (the former -, the latter -) and addition (another -, a further -) (Quirk et al., 1972:657; Halliday and Hasan, 1976:2.5 on 'comparative reference').

- Devices of ellipsis and substitution (one, so) may also mark linked reference, the ellipted or non-substituted part of the expression marking the similarity, and the remainder the difference, between the linked referents.

2.4.3 Referential routines

Look for repeated patterns of referential acts:
- pairs (as itemised in the last section of ch.6);
- combinations of pairs;
- other multiples.

2.4.4 Reference and predication

- Look for relations of interactivity both between subject nominal expressions and their associated predications and between non-subject nominal expressions and the predications which contain them.

- The content of a referential expression may count as a condition, an explanation, a concession, etc., in respect of the content of the predication (This sensitive person was quickly worn down by the harsh conditions
under which she was held / *Thrice divorced Bertha is trying again*). It is useful to distinguish
(i) cases where the content of the nominal expression is such as to make the predicative content only to be expected, as in the first example above;
(ii) cases where the content of the nominal expression is such as to make the predicative content surprising, as in the second example;
(iii) all other cases.

- The distribution of content in discourse as between nominal expressions and the rest should be noted (cf. Jespersen, 1924:131, Halliday, 1967, Quirk et al., 1972:932, on 'nominal style' in which the content of discourse is predominantly nominalised).

- Links of interactivity between subject nominal and predicate may be marked in the tense, aspect and modality of the latter (cf. Quirk et al., 1972).

2.4.5 Reference and performative force

- Note any associations between *rf* and the performative force of the overall speech act (earlier called unit of discourse activity) of which they are part; e.g. between REL, EST and INFORM, between E and GENERALISE, PREDICT, and between e (non-specific token of type) and QUESTION, DENIAL.
2.4.6 Reference and interactive acts

- Note the contribution of nominal expressions and their referential functions to the interpretation of the overall relationship of interactivity between one UDA and another.
PART III APPLICATION

Chapter 8 Discourse performance: An essay in nominal-referential analysis

1 Introduction

My purpose in this chapter is not to manipulate large quantities of data and produce 'results' which might have some immediate utility, but to investigate quite a small amount of data and thereby to demonstrate, in the first instance, the efficacy of the positions on discourse, nominality and reference which have been developed in Parts I and II. I need to establish that they work, and how they work. There will, of course, be some results; the analysis will reveal some regularities and patterns in the data; but producing them is not the major object of the exercise. In Chapter 9 I shall attempt to show how such results, not merely those particular ones, may have utility in language teaching practice.

My observations in Chapter 9 will relate particularly to the teaching of English for academic purposes, and the type of discourse I have chosen for analysis is in keeping with that emphasis. Academic writing may roughly be categorised according to its 'distance' from the student who is called upon to read it. Most remote is a scholar's own account of his original research; in the middle ground is a scholar's synthesis of research findings by himself and others working in a particular field; and most immediate is the textbook directed to the student's general or specialist needs. My data belong in the
second of these categories. They consist of a single chapter - Chapter 10, 'The Creation of Tribes' - of John Iliffe's A Modern History of Tanganyika, published by C.U.P. in 1979. The book is described on its cover as 'the first comprehensive and fully documented history of modern Tanganyika .... (which) brings together the research which scholars of many nationalities have carried out in Tanzania over the last twenty years, and attempts to synthesise their findings with the evidence available from African and European records in Tanzania, Britain and Germany.' In his introductory chapter Iliffe describes his work as 'a general history which deals with many aspects of Tanganyika's past and with numerous small societies. It is written in the belief that the essence of history is complexity.'

It is this complexity which attracted me to the book as a source of interesting data for discourse analysis. How can complexity of material be reconciled with clarity of exposition? There is a historian's answer to this question: 'To comprehend such diversity and write a connected history of such a land requires organising themes. Those chosen are the five most important aspects of Tanganyika's modern experience ...' There is also, in a general way, a linguist's answer: to expound such diversity requires, at a more micro level, organising discourse, adopting certain routines which facilitate the presentation of the historical data and their manifold interrelationships - of sequence, consequence, comparison, contrast, condition, etc. - in manageable form. I have proceeded on the assumption that nominal-referential analysis will reveal some of these routines, and that this revelation, apart from any intrinsic interest it may have,
will be capable of yielding some value of a practical sort.

The chapter has twenty-four pages, about 9,000 words. My analysis is necessarily selective. In the first part I have concentrated on certain functions (and their realisations) and have described certain routines. In the second part I have analysed two passages in some detail.

2 Functions and Patterns

2.0 Sample of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Early in 1925</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Sir Donald Cameron // arrived in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Tanganyika // as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Governor.*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A date, a person, a place, a role: simple history. Two undoubted referring expressions and one plainly attributing one:
simple discourse. Predictable. Easy to analyse. And extremely untypical. Compare:

* (i) To the left, in ( ), the quotation reference. The first figure corresponds to the number of the subsection (0, 1, 2, 3) in which the quotation is discussed; the second two figures give the page reference excluding the first figure, which in all cases is 3 (e.g. 020a can be found on p. 320 of the book); the letters differentiate separate quotations from the same page.

(ii) Within columns, the nominal line number and the rf (referential function).

(iii) To the right of //, co-text which is not nominal or not considered in the immediate analysis.
Each tribe //must be considered as a distinct unit...

Each tribe //must be under a chief',

one provincial commissioner //told his staff //in 1926. But

most administrators //knew that

many peoples //had no chiefs //and

the construction of conciliar systems for stateless peoples //was

Cameron's chief contribution to indirect rule. //Consequently, when

an official //proposed to subordinate

lesser Nyakusa chiefs //to

more powerful ones,

a superior //quickly pointed out that

the object //was not to 'manufacture paramount chiefs'.

'We //don't want to know

what he can devise //so much as

what the natives devised long ago',

another //added, and

Cameron //summarised

the whole policy //by explaining that

'Mr Thompson //must take

the tribal unit'.
In this passage, the author's comments are carefully interwoven with quotations from some of the men who conceived and established indirect rule in Tanganyika. His developing theme is not a series of events involving particular people at particular times in particular places, but the emergence over time, in people's minds, in their words, in their official minutes, in their everyday decision-making, of a complex and only vaguely defined system of government, one which they were operating while they were inventing it. The referential functions are predominantly non-specific, the expressions evoking a type of abstract entity (E - 'the policy'), a group or some portion of a group (E. v - 'most administrators', 'many peoples'), a token of a type considered along with all its co-tokens (e - 'a tribe'), a class with one member (E. att - 'the tribal unit' - whatever it is), a species of outcomes which is new knowledge to the reader (EST - 'the construction of conciliar systems'), a negative property (A - 'no chiefs'), and so on. In some cases one can be reasonably sure that the rf of an expression is such and such. In others there are ambiguities and subtleties which make the allocation of a single definite function seem arbitrary and distorting. For example, for 'each tribe', we may read: 'If something is a tribe ...'. If this reading is correct, the rf is e (evoking, but not generic). But we may perhaps read: 'For each specific one of the finite set of known, identifiable tribes at this point in time in Tanganyika .... consider it as a distinct unit'. On this reading, the rf should be referring (general distributive reference). The wider context of 'the creation of tribes' does make the evoking interpretation more plausible, but it does not, perhaps, exclude the
referring function altogether.

The few nominals with specific rf are largely relating: 'one provisional commissioner', 'an official', 'a superior', 'another'. Even with these apparently uncomplicated expressions, however, there is room for doubt. For it is not as individuals that they are brought, however briefly, on to history's stage, but as types. 'One provisional commissioner' functions almost solely as a comment on the words which the referent of the expression - whoever he was - in fact spoke. On these grounds one might reasonably interpret the expression as E; or ambiguously as E/REL. (Apart from Cameron himself, the only individual who emerges plainly as such in this passage is Mr Thompson. He is in a quotation, not the author of one.)

The fact that we encounter such uncertainties and ambiguities so frequently should not be a cause of surprise or, necessarily, of discouragement. To classify illocutionary functions, of any sort, is to impose more order on reality, more discreteness, than reality readily admits of. There is in fact no line between specific and non-specific, or between known and not-known; there are merely more or less grey areas. But it is difficult to work in discourse analysis without imagining a line and without using it to separate. And, if we are reasonably consistent, we may yet discover patterns which give not the whole, and certainly not an exact, but nevertheless a broadly plausible and somewhat usable, impression of the structure of some discourse.

I have not attempted an analysis of all the nominal expressions in my data. I supposed that the narrative and expository nature of historical writing might give particular significance as types to
relating and establishing expressions. And I observed that indicating and attributing expressions play an especially important role in certain detectable routines. I have therefore restricted the first part of my analysis to these.

2.1 'Not-Known'

Contrary to expectation, there are rather few relating expressions in the data, perhaps seventy in all. About a quarter of these refer to events and social transformations, to institutions, or to written statements and treatises. One or two - 'a car', 'a lion' - refer to concrete objects, participants in events. The remainder refer to people.

(i) Events etc.

(136a) | | //By contrast
1 | EST | unwillingness to meet the political and intellectual interests of African leaders //hampered
2 | REL | the adaptation experiment conducted on Kilimanjaro by
2a | (REL,I)* | (the Lutheran missionary, Bruno Gutmann).
........ //Legend has it that
3 | REL | a campaign led by
3a | (R) | (Joseph Merinyo) //culminated in
4 | REL(R) | an all-night confrontation between (Merinyo) and (Gutmann) during which (the missionary) was persuaded to accept an African clergy.
4a | (R)(R) |

* Bracketting is used to indicate the embedding of a nominal and the RF of an embedded nominal.
The very general state of affairs evoked by the establishing expression contrasts with the particular and identifiable experiment described in REL₂. The experiment is here mentioned for the first time, as is Gutmann himself, but the expression is definite by virtue of its 'referent-establishing relative clause.' The definiteness conveys the impression that the experiment is an important and widely known piece of Tanganyika's history. It is remarkable that this is one of only three instances in the data of the 'definite + establishing relative' nominal type. The other instances are:

(131a) the very striking unification and geographical expansion of the Iraqw people which took place in the twentieth century;
(139) the 'tribal school' created at Malangali after 1928 by W.B. Mumford,

which both carry the same sort of implication. A few other definite and possibly relating expressions (apart from references to people) appear in the data, but these are all institutional names or 'pseudo-names':

(138a) the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Native Education
(138b) the Phelps-Stokes Fund
(140) Makerere.

In all these cases, it is of course possible that known-ness is simply assumed. However, by the criterion of first mention in the book, all are relating.

REL₃ and 4 in the passage quoted are, as indefinite CNPs, representative of what we may regard as the standard form for a relating expression. What is highly variable, across different domains of discourse, within the standard form, is the extent and complexity of modification. It was seen in Chapter 5 that, in
compressed journalistic narrative style, a single relating expression may encapsulate all, or almost all, of a story. The present data do not afford many notable instances of such 'nominal-narrative' style.

REL+ in (136a), describing not only an event of a certain type but also packing in its two protagonists and its outcome, is something of an exception. Most of the institution and policy-statement or treatise references show single pre- or post-modification:

(120b) a conference of district officers
(121) a legislative council
(129a) a single native administration
(131b) a council to defend hereditary authority
(132a) a council of chiefs
(132b) a Nyakusa union
(134a) an association 'to protect their interests in the country of their adoption'
(135a) a treatise on indigenous medicine
(137a) a history of Kilimanjaro
(138a) a policy statement on the same lines.

There is a single exception to this pattern of relating simplicity:

(133a) REL+ Cameron implemented this policy and established

REL a partnership between government and missions under which government subsidised mission schools which met its standards with regard to syllabuses and teachers' qualifications, while missions gained the right to consultation.
(ii) People

Relating references to people in the present data may, with only a few exceptions, be placed in three broad categories. The first is the category of anonymous officials, minor figures and passers-by, normally introduced as the sources or recipients of quotations, attitudes and opinions, and in relation to which, as has already been noted, the referential function is only weakly specific. Some further examples:

(122)  
| ?REL | a visitor ....  

(124a)  
| ?REL | a district officer //explained  

(124b)  
| ?REL | an officer //reported from Songea  

(128a)  
| ?REL | a social anthropologist //expl.  

(128b)  
| ?REL | a district officer //complained in 1938  

(129b)  
| ?REL | many chiefs //welcomed educated guidance  

(134b)  
| REL | a scarcely disinterested missionary in Mlalo, //the British rejected the petition...  

137b)  
| REL | A Chaga dissident of 1937 //wrote a history of Kilimanjaro aimed chiefly against authority
(137c) //I have thought it well to claim the chief-
tainship of this country,'

REL a Rare aspirant //blandly explained,

//'for it has been my family's inheritance
 for many years...'

Only in the last three cases are the referents anything more than
token figures: (134b) is fleshed out with some pre-modifying self-
interest and his advice was an act with a historical consequence.
The referents of (137b) and (137c) are certainly presented as repre-
sentative types but the categories they are placed in, 'dissident',
'aspirant', are given a more individual significance by the exposi-
tion which follows.

The second category is one of local leaders. There is a notable
consistency in the form of the relating expressions which introduce
these people:

(125c) Saidi Furdikira of Unyanyembe
(128d) Makongoro of Ikizu
(128e) Kasusura of Rusubi
(129c) Towegale of lowland Urema

All local leaders (chiefs, hereditary aristocrats, etc. - there are
fifteen of them mentioned in the data) and only local leaders are, on
first mention, identified in this way.

The third category includes all other named Tanganyikans. There
are three patterns:

REL (pNP) - A(cNP)

(135a) John Juma, son of a Kilindi man,
(133b) Geldart Mhina, a Christian Bondei clerk and founder of TTACSA,
(135b) Michael Kikurwe, a Zigua teacher and cultural tribalist,
(141a) Augustine Makame (grandson of Samuel Sehoza),
(141b) Matthew Ramadhani (son of the former senior African teacher of Kivungani).

REL (cNP) - I(pNP)

(131c) a remarkable ritual leader, Hade Bea,
(135c) the Nyakusa pastor, Lazarus Mwanisi,
(135d) a Chagga teacher, Petro Njau,
(137d) the Safwa antiquarian, Johannes Syarana Zambi.

The pattern may be extended by an A-expression:

(136a) another Bondei teacher, John Sepeku – later Tanganyika's first Anglican archbishop –

The choice of definite rather than indefinite determiner, if not random in such cases, may be explained thus: that the definite article creates presuppositions that the referent already is placed ('located') - has his niche - in Tanganyikan history: a kind of historiographical honorific.

REL (pN prep place)

(137c) 1 | REL | J.M. Kadaso in Bukwimba,
2 | REL | Nathaniel Mtui on Kilimanjaro,
3 | REL | Dominikus Chabrama in Mshope,
4 | REL | and many lesser men //filled
5 | REL | countless exercise books //with
6 | E.v | local traditions.
The form of RELs (1), (2) and (3) is clearly motivated by E.v.

The series (1 - 4), with its individual relating references followed by a somewhat vague descriptive 'etc', is repeated at various points in the data.

Establishing expressions present a number of difficulties, not the least of which is the question of what counts as 'not knowing' a type of entity as opposed to 'not knowing' some specific instance of a type (as in the case when an expression is used with a relating function). A certain type, e.g. a biological species, may be absolutely not known (or assumed to be not known) to a hearer or reader; another type, e.g. a situation or form of behaviour, may be known in principle but may not be known in its connection with a certain place and time. There is, of course, no clear way of differentiating this 'relatively-establishing' function from plain evoking, and many nominals with non-specific rf (for example a large proportion of those which are the 'targets' of indicating expressions in the list given in the next section) are properly interpreted as indeterminate. Existential syntax - there, BE, indefinite, locative - and its variations, is a predictable accompaniment of some fairly unambiguous cases:

\[(124c)\]

\[\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & \text{R} & \text{Tanganyika} \\
2 & \text{EST} & \text{a vast social reorganisation in which Europeans and Africans combined to create} \\
2a & \text{(EST)} & \text{(a new political order based on mythical history)}
\end{array}\]
Indirect rule //marked
2 EST a second stage of European control,
3 EST a deeper penetration of society by the state,
4 EST a most important standardisation of Tanganyikan life.

//and there was
1 EST a general tendency to level out the chief's power, reducing that of a Merere or Kalemera while increasing that experienced in more egalitarian societies
2 EST a general consequence of intermingling in the earlier colonial period.

//Inter-war history reveals
1 EST a similar combination of intellectual ambivalence, political self-seeking, and creative energy

//Behind the new thinking lay
1 EST psychological and racial theories,
2 EST white fears of black Americans,
3 EST middle class fears of working class Europeans,
4 EST anxiety to perpetuate Christian principles,
5 EST unhappy experience of Indian education //and
6 EST a host of other reasons and prejudices.

//Behind the whole structure ... lay
1 EST the underlying violence of colonial government.
'Experienced', 'marked', 'reveals', 'lay', with their implied or stated, temporal or locational, locatives, are, in the data, the characteristic signals of such expressions. (131d) is an interesting example (not the only one; others are noted below) which reads as a somewhat surprising reversal of an Indicating + EST routine: surprising in that the latter alternative at least arguably reads more naturally. The disguised existential nature of the construction is easily seen if 'there was' is inserted before EST₁ and 'which' before 'was' A₂. (126) is the only example of an establishing expression with the. The definite article here may be explained as marking a mediated relationship (cf. 'his parents' quarrels' discussed in Chapter 6) but only on the assumption that it is generally accepted that violence is to colonial governments as quarrels to parents, churches to vicars, leaders to cults, etc.

One quite distinctive type of establishing expression calls for exemplification and comment:

(113)  //In pre-colonial Tanganyika each individual had belonged to

1 EST several social groups:
2 A,A nuclear family and extended family,
3 A,A lineage and chieftain,
4 A,A clan and tribe.

(119a) //... some district officers made

1 EST their own innovations.
2 A introducing akidas into districts where there had been none before the war, as in Kigoma
merging small chiefdoms into large ones in an attempt to create 're-united tribes', as in Tabora

Under indirect rule, a native administration consisted of

- three parts:
  - a native authority - chief, council or some combination of these - with legislative and executive powers;
  - native courts;
  - a native treasury which collected all taxes

Alongside administrative motives for indirect rule were broader considerations.

African priests and teachers cooperated because they gained two important advantages.

The establishing expressions in these examples describe general or vague categories the precise character of which is subsequently given in more detail. They thus convey a certain anticipatory force which gives them an affinity to indicating expressions. (That they are, in fact, in important respects quite distinct from indicating expressions will become apparent in the next section.) With their following nominal expressions (if any) they constitute a pattern which may be seen as the non-specific counterpart of REL - I: they introduce a class (not an individual); and the subsequent expression gives the defining attributes of its members. It is for this reason
that these expressions are properly regarded as attributing, and not evoking. (118) \( A_2 \), for example, may be read as 'a group which was a nuclear family'; (119b) \( A_2 \), 'a part which was a native authority.'

2.2 The Indicating Function

2.2.1 Standard form

An indicating expression is a nominal whose function is to evoke a category and to point forward to another nominal. The category evoked is normally connected, by some explicit or implicit anaphora, to some previously mentioned referent, or more vaguely to some topic or comment in the preceding discourse. The target nominal, or focus, which may fulfil any primary referential function, picks out a referent of which the indicating description is implicitly asserted to be true. The organising power of any indicating expression is thus a triple one: It connects to some previous referent or proposition; it signals the introduction, or re-introduction, into the discourse of some new (or newly relevant) topic, which is the referent of the target nominal; and it makes a preliminary comment on that topic, a comment which, very often, in a general way, anticipates what is to be predicated of the target referent, once it has been revealed.

The following example may be taken as typical:

(239)  
\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c}
1 & A & \text{its simplest,} \\
2 & B & \text{adaptive education} \\
3 & A & \text{organising a school's houses by 'tribes'} ... \\
4 & \text{Ind} & \text{The Government's most remarkable attempt at adaptation} \\
\end{array}
\]
the 'tribal school' created at Malangali after 1928 by W.B. Mumford.

//Imitating

the education of pages at the Hehe and Sangu courts

//used

Mumford

//as

e

e

students who themselves wore 'traditional' (late 19th century) dress, lived in tembe dormitories, exercised themselves by spear-throwing and tribal dances rather than football, and learned tribal history and handicrafts rather than the alien skills of literacy.

The indicating expression is the pivot of this passage. The category evoked - the government's most remarkable attempt at adaptation - is included in the larger category - adaptive education - evoked at an earlier point in the paragraph. The expression points forward to a relating expression - 'the tribal school created at Malangali' - whose referent becomes the topic for the remainder of the paragraph. It also describes an attribute which is implicitly asserted to be an actual attribute of this referent; i.e. we are to understand it is the case that the tribal school at Malangali was the government's most remarkable attempt at adaptation. Furthermore, this attribution becomes a frame within which comment on the new topic is then elaborated: the imitation of the education of pages, the use of elders, the spear-throwing and tribal dances, etc., are all part of what made the attempt 'remarkable'.

This passage also serves to illustrate what we may call the standard form for the use of such expressions, i.e. that in which
the indicating expression is the subject of its sentence and the
target nominal is syntactically connected to it as complement by
copula BE (or, in a few cases, BE + preposition). There are 30
instances of this form in the data. They are listed below in their
order of occurrence.

(218a) | Ind | The policy //was
       | *E/ST | indirect rule

(218b) | Ind | The chief emphasis //was on
       | E/ST | tribal identity

(219a) | Ind | Its essence //was
       | E/ST | the complete integration of indigenous political
             systems into the colonial administration

(220a) | Ind | The European officer's normal role //was
       | E/ST | to supervise and educate.

(322a) | Ind | Tanganyika's peculiarity //was
       | R/EL | that it had been a German colony

(323a) | Ind | the object //was not
       | E/ST | to 'manufacture paramount chiefs'

(327a) | Ind | its main supporters //were
       | R | the progressive chiefs

(327b) | Ind | its chief virtue //was indeed
       | E/ST | to release their energies

* E/ST, R/EL etc. indicate functional ambiguity or indeterminacy.
led, perhaps the most remarkable Mgeni of the Turu

The outstanding exponent of progressive traditionalism Francis Iwamugira of Buhaya

The most blatant tribe-maker H.C. Steibel.

The chief obstacles to Cameron's social engineering were stateless peoples.

One alternative to subordinate a stateless people's neighbouring chiefdom

Another approach to elevate the most prominent local headmen into chiefs

The most spectacular new tribe-the Nyakusa

The most dramatic incident of the Shambaa civil war the Kiva uprising

The one indubitably traditional thing about the kingdom that its power relations were contentious

The final consequences of restoring the Shambaa kingdom to revive the ancient dispute about its borders
The problem to synthesise

One area of rethinking an interest among African Christians in the indigenous religions...

Another motive a real desire to define oneself and one's tribe by its origins

The only possible kind of enduring autochthonous change degeneration

The most important embodiment of indirect rule ideology education policy.

The outcome emphasis on adaptation

its bias adaptation

The Government's most remarkable attempt at adaptation the 'tribal school' created at Malangali...

the crux to incorporate agricultural training into the timetable

What Africans wanted, at this time and throughout the colonial period, literary, assimilative, education in a European language
The height of ambition for African schoolboys was Makerere College.

The first Tanganyikan entrant was Martin Kayamba's son, Hugh Godfrey.

2.2.2 Variations

Two main types of deviation from the standard form are found in the data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>Inclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(227c)</td>
<td>(227c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>REL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other sons of Kivungani men who followed him in the 1930's //included

Augustine Makame (grandson of Samuel Sehosa) //and

Mathew Ramadhani (son of the former senior African teacher at Kivungani).
Two of these mark the inclusiveness of the indicating expression by among, one by substituting 'included' for BE. Of the former, one substitutes 'might be listed' for BE.

(ii) The 'Ind - A - F' routine

(241c)  
1 Ind hereditary aristocrats //were  
2 REL Adam Sapi Mkwawa of Uhehe,  
3 REL Msabila Ingusha of Nzega //and  
4 REL Joseph Mutahangarwa of Kizibu...

(218c)  
1 Ind The motives for introducing indirect rule //were  
2 A mixed.  
3 Ind One //was  
4 E administrative efficiency.

(228)  
1 Ind Other benefits  
   pred //also accrued to native authorities  
   prop (description of benefits given)

(232c)  
1 Ind One example of tribal aggregation  
   pred //so completely illustrates the process that it deserves more extensive treatment:  
   R/EL the introduction of indirect rule into the region surrounding the lower Pangani

(235c)  
1 Ind Their solutions //were  
2 A often highly personal.  
3 Prop (description of solutions given)
(239c) 1 Ind | Mumford's motives //were
2    A | mixed.
3  prop | (description of motives given).

In this routine the move from indicating expression to the target primary (P) is interrupted by an expression which describes an attribute of the indicating category. In two cases - marked 'pred' (= predicate) - the attribution is non-nominal. In three cases - marked 'prop' (= one or a series of propositions) - the target is non-nominal. (218c) illustrates a pro-NP anaphoric to an indicating expression. This also is an inclusive device: equivalent to 'they included' or 'Among them were' administrative efficiency.

2.2.3 Indicating nominals: form
N = 38
nomCL: 1
cNP: 37

The single nomCL is a WHAT clause in a pseudo-cleft construction (240a).

(i) cNPs: denotative function

heads: concrete 8
abstract 29

Of the concrete noun heads, one, if it is properly regarded as concrete, denotes a second-order entity ('incident': 332a); the remaining seven (which include the ellotted 'progressive chief' in 327c) are all first order nouns denoting people or groups: 'supporters', 'tribe-maker', 'new tribe', 'Tanganyikan entrant', 'sons',
'contemporaries and counterparts', 'aristocrats'.

The abstract nouns in the data afford an excellent sample of the type characteristically found as heads of indicating expressions in such expository 'arts and social science' discourse, mostly denoting properties or necessary features of the types of entities or states of affairs etc. to which they make reference: 'emphasis', 'essence', 'role', 'peculiarity', 'object', 'virtue', 'exponent', 'obstacle', 'alternative', 'approach', 'consequence', 'outcome', 'bias', 'crux', 'motive', 'benefit', 'example', 'embodiment', 'solution', 'problem', 'area', 'kind'. 'Thing' (232b) serves as a dummy abstract noun where English fails to supply a suitable content noun.

Premodifiers: they may be categorised as follows:

- 'superlatives': 'most remarkable', 'most blatant', 'most spectacular', 'most dramatic', 'most important'
- 'evaluators': 'chief', 'normal', 'main', 'outstanding', 'only possible'
- 'others': 'hereditary'

The superlatives and evaluators are the characteristic premodifiers of indicating expressions.

Postmodifiers:

All are prepositional. Their function is to make the backwards reference of the indicating expression explicit. None of the indicating expressions in the data show both postmodification and a genitive determiner. 21 of the 37 CNP expressions show one or the other. In the remaining cases the backwards reference, though not explicit, is clear, as for example in:
(339b) Advocates of adaptation realised that the crux was to incorporate agricultural training into the timetable.... evidently the crux in making adaptive education a success.

(ii) cNPs: determinative function

pivot (i.e. central) determiners: \( N = 37 \)

**DEFEITISERS : 29**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sing.</th>
<th>pl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRON</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>cNP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pNP</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NON-DEFEITISERS : 8**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>another</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**post-pivot determiners: \( N = 3 \)**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(the) one</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the) first</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the) final</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequency table for all determiners in indicating expressions in the data is as follows:

1. the \( (19) \)
2. genitives \( (10) \)
3. **itemisers** (4)

4. **one** (3)

Since indicating categories are 'located' in relation to some previous referent or topic, the predominant definiteness (78%) is readily explained. Indicating expressions are non-definite where the category is inclusive: 'one area of rethinking' (among several), 'another motive' (but not necessarily the only other one) etc. Most of the non-definitisers in the list are itemisers which, it will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 5, are indefinite but relational.

The paradigm indicating expression in the data is:

- definite (*the* or genitive);
- singular (75%);
- with abstract noun head;
- with superlative or evaluating premodifier, or
- post-pivot itemiser (ordinal); and
- prepositional postmodifier where it is necessary for the
  backwards reference to be made explicit.

2.2.4 Comparison with establishing expressions

Comparing such expressions with the 'anticipatory' establishing expressions discussed at the end of section 2.1 we may note the following points. The heads of the establishing expressions - 'group', 'part', 'innovation', 'advantage', 'consideration' - are similar in their abstract denotation to those in the indicating expressions. In other respects the establishing expressions are significantly different. All are plural. All but one are indefinite, and their
indefinite determiners are not itemisers but quantifiers ('several', 'three', 'two') or zero. Their premodifiers are not superlatives or evaluators (with the rather weak exception of 'important' in 136). There are no postmodifiers. Furthermore, they appear not as subjects but as objects or complements. Their linkage with their target expressions is varied. In one case (119b) we find a pronoun anaphoric to the establishing expressions connected by 'varied from... to... to the target. In two cases (118d, 119c) the linkage consists of a colon. In the remaining cases there is no linkage at all: the establishing expression and its target are in separate sentences, and the target is an extended description - a series of propositions - rather than a single nominal expression (or several such expressions in co-ordination). Lastly, though they resemble indicating expressions in providing a frame for what follows, they are not so clearly linked thematically with what has gone before: the categories they describe are 'new', 'not-known'; hence properly in rheme not theme.

Initiation-plus-follow-up is the most prevalent routine in all expository discourse. Indicating expressions are one particular and quite clearly distinguishable means of 'initiating'. It will be convenient in our analysis to preserve their separate identity, and to avoid extending the term 'indicating expression' to all nominals with an initiating function.

2.3 The Attributing Function and Some Attributing Routines

2.3.1 Choice: attributing or indicating?

It was noted in Chapter 6 that indicating expressions are, in effect, attributing expressions that have been given primary referential function. Not all attributing expressions are equally
'convertible' in this way. Adjective phrases cannot normally be indicating, and neither can indefinite CNPs which have non-abstract heads and which have neither modifiers nor itemising determiners. I begin my analysis of attribution - or rather for the reason just given, continue it - by looking at attributing expressions which have all the formal qualifications for being indicating but have been placed in the discourse as referential secondaries, not primaries. The following example is typical:

(331b) 1 R The KNPA //was
2 A the first organisation to override Kilimanjaro's chiefdom rivalries, ....

Out of context, the reversal of this would be unremarkable:

1 Ind The first organisation to override Kilimanjaro's chiefdom rivalries //was
2 R the KNPA

The writer's choice of the R - A pattern rather than Ind - R can be accounted for by general principles of thematisation: new-ness, salience in discourse, emphasis or de-emphasis, etc. In this, as in most cases, the immediately preceding and succeeding co-text are enough to explain the choice. In the preceding clause,

... aggregation was often encouraged by social change,

the focal part of the new information - 'social change' - describes a generic category of which 'the KNPA', as theme of the first clause in the second sentence, provides a particular instance. In the latter clause, the attributing expression is all 'new' and it establishes a basis of given-ness for the theme of the subsequent
clause, whose rheme is an instance of the theme of the initial clause 'aggregation'. The pivotal role of the attributing expression is clearly seen:

\[\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
(331b) & 1. E aggregation \quad \text{was often encouraged by} \\
 & 2. E social change. \\
 & 3. R The KNPFA \quad \text{was} \\
 & 4. A the first organisation to override Kilimanjaro's chiefdom rivalries \quad \text{for example, and} \\
 & 5. R(E_3) (its) success \quad \text{led Chagga chiefs to unite in} \\
 & 6. REL a council to defend hereditary authority. \\
\hline
\end{array}\]

There are other similar cases in the data. (I have included a small portion of relevant co-text in each case.)

\[\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
(326) & 1. E the whole structure, \quad \text{Behind} \\
 & 2. A latent and rarely visible, \quad \text{was} \\
 & 3. E the underlying violence of colonial rule. \quad \text{It was no accident that} \\
 & 4. E lawyers \quad \text{were} \\
 & 5. A(E_4) the Europeans most critical of 'the oppressive and static qualities of (indirect rule)'
\hline
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
(323b) & 1. E Many peoples \quad \text{had} \\
 & 2. A no chiefs, \quad \text{and} \\
 & 3. E the construction of conciliar systems for stateless peoples \quad \text{was} \\
 & 4. A Cameron's chief contribution to indirect rule.
\hline
\end{array}\]
(330e) //Nobody doubted that
1 E councils //were less efficient and convenient than
2 E paramount chiefs. //If
3 E a chief like Mgeni //could be induced to emerge
4 E this //was
5 A the ideal solution.

(331c) //Among the Kerewe the bangoma broke down status divisions and helped to create a single tribe, and
1 EST a trend towards specifically tribal dances //was
2 A a general consequence of intermingling in the colonial period.

(320c) 1 A A West Indian creole,
2 R Cameron //shared
3 E the period's widespread scepticism of the desirability of assimilating non-Europeans to European culture.
4 E Volksmission theory //was
5 A(E3) one expression of (this scepticism).
6 E Indirect rule //was
7 A(E3) (its) political counterpart //and
8 E it //was reinforced by postwar despair with European values, especially among conservative Englishmen.

Out of context, reversal reads well in all cases, not excluding (330e) providing we substitute the anaphor for the anaphoric 'this'
as the target of the putative indicating expression, 'the ideal solution'. All the A-expressions fit the general grammatical description of indicating expressions given in the previous section. Within context, a variety of thematic considerations appear to account for the writer's choice of A rather than Ind. I shall not examine them in detail. In general, two main considerations, which I shall exemplify, appear to be operative: (i) whether the basis for making the A/Ind expression theme in clause 2 is laid in the rheme of clause 1; and (ii) whether the A/Ind expression is intended to be productive of a new theme in clause 3. In (326) there is a rather tenuous connection between E_3 ('underlying violence') and E_4 ('lawyers'), and one might therefore expect A_3 to have been made theme with indicating function. However, the target of an indicating expression receives particular emphasis in discourse and would normally be productive of some further development related to its referent. In this case the author has no more to say about lawyers. Rather, it is 'the oppressive and static qualities of indirect rule' which is productive. In (325b) there are grounds in 'no chiefs' for having E_3 as an evoking theme of clause 2 but none for having A_4 as an indicating theme. Consideration (i) applies even though A_4 is only very weakly productive in the subsequent discourse (omitted). In (330e) 'the ideal solution' is not productive in the following discourse (omitted) but neither does the previous clause provide any basis for thematising it as an indicating expression. On these grounds, I find it difficult to explain the order of events in (331c). Ind-EST seems equally coherent, if not more so. Conceivably aesthetic considerations of 'end weight' (Quirk et al. 1972:934ff) account
for the EST - A pattern as it appears. (320c) may also, in part, require a stylistic explanation. Consideration (i) would normally have $A_5$ as indicating theme. But $E_3$ ('indirect rule'), as the topic of the chapter, is too salient to be susceptible of a further boost as the target of an indicating expression, and $E_5$ is parallel with $E_4$. Both must therefore be theme in their respective clauses, though in neither case does $E_1$ provide a clear basis to warrant this. It is also noteworthy that the $A_5$ and $A_7$ rhemes contain embedded expressions which are co-referential with rheme $E_2$, in the first sentence, and with theme $E_2$, in the second. Once more, the pivotal role of attribution, in this discourse, is apparent.

2.3.2 Pre-primary attribution

The same short text (320c) will serve to introduce the next stage of the analysis. The text begins with an attributing expression which describes an attribute of the referent of the following referring expression. Though $A_1$ is functionally similar to an indicating expression in preceding and, so to speak, heralding the following primary, it is dissimilar in that its referential function is secondary. It is, moreover, dissimilar in its form, having none of the special lexico-grammatical characteristics of an indicating expression, and also in its syntactic connection with $R_2$, which consists of comma punctuation (marked intonationally by falling tone, pause), and not BE or some substitute. One further respect in which $A_1$ is unlike an indicating expression is that it is explanatory in relation to the predicate of $R_2$. Being 'a West Indian creole' (Quirk et al. treat such phrases as verbless adverbal clauses), Cameron therefore shared the period's scepticism.
There are a number of similar examples in the data:

(333b) 1 A A resolutely stateless people.  
2 E the Bondi  
3 pred //could not accept any of their number as a leader.

(332c) 1 A An elderly, frail, introspective and superstitious man  
2 R be //was 
3 A terrified of witchcraft, 
4 A convinced that Yugha would be as fatal to him as to his father and grandfather //and 
5 A so aware that he reigned by British favour that he apparently hoarded his salary in order to return it when he was deposed.

Apart from their explanatory function, such pre-primary attributions may express a meaning in relation to which the following R or E is additive (or reinforcing), as in (326), above, where the 'latent and rarely visible' of A₂ anticipates the 'underlying' of E₂; or contrastive, as in:

(321) //Alongside  
1 A(E) (its) idealism 
2 E indirect rule //contained 
3 A much conservative self-interest.

I shall call the pattern illustrated in the preceding examples the 'A - P - A' routine. It is closely paralleled in the following examples, representative of a routine which we may call 'embedded A - P - pred' in which the precedent attribution is embedded, as pre-
head adjunct or premodifier, in the primary:

(331d) 1 E(A) | Such (jealously egalitarian) peoples as the Matumbi
2 pred | //failed to produce any native autho-

(331e) 1 EST(A) An (attempted) Rangwa paramountcy
2 pred | 'foundered on the mountaineers'
         | individualism and lust for
         | independence'

(340) 1 R(A) | the (deferential) Iwamugira
2 pred | //had complained....

The relation of the initial A to the subsequent predicate in
these three examples is, respectively: explicative (they failed
because of being egalitarian), implicative (that it was 'attempted'
implies that it 'foundered'), and concessive (he complained, despite
being deferential).

2.3.3 Interactivity of post-primary attributions

Finally, we find attributing expressions which, while being
neither pre-primary nor embedded-in-primary, are productive in the
discourse in that one or more subsequent attributions are in a clear
interactive relationship with them.

(322b) 1 E | Indirect rule //was not simply
2 A | 'divide and rule'.
3 E | It //had
4 A(A) | more positive goals than (that).
The pattern is 'P - A - P - A ....', with the Ps co-referential and the As interactively linked: in (322b) the relationship is one of contrast, in (341d) of detail.

2.3.4 Attributing expressions: form

I have drawn attention to the distinction which exists between those attributing expressions which show lexico-grammatical similarity (and convertability) to indicating expressions and those which do not. In the former category we have seen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DET</th>
<th>HEAD</th>
<th>of this scepticism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>one</td>
<td>expression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>its</td>
<td>political</td>
<td>counterpart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron's chief</td>
<td>contribution</td>
<td>to indirect rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>most critical of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the</td>
<td>ideal</td>
<td>solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the first</td>
<td>organisation</td>
<td>to override ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>general</td>
<td>consequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the latter category:
oNP / pre-primary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DET</th>
<th>HEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>West Indian creole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>resolutely stateless people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An</td>
<td>elderly, frail, introspective and superstitious man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>its</td>
<td>idealism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

oNP / post-primary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DET</th>
<th>HEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*(321) much</td>
<td>conservative self-interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(322b) more</td>
<td>positive aims than that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(341) a</td>
<td>vital counterweight to adaptive education</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adjP / pre-primary

(326) latent and rarely visible

adjP / post-primary

(332c) terrified of witchcraft
      " convinced that ...
      " aware that ...

(341d) anti-tribal
      " meritocratic
      " taking most students ...

Those marked * are complements of forms other than BE: 'alongside' (321), 'had' (322b), 'contained' (322b). The remaining oNP pre-primaries fall into the pattern,
a + premodifier(s) + human noun

The remaining post-primaries are predominantly adjectival and participial.

2.3.5 The \((\text{IND} \ - \ P) \ + \ (\text{A} \ - \ P \ - \ A)\) routine

The \text{Ind} \ - \ P and the \text{A} \ - \ P \ - \ A/pred patterns combine in this routine of which there are several examples in the data and numerous examples in the work as a whole:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(340)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>The height of ambition for African schoolboys //was</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>R/EL</td>
<td>Makerere College.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Founded in Kampala in Uganda in 1922,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Makerere //developed as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>a professional and liberal arts college.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(318)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>The policy //was</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>E/ST</td>
<td>indirect rule. //Although</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>conservative in origin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>it //was</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>radical in effect //because</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>it</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>pred</td>
<td>//rested on historical misunderstanding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(329b)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Ind</th>
<th>The most blatant tribe-maker //was</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>H.C. Steibel.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Trained in the Transvaal,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>pred</td>
<td>//believed that Africans belonged by nature and history to 'tribal nations'.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The routine is a device for organizing attribution. The indicating expression provides a frame for what follows. ('This concerns': something which was the height of ambition for schoolboys/something which was a policy/someone who was a blatant tribemaker/someone who was the outstanding proponent of progressive traditionalism.) A₁ is focussing. ('Note this relevant detail': founded in Kampala/conservative in origin/trained in the Transvaal/a mission educated courtier from Kiziba.) A₂ is additive (329a), contrastive (318), consecutive (340) or resultative (329b) in relation to A₁. Everything else merely refers to or evokes the subject - the focus - of these attributions.

### Analysis of Two Passages

#### 3.1 Passage A: the analysis

The passage consists of a single paragraph (p. 327) of about 250 words. All nominal expressions are analysed, except for: weakly-specific relating expressions referring to (or evoking) token figures
as the sources of quotations, etc.; some generic expressions occurring in adverbials; dates; impersonal it; and once only references to items of marginal relevance in the prevailing context, e.g. 'the war'.

My practice with embedded nominals is to analyse only those which show an interactive relationship of co- or cross-reference with other nominals in the passage. For example, in the A-expression (6) 'the key figures in indirect rule', the embedded 'indirect rule' is analysed as co-referential with 'the system' (1) but in the A-expression 'obsequious towards Europeans' (25) there is no separate analysis of Europeans.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
<th>NPI</th>
<th>Nominals</th>
<th>Co-text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>?R</td>
<td>the system</td>
<td></td>
<td>(its) main supporters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the progressive chiefs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(their) lives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>they</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the key figures in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(indirect rule).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(its) chief virtue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to release (their)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>energies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perhaps the most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>remarkable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Mgeni of (the Turu.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>With</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>two hundred thousand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>subjects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Tanganyika)'s most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>powerful chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>//and most administrators thought</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(its) best.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>He</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>no hereditary status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Turu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stateless,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>he // had risen through diplomatic skill and European favour during the war, and became paramount chief // in 1924.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>fluent in Swahili // but</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>barely literate,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>obsequious towards Europeans // but</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>popular with his subjects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>he // was exactly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>the government-appointed intermediary acceptable and necessary to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>a (e) (a stateless people compelled to deal with</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>b ((e)) (a colonial government) and anxious for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>A(E)</td>
<td>c ((e)) (the leadership needed to enact new laws and organise development.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Mgeni // was</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>famed for (justice in court) // but</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>education,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>ploughing,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>famine crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and all the rural developments at
(a progressive chief)'s command.

//Although

rich in cattle,

//was

(his) salary

relatively small

//and

he

//refused

the motor car that was normally

(the progressive chief)'s status
symbol.

// 'Met

Chief Mgeni',
//was a dist-

strict offi-

cer's first
diary entry

on reaching

Singida
//and there-
after he
rarely
communic-
ated with

the Turu
//except
through

the chief.
//Among

(Mgeni)'s contemporaries and
counterparts
//might be
listed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routine</th>
<th>(co-ref)</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>RF</th>
<th>Analysed Nominals</th>
<th>Co-text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P - P</td>
<td></td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Minja of Ugweno,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - P</td>
<td></td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Abdiel Shangali of Machame,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - P</td>
<td></td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Gabriel Ruhumbika of Ukerewe,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - P</td>
<td></td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Dominikus Chabruma of Mshope,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P - P</td>
<td></td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td>and many others who recreated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>(E)((E))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(the tradition of (progressive chieftainship) stretching back to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>((R))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Rindi) and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>((R))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Mrambo.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Co-text = any text other than analysed nominals

rf = referential function

line = line number; only lines with nominals are numbered; numbers with letters indicate lines with embedded nominals, e.g. (28a) identifies an embedded nominal in the nominal beginning at line 28.

focus = focal expression of any indicating, attributing or identifying expression (see 3.3.2 (iii))

co-ref = first-mention of referent

(co-ref)= first-mention of referent of embedded nominal

routine = regular pattern of referential functions.
3.2 Passage A: discussion of functions and forms

The breakdown of rf for all analysed nominals is as follows: (N=67):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main nominals</th>
<th>Embeddings</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON - SPECIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/e</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>47 (70%)</td>
<td>20 (30%)</td>
<td>67 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The passage shows an even balance between specific and non-specific rf. However, the specific rf are all primary, while among the main nominals the non-specific rf are predominately secondary. The dominant functions in the passage are thus R/EL and A (77%).

The analysed embedded nominals are all primary/known.

The RF analysis of the following nominals calls for comment:

'the system' (1)

At some points in the data, the intended referent of 'indirect rule' and its co-referentials is 'indirect rule as one possible type of system of colonial government'; at other points it is 'the indirect system of rule actually operating in Tanganyika from the time of
Cameron'. In the former case the expression is used with evoking, in the latter with - arguably - referring function. The latter interpretation seems called for in this passage, but it is possible that there is an intentional E/R equivocation.

'the Turu' (18)

Nominals of this form denoting ethnic or political groups are frequently problematic, especially when there is no distinction in lexis between a 'generic' and 'specific' form. In this instance, the intention may be glossed as 'the Turu people, of whatever generation or socio-political grouping', i.e. the reference is totally generic.

'a stateless people' (28a); 'a colonial government' (28b)

Though in their context these read as expressions of 'indifference' - any stateless people compelled to deal with any colonial government - it is clear that the writer has a particular people (the Turu) and a particular government (that of Tanganyika at the time) in mind. Both these referents are previously established in the discourse, the former, but not the latter, within the passage being analysed. In so far as the reference is not 'indifferent' there is an element of indirectness in the use of non-defining determination. The effect is to give emphasis to the attributive aspect of the nominals ('stateless', 'colonial').

'the chief' (44)

This expression may conceivably be read either as R or as E. (If the latter, then as an instance of Donnellan's 'attributive' use -
'whoever was the chief'). R seems, on the whole, a more likely interpretation, in the context of discussion of Mgeni.

3.3 Passage A: Interactivity

3.3.1 Pairs and patterns

The passage consists almost entirely of a series of indicating and attributing routines. There are four indicating expressions. The first two (2,7) link the progressive chiefs and 'their energies' to indirect rule. The third (9) links the chiefs to a specific historical figure, Mgeni, with a description of whom, as a model of progressive chieftainship under indirect rule, the passage is mainly concerned. The fourth links this individual to a number of others in the same mould, four of them identified by name and tribe.

Two of the Ind-P pairs initiate the Ind-P-A-P-A routine described above. The second of them is extended by a further P-A.

There are two further examples of pre-P attribution. In the first of these, no fewer than five attributing expressions are accumulated in advance of a pronominal P.

3.3.2 Co-reference and cross-reference

(i) Chains of co-reference

Chain A

1 the system
2 its (main supporters)
6 (the key figures in) indirect rule

Chain B

3 the progressive chiefs
their (lives)  

they  

(to release) their (energies)  

(perhaps the  

most remarkable

[one of) the progressive chiefs]  

[ellipted]

Mgeni of the Turu

he

he

he

he

he

Mgeni

he

his (salary)

he

Chief Mgeni

the chief

Mgeni('s contemporaries and counterparts)

(Mgeni of) the Turu

the Turu

the Turu
All the anaphoric items, with the exception of 'indirect rule' (6) are predictably definite. (The exception may be accounted for as a conventional reduction of 'the system of indirect rule'.) Two are subordinate nominals functioning in postmodification. (One of these - (9) - is part of an ellipted postmodifier.) Five are possessive determiners, one of which (2) links one chain - A - to another - B - through the indicating function of the expression of which it is part. Another - (45) - by the same means links Chain C to the series of linked references at (46-50).

The non-pronominal forms in Chain C may be explained as follows: 'Mgeni' (29,45) in terms of stylistic variation and re-emphasis; 'Chief Mgeni' (41): quotation; 'the chief' (44): paradigmatic linkage to 'a district officer' (41) - both describe roles.

The lack of pronominalisation in Chain D may be explained as follows: (18) - the expression is anaphoric to a subordinate nominal; (43) - textual distance from (18).

(ii) Serial cross-reference (lists)

A list, in discourse, is a form of paradigmatic linkage in which items asserted or presupposed to have some significant features in common are presented in co-ordination, syntetic or asyntetic, or as functionally equivalent items in parallel structures, for example as subjects in a series of simple declarative sentences. There are two instances in Passage A, both of the same pattern:

(30-35) justice in court
education,
ploughing,
plague crops,
and all the rural developments at
a progressive chief's command

(46-50) Minja of Ugweno,
Abdul Shangali of Machame,
Gabriel Ruhumbika of Ukerewe,
Dominikus Chabrama of Mshope,
and many others who recreated
the tradition of progressive chieftainship ...

The pattern is a, b, c, ... and x, where x both extends the list in
an indefinite way and summarises the main characteristics of all
its members.

(iii) Focal cross-reference (the attributing routines)

By focal cross-reference I mean relations of interactivity
existing between indicating, attributing and identifying expressions
which have a single 'focus', i.e. the primary referent of which the
descriptions in question are predicated. Focal cross-reference
draws attention to interactivity of various sorts: rf-rf interact-
activity (e.g. between two A-expressions); rf-pred interactivity
(e.g. between the focus and an A-expression); and the interactive
act (e.g. of contrast, consequence) which links one UDA (unit of
discourse activity) with another.

The passage contains the following five examples:
(9 - 18)

Linked A-expressions

perhaps the most remarkable (Ind) (9)
two hundred thousand subjects (4) (11)
Tanganyika's most powerful chief (A) (13)
its best (A) (15)

Focus
Mgeni of the Turu (REL) (10)

The A-expressions are linked not only in having a common focus but in expressing a common idea: scale of achievement. (All four expressions are 'superlative', either explicitly - 'most', 'most', 'best' - or by implication - 'two hundred thousand'.) The three A-expressions provide details which jointly establish a justification (= interactive act) for the description asserted in the Im-expression to be true of the focal referent. The linkage between the A-expressions is as follows:

(11): (13) - state of affairs : consequence
(13): (15) - merely additive.

The consequential relation is marked by 'with'; the additive relation by 'and'.

(16-21)

Linked A-expressions
no hereditary status (A) (17)
stateless (A) (19)
paramount chief (A) (21)

Foci
he (R) (16,20)
the Turu (E.t) (18)
Although only (17) and (21) are linked in having the same focus, all three are linked in terms of content: (17) and (19) mark this in being (both) negative; and all three denote concommitants of power. ('Stateless' may be glossed (approximately): 'lacking authoritative government'). The foci ('he'/'the Turu') are linked by class-membership.

The interactive act of explanation relates the attribution to the Turu (of statelessness) to the attribution to Mgeni (of being without hereditary status); and this latter attribution is related to that of Mgeni's chieftainship by the interactive act of concession. These various connections may be summarised as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
(a) & he & no hereditary status \\
\hline
(a)^* \leftrightarrow (b) & the Turu & stateless \\
\hline
(a) \uparrow (c) & he & paramount chief \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

(22-28)

Linked A-expressions

- a muslim
- fluent in Swahili
- barely literate
- obsequious towards Europeans
- popular with his subjects
- the government appointed intermediary...

* Broad categories of interactive relationship are summarised as follows:
  & = additive
  ! = contrastive
  <$> = explicative
  = = equative
Focus

he (R) (27)

The $A$-expressions are all linked in having the same focus. They also express the same idea, but this is a complex one: suitability as an intermediary. Some of the pre-primary attributions describe attributes acceptable to the Turu, others describe attributes acceptable to the government. The post-primary attribution summarises and characterises this mixed set of attributes. The various relationships may be shown as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Attributes acceptable to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Turu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>a muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) &amp; (b)</td>
<td>popular with his subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) &amp; (b) $\leftrightarrow$ (c)</td>
<td>exactly the government appointed intermediary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(29-35)

The attributing expression 'famed for justice in court' (30) is linked to the predicate expression 'encouraged education, ...' both by common focus, 'Mgeni' (29) and by a common content, i.e. the idea of wise rule, which is encapsulated in the serial linked references, 'justice', 'education', 'ploughing', etc. described above.
(36-40)

**Linked A-expressions**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rich in cattle</td>
<td>(A) (36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relatively small</td>
<td>(A) (38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Linked foci**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>he</td>
<td>(R) (39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>his salary</td>
<td>(R) (37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The A-expressions are linked by a common topic - wealth - and are in a contrastive relationship. The foci are linked pragmatically in that (37) describes a property of (39), and are linked grammatically through the possessive 'his'. The predicate at (39/40), 'refused the motor-car', continues the theme of (36/38), and the relationship of the respective UDAs is additive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
<td>rich in cattle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)! (b)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>his salary</td>
<td></td>
<td>relatively small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(b) &amp; (c)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>he</td>
<td></td>
<td>refused the motor-car ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iv) Rf modulation

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>the progressive chiefs</td>
<td>(R.g)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>a progressive chief</td>
<td>(E/e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>the progressive chief('s status symbol)</td>
<td>(E/e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between (35/40), on the one hand, and (3) and the other nominals in Chain B, on the other hand, is one of cross-reference not co-reference. The characteristics of this cross-
reference are: (a) the denotation of all the expressions is the same, i.e. they describe the same type of entity; (b) the referential function is different: - (3) is used to refer to all the progressive chiefs actually involved in indirect rule; (35) and (40) are used to refer, ambivalently, to the entire species or to some arbitrary token of the type. (We may read (35) as 'the progressive chief'; (40) as 'the status symbol of a/any progressive chief'.)

A similar case is found in the relationship between Chain D — 'the Turu' — and (28a), 'a stateless people ...', the former being used to evoke a certain type, the latter to evoke a token of a superordinate type (the class of all stateless peoples), in such a way that the token and the type are implicitly equivalent. Likewise, 'a colonial government' (28b) evokes a token of the type colonial governments, and is thus in a relationship of modulated cross-reference to any previous expression referring to the actual colonial government of the time and place. (There is, however, no such previous reference in the passage.)

In all such cases we may say that the modulated reference connects by allusion to the referent of the linked expression.

(v) Constructional cross-reference

Lastly we may note a form of syntagmatic linkage in which certain items existing in some spatio-temporal and/or socio-cultural and/or causal-consequential relationship to one another are brought together in the discourse in a manner intended to give prominence to these connections. An example is found at (41-44), where the device of the district officer's diary enables the writer to bring together in a summary way certain key facts in the current narrative: the person (Mgeni), the place (Singida), the people (the Turu), and the role (being chief).
### 3.4 Passage B: the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routine (co-ref)</th>
<th>Co-ref focus</th>
<th>Line</th>
<th>rf</th>
<th>Analysed nominals</th>
<th>Co-text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Byatt</td>
<td>had little interest in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>district administration</td>
<td>and left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>district officers</td>
<td>to their own devices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>administration</td>
<td>faced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EST</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>serious difficulties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?R</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>The secretariat</td>
<td>was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>overburdened</td>
<td>and wished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e(e)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>to decentralise by creating (provinces),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a ?E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>a proposal equally welcome to (district officers)</td>
<td>who wanted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>less detailed interference</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>more general guidance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tribute</td>
<td>was increasingly resented as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>commercial agriculture</td>
<td>developed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>?R</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>the Treasury</td>
<td>insisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e(R)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>that ( he) increase taxation to meet (Tanganyika)'s continuing deficits,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a (R)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Byatt</td>
<td>proposed in March 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentence</td>
<td>Nominal</td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Analysed Nominals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>e(R)</td>
<td>that (he) should at the same time replace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>(the chief's tribute) by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(salaries from government funds).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>?R</td>
<td></td>
<td>The colonial office //greeted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>R(R)</td>
<td>(Byatt)'s proposal //as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>&quot;a step in the direction of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>('indirect rule'&quot; //and replied with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>REL</td>
<td></td>
<td>a selection of papers on</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>(E)</td>
<td>((that policy) in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(Nigeria)).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21b</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>(Nigeria)'s newly conquered Muslim emirates,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>indirect rule //had developed into</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
<td>a doctrine.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>(co-ref)</td>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Line</td>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Analysed Nominals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ind(E)</td>
<td>(Its) essence</td>
<td>//was the complete integration of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a(E)</td>
<td>(indigenous political systems) into</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b(E)</td>
<td>(the colonial administration)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 e</td>
<td>two sets of rulers -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 a</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(British) and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 b</td>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>(native) - working either separately or in cooperation //but</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28 e</td>
<td></td>
<td>a single government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>The system //differed from both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15a</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>R(R)</td>
<td>(Byatt)'s Tanganyika* //where</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>native authorities //needed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>no indigenous status //and from</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>a 'native state' //as broadly in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>Buganda) //where</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>relations between</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a(E)</td>
<td>(European) and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b(E)</td>
<td>(African rulers) //were</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>fixed by treaty. //Under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>indirect rule //Consisted of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39 E/e</td>
<td></td>
<td>a native administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Underlined brackets are from the original text.
three parts:

a native authority - chief, council or some combination of these - with legislative and executive powers;

native courts; //and

a native treasury, which collected all taxes, remitting a percentage to government and retaining the rest to pay the native authority and finance local works and services.

(The European officer)'s normal role //was
to supervise and educate //but if necessary
he //could issue orders to
the native administration.

This policy //was
admired by

a (REL) (many officials anxious to bring

((R)) ((Tanganyika)) into

((E)) ((the mainstream of colonial government)).

//Late in 1924
a conference of district officers //unanimously recommended
decentralisation through provinces,
commutation of tribute, //and
the establishment in each area of

'an autonomous local native Government having its own legislation, treasury and authorities'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>line</th>
<th>Analysed nominals</th>
<th>//Co-text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Sir Donald Cameron</td>
<td>//Early in 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Tanganyika</td>
<td>//Arrived in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>//as</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>seventeen years in (Nigeria),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>he</td>
<td>//had been a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>a Labour government</td>
<td>appointed by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>a man of liberal views,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>administrative efficiency</td>
<td>//and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>personal dynamism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>He</td>
<td>//later denied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>that (he) reached</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15a</td>
<td>(Tanganyika) itching to introduce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19a</td>
<td>(indirect rule)</td>
<td>//but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>(his) letters</td>
<td>//belie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>this</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The passage is approximately four-hundred words in length and extends over one complete and two partial paragraphs in the data. (p.319-20) All nominals have been analysed, except dates and one or two expressions which are constituents of idioms ('little interest', 'their own devices').
3.5 Passage B: discussion of functions and forms
(N = 98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main nominals</th>
<th>Embeddings</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31 (32%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Main nominals</th>
<th>Embeddings</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NONSPECIFIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E/e</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67 (68%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ALL | 69 (70%) | 29 (30%) | 98 (100%) |

'Indirect rule' (20a) in this passage is plainly evoking. The expression evokes, and the passage as a whole describes, a system of government as a type rather than as a specific token of the type, and it is therefore not surprising that the rf in this passage are predominantly non-specific: 68%, in contrast with the 50% of passage A, which described a particular person operating with a particular administrative framework. Secondary rf (all attributing) are relatively few: 16%, in contrast with the 37% of passage A.

The following nominals also call for comment:
'district officers' (3,9a)
I read this as 'anyone who was a district officer', hence non-specific, but a R.g interpretation is possible.
'the secretariat', 'the Treasury', 'the colonial office' \((6,14,18)\)

These are interpreted as referring to specific, spatio-temporally located, organs of government, rather than as evoking the non-specific set of individuals who operate them. By contrast, 'administration' \((4)\) is only interpretable as \(E\). The absence of the definite article here clearly marks this difference in function.

'to decentralise' \((8)\), 'less detailed interference' \((10)\), etc.

Expressions which fall under the scope of verbs of wanting, proposing, etc. are properly interpreted as evoking a token of the type \((e)\), i.e. the referent is neither specific (an actual individual) nor generic (the species as a whole). There are numerous examples in the passage.

'a native administration' \((39)\)

This example clearly illustrates the type/token indeterminacy of the 'representative generic' indefinite nominal in subject position.

Both the and each would be substitutable for 'a', the former predisposing a type, the latter a token, interpretation.

3.6 Passage B: Interactivity

3.6.1 Pairs and patterns

The passage lacks the highly structured series of indicating/attributing routines which characterise Passage A, though there are two attributing routines of some interest at \((22-24)\) and at \((54-62)\). Establishing expressions are of greater significance in this passage, two as targets of indicating expressions \((25,44)\) and two \((5,40)\) as instances of the sort of anticipatory establishing function described
in an earlier section. Of particular importance are some complex patterns of cross-reference involving evoking expressions.

3.6.2 Co-reference and cross-reference

(i) Chains of co-reference

There are multiple references to: district officers (x2); Byatt (x6); tribute (x2); indirect rule (x8); Tanganyika (x5); Nigeria (x3); the European officer (x2); a native administration (x2); Sir Donald Cameron (x5). The second reference to 'the European officer' (44) affords an example of pronominal anaphora to an E-expression. The second reference to 'a native administration' (47) affords an example of a definite cNP anaphoric to an indefinite E-expression. The second reference in the 'Tanganyika' chain (31) is not strictly co-referential with the others. The head of the expression - 'Byatt's Tanganyika' - denotes what the others are used to refer to, but the expression as a whole refers to Tanganyika under a certain, and limiting, aspect. Such a case might better, therefore, be dealt with as a form of cross-reference. The most important chain of co-reference in the passage is that referring to 'indirect rule':

20a ('a step in the direction of) "indirect rule"
21a (a selection of papers on) that policy
23 indirect rule
25 its(essence)
29 the system
38 indirect rule
48 this policy
64 (... itching to introduce) indirect rule
There are two denotative substitutions ('policy', 'system'). It is of interest that the lexical item policy when used anaphorically seems to require, in a way that system does not, the additional deictic force of this and that.

(ii) Parallel cross-reference

In parallel cross-reference, two or more expressions are presented - normally as functionally equivalent constituents in parallel constructions (e.g. as subjects in declarative sentences) - as referring to entities having some degree of pragmatic equivalence in the state of affairs, or series of events, being expounded. The establishing expression at (5), 'serious difficulties', is expounded in two UDAs (in an interactive act relationship of DETAIL to the preceding DTA) with subject nominals 'the secretariat' (6) and 'tribute' (12) respectively. These nominals are thus in parallel cross-reference in that both refer to the institutions in which the 'serious difficulties' were being experienced. In turn, 'the secretariat' (6), as the subject of 'wished', and 'district officers' (9a) as the antecedent of the relative-pronoun subject of 'wanted', are placed in parallel cross-reference, as are the objects of these verbs, respectively 'to decentralise by creating provinces' (8) and 'less detailed interference and more general guidance' (10, 11). This latter expression contains two nominals which themselves are in parallel. The parallelism of these various expressions encourages the reflection that the wishes of the two groups (the secretariat, the district officers) were compatible, and that decentralisation to 'provinces' (intermediate between central and district government) would have had both
the, superficially contrasting, effects desired by the district officers. The second 'serious difficulty', 'tribute', is placed in parallel with 'commercial agriculture', a parallelism marked (a) by their equivalent grammatical status as subjects of their clause, (b) by the conjunction 'as', and (c) by a partial equivalence in content of the two predicates ('increasingly'/'developed'). In summary:

- Secretariat [district officers] wanted to decentralise
  - less interference
  - more guidance

(iii) Focal cross-reference
(22-24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Focus</th>
<th>Pred</th>
<th>Linked 'A's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 'Indirect rule'</td>
<td>'devised as'</td>
<td>'an expedient method ...' (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) ! (b)</td>
<td>'had developed into'</td>
<td>'a doctrine' (24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interactive act of CONTRAST (CONCESSION) with links UDA (a) and (b) is given cohesive substance in (i) the common subject (the focus of the A-expressions) being placed centrally - pattern A-P-A; (ii) the antonymy of the two A-expressions.
Focus: 'three parts' (EST) (40)

Linked 'A's: 'a native authority ...' (41)
'native courts' (42)
'a native treasury ...' (43)

The relationship between the A-expressions is additive; that between the three 'A's and the focus is one of equivalence (=).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Linked A-expressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'three parts' (=)</td>
<td>a native authority ... (&lt;br/&gt;) native courts (&lt;br/&gt;) a native treasury ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The zero-determination of 'native courts' is noteworthy, since this form, rather than some, is characteristic of cNPs with an attributing function.

(57-62)

Focus | Linked 'A'-expressions
--- | ---
(a) | 'seventeen years in Nigeria' (57) (REL)
(b) 'he'(58) | 'a man of liberal views' (60)
(c) (=Cameron) | 'administrative efficiency'(61)
(d) (R) | 'personal dynamism' (62)

(b), (c) and (d) are additive. (a), though a relating expression, indirectly describes a property of Cameron which is relevant to his appointment. (We thus have a further instance of the A-P-A routine.)
The relationship of (a) to (b, c, d) is rather unclear. It may simply be additive or it may be partly explicative.

(iv) Constructional cross-reference

**Cameron's appointment**

The last part of the passage (54-62) gives prominence to the following connections:

| appointee: | Cameron | (subject) |
| place: | Tanganyika | ('arrived in') |
| office: | governor | ('as') |
| appointer: | labour government | ('appointed by a') |
| qualifications: | (57 - see above) | ('after') |
| | (60-62 see above) | ('as') |

The first column gives the elements in the 'construction'; the second their actualisation; the third the means of their syntagmatic connection. Of some interest in the third column are the explicative, or justificatory, 'as' and the ascriptive 'a' which together serve to link the appointer to the appointee’s qualifications. The use of the indefinite article appears, here as elsewhere, to give prominence to the attributing rather than the referring properties of the nominal expression, which therefore is read as evoking a type (a type which may be expected to favour 'a man of liberal views') no less strongly than as referring to an actual instance of the type, namely the government of the day. 'A labour government' thus provides a further instance of a modulated rf, being not, or at least not wholly, co-referential with 'the labour government' (a reference which is
unexpressed in the passage but clearly implied).

**Indirect rule**

The passage is about indirect rule, as Passage A was about Mgeni of the Turu. Where the latter built up a description of its subject through an intricate pattern of indicating and attributing routines, the present passage makes extensive use of other forms of cross-reference. In this process, the purely syntagmatic links of constructional cross-reference are especially apparent, though the elements which they connect are then linked to each other in various relations of interactivity. The main elements in the construction are: the difference between indirect rule, on the one hand, and direct rule and the 'native state', on the other; the distinctness in different ways - of indigenous and colonial administration in the former. To give a detailed exposition of this process would require a rather lengthy essay in itself. I shall merely note, as examples, two parts of the construction, which may be illustrated as follows:

(17-20)

agent: Byatt (subject)
replaced item: the chief's tribute (proposed ... replace)
replacement item: salaries from government funds (by)
effect: indirect rule (step in the direction of)
process: complete integration (nominalised verb)
affected: indigenous political systems (of)
recipient: the colonial administration (into)
negative effect: two sets of rulers (so that there are not)
detail: British and African (-)
positive effect: a single government (but)

4. Summary

In this chapter I have done the following.

In part 1, I described the kind of data I proposed to analyse - its subject matter, its complexity, its 'status' in academic writing - and my reasons for doing so.

In part 2, I confronted some of the problems of indeterminacy of referential function. I looked in some detail at relating and establishing expressions and I gave a comprehensive account of the indicating expressions in the data. I noted certain stylised patterns for making relating reference to different categories of people; I noted certain variations on existential syntax in the environment of establishing expressions; I described the triple function of indicating expressions - anaphoric, anticipatory and attributing; I analysed their form and described the 'paradigm' indicating expression; I listed thirty instances of the standard Ind-P routine, and described two types of variation on it. I then looked at attributing expressions, their form as well as their place in various routines, for example the A-P-A routine; I described a routine common in the book and well exemplified in the data, which combines Ind-P with A-P-A.
In part 3, I analysed two passages in detail. I quantified and compared their referential functions. I discussed the function of a number of problematic or instructive nominal expressions. I commented, but not systematically, on various points of grammatical form. I summarised for each passage the preponderant routines that I observed. I described chains of co-reference. I took pronominalisation as the norm for non-initial reference and attempted to account for instances of non-pronominal anaphora. I noted cases of linkage between one chain and another. I described cases of 'serial', 'focal', 'parallel' and 'constructional' cross-reference, and I noted several cases of 'rf-modulation'. I related these various instances of nominal interactivity, where it seemed instructive to do so, to the interactive act linking two units of discourse activity. I made some comparisons between passage A and passage B in terms of the dominant relations of interactivity in each.

I have found that my most persistent problem has been the problem of indeterminacy of referential function. I do not think this problem can easily be overcome - for reasons which I gave earlier - but I think its significance can be reduced by achieving, with practice, consistency in interpretation. Consistency at least ensures that some patterns will reliably emerge from the analysis, and should ensure that similar patterns would emerge if similar data were analysed, or if the same data were reanalysed at a later date. These, of course, are not the patterns of the data, the structures of the discourse, but they are some of them. Other systems of analysis will reveal other patterns: only nominal-referential/such
as I proposed in Part II will reveal the patterns I have just described.

Whether revealing them is something of value - and in particular something of practical value, of 'utility' - is the question I discuss briefly in my concluding chapter. I have not, of course, answered, since there is no single answer, the question how complexity of content is made manageable in the routine patterns of discourse. But I believe the results of the analysis suggest, at least, that the approach I have adopted can make its contribution to the task of finding out.
1 A 'relevant model'?

It naturally follows that applied linguistic models of language would vary according to the kind of language user concerned. They would be consumer based ... You do not start with a model as given and then cast about for ways in which it might come in handy. You start instead with a characterisation of the learner and his circumstances. (Widdowson, 1980b:169)

It may appear that I am doing what Widdowson is saying that we should not do: having started with a 'model' - having constructed a position - and having tried it out on some data, I now reach the stage of attempting to demonstrate some plausible use - other than the simple satisfaction of analysing discourse - to which it may be put. My defence is that the use which I have in mind - the teaching of language as communication - is a very broad one and non-controversial; that the model on which communicative language teaching has been based has shown itself to be capable of improvement in certain respects; and that, in so far as my own attempt at position-building has been successful, it should be possible to indicate some ways in which communicative language teaching can, correspondingly, be made more effective. In short, my imagined 'consumers' are not some particular group ('teachers of literature', 'students of physics doing a course in ESP' are Widdowson's examples
of groups for whom 'relevant models' might need to be specifically devised) but all those who have some or other more or less specific purpose in connection with the teaching or learning of English.

The applied linguistic research on which developments in communicative language teaching have largely been based has been undertaken in three main areas: needs analysis, discourse analysis, and methodology. Work in the first of these areas has been intended to throw light on the various roles, situations, activities, topics, channels of communication, etc., in relation to which the target communicative repertoire of a particular learning group can be defined. Work in the second area has aimed to reveal the notions and functions and discourse routines, along with their characteristic linguistic realisations, which typify the various forms of communication in which the learners will be expected to have competence. Work in methodology has been concerned to give a general definition to the effective communicative classroom and also to devise efficient types of communication exercise.¹ My own work of position-building has been entirely within the second of these areas. I have had nothing to say about needs analysis, and this for the reason given above that I have assumed a general applicability to communicative teaching of the position that I have constructed. Up to this point, also, I have had nothing to say - except in a very general way in chapter 1 - about methodology. I shall attempt no original contribution in this area but, in the third section of this chapter, I shall try to show how the output of nominal-referential analysis may fit with some of the proposals made by others. My
Immediate purpose is to demonstrate that this does in fact need to be done: that reference, despite its importance in linguistic communication, has, on the whole, been ignored.

2 Reference and the communicative approach

The communicative approach depends on the recognition of the distinction between, and the articulation of the connection between, language and communication. Applied linguists have thus been drawn to the work of theorists who appear to provide a coherent account of this difference and this relationship and in particular, for reasons discussed earlier, to speech act theory. Speech act theory, however, suffers from what Bierwisch (1980) calls an 'original sin'. It is the view that, in words which Bierwisch quotes from Wunderlich, speech act theory is 'an extension of the theory of meaning in natural language'. The consequence of the sin is that 'the basic distinction between language and communication' is obscured and Bierwisch argues that, despite the various careful distinctions that Austin, Searle and others have taken pains to make, they still 'mix language and communication'. The various acts - phonetic, phatic, rhetic, illocutionary, perlocutionary - are 'rather construed as interlocked layers within the domain of language use'.

The reason behind this view seems to be first the lack of a systematic theory of language explaining the coherent principles underlying the phonetic, syntactic and semantic organisation of linguistic utterances, and second the lack of any systematic notion of communication as based on genuine principles of social
interaction. One of the consequences is the tendency to consider the relation between illocutionary acts and linguistic structures as a matter of interesting detail, not of systematic explanation (op. cit. p4).

One area in which the effect of this lack of 'systematic explanation' is especially apparent is, as I have argued throughout, that of reference. Referential acts are acts but not, according to Austin and Searle, illocutionary acts. The distinction — and connection — between the communicative act (of reference) and the meaning and form of the linguistic expression (the nominal) uttered in the performance of the act is thus even less clear than that between the indisputably illocutionary act of promising (something) and the locutionary (or 'utterance') act of saying 'I promise....'

The effect of this on the communicative approach is that reference has not been seen as a communicative category and it is for this reason that it has received so little attention from applied linguists. That it has, in fact, been largely neglected is confirmed by the following brief survey of (i) work in discourse analysis, (ii) proposals relating to the content of communicative syllabuses, and (iii) communicative course books and other teaching materials.

teaching. (See, for example, papers by Allen and Widdowson, Mackay and Mountford, and Candlin, Kirkwood and Moore, in Mackay and Mountford (1978).)

(ii) Wilkins (1976), under his heading 'semantico-grammatical categories', includes 'deixis' - 'the capacity to refer an utterance to the context in which it occurs', i.e., specifically, to time, place, and person. Van Ek, likewise, includes deixis - 'which may be definite or indefinite, 'non-anaphoric' or 'anaphoric' - in his index of 'general notions'. Munby (1978), under his 'taxonomy of language skills' includes 'using exophoric reference' along with 'reading between the lines' and 'integrating data in the text with our experience and knowledge of the world' as instances of 'interpreting a text by going outside it'.

(iii) A survey of communicative teaching materials produced in the period 1974 - 1983 reveals three aspects of nominal reference which are regularly or occasionally treated. The most prominent of these is anaphora, exercises on which appeared, under the name 'contextual reference', in the first of the 'Focus' textbooks (Allen and Widdowson, 1974) and have continued to be a feature of communicative reading materials since. This exercise draws the learner's attention to the way pronouns and demonstratives are used to refer to something already mentioned and so serve to relate one statement to another (op.cit.).

In other books, including one by the same authors (1978), anaphoric nominals other than pronouns and demonstratives are included in the exercises. One of the books surveyed (Johnson, 1981) introduces the student to the distinction between 'referring back' and 'giving new
information', pointing out that the first part of the sentence normally has the former function, the last part the latter. It includes exercises on re-writing sentences so as to produce this arrangement.

Another way in which nominality-reference is - occasionally - treated is in exercises which link aspects of noun phrase structure explicitly to aspects of referential function. The main source of examples of such exercises is the 'Focus' series, most titles of which contain sections dealing with noun phrase postmodification, and in particular the distinction between 'defining' and 'non-defining' relative clauses. It is pointed out to the student that, whereas defining relative clauses 'tell us what we are talking about', non-defining relative clauses 'simply add some extra information'. Exercises involve combining two sentences 'if the noun phrases in italics refer to the same thing'. In general, however, the nominality-reference part of the relation between grammar and communication is rarely touched on in these materials. Definiteness and specificity are nowhere explicitly treated. In Candlin & Edelhof (1982), for example, with its regular exercises on function and form, the functions dealt with do not include reference and the forms do not include nominals.

Nominality-reference is sometimes found to be at least implicitly treated in those units of communicative materials which deal with such functions as generalisation, definition and classification. For example, Reading and thinking in English (Discovering discourse) points out, in a unit on generalisation, the relation between:

A person bitten by a mamba will probably die;
The mamba venom is usually fatal;
Most mamba bites are fatal;
all of which make generalisations, but in terms of probability, frequency and quantity, respectively. Exercises are given in the comprehension and writing of the three types, with the quantifiers most, many, some, and few used to indicate different degrees of generality by quantity. In the same book, the unit on definitions demonstrates the structure of definitions - 'class + characteristics' - and shows how the characteristics are connected to the class by relative words and expressions such as that, which, in which, by which, etc. The unit on classification differentiates two types, one moving from 'specific' to 'general', and marked by such expressions as is a member of, is placed in the class of, the other from 'general' to 'specific' and marked by such expressions as comprises. However, the attention of the student is not drawn, either in the presentation or the exercises, to the grammatical form of the nominals which are thereby linked, and in general the nominal element, which is of central importance in relation to all three of these performative functions, is given little explicit attention.

3 For example

3.1 'What to teach'

In determining what to teach it was suggested in chapter 1 that the relevant considerations are (i) 'practical' - the learners' needs, and (ii) 'theoretical' - the nature of language. It was then argued that the 'theoretical' aspect also is essentially practical, that the task of the applied linguist is not to produce better theories but to construct workable positions: to reflect on the nature of language
with some practical end in view. This may be done at a very general level, and the result will be an 'approach'. At a more particular level the aim may be to produce a syllabus for a certain group of learners; then it may be necessary to undertake analysis of certain kinds of discourse, and the kinds of discourse analysed will be those in which the learners need to attain communicative competence. The output of the analysis will contribute to the determination of the content of the syllabus. Let us therefore assume, for the sake of exemplification, that we are concerned with a particular group of students: arts and social science students entering a university programme in which the medium of instruction is English. The students, who have used English in their secondary education, are deemed to need an intensive 'communication skills' course in order to improve their reading and writing skills: their ability to read and take notes on a book such as Iliffe's with fluency and intelligent understanding and their ability to write a good essay. Let us also assume that the students in question (i) have an adequate basic grasp of the grammar of English nominal expressions; (ii) have plenty of experience of reading school textbooks and writing school essays; (iii) have relevant but imperfect applicational competence: problems show up particularly in their writing; (iv) are weak in 'procedural competence' — in ability to use their knowledge, in 'accomplishment'; and (v) in studying, as discourse, material such as that analysed in chapter 8 will be developing not only their ability to read and write but also their knowledge of historical praxis: of how historical exposition is done.
If these are the students, what shall they be taught? The essence of communicative syllabus design is captured in Widdowson's (1973b/1979:50) definition of discourse as 'the use of sentences in combination': we must teach sentences; we must teach their use; and we must teach the possibilities for their formal and functional inter-relationship. So far as the nominal-referential part of communicative competence is concerned, the content of the syllabus will be referential functions, nominal expressions, and patterns of interactivity (routines) described in terms of referential inter-relationships.

The following is a brief example of how such content might appear.

**rf:** INDICATING

nominal realisation:

- cNP denotative: abstract nouns such as:
  - emphasis, essence, role,
  - peculiarity, object,
  - exponent, alternative,
  - approach, consequence,
  - crux, embodiment, ...

- people and group nouns such as:
  - supporters, contemporaries,
  - counterparts, ...

- superlatives and evaluative adjectives such as:
  - main, chief, normal,
  - outstanding, ...
prep. phrase postmodification:
of, at, about phrases
determinative:
definitisers:
the, possessive determiners
itemisers: (ordering)
first, last, next, ...
(adding)
further, another, ...

rf: RELATING

nominal realisation:
pNP
N of N (person of place)
e.g. Makongoro of Ikizu
Towegale of lowland Ubena
pN - prep - place
e.g. J.M. Kadaso in Bukwimba
Nathaniel Mtui on Kilimanjaro

routine: Ind - P
(P = REL or EST)

links:
Ind - BE - P
Among - Ind - BE - P
Ind - INCLUDE - P

Examples:
'The outstanding proponent of progressive traditionalism was Francis Iwamugira of Buhaya.'
'The chief obstacles to Cameron's social engineering were stateless peoples.'
**routine:**  $A - P - A$

$\ (P = R \text{ or } E)$

**links:**

- Initial A appositive
- *Alongside* - A
- *With* - A

**Examples:**

'TAn elderly, frail, introspective and superstitious man, he was terrified of witchcraft, ...'

'Alongside its idealism, indirect rule contained much conservative self-interest.'

**routine:**  $(\text{Ind} - P) + (A - P - A)$

**Example:**

'Perhaps the most remarkable was Mgeni of the Turu. With two hundred thousand subjects, he was Tanganyika's most powerful chief ...'

### 3.2 'How to teach it'

In deciding principles of methodology it was suggested in chapter 1 that the relevant considerations are: (i) 'practical' - capacities of learners; (ii) 'theoretical' - the nature of learning. In relation to the latter, I shall start by making certain basic assumptions about the teaching of EAP. First, the language is best presented as 'an aspect of the subject being studied' (Allen & Widdowson, 1974).

To understand how Iliffe organises his material as discourse is to understand something of how a historian sets about his business. The 'E' and the 'AP' cannot easily be separated. Second, the learners will respond best to a 'rational and problem-solving approach' (ibid.).
They should 'themselves be analysts of discourse' (Candlin, 1976; Candlin & Edelhof, 1982), 'metacommunicating' in a classroom which is 'both observatory and laboratory' (Breen and Candlin, 1981). In their approach to reading they must be carefully analytic; in their approach to writing deliberately synthetic. (This is not to say that all EAP is 'learning' and none 'acquisition' (Krashen, 1981) but this is a clear case where 'monitoring' aids rather than hinders communication, is more than a 'supplement', is essential to the process.) Third, analysis and synthesis are mutually supporting: reading is learnt through writing, writing through reading. Fourth, in the analytic-synthetic process there is necessarily a concentration of attention on the parts - some of these to the exclusion of others - at the expense of the whole. However, it is evident that the whole may have meaning and function which the sum of the parts may lack: exercises should therefore aim to develop the learners' understanding not only in detail and selectively, through attention to the parts, but also 'globally' (Candlin and Edelhof, op. cit.), through attention to the discourse as a whole.

Taking the fragment of syllabus content illustrated above as determining 'what' is to be taught, and taking Passage A (chapter 8, section 3) as the teaching text, I shall, very briefly, describe a number of exercise types (all of which appear in various guises in the communicative materials surveyed) which might, for the sort of learners I have in mind for this example, be effective. (Exercise material and examples are taken not just from passage A but from the chapter which I analysed as a whole.)
FORMING, COMBINING AND REVERSING

List A: people, groups, institutions
the Nyakyusa
H.C. Steibel
Francis Iwamugira
the Kiva uprising

List B: unique or notable attributes
spectacular new tribe
blatant tribe-maker
proponent of progressive traditionalism
dramatic incident of the Shambaa civil war

1. Write: 'The Nyakyusa were the most spectacular new tribe'.
   'Francis Iwamugira was the outstanding proponent of progressive traditionalism'.
   etc.

2. Make up your own examples, taking for the subject of your sentence some historical or political figure with whom you are familiar.

3. Reverse the nominals in your sentences.
   Write: 'The most spectacular new tribe were the Nyakyusa.'
   'The outstanding proponent of progressive traditionalism was Francis Iwamugira.'

   Suggest, in a sentence or two, a preceding context which would account for a writer selecting the reversed rather than the original form.
   Example: 'Tribal formation accelerated as a result of indirect rule. The most spectacular new tribe were the Nyakyusa.'

RECOGNITION OF RF ROUTINE

1. Look.
   Find instances in Passage A of sentences whose nominals are similar in function to those you have constructed (after reversal).
2. Describe.

What is described by the initiating nominal?
What is its function in the discourse?
How does it connect with the preceding context?

3. Reverse.

Try reversing the examples you have found in the text.
Are the functions of the reversed nominals the same as they were before reversal?
Does the reversed sentence fit in the discourse?

PREDICTION

What would you predict in 'C'? (There may be more than one suitable answer.)

'A'

A resolutely stateless people,

'B'

the Bondei

'C'

(1) adapted to indirect rule and easily accepted a chief.
(2) could not accept any of their number as a leader.
(3) were alarmed by the restoration of the Shambaa kingdom.

'A'

An elderly, frail, introspective and superstitious man

'B'

Kinyashi

'C'

(1) was terrified of witchcraft.
(2) much impressed Cameron by his qualities of leadership.
(3) was so aware that he ruled by British favour that he apparently hoarded his salary in order to return it when he was deposed.
1. Note the pattern of functions in the following example:

'Such jealously egalitarian peoples as the Matumbi failed to produce any native authority.'

The subject of the sentence contains an expression which helps to explain what is said in the last part of the sentence.

2. Combine the 'A' and the 'B' expressions in the examples in the PREDICTION exercise in a similar way so as to achieve a similar effect.

PARALLEL WRITING

1. Model: study lines 9 - 15 of Passage A, paying particular attention to the function of the nominal expressions.

2. Content:

Institution: Makerere College
Attributes: founded in Kampala in 1922
developed as a professional and liberal arts college
the height of ambition for African schoolboys

3. Write out in two sentences the content in (2) on the pattern of the model (1).

ADDING INFORMATION

1. Content: (further attributes)

a vital counterweight to adaptive education
anti-tribal
meritocratic
took most students by competitive examination regardless of origin
2. Combine this information with the output of the previous exercise.

CORRECTING STATEMENTS

1. Study lines 22 - 26 of Passage A.

2. Correct these statements if necessary:

   Mgeni was fluent in Swahili because he was a Muslim.

   Mgeni was a suitable intermediary because he was barely literate.

   Mgeni was popular with his subjects although he was obsequious to Europeans.

   Mgeni was acceptable to Europeans although he was obsequious.

SUMMARY

Complete the following with the minimum information necessary to give a clear understanding of the writer's theme in Passage A:

What made Mgeni remarkable was

(a) .............................................

(b) .............................................

(c) .............................................

Mgeni was the most remarkable of ....................

These people were important since they were ...........

..................................................

From the description of Mgeni we can infer that this was so for the following reason(s): .............................................

..................................................
PARAGRAPH WRITING

1. Using notes (supplied) on a given individual (institution, event, etc.) giving information on (a) attributes of the individual and (b) the importance of the individual as an example of a type with a particular historical significance; write a paragraph modelled as closely as possible on Passage A.

2. Research your own individual and write another paragraph on the same pattern.

4 Conclusion

I hope it is clear, from these briefly sketched suggestions, that the output of nominal-referential analysis can be well accommodated within the present framework of communicative syllabus design and methodology. My proposals go a little way beyond - or a little deeper into - 'the use of sentences in combination' since I have been concerned also, and primarily, with the use of parts of sentences in combination: the nominal parts, their referential use, and their involvement in various patterns of interactivity. All I have written

points clearly to the conclusion that the main foundation of the practical study of language should be connected texts, whose study must, of course, be accompanied by grammatical analysis;

a conclusion - it is that of Sweet (1899:100) - that we would want to modify today only to the extent of substituting for the last phrase 'discourse analysis, in which grammatical analysis is necessarily included.'
APPENDIX A
NOTES

Chapter 1

1 A better term - more modest, more realistic - might be 'systematic'. For Corder (1973:11) 'applied linguistics deals with that part of the language teaching operation which is potentially susceptible of some sort of rigorous systematisation', a systematisation which is 'based upon scientifically acquired knowledge'.

2 Roulet's statement (1975) that 'up until the beginning of the twentieth century linguistic theory, linguistic description and language teaching were considered as one' would perhaps be true of Sweet if 'practised' were substituted for 'considered'. Jespersen, like Sweet, wrote a book, How to teach a foreign language (1904), devoted to principles of language teaching; but even at his most theoretical - e.g. in The philosophy of grammar (1924) - the pedagogic aspect emerges.

3 cf Widdowson (1973a): 'Applied linguistics is the speculative branch of language teaching rather than the practical area of linguistics.' While accepting the correctness of this view, one should note that the label 'applied linguist' is commonly attached to a variety of people with a professional interest in language, ranging from the language teacher (therapist, interpreter, etc.) with some interest in theory to the linguist with some interest in practice. I am here using the expression in a somewhat restricted sense to refer to the teacher's 'more theoretical colleague' (Johnson & Morrow, 1981:15), the academic middleman to whom applied linguistics is a separate discipline, distinguishable both from the theoretical-descriptive disciplines which supply many of its ideas and from the practical disciplines which justify its existence.

4 I have presented the distinction between theories and positions rather starkly so as to make my point as clearly as possible. However, criteria of practicality are by no means eschewed by all linguists. Halliday, for example, has expressed the view that 'in assessing the value of a description it is reasonable to ask whether it has proved useful for the purposes for which it is intended'.

5 e.g. by Candlin (1975)
e.g. Wilkins (1972:217ff): 'By "insights" I mean linguistic notions that increase one's understanding of the nature of language. They do this without providing specific points of information that can be built into language teaching .... (Applications) will be cases where notions and information drawn from linguistics act directly upon the process of language teaching.'


On the distinction between text analysis and discourse analysis, see Widdowson (1973b).

By contrast, in the Firthian school, the analysis of meaning has always been central: 'The context of situation ... forms the basis of the hierarchy of techniques for the statement of meaning' (Firth, 1957).

'Linguists deal with dictionary meanings; sociologists with situated meanings' (Gumperz and Hymes, 1972).

Theoretical and descriptive work on performance skills - in the guise of 'member's resources for finding what they find and doing what others will find them to have done' (Turner, 1974:11) - is to be found in the writings of the ethnomethodological school of sociology. As to actual instances of performance, the Firthian school, again in striking contrast with what has been central for Chomsky and his followers, has always regarded linguistics as 'a group for related techniques for the handling of speech events' (Firth, 1957).

There is much to be said for the view expressed by Bell (1974:14) that sociolinguists are forced to seek out variation: '... the description of variation in language known as sociolinguistics'. In similar vein the reviewer of the Pride & Holmes volume (Linguistics 147) observes: 'Speech event analysis is not necessarily part of sociolinguistics - but only when participants are viewed not only as individuals but as representatives of certain social entities.'

Gregory (1967) provides a formulation which seems to me to capture accurately and well the essential nature of discourse analysis (though, being a true Firthian, he just calls this 'linguistics'): 'Linguistics is perhaps most itself when it focusses on language as human, social behaviour, when it has a balanced concern both with modelling linguistic competence and with what actually happens in situations, patterns discoverable in the record of language events .... The language event being both a manifestation of competence and an instance of performance must remain our point of departure and concern'.
In general it seems that most of what the ethnomethodologists are interested in falls into the categories 'can't be taught' or 'doesn't need to be taught' since, in so far as they are concerned with utterances, it is social content, not linguistic form, that matters to them. (Their work may nevertheless contain important 'implications'). The same comment applies to much of the most widely quoted work of philosophers such as Searle and Grice who are also concerned, though in a different way, with 'members' resources', for example: background assumptions for the interpretation of literal meanings (Searle, 1979:125); the co-operative principle (Grice, 1975).

Lyons (1977:76) favours the term 'productivity' for creativity in this sense.

e.g., Jespersen (1904:5) 'The purpose in learning foreign languages ... must be in order to get a way of communicating with places which our native tongue cannot reach.' Palmer (1917:153) drew a distinction between 'ideal standard programmes' and 'special programmes ... answering particular requirements'.

For variations on this theme see Munby (1978), van Ek (1977) and Wilkins (1975). They have, however, little to say on discourse routines.

Numerous references could be cited to support this statement, e.g., Wilkins (1976:18) 'The notional syllabus is in contrast with the other two because it takes the desired communicative activity as the starting point.' In the same vein: van Ek (1977:2), Widdowson (1978:19).

Jespersen also anticipated the notions/functions distinction as found in most proposals nowadays for communicative syllabuses (e.g., van Ek 1977:5) since he recognised a category of 'notional moods' (p. 319ff) which are equivalent to somewhat high-level categories of illocutionary force; e.g., 'advisory', 'precautive', 'hortatory', 'permissive', 'promissive'. (It is notable that this is not a taxonomy of illocutionary verbs à la Austin!)

Sweet: 'All study of language must be based on phonetics' (1899:4). 'The first stage, the mechanical, begins with a thorough mastery of the pronunciation of the language ... In (the grammatical) stage the texts will be chosen so as to embody the different grammatical categories in progressive order of difficulty ...' (p. 117-119). 'The improved pronunciation thus acquired helps in a high degree the acquiring of the other (signification) side of language' (Jespersen, 1904:181).
The grammatical foundation of audio-lingual methodology is pattern practice, which is inherently 'meaningless' (Dakin, 1973:48); the lexical foundation is the association of unknown content (meaning) with known expression (form). The basic meaning teaching techniques are translation (i.e. the use of an IL 'version' of a previously learnt L2 text) and dialogues (i.e. the practice of patterns and vocabulary items in socio-culturally significant contexts). Both techniques involve a movement from 0 to 1.

of Mumby (1978:218) for a characteristic statement on this.

23 e.g. Widdowson (1979b:247), Wilkins (1979:92), Brumfit (1980:101), Widdowson (1980:243). Wilkins gets to the heart of the matter: 'I suspect that even when we are more knowledgeable about the pragmatics of language we may still decide that the facts of use are not sufficiently generatable for them to be suitable as the sole basis for the organisation of the early stages of language learning.'

of Allen & Widdowson (1975:92): 'Taken together, these two approaches - the study of the language system per se, and of the communicative properties of this system - promise to provide a more satisfactory guide as to how language teachers might achieve their ends.'

Lyons (1981:187) adopts the view that 'most speech acts are culture-specific' but accepts that some may be universal, e.g. statement, question and command. His example of a culture-specific speech act is 'breach of contract', which may or may not be culture-specific but does not, on rapid introspection, seem to me normally to be a speech act at all. My own view is that, while the meanings of performative verbs are necessarily culture-specific (or at least grammar-specific) illocutionary acts are largely universal. If this is so, it has the important consequence for language teaching that whereas the lexical contrast has to be taught, the illocutionary contrast does not. This point will be developed in chapter 3.
Chapter 2

1. Chomsky (1976) discusses these issues at some length, with particular reference to the views of 'communication-intention' theorists such as Strawson, Searle and Grice. His remark that 'I can be using language in the strictest sense with no intention of communicating' is echoed in Kuroda (1979): 'Non-communicative functions of language are far more significant than one might ordinarily assume.' Widdowson (1980) develops some of the applied linguistic implications of such a point of view.

2. I give a full account of the interaction/interactivity distinction below (Chapter 4). I prefer to put 'process' in contrast with 'structure' rather than with the sometimes favoured 'product of discourse' since it seems difficult to determine a meaning for 'product' which is readily distinguishable from the meaning of 'text' or, alternatively, which does not seem roughly equivalent to 'a particular hearer/reader's interpretation of a particular text on a particular occasion'. Since my own approach to discourse is by way of supposed intentions of speakers rather than supposed reactions of hearers, I have no particular use for 'product' in this latter sense.

3. Of course, an action such as the one mentioned may become a 'message' in the context of a particular relationship and a particular interaction (e.g. 'I don't want to please you' or 'I don't want to accept your authority'). But it cannot constitute a discourse message since it does not involve the interpretation of a linguistic or paralinguistic signal, i.e. is not 'conventional' in a linguistic way.

4. This approach is thus in contrast both with that of 'text grammar', which is concerned to characterise 'a text' as a grammatical unit in which 'the relation between a sentence and the text of which it is a component part is, in all relevant respects, comparable with the relation that holds between a word, or phrase, and the sentence of which it is a grammatically dependent constituent' (Lyons, 1977:630); and with that of Halliday and Hasan (1976), for whom 'a text' is 'any passage, spoken or written, of any length, which forms a unified whole' ... 'a unit of language in use' ... 'a semantic unit, a unit not of form but of meaning' ... 'it functions as a unity with respect to its environment'. The difficulty with this approach from the point of view of discourse analysis is that it begs some fundamental questions, namely whether, to what extent, and by what means, a text achieves unity as discourse. Lyons suggests that, in the sense of the term as the phonologically transcribable product of everyday language behaviour, 'the relevant question is not "Is this a text?", which carries with
it presuppositions of internal organic unity and determinate external boundaries, but "Does this constitute text (rather than non-text)?" The difference between these two questions, Lyons continues, is of considerable theoretical and practical importance. The second (in which 'text' is used as an uncountable noun) gives due recognition to the fact that successive text-sentences, in either a dialogue or a monologue, tend to be connected in various ways; but it neither presupposes nor implies that what is correctly describable as text is, or forms part of, some determinate unified whole."

One might argue that discourse is an elaborative process, but textualisation is by definition reductive since, as we have seen, there is less in the signal than there is in the message. (of Candlin & Saedi forthcoming)

Since it has no significant bearing on the general position that I am attempting to construct, I leave open the question whether the prosodic systems of stress and intonation should be treated as part of 'discourse minus content-dependent interpretation'.

Following Lyons (1981:111ff)

In chapter 4 I shall have more to say about cohesion, and it will become clear that my use of the term is different in certain respects both from that of Halliday and Hasan and from that of Widdowson (e.g. in Widdowson, 1978).

See, for example, Edmondson (1981) which makes no reference at any point to the relevance of choices in grammar to intentions in communication, and, with the exception of 'sentence', contains not a single grammatical term in its index. Coulthard's Introduction (1977), though making the customary genuflection to 'the central problem in discourse analysis, the interface between form and function', has, with the exception of the chapter on intonation, almost nothing to say on this topic. This is no doubt more a reflection of the state of the art at the time than of the author's own interests (cf Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975).

Or, in spoken language, whatever syntactic structures we can identify.

This 'spirit' had its origins in the work of Malinowski, who was the first to regard words as acts and was the first to regard the description of such acts as a normal and necessary part of the description of the culture of a community. For him, 'words are part of action and they are equivalent to actions.' It follows that 'the real linguistic fact is the full utterance in its context of situation' and, for
Malinowski, much of whose fieldwork was devoted to the recording of texts, 'if we jotted down the words spoken and treated them as a text divorced from its context of action and situation, the words would obviously remain meaningless and futile.' Malinowski put context on the linguistic map, a 'context that must burst the bounds of mere linguistics and be carried over into the analysis of the general conditions under which a language is spoken' (Malinowski, 1935). His belief in the importance of contextual meaning (almost to the point of denying the existence of any other type of meaning) was given more substantial theoretical foundations in the work of Firth (and his followers) who (a) emphasised the 'typical' and the abstract as opposed to the particular and the concrete in his exposition of context of situation, and (b) regarded contextual analysis as contributing, along with analysis at various other levels, to the overall 'statement of meanings'.

The current trend in the ethnography of speaking, as represented most notably in the work of Hymes, is in harmony with this earlier work in its concern with the 'interaction of language and social life' (Hymes, 1972), 'the radical linking of the verbal and the socio-cultural in the conduct of speaking' (Bauman & Sherzer, 1974) but diverges from Malinowski in its more balanced appreciation of the importance of 'linguistic means' and 'social meaning' (Hymes, op.cit.), calling, as Hymes does, for 'a mode of description that is jointly ethnographic and linguistic', and diverges from Firth in regarding context as not just another 'level' in the overall analysis of speech events but as one among a number of 'autonomous systems of signals from both the various levels of grammar and social settings' (ibid., my emphasis).

According to Hudson (1981), this is an 'issue on which linguists can agree', viz: 'Part of this information (i.e. that conveyed by the utterance of a sentence on a particular occasion) is the literal meaning of the sentence uttered, which reflects the meanings of the lexical items in it and the syntactic relations between them. Part of it, however, derives from the context in which the sentence is used.'

This is to use the term 'subjectivity of discourse' in a rather wider sense than Lyons' 'subjectivity of utterance' (1981:240), defined as 'the locutionary agent's expression of himself in the act of utterance and of the reflection of this in the phonological, grammatical and lexical structure of the utterance inscription'. Lyons links this notion crucially to the speaker's perception of his role in the context of utterance. I wish to say that 'subjectivity' denotes the definition that the speaker gives to the context of utterance as a whole, including his part in it, of Schieber (1979:129): 'The set of assumptions that correspond to what the speaker is taking for granted at a certain moment will be referred to as the context at that moment.'
For general accounts and references, see, e.g., Lyons (1977: 607ff.), Bell (1976).

Kempson (1975:167) calls this the 'pragmatic universe of discourse'. 'What we have to capture is that in any conversation there is a body of facts which both speaker and hearer believe they agree on and which is therefore not in dispute: this set of propositions constitute their shared knowledge - knowledge which they believe they share.'

On the contribution of context to disambiguation of McCawley (1968), Leech (1974:78).

The 'state of affairs' itself is relative to the 'universe of discourse' (Searle, 1969; Lyons, 1981) or 'discourse world' (Edmondson, 1981) by reference to which the truth value of a particular set of propositions is determined. For example, the universe of discourse may be a fictional one.

I use the term 'performative' in preference to 'illocutionary' for reasons which will be made clear in chapter 4.

van Dijk (1977) lays stress on the 'dynamic' character of context .... 'Situations do not remain identical in time, but change. Hence a context is a COURSE OF EVENTS ...'

E.g. by Enkvist (1968)

Malinowski (1930) believed that his notion of context of situation made clear the difference between spoken language (situation bound) and written language, 'torn out of any context of situation'. He saw written statements as 'bringing their message to posterity unaided', having to 'contain this message within their own bounds'. In the case of a modern scientific book 'we might be tempted to say metaphorically that the meaning is wholly contained in or carried by the book'. Firth also saw 'many difficulties in dealing with written language, which may itself be considered as "an abstraction from insistent surroundings". But a great deal can be done with writing that is immersed in the immediacy of social intercourse, and any remoter text which can be apprehended in use can be regarded as having such temporary meaning as is given to it by the reader.' The point of accepting that context of situation is no less relevant to the interpretation of written language than to the interpretation of spoken, is reached by Basso (1974) who, in sketching the outline of an 'ethnography of writing', argues that 'when all is said and done we shall find that the activity of writing, like the activity of speaking, is a supremely social act.'
Chapter 3

1 The term 'fixed meanings' is used in a similar way in Posner (1980).

2 According to Searle (1969:19), 'whatever can be meant can be said' (principle of expressibility). I would suppose that much of the difficulty of formal semantics is that this is not obviously true of decontextualised meaning.


4 Searle et al. (1980:ix-xl) give a useful sketch of 'three different, more or less "traditional" attitudes to pragmatics': ** that associated with formal philosophy and logic (key notion: "sense"), and that associated with ordinary language philosophy (key notion: "use"). They note that in all three traditions 'something like a notion of literal meaning is essential, and contrast between literal meaning and speaker utterance meaning seems essential to any account of language'. In the same volume, Posner (p. 132) makes a distinction between 'meaning-maximalists' who 'attempt to deduce as much as possible from the literal meanings of verbal expressions and tend to assume richness and ambiguity in the meanings of words' and 'meaning-minimalists' who 'attribute more importance to the pragmatic rules of reinterpretation as opposed to literal meanings and tend to accept only minimal meanings and unambiguous words'.

5 Nunberg (1979) starts out from the proposition that 'the semantic-pragmatic distinction cannot be validated even in principle: there is no way to determine which regularities are conventional and which are not'. He does not however, deny that words have 'conventional' meanings, only that the rules for specifying them are necessarily indeterminate.

6 One could cite Malinowski and Wittgenstein as, in their different ways, firm disbelievers in dictionary meanings; Halliday and Searle as, in their different ways, firm disbelievers in autonomous syntax. All see the form of language as moulded by its communicative functions. An interesting example of a convert who almost recanted is Givon (1979): 'I found myself gravitating towards a position as extreme as Garcia's, that is towards rejecting the existence of syntax altogether and viewing it as a complex artifact arising from the interaction of various communicative principles and processing strategies. What I propose to do in this study is in a sense a tactical retreat from this extreme position ...' (Syntax exists, but only as a **denotation; that associated with linguistic semantics (key notion:
dependent, functionally motivated, entity.) Sampson (1980) is also an anti-literalist, but in his case the argument is from 'creativity', not from 'communication'.

For reasons given earlier I do not here consider the possibility of adding a fifth item, 'meanings of intonation patterns'.


See especially Bolinger (1977). As a meticulous descriptivist, Bolinger does not wish to see even the slightest differences of meaning swept under the theoretical carpet. Pure theory can, however, lead to similar conclusions, as for example in Partee's account of Montague grammar, referred to in Chomsky (1980:165).

Such an account can be regarded as the pragmatic alternative to that given by such theorists of 'speech act semantics' as Ross and Saddock. For a recent criticism of the latter approach see Searle (1979: last chapter).

In all the cases quoted, Grice's 'modified Occam's razor' - 'meanings are not to be multiplied beyond necessity' (Grice, 1978) - is seen to be at work. Further instances of semantic razoring can be found in Atlas's account of negation (Atlas, 1980), Posner's account of sentence connectives (Posner, 1980) and Kempson & Cormack's (1981) account of 'Ambiguity and quantification'.

If axiom B is granted, then polysemy - as denoting related senses of a single lexeme - is lost. What is left is, at most, Bolinger's 'local tinges which pass for distinct senses' and which result from the interaction of language and context. Homonymous lexemes, as distinct forms accidentally sharing the same substance, pose no challenge to the axiom. The problem is: where to draw the line; rather as the problem in syntax is where, and where not, to recognise a 'constructional ambiguity' (of Matthews, 1981: 17).

The question what is cross-cultural (or universal) and what is culture specific is clearly an empirical one. It is in providing a systematic means of obtaining information to answer this question that the 'ethnography of speaking' (Hymes, 1974, etc.) makes its special contribution to progress in applied linguistics.

For a criticism of attempts to identify meanings with concepts, see Lyons (1977: 115).

Wilkins (1976) is particularly obscure on this point, appearing to equate 'content' (around which it is proposed a notional syllabus is organised) with 'concepts' and 'functions' (which together equal 'notions'), and concepts, but not functions, with grammatical and lexical meaning. It is, furthermore, not at all
clear whether the 'semantico-grammatical categories' are intended to be categories of English grammar or universal concepts. The latter interpretation seems unlikely to be correct since we are warned that content is inseparable from form. But if the former is the correct view, it is not clear how a notional syllabus differs from a grammatical one except in giving different names to the various bits which have to be taught.

Bates (1976) distinguishes the 'cognitive-action system' from which all linguistic knowledge - pragmatic, semantic and syntactic - is derived and 'the separate functional processes (operating) at any given moment in speaking'. It is the latter with which I am not concerned in this chapter. In chapter 4, which deals with performance, I shall have something to say about the product of these processes but, again, little about the processes themselves.

'These means are regularly used in a quite conventional way (and) what people intend to communicate by what they say is regularly related to the conventional meanings of the sentences they utter' (Strawson, 1973:96). But for its extra syllables and the fact that 'rules of use' is well established, 'regularities' would be the better term.

e.g. Candlin (1976), 'The present concern is with relationships in discourse, the connections between an utterance and its interpretation, and it is here that linguists like Kempson (1975) plead for an abandonment of the conflation of semantics and pragmatics, shunting the explanation of how language is used for communication into the latter, ..., while keeping the former to the proper bailiwick of determining referential rules.' (My emphasis: I assume that Candlin here has in mind 'descriptive' or 'propositional' meaning - language in its 'identional' function.) And later, in his 'third layer of meaning' 'we need to place the utterance in someone's mouth in a particular context, and in so doing the utterance acquires sociolinguistic meaning; it takes on as it were illocutionary force and enters pragmatics.'

The clearest statement I know which is in direct contradiction to the implication of the remarks just quoted (above:fn.18) is given in Stalnaker (1972:384). Stalnaker points out that in most cases the context of utterance affects 'not only the force with which the proposition is expressed, but also the proposition itself'. He thus identifies two major types of problem in pragmatics: the illocutionary and the propositional.

The statement of the code-meaning of crocodile is borrowed from the definition given in Longman's Dictionary of contemporary English (1978). My example is based on Allan (1981), whose view that 'interpretation is a function of pragmatic processes operating on the interaction between the semantics of a linguistic
expression' and its context' exactly accords with the central idea of this chapter. Allan's paper includes an elaborate and persuasive account of the 'hierarchy of interpreter control' which guides a hearer or reader to a particular interpretation of a certain linguistic expression in a certain context.

21 In relation to the examples (quoted at an earlier point in the discussion) 'I will be there at 9.15' etc., Leech (1980:81) writes: 'The intentional or predictive meaning of will is present in all cases.' But why is it necessary to posit two alternative meanings present in all cases?

22 Participant roles (a la Halliday) are therefore seen as the product of pragmatic interpretation rather than as sentential functions or cases (a la Anderson or Fillmore). The difference between these approaches is noted in Allen & Widdows (1975:74).

23 What, then, is 'literal' meaning? Searle (1979:117) argues that it cannot be equated with context-free meaning since 'the notion of the literal meaning of a sentence only has application relative to a set of contextual or background assumptions'. I think that it is useful not to equate the two terms, and to understand literal meaning as a form of utterance meaning in which the interpretation given to an utterance is close to and directly connected to the grammatical meaning of the sentence uttered.

24 See Canale and Swain (1980), Munby (1978), Widdowson (1979: passim), for other attempts to clarify the notion of communicative competence in an applied linguistically useful way.
Searle (1979:vii) writes of 'the full-blown illocutionary act with its illocutionary force and its propositional content'.

For Austin's account of the 'phonetic-phatic-rhetorical' distinctions, see Austin (1962: Lecture VII). For a criticism of Searle's (1968, 1969) refinements on Austin, see Cohen (1974). Cohen accuses Searle (a) of multiplying distinctions, (b) of positing the existence of acts (e.g. referring) too small to have an independent existence, and (c) having started along this path, not proceeding to the logical conclusion: What about connecting, quantifying, modalising (etc.) acts? One answer to this might be that, even though it is usually true that referring acts require the wider context of the whole illocutionary act for their interpretation, very often the illocutionary act requires the wider context of the discourse for its own interpretation. Further, the distinction between referring acts and predicate acts, though not without theoretical difficulties, is more or less self-evident; while it is not at all clear what is to be understood by 'quantifying act' or 'modalising act'. As to connecting acts, if it is acts for connecting other acts that Cohen has in mind, then these must certainly be part of our overall understanding of discourse (see below in this chapter).

I do not wish to suggest that all indirect speech acts are perlocutionary effects. A/A indirect acts are, S/A indirect acts are not (see discussion in chapter 3).

'Uptake' (Austin, 1962) thus ceases to be a condition for the successful performance of an illocutionary act and becomes a universal IPE. I cannot ask so-and-so to do something without intending that so-and-so should recognise that I have asked him to do something, but I can do so even though he doesn't actually recognise what I have done.

It is possible that not only non-conventional IPEs but illocutionary forces themselves can be explained in terms of the Co-operative Principle. Kempson (1975) argues that 'the close affinity between the deduction of illocutionary force and the deduction of implicatures suggests that illocutionary force on utterances is but one of the aspects of implicated meaning of utterances and is not different from it in kind'. This helps to sharpen Kempson's delimitation of semantics and pragmatics but simultaneously to obscure the illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction - one which Kempson does not make explicitly in her discussion (p. 202-205).

See 'note on data sources'.
Speech function taxonomies of various sorts appear in Wilkins (1976), van Ek (1977), Limby (1978), Edmondson (1981). The acts described in Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) are 'functions of an utterance or part of an utterance within the discourse' (p.14) and are thus what I would call (see below) 'interactive acts'. So far as referential acts are concerned, applied linguistics has had no clear taxonomic model - such as that of Searle (1975) for illocutionary acts - on the basis of which to develop a position. A review of the relevant literature in linguistics and philosophy is given in chapter 6.

An interest abundantly illustrated in Sinclair (ed.) (1980), an issue of Applied Linguistics devoted to 'Applied discourse analysis'. A mild expression of caution is to be found in Widdowson (1979a): 'I am not at all sure how far a process analysis is possible.'

R.A. Hinde, lecture given in Edinburgh University, early 1970s.

For a discussion of this issue see Edmondson (1981:33ff). Though I agree with his comments on the significance of non-verbal acts for what he calls the 'structure' of an interaction, I do not agree with his conclusion that 'in terms of the coherence of a conversational discourse there appears to be no essential difference between verbal and non-verbal acts.' (cf. chapter 2, above, Proposition D4.)

'In Austin's theory, the notion of the perlocutionary act is an implicit recognition that a 'speech act' has an interactional component' (Edmondson, 1981:20).

Balance should not be confused with turn-taking. Where two people are interacting, the number of turns is bound to be equal or (in the case where the same speaker both begins and ends the interaction) to differ by only one.

of Widdowson (1979a): 'The producer of written discourse is playing with an unseen ... unknown player. He anticipates his opponent's moves by writing them into the discourse.' Though it seems reasonable to describe this process as 'interaction', I am less happy with the currently popular 'negotiation', which definitely seems to imply an active participation of two or more parties.

For example, Hymes (1972b): 'Discourse may be seen in terms of acts both syntagmatically and paradigmatically, i.e. both as a sequence of speech acts and in terms of classes of acts among which choice has been made at various points.'

This brief discussion of contrast owes a great deal to the work of my colleague Saida Yahya-Othman.
It goes, I think, without saying that interactive acts – as indeed interactivity generally – can link utterances of different participants in an interaction, i.e. what B says may be intended, for example, to be heard as in contrast with what A has said.

Sometimes called 'adjacency pairs'. In certain domains of discourse such pairs may conventionally constitute 'moves' or 'exchanges' (cf. Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975).

See Widdowson (1973a) for his original formulation, Widdowson (1979a) for a more recent discussion.

Searle's 'normal input and putput conditions' (Searle, 1969:57).

'Strategic competence' is a term used by Canale and Swain (1980) to cover the resources of the language learner for coping with potential breakdowns in communication. But, as Widdowson (1979a) says, 'All competence is transitional'. We can easily extend the notion of strategic competence to include the resources even of the mature native speaker not just for avoiding communicative breakdown but for achieving the most effective communication possible in the circumstances. Widdowson's own 'procedural competence' (op.cit.) goes somewhat beyond the notion (his notion) of rules of use to include 'the manipulation of rules to suit particular occasions'. However, closest to the idea I am trying to describe here is, I think, Hymes' (1972a) 'abilities for the use of knowledge' which stresses variation as between one member of a community and another, not in 'competence' (what is known), but in skill (what a particular individual can do).

In the past, the art of 'accomplishment' was called rhetoric, defined in Chambers Dictionary as 'the theory and practice of eloquence, whether spoken or written; the whole art of using language'. The term 'rhetoric' may also be used for the art of teaching this art. This is one aspect of language teaching to which applied linguists, despite the development of the communicative approach, have yet to give serious consideration.

Motivations for and approaches to discourse analysis are discussed in Grimes (1975), Widdowson (1979).
Chapter 5

1. 'These conventions of reference are not part of grammar. To express them would require a richer theory, integrating a number of cognitive systems' (Chomsky, 1979:147).

2. i.e. relative clauses with no overt antecedent, cf Huddleston (1971:232).

3. This sort of statement is not found in the 'scholarly, compendious' traditional grammars of e.g. Sweet, Poutsma, Kruisinga, but rather in the simplified 'school grammars' which were based on them. On this point see Allen & Widdowson (1975:49).

4. 'In general we should expect the descriptive force of nouns to be such that they are more efficient tools for the job of showing what unique reference is intended when such a reference is signalled; and we should also expect the descriptive force of the words we naturally and commonly use to make unique references to mirror our interest in the salient, relatively permanent and behavioural characteristics of things' (Strawson, 1950/1963:196).

5. Although Lyons (1968:1) describes 'phrase' as a 'technical term of traditional grammar', it is very difficult to find any traditional grammar in which the term is actually used, except in a stylistic sense. Michael (1970) seems to be closer to the truth: 'Phrase is a category which cannot be said to exist, in grammar, until modern times.'

6. e.g. Sweet (1892:153): 'A word-group may be grammatically equivalent to a part of speech.'

7. Quirk et al. (1972:734) recognize 'five major categories': the that clause or dependent declarative clause; the dependent interrogative clause; the nominal relative clause; the to-infinitive clause; the -ing clause.

8. of Lyons (1981:223) who distinguishes the 'descriptive' and the 'purely referential' components of definite descriptions.

9. 'Open-class quantifiers' e.g. a piece of, a bucket of, ... do not fit easily into this classification.

10. This distinction between sense and context-dependent denotation is approximately equivalent to 'the Saussurean and Guillaumian distinction between nom en puissance (= noun in tongue) and nom en effet (= noun in discourse)' (Hewson, 1972:78 and fn.).
For arguments for and against the 'NOM,S' analysis of relative clauses see Stockwell et al. (1973, chapter 7); for a semantic interpretation argument, within the Montague theory, against NP,S and for NOM,S, see Partee (1976). Recognising HEAD + MODIFIERS as a single grammatical constituent intermediate between NP and N is a major advantage of the X analysis of NPs (Radford, 1981:91ff).

The problems are discussed e.g. in Lyons (1977:392 & 430) and Matthews (1981:160ff).

For examples, Quirk et al. (1972, sec. 4.33-34).

On supplementive clauses, Quirk et al. (1972, 11.48-51).

On the co-ordinate source for non-restrictive relative clauses, Huddleston (1976), Stockwell et al. (1973) etc. etc.

For arguments on these lines see also Vendler (1968:13), Matthews (1981:230).

This is not to suggest that choice of pre- or post-head position, whether for restrictives or non-restrictives, is not otherwise significant. Quirk et al. (1972:859) point out that modification at its 'most restrictive' tends to come after the head, and that permanent or characteristic features tend to be expressed in pre- rather than post-modification. Lazarus (1973) argues that even in the non-restrictive case, in premodification 'a tighter perceptual relationship is achieved'.

Nevertheless, as Matthews (1981:228) points out, it is sometimes 'hard to say exactly when we are dealing with a single phrase, or single referring expression, instead of two'. Burton-Roberts (1975) argues against the very notion of close (restrictive) apposition as a contradiction in terms and suggests it is better treated within the general description of modified nouns.

The main formal differences are listed in Stockwell et al. (1973:422). Smith (1964) discusses restrictions between determiners and the two types of relative clause. Quirk (1968) gives an analysis of restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses as the differences appear in educated spoken English.

The term 'semi-adverbial', meaning that a clause functions partly adjectivally - modifying a noun - and partly adverbially, is found in some traditional grammars, e.g. Kruisinga and Erades (1951:157).

But cf chapter 6, below, on the insecurity of the predication/reference distinction.

It will be noted that the term 'quantify' is used here much as in descriptive grammars such as Quirk et al. (1972), not as by logicians and formal semanticists.
For discussion, see chapter 6, below.

For a discussion of these pairs see Vendler (1937:92).

The individuatedness of the intended referent of an NP may be apparent from co-textual or extra-textual context (Allan, 1980). Only determiners which without contextual support unequivocally indicate 'individuated' meaning are here called individuating.

Chambers Dictionary (1959) defines 'discrete' as 'separate: discontinuous: consisting of distinct parts: referring to distinct objects'.

For a criticism of the proposal by C. Baker on the existential sentence as source of the indefinite article, see Stockwell et al. (1973:72). For a review of Hawkins' (1974) proposal on the 'exclusive function' of a (in contrast with the inclusive function of the) see Cruse (1980).

e.g. by D. Perlmutter (see Stockwell et al., 1973:70).

'Indeed (this account) seems so intuitively obvious once stated that one can scarcely repress a raising of the eyebrows at Hawkins' claim that he is the first to propose it ...' (Cruse, 1980). In fact a somewhat similar point is made in Stockwell et al. (1973): 'The definite article usually indicates co-extensiveness with a particular set ...' (p. 81).

i.e., essentially, that every occurrence of the is 'cataphoric'.

i.e. in which concepts can be 'located' in relation to one another, either through the part, or the property, being located in relation to the whole (the summit of a mountain, the hardness of a diamond) or through one concept being 'bounded' by others. 'Concepts, as distinct from percepts, do not exist in isolation. We do not delimit percepts in terms of percepts ... but I do distinguish deer because they are bounded by horses on one side, cattle on another side ...' (D. Bickerton, Roots of language, 1981).

Mill (and others) vs Frege (and others). For a recent discussion see Searle (1969).

See Lyons (1977:219ff) for a discussion of descriptive uses of names.

Radford (1980:97ff), discussing the phrase 'a student of physics with long hair' as part of his review of X syntax, very clearly illuminates much of this complexity.

These aspects of the semantics of nominalisation are discussed in Quirk et al. (1972:734ff), Stockwell et al. (1973:508ff).
Lyons distinguishes unuclear and extra-nuclear constituents (1968:334); Matthews distinguishes complements and peripheral elements (1981:123). Most of the difficulties in maintaining such distinctions concern certain locative and temporal constituents rather than nominals. The traditional term 'adnominal' (e.g. its use in Poutsma (1926)) is out of linguistic fashion but is resuscitated in Lyons (1968).


It follows from this that the restrictive/non-restrictive distinction is non-functional in predicate NPs and where the signs of non-restrictive modification are apparent (comma punctuation, separate tone groups) this is more plausibly attributable to motivations of information structuring than to the semantics of restrictiveness. This point is made by Huddleston (1971:214) in connection with indefinite NPs in general, but it seems to me that, though it is broadly true of indefinite NPs with non-specific reference, it is not applicable to those with specific reference, in which the restrictive/non-restrictive contrast seems to be fully operative.

Traditional because of the view expressed e.g. by Jespersen that the difference between nouns and adjectives is merely one of specialisation (nouns connoting several, adjectives only one, attribute; of he is black/he is a black); transformational on the sort of grounds presented by Ross (1969:352-360). On NPs as predications, Allan (1973).

On full/partial, strict/weak apposition, Quirk et al. (1972).

Examples (46), (47), and (48) illustrate three types of apposition labelled (Quirk et al. 1972) 'designation', 'appellation' and 'identification' respectively. I discuss them further in the next chapter.

Unless we are to regard a phrase such as 'my brother John' as a type of NP with proper noun head and non-restrictive adjunct 'my brother'.

For a review and criticism of the literature postulating a locative source for there in existential sentences, see Breivik (1981).

All these variations are noted in Quirk et al. (1972). They give a list of verbs such as arrive which have the implication of existence, succession or occurrence and can substitute for BE in existential sentences. They propose that one function of there is to make possible the movement of an indefinite NP conveying new information into non-theme position, where its newness will not appear awkward. This is in line with Breivik's account of existential there as 'subject NP and presentative signal'.

Chapter 6

1 Higham (1974:151ff) calls the the in phrases of this sort 'relational'. She gives reasons for believing that before a 'relational noun' (the summit of a mountain, the leg of a table) 'the determiner the is not an infallible signal of definiteness' - a view which conflicts with the position adopted here - but notes that 'the range of interpretations available for the matrix phrase includes that of the embedded non-definite phrase: (existence-establishing) I saw the summit of a mountain, (generic) The summit of a mountain is its highest point, (non-specific) I feel as if I were on the summit of a mountain.'

2 See, for example, the discussion of 'Leda and the swan' in Halliday (1966), Leech (1969), Widdowson (1975).

3 e.g. work by Brown and Gilman, Brown and Ford, Ervin-Tripp and others (on rules of address) reviewed, e.g., in Hudson (1980:120ff); by Sacks, Schegloff and others (on 'membershipping') reviewed, e.g., in Coulthard (1977:80ff).


5 See, for example, Mitchell (1975) chapter 6.

6 e.g. Kempson (1977:12), Fodor (1977:14).

7 This being one of the main points on which Strawson (1950) takes issue with Russell: 'We are apt to think we are talking about sentences and expressions when we are talking about the uses of sentences and expressions ... This is what Russell does.'


9 'From various points of view includes physically, socially, and even attitudinally. Lyons' (1981:232ff) distinctions between 'pure' and 'impure' deixis and between 'secondary' and 'primary' deixis are relevant here.

10 Lyons uses 'individual' in approximately the sense in which Strawson (1959) and Searle (1969) use 'particular'. Strawson uses the former term to mean 'whatever can appear as a logical subject'; individuals may thus be particulars or non-particulars.

11 For Searle (1969:115) whatever existence they have is 'not in the world but in our mode of representing the world.' Of 'Sam is drunk' he asks: 'What, if anything, stands to "is drunk" as Sam stands to "Sam"?' His answer is 'nothing'. Universals
are merely meanings. But for Frege, the answer is 'a concept' and a concept is what is referred to by 'is drunk'. For Strawson, also, both subject and predicate 'identify non-linguistic items' (discussion in Searle, ch. 5).

12 The essence of the argument advanced in Strawson (1959) is that if particulars were experienced, as Russell would have it, as momentary private objects, there would be no possibility of reference.

13 'We have more use for some of the ideas of particulars that we can frame in this way than we have for others. In general, we perhaps have most use for the ideas of particular events so framed, less use for the ideas of particular conditions or states, least use for the ideas of particulars which are simply cases of qualities or properties.... Some philosophers, no doubt, made too much of the category of particularised qualities. But we need not therefore deny that we acknowledge them.' Strawson (1959:168fn).

14 Again Strawson (op. cit. p. 21): 'Perhaps not all particulars are in time and space. But it is at least plausible to assume that every particular which is not is related in some way to one which is.'

15 I have found various authorities by no means clear on the question whether the class of particulars includes hypotheticals etc. Searle (1969:73) calls reference to actual particulars 'categorical' reference. Both Searle and Lyons (1981) allow the possibility of 'reference' to hypotheticals.

16 Coppetters points out that the distinction is grammatically marked in French, 'il' being preferred for the 'being-as-subject' referent and 'ce' for 'being-as-concept'. Similar distinctions have been made by others; cf. Grimes' (1975) account of 'viewpoint' and Lakoff's 'participant' vs. 'observer' view of 'same referent in different worlds' (discussed in Cicourel, 1974).

17 Compare the more widely held view found e.g. in Grice (1975:44), Huddleston (1976:5) that such expressions differ in sense but not in reference. The classic example is the Morning Star/Evening Star, held to be the same in reference, different in sense. But 'Frege's way of putting the thing seems to invite the objection that the two expressions ... do not refer to the same thing. For the first refers to the planet Venus when seen in the morning before sunrise. The second refers to the same planet when it appears in the heavens after sunset' (Linsky, (1963). 'My son's father' and 'My father's son' may both be self-referring. But do they differ only in sense?
In definitely referring the speaker picks out or identifies some particular object which he then goes on to say something about ...' (Searle, 1969:81). In philosophical discussions of reference, starting with Russell's use of the term 'definite description', 'definite' is used to denote not what is grammatically definite but what is pragmatically definite. When following this usage I shall put the word in inverted commas.

The utterance of a name to warn, remind, etc, Lyons calls 'quasi-reference' (1977:217).

No (Linsky, 1963); yes (Lyons, 1977).

In fact, Austin's classification is of performative verbs rather than forces.

Linsky would call this a name-mentioning expression rather than a referring expression.

Searle's 'raises the question of the truth or falsity of' is an attempt to find a more neutral way of describing what predication does than 'says something about' (Searle, 1969:124).)

Whether equative sentences are properly regarded as having subject-predicate form is an issue with a bearing on the question whether (as is commonly asserted) particulars cannot be predicated. (This point is discussed by Strawson (1959:242ff).)

of the discussion in chapter 5 on the meaning of proper names and pronouns.

On this question of the effect of an inexact fit between the content of an expression and what is true of its referent, see Linsky (1959), Donnellan (1966), Searle (1969), Daniels (1972), Lyons (1981). Searle points out that one sometimes finds 'questionable descriptors tacked onto otherwise satisfactory referring expressions for rhetorical effect' as in 'our glorious leader'. It seems to me that the truth/falsity of non-restrictive adjuncts in nominal expressions in respect of the referent of the expression is a separate issue from that discussed by Linsky etc.; cf. Lyons' example (1981:226) 'Where did you get that beautiful dress?'. Neither 'glorious' nor 'beautiful' in these examples appears intended to be identifying, but rather to be an attribution tacked on to an identifying expression, 'our leader', 'that dress'.

Russell's view was that 'denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning' (Russell, 1905).

Non-referential because there is no object which stands to 'a house' in (58) as the house which John is looking at stands to 'a house' in (37). On referential/non-referential, Partee (1972).
For an account of approaches to specificity within a TG framework, Stockwell et al. (1973).

Karttunnen (1968), who associates specificity with the idea of 'having a particular individual in mind', shows the specific/non-specific readings of his example 'I talked with a logician' by the formulae 'I talked with c and c is a logician' (specific; in mind; constant represents unique referent) and 'I talked with some x such that x is a logician' (non-specific; not in mind; 'what matters is not the particular individual but rather the class to which he belongs').

On the connection between specificity and existence, Heringer (1969), Karttunnen (1968), Partee (1972). 'It is not just definite descriptions which involve existential presuppositions but referring expressions of all kinds' (Lyons, 1981:225).


'You haven't come here to see me. You've come to see the President.' J. Carter addressing crowd.

This equivalence, accepted by e.g. Partee (1972), is disputed by Petersen (1976). The referential/attribution distinction has been seen also as the origin of the transparent/opaque distinction in sentences with predicates of propositional attitude (Bell, 1973; Cole, 1978). Klein (1979) disputes Bell's analysis of the R/A distinction in terms of an underlying restrictive/non-restrictive structural ambiguity on the lines of Bach (1968).

For an attempt to demolish the distinction altogether and reconstitute it as a difference in direct/indirect use of language, Searle (1979), chapter 6.

Stalnaker (1972) points out that the R/A distinction can also be seen in the use of proper names.

If the referent of a plural definite NP is 'all the individuals' existing at some point in time or over some span of past time then the reference is 'general' not generic (cf. Lyons, 1977:194).

'By discourse referent we have meant an entity that - once it has been established - can be referred to by a pronoun or revived by a definite description' (Karttunnen, 1968).

i.e. 'referential point', cf. Searle's term 'illocutionary point' (Searle, 1979:3).

'We shall not say that a pronoun (or other nominal) refers to its antecedent but rather that it refers to the referent of the antecedent expression with which it is correlated' (Lyons, 1977:660).
Hawkins (1974) refers to it as 'associative anaphora', Clark and Clark (1977) as 'bridging'. Strawson's (1964) distinction between 'identifying knowledge' and 'identifying presumption' seems to be concerned with approximately the same point.

Nominals with 'group nouns' such as cabinet, government, team, may thus be said to be used with either unitary or with general referring function: general if the speaker has in mind all the members of the group ('the cabinet are being slow in coming to a decision'); unitary if the speaker has in mind the group as a unit ('the cabinet is a weak one').

This sort of vagueness should not be confused with motivated vagueness, what Strawson (1950) calls the 'arch' use, i.e. in which the speaker knows that the hearer could identify the individual or group of individuals he has in mind if he were to supply an adequate identifying expression, but in which he chooses not to. An example: 'A radio commercial for a chain of liquor stores has been banned because it refers obliquely, obliquely, and without permission, to a certain gentleman' (M).

An instance of Strawson's 'weak' or 'relative' identification.

Hawkins (1974) uses the term 'referent establishing relative clause' to describe the postmodifier in such expressions.

This distinction closely but not exactly parallels Halliday's (1968) distinction between 'encoding' and 'decoding' interpretations of equative sentences. One of his examples is: 'The noisiest ones are the freshmen' interpreted as (a) You notice those noisiest ones over there? (decoding) and (b) You want to know who make the most noise? (encoding). The (b) interpretation has a subject with referential function which (below) I call 'indicating'; the complement of (a) I call 'identifying'.

And such marked cases count as an exception to the statement made earlier that all referential secondaries are syntactic secondaries.

The terms 'toto-generic' and 'parti-generic' are found in Jespersen (1949) and other traditional grammarians. There is, however, some divergence from traditional usage in my own application of the terms.

As has been quite widely noted, such sentences can be rephrased so as to refer to a hypothetical particular: 'If a false belief is held, then, in suitable circumstances ...'

On the non-specificity/complements, Donnellan (1966), Heringer (1969). Burton-Booth (1975) argues that 'NPs determined by the generic indefinite article represent abstract concepts, and as such are not inherently different from indefinite NPs appearing in copulative sentences'.

cf. Lyons' (1977) discussion of the ascriptive interpretation of sentences such as 'Giscard d'Estaing is the President of France'.

41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
Chapter 9

1. Discussions of communicative methodology, suggestions for exercise types, examples of materials, etc. can be found in, e.g., Brumfit (1980), Brumfit & Johnson (eds.) (1980), Mackay & Mountford (1978), Widdowson (1978, 1979). Prefaces to teachers' editions of course materials provide an excellent source of interesting and useful ideas.

2. Even when the distinction between 'language' and 'communication' is more clearly recognised - as with performative illocutionary functions - the problem of describing, both in principle and in 'interesting detail', the relation between function and form remains, I think it is quite widely recognised, a major area of difficulty for the communicative approach: one in which, as I suggested in Part I, a great deal of applied linguistic research is waiting to be done.

3. The following are the materials which I consulted. (They do not appear in the general list of references.)


Communication Skills Unit (nd) Communication skills for medicine. University of Dar es Salaam.

Cooper, J. (1979) Think and link: An advanced course in reading and writing skills. Arnold.


Maclean, J. (1975) English in basic medical science. O.U.P.


*Reading and thinking in English: Concepts in use; Discovering discourse; Discourse in action*. O.U.P.


This statement would need to be modified if we were to take account of expositions of 'communicative grammar' (e.g. Leech and Svartvik, 1975) in which the headings under which the grammar is presented are notional and functional rather than morpho-syntactic. An example of such a grammar devised for a specific EAP purpose is North (1983), which does include a section on specificity and definiteness.
In working on the taxonomy of referential functions described in chapter 6, I looked at data from a variety of different styles of written discourse. Some of these are represented in the examples given in the text. The main sources of examples are:


(JSN) 'Journalistic short narrative'. A collection of short 'true' stories from different journalistic sources.

(M) 'Miscellaneous'. Non-invented data from a variety of sources.
REFERENCES

The following abbreviations are used:

AL               Applied Linguistics
FL               Foundations of Language
J. Phil. Logic   Journal of Philosophical Logic
Lg               Language
Ling             Linguistics
Ling. & Phil.    Linguistics and Philosophy
Stud. Lg.        Studies in Language

Where an item is shown with two dates, e.g. Strawson, P.F. (1950/1963), the first date is that of original publication, the second is that of the edition or volume which I consulted and to which any page references in the text are made.


Allan, K. (1973) 'Complement noun phrases and prepositional phrases, adjectives and adverbs'. FL 10,3.


Bach, E. (1967) 'Have and be in English syntax'. Lg 43.


Bacon, J. (1973) 'Do generic descriptions denote?' Mind 82.


Bell, J.M. (1973) 'What is referential opacity?' J. Phil. Logic 2


Bolinger, D. (1973) 'Ambient "it" is meaningful too'. JL 9,2.


Carlson, G.W. (1979) 'Generics and atemporal when'. Ling.&Phil.3


Chomsky (1971b) 'Deep structure, surface structure and semantic interpretation'. In Steinberg and Jakobovits (eds.) (1971).


Davis, S. (1979) 'Perlocutions'. Ling. & Phil. 3 Reprinted in Searle et al. (1980).


Ebert, K.H. (1972) 'Functions of relative clauses in reference acts'. (Photocopy seen; place of publication not given.)


Hymes, D. (1972b) 'Models of the interaction of language and social life'. In Gumperz and Hymes (1972).


Kempson, R. & A. Cormack (?forthcoming) 'On specificity'. (Draft version seen, of which shortened version was given by RMK to LAGB meeting at York, Sept. 1981).


Kuroda, S-Y. (1979) 'Some thoughts on the foundations of the theory of language use'. Ling. & Phil. 3.


Lazarus, L.M. (1973) 'The deep structure of the prenominal adjective in English'. Ling. 102.


Nunberg, G. (1979) 'The non-uniqueness of semantic solutions: polysemy'. *Ling. & Phil. 3*.


Oller, J. (1972) 'On the relation between syntax, semantics and pragmatics'. *Ling. 83*.


Widdowson, H.G. (1980b) 'Models and fictions'. AL 1,2.


